Filed 6/6/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re NOAH G., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B268442

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK01921)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel 

Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Acting Assistant County 

Counsel, Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

The mother, A.R, appeals from the September 29, 2015 order terminating her 

parental rights. She argues the juvenile court should have applied the beneficial parentchild relationship exception pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1

section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile court reasonably concluded the mother failed to 

show her relationship with the children outweighed the benefits of adoption. We affirm 

the order. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 22, 2013, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (the department) filed a section 300 petition. The petition was filed on behalf of 

four-year-old Noah G. and newborn Jose G. The petition alleges the children are 

dependents of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleges: 

the mother has a history of illicit drug abuse, including marijuana and methamphetamine; 

this drug use renders her incapable of providing the children with proper care and 

supervision; the mother used illicit drugs throughout her pregnancy with Jose; the mother 

tested positive for methamphetamine at Jose‟s birth on October 16, 2013; and the 

 

1

Future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
3

mother‟s drug abuse endangered the children‟s health and safety and placed them at risk 

of physical harm and damage. 

At the October 22, 2013 detention hearing, the juvenile court found the department 

made a prima facie showing that the children were described by section 300, subdivision 

(c). The juvenile court released the children to the mother over the department‟s 

objection. The department was ordered to: provide family maintenances services to the 

mother and father; refer the family to family preservation services; make unannounced 

home visits; and refer the parents for weekly random and on demand drug testing. 

At the March 4, 2014 adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile court 

sustained the amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The children were 

placed in the home of the parents under the supervision of the department. The parents 

were ordered to participate in individual, drug and alcohol counseling, random alcohol 

and drug testing, and parenting classes. 

On August 4, 2014, the department filed a supplemental petition pursuant to 

section 387. The section 387 petition alleges the parents tested positive for drugs and 

failed to regularly participate in a substance abuse treatment program. The parents‟

failure to comply with the juvenile court‟s orders endangered the children‟s health and 

safety and placed them at risk of physical harm. At the detention hearing on the 

supplemental petition, the juvenile court detained the children. The juvenile court 

ordered the department to provide the family with family reunification services. The 

parents were granted monitored visits at least twice a week with the department having 

discretion to liberalize visits and to release the boys to a parent. 
4

At the September 19, 2014 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court 

sustained the allegations in the section 387 petition. The juvenile court ordered the 

children placed with their maternal grandmother. The department was ordered to provide 

the family with reunification services. The parents were granted monitored visits at least 

twice a week for at least one hour with the department having discretion to liberalize. 

The parents were ordered to participate in: individual, alcohol and drug counseling; 

random alcohol and drug testing; and parenting classes. At the May 4, 2015 six-month 

review hearing, the juvenile court found the children‟s return to the parents‟ custody 

would create a substantial risk of detriment to the youngsters‟ well-being. The juvenile 

court found the parents were not in compliance with the case plan and terminated family 

reunification services. 

At the section 366.26 hearing on September 29, 2015, the juvenile court found by 

clear and convincing evidence that the children would likely be adopted. The juvenile 

court found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply and 

terminated parental rights. The juvenile court explained: “It is clear that the parents have 

had regular consistent visitation and contact and do have a parental role and relationship 

in the children‟s lives, but they have participated in no programs in over a year. [¶] The 

younger child has lived with them less than half of his life. The case law and code 

discussed two different things; one is the extent to which the parental role and 

relationship outweighs the benefit of permanence to adoption, which I don‟t think the 

parents have shown, especially in light of their failure to participate in anything in the last 

year and the fact that they still have monitored visits. [¶] The limited amount of time 
5

that Jose has lived with them and Noah being out of their care for over a year. Second 

issue is whether it would be emotionally detrimental to the children to terminate the 

parental role and relationship, and at this point there‟s been no showing that it would be 

emotionally detrimental to the children, especially to Jose. [¶] The children enjoy 

visiting with their parents and having the parents over, would like to be able to live with 

their parents, if they could, but that is impossible. Even the extent to which the mother 

discusses Noah being unhappy when she leaves at the end of the day, really didn‟t show 

that being to the level of emotional detriment.” 

The mother filed her notice of appeal on September 29, 2015. 

 

III. EVIDENCE

-

A. October 22, 2013 Detention Report

On October 16, 2013, the department received a referral alleging the mother and 

Jose tested positive for amphetamines. The mother did not receive prenatal care during 

her pregnancy with Jose. She started using methamphetamine and marijuana 10 years 

ago, using drugs on the weekends or on a monthly basis. The mother began using drugs 

because of the pressure of taking care of the maternal great-grandmother. She used 

methamphetamine from January to June 2013 because she did not think she was 

pregnant. The mother stopped using methamphetamine in June but admitted she used 

drugs in August and on October 13, 2013. The children were released to the father. The 
6

parents and the children‟s social worker agreed the father and the children would move in 

with the maternal grandmother, Pamela R. 

