NBSIR 76-1007

Psychological Deterrents to

Nuclear Theft:

A Preliminary Literature

Review and Bibliography

Patrick G. Meguire

Joel J. Kramer

Center for Consumer Product Technology

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D. C. 20234

Prepared by

Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D. C. 20234

March 1976

Final

Prepared for

Intelligence and Security Directorate

Defense Nuclear Agency

Washington, D. C. 20305

This work was sponsored by the Defence Nuclear Agency under:

Subtask Code P99QAX DE910 and Work Unit 01

NBSIR 76-1007

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS TO

NUCLEAR THEFT:

A PRELIMINARY LITERATURE

REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Patrick G. Meguire

Joel J. Kramer

Center for Consumer Product Technology

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D. C. 20234

Prepared by

Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D. C. 20234

March 1976

Final

Prepared for

Intelligence and Security Directorate

Defense Nuclear Agency

Washington, D. C. 20305

This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under:

Subtask Code P99QAX DE910 and Work Unit 01

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Elliot L Richardson, Saamtaiy

James A. Baker, III, Und9r S0cr»t»rY

Dr. Betsy Ancker-Johnson, Assistant Secratary for Sa'anea and Taehnohgy

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Ernest Ambler, Acting Oiraetor
L
ABSTRACT

A review of the unclassified literature dealing with

psychological deterrents was conducted for the Defense Nuclear

Agency (DNA) . Its purpose was to identify techniques that

might be useful in DNA's Forced-Entry Deterrent Systems (FEDS)

Program for psychologically deterring nuclear weapon theft.

The review indicates that while human psychological processes

(sensory, perceptual, and cognitive) can be manipulated by

various means, definitive empirical data are lacking which

directly relate to deterring nuclear weapon theft. Behavioral

impact research should be undertaken by DNA to (1) ascertain

the deterrence values of the many techniques identified and (2)

test the hypotheses implicit in the FEDS concept.

KEYWORDS: Behavioral impact; cognitive processes, nuclear weapon

theft; perceptual processes; psychological deterrence;

security systems; sensory processes; threat analysis

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1. Introduction 1

2. The Nuclear Weapon Storage Site 3

3. Threat Characteristics 5

3.1 The Terrorist Threat 6

3.2 Scenario 10

4. NWSS Security Philosophy 12

5. Psychological Deterrents - Literature Review. . . 13

5.1 Psychological Aspects of Deterrence 14

5.2 Sununary 32

5.3 Implications for Future Research 33

6. Bibliography 36

6.1 Background Information 36

6.2 Sensory Processes 36

6.3 Perceptual Processes 44

6.4 Cognitive Processes 44

iii

Psychological Deterrents to liuclear Theft:

A Preliminary Literature Review and Bibliography

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been an increased concern over

the possibility that nuclear materials or weapons might be

stolen or diverted for purposes of political blackmail and/or

terrorism. With this possibility and its grim consequences in

mind, responsible government and industrial officials have been

voicing concern over the adequacy of contemporary security

systems, procedures and nuclear safeguards. Two recent books

on the subject. The Curve of Binding Energy by John McPhee [2]

,

and IJuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards by reason Willrich and

Theodore B. Taylor [4], have dramatically popularized the

reality and feasibility of nuclear theft.

VJhile the preponderance of the concern has been directed at

physical security considerations such as the strength of

barriers, the effectiveness of automatic intrusion detection

and alarm systems, and the preparedness of responsible security

force teams, there has also been recent interest in the

potential application of psychological/behavioral principles to

the design of security devices/systems. The incorporation of

such principles into hardware design and security system

development may result in increasing the likelihood of an

attempted theft being aborted once it has begun, primarily

through manipulating human sensory, perceptual, and cognitive

processes.

The primary purpose of this report is to provide the

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) with an unclassified literature

review and bibliography related to the psychological/behavioral

factors that should be considered in the design, development

and conceptualization of a new Forced-Entry Deterrent System

(FEDS) . DNA has defined FEDS to be "a system composed of one or

more of several optional security elements, each of which is

specifically designed to impact upon the human senses for the

purpose of impeding, delaying, diverting or dissuading

unauthorized entry, and if gained, seriously impeding an

attempt to escape and remain undetected." From a total systems

viewpoint, a forced-entry deterrent system should enhance the

capabilities of security response forces/personnel.
since the concept of psychological deterrence to nuclear

theft is of recent origin and since the topic of nuclear theft

is of a highly sensitive nature, it was nearly impossible to

find unclassified behavioral research sources directly relevant

to nuclear security. As a result, the research cited in this

report is of an extremely diverse nature and is only indirectly

related to the psychological deterrence concept. Nevertheless,

the review and bibliography provide a good indication of the

v/ork which has been conducted to date and may provide some

useful guidelines for the planning of DNA ' s future research,

development and evaluation efforts. A search of the classified

literature was recently begun by NBG behavioral scientists and,

to the extent that this source provides more relevant research

results, a separate report will be prepared and submitted in a

manner jointly agreed to by HDS and DNA.

It should be noted that while the difference between

psychological deterrence and physical deterrence is often of a

very subtle nature, the emphasis of this report is upon means

of directly affecting the sensory, perceptual, and cognitive

processes of potential intruders. Other psychological

processes including learning, motivation, and psycho-social,

have been examined to a much lesser extent. In general, any

means of affecting the performance efficiency and/or

motivation of an assault group may be considered to have

psychological/behavioral components. Hence, all physical

security systems have some psychological deterrence value.

Only those studies citing specific behavioral data have been

considered

.

Nuclear theft might be attempted at any of a wide variety

of locations, including atomic power plants, fissionable

material processing plants, military installations, and in

transit. DNA's mission, and the fact that weapons are in high

demand by terrorist organizations, served to limit this report

to security considerations in and around military facilities

containing one or more Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites (NWSS)

.

The application of FEDS to other potential nuclear theft target

areas is not to be excluded, however, as a related and natural

outgrowth of the current effort.

Reproductions of all available articles and other sources

found useful in preparing this report will be submitted under

separate cover as an appendix to this report.
2. The Nuclear Weapons Storage Site (NWSS)

It is assumed that the target of attack by an adversary is

one or more portable nuclear warheads stored in a dedicated

installation complex, such as a Nuclear Weapons Storage Site.

For the purposes of the present report, FEDS design

considerations will be limited to the NV7SS and its immediate

vicinity, although it is recognized that an attack may involve

areas outside of the immediate vicinity.

Our conceptual diagram of a nuclear storage facility is

shown in figure 1. This diagram is not specific to any storage

facility, nor is it a suggestion for layout design. It merely

conceptualizes a series or progression of barriers from

periphery inward to the target (nuclear device) . It suggests

that the goal of the FEDS is to delay or halt an intrusion

attempt at some specified stage prior to penetration of the

Nuclear Weapons Storage Unit (NWSU) or negate an achieved

access to the device, e.g., by activating mechanisms which

render the device inoperable. The figure represents a

progression in time as well as in space since the "rings"

function as a delaying action by the FEDS to gain time for

defense response.

The functions of the barriers in figure 1 should reflect an

increasingly drastic and aggressive defense response from

periphery to center. The extra-perimeter area and perimeter

barrier should have primarily non-injurious surveillance and

delaying functions, i.e., they should be designed to handle

low-level threats such as hunters, curious hikers or

adventuresome children.

In the center, i.e., in the NWSU, the FEDS may be disabling

to the extent of rendering the nuclear device inoperable or of

destroying the nuclear device, the attackers and, if absolutely

necessary, the defenders. Between the periphery and the

center, the level of destructiveness of the barriers must be

governed by considerations of effectiveness in deterrence

tactics; e.g., disruption of communication or degradation of

decision making might be more effective than bodily injury in

disrupting the overall effectiveness of intrusion operations.
1. Extra-perimeter area (clear zone)

2. Perimeter barrier

3. Inner barrier

4. Inner barrier

5. Nuclear Weapons Storage Unit(s)

6. Nuclear devicefs)

Figure 1. liuclear V7eapons Storage Site

4
3. THREAT CHARACTERIZATION

There are numerous reasons why one or more persons may

attempt an intrusion into or near a NWSS. Similarly, the

seriousness and dedication with which an attempt is made may

vary widely. With these considerations in mind, intrusion

attempts may best be conceptualized as lying upon a threat

continuum ranging from a null level threat through a worst-case

threat. Typical threats along this continuum might include:

Threat Level Example

o Null-level threat No attempted intrusion in

progress; most common situation

at NWSS.

o Low- level threat Child intruding to retrieve ball;

farmer intruding to retrieve

livestock.

o High-level threat

o Worst-case threat

o Medium- level threat Small group of moderately prepared

and motivated intruders attempting

to vandalize or disrupt operations

at mi^s.

Medium to large size group of

highly- trained , dedicated, and

well prepared terrorist intruders

attempting a full-scale, wellplanned, nuclear weapon theft.

Probably equivalent to high level

threat with the addition of

complete intelligence information

and a willingness to die for the

cause

.

Considering the great diversity of possible threats,

physical and psychological intrusion deterrence systems should

be designed to deal effectively, yet discriminately , with the

entire range of the threat continuum. Hence, the child or

thrill seeker attempting an intrusion should ideally be

deterred by passive, non-harmful means; while a group

representing the worst-case threat must be deterred by any

means possible. In general, the greater the threat level, the

more efficient the physical and psychological deterrents sliould

be

.
If a FEDS is designed to effectively protect aqainst the

worst case threat, it is reasonable to assume that lesser

threats will also be addressed. Ilovrever, the measures designed

to cover the worst case may be too drastic in the event of a

low-level threat. FEDS must therefore effectively deal with

this problem, and this is the major reason for the graduated

deterrence indicated in the model.

3.1 The Terrorist Threat

The development of nuclear weaponry and associated weapons

delivery systems, combined with the astronomic cost of largescale, conventional warfare, tends to make direct conflict

between major powers a highly risky and undesirable endeavor.

In recent years, we have continued to see subsidized conflicts

between and within relatively small nations. A climate of

"controlled conflict" has led to the wide-spread development of small-group combat tactics highly suitable for direct,

short-term employment against government facilities and

installations.

These specialized, small-group combat tactics are wellsuited for the militant arms of small protest, dissident, or

grievance groups which utilize terrorism as a political

technique. The wide-spread existence and shifting alliances of

these groups provide terrorists with world-v/ide recruiting,

training and deployment capabilities. Hence, terrorists might

be recruited in one country, trained in another country, and

deployed against targets in yet another country. Clearly, fev/

generalizations can be made concerning the cultural and

ideological backgrounds of potential terrorist groups.

