This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6

STATE OF NEW MEXICO , 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 28,481 9 JOHN RAMIREZ , 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Albert S. “Pat” Murdoch, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 19 Will O’Connell, Assistan t Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellant 222 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 ROBLES, Judge. 2 John Ramirez (Defendant) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to 3 suppress. Defendant assert s protection under both the fe deral and state constitutions 4 and argues that a police officer, investigating a parking violation, may not further 5 detain an individual by requesting a licenseand registration and, in doing so, results 6 in an unconstitutional detention, which must result in the suppression of the evidence. 7 In doing so, Defendant asks this Court to make a distinction between how we treat 8 parking violations and moving violations. We conclude that our law does not support 9 such a distinction. Furthermore, applying our seizure analysis, we conclude that there 10 was nothing unlawful about Defendant’s stop. Defendant does not explain how our 11 analysis of the New Mexico Constitution should be different than its federal 12 counterpart. Because of the limited manner in which Defendant addresses this 13 argument and our duty to resist making arguments for parties, we decline to discuss 14 any possible distinctions between the tw o formative documents. Accordingly, we 15 affirm. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the only witness presented was 18 Officer Andrew Feist, who testified as fo llows. On March 17, 2006, Officer Feist was 193 on routine mountain bike patrol when he no ticed Defendant’s illegally parked vehicle. 1 The vehicle was not running and was double- parked in a handicapped space, blocking 2 the handicapped ramp. The officer began talki ng with an individual in the vicinity and 3 inquired whether he was the owner of the illegally parkedvehicle, “at which time[,] 4 he told me he was not.” As the officer was talking with the individual, the officer 5 “heard car doors slam and the engine . . . start up.” 6 Officer Feist returned to the vehicle and saw Defendant in the driver’s seat with 7 another individual in the passenger’s seat. The officer identified himself and asked 8 Defendant whether he had a handicap parking placard, to which Defendant replied he 9 did not. It was then that the officer aske d Defendant for his li cense and registration, 10 so that he could write him a citation. As Defendant leaned towards the glove 11 compartment, the officer “leaned into the vehicle and looked straight down into the 12 driver’s door [but without placing his] head inside the vehicle, just directly alongside, 13 to look down there.” In the armrest of th e door, there was “a clear plastic baggie that 14 contained a brown substance that, through [the officer’s] training and experience, was 15 consistent with heroin. Alongside of that , there was a one-dollar bill that was rolled 16 up and had both ends of it burnt.” The offi cer stated “[t]hat [a one-dollar bill] is 17 commonly used in the smoking of a narcotic.” 184 As a result of this discovery, Defendant was arrested. Officer Feist testified 1 further that his reason for attempting to make contact with the owner of the illegally 2 parked vehicle was to see whether the owner had a handicap placard, or to see if there 3 was some kind of emergency which would justify the vehi cle being parked as it was. 4 The district court denied the motion to s uppress, and Defendant entered a conditional 5 plea to possession of heroin, reserving his rightto appeal the district court’s denial, 6 and was sentenced to eighteen months of supervised probation. 7 II. DISCUSSION 8 “The standard of reviewfor suppression rulings is whether the law was 9 correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the 10 prevailing party.” State v. Jason L ., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 11 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will adopt an interpretation 12 of the factual background that is “most favorab le to the prevailing party, as long as the 13 facts are supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Vandenberg , 2003-NMSC-030, 14 ¶ 18, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. It is “[a]gainst [the] factual backdrop [that] we 15 evaluate de novo the reasonableness of the conduct of law en forcement officers, 16 considering the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Gutierrez , 2008-NMCA-015, 17 ¶ 4, 143 N.M. 522, 177 P.3d 1096 (filed 2007). 185 A. Request for Driver’s Information 1 Defendant argues that a parking violation is different from a moving violation. 2 Defendant also argues that because a parki ng ticket can be issued without examining 3 a driver’s license or registration, OfficerFeist’s request for such documentation was 4 not constitutional. 5 New Mexico cases have previously heldthat following a lawful stop, a police 6 officer may ask a driver for their driving documentation. State v. Reynolds , 119 N.M. 7 383, 386, 388, 890 P.2d 1315, 1318, 1320 (1995) (noting that individuals have little 8 privacy interests in public doc umentation and stating that “[i]f a driver invites the 9 attention of a police officer by engaging in unsafe driving conduct, or whenever an 10 officer is reasonably called upon to make contact with a driver . . . , the officer has the 11 right to know with whom he is talking and may check to see that the driver is both 12 licensed and driving a car that is registered and insured”); State v. Rubio , 13 2006-NMCA-067, ¶ 13, 139 N.M. 612, 136 P.3d 1022 (following a lawful vehicle 14 stop, a request for documents in connectio n with the stop does not violate state or 15 federal constitutions). “Following a valid stop, for a traffic violation, an officer may 16 lawfully continue with a de minimis dete ntion for inquiry into matters reasonably 17 related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop and to check out license, 18 registration, and insurance.” State v. Affsprung , 2004-NMCA-038, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 196 306, 87 P.3d 1088. This applies to situ ations involving both moving and non-moving 1 vehicles. State v. Williams , 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 16, 139 N.M. 578, 136 P.3d 579. 2 Our statutory scheme does not distinguish between parking and moving 3 violations in this regard. NMSA 1978, Section 66- 7-352.5(A)-(B) (2007) makes it 4 unlawful to park a vehicle in a space reserv ed for persons with mobility impairment, 5 or to park in such a manner so as to bl ock access to any part of a curb designed for 6 access by persons with mobility impairment. This provision is included as part of the 7 traffic code, and law enforcement personne l are allowed to issue citations for 8 violations of this section. NMSA 1978, § 66-7-352.6(A) (2006). The traffic laws laid 9 out in Chapter 66, Article 7 relate to the operation of vehicles “upon highways, except 10 where a different place is specifically referred to in a given s ection.” NMSA 1978, 11 § 66-7-2(A) (2001). Immediately following that language, Section 66-7-352.5 is 12 specifically identified as one of the excep tions that shall apply “throughout the state” 13 and not just on highways. § 66-7-2(B). Th erefore, the particular type of illegal 14 parking addressed by Section 66-7-352.5 is a violation of the traffic code. Our 15 statutes command obedience to the traffic laws located throughout Article 7 of 16 Chapter 66 and makes it a misdemeanor for an individual todo one of the enumerated 17 forbidden acts or fail to perform a required act. NMSA 1978, § 66-7-3 (1978). 18 Finally, drivers are required to carry their licenses while operating a motor vehicle and 197 to produce them upon demand by an officer. See NMSA 1978, § 66-5-16 (1985); 1 Williams , 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 15 (concluding that anindividual sitting in the driver’s 2 seat of a parked vehicle is a driverand operator under New Mexico law). We 3 therefore conclude that the statutory frame work, combined with our existing case law, 4 allows police officers to obtain drivers’ information following a lawful stop or 5 detention. 6 B. Seizure 7 The State concedes that Defendant was seized. The Fourth Amendment 8 protects citizens from unreasonable seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Williams , 9 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 8. We use a two-part te st to determine whether a traffic stop or 10 an investigatory stop was reasonable. Id . ¶¶ 3, 16, 19, 22 (using th e two-part test after 11 concluding that the defendant was seized to determine whether a police officer 12 lawfully interacted with a driver of a legally parked car when he asked the driver for 13 his license). The test contemplates “wheth er the officer’s action was justified at its 14 inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 15 justified the interference in the first place

