Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 17-11 Audit Report

Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure: 

Sustainment Challenges and Lack of 

Repairs Put U.S. Investment at Risk

SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure

SIGAR

O C T O B E R

2016
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil. 

WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

Since 2002, the United States, through 

programs initiated by the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and 

the Department of Defense (DOD), has 

spent approximately $2.8 billion building 

and maintaining Afghanistan’s road 

infrastructure, while working to 

implement more than $150 million in 

other road-related programs to improve 

the Afghan Ministry of Public Works’ 

(MOPW) management of road 

construction and maintenance.

The objectives of this audit were to 

determine the extent to which (1) U.S. 

agencies have fully accounted for the 

road construction they funded in 

Afghanistan; (2) selected U.S.-funded 

roads have been maintained and what 

the current condition of a subset of those 

roads is; (3) U.S.-funded road 

construction and capacity-building 

programs achieved program goals and 

are sustainable; and (4) challenges, if 

any, exist to the Afghan government’s 

ability to perform and self-fund road 

maintenance.

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

Since 2002, USAID and DOD have spent approximately $2.8 billion to 

construct and repair Afghanistan’s road infrastructure, and perform 

capacity-building activities. USAID spent at least $1.9 billion on eight 

programs dedicated to building Afghanistan’s road infrastructure. 

Additionally, USAID has developed plans to spend more than $150 million 

on three road-related programs. Finally, USAID implemented two broader 

stability programs—known as Community Development Programs—that 

provided at least $335 million for short-term employment programs, 

including road construction, in support of counterinsurgency efforts. 

Although USAID could account for the program costs and locations for 

seven of the eight dedicated road construction programs, it could not 

provide precise location data for a $366 million Secondary Roads 

program. For its part, DOD spent at least $847 million on road-related 

projects funded under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

(CERP). SIGAR previously identified limitations in DOD’s tracking of certain 

projects, and these limitations prevented SIGAR from determining how 

much DOD spent on 462 of 4,687 road-related projects the department 

implemented. The limitations included a lack of unique project identifying 

numbers that could be used to track the costs for each CERP project 

implemented between fiscal year (FY) 2004 and FY 2006, and an inability 

to determine what proportion each bulk-funded project was spent on 

road-related activities, an issue DOD resolved in FY 2010 and FY 2011. 

However, DOD was able to provide the required location information for 

SIGAR's selection of 57 road-related CERP projects worth $126 million. 

SIGAR selected and assessed the condition of 1,640 kilometers of U.S.-

funded national and regional highways, or approximately 22 percent of all 

paved roads in Afghanistan. The results indicate that most of these 

highways need repair and maintenance. For example, SIGAR performed 

inspections of 20 road segments and found that 19 segments had road 

damage ranging from deep surface cracks to roads and bridges destroyed 

by weather or insurgents. Moreover, 17 segments were either poorly 

maintained or not maintained at all, resulting in road defects that limited 

drivability. MOPW officials acknowledged that roads in Afghanistan are in 

poor condition. In August 2015, an MOPW official stated that 20 percent 

of the roads were destroyed and the remaining 80 percent continue to 

deteriorate. The official added that the Kabul to Kandahar highway is 

beyond repair and needs to be rebuilt. USAID estimated that unless 

maintained, it would cost about $8.3 billion to replace Afghanistan’s road 

infrastructure, and estimated that 54 percent of Afghanistan’s road 

infrastructure suffered from poor maintenance and required rehabilitation 

beyond simple repairs.

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 17-11 AUDIT REPORT

October 2016

Afghanistan's Road Infrastructure: Sustainment Challenges and Lack 

of Repairs Put U.S. Investment at Risk
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil. 

USAID and DOD spent billions of dollars on road construction in Afghanistan, but have had only limited success in

ensuring the long-term sustainability of those roads. In 2007, in an effort to provide road maintenance and build 

capacity at the MOPW, USAID initiated a road maintenance and capacity-building program known as Task Order 14. 

Although Task Order 14 did fund road maintenance operations, it was unsuccessful in establishing a sustainable road 

maintenance plan and program because: (1) performing capacity-building programs alongside the road maintenance 

programs caused a disincentive for the MOPW to improve its capacity, and (2) the MOPW was unwilling to reorganize 

itself in an effective manner to create a sustainable road maintenance program. 

In November 2013, in an effort to continue capacity building at the MOPW, USAID initiated the Road Sector 

Sustainability Program (RSSP). RSSP focuses on capacity-building activities through the creation of new entities within 

the MOPW and does not concurrently finance road maintenance activities. The success of RSSP will ultimately be 

contingent on USAID receiving and maintaining buy-in and tangible commitment from the Afghan government to 

implement necessary reforms. So far, the MOPW has demonstrated its commitment to reforms by proposing 

legislation that would establish a Road Authority, a Road Fund, and a Transportation Institute, all of which were 

recommended under RSSP. However, there is no guarantee that the Afghan Parliament will pass legislation to create 

these entities or that the proposed Road Authority will be independent as intended. 

As demonstrated by the failure of Task Order 14, continuing to fund Afghan road maintenance could be a disincentive 

for the MOPW to implement reforms. When discussing the road maintenance needs for Afghanistan, one MOPW 

official stated that Afghanistan was working to conduct and fund its own road maintenance, but also insisted that 

donors would fund and perform necessary road maintenance if it could not. Without the firm commitment from all 

relevant elements of the Afghan government, the reforms proposed under RSSP may be unsustainable, waste 

taxpayer dollars, and ultimately prove unsuccessful in developing the Afghan government’s capacity to maintain its 

roads. 

DOD followed guidance requiring that it obtain assurances from the Afghan government that road projects funded 

through CERP would be sustained. Unfortunately the assurances given by the Afghan government were often 

unrealistic. SIGAR has previously raised concerns regarding the sustainment of CERP road projects. In response to a 

2009 SIGAR inspection report, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan acknowledged that the Afghan government was unable to 

sustain DOD-funded roads at the time, and noted that it strived “for a balance between static inaction and dynamic 

reconstruction efforts that move the Afghanistan people forward.” The department cited an “unwritten obligation to 

make progress with respect to reconstruction efforts,” with the expectation that the Afghan government would one 

day be able to fulfill its sustainment agreements. According to a former U.S. Forces–Afghanistan official who was 

second in command of CERP during FY 2015, DOD was aware that the Afghan government would always sign the 

required sustainment memorandum acknowledging that it had the responsibility and capability to sustain a project, 

despite not always having the capability to do so. The official also noted that the Afghan government was consistently 

unable to sustain CERP projects, even when it gave assurances that the projects could be sustained. Following the 

peak in CERP spending in FY 2009, funding for road-related CERP projects began to decrease. 

Weak capacity, corruption, funding issues, and insecurity limit the MOPW’s ability to maintain Afghanistan’s road 

infrastructure. The lack of technical capacity within the ministry is a long-standing challenge. In May 2015, USAID 

issued its most recent assessment of the MOPW’s operations, practices, and management, and found that prior 

donor initiatives failed to achieve meaningful reforms and that donor capacity-building efforts did not have a 

significant or lasting impact. The assessment concluded that the MOPW was in need of structural reform, citing 

ongoing critical weaknesses, including a lack of skilled staff, poor communication, antiquated systems and processes, 

and a lack of will to implement necessary reforms.

Corruption continues to be a problem that hampers the ministry’s ability to maintain roads. A February 2012 USAID 

assessment of the MOPW found that employees were hired based on nepotism and personal connections, noting that 

high-paying positions were offered to people with personal connections. Another USAID assessment completed in 
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil. 

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS

To ensure the remaining activities of the RSSP, as well as any future road programs, address the shortcomings of 

previous programs and increase the MOPW’s capacity to maintain Afghanistan’s roads, we recommend that the USAID 

Administrator condition future RSSP and MOPW funding to the successful creation of an independent Road Authority, 

Road Fund, and Transportation Institute. USAID concurred with the recommendation. DOD stated that its road 

construction and maintenance activities in Afghanistan have largely concluded and that while project sustainment was 

desired, other goals sometimes outweighed the potential risk that a project might not be sustained.

 

January 2015 noted that nepotism and favoritism were still apparent in the appointment of managers and staff, and 

that donors lacked confidence in the MOPW’s ability to be effective, efficient, transparent, lawful, and professional. 

Corruption has had a direct impact on the activities and financing of MOPW activities. For example, according to a 

senior MOPW official, the MOPW stopped collecting tolls on the roads due to high levels of corruption. The official 

explained that since the tolls were collected in cash, drivers would pay bribes to the toll collectors in exchange for 

reduced tolls. A similar type of bribe was being paid at weigh stations, where drivers of overweight trucks would pay 

bribes to avoid fines. In response to these problems, the official stated that the MOPW implemented new controls, 

such as random checks of stations, the use of undercover employees, and increased tracking of vehicle weights as 

they exit and enter different weigh stations, the implementation of which increased revenues at one weigh station 

400 to 600 percent. 

The MOPW also does not have adequate funding to perform necessary road maintenance. MOPW officials stated that 

it would cost $100 million annually to carry out the necessary emergency, routine, periodic, and winter maintenance 

on Afghanistan’s road infrastructure. However, according to data provided by the ministry officials, between 2011 and 

2016, it received, on average, $21.3 million annually from the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF). In December 2015, 

USAID reported that the MOF had raised concerns about the MOPW’s ability to manage its budget and operate in an 

effective, efficient, and transparent matter. The MOPW’s continued inability to maintain Afghanistan’s road 

infrastructure threatens to waste the billions of dollars that the U.S. government has already invested in Afghanistan’s 

road infrastructure since 2002. 