Vi/hile terrorists have yet to attempt the theft of a nuclear

device, there have been some related incidents v/hich would

indicate that the possibility does exist. A student threatened

to blow up Orlando, Florida by use of a homemade nuclear

weapon, unless given $1 million. A man hijacked an airplane

and threatened to dive-bomb the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

High-level U.S. Army sources have stated in a recent Washington

Post article that the quantity and variety of weapons stolen

from U.S. arms rooms are already sufficient to equip the

equivalent of ten full battalions.
The precise number of terrorist groups in existence in the

v/orld at present is unknown, but best estimates indicate the

existence of at least 50 such groups, most of them v/ellfinanced. The seriousness of the terrorist threat has been

discussed in a wide variety of books, articles, and

congressional hearings. Numerous publications have dealt with

the history, goals, techniques and personality traits of the

various terrorist organizations. \Jhile very little of the

information contained in these documents appears to be directly

related to the design of psychological deterrence systems, some

of the general material on insurgency, counter- insurgency and

terrorism is useful as background information for describing

the range of intrusions with which a FEDS must be designed to

cope. Representative examples of this literature are cited in

Section 6.

Along with and basic to the specialized development of

small-group combat tactics, the necessary fire power (and other

technical requirements to implement these tactics) has been

well developed. This development has resulted in a very large

and poorly controlled inventory of sophisticated individual

v7eapons and other combat devices v;hich are readily available to

terrorists for use in various forced entry operations including

theft of non-nuclear weapons and industrial espionage. Recent

developments in Southeast Asia, for example, will probably

ensure ample supplies of U.S. military arms for terrorist use,

especially for those terrorists who are subsidized by

governments unfriendly to the United States. Thus, the design

of a FEDS to prevent nuclear weapon theft may contain

subsystems (components) which can be used as deterrents to nonnuclear weapon theft and, as well, have application to

civilian-sector security problems.

3.1.1 Intruder Characteristics

The relevancy of the available psychological/behavioral

literature to FEDS design is to a large extent a function of

the personal characteristics of potential intruders. As noted

earlier, the population from v/hich intruder groups may be drawn

is extremely heterogeneous. Further, the basis for sample

selection, i.e., team recruitment, can be influenced by

political, strategic, and tactical considerations which further

obscure the general personal characteristics of intrusion team

members. The problem of defining intruder characteristics

makes it difficult to determine applicable psychological

criteria for the design, test, and evaluation of a FEDS. A

"best-educated guess" approach to terrorist personal

characteristics provides the following gross generalizations:
(1) Age - The raajority of intrusion team members can be assumed

to be' "relatively young, e.g., late teens to early thirties.

This assumption is based upon the age characteristics of known

terrorist personnel, but does not preclude the possible

inclusion of somewhat older individuals or even very young

ones. The significance of age appears to be related to agility

and endurance but not to muscular strength.

(2) Sex - The raajority of the members of an elite terrorist

assault team would probably be males; however, the inclusion of

women in the team should not be ruled out, as some terrorist

aircraft hijackers have been female and some guerilla troops,

e.g., among the HUKS, frequently include women. Unfortunately,

in view of regional variations in female vs. male anthropometry

and motor capabilities, it is doubtful if any valid, ergonomic,

sex-normative data can be obtained from the literature for FEDS

design purposes. It is conceivably possible that certain

hormonal characteristics might be relevant to FEDS design,

e.g., chemical agents, but this would seem speculative at

present.

(3) Psychological Processes - The intellectual functioning of

potential, worst-case intruders may be assumed to be greater

than population norms. Sensory and perceptual functioning, on

the other hand, are probably more typical of the population at

large. Thus, the FEDS should be designed to effectively deal

with the full range of normal human sensory and perceptual

mechanisms. Unfortunately, little normative data has been

collected in the motivational context of an elite terrorist

intrusion effort. Therefore, data relevant to human tolerance

and performance levels under conditions of sensory overload or

stress must be interpreted very cautioiisly. If data of this

nature are used for the purposes of FEDS design, the extreme

values of the normative data should possibly be considered more

representative of terrorist norms.

Pe^: sona 1 i ty and Mot ivat ion - Terrorist team members should

be considered highly fanatical and dedicated to their cause.

While their confidence and dedication are high, they also will

not hesitate to make great sacrifices (including their own

lives) if it will increase the chances for successfully

achieving the mission. Their courage is extreme, and they may

be expected to remain calm and confident, even under fire.

8.
(5) Skills - The organization of the intruder tean, especially

the skill inventory, may be expected to be tailored to the

characteristics of the target facility. In this regard, the

organization can be expected to be similar to that recommended

by HumRRO for Small Independent Action Forces (SIAF) (Olmstead et

al. [3]) except that it may not be structured or manned to utilize

the level of logistics support envisioned for the SIAF.

In considering the types of individuals who are likely to

be involved in a full-scale, nuclear weapon theft attempt, it

should be emphasized that the terrorist, the mercenary, and the

common criminal attempting a break-in burglary of a home or

business vary substantially. There is little correspondence

between the three in motivation, goal, or modus operandi. The

terrorist and mercenary levels of motivation are probably far

higher than that of the criminal. The terrorist's goal is to

achieve political publicity for his cause, even if not for

himself, rather than clandestine personal financial gain, while

the mercenary is primarily interested in personal financial

gain. Discovery and combat are events that terrorists and

mercenaries will accept, rather than forgo the goal. The

specific design features and criteria of FEDS for preventing a

criminal burglary would probably differ substantially for the

nuclear threat scenario. Therefore, most of the behavioral

literature dealing with deterring home and commercial burglary

may be considered irrelevant to the FEDS design problem.

In the worst case, then, the FEDS must be designed to

counter a threat which is characterized by:

1. The employment of small-group combat tactics of wellestablished effectiveness.

2. The choice and utilization of equipment suitably

designed for such tactics.

3. The employment of tactics and equipment by terrorists

whose main predictable psychological characteristics

are high levels of motivation, training and capability.

4. A goal whose achievement is of utmost importance to

the terrorists: theft of a nuclear weapon for purposes

of international terrorism and/or blackmail.
3.2 Scenario

The major activities involved in a well-organized, highlevel intrusion attempt occur in two general phases as follows:

Preparation

Phase

Intrusion

Phase

(1) Selecting and organizing assault team

(2) Planning assault attempt

(3) Acquiring physical resources

(4) Acquiring strategic information

(5) Training assault team

(6) Penetrating the ^P7SS

(7) Penetrating the NV7SU

(8) Activities at NWSU

(9) Escaping

In general, the activities involved in the preparation

phase would be covert, and may not therefore easily be

influenced by traditional deterrence measures. It is during

the intrusion phase, which is primarily overt in nature, that

deterrence systems should be effective.

The number of possible intrusion scenarios is practically

limitless. Hence, in attempting to understand the means by

which forced entries might be accomplished, a "typical"

scenario will be examined (see Mayer and Pazzelle [1] for a

more detailed description of adversary capabilities and

probable intrusion techniques) . This scenario assumes a

relatively overt attempt by a small terrorist group with the

mission of obtaining and removing an intact and operational

nuclear warhead. While there are numerous other possible types

of intrusion attempts (e.g., entirely clandestine collaboration

with facility personnel) , the overt, aggressive intrusion

scenario appears to be the best for demonstrating the

behavioral impact of FEDS. It should be noted that a realworld, overt, forced entry attempt would probably be more

clandestine in its initial stages than the following scenario

indicates.

The forced entry attempt is assumed to commence at some

initial contact and proceed through a series of penetration

stages until the target (the nuclear device) is reached.

During any of these stages, the intruders and response forces

are carrying out coordinated action within the framework of the

FEDS mission and capabilities.

10.
The initial penetration effort is focused on the

outermost perimeter barrier. If the intruders have not

previously been detected in the extra-perimeter area by routine

surveillance or possibly intrusion detection sensors, perimeter

barrier penetration should initiate a FEDS warning that an

intrusion attempt is under way. Action by the intruders

consists of an organized penetration attempt on the perimeter

barrier by a handful of intruders, and may be preceded or

accompanied by suppression of individual guards and/or by

covering fire from the extra-perimeter area. Action by FEDS

should consist of detection, initial evaluation of the tactical

situation, such aggressive or passive responses as may be

available at this stage, and alerting primary security forces.

It may be difficult at this stage to determine if the entry

attempt constitutes a maximum threat, i.e., from an elite

terrorist group, or a less-than-maximum threat; e.g., by

vandals or a protest group. In the latter case, a maximum

response by the FEDS could produce undesirable injuries or

deaths which would be incommensurate with the seriousness of

the threat or the status of the intruders. However, it should

be realized that at this stage the incorporation of a

"merciful" response into the FEDS design at the expense of

deterrence effectiveness could allow terrorists to gain a

significant tactical advantage by posing as lower- threat-level

intruders. The present scenario assumes that FEDS makes no

distinction between levels of threat once the fact of a forced

entry attempt at the perimeter barrier is established.

The sequence of events between initial (outer perimeter)

and final (NWSU) penetration cannot be easily typified, since

the tactical situation is highly fluid, with a great diversity

of possible FEDS/intruder interaction. The intruders' tactics

are to negotiate barriers, avoid contact with or otherwise

counteract FEDS, and minimize penetration time. The FEDS'

tactics are to prolong penetration time and to maintain contact

with the intruders. Between initial and final penetration,

there is no overriding reason for a lethal deterrence

capability. In fact, the FEDS purpose is probably better

served by confusion, containment and capture, since this might

yield data useful in the prevention of future intrusion

attempts.

11.
The final penetration effort is at the m-JSU. At this point,

the FEDS response should be sufficient to completely

incapacitate one or more intruders. Psychological design

factors should be used to enhance the physical resistance

of the storage unit, and disrupt the intruders' efforts to

utilize whatever forced-entry equipment they have brought with

them. It is difficult to estimate the relative strength of the

intrusion and defense teams at this stage of the assault.

However, it does not seem reasonable that a seriously weakened

intrusion force could carry out an effective break-in effort

against a strong and active defense. Hence, it must be assumed

that during the previous stages the FEDS were either bypassed

or seriously degraded. Thus, the storage unit FEDS should be

entirely self-sufficient in terms of initiation of response,

and source of available power.