. ” Reynolds , 119 N.M. at 385, 890 P.2d at 16 1317 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Within the first inquiry, a 17 seizure of a citizen is allowed if it is supported by the exis tence of reasonable 18 suspicion. Gutierrez , 2008-NMCA-015, ¶ 11. Reasonable suspicion consists of 198 specific articulable facts that objectivel y would give the reasonable person the 1 inference that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed. Id . However, the 2 reasonableness aspect is judged by focusi ng on the government’s interest in the 3 intrusion balanced against the citizen’s cons titutional interest in being free of such an 4 intrusion. Reynolds , 119 N.M. at 385, 890 P.2d at 1317; Williams , 2006-NMCA-062, 5 ¶ 8. 6 Our cases have previously held that individuals may be legally stopped if a 7 police officer has a reasonable suspicion th at the person in question has violated a 8 traffic law. Affsprung , 2004-NMCA-038, ¶ 9. In Williams , this Court concluded that 9 seizure analysis should be used whether a vehicle was moving or not moving at the 10 beginning of the police-citizen interacti on. 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 16. We noted that 11 holding otherwise would offer more or le ss constitutional protections to a citizen, 12 depending on whether the vehicle they were in was in motion. Id . ¶ 17. 13 Just because a parking ticket may be written without communicating with a 14 driver or examining a driver’s license, does not mean that it is the only way to issue 15 such a citation. In the inst ant case, Officer Feist testifie d that he observed a vehicle 16 illegally parked, and his initial reason for approaching Defendant was the parking 17 violation. Cf. ¶¶ 8, 25 (noting that the police offi cer had no articulable facts that the 18 defendant was or was about tobe engaged in criminal activity, and that the officer 199 observed no traffic violation when he appro ached a legally parked vehicle and asked 1 the person sitting in the driver’s seat for his license). We therefore conclude that the 2 officer had sufficiently specific articulablefacts particular to the situation that 3 Defendant had broken a law. Once it was concluded that Defendant did not have a 4 legitimate reason for double-parking and parking in a handicapped space, blocking the 5 handicapped ramp, the officer could lawfu lly prevent Defendant from leaving the 6 scene in order to give him a parki ng ticket and not offend the constitution by 7 requesting Defendant’s li cense and registration. 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 We affirm Defendant’s convic tion for possession of heroin. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

