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REVITALIZING U.S.-ASEAN RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 2017

Serial No. 115–30

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Amy Searight, Ph.D., senior adviser and director, Southeast Asia Program, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 7

Mr. Walter Lohman, director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation ........................................................................................................................ 17

Zachary M. Abuza, Ph.D., professor, National War College ................................ 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Amy Searight, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 10

Mr. Walter Lohman: Prepared statement ............................................................. 19

Zachary M. Abuza, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 28

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 56

(1)

REVITALIZING U.S.-ASEAN RELATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Members present will be permitted to submit written statements 

to be included in the official hearing record. Without objection, the 

hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material for the record, subject 

to length limitations and the rules. 

Good afternoon, everybody. As we wait for other members to 

come in, I look forward to hearing from you. 

Still in the early days of a new administration, at a tumultuous 

time in the international affairs and especially in Asia, we find ourselves at a point of international uncertainty about U.S. policies for 

engaging with the 10 nations of the Association of the Southeast 

Asian Nations, better known as ASEAN. With that in mind, we 

have convened this hearing to evaluate U.S.-ASEAN policies and 

form a set of recommendations that we can deliver to the administration for U.S. relations with this important partner. 

As 2017 is ASEAN’s 50th anniversary and the 40th anniversary 

of U.S.-ASEAN relations, this is a particularly important year to 

review our engagement with ASEAN and continue improving the 

relationship. ASEAN is Southeast Asia’s premier multilateral 

grouping made up of Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Collectively, the group makes up the world’s third largest population 

and the fifth largest economy. ASEAN is a critical diplomatic, economic, and security partner for the United States. 

U.S.-ASEAN engagement has trended upwards for years, and it 

remains strong and has a bright outlook. In 2015, the U.S.-ASEAN 

relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership. And 2016 

marked two important firsts: The first U.S.-ASEAN summit at 

Sunnylands and the first ever visiting of a sitting U.S. President 

to Laos. 

Our economic connection is also significant, as ASEAN is the 

fourth largest good export market for the United States, and we 

are ASEAN’s fourth largest trading partner. As the second fastest 

2

1This number is actually $21⁄2 trillion and is corrected by the chairman later in the hearing. 

growing economy in Asia and with a combined economy of $21⁄2 billion,1 the importance of ASEAN as a market for the U.S. is considerable. 

As a security partner, ASEAN is also invaluable. The grouping 

is strategically located astride some of the world’s most critical sea 

lanes, and shares the U.S. pursuit of regional stability through 

rules, order, and peaceful dispute settlement. 

ASEAN includes two U.S. treaty allies: Thailand and the Philippines. Despite the hugely important interest we share, we have 

come to a period of uncertainty in U.S. relationships. Part of this 

is the natural period of recalculation that comes with any new administration, but has been exasperated because the rebalance to 

Asia was, in some respects, a one-legged stool. 

Our strategy for engaging Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, relied so heavily on the TPP that when the United States withdrew, 

there was not much of a policy left. Uncertainties have been 

heightened further by instability in the region, lack of clarity about 

the administration’s America First rhetoric, and the increasing 

competition from China and initiatives like its One Belt, One Road 

policy which challenges U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The administration has done fairly extensive early outreach to 

many Asian partners, which should be commended on, but most of 

these conversations have revolved around the nuclear menace from 

North Korea. But our partnership with ASEAN is broader than 

that, a fact that some promising recent statements have recognized. 

Vice President Pence spoke extensively about U.S.-ASEAN security and economic cooperation during a recent visit to the ASEAN 

secretariat in late April. The Vice President should be applauded 

for this visit and the announcement he made that President Trump 

will attend East Asia Summit, the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and the 

APEC economic leaders meeting. As we all hear from one witness, 

on the diplomatic front in Southeast Asia, 80 percent of success is 

showing up. 

Secretary of State Tillerson also addressed U.S.-ASEAN relations 

in a recent speech declaring the intent to resolidify our relationships with ASEAN on a number of security and trade issues and 

clarifying that America First does not mean that our national security and economic prosperity comes at the expense of others. 

This leadership has been helpful, but we have yet to hear a complete policy that will give our ASEAN partners a better sense of 

how the United States will gauge going forward. Our influence and 

interests in Asia are at stake. The nations of ASEAN are walking 

a tightrope between the power centers of the United States and 

China. If the United States withdraws from Asia, ASEAN won’t be 

able to stay standing. A monopolar Asia would mean less opportunity for the United States to undertake valuable economic and 

security cooperation with ASEAN. In short, we need a plan. 

With that, to help us toward this goal, we are privileged to be 

joined by the expert panel this afternoon. I thank the witnesses for 

joining us and members of the subcommittee for their participation. 

3

Without objection, the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the hearing. 

I now turn to our ranking member for any remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I welcome this hearing on ASEAN. ASEAN is a very diverse area 

geopolitically. Indonesia and the Philippines have practiced democracy for many years; Vietnam and Laos never have. I am concerned 

with ASEAN issues in general, but particularly trade, terrorism, 

and the negative effects of the President’s proposed 2018 budget 

cuts to State Department and USAID. 

Mr. Chairman, as you point out, this is a very important market. 

Our trade relationship is big. It is important, and I might add, extremely unfair. We have seen an increase in our trade deficit with 

ASEAN every year since 2006. It now stands at well over $83 billion. That means that if we had balanced trade with ASEAN, we 

would have well more than 1 million American jobs. 

Now, given our somewhat tight job and labor market, that would 

mean a rapid increase in wages in this country. But we don’t have 

fair or balance trade with ASEAN, most notably with Vietnam, 

where not only do we have to compete against 40-cent-an-hour 

labor, but we are told that if we open up, we will get free access 

to Vietnam’s markets. Well, Vietnam doesn’t have freedom, Vietnam doesn’t have markets. We have almost a $32 billion trade deficit with Vietnam, which is not the result of free economics. It is 

not the result of free trade. 

Wall Street can repeat that over and over again, because they 

can make a lot of money jacking up the trade deficit and minimizing their demand for American labor. But the fact is the decisions on whether to make major purchases of American goods or 

instead those from Europe are political decisions made in Hanoi by 

the Vietnamese Communist Party. To say that we can’t sell in Vietnam because our goods aren’t good, because our workers aren’t 

good is an attack against America completely unjustified by the 

facts. 

These are political decisions made in Hanoi which understands 

that the American foreign policy establishment will look the other 

way as they run a huge trade deficit with us. They know Europe 

will not look the other way, so they buy from Europe and, I might 

add, Asia. 

The combatting terrorism. ASEAN countries face local and international terrorism. There are over a dozen armed radical Islamic 

groups in the region. We have seen al-Qaeda’s influence through JI 

and its affiliates, which are responsible for the 2002 Bali attacks. 