Penetration of the storage unit initiates FEDS operations

v/ithin the unit, hence making the removal of the nuclear device

as difficult as possible. The deterrents would be designed for

direct interference with the sensory and motor processes

required for the task of obtaining and removing the nuclear

device, e.g., interference with stability, locomotion, and

vision, including the use of sensory stressors and chemical

agents. The measure of last resort might be non-nuclear

destruction of the device or even the storage unit itself.

4. int.^ss security philosophy

One behavioral approach to solving the security problems

associated with the full threat continuum, i.e., deterring lo\-flevel threats without injury to the intruder, while deterring

high-level threats at all costs, is represented by the maze

concept. In this approach, the intruder (s) encounters a series

of progressively more difficult, confusing and/or harmful

physical barriers and obstructions. The farther into the

system the intruder (s) goes, the greater the risks of

detection, disablement, serious injury or death become. In

general, this approach centers around completely denying the

intrusion of all low-level threats, while denying and/or

delaying the intrusion of high-level threats. Maze

configurations may be designed and implemented such that

penetration attempts become disorganized, with resulting

confusion of the team members. It may even be possible to stop

short of activating potential disabling or harmful subsystems

by structuring the maze to insure that "negotiated survival"

can be achieved at certain decision points.
The concept of delay is extremely important in current

security systems philosophy. Each additional minute consumed

by an intrusion force provides additional time for security

forces to respond to and thwart the intrusion attempt. This

reliance upon backup security forces implicitly accepts the

notion that there does not presently exist a physical security

system which may be considered completely fool-proof. Hence,

well-trained, hopefully well-prepared security forces may be

considered to be the ultimate line of defense, and all other

physical security systems must be considered secondary to them

In line with this philosophy, a great deal of emphasis is

currently placed upon the human aspects of the security system

Communications, logistics, and training are all of primary

importance. Physical barriers and detection systems are

designed primarily to aid security forces in the conduct of

their job. Psychological deterrents should be designed to

perform the same function.

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS -LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature search was conducted in three phases.

1. Location of the sources and titles of pertinent

publications.

2. Establishment of criteria which governed the

acceptance or rejection of an article for inclusion

in the bibliography.

3. Reviewing acceptable items.

Only non-classified literature was reviewed for the

purposes of this report.

Several approaches were used to locate the literature for

review. The three primary sources were:

1. Computerized literature searches, including searches of

(a) Defense Documentation Center (DDC)

(b) National Technical Information Service (NTIS)

(c) Psychological Abstracts Search and Retrieval

Services (PASAR)
2. Individual contacts with authorities in the field, and

3. Libraries in the Washington, D.C. area.

An article was deemed acceptable only if it conformed to

the following criteria:

1. The article had to contain either general background or

behavioral information relevant to the design of FEDS

hardware and associated security procedures.

2. The article had to contain information of a psychological or behavioral nature which was at least partly

relevant to the deterrence of medium and/or high-level

threats.

5.1 Psychological Aspects of Deterrence - General

Deterrents to nuclear theft may be thought of as being

either primarily physical or psychological in nature; however,

the distinction between the physical and psychological

properties is not always clear cut as many deterrents have both

properties. For example, a fence with barbed tape on top may

influence the perceived difficulty of penetration of that fence

while different fence configurations will result in different

minimum penetration times, a physical performance

consideration. The perceived difficulty of fence penetration

is obviously more psychological in nature, and typifies the

major emphasis of the literature review.

The primary consideration in deciding upon the potential

usefulness of a psychological deterrent is the extent of its

effects upon intrusion initiation and efficiency. More

specifically, these effects should:

(1) be appropriate for medium and high-level threats,

(2) be reliable,

(3) produce no permanent serious bodily injury,

(4) appear rapidly after initial contact,

(5) be difficult to counter, and

(6) be produced by equipment which is reliable, costeffective, and easily maintained.

14.
Any potential deterrent which does not meet all of these

criteria is considered inappropriate for use as a psychological

deterrent to nuclear theft.

The psychological processes which might readily be

manipulated for deterrence purposes include: (1) sensation,

(2) perception, and (3) cognition. The manipulation of

motivational, learning, and psycho-social processes appears to

be more complex within the rubric of nuclear theft and is only

discussed briefly because relevant, unclassified literature

does not exist. In general, the more basic the psychological

process, e.g., sensation and perception, the more amenable it

is to deterrence considerations.

5.1.1 Sensory Processes

While each of the various human sensory systems is capable

of comfortably detecting a wide range of stimulus intensities

of appropriate form, each sensory system has certain intensity

limitations beyond which the stimulus becomes noxious, or even

painful, to the person involved. Literally thousands of

studies have been conducted which demonstrate the deleterious

effects these noxious stimuli may have upon hiiman performance

and higher order behavioral processes, e.g., decision making,

problem solving, and memory.

While the number of noxious stimuli known to have aversive

effects upon man is large, only a few of these appear to be

appropriate for psychological deterrence purposes. Typical

stressors which were rejected for possible use within the FEDS

concept included compression and decompression, acceleration

and deceleration, vibration and weightlessness. These

stressors are obviously inappropriate to the static, open air

conditions which characterize the IWSS. Stressors which were

accepted as being of some potential deterrence value were:

(1) noise, (2) radiation (including microwaves and visible

light), (3) temperature, and (4) chemical agents.

Wilkinson [5] has identified six factors which may

influence the extent to which environmental stressors have an

influence upon human performance. The extent to which these

factors hold true in the context of a NWSS intrusion attempt

will depend upon the specific tactics involved in the

intruders' planned scenario. The factors are: (1) duration of

v/ork on the task, (2) familiarity with the task and its

associated stresses, (3) the level of incentive, (4) the

character of the task, (5) the presence of other stressors, and

(6) the aspect of the task which is most important.

15.
5.1.1.1 Noise

Hundreds of studies have been conducted dealing with the

effects of noise upon man. The number and variety of both

independent and dependent variables that have been investigated

is almost endless. Typical independent variables have included

noise intensity, frequency composition, duration, regularity,

relative location, and a wide variety of human mental and

physical characteristics. Typical dependent variables have

included physiological effects and the efficiency of mental and

performance functioning under a wide range of task

requirements. Comprehensive reviews of the effects of noise

upon man have been prepared by several authors (Kryter [27;

Broadbent [11]; Jerison [24]; Davies [16]; Poulton [36];

Buclcley [14] ) .

In terms of the FEDS concept, there are several means by

which noise might serve as a useful and efficient psychological

deterrent:

(1) noise may act as an audible alarm system for the NWSS

security force;

(2) noise may be used to warn the intruders that their presence

has been detected;

(3) noise may produce interference with verbal communications

between members of the assault team;

(4) noise may induce incapacitating physiological effects

such as pain, dizziness, blurred vision, nausea, etc; and

(5) noise may have deleterious effects upon intruder

intellectual and motor performance, hence slowing the

completion of the attack.

The ideal location for a high intensity noise deterrence

system would probably be inside or near the NWSU, and would be

activated by unauthorized entry into the unit. The major

drawbacks of this approach are (1) possible technological

difficulties in the design of the system, and (2) susceptibility

of the noise generation device to destruction.

16.
Several studies have indicated that noise mighb have

particularly strong effects upon intruders under the hightension conditions of an intrusion attempt. More specifically,

these studies (Shambaugh [38]; Barrett [8]; Broadbent [13];

Cohen et al. [15]) have shown that subjects exhibiting anxiety

and introverted emotional characteristics are more susceptible

to the effects of intense noise than are more relaxed and

extroverted subjects. It is assumed here, of course, that due

to the nature of the tasJc, NWSS intruders would have a greater

than usual degree of anxiety, and would be somewhat anxious

about their precarious endeavor.

Audible alarm effects

While no studies dealing with the deterrence effectiveness

of audible intrusion alarms were found, it is probably

reasonable to assume that at the very least, covert intrusion

attempts might be deterred or plans altered by the activation

of an extremely intense audible alarm.

Speech Interference Effects ' '

The effects of noise upon speech intelligibility are well

documented. Numerous approaches have been taken to the

measurement and quantification of speech disruption, the most

well-known of which are the "Speech Interference Level" and

"Articulation Index" (Kryter [29] ) . Specifications using these

indices are given in terms of loudness of the speaker's voice,

frequency composition of the masking noise, and separation - distance between speaker and listener. Webster [41] provides a

simplified, yet highly accurate, means of determining Speech

Interference Levels under conditions of extremely high

intensity noise . Morgan et al. [32] provide evidence that a

100 dB masking noise at frequencies comparable to the human

voice (600-4800 Hz) is sufficient to preclude effective verbal

communications between two individuals separated by a distance

of six inches.

Physiological Effects

Several authors have presented evidence that exposure to

extremely intense noises (greater than 120 dB) may result in

disturbing physiological effects in human subjects. Dickson

and Chadwick [17] reported that persons subjected to jet

aircraft noises of approximately 140 dB for moderate time

17.
durations have complained of a variety of symptoms associated

with severe disequilibrium, e.g., loss of balance, dizziness,

nausea, and involuntary eye movements (nystagmus) . Similarly,

Kryter [27] and Ades et al. [7] reported cases of ear pain,

blurred vision, slight increases in skin temperature,

dizziness, and nystagmus as a result of exposures to 150 dB

noise levels. Some attempts have been made to explain

deleterious noise effects upon performance in terms of

disruption of vestibular function (Harris [19]; Nixon et al.

[33]).

High intensity noises in the infrasonic (5-20 Hz) and

ultrasonic (16-20 kHz) ranges may cause extreme disruption of a

variety of physiological processes, although little empirical

evidence has been gathered to support this viewpoint. Kryter

[28] speculates that extreme infrasonics may cause extreme

amounts of ear pain, dizziness, nausea, and possibly resonant

vibrations in the chest, throat, nasal cavities, and eyes.

Similarly, ultrasonics may be expected to cause nausea,

headache, fatigue and tinnitus (ringing sensation in the ears)

.

Acton and Carson [6] and Skillern [39] have demonstrated some

of the hypothesized effects of ultrasonic noise. They note

that the disturbing effects were especially evident in young

and healthy individuals with sensitive hearing.

