NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 17a0644n.06 

No. 16-3987 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN ROE; JANE ROE, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

 ) ON APPEAL FROM THE 

v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

 ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN 

AMAZON.COM; BARNES & NOBLE ) DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BOOKSELLERS, INCORPORATED; ) 

SMASHWORDS, INC., ) OPINION 

) 

Defendants-Appellees, ) 

 ) 

APPLE INC., et al., ) 

) 

Defendants. 

BEFORE: NORRIS, SUHRHEINRICH, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges. 

 ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs John and Jane Roe sued an individual 

author along with Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., and Smashwords, Inc. (the 

“Corporate Defendants”) over a book that used a picture of the plaintiffs on the cover without 

their permission. The plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the Corporate Defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 
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No. 16-3987

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I. 

In December 2014, Greg McKenna1 authored A Gronking to Remember (“Gronking”) 

and published it under the pseudonym Lacey Noonan. Gronking is a fictional work of erotica and 

satire featuring “the make-believe exploits of a married woman who becomes fascinated with 

New England Patriots football player Rob Gronkowski.” According to plaintiffs, Gronking “is 

less than tasteful and is offensive.” 

To create part of the cover for Gronking, McKenna downloaded a photograph of the 

plaintiffs embracing he found on the internet. This photograph was taken to commemorate the 

plaintiffs’ engagement and was placed on the photographer’s website with the plaintiffs’ 

permission. The plaintiffs did not give McKenna permission to use their photograph and received 

no compensation from him. 

McKenna decided to self-publish Gronking through several online services, including 

Smashwords, Inc., Kindle Direct Publishing (“KDP”), CreateSpace, and NOOK Press. 

Smashwords purports to be the largest distributor of self-published electronic books (“e-books”) 

in the world. KDP and CreateSpace are self-publishing services provided by Amazon.com, Inc., 

to create e-books and books in print. NOOK Press is an e-book platform offered by Barnes 

& Noble, Inc. Smashwords, KDP, CreateSpace, and NOOK Press played no role in creating, 

designing, or editing the cover of Gronking. 

In order to self-publish his book through these companies’ platforms, McKenna had to 

agree to their various terms of service. Smashwords required that McKenna warrant that his book 

did not “violate any right of privacy which is libelous or violate any personal right or other right 

of any kind of any person or entity.” To utilize KDP and CreateSpace, McKenna had to represent 

 

1

 McKenna’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied by the district court and the claims against him are 

still pending. He is not a party to this appeal. [Page ID 993-98.] 
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No. 16-3987

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to Amazon that he had all the necessary legal rights to his book, including the cover. McKenna 

had to make similar representations to Barnes & Noble. McKenna acknowledged making these 

warranties and representations to the Corporate Defendants. 

Gronking received media coverage in connection with Gronkowski’s participation in the 

2015 Super Bowl. The cover of Gronking, which included the plaintiffs’ photograph, was 

displayed on The Tonight Show, Jimmy Kimmel Live, and at media day for the Super Bowl. The 

attention given to the book by the national media appears to be how the plaintiffs became aware 

that their picture was used on the cover of Gronking. 

Following this media exposure, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Corporate 

Defendants and McKenna in the Common Pleas Court of Miami County, Ohio, which was later 

removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio based on diversity 

of citizenship jurisdiction. McKenna filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the 

Corporate Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied 

McKenna’s motion but granted summary judgment in favor of the Corporate Defendants. Roe v. 

Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1035, 1040 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 

This appeal followed. 

II. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d 592, 

595 (6th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts consider the evidence and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The focus of the summary judgment inquiry is whether 
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No. 16-3987

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the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element of its case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of 

evidence in support of plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which 

the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

252 (1986). 

In its opinion, the district court emphasized the difference between “publishers” and 

“distributors,” holding that the Corporate Defendants were distributors broadly protected by the 

First Amendment because their self-publishing services were the “next logical step after the 

photocopier.” Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 1038-40. The district court held that “[s]tates may 

not impose criminal or civil liability against booksellers or other distributors for distribution 

where the distributor neither knew nor had any reason to know of alleged wrongdoing pertaining 

to specific content.” Id. at 1040 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959)). We 

question the district court’s First Amendment analysis. However, because the record cannot 

support a finding of liability on the part of the Corporate Defendants, the grant of summary 

judgment was proper and we not address that issue. 

In their complaint, plaintiffs assert three claims against the defendants: wrongful 

appropriation of their persona in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2741 (right of publicity), 

invasion of privacy by means of appropriation (common-law right of publicity), and the privacy 

tort of false light. 

Under Ohio’s right of publicity statute, “a person shall not use any aspect of an 

individual’s persona for a commercial purpose.” See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.02(A). 

Persona means “an individual’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, or 

distinctive appearance, if any of these aspects have commercial value.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
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§ 2741.01(A) (emphasis added). While plaintiffs need not be national celebrities to assert a right 

of publicity claim, they must at least “demonstrate that there is value in associating an item of 

commerce with [their] identity.” Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th 

Cir. 2000); see also McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the 

right of publicity is worthless without association). 

Similarly, a defendant is subject to liability under the Ohio common-law right of 

publicity tort when he “appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another.” 

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 1 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev’d on 

other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Again, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their name or 

likeness has value, Id. at 458 n.4; see also James v. Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 119, 123 

(Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to 

the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other value associated with the name or the likeness 

that the right of privacy is invaded.”). The mere incidental use of a person’s name or likeness is 

not actionable in an appropriation claim. Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 591 N.E.2d 793, 794 (Ohio Ct. 

App. 1990) (per curiam). 

Finally, while it is questionable whether the Roes alleged a false light invasion of privacy 

tort under Ohio law, we will assume that they did so for purposes of this appeal. Under false 

light, “one who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the 

public in a false light” is liable if “(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be 

highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 

disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be 

placed.” Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Ohio 2007). 
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After a careful review of the record, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiffs, we conclude that the plaintiffs have not offered any facts to support a finding of 

liability on the part of the Corporate Defendants. The Roes do not argue, and there is no 

summary judgment evidence in the record to suggest, that there was any commercial value in 

associating their likeness with the Corporate Defendants. At most, plaintiffs attempted to show 

that the association between the Roes’ image and the Corporate Defendants is incidental, which 

is not enough. Vinci, 591 N.E.2d at 794. Further, plaintiffs have offered no summary judgment 

evidence tending to show that the Corporate Defendants knew or had reason to know that 

McKenna was using their photograph without permission. Plaintiffs contend that the Corporate 

Defendants should have inquired as to whether McKenna owned the rights to the photo. But they 

did. In one form or another, each of the Corporate Defendants required that McKenna represent 

and warrant that his book did not violate the legal rights of others. Therefore, a jury could not 

reasonably find liability, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. 

III. 

For the reasons above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.