The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault

Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and 

Gun Violence, 1994-2003

Author(s): Christopher S. Koper 

Document No.: 204431

Date Received: July 2004

Award Number: 98-IJ-CX-0039

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to

traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect

the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.
An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault 

Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and 

Gun Violence, 1994-2003 

Report to the National Institute of Justice, 

United States Department of Justice 

By 

Christopher S. Koper 

(Principal Investigator) 

With 

Daniel J. Woods and Jeffrey A. Roth 

June 2004 

 Jerry Lee Center of Criminology 

 University of Pennsylvania 

 3814 Walnut Street 

 Philadelphia, PA 19104

 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Preface i 

Acknowledgments ii

1. Impacts of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, 1994-2003: Key Findings and 

Conclusions 1 

2. Provisions of the Assault Weapons Ban 4 

2.1. Assault Weapons 4 

2.2. Large Capacity Magazines 6 

2.3. Foreign Rifles Capable of Accepting Large Capacity Magazines for 

Military Rifles 8 

2.4. Ban Exemptions 10 

2.5. Summary 11 

3. Criminal Use of Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines Before the 

Ban 14 

3.1. Criminal Use of Assault Weapons 15 

3.2. Criminal Use of Large Capacity Magazines 18 

3.3. Summary 19 

4. Overview of Study Design, Hypotheses, and Prior Findings 20 

4.1. Logical Framework for Research on the Ban 20 

4.2. Hypothesized Market Effects 21 

4.3. Prior Research on the Ban’s Effects 23 

5. Market Indicators for Assault Weapons: Prices and Production 25 

5.1. Price Trends for Assault Weapons and Other Firearms 25 

5.2. Production Trends for Assault Weapons and Other Firearms 33 

5.3. Summary and Interpretations 36 

6. Criminal Use of Assault Weapons After the Ban 39 

6.1. Measuring Criminal Use of Assault Weapons: A Methodological 

Note 39 

6.2. National Analysis of Guns Reported By Police to the Federal 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 40 

6.3. Local Analyses of Guns Recovered By Police 46 

6.4. Summary 51 

7. Market Indicators for Large Capacity Magazines: Prices and Importation 61 

7.1. Price Trends for Large Capacity Magazines 61 

7.2. Post-Ban Importation of Large Capacity Magazines 65 

7.3. Summary and Interpretations 65 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) 

8. Criminal Use of Large Capacity Magazines After the Ban 68 

8.1. Baltimore 69 

8.2. Anchorage 73 

8.3. Milwaukee 75 

8.4. Louisville 77 

8.5. Summary 78 

9. The Consequences of Crimes With Assault Weapons and Large Capacity 

Magazines 80 

9.1. The Spread of Semiautomatic Weaponry and Trends in Lethal and 

Injurious Gun Violence Prior to the Ban 81 

9.2. Shots Fired in Gun Attacks and the Effects of Weaponry on Attack 

Outcomes 83 

9.3. Post-Ban Trends in Lethal and Injurious Gun Violence 91 

9.4. Summary 96 

10. Looking to the Future: Research Recommendations and Speculation About 

the Possible Consequences of Reauthorizing, Modifying, or Lifting the Assault 

Weapons Ban 98 

10.1. Research Recommendations and Data Requirements 98 

10.2. Potential Consequences of Reauthorizing, Modifying, or Lifting 

the Assault Weapons Ban 100 

References 102 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
PREFACE 

Gun violence continues to be one of America’s most serious crime problems. In 

2000, over 10,000 persons were murdered with firearms and almost 49,000 more were 

shot in the course of over 340,000 assaults and robberies with guns (see the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s annual Uniform Crime Reports and Simon et al., 2002). The 

total costs of gun violence in the United States – including medical, criminal justice, and 

other government and private costs – are on the order of at least $6 to $12 billion per year 

and, by more controversial estimates, could be as high as $80 billion per year (Cook and 

Ludwig, 2000). 

However, there has been good news in recent years. Police statistics and national 

victimization surveys show that since the early 1990s, gun crime has plummeted to some

of the lowest levels in decades (see the Uniform Crime Reports and Rennison, 2001). 

Have gun controls contributed to this decline, and, if so, which ones? 

During the last decade, the federal government has undertaken a number of 

initiatives to suppress gun crime. These include, among others, the establishment of a 

national background check system for gun buyers (through the Brady Act), reforms of the 

licensing system for firearms dealers, a ban on juvenile handgun possession, and Project 

Safe Neighborhoods, a collaborative effort between U.S. Attorneys and local authorities 

to attack local gun crime problems and enhance punishment for gun offenders. 

Perhaps the most controversial of these federal initiatives was the ban on 

semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines enacted as 

Title XI, Subtitle A of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 

This law prohibits a relatively small group of weapons considered by ban advocates to be 

particularly dangerous and attractive for criminal purposes. In this report, we investigate 

the ban’s impacts on gun crime through the late 1990s and beyond. This study updates a 

prior report on the short-term effects of the ban (1994-1996) that members of this 

research team prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Congress (Roth 

and Koper, 1997; 1999). 

i 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This research was supported by National Institute of Justice (U.S. Department of 

Justice) grants 2003-IJ-CX-1029 to the University of Pennsylvania and 98-IJ-CX-0039 to 

the Urban Institute. The Jerry Lee Center of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania 

provided additional support. The views expressed are those of the author. They do not 

reflect official positions of the United States Department of Justice and should not be 

attributed to the trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, the Urban Institute, or any of 

the other persons or organizations listed below. 

The author wishes to thank several people and organizations that assisted this 

effort in numerous ways. Daniel Woods assisted with data analysis. Jeffrey Roth, who 

directed our first study of the assault weapons ban, provided advice and editorial input. 

Additional research assistance was provided by the following former employees of the 

Urban Institute: Gretchen Moore, David Huffer, Erica Dinger, Darin Reedy, Kate 

Bunting, Katie Gorie, and Michele Waul. The following persons and organizations 

provided databases, information, or other resources utilized for this report: Glenn Pierce 

(Northeastern University), Pamela Shaw and Edward Koch (Baltimore Police 

Department), Robert Shem (Alaska State Police), Bill McGill and Mallory O’Brien 

(currently or formerly of the Firearm Injury Center, Medical College of Wisconsin), Rick 

Ruddell (California State University, Chico), Scott Doyle (Kentucky State Police), 

Terrence Austin and Joe Vince (currently or formerly of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives), Carlos Alvarez and Alan Lynn (Metro-Dade Police 

Department), Charles Branas (Firearm and Injury Center, University of Pennsylvania), 

Caroline Harlow (Bureau of Justice Statistics), and Rebecca Knox (Brady Center to 

Prevent Handgun Violence). Robert Burrows (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives) and Wain Roberts (Wain Roberts Firearms) shared technical expertise on 

firearms. Anonymous reviewers for the National Institute of Justice provided thorough 

and helpful comments on earlier versions of this report, as did Terrence Austin and 

Robert Burrows of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Finally, I 

thank Lois Mock, our National Institute of Justice grant monitor, for her advice and 

encouragement throughout all of the research that my colleagues and I have conducted on 

the assault weapons ban. 

ii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
1. IMPACTS OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN, 1994-2003: KEY 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This overview presents key findings and conclusions from a study sponsored by 

the National Institute of Justice to investigate the effects of the federal assault weapons 

ban. This study updates prior reports to the National Institute of Justice and the U.S. 

Congress on the assault weapons legislation. 

The Ban Attempts to Limit the Use of Guns with Military Style Features and Large 

Ammunition Capacities

• Title XI, Subtitle A of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of

1994 imposed a 10-year ban on the “manufacture, transfer, and possession” of 

certain semiautomatic firearms designated as assault weapons (AWs). The ban is 

directed at semiautomatic firearms having features that appear useful in military 

and criminal applications but unnecessary in shooting sports or self-defense 

(examples include flash hiders, folding rifle stocks, and threaded barrels for 

attaching silencers). The law bans 18 models and variations by name, as well as 

revolving cylinder shotguns. It also has a “features test” provision banning other 

semiautomatics having two or more military-style features. In sum, the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has identified 118 models and 

variations that are prohibited by the law. A number of the banned guns are 

foreign semiautomatic rifles that have been banned from importation into the U.S. 

since 1989. 

• The ban also prohibits most ammunition feeding devices holding more than 10 

rounds of ammunition (referred to as large capacity magazines, or LCMs). An 

LCM is arguably the most functionally important feature of most AWs, many of 

which have magazines holding 30 or more rounds. The LCM ban’s reach is 

broader than that of the AW ban because many non-banned semiautomatics 

accept LCMs. Approximately 18% of civilian-owned firearms and 21% of 

civilian-owned handguns were equipped with LCMs as of 1994. 

• The ban exempts AWs and LCMs manufactured before September 13, 1994. At 

that time, there were upwards of 1.5 million privately owned AWs in the U.S. and 

nearly 25 million guns equipped with LCMs. Gun industry sources estimated that 

there were 25 million pre-ban LCMs available in the U.S. as of 1995. An 

additional 4.7 million pre-ban LCMs were imported into the country from 1995 

through 2000, with the largest number in 1999. 

• Arguably, the AW-LCM ban is intended to reduce gunshot victimizations by 

limiting the national stock of semiautomatic firearms with large ammunition 

capacities – which enable shooters to discharge many shots rapidly – and other 

features conducive to criminal uses. The AW provision targets a relatively small 

number of weapons based on features that have little to do with the weapons’ 

1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
operation, and removing those features is sufficient to make the weapons legal. 

The LCM provision limits the ammunition capacity of non-banned firearms. 

The Banned Guns and Magazines Were Used in Up to A Quarter of Gun Crimes 

Prior to the Ban 

• AWs were used in only a small fraction of gun crimes prior to the ban: about 2% 

according to most studies and no more than 8%. Most of the AWs used in crime 

are assault pistols rather than assault rifles. 

• LCMs are used in crime much more often than AWs and accounted for 14% to 

26% of guns used in crime prior to the ban. 

• AWs and other guns equipped with LCMs tend to account for a higher share of 

guns used in murders of police and mass public shootings, though such incidents 

are very rare. 

The Ban’s Success in Reducing Criminal Use of the Banned Guns and Magazines 

Has Been Mixed 

• Following implementation of the ban, the share of gun crimes involving AWs 

declined by 17% to 72% across the localities examined for this study (Baltimore, 

Miami, Milwaukee, Boston, St. Louis, and Anchorage), based on data covering all 

or portions of the 1995-2003 post-ban period. This is consistent with patterns 

found in national data on guns recovered by police and reported to ATF. 

• The decline in the use of AWs has been due primarily to a reduction in the use of 

assault pistols (APs), which are used in crime more commonly than assault rifles 

(ARs). There has not been a clear decline in the use of ARs, though assessments 

are complicated by the rarity of crimes with these weapons and by substitution of 

post-ban rifles that are very similar to the banned AR models. 

• However, the decline in AW use was offset throughout at least the late 1990s by 

steady or rising use of other guns equipped with LCMs in jurisdictions studied 

(Baltimore, Milwaukee, Louisville, and Anchorage). The failure to reduce LCM 

use has likely been due to the immense stock of exempted pre-ban magazines, 

which has been enhanced by recent imports. 

It is Premature to Make Definitive Assessments of the Ban’s Impact on Gun Crime 

• Because the ban has not yet reduced the use of LCMs in crime, we cannot clearly 

credit the ban with any of the nation’s recent drop in gun violence. However, the 

ban’s exemption of millions of pre-ban AWs and LCMs ensured that the effects 

2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of the law would occur only gradually. Those effects are still unfolding and may 

not be fully felt for several years into the future, particularly if foreign, pre-ban 

LCMs continue to be imported into the U.S. in large numbers. 

The Ban’s Reauthorization or Expiration Could Affect Gunshot Victimizations, But 

Predictions are Tenuous 

• Should it be renewed, the ban’s effects on gun violence are likely to be small at 

best and perhaps too small for reliable measurement. AWs were rarely used in 

gun crimes even before the ban. LCMs are involved in a more substantial share 

of gun crimes, but it is not clear how often the outcomes of gun attacks depend on 

the ability of offenders to fire more than ten shots (the current magazine capacity 

limit) without reloading.

• Nonetheless, reducing criminal use of AWs and especially LCMs could have nontrivial effects on gunshot victimizations. The few available studies suggest that 

attacks with semiautomatics – including AWs and other semiautomatics equipped 

with LCMs – result in more shots fired, more persons hit, and more wounds 

inflicted per victim than do attacks with other firearms. Further, a study of 

handgun attacks in one city found that 3% of the gunfire incidents resulted in 

more than 10 shots fired, and those attacks produced almost 5% of the gunshot 

victims. 

• Restricting the flow of LCMs into the country from abroad may be necessary to 

achieve desired effects from the ban, particularly in the near future. Whether 

mandating further design changes in the outward features of semiautomatic 

weapons (such as removing all military-style features) will produce measurable 

benefits beyond those of restricting ammunition capacity is unknown. Past 

experience also suggests that Congressional discussion of broadening the AW ban 

to new models or features would raise prices and production of the weapons under 

discussion. 

• If the ban is lifted, gun and magazine manufacturers may reintroduce AW models 

and LCMs, perhaps in substantial numbers. In addition, pre-ban AWs may lose 

value and novelty, prompting some of their owners to sell them in undocumented 

secondhand markets where they can more easily reach high-risk users, such as 

criminals, terrorists, and other potential mass murderers. Any resulting increase 

in crimes with AWs and LCMs might increase gunshot victimizations for the 

reasons noted above, though this effect could be difficult to measure. 

3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
2. PROVISIONS OF THE ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN 

2.1. Assault Weapons 

Enacted on September 13, 1994, Title XI, Subtitle A of the Violent Crime Control 

and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 imposes a 10-year ban on the “manufacture, transfer, 

and possession” of certain semiautomatic firearms designated as assault weapons 

(AWs).1

 The AW ban is not a prohibition on all semiautomatics. Rather, it is directed at 

semiautomatics having features that appear useful in military and criminal applications

but unnecessary in shooting sports or self-defense. Examples of such features include 

pistol grips on rifles, flash hiders, folding rifle stocks, threaded barrels for attaching 

silencers, and the ability to accept ammunition magazines holding large numbers of 

bullets.2

 Indeed, several of the banned guns (e.g., the AR-15 and Avtomat Kalashnikov 

models) are civilian copies of military weapons and accept ammunition magazines made 

for those military weapons. 

As summarized in Table 2-1, the law specifically prohibits nine narrowly defined 

groups of pistols, rifles, and shotguns. A number of the weapons are foreign rifles that 

the federal government has banned from importation into the U.S. since 1989. Exact 

copies of the named AWs are also banned, regardless of their manufacturer. In addition, 

the ban contains a generic “features test” provision that generally prohibits other 

semiautomatic firearms having two or more military-style features, as described in Table 

2-2. In sum, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) 

has identified 118 model and caliber variations that meet the AW criteria established by 

the ban.3

Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrate a few prominent AWs and their features. Figure 2-1 

displays the Intratec TEC-9 assault pistol, the AW most frequently used in crime (e.g., 

see Roth and Koper 1997, Chapter 2). Figure 2-2 depicts the AK-47 assault rifle, a 

weapon of Soviet design. There are many variations of the AK-47 produced around the 

world, not all of which have the full complement of features illustrated in Figure 2-2. 

 

1

 A semiautomatic weapon fires one bullet for each squeeze of the trigger. After each shot, the gun 

automatically loads the next bullet and cocks itself for the next shot, thereby permitting a somewhat faster 

rate of fire relative to non-automatic firearms. Semiautomatics are not to be confused with fully automatic 

weapons (i.e., machine guns), which fire continuously as long as the trigger is held down. Fully automatic 

weapons have been illegal to own in the United States without a federal permit since 1934. 2

 Ban advocates stress the importance of pistol grips on rifles and heat shrouds or forward handgrips on

pistols, which in combination with large ammunition magazines enable shooters to discharge high numbers

of bullets rapidly (in a “spray fire” fashion) while maintaining control of the firearm (Violence Policy 

Center, 2003). Ban opponents, on the other hand, argue that AW features also serve legitimate purposes for 

lawful gun users (e.g., see Kopel, 1995). 3

 This is based on AWs identified by ATF’s Firearms Technology Branch as of December 1997. 

4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 2-1. Firearms Banned by the Federal Assault Weapons Ban 

Firearm Description 1993 Blue Book Price Pre-Ban Fede

Legal Status 

Avtomat Kalashnikov (AK) (by Norinco,Mitchell, Poly Technologies)

Chinese, Russian, other foreign and domestic: .223 or7.62x39mm caliber, semiauto. rifle; 5, 10, or 30 shotmagazine, may be supplied with bayonet

$550 (generic import); add10-15% for folding stockmodels

Imports banned 1989. 

Uzi, Galil Israeli: 9mm, .41, or .45 caliber semiauto. carbine, minicarbine, or pistol. Magazine capacity of 16, 20, or 25,

depending on model and type (10 or 20 on pistols). 

$550-$1050 (Uzi)$875-$1150 (Galil) 

Imports banned 1989

Beretta AR-70 Italian: .222 or .223 caliber semiauto. paramilitary design rifle; 

5, 8, or 30 shot magazine. 

$1050 Imports banned 

1989. 

Colt AR-15 Domestic: primarily .223 caliber paramilitary rifle or carbine; 

5 shot magazines, often comes with two 5-shot detachablemagazines. Exact copies by DPMS, Eagle, Olympic, and others. 

$825-$1325 Legal (civilian

version of militaM-16)

Fabrique National FN/FAL, FN/LAR, FNC 

Belgian design: .308 caliber semiauto. rifle or .223 combat carbine with 30 shot magazine. Rifle comes with flash hider, 4 position fire selector on automatic models. Discontinued in1988. 

$1100-$2500 Imports banned 

1989. 

Steyr AUG Austrian: .223/5.56mm caliber semiauto. paramilitary design

rifle. 

$2500 Imports banned 

1989

SWD M-10, 11, 11/9, 12 

Domestic: 9mm, .380, or .45 caliber paramilitary designsemiauto. pistol; 32 shot magazine. Also available insemiauto. carbine and fully automatic variations. 

$215 (M-11/9) Legal 

TEC-9, DC9, 22 Domestic: 9mm caliber semiauto. paramilitary design pistol, 

10 or 32 shot magazine.; .22 caliber semiauto. paramilitary design pistol, 30 shot magazine. 

$145-$295 Legal 

Revolving Cylinder Shotguns 

Domestic: 12 gauge, 12 shot rotary magazine; paramilitary configuration

$525 (Street Sweeper) Legal 

1 Imports were halted in 1994 under the federal embargo on the importation of firearms from China. 2 Imports banned by federal executive order, April 1998.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 2-2. Features Test of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban 

Weapon Category Military-Style Features 

(Two or more qualify a firearm as an assault weapon) 

Semiautomatic pistols 

accepting detachable 

magazines: 

1) ammunition magazine that attaches outside the 

pistol grip 

2) threaded barrel capable of accepting a barrel 

extender, flash hider, forward handgrip, or silencer 

3) heat shroud attached to or encircling the barrel 

4) weight of more than 50 ounces unloaded 

5) semiautomatic version of a fully automatic weapon 

Semiautomatic rifles 

accepting detachable 

magazines: 

1) folding or telescoping stock 

2) pistol grip that protrudes beneath the firing action 

3) bayonet mount 

4) flash hider or threaded barrel designed to 

accommodate one 

5) grenade launcher 

Semiautomatic shotguns: 1) folding or telescoping stock 

2) pistol grip that protrudes beneath the firing action 

3) fixed magazine capacity over 5 rounds 

4) ability to accept a detachable ammunition magazine

2.2. Large Capacity Magazines 

In addition, the ban prohibits most ammunition feeding devices holding more than 10

rounds of ammunition (referred to hereafter as large capacity magazines, or LCMs).4

 Most 

notably, this limits the capacity of detachable ammunition magazines for semiautomatic 

firearms. Though often overlooked in media coverage of the law, this provision impacted a 

larger share of the gun market than did the ban on AWs. Approximately 40 percent of the 

semiautomatic handgun models and a majority of the semiautomatic rifle models being 

manufactured and advertised prior to the ban were sold with LCMs or had a variation that was 

sold with an LCM (calculated from Murtz et al., 1994). Still others could accept LCMs made 

for other firearms and/or by other manufacturers. A national survey of gun owners found that 

18% of all civilian-owned firearms and 21% of civilian-owned handguns were equipped with 

magazines having 10 or more rounds as of 1994 (Cook and Ludwig, 1996, p. 17). The AW

provision did not affect most LCM-compatible guns, but the LCM provision limited the 

capacities of their magazines to 10 rounds. 

 

4

 Technically, the ban prohibits any magazine, belt, drum, feed strip, or similar device that has the capacity to

accept more than 10 rounds or ammunition, or which can be readily converted or restored to accept more than 10 

rounds of ammunition. The ban exempts attached tubular devices capable of operating only with .22 caliber 

rimfire (i.e., low velocity) ammunition.

6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 2-1. Features of Assault Weapons: 

The Intratec TEC-9 Assault Pistol 

Threaded Barrel

Designed to accommodate a silencer 

Barrel Shroud

Cools the barrel of the weapon so it will 

not overheat during rapid firing. Allows 

the shooter to grasp the barrel area during 

rapid fire without incurring serious burns.

Large Capacity Magazine Outside Pistol Grip

Characteristic of an assault weapon, not a 

sporting handgun. 

 

Adapted from exhibit of the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. 

As discussed in later chapters, an LCM is perhaps the most functionally important 

feature of many AWs. This point is underscored by the AW ban’s exemptions for 

semiautomatic rifles that cannot accept a detachable magazine that holds more than five rounds 

of ammunition and semiautomatic shotguns that cannot hold more than five rounds in a fixed 

or detachable magazine. As noted by the U.S. House of Representatives, most prohibited AWs 

came equipped with magazines holding 30 rounds and could accept magazines holding as 

many as 50 or 100 rounds (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1998, p. 14). Also, a 1998 federal 

executive order (discussed below) banned further importation of foreign semiautomatic rifles 

capable of accepting LCMs made for military rifles. Accordingly, the magazine ban plays an 

important role in the logic and interpretations of the analyses presented here. 

7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 2-2. Features of Assault Weapons: 

The AK-47 Assault Rifle 

Flash Suppressor

Reduces the flash from the barrel 

of the weapon, allowing the 

shooter to remain concealed when

shooting at night. 

Barrel Mount 

Designed to

accommodate a 

bayonet, serves no

sporting purpose. 

Folding Stock

Sacrifices accuracy for 

concealability and mobility 

in combat situations.

Large Capacity 

Detachable Magazine 

Permits shooter to fire dozens 

of rounds of ammunition 

without reloading. Pistol Grip 

Allows the weapon to be

“spray fired” from the hip.

Also helps stabilize the 

weapon during rapid fire. 

Adapted from exhibit of the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. 

2.3. Foreign Rifles Accepting Large Capacity Military Magazines 

In April of 1998, the Clinton administration broadened the range of the AW ban 

by prohibiting importation of an additional 58 foreign semiautomatic rifles that were still 

legal under the 1994 law but that can accept LCMs made for military assault rifles like 

the AK-47 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1998).5

 Figure 2-3 illustrates a few such 

rifles (hereafter, LCMM rifles) patterned after the banned AK-47 pictured in Figure 2-2. 

The LCMM rifles in Figure 2-3 do not possess the military-style features incorporated

into the AK-47 (such as pistol grips, flash suppressors, and bayonet mounts), but they 

accept LCMs made for AK-47s.6

 

5

 In the civilian context, AWs are semiautomatic firearms. Many semiautomatic AWs are patterned after 

military firearms, but the military versions are capable of semiautomatic and fully automatic fire. 6

 Importation of some LCMM rifles, including a number of guns patterned after the AK-47, was halted in

1994 due to trade sanctions against China (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1998). 

8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 2-3. Foreign Semiautomatic Rifles Capable of Accepting Large Capacity Militar

Magazines: AK47 Copies Banned by Executive Order in 1998

Taken from U.S. Department of the Treasury (1998)

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
2.4. Ban Exemptions 

2.4.1. Guns and Magazines Manufactured Prior to the Ban 

The ban contains important exemptions. AWs and LCMs manufactured before 

the effective date of the ban are “grandfathered” and thus legal to own and transfer. 

Around 1990, there were an estimated 1 million privately owned AWs in the U.S. (about 

0.5% of the estimated civilian gun stock) (Cox Newspapers, 1989, p. 1; American 

Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, 1992), though those counts probably 

did not correspond exactly to the weapons prohibited by the 1994 ban. The leading 

domestic AW producers manufactured approximately half a million AWs from 1989 

through 1993, representing roughly 2.5% of all guns manufactured in the U.S. during that 

time (see Chapter 5). 

We are not aware of any precise estimates of the pre-ban stock of LCMs, but gun 

owners in the U.S. possessed an estimated 25 million guns that were equipped with 

LCMs or 10-round magazines in 1994 (Cook and Ludwig, 1996, p. 17), and gun industry 

sources estimated that, including aftermarket items for repairing and extending 

magazines, there were at least 25 million LCMs available in the United States as of 1995 

(Gun Tests, 1995, p. 30). As discussed in Chapter 7, moreover, an additional 4.8 million 

pre-ban LCMs were imported into the U.S. from 1994 through 2000 under the 

grandfathering exemption.

2.4.2. Semiautomatics With Fewer or No Military Features

Although the law bans “copies or duplicates” of the named gun makes and 

models, federal authorities have emphasized exact copies. Relatively cosmetic changes, 

such as removing a flash hider or bayonet mount, are sufficient to transform a banned 

weapon into a legal substitute, and a number of manufacturers now produce modified, 

legal versions of some of the banned guns (examples are listed in Table 2-1). In general, 

the AW ban does not apply to semiautomatics possessing no more than one military-style 

feature listed under the ban’s features test provision.7

 For instance, prior to going out of 

business, Intratec, makers of the banned TEC-9 featured in Figure 2-1, manufactured an 

AB-10 (“after ban”) model that does not have a threaded barrel or a barrel shroud but is 

identical to the TEC-9 in other respects, including the ability to accept an ammunition 

magazine outside the pistol grip (Figure 2-4). As shown in the illustration, the AB-10 

accepts grandfathered, 32-round magazines made for the TEC-9, but post-ban magazines 

produced for the AB-10 must be limited to 10 rounds. 

 

7

 Note, however, that firearms imported into the country must still meet the “sporting purposes test” 

established under the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. In 1989, ATF determined that foreign

semiautomatic rifles having any one of a number of named military features (including those listed in the 

features test of the 1994 AW ban) fail the sporting purposes test and cannot be imported into the country. 

In 1998, the ability to accept an LCM made for a military rifle was added to the list of disqualifying 

features. Consequently, it is possible for foreign rifles to pass the features test of the federal AW ban but

not meet the sporting purposes test for imports (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1998).

10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Another example is the Colt Match Target H-Bar rifle (Figure 2-5), which is a 

legalized version of the banned AR-15 (see Table 2-1). AR-15 type rifles are civilian 

weapons patterned after the U.S. military’s M-16 rifle and were the assault rifles most 

commonly used in crime before the ban (Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 2). The postban version shown in Figure 2-5 (one of several legalized variations on the AR-15) is 

essentially identical to pre-ban versions of the AR-15 but does not have accessories like a 

flash hider, threaded barrel, or bayonet lug. The one remaining military feature on the 

post-ban gun is the pistol grip. This and other post-ban AR-15 type rifles can accept 

LCMs made for the banned AR15, as well as those made for the U.S. military’s M-16. 

However, post-ban magazines manufactured for these guns must hold fewer than 11 

rounds. 

The LCMM rifles discussed above constituted another group of legalized AWtype weapons until 1998, when their importation was prohibited by executive order. 

Finally, the ban includes an appendix that exempts by name several hundred models of 

rifles and shotguns commonly used in hunting and recreation, 86 of which are 

semiautomatics. While the exempted semiautomatics generally lack the military-style 

features common to AWs, many take detachable magazines, and some have the ability to 

accept LCMs.

8

 

2.5. Summary 

 

In the broadest sense, the AW-LCM ban is intended to limit crimes with 

semiautomatic firearms having large ammunition capacities – which enable shooters to 

discharge high numbers of shots rapidly – and other features conducive to criminal 

applications. The gun ban provision targets a relatively small number of weapons based 

on outward features or accessories that have little to do with the weapons’ operation. 

Removing some or all of these features is sufficient to make the weapons legal. In other 

respects (e.g., type of firing mechanism, ammunition fired, and the ability to accept a 

detachable magazine), AWs do not differ from other legal semiautomatic weapons. The 

LCM provision of the law limits the ammunition capacity of non-banned firearms. 

 

8

 Legislators inserted a number of amendments during the drafting process to broaden the consensus 

behind the bill (Lennett 1995). Among changes that occurred during drafting were: dropping a requirement 

to register post-ban sales of the grandfathered guns, dropping a ban on “substantial substitutes” as well as 

“exact copies” of the banned weapons, shortening the list of named makes and models covered by the ban, 

adding the appendix list of exempted weapons, and mandating the first impact study of the ban that is

discussed below. 