Performance Decrement Effects

The effects of noise upon measures of human performance are

extremely varied, and are dependent upon numerous noise and

task conditions. Conflicting experimental results are common

in the literature as a result of this plethora of situational

variables. Poulton [36] has attempted to explain these

discrepant results in terms of the interaction of the negative

(distraction, vestibular stimulation, startle response) and

positive (arousal) effects of moderate levels of noise. Hence,

at levels below 120 dB, noise has little, if any, systematic

effect upon a variety of mental and performance tasks of a

simple nature (e.g., Broadbent [12]; Brewer and Briess [9];

Helper [20]; Loeb et al. [30]; Plutchik [35]; Sanders [37];

Park and Payne [34]). At sound intensities in excess of 12 0

dB, and/or with tasks of a more complex nature (especially

tasks involving complex sensorimotor functioning), more

systematic effects begin to appear. In general, the greater

the intensity and frequency, the greater will be the deficit in

performance (Broadbent [11]). In addition, non-uniform (i.e..

18.
intermittent, or modulated) noise also produces greater

performance decrements than uniform noise (Glass et al. [18]).

The modulation of intensity may be more disturbing than the

modulation of frequency (Miller [31]).

The mechanisms by which noise causes decrements in mental

and motor performance are not well understood. Hence, a

variety of theories have been presented. These include, (a)

noise causes distortion of time perception and/or short term

memory (Jerison [21], [22], [23]; Jerison and Arginteanu [25];

Jerison and Smith [26]), (b) noise affects vestibular

functioning (Harris [19]; Nixon et al . [33]), (c) noise results

in distraction away from the relevant task (Teichner et al.

[40]), and (d) noise causes a "blinking" of the perceptual

mechanism (Broadbent [10] ) . At extremely high levels of

intensity, especially for infra- and ultra-sonic frequencies,

physiological disturbances may also lead to severe performance

decrements.

5.1.1.2 Radiation

Physicists distinguish between two fundamentally different

classes of radiation: corpuscular and electromagnetic. As

these two classes generally have radically different behavioral

and physiological effects, they will be discussed separately.

In-depth reviews dealing with the major behavioral effects of

radiation have been presented by several authors (Poulton [36]

;

Furchtgott [48] and [49]; Thompson and Bourgeois [55]; Harlow

[50]; Eakin and Thompson [45]).

Corpuscular Radiation

Corpuscular radiation consists of streams of atomic or subatomic particles traveling at speeds approaching that of

light. These particles vary greatly in terms of their mass and

electrical properties. Typical particles include helium

nuclei, protons, deuterons, neutrons, electrons and positrons.

Corpuscular radiations affect man primarily as a result of

the transfer of their kinetic energy to the cellular tissues

they strike. Due to the relatively large amounts of energy

involved, this transfer process usually results in the

destruction of or damage to the cells impacted. Hence,

behavioral effects are generally the result of cellular

disruption within the nervous system. In general, this type of
radiation produces no painful or uncomfortable sensation in man

during the exposure period, but the consequences of such

exposures may become catastrophic over time. Due to the

extreme effects of corpuscular radiation, and the long time

factor leading to the consequences of such exposure, most of

the available data relevant to behavioral effects have been

collected through sub-human animal experimentation.

Psychological effects are impossible to demonstrate in the

absence of the associated serious physiological disruptions.

In review of its irreversibly harmful nature, and the

lack of information directly relevant to the psychological/

behavioral effects of corpuscular radiation on human

subjects, corpuscular radiation may not be a likely

mechanism for achieving psychological/behavioral deterrence.

The potential danger to security forces and the additional

safeguards required to protect them and other authorized

personnel are further disadvantages.

Electromagnetic Radiations

Electromagnetic radiations consist of oscillating fields of

electric and magnetic energy traveling at the speed of light.

These radiations are generally classified according to their

wavelengths or frequencies, where wavelength is inversely

related to frequency. Typical electromagnetic radiations

include: radio, radar, microwave, infrared, and ultraviolet as

well as visible light.

Generally, the higher the frequency, the greater the amount

of radiation absorbed by the cells of the body; while the lower

the frequency, the further the radiation will penetrate into

the body. At low to moderate intensities, radiation absorption

does not typically cause extensive damage to the exposed cells

because of the dissipation of the newly acquired energy in the

form of heat.

The effects of electromagnetic radiation penetration and

absorption can be categorized as follows: (1) thermal effects

of microwave and infrared radiation, (2) non-thermal effects of

microwave radiation, and (3) effects of visible light. These

categories are discussed separately in the following sections.

20.
Thermal Effects of Microwave and Infrared Radiation

The most dramatic thermal effects are produced by the

microwave and infrared regions of the electromagnetic spectrum.

At high intensities, severe burns and cellular destruction may

occur on the outer body surfaces. As the thermal effects of

microwave and infrared radiation are predominately physical in

nature, only the threat of their use appears to be useful as a

psychological deterrent.

Non-thermal Effects of Microwave Radiation

In addition to producing thermal effects, microwave

radiation has frequently been cited as being responsible for

non-thermal changes in integrated central nervous system

activity (Thompson and Bourgeois [55]). The behavior

consequences most frequently reported have been general

disability, listlessness and increased irritability (Kevorkian

[52]; Sadchikova and Orlova [53]; Jaski [51]; Sercl et al

.

[54]; Droqichina [44]; Edelwejn and Haduch [46]). However,

some authorities believe these effects may be the result of

indirect thermal effects upon metabolic and circulatory

processes within the brain (Dahlen [43]).

Thompson and Bourgeois [55] have presented a review of

numerous studies which have demonstrated that microwave

radiation may have non-thermal effects upon sensory functioning

and/or perceptual organization in man. More specifically,

auditory, visual, and olfactory hallucinations, as well as

altered sensory functioning, have been cited. Related to these

findings is the fact that microwaves, under certain conditions,

may be detectable by human subjects through "non-specific

sensory channels" (Frey [47]). The literature appears to make

little distinction between acute and chronic effects. To be

useful as a psychological deterrent, the non-thermal effects of

microwave radiation must be relatively immediate.

In general, the psychological and behavioral, non- thermal

effects of microwave radiation are as yet not understood, and

much debate remains over the conditions and underlying

mechanisms by which these effects occur. Hence, the use of

this approach in the FEDS program would appear to be highly

speculative at present. As more data are collected, the

effectiveness of microwave radiation as a psychological/

behavioral deterrent should be reassessed.
Effects of Visible Light

Electromagnetic radiation in the range of approximately

400-700 micrometers is detectable by the human eye

and perceived as light. To be effective as a controllable

psychological deterrent within the context of FEDS, light

should be used externally at night or within the confines of

the NWSU. Light, if intense enough, may be used under daylight

conditions; however, the costs associated with high intensity

light sources for daytime use would probably not be worth the

level of deterrence achieved. In general, the effects of light

upon human behavior may be traced to one or more of the

following characteristics of light: (1) intensity

(brightness) , (2) dominant wavelength (hue) , (3) purity of

wavelength (saturation) , and (4) spatial and temporal arrival

patterns

.

For the purposes of FEDS design, the effects of hue and

saturation may be eliminated immediately, as the literature

suggests no deterrence value for these characteristics; while

hue has occasionally been associated with "mood" , these effects

highly idiosyncratic. Insufficient intensity will, of course,

result in degraded performance for most tasks (Poulton [36]).

Excessive illumination (glare) will have the same effect. The

proper amount of light to be used as a deterrent to potential

intrusion attempts is extremely difficult to prescribe, as it

has been shown that its effectiveness as an urban crime

deterrent is highly dependent upon structural layout and usage

(Wright et al. [56] ) .

The major difficulty involved in determining an optimum

arrangement and level of deterrent lighting is related to the

fact that both the intruders and the security forces require

light in order to operate efficiently, yet may prefer darkness

to preclude their detection by the opposition. The presence of

optical intrusion detection systems may further complicate the

design of the ideal lighting system. Little behavioral

research directly relevant to the lighting of the NWSS has been

conducted.

Fl\ifctuating levels of illumination (flicker) may be of some

limited use as a psychological deterrent. Intense flicker at

rates of 5 to 20 cycles per second is known to cause attacks

resembling epilepsy in certain susceptible people. More common

is the illusory detection of motion, color, and/or patterns.

These effects frequently lead to feelings of confusion and/or

anxiety (Poulton [36]).

22.
Random, intermittent application of lighting at various

points around the outer security perimeter might produce

greater amounts of uncertainty on the part of potential

intruders. In addition, it would prevent the adaptation of

intruders' eyes to a given level of illumination, thus further

degrading performance capabilities. Extremely intense flashes

of illumination might be used to produce "flash blindness"

effects (Brown [42]).

5.1.1.3 Temperature

Extremes of heat and cold may serve as effective deterrents

within the confines of the NT^TSU. The effectiveness of this

approach is dependent upon three mechanisms: (1) performance

degradation, (2) physiological tolerance limits, and (3) skin

pain from momentary, high intensity thermal pulses.

Performance Degradation

Degradation of psychomotor performance has been reported in

numerous studies for both heat and cold (e.g.. Bell and Provins

[57]; Pepler [73]; Wilkinson et al. [81]; Wing [82]; Kay [67];

Trun±>ull [78] ; Dusek [64] ; Peacock [71] ) . A few studies have

also suggested the possible degradation of cognitive

functioning (Viteles and Smith [79]; Mackworth [70]; Carpenter

[63]) and attention (V7ing [82]; Bursill [61]; Pepler [72])

under conditions of thermal stress. These effects upon mental

functioning are probably the indirect result of discomfort and

its consequent distraction, rather than any direct effects upon

neural processes per se (Pepler [74]).

While thermal stress clearly has drastic effects upon human

performance, the extent of these effects (for a given

temperature) vary considerably, depending upon the nature of

the task and the degree of motivation involved (Teichner [77]).

It is not unexpected then, that for relatively short periods of

time, individuals can compensate for thermal stress conditions

by making a concerted effort to perform the task involved

(Pepler [74]). Therefore, it might be expected that highly

motivated terrorists involved in the theft of nuclear weapons

might be relatively unaffected by adverse temperatures for a

brief period of time.

Berenson and Robertson [58] have shown that performance

degradation is generally first observed at temperatures of
approximately 75 percent of the physiological tolerance limits

(described in the following section) . These adverse effects

may begin to disappear after a short while as a result of

acclimatization to the adverse temperature (Blockley [59]).

Therefore, a slight increase in the level of thermal stress to

that approaching the physiological tolerance limit might

reasonably be expected to serve as a more effective deterrent.

Physiological Tolerance Limits

Physiological tolerance limits are dependent upon a variety

of factors including exposure duration, type of clothing worn

and humidity. Trumbull [78] has presented data relevant to

thermal tolerance limits for sitting, "normally" clothed

subjects as a function of relative humidity and exposure

duration. The temperature at which faintness, breathing

difficulty or nausea occurred defined the tolerance limit.