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report

The March 4, 2014 jurisdiction and disposition report states the children remained 

in the care and custody of the parents. The children were bonded with the parents. The 

parents agreed they would benefit from the substance abuse treatment programs. They 

also agreed to comply with all court-order services including random drug testing. But 

the parents failed to appear for drug tests. The parents also had not participated in any 

drug treatment program but reported they would start soon. 

 

C. August 4, 2014 Detention Report

On July 30, 2014, the children were detained after the mother tested positive for

methamphetamine and amphetamine. The mother tested positive for cannabinoids on 

March 10, 2104. Of the 14 random drug tests from March 25 to July 14, 2014, the 

mother missed 12 tests. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine and 

amphetamine on July 23, 2014, when she came for intake at a substance abuse treatment 

program. The father failed to appear for any drug tests after he tested positive for 

cannabinoids on March 11, 2014, while in treatment. The father stopped coming to 

treatment and was discharged from the drug treatment program on April 4, 2014. 
7

According to the detention report, the mother appeared overwhelmed and did not 

follow up on family preservation services offered by the department social worker. The 

parents failed to take Noah for tutoring and for speech therapy evaluation. Mona Raya 

from the Duarte child center stated: “[I]t has been a real, real struggle to work with them. 

The child is always late. Mom knows that the child will be going to kinder, but the child 

is never here in school. He was supposed to be tested for services, but since the child is 

never here, they already missed 2 appointments. I always call mom and she never picks 

up.” The parents admitted they were not in compliance with the court orders and had no 

excuse. The parents reported they were “„lacking motivation‟” to do anything. 

 

D. Status Review Reports

The August 13, 2014 interim review report indicates the children were placed with 

the maternal grandmother on August 8, 2014. The maternal grandmother resides in a two 

bedroom, two bathroom apartment in the same apartment complex as the parents. The 

maternal grandmother lives with Terri R., a sister. Also residing in the maternal 

grandmother‟s apartment are Terri‟s two adult daughters, Amore R. and Megan R. They 

converted one of the bedrooms into the children‟s room with a bed for Noah and a crib 

and changing table for Jose. The maternal grandmother was retired and could be home to 

take care of both of the children. The maternal family had a close relationship with the 

children and saw them every single day. The maternal family stated they would comply 
8

with the court orders and limit the parents to visitation hours as if the children were in 

placement. 

The March 19, 2015 status review report states: the children continue to thrive in 

the maternal grandmother‟s home; the parents live nearby and were a daily presence in 

the children‟s lives; the mother reported seeing the boys almost every day and helping to 

care for them; both parents had a very close relationship with the children; the maternal 

grandmother reported the visits went very well; the parents did not participate in any 

substance abuse treatment program and failed to appear for any drug tests; and the

parents missed all 11 drug tests from August 2014 to February 2015. The department 

was unable to determine if the parents were drug free because they both continued to 

refuse to test after results came back positive. The maternal grandmother stated she was 

“„more than willing to adopt‟” the children if the parents failed to reunify with the boys. 

E. Section 366.26 Report

The September 29, 2015 section 366.26 report states: the children were bonded 

with the parents and maternal grandmother; the parents live in the same apartment 

complex as the children and visited them regularly; all visits were monitored by the 

maternal grandmother ; and family reunification services for the parents were terminated 

on May 4, 2015. The parents failed to comply with the court orders. According to the 

report, the parents failed to drug test and complete a narcotics treatment program. 

According to the social worker, the parents admitted they lacked the motivation to obey 
9

court orders or begin court-ordered programs. The department recommended termination 

of parental rights with adoption as the permanent plan. 

F. Testimony at Section 366.26 Hearing

On September 29, 2015, the section 366.26 hearing was held. Children‟s social 

worker Priya Chakrabarti testified the mother saw the children every day according to the 

maternal grandmother. The mother‟s visits were monitored by the maternal family. The 

mother would come over and drop Noah off to school with two of the maternal relatives. 

Then she would return to the maternal grandmother‟s apartment and spend time with Jose 

while Noah was at school. The mother would bathe Jose and prepare and feed him food. 