While JI’s influence has waned, other groups, including ISIS, are 

growing. Malaysia is seeing a significant increase in cyber recruitment for jihadist organizations. Southern Philippines have six 

small groups who have pledged their loyalty to ISIS. We have the 

Mujahedeen, Indonesia, Timor, MIT group who has pledged its support for ISIS. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses what 

we can do to help our ASEAN allies deal with this threat, both to 

themselves and to the world. 

Finally, we deal with trying to maintain America’s global leadership with the 2018 budget proposal. The State Department USAID 

maintains programs in ASEAN countries which are critical, and 

provide clean water, combat climate change, fight proliferation of 

AIDS, fight counter-violent extremism and terrorism. For example, 

in Malaysia, we have planned counterterrorism transnational crime 

7

initiatives countering weapons of mass destruction proliferation 

programs; similar efforts in Thailand and other ASEAN countries. 

We are working against climate change to which ASEAN countries are uniquely vulnerable. Without U.S. development, health, 

climate, and security assistance, the ASEAN region will be a less 

stable area. But it will certainly be a less pro-American area if we 

cut back our diplomatic efforts. That is why 120 three- and fourstar generals and admirals have written to House leadership in 

February urging the U.S. to maintain a robust foreign affairs budget. 

We have challenges in ASEAN around the world, and I look forward to learning from our panelists how we can best deal with 

those challenges. I thank you. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Ranking Member, and I look forward to 

having that. And I remember the remarks of General Mattis. He 

said: If you cut that foreign aid, we are going to have to spend that 

in ammunition, and I know we don’t want that. 

And so with us today, we are thankful to be joined today by Dr. 

Amy Searight, senior adviser and director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Southeast Asia Program. We look 

forward to hearing from you. 

Mr. Walter Lohman, director of the Asia Study Center at the 

Heritage Foundation. And Dr. Zachary Abuza, professor at the National War College. 

We thank the panel for joining us today to share their experience 

and expertise. Our goal is it to take the information that you give 

us, and as we have in the past, we have directed foreign policy that 

we can pass on to the State Department or the President to direct 

our pivot to Asia, and we look forward to hearing from you on that. 

And we have had that in the past and have done that with Chairman Royce in the full committee. It is so important with your input 

here, because that hopefully will lead to some policies that will 

make us all stronger and more secure. 

Being the chairman of this committee, one of my goals and my 

ultimate goal is it to reach out to that whole Asia-Pacific region 

and strengthen our relationships with all those countries, focus on 

economic and trade and national security so that we can keep 

doing what we do. 

So, Dr. Searight, if you would, press the red button to talk and 

make sure your microphone is there. And we will try to hold you 

to 5 minutes, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF AMY SEARIGHT, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND 

DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Thank you. 

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished 

members of the committee, it is an honor to be before you here 

today to discuss the future of U.S. security relations with Southeast Asia. 

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN 

and the 40th anniversary of U.S.-ASEAN relations, making it a 

natural time to take stock of U.S. ties with Southeast Asia and conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:24 Jun 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\051717\25457 SHIRL
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sider ways to improve relations with this increasingly important region. 

Southeast Asia is an integral part of the larger Asia Pacific that 

will play a key role in propelling the U.S. economy in the decades 

ahead. ASEAN is at the heart of Asian economic integration efforts, and also brings together Asia-Pacific leaders every year to 

discuss strategic issues at its diplomatic meetings and summits. 

Located at the crossroads between east and south Asia and the 

Pacific and Indian Oceans, Southeast Asia is also increasingly a region—an arena in which geopolitical rivalries between the United 

States, China, Japan, and India play out. 

ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture also gives it an 

important normative role to play, and its promotion of norms and 

rules, including the peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for 

international law, in turn help to uphold the rules-based order in 

the Indo-Pacific. 

The strategic rebalance to Asia built on an already strong base 

to further strengthen key relationships and build new partnerships. Enhanced defense cooperation agreements with both the 

Philippines and Singapore allow for greater rotational access for 

U.S. Forces to facilities in those two countries. The defense relationships with Malaysia and Indonesia are as strong as they have 

ever been. The rebalance expanded U.S. strategic options in mainland Southeast Asia, with Vietnam emerging as an important partner and Burma being incorporated back into the international community. 

Concerns about Chinese actions in the South China Sea have created a growing demand signal from many Southeast Asian countries for an expanded U.S. security presence in the region. U.S. 

freedom of navigation operations, or FONOPs, in the South China 

Sea are quietly welcomed by most Southeast Asian countries, even 

those whose excessive maritime claims are challenged along with 

those of China. 

There is an increasing demand in Southeast Asia for assistance 

with maritime security capacity building, which has led to the refocusing of existing U.S. security assistance programs, such as the 

Foreign Military Financing and Excess Defense Articles programs 

toward maritime security. New programs, such as the Southeast 

Asia maritime security initiative, have been created to augment existing programs and fill gaps to improve the effectiveness of U.S. 

maritime capacity building efforts with allies and partners in 

Southeast Asia. 

The case for continued high-level and intensive engagement with 

Southeast Asia is compelling, and members of both the executive 

and legislative branches should not hesitate to make that case to 

the American people. Our allies and partners watch our strategic 

messages and policy pronouncements very closely, and often shape 

their policies with an eye on those of the United States. 

Given this dynamic, it is important that the U.S. Government 

issue clear and consistent strategic messages, particularly on issues 

like disputes in the South China Sea, and avoid inconsistent execution of policies, which can lead to confusion and undercut the perception of our resolve. 

9

Moving forward, FONOPs and routine presence operations 

should be executed on a regular basis in the South China Sea to 

demonstrate our resolve to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. 

U.S. defense relationships in Southeast Asia are strong, and it is 

all too easy to fall into the trap of focusing on military solutions 

to security challenges to the exclusion of economic and diplomatic 

approaches. This is a mistake, as Southeast Asian countries view 

security through the lens of economic growth and integration, and 

they place a high priority on both their economic and political relationship with the United States. 

The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step 

in the wrong direction on this front, and Washington will need to 

devise and promote other ideas and vehicles for economic engagement with Southeast Asia in order for U.S leadership in the region 

to remain credible in the long run. 

Things are easier on the diplomatic front in Southeast Asia 

where, in the words of Woody Allen, 80 percent of success is showing up. There is no substitute for high-level participation and 

ASEAN-centered regional meetings, which is why the President’s 

announcement that he will attend the East Asia Summit in the 

Philippines, the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and the APEC forum in 

Vietnam this November is so important. 

Reinvigorating restrained alliances with the Philippines and 

Thailand will be job number one for the administration. With the 

Philippines, the United States should strive to preserve the alliance to the greatest extent possible, while taking a firm position 

on human rights excesses of the Duterte administration. 

In Thailand, the United States should explore whether the new 

Constitution and the tentative preparation for elections in the 

wake of the royal transition provide an opportunity to begin resetting ties without rewarding the military government. The Departments of State and Defense should immediately resume dialogues 

with Thailand on issues of mutual strategic interest. 