11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 2-4. Post-Ban, Modified Versions of Assault Weapons: 

The Intratec AB (“After Ban”) Model (See Featured Firearm) 

12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 2-5. Post-Ban, Modified Versions of Assault Weapons: 

The Colt Match Target HBAR Model 

13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
3. CRIMINAL USE OF ASSAULT WEAPONS AND LARGE CAPACITY 

MAGAZINES BEFORE THE BAN 

 

During the 1980s and early 1990s, AWs and other semiautomatic firearms

equipped with LCMs were involved in a number of highly publicized mass murder 

incidents that raised public concern about the accessibility of high powered, military-style 

weaponry and other guns capable of discharging high numbers of bullets in a short period 

of time (Cox Newspapers, 1989; Kleck, 1997, pp.124-126,144; Lenett, 1995). In one of 

the worst mass murders ever committed in the U.S., for example, James Huberty killed 

21 persons and wounded 19 others in a San Ysidro, California MacDonald’s restaurant on 

July 18, 1984 using an Uzi carbine, a shotgun, and another semiautomatic handgun. On 

September 14, 1989, Joseph Wesbecker, armed with an AK-47 rifle, two MAC-11 

handguns, and a number of other firearms, killed 7 persons and wounded 15 others at his 

former workplace in Louisville, Kentucky before taking his own life. Another 

particularly notorious incident that precipitated much of the recent debate over AWs 

occurred on January 17, 1989 when Patrick Purdy used a civilian version of the AK-47 

military rifle to open fire on a schoolyard in Stockton, California, killing 5 children and 

wounding 29 persons. 

There were additional high profile incidents in which offenders using 

semiautomatic handguns with LCMs killed and wounded large numbers of persons. 

Armed with two handguns having LCMs (and reportedly a supply of extra LCMs), a rifle, 

and a shotgun, George Hennard killed 22 people and wounded another 23 in Killeen, 

Texas in October 1991. In a December 1993 incident, a gunman named Colin Ferguson, 

armed with a handgun and LCMs, opened fire on commuters on a Long Island train, 

killing 5 and wounding 17. 

Indeed, AWs or other semiautomatics with LCMs were involved in 6, or 40%, of 

15 mass shooting incidents occurring between 1984 and 1993 in which six or more 

persons were killed or a total of 12 or more were wounded (Kleck, 1997, pp.124-126, 

144). Early studies of AWs, though sometimes based on limited and potentially 

unrepresentative data, also suggested that AWs recovered by police were often associated 

with drug trafficking and organized crime (Cox Newspapers, 1989; also see Roth and 

Koper, 1997, Chapter 5), fueling a perception that AWs were guns of choice among drug 

dealers and other particularly violent groups. All of this intensified concern over AWs 

and other semiautomatics with large ammunition capacities and helped spur the passage 

of AW bans in California, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Hawaii between 1989 and 1993, 

as well as the 1989 federal import ban on selected semiautomatic rifles. Maryland also 

passed AW legislation in 1994, just a few months prior to the passage of the 1994 federal 

AW ban.9

Looking at the nation’s gun crime problem more broadly, however, AWs and 

LCMs were used in only a minority of gun crimes prior to the 1994 federal ban, and AWs 

were used in a particularly small percentage of gun crimes. 

 

9

 A number of localities around the nation also passed AW bans during this period. 

14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
3.1. Criminal Use of Assault Weapons 

Numerous studies have examined the use of AWs in crime prior to the federal 

ban. The definition of AWs varied across the studies and did not always correspond 

exactly to that of the 1994 law (in part because a number of the studies were done prior to 

1994). In general, however, the studies appeared to focus on various semiautomatics 

with detachable magazines and military-style features. According to these accounts, 

AWs typically accounted for up to 8% of guns used in crime, depending on the specific 

AW definition and data source used (e.g., see Beck et al., 1993; Hargarten et al., 1996; 

Hutson et al., 1994; 1995; McGonigal et al., 1993; New York State Division of Criminal 

Justice Services, 1994; Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapters 2, 5, 6; Zawitz, 1995). A 

compilation of 38 sources indicated that AWs accounted for 2% of crime guns on average 

(Kleck, 1997, pp.112, 141-143).10

Similarly, the most common AWs prohibited by the 1994 federal ban accounted 

for between 1% and 6% of guns used in crime according to most of several national and 

local data sources examined for this and our prior study (see Chapter 6 and Roth and 

Koper, 1997, Chapters 5, 6):

• Baltimore (all guns recovered by police, 1992-1993): 2% 

• Miami (all guns recovered by police, 1990-1993): 3% 

• Milwaukee (guns recovered in murder investigations, 1991-1993): 6% 

• Boston (all guns recovered by police, 1991-1993): 2% 

• St. Louis (all guns recovered by police, 1991-1993): 1% 

• Anchorage, Alaska (guns used in serious crimes, 1987-1993): 4% 

• National (guns recovered by police and reported to ATF, 1992-1993): 5%11

• National (gun thefts reported to police, 1992-Aug. 1994): 2% 

• National (guns used in murders of police, 1992-1994): 7-9%12

• National (guns used in mass murders of 4 or more persons, 1992-1994): 4-13%13

Although each of the sources cited above has limitations, the estimates 

consistently show that AWs are used in a small fraction of gun crimes. Even the highest 

 

10 The source in question contains a total of 48 estimates, but our focus is on those that examined all AWs 

(including pistols, rifles, and shotguns) as opposed to just assault rifles. 11 For reasons discussed in Chapter 6, the national ATF estimate likely overestimates the use of AWs in 

crime. Nonetheless, the ATF estimate lies within the range of other presented estimates. 12 The minimum estimate is based on AW cases as a percentage of all gun murders of police. The 

maximum estimate is based on AW cases as a percentage of cases for which at least the gun manufacturer 

was known. Note that AWs accounted for as many as 16% of gun murders of police in 1994 (Roth and

Koper, 1997, Chapter 6; also see Adler et al., 1995). 13 These statistics are based on a sample of 28 cases found through newspaper reports (Roth and Koper, 

1997, Appendix A). One case involved an AW, accounting for 3.6% of all cases and 12.5% of cases in

which at least the type of gun (including whether the gun was a handgun, rifle, or shotgun and whether the 

gun was a semiautomatic) was known. Also see the earlier discussion of AWs and mass shootings at the 

beginning of this chapter. 

15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
estimates, which correspond to particularly rare events such mass murders and police 

murders, are no higher than 13%. Note also that the majority of AWs used in crime are 

assault pistols (APs) rather than assault rifles (ARs). Among AWs reported by police to 

ATF during 1992 and 1993, for example, APs outnumbered ARs by a ratio of 3 to 1 (see 

Chapter 6). 

The relative rarity of AW use in crime can be attributed to a number of factors. 

Many AWs are long guns, which are used in crime much less often than handguns. 

Moreover, a number of the banned AWs are foreign weapons that were banned from

importation into the U.S. in 1989. Also, AWs are more expensive (see Table 2-1) and 

more difficult to conceal than the types of handguns that are used most frequently in 

crime. 

3.1.1. A Note on Survey Studies and Assault Weapons 

The studies and statistics discussed above were based primarily on police 

information. Some survey studies have given a different impression, suggesting 

substantial levels of AW ownership among criminals and otherwise high-risk juvenile 

and adult populations, particularly urban gang members (Knox et al., 1994; Sheley and 

Wright, 1993a). A general problem with these studies, however, is that respondents 

themselves had to define terms like “military-style” and “assault rifle.” Consequently, 

the figures from these studies may lack comparability with those from studies with police 

data. Further, the figures reported in some studies prompt concerns about exaggeration 

of AW ownership (perhaps linked to publicity over the AW issue during the early 1990s 

when a number of these studies were conducted), particularly among juvenile offenders, 

who have reported ownership levels as high as 35% just for ARs (Sheley and Wright, 

1993a).14

Even so, most survey evidence on the actual use of AWs suggests that offenders 

rarely use AWs in crime. In a 1991 national survey of adult state prisoners, for example, 

8% of the inmates reported possessing a “military-type” firearm at some point in the past 

(Beck et al., 1993, p. 19). Yet only 2% of offenders who used a firearm during their 

conviction offense reported using an AW for that offense (calculated from pp. 18, 33), a 

figure consistent with the police statistics cited above. Similarly, while 10% of adult 

inmates and 20% of juvenile inmates in a Virginia survey reported having owned an AR, 

none of the adult inmates and only 1% of the juvenile inmates reported having carried 

them at crime scenes (reported in Zawitz, 1995, p. 6). In contrast, 4% to 20% of inmates 

surveyed in eight jails across rural and urban areas of Illinois and Iowa reported having

used an AR in committing crimes (Knox et al., 1994, p. 17). Nevertheless, even 

assuming the accuracy and honesty of the respondents’ reports, it is not clear what 

 

14 As one example of possible exaggeration of AW ownership, a survey of incarcerated juveniles in New 

Mexico found that 6% reported having used a “military-style rifle” against others and 2.6% reported that 

someone else used such a rifle against them. However, less than 1% of guns recovered in a sample of 

juvenile firearms cases were “military” style guns (New Mexico Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis 

Center, 1998, pp. 17-19; also see Ruddell and Mays, 2003). 

16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
weapons they were counting as ARs, what percentage of their crimes were committed 

with ARs, or what share of all gun crimes in their respective jurisdictions were linked to 

their AR uses. Hence, while some surveys suggest that ownership and, to a lesser extent, 

use of AWs may be fairly common among certain subsets of offenders, the overwhelming 

weight of evidence from gun recovery and survey studies indicates that AWs are used in 

a small percentage of gun crimes overall. 

3.1.2. Are Assault Weapons More Attractive to Criminal Users Than Other Gun Users?

Although AWs are used in a small percentage of gun crimes, some have argued 

that AWs are more likely to be used in crime than other guns, i.e., that AWs are more

attractive to criminal than lawful gun users due to the weapons’ military-style features

and their particularly large ammunition magazines. Such arguments are based on data 

implying that AWs are more common among crime guns than among the general stock of 

civilian firearms. According to some estimates generated prior to the federal ban, AWs 

accounted for less than one percent of firearms owned by civilians but up to 11% of guns 

used in crime, based on firearms reported by police to ATF between 1986 and 1993 (e.g., 

see Cox Newspapers, 1989; Lennett, 1995). However, these estimates were problematic 

in a number of respects. As discussed in Chapter 6, ATF statistics are not necessarily 

representative of the types of guns most commonly recovered by police, and ATF 

statistics from the late 1980s and early 1990s in particular tended to overstate the 

prevalence of AWs among crime guns. Further, estimating the percentage of civilian 

weapons that are AWs is difficult because gun production data are not reported by model, 

and one must also make assumptions about the rate of attrition among the stock of 

civilian firearms. 

Our own more recent assessment indicates that AWs accounted for about 2.5% of 

guns produced from 1989 through 1993 (see Chapter 5). Relative to previous estimates, 

this may signify that AWs accounted for a growing share of civilian firearms in the years 

just before the ban, though the previous estimates likely did not correspond to the exact 

list of weapons banned in 1994 and thus may not be entirely comparable to our estimate. 

At any rate, the 2.5% figure is comparable to most of the AW crime gun estimates listed 

above; hence, it is not clear that AWs are used disproportionately in most crimes, though 

AWs still seem to account for a somewhat disproportionate share of guns used in murders 

and other serious crimes. 

Perhaps the best evidence of a criminal preference for AWs comes from a study 

of young adult handgun buyers in California that found buyers with minor criminal 

histories (i.e., arrests or misdemeanor convictions that did not disqualify them from

purchasing firearms) were more than twice as likely to purchase APs than were buyers 

with no criminal history (4.6% to 2%, respectively) (Wintemute et al., 1998a). Those 

with more serious criminal histories were even more likely to purchase APs: 6.6% of 

those who had been charged with a gun offense bought APs, as did 10% of those who had 

been charged with two or more serious violent offenses. AP purchasers were also more 

likely to be arrested subsequent to their purchases than were other gun purchasers. 

17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Among gun buyers with prior charges for violence, for instance, AP buyers were more 

than twice as likely as other handgun buyers to be charged with any new offense and 

three times as likely to be charged with a new violent or gun offense. To our knowledge, 

there have been no comparable studies contrasting AR buyers with other rifle buyers. 

3.2. Criminal Use of Large Capacity Magazines 

Relative to the AW issue, criminal use of LCMs has received relatively little 

attention. Yet the overall use of guns with LCMs, which is based on the combined use of 

AWs and non-banned guns with LCMs, is much greater than the use of AWs alone. 

Based on data examined for this and a few prior studies, guns with LCMs were used in 

roughly 14% to 26% of most gun crimes prior to the ban (see Chapter 8; Adler et al., 

1995; Koper, 2001; New York Division of Criminal Justice Services, 1994). 

• Baltimore (all guns recovered by police, 1993): 14% 

• Milwaukee (guns recovered in murder investigations, 1991-1993): 21% 

• Anchorage, Alaska (handguns used in serious crimes, 1992-1993): 26% 

• New York City (guns recovered in murder investigations, 1993): 16-25%15 

• Washington, DC (guns recovered from juveniles, 1991-1993): 16%16 

• National (guns used in murders of police, 1994): 31%-41%17

Although based on a small number of studies, this range is generally consistent 

with national survey estimates indicating approximately 18% of all civilian-owned guns 

and 21% of civilian-owned handguns were equipped with LCMs as of 1994 (Cook and 

Ludwig, 1996, p. 17). The exception is that LCMs may have been used 

disproportionately in murders of police, though such incidents are very rare. 

As with AWs and crime guns in general, most crime guns equipped with LCMs 

are handguns. Two handgun models manufactured with LCMs prior to the ban (the 

Glock 17 and Ruger P89) were among the 10 crime gun models most frequently 

recovered by law enforcement and reported to ATF during 1994 (ATF, 1995). 

 

15 The minimum estimate is based on cases in which discharged firearms were recovered, while the 

maximum estimate is based on cases in which recovered firearms were positively linked to the case with

ballistics evidence (New York Division of Criminal Justice Services, 1994). 16 Note that Washington, DC prohibits semiautomatic firearms accepting magazines with more than 12 

rounds (and handguns in general). 17 The estimates are based on the sum of cases involving AWs or other guns sold with LCMs (Adler et al., 

1995, p.4). The minimum estimate is based on AW-LCM cases as a percentage of all gun murders of

police. The maximum estimate is based on AW-LCM cases as a percentage of cases in which the gun 

model was known. 

18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
3.3. Summary 

In sum, AWs and LCMs were used in up to a quarter of gun crimes prior to the 

1994 AW-LCM ban. By most estimates, AWs were used in less than 6% of gun crimes

even before the ban. Some may have perceived their use to be more widespread, 

however, due to the use of AWs in particularly rare and highly publicized crimes such as 

mass shootings (and, to a lesser extent, murders of police), survey reports suggesting high 

levels of AW ownership among some groups of offenders, and evidence that some AWs 

are more attractive to criminal than lawful gun buyers. 

In contrast, guns equipped with LCMs – of which AWs are a subset – are used in 

roughly 14% to 26% of gun crimes. Accordingly, the LCM ban has greater potential for 

affecting gun crime. However, it is not clear how often the ability to fire more than 10 

shots without reloading (the current magazine capacity limit) affects the outcomes of gun 

attacks (see Chapter 9). All of this suggests that the ban’s impact on gun violence is 

likely to be small. 

19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
4. OVERVIEW OF STUDY DESIGN, HYPOTHESES, AND PRIOR FINDINGS 

Section 110104 of the AW-LCM ban directed the Attorney General of the United 

States to study the ban’s impact and report the results to Congress within 30 months of 

the ban’s enactment, a provision which was presumably motivated by a sunset provision 

in the legislation (section 110105) that will lift the ban in September 2004 unless 

Congress renews the ban. In accordance with the study requirement, the National 

Institute of Justice (NIJ) awarded a grant to the Urban Institute to study the ban’s shortterm (i.e., 1994-1996) effects. The results of that study are available in a number of 

reports, briefs, and articles written by members of this research team (Koper and Roth, 

2001a; 2001b; 2002a; Roth and Koper, 1997; 1999).18 In order to understand the ban’s 

longer-term effects, NIJ provided additional funding to extend the AW research. In 2002, 

we delivered an interim report to NIJ based on data extending through at least the late 

1990s (Koper and Roth, 2002b). This report is based largely on the 2002 interim report, 

but with various new and updated analyses extending as far as 2003. It is thus a 

compilation of analyses conducted between 1998 and 2003. The study periods vary 

somewhat across the analyses, depending on data availability and the time at which the 

data were collected. 

4.1. Logical Framework for Research on the Ban 

An important rationale for the AW-LCM ban is that AWs and other guns 

equipped with LCMs are particularly dangerous weapons because they facilitate the rapid 

firing of high numbers of shots, thereby potentially increasing injuries and deaths from

gun violence. Although AWs and LCMs were used in only a modest share of gun crimes 

before the ban, it is conceivable that a decrease in their use might reduce fatal and nonfatal gunshot victimizations, even if it does not reduce the overall rate of gun crime. (In 

Chapter 9, we consider in more detail whether forcing offenders to substitute other guns 

and smaller magazines can reduce gun deaths and injuries.)

It is not clear how quickly such effects might occur, however, because the ban 

exempted the millions of AWs and LCMs that were manufactured prior to the ban’s 

effective date in September 1994. This was particularly a concern for our first study, 

which was based on data extending through mid-1996, a period potentially too short to 

observe any meaningful effects. Consequently, investigation of the ban’s effects on gun 

markets – and, most importantly, how they have affected criminal use of AWs and LCMs 

– has played a central role in this research. The general logic of our studies, illustrated in 

Figure 4-1, has been to first assess the law’s impact on the availability of AWs and 

LCMs, examining price and production (or importation) indices in legal markets and 

relating them to trends in criminal use of AWs and LCMs. In turn, we can relate these 

market patterns to trends in the types of gun crimes most likely to be affected by changes 

in the use of AWs and LCMs. However, we cannot make definitive assessments of the 

 

18 The report to Congress was the Roth and Koper (1997) report. 

20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
ban’s impact on gun violence until it is clear that the ban has indeed reduced criminal use 

of AWs and LCMs. 

Figure 4-1. Logic Model for Research on the Assault Weapons Ban 

AW Ban 

Availability of AWsLCMs in Gun Markets

(prices, production) 

Use of 

AWs-LCMs 

in Crime 

Consequences of 

AW-LCM Use 

(murders, injuries)

4.2. Hypothesized Market Effects 

4.2.1. A General Description of Gun Markets 

Firearms are distributed in markets commonly referred to as primary and 

secondary markets. Illicit gun transactions occur in both markets. Primary markets 

include wholesale and retail transactions by federally-licensed gun dealers, referred to as 

federal firearm licensees. Licensed dealers are required to, among things, follow federal 

and state background procedures to verify the eligibility of purchasers, observe any 

legally required waiting period prior to making transfers, and maintain records of gun 

acquisitions and dispositions (though records are not required for sales of ammunition 

magazines). 

Despite these restrictions, survey data suggest that as many as 21% of adult gun 

offenders obtained guns from licensed dealers in the years prior to the ban (Harlow, 2001, 

p. 6; also see Wright and Rossi, 1986, pp. 183,185). In more recent years, this figure has 

declined to 14% (Harlow, 2001, p. 6), due likely to the Brady Act, which established a 

national background check system for purchases from licensed dealers, and reforms of 

the federal firearms licensing system that have greatly reduced the number of licensed 

gun dealers (see ATF, 2000; Koper, 2002). Some would-be gun offenders may be legally 

eligible buyers at the time of their acquisitions, while others may seek out corrupt dealers 

or use other fraudulent or criminal means to acquire guns from retail dealers (such as 

recruiting a legally entitled buyer to act as a “straw purchaser” who buys a gun on behalf 

of a prohibited buyer). 

Secondary markets encompass second-hand gun transactions made by nonlicensed individuals.19 Secondary market participants are prohibited from knowingly 

transferring guns to ineligible purchasers (e.g., convicted felons and drug abusers). 

However, secondary transfers are not subject to the federal record-keeping and 

background check requirements placed on licensed dealers, thus making the secondary 

 

19 Persons who make only occasional sales of firearms are not required to obtain a federal firearms license 

(ATF, 2000, p. 11). 

21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
market almost entirely unregulated and, accordingly, a better source of guns for criminal 

users.20 In the secondary market, ineligible buyers may obtain guns from a wide variety 

of legitimate or illegitimate gun owners: relatives, friends, fences, drug dealers, drug 

addicts, persons selling at gun shows, or other strangers (e.g., see Wright and Rossi, 

1986; Sheley and Wright, 1993a). Of course, ineligible purchasers may also steal guns 

from licensed gun dealers and private gun owners. 

Secondary market prices are generally lower than primary market prices (because 

the products are used), though the former may vary substantially across a range of gun 

models, places, circumstances, and actors. For example, street prices of AWs and other 

guns can be 3 to 6 times higher than legal retail prices in jurisdictions with strict gun 

controls and lower levels of gun ownership (Cook et al., 1995, p. 72). Nonetheless, 

experts note that primary and secondary market prices correspond to one another, in that 

relatively expensive guns in the primary market are also relatively expensive in the 

secondary market. Moreover, in any given locality, trends in secondary market prices 

can be expected to track those in the primary market because a rise in primary market 

prices for new weapons will increase demand for used weapons and therefore increase

secondary market prices (Cook et al., 1995, p. 71). 

4.2.2. The AW-LCM Ban and Gun Markets 

In the long term, we can expect prices of the banned guns and magazines to 

gradually rise as supplies dwindle. As prices rise, more would-be criminal users of AWs 

and LCMs will be unable or unwilling to pay the higher prices. Others will be 

discouraged by the increasing non-monetary costs (i.e., search time) of obtaining the 

weapons. In addition, rising legal market prices will undermine the incentive for some

persons to sell AWs and LCMs to prohibited buyers for higher premiums, thereby 

bidding some of the weapons away from the channels through which they would 

otherwise reach criminal users. Finally, some would-be AW and LCM users may 

become less willing to risk confiscation of their AWs and LCMs as the value of the 

weapons increases. Therefore, we expect that over time diminishing stocks and rising 

prices will lead to a reduction in criminal use of AWs and LCMs.21 

 

20 Some states require that secondary market participants notify authorities about their transactions. Even 

in these states, however, it is not clear how well these laws are enforced. 21 We would expect these reductions to be apparent shortly after the price increases (an expectation that, as 

discussed below, was confirmed in our earlier study) because a sizeable share of guns used in crime are 

used within one to three years of purchase. Based on analyses of guns recovered by police in 17 cities, 

ATF (1997, p. 8) estimates that guns less than 3 years old (as measured by the date of first retail sale) 

comprise between 22% and 43% of guns seized from persons under age 18, between 30% and 54% of guns 

seized from persons ages 18 to 24, and between 25% and 46% of guns seized from persons over 24. In

addition, guns that are one year old or less comprise the largest share of relatively new crime guns (i.e., 

crime guns less than three years old) (Pierce et al., 1998, p. 11). Similar data are not available for 

secondary market transactions, but such data would shorten the estimated time from acquisition to criminal 

use. 

22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
However, the expected timing of the market processes is uncertain. We can 

anticipate that AW and LCM prices will remain relatively stable for as long as the supply 

of grandfathered weapons is adequate to meet demand. If, in anticipation of the ban, gun 

manufacturers overestimated the demand for AWs and LCMs and produced too many of 

them, prices might even fall before eventually rising. Market responses can be 

complicated further by the continuing production of legal AW substitute models by some

gun manufacturers. If potential AW buyers are content with an adequate supply of legal 

AW-type weapons having fewer military features, it will take longer for the 

grandfathered AW supply to constrict and for prices to rise. Similarly, predicting LCM 

price trends is complicated by the overhang of military surplus magazines that can fit 

civilian weapons (e.g., military M-16 rifle magazines that can be used with AR-15 type 

rifles) and by the market in reconditioned magazines. The “aftermarket” in gun 

accessories and magazine extenders that can be used to convert legal guns and magazines 

into banned ones introduces further complexity to the issue. 

4.3. Prior Research on the Ban’s Effects 

To summarize the findings of our prior study, Congressional debate over the ban 

triggered pre-ban speculative price increases of upwards of 50% for AWs during 1994, as 

gun distributors, dealers, and collectors anticipated that the weapons would become

valuable collectors’ items. Analysis of national and local data on guns recovered by 

police showed reductions in criminal use of AWs during 1995 and 1996, suggesting that 

rising prices made the weapons less accessible to criminal users in the short-term

aftermath of the ban. 

However, the speculative increase in AW prices also prompted a pre-ban boost in 

AW production; in 1994, AW manufacturers produced more than twice their average 

volume for the 1989-1993 period. The oversupply of grandfathered AWs, the availability 

of the AW-type legal substitute models mentioned earlier, and the steady supply of other 

non-banned semiautomatics appeared to have saturated the legal market, causing 

advertised prices of AWs to fall to nearly pre-speculation levels by late 1995 or early 

1996. This combination of excess supply and reduced prices implied that criminal use of 

AWs might rise again for some period around 1996, as the large stock of AWs would 

begin flowing from dealers’ and speculators’ gun cases to the secondary markets where 

ineligible purchasers may obtain guns more easily. 

We were not able to gather much specific data about market trends for LCMs. 

However, available data did reveal speculative, pre-ban price increases for LCMs that 

were comparable to those for AWs (prices for some LCMs continued to climb into 1996), 

leading us to speculate – incorrectly, as this study will show (see Chapter 8) – that there 

was some reduction in LCM use after the ban.22

 

22 To our knowledge, there have been two other studies of changes in AW and LCM use during the postban period. One study reported a drop in police recoveries of AWs in Baltimore during the first half of

1995 (Weil and Knox, 1995), while the other found no decline in recoveries of AWs or LCMs in

Milwaukee homicide cases as of 1996 (Hargarten et al., 2000). Updated analyses for both of these cities 

23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Determining whether the reduction in AW use (and perhaps LCM use) following 

the ban had an impact on gun violence was more difficult. The gun murder rate dropped 

more in 1995 (the first year following the ban) than would have been expected based on 

preexisting trends, but the short post-ban follow-up period available for the analysis 

precluded a definitive assessment as to whether the reduction was statistically meaningful 

(see especially Koper and Roth, 2001a). The reduction was also larger than would be 

expected from the AW-LCM ban, suggesting that other factors were at work in 

accelerating the decline. Using a number of national and local data sources, we also 

examined trends in measures of victims per gun murder incident and wounds per gunshot 

victim, based on the hypothesis that these measures might be more sensitive to variations 

in the use of AWs and LCMs. These analyses revealed no ban effects, thus failing to 

show confirming evidence of the mechanism through which the ban was hypothesized to 

affect the gun murder rate. However, newly available data presented in subsequent 

chapters suggest these assessments may have been premature, because any benefits from

the decline in AW use were likely offset by steady or rising use of other guns equipped 

with LCMs, a trend that was not apparent at the time of our earlier study. 

We cautioned that the short-term patterns observed in the first study might not 

provide a reliable guide to longer-term trends and that additional follow-up was 

warranted. Two key issues to be addressed were whether there had been a rebound in 

AW use since the 1995-1996 period and, if so, whether that rebound had yet given way to 

a long-term reduction in AW use. Another key issue was to seek more definitive 

evidence on short and long-term trends in the availability and criminal use of LCMs. 

These issues are critical to assessing the effectiveness of the AW-LCM ban, but they also 

have broader implications for other important policy concerns, namely, the establishment 

of reasonable timeframes for sunset and evaluation provisions in legislation. In other 

words, how long is long enough in evaluating policy and setting policy expiration dates?

 are presented in Chapters 6 and 8. 

24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
5. MARKET INDICATORS FOR ASSAULT WEAPONS: PRICES AND 

PRODUCTION 

This chapter assesses the ban’s impact on the availability of AWs in primary and 

secondary markets, as measured by trends in AW prices and post-ban production of legal 

AW substitute models. Understanding these trends is important because they influence 

the flow of grandfathered weapons to criminals and the availability of non-banned 

weapons that are close substitutes for banned ones. In the next chapter, we assess the 

impact of these trends on criminal use of AWs, as approximated by statistics on gun 

seizures by police. (Subsequent chapters present similar analyses for LCMs.) 

Following our previous methods, we compare trends for AWs to trends for 

various non-banned firearms. The AW analyses generally focus on the most common 

AWs formerly produced in the U.S., including Intratec and SWD-type APs and AR-15-

type ARs produced by Colt and others. In addition, we selected a small number of 

domestic pistol and rifle models made by Calico and Feather Industries that fail the 

features test provision of the AW legislation and that were relatively common among 

crime guns reported by law enforcement agencies to ATF prior to the ban (see Roth and 

Koper, 1997, Chapter 5). Together, this group of weapons represented over 80% of AWs 

used in crime and reported to ATF from 1993 through 1996, and the availability of these 

guns was not affected by legislation or regulations predating the AW-LCM ban.23 We

also examine substitution of legalized, post-ban versions of these weapons, including the 

Intratec AB-10 and Sport-22, FMJ’s PM models (substitutes for the SWD group), Colt 

Sporters, Calico Liberty models, and others. We generally did not conduct comparative 

analyses of named foreign AWs (the Uzi, Galil, and AK weapons) because the 1989 

federal import ban had already limited their availability, and their legal status was 

essentially unchanged by the 1994 ban. 

The exact gun models and time periods covered vary across the analyses (based 

on data availability and the time at which data were collected). The details of each 

analysis are described in the following sections. 