Ms. Chakrabarti had seen the mother bring groceries over to the maternal grandmother‟s 

home. The mother would pick up Noah from school with Megan R. or Amore R. and 

attended school events. In addition, the mother helped Noah with his homework after 

school. The mother visited Noah when he was in the hospital and attended his most 

recent medical appointment. Noah and Jose were bonded with the mother and the 

maternal family. Ms. Chakrabarti stated both Noah and Jose recognized the mother as 

their “mom.” 

The mother testified on her own behalf. The mother went to the grandmother‟s 

home every day at 7:15 a.m. to help Noah get ready for school. She helped Noah comb 

his hair, brush his teeth and dress for school. The mother made Noah breakfast and 

dropped him off to school with her family. She visited Noah‟s school twice, for the first 
10

day of school and the “back to school” night. The mother testified she and the maternal 

family helped Noah with his homework. The mother stated: “We all do it together. I 

mean one day I‟ll do it or my mom will do it. The next day it‟s kind of joined together. 

We all participate.” The mother attended some of Noah‟s medical appointments. The 

mother visited Noah every day during visiting hours when Noah spent a week at the 

hospital. She would go home after 8 p.m. while the maternal grandmother stayed with 

Noah at the hospital. Noah had a followup visit after he was discharged from the hospital 

but the mother did not attend the medical appointment. When the mother was asked who 

made the decision to take Noah to the hospital, the mother replied: “My mom‟s, of 

course, and you know basically everybody. You know we wanted what was best for him, 

you know.” The mother testified the maternal grandmother asked for the mother‟s input 

when Noah was sick. The mother stated, “She asked me if I would just go to the hospital 

with them. I said absolutely.” 

The mother testified she spent time with Jose during the day while monitored by 

the maternal family. She played and did activities with Jose including watching Disney 

learning shows and “Frozen” with him. The mother prepared food, fed Jose and bathed 

him. She also attended some of Jose‟s medical appointments. 

The mother stated Noah enjoyed spending time with her. She testified: “[H]e tells 

me how much he wants to come home and how much he wants to be with me. When I 

have to leave, he does not want me to leave.” The mother added, “I usually leave around 

8:15, try to put him to sleep at night, but he is frustrated because I have to go.” The 
11

mother put Noah to bed four days out of the week. The mother testified Jose would cry 

when she left for the night. 

The juvenile court asked the mother, “So you‟re basically there all of the time?” 

The mother answered, “As much as I can be.” The court queried, “Well if you‟re there 

all of the time, when do you go to your drug program?” The mother replied, “I have not 

started, sir.” 

IV. DISCUSSION

At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court selects and implements a permanent 

plan for the dependent child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53; In re Marilyn 

H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304.) Our Supreme Court has summarized the juvenile court‟s 

options at the section 366.26 hearing: “In order of preference the choices are: (1) 

terminate parental rights and order that the child be placed for adoption (the choice the 

court made here); (2) identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and require 

efforts to locate an appropriate adoptive family; (3) appoint a legal guardian; or (4) order 

long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Whenever the court finds „that it is likely 

the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child 

placed for adoption.‟ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)” (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 

53; In re K.H. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 406, 414; In re Hector A. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 

783, 790-791.) 
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One exception to adoption is the beneficial parental relationship exception. This 

exception is set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) which states: “[T]he 

court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies: . . . [¶] (B) 

The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be 

detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The 

parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship.” (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621.) 

The mother has the burden of proving her relationship with the children would outweigh 

the well-being they would gain in a permanent home with an adoptive parent. (In re G.B. 

(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) 

Evidence of frequent and loving contact is not enough to establish a beneficial parental 

relationship. (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 645; In re Bailey J. (2010) 

189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316.) The mother also must show she occupies a parental 

role in the children‟s lives. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; In re K.P., 

supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) 

Appellate courts have adopted differing standards of review for the parental 

relationship exception determination. Many courts review for substantial evidence. (In 

re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297; 

In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333-1334; In re Autumn H. (1994) 

27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) Other courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard of 

review. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) More recently, courts have adopted both the substantial 
13

evidence and abuse of discretion standards of review. (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 

Cal.App.4th 389, 395; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530; In re K.P., supra, 203 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622; In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315.) 

In evaluating the juvenile court‟s determination as to the factual issue of the existence of 

a beneficial parental relationship, these courts review for substantial evidence. (In re 

Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395; In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 

530; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 622; In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1314.) But whether termination of the parental relationship would be detrimental to 

the child as weighed against the benefits of adoption is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

(In re Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395; In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 530-531; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 622; In re Bailey J., supra, 189 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.) No error occurred under any of these standards of review. 