Typical tolerance limits were 125*»F (52"*C) for heat, and SO^F

(-1®C) for cold (both for 1/2 hour exposure at 30 percent

relative humidity) . Lind [69] provides similar data relevant

to thermal tolerance levels for sitting and working

individuals. Continued exposure to thermal conditions in

excess of the stated tolerance limits, and without protective

garments, may result in craimps, exhaustion, and/or stroke in

the case of heat; and shock in the case of cold (Buskirk and

Bass [62] )

.

While thermal conditions in excess of the physiological

tolerance limits would probably prove to be reasonably

effective for deterrence purposes, there are several reasons

why the use of this approach may be unsatisfactory. These are:

(1) the expense, difficulty, and impracticality of maintaining

the I-IWSU at a prescribed deterrent level, (2) the possibility

that intruders may be wearing suitable protective garments, and

(3) possible damage to equipment items and weapons when they

are exposed to long-term, extreme thermal conditions.

Some of these drawbacks may be avoided, however, by a

quick-acting, highly efficient heating or cooling system

designed to be triggered at the onset of an illegal entry into

the storage unit. Such a system might involve microwave

radiation, or the dispersion of extremely hot or cold aerosols

(e.g., steam, liquid oxygen, etc.). Not only would systems of

this type produce intolerable temperature levels within the

IWSU, but direct exposure to the thermal pulses emanating from

these systems (e.g., microwaves, gas exhaust) could produce

immediate extreme skin pain with comparatively minor damage to

the outer layers of skin.

24
Skin Pain from Thermal Pulses

Heat pulses may be transmitted by means of conduction,

convection, or radiation. The temperatures and exposure

durations required to produce pain are known for each of these

transmission modes. Blockley [59] has provided an excellent

summary of the data related to the threshold requirements for

each temperature transmission mode. More specific information

may be found in the original source articles (Buettner [60]

;

Hardy [65]; Kaufman et al. [66]; Kissen and Hall [68]; Stoll

and Green [76] ; Webb [80] ) . Exposure to extremely cold

surfaces or air currents may cause pain and or damage to outer

skin surfaces. Contact with extremely cold, polished metal

surfaces may cause skin to stick to the metal surface, while

exposure to -lO^F (-23°C) air moving at a mere five miles per

hour can cause the skin to freeze within 30 seconds (Siple and

Passel [75]). Again, an excellent review of tolerance levels

for cold pulses (wind chill) is presented by Blockley [59]

.

All of the exposure requirements necessary to produce extreme

pain to exposed skin appear to be within the realm of current

technology.

5.1.1.4 Chemical Agents and Drugs

There are numerous chemical substances which are known to

have noxious effects upon humans. The effects of these

substances range from irreversible damage to the tissues of the

human body, to subtle psychological changes with few directly

observable effects. In light of the lethal or highly injurious

nature of many of the chemical agents developed for warfare

purposes, these substances should be excluded from

consideration as potential psychological deterrents, pending

final interpretation of EXECUTIVE ORDER 11850 by DNA.

Similarly, the lack of information concerning possible

irreversible, long-term, or delayed effects resulting from

certain "psychoactive" drugs precludes their consideration for

use as psychological deterrents.

The chemical agents which appear to be most appropriate for

use within the framework of the FEDS concept are those

resulting in irritating, yet non-injurious effects. Desirable

effects would include watering of the eyes, coughing, stinging

sensations, shortness of breath, repulsive odor and/or taste,

dizziness and nausea. Numerous substances having these effects

have been developed and used for law enforcement (riot control)

and warfare (area denial) purposes.
Jones [84] provides an excellent, in-depth review of the

use and effectiveness of the common law enforcement chemical

agents (e.g., tear gas) and associated equipment. Related

information is provided concerning dispersion techniques,

countermeasures, and treatment. While Jones' text was intended

primarily for use by law enforcement officials, and is geared

towards riot control and mob dispersion, it provides adequate

information for the evaluation of chemical agents as potential

FEDS components. >

Coates [83] has presented a comprehensive review of the

potential use of non-lethal chemical agents for the disruption

of enemy missions in combat situations. In addition to the

irritating effects associated with law enforcement chemical

agents, this author includes a discussion of several other

chemical effects including itching, pain, imbalance, and

temporary blindness and paralysis.

In general, the substances and techniques discussed by

Jones and Coates would be easily applicable to the FEDS

concept. Depending upon the nature of the chemical dispersion

system, and the concentration of the substance used, chemical

agents could be used inside and/or outside of the NWSU.

One great advantage to the use of chemical irritants is

that they may be extremely difficult to counteract. This

advantage stems from the fact that chemical agents can possess

several deterrent characteristics simultaneously. For example,

an opaque, sticky, and irritating aerosol may be particularly

effective, since it occludes vision, impedes motor performance,

and causes disabling physical discomfort. However, studies

which evaluate the effectiveness of these "combination"

chemical irritants are non-existent in the unclassified

literature.

5.1.2 Perceptual Processes

The distinction between human sensory and perceptual

processes is not clear cut. For the purposes of this review,

perception may be regarded as the organization of sensory

information into a meaningful image of the world. It should be

noted that this "image" is by no means a one-to-one

representation of the actual physical world, and it is this

important property of perception which suggests some possible

use for it in the design of psychological deterrence systems.
In terms of the FEDS concept, the visual perception

processes of potential intruders would probably be the easiest

to manipulate. Thus, it may be possible to design the physical

attributes of a deterrence system such that they visually

appear to be much more difficult to overcome than they actually

are. An example would be a fence made to appear higher or

more resistant to penetration than it actually is.

While basic laboratory research has demonstrated the

existence of numerous illusory mechanisms which might possibly

be used for deterrence purposes, little practical real-world

research applicable to FEDS has yet been conducted in this

area. The most readily applicable illusions would appear to be

those relating to the size, distance, relative location, and

apparent visibility of objects and/or persons (camouflage and

mirrors) . Discussions of specific illusions may be found in

many sources (e.g., Hochberg [37]; Graham [86]; Dember [85]).

Illusory mechanisms may be utilized to make the intruders'

tasks appear more difficult than they actually are, make the

tasks in fact more difficult to accomplish, and can even be

used to make defensive systems appear easy to penetrate when,

in fact, they are not.

The perceived effectiveness of physical deterrence systems can

be evaluated with existing techniques. Survey methodology can

be used with attack teams composed of highly trained volunteers

(e.g., special forces units) both before and after a staged

assault attempt to obtain information concerning both the preand post-assault perceptions of the team members. Preliminary

studies utilizing this technique have been undertaken by

behavioral scientists assocated with the Law Enforcement

Standards Laboratory at the National Bureau of Standards [88]

.

Perceptually oriented defensive systems appear to be useful

for deterring low- and medium-level threats by discouraging the

initiation of assault and by influencing the perceptual

organization of the intruders during their penetration. For

high-level and worst-case threats, perceptually oriented

defensive systems may not be as effective from a deterrence

standpoint, although there may be some benefit served by

influencing perceptual organization during attack.

27.
5.1.3 Cognitive Processes

The cognitive processes traditionally include such mental

activities as decision making, problem solving, creativity,

memorization, pattern recognition, language and concept

formation. The processes of decision making and problem

solving are of key significance to the FEDS concept in that

they represent processes which are more complex than the

processes of sensation and perception, and may be expected to

be much more difficult to influence for deterrence purposes.

For the most part, the pre-assault planning and decision

making activities of potential intruders are beyond the realm

of direct manipulation. The perceived difficulty of various

attack scenarios will, of course, affect the planning phase of

the potential assault. More purely cognitive deterrents might

include techniques such as propaganda usage, staged assault

attempts resulting in failure, and strict legal penalties.

Very little information is available on the effectiveness of

such techniques within the context of the terrorist threat.

Cognitive processes during or immediately preceding the

actual intrusion phase may be more readily influenced than

during the preparation phase. Any condition resulting in fear

and/or confusion on the part of the attack group will have some

effect upon their ability to make quick and accurate decisions.

This may or may not be beneficial, as either logical or

illogical decisions on the part of terrorists may lead to

unpredictable consequences.

Three approaches relevant to the manipulation of intruders'

cognitive processes were identified as being of potential use

in the consideration of FEDS design. These were: (1) effects

of information overload and/or conflicting information, (2)

effects of the threat of apprehension or serious personal

injury, and (3) effects due to strenuous physical activity.

These approaches are discussed separately below.

5.1.3.1 Information Overload

Information relevant to the defense of a NWSS and/or the

progress of an intrusion attempt may be selectively presented

to the members of an assault team by a variety of means, the

most practical being signs and loudspeaker messages. This

information may be manipulated in a variety of ways to confuse

28.
and/or disorganize the intrusion team. For example, the number

of messages, the amount of information per message, the

validity of the messages, and the temporal/spatial locations of

the messages may all be varied. It must obviously be assumed

that the intruders are familiar with the language used in the

presentation of the information.

While it is difficult to predict what specific effects, if

any, the content of a given message may have upon intruders'

behavior, the frequency, validity, and amount of information

per message, as well as the amount of conflict between

successive messages may be designed to "overload" the

intruders' cognitive functioning, hopefully resulting in

confusion and anxiety. As a minimum, the presentation of

unexpected information should momentarily distract the

intruders from their ongoing activities. The confusion effects

of information overload stem from the well-known fact that man

is extremely limited in his ability to process incoming

information (Fitts and Posner [95]; Poulton [36]), When two or

more messages are presented simultaneously, it is extremely

difficult to adequately process the information contained in

both. If the information contained in one or both of the

messages is familiar, and the presentation rates of the two

messages is similar, it may be possible for a person to

alternate his attention between the two messages sufficiently

to receive both. But if the information of both messages is

unfamiliar, and the presentation characteristics (e.g., speed,

volume, etc.) are dissimilar, both messages may not be

satisfactorily monitored. Under the latter circumstances, the

person will frequently listen to only one of the two messages,

and will hear nothing of the other message, with the possible

exception of a few key words (Cherry [90]; Cherry and Taylor

[91]; Broadbent [12]). This partial information from the

unattended message may cause an attempt to mentally reconstruct

the message, thus leading to confusion and/or anxiety when this

is found to be impossible (particularly if the lost information

is felt to have been of extreme importance) . The amount of

information lost is primarily dependent upon: (1) the number

of simultaneous messages presented, (2) the message

presentation characteristics, and (3) the degree of uncertainty

about the information content of the messages (Fitts and Posner

[95]).