5.1. Price Trends for Assault Weapons and Other Firearms 

 

To approximate trends in the prices at which AWs could be purchased throughout 

the 1990s, we collected annual price data for several APs, ARs, and non-banned 

comparison firearms from the Blue Book of Gun Values (Fjestad, 1990-1999). The Blue 

Book provides national average prices for an extensive list of new and used firearms

based on information collected at gun shows and input provided by networks of dealers 

 

23 The Intratec group includes weapons made by AA Arms. The SWD group contains related models

made by Military Armaments Corporation/Ingram and RPB Industries. The AR-15 group contains models 

made by Colt and copies made by Bushmaster, Olympic Arms, Eagle Arms, SGW Enterprises, Essential

Arms, DPMS, and Sendra. 

25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and collectors. The Blue Book is utilized widely in the gun industry, though prices in any 

given locality may differ notably from the averages appearing in the Blue Book. 

To assess time trends in gun prices, we conducted hedonic price analyses (Berndt, 

1990) in which the gun prices were regressed upon a series of year and model indicators. 

The coefficients for the year indicators show annual changes in the prices of the guns 

relative to 1994 (the year the ban went into effect), controlling for time-stable differences 

in the prices of various gun models. Since manufacturers’ suggested retail prices 

(MSRP) were not available for banned AWs during post-ban years, we utilized prices for 

AWs in 100% condition for all years.24 For non-banned firearms, we used MSRP.25 For 

all models, we divided the gun prices by annual values of the gross domestic product 

price deflator provided in the December 2001 and 2000 issues of Economic Indicators

and logged these adjusted prices. 

 

Each model presented below is based on data pooled across a number of firearm

models and years, so that observation Pjt represents the price of gun model j during year t. 

We weighted each observation, Pjt, based on cumulative estimates of the production of 

model j from 1985 or 1986 (depending on data availability) through year t using data 

provided by gun manufacturers to ATF and published by the Violence Policy Center 

(1999).26, 27 

 

24 Project staff also collected prices of weapons in 80% condition. However, the levels and annual changes 

of the 80% prices were very highly correlated (0.86 to 0.99) with those of the 100% condition prices. 

Therefore, we limited the analysis to the 100% prices. 25 We utilized prices for the base model of each AW and comparison firearm (in contrast to model 

variations with special features or accessories). 26 The regression models are based on equal numbers of observations for each gun model. Hence, 

unweighted regressions would give equal weight to each gun model. This does not seem appropriate,

however, because some guns are produced in much larger numbers than are other guns. Weighting the

regression models by production estimates should therefore give us a better sense of what one could

“typically” expect to pay for a generic gun in each study category (e.g., a generic assault pistol). 27 Several of the selected weapons began production in 1985 or later. In other cases, available production 

data extended back to only the mid-1980s. Published production figures for handguns are broken down by

type (semiautomatic, revolver) and caliber and thus provide perfect or very good approximations of

production for the handgun models examined in this study. Rifle production data, however, are not

disaggregated by gun type, caliber, or model. For the ARs under study, the production counts should be

reasonable approximations of AR production because most of the rifles made by the companies in question 

prior to the ban were ARs. The rifles used in the comparison (i.e., non-banned) rifle analysis are made by

companies (Sturm Ruger, Remington, and Marlin) that produce numerous semiautomatic and nonsemiautomatic rifle models. However, the overall rifle production counts for these companies should 

provide some indication of differences in the availability of the comparison rifles relative to one another. 

Because production data were available through only 1997 at the time this particular analysis was 

conducted (Violence Policy Center, 1999), we used cumulative production through 1997 to weight the 

1998 and 1999 observations for the comparison handgun and comparison rifle models. This was not a 

consideration for AWs since their production ceased in 1994 (note that the AW production figures for 1994 

may include some post-ban legal substitute models manufactured after September 13, 1994). Nonetheless, 

weighting had very little effect on the inferences from either of the comparison gun models. 

26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
5.1.1. Assault Pistol Prices

The analysis of AP prices focuses on the Intratec TEC-9/DC-9, TEC-22, SWD M11/9, and Calico M950 models. Regression results are shown in Table 5-1, while Figure 

5-1 graphically depicts the annual trend in prices for the period 1990 through 1999. None 

of the yearly coefficients in Table 5-1 is statistically significant, thus indicating that 

average annual AP prices did not change during the 1990s after adjusting for inflation. 

Although the model is based on a modest number of observations (n=40) that may limit 

its statistical power (i.e., its ability to detect real effects), the size of the yearly 

coefficients confirm that prices changed very little from year to year. The largest yearly 

coefficient is for 1990, and it indicates that AP prices were only 4% higher in 1990 than 

in 1994.28

This stands in contrast to our earlier finding (Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 4) 

that prices for SWD APs may have risen by as much as 47% around the time of the ban. 

However, the earlier analyses were based on semi-annual or quarterly analyses advertised 

by gun distributors and were intended to capture short-term fluctuations in price that 

assumed greater importance in the context of the first AW study, which could examine 

only short-term ban outcomes. Blue Book editions released close in time to the ban (e.g., 

1995) also cautioned that prices for some AWs were volatile at that time. This study 

emphasizes longer-term price trends, which appear to have been more stable.29

 

28 To interpret the coefficient of each indicator variable in terms of a percentage change in the dependent 

variable, we exponentiate the coefficient, subtract 1 from the exponentiated value, and multiply the 

difference by 100. 29 Although the earlier analysis of AP prices focused on the greatest variations observed in semi-annual

prices, the results also provide indications that longer-term trends were more stable. Prices in 1993, for 

example, averaged roughly 73% of the peak prices reached at the time the ban was implemented (i.e., late 

1994), while prices in early 1994 and late 1995 averaged about 83% and 79% of the peak prices, 

respectively. Hence, price variation was much more modest after removing the peak periods around the 

time of the ban‘s implementation (i.e., late 1994 and early 1995). The wider range of APs used in the 

current study may also be responsible for some of the differences between the results of this analysis and 

the prior study. 

27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 5-1. Regression of Assault Pistol and Comparison Handgun Prices on Annual 

Time Indicators, 1990-1999, Controlling for Gun Model 

Assault Pistols (n=40) Comparison Handguns 

(n=38) 

Estimate T Value Estimate T Value

Constant 1.56 26.94*** -0.21 -6.81***

1990 0.04 1.07 0.12 2.07**

1991 0.01 0.30 0.09 1.79*

1992 -0.01 -0.32 0.05 1.30

1993 -0.03 -1.09 0.02 0.48

1995 0.01 0.22 -0.02 -0.48

1996 -0.01 -0.45 -0.09 -2.69***

1997 -0.03 -1.13 -0.11 -3.26***

1998 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -1.99*

1999 -0.02 -0.58 -0.14 -4.02***

Tec-9 -0.67 -11.95***

Tec-22 -0.89 -15.59***

SWD -0.64 -11.49***

Davis P32 0.09 3.63***

Davis P380 0.20 8.20***

Lorcin L380 0.29 11.35***

F value 

(p value) 

27.79 

<.01 

16.24 

<.01 

Adj. R-square 0.89 0.83

Time indicators are interpreted relative to 1994. Assault pistol model indicators are interpreted relative to

Calico 9mm. Comparison handgun models are interpreted relative to Lorcin .25 caliber. 

* Statistically significant at p<=.10. 

** Statistically significant at p<=.05. 

*** Statistically significant at p<=.01. 

28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 5-1. Annual Price Trends for Assault Pistols and SNS

Handguns, 1990-1999

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Assault SNS

1=1994 price

Assault pistol prices basd on TEC9, TEC22, SWD M11/9, and Calico M950. SNS prices based on Davis P32 and P380 and 

Lorcin L25 and L380.

5.1.2. Comparison Handgun Prices 

For comparison, Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 illustrate price trends for a number of 

non-banned, cheaply priced, and readily concealable semiautomatic handgun models: the 

Davis P32 and P380 and the Lorcin L25 and L380. Such guns are often referred to as 

Saturday night specials (SNS). By a number of accounts, SNS-type guns, and Davis and 

Lorcin models in particular, are among the guns most frequently used in crime (ATF, 

1995; 1997; Kennedy et al., 1996; Wintemute, 1994). Although the differences between 

APs and SNS handguns (particularly the fact that most SNS handguns do not have 

LCMs) suggest they are likely to be used by gun consumers with different levels of 

firearms experience and sophistication, the SNS guns are arguably a good comparison 

group for APs because both groups of guns are particularly sensitive to criminal demand. 

Like AP buyers, SNS buyers are more likely than other gun buyers to have criminal 

histories and to be charged with new offenses, particularly violent or firearm offenses, 

subsequent to their purchases (Wintemute et al., 1998b). 

Prices of SNS handguns dropped notably throughout the 1990s. Prices for SNS 

handguns were 13% higher in 1990 than in 1994. Prices then dropped another 13% from

1994 to 1999. This suggests that although AP prices remained generally stable 

throughout the 1990s, they increased relative to prices of other guns commonly used in 

crime. We say more about this below. 

29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
5.1.3. Assault Rifle Prices

To assess trends in prices of ARs, we examined prices for several Colt and 

Olympic rifle models in the AR-15 class, as well as Calico models M900 and M951 and 

Feather models AT9 and AT22.30 Because rifle production data are not disaggregated by 

weapon type (semiautomatic, bolt action, etc.), caliber, or model, the regressions could 

only be weighted using overall rifle production counts for each company. For this 

reason, we calculated the average price of the ARs made by each company for each year 

and modeled the trends in these average prices over time, weighting by each company’s 

total rifle production.31

Results shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-2 demonstrate that AR prices rose 

significantly during 1994 and 1995 before falling back to pre-ban levels in 1996 and 

remaining there through 1999. Prices rose 16% from 1993 to 1994 and then increased 

another 13% in 1995 (representing an increase of nearly one third over the 1993 level). 

Yet by 1996, prices had fallen to levels virtually identical to those before 1994. These 

patterns are consistent with those we found earlier for the 1992-1996 period (Roth and 

Koper, 1997, Chapter 4), though the annual price fluctuations shown here were not as 

dramatic as the quarterly changes shown in the earlier study. 

Note, however, that these patterns were not uniform across all of the AR 

categories. The results of the model were driven largely by the patterns for Colt rifles, 

which are much more numerous than the other brands. Olympic rifles increased in price 

throughout the time period, while prices for most Calico and Feather rifles tended to fall 

throughout the 1990s without necessarily exhibiting spikes around the time of the ban.

 

30 Specifically, we tracked prices for the Match Target Lightweight (R6530), Target Government Model

(R6551), Competition H-Bar (R6700), and Match Target H-Bar (R6601) models by Colt and the 

Ultramatch, Service Match, Multimatch M1-1, AR15, and CAR15 models by Olympic Arms. Each of

these models has a modified, post-ban version. We utilized prices for the pre-ban configurations during

post-ban years. 31 Prices for the different models made by a given manufacturer tended to follow comparable trends, thus

strengthening the argument for averaging prices.

30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 5-2. Regression of Assault Rifle and Comparison Semiautomatic Rifle Prices 

on Annual Time Indicators, 1991-1999, Controlling for Gun Make 

Assault Rifles (n=36) Comparison Rifles (n=27) 

Estimate T value Estimate T value

Constant 1.31 21.15*** 1.40 76.75***

1991 -0.12 -1.98* -0.01 -0.21

1992 -0.13 -2.26** 0.01 0.30

1993 -0.15 -2.78** 0 -0.13

1995 0.12 2.47** 0.03 1.08

1996 -0.11 -2.27** 0.04 1.69

1997 -0.11 -2.23** 0.03 1.46

1998 -0.12 -2.47** 0.02 0.91

1999 -0.14 -2.71** 0.03 1.21

Colt (AR-15 type) 1.07 19.93*** 

Olympic (AR-15 type) 1.14 16.08*** 

Calico 0.43 5.53***

Ruger 0.26 20.07***

Remington 0.29 21.69***

F statistic 

(p value) 

50.52 

<.01 

63.62 

<.01 

Adj. R-square 0.94 0.96

Time indicators interpreted relative to 1994. Assault rifle makes interpreted relative to Feather. 

Comparison rifle makes interpreted relative to Marlin. 

* Statistically significant at p<=.10. 

** Statistically significant at p<=.05. 

*** Statistically significant at p<=.01.

31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 5-2. Annual Price Trends for Assault Rifles and 

Comparison Semiautomatic Rifles, 1991-1999

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Assault Comparison

Assault rifle prices based on Colt and Olympic AR-type, Calico, and Feather models. Comparison rifle prices based on

selected Remington, Marlin, and Sturm Ruger models.

1=1994 price

5.1.4. Comparison Semiautomatic Rifles. 

The analysis of comparison rifle prices includes the Remington 7400, Marlin Model 9, 

and Sturm Ruger Mini-14 and Mini-30 models (the Ruger model prices were averaged for each 

year). The AW legislation exempted each of these semiautomatic rifles by name, though the 

exemption does not apply to Mini-14 models with folding stocks (a feature included in the ban’s 

features test). The Ruger models are of particular interest since they are among only four 

exempted guns that can accept LCMs made for military rifles (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 

1998, p. 23), though Ruger produced LCMs only for the Mini-14 model and substituted a 5-

round magazine for this gun in 1989 (Fjestad, 2002, pp. 1361-1362). The Marlin model was also 

manufactured with an LCM prior to 1990 (Fjestad, 2002, p. 917). The Remington model is 

manufactured with a detachable 4-round magazine. 

Prices for these guns remained steady throughout the decade (see Table 5-2 and Figure 5-

2). The largest change was a 4% increase (non-significant) in prices in 1996 relative to prices in 

1994. Therefore, the rifle price spikes in 1994 and 1995 were specific to assault rifles. 

However, the steady annual price trends may mask short-term fluctuations that we found 

32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
previously (Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 4) for some non-banned semiautomatic rifles 

(including the Ruger Mini-14) during 1994 and early 1995.32

5.2. Production Trends for Assault Weapons and Other Firearms 

 

To more fully assess the ban’s effects on gun markets, examination of pre and post-ban 

trends in production of AWs and legal AW substitutes is a useful complement to studying price 

trends. Our earlier work revealed a spike in AW production during 1994 as the ban was being 

debated. Post-ban production of legal AW substitutes should reveal additional information about 

the reaction of gun markets to the ban. If production of these models has fallen off dramatically, 

it may suggest that the market for AWs has been temporarily saturated and/or that consumers of 

AWs favor the original AW models that have more military-style features. Stable or rising 

production levels, on the other hand, may indicate substantial consumer demand for AW 

substitutes, which would suggest that consumers consider the legal substitute models to be as 

desirable as the banned models. 

5.2.1. Production of Assault Pistols and Other Handguns

Figure 5-3 presents production trends for a number of domestic AP manufacturers from 

1985 through 2001 (the most recent year available for data on individual manufacturers).33 After 

rising in the early 1990s and surging notably to a peak in 1994, production by these companies 

dropped off dramatically, falling 80% from 1993-1994 to 1996-1997 and falling another 35% by 

1999-2000 (Table 5-3).34 Makers of Intratec and SWD-type APs continued manufacturing 

modified versions of their APs for at least a few years following the ban, but at much lower 

volumes than that at which they produced APs just prior to the ban. Companies like AA Arms

and Calico produced very few or no AP-type pistols from 1995 onward, and Intratec – producers 

of the APs most frequently used in crime – went out of business after 1999. 

However, the pattern of rising and then falling production was not entirely unique to APs. 

Table 5-3 shows that production of all handguns and production of SNS-type pistols both 

declined sharply in the mid to late 1990s following a peak in 1993. Nonetheless, the trends – 

 

32 We attributed those short-term fluctuations to pre-ban uncertainty regarding which semiautomatic rifles would be

prohibited by the ban. Also note that the prior findings were based on a different set of comparison semiautomatic

rifles that included a number of foreign rifles. We concentrated on domestically produced rifles for this updated 

analysis in order to make more explicit links between rifle price and production trends (data for the latter are

available only for domestic firearms). 33 Production figures for individual manufacturers through 2000 have been compiled by the Violence Policy Center 

(2002). Year 2001 data are available from ATF via the Internet (see www.atf.treas.gov). National gun production 

totals through 1998 are also available from ATF (2000, p. A-3). 34 The assault pistol production figures used here and in the price analysis include 9mm and .22 caliber pistols made

by Intratec, 9mm pistols manufactured by AA Arms, all non-.22 caliber pistols manufactured by S.W. Daniels,

Wayne Daniels, and Military Armaments Corporation (which together constitute the SWD group), and .22 and 9mm 

pistols manufactured by Calico. Intratec produces a few non-AW models in .22 and 9mm calibers, so the Intratec

figures will overstate production of assault pistols and their legal substitutes to some degree. The comparison, SNS 

production figures are based on all handguns produced by Lorcin Engineering and Davis Industries. 

33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
both peak and decline – were more dramatic for APs than for other handguns. Production of APs 

rose 69% from 1990-1991 to 1993-1994, while SNS production and overall handgun production 

each increased 47%. From 1993-1994 to 1996-1997, production of AP-type handguns, SNS 

models, and all handguns declined 80%, 66%, and 47%, respectively. Further, production of 

AP-type handguns continued to decline at a faster rate than that of other handguns through the 

end of the decade.35

Figure 5-3. Assault Pistol Production, 1985-2001

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Intratec SWD Calico AA Arms

 

35 Lorcin, a prominent SNS brand that we examined for the price and production analyses, went out of business

after 1998. Unlike the situation in the AP market (where, to our knowledge, former AP makers have not been

replaced on any large scale), the SNS market appears to have compensated somewhat to offset the loss of Lorcin. 

The SNS change from 1996-1997 to 1999-2000 is based on examination of a larger group of SNS-type makers, 

including Lorcin, Davis, Bryco, Phoenix Arms, and Hi-Point. Production among this group declined by 22% from

1996-1997 to 1999-2000, a decline greater than that for total handgun production but less than that for AP-type 

production. 

34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 5-3. Production Trends for Assault Weapons and Other Firearms, 1990-2000* 

Firearm Category % Change 

1990/91 to 

1993/94 

% Change 

1993/94 to 

1996/97 

% Change 

1996/97 to 

1999/2000 

Total Handguns 47% -47% -10% 

Assault Pistols 

(or Post-Ban 

Models) 

69% -80% -35%

SNS Handguns 47% -66% -22% 

Total Rifles 22% 8% 18% 

Assault Rifles 

(or Post-Ban 

Models) 

81% -51% 156%

Comparison 

Rifles 

15% 13% -16%

* Total handgun and rifle figures include all production by U.S. manufacturers. Assault pistols include 

Intratec group, SWD group, and Calico models. SNS figures are based on Lorcin Engineering and Davis 

Industries for changes up through 1996-1997. Because Lorcin went out of business after 1998, the SNS 

change from 1996-1997 to 1999-2000 is based on a larger group of SNS makers including Lorcin, Davis, 

Bryco, Phoenix Arms, and Hi-Point. Assault rifles include AR-15 type models by Colt and others. 

Comparison rifles include Sturm Ruger, Remington, and Marlin. 

5.2.2. Production of Assault Rifles and Other Rifles 

As shown in Figure 5-4, production of AR-15 type rifles surged during the early 

1990s, reaching a peak in 1994.36 AR production during the early 1990s rose almost 4 

times faster than total rifle production and over 5 times faster than production of the 

comparison rifles examined in the price analysis (Table 5-3). Yet, by 1996 and 1997, 

production of legalized AR-type rifles had fallen by 51%, as production of other rifles 

continued increasing. AR production trends reversed again during the late 1990s, 

however, rising over 150%.37 Total rifle production increased much more modestly 

during this time (18%), while production of the comparison rifles declined. 

 

36 Note again that the AR and legalized AR production figures are approximations based on all rifles

produced by the companies in question (rifle production data are not available by type, caliber, or model), 

but it appears that most rifles made by these companies during the study period were AR-type rifles. Also, 

the figures for the comparison rifle companies (Ruger, Marlin, and Remington) are based on all rifles

produced by these companies (the price analysis focused on selected semiautomatic models). 37 There was also a notable shift in market shares among AR makers, as Bushmaster overtook Colt as the 

leading producer of AR-15 type rifles (Figure 5-4). 

35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 5-4. Assault Rifle Production, 1986-2001 (AR-15 Type)

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Colt AR Bushmaster Other Total

Other: Olympic, Eagle/Armalite, DPMS, Essential Arms, Sendra.

5.3. Summary and Interpretations

 

Below, we offer some interpretations of the patterns found in the price and 

production analyses, keeping in mind that these analyses were largely descriptive, so 

causal inferences must be made cautiously. As documented in our earlier study, 

Congressional debate over the AW-LCM ban triggered speculative price increases for 

AWs in the months leading up to the ban’s enactment. This study’s examination of 

longer-term, annual price trends suggests that this speculative effect was very brief (and 

perhaps quite variable across jurisdictions) for APs but persisted through 1995 for ARs. 

This implies that speculators and sophisticated gun collectors (who we suspect played a 

large role in driving price trends) have more interest in ARs, which tend to be higher in 

quality and price than APs. 

Responding to the speculative price growth, AW manufacturers boosted their 

production of AWs in 1994. Although total handgun and rifle production were 

increasing during the early 1990s, the rise in AW production was steeper, and there was a 

production peak unique to AWs in 1994 (production of other handguns peaked in 1993). 

It seems that this boost in the supply of grandfathered AWs was sufficient to satisfy 

speculative demand, thereby restoring national average AP prices to pre-ban levels within 

a year of the ban and doing the same for AR prices by 1996. AW prices remained stable 

through the late 1990s, and production of legalized AW-type weapons dropped off 

36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
substantially, at least through 1998. This suggests that the supply of grandfathered AWs 

was sufficient to meet demand through the late 1990s. 

However, prices of APs rose relative to other handguns commonly used in crime 

during the 1990s. Handgun prices and production declined in general during the late 

1990s, implying a decrease in demand for APs and other handguns that probably 

stemmed from the nation’s declining crime rates.38 But the AW ban’s restriction of the 

AP supply, combined with the interest of speculators and collectors in these guns, may 

have prevented AP prices from falling as did prices for other handguns. The market 

patterns also suggest that consumers of APs are not as easily satisfied by legalized APs 

with fewer military-style features; despite the increasing value of APs (in relative terms), 

post-ban production of legalized APs declined faster than did production of other 

handguns, and some AP makers went out of business. 

Prices of ARs, on the other hand, remained steady during the late 1990s (after the 

speculative price bubble of 1994-1995) both in absolute terms and relative to other rifles. 

The failure of AR prices to rise in at least relative terms, as occurred for APs, and the 

temporary drop in production of AR-type rifles after the ban may signify that the AR 

market was saturated relative to the AP market for a least a number of years following the 

ban. However, demand for AR-type rifles later rebounded, as evidenced by the 

resurgence in production of legalized, AR-type rifles in the late 1990s. In fact, more of 

these guns were produced in 1999 than in 1994. Unlike AP users, therefore, rifle users 

appear to be readily substituting the legalized AR-type rifles for the banned ARs, which 

may be another factor that has kept prices of the latter rifles from rising. All of this 

suggests that rifle owners, who have a lower prevalence of criminal users than do 

handgun owners, can more easily substitute rifles with fewer or no military features for 

the hunting and other sporting purposes that predominate among rifle consumers. 

Another relevant factor may have been a surge in the supply of foreign 

semiautomatic rifles that can accept LCMs for military weapons (the LCMM rifles 

discussed in Chapter 2) during the early 1990s. Examples of LCMM rifles include 

legalized versions of banned AK-47, FN-FAL, and Uzi rifles. Importation of LCMM

rifles rose from 19,147 in 1991 to 191, 341 in 1993, a nine-fold increase (Department of 

the Treasury, 1998, p. 34). Due to an embargo on the importation of firearms from China 

(where many legalized AK-type rifles are produced), imports of LCMM rifles dropped 

 

38 It seems likely that the rise and fall of handgun production was linked to the rising crime rates of the late

1980s and early 1990s and the falling crime rates of the mid and late 1990s. Self-defense and fear of crime 

are important motivations for handgun ownership among the general population (e.g., Cook and Ludwig, 

1996; McDowall and Loftin, 1983), and the concealability and price of handguns make them the firearms

of choice for criminal offenders. It is likely that the peak in 1993 was also linked to the Congressional 

debate and passage of the Brady Act, which established a background check system for gun purchases from

retail dealers. It is widely recognized in the gun industry that the consideration of new gun control

legislation tends to increase gun sales. 

The decline in production was more pronounced for SNS handguns, whose sales are likely to be

particularly sensitive to crime trends. Criminal offenders make disproportionate use of these guns. We can

also speculate that they are prominent among guns purchased by low-income citizens desiring guns for 

protection. In contrast, the poor quality and reliability of these guns make them less popular among more 

knowledgeable and affluent gun buyers. 

37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
back down to 21,261 in 1994. Importation of all foreign LCMM rifles was ended by 

federal executive order in 1998. 

ATF has reported that criminal use of LCMM rifles increased more quickly 

during the early 1990s than did that of other military-style rifles (U.S. Department of the 

Treasury, 1998, p. 33; also see Chapter 6). Accordingly, it is possible that the availability 

of LCMM rifles also helped to depress the prices of domestic ARs and discourage the 

production of legalized ARs during the 1990s, particularly if criminal users of rifles place 

a premium on the ability to accept LCMs. It is noteworthy, moreover, that the rebound in 

domestic production of legalized ARs came on the heels of the 1998 ban on LCMM 

rifles, perhaps suggesting the LCMM ban increased demand for domestic rifles accepting 

LCMs. 

In sum, this examination of the AW ban’s impact on gun prices and production 

suggests that there has likely been a sustained reduction in criminal use of APs since the 

ban but not necessarily ARs. Since most AWs used in crime are APs, this should result 

in an overall decline in AW use. In the following chapter, we examine the accuracy of

this prediction. 

38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
6. CRIMINAL USE OF ASSAULT WEAPONS AFTER THE BAN 

6.1. Measuring Criminal Use of Assault Weapons: A Methodological Note 

 

In this chapter, we examine trends in the use of AWs using a number of national 

and local data sources on guns recovered by law enforcement agencies (we focus on the 

domestic AW models discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter). Such data 

provide the best available indicator of changes over time in the types (and especially the 

specific makes and models) of guns used in violent crime and possessed and/or carried by 

criminal and otherwise deviant or high-risk persons. The majority of firearms recovered 

by police are tied to weapon possession and carrying offenses, while the remainder are 

linked primarily to violent crimes and narcotics offenses (e.g., see ATF, 1976; 1977; 

1997; Brill, 1977). In general, up to a quarter of guns confiscated by police are 

associated with violent offenses or shots fired incidents (calculated from ATF, 1977, pp. 

96-98; 1997; Brill, 1977, pp. 24,71; Shaw, 1994, pp. 63, 65; also see data presented later 

in this chapter). Other confiscated guns may be found by officers, turned in voluntarily 

by citizens, or seized by officers for temporary safekeeping in situations that have the 

potential for violence (e.g., domestic disputes). 

Because not all recovered guns are linked to violent crime investigations, we 

present analyses based on all gun recoveries and gun recoveries linked to violent crimes 

where appropriate (some of the data sources are based exclusively, or nearly so, on guns 

linked to violent crimes). However, the fact that a seized gun is not clearly linked to a 

violent crime does not rule out the possibility that it had been or would have been used in 

a violent crime. Many offenders carry firearms on a regular basis for protection and to be 

prepared for criminal opportunities (Sheley and Wright, 1993a; Wright and Rossi, 1986). 

In addition, many confiscated guns are taken from persons involved in drugs, a group 

involved disproportionately in violence and illegal gun trafficking (National Institute of 

Justice, 1995; Sheley and Wright, 1993a). In some instances, criminal users, including 

those fleeing crime scenes, may have even possessed discarded guns found by patrol 

officers. For all these reasons, guns recovered by police should serve as a good 

approximation of the types of guns used in violent crime, even though many are not 

clearly linked to such crimes. 

Two additional caveats should be noted with respect to tracking the use of AWs. 

First, we can only identify AWs based on banned makes and models. The databases do 

not contain information about the specific features of firearms, thus precluding any 

assessment of non-banned gun models that were altered after purchase in ways making 

them illegal. In this respect, our numbers may understate the use of AWs, but we know 

of no data source with which to evaluate the commonality of such alterations. Second, 

one cannot always distinguish pre-ban versions of AWs from post-ban, legalized versions 

of the same weapons based on weapon make and model information (this occurs when 

the post-ban version of an AW has the same name as the pre-ban version), a factor which 

may have caused us to overstate the use of AWs after the ban. This was more of a 

problem for our assessment of ARs, as will be discussed below. 

39 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Finally, we generally emphasize trends in the percentage of crime guns that are 

AWs in order to control for overall trends in gun violence and gun recoveries. Because 

gun violence was declining throughout the 1990s, we expected the number of AW

recoveries to drop independently of the ban’s impact. 

6.2. National Analysis of Guns Reported By Police to the Federal Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 

6.2.1. An Introduction to Gun Tracing Data 

In this section, we examine national trends in AW use based on firearm trace 

requests submitted to ATF by federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel 

throughout the nation. A gun trace is an investigation that typically tracks a gun from its 

manufacture to its first point of sale by a licensed dealer. Upon request, ATF traces guns 

seized by law enforcement as a service to federal, state, and local agencies. In order to 

initiate a trace on a firearm, the requesting law enforcement agency provides information 

about the firearm, such as make, model, and serial number. 

