SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

63 

CA 16-00028 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, DEJOSEPH, AND CURRAN, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 

PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HOWARD A. ZUCKER, M.D., J.D., AS COMMISSIONER 

OF NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND NEW 

YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 

RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (VICTOR PALADINO OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

WHITEMAN, OSTERMAN & HANNA LLP, ALBANY (CHRISTOPHER E. BUCKEY OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of the

Supreme Court, Oneida County (Bernadette T. Clark, J.), entered

December 7, 2015 in a CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory

judgment action. The judgment denied the motion of respondents to

dismiss petitioner’s first cause of action and directed respondents to

pay petitioner’s reimbursement claim in the amount of $251,467. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the second decretal

paragraph is vacated, the motion is granted and the first cause of

action is dismissed. 

Memorandum: Petitioner-plaintiff (petitioner) commenced this

combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action

seeking, inter alia, to compel respondents-defendants (respondents) to

pay claims that petitioner submitted to respondents, in which

petitioner sought reimbursement for Medicaid expenditures known as

overburden expenditures (see e.g. Matter of County of Chautauqua v

Shah, 126 AD3d 1317, 1317, affd sub nom. Matter of County of Chemung v

Shah, 28 NY3d 244). In the first cause of action in the petitioncomplaint (petition), petitioner alleged that respondents failed to

act upon a claim within the time limits set forth in 18 NYCRR 601.4,

and that respondents therefore had a ministerial duty to pay the claim

without regard to its underlying merits. Respondents appeal from a

judgment that denied their motion to dismiss the first cause of action

and granted petitioner’s request for judgment in its favor on that

cause of action. We agree with respondents that Supreme Court erred

in denying their motion.
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CA 16-00028 

The regulation at issue states that respondents are responsible

for examining claims such as the one at issue here, and respondents’

“[i]nitial determinations objecting to the allowability of a claim for

reimbursement will be made in a timely manner not to exceed 90 days

from the time of receipt by [respondents], unless [respondents notify

petitioner] that a specified amount of additional time, not to exceed

an additional 90 days, is necessary to complete examination of the

claim” (18 NYCRR 601.4). In the claim at issue on this appeal, the

court concluded that respondents notified petitioner, on the 87th day

after receipt of the claim, that they required up to an additional 90

days in which to determine the claim, and then denied it on the 179th

day after receiving the claim. The court found that the denial of the

claim was untimely because the court interpreted the regulation as

mandating that the additional 90 days began to run on the day that

petitioner received the notice that respondents required additional

time, with the result that the denial was issued 92 days after the

notice was received. 

It is well settled that “the interpretation given to a regulation

by the agency which promulgated it and is responsible for its

administration is entitled to deference if that interpretation is not

irrational or unreasonable” (Matter of Gaines v New York State Div. of

Hous. & Community Renewal, 90 NY2d 545, 548-549; see Matter of IG

Second Generation Partners L.P. v New York State Div. of Hous. &

Community Renewal, Off. of Rent Admin., 10 NY3d 474, 481). “Put

another way, the courts will not disturb an administrative agency’s

determination unless it lacks any rational basis” (IG Second

Generation Partners L.P., 10 NY3d at 481, citing Matter of Gilman v

New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 99 NY2d 144, 149). 

Respondents’ interpretation of the regulation is that the

additional 90 days is added to the initial 90 days so that, upon

notifying petitioner that it required additional time in which to

determine the claim, respondents had a total of 180 days in which to

make the determination. We agree with respondents that their

interpretation of the regulation is rational and entitled to

deference. There is no indication in the part of the regulation at

issue that the additional time began to run upon receipt of notice by

petitioner, whereas a subdivision of the same regulation states that

“reductions, recoupments or adjustments when made by [respondents] are

final and binding when [petitioner] is notified that the reduction,

recoupment or adjustment has been or will be made” (18 NYCRR 601.4

[h]). Three other subdivisions contain similar references to receipt

of notice by a claimant (see 18 NYCRR 601.4 [e], [f], [g]). 

Regulations are generally subject to the same canons of construction

as statutes (see Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 477). 

One such canon provides that, “ ‘[w]here a law expressly describes a

particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an

irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not

included was intended to be omitted or excluded’ ” (Matter of Town of

Riverhead v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 5 NY3d 36, 42-

43). Thus, respondents rationally concluded that, inasmuch as the

part of the regulation at issue contains no language supporting the

interpretation advanced by petitioner and adopted by the court, that
-3- 63 

CA 16-00028 

language was “ ‘intended to be omitted or excluded’ ” (id. at 43).

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, there is no evidence that

respondents previously interpreted the regulation in the manner

advanced by petitioner. The mere fact that respondents issued their

denials prior to the expiration of the full 180 days on three other

claims, all decided at the same time, is not evidence that such action

was meant to indicate that such a course of action was required,

particularly in view of the unique circumstances of those simultaneous

denials.

Finally, it is well settled that, “[a]bsent an express limitation

upon the power of a particular agency to act after the expiration of

the relevant statutory period, the time limits within which an

administrative agency must act generally are construed as

discretionary” (Matter of Meyers v Maul, 249 AD2d 796, 797, lv denied

92 NY2d 807). As the Court of Appeals noted, “ ‘[a] rule that

rendered every administrative decision void unless it was determined

in strict literal compliance with statutory [or regulatory] procedure

would not only be impractical but would also fail to recognize the

degree to which broader public concerns, not merely the interests of

the parties, are affected by administrative proceedings’ ” (Matter of

Dickinson v Daines, 15 NY3d 571, 575). Even assuming, arguendo, that

the regulatory time limit was exceeded by one or two days, we conclude

that the court erred in granting the petition in part and directing

respondents to pay a claim that the Court of Appeals has unequivocally

stated was extinguished by statute (see County of Chemung, 28 NY3d at

256). 

Respondents’ remaining contentions are academic in light of our

determination.

Entered: February 3, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court