It is undisputed the mother maintained regular visitation and contact with the 

children. The mother visited the children daily. She helped Noah get ready for school, 

prepared him breakfast, took him to and from school, and helped him with homework. In 

addition, the mother took daily care of Jose by preparing and feeding him food, bathing 

him and playing with him. The children were bonded with their parents and the maternal 

family. The juvenile court found, “It is clear that the parents have had regular consistent 

visitation and contact and do have a parental role and relationship in the children‟s 

lives. . . .” 

But the trial court concluded the mother failed to show termination of her parental 

relationship would be detrimental to the children when weighed against the benefits of 
14

adoption. The mother challenges this ruling. She contends the juvenile court should 

have ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship, rather than adoption, given the 

strong beneficial parental relationship she has with the children. The mother asserts the 

juvenile court erred by focusing on the parents‟ failure to comply with reunification 

services and inability to provide a home for the children. The mother‟s contentions are 

without merit.

The mother fails to show her beneficial relationship with the children would 

outweigh the well-being they would gain in a permanent home with the maternal 

grandmother. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; In re K.P., supra, 203 

Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) The mother did not occupy a parental role such that termination 

of her parental rights would be detrimental to the children. When the children were first 

detained in October 2013, they were released to the mother‟s custody over the 

department‟s objection. During the time the children were in the mother‟s custody, she 

appeared overwhelmed and did not follow up on family preservation services. The 

mother failed to take Noah for tutoring and for speech therapy evaluation. Ms. Raya 

from the Duarte child center reported: “[I]t has been a real, real struggle to work with 

them. The child is always late. Mom knows that the child will be going to kinder, but 

the child is never here in school. He was supposed to be tested for services, but since the 

child is never here, they already missed 2 appointments. I always call mom and she 

never picks up.” On July 30, 2014, the children were detained again after the mother 

tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. While the mother visited 

frequently and participated in the children‟s care after they were placed with the maternal 
15

grandmother, the mother‟s visits were monitored. The maternal grandmother was the 

children‟s primary caregiver. The maternal grandmother took Noah for speech therapy 

evaluation and ensured his educational needs were met. The maternal grandmother also 

made medical decisions for the children. The mother testified the maternal grandmother 

decided to take Noah to the hospital when he was sick and stayed overnight with him 

when he was there for a week. The mother acknowledged the children were doing 

“wonderful” under the maternal grandmother‟s care. The mother stated she was grateful 

Noah had a set school schedule and structure in his life. 

Furthermore, the juvenile court could properly focus on the mother‟s unresolved 

substance addiction issues because the children became dependents of the court due to 

her drug abuse. It is undisputed the mother failed to comply with court orders to attend 

individual, alcohol and drug counseling, parenting classes and narcotics testing. The 

mother tested positive for cannabinoids on March 10, 2104. Of the 14 random drug tests 

from March 25, 2014 to July 14, 2014, the mother missed 12 tests. The mother tested 

positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on July 23, 2014 when she came for 

intake at a substance abuse treatment program. After the positive drug test, the mother 

missed all 11 drug tests from August 2014 to February 2015. The department was unable 

to determine if the mother was drug free because she refused to test after the July 2014 

positive drug test. The mother admitted she had no excuse. She stated she lacked 

motivation to start the court-ordered programs. The section 366.26 report states, “Mother 

and father appear to have done nothing towards rectifying the situation which led to 
16

[department] involvement . . . .” Further, the mother admitted at the section 366.26 

hearing that she had not started her drug treatment program. 

The mother relies on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 298-301 (S.B.) to 

support her contention that the beneficial parental relationship outweighs any need for 

adoption. The mother‟s reliance is misplaced. In S.B. the father admitted to using 

methamphetamine “on and off” for 30 years. (S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 293.) 

The child was removed from the father‟s custody. Thereafter, the father complied with 

every aspect of his case plan including maintaining his sobriety. (Ibid.) The department 

reported the father made “„consistent efforts to alleviate and or mitigate the reasons his 

family was brought to the attention of the court.‟” (Id. at p. 294.) In concluding the 

beneficial parental relationship applied, the Court of Appeal reasoned the father‟s full 

compliance with the case plan evidenced complete devotion to the child‟s welfare. (Id. at 

pp. 300-301.) 