Although ATF tracing data provide the only available national sample of the types 

of guns used in crime and otherwise possessed or carried by criminal and high-risk 

groups, they do have limitations for research purposes. Gun tracing is voluntary, and 

police in most jurisdictions do not submit trace requests for all, or in some cases any, 

guns they seize. Crime and tracing data for 1994, for example, suggest that law 

enforcement agencies requested traces for 27% of gun homicides but only 1% of gun 

robberies and gun assaults known to police during that year (calculated from ATF, 1995 

and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1995, pp. 13, 18, 26, 29, 31, 32). 

The processes by which state and local law enforcement agencies decide to 

submit guns for tracing are largely unknown, and there are undoubtedly important 

sources of variation between agencies in different states and localities. For example, 

agencies may be less likely to submit trace requests in states that maintain their own 

registers of gun dealers' sales. Knowledge of ATF's tracing capabilities and procedures,39

as well as participation in federal/state/local law enforcement task forces, are some of the 

other factors that may affect an agency's tracing practices. Further, these factors are 

likely to vary over time, a point that is reinforced below. 

Therefore, firearms submitted to ATF for tracing may not be representative of the 

 

39 To illustrate, ATF cannot (or does not) trace military surplus weapons, imported guns without the 

importer name (generally, pre-1968 guns), stolen guns, or guns without a legible serial number (Zawitz

1995). Tracing guns manufactured before 1968 is also difficult because licensed dealers were not required 

to keep records of their transactions prior to that time. Throughout much of the 1990s, ATF did not

generally trace guns older than 5-10 years without special investigative reasons (Kennedy et al., 1996, p. 

171). Our data are based on trace requests rather than successful traces, but knowledge of the preceding 

operational guidelines might have influenced which guns law enforcement agencies chose to trace in some

instances. 

40 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
types of firearms typically seized by police. In general, not much is known about the 

nature of potential bias in tracing data. In prior studies, however, AWs tended to be more 

common in tracing data than in more representative samples of guns confiscated by 

police (Kleck, 1997, pp. 112, 141). This suggests that police have been more likely 

historically to initiate traces for seized AWs than for other seized guns. Although 

comparisons across studies are complicated by varying definitions of AWs used in 

different analyses, studies of guns confiscated by police or used in particular types of 

crimes generally suggest that AWs accounted for up to 6% of crime guns and about 2% 

on average prior to the federal AW ban (see Chapter 3 and Kleck, 1997, p. 141), whereas 

studies of pre-ban tracing data indicated that 8% of traced guns, and sometimes as many 

as 11%, were AWs (Cox Newspapers, 1989; Lenett, 1995; Zawitz, 1995). 

Changes over time in the tracing practices of law enforcement agencies present 

additional complexities in analyzing tracing data. Due to improvements in the tracing 

process, ATF promotional efforts, and special initiatives like the Youth Crime Gun 

Interdiction Initiative (see ATF, 1997; 1999 and more recent reports available via the 

Internet at www.atf.treas.gov),40 the utilization of tracing grew substantially throughout 

the 1990s in jurisdictions that chose to participate (also see ATF, 2000; Roth and Koper, 

1997). To illustrate, trace requests to ATF rose from roughly 42,300 in 1991 to 229,500 

in 2002 (see Table 6-1 in the next section), an increase of 443%. This growth reflects 

changes in tracing practices (i.e., changes in the number of agencies submitting trace 

requests and/or changes in the percentage of recovered guns for which participating 

agencies requested traces) rather than changes in gun crime; gun homicides, for example, 

were falling throughout the 1990s (see Table 6-1 in the next section) and were a third 

lower in 2002 than in 1991. 

Therefore, an increase in trace requests for AWs does not necessarily signal a real 

increase in the use of AWs. Further, examining trends in the percentage of trace requests 

associated with AWs is also problematic. Because law enforcement agencies were more 

likely to request traces for AWs than for other guns in years past, we can expect the 

growth rate in tracing for non-AWs to exceed the growth rate in traces for AWs as gun 

tracing becomes more comprehensive. Consequently, AWs are likely to decline over time 

as a share of trace requests due simply to reporting effects, except perhaps during periods 

when AWs figure prominently in public discourse on crime.41

 

40 As part of this initiative, police in a few dozen large cities are submitting trace requests to ATF for all 

guns that they confiscate. The initiative began with 17 cities in 1996 and has since spread to 55 major 

urban jurisdictions. 41 To illustrate, assume that a hypothetical police agency recovers 100 guns a year, 2 of which are AWs, 

and that the agency has a selective tracing policy that results in the submission of trace requests for 20 of

the guns, including 1 of the recovered AWs. Under this scenario, the department would be almost three

times as likely to request traces for AWs as for other guns. If the department adopted a policy to request 

traces on all guns (and again recovered 2 AWs and 98 other guns), AW traces would double and traces of 

other guns would increase by more than 400%. Moreover, AWs would decline from 5% of traced guns to 

2% of traced guns due simply to the change in tracing policy.

41 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
6.2.2. Traces of Assault Weapons, 1990-2002 

 

Figure 6-1 illustrates the share of all traces that were for AWs from 1990 through 

2002. A more detailed assessment of annual changes in traces for AWs and other guns is 

presented in Table 6-1. Changes in gun murders are also shown in Table 6-1 to 

emphasize the differences in trends for tracing and gun crime. Below, we summarize key 

points from the analysis. Due to the instrumentation problems inherent in tracing data, 

statistical tests are not presented.42

Figure 6-1. Police Recoveries of Assault Weapons Reported to

ATF (National), 1990-2002

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

As % of Traced Guns (N=1,658,975)

Includes Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and selected Calico and Feather models.

 

42 Nearly 30% of the tracing records lack specific gun model designations (the crucial elements for 

conducting a trace are the gun make and serial number). For the makes and types of guns likely to be AWs,

however, the missing model rate was slightly under 10%. Further, we were able to identity some of the

latter weapons as AWs with reasonable confidence based on the makes, types, and calibers alone. 

Nevertheless, we conducted a supplemental analysis using only those records for which the gun model was 

identified. The results of that analysis were substantively very similar to those presented below. 

42 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6-1. Annual Percentage Changes in Gun Murders and Police Requests to 

ATF for Traces of Assault Weapons and Other Firearms, 1991-2002 (Number of 

Traces in Parentheses) 

Year Gun 

Murders

(1) 

All 

Traces

(2) 

AW

Traces*

(3) 

AP 

Traces

(4) 

AR 

Traces

(5) 

AW and

AW

Substitute 

Traces

(6) 

Violent 

Crime 

Traces

(7) 

AW

Violent 

Crime 

Traces

(8) 

LCMM 

Rifle 

Traces**

(9) 

1991 9% 14%

(42281)

14% 

(2378)

24% 

(1775)

-6% 

(603)

14% 

(2378)

19% 

(6394)

20% 

(344)

-- 

1992 -1% 6%

(44992)

1% 

(2398)

4% 

(1838)

-7% 

(560)

1% 

(2398)

3% 

(6558)

7% 

(367)

-- 

1993 5% 20%

(54189)

25% 

(2994)

20% 

(2199)

42% 

(795)

25% 

(2994)

26% 

(8248)

41% 

(516)

252% 

(183)

1994 -4% 53%

(82791)

11% 

(3337)

23% 

(2706)

-21% 

(631)

11% 

(3337)

22% 

(10083)

-18% 

(424)

223% 

(592)

1995 -10% -6%

(77503)

-19% 

(2730)

-24% 

(2051)

8% 

(679)

-18% 

(2747)

23% 

(12439)

-15% 

(362)

-10% 

(530)

1996 -9% 66%

(128653)

12% 

(3059)

13% 

(2309)

10% 

(750)

17% 

(3214)

67% 

(20816)

27% 

(459)

40% 

(743)

1997 -7% 42%

(183225)

31% 

(4019)

31% 

(3017)

34% 

(1002)

36% 

(4362)

11% 

(23147)

13% 

(519)

24% 

(925)

1998 -11% 5%

(192115)

0% 

(4014)

-9% 

(2751)

26% 

(1263)

7% 

(4681)

3% 

(23844)

-22% 

(404)

33% 

(1227)

1999 -8% -2%

(188296)

-11% 

(3581)

-12% 

(2414)

-8% 

(1167)

-6% 

(4406)

3% 

(24663)

0% 

(404)

-18% 

(1003)

2000 1% -3%

(182961)

-11% 

(3196)

-16% 

(2027)

0% 

(1169)

-6% 

(4143)

-13% 

(21465)

-25% 

(305)

-14% 

(859)

2001 -1% 18%

(215282)

1% 

(3238)

5% 

(2138)

-6% 

(1100)

3% 

(4273)

20% 

(25822)

6% 

(322)

-3% 

(833)

2002 6% 7%

(229525)

19% 

(3839)

4% 

(2214)

48% 

(1625)

12% 

(4765)

20% 

(30985)

65% 

(531)

4% 

(865)

* Based on Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and Calico and Feather models. 

** Foreign semiautomatic rifles accepting large capacity military magazines (banned by executive order in 

1998). (Data are not shown for 1991 and 1992 because very few of these guns were traced in those years.)

43 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
6.2.2.1. Assault Weapons as a Percentage of Crime Gun Traces

As shown in Figure 6-1, AWs declined from 5.4% of crime gun traces in 1992-

1993 to 1.6% in 2001-2002, a decline of 70%. Although this downward trend could be 

attributable in large part to changes in tracing practices, it is noteworthy that it did not 

begin until 1994 (the year of the ban); during the pre-ban years, 1990 to 1993, AWs 

accounted for a steady share of traces despite a 46% increase in total tracing volume. It is 

also remarkable that about 3,200 AWs were traced in both 2000 and 2001, which is 

virtually identical to the average number traced during 1993 and 1994 (3,166) even 

though total traces increased more than 190% during the same period (Table 6-1, 

columns 2 and 3).43

6.2.2.2. Annual Changes in Traces for Assault Weapons and Other Guns

Throughout most of the post-ban period (particularly 1995 to 2001), AW traces 

either increased less or declined more than total traces (Table 6-1, columns 2 and 3), a 

pattern that is also consistent with a decline in the use of AWs relative to other guns, 

though it too may be distorted by changes in tracing practices. This pattern was largely 

consistent whether analyzing all traces or only traces associated with violent crimes 

(columns 7 and 8).44

The years when total traces declined or were relatively flat are arguably the most 

informative in the series because they appear to have been less affected by changes in

tracing practices. For example, there was a 6% decline in total trace requests from 1994 

to 1995 (the years featured in our earlier study) that coincided with a 10% drop in gun 

murders (Table 6-1, column 1). Therefore, it seems tracing practices were relatively 

stable (or, conversely, reporting effects were relatively small) from 1994 to 1995. The 

19% reduction in AW traces during this same period implies that AW use was declining 

faster than that of other guns. Furthermore, there were fewer AW traces in 1995 than in 

1993, the year prior to the ban. The fact that this occurred during a period when the AW 

issue was very prominent (and hence police might have been expected to trace more of 

the AWs they recovered) arguably strengthens the causal inference of a ban effect.45

Total traces also declined slightly (2%-3%) in 1999 and 2000. In each of those 

years, the decline was greater for AWs (11%). Thus, in years when tracing declined 

overall, AW traces fell 3 to 6 times faster than did total traces. Put another way, AWs 

fell between 9% and 13% as a percentage of all traces in each of these years. 

The general pattern of AW traces increasing less or declining more than those of 

 

43 These general findings are consistent with those of other tracing analyses conducted by ATF (2003

Congressional Q&A memo provided to the author) and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence (2004). 44 A caveat is that requests without specific crime type information are often grouped with weapons

offenses (ATF, 1999). Therefore, traces associated with violent crimes are likely understated to some

degree.

45 This inference is also supported by our earlier finding that trace requests for AWs declined by only 8% 

in states that had their own AW bans prior to the federal ban (Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 5). 

44 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
other crime guns was clearly apparent for APs but less consistent for ARs (Table 6-1, 

columns 4 and 5). For example, AR traces went up 26% in 1998 while total traces went 

up only 5% and AP traces declined 9%. In 2000, total and AP traces fell 3% and 16%, 

respectively, but AR traces remained flat. This is consistent with predictions derived 

from the price and production analyses described above. But note that the post-ban AR

counts could be overstated because the data do not distinguish pre-ban from post-ban 

versions of some popular AR-15 type rifles like the Colt Sporter and Bushmaster XM-15. 

(Also note that the percentage of traces for ARs did fall from 1.4% in 1992-1993 to 0.6% 

in 2001-2002.) 

More generally, the use of post-ban AW-type weapons (including both legalized 

APs and ARs) has not been widespread enough to completely offset the apparent decline 

in the use of banned AWs. Combined traces for banned AWs and AW substitutes (Table 

6-1, column 6) also followed the pattern of increasing less or declining more than did 

total traces throughout most of the period, though the differences were not as pronounced 

as those between AWs and total traces. In 1999 and 2000, for example, AWs traces 

dropped 11%, while combined traces for AWs and legal substitutes declined only 6%. 

Still, the latter figure was greater than the 2%-3% drop for total traces. 

 Finally, traces of the LCMM rifles banned by executive order in 1998 were 

generally rising to that point, reaching levels as high as those for AR-15 type rifles (Table 

6-1, column 9). Since 1998, however, the number of traces for LCMM rifles has fallen

substantially. Despite a 4% increase from 2001 to 2002, the number of LCMM traces in 

2002 (865) was 30% lower than the peak number traced in 1998 (1,227). Tentatively, 

this suggests that the 1998 extension of the ban has been effective in curtailing weapons 

that offenders may have been substituting for the ARs banned in 1994. 

6.2.2.3. Did Use of Assault Weapons Rebound in 2002? 

In 2002, tracing volume increased 7%, which closely matched the 6% increase in 

gun murders for that year. In contrast to the general pattern, AW traces increased by 

19%, suggesting a possible rebound in AW use independent of changes in tracing 

practices, a development that we have predicted elsewhere (Roth and Koper, 1997) based 

on the boom in AW production leading up to the ban. The disproportionate growth in 

AW traces was due to ARs, however, so it could partially reflect increasing use of postban AR-type rifles (see the discussion above). 

Moreover, this pattern could be illusory. With data from the most recent years, it 

was possible to run a supplementary analysis screening out traces of older weapons (not 

shown). Focusing on just those guns recovered and traced in the same year for 2000 

through 2002 revealed that recoveries of AWs declined in 2001, more so for ARs (16%) 

than for APs (9%), while total traces increased 1%.

46 Traces for APs and ARs then 

 

46 The tracing database indicates when guns were recovered and when they were traced. However, the

recovery dates were missing for 30% of the records overall and were particularly problematic for years

prior to 1998. For this reason, the main analysis is based on request dates. The auxiliary analysis for 2000-

45 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
increased in 2002 (1% and 6%, respectively) but by less than total traces (8%). 

Therefore, the disproportionate growth in AR traces in 2002 shown in Table 6-1 may 

have been due to tracing of older AWs by newly participating police agencies. 

6.2.2.4. Summary of the ATF Gun Tracing Analysis

Complexities arising from recent changes in the use of gun tracing by law 

enforcement warrant caution in the interpretation of ATF gun tracing data. 

Notwithstanding, the data suggest that use of AWs in crime, though relatively rare from

the start, has been declining. The percentage of gun traces that were for AWs plummeted 

70% between 1992-1993 and 2001-2002 (from 5.4% to 1.6%), and this trend did not 

begin until the year of the AW ban. On a year-to-year basis, AW traces generally 

increased less or declined by more than other gun traces. Moreover, in years when 

tracing volume declined – that is, years when changes in reporting practices were least 

likely to distort the data – traces of AWs fell 3 to 6 times faster than gun traces in general. 

The drop in AW use seemed most apparent for APs and LCMM rifles (banned in 1998). 

Inferences were less clear for domestic ARs, but assessment of those guns is complicated 

by the possible substitution of post-ban legal variations. 

6.3. Local Analyses of Guns Recovered By Police 

 

Due to concerns over the validity of national ATF tracing data for investigating the 

types of guns used in crime, we sought to confirm the preceding findings using local data 

on guns recovered by police. To this end, we examined data from half a dozen localities 

and time periods. 

• All guns recovered by the Baltimore Police Department from 1992 to 2000 

(N=33,933) 

• All guns recovered by the Metro-Dade Police Department (Miami and Dade 

County, Florida) from 1990 to 2000 (N=39,456) 

• All guns recovered by the St. Louis Police Department from 1992 to 2003 

(N=34,143) 

• All guns recovered by the Boston Police Department (as approximated by trace 

requests submitted by the Department to ATF) from 1991 to 1993 and 2000 to 

2002 (N=4,617)47

 2002 focuses on guns both recovered and traced in the same year because it is likely that some guns 

recovered in 2002 had not yet been traced by the spring of 2003 when this database was created. Using

only guns recovered and traced in the same year should mitigate this bias. 47 The Boston Police Department has been tracing guns comprehensively since 1991 (Kennedy et al.,

1996). However, we encountered difficulties in identifying Boston Police Department traces for several 

years in the mid-1990s. For this reason, we chose to contrast the 1991 to 1993 period with the 2000 to

2002 period. 

46 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
• Guns recovered during murder investigations in Milwaukee County from 1991 to 

1998 (N=592)48 

• Guns linked to serious crimes in Anchorage and other parts of Alaska and 

submitted to state firearm examiners for evidentiary testing from 1987 to 2000 

(N=900)49

The selection of these particular locations and samples reflects data availability.50 

The locations were not selected randomly, and some of the samples are small for 

conducting trend analysis of relatively rare events (i.e., AW recoveries). Accordingly, 

we must use caution in generalizing the results to other places. However, the data 

sources reflect a wide geographic range and cover post-ban periods extending through at 

least the latter 1990s (and typically through the year 2000 or beyond). To the extent that 

the results are similar across these jurisdictions, therefore, we can have more confidence 

that they reflect national patterns. 

In each jurisdiction, we examined pre-post changes in recoveries of AWs 

(focusing on the domestic AW group defined earlier) and substitution of post-ban AW

models for the banned models. Where possible, we conducted separate analyses of all 

AW recoveries and those linked specifically to violent crimes.51 We also differentiated 

between AP and AR trends using the larger databases from Baltimore, Miami, and St. 

Louis. But since most of these databases do not extend more than two years beyond 

1998, we do not present analyses specifically for LCMM rifles. 

Key summary results are summarized in Table 6-2, while more detailed results 

from each site appear at the end of the chapter in Tables 6-3 through 6-6 and Figures 6-2 

through 6-6.52 The number of AW recoveries declined by 28% to 82% across these 

 

48 The data are described in reports from the Medical College of Wisconsin (Hargarten et al., 1996; 2000) 

and include guns used in the murders and other guns recovered at the crime scenes. Guns are recovered in 

approximately one-third of Milwaukee homicide cases. 

49 The data include guns submitted by federal, state, and local agencies throughout the state. Roughly half 

come from the Anchorage area. Guns submitted by police to the state lab are most typically guns that were 

used in major crimes against persons (e.g. murder, attempted murder, assault, robbery). 50 We contacted at least 20 police departments and crime labs in the course of our data search, focusing

much of our attention on police departments participating in ATF’s Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative 

(YCGII) (ATF, 1997; 1999). Departments participating in the YCGII submit data to ATF on all guns that 

they recover. Though the YCGII did not begin until 1996 (well after the implementation of the AW ban), 

we suspected that these departments would be among those most likely to have electronically-stored gun 

data potentially extending back in time to before the ban. Unfortunately, most of these departments either 

did not have their gun data in electronic format or could not provide data for other reasons (e.g., resource 

constraints). In the course of our first AW study (Roth and Koper, 1997), we contacted many other police 

departments that also did not have adequate data for the study. 51 All of the Milwaukee and Anchorage analyses were limited to guns involved in murders or other serious 

crimes. Despite evidence of a decline, AW recoveries linked to violence were too rare in Boston to

conduct valid test statistics. 52 We omitted guns recovered in 1994 from both the pre and post-ban counts because the speculative price 

increases for AWs that occurred in 1994 (see previous section and Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 4) raise 

questions about the precise timing of the ban’s impact on AW use during that year, thereby clouding the 

designation of the intervention point. This is particularly a concern for the Baltimore analysis due to a 

47 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
locations and time periods, but the discussion below focuses on changes in AWs as a share 

of crime guns in order to control for general trends in gun crime and gun seizures. Prior to 

the ban, AWs ranged from about 1% of guns linked to violent crimes in St. Louis to nearly 

6% of guns recovered in Milwaukee murder cases.53

AWs dropped as share of crime guns in all jurisdictions after the ban. Reductions ranged

from a low of 17% in Milwaukee (based on guns linked to homicides) to a high of 72% in

Boston (based on all crime guns) but were generally between 32% and 40%.

54, 55 A decline 

in the use of AWs relative to other guns was generally apparent whether examining all AW 

recoveries or just those linked to violent crimes.

56 An exception was in St. Louis, where 

 state AP ban that took effect a few months prior to the federal AW ban. 53 These figures should be treated as approximations of the prevalence of AWs. On the one hand, the

numbers may understate the prevalence of AWs to a small degree because they are based on only the 

domestic AW group defined earlier. Based on analysis of national ATF gun tracing data, we estimated 

previously that the domestic AW group accounts for 82% of AWs used in crime (Roth and Koper, 1997, 

Chapter 5). To further test the reliability of this assessment, we investigated the prevalence of all banned 

AW models among guns recovered in Baltimore using an ATF list of all guns defined as AWs under the 

1994 Crime Act criteria (118 model and caliber combinations). We chose the Baltimore database because 

it provides a complete inventory of guns recovered by police in that city during the study period and,

having been maintained by crime lab personnel, is particularly thorough with regard to make and model

identifications. Though there was some ambiguity in classifying a small number of AK-type 

semiautomatic rifles (there are many civilian variations of the AK-47 rifle, some of which were legal under 

the 1994 legislation), our examination suggested that the domestic AW group accounted for approximately 

90% of the AWs recovered in Baltimore. (In addition, including all AWs had virtually no effect on the prepost changes in AW use in Baltimore.) But as discussed previously, the counts could also overstate AW

use to some degree because imprecision in the identification of gun models in some data sources may have 

resulted in some legalized firearms being counted as banned AWs. 54 The AW counts for Miami also include Interdynamics KG9 and KG99 models. These models were 

produced during the early 1980s and were forerunners to the Intratec models (ATF restricted the KG9 

during the early 1980s because it could be converted too easily to fully automatic fire). These weapons 

were very rare or non-existent in most of the local data sources, but they were more common in Miami,

where Interdynamics was formerly based. Including these guns increased the AW count in Miami by about 

9% but did not affect pre-post changes in AW recoveries. 55 State AW legislation passed in Maryland and Massachusetts could have had some impact on AW trends

in Baltimore and Boston, respectively. Maryland implemented an AP ban, similar in coverage to the 

federal AW ban, in June 1994 (Maryland has also required background checks for retail sales of a broader

list of state-defined AWs since 1989), and Massachusetts implemented additional legislation on federallydefined AWs in late 1998. The timing and scope of these laws make them largely redundant with the 

federal ban, so they should not unduly complicate inferences from the analysis. However, Maryland

forbids additional transfers of grandfathered APs, and Massachusetts has imposed additional requirements 

for possession and transfer of LCMs and guns accepting LCMs. Both states also have enhanced penalties 

for certain crimes involving APs, LCMs, and/or guns accepting LCMs. Hence, the ban on AWs was 

arguably strengthened in Baltimore and Boston, relative to the other jurisdictions under study. This does

not appear to have affected trends in AW use in Baltimore, which were very similar to those found in the 

other study sites. However, use of AWs and combined use of AWs and post-ban AW substitutes declined

more in Boston than in any other study site. Although the trends in Boston could reflect ongoing, post2000 reductions in use of AWs and similar weapons (Boston was one of the only study sites from which we

obtained post-2000 data), it is possible that the Massachusetts legislation was also a contributing factor. 56 There may be some inconsistency across jurisdictions in the identification of guns associated with

violent crimes. In Miami, for example, 28% of the guns had an offense code equal to “other/not listed,”

and this percentage was notably higher for the later years of the data series. 

48 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6-2. Pre-Post Changes in Assault Weapons As a Share of Recovered Crime 

Guns For Selected Localities and Time Periods: Summary Results (Total Number 

of Assault Weapons for Pre and Post Periods in Parentheses) a

Locality and Time 

Period 

AWs AWs 

(Linked to 

Violence) 

APs ARs AWs and 

Post-Ban 

Substitutes 

Baltimore (all 

recoveries) 

pre=1992-1993, 

post=1995-2000 

-34%*** 

(425) 

-41%** 

(75) 

-35%*** 

(383) 

-24% 

(42) 

-29%*** 

(444) 

Miami-Dade (all 

recoveries) 

pre=1990-1993, 

post=1995-2000 

-32%*** 

(733) 

-39%*** 

(101) 

-40%*** 

(611) 

37%* 

(115) 

-30%*** 

(746) 

St. Louis (all recoveries) 

pre=1992-1993, 

post=1995-2003 

-32%*** 

(306) 

1% 

(28) 

-34%*** 

(274) 

10% 

(32) 

-24%** 

(328) 

Boston (all recoveries) 

pre=1991-1993, 

post=2000-2002 

-72%*** 

(71) 

N/A N/A N/A -60%***

(76) 

Milwaukee (recoveries 

in murder cases) 

pre=1991-1993, 

post=1995-1998 

N/A -17%

(28) 

N/A N/A 2%

(31) 

Anchorage, AK 

(recoveries in serious 

crimes) 

pre=1987-1993, 

post=1995-2000 

N/A -40% 

(24) 

N/A N/A -40%

(24) 

a. Based on Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and Calico and Feather models. See the text for

additional details about each sample and Tables 6-3 through 6-6 for more detailed results from each 

locality. * Statistically significant change at chi-square p level < .1 

** Statistically significant change at chi-square p level < .05 

*** Statistically significant change at chi-square p level < .01

49 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
AWs declined as share of all guns but not of guns linked to violent crimes, though the 

latter test was based on rather small samples. 

These reductions were not due to any obvious pre-ban trends (see Figures 6-2 

through 6-6 at the end of the chapter). On the contrary, AW recoveries reached a peak in 

most of these jurisdictions during 1993 or 1994 (Boston, which is not shown in the 

graphs due to missing years, was an exception). We tested changes in AW prevalence 

using simple chi-square tests since there were no observable pre-existing time trends in 

the data. Due to the small number of AWs in some of these samples, these changes were 

not all statistically significant. Nonetheless, the uniformity of the results is highly 

suggestive, especially when one considers the consistency of these results with those 

found in the national ATF tracing analysis. 

The changes in Tables 6-2 through 6-6 reflect the average decline in recoveries of 

AWs during the post-ban period in each locality. However, some of these figures may 

understate reductions to date. In several of the localities, the prevalence of AWs among 

crime guns was at, or close to, its lowest mark during the most recent year analyzed (see 

Figures 6-2 through 6-6 at the end of the chapter), suggesting that AW use continues to 

decline. In Miami, for example, AWs accounted for 1.7% of crime guns for the whole 

1995 to 2000 period but had fallen to 1% by 2000. Further, the largest AW decline was 

recorded in Boston, one of two cities for which data extended beyond the year 2000 

(however, this was not the case in St. Louis, the other locality with post-2000 data). 

Breakouts of APs and ARs in Baltimore, Miami, and St. Louis show that the 

decline in AW recoveries was due largely to APs, which accounted for the majority of 

AWs in these and almost all of the other localities (the exception was Anchorage, where 

crimes with rifles were more common, as a share of gun crimes, than in the other sites). 

Pre-post changes in recoveries of the domestic AR group weapons, which accounted for 

less than 1% of crime guns in Baltimore, Miami, and St. Louis, were inconsistent. AR 

recoveries declined after the ban in Baltimore but increased in St. Louis and Miami. As 

discussed previously, however, the AR figures may partly reflect the substitution of postban, legalized versions of these rifles, thus overstating post-ban use of the banned 

configurations. Further, trends for these particular rifles may not be indicative of those 

for the full range of banned rifles, including the various foreign rifles banned by the 1994 

law and the import restrictions of 1989 and 1998 (e.g., see the ATF gun tracing analysis 

of LCMM rifles).57

 

57 As discussed in the last chapter, our research design focused on common AWs that were likely to be 

most affected by the 1994 ban as opposed to earlier regulations (namely, the 1989 import ban) or other

events (e.g., company closings or model discontinuations prior to 1994). However, an auxiliary analysis 

with the Baltimore data revealed a statistically meaningful drop in recoveries of all ARs covered by the 

1994 legislation (not including the LCMM rifles) that was larger than that found for just the domestic group 

ARs discussed in the text. Similarly, an expanded AR analysis in Miami showed that total AR recoveries 

declined after the ban, in contrast to the increase found for the domestic group ARs. (Even after expanding

the analysis, ARs still accounted for no more than 0.64% of crime guns before the ban in both locations. 