The United States has several enduring advantages that lead 

Southeast Asia to continue to turn to it as a security partner of 

choice, including the world’s best military, high favorability ratings 

among most local populations, and a less threatening foreign policy 

than that of China. Given these advantages, Washington can continue to play the long game in Asia, confident that chinese adventurism is likely to push many states to turn to the United States 

for support. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Searight follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Dr. Searight. 

Mr. Lohman. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WALTER LOHMAN, DIRECTOR, ASIAN 

STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. LOHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sherman, Ms. 

Gabbard. Thank you for having me to testify here today. I appreciate the time that all of you put into the work of this subcommittee. I know especially Southeast Asia is not the easiest 

thing to get attention to, and the work that you have put into it 

is very admirable and very important. 

I am particularly glad that you’re taking a closer look at the economic component of our policy in Southeast Asia. It is every bit as 

important as the other elements. In fact, it may be more important 

than the other elements. 

I want to make five points here in my summary. 

First, if the strategic goal of the United States in the Asia Pacific 

is to prevent a single power, today China, from gaining dominance, 

it cannot accomplish this on its own, and it cannot do it with only 

a negative agenda. Our efforts to push back on objectionable Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, for instance, must have a 

positive context, and economic engagement is perfect for that. In 

fact, ASEAN is best equipped to deal with economic issues. 

Number two, whatever you may read in the headlines, the states 

of Southeast Asia are most interested in economics, not in conflict. 

The region is very economically diverse: High-income countries and 

developed economies and low to high middle-income countries. 

Some of these countries have severe development problems, some 

are stuck in the middle-income trap, others are headed in that direction. Most are in serious need of infrastructure investment. But 

they are all more than interested in making money than settling 

political scores with their neighbors. 

Number three, foreign economic involvement in ASEAN is also 

very diverse. The U.S. does not have a dominant share of the market, but neither does China or any other single country. This is 

often overlooked when we hear about China being the region’s leading trading partner. It is the region’s largest trading partner, but 

the statement oversimplifies things. And we can talk about that a 

little bit in Q&A if you would like. 

Number four, China is leveraging its economic engagement in 

the region far more effectively than the U.S. is. They are making 

it attractive for countries in the region to set aside concerns about 

China’s creeping political dominance in exchange for the promise of 

economic benefits, perhaps to the region and individual countries’ 

detriment in the long-term. 

Number five, security guarantees, military presence, and diplomacy are not enough. The U.S. must be much more visibly and formally involved in the economic life of the region. And you are looking for ideas, I just have a few ideas to offer you in this regard. 

Number one, we should develop new high standard FTAs. There 

are several countries in the region that would be good candidates 

for this. We have tried with Malaysia and Thailand several years 

ago to no avail. Those are things that we can pursue again. 

18

The second thing is we need to develop options for less developed 

countries in the region, things that are less than full-blown FTAs. 

Everything we do doesn’t have to be a complete gold standard FTA. 

Something that Congress can do, actually, without necessarily the 

aid of the administration, at least not as a recommendation for the 

administration, but something you can do is look at models like the 

SAVE Act. There was a bill introduced in both houses several years 

ago called the SAVE Act, which would allow Filipino apparel made 

with American fabric to enter the United States duty free. It is a 

win-win for both sides. 

We need to coordinate better with global partners; Japan in particular, because Japan actually is very big on infrastructure and 

they are good at it. We don’t do infrastructure abroad so well. We 

can work with the Europeans much more. They are natural partners. They are people that agree with us on values. We have a lot 

of synergy economically with them. 

We need to make a better show of what American companies are 

already doing in the region, and help give them entre to foreign 

leaders that they need to see in order to make investments in the 

region. 

The U.S. should be involved with as many ASEAN meetings as 

possible, especially those involving trade, like the Economic Ministers Meeting which happens every year. It will happen this year 

in September, in the fall anyway. Bob Lighthizer should be at that 

meeting. 

Then finally, we should prioritize the U.S.-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and ASEAN assistance programs. 

And we can talk about that more too, if you would like. But there 

were several options that both the Bush administration and Obama 

put on the table during their times in office, and this administration needs to develop their own suite of assistance programs for 

ASEAN. 

The way the U.S. prevents China from advancing toward a dominant position in the region is not just by pushing back on bad behavior, but by staying energetically engaged across the whole range 

of interests and keeping the region open to all comers. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lohman follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you for that. I want to—I really want to go 

back to that when we get to the questioning part because, I mean, 

you both are hitting on something very, very strategic. 

Dr. Abuza, I look forward to hearing from you. 

STATEMENT OF ZACHARY M. ABUZA, PH.D., PROFESSOR, 

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE 

Mr. ABUZA. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having me, 

and also Mr. Sherman, Representative Gabbard, thank you very 

much for your——

Mr. YOHO. Can I get you to bring your microphone a little closer 

maybe? Thank you. 

Mr. ABUZA. I have to begin with the disclaimer that I am here 

in my own capacity. I do not represent the views of the Department 

of Defense or the National War College. 

Here, in Southeast Asia, when we are talking about peace and 

prosperity, there is so much that we need to talk about in terms 

of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Southeast Asia and the 

United States plays a very important role in dealing with all of 

these. And that is a role that China can never or will never play 

in the region. So this is an important counter comparative advantage that we have. 

The news in Southeast Asia is actually quite good. I cannot think 

of a region that has had such successful counterterrorism operations. You can look to a country like Indonesia. They have had 

some of the most successful counterterrorism in the world at the 

same time that they have helped to consolidate their democracy 

and rule of law. That is something that we really need to take into 

consideration. 

I won’t go into all the details of the successes that we have seen. 

I am going to focus on a couple concerns that I have down the pike, 

and you can read more into my written statements. 

The first is there are a lot of Southeast Asians who would like 

to get to Iraq and Syria. There is no shortage there, but it is a 

logistical issue. There are backlogs. The good news is that we are 

getting a lot of cooperation within the region amongst the security 

services. 

The second thing that really concerns me is that compared to 

Jemaah Islamiyah, the al-Qaeda-based group, the pathways to recruitment into IS in Southeast Asia are much more diverse. In Indonesia, they follow traditional networks that JI relied on, but in 

Malaysia, you will see that they—also much more online recruitment. IS is able to recruit across the socioeconomic spectrum. 

Another thing that is very different is their use of women. JI 

never used women in this role or in any role in terrorism. IS has 

employed women as key recruiters, indoctrinators, and more recently, attempted suicide bombers. 

Third, although there have only been a few, three or four, Indonesian suicide bombers in Iraq and Syria, there have been seven 

or eight Malaysians. The genie is out of the bottle, and this does 

play into the hagiography that trickles back into Southeast Asia. 