Finally, in addition to being maintained to a drivable standard, Afghanistan’s roads must be safe enough from 

insurgent attack to allow for travel and maintenance. MOPW officials told SIGAR that security conditions vary 

throughout the country, and the ministry could perform maintenance only where security conditions allowed. SIGAR 

noted that 6 of the 20 road segments it inspected had insurgent activity and identified 13 insurgent checkpoints. The 

ministry officials stated that, in order to address maintenance needs, the MOPW is beginning to use local Afghan 

contractors to perform road work, because they have fewer problems with insurgents than international contractors. 

They noted that Afghanistan’s road infrastructure plays an important role in the country’s development and 

governance, and if the Kabul to Kandahar highway were to become impassable, the central government would 

collapse. However, the same MOPW officials were confident that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 

would increase security if the situation got worse.
October 27, 2016 

The Honorable Ashton B. Carter 

Secretary of Defense 

The Honorable Gayle E. Smith 

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development 

The Honorable P. Michael McKinley 

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Mr. Herbert B. Smith 

USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan 

This report discusses the results of SIGAR’s audit of U.S. efforts to support Afghanistan’s road infrastructure. 

We determined the extent to which (1) U.S. agencies have fully accounted for the road construction they 

funded in Afghanistan; (2) selected U.S.-funded roads have been maintained and what the current condition of 

a subset of those roads is; (3) U.S.-funded road construction and capacity-building programs achieved program 

goals and are sustainable; and (4) challenges, if any, exist to the Afghan government’s ability to perform and 

self-fund road maintenance. The report focuses on efforts implemented from 2002 through 2016. 

We are making one recommendation to the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID). Specifically, we recommend that the USAID Administrator condition future funding for the Road Sector 

Sustainability Program and the Afghan Ministry of Public Works to the successful creation of an independent 

Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute. We received written comments on a draft of this 

report from USAID, which are reproduced in appendix III. USAID concurred with the recommendation. 

Additionally, USAID provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report, as appropriate. 

We also received written comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, which are reproduced in 

appendix IV. DOD stated that its road construction and maintenance activities in Afghanistan have largely 

concluded and that while project sustainment was desired, other goals sometimes outweighed the potential 

risk that a project might not be sustained. DOD also provided oral and written technical comments, which we 

incorporated into this report, as appropriate. 

SIGAR conducted this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110‐181, as amended, and the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

John F. Sopko 

Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background .................................................................................................................................................................. 1

USAID and DOD Cannot Determine the Cost or Location of Some U.S.-funded Roads ........................................... 4

Most U.S.-funded Roads In Afghanistan that We Inspected Need Repair ............................................................... 6

USAID and DOD Have No Assurances that Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Will Be Sustained, and USAID’s 

Capacity-building Efforts Have Not Achieved Program Goals .................................................................................10

Weak Capacity, Corruption, Funding Issues, and Insecurity Hamper the MOPW’s Ability to Maintain 

Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure............................................................................................................................14

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................18

Recommendation ......................................................................................................................................................18

Agency Comments .....................................................................................................................................................18

Appendix I - Scope and Methodology .......................................................................................................................20

Appendix II - Assessment Performed on the MOPW’s Capacity ..............................................................................22

Appendix III - Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development .....................................................24

Appendix IV - Comments from the Department of Defense ....................................................................................29

Appendix V - Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................31

TABLES 

Table 1 - Known Amounts Disbursed for USAID- and DOD-Funded Road Programs ............................................... 3

Table 2 - Results of SIGAR Inspections ...................................................................................................................... 8

Table 3 - Summary of Assessments of MOPW Capacity ..........................................................................................22

FIGURES 

Figure 1 - U.S.-Constructed Roads Included in SIGAR’s Analyses ............................................................................ 7

Figure 2 - Explanation of Road Condition Terminology .............................................................................................. 8

PHOTOS 

Photo 1 - Minor Defects Needing Repair on Road Segment between Herat and Adraskan ................................... 9

Photo 2 - Section of Road Washed Away on Road Segment between Maidan Shahr and Ghazni ......................... 9

Photo 3 - Collapsed Bridge on Road Segment between Faizabad and Kishum ...................................................... 9

Photo 4 - Road Maintenance Performed on One Side of Road on the Kabul-to-Kandahar Highway ..................... 9
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page vi

ABBREVIATIONS 

ADS Automated Directives System

Amec Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure Inc.

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

DOD Department of Defense

FY fiscal year

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office

MAAWS-A Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan

MOF Ministry of Finance

MOPW Ministry of Public Works

RSSP Road Sector Sustainability Program

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 1 

Since 2002, the United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 

Department of Defense (DOD), has spent approximately $2.8 billion building and repairing Afghanistan’s road 

infrastructure. During that time, the U.S. government also obligated an additional $150 million in capacitybuilding initiatives to develop Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works (MOPW), which is responsible for building 

and maintaining much of the country’s road infrastructure. In 2008, the Afghan government and its 

international donors created the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. One aim of the strategy was to

build a sustainable system for road maintenance by 2008, and a fully upgraded and maintained road 

infrastructure connecting Afghanistan’s largest cities and neighboring countries by 2009.1 Despite the United 

States’ and international donors’ investment in Afghanistan’s road infrastructure, according to a 2015 World 

Bank report, 85 percent of the road infrastructure is in poor condition.2 USAID and the Asian Development 

Bank have estimated it would cost $8.3 billion to replace Afghanistan’s road infrastructure if not maintained 

properly.3 

The objectives of this audit were to determine the extent to which (1) U.S. agencies have fully accounted for 

the road construction they funded in Afghanistan; (2) selected U.S.-funded roads have been maintained and 

what the current condition of a subset of those roads is; (3) U.S.-funded road construction and capacitybuilding programs achieved program goals and are sustainable; and (4) challenges, if any, exist to the Afghan 

government’s ability to perform and self-fund road maintenance. 

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed USAID and DOD contract and planning documents, summary 

reports, technical assessments, close-out lessons learned reports, and other contract deliverables the 

agencies and their implementing partners prepared. We reviewed previous SIGAR audits and inspections of 

U.S.-funded roads in Afghanistan, reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOD 

Office of Inspector General, and white papers prepared by foreign donors. Furthermore, we performed 

inspections on a selection of U.S.-funded road segments totaling 1,640 kilometers, which represent about 22 

percent of all paved roads in Afghanistan.4,5 We also reviewed Afghan decrees and laws pertaining to road 

maintenance and associated excise tax and fees, and the MOPW’s mission statement, budgets, and historical 

cost information. Furthermore, we interviewed officials from USAID, DOD, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

USAID’s implementing partner Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure, Inc. (Amec), the MOPW, the 

Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Kingdom’s 

Department for International Development. We conducted this work from May 2015 to October 2016 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope 

and methodology is in appendix I. 

BACKGROUND 

USAID’s December 2015 Final Road Fund Study estimated there were more than 123,000 kilometers of roads 

in Afghanistan, of which approximately 7,600 kilometers were paved.6 Afghanistan’s road infrastructure is 

 

1 Government of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Transportation and Civil Aviation Strategy, Pillar 

III, Infrastructure, 2008. 

2 World Bank, Afghanistan Country Snapshot, October 2015. 

3 USAID, Final Road Fund Study (Component 3), Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Public Works, December 9, 2015, 

which cites Asian Development Bank, Strategic Roadmap for Development Partner Support to O&M of Afghanistan Roads, 

August 2015. 

4 The inspections involve assessing the general physical condition of the road segments, documenting the type of road 

surfaces, number of lanes, the types of defects observed, types of defects repaired, traffic conditions, and the overall 

security condition. 

5 The roads we selected for inspection consisted of U.S.-funded national and regional highways that connected cities to 

each other or to the ring road, which connects several major cities in across Afghanistan. 

6 USAID, Final Road Fund Study (Component 3) Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Public Works, December 2015. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 2 

comprised of regional and national highways, provincial roads, rural roads, and city roads. Regional highways 

are paved roads that connect Afghanistan’s largest cities and its neighboring countries. National highways are 

paved roads that connect the provincial capitals to the regional highways. Provincial roads are paved or gravel 

roads that connect district centers within provinces to the provincial capital. Rural roads are smaller gravel 

roads that connect remote areas with district centers. 

The MOPW and the MOF have primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s road infrastructure. The MOPW is 

responsible for constructing and maintaining the regional, national, and provincial highways and roads, while 

the MOF is responsible for approving the MOPW’s budget requests and collecting revenues generated from the 

fuel excise tax and other road user charges, such as tolls and fines, and providing them to the MOPW to pay for 

maintenance.7 Since 2002, USAID, DOD, and other international donors, including the World Bank, the Asian 

Development Bank, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, and the Japanese 

International Cooperation Agency, have spent billions to construct and repair Afghanistan’s roads and build the 

Afghan government’s capacity to do such work itself. 

U.S. Road Construction, Maintenance, and Capacity-Building Efforts 

As part of its road development efforts since 2002, USAID spent approximately $2.1 billion on eight dedicated 

road construction programs and three road-related maintenance and development programs. USAID also 

implemented two bulk-funded Community Development Programs totaling more than $335 million that 

included road construction projects; however, the road construction costs could not be reliably distinguished 

from the other program costs, and as such, those costs could not be precisely calculated.8 According to USAID, 

these programs built more than 2,000 kilometers of Afghanistan’s national highways, linking the five largest 

cities and connecting the 80 percent of Afghanistan’s population that lives within 50 kilometers of a national 

highway, while also building the MOPW’s capacity. 

For its part, DOD has spent at least $847 million on approximately 4,700 road-related projects funded through 

the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).9,10 In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD 

noted that more than 2,800, or 60 percent, of these projects were for small-scale road repairs, such as 

repairing potholes and damage caused by improvised explosive devices, snow removal, or dust suppression. 