As with the domestic AR group, there are complexities in identifying banned versus non-banned versions

of some of the other ARs, so these numbers are approximations.) Consequently, a more nuanced view of

AR trends may be that AR use is declining overall, but this decline may be due largely to the 1989 import 

50 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Finally, the overall decline in AW use was only partially offset by substitution of 

the post-ban legalized models. Even if the post-ban models are counted as AWs, the 

share of crime guns that were AWs still fell 24% to 60% across most jurisdictions. The 

exception was Milwaukee where recoveries of a few post-ban models negated the drop in 

banned models in a small sample of guns recovered during murder investigations.58

6.4. Summary 

Consistent with predictions derived from the analysis of market indicators in 

Chapter 5, analyses of national ATF gun tracing data and local databases on guns 

recovered by police in several localities have been largely consistent in showing that 

criminal use of AWs, while accounting for no more than 6% of gun crimes even before 

the ban, declined after 1994, independently of trends in gun crime. In various places and 

times from the late 1990s through 2003, AWs typically fell by one-third or more as a 

share of guns used in crime.59, 60 Some of the most recent, post-2000 data suggest 

 restrictions that predated the AW ban. It is not yet clear that there has been a decline in the most common 

ARs prohibited exclusively by the 1994 ban. 58 This was not true when focusing on just those guns that were used in the incident as opposed to all guns 

recovered during the investigations. However, the samples of AWs identified as murder weapons were too

small for valid statistical tests of pre-post changes. 

59 These findings are also supported by prior research in which we found that reported thefts of AWs 

declined 7% in absolute terms and 14% as a fraction of stolen guns in the early period following the ban 

(i.e., late 1994 through early 1996) (Koper and Roth, 2002a, p. 21). We conducted that analysis to account 

for the possibility that an increase in thefts of AWs might have offset the effect of rising AW prices on the 

availability of AWs to criminals. Because crimes with AWs appear to have declined after the ban, the theft 

analysis is not as central to the arguments in this paper. 60 National surveys of state prisoners conducted by the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics show an

increase from 1991 to 1997 in the percentage of prisoners who reported having used an AW (Beck et al., 

1993; Harlow, 2001). The 1991 survey (discussed in Chapter 3) found that 2% of violent gun offenders 

had carried or used an AW in the offense for which they were sentenced (calculated from Beck et al. 1993, 

pp. 18,33). The comparable figure from the 1997 survey was nearly 7% (Harlow, 2001, pp.3, 7). 

Although these figures appear contrary to the patterns shown by gun recovery data, there are 

ambiguities in the survey findings that warrant caution in such an interpretation. First, the definition of an

AW (and most likely the respondents’ interpretation of this term) was broader in the 1997 survey. For the 

1991 survey, respondents were asked about prior ownership and use of a “...military-type weapon, such as 

an Uzi, AK-47, AR-15, or M-16” (Beck et al., 1993, p. 18), all of which are ARs or have AR variations. 

The 1997 survey project defined AWs to “...include the Uzi, TEC-9, and the MAC-10 for handguns, the 

AR-15 and AK-47 for rifles, and the ‘Street Sweeper’ for shotguns” (Harlow, 2001, p. 2). (Survey

codebooks available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research also show that 

the 1997 survey provided more detail and elaboration about AWs and their features than did the 1991

survey, including separate definitions of APs, ARs, and assault shotguns.) 

A second consideration is that many of the respondents in the 1997 survey were probably 

reporting criminal activity prior to or just around the time of the ban. Violent offenders participating in the 

survey, for example, had been incarcerated nearly six years on average at the time they were interviewed 

(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000, p. 55). Consequently, the increase in reported AW use may reflect an 

upward trend in the use of AWs from the 1980s through the early to mid 1990s, as well as a growing 

recognition of these weapons (and a greater tendency to report owning or using them) stemming from

publicity about the AW issue during the early 1990s. 

Finally, we might view the 1997 estimate skeptically because it is somewhat higher than that from

most other sources. Nevertheless, it is within the range of estimates discussed earlier and could reflect a 

51 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
reductions as high as 70%.61 This trend has been driven primarily by a decline in the use 

of APs, which account for a majority of AWs used in crime. AR trends have been more 

varied and complicated by the substitution of post-ban guns that are very similar to some

banned ARs. More generally, however, the substitution of post-ban AW-type models 

with fewer military features has only partially offset the decline in banned AWs. 

These findings raise questions as to the whereabouts of surplus AWs, particularly 

APs, produced just prior to the ban. Presumably, many are in the hands of collectors and 

speculators holding them for their novelty and value.62 Even criminal possessors may be 

more sensitive to the value of their AWs and less likely to use them for risk of losing 

them to police. 

Finally, it is worth noting the ban has not completely eliminated the use of AWs, 

and, despite large relative reductions, the share of gun crimes involving AWs is similar to 

that before the ban. Based on year 2000 or more recent data, the most common AWs 

continue to be used in up to 1.7% of gun crimes. 

 somewhat higher use of AWs among the subset of offenders who are most active and/or dangerous; recall

that the highest estimate of AW use among the sources examined in this chapter came from a sample of 

guns recovered during murder investigations in Milwaukee (also see the discussion of offender surveys and

AWs in Chapter 3). 61 Developing a national estimate of the number of AW crimes prevented by the ban is complicated by the 

range of estimates of AW use and changes therein derived from different data sources. Tentatively,

nonetheless, it appears the ban prevents a few thousand crimes with AWs annually. For example, using 2%

as the best estimate of the share of gun crimes involving AWs prior to the ban (see Chapter 3) and 40% as a 

reasonable estimate of the post-ban drop in this figure implies that almost 2,900 murders, robberies, and 

assaults with AWs were prevented in 2002 (this assumes that 1.2% of the roughly 358,000 gun murders,

gun robberies, and gun assaults reported to police in 2002 [see the Uniform Crime Reports] involved AWs 

but that 2% would have involved AWs had the ban not been in effect). Even if this estimate is accurate, 

however, it does not mean the ban prevented 2,900 gun crimes in 2002; indeed, the preceding calculation

assumes that offenders prevented from using AWs committed their crimes using other guns. Whether 

forcing such weapon substitution can reduce the number of persons wounded or killed in gun crimes is 

considered in more detail in Chapter 9. 62 The 1997 national survey of state prisoners discussed in footnote 60 found that nearly 49% of AW

offenders obtained their gun from a “street” or illegal source, in contrast to 36% to 42% for other gun users 

(Harlow, 2001, p. 9). This could be another sign that AWs have become harder to acquire since the ban,

but the data cannot be used to make an assessment over time. 

52 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6-3. Trends in Police Recoveries of Domestic Assault Weapons in Baltimore, 

1992-2000 a

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change

A. All Recoveries Jan. 1992-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 2000 

Total AWs 135 290 

Annual Mean 67.5 48.33 -28% 

AW’s as % of Guns 

APs 

Annual Mean 

APs as % of Guns 

ARs 

Annual Mean 

ARs as % of Guns 

Total AWs and 

Substitutes 

Annual Mean 

AWs/Subs as % of Guns 

B. Recoveries Linked 

to Violent Crimes b

Total AWs 

Annual Mean 

AWs as % of Violent 

Crime Guns

1.88% 

123 

61.5 

1.71% 

12 

6 

0.17% 

135 

67.5 

1.88% 

28 

14 

2.1% 

1.25% 

260 

43.33 

1.12% 

30 

5 

0.13% 

309 

51.5 

1.33% 

47 

7.83 

1.24% 

-34%** 

-30% 

-35%** 

-17% 

-24% 

-24% 

-29%** 

-44% 

-41%* 

a. Domestic assault weapons include Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and Calico and Feather

models. 

b. Murders, assaults, and robberies 

* Chi-square p level < .05 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/APs/ARs/AW-subs were tested 

for statistical significance). 

** Chi-square p level < .01 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/APs/ARs/AW-subs were tested 

for statistical significance). 

53 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 6-2. Police Recoveries of Assault Weapons in 

Baltimore, 1992-2000

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

As % of Recovered Guns (N=33,933)

Includes Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and selected Calico and Feather models.

54 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6-4. Trends in Police Recoveries of Domestic Assault Weapons in Miami 

(Metro-Dade), 1990-2000 a

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change

A. All Recoveries Jan. 1990-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 2000 

Total AWs 403 330 

Annual Mean 100.75 55 -45% 

AW’s as % of Guns 

APs 

Annual Mean 

APs as % of Guns 

ARs 

Annual Mean 

ARs as % of Guns 

Total AWs and 

Substitutes 

Annual Mean 

AWs/Subs as % of Guns 

B. Recoveries Linked 

to Violent Crimes b

Total AWs 

Annual Mean 

AWs as % of Violent 

Crime Guns

2.53% 

355 

88.75 

2.23% 

43 

10.75 

0.27% 

403 

100.75 

2.53% 

69 

17.25 

2.28% 

1.71% 

256 

42.67 

1.33% 

72 

12 

0.37% 

343 

57.17 

1.78% 

32 

5.33 

1.39% 

-32%*** 

-52% 

-40%*** 

12% 

37%* 

-43% 

-30%*** 

-69% 

-39%** 

a. Domestic assault weapons include Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and Calico and Feather

models. 

b. Murders, assaults, and robberies 

* Chi-square p level < .1 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/APs/ARs/AW-subs were tested

for statistical significance) 

** Chi-square p level < .05 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/APs/ARs/AW-subs were tested 

for statistical significance) 

*** Chi-square p level <.01 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/APs/ARs/AW-subs were

tested for statistical significance)

55 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 6-3. Police Recoveries of Assault Weapons in Miami 

(Metro-Dade), 1990-2000

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

As % of Recovered Guns (N=39,456)

Includes Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and selected Calico and Feather models.

56 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6-5. Trends in Police Recoveries of Domestic Assault Weapons in St. Louis, 

1992-2003 a

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change

A. All Recoveries Jan. 1992-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 2003 

Total AWs 94 212 

Annual Mean 47 23.56 -50% 

AW’s as % of Guns 

APs 

Annual Mean 

APs as % of Guns 

ARs 

Annual Mean 

ARs as % of Guns 

Total AWs and 

Substitutes 

Annual Mean 

AWs/Subs as % of Guns 

B. Recoveries Linked 

to Violent Crimes b

Total AWs 

Annual Mean 

AWs as % of Violent 

Crime Guns

1.33% 

87 

43.5 

1.23% 

7 

3.5 

0.1% 

94 

47 

1.33% 

8 

4 

0.8% 

0.91% 

187 

20.78 

0.81% 

25 

2.78 

0.11% 

234 

26 

1.01% 

20 

2.2 

0.81% 

-32%** 

-52% 

-34%** 

-21% 

10% 

-45% 

-24%* 

-45% 

1% 

a. Domestic assault weapons include Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and Calico and Feather

models. 

b. Murders, assaults, and robberies 

* Chi-square p level < .05 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/APs/ARs/AW-subs were tested 

for statistical significance) 

** Chi-square p level <.01 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/APs/ARs/AW-subs were tested 

for statistical significance)

57 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 6-4. Police Recoveries of Assault Weapons in St. 

Louis, 1992-2003

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

As % of Recovered Guns (N=34,143)

Includes Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and selected Calico and Feather models.

58 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6-6. Trends in Police Recoveries of Domestic Assault Weapons in Boston, 

Milwaukee, and Anchorage (Alaska) a

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change

Boston

(All Gun Traces) 

Jan. 1991-Dec. 1993 Jan. 2000-Dec. 2002 

AWs 60 11

Annual Mean 20 3.7 -82% 

AWs as % of Guns 

AWs and Substitutes 

Annual Mean 

AWs/Subs as % of Guns 

2.16% 

60 

20 

2.16% 

0.6% 

16 

5.3 

0.87% 

-72%* 

-74% 

-60%* 

Milwaukee

(Guns Recovered in 

Murder Cases) 

Jan. 1991-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 1998 

AWs 15 13

Annual Mean 5 3.25 -35% 

AWs as % of Guns 

AWs and Substitutes 

Annual Mean 

AWs/Subs as % of Guns 

5.91% 

15 

5 

5.91% 

4.91% 

16 

4 

6.04% 

-17% 

-20% 

2% 

Anchorage

(Guns Tested for 

Evidence) 

Jan. 1987-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 2000 

AWs 16 8

Annual Mean 2.29 1.33 -42% 

AW’s as % of Guns 

AWs and Substitutes 

3.57% 

N/A 

2.13% 

N/A 

-40% 

a. Domestic assault weapons include Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and Calico and Feather

models. 

* Chi-square p level < .01 (changes in percentages of guns that were AWs/AW-subs were tested for 

statistical significance)

59 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 6-5. Assault Weapons Recovered in Milwaukee County

Murder Cases, 1991-1998

0

2

4

6

8

10

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

As % of Guns Recovered in Murder Cases (N=592)

Includes Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and selected Calico and Feather models.

Figure 6-6. Police Recoveries of Assault Weapons in 

Anchorage (Alaska), 1987-2000

0

2

4

6

8

10

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

As % of Guns Submitted for Evidentiary Testing (N=900)

Includes Intratec group, SWD group, AR-15 group, and selected Calico and Feather models.

60 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
7. MARKET INDICATORS FOR LARGE CAPACITY MAGAZINES: PRICES 

AND IMPORTATION 

The previous chapters examined the AW-LCM ban’s impact on the availability 

and criminal use of AWs. In this chapter and the next, we consider the impact of the 

ban’s much broader prohibition on LCMs made for numerous banned and non-banned 

firearms. We begin by studying market indicators. Our earlier study of LCM prices for a 

few gun models revealed that prices rose substantially during 1994 and into 1995 (Roth 

and Koper, 1997, Chapter 4). Prices of some LCMs remained high into 1996, while 

others returned to pre-ban levels or oscillated more unpredictably. The price increases 

may have reduced LCM use at least temporarily in the short-term aftermath of the ban, 

but we could not confirm this in our prior investigation. 

7.1. Price Trends for Large Capacity Magazines 

For this study, we sought to approximate longer term trends in the prices at which 

users could purchase banned LCMs throughout the country. To that end, we analyzed 

quarterly data on the prices of LCMs advertised by eleven gun and magazine distributors 

in Shotgun News, a national gun industry publication, from April 1992 to December 

1998.63 Those prices are available to any gun dealer, and primary market retailers 

generally re-sell within 15% of the distributors’ prices.64 The distributors were chosen 

during the course of the first AW study (Roth and Koper, 1997) based on the frequency 

with which they advertised during the April 1992 to June 1996 period. For each quarterly 

period, project staff coded prices for one issue from a randomly selected month. We

generally used the first issue of each selected month based on a preliminary, informal 

assessment suggesting that the selected distributors advertised more frequently in those 

issues. In a few instances, first-of-month issues were unavailable to us or provided too 

few observations, so we substituted other issues.65 Also, we were unable to obtain 

Shotgun News issues for the last two quarters of 1996. However, we aggregated the data 

annually to study price trends, and the omission of those quarters did not appear to affect 

the results (this is explained further below). 

We ascertained trends in LCM prices by conducting hedonic price analyses, 

 

63 The Blue Book of Gun Values, which served as the data source for the AW price analysis, does not 

contain ammunition magazine prices. 64 According to gun market experts, retail prices track wholesale prices quite closely (Cook et al., 1995, p.

71). Retail prices to eligible purchasers generally exceed wholesale (or original-purchase) prices by 3% to

5% in the large chain stores, by about 15% in independent dealerships, and by about 10% at gun shows 

(where overhead costs are lower). 65 The decision to focus on first-of-month issues was made prior to data collection for price analysis

update. For the earlier study (Roth and Koper, 1997), project staff coded data for one or more randomly

selected issues of every month of the April 1992 to June 1996 period. For this analysis, we utilized data

from only the first-of-month issues selected at random during the prior study. If multiple first-of-month 

issues were available for a given quarter, we selected one at random or based on the number of recorded 

advertisements. If no first-of-month issue was available for a given quarter, we selected another issue at

random from among those coded during the first study.

61 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
similar to those described in the AW price analysis (Chapter 5), in which we regressed 

inflation-adjusted LCM prices (logged) on several predictors: magazine capacity 

(logged), gun make (for which the LCM was made), year of the advertisement, and 

distributor. We cannot account fully for the meaning of significant distributor effects. 

They may represent unmeasured quality differentials in the merchandise of different 

distributors, or they may represent other differences in stock volume or selling or service 

practices between the distributors.66 We included the distributor indicators when they 

proved to be significant predictors of advertised price. In addition, we focused on LCMs 

made for several of the most common LCM-compatible handguns and rifles, rather than 

try to model the differences in LCM prices between the several hundred miscellaneous 

makes and models of firearms that were captured in the data. Finally, for both the 

handgun and rifle models, we created and tested seasonal indicator variables to determine 

if their incorporation would affect the coefficient for 1996 (the year with winter/spring 

data only), but they proved to be statistically insignificant and are not shown in the results 

below.67

7.1.1. Large Capacity Magazines for Handguns

The handgun LCM analysis tracks the prices of LCMs made for Intratec and 

Cobray (i.e., SWD) APs and non-banned semiautomatic pistols made by Smith and 

Wesson, Glock, Sturm Ruger, Sig-Sauer, Taurus, and Beretta (each of the manufacturers 

in the former group produces numerous models capable of accepting LCMs). In general, 

LCMs with greater magazine capacities commanded higher prices, and there were 

significant price differentials between LCMs made for different guns and sold by 

different distributors (see Table 7-1). Not surprisingly, LCMs made for Glock handguns 

were most expensive, followed by those made for Beretta and Sig-Sauer firearms. 

Turning to the time trend indicators (see Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1), prices for 

these magazines increased nearly 50% from 1993 to 1994, and they rose another 56% in 

1995. Prices declined somewhat, though not steadily, from 1996 to 1998. Nevertheless, 

prices in 1998 remained 22% higher than prices in 1994 and nearly 80% higher than 

those in 1993. 

 

66 For example, one possible difference between the distributors may have been the extent to which they

sold magazines made of different materials (e.g., steel, aluminum, etc.) or generic magazines manufactured

by companies other than the companies manufacturing the firearms for which the magazines were made. 

For example, there were indications in the data that 3% of the handgun LCMs and 10% of the AR-15 and

Mini-14 rifle LCMs used in the analyses (described below) were generic magazines. We did not control

for these characteristic, however, because such information was often unclear from the advertisements and 

was not recorded consistently by coders. 67 Project staff coded all LCM advertisements by the selected distributors. Therefore, the data are

inherently weighted. However, the weights are based on the frequency with which the different LCMs

were advertised (i.e., the LCMs that were advertised most frequently have the greatest weight in the 

models) rather than by production volume. 

62 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7-1. Regression of Handgun and Rifle Large Capacity Magazine Prices on Annual 

Time Indicators, 1992-1998, Controlling for Gun Makes/Models and Distributors 

Handgun LCMs

(n=1,277) 

Rifle LCMs (n=674) 

Estimate T value Estimate T value

Constant -1.79 -12.74*** -4.10 -19.12***

1992 -0.19 -2.11** -0.48 -4.20***

1993 -0.38 -6.00*** -0.55 -6.14***

1995 0.44 6.88*** -0.25 -2.64***

1996 0.29 4.05*** -0.12 -0.93

1997 0.36 6.33*** -0.31 -3.68***

1998 0.20 3.51*** -0.44 -5.19***

Rounds (logged) 0.26 5.73*** 0.84 15.08***

Cobray -0.36 -4.15***

Glock 0.41 8.15***

Intratec -0.40 -4.18***

Ruger -0.42 -7.79***

Smith&Wesson -0.08 -1.71*

Sig-Sauer 0 -0.09

Taurus -0.31 -6.10***

AK-type -0.25 -3.15***

Colt AR-15 0.14 1.68* 

Ruger Mini-14 -0.08 -0.92 

Distributor 1 -0.72 -16.38*** -0.35 -5.15***

Distributor 2 -0.15 -0.97 -0.83 -5.24***

Distributor 3 -0.16 -3.93*** 0.19 2.69*** 

Distributor 4 -0.55 -5.72*** 0.16 0.80 

Distributor 5 -0.07 -1.79* -0.18 -2.65***

Distributor 6 -0.53 -1.23 -0.12 -0.32

Distributor 7 -1.59 -3.70*** -0.10 -0.91

Distributor 8 0.14 0.70 

Distributor 9 -0.91 -12.52*** -0.48 -4.00***

F statistic 

(p value)

58.76 

<.0001

21.22 

<.0001 

Adj. R-square 0.51 0.38

Year indicators are interpreted relative to 1994, and distributors are interpreted relative to distributor 10. 

Handgun makes are relative to Beretta and rifle models are relative to SKS. 

* Statistically significant at p<=.10. 

** Statistically significant at p<=.05. 

*** Statistically significant at p<=.01.

63 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 7-1. Annual Price Trends for Large Capacity 

Magazines, 1992-1998

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Handguns Rifles

1 = 1994 Price

Based on 1,277 sampled ads for LCMs fitting models of 8 handgun makers and 674 sampled ads for LCMs fitting 4 rifle model groups.

7.1.2. Large Capacity Magazines for Rifles

We approximated trends in the prices of LCMs for rifles by modeling the prices 

of LCMs manufactured for AR-15, Mini-14, SKS,68 and AK-type rifle models (including 

various non-banned AK-type models). As in the handgun LCM model, larger LCMs 

drew higher prices, and there were several significant model and distributor effects. AR15 magazines tended to have the highest prices, and magazines for AK-type models had 

the lowest prices (Table 7-1). 

Like their handgun counterparts, prices for rifle LCMs increased over 40% from

1993 to 1994, as the ban was debated and implemented (see Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1). 

However, prices declined over 20% in 1995. Following a rebound in 1996, prices moved 

downward again during 1997 and 1998. Prices in 1998 were over one third lower than 

the peak prices of 1994 and were comparable to pre-ban prices in 1992 and 1993. 

 

68 The SKS is a very popular imported rifle (there are Russian and Chinese versions) that was not covered 

by either the 1989 AR import ban or the 1994 AW ban. However, importation of SKS rifles from China 

was discontinued in 1994 due to trade restrictions. 

64 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
7.2. Post-Ban Importation of Large Capacity Magazines 

 

ATF does not collect (or at least does not publicize) statistics on production of 

LCMs. Therefore, we cannot clearly document pre-ban production trends. Nevertheless, 

it seems likely that gun and magazine manufacturers boosted their production of LCMs

during the debate over the ban, just as AW makers increased production of AWs. 

Regardless, gun industry sources estimated that there were 25 million LCMs available as 

of 1995 (including aftermarket items for repairing magazines or converting them to 

LCMs) (Gun Tests, 1995, p. 30). 

Moreover, the supply of LCMs continued to grow even after the ban due to 

importation of foreign LCMs that were manufactured prior to the ban (and thus 

grandfathered by the LCM legislation), according to ATF importation data.69 As shown 

in Table 7-2, nearly 4.8 million LCMs were imported for commercial sale (as opposed to 

law enforcement uses) from 1994 through 2000, with the largest number (nearly 3.7 

million) arriving in 1999.

70 During this period, furthermore, importers received 

permission to import a total of 47.2 million LCMs; consequently, an additional 42 million 

LCMs may have arrived after 2000 or still be on the way, based on just those approved 

through 2000.71, 72

To put this in perspective, gun owners in the U.S. possessed 25 million firearms

that were equipped with magazines holding 10 or more rounds as of 1994 (Cook and 

Ludwig, 1996, p. 17). Therefore, the 4.7 million LCMs imported in the U.S. from 1994 

through 2000 could conceivably replenish 19% of the LCMs that were owned at the time 

of the ban. The 47.2 million approved during this period could supply nearly 2 additional 

LCMs for all guns that were so equipped as of 1994. 

7.3. Summary and Interpretations

Prices of LCMs for handguns rose significantly around the time of the ban and, 

despite some decline from their peak levels in 1995, remained significantly higher than 

pre-ban prices through at least 1998. The increase in LCM prices for rifles proved to be 

more temporary, with prices returning to roughly pre-ban levels by 1998.73

 

69 To import LCMs into the country, importers must certify that the magazines were made prior to the ban.

(The law requires companies to mark post-ban LCMs with serial numbers.) As a practical matter, however, 

it is hard for U.S. authorities to know for certain whether imported LCMs were produced prior to the ban. 70 The data do not distinguish between handgun and rifle magazines or the specific models for which the 

LCMs were made. But note that roughly two-thirds of the LCMs imported from 1994 through 2000 had 

capacities between 11 and 19 rounds, a range that covers almost all handgun LCMs as well as many rifle 

LCMs. It seems most likely that the remaining LCMs (those with capacities of 20 or more rounds) were 

primarily for rifles. 71 The statistics in Table 7-2 do not include belt devices used for machine guns. 72 A caveat to the number of approved LCMs is that importers may overstate the number of LCMs they

have available to give themselves leeway to import additional LCMs, should they become available. 73 A caveat is that we did not examine prices of smaller magazines, so the price trends described here may

not have been entirely unique to LCMs. Yet it seems likely that these trends reflect the unique impact of 

the ban on the market for LCMs. 

65 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7-2. Large Capacity Magazines Imported into the United States or Approved 

For Importation for Commercial Sale, 1994-2000 

Year Imported Approved

1994 67,063 77,666

1995 3,776 2,066,228

1996 280,425 2,795,173

1997 99,972 1,889,773

1998 337,172 20,814,574

1999 3,663,619 13,291,593

2000 346,416 6,272,876

Total 4,798,443 47,207,883

Source: Firearms and Explosives Imports Branch, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. 

Counts do not include “links” (belt devices) or imports for law enforcement purposes. 

The drop in rifle LCM prices between 1994 and 1998 may have due to the 

simultaneous importation of approximately 788,400 grandfathered LCMs, most of which 

appear to have been rifle magazines (based on the fact that nearly two-thirds had 

capacities over 19 rounds), as well as the availability of U.S. military surplus LCMs that 

fit rifles like the AR-15 and Mini-14. We can also speculate that demand for LCMs is 

not as great among rifle consumers, who are less likely to acquire their guns for defensive 

or criminal purposes. 

The pre-ban supply of handgun LCMs may have been more constricted than the 

supply of rifle LCMs for at least a few years following the ban, based on prices from

1994 to 1998. Although there were an estimated 25 million LCMs available in the U.S. 

as of 1995, some major handgun manufacturers (including Ruger, Sig Sauer, and Glock) 

had or were close to running out of new LCMs by that time (Gun Tests, 1995, p. 30). Yet 

the frequency of advertisements for handgun LCMs during 1997 and 1998, as well as the 

drop in prices from their 1995 peak, suggests that the supply had not become particularly 

low. In 1998, for example, the selected distributors posted a combined total of 92 LCM 

ads per issue (some of which may have been for the same make, model, and capacity 

combinations) for just the handguns that we incorporated into our model.74 Perhaps the 

 

74 Project staff found substantially more advertisements per issue for 1997 and 1998 than for earlier years. 

For the LCMs studied in the handgun analysis, staff recorded an average of 412 LCM advertisements per 

year (103 per issue) during 1997 and 1998. For 1992-1996, staff recorded an average of about 100 ads per 

year (25 per issue) for the same LCMs. A similar but smaller differential existed in the volume of ads for 

the LCMs used in the rifle analysis. The increase in LCM ads over time may reflect changes in supply and 

66 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
demand for enhanced firepower among handgun consumers, who are more likely to 

acquire guns for crime or defense against crime, was also a factor (and perhaps a large 

one) putting a premium on handgun LCMs. 

Although we might hypothesize that high prices depressed use of handguns with 

LCMs for at least a few years after the ban, a qualification to this prediction is that LCM 

use may be less sensitive to prices than is use of AWs because LCMs are much less 

expensive than the firearms they complement and therefore account for a smaller fraction 

of users’ income (e.g., see Friedman, 1962). To illustrate, TEC-9 APs typically cost $260 

at retail during 1992 and 1993, while LCMs for the TEC-9, ranging in capacity from 30 

to 36 rounds, averaged $16.50 in Shotgun News advertisements (and probably $19 or less 

at retail) during the same period. So, for example, a doubling of both gun and LCM 

prices would likely have a much greater impact on purchases of TEC-9 pistols than 

purchases of LCMs for the TEC-9. Users willing and able to pay for a gun that accepts 

an LCM are most likely willing and able to pay for an LCM to use with the gun. 

Moreover, the LCM supply was enhanced considerably by a surge in LCM 

imports that occurred after the period of our price analysis. During 1999 and 2000, an 

additional 4 million grandfathered LCMs were imported into the U.S., over two-thirds of

which had capacities of 11-19 rounds, a range that covers almost all handgun LCMs (as 

well as many rifle LCMs). This may have driven prices down further after 1998. 

In sum, market indicators yield conflicting signs on the availability of LCMs. It is 

perhaps too early to expect a reduction in crimes with LCMs, considering that tens of 

millions of grandfathered LCMs were available at the time of the ban, an additional 4.8

million – enough to replenish one-fifth of those owned by civilians – were imported from

1994 through 2000, and that the elasticity of demand for LCMs may be more limited than 

that of firearms. And if the additional 42 million foreign LCMs approved for importation 

become available, there may not be a reduction in crimes with LCMs anytime in the near 

future. 

 demand for LCMs during the study period, as well as product shifts by distributors and perhaps changes in

ad formats (e.g., ads during the early period may have been more likely to list magazines by handgun

model without listing the exact capacity of each magazine, in which case coders would have been more 

likely to miss some LCMs during the early period). Because the data collection effort for the early period 

was part of a larger effort that involved coding prices in Shotgun News for LCMs and numerous banned

and non-banned firearms, it is also possible that coders were more likely to miss LCM ads during that 

period due to random factors like fatigue or time constraints. 