_______________________________ 12 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 13

I CONCUR: 14

______________________________ 15 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 16

TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge (specially concurring) 1710 GARCIA, Judge (specially concurring). 1 I write to specially concur in this deci sion because Office Feist testified that he 2 used the request for Defendant to providehis license and registration documents as 3 an opportunity to lean in and look into th e driver’s compartment of the vehicle while 4 Defendant was retrieving the requested documentation. See State v. Prince , 2004- 5 NMCA-127, ¶¶ 10-11, 136 N.M. 521, 101 P.3d 332 (recognizing that an expansion 6 of the scope of an initial traffic stop requires an articulation of specific and 7 particularized facts to establish a reasonable belief that defendant has drugs in his 8 possession). Defendant and the district court did notfollow up with additional 9 questions about this interesting maneuver by Officer Feist at the suppression hearing. 10 I cannot avoid commenting on the pretextualnature of this maneuver even though I 11 recognize that our plain view doctrine might apply to this situation. 12 Additional questioning was needed todevelop the unknown reasons behind 13 Officer Feist’s intentional maneuver to peer inside the driv er compartment while 14 Defendant was instructed to retrieve his documents on the other side of the vehicle. 15 The Fourth Amendment could be implicatedif the purpose of the stop changed when 16 Officer Feist reached the driver’s window and had visual contact with Defendant. At 17 this point, Office Feist’s instincts and susp icions may have transformed the stop into 18 an investigation detention to pursue new su spicions or hunches re garding narcotics or 1911 other activities by Defendant or his passenger. His instru ction that kept Defendant 1 busy in the glove compartment while he immediately repositioned himself to peer 2 down into every area of the driver’s compartment suggest that something raised new 3 suspicions for the officer. Officer Feist’s failure to follow through with the traffic 4 citation only heightens my concern regarding his intentions once he reached the 5 vehicle. Without further development of this issue below, however, we cannot 6 address these concerns further. I theref ore concur based upon the record before us. 7

___________________________________ 8 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 9