According to DOD officials familiar with CERP, CERP financed road projects in two primary ways: (1) U.S. 

military personnel in Afghanistan, in coordination with local Afghan officials, initiated small road projects for 

local communities, or (2) DOD used the funds in collaboration with USAID to finance different sections of larger 

road projects. 

Table 1 shows the total amounts disbursed for USAID- and DOD-funded dedicated road programs since 2002. 

It does not include U.S.-funded roads constructed under the two USAID bulk-funded Community Development 

Programs. 

 

7 Afghanistan’s Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development is responsible for maintaining the country’s rural roads. 

Our audit focused on the regional, national, and provincial highways, and as such, only discusses the operations of the 

MOPW. 

8 Bulk-funded programs use one funding stream to implement multiple smaller projects. An example is a program broadly 

designed to increase local employment that includes funding for road projects that provide short-term employment. 

9 CERP enables military commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements by carrying 

out projects that are intended to immediately assist the indigenous population and can be sustained by the local 

population or government. See U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) SOP, USFOR-A Pub 1-06, updated December 2009. 

10 We have an ongoing audit examining CERP. The audit focuses on the sufficiency of the data contained in CERP 

databases and the effectiveness of the CERP program. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 3 

Table 1 - Known Amounts Disbursed for USAID- and DOD-Funded Road Programs

Source: USAID- and DOD-provided data

On November 1, 2007, in an effort to maintain existing roads and build technical capacity at the MOPW, USAID 

awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee road maintenance and capacity-building program, known as Task Order 14, to 

the Louis Berger Group Inc./Black & Veatch Special Projects Corporation Joint Venture. Initially, Task Order 14 

was valued at $32 million with a completion date of October 31, 2010. However, various modifications 

increased the total to over $53 million and extended the contract completion date to December 31, 2011. The 

program’s objectives were to develop a new independent organization, the Road Management Unit, within the 

MOPW to manage road maintenance subcontracts, plan annual maintenance work, and develop a sustainable 

road maintenance program for Afghanistan. On December 30, 2011, USAID ended Task Order 14 and 

transferred the program’s activities to the Afghan government. 

In November 2013, at the request of the Afghan government, USAID initiated the $96.5 million Road Sector 

Sustainability Program (RSSP). According to USAID officials, applying the lessons learned from Task Order 14, 

RSSP has been focused on building the MOPW’s capacity by establishing three independent Afghan 

government entities intended to improve the MOPW’s accountability and effectiveness in road planning, 

development, and maintenance. 

USAID and DOD Guidance on Program Turnover and Sustainability 

Both USAID and DOD have published guidance on the turnover and sustainability of reconstruction programs in 

Afghanistan. USAID relied on the Automated Directives System (ADS), various policies and procedures 

governing the agency’s programs, as well as supplemental guidance. In June 2011, USAID released the 

Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance for USAID in Afghanistan, which built upon previous USAID guidance. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 4 

This guidance calls for the creation of conditions that allow for the successful and lasting transition of USAID 

programs to the Afghan government. To achieve that, the guidance established three principles: (1) increase 

Afghan ownership and capacity; (2) contribute to Afghanistan’s stability and confidence; and (3) operate 

effectively, programmatically, and fiscally, which requires USAID to identify recurring costs for development 

programs and obtain assurances that Afghan partners have the willingness, resources, and capacity to sustain 

the agency’s investments into the future. To this end, upon the completion of road construction programs, 

USAID transferred to the MOPW the documents that are necessary for road maintenance, such as technical 

specifications. In addition, USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015 states that sustainability planning should be 

an operational principle from the start and should include building skills, knowledge, institutions, and 

promoting incentives that can make development processes self-sustaining.11 

To promote sustainability, USAID uses “conditions precedent” to require ministries to meet milestones or other 

triggers before releasing program funding. In 2012, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework reaffirmed the 

joint responsibility of the Afghan government and the international community for the economic development 

of Afghanistan through the international community’s continued assistance to Afghanistan, as well as the 

monitoring of development and governance benchmarks in a transparent manner, and increasing funding to 

the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund through incentive mechanisms. In October 2014, the 

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations issued a report that stated, 

The U.S. should also condition a higher percentage of its funding: if done properly by ensuring Afghan 

buy-in, conditioning U.S. assistance can improve the accountability of our aid, strengthen reformers 

and institutions in the Afghan government and result in better development outcomes.12 

Since 2009, DOD required planned CERP projects to have a sustainability component built into each project 

from its inception, when applicable.13 DOD guidance explicitly made project sustainability the responsibility of 

the end user—in this case, the Afghan government. In the CERP guidelines, DOD made it a requirement for the 

local community or government to sustain CERP construction projects once completed. To fulfill this 

requirement, DOD officials were required, for projects costing more than $50,000 and which required 

sustainment, to document the operating and sustainability costs each project would incur and obtain a 

signature from an appropriate Afghan official acknowledging his or her understanding and commitment to 

budget for the sustainment of the project once it was completed. DOD guidance also required documentation 

of each project’s location.14 Specifically, the guidance required the Global Positioning System starting and 

ending coordinates for each planned project, so its exact location would be recorded. 

USAID AND DOD CANNOT DETERMINE THE COST OR LOCATION OF SOME U.S.-

FUNDED ROADS 

USAID and DOD can account for and locate most of the roads they constructed through dedicated road 

programs and through CERP. However, USAID was not able to provide the precise locations of roads it 

constructed under one roads program worth almost $366 million. Previously reported issues with CERP data 

 

11 USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015.

12 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance Post2014, S. Rep 113-29 at 1 (2014). 

13 U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program Standard Operating Procedure, December 2009. According to DOD officials, not all CERP projects require 

sustainment. For example, road-related projects such as bomb blast or other emergency repairs, snow removal, or dust 

suppression are intended to improve road conditions in the short term and do not require long-term sustainment. 

14 U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) SOP, USFOR-A Pub 1-06, updated December 2009. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 5 

prevented us from fully accounting for the cost of all road-related CERP projects.15 However, DOD was able to 

provide the locations of all 57 road-related CERP projects worth over $500,000.16

The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that agencies, such as USAID, maintain contract files that contain 

specific details about a program’s cost and location.17 To comply with these regulations, USAID has procedures 

within its ADS and supplemental guidance describing how to maintain contract files and the information they 

are required to contain, including location data for programs.18 USAID was able to provide the cost information 

for all eight of its dedicated road programs, with costs totaling more than $1.9 billion, and precise location 

coordinates for seven of those programs, totaling more than 1,300 kilometers. However, for the $366 million 

Secondary Roads Program, USAID provided road locations at the district level, but could not provide more 

precise location data because specific Global Positioning System coordinates were not required at the time of 

the contract. Therefore, we could not determine the precise location of the roads constructed under the 

program. In addition to the eight dedicated road construction programs the agency funded, USAID funded two 

broader, bulk-funded stability programs known as Community Development Programs that supported 

counterinsurgency efforts through short-term employment projects in Balkh and Kandahar provinces. These 

programs totaled more than $335 million in spending and included projects to construct various types of 

infrastructure, such as roads or dams, and provide training to ensure the projects’ sustainment. We attempted 

to determine the amount of bulk funds spent on road construction and the exact location of the roads 

constructed, but USAID was unable to provide the contract files for our review. According to USAID’s response 

to a draft of this report, newer contract provisions now ensure specific location data are a part of the 

monitoring requirements. 

Based on our analysis of data on DOD’s road construction efforts from fiscal year (FY) 2004 through FY 2014, 

we found that DOD had spent at least $847 million on road-related CERP projects throughout Afghanistan.19

However, as we noted in a prior report, limitations in how DOD tracked certain CERP projects prevented us 

from determining the actual amount spent for all road-related projects.20,21 DOD’s Financial Management 

Regulation requires military officials to track their use of CERP funds using various approved project 

categories.22,23 This CERP requirement meant that DOD categorized road projects under the “transportation”

 

15 These limitations included a lack of unique project identifying numbers that could be used to track the costs for each 

CERP project implemented between FY 2004 and FY 2006, and an inability to determine what proportion each bulk-funded 

project was spent on road-related activities, an issue DOD resolved in FY 2010 and FY 2011. 

16 We reviewed CERP projects worth more than $500,000 as those projects required the use of a warranted contracting 

officer (see U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) SOP, USFOR-A Pub 1-06, updated December 2009). 

17 Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 4.8, “Government Contracting Files.”

18 USAID, Automated Directives System, Chapter 302, USAID Direct Contracting, sections 302.2, 302.3, and 302.4. 

19 The projects we identified included road construction, rehabilitation, repair, refurbishment, improvement, and 

maintenance and the associated infrastructure, such as culverts, designed to restore or maintain the integrity and 

passable nature of roads or bridges for motor vehicles. 

20 We described these same limitations in CERP data in our audit of U.S. efforts to support primary and secondary 

education in Afghanistan (see SIGAR, Primary and Secondary Education in Afghanistan: Comprehensive Assessments 

Needed to Determine the Progress and Effectiveness of over $759 Million in DOD, State, and USAID Programs, SIGAR 16-

32-AR, April 26, 2016). 

21 Because DOD did not track bulk funds at the project level, we could not disaggregate how much of a bulk fund went to 

each individual CERP project. DOD has since resolved the issue in FY 2010 and FY 2011, and now all projects within a bulk 

fund have a unique identifying number. 