67 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
8. CRIMINAL USE OF LARGE CAPACITY MAGAZINES AFTER THE BAN 

Assessing trends in criminal use of LCMs is difficult. There is no national data 

source on crime guns equipped with LCMs (ATF national tracing data do not include 

information about magazines recovered with traced firearms), and, based on our contacts 

with numerous police departments over the course of this study and the first AW study, it 

seems that even those police departments that maintain electronic databases on recovered 

firearms do not typically record the capacity of the magazines with which the guns are 

equipped.75,76 Indeed, we were unable to acquire sufficient data to examine LCM use for 

the first AW study (Roth and Koper, 1997). 

For the current study, we obtained four data sources with which to investigate 

trends in criminal use of LCMs. Three of the databases utilized in the AW analysis – 

those from Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Anchorage – contained information about the 

magazines recovered with the guns (see the descriptions of these databases in Chapter 6). 

Using updated versions of these databases, we examined all LCM recoveries in Baltimore 

from 1993 through 2003, recoveries of LCMs in Milwaukee murder cases from 1991 to 

2001, and recoveries of LCMs linked to serious crimes in Anchorage (and other parts of 

Alaska) from 1992 through 2002.77 In addition, we studied records of guns and 

magazines submitted to the Jefferson Regional Forensics Lab in Louisville, Kentucky 

from 1996 through 2000. This lab of the Kentucky State Police services law enforcement 

agencies throughout roughly half of Kentucky, but most guns submitted to the lab are 

from the Louisville area. Guns examined at the lab are most typically those associated 

with serious crimes such as murders, robberies, and assaults. 

The LCM analyses and findings were not as uniform across locations as were 

those for AWs. Therefore, we discuss each site separately. As in the AW analysis, we 

emphasize changes in the percentage of guns equipped with LCMs to control for overall 

trends in gun crime and gun recoveries. Because gun crime was falling during the latter 

1990s, we anticipated that the number of guns recovered with LCMs might decline 

independently of the ban’s impact. (Hereafter, we refer to guns equipped with LCMs as 

LCM guns.) 

 

75 For the pre-ban period, one can usually infer magazine capacity based on the firearm model. For postban recoveries, this is more problematic because gun models capable of accepting LCMs may have been

equipped with grandfathered LCMs or with post-ban magazines designed to fit the same gun but holding 

fewer rounds. 76 As for the AW analysis in Chapter 6, we utilize police data to examine trends in criminal use of LCMs. 

The reader is referred to the general discussion of police gun seizure data in Chapter 6. 77 Findings presented in our 2002 interim report (Koper and Roth, 2002b) indicated that LCM use had not

declined as of the late 1990s. Therefore, we sought to update the LCM analyses where possible for this 

version of the report. 

68 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
8.1. Baltimore 

 

In Baltimore, about 14% of guns recovered by police were LCM guns in 1993. 

This figure remained relatively stable for a few years after the ban but had dropped 

notably by 2002 and 2003 (Figure 8-1). For the entire post-ban period (1995-2003), 

recoveries of LCM guns were down 8% relative to those of guns with smaller magazines 

(Table 8-1, panel A), a change of borderline statistical significance. Focusing on the 

most recent years, however, LCM gun recoveries were 24% lower in 2002 and 2003 than 

during the year prior to the ban, a difference that was clearly significant (Table 8-1, panel 

B).78,79,80 This change was attributable to a 36% drop in LCM handguns (Table 8-1, 

panel C). LCM rifles actually increased 36% as a share of crime guns, although they still 

accounted for no more than 3% in 2002 and 2003 (Table 8-1, panel D).81

Yet there was no decline in recoveries of LCM guns used in violent crimes (i.e., 

murders, shootings, robberies, and other assaults). After the ban, the percentage of 

violent crime guns with LCMs generally oscillated in a range consistent with the pre-ban 

level (14%) and hit peaks of roughly 16% to 17% in 1996 and 2003 (Figure 8-1).82 

Whether comparing the pre-ban period to the entire post-ban period (1995-2003) or the 

most recent years (2002-2003), there was no meaningful decline in LCM recoveries 

linked to violent crimes (Table 8-2, panels A and B).83 Neither violent uses of LCM 

 

78 Data on handgun magazines were also available for 1992. An auxiliary analysis of those data did not 

change the substantive inferences described in the text. 79 The Maryland AP ban enacted in June 1994 also prohibited ammunition magazines holding over 20

rounds and did not permit additional sales or transfers of such magazines manufactured prior to the ban. 

This ban, as well as the Maryland and federal bans on AWs that account for many of the guns with

magazines over 20 rounds, may have contributed to the downward trend in LCMs in Baltimore, but only

2% of the guns recovered in Baltimore from 1993 to 2000 were equipped with such magazines. 80 All comparisons of 1993 to 2002-2003 in the Baltimore data are based on information from the months

of January through November of each year. At the time we received these data, information was not yet 

available for December 2003, and preliminary analysis revealed that guns with LCMs were somewhat less 

likely to be recovered in December than in other months for years prior to 2003. Nevertheless, utilizing the 

December data for 1993 and 2002 did not change the substantive inferences. We did not remove December 

data from the comparisons of 1993 and the full post-ban period because those comparisons seemed less 

likely to be influenced by the absence of one month of data. 81 This increase may have been due largely to a general increase in rifle seizures. LCM rifles actually 

dropped as a percentage of all rifle recoveries from 1993 to 2002-2003, suggesting that recoveries of LCM

rifles were increasing less than recoveries of other rifles. 82 For 1996, 45% of all records and 24% of those linked to violent crimes had missing data for magazine

capacity (due to temporary changes in operational procedures in the Baltimore crime lab). For other years, 

missing data rates were no more than 6%. Based on those cases for which data were available, the share of

guns with LCMs in 1996 was comparable to that in other years, particularly when examining all gun

recoveries. At any rate, the analyses focusing on 1993, 2002, and 2003 reinforce the findings of those that 

include the 1996 data. 83 The ammunition capacity code in the Baltimore data usually reflected the full capacity of the magazine 

and weapon, but sometimes reflected the capacity of the magazine only. (For instance, a semiautomatic 

with a 10-round magazine and the ability to accept one additional round in the chamber might have been 

coded as having a capacity of 10 or 11.) Informal assessment suggested that capacity was more likely to 

reflect the exact capacity of the magazine in the early years of the database and more likely to reflect the 

full capacity of the gun and magazine in later years. For the main runs presented in the text and tables, 

guns were counted as having LCMs if the coded capacity was greater than 11 rounds. This ensured that

LCMs were not overestimated, but it potentially understated LCM prevalence, particularly for the earlier 

69 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
handguns or LCM rifles had declined appreciably by 2002-2003 (Table 8-2, panels C and 

D). Hence, the general decline in LCM recoveries may reflect differences in the 

availability and use of LCMs among less serious offenders, changes in police practices,84

or other factors. 

Figure 8-1. Police Recoveries of Guns Equipped With Large 

Capacity Magazines in Baltimore, 1993-2003

0

5

10

15

20

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

All guns Violent crime guns

As % of Recovered Guns (N=33,403)

 years. However, coding the guns as LCM weapons based on a threshold of 10 (i.e., a coded capacity over 

10 rounds) in 1993 and a threshold of 11 (i.e., a coded capacity over 11 rounds) for 2002-2003 did not

change the inferences of the violent crime analysis. Further, this coding increased the pre-ban prevalence

of LCMs by very little (about 4% in relative terms). 84 During the late 1990s, for example, Baltimore police put greater emphasis on detecting illegal gun

carrying (this statement is based on prior research and interviews the author has done in Baltimore as well 

as the discussion in Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, 1998). One can hypothesize that this effort

reduced the fraction of recovered guns with LCMs because illegal gun carriers are probably more likely to

carry smaller, more concealable handguns that are less likely to have LCMs. 

70 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8-1. Trends in All Police Recoveries of Firearms Equipped With Large 

Capacity Magazines, Baltimore, 1993-2003 

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change

A. All LCM Guns Jan.-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Nov. 2003 

Total 473 3703 

Annual Mean 473 445.86 a -6% 

LCM Guns as % of All 

Guns 

13.51% 12.38% -8%* 

B. All LCM Guns Jan.-Nov. 1993 Jan.-Nov. 2002-2003 

Total 430 626

Annual Mean 430 313 -27% 

LCM Guns as % of All 

Guns 

13.47% 10.3% -24%***

C. LCM Handguns Jan.-Nov. 1993 Jan.-Nov. 2002-2003 

Total 359 440

Annual Mean 359 220 -39% 

LCM Handguns as % of 

All Guns 

11.25% 7.24% -36%***

D. LCM Rifles Jan.-Nov. 1993 Jan.-Nov. 2002-2003 

LCM Rifles 71 183

Annual Mean 71 91.5 29%

LCM Rifles as % of All 

Guns 

2.22% 3.01% 36%**

a. Annual average calculated without 1996 and 2003 (to correct for missing months or missing magazine 

data). 

* Chi-square p level < .10 (changes in percentages of guns equipped with LCMs were tested for statistical

significance) 

** Chi-square p level <.05 (changes in percentages of guns equipped with LCMs were tested for statistical 

significance) 

** Chi-square p level < .01 (changes in percentages of guns equipped with LCMs were tested for statistical 

significance) 

71 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8-2. Trends in Police Recoveries of Firearms Equipped With Large Capacity 

Magazines in Violent Crime Cases, Baltimore, 1993-2003 

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change a

A. All LCM Guns Jan.-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Nov. 2003 

Total 87 711 

Annual Mean 87 81.86 b -6% 

LCM Guns as % of All 

Guns 

14.01% 14.44% 3% 

B. All LCM Guns Jan.-Nov. 1993 Jan.-Nov. 2002-2003 

Total 79 104

Annual Mean 79 52 -34% 

LCM Guns as % of All 

Guns 

13.96% 13.65% -2%

C. LCM Handguns Jan.-Nov. 1993 Jan.-Nov. 2002-2003 

Total 62 81

Annual Mean 62 40.5 -35% 

LCM Handguns as % of 

All Guns 

10.95% 10.63% -3%

D. LCM Rifles Jan.-Nov. 1993 Jan.-Nov. 2002-2003 

LCM Rifles 17 23

Annual Mean 17 11.5 -32%

LCM Rifles as % of All 

Guns 

3% 3.02% 1%

a. Changes in the percentages of guns with LCMs were statistically insignificant in chi-square tests. 

b. Annual average calculated without 1996 and 2003 (to correct for missing months or missing magazine 

data). 

72 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
8.2. Anchorage 

In the Alaska database, magazine capacity was recorded only for guns recovered 

during the post-ban years, 1995 through 2002. However, we estimated pre-ban use of 

LCM handguns by identifying handgun models inspected during 1992 and 1993 that were 

manufactured with LCMs prior to the ban.85 This permitted an assessment of pre-post 

changes in the use of LCM handguns. 

As shown in Figure 8-2 (also see Table 8-3, panel A), LCM guns rose from 14.5% 

of crime guns in 1995-1996 to 24% in 2000-2001 (we present two-year averages because 

the sample are relatively small, particularly for the most recent years) and averaged about 

20% for the entire post-ban period. LCM handguns drove much of this trend, but LCM 

rifles also increased from about 3% of crime guns in 1995-96 to 11% in 2000-2001. 

Figure 8-2. Police Recoveries of Guns Equipped With Large 

Capacity Magazines in Anchorage (Alaska), 1995-2002

0

5

10

15

20

25

1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002

As % of Guns Submitted for Evidentiary Testing (N=405)

Two year averages.

 

85 To make these determinations, we consulted gun catalogs such as the Blue Book of Gun Values and 

Guns Illustrated.

73 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8-3. Trends in Police Recoveries of Firearms Equipped With Large Capacity 

Magazines in Violent Crime Cases, Anchorage (Alaska), 1992-2002 a

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change b

A. All LCM Guns 

N/A Jan. 1995-Dec. 2002 

Total 80 

Annual Mean 10 N/A 

LCM Guns as % of All 

Guns 

19.75% N/A 

B. LCM Handguns Jan. 1992-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 2002 

Total 17 57

Annual Mean 8.5 7.13 -16% 

LCM Handguns as % All 

Handguns 

26.15% 22.35% -15%

C. LCM Handguns Jan. 1992-Dec. 1993 Jan. 2001-Dec. 2002 

Total 17 10

Annual Mean 8.5 5 -41% 

LCM Handguns as % of 

All Handguns 

26.15% 19.23% -26%

a. Based on guns submitted to State Police for evidentiary testing.

b. Changes in the percentages of guns equipped with LCMs were statistically insignificant in chi-square tests. 

Investigation of pre-post changes for handguns revealed an inconsistent pattern 

(Figure 8-3). LCM handguns dropped initially after the ban, declining from 26% of 

handguns in 1992-1993 to 18% in 1995-1996. However, they rebounded after 1996, 

reaching a peak of 30% of handguns in 1999-2000 before declining to 19% in 2001-2002. 

For the entire post-ban period, the share of handguns with LCMs was about 15% 

lower than in the pre-ban period (Table 8-3, panel B). By the two most recent post-ban 

years (2001-2002), LCM use had dropped 26% from the pre-ban years (Table 8-3, panel 

C). These changes were not statistically significant, but the samples of LCM handguns 

were rather small for rigorous statistical testing. Even so, it seems premature to conclude 

74 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
that there has been a lasting reduction in LCM use in Alaska. LCM use in 2001-2002 

was somewhat higher than that immediately following the ban in 1995-1996, after which 

there was a substantial rebound. Considering the inconsistency of post-ban patterns, 

further follow-up seems warranted before making definitive conclusions about LCM use 

in Alaska. 

Figure 8-3. Police Recoveries of Handguns Equipped With

Large Capacity Magazines in Anchorage (Alaska), 1992-2002

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1992-1993 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002

As % of Handguns Submitted for Evidentiary Testing (N=319)

Two-year averages. Data for 1994 excluded.

8.3. Milwaukee 

LCM guns accounted for 21% of guns recovered in Milwaukee murder 

investigations from 1991 to 1993 (Table 8-4, panel A). Following the ban, this figure 

rose until reaching a plateau of over 36% in 1997 and 1998 (Figure 8-4). On average, the 

share of guns with LCMs grew 55% from 1991-1993 to 1995-1998, a trend that was 

driven by LCM handguns (Table 8-4, panels A and B).86 LCM rifles held steady at 

between 4% and 5% of the guns (Table 8-4, panel C). 

We also analyzed a preliminary database on 48 guns used in murders during 2000 

and 2001 (unlike the 1991-1998 database, this database did not include information on 

other guns recovered during the murder investigations). About 11% of these guns were 

LCM guns, as compared to 19% of guns used in murders from 1991 to 1993 (analyses 

not shown). However, nearly a quarter of the 2000-2001 records were missing 

information on magazine capacity.87 Examination of the types and models of guns with 

 

86 LCM guns also increased as share of guns that were used in the murders (the full sample results 

discussed in the text include all guns recovered during the investigations). 87 Magazine capacity was missing for less than 4% of the records in earlier years. 

75 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
unidentified magazines suggested that as many as 17% of guns used in murders during 

2000 and 2001 may have been LCM guns (based on all those that either had LCMs, were 

models sold with LCMs prior to the ban, or were unidentified semiautomatics). While 

this still suggests a drop in LCM use from the peak levels of the late 1990s (26% of guns 

used in murders from 1995 to 1998 had LCMs), it is not clear that LCM use has declined 

significantly below pre-ban levels. 

Table 8-4. Trends in Police Recoveries of Firearms Equipped With Large Capacity 

Magazines in Murder Cases, Milwaukee County, 1991-1998 

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change

A. All LCM Guns 

Jan. 1991-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 1998 

Total 51 83

Annual Mean 17 20.75 22% 

LCM Guns as % of All 

Guns 

20.9% 32.42% 55%*

B. LCM Handguns Jan. 1991-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 1998 

Total 40 71

Annual Mean 13.33 17.75 33%

LCM Handguns as % of 

All Guns 

16.39% 27.73% 69%*

C. LCM Rifles Jan. 1991-Dec. 1993 Jan. 1995-Dec. 1998 

Total 11 12

Annual Mean 3.67 3 -18%

LCM Rifles as % of All 

Guns 

4.51% 4.69% 4%

* Chi-square p level < .01 (changes in percentages of guns equipped with LCMs were tested for statistical

significance) 

76 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 8-4. Recoveries of Guns Equipped With Large Capacity

Magazines in Milwaukee County Murder Cases, 1991-1998

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

As % of Guns Recovered in Murder Cases (N=571)

8.4. Louisville 

The Louisville LCM data are all post-ban (1996-2000), so we cannot make prepost comparisons. Nonetheless, the share of crime guns with LCMs in Louisville (24%) 

was within the range of that observed in the other cities during this period. And similar 

to post-ban trends in the other sites, LCM recoveries peaked in 1997 before leveling off 

and remaining steady through the year 2000 (Figure 8-5). LCM rifles dropped 21% as a 

share of crime guns between 1996 and 2000 (analyses not shown), but there were few in 

the database, and they never accounted for more than 6.2% of guns in any year. 

77 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 8-5. Police Recoveries of Guns Equipped With Large 

Capacity Magazines in Louisville (Kentucky), 1996-2000

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

As % of Guns Submitted for Evidentiary Testing (N=681)

Year 2000 data are not for the full year.

8.5. Summary 

Despite a doubling of handgun LCM prices between 1993 and 1995 and a 40% 

increase in rifle LCM prices from 1993 to 1994, criminal use of LCMs was rising or 

steady through at least the latter 1990s, based on police recovery data from four 

jurisdictions studied in this chapter. These findings are also consistent with an earlier 

study finding no decline in seizures of LCM guns from juveniles in Washington, DC in 

the year after the ban (Koper, 2001).88 Post-2000 data, though more limited and 

inconsistent, suggest that LCM use may be dropping from peak levels of the late 1990s 

but provide no definitive evidence of a drop below pre-ban levels.89 These trends have 

been driven primarily by LCM handguns, which are used in crime roughly three times as 

 

88 From 1991 to 1993, 16.4% of guns recovered from juveniles in Washington, DC had LCMs (14.2% had 

LCMs in 1993). In 1995, this percentage increased to 17.1%. We did not present these findings in this 

chapter because the data were limited to guns recovered from juveniles, the post-ban data series was very 

short, and the gun markets supplying DC and Baltimore are likely to have much overlap (Maryland is a 

leading supplier of guns to DC – see ATF, 1997; 1999). 

89 We reran selected key analyses with the Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Louisville data after excluding .22 

caliber guns, some of which could have been equipped with attached tubular magazines that are exempted 

from the LCM ban, and obtained results consistent with those reported in the text. It was possible to

identify these exempted magazines in the Anchorage data. When they were removed from Anchorage’s 

LCM count, the general pattern in use of banned LCMs was similar to that presented in the main 1995-

2002 analysis: guns with banned LCMs rose, reaching a peak of 21% of crime guns in 1999-2000, before

declining slightly to 19% in 2001-2002. 

78 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
often as LCM rifles. Nonetheless, there has been no consistent reduction in the use of 

LCM rifles either. 

The observed patterns are likely due to several factors: a hangover from pre-ban 

growth in the production and marketing of LCM guns (Cook and Ludwig, 1997, pp. 5-6; 

Wintemute, 1996);90 the low cost of LCMs relative to the firearms they complement, 

which seems to make LCM use less sensitive to prices than is firearm use;91 the utility 

that gun users, particularly handgun users, attach to LCMs; a plentiful supply of 

grandfathered LCMs, likely enhanced by a pre-ban surge in production (though this has 

not been documented) and the importation of millions of foreign LCMs since the ban;

92

thefts of LCM firearms (see Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 4); or some combination of 

these factors.

93 However, it is worth noting that our analysis did not reveal an upswing in 

use of LCM guns following the surge of LCM importation in 1999 (see the previous 

chapter). It remains to be seen whether recent imports will have a demonstrable effect on 

patterns of LCM use. 

Finally, we must be cautious in generalizing these results to the nation because 

they are based on a small number of non-randomly selected jurisdictions. Nonetheless, 

the consistent failure to find clear evidence of a pre-post drop in LCM use across these 

geographically diverse locations strengthens the inference that the findings are indicative 

of a national pattern. 

 

90 To illustrate this trend, 38% of handguns acquired by gun owners during 1993 and 1994 were equipped

with magazines holding 10 or more rounds, whereas only 14% of handguns acquired before 1993 were so

equipped (Cook and Ludwig, 1997, pp. 5-6). 91 Although elevated post-ban prices did not suppress use of LCMs, a more subtle point is that LCM use 

rose in most of these locations between 1995 and 1998, as LCM prices were falling from their peak levels 

of 1994-1995. Therefore, LCM use may have some sensitivity to price trends. 92 However, we do not have the necessary data to determine if LCMs used in crime after the ban were 

acquired before or after the ban. 

93 In light of these considerations, it is conceivable that the ban slowed the rate of growth in LCM use, 

accelerated it temporarily (due to a pre-ban production boom), or had no effect. We do not have the data

necessary to examine this issue rigorously. Moreover, the issue might be regarded as somewhat

superfluous; the more critical point would seem to be that nearly a decade after the ban, LCM use has still 

not declined demonstrably below pre-ban levels. 

79 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
9. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMES WITH ASSAULT WEAPONS AND 

LARGE CAPACITY MAGAZINES 

One of the primary considerations motivating passage of the ban on AWs and 

LCMs was a concern over the perceived dangerousness of these guns and magazines. In 

principal, semiautomatic weapons with LCMs enable offenders to fire high numbers of 

shots rapidly, thereby potentially increasing both the number of person wounded per 

gunfire incident (including both intended targets and innocent bystanders) and the 

number of gunshot victims suffering multiple wounds, both of which would increase 

deaths and injuries from gun violence. Ban advocates also argued that the banned AWs 

possessed additional features conducive to criminal applications. 

The findings of the previous chapters suggest that it is premature to make 

definitive assessments of the ban’s impact on gun violence. Although criminal use of 

AWs has declined since the ban, this reduction was offset through at least the late 1990s 

by steady or rising use of other guns equipped with LCMs. As argued previously, the 

LCM ban has greater potential for reducing gun deaths and injuries than does the AW

ban. Guns with LCMs – of which AWs are only a subset – were used in up to 25% of 

gun crimes before the ban, whereas AWs were used in no more than 8% (Chapter 3). 

Furthermore, an LCM is arguably the most important feature of an AW. Hence, use of 

guns with LCMs is probably more consequential than use of guns with other militarystyle features, such as flash hiders, folding rifle stocks, threaded barrels for attaching a 

silencers, and so on.94

This is not to say that reducing use of AWs will have no effect on gun crime; a 

decline in the use of AWs does imply fewer crimes with guns having particularly large 

magazines (20 or more rounds) and other military-style features that could facilitate some

crimes. However, it seems that any such effects would be outweighed, or at least 

 

94 While it is conceivable that changing features of AWs other than their magazines might prevent some

gunshot victimizations, available data provide little if any empirical basis for judging the likely size of such 

effects. Speculatively, some of the most beneficial weapon redesigns may be the removal of folding stocks 

and pistol grips from rifles. It is plausible that some offenders who cannot obtain rifles with folding stocks 

(which make the guns more concealable) might switch to handguns, which are more concealable but 

generally cause less severe wounds (e.g. see DiMaio, 1985). However, such substitution patterns cannot be

predicted with certainty. Police gun databases rarely have information sufficiently detailed to make

assessments of changes over time in the use of weapons with specific features like folding stocks. Based 

on informal assessments, there was no consistent pattern in post-ban use of rifles (as a share of crime guns) 

in the local databases examined in the prior chapters (also see the specific comments on LCM rifles in the 

previous chapters). 

Pistol grips enhance the ability of shooters to maintain control of a rifle during rapid, “spray and

pray” firing (e.g., see Violence Policy Center, 2003). (Heat shrouds and forward handgrips on APs serve 

the same function.) While this feature may prove useful in military contexts (e.g., firefights among groups

at 100 meters or less – see data of the U.S. Army’s Operations Research Office as cited in Violence Policy 

Center, 2003), it is unknown whether civilian attacks with semiautomatic rifles having pistol grips claim

more victims per attack than do those with other semiautomatic rifles. At any rate, most post-ban AR-type 

rifles still have pistol grips. Further, the ban does not count a stock thumbhole grip, which serves the same 

function as a pistol grip (e.g., see the illustration of LCMM rifles in Chapter 2), as an AR feature. 

80 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
obscured, by the wider effects of LCM use, which themselves are likely to be small at 

best, as we argue below.95

Because offenders can substitute non-banned guns and small magazines for 

banned AWs and LCMs, there is not a clear rationale for expecting the ban to reduce 

assaults and robberies with guns.96 But by forcing AW and LCM offenders to substitute 

non-AWs with small magazines, the ban might reduce the number of shots fired per gun 

attack, thereby reducing both victims shot per gunfire incident and gunshot victims 

sustaining multiple wounds. In the following sections, we consider the evidence linking

high-capacity semiautomatics and AWs to gun violence and briefly examine recent trends 

in lethal and injurious gun violence. 

9.1. The Spread of Semiautomatic Weaponry and Trends in Lethal and Injurious 

Gun Violence Prior to the Ban 

 

Nationally, semiautomatic handguns grew from 28% of handgun production in 

1973 to 80% in 1993 (Zawitz, 1995, p. 3). Most of this growth occurred from the late 

1980s onward, during which time the gun industry also increased marketing and 

production of semiautomatics with LCMs (Wintemute, 1996). Likewise, semiautomatics 

grew as a percentage of crime guns (Koper, 1995; 1997), implying an increase in the 

average firing rate and ammunition capacity of guns used in crime.97

 

95 On a related note, a few studies suggest that state-level AW bans have not reduced crime (Koper and 

Roth, 2001a; Lott, 2003). This could be construed as evidence that the federal AW ban will not reduce 

gunshot victimizations without reducing LCM use because the state bans tested in those studies, as written

at the time, either lacked LCM bans or had LCM provisions that were less restrictive than that of the 

federal ban. (New Jersey’s 1990 AW ban prohibited magazines holding more than 15 rounds. AP bans 

passed by Maryland and Hawaii prohibited magazines holding more than 20 rounds and pistol magazines 

holding more than 10 rounds, respectively, but these provisions did not take effect until just a few months 

prior to the federal ban.) However, it is hard to draw definitive conclusions from these studies for a number 

of reasons, perhaps the most salient of which are the following: there is little evidence on how state AW 

bans affect the availability and use of AWs (the impact of these laws is likely undermined to some degree 

by the influx of AWs from other states, a problem that was probably more pronounced prior to the federal

ban when the state laws were most relevant); studies have not always examined the effects of these laws on

gun homicides and shootings, the crimes that are arguably most likely to be affected by AW bans (see 

discussion in the main text); and the state AW bans that were passed prior to the federal ban (those in

California, New Jersey, Hawaii, Connecticut, and Maryland) were in effect for only three months to five

years (two years or less in most cases) before the imposition of the federal ban, after which they became 

largely redundant with the federal legislation and their effects more difficult to predict and estimate. 96 One might hypothesize that the firepower provided by AWs and other semiautomatics with LCMs

emboldens some offenders to engage in aggressive behaviors that prompt more shooting incidents. On the

other hand, these weapons might also prevent some acts of violence by intimidating adversaries, thus 

discouraging attacks or resistance. We suspect that firepower does influence perceptions, considering that 

many police departments have upgraded their weaponry in recent years – often adopting semiautomatics 

with LCMs – because their officers felt outgunned by offenders. However, hypotheses about gun types and 

offender behavior are very speculative, and, pending additional research on such issues, it seems prudent to

focus on indicators with stronger theoretical and empirical foundations. 97 Revolvers, the most common type of non-semiautomatic handgun, typically hold only 5 or 6 rounds (and

sometimes up to 9). Semiautomatic pistols, in contrast, hold ammunition in detachable magazines that, 

prior to the ban, typically held 5 to 17 bullets and sometimes upwards of 30 (Murtz et al., 1994). 

81 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The impact of this trend is debatable. Although the gun homicide rate rose 

considerably during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994, p. 

13), the percentage of violent gun crimes resulting in death was declining (see Figure 9-1 

and the related discussion in section 9.3). Similarly, the percentage of victims killed or 

wounded in handgun discharge incidents declined from 27% during the 1979-1987 period 

to 25% for the 1987-1992 period (calculated from Rand, 1990, p. 5; 1994, p. 2) as 

semiautomatics were becoming more common crime weapons.98 On the other hand, an 

increasing percentage of gunshot victims died from 1992 to 1995 according to hospital 

data (Cherry et al., 1998), a trend that could have been caused in part by a higher number 

of gunshot victims with multiple wounds (also see McGonigal et al., 1993). Most 

notably, the case fatality rate for assaultive gunshot cases involving 15 to 24-year-old 

males rose from 15.9% in late 1993 to 17.5% in early 1995 (p. 56). 

Figure 9-1. Percentage of Violent Gun Crimes Resulting in

Death (National), 1982-2002

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Based on gun homicides, gun robberies, and gun assaults reported in the Uniform Crime Reports and Supplemental Homicide Reports.

