Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 30, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00151-CV

5500 GRIGGS, Appellant

V.

FAMCOR OIL, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 270th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2009-21808

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant 5500 Griggs (“Griggs”) filed suit against Famcor Oil, Inc. 

(“Famcor”) for breach of contract. The trial court granted Famcor’s no-evidence 

motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. In one issue, Griggs 

contends that the trial court erred by granting Famcor’s motion. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2001, the surface and mineral owners of a 640-acre tract of real 
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property in San Jacinto County, Texas (“the Property”) executed a Surface Use 

Agreement (“the Agreement”). The Agreement listed International Paper and 

several other entities as surface owners1and Pure Resources L.P. as the mineral 

owner. The Agreement created obligations for the surface and mineral owners, as 

well as their “respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns.”

In 2003, Griggs, a Texas corporation, purchased International Paper’s interest in 

the surface of the Property. Griggs contends that Famcor is now the owner of all or 

some of the mineral rights in the Property. 

In 2009, Griggs filed a breach-of-contract suit against Famcor, alleging that 

Famcor violated the terms of the Agreement by failing to compensate Griggs for 

the alleged reduction in fair market value of the Property caused by Famcor’s 

drilling operations. According to Famcor, Griggs did not respond to discovery for 

over four years. Famcor filed its first no-evidence motion for summary judgment in 

June 2014. Famcor argued that pursuant to Rule 193.6 of the Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure, Griggs was prohibited from introducing into evidence any material or 

information that was not timely disclosed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. However, 

according to Famcor, the trial court denied Famcor’s motion and granted Griggs 

leave to answer any outstanding discovery. Famcor contends that Griggs did not 

respond to discovery for several more months, prompting Famcor to file its second 

no-evidence motion for summary judgment in October 2014.

In its second motion, Famcor argued that Griggs had not produced sufficient 

evidence to support any of the elements of breach of contract. Famcor also

contended that Griggs was specifically prohibited from introducing any evidence 

 

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The Agreement listed the following entities as surface owners: International Paper 

Company; International Paper Realty Company; IP Farms, Inc.; IP Petroleum Company, Inc.; IP 

Timberlands Operating Company, Ltd.; GCO Minerals Company; The Long-Bell Petroleum 

Company, Inc.; American Central Corporation; Champion Realty Corporation; Sustainable 

Forests LLC; and SP Forests LLC.
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of damages under Rule 193.6. In response, Griggs argued that it had presented 

evidence of each element of breach of contract. Griggs also attached the following 

summary judgment evidence to its response to Famcor’s motion:

 Exhibit A – Special Warranty Deed from International Paper to 

Griggs, covering the Property2;

 Exhibit B – an incomplete copy of the Agreement3;

 Exhibit C – notices of damages sent by Griggs to Famcor;

 Exhibit D – photographs of the alleged damage to the Property;

 Affidavit of Sharon Lewis, Griggs’s president and sole 

shareholder; and

 Affidavit of Joseph Stanfield, Griggs’s valuation expert.

Famcor then filed a reply to Griggs’s summary judgment response. In its 

reply, Famcor objected to each item of summary judgment evidence presented by 

Griggs. However, the trial court granted Famcor’s second no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment without stating the basis for its decision or ruling on any of 

Famcor’s objections. Griggs appeals.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment if: (1) the 

moving party asserts that there is no evidence of one or more specified elements of 

a claim or defense on which the adverse party would have the burden of proof at 

trial; and (2) the respondent fails to point out summary judgment evidence raising a 

 

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The signature page of the deed indicates that the deed had 3 exhibits: Exhibit A: 

Description of Premises; Exhibit B: Permitted Exceptions; and Exhibit C: Mineral Reservation. 

However, only Exhibit A was attached. The deed does not mention the Agreement.

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The Agreement references Exhibits A–D; however, Griggs only produced Exhibit A. 

Further, it appears that Griggs only attached a portion of Exhibit A. 
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genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. See Tex. R. Civ. 

P. 166a(i); KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015). In 

reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we review the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-movant against whom the summary judgment was 

rendered. Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009) (citing City of 

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)). If the non-movant brings 

forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, then 

the trial court cannot properly grant the no-evidence motion for summary 

judgment. Id. When, as here, the trial court does not state the basis for its decision 

in its summary judgment order, we must uphold the order if any of the theories 

advanced in the motion is meritorious. See Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 

S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989).

B. Breach of Contract

One of the essential elements on which Famcor sought a no-evidence 

summary judgment was that Famcor breached the terms of the Agreement. See

West v. Triple B Servs., LLP, 264 S.W.3d 440, 446 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Therefore, Griggs was required to produce more than a 

scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to this element of its 

claim for breach of contract. See Freezia v. IS Storage Venture, LLC, 474 S.W.3d 

379, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Forbes Inc. v. 

Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003)). 

On appeal, Griggs does not specifically address any of the elements of 

breach of contract, but generally states that it has produced evidence to establish 

the following: 

1. Griggs’s ownership of the Property;

2. Famcor’s ownership of a portion of the mineral interest;
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3. The terms of the Agreement;

4. Famcor’s drilling of a well on the Property; and

5. A reduction in the fair market value of the Property. 

After reviewing the summary judgment evidence, we conclude that Griggs 

has presented no evidence that Famcor breached the Agreement. See Merrell Dow 

Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (stating no-evidence 

standard of review). Under the applicable standard of review, the summary 

judgment evidence does not raise a genuine fact issue as to whether Famcor was a 

party to the Agreement or otherwise bound by the Agreement; therefore, there is 

no fact issue as to whether Famcor breached the Agreement. See Alta Mesa 

Holdings, L.P. v. Ives, ___ S.W.3d ___, 14-14-00739-CV, 2016 WL 1534007, at 

*7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 2016, no pet. h.); Interstate Inv. 

Corp v. Rillo, No. 01-03-00818-CV, 2005 WL 267663, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] Feb. 3, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); Miles v. Plumbing Servs. of Houston, 

Inc., 668 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d 

n.r.e.).

Griggs does not point to any evidence demonstrating that Famcor was a 

party to the Agreement, the document that Griggs claims Famcor breached. The 

affidavit of Griggs’s president, Sharon Lewis, simply asserts that Famcor owns a 

mineral interest in the Property. Lewis failed to state any facts to support her claim 

that Famcor owned a mineral interest. Therefore, that portion of her affidavit is 

conclusory and is not proper summary judgment proof. See Methodist Hosp. v. 

Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 329 S.W.3d 510, 530 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, 

pet. denied) (holding that affiant’s statements about opposing party were 

conclusory). A conclusory statement is one that does not provide the underlying 

facts to support the conclusion. 1001 McKinney Ltd. v. Credit Suisse First Boston 

Mortgage Capital, 192 S.W.3d 20, 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. 
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denied). Conclusory statements in an affidavit unsupported by facts are insufficient 

to support or defeat summary judgment. Rizkallah v. Conner, 952 S.W.2d 580, 587 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet. (citing Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 

924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996)). According to the Agreement provided by 

Griggs, Pure Resources was the owner of the mineral interest in 2001. Griggs has 

provided no evidence to indicate that Pure Resources ever transferred any part of

the mineral interest to Famcor or that Famcor is bound by the Agreement even 

though Famcor is not named as a party in the Agreement. 

Because there is no evidence to show that Famcor has any obligations under 

the Agreement, there is no evidence of any breach of contract. Accordingly, the 

trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Famcor as to 

Griggs’s claim for breach of contract. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Wise.