22 DOD, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27, January 2009. 

23 Initially, DOD required officials to track CERP projects using 15 different categories (see DOD Under Secretary of 

Defense, Memorandum for Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command and the Secretary of the Army: Guidance on the 

Use of Appropriate Funds for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), November 2003). DOD added 

additional categories in subsequent years, eventually expanding to 20 categories in 2009 (see DOD, Financial 

Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27, January 2009). 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 6 

category. Since DOD was not required to create additional subcategories for projects, such as roads, the 

department could not easily specify which CERP projects supported road-related activities. Therefore, starting 

with projects DOD identified as being in the transportation category, we used the project titles and descriptions 

to determine which projects supported road-related activities and the costs of those projects.24 

Based on our analysis, DOD’s efforts included 4,687 individual CERP projects that supported a variety of roadrelated activities. We were able to identify $847 million in CERP funds used to conduct 4,225 of the 4,687 

projects. However, we could not identify exact funding amounts for the remaining 462 projects using the 

financial data DOD provided for two reasons. First, CERP data between FY 2004 and FY 2006 did not include 

the unique project identifying numbers needed to track each project’s cost, a problem that affected 377 CERP 

projects. Second, because certain CERP projects were funded with bulk funds, we could not determine how 

much of each bulk-funded project was spent on roads. This affected 85 CERP road projects constructed 

between FY 2007 and FY 2011, each worth less than $5,000. 

In addition to analyzing the CERP project cost data, we reviewed road-related CERP projects for required 

location data. Beginning in December 2009, CERP guidance required that DOD record the starting and ending 

location coordinates for planned CERP projects.25 We selected and reviewed road-related CERP projects 

subject to this guidance that were worth more than $500,000. This selection covered 57 individual projects 

worth $126 million. We determined that DOD provided the required location data for all 57 road-related CERP 

projects. Our analysis indicates that this is an improvement since the GAO reported in 2008 that due to 

missing documentation and frequent staff rotation, DOD did not know where some CERP-funded roads were 

built, and the DOD Office of Inspector General reported in 2011 that CERP location data were incomplete, 

inaccurate, or inconsistent.26 

Although USAID provided the location for most of its road construction programs undertaken since 2002, it is 

impossible to review the condition of those roads for which precise location coordinates are unavailable. 

Without accurate location data, USAID and the Afghan government will not be able to maintain those roads. 

MOST U.S.-FUNDED ROADS IN AFGHANISTAN THAT WE INSPECTED NEED 

REPAIR 

We found that most roads constructed using U.S. funds need various levels of maintenance and repair due to 

many factors, including weather, insurgency, and a lack of maintenance by the MOPW. During our audit, we 

selected and reviewed 1,640 kilometers of U.S.-funded national and regional highways, or approximately 22 

percent of all paved roads in Afghanistan. Figure 1 shows the roads analyzed in this report. 

 

24 Appendix I contains more details on our methodology for reviewing CERP activities. 

25 U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) SOP, December 2009. 

26 GAO, Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance 

Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689, July 8, 2008; and DOD Inspector General, Management Improvements Needed in 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, DODIG-2012-023, November 21, 2011. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 7 

Figure 1 - U.S.-Constructed RoadsIncluded in SIGAR’s Analyses

Source: SIGAR analysis

Inspections Showed Most Road Segments Needed Repairs 

In November and December 2015, we inspected 1,640 kilometers of U.S.-funded roads divided into 20 

segments. Due to security concerns, we could not physically inspect the full 1,640 kilometers of roads and had 

to perform visible inspections from a car. To track the roads we inspected, we divided them into 20 segments. 

The distances of these segments ranged from 22 to 173 kilometers. We performed physical inspections, took 

photographs, and surveyed users for 6 road segments, totaling 465 kilometers, and visually inspected the 

remaining 14 segments, totaling 1,175 kilometers. We rated the condition of each road segment as bad, fair, 

good, or very good (see figure 2 for more details). 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 8 

Figure 2 - Explanation of Road Condition Terminology

Source: SIGAR, December 2015

We found road damage that varied from surface cracks to destroyed road sections and bridges on 19 of the 

segments. Specifically, the inspections, based on our analysis, showed that of the 20 segments, 3 were in bad 

condition, 10 were in fair condition, 5 were in good condition, and 2 were in very good condition. Moreover, our 

inspections found that either no or poor-quality maintenance had been performed on 17 segments, and 3 

segments had evidence of good repair work. Table 2 shows the results of our inspections, noting both the 

general condition of each segment and the apparent level of maintenance being performed. 

Table 2 - Results of SIGAR Inspections

Source: SIGAR, December 2015
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 9 

Photo 1 illustrates minor surface cracks that require maintenance to avoid further deterioration of the road 

due to continued use, rain, or snow, but do not affect the drivability of the road segment between Herat and 

Adraskan. In contrast, photo 2 illustrates a section of road that had washed away, reducing the width and 

limiting drivability of the 104-kilometer segment between Maidan Shahr and Ghazni. We also found that the 

101-kilometer Gardez-to-Khowst road segment had five areas where the road was destroyed and two areas 

where portions were washed away, despite USAID having completed this road segment in December 2015, 

shortly before our site inspection. On the Faizabad-to-Kishum road segment located in a mountainous region, 

some sections had surface damage, some were damaged by soil erosion, and others were washed out as the 

road passed over, or next, to riverbeds. Photo 3 illustrates a bridge that collapsed along this road segment. 

Photo 4 illustrates a portion of the Kabul-to-Kandahar highway where only half of the two-lane road was 

repaved as part of maintenance efforts, while the other half had been allowed to deteriorate to the point that it 

has appeared to revert to a gravel road. 

Photo 1 - Minor Defects Needing Repair on 

Road Segment between Herat and Adraskan

Source: SIGAR, November 17, 2015

Photo 2 - Section of Road Washed Away on Road 

Segment between Maidan Shahr and Ghazni

Source: SIGAR, November 3, 2015

Photo 3 - Collapsed Bridge on Road Segment 

between Faizabad and Kishum

Source: SIGAR, November 9, 2015

Photo 4 - Road Maintenance Performed on One 

Side of Road on the Kabul-to-Kandahar Highway

Source: SIGAR, November 2, 2015
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 10

USAID AND DOD HAVE NO ASSURANCES THAT AFGHANISTAN’S ROAD 

INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE SUSTAINED, AND USAID’S CAPACITY-BUILDING 

EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED PROGRAM GOALS 

As a result of the MOPW’s lack of capacity, many U.S.-funded roads lack needed maintenance and are 

deteriorating. USAID and DOD have developed guidelines to ensure the sustainability of programs that they 

implement. However, both agencies have had little success ensuring that the roads they constructed would be 

sustained. Furthermore, DOD often relied on unrealistic sustainment assurances from the Afghan government. 

USAID’s Road Sector Sustainability Program May Lack Sufficient Commitment from 

the Afghan Government to Reform the MOPW 

USAID has issued regulations and guidance calling for agency programs to account for sustainability needs 

before starting programming. For example, the USAID Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance advises the 

agency to determine if the Afghan government can maintain USAID’s investment, or, if it does not demonstrate 

sufficient commitment to do so, modify, end, or postpone programs. However, despite these precautions, 

USAID’s road construction programs may be unsustainable without formal and tangible Afghan government 

commitment to reform how the MOPW operates. 

Since 2007, USAID has been working with the MOPW to strengthen the ministry’s capacity to maintain 

Afghanistan’s road infrastructure. Unfortunately, USAID has only had limited success in this regard, and the 

relative lack of progress in this area threatens the sustainability of the new roads international donors have 

built. For example, a 2008 GAO report stated that the Afghan government did not have a fiscally sustainable 

road maintenance program and would likely need to rely on international donors to maintain those roads.27

Without a sustainable road maintenance program, GAO concluded that newly constructed roads would likely 

deteriorate, the expected benefits from the donor-provided road infrastructure would likely not be realized, and 

billions of dollars spent on road construction would be wasted. GAO also noted that the Afghan government’s 

support for road maintenance had been limited by the lack of human capacity and organization to carry out 

tasks such as budgeting, procurement, and contract administration, all of which are necessary to implement a 

road maintenance program. 

Task Order 14 was USAID’s first attempt at reforming the MOPW so that it could eventually take over the 

management and funding of road maintenance. The task order began in 2007 and was intended to create an 

independent Road Maintenance Unit within the ministry to manage road contracts and budgets, as well as plan 

and schedule annual maintenance work, thereby creating a sustainable road maintenance program. As part of 

the program, the MOPW was to transfer staff to the road maintenance unit, while USAID’s contractor was to 

further enhance the unit’s capacity by training those employees. However, after 4 years and $53 million spent, 

USAID terminated the program. 

According to USAID’s Task Order 14 Performance Evaluation report and interviews with Amec and World Bank 

officials, Task Order 14 did not meet its reform goals due to a lack of cooperation from the MOPW’s senior 

leadership. The report concluded that, by providing funding for road maintenance without regard to whether 

the MOPW implemented needed organizational reforms, the program inadvertently created a disincentive for 

the MOPW to make those reforms. The report also found that because USAID directly funded and managed

contracts for emergency road maintenance, the MOPW became less concerned with capacity building because 

road maintenance was being performed. Additionally, the report mentioned that the ministry lacked the 

political will to reorganize itself in a manner that would allow for the creation of an effective road management 

unit. 

 

27 GAO, Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance 

Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689, July 2008. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 11

In an effort to continue capacity building—and at the Afghan government’s request—USAID designed a second 

program in 2013, the $96.5 million RSSP, to reform the MOPW. In compliance with the ADS, USAID obtained a 

signed endorsement from the Minister of Public Works for the program’s activities, thus documenting the 

government’s official agreement to undertake identified reforms.28 USAID designed RSSP’s activities to be 

implemented sequentially to gradually increase the MOPW’s responsibility for managing funds and activities for 

road maintenance. USAID and Amec officials explained that with the exception of a relatively small emergency 

road maintenance fund, known as Activity 1, the success of each program activity, is contingent on the success 

and sustainability of the preceding activities. 