 

98 A related point is that there was a general upward trend in the average number of shots fired by 

offenders in gunfights with New York City police from the late 1980s through 1992 (calculated from

Goehl, 1993, p. 51). However, the average was no higher during this time than during many years of the 

early 1980s and 1970s. 

82 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Some researchers have inferred links between the growing use of semiautomatics 

in crime and the rise of both gun homicides and bystander shootings in a number of cities 

during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Block and Block, 1993; McGonigal et al., 1993; 

Sherman et al., 1989; Webster et al., 1992). A study in Washington, DC, for example, 

reported increases in wounds per gunshot victim and gunshot patient mortality during the 

1980s that coincided with a reported increase in the percentage of crime guns that were 

semiautomatics (Webster et al., 1992). 

Nevertheless, changes in offender behavior, coupled with other changes in crime 

guns (e.g., growing use of large caliber handguns – see Caruso et al., 1999; Koper, 1995; 

1997; Wintemute, 1996), may have been key factors driving such trends. Washington, 

DC, for example, was experiencing an exploding crack epidemic at the time of the 

aforementioned study, and this may have raised the percentage of gun attacks in which 

offenders had a clear intention to injure or kill their victims. Moreover, studies that 

attempted to make more explicit links between the use of semiautomatic firearms and 

trends in lethal gun violence via time series analysis failed to produce convincing 

evidence of such links (Koper, 1995; 1997). However, none of the preceding research 

related specific trends in the use of AWs or LCMs to trends in lethal gun violence. 

9.2. Shots Fired in Gun Attacks and the Effects of Weaponry on Attack Outcomes 

 

The evidence most directly relevant to the potential of the AW-LCM ban to 

reduce gun deaths and injuries comes from studies examining shots fired in gun attacks 

and/or the outcomes of attacks involving different types of guns. Unfortunately, such 

evidence is very sparse.

As a general point, the faster firing rate and larger ammunition capacities of 

semiautomatics, especially those equipped with LCMs, have the potential to affect the 

outcomes of many gun attacks because gun offenders are not particularly good shooters. 

Offenders wounded their victims in no more than 29% of gunfire incidents according to 

national, pre-ban estimates (computed from Rand, 1994, p. 2; also see estimates 

presented later in this chapter). Similarly, a study of handgun assaults in one city 

revealed a 31% hit rate per shot, based on the sum totals of all shots fired and wounds 

inflicted (Reedy and Koper, 2003, p. 154). Other studies have yielded hit rates per shot 

ranging from 8% in gunfights with police (Goehl, 1993, p. 8) to 50% in mass murders 

(Kleck, 1997, p. 144). Even police officers, who are presumably certified and regularly 

re-certified as proficient marksman and who are almost certainly better shooters than are 

average gun offenders, hit their targets with only 22% to 39% of their shots (Kleck, 1991, 

p. 163; Goehl, 1993). Therefore, the ability to deliver more shots rapidly should raise the 

likelihood that offenders hit their targets, not to mention innocent bystanders.99

 

99 However, some argue that this capability is offset to some degree by the effects of recoil on shooter aim,

the limited number of shots fired in most criminal attacks (see below), and the fact that criminals using 

non-semiautomatics or semiautomatics with small magazines usually have the time and ability to deliver 

multiple shots if desired (Kleck, 1991, pp. 78-79). 

83 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A few studies have compared attacks with semiautomatics, sometimes specifically 

those with LCMs (including AWs), to other gun assaults in terms of shots fired, persons 

hit, and wounds inflicted (see Tables 9-1 and 9-2). The most comprehensive of these 

studies examined police reports of attacks with semiautomatic pistols and revolvers in 

Jersey City, New Jersey from 1992 through 1996 (Reedy and Koper, 2003), finding that 

use of pistols resulted in more shots fired and higher numbers of gunshot victims (Table 

9-1), though not more gunshot wounds per victim (Table 9-2).100 Results implied there

would have been 9.4% fewer gunshot victims overall had semiautomatics not been used 

in any of the attacks. Similarly, studies of gun murders in Philadelphia (see McGonigal 

et al., 1993 in Table 9-1) and a number of smaller cities in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Iowa 

(see Richmond et al., 2003 in Table 9-2) found that attacks with semiautomatics resulted 

in more shots fired and gunshot wounds per victim. An exception is that the differential 

in shots fired between pistol and revolver cases in Philadelphia during 1990 did not exist 

for cases that occurred in 1985, when semiautomatics and revolvers had been fired an 

average of 1.6 and 1.9 times, respectively. It is not clear whether the increase in shots 

fired for pistol cases from 1985 to 1990 was due to changes in offender behavior, changes 

in the design or quality of pistols (especially an increase in the use of models with LCMs 

– see Wintemute, 1996), the larger sample for 1990, or other factors. 

 

100 But unlike other studies that have examined wounds per victim (see Table 9-2), this study relied on

police reports of wounds inflicted rather than medical reports, which are likely to be more accurate. 

84 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9-1. Shots Fired and Victims Hit in Gunfire Attacks By Type of Gun and 

Magazine 

Data Source Measure Outcome

Gun attacks with 

semiautomatic pistols and 

revolvers, Jersey City, 1992-

1996 a

Shots Fired Avg. = 3.2 – 3.7 (n=165 pistol cases) * 

Avg. = 2.3 – 2.6 (n=71 revolver cases) * 

Gun homicides with 

semiautomatic pistols and 

revolvers, Philadelphia, 1985 

and 1990 b

Shots Fired Avg. = 1.6 (n=21 pistol cases, 1985) 

Avg. = 1.9 (n=57 revolver cases, 1985) 

Avg. = 2.7 (n=95 pistol cases, 1990) 

Avg. = 2.1 (n=108 revolver cases, 1990) 

Gun attacks with 

semiautomatic pistols and 

revolvers, Jersey City, 1992-

1996 a 

Victims Hit Avg. = 1.15 (n=95 pistol cases) * 

Avg. = 1.0 (n=40 revolver cases) * 

Mass shootings with AWs, 

semiautomatics having LCMs, 

or other guns, 6+ dead or 12+ 

shot, United States, 

1984-1993 c

Victims Hit Avg. = 29 (n=6 AW/LCM cases) 

Avg. = 13 (n=9 non-AW/LCM cases) 

Self-reported gunfire attacks 

by state prisoners with AWs, 

other semiautomatics, and nonsemiautomatic firearms,

United States, 1997 or earlier d

% of Attacks 

With Victims 

Hit 

19.5% (n=72 AW or machine gun cases) 

22.3% (n=419 non-AW, semiautomatic 

cases) 

23.3% (n=608 non-AW, nonsemiautomatic cases)

a. Reedy and Koper (2003)

b. McGonigal et al. (1993) 

c. Figures calculated by Koper and Roth (2001a) based on data presented by Kleck (1997, p. 144)

d. Calculated from Harlow (2001, p. 11). (Sample sizes are based on unpublished information provided

by the author of the survey report.)

* Pistol/revolver differences statistically significant at p<.05 (only Reedy and Koper [2003] and Harlow

[2001] tested for statistically significant differences). The shots fired ranges in Reedy and Koper are based 

on minimum and maximum estimates.

85 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9-2. Gunshot Wounds Per Victim By Type of Gun and Magazine 

Data Source Measure Outcome 

Gun attacks with semiautomatic 

pistols and revolvers, Jersey 

City, 1992-1996 a

Gunshot 

Wounds 

Avg. = 1.4 (n=107 pistol victims) 

Avg. = 1.5 (n=40 revolver victims) 

Gun homicides with 

semiautomatic pistols and 

revolvers, Iowa City (IA), 

Youngstown (OH), and 

Bethlehem (PA), 1994-1998 b

Gunshot 

Wounds 

Avg. = 4.5 total (n=212 pistol victims)* 

Avg. = 2.9 entry 

Avg. = 2.0 total (n=63 revolver victims)* 

Avg. = 1.5 entry 

Gun homicides with assault 

weapons (AWs), guns having 

large capacity magazines

(LCMs), and other firearms, 

Milwaukee, 1992-1995 c 

Gunshot 

Wounds 

Avg. = 3.23 (n=30 LCM victims) ** 

Avg. = 3.14 (n=7 AW victims) 

Avg. = 2.08 (n=102 non-AW/LCM victims)** 

a. Reedy and Koper (2003)

b. Richmond et al. (2003) 

c. Roth and Koper (1997, Chapter 6) 

* Pistol/revolver differences statistically significant at p<.01. 

** The basic comparison between LCM victims and non-AW/LCM victims was moderately significant

(p<.10) with a one-tailed test. Regression results (with a slightly modified sample) revealed a difference

significant at p=.05 (two-tailed test). Note that the non-LCM group included a few cases involving nonbanned LCMs (.22 caliber attached tubular devices).

Also, a national survey of state prisoners found that, contrary to expectations, 

offenders who reported firing on victims with AWs and other semiautomatics were no 

more likely to report having killed or injured victims than were other gun offenders who 

reported firing on victims (Table 9-1). However, the measurement of guns used and 

attack outcomes were arguably less precise in this study, which was based on offender 

self-reports, than in other studies utilizing police and medical reports.101

Attacks with AWs or other guns with LCMs may be particularly lethal and 

injurious, based on very limited evidence. In mass shooting incidents (defined as those in 

which at least 6 persons were killed or at least 12 were wounded) that occurred during the 

decade preceding the ban, offenders using AWs and other semiautomatics with LCMs 

(sometimes in addition to other guns) claimed an average of 29 victims in comparison to 

an average of 13 victims for other cases (Table 9-1). (But also see the study discussed in 

the preceding paragraph in regards to victims hit in AW cases.) 

Further, a study of Milwaukee homicide victims from 1992 through 1995 revealed 

that those killed with AWs were shot 3.14 times on average, while those killed with any 

 

101 See the discussion of self-reports and AW use in Chapter 3. 

86 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gun having an LCM were shot 3.23 times on average (Table 9-2). In contrast, victims 

shot with guns having small magazines had only 2.1 wounds on average. If such a 

wound differential can be generalized to other gun attacks – if, that is, both fatal and nonfatal LCM gunshot victims are generally hit one or more extra times – then LCM use 

could have a considerable effect on the number of gunshot victims who die. To illustrate, 

the fatality rate among gunshot victims in Jersey City during the 1990s was 63% higher 

for those shot twice than for those shot once (26% to 16%) (Koper and Roth, 2001a; 

2001b). Likewise, fatality rates are 61% higher for patients with multiple chest wounds 

than for patients with a single chest wound (49% to 30.5%), based on a Washington, DC 

study (Webster et al., 1992, p. 696). 

Similar conclusions can also be inferred indirectly from the types of crimes 

involving LCM guns. To illustrate, handguns associated with gunshot victimizations in 

Baltimore (see the description of the Baltimore gun and magazine data in the preceding 

chapter) are 20% to 50% more likely to have LCMs than are handguns associated with 

other violent crimes, controlling for weapon caliber (Table 9-3). This difference may be 

due to higher numbers of shots and hits in crimes committed with LCMs, although it is 

also possible that offenders using LCMs are more likely to fire on victims. But 

controlling for gunfire, guns used in shootings are 17% to 26% more likely to have LCMs 

than guns used in gunfire cases resulting in no wounded victims (perhaps reflecting 

higher numbers of shots fired and victims hit in LCM cases), and guns linked to murders 

are 8% to 17% more likely to have LCMs than guns linked to non-fatal gunshot 

victimizations (perhaps indicating higher numbers of shots fired and wounds per victim 

in LCM cases).102 These differences are not all statistically significant, but the pattern is

consistent. And as discussed in Chapter 3, AWs account for a larger share of guns used 

in mass murders and murders of police, crimes for which weapons with greater firepower 

would seem particularly useful. 

 

102 Cases with and without gunfire and gunshot victims were approximated based on offense codes 

contained in the gun seizure data (some gunfire cases not resulting in wounded victims may not have been

identified as such, and it is possible that some homicides were not committed with the guns recovered

during the investigations). In order to control for caliber effects, we focused on 9mm and .38 caliber

handguns. Over 80% of the LCM handguns linked to violent crimes were 9mm handguns. Since all (or

virtually all) 9mm handguns are semiautomatics, we also selected .38 caliber guns, which are close to 9mm 

in size and consist almost entirely of revolvers and derringers. 

The disproportionate involvement of LCM handguns in injury and death cases is greatest in the 

comparisons including both 9mm and .38 caliber handguns. This may reflect a greater differential in 

average ammunition capacity between LCM handguns and revolvers/derringers than between LCM

handguns and other semiautomatics. The differential in fatal and non-fatal gunshot victims may also be 

due to caliber effects; 9mm is generally a more powerful caliber than .38 based on measures like kinetic 

energy or relative stopping power (e.g., see DiMaio, 1985, p. 140; Warner 1995, p. 223; Wintemute, 1996,

p. 1751). 

87 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9-3. Probabilities That Handguns Associated With Murders, Non-Fatal 

Shootings, and Other Violent Crimes Were Equipped With Large Capacity 

Magazines in Baltimore, 1993-2000 

Handgun Sample % With 

LCM

% Difference

(#2 Relative to #1)

A. Handguns Used in Violent Crimes With 

and Without Gunshot Injury 

1) 9mm and .38: violence, no gunshot victims 23.21% 

2) 9mm and .38: violence with gunshot 

victims 

34.87% 50%*

1) 9mm: violence, no gunshot victims 52.92% 

2) 9mm: violence with gunshot victims 63.24% 20%*

B. Handguns Used in Gunfire Cases With 

and Without Gunshot Injury 

1) 9mm and .38: gunfire, no gunshot victims 27.66% 

2) 9mm and .38: gunfire with gunshot victims 34.87% 26%

1) 9mm: gunfire, no gunshot victims 54.17% 

2) 9mm: gunfire with gunshot victims 63.24% 17%

C. Handguns Used in Fatal Versus NonFatal Gunshot Victimizations

1) 9mm and .38: non-fatal gunshot victims 32.58% 

2) 9mm and .38: homicides 38.18% 17%

1) 9mm: non-fatal gunshot victims 61.14% 

2) 9mm: homicides 66.04% 8% 

* Statistically significant difference at p<.01 (chi-square).

88 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The findings of the preceding studies are subject to numerous caveats. There 

were few if any attempts to control for characteristics of the actors or situations that 

might have influenced weapon choices and/or attack outcomes.103 Weapons data were 

typically missing for substantial percentages of cases. Further, many of the comparisons 

in the tables were not tested for statistical significance (see the notes to Tables 9-1 and 9-

2).

104

 Tentatively, nonetheless, the evidence suggests more often than not that attacks 

with semiautomatics, particularly those equipped with LCMs, result in more shots fired, 

leading to both more injuries and injuries of greater severity. Perhaps the faster firing 

rate and larger ammunition capacities afforded by these weapons prompt some offenders 

to fire more frequently (i.e., encouraging what some police and military persons refer to 

as a “spray and pray” mentality). But this still begs the question of whether a 10-round 

limit on magazine capacity will affect the outcomes of enough gun attacks to measurably 

reduce gun injuries and deaths. 

 

103 In terms of offender characteristics, recall from Chapter 3 that AP buyers are more likely than other gun 

buyers to have criminal histories and commit subsequent crimes. This does not seem to apply, however, to

the broader class of semiautomatic users: handgun buyers with and without criminal histories tend to buy 

pistols in virtually the same proportions (Wintemute et al., 1998b), and youthful gun offenders using pistols 

and revolvers have very comparable criminal histories (Sheley and Wright, 1993b, p. 381). Further, 

semiautomatic users, including many of those using AWs, show no greater propensity to shoot at victims

than do other gun offenders (Harlow, 2001, p. 11; Reedy and Koper, 2003). Other potential confounders to 

the comparisons in Tables 9-1 and 9-2 might include shooter age and skill, the nature of the circumstances 

(e.g., whether the shooting was an execution-style shooting), the health of the victim(s), the type of location 

(e.g., indoor or outdoor location), the distance between the shooter and intended victim(s), the presence of

multiple persons who could have been shot intentionally or accidentally (as bystanders), and (in the mass

shooting incidents) the use of multiple firearms. 104 Tables 9-1 and 9-2 present the strongest evidence from the available studies. However, there are 

additional findings from these studies and others that, while weaker, are relevant. Based on gun model 

information available for a subset of cases in the Jersey City study, there were 12 gunfire cases involving 

guns manufactured with LCMs before the ban (7 of which resulted in wounded victims) and 94 gunfire 

cases involving revolvers or semiautomatic models without LCMs. Comparisons of these cases produced 

results similar to those of the main analysis: shot fired estimates ranged from 2.83 to 3.25 for the LCM 

cases and 2.22 to 2.6 for the non-LCM cases; 1.14 victims were wounded on average in the LCM gunshot

cases and 1.06 in the non-LCM gunshot cases; and LCM gunshot victims had 1.14 wound on average, 

which, contrary to expectations, was less than the 1.47 average for other gunshot victims. 

The compilation of mass shooting incidents cited in Table 9-1 had tentative shots fired estimates 

for 3 of the AW-LCM cases and 4 of the other cases. The AW-LCM cases averaged 93 shots per incident, 

a figure two and a half times greater than the 36.5 shot average for the other cases. 

Finally, another study of firearm mass murders found that the average number of victims killed

(tallies did not include others wounded) was 6 in AW cases and 4.5 in other cases (Roth and Koper, 1997, 

Appendix A). Only 2 of the 52 cases studied clearly involved AWs (or very similar guns). However, the 

make and model of the firearm were available for only eight cases, so additional incidents may have 

involved LCMs; in fact, at least 35% of the cases involved unidentified semiautomatics. (For those cases in

which at least the gun type and firing action were known, semiautomatics outnumbered nonsemiautomatics by 6 to 1, perhaps suggesting that semiautomatics are used disproportionately in mass 

murders.) 

89 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
9.2.1. Will a 10-Round Magazine Limit Reduce Gunshot Victimizations? 

Specific data on shots fired in gun attacks are quite fragmentary and often inferred 

indirectly, but they suggest that relatively few attacks involve more than 10 shots fired.105 

Based on national data compiled by the FBI, for example, there were only about 19 gun 

murder incidents a year involving four or more victims from 1976 through 1995 (for a 

total of 375) (Fox and Levin, 1998, p. 435) and only about one a year involving six or 

more victims from 1976 through 1992 (for a total of 17) (Kleck, 1997, p. 126). Similarly, 

gun murder victims are shot two to three times on average according to a number of 

sources (see Table 9-2 and Koper and Roth, 2001a), and a study at a Washington, DC 

trauma center reported that only 8% of all gunshot victims treated from 1988 through 

1990 had five or more wounds (Webster et al., 1992, p. 696). 

However, counts of victims hit or wounds inflicted provide only a lower bound 

estimate of the number of shots fired in an attack, which could be considerably higher in 

light of the low hit rates in gunfire incidents (see above).106 The few available studies on

shots fired show that assailants fire less than four shots on average (see sources in Table 

9-1 and Goehl, 1993), a number well within the 10-round magazine limit imposed by the 

AW-LCM ban, but these studies have not usually presented the full distribution of shots 

fired for all cases, so it is usually unclear how many cases, if any, involved more than 10 

shots. 

An exception is the aforementioned study of handgun murders and assaults in 

Jersey City (Reedy and Koper, 2003). Focusing on cases for which at least the type of 

handgun (semiautomatic, revolver, derringer) could be determined, 2.5% of the gunfire 

cases involved more than 10 shots.107 These incidents – all of which involved pistols – 

had a 100% injury rate and accounted for 4.7% of all gunshot victims in the sample (see 

Figure 9-2). Offenders fired a total of 83 shots in these cases, wounding 7 victims, only 1 

of whom was wounded more than once. Overall, therefore, attackers fired over 8 shots 

 

105 Although the focus of the discussion is on attacks with more than 10 shots fired, a gun user with a postban 10-round magazine can attain a firing capacity of 11 shots with many semiautomatics by loading one 

bullet into the chamber before loading the magazine. 106 As a dramatic example, consider the heavily publicized case of Amadou Diallo, who was shot to death 

by four New York City police officers just a few years ago. The officers in this case fired upon Diallo 41 

times but hit him with only 19 shots (a 46% hit rate), despite his being confined in a vestibule. Two of the 

officers reportedly fired until they had emptied their 16-round magazines, a reaction that may not be

uncommon in such high-stress situations. In official statistics, this case will appear as having only one

victim. 107 The shots fired estimates were based on reported gunshot injuries, physical evidence (for example, shell 

casings found at the scene), and the accounts of witnesses and actors. The 2.5% figure is based on 

minimum estimates of shots fired. Using maximum estimates, 3% of the gunfire incidents involved more 

than 10 shots (Reedy and Koper, 2003, p. 154). 

A caveat to these figures is that the federal LCM ban was in effect for much of the study period

(which spanned January 1992 to November 1996), and a New Jersey ban on magazines with more than 15

rounds predated the study period. It is thus conceivable that these laws reduced attacks with LCM guns and 

attacks with more than 10 shots fired, though it seems unlikely that the federal ban had any such effect (see 

the analyses of LCM use presented in the previous chapter). Approximately 1% of the gunfire incidents 

involved more than 15 shots. 

90 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
for every wound inflicted, suggesting that perhaps fewer persons would have been 

wounded had the offenders not been able to fire as often.108

Figure 9-2. Attacks With More Than 10 Shots Fired

Jersey City Handgun Attacks, 1992-1996 

• 2.5% - 3% of gunfire incidents involved 11+ shots 

– 3.6% - 4.2% of semiauto pistol attacks 

• 100% injury rate 

• Produced 4.7% of all gunshot wound victims 

• 8.3 shots per gunshot wound 

Based on data reported by Reedy and Koper (2003). Injury statistics based on the 2.5% of cases 

involving 11+ shots by minimum estimate. 

Caution is warranted in generalizing from these results because they are based on 

a very small number of incidents (6) from one sample in one city. Further, it is not 

known if the offenders in these cases had LCMs (gun model and magazine information 

was very limited); they may have emptied small magazines, reloaded, and continued 

firing. But subject to these caveats, the findings suggest that the ability to deliver more 

than 10 shots without reloading may be instrumental in a small but non-trivial percentage 

of gunshot victimizations. 

On the other hand, the Jersey City study also implies that eliminating AWs and 

LCMs might only reduce gunshot victimizations by up to 5%. And even this estimate is 

probably overly optimistic because the LCM ban cannot be expected to prevent all 

incidents with more than 10 shots. Consequently, any effects from the ban (should it be 

extended) are likely to be smaller and perhaps quite difficult to detect with standard 

statistical methods (see Koper and Roth, 2001a), especially in the near future, if recent 

patterns of LCM use continue. 

9.3. Post-Ban Trends in Lethal and Injurious Gun Violence 

 

Having established some basis for believing the AW-LCM ban could have at least 

a small effect on lethal and injurious gun violence, is there any evidence of such an effect 

to date? Gun homicides plummeted from approximately 16,300 in 1994 to 10,100 in 

1999, a reduction of about 38% (see the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 

 

108 These figures are based on a supplemental analysis not contained in the published study. We thank

Darin Reedy for this analysis. 

91 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Reports). Likewise, non-fatal, assaultive gunshot injuries treated in hospitals nationwide 

declined one-third, from about 68,400 to under 46,400, between 1994 and 1998 (Gotsch 

et al., 2001, pp. 23-24). Experts believe numerous factors contributed to the recent drop 

in these and other crimes, including changing drug markets, a strong economy, better 

policing, and higher incarceration rates, among others (Blumstein and Wallman, 2000). 

Attributing the decline in gun murders and shootings to the AW-LCM ban is problematic, 

however, considering that crimes with LCMs appear to have been steady or rising since 

the ban. For this reason, we do not undertake a rigorous investigation of the ban’s effects 

on gun violence.109

But a more casual assessment shows that gun crimes since the ban have been no 

less likely to cause death or injury than those before the ban, contrary to what we might 

expect if crimes with AWs and LCMs had both declined. For instance, the percentage of 

violent gun crimes resulting in death has been very stable since 1990 according to 

national statistics on crimes reported to police (see Figure 9-1 in section 9.1).110 In fact, 

the percentage of gun crimes resulting in death during 2001 and 2002 (2.94%) was 

slightly higher than that during 1992 and 1993 (2.9%).

Similarly, neither medical nor criminological data sources have shown any postban reduction in the percentage of crime-related gunshot victims who die. If anything, 

this percentage has been higher since the ban, a pattern that could be linked in part to 

more multiple wound victimizations stemming from elevated levels of LCM use. 

According to medical examiners’ reports and hospitalization estimates, about 20% of 

gunshot victims died nationwide in 1993 (Gotsch et al., 2001). This figure rose to 23% in 

1996, before declining to 21% in 1998 (Figure 9-3).111 Estimates derived from the 

Uniform Crime Reports and the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ annual National Crime 

Victimization Survey follow a similar pattern from 1992 to 1999 (although the ratio of 

fatal to non-fatal cases is much higher in these data than that in the medical data) and also 

show a considerable increase in the percentage of gunshot victims who died in 2000 and 

2001 (Figure 9-3).112 Of course, changes in offender behavior or other changes in crime 

 

109 In our prior study (Koper and Roth 2001a; Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 6), we estimated that gun 

murders were about 7% lower than expected in 1995 (the first year after the ban), adjusting for pre-existing

trends. However, the very limited post-ban data available for that study precluded a definitive judgment as 

to whether this drop was statistically meaningful (see especially Koper and Roth, 2001a). Furthermore,

that analysis was based on the assumption that crimes with both AWs and LCMs had dropped in the shortterm aftermath of the ban, an assumption called into question by the findings of this study. It is now more

difficult to credit the ban with any of the drop in gun murders in 1995 or anytime since. We did not update 

the gun murder analysis because interpreting the results would be unavoidably ambiguous. Such an

investigation will be more productive after demonstrating that the ban has reduced crimes with both AWs 

and LCMs. 

110 The decline in this figure during the 1980s was likely due in part to changes in police reporting of

aggravated assaults in recent decades (Blumstein, 2000). The ratio of gun murders to gun robberies rose 

during the 1980s, then declined and remained relatively flat during the 1990s. 111 Combining homicide data from 1999 with non-fatal gunshot estimates for 2000 suggests that about 20% 

of gunshot victimizations resulted in death during 1999 and 2000 (Simon et al., 2002). 112 The SHR/NCVS estimates should be interpreted cautiously because the NCVS appears to undercount 

non-fatal gunshot wound cases by as much as two-thirds relative to police data, most likely because it fails 

to represent adequately the types of people most likely to be victims of serious crime (i.e., young urban

males who engage in deviant lifestyles) (Cook, 1985). Indeed, the rate of death among gunshot victims 

92 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
weaponry (such as an increase in shootings with large caliber handguns) may have 

influenced these trends. Yet is worth noting that multiple wound shootings were elevated 

over pre-ban levels during 1995 and 1996 in four of five localities examined during our 

first AW study, though most of the differences were not statistically significant (Table 9-

4, panels B through E). 

Another potential indicator of ban effects is the percentage of gunfire incidents 

resulting in fatal or non-fatal gunshot victimizations. If attacks with AWs and LCMs result 

in more shots fired and victims hit than attacks with other guns and magazines, we might 

expect a decline in crimes with AWs and LCMs to reduce the share of gunfire incidents

resulting in victims wounded or killed. Measured nationally with UCR and NCVS data, 

this indicator was relatively stable at around 30% from 1992 to 1997, before rising to about 

40% from 1998 through 2000 (Figure 9-4).113 Along similar lines, multiple victim gun 

homicides remained at relatively high levels through at least 1998, based on the national 

average of victims killed per gun murder incident (Table 9-4, panel A).114

 appears much higher in the SHR/NCVS series than in data compiled from medical examiners and hospitals 

(see the CDC series in Figure 9-3). But if these biases are relatively consistent over time, the data may still 

provide useful insights into trends over time. 113 The NCVS estimates are based on a compilation of 1992-2002 data recently produced by the InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR study 3691). In 2002, only 9% of nonfatal gunfire incidents resulted in gunshot victimizations. This implies a hit rate for 2002 that was below 

pre-ban levels, even after incorporating gun homicide cases into the estimate. However, the 2002 NCVS 

estimate deviates quite substantially from earlier years, for which the average hit rate in non-fatal gunfire 

incidents was 24% (and the estimate for 2001 was 20%). Therefore, we did not include the 2002 data in

our analysis. We used two-year averages in Figures 9-3 and 9-4 because the annual NCVS estimates are 

based on very small samples of gunfire incidents. The 2002 sample was especially small, so it seems 

prudent to wait for more data to become available before drawing conclusions about hit rates since 2001. 114 We thank David Huffer for this analysis. 

93 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 9-3. Percentage of Gunshot Victimizations Resulting in Death 

(National), 1992-2001

0

10

20

30

40

50

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

CDC SHR/NCVS

SHR/NCVS series based on two-year averages from the Supplemental Homicide Reports and National Crime Victimization Survey. CDC

series based on homicide and hospitalization data from the Centers for Disease Control (reported by Gotsch et al. 2001).