Speaking about trickle backs, Southeast Asians are starting to 

trickle back. There were an estimated 1,000, 1,200 Southeast 

Asians who went to Iraq and Syria. That is down dramatically. 

27

They weren’t all combatants. They brought a lot of their family 

members, wives and children, enough that they opened up their 

own school, Bahasa language school. But they are starting to trickle back. 

Malaysia has tools at its disposal to deal with this. They can arrest people, detain them without trial, which is problematic in 

other ways. Indonesia does not. And that is something they are debating now. It is something that we need to be concerned about in 

terms of their own consolidation of democracy. 

Let me move on, though, to what I consider the biggest concerns, 

and that is the security situation in the southern Philippines. Since 

the collapse of the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation 

Front, the southern Philippines has once again become kind of a 

black hole for Southeast Asia, not just a domestic security concern, 

but one that impacts the entire region. There a number of different 

groups, small cells that have pledged allegiance to IS. Most of this 

has been for marketing tools or I would say rather than a pure affiliation and command and control. But it is important to note that 

the southern Philippines once again is attracting militants from 

around the region to train and regroup, including Bangladesh. 

The last thing that I would focus on is the rise of the Abu Sayyaf 

once again, and not just the kidnappings that we have seen and 

the gruesome beheadings of Westerners. What is really impacting 

this is the maritime kidnappings. Since March of last year, there 

have been 19 separate maritime operations going after fishing 

boats, barges, tramp steamers in the region. This has really impacted regional trade, and it is showing no signs of ending. 

The last point that I would be concerned about and what we 

need to work with our ASEAN partners on is the desperate situation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh. This is a situation that is ripe 

for exploitation. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abuza follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you all for the great testimony. It such an important area, and as we have seen, we know that whole theater—

there is 85 percent of the world trade goes through the South 

China Sea. With the pivot that we supposedly had to the Asia-Pacific area, it didn’t happen the way it should have. We look forward 

to this administration clarifying its America First policy. I think 

what we see with that, we can’t be first if we don’t help our neighbors and our partners. And I think that is what you will see coming out here. 

I misspoke when I did my opening testimony. When we were 

talking about the size of that region being the third most populous 

with, I think it is 600 and some—630 million people, it is the fifth 

largest economy, and I said it was $21⁄2 billion; it is $21⁄2 trillion. 

Just a mistake of a few zeros. But it is such a large area. 

Then I guess some of my questions are, the first one, in your experience, what would be a way to rein in the trade and the trust 

or to get that trade back that we lost with the anticipated TPP, 

which wasn’t going to pass the House? Everybody wants to blame 

this administration, but it wasn’t going to pass the House and the 

Senate the way it was prior to that. 

I am glad, Mr. Lohman, you brought up strong free trade agreements. I am happy to say we have done letters of strong free trade 

agreements already with Taiwan, Japan, and Vietnam out of this 

committee. One of them came out of another committee we did 

jointly, because we see that as a way of making that relationship 

stronger. I think the bilateral or even multiple bilaterals or 

trilaterals. What are your thoughts on that and how would you expound on that? And what countries would you pick? 

Because if you look at like South Korea, South Korea is one of 

our largest trading partners. And then we have other trading partners. When I look at that and I try to figure out why does South 

Korea become so successful at trading, and then you see like Vietnam and some of the other countries becoming stronger in trade 

with us, what is it about their government, about their rule of law, 

about their society that allows one country to become successful 

and large trading partners where the others don’t? Who would you 

target initially? 

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, we have already targeted the freest economy 

in the region, which is Singapore. And I will point out that Singapore is the only country in the region that the United States runs 

a trade surplus with. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. LOHMAN. It is the only country that we also have a free trade 

agreement with. So I do think free trade agreements are a vehicle 

to sit down and work through these issues with the countries in 

question. If you are not sitting with them and talking about these 

problems, you are not going to address them. 

Now, you could argue about the substance of those agreements 

and how tough our negotiators are, but if you don’t sit down and 

talk with them, you are not going to fix anything. 

I do think Vietnam is a good candidate. Vietnam signed on to the 

TPP, and by all accounts they are going ahead and making the reforms that were required by TPP anyway. So they certainly see a 

41

connection between economic freedom and prosperity and becoming 

a free trade partner. 

Malaysia is a good candidate. Like I said, we got maybe 90 percent of the way there or 85 percent of the way there during the 

Bush administration. We couldn’t close the deal. 

Thailand, you know, there are some political things we want to 

think about with regard to Thailand, but still Thailand would be 

a good example. 

But as I pointed out in my testimony, I think there are things 

that we could do that are not full-blown trade agreements. FTAs 

take years to accomplish, very complicated, they are very costly in 

domestic political terms for some of these countries. We could do 

much smaller things that would benefit our profile in the region 

and economically would benefit both of us. That is why I point to 

the SAVE Act, not necessarily for the Philippines, though it could 

be for the Philippines; not necessarily for textiles, although it could 

be textiles. But that idea of a limited agreement on certain sectors 

that would benefit both sides. 

Mr. YOHO. Dr. Abuza, do you want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. ABUZA. I am no expert in trade. But let me make one point 

about the TPP: I am agnostic on that as a trade agreement. I can’t 

even pretend to understand the complexity of it. But countries like 

Vietnam really viewed the TPP, or Singapore viewed the TPP, in 

many ways as the Obama administration did, much more than a 

trade deal; that it was a strategic anchor, something that committed the United States to the region. 

And now that the Trump administration has taken that off the 

table, it really did lasting damage to the perception of United 

States reliability in the region. 

I just got back from Vietnam and had very high-level meetings 

across the government, the Communist Party, the military. They 

are just agog because they really wonder what that says about how 

long our commitment to the peace and stability in the region over 

the long term. 

Mr. YOHO. Point made. And that is why it is so important to 

have this meeting, so we can figure out what is the best way to go. 

I think the free trade agreement—because we want them to know 

that we are back, that we are here, that we are going to be strong 

allies. I think we are going to have time, if you guys have time, 

to do two rounds of questioning. I want to come back to you Dr. 

Searight. 

But at this time, I am going to turn it over to my ranking member, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Abuza, countries that want to run up huge 

trade surpluses with us, in effect, take our jobs, will always tell us 

that, boy, if you give us all the jobs, or better yet, tell people not 

to notice that we are taking all the jobs, we will be great military 

strategic partners. We really need you involved. 

So you tell us Vietnam really wants us involved and they are disappointed with TPP. Are they willing to enter into an agreement 

with us that mandates balanced trade flows as an essential element of such trade agreement or are they only in favor of a strategic military alliance, as long as they get to take more of our jobs? 

42

And am I—you know, it is possible you have had no discussion 

on this, but is there any evidence that they are willing to have balanced trade because they want us so involved in their region? 