 Activity 1 - USAID directly entered into and managed contracts with four Afghan construction firms—

BCURA Construction Company, Faizi Masroor Construction Company, State Women Corporation, and 

Omid Afghanistan Construction and Engineering Company—to provide up to $5 million in emergency 

road maintenance over a 1-year period. The MOPW was responsible for requesting road maintenance 

under these contracts. 

 Activity 2 - USAID contracted directly with Amec to provide $25.5 million in technical assistance to the 

MOPW through the design of a new organizational structure for the MOPW. The primary objective of 

this activity is to improve the management, financing, and efficiency of the road sector in Afghanistan, 

and to shift road construction and maintenance functions from the MOPW to a commercialized system 

implemented by private contractors. To accomplish this objective, Amec conducted surveys of other 

nations’ road management bodies and designed and proposed three new independent institutions: 

the Road Authority, the Road Fund, and the Transportation Institute. The Road Authority would be 

responsible for managing Afghanistan’s road infrastructure by planning maintenance and developing 

policies and standards. The Road Fund would be responsible for funding the Road Authority’s 

activities. Finally, the Transportation Institute would develop standards, construction manuals, and 

quality assurance and quality controls procedures, and research and adopt new technologies to create 

a safe, sustainable transportation system. 

According to the contract documents and work plan for Activity 2, it was split into two phases. Phase 1 

consisted of designing and presenting options for the creation of the Road Authority, the Road Fund, 

and the Transportation Institute to the MOPW. Phase 2, scheduled to begin once the Afghan 

government established the three new entities, would consist of Amec providing training to MOPW 

employees on the new roles of the Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute. An Amec 

official stated that in January 2016, Amec presented the MOPW with several options for establishing 

the three entities, including draft legislation. However, as of August 2016, the Afghan Parliament had 

yet to approve the creation of the Road Authority, the Road Fund, and the Transportation Institute. 

 Activity 3 - USAID stated that Activity 3 would provide $33 million to an implementing partner to help 

the MOPW develop the Road Authority, the Road Fund, and the Transportation Institute through 

capacity building at the newly established entities. 

 Activity 4 – The MOPW directly manages $33 million in funding provided by the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Trust Fund, which is administered by the Asian Development Bank, for the Road 

Authority and Transportation Institute. 

Thus far, USAID has only initiated Activity 1 and phase 1 of Activity 2 of RSSP. 

The MOPW demonstrated its commitment to reform in May 2016 by agreeing to legislation that would 

establish the Road Authority, the Road Fund, and the Transportation Institute. Furthermore, in June 2016, the 

Afghan government convened the Inter-Ministerial Project Steering Committee to endorse RSSP and the 

establishment of the Road Authority, the Road Fund, and the Transportation Institute through a new standalone law.29 Additionally, in July 2016, the Chief Advisor to the President on Infrastructure, Human Capital, and 

 

28 USAID, Automated Directives System, Chapter 201, USAID Planning, section 201.3.16.3(d). 

29 The committee is comprised of various ministries and representatives, including the MOPW, the MOF, and the Ministry of 

Justice. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 12

Technology endorsed RSSP and the selection of the legislative option for the creation the Road Authority, the 

Road Fund, and the Transportation Institute. However, there is no guarantee that the Afghan Parliament will 

consider the proposed legislation in the current or future sessions, or whether it will enact them. Furthermore, 

Amec estimates that once the laws are introduced, it could take 2 years to receive Parliament’s approval. As of 

August 2016, the proposed laws have yet to be introduced in the Afghan Parliament, raising concerns 

regarding the viability of this approach to MOPW reform and the future of RSSP. 

An additional concern is that even if the Afghan Parliament does pass legislation creating the Road Authority 

and the Road Fund, those entities will not be as fully independent as RSSP intended. Both the RSSP contract 

and USAID’s Final Road Fund Study state that the Road Authority and Road Fund are to be independent 

authorities. Without full autonomy, the Road Authority and the Road Fund could be subject to political 

interference by the MOPW or bureaucratic pressures. However, the official endorsement letter by the President 

of Afghanistan’s Chief Advisor on Infrastructure, Human Capital, and Technology referred to the Road Authority 

and the Road Fund “as semi-autonomous.” Additionally, a July 2016 USAID document describing ongoing 

RSSP efforts also stated that the Road Authority and the Road Fund will be semi-autonomous. This raises 

questions as to whether the Road Authority and the Road Fund, if created, would be able to successfully 

reform the MOPW and improve road conditions in Afghanistan. 

In fact, USAID’s Road Fund Final Study stated that “Boards of directors of Road Funds should be autonomous 

in administrative and financial matters, to decrease the risk of bureaucratic and political interference.”

According to the study, “Most first-generation Road Funds [Boards of Directors] were dominated by public 

sector representatives and chaired by ministers or other senior officials accountable first to their governments 

and second to the Road Fund, which sometimes resulted in biased decisions not in line with road users’ 

interests.” 

Furthermore, without an autonomous Road Fund, the Road Authority could be under similar funding restraints 

as the current MOPW. Amec, foreign donors, and MOPW officials stated that the MOF is not providing sufficient 

funds, or even all of the collected road user charges, to the MOPW. Without an autonomous Road Fund 

collecting road user charges under its own budget, the MOF may underfund the Road Authority. 

USAID’s Task Order 14 final performance evaluation underscored the need to separate efforts to reform 

Afghan institutions from funding the activities those entities are supposed to perform. Applied to the MOPW, 

this would mean separating efforts to reform the ministry from efforts to maintain Afghan roads. According to 

USAID officials, the work plan for Activity 2, and contract documents, Activity 2 of RSSP is intended to lead to 

the creation of the Road Authority, the Road Fund and the Transportation Institute. If USAID were to initiate 

Activities 3 and 4 prior to the establishment of those entities, that could create a disincentive for the MOPW to 

reform. In fact, one Amec official told us that USAID should not fund Activity 3 until the Afghan Parliament 

passes the proposed legislation establishing the Road Authority, the Road Fund, and the Transportation 

Institute. The official also stated that USAID must ensure that other donors do not provide funding to the 

MOPW until the ministry is reformed. 

By withholding funding for future activities until the Afghan Parliament passes the proposed legislation, USAID 

would be acting in manner consistent with the Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance, which requires the 

Afghan government to have the willingness, resources, and capacity to sustain USAID programs. For example, 

USAID has used conditions precedent in other situations as a form of conditionality in which a program must 

meet milestones before releasing additional funds to the host government. Withholding funds until necessary 

steps are taken to reform the MOPW would also be consistent with congressional and international donor 

guidelines. 

The principles laid out in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework reaffirm the use of incentive mechanisms 

when providing funding to the Afghan government. Finally, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

reaffirmed the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework by stating that the U.S. “should condition a higher 

percentage its funding” and that “if done properly by ensuring buy-in from the Afghan government, conditioning 

U.S. assistance can improve the accountability of our aid, strengthen reformers and institutions in the Afghan 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 13

government and result in better development outcomes.”

30 As demonstrated by the failure of Task Order 14, 

continuing to fund Afghan road maintenance without a proper amount of conditionality could lead to 

disincentives for reform within the MOPW. In fact, when discussing the road maintenance needs for 

Afghanistan, an MOPW official stated that although Afghanistan was working to conduct and fund its own road 

maintenance, foreign donors would fund and perform necessary road maintenance if the MOPW could not, due 

to the necessity of the country having a functioning road infrastructure. 

Without a firm commitment from all relevant elements of the Afghan government, including the MOPW, the 

MOF, and the Afghan Parliament, the reforms developed under RSSP may remain unimplemented or, if 

enacted, may be unsustainable. The failure to properly implement the reforms proposed under RSSP could 

result in a continued lack of sufficient maintenance and a waste of taxpayer dollars. 

DOD-Funded CERP Road Projects Faced Challenges to Sustainment 

We found that DOD faced numerous challenges getting the Afghan government to sustain CERP-funded road 

projects. Although DOD followed its own guidance requiring officials to obtain assurances that the Afghan 

government would sustain CERP-funded road projects, those assurances were often unrealistic. The MAAWS-A 

stated that, in coordination with Afghan officials, DOD needed to take into account project sustainability by

ensuring that the project met a perceived need by the population, providing ongoing costs to Afghan officials, 

and ensuring that local Afghan officials would maintain the project in the future.31 For construction projects 

costing more than $50,000, the MAAWS-A required DOD to receive a sustainment memorandum agreement 

signed by a local government official acknowledging that the Afghan government was responsible for 

sustaining the project once it was completed. The MAAWS-A concluded that if a local official was not willing to 

protect the U.S. investment by sustaining the project, it should not be funded.32 While CERP guidance required 

local Afghan government officials to assume the responsibility for the sustainment of projects, those 

assurances are not legally binding. 

We have previously identified concerns about the sustainment of CERP road projects. During the height of 

CERP spending in FY 2009, we found that the Afghan government did not have the resources necessary to 

maintain a CERP-funded road, despite the MOPW’s assurances to the contrary.33 In its response to our 

inspection, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan acknowledged that the Afghan government was unable to sustain the 

roads that had been transferred to it, and noted that it strived “for a balance between static inaction and 

dynamic reconstruction efforts that move the Afghanistan people forward.” The response further stated that 

there was an “unwritten obligation to make progress with respect to reconstruction efforts” while following 

regulations, with the expectation that the Afghan government one day could sustain the projects that it said it 

could.34 Following the peak in CERP spending in FY 2009, funding for road-related CERP projects began to 

decrease. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that spending on CERP-funded transportation 

projects significantly decreased after FY 2009, dropping by more than 80 percent from FY 2009 to FY 2010, 

according to obligation data DOD reported to Congress. 