In a later case, In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 937, the same appellate 

court limited S.B. to its particular facts. (See In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 

530.) In Jason J., the Fourth Appellate District, Division One explained: “In [S.B.], this 

court reversed an order terminating the father‟s parental rights over his daughter, S.B., 

under the parent-child beneficial relationship exception to adoption. The parties agreed 

the father maintained regular, consistent and appropriate visitation with S.B., and the 

evidence showed he was S.B.‟s primary caretaker for three years; when she was removed 

from his custody he immediately acknowledged his drug use was untenable, started 

services, maintained his sobriety, sought medical and psychoanalytic services and 
17

complied with every aspect of his case plan; after a year apart S.B. continued to display a 

strong attachment to her father; and she loved her father and wanted their relationship to 

continue. (Id. at p. 298.) This court concluded the „record here fully supports the 

conclusion [the father] continued the significant parent-child relationship despite the lack 

of day-to-day contact with S.B. after she was removed from his care.‟ (Id. at p. 299.) The 

opinion states, „S.B. loved her father, wanted their relationship to continue and derived 

some measure of benefit from his visits.‟ (Id. at pp. 300–301.) The S.B. opinion must be 

viewed in light of its particular facts. It does not, of course, stand for the proposition that 

a termination order is subject to reversal whenever there is „some measure of benefit‟ in 

continued contact between parent and child.” (In re Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 937.)

In the case of In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 558-559, the same appellate 

court stressed: “[W]e once again emphasize that S.B. is confined to its extraordinary 

facts. It does not support the proposition a parent may establish the parent-child 

beneficial relationship exception by merely showing the child derives some measure of 

benefit from maintaining parental contact.” (See In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 

530.) In C.F., the Fourth Appellate District, Division One rejected the mother‟s reliance 

on S.B. because the facts were readily distinguishable. (In re C.F., supra, 193 

Cal.App.4th at p. 558.) The Court of Appeal explained, “[The mother] did not maintain 

her sobriety. She resumed drug use and lost custody of her children after the 

reunification period ended. She made no showing the termination of parental rights 

would cause the children any detriment.” (Ibid.) 
18

Like the parent in C.F., the mother did not comply with the court ordered case 

plan. The mother did not start her substance abuse treatment program and repeatedly 

failed to undergo drug testing. As in C.F., the mother did not maintain her sobriety and 

lost custody of her children after she resumed drug use. Like In re C.F., the facts here are 

readily distinguishable from S.B. The father in S.B. fully complied with his case plan 

while the mother here disregarded the court orders. 

In her reply brief, the mother asserts there is no evidence she continued using 

drugs after her positive test on July 23, 2014. Although there is no direct evidence of 

continued drug use, the mother missed all 11 drug tests after her July 2014 positive test. 

Under these circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably infer the mother‟s failure 

to comply with a court-ordered drug test may be considered as a positive test. (In re 

Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 104 & fn. 5; see also In re N.M. (2003) 108 

Cal.App.4th 845, 857 [parents obligated under case plan to prove abstinence from illegal 

drugs].) This is not a case where there is a reasonable explanation for missing a test; e.g. 

a parent gets off work late and belatedly arrives at a testing facility. A juvenile court, 

under those manifestly innocent circumstances, could decline to view the failure to 

appear for a drug test as a sinister effort to evade responsibility. However, the juvenile 

court could reasonably conclude that common sense suggests a parent who consistently 

fails to appear for drug tests does so because of a consciousness of guilt. (People v. 

Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 310-311 [no error occurred because the trial court 

instructed the jury it could infer a consciousness of guilt from the defendant‟s refusal to 

take a blood test]; People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 114, 
19

118-119 [evidence of a refusal to undergo a blood alcohol test is evidence of a 

consciousness of guilt]; People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893 [refusal to 

undergo a narcotics test in a driving under the combined influence of alcohol and drugs 

prosecution is evidence of consciousness of guilt].) Moreover, the mother's longstanding drug abuse is in stark contrast to that in S.B. And her drug abuse is evidence 

continuing the parent-child relationship would not be beneficial. The juvenile court, 

under any standard of review, could conclude the evidence was insufficient to 

demonstrate termination of the mother‟s parental rights would be detrimental to the 

children. 

V. DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

TURNER, P. J.

I concur:

KUMAR, J.*

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
20

In re Noah G., et al.

B268442

BAKER, J., Concurring

I join the majority‟s opinion, except its discussion of the circumstances in which a 

trial court may consider a missed drug test to be equivalent to a positive drug test. In my 

view, we need not opine on the circumstances under which a trial court may infer 

consciousness of guilt from the failure to submit to drug testing in order to resolve the 

issues before us. Rather, it is mother A.R.‟s failure to seek treatment for a longstanding 

drug problem, including drug testing that is customarily a core component of such 

treatment, that stands this case in stark contrast to In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 

and undercuts the showing mother attempted to make in support of invoking the 

beneficial parent relationship exception.

BAKER, J.