Mr. ABUZA. Again, I——

Mr. SHERMAN. If you don’t know, you don’t know. I will regard 

that as a rhetorical question, and I will move on to Mr. Lohman, 

unless—you are for the SAVE Act. Obviously, that would help to 

some degree those who make fabric in the United States. It would 

cost us jobs among those who make garments here in the United 

States. Every analysis I saw, and there weren’t many, said it would 

cost us jobs and increase our trade deficit. 

Are you aware of any study that says that that Act would increase jobs in America or reduce our trade deficit, or are you just 

philosophically in favor of such a bill? 

Mr. LOHMAN. No. But I do recall studies by retailers of the 

United States. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Oh, yes, retailers are in favor of cheap imports, 

yes. 

Mr. LOHMAN. But retailers also provide jobs. Working at 

Walmart is not——

Mr. SHERMAN. If you believe that the way we can increase jobs 

in America is to reduce our manufacturing and make it up by having more malls——

Mr. LOHMAN. We were just talking about a tiny bit of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, obviously, the SAVE Act is not the most important piece of legislation ever submitted to Congress. It will have 

a slight effect one way or the other. And that effect will be negative 

on jobs in the manufacturing sectors of the United States. 

But I want to move on to an area where Dr. Abuza has more 

background, and that is the Christian Governor of Jakarta, who 

was found guilty on charges of blasphemy. It is one thing to have 

terrorists to cooperate with the Government in Jakarta to deal with 

terrorist groups that they are dedicated to opposing. It is another 

thing when the government engages in what can only be called an 

act of terrorism against one of the leaders of its own government. 

What can be done to deal with this outrageous 2-year sentence 

and to be done with the idea of if not the level of freedom of religion that we have here in the United States, at least not the—this 

level of oppression? 

Mr. ABUZA. The blasphemy laws actually have been on the books 

for a number of decades. It actually was enacted under Suharto. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ABUZA. It has been increasingly abused. It was there for 

many years. But certainly, since you have had the rise of democracy since 1998, you have also had the rise of Islamist politics in 

Indonesia. I just hate to say it, but there is good politics in this, 

and no one seems to be willing to stand up and defend religious 

minorities right now. There are just not votes in it. 

I am very concerned right now——

Mr. SHERMAN. Is the average Indonesian citizen aware of the adverse effect that can have on Indonesia’s relationship with the rest 

of the world? 

Mr. ABUZA. Indonesia has this wonderful tradition of pluralism, 

syncretic Islam, but that is changing. It is a less tolerant place. 

43

There is more fundamental Islam Wahhabism or Salafism is growing in the country. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I could interrupt, is one of the reasons for that 

funding of extremist ideological—not terrorism but ideological 

Islam out of Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabi movement? 

Mr. ABUZA. That has been a very important part of this. The 

Saudis have a foundation in a university, known as LIPIA, that 

continues to fund scholarships and madrasas. Yes, this is happening all the time. And it is not just them, it is from other Gulf 

States. 

But one point, American—you know, after Suharto fell and you 

had free speech and democracy restored, in many ways the pendulum swung too far, and you had the rise of what are often referred to as anti-vice organizations. They are basically Islamist vigilante groups. The most prominent one is the FPI right now that 

led these mass demonstrations starting in December against the 

Christian Governor of Jakarta, Ahok. 

I think the Indonesians, their democracy is fairly well consolidated now. I think it is time that we start to put a little more pressure on them to say, listen, every country that has free speech also 

has some limits on free speech, and incitements of violence is not 

protected free speech. They have got to start to address this or this 

is going to be part and parcel of the 2019 Presidential election. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Ms. Gabbard from Hawaii. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Abuza, I want to follow up on Congressman Sherman’s questioning and some of your statements about how ISIS is recruiting 

across the socioeconomic spectrum, in particular focusing on 

women where that hasn’t occurred before. What are their tools for 

recruitment? Because this evidence of recruiting across the socioeconomic spectrum is something that is, unfortunately, kind of dismissed often when people talk about who are ISIS’ recruits most 

likely to be. So if you can expand on that a little bit. 

Mr. ABUZA. So during the period of Jemaah Islamiyah in the 

2000s, the best determinant of who became a member were who 

your father was, who your brother was, what madrasa you studied 

at, and what mosque you attended. You were tied to the community, and it was a very slow and gradual process. 

What they found—the security forces in Malaysia and Tunisia 

found is that because IS does so much of their recruitment online, 

it is given a special role for women to play as recruiters, as indoctrinators, people actually goading people to go and travel. Southeast Asian women who have traveled to Iraq and Syria to serve as 

nurses, who are to marry jihadists over there have played really 

important roles on social media in leading this charge. 

The Malaysian police have really found that almost every major 

cell that they have disrupted had a woman as one of the key recruiters, indoctrinators, or money people. So they are just being 

empowered in different ways. 

Recently, in Indonesia, the authorities arrested a woman who 

had already been recruited to be a suicide bomber. That would 

have been a first in Southeast Asia. So the precedent is there. 

44

Ms. GABBARD. If the promise is not money, it is not security, it 

is not stability, what is the promise? What is the message they are 

using for recruiting? 

Mr. ABUZA. It is commitment to the cause. It is a pure ideologically driven commitment to forward the glory of Islam. 

Ms. GABBARD. So how is it that I think you mentioned in Indonesia, you mentioned great progress or gains in counterterrorism. 

How do you match that with your other statement about the rise 

of Wahhabism and extremism within Indonesia that is having 

these other impacts, of course, politically as was mentioned, but 

also with the increasing numbers of people who would be receptive 

to ISIS recruitment? 

Mr. ABUZA. The numbers of Wahhabis in Southeast Asia is probably about 10 percent, but it is growing. There is a debate within 

the counterterrorism field that people in the Salafi community 

might be the best antidote as long as they are quietest and they 

are not espousing violence. They simply have their social agenda. 

I personally am not so convinced of that, but it is one that you do 

hear a lot, that these are the people best able to challenge the ideology of ISIS. 

Ms. GABBARD. Are you aware of any examples of that in the 

world? 

Mr. ABUZA. Well, let me give you a different example. So since 

2010, JI as a militant terrorist organization has really been 

defunct, and the Indonesian Government has given members of JI 

inordinate amount of space to go out, proselytize, run their 

mosques, run their madrasas, engage, as long as they are not targeting civilians or engaging in violence. 

You know, it makes me think, is this just a tactical good time 

to lie low as they watch their strategic rival IS take the abuse, take 

the punishment, get the arrests, and they are waiting in the wings 

to pick up the pieces in another few years? So I am not sure this 

is the best thing to do. Our best hope is that Indonesia’s very rich 

civil society in moderate Muslims are able to withstand this cultural invasion of Wahhabism. 

Indonesian Islam really is syncretic. It has been on the back foot 

in the past few years just because some of it is anger toward the 

United States. For example, the war in Iraq in 2003 was wildly unpopular in Indonesia. That certainly did not help moderates in the 

country. But I really—I do believe that there is a rich cultural resilience in Indonesia. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOHO. If we do have the time, we can go around a second 

round. 