 

30 U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance Post2014, S. Prt. 113-29 at 1 (2014). 

31 U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) SOP, USFOR-A Pub 1-06, updated December 2009, Section 3(B)(1). 

32 U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) SOP, USFOR-A Pub 1-06, updated December 2009, Section 4(B)(5)(A). 

33 SIGAR, Inspection of Mahmood Raqi to Nijrab Road Project in Kapisa Province: Contract Requirements Met; But 

Sustainability Concerns Exist, SIGAR Inspection 09-02, October 2, 2009. 

34 SIGAR, Inspection of Mahmood Raqi to Nijrab Road Project in Kapisa Province: Contract Requirements Met; But 

Sustainability Concerns Exist, SIGAR Inspection 09-02, October 2, 2009. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 14

In a 2011 report that examined CERP-funded asphalt road projects in Laghman Province, we found similar 

sustainment issues. 35 This report examined nine CERP-funded asphalt road projects initiated between 

November 2007 and December 2009. Two projects were completed, and the remaining seven were ongoing 

when we conducted our fieldwork in 2010. In all cases, the projects lacked adequate assurances that the 

Afghan government had the resources to maintain them. We recommended that U.S. Forces–Afghanistan work 

with Afghan officials to develop sustainment plans for CERP projects that were not being sustained and identify 

steps for local Afghan officials to take to ensure transferred CERP projects could be sustained before 

committing additional CERP funds. In its response, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan acknowledged the limited ability of 

local Afghan governments to maintain infrastructure projects and that U.S. Forces–Afghanistan would continue 

to use the sustainment memorandum to address sustainment issues. 

Although CERP road spending has decreased significantly since FY 2009, multiple U.S. Forces–Afghanistan 

officials involved in the approval of 2015 CERP projects said the Afghan government could not sustain every 

CERP-funded project. For example, according to a U.S. Forces–Afghanistan official who was second in 

command of all CERP programs during 2015, DOD was aware that the Afghan government would always sign 

the required sustainment memorandum acknowledging that it had the responsibility and capability to sustain a 

project, despite not always having the capacity to do so. Another U.S. Forces–Afghanistan official, who was the 

overall program coordinator for all CERP projects in 2015, told us that DOD may not have intended for all CERP 

road projects to be sustainable. The official stated that construction standards for roads varied depending on 

how long the road was needed and that building a road designed to last 1 year could be an appropriate use of 

CERP funds, as long as the road met the identified needs of the users. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that CERP is a tool for commanders to use to improve 

security and stability within their areas of responsibility. According to DOD, while maximizing the value and 

usefulness of projects through maintenance efforts is desired, there are times when other goals outweigh the 

potential risk of poor sustainment. For example, paving a road makes it more difficult for insurgents to place 

improvised explosive devices in roadways. A commander, therefore, may decide to pave a section of road to 

reduce the threat of IEDs even if there is a risk the asphalt may not be properly maintained over time. 

WEAK CAPACITY, CORRUPTION, FUNDING ISSUES, AND INSECURITY HAMPER 

THE MOPW’S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AFGHANISTAN’S ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 

Afghan Government Acknowledges Road Infrastructure Needs Repair 

An MOPW official told us in August 2015 that 20 percent of Afghanistan’s roads were destroyed and the 

remaining 80 percent continue to deteriorate. This MOPW official specifically cited the Kabul-to-Kandahar 

highway, stating that it needs to be rebuilt due to improvised explosive device blasts, washouts, and wear, 

which is similar to what we found during our inspection. 

USAID’s December 2011 closeout report for Task Order 14 noted that, if not properly maintained, it would cost 

$8.3 billion to replace Afghanistan’s road infrastructure.36 USAID’s December 2015 Final Road Fund Study 

cited an Asian Development Bank road maintenance road map that estimated the value of Afghanistan’s roads 

at $8.3 billion in 2010, but concluded that the value had decreased by $3.6 billion, or 44 percent, due to poor 

 

35 SIGAR, Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but Oversight 

Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste, SIGAR Audit 11-7, January 

27, 2011. 

36 USAID, Final Closeout Report, TO 14 – Road Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Capacity Building Program, 

December 2011. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 15

maintenance, and 54 percent of the road infrastructure needed more than simple repairs.37 As part of the 

inspections we conducted, we surveyed 174 Afghans on six separate road segments about their perceptions 

about, and experiences on, Afghanistan’s road infrastructure, specifically their perception of road conditions, 

maintenance efforts, and security. Our survey found that 52 percent of respondents felt road conditions had 

gotten worse in the past year, and 67 percent believed they would continue to get worse in the next year. 

The MOPW’s Capacity Problems Remain 

In an attempt to build technical capacity at the MOPW, USAID and other donors have spent more than 

$60 million on capacity-building training efforts. However, according to USAID, donor assessments, and MOPW 

officials, these efforts have not succeeded. This conclusion is borne out in multiple studies USAID and other 

donors have conducted since 2012. See appendix II for a summary of the results from each study. 

A February 2012 USAID assessment of the MOPW’s ability to perform road maintenance found numerous 

issues limiting its capacity, including poor communication, a lack of processes and coordination, a lack of an 

inventory of Afghanistan’s roads, and non-transparent contracting practices.38 USAID concluded that the 

MOPW was unable to provide effective routine road maintenance. A February 2012 Ernst & Young assessment 

of the MOPW, conducted under a contract with USAID, evaluated the MOPW’s financial systems and identified 

35 corrective measures the ministry would have to implement before it would be capable of managing direct 

assistance.39 Ernst & Young concluded that the MOPW was unable to manage on-budget assistance. 

Later studies by international donors found similar capacity issues at the ministry. For example, USAID’s Final 

Organizational Assessment of the MOPW summarized a July 2013 study by Australia’s Agency for International 

Development that found that donors’ capacity-building efforts were not being sustained by the MOPW, and a 

July 2014 World Bank training needs assessment found that the ministry had limited capacity to plan and 

perform road maintenance or use engineering software.40

In May 2015, USAID issued its Final Organizational Assessment of the MOPW, an assessment of the ministry’s 

operations, practices, and management.41 This assessment found that prior donor initiatives did not achieve 

meaningful reforms and noted that donor capacity-building efforts did not have a significant or lasting impact. 

This assessment concluded that the MOPW needed structural reform, citing ongoing critical weaknesses 

including lack of a skilled staff, poor communication, antiquated systems and processes, and a lack of will to 

implement necessary reforms. 

The lack of technical capacity at the MOPW impacts the transition and sustainability of donor efforts. For 

example, according to a World Bank official, capacity issues prevented the World Bank from transferring its 

 

37 USAID, Final Road Fund Study (Component 3), Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Public Works, December 9, 2015, 

p. 26; and Asian Development Bank, Strategic Roadmap for Development Partner Support to O&M of Afghanistan Roads, 

August 2015. 

38 USAID, Evaluation of the Ministry of Public Works Capacity to Conduct Roadway Operations and Maintenance (O&M), 

February 11, 2012. 

39 Ernst and Young, Report on Pre-Award Assessment of Ministry of Public Works, February 2012, pp. 9–10. In January 

2013, we reported on this and other assessments USAID conducted itself or contracted for to determine whether various 

ministries were capable of managing direct assistance funds (see SIGAR, Direct Assistance: USAID Has Taken Positive 

Action to Assess Afghan Ministries’ Ability to Manage Donor Funds, but Concerns Remain, SIGAR 14-32-AR, January 30, 

2014). Direct assistance is a form of on-budget assistance, which is funding channeled through a host nation’s national 

budget. 

40 USAID, Final Organizational Assessment of Ministry of Public Works (Component 1), USAID RSSP Technical Assistance to 

Ministry of Public Works, January 2015; Australian Agency for International Development, Diagnostic Report for MoPW 

Under USAID and Ministry of Finance for DAFA III Program to Support the Public Financial Management Program in 4 

Ministries: MoPW, MoE, MAIL, and MoPH for a staged Capacity Building Model, July 2013; and World Bank, Training Needs 

Assessment Report, National and Regional Corridors Program (NRRCP), July 16, 2014. 

41 USAID, Final Organizational Assessment of Ministry of Public Works (Component 1), USAID RSSP Technical Assistance to 

Ministry of Public Works, January 2015. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 16

rural road maintenance program to the ministry because it lacks the ability to manage road infrastructure and 

develop and execute contracts. This official concluded that the MOPW largely remains non-functional. In a 

second example, in December 2015, USAID transferred the final segment of the Gardez to Khowst highway to 

the MOPW. When we inspected the road later than same month, we found that it already suffers from poor 

maintenance and has major road defects affecting its drivability. 

Corruption at the MOPW Remains an Issue 

USAID, donor assessments, and an MOPW official said corruption continues to be an issue that hampers the 

ministry’s ability to maintain roads. USAID’s February 2012 assessment of the MOPW found that employees 

were hired based on nepotism and personal connections, noting that high-paying positions were offered to 

people with personal connections.42 The organizational assessment of the MOPW also found that nepotism 

and favoritism were still apparent in the appointment of managers and staff, and that donors lacked 

confidence in the MOPW’s ability to be effective, efficient, transparent, lawful, and professional. Furthermore, 

the assessment recommended that future transition activities should take these findings into account. 

Corruption can have a direct impact on the activities and financing of MOPW activities. For example, a senior 

MOPW official told us that the MOPW stopped collecting tolls on the roads due to high levels of corruption. The 

official explained that since the tolls were collected in cash, drivers would pay bribes to the toll collectors in 

exchange for reduced tolls. The official stated that a similar type of bribe was being paid at weigh stations, 

where drivers of overweight trucks would pay bribes to avoid fines. According to this official, in response to 

these problems the MOPW implemented new controls, such as random checks of stations, the use of 

undercover employees, and increased tracking of vehicle weights as they exit and enter different weigh 

stations. The MOPW official said following the implementation of these controls, revenues increased 400 to 

600 percent at one weigh station alone. 