For the purposes of psychological deterrence, an

appropriate means of information overload presentation would

probably be the loudspeaker. Thus, numerous loudspeakers

positioned throughout the NWSS simultaneously broadcasting

29.
contradictory, pre-taped messages might (1) provide

contradictory information to different members of the intrusion

team, (2) provide contradictory information to a given member

of the team, (3) cause confusion and/or anxiety about partially

attended-to information, and (4) distract the intruders from

their ongoing activities. However, caution must be exercised

in the use of loudspeaker messages to ensure that response

force members do not become confused as well.

Poulton [36] has presented an excellent review of the

effects of simultaneous loudspeaker presentations. In addition

to the considerations mentioned earlier in this discussion, he

presents evidence that information presented from a previously

quiet loudspeaker may prove to be particularly distracting,

especially when it follows a lengthy presentation from one or

more different loudspeakers.

Numerous authors (e.g., Klemmer and Muller [99]; Alluisi et

al. [39]; Gumming and Croft [92]) have demonstrated that as

information overload occurs, performance of ongoing tasks

deteriorates. Finally, the concept of presenting too much or

too little sensory and/or perceptual information (removing cues

and presenting conflicting cues) may result in deterioration of

task performance.

5.1.3.2 Personal Threat

The threat of serious personal injury and/or apprehension

by security forces may be used to achieve psychological

deterrence. In many respects, this threat may be considered

the fundamental factor basic to all forms of deterrence. Thus,

any procedure or technique which increases the likelihood of

personal injury or capture may be expected to decrease the

likelihood of an intrusion attempt being made. Furthermore,

the more obvious the threat involved, the more deterrence value

it may be expected to possess.

It follows from this rather simple analysis that potential

threatening conditions within the rwss should be made as

obvious as possible to all persons within the immediate

vicinity. The presence of well-equipped security forces,

automatic intrusion alarm and counter-intrusion systems, and

signs mentioning the "authorized use of lethal force" should

be clearly visible.

30.
Very little empirical information applicable to predicting

the effectiveness of personal threat as a deterrent is

available. Poulton [36] reviews literature which indicates

that inappropriately high levels of "arousal" may degrade

performance and incentive. However, within the context of the

high-level intrusion attempt, these data may be suspect, as the

mechanism of "inappropriately high arousal levels" may not be

applicable to the terrorist personality.

Swann [104] has compiled a bibliography and presented a

brief review of the literature dealing with military combat

suppression. Most of the papers he reviews deal with the

suppressive effects of conventional weapons (e.g., Naylor et

al. [101]; Polmer et al. [103]; Terry [105]). While these

reports have generally failed to provide definitive knowledge

of the psychological effects of weapons, one relevant finding

was uncovered. Mills and Yale [100] have shown that a probability

of being incapacitated by opposing weapons fire of

approximately .005 is sufficient to cause military personnel to

take cover and avoid using their own weapons. Kenney et al.

[98] have reported the means by which this probability and

inference were determined; however, the report's contents are

classified. A related study not included in the Swann

bibliography was reported by Olley and Krauss [102] . These

authors investigated a variety of variables which they felt

might be influential in the decison of military troops to fire

in combat. They found the most influential variable to be

"ordered to shoot," and the least influential to be "proximity

of target." Moderately influential (all rated to be equal in

significance) were "risk from enemy fire," "target

identiflability, " and "others in group firing."

5.1.3.3 Strenuous Physical Activity

Strenuous physical activity on the part of intruders may

have several beneficial effects for deterrence purposes. Most

obvious is the momentary discomfort (e.g., sweating, cramps,

breathing difficulty) associated with extreme physical

exertion. Second, violent exercise is known to temporarily

reduce the efficiency of brain functioning (Hammerton and

Tickner [96] ) . Finally, muscular fatigue following strenuous

exercise may result in uncontrolled muscular movements

(Carpenter (63]; Hammerton and Tickner [97]).
While the physical and mental effects of extreme physical

exercise may be applicable to FEDS design, the precise control

of these effects may be difficult to achieve. For example, the

effects are dependent upon the general fitness of the

individuals involved (Poulton [36]), and submaxinal exertion

may actually result in improved physical and mental performance

(Davey [93] and [94]). In general, FRDS should be designed to

ensure a maximum level of intruder physical exertion, with

little opportunity for rest or relaxation.

5.1.4 Psycho-social, Learning, and Motivational Processes

As was the case with cognitive processes, the direct

manipulation of potential intruders' psycho-social, learning,

and motivational processes prior to the actual assault attempt

appears to be impractical for high-level to worst-case threats.

The specific nature of personality traits, social interactions,

training, and motivating political and economic ideologies

leading to an intrusion attempt is highly speculative at this

time, but appears likely to be formed as a result of years of

discontentment and radical association. As such, these

processes seem presently to be relatively stable in nature.

The manipulation of these same processes during the actual

intrusion attempt may have some very limited practical

significance for FEDS design, but it is unclear at present how

these processes may best be utilized for deterrence purposes.

5.2 Summary

An unclassified literature review was conducted to identify

possible techniques and mechanisms that might be useful within

the context of the FEDS Program for psychologically deterring

nuclear weapon theft. Generally, this literature indicates

that while human psychological/behavioral processes can be

directly manipulated by various means, little definitive

empirical data was found to be directly related to actually

achieving psychological deterrence for various postulated

levels of threat. Basic (laboratory) and limited applied

(field) research results concerning impacts on human sensory,

perceptual and cognitive processes have been cited only to show

the potential value of a variety of techniques. Research

dealing with human psycho-social, learning, and motivational

processes appears to be even more inadequate and highly

speculative in nature with respect to achieving deterrence.
5.3 Implications for Future Research

Critical topics associated with the potential usefulness

and reliability of psychological deterrence mechanisms within

the FEDS context and the nuclear weapon theft application

include: (1) the level of threat v/hich must be deterred, (2)

the type and quantity of intelligence data available to

unauthorized intruders, and (3) the selection and use of

countermeasures appropriate to the intelligence information

available. The unclassified deterrence literature reviewed

does not effectively deal with these issues. To better define

and understand these topics, all pertinent classified

documentation must be critically reviewed and evaluated,

assuming that such documentation exists.

While certain psychological deterrents may be expected to

be highly effective against relatively unprepared and

moderately motivated intruders, higher levels of motivation and

the use of, in many cases, simple countermeasures could greatly

reduce the effectiveness of such deterrents. For example, the

desired effects of high intensity noise and confusing

loudspeaker messages may be negated by using ear-covers; the

effects of high-intensity light negated by using goggles; the

effects of certain radiations minimized or eliminated by

wearing reflective clothing (e.g., tin-foil); the effect of

chemical irritants reduced by using gas masks, etc.

Alternatively, the source of the deterrent may be destroyed or,

in the case of chemical irritants and drugs, use of an

appropriate counter-actant would neutralize the effects.

Clearly, an extensive amount of definitive behavioral

impact research should be undertaken by DNA in the FEDS Program

to ascertain the actual and relative (comparative) deterrence

values of many if not all of the potential techniques and

mechanisms cited in this report. Table 1, presented on

page 35, may be useful to DNA in its determination of

research priorities and possible directions for system

development efforts. At this time, the table represents the

authors' preliminary opinions as to the likelihood of achieving

psychological deterrence for low, medium, high, and worst-case

levels of threat. It should be noted and emphasized that the

unclassified literature cited in this report does not directly

support or negate the judgments made, as the reported studies

do not consider the level-of-threat concept.
In conclusion, the behavioral/psychological design

parameters of a system that will, in fact, deter high-level and

worst-case threats are, at present, unknown. The uncertainties

reflected in table 1 may be interpreted as justification for

(1) developing mechanisms (devices) and techniques (procedures)

subject to feasibility testing, (2) conducting controlled

behavioral impact studies to determine the level of

psychological deterrence achievable, and (3) conducting

cost/effectiveness analyses. All deterrence systems,

regardless of their degree of sophistication, should be backed

up by well armed, well prepared security forces, with special

emphasis placed upon the "weakest links" of the system.

34.
Table 1. Level of Threat - Hypothesized Psychological Deterrent Impact

Low Med ium High Worst Case

Yes No u* Yes No U* Yes No u* Yes No U*

Noise Effects

Audible Alarm

Speech Interference

Physiological

Performance Decrement

X

VA

X

y

X

A

V

y

X

VA

X

X

X

X

X

Radiation Effects

Corpuscular y y y X

Electromagnetic

Microwave

Infrared

Visible Light X

X

AV

X

X

A

X

X

VA

X

X

X

Temperature Effects

Performance

Physiological Tolerance

X

y

X

y

X

AY

X

X

Chemical Agents & Drugs Y y A X

Perceptual Distortion & Disorganization

X X X X

Cognitive Functioning

Information Overload

Personal Threat

Strenuous Physical Activity

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Psychosocial Influences X X X X

Learning Processes X X X X

Motivation Influences X X X X

Uncertain

.

35
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

This section provides a bibliographic listing of the source

materials referenced in the preceding sections of this report.

The references are grouped alphabetically according to the

major topical areas discussed. While the references dealing

with each topical area should by no means be considered

exhaustive, they appear to be, in the opinion of the authors,

the most important and representative documents related to the

psychological deterrence of nuclear theft. Related sources of

lesser importance are discussed in many of the references

cited.

6.1 Background Information on the Threat of Nuclear

Weapons Theft

[1] Mayer, E.E. , and Pezzelle, R. M. , Adversary Capabilities;

Nuclear Site Security. BDM Corporation, Vienna, Virginia,

Report No. BDM/w-74-121-TR-l , January 1975.

[2] McPhee, J. , The Curve of Binding Energy; A Journey

into the Awesome and Alarming World of Theodore B. Taylor . New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1974

.

[3] Olmstead, J. A., Powers, T. R. , and Caumess, J. A.,

Selection and Training for Small Independent Action Forces.

HumRRO, TR 71-17, 8-71; TR 72-2, 2-72.

[4] Willrich, M. , and Taylor, T. B., Nuclear Theft: Risks

and Safeguards . Cambridge, Mass.l Ballinger Co.

,

1974.

6.2 Sensory Processes

[5] Wilkinson, R. T. , "Some Factors Influencing the Effect of

Environmental Stressors Upon Performance." Psychol . Bulletin 72 (1969), 260-272.

6.2.1 Noise

[6] Acton, W. I., and Carson, M. B. , "Auditory and Subjective

Effects of Airborne Noise from Industrial Ultrasonic

Sources." Brit. J. Industrial Med . 24 (1967), 297-304.