I just want to go back to the U.S. trade. I think Singapore is a 

good example. If you look at how we started—and my goal is to 

have this with other countries in there as you talked about. The 

U.S.-Singapore trade of FTA goes into effect in 2004. Trade surplus 

in 2003 was $1.4 billion. Today it is $9.1 billion. Our goal is to have 

balanced trade as important as it is free trade agreements. If we 

can repeat that model over and over again, I feel us building 

stronger, a stronger alliance and unity in that area to stave off 

45

China, because we see what China is doing in the South China 

Sea. 

The reports, and we already have known this, that they are 

weaponizing those islands. And of course, there is a cause and effect. They are doing that, now Vietnam wants to do it. If Vietnam 

does it, the next country is going to want to do it, and it builds, 

it creates an instability in that area where we really should be focusing on the economic trades. 

Dr. Searight, you were talking about—you testified about the inconsistent execution of policies with an on again, off again FONOPs 

being the best example. How do we best solve this? What specifically should the administration do differently? 

I commend them for going down there and putting an emphasis, 

Mike Pence and President Trump going down there. So I would 

like to hear what your thoughts are on that. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Well, I do think engagement as we saw with the 

Vice President’s trip is very important. But I would say that when 

it comes to being clear and consistent on key issues, like the South 

China Sea, I think it is very important for this administration to 

devise a strategy to really put some thought and effort into thinking through what our core interests are and what options we have 

and how to weave that together into a real strategy, and then go 

out with allies and partners, ideally, and articulate our interests 

and our approach and have—and then as I said in my testimony, 

things like freedom of navigation operations and routine presence 

operations. I think it is very important to be consistent in executing them and to be very clear about the reason why we do 

things like freedom of navigation operations. It is because we have 

a core interest in freedom of navigation. We should do it consistently, regularly wherever international law allows and not buy into 

the Chinese narrative that conducting freedom of navigation operations is provocative by having a consistent baseline of regularly 

executing them like clockwork and not pulling them down and 

ratcheting them back up or thumping our chests before or after we 

do them, but just be very low key and consistent. I think that 

would go a long way in demonstrating our resolve and upholding 

a core principle to the United States. 

Mr. YOHO. Let me ask you this, because what we see is an aggressive China. Mr. Lohman, you were talking about the U.S. can’t 

accomplish this on its own; we need multiple nations and the cooperation of them. China is doing what they can and they are 

leveraging their economic clout, and they are doing that because 

they can, they are cash rich. We are distracted, our foreign policy—

I have been a critic of it for the last 20, 30 years. I think we are 

way off course, and we really need to focus. 

But when we see an aggressive China claiming areas that historically have been kind of sovereign areas or open areas, and then 

you have the arbitration court ruling against them on their claim 

to the South China Sea. Yet the world stood by while they built island after island, over 4,000 acres, building military complexes and 

runways. We know what they are doing and we know what the intent is, but yet the world stood by, we stood by. 

How do you stop that at this point and what effect will that have 

on the ASEAN countries? Because we know China is trying to partVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:24 Jun 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\051717\25457 SHIRL
46

ner up with them too. We saw what the Philippines did, and they 

don’t like what China is doing, but they are like, well, we are going 

turn a blind eye to it. If we all turn a blind eye to it, they are going 

to rule that area. What are your thoughts on that? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Well, I do think it is very difficult to roll back the 

things that China has done, and it is also going to be very difficult 

to stop them from further developing these outposts and militarizing them. I think it is important for the United States to demonstrate commitment to staying engaged. Again, as is often said 

the United States does not take a side in a particular dispute, but 

it does take a very strong position on how the dispute should be 

resolved. They should be resolved according to noncoercion and respect for the rule of law, which is why the arbital tribunal ruling 

is so important. 

We basically—the United States stands for a rules-based order 

that allows countries to make choices freely and not be bullied by 

other countries. I think just continuing to express those principles 

and backing them up by high-level, consistent, strategic engagement across the range of government tools is really important. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. I want to question, and whoever feels best 

to answer this, we are talking about the specific areas and specific 

sectors, whether it be infrastructure, telecoms, energy, et cetera, 

that you believe could serve as an opportunity for greater economic 

cooperation between the U.S. and the ASEAN countries. If you 

could pick a sector, would it be energy, telecoms, semiconductors? 

What would it be, just real briefly, if you can answer that? 

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, I think the most crying need in ASEAN is infrastructure, transportation and the like. Energy is a big issue for 

them. The United States companies aren’t that big on doing infrastructure abroad, but we do have partners that do it. The Japanese, for instance, they have very serious plans for infrastructure 

investments in Southeast Asia, and they are making those investments, so we can coordinate with them more on that. Energy, we 

have a little bit better position to do energy investments, but those 

are also things we could partner on in the region. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. We will go back to Mr. Sherman. Second round. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. To listen to the United States on these little 

islets in the South China Sea, you would think that this was the 

only maritime dispute in the world. There is no oil on these islets. 

They are just an excuse for two nationalistic governments, the U.S. 

and Beijing, and perhaps some others, to beat their chests and find 

something to fight about. 

But there is a maritime dispute that actually is a maritime dispute for practical reasons, and that is the one between East Timor 

and Australia. Should we—and are any of our witnesses familiar 

with that dispute? 

Okay. I will just make the point that it illustrates the fact that 

the U.S. has chosen and our foreign policy establishment has chosen to ignore dozens of important maritime disputes, but it meets 

the needs of both the U.S. and Chinese military establishments to 

wildly exaggerate the importance of the little islets in the South 

China Sea. I don’t know if Mr. Lohman has a background on that. 

47

Mr. LOHMAN. I could just comment on the comparison. I mean, 

the South China Sea, so much attention is focused on it because 

it is so important strategically. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will back off that. The exaggeration, you perhaps 

are unfamiliar with my comments in this room, so I will bore my 

colleagues. 

Yes, trillions of dollars of trade goes through the South China 

Sea, almost all of it in and out of Chinese ports, and if China had 

the strategic power that they are alleged to be seeking, they could 

blockade their own ports. In addition, there is some oil from the 

Middle East that goes through some of the disputed areas, which 

could at a cost of less than 1 cent a gallon to Japanese consumers 

be routed far away from that. So it does meet the needs of those 

that want to see an expansion of military tension or at least military expenditures to say that we are protecting trillions of dollars 

of free trade. That is all—you know, as I say, it is in and out of 

Chinese ports. 

So whereas there really is oil in the disputed territory, and natural gas too, between the Timor and Australia, but since no one 

can use that dispute to justify an increase in nationalistic passions 

or Pentagon expenditures, no one in this room has looked at it, except I looked at it just a little bit. 

Dr. Abuza, which countries in the ASEAN region are most likely 

to have this influx of ISIS fighters as they trickle back? And a related question is, should we be doing more in the area of broadcasting to reach out to the populations, particularly Islamic populations, in Southeast Asia? 