The MOPW Lacks Sufficient Funding and Ability to Manage Budgets to Perform 

Necessary Road Maintenance 

USAID and donors have found that the MOPW does not have adequate funding to perform necessary road 

maintenance. MOPW officials stated that it would cost $100 million annually to carry out the necessary 

emergency, routine, periodic, and winter maintenance on Afghanistan’s road infrastructure. However, 

according to data provided by the ministry officials, between 2011 and 2016, it received, on average, $21.3 

million annually from the MOF. The officials said the lack of funding has resulted in the deterioration of roads, 

and that the roads will continue to deteriorate if the ministry does not receive funding at a level closer to 

annual road maintenance costs. 

An MOPW official told us that the ministry annually requested far less than it determined it needed to perform 

road maintenance because the MOF was unwilling to approve the actual amount necessary. However, Amec 

and other donor officials stated that the MOPW needed to improve how it requested funding, and MOF officials 

said the MOPW often did not spend all of the development budget allocated to it annually.43 An MOPW official 

said MOF officials have directed the MOPW to use unspent developmental funds for road maintenance; 

however, according to this MOPW official, because Afghan law prohibits the MOPW from reallocating those 

funds for operational needs, Afghanistan’s road maintenance needs continue to be underfunded. 

USAID’s December 2015 Final Road Fund Study report corroborated the MOPW’s assertions, noting that the 

ministry’s budget allocation emphasized road construction rather than maintenance, and concluded that the 

 

42 USAID, Evaluation of the Ministry of Public Works Capacity to Conduct Roadway Operations and Maintenance (O&M), 

February 11, 2012. 

43 The MOPW’s overall budget contains a developmental and operational budget category. According to an MOPW official, 

the developmental budget can be carried over from one year to the next and is meant for new road development, while the 

MOPW’s operational budget must be spent annually and is meant for maintenance and operation expenses.
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 17

Afghan government needed to use its budget better by increasing the allocation for road maintenance.44

Additionally, the report stated that that the MOF had raised concerns about the MOPW’s ability to manage its 

budget, and that the MOF is concerned with the MOPW’s ability to operate in an effective, efficient, and 

transparent matter. According to the USAID report, these concerns resulted in the MOF being reluctant to 

increase funding for the MOPW without meaningful change. The report concluded that road maintenance 

remains highly underfunded, and the MOPW needs to develop additional revenue streams or rely on donors to 

make up a $500 million budget shortfall anticipated for the next 5 years. 

To increase funding for road maintenance, Afghanistan instituted a tax on imported fuel and created road user 

fees, the revenues from which are supposed to be specifically earmarked for road maintenance.45 Despite 

these efforts, MOPW officials said the MOF—the Afghan ministry which collects revenue—has not provided all 

earmarked revenues to the MOPW and violates the law by not using the revenues exclusively for road 

maintenance and possibly uses the revenues to fill Afghanistan’s other budget gaps.

46 The United Kingdom’s 

Department for International Development and Amec officials, along with a December 2015 USAID report, 

corroborated the MOPW’s claims, stating that the MOF withholds revenues from the fuel tax and road user 

fees, and possibly uses them to fill Afghanistan’s other budget gaps. MOF officials disputed this claim and 

stated that the MOPW receives all revenues from the fuel tax and road user fees. During the course of this 

audit, we could not determine whether this was true. 

Last, we found various budgetary inconsistencies regarding funding for road maintenance. In examining the 

MOPW’s budget requests, approvals, and income generated by the fuel tax, we identified differences between 

the funding amounts cited by the MOPW, the MOF, and Amec. For example, the MOPW provided us with budget 

information on various occasions, and none of the information was consistent. Additionally, officials from the 

MOPW stated that the ministry’s FY 2015 budget was $17.5 million. However, officials from the MOF stated 

that it was $14.9 million. In another example, the MOPW stated that the fuel excise tax generated $60 million 

in FY 2014, while the MOF indicated that it was $17.9 million, and Amec determined it was $20.5 million. 

According to MOF officials, in 2015, the tax doubled from 1 afghani per liter to 2 afghanis per liter. Despite this 

increase, MOF officials estimated that only $30 million was generated by the fuel excise tax in FY 2015, while 

Amec estimated that $120 million was collected for this same time period. Due to these inconsistencies, we 

could not determine the exact amount of road maintenance funding the MOPW requested, how much the MOF 

provided, and how much the MOF collected in road user fees. 

Security Issues Hamper Road Maintenance Efforts 

In addition to being maintained to a drivable standard, Afghanistan’s roads must be safe enough from 

insurgent attack to allow for travel and maintenance. MOPW officials said security conditions vary throughout 

the country, noting that northern and central Afghanistan do not face the same security challenges as the 

south, and that the MOPW could perform maintenance only where security conditions allowed. They said that 

the MOPW is beginning to use local Afghan contractors to perform maintenance because they have fewer 

problems with insurgents than international contractors. 

During our inspections, we noted that 6 of the 20 road segments had insurgent activity and identified 13 

insurgent checkpoints. Additionally, through our surveys, we found that when respondents were asked about 

 

44 USAID, Final Road Fund Study (Component 3), Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Public Works, December 9, 2015. 

45 In 2011, the Afghan government issued Ministers Council Approval Number 3, which implemented a 1 afghani ($0.02) 

per liter fuel tax as a road user charge and explicitly earmarking these funds for road maintenance. Afghan law requires the 

MOF to collect the fuel tax revenue and place it into a special account and transfer the funds to the MOPW for road 

maintenance. Similarly, The Afghanistan Road Toll Gazette Publication Number 1091 of 1391 codified the Ministers 

Council decree and also requires the MOF to collect and place funds from other road user charges, such as tolls and fines, 

into a special account and to transfer those funds to that MOPW. 

46 Government of Afghanistan, The Afghanistan Road Toll Gazette Publication Number 1091 of 1391, Article 6, November 

12, 2012. 
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road security during the day, 69 percent felt that the roads were either “very safe” or “somewhat safe,” and 

that insurgents were the biggest security concern. When asked about security during the night, 59 percent of 

the respondents felt that the roads were either “very unsafe” or “somewhat unsafe,” again with insurgents 

being the biggest security concern. 

Finally, MOPW officials said Afghanistan’s road infrastructure plays an important role in the country’s 

development and governance, and if the Kabul to Kandahar highway were became impassable, the central 

government would collapse. However, the same MOPW officials were confident that the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces would increase security if the situation got worse. 

CONCLUSION 

USAID, DOD, and other international donors have invested billions of dollars to build an extensive road 

infrastructure in Afghanistan, with the U.S. contribution totaling approximately $2.8 billion. However, many of 

the country’s roads are in need of repair. Further, despite past and current efforts, neither USAID’s nor other 

donor’s efforts have succeeded in building sufficient technical capacity within the MOPW to enable it to 

effectively perform its mission of constructing and maintaining Afghanistan’s roads. 

Although USAID’s RSSP takes into account the lessons learned from prior programs that failed to develop or 

reform the MOPW, the risk remains that the Afghan government will not embrace the reforms proposed as part 

of this ongoing program. Without tangible Afghan government action to support the needed reforms, including 

the passage of legislation to establish an independent Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation 

Institute, the effective management and sustainment of Afghanistan’s road infrastructure will remain an 

elusive goal. The MOPW continues to lack the capacity to fund and perform effective road maintenance. 

Therefore, the creation of these three agencies is necessary to lessen the risk that RSSP will become another 

program that simply pays for the maintenance of Afghanistan’s roads, but does not prepare the MOPW to take 

the lead in maintaining Afghanistan’s roads. Furthermore, the continued deterioration of the road 

infrastructure could weaken the Afghan government’s reach throughout the country, inhibit commerce, and 

restrict the freedom of movement of Afghans. Unless USAID, along with its other donor partners, takes 

additional action to demand needed reforms, and the Afghan government demonstrates a commitment to 

implementing those reforms, Afghanistan will continue to rely on donor funding for road maintenance and 

reconstruction for the foreseeable future. 

RECOMMENDATION 

To ensure the remaining activities of the RSSP, as well as any future road programs, address the shortcomings 

of previous programs and increase the MOPW’s capacity to maintain Afghanistan’s roads, we recommend that 

the USAID Administrator condition future RSSP and MOPW funding to the successful creation of an 

independent Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute. 

AGENCY COMMENTS 

We provided a draft of this report to USAID and DOD for review and comment. USAID and DOD, through the 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, provided written 

comments which are reproduced in appendices III and IV, respectively. USAID and DOD also provided oral and 

written technical comments, which we incorporated into this report, as appropriate. 
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 19

USAID Comments 

USAID concurred with our recommendation and stated that the recommendation aligns with its “current 

approach, which ensures that any future road programs address the shortcomings of previous programs and 

increase the MOPW’s capacity to maintain Afghanistan’s roads.” USAID also stated that the Afghan 

government has taken steps to demonstrate its commitment to reform, including formally endorsing the 

creation of a Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute. Furthermore, USAID noted that “the 

newly released Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework specifically identified road sector 

reform as a key component of the energy and infrastructure development and growth strategy for the country.”

Based on this information, USAID Afghanistan requested that SIGAR close the recommendation. 