[7] Ades, H. V7. , Grabiel, A., Morril, S. N. Tolhurst, G. C,

and Niven, J. I., "Non-Auditory Effects of High Intensity

Sound Stimulation on Deaf Hunan Subjects." J. Aviat . Med. 29 (1958) , 454-467.
[8] Barrett, A. M. , Personality Characteristics Under the

Stress of High-Intensity Sound. PhD Thesis, Penn. State

University, University Park, Pa., 1950.

[9] Brewer, D. W. , and Briess , F. B., "Industrial Noise:

Laryngeal Considerations." N.Y. State J. Med . 60

(1960), 1737-1740.

[10] Broadbent, D. E. , "The Role of Auditory Localization

in Attention and Memory Span." J. Exp. Psychol . 47

(1954) , 191-196.

[11] , "Effects of Noise on Behavior." In

C. M. Harris (Ed.) : Handbook of Noise Control . New York:

McGraw, 1957, 1-34.

[12] , Perception and Conmiunication . Oxford:

Pergamon, 1958,

[13] , The Twenty Dials and Twenty Lights Test

Under Noise Conditions. Report 160/51. Medical Research

Council, Cambridge, England, 1961.

[14] Buckley, J. P. , "Physiological Effects of Environmental

Stimuli." J. Pharm. Sci . 61 (1972), 1175-1188.

[15] Cohen, A., Hummel, W. F., Turner, T. W. , and Duker-Dobos,

F. N. , Effects of Noise on Task Performance. Report

RR-4, U\ S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,

Occupational Health Research and Training Facility,

Cincinnati, Ohio, 1966.

[16] Davies, D. R. , "Physiological and Psychological Effects of

Exposure to High Intensity Noise." Applied Acoustics , 1 (1968), 215-233.

[17] Dickson, E. D. D. , and Chadwick, D. L. "Observations on

Disturbances of Equilibrium and other Symptoms Induced by

Jet Engine Noise." J. Laryngol. Otol ., 65 (1951), 154-165.

[18] Glass, D. C, Singer, J. E. , and Friedman, L. N., "Psychic

Cost of Adaption to an Environmental Stressor," J. Pers . Soc. Psychol. , 12 (1969), 200-210.
[19] Harris, C. S., The Effects of High Intensity Noise on

Human Performance. Report AMRL-TR-6 7-119 , Air Force

Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1968.

[20] Helper, M. M. , The Effects of Noise on Work Output and

Physiological Activation. Report 270, U. S. Army Medical

Research Laboratories, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1957,

[21] Jerison, H. J., "Paced Performance on a Complex Counting

Task Under Noise and Fatigue Conditions." Am. Psychol . 9

(1954) , 399-400.

[22] , Effects of a Combination of Noise and

Fatigue on a Complex Counting Task. Report WADC-TR-5 5-360

,

AD 95232, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1955.

[23] , Differential Effects of Noise and Fatigue

on a Complex Counting Task. Report WADC-TR-55-359 , AD

110506, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1956.

[24] , "Effects of Noise on Human Perfomance,"

J. Appl. Psychol . 43 (1959), 96-101.

Jerison, H. J., and Arginteanu, J., Time Judgements,

Acoustic Noise, and Judgement Drift. Report WADC-TR-57-

454, AD 130963, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,

1958.

Jerison, H. J., and Smith, A. K., Effects of Acoustic

Noise on Time Judgement. Report WADC-TR-55-358 , AD

99641, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1955.

[27] Kryter, K. D., "The Effects of Noise on Man." J. Speech

Disorders , Monogr. Suppl. No. 1, 19 50.

[28] , The Effects of Noise on Man . New York:

Academic Press , 1970.

[29] , "Speech Communication." In M. P. Van Cott

and R. G. Kinkade's Human Engineering Guide to Equipment

Design , U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C,

1972.

38
[30] Loeb, M. , Richmond, G. , and Jeantheau, G., The Influence

of Intense Noise on Performance of a Precise Fatiguing

Task. Report 268, U. S. Army Medical Research Laboratories,

Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1956.

[31] Miller, G. A., "Sensitivity to Changes in the Intensity of

White Noise and its Relation to Masking and Loudness."

J. Acoust. Soc. Am . 19 (1947), 609-619.

[32] Morgan, C. T. , Cook, J. S., Chapanis, A., and Lund, M. W. , (Eds.), Human Engineering Guide to Equipment Design . New

York: McGraw, 1963.

[33] Nixon, C. W. , Harris, C. , and vonGierke, H., Rail Test to

Evaluate Equilibrium in Low-Level Wideband Noise. Report

AMRL-TR-66-85 , U. S. Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories,

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1966.

[34] Park, J. L. , Jr., and Payne, M. C, Jr., "Effects of Noise

Level and Difficulty of Task in Performing Division,"

J. Appl. Psychol . 47 (1963), 367-368.

[35] Plutchik, R. , "Effect of High Intensity Intermittent Sound

on Compensatory Tracking and Mirror Tracing," Perceptual and

Motor Skills 12 (1961), 187-194.

[36] Poulton, E. C, Environment and Human Efficiency . Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970.

[37] Sanders, A., "The Influence of Noise on Two Discrimination

Tasks," Ergonomics 4 (1961), 253-258.

[38] Shambaugh, J. S., Jr., An Investigation of Certain

Individual Differences Under the Stress of High Intensity

Sound. Ph.D. Thesis, Penn. State University, University

Park, Pa., 1950.

[39] Skillern, C. P. , "Human Response to Measured Sound

Pressure Levels from Ultrasonic Devices." Am. Ind. Hyg.

Assoc. J . 26 (1965), 132-136.

[40] Teichner, W. H., Arees, E., and Reilly, R. , "Noise and

Human Performance, A Psychophysiological Approach."

Ergonomics 6 (1963), 83-97.

39
[41] VJebster, J. C, "Relations Between Speech-Interference

Contours and Idealized Articulation-Index Contours."

J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 36 (1964), 1962-1969.

6.2.2 Radiation

[42] Brown, J. L. , "Flash Blindness." Amer . J. Optha

1

. 60

(1965), 505-520.

[43] Dahlen, R. W. , "Effects of Irradiation on the Mead Region

of Dogs with 2450 mc Microwaves." Diss. Abstr . 21 (1960),

1612.

[44] Drogichina, E. E. , "The Symptoms of Chronic UHF Influence

on the Human Organism," In A. A. Letavet and A. V. Gordon

(Eds.) Biological Action of UIIF . Moscow: Acad. Med, Sci.

U.S.S.R., 1962, 22-24 (OTS 62-19175R816 )

.

[45] Eakin, S. K. , and Thompson, W. D. , "Behavioral Effects of

Stimulation by UHF Radio Fields." Psychol. Rep . 17

(1965), 595-602.

[46] Edelwejn, Z., and Haduch, S., "EEC Studies on Persons

V^/orking Within the Reach of Microwave." Acta Physiol . 13

(1962), 431-435.

[47] Frey, A. H. , "Auditory System Response to Radio Frequency

Energy." Aerospace Med . 32 (1961), 1140-1142.

[48] Furchtgott, E. , "Behavioral Effects of Ionizing Radiations:

1955-1961." Psychol. Bull . 60 (1963), 157-199.

[49] , "Behavioral Effects of Ionizing Radiations."

In E. Furchtgott (Ed.) Pharmacological and Biophysical

Agents and Behavior . New York: Academic Press, 1971.

[50] Harlow, H. F., "Effects of Radiation on the Central Nervous

System and Behavior; General Survey," In T. J. Haley and

R. S. Snyder (Eds.) Response of the Nervous System to

Ionizing Radiation . New York: Academic Press, 196 2,

627-644.

[51] Jaski, T. , "Radio Waves and Life." Radio Electron 9

(1960), 43-45.
[52] Kevorkian, A. A., Work with UHF Pulse Generators from

the Point of View of Work Hygiene. Institute of Work

Hygiene and Professional Diseases . Moscow: Acad. Med,

Sci., U.S.S.R., 1948, (OTS 59-21098. , Translation)

.

[53] Sadchikova, A. A., and Orlova, A. A., "Clinical Picture

of the Chronic Effects of Electromagnetic Microwaves."

Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Diseases , 2, 1958,

18-22. (OTS 59-11437, 1959, Translation).

[54] Sercl, M. , Jechova, D., Komorska, J., Kyral , V., Licha, H.

,

Licky, J., Nettl, S., Simikva, D., Slovicek, J., Urcha, L.,

Zdrahal, L. , Tusl, M. , Svorcova, S., and Kamt, V., "On

the Effects of cm Electromagnetic Waves on the Nervous

System of Man: Radar." Sb. Ved. Pr. Lek. Fak Karlovy

Univ. Hradci Koalove , 4 (1961) , 427-440.

[55] Thompson, W. D. , and Bourgeois, A. E. , "Nonionizing

Radiation". In E. Furchtgott (Ed.) Pharmacological and

Biophysical Agents and Behavior . New York : Academic

Press, 1971.

[56] Wright, R. , Heilweil, M. , Pelletior, P., and Dickinson, K.

,

The Impact of Street Lighting on Street Crime. Univ. of

Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (National Institute of Law

Enforcement and Criminal Justice grant 75-NI-99-0046-G)

May, 1974.

6.2.3 Temperature

[57] Bell, C. R. , and Provins , K. A., "Effects of High

Temperature Environmental Conditions on Human Performance."

J. Occup. Med . 4 (1962), 202-211.

[58] Berenson, P. J., and Robertson, W. G., "Temperature."

In J. F. Parker and V. R. West (Eds.) Bioastronautics

Data Book. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

Washington, D. C. (NASA SP-3006) , 1973.

[59] Blockley, W. V., "Temperature." In P. Webb (Ed.)

Bioastronautics Data Book . National Aeronautics and

Space Administration, Washington, D. C. (NASA-SP-3006)

,

1964.

[60] Buettner, K. , "Effects of Extreme Heat and Cold on Human

Skin. III. Penetrating Flash." J. Appl. Physiol. 5 (1952), 207-220.

^ ^

41.
[61] Bursill, A. E., "The Restriction of Peripheral Vision

During Exposure to Hot and Humid Conditions." Quart. J.

Exp. Psychol . 10 (1958) , 113.