Mr. ABUZA. In sheer numbers, Indonesia has the largest numbers 

of Southeast Asians. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are they from any particular part of Indonesia, 

Aceh, or anywhere else? 

Mr. ABUZA. It is concentrated in three different islands: Central 

Sulawesi, Java, and parts of Sumatra. On a per capita basis, Malaysia has far more members who have gone there. It tends to concern me because I don’t think that Malaysia has the social resilience to deal with an attack the way Indonesia does. You know, you 

think about the January 2016 IS attack in Jakarta. That was up 

and running—the shop was up and running the next day. The Indonesians moved on. I think any attack in Malaysia would just 

be—I think the government would overreact. I think it would just 

cause a lot more problems there. 

In terms of people coming back, we have to think about, because 

the countries have gotten very good about sharing flight manifests, 

Malaysians traveling through Indonesia to go to Turkey and vice 

versa, we have got to work closely with Thailand and other countries that these people would be transiting through. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What about our broadcasting efforts? Any comment on that? 

Mr. ABUZA. We should support this, but this is stuff that should 

be done by the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments. They have 

both set up countermessaging centers with the United States’ assistance. In some ways I am angry and disappointed that we allowed it to be two different bilateral centers rather than kind of 

48

forging more regional cooperation in this. And I hope that the 

United States——

Mr. SHERMAN. But it shouldn’t be a voice of America. It should 

be the voice of Indonesia or a voice of Malaysia? 

Mr. ABUZA. There are things that we do. I am a huge fan of 

something that Radio Free Asia does called BenarNews. One of the 

things that they are focusing on is saying a lot of this militancy 

just doesn’t get good coverage in their countries, and so they engage in fairly long-form journalism to go into a little more detail 

about these operations. I think that is wonderful bang for the U.S. 

taxpayer buck. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. I will next got to Mr. Scott Perry from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Keeping with the line of questioning Mr. Sherman was just going 

through, how do you characterize the risk of ISIS or just the radical Islamist terrorism, if you will, those organizations in Southeast 

Asia? Like, how do you characterize the risk, if you could? 

Mr. ABUZA. Manageable. 

Mr. PERRY. Manageable? 

Mr. ABUZA. Yes. The threat is there. I don’t want to overstate it. 

I think we will see political violence as a fact of life in Southeast 

Asia for some time to come. I don’t see that going away. But I have 

a lot of confidence in the security services in the region. They have 

done a very good job. 

Compared to where they were in 2001, 2002, they have been very 

proactive and involved. They have not overreacted. I think they 

have very good intelligence on the ground. More and more, there 

is better cooperation between the governments that no longer—you 

know, 2002, 2003, any intelligence sharing really required the 

intervention of senior political leaders to make it happen just because the security services tended to be very mistrustful of one another. That is not the case now. There is just a lot of routine sharing of information cooperation between them, so it is a manageable 

threat. 

Mr. PERRY. So while they are individually and maybe collaboratively managing the threat, is there anything that organizations 

such as ASEAN is doing or should be doing? I just want to get a 

little more granularity to what Mr. Sherman—and is there a different cultural awareness or viewpoint toward the radicalism or 

fundamentalism, I mean, especially in places like Malaysia, as you 

noted, the largest Muslim country in the area? I mean, is there a 

different cultural viewpoint regarding security than, say, what we 

have or Europe has in this regard? 

Mr. ABUZA. They take security very seriously because they are 

concerned about economic growth and prosperity, and it is very 

hard to attract foreign investment when the bombs are going off. 

So your first question was about the——

Mr. PERRY. About other organizations, what they are doing, what 

they should be doing. Is there a collaborative effort or is it essentially individual nation efforts in collaboration? 

Mr. ABUZA. ASEAN as an umbrella organization holds annual 

chief of police and chief of intelligence and chief of defense meetings, so there is that level of coordination that ASEAN can do. It 

49

breeds familiarity, working relationships. But ASEAN itself does 

not get involved in actual security operations. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Let me shift gears here a little bit. I don’t 

know if I have enough time to talk about China. Just in referring 

to the good gentleman from California’s assertions, maybe I will 

put it that way—I happen to believe that the Chinese construction 

of the islands and militarization and provocative actions are problematic, not from the standpoint of two nationalistic governments, 

but I don’t think the United States wants to do any more than it 

has to or should to maintain sea lanes and keep everything open 

in that regard and safe. But I think China is doing what they are 

doing, and we are going to be forced to react, not that we want to. 

We don’t want to send the military. We don’t want to do any of this 

stuff, but I don’t think we can let them just continue to be engaged 

in that activity, because I think it will beget more and more difficult activity to deal with. So let me just make that statement. 

Now recently, the President invited the Thai Prime Minister and 

the President of the Philippines to the White House to discuss cooperation regarding North Korea. I am just wondering, you know, 

as China is, I think, an 80 percent trading partner with North 

Korea, somebody has got to do the other 20 percent I suppose. But 

what role can you see these countries playing in addition to maybe 

other ASEAN members to counter North Korea? Do they have a 

functional role, the Philippines, Thailand? Do they have a functional role in North Korea in this regard? Anybody. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. You know, it is interesting that Thailand and the 

Philippines do trade with North Korea. They are ranked fourth and 

fifth respectively in terms of imports from North Korea, and many 

countries in the region have diplomatic relations with North Korea. 

So there certainly is more that many of these countries can do to 

really enforce sanctions and perhaps curtail diplomatic efforts. 

Also, ASEAN as a group, as a grouping, having ASEAN support for 

putting out strong statements criticizing North Korean provocations I think is very important, and I think we have seen even 

more backbone recently among ASEAN countries to really put out 

tough statements because of the poisoning of Kim Jong-un’s brother in Malaysia. And so Malaysia, Vietnam, you know, many of 

these countries are quite upset to get pulled into this——

Mr. PERRY. With the chairman’s indulgence just for a final followup here, the harsh rhetoric, so to speak, I guess it is nice, so 

to speak, from our standpoint. We like to see that isolationism but 

do you think it affects the leader of North Korea tangibly? He 

doesn’t seem to be affected by any of that. In my opinion, it looks 

like only tangible things. He almost revels in being a pariah and 

being downcast by his neighbors or anybody else. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Well, I think the regime does depend to some extent on having access to a number of countries and being able 

to——

Mr. PERRY. Yeah, but the harsh statements alone——

Ms. SEARIGHT. Right. That is not going to be sufficient. It is not 

a sufficient condition. But can I make one other point, which is, I 

think it is a little bit unfortunate that the framing of the President’s phone calls and invitations to these leaders to come to Washington, the narrative that emerged with this was all about building 

50

a coalition against North Korea. I don’t think that was the primary 

motivation. North Korea is an important issue that the President 

should talk to these countries about, but it is one of many, many 

of the other issues that we have been talking about today. Economics, security relationships, counterterrorism, are more important to 

these countries and their interests and to the dynamics in the region than focusing on North Korea. 