94 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9-4. Short-Term, Post-Ban Changes in the Lethality and Injuriousness of 

Gun Violence: National and Local Indicators, 1994-1998 a 

Measure and 

Location 

Pre-Ban Period Post-Ban Period Change 

A. Victims Per Gun 

Homicide Incident 

(National) 

Jan. 1986-Sept. 1994 

1.05 

(N=106,668) 

Oct. 1994-Dec. 1998 

1.06 

(N=47,511) 

1%** 

B. Wounds per 

Gun Homicide 

Victim: Milwaukee 

County 

Jan. 1992-Aug. 1994 

2.28 

(N=282) 

Sept. 1994-Dec. 1995 

2.52 

(N=136) 

11% 

C. Wounds Per 

Gun Homicide 

Victim: Seattle 

(King County) 

Jan. 1992-Aug. 1994 

2.08 

(N=184) 

Sept. 1994-Jun. 1996 

2.46 

(N=91) 

18% 

D. Wounds Per 

Gunshot Victim: 

Jersey City (NJ) 

Jan. 1992-Aug. 94 

1.42 

(N=125) 

Sept. 1994-Jun. 1996 

1.39 

(N=137) 

-2% 

E. % of Gun 

Homicide Victims 

With Multiple 

Wounds: San 

Diego County 

Jan. 1992-Aug. 1994 

41% 

(N=445) 

Sept. 1994-Jun. 1996 

43% 

(N=223) 

5% 

F. % of Non-Fatal 

Gunshot Victims 

With Multiple 

Wounds: Boston 

Jan. 1992-Aug. 1994 

18% 

(N=584) 

Sept. 1994-Dec. 1995 

24% 

(N=244) 

33%* 

a. National victims per incident figures based on unpublished update of analysis reported in Roth and

Koper (1997, Chapter 5). Gunshot wound data are taken from Roth and Koper (1997, Chapter 6) and

Koper and Roth (2001a). Wound data are based on medical examiners’ reports (Milwaukee, Seattle, San

Diego), hospitalization data (Boston), and police reports (Jersey City). 

* Chi-square p level < .1. 

** T-test p level < .01.

95 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
If anything, therefore, gun attacks appear to have been more lethal and injurious 

since the ban. Perhaps elevated LCM use has contributed to this pattern. But if this is 

true, then the reverse would also be true – a reduction in crimes with LCMs, should the 

ban be extended, would reduce injuries and deaths from gun violence. 

Figure 9-4. Percentage of Gunfire Cases Resulting in Gunshot

Victimizations (National), 1992-2001

0

10

20

30

40

50

1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001

Based on two-year averages from the Supplemental Homicide Reports and National Crime Victimization Survey.

9.4. Summary 

Although the ban has been successful in reducing crimes with AWs, any benefits 

from this reduction are likely to have been outweighed by steady or rising use of nonbanned semiautomatics with LCMs, which are used in crime much more frequently than 

AWs. Therefore, we cannot clearly credit the ban with any of the nation’s recent drop in 

gun violence. And, indeed, there has been no discernible reduction in the lethality and 

injuriousness of gun violence, based on indicators like the percentage of gun crimes 

resulting in death or the share of gunfire incidents resulting in injury, as we might have 

expected had the ban reduced crimes with both AWs and LCMs. 

However, the grandfathering provision of the AW-LCM ban guaranteed that the 

effects of this law would occur only gradually over time. Those effects are still unfolding 

and may not be fully felt for several years into the future, particularly if foreign, pre-ban 

LCMs continue to be imported into the U.S. in large numbers. It is thus premature to 

make definitive assessments of the ban’s impact on gun violence. 

96 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Having said this, the ban’s impact on gun violence is likely to be small at best, 

and perhaps too small for reliable measurement. AWs were used in no more than 8% of 

gun crimes even before the ban. Guns with LCMs are used in up to a quarter of gun 

crimes, but it is not clear how often the outcomes of gun attacks depend on the ability to 

fire more than 10 shots (the current limit on magazine capacity) without reloading. 

Nonetheless, reducing crimes with AWs and especially LCMs could have nontrivial effects on gunshot victimizations. As a general matter, hit rates tend to be low in 

gunfire incidents, so having more shots to fire rapidly can increase the likelihood that 

offenders hit their targets, and perhaps bystanders as well. While not entirely consistent, 

the few available studies contrasting attacks with different types of guns and magazines 

generally suggest that attacks with semiautomatics – including AWs and other 

semiautomatics with LCMs – result in more shots fired, persons wounded, and wounds 

per victim than do other gun attacks. Further, a study of handgun attacks in one city 

found that about 3% of gunfire incidents involved more than 10 shots fired, and those 

cases accounted for nearly 5% of gunshot victims. However, the evidence on these 

matters is too limited (both in volume and quality) to make firm projections of the ban’s 

impact, should it be reauthorized. 

97 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
10. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS AND 

SPECULATION ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF REAUTHORIZING, 

MODIFYING, OR LIFTING THE ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN 

In this chapter, we discuss future lines of inquiry that would be informative 

whether or not the AW-LCM ban is renewed in September 2004. We then offer some

brief thoughts about the possible consequences of reauthorizing the ban, modifying it, or 

allowing it to expire. 

10.1. Research Recommendations and Data Requirements 

10.1.1. An Agenda for Assault Weapons Research and Recommendations for Data 

Collection by Law Enforcement 

 

The effects of the AW-LCM ban have yet to be fully realized; therefore, we 

recommend continued study of trends in the availability and criminal use of AWs and 

LCMs. Even if the ban is lifted, longer-term study of crimes with AWs and LCMs will 

inform future assessment of the consequences of these policy shifts and improve 

understanding of the responses of gun markets to gun legislation more generally.115

Developing better data on crimes with LCMs is especially important. To this end, 

we urge police departments and their affiliated crime labs to record information about 

magazines recovered with crime guns. Further, we recommend that ATF integrate 

ammunition magazine data into its national gun tracing system and encourage reporting 

of magazine data by police departments that trace firearms. 

As better data on LCM use become available, more research is warranted on the 

impacts of AW and LCM trends (which may go up or down depending on the ban’s fate) 

on gun murders and shootings, as well as levels of death and injury per gun crime. 

Indicators of the latter, such as victims per gunfire incident and wounds per gunshot 

victim, are useful complementary outcome measures because they reflect the mechanisms

through which use of AWs and LCMs is hypothesized to affect gun deaths and 

injuries.116 Other potentially promising lines of inquiry might relate AW and LCM use to 

mass murders and murders of police, crimes that are very rare but appear more likely to 

involve AWs (and perhaps LCMs) and to disproportionately affect public perceptions.117 

 

115 Establishing time series data on primary and secondary market prices and production or importation of

various guns and magazines of policy interest could provide benefits for policy researchers. Like similar 

statistical series maintained for illegal drugs, such price and production series would be valuable 

instruments for monitoring effects of policy changes and other influences on markets for various weapons. 116 However, more research is needed on the full range of factors that cause variation in these indicators

over time and between places. 117 Studying these crimes poses a number of challenges, including modeling of rare events, establishing the 

reliability and validity of methods for measuring the frequency and characteristics of mass murders (such as 

through media searchers; see Duwe, 2000, Roth and Koper, 1997, Appendix A), and controlling for factors 

like the use of bullet-proof vests by police. 

98 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Finally, statistical studies relating AW and LCM use to trends in gun violence should 

include statistical power analysis to ensure that estimated models have sufficient ability

to detect small effects, an issue that has been problematic in some of our prior time series 

research on the ban (Koper and Roth, 2001a) and is applicable more generally to the 

study of modest, incremental policy changes. 

Research on aggregate trends should be complemented by more incident-based 

studies that contrast the dynamics and outcomes of attacks with different types of guns 

and magazines, while controlling for relevant characteristics of the actors and situations. 

Such studies would refine predictions of the change in gun deaths and injuries that would 

follow reductions in attacks with AWs and LCMs. For instance, how many homicides 

and injuries involving AWs and LCMs could be prevented if offenders were forced to 

substitute other guns and magazines? In what percentage of gun attacks does the ability 

to fire more than ten rounds without reloading affect the number of wounded victims or 

determine the difference between a fatal and non-fatal attack? Do other AW features 

(such as flash hiders and pistol grips on rifles) have demonstrable effects on the outcomes 

of gun attacks? Studies of gun attacks could draw upon police incident reports, forensic 

examinations of recovered guns and magazines, and medical and law enforcement data 

on wounded victims. 

10.1.2. Studying the Implementation and Market Impacts of Gun Control 

 

More broadly, this study reiterates the importance of examining the 

implementation of gun policies and the workings of gun markets, considerations that 

have been largely absent from prior research on gun control. Typical methods of 

evaluating gun policies involve statistical comparisons of total or gun crime rates 

between places and/or time periods with and without different gun control provisions. 

Without complimentary implementation and market measures, such studies have a “black 

box” quality and may lead to misleading conclusions. For example, a time series study of 

gun murder rates before and after the AW-LCM ban might find that the ban has not 

reduced gun murders. Yet the interpretation of such a finding would be ambiguous, 

absent market or implementation measures. Reducing attacks with AWs and LCMs may 

in fact have no more than a trivial impact on gun deaths and injuries, but any such impact 

cannot be realized or adequately assessed until the availability and use of the banned guns 

and magazines decline appreciably. Additionally, it may take many years for the effects 

of modest, incremental policy changes to be fully felt, a reality that both researchers and 

policy makers should heed. Similar implementation concerns apply to the evaluation of 

various gun control policies, ranging from gun bans to enhanced sentences for gun 

offenders. 

Our studies of the AW ban have shown that the reaction of manufacturers, 

dealers, and consumers to gun control policies can have substantial effects on demand 

and supply for affected weapons both before and after a law’s implementation. It is 

important to study these factors because they affect the timing and form of a law’s impact 

99 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
on the availability of weapons to criminals and, by extension, the law’s impact on gun 

violence. 

10.2. Potential Consequences of Reauthorizing, Modifying, or Lifting the Assault 

Weapons Ban 

10.2.1. Potential Consequences of Reauthorizing the Ban As Is 

Should it be renewed, the ban might reduce gunshot victimizations. This effect is 

likely to be small at best and possibly too small for reliable measurement. A 5% 

reduction in gunshot victimizations is perhaps a reasonable upper bound estimate of the 

ban’s potential impact (based on the only available estimate of gunshot victimizations 

resulting from attacks in which more than 10 shots were fired), but the actual impact is 

likely to be smaller and may not be fully realized for many years into the future, 

particularly if pre-ban LCMs continue to be imported into the U.S. from abroad. Just as 

the restrictions imposed by the ban are modest – they are essentially limits on weapon 

accessories like LCMs, flash hiders, threaded barrels, and the like – so too are the 

potential benefits.118 In time, the ban may be seen as an effective prevention measure 

that stopped further spread of weaponry considered to be particularly dangerous (in a 

manner similar to federal restrictions on fully automatic weapons). But that conclusion 

will be contingent on further research validating the dangers of AWs and LCMs. 

10.2.2. Potential Consequences of Modifying the Ban 

We have not examined the specifics of legislative proposals to modify the AW

ban. However, we offer a few general comments about the possible consequences of 

such efforts, particularly as they relate to expanding the range of the ban as some have

advocated (Halstead, 2003, pp. 11-12). 

 

118 But note that although the ban’s impact on gunshot victimizations would be small in percentage terms 

and unlikely to have much effect on the public’s fear of crime, it could conceivably prevent hundreds of

gunshot victimizations annually and produce notable cost savings in medical care alone. To help place this 

in perspective, there were about 10,200 gun homicides and 48,600 non-fatal, assault-related shootings in

2000 (see the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for the gun homicide estimate and Simon et al. [2002] for the 

estimate of non-fatal shootings). Reducing these crimes by 1% would have thus prevented 588 gunshot

victimizations in 2000 (we assume the ban did not actually produce such benefits because the reduction in

AW use as of 2000 was outweighed by steady or rising levels of LCM use). This may seem insubstantial

compared to the 342,000 murders, assaults, and robberies committed with guns in 2000 (see the Uniform 

Crime Reports). Yet, gunshot victimizations are particularly costly crimes. Setting aside the less tangible 

costs of lost lives and human suffering, the lifetime medical costs of assault-related gunshot injuries (fatal 

and non-fatal) were estimated to be about $18,600 per injury in 1994 (Cook et al., 1999). Therefore, the

lifetime costs of 588 gun homicides and shootings would be nearly $11 million in 1994 dollars (the net

medical costs could be lower for reasons discussed by Cook and Ludwig [2000] but, on the other hand, this

estimate does not consider other governmental and private costs that Cook and Ludwig attribute to gun 

violence). This implies that small reductions in gunshot victimizations sustained over many years could 

produce considerable long-term savings for society. We do not wish to push this point too far, however,

considering the uncertainty regarding the ban’s potential impact. 

100 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 

Gun markets react strongly merely to debates over gun legislation. Indeed, debate 

over the AW ban’s original passage triggered spikes upwards of 50% in gun distributors’ 

advertised AW prices (Roth and Koper, 1997, Chapter 4). In turn, this prompted a surge 

in AW production in 1994 (Chapter 5). Therefore, it seems likely that discussion of 

broadening the AW ban to additional firearms would raise prices and production of the 

weapons under discussion. (Such market reactions may already be underway in response 

to existing proposals to expand the ban, but we have not investigated this issue.) 

Heightened production levels could saturate the market for the weapons in question, 

depressing prices and delaying desired reductions in crimes with the weapons, as appears 

to have happened with banned ARs. 

Mandating further design changes in the outward features of semiautomatic 

weapons (e.g., banning weapons having any military-style features) may not produce 

benefits beyond those of the current ban. As noted throughout this report, the most 

important feature of military-style weapons may be their ability to accept LCMs, and this 

feature has been addressed by the LCM ban and the LCMM rifle ban. Whether changing 

other features of military-style firearms will produce measurable benefits is unknown. 

Finally, curbing importation of pre-ban LCMs should help reduce crimes with 

LCMs and possibly gunshot victimizations. Crimes with LCMs may not decline 

substantially for quite some time if millions of LCMs continue to be imported into the 

U.S. 

10.2.3. Potential Consequences of Lifting the Ban 

 

If the ban is lifted, it is likely that gun and magazine manufacturers will 

reintroduce AW models and LCMs, perhaps in substantial numbers.119 In addition, AWs 

grandfathered under the 1994 law may lose value and novelty, prompting some of their 

lawful owners to sell them in secondary markets, where they may reach criminal users. 

Any resulting increase in crimes with AWs and LCMs might increase gunshot 

victimizations, though this effect could be difficult to discern statistically. 

It is also possible, and perhaps probable, that new AWs and LCMs will eventually 

be used to commit mass murder. Mass murders garner much media attention, particularly 

when they involve AWs (Duwe, 2000). The notoriety likely to accompany mass murders 

if committed with AWs and LCMs, especially after these guns and magazines have been 

deregulated, could have a considerable negative impact on public perceptions, an effect 

that would almost certainly be intensified if such crimes were committed by terrorists 

operating in the U.S. 

 

119 Note, however, that foreign semiautomatic rifles with military features, including the LCMM rifles and 

several rifles prohibited by the 1994 ban, would still be restricted by executive orders passed in 1989 and

1998. Those orders stem from the sporting purposes test of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

101 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
REFERENCES 

Adler, W.C., Bielke, F.M., Doi, D.J., and Kennedy, J.F. (1995). Cops Under Fire: Law 

Enforcement Officers Killed with Assault Weapons or Guns With High Capacity 

Magazines, Handgun Control, Inc., Washington, DC. 

American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs. (1992). Assault weapons as 

a public health hazard in the United States. JAMA 267:3067-3070. 

Berndt, E.R. (1990). The Practice of Econometrics: Classic and Contemporary, Addison 

Wesley, Reading, MA. 

Beck, A., Gilliard, D., Greenfeld, L., Harlow, C., Hester, T., Jankowski, L., Snell, T., 

Stephan, J., and Morton, D. (1993). Survey of State Prison Inmates, 1991 (NCJ-136949), 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

Block, C.R. and Block, R. (1993). Street Gang Crime in Chicago (NCJ-144782), 

National Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

Blumstein, A. (2000). Disaggregating the violence trends. In Blumstein, A. and Wallman, 

J. (eds.), The Crime Drop in America, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 13-44. 

Blumstein, A. and Wallman, J. (eds.), (2000). The Crime Drop in America, Cambridge 

University Press, New York. 

Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. (2004). On Target: The Impact of the 1994 

Federal Assault Weapons Act, Washington, DC. 

Brill, S. (1977). Firearm Abuse: A Research and Policy Report, Police Foundation, 

Washington, DC. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. (1976). Project Identification: A Study of 

Handguns Used in Crime, United States Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. (1977). Concentrated Urban Enforcement 

(CUE), United States Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. (1995). The National Tracing Center 1994 

Yearend Report, United States Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. (1997). Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: 

The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 17 Communities, United States Department of the 

Treasury, Washington, DC. 

102 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. (1999). Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: 

The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 27 Communities, United States Department of the 

Treasury, Washington, DC. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. (2000). Commerce in Firearms in the United 

States, United States Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC. 

Bureau of Justice Statistics. (1994). Firearms and Crimes of Violence: Selected Findings 

from National Statistical Series (NCJ-146844), United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 

Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2000). Correctional Populations in the United States, 1997

(NCJ-177613), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

Caruso, R.P., Jara, D.I. and Swan, K.G. (1999). Gunshot wounds: Bullet caliber is 

increasing. The Journal of Trauma: Injury, Infection, and Critical Care 46:462-465. 

Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. (1998). On the Front Line: Making Gun 

Interdiction Work, Handgun Control, Inc., Washington, DC. 

Cherry, D., Annest, J.L., Mercy, J.A., Kresnow, M., and Pollock, D.A. (1998). Trends in 

nonfatal and fatal firearm-related injury rates in the United States, 1985-1995. Annals of 

Emergency Medicine 32:51-59. 

Cook, P.J. (1985). The case of the missing victims: Gunshot woundings in the National 

Crime Survey." Journal of Quantitative Criminology 1:91-102. 

Cook, P.J., Lawrence, B.A., Ludwig, J., and Miller, T.R. (1999). The medical costs of 

gunshot injuries in the United States. JAMA 282:447-454. 

Cook, P.J. and Ludwig, J. (1996). Guns in America: Results of a Comprehensive National 

Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use, Police Foundation, Washington, DC. 

Cook, P.J. and Ludwig, J. (1997). Guns in America: National Survey on Private 

Ownership and Use of Firearms (NCJ-165476), National Institute of Justice, United 

States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

Cook, P.J. and Ludwig, J. (2000). Gun Violence: The Real Costs. New York: Oxford 

University Press. 

Cook, P.J., Molliconi, S., and Cole, T.B. (1995). Regulating gun markets. Journal of 

Criminal Law and Criminology 86:59-92. 

Cox Newspapers. (1989). Firepower: Assault Weapons in America, Cox Enterprises, 

Washington, DC. 

103 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
DiMaio, V.J.M. (1985). Gunshot Wounds: Practical Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and 

Forensic Techniques, Elsevier, New York. 

Duwe, G. (2000). Body-count journalism: The presentation of mass murder in the news 

media. Homicide Studies 4:364-399. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, (1982-2003). Crime in the United States, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

Fjestad, S.J. (1990-2002). Blue Book of Gun Values (11th-23rd eds.), Blue Book 

Publications, Minneapolis. 

Fox, J.A. and Levin, J. (1998). Multiple homicide: Patterns of serial and mass murder. In 

Tonry, M. (ed.), Crime and Justice, Vol. 23, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 

407-455. 

Friedman, M. (1962). Price Theory: A Provisional Text, Aldine Publishing Company, 

Chicago. 

Goehl, G. (1993). 1992 Firearms Discharge Assault Report, Police Academy Firearms

and Tactics Section, New York City Police Department, New York. 

Gotsch, K.E., Annest, J.L., Mercy, J.A., and Ryan, G.W. (2001). Surveillance for fatal 

and nonfatal firearm-related injuries – United States, 1993-1998. Morbidity and Mortality 

Weekly Report (MMWR) CDC Surveillance Summaries 50(SS-2):1-34. 

Gun Tests. (1995). Magazine rule change unlikely. March. 

Halstead, T.J. (2003). The Assault Weapons Ban: Legal Challenges and Legislative 

Issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC (distributed by Penny Hill 

Press, Derwood, MD). 

Hargarten, S.W., Karlson, T.A., O’Brien, M., Hancock, J., and Quebbeman, E. (1996). 

Characteristics of firearms involved in fatalities. JAMA 275:42-45. 

Hargarten, S.W., Kuhn, E.M., Nie, C.L., O’Brien, M.E., Withers, R.L., and Wintemute, 

G.J. (2000). Homicide gun characteristics before and after the 1994 crime bill. In 

Blackman, P.H., Leggett, V.L., Olson, B.L., and Jarvis, J.P. (eds.), The Varieties of

Homicide and Its Research: Proceedings of the 1999 Meeting of the Homicide Research 

Working Group, FBI Academy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Quantico, VA. 

Harlow, C.W. (2001). Firearm Use By Offenders (NCJ-189369, Revised Feb. 2002), 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

104 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Hutson, H.R., Anglin, D., and Pratts, M.J., Jr. (1994). Adolescents and children injured or 

killed in drive-by shootings in Los Angeles. New England Journal of Medicine 330:324-

327. 

Hutson, H.R., Anglin, D., Kyriacou, D.N., Hart, J., and Spears, K. (1995). The epidemic 

of gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County from 1979 through 1994. JAMA

274:1031-1036. 

Kennedy, D.M., Piehl, A.M., and Braga, A.A. (1996). Youth violence in Boston: gun 

markets, serious youth offenders, and a use-reduction strategy. Law and Contemporary 

Problems 59:147-196. 

Kleck, G. (1991). Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America. Aldine de Gruyter, New 

York. 

Kleck, G. (1997). Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control. Aldine de Gruyter, New 

York. 

Knox, G.W., Houston, J.G., Laskey, J.A., McCurrie, T.F., Tromanhauser, E.D., Laske, 

D.L. (1994). Gangs and Guns: A Task Force Report from the National Gang Crime 

Research Center, National Gang Crime Research Center, Chicago 

Kopel, D.B. (1995). Assault weapons. In Kopel (ed.), Guns: Who Should Have Them? 

Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, pp. 159-232. 

Koper, C.S. (1995). Gun Lethality and Homicide: Gun Types Used By Criminals and the 

Lethality of Gun Violence in Kansas City, Missouri, 1985-1993, (Ph.D. Dissertation), 

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland, College Park. 

Koper, C.S. (1997). Gun Density Versus Gun Type: Did the Availability of More Guns or 

More Lethal Guns Drive Up the Dallas Homicide Rate, 1980-1992? (Report NCJ-187106 

to the National Institute of Justice), Crime Control Institute, Philadelphia.

Koper, C.S. (2001). A Follow-Up Assessment of the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban: 

Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, Presentation at the annual meeting of the 

American Society of Criminology, Atlanta. 

Koper, C.S. (2002). Federal legislation and gun markets: How much have recent reforms 

of the federal firearms licensing system reduce criminal gun suppliers? Criminology and 

Public Policy 1:151-178. 

Koper, C.S. and Roth, J.A. (2001a). The impact of the 1994 federal assault weapon ban 

on gun violence outcomes: an assessment of multiple outcome measures and some

lessons for policy evaluation. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 17:33-74. 

105 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Koper, C.S. and Roth, J.A. (2001b). A priori assertions versus empirical inquiry: A reply 

to Kleck. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 17:81-88. 

Koper, C.S. and Roth, J.A. (2002a). The impact of the 1994 federal assault weapons ban 

on gun markets: An assessment of short-term primary and secondary market effects. 

Journal of Quantitative Criminology 18:239-266. 

Koper, C.S and Roth, J.A. (2002b). An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault 

Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets, 1994-2000 (Draft Report to the National 

Institute of Justice), Jerry Lee Center of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania, 

Philadelphia and The Urban Institute, Washington, DC. 

Lennet, M.G. (1995). Taking a bite out of violent crime. University of Daytona Law 

Review 20:573-617. 

Lott, J.R., Jr. (2003). The Bias Against Guns: Why Almost Everything You’ve Heard 

About Gun Control is Wrong, Regnery Publishing, Washington, DC. 

McDowall, D. and Loftin, C. (1983). Collective security and the demand for legal 

handguns. American Journal of Sociology 88:1146-1161. 

McGonigal, M.D., Cole, J., Schwab, C.W., Kauder, D.R., Rotondo, M.F., and Angood, 

P.B. (1993). Urban firearm deaths: a five-year perspective. The Journal of Trauma: 

35:532-537. 

Murtz, H.A. and the Editors of Gun Digest. (1994). Guns Illustrated 1994, DBI Books, 

Northbrook, IL. 

National Institute of Justice. (1995). Arrestees and Guns: Monitoring the Illegal 

Firearms Market (NCJ-184205), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

New Mexico Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis Center. (1998). Controlling New 

Mexico Juveniles’ Possession of Firearms, Institute for Social Research, University of

New Mexico, Albuquerque. 

New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. (1994). Assault Weapons and 

Homicide in New York City, Albany, New York. 

Pierce, G.L., Briggs, L.R., and Carlson, D.A. (1998). National Report on Firearm Trace 

Analysis for 1996-1997, Northeastern University, Boston. 

Rand, M.R. (1990). Handgun Crime Victims (NCJ-123559), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

Rand, M.R. (1994). Guns and Crime (NCJ-147003), Bureau of Justice Statistics, United 

States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

106 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Reedy, D.C. and Koper, C.S. (2003). Impact of handgun types on gun assault outcomes: a 

comparison of gun assaults involving semiautomatic pistols and revolvers. Injury 

Prevention 9:151-155. 

Rennison, C.M. (2001). Criminal Victimization 2000: Changes 1999-2000 With Trends 

1993-2000 (NCJ-187007), Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC. 

Richmond, T.S, Branas, C.C, Cheney, R.A, and Schwab, C.W. (2004, under review). The 

Case for Enhanced Data Collection of Handgun Type, Firearm and Injury Center at Penn, 

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 

Roth, J.A. and Koper, C.S. (1997). Impact Evaluation of the Public Safety and 

Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act of 1994, The Urban Institute, Washington, 

DC. 

Roth, J.A. and Koper, C.S. (1999). Impacts of the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban: 1994-96

(NCJ-173405), National Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 

Ruddell, R. and Mays, G.L. (2003). Examining the arsenal of juvenile gunslingers: trends 

and policy implications. Crime and Delinquency 49:231-252. 

Shaw, J.W. (1994). Community Policing Against Crime: Violence and Firearms (Ph.D. 

dissertation), Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland, 

College Park. 

Sheley, J.F. and Wright, J.D. (1993a). Gun Acquisition and Possession in Selected 

Juvenile Samples (NCJ-145326), National Institute of Justice, United States Department 

of Justice, Washington, DC. 

Sheley, J.F. and Wright, J.D. (1993b). Motivations for gun possession and carrying 

among serious juvenile offenders. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 11:375-388. 

Sherman, L.W., Steele, L., Laufersweiler, D., Hoffer, N., and Julian, S.A. (1989). Stray 

bullets and ‘mushrooms’: Random shootings of bystanders in four cities, 1977-1988. 

Journal of Quantitative Criminology 5:297-316. 

Simon, T.R., Saltzman, L.E., Swahn, M.H., Mercy, J.A., Ingram, E.M., and Mahendra, 

R.R, Annest, J.L., and Holmgreen, P. (2002). Nonfatal physical assault-related injuries 

treated in hospital emergency departments – United States, 2000. Morbidity and 

Mortality Weekly Report 51:460-463. 

United States Department of the Treasury. (1998). Department of the Treasury Study on 

the Sporting Suitability of Modified Semiautomatic Assault Rifles, Washington, DC. 

107 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Violence Policy Center. (1999). Firearms Production in America (1999 Edition), 

Washington, DC. 

Violence Policy Center (2002). Firearms Production in America (2002 Edition), 

Washington, DC. 

Violence Policy Center (2003). Bullet Hoses: Semiautomatic Assault Weapons – What 

Are They? What’s So Bad About Them? Washington, DC. 

Warner, K. (ed.). (1995). Gun Digest 1995/49th Annual Edition, DBI Books, Northbrook, 

IL. 

Webster, D.W., Champion, H.R., Gainer, P.S., and Sykes, L. (1992). Epidemiologic 

changes in gunshot wounds in Washington, DC, 1983-1990. Archives of Surgery

127:694-8. 

Weil, D.S. and Knox, R. (1995). Estimating the Impact in Baltimore of the Maryland Ban 

on the Sale of Assault Pistols and High Capacity Magazines, The Center to Prevent 

Handgun Violence, Washington, DC. 

Wintemute, G.J. (1994). Ring of Fire: The Handgun Makers of Southern California, 

Violence Prevention Research Program, University of California, Davis. 

Wintemute, G.J. (1996). The relationship between firearm design and firearm violence: 

Handguns in the 1990s." JAMA 275:1749-1753. 

Wintemute, G.J., Wright, M.A., Parham, C.A., Drake, C.M., Beaumont, J.J. (1998a). 

Criminal activity and assault-type handguns: A study of young adults. Annals of 

Emergency Medicine 32. 

Wintemute, G.J., Parham, C.A., Wright, M.A., Beaumont, J.J., and Drake, C.M. (1998b). 

Weapons of choice: Previous criminal history, later criminal activity, and firearm

preference among legally authorized young adult purchasers of handguns. The Journal of 

Trauma: Injury, Infection, and Critical Care 44:155-160. 

Wright, J.D. and Rossi, P.H. (1986). Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey of 

Felons and Their Firearms, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. 

Zawitz, M.W. (1995). Guns Used in Crime (NCJ-148201), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 

108 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by 

the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.