[62] Buskirk, E. R. , and Bass, D. E. , Climate and Exercise. '

Report QREC-EP-61. Quartermaster Research and Engineering

Center, Natick, Massachusetts, 1957. j

[63] Carpenter, A., "The Effect of Room Temperature on the I

Performance of the Resistance Box Test." R.N. Pers. Res. I

Comm. Report No 46/318, 1946, London: Med. Res. Council. 1

[64] Dusek, E. R. , "Effects of Temperature on Normal Performance.

Protection and Functioning of the Hands in Cold Climates . Washington, D. C: National Academy of Science, National

Research Council, 1957.

[65] Hardy, J. D. , (Ed.) The Physiological Problems in Space

Exploration . Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1954.

[66] Kaufman, W. C. , Swan, A. G., and Davis, M. T. , Skin

Temperature Responses to Simulated Thermonuclear Flash.

ASK-TR-61-510 , Aeronautical Systems Division, WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1961.

[67] Kay, H., Report on Artie Trials on Board H.M.S. Vengeance,

February-March 1949. Royal Naval Personnel Research

Committee, Report No. 534. Medical Research Council,

London, 1949.

[68] Kissen, A. T. , and Hall, J. F., Physiologic Response to

Transient Heat Stress in Reflective versus Non-Reflective

Clothing. AMRL-TDR-6 3-79 . Aerospace Medical Research

Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,

August, 1963. m

[69] Lind, A. R. , "Man's Tolerance to Extreme Heat." In

Davies, C. N. , Davis, P. R. , and Tyrer, F. H. , (Eds.) ^ The Effects of Abnormal Physical Conditions at Work . Ebinburgh: Livingstone, 1967, 50-59.

[70] Mackworth, N. H. , Researches on the Measurement of

Human Performance. Med. Res. Counc. (Gr. Brit.),

Spec. Rep. Ser., 1950, Complete Report No. 268.

42.
[71] PeacocJc, L. J. , A Field Study of Rifle Aiming Steadiness

and Serial Reaction Time Performance as Affected by

Thermal Stress and Activity. Report No. 231, Army

Medical Researcli Laboratories, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 19 56.

[72] Pepler, R. D., "Warmth and Performance: An Investigation

in the Tropics." Ergonomics 2 (1958), 63-88.

[73] , "Performance and Well-being in Heat." In

J. D. Hardy TEd . ) Temperature - Its Measurement and Control

in Science and Industry . Vol. 3, Part 3. New YorJc

:

Reinhold Publishing Co., 1963.

[74] , "Ambient Temperature." In E. Furchtgott (Ed.)

Pharmacological and Biophysical Agents and Behavior . New

York: Academic Press, 1971.

[75] Siple, P. A., and Passel, C. F., "Measurements of Dry

Atmospheric Cooling in Subfreezing Temperatures."

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 89 (1945) , 177-199.

[76] Stoll, A, M. , and Green, L. C, "Relationship Between Pain

and Tissue Damage Due to Thermal Radiation." J. Appl.

Physiology 14 (3) (1959), 373-382.

[77] Teichner, W. M. , Temperature, Humidity, and Ventilation . Guggenheim Center for Aviation Health and Safety, Harvard

School of Public Health, Boston, Mass., 1961.

[78] Trumbull, R. , Environmental Modification for Human

Performance. ONR-ACR-105-11 , Office of Naval Research,

Washington, D. C, 1956. Submarine Medical Practice,

NAVMED-D-5054 . Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,

Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, 1956.

[79] Viteles, M. S., and Smith, K. R. , "An Experimental

Investigation of the Effects of Change in Atmospheric

Conditions and Noise on Performance." Amer. Soc. Heat.

Vent. Eng. 20 (1952), 188-195.

[80] Webb, P., "Pain Limited Heat Exposures." In J.D. Hardy

(Ed.) Temperature, Its Measurement and Control in Science

and Industry, Vol. 3, Biology and Medicine . New York

:

Reinhold Publishing Co., 1963.

43.
[81] Wilkinson, R. T., Fox, R. H., Goldsmith, R., Hampton, I.F.G.,

and Lewis, H. E. , "Psychological and Physiological Responses

to Raised Body Temperature." J. Appl. Physiol . 19 (1964),

287-291.

[82] Wing, J. P., "Upper Thermal Tolerance Limits for Unimpaired

Mental Performance." Aerospace Med . 36 (1965), 960-964.

6.2.4 Chemical Agents and Drugs

[83] Coates, J. F., Non-Lethal and Non-Destructive Combat in Cities

Overseas. Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington, Va.,

May, 1970.

[84] Jones, E. S., Law Enforcement Chemical Agents and Related

Equipment . Santa Cruz, Calif.: Davis Publishing Co., 1970.

6.3 Perceptual Processes

[85] Dember, W. N. , The Psychology of Perception , New York:

Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964.

[86] Graham, C. H., "Visual Form Perception." In C.H. Graham

(Ed.) Vision and Visual Perception (Chapter 19). New York:

John Wiley & Sons, 1966.

[87] Hochberg, J* E. , Perception . Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.

[88] National Bureau of Standards. Preliminary Observations

of Complex Fence and Barrier Assaults. Phase I and II

reports. Law Enforcement Standards Lab, NBS , Washington, D.C.

1975.

6.4 Cognitive Processes

[89] Alluisi, E. A., Muller, P.F., and Fitts, P.M., "An

Information Analysis of Verbal and Motor Responses in a

Forced-Paced Serial Task." J. Exp. Psychol . 53 (1957),

153-158.

I

44
i

[90] Cherry, E. C, "Some Experiments on the Recognition of

Speech, With One and Two Ears." J. Acoust. Soc . Amer ., 25 (1953) , 975-979.

[91] Cherry, E. C, and Taylor, W. K. , "Some Further Experiments

Upon the Recognition of Speech, VJith One and With Two Ears."

J. Acoust. Soc. Amer ., 26 (1954), 554-559.

[92] Cumming, R. W. , and Croft, P. G. , "Human Information

Processing Under Varying Task Demand." Ergonomics , 16

(1973), 581-586.

[93] Davey, C. P., "Mental Performance After Physical Activity."

Australian Journal of Sports Medicine , 4 (1972), 25-33.

[94] , "Physical Exertion and Mental Performance."

Ergonomics , 16 (1973), 595-599.

[95] Fritts, P. M. , and Posner, M. I., Human Performance , Belmont,

Calif.: Broo]cs/Cole Publishing Co., 1969.

[96] Hammerton, M. , and Tickner, A. H., "Physical Fitness and

Skilled Work After Exercise." Ergonomics , 11 (1968), 41-45.

[97] , "An Investigation into the Effect of

Exercising Particular Limb-Segments upon Performance in a

Tracking Task." Ergonomics , 12 (1969), 47-49.

[98] Kinney, D. G. , Hugo, A. J., and Brown, M. L., "Suppressive

Fire Support Effectiveness of Marine Corps Attack Helicopters

and Aircraft." Tech Note 12-75-13, Naval Weapons Center,

China Lake, Calif. (1973) (Confidential)

.

[99] Klemmer, E. T., and Muller, P. F., The Rate of Handling

Information; Key Pressing Responses to Light Patterns.

United States Air Force. Human Factors Operations

Research Laboratory. Memo Report No. 34.

[100]Mills, D. L., and Yale, W. W. , An Exploratory Study

of Human Reactions to Fragmentation Weapons . Weapons

Systems Laboratory Research Memo No. 66, 1961.

[101]Naylor, J. C, Page, M. M.,et al. Proceedings of

the First Symposium on the Psychological Effects of

Non-Nuclear Weapons, Vol. I. University of Oklahoma

Research Institute, (AD 601 071), 1964.

45.
[102]Olley, R. I., and Krauss, H. H. , "Variables Which

May Influence the Decision to Fire in Combat."

J. Soc. Psychol ., 92 (1974), 151-152.

[103] Polmer , J. D. , Dahlke, A. L. , Terry, R. A., et al.

Investigation of Psychological Effects of Non-Huclear

Weapons for Limited V7ar, Vol. II. University of

Oklahoma Research Institute , (AD 480 104), 1966.

[104]Swann, E. G. , Combat Suppression: A Bibliography.

United States Army Institute, Arlington, Va. (draft

copy) , 1974.

[105]Terry, R. A., Toward a Psychological Index of Weapons

Effectiveness, Part I: Field Studies. University of

Oklahoma Research Institute, (AD 609 089) , 1964.

USCOMM-NBS-DC 46.
Nb&-I I4A (MEV.

U.S. DEPT. OF COMM. 1. PUBLICATION OR RKPORT NO. 2. Gov't Accession

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA ^^^^^ No.

3. Recipient's Accession No.

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS TO NUCLEAR TEEFT:

A Preliminary Literature Review and Bibliography

5. Publication Date

March 1976

6. Performing Organization Code

7. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Meguire, Joel Kraner

8. Performing Organ. Report No.

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20234

10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.

11. Contract/Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Complete Address (Street, City, State, ZIP)

Intelligence and Security Directorate

Defense Nuclear Agency

Department of Defense

Wa.Qhinrrl-nn. n.T. 90-^0^;

13. Type of Report & Period

Covered

Final

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. supplementaryIvjote's

16. abstract (A 200-word or less factual summary of most si^ifleant information. If document includes a significant

bibliography or literature survey, mention it here.)

A review of the unclassified literature dealing with psychological deterrents

was conducted for the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) . Its purpose was to identify

techniques that might be useful in DNA's Forced-Entry Deterrent Systems (FEDS) Program

j-vji jjayciiuiuy xcaxxy u.t;L.cj.j.xny riiicxcaj. weapon tnert.. ins revxew inoicaues xjcisuz. wnixe

human psychological processes (sensory, perceptual, and cognitive) can be manipulated

by various means, definitive enpirical data are lacking vMch directly relate to

deterring nuclar weapon theft. Behavioral inpact research should be undertaken by

DiSIA to (1) ascertain the deterrence values of the many techniques identified and

(2) test the hypotheses inplicit in the FEDS concept.

17, KEY WORDS (six to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only the first letter of the first key word unless a proper name; separated by semicolons)

Behavioral inpact; cognitive processes; nuclear weapon theft; perceptual processes;

psychological deterrence; security systems; sensory processes; threat analysis

18. AVAILABILITY [X Unlimited

For Official Distribution. Do Not Release to NTIS

1

' Order From Sup. of Doc, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402. SD Cat. No. C13

1 X! Order From National Technical Information Service (NTIS)

Springfield, Virginia 22151

19. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS REPORT)

IS

UNCLASSIFIED

21. NO. OF PAGES

50

20. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS PAGE)

UNCLASSIFIED

22, Price

$4.00

USCOMM-DC 29042-P74
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