While we are encouraged by USAID’s commitment to learning from the mistakes of prior programs, we disagree 

with USAID’s request to close the recommendation. As evidenced by the existence and goals of the RSSP, the 

establishment of an independent Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute is necessary to 

reform the MOPW and ensure the mistakes of the past are not repeated. Moreover, as discussed in the report, 

USAID’s own guidance, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, and statements from the U.S. Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations all suggest that by placing conditions on future funding for Afghan ministries, 

USAID will create incentives for the Afghan government to implement desired reforms. However, if USAID 

proceeds to fund activities 3 and 4 of RSSP or future road programs prior to Afghanistan passing legislation to 

establish an independent Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute, the agency could end up 

repeating the shortcomings of Task Order 14 and create disincentives for reform. Therefore, we will keep the 

recommendation open until we obtain evidence that future RSSP and MOPW funding is conditioned on the 

establishment of the Independent Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute. 

DOD Comments 

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD noted that its road construction and maintenance activities in 

Afghanistan have largely concluded. DOD reiterated that while maximizing the value and usefulness of projects 

through future sustainment was desired, other goals sometimes outweighed the potential risk that a project 

might not be sustained in the long-term. However, DOD stated that it was encouraged by the recent 

developments summarized in the report indicating that the Afghan government continues to demonstrate its 

commitment toward reform and the creation of a Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation Institute that 

will help the Afghan government establish a self-supporting, commercialized transportation system. 
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APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

This audit examined U.S. government efforts to construct and sustain roads, and build capacity within the 

Afghan government to perform road maintenance from 2002 through June 2016. The objectives of this audit 

were to determine the extent to which (1) U.S. agencies have fully accounted for the road construction they 

funded in Afghanistan; (2) selected U.S.-funded roads have been maintained and what the current condition of 

a subset of those roads is; (3) U.S.-funded road construction and capacity-building programs achieved program 

goals and are sustainable; and (4) challenges, if any, exist to the Afghan government’s ability to perform and 

self-fund road maintenance. We focused on roads the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 

Department of Defense (DOD), the principal U.S. agencies that fund road construction and maintenance 

programs in Afghanistan, constructed for civilian use, and capacity building programs specific to USAID. 

To determine the extent to which USAID has fully accounted for the road construction it has funded in 

Afghanistan, we requested that the agency identify all programs and initiatives specifically pertaining to road 

construction, road maintenance, and building the capacity of the Afghan government to maintain its road 

infrastructure implemented from 2002 to June 2016. We specifically requested a name and description for 

each program, amounts disbursed for completed programs, amounts obligated for ongoing programs, and 

location data. To analyze the location of specific road programs, we assessed whether the program’s Global 

Positioning System coordinates were within the identified province, district, or village, and located on or near a 

road. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has fully accounted for the road construction it has funded in 

Afghanistan, we analyzed project and funding data from Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

annual fourth quarter reports to Congress from fiscal year (FY) 2004 through FY 2015. Because the reports 

contained obligation and disbursement data valid as of the report dates only, we obtained updated obligation 

and disbursement data from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and consolidated the data to create 

a single, aggregated dataset that joined project information with final expenditure data. We used this 

consolidated CERP dataset to identify 4,687 projects that supported road construction and maintenance by 

conducting key word searches of project titles and descriptions. The projects we identified included 

construction, rehabilitation, repair, refurbishment, improvement, and maintenance of roads and their 

associated infrastructure, such as culverts, designed to restore or maintain the integrity and passable nature 

of roads or bridges for motor vehicles. We used the same consolidated dataset to identify 57 projects that 

were completed after December 1, 2009, disbursed more than $500,000 each, and were required to have 

geo-coordinates to determine if DOD had recorded the geo-coordinates of its road projects. We compared the 

results against the locations documented in the Combined Information Data Network Exchange database—the 

database where CERP project files are kept—and determined if the project’s Global Positioning System 

coordinates were within the stated province, district, or village and located on or near a road. 

To determine the extent to which selected U.S.-funded roads have been maintained and the current condition 

of a subset of those roads, we conducted site inspections to assess the general physical condition of 1,640 

kilometers of road divided into 20 segments. The inspections documented the types of road surfaces used, the 

number of lanes, the types of defects observed and repaired, traffic conditions, and the overall security 

condition, to include levels of insurgent activity and solicited bribes. Six inspections included photography of 

the road segment’s conditions and surveys of the segment’s users. We did not collect photographic and 

testimonial evidence for the remaining 14 segments due to security considerations. 

In December 2014, SIGAR entered into a cooperative agreement with Afghan civil society partners. Under this 

agreement, our Afghan partners conduct specific inspections, evaluations, and other analyses. In this regard, 

Afghan inspectors and engineers inspected 1,640 kilometers of roads from October 2015 through November 

2015. We developed a standardized inspection checklist that included the items previously noted. We 

compared the information our Afghan civil society partners provided to accepted engineering practices, 

relevant standards, regulations, laws, and codes for quality and accuracy. In addition, as part of our monitoring 

and quality control process, we: 
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 met with the Afghan engineers to ensure that the approach and planning for the inspection were 

consistent with the objectives of our inspection and the terms of our cooperative agreement; 

 discussed significant inspection issues with them; 

 monitored our partners’ progress in meeting milestones and revised contract delivery dates as 

needed; and 

 conducted oversight of them in accordance with SIGAR’s policies and procedures to ensure their work 

resulted in impartial, credible, and reliable information. 

To determine the extent to which the U.S.-funded road construction and capacity-building programs achieved 

program goals and are sustainable, we reviewed USAID and DOD documents, including contracts and task 

orders, and planning documents, lessons learned reports, and other contract deliverables USAID, DOD, and 

their implementing partners prepared. Specifically, to determine if U.S.-funded capacity building programs met 

their stated outcomes, we reviewed contract close-out documents. We also reviewed our prior audits on CERP 

and road-related efforts, prior Government Accountability Office and the DOD Office of Inspector General 

reports, as well as assessments and reports prepared by various foreign donors.47 Furthermore, we 

interviewed officials from USAID, DOD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), USAID’s implementing partner

Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure, Inc. (Amec), the Afghan Ministry of Public Works (MOPW), 

the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Kingdom’s 

Department for International Development. 

To determine the extent to which challenges, if any, exist to the Afghan government’s ability to perform and 

self-fund road maintenance, we reviewed assessments and evaluations, close-out lessons learned reports, and 

other contract deliverables USAID, DOD, and their implementing partners prepared. We also interviewed 

officials from USAID, DOD, USACE, Amec, the MOPW, the MOF, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, 

and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development.

Although we did not use computer-processed data from USAID, we relied on computer-processed data from 

DOD to identify the road construction and maintenance programs the department implemented in Afghanistan 

from FY 2004 through FY 2015. We concluded that although DOD’s data had limitations when used alone, 

consolidating that data with updated funding data from Defense Finance and Accounting Services allowed us 

to create a sufficiently reliable data set for the purposes of this report. We also assessed internal controls to 

determine the extent to which DOD and Defense Finance and Accounting Services had systems in place to 

track and report on their efforts in Afghanistan. The results of our assessment are included in the body of the 

report. 

We conducted our audit work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from May 2015 to October 2016, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This audit was performed by SIGAR under the 

authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. 

 

47 For example, SIGAR, Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but 

Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste, SIGAR Audit 11-7, 

January 27, 2011; GAO, Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable 

Maintenance Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689, July 2008; Department of Defense Inspector General, Management 

Improvements Needed in Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, DODIG-2012-023, November 21, 

2011; and The World Bank, Training Needs Assessment Report, National and Regional Resource Corridors Program, July 

16, 2014. 
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APPENDIX II - ASSESSMENT PERFORMED ON THE MOPW’S CAPACITY 

Since 2012, the U.S. Agency for International Development (UASID) and its implementing partners completed 

multiple assessments of the Ministry of Public Works’ (MOPW) capabilities. We reviewed these assessments 

during the course of our audit and summarized the objectives and findings of the assessments the table 

below. 

Table 3 - Summary of Assessments of MOPW Capacity
SIGAR 17-11-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghanistan’s Road Infrastructure Page 23

Source: SIGAR summary of data provided by USAID, the World Bank, United Kingdom Department for International 

Development, and Australian Agency for International Development assessments of the MOPW between 2008 and 

2015
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APPENDIX III - COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 
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SIGAR Response to USAID Comments 

1. We reviewed USAID’s comment and revised the sentence identified as follows: 

However, for the $366 million Secondary Road Program, USAID provided road locations at the 

district level, but could not provide more precise location data because specific Global Positioning 

System coordinates were not required at the time of the contract... According to USAID’s response 

to a draft of this report, newer contract provisions now ensure specific location data are a part of 

the monitoring requirements. 

2. We disagree with USAID’s assertion that our statement is inaccurate and unsupported. Our report 

notes that multiple officials within the Afghan government have voiced support for the reforms 

proposed by the RSSP. However, as of the date of this report, the Afghan Parliament has not passed 

legislation to formally establish an independent Road Authority, Road Fund, and Transportation 

Institute. If USAID has information showing that passage of the reform legislation is in fact guaranteed, 

we will consider that information. 

 
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APPENDIX IV - COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
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APPENDIX V - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Christopher Borgeson, Senior Program Manager 

Adriel Harari, Auditor-in-Charge 

Ahmad Fawad, Program Analyst 

Margaret Tiernan, Program Analyst 
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This performance audit was conducted 

under project code SIGAR-107A.
Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

Public Affairs

SIGAR’s Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate 

and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to: 

 improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

 improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and 

their contractors; 

 improve contracting and contract management 

processes; 

 prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

 advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. 

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR’s Web 

site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publicly released reports, 

testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site. 

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of 

fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact 

SIGAR’s hotline: 

 Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud 

 Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil 

 Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

 Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303 

 Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

 Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

 U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065 

Public Affairs Officer 

 Phone: 703-545-5974

 Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil 

 Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs 

2530 Crystal Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202