So North Korea is an important issue. It should be discussed. 

ASEAN plays an important role in, again, kind of pointing out normative statements against North Korea and convening other powers to build a coalition, but it is not the main issue between these 

countries. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Thank you. 

I am going to give the ranking member a few seconds here to 

clarify a statement, then we will go to Ms. Gabbard. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to make it clear, China’s actions in the 

South China Sea are wrongful. They are important. They are just 

not quite as important as everybody else thinks they are. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

I would like to follow up on the topic of North Korea. Dr. 

Searight, I represent Hawaii, and every time North Korea conducts 

another missile launch, another missile test, and every time my 

constituents see and hear about their continuing increased capabilities, we become more and more concerned about the threat that 

is posed. So even as some of the ASEAN countries may not think 

that North Korea is a very important issue, it is to our country. 

Beyond sanctions, beyond the ASEAN countries enforcing sanctions and beyond making statements, do you and to others on the 

panel, how do you feel ASEAN as a whole can be most effective in 

moving North Korea toward the ultimate objective of 

denuclearization? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Well, again, I think ASEAN does have a role to 

play. It is a convener of leaders in the region. It plays a very important coordinating role and a normative role in really articulating the expected rules and norms of behavior. There is work that 

individual countries can do to toughen some sanctions, I think, but 

I don’t think ASEAN is the key to dealing with the North Korea 

situation. I mean, I think other countries in Northeast Asia, starting with China, but working with Japan and South Korea, our allies, and Europe, is ultimately going to be more important, and 

Russia as well. 

Mr. ABUZA. I do think Southeast Asian countries do play a role 

in this. If you think about what keeps this regime alive, the funding they rely on, this often comes through Southeast Asia, through 

unregulated banking across the region. We certainly could put 

more pressure on them and more cooperation with their financial 

intelligence units to go after North Korean money laundering. A lot 

of precursors for the drugs, methamphetamines that are produced 

by the North Korean regime, are made in Southeast Asia or India 

and transit through Southeast Asia. I can think of several cases in 

51

which these were seized in Southeast Asian ports in the past, so 

we could get more cooperation in port security there. 

The Proliferation Security Initiative, the interdiction of North 

Korean vessels at sea, we can get more support from Southeast 

Asian nations to help with this in terms of the types of training 

we do with their navies. These could be scenarios that we could do. 

I will leave it at that. 

Ms. GABBARD. You know, for a long time now, everyone has 

talked about China kind of being the strongest leverage point in 

getting North Korea to change their behavior, come to the table, or 

whatever the case may be, but even with China’s kind of heightened criticism of North Korea’s antics and North Korea appearing 

to thumb their nose at China, what impact do you think that has 

on the current path forward that our State Department is taking? 

And, secondly, given the heightened U.S.-Russia tensions, what is 

Russia’s role likely to be here? Is it to share the objective that we 

have in denuclearization or to perhaps work more with North 

Korea? 

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, I think when the administration was considering this policy of really pressing the Chinese—actually, not so 

much pressing them, but relying on them to take a lead on this 

North Korea issue, had they called in almost any expert in town 

and asked them whether this would work, they would have been 

told, no, it won’t work. The Chinese won’t do this of their own volition, and they won’t do it for you. 

The only way the Chinese are going to do anything on this, and 

their cooperation is absolutely essential, the only way they are 

going to do anything is through a great deal of pressure: Thirdparty sanctions on their companies, calling on them to crack down 

on the interaction that they do have with North Korea that is already prohibited by the U.N. Security Council. That is the only way 

to get cooperation from the Chinese. 

Ms. GABBARD. Nothing else. Thank you. 

Mr. PERRY [presiding]. Well, the ranking member is done. Maybe 

I do have a final question here since I am here in the chair. 

So the implications of Chinese economic activities in the area, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other Chinese efforts to promote infrastructure 

development within ASEAN, as these expand, these initiatives, 

what are the implications to American foreign policy in the region 

with those, if you have any thoughts? 

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, first of all, I think that we underestimate our 

own resources. We have more resources than the Chinese do to invest in the region, trade with the region. It is just that the decisions are made in boardrooms in the United States. They are not 

centralized like they are in Beijing. We are a much bigger investor 

in Southeast Asia than the Chinese are. The EU is bigger than all 

of us. Japan is bigger than China. So I think we underestimate 

how much we do have there. 

That said, I think the OBOR project is real. Some of the coverage 

of it, some of the commentary that it is going to go away, that it 

is really not all it is cracked up to be, I think is misguided. It may 

not spend $1 trillion in total, but if it spends $1⁄2 trillion, that is 

still a lot, right? I think ultimately the challenge it presents the 

52

United States is that it causes other countries in the region to soft 

pedal their political concerns because they have an opportunity to 

bring in this investment. 

The Chinese play it up so much. They bring Duterte to Beijing. They give him $24 billion in investment. It doesn’t matter that 

they are a relatively small investor in the Philippines in the overall 

scheme of things. They are grabbing the headlines. They are creating the narrative, and I think that will cause the countries in the 

region to back off on the things that are most important or that 

are important, like South China Sea. That is why Philippines 

backed up, because they are interested in that investment, and it 

is not really worth the trouble to press the Chinese so hard if they 

can also get benefits by staying quiet about it. I think it is similar 

to what has happened in Malaysia. Throughout the region there is 

that dynamic. 

Mr. YOHO. I wanted to come back to the South China Sea and 

what China is doing, because we see that threat. We see them 

pushing there, and we did back out of the TPP, however it was 

done. I think the biggest difference and, yes, there are some other 

disputes there. If you look at East Timor and Australia, that is a 

combined population of about 24-, 25 million people. I don’t think 

a large part of the trade for the world goes through there. With 

China claiming the nine-dash lines as their area, I think this is a 

concern for all of us. 

I think they are playing it smart. They are not engaged all over 

the world in conflicts as we are and as we have been. We are distracted. We have got the Middle East. We have got what is going 

on in North Korea. As you brought up, China has the biggest influence that could help resolve this problem. This is a problem that 

is not just our problem. This is not the Korean Peninsula problem 

or the Asia Pacific theater. This is a world problem. I agree with 

the Brigadier General that we don’t want to go to war. We don’t 

want to fight anybody. We just want to have, like I said in the beginning of this, develop economic and trade, and we all have a 

hand in national security with the way the world is today. That is 

something we all benefit from, and we all should work to strive to 

get that. 

So with that, does anybody else have any comments, questions, 

closing? 

Well, with that, I just want to tell you how much I appreciate 

you being here. I look forward to talking to you down the road and 

getting input from you. And if it is okay, we will reach out to you 

periodically. 

And with that, this meeting is going to adjourn. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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