In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

IN THE MATTER OF:

STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,

Debtor. 

APPEALS OF:

WENDY ALISON NORA

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora appeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages 

and costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an 

order suspending her from the practice of law in the Western 

District of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not 

Nora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re 
2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

Disciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);

In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 

1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778 

F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against 

Nora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be 

her last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and unprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district 

court’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice 

and legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the suspension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora. 

I. Background 

Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these appeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court system, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court, 

and two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the 

procedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals, 

we detail it below. 

A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action 

Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006, 

taking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note. 

The Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity controlled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in 

Dane County Circuit Court in 2010.1 

Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In 

response, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery 

that they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce 

 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Association for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 

2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this 

opinion refers to appellee as HSBC. 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3

its note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded 

HSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank 

USA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (unpublished table decision). 

B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions 

Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wisconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended 

the Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure 

judgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 

(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone 

HSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy 

proceedings remained pending in federal court. 

Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that 

proposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage 

payments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court 

conducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity entitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated 

its claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts. 

 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s 

emergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition 

for Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Motion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules 

at ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr. 

3, 2016), ECF No. 9. 
4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it 

rejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the 

case without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court concluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all 

the earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which 

could be made and was made in the state foreclosure action, 

in the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on 

Chapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-

10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bankruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913 

F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the 

plan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the creditor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on 

behalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing 

HSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of 

fraud on the court. 

Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven 

Lisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on 

behalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the 

Lisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order, 

HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016). 

Nora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar 

to the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven 

Lisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of 

good faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay 

the final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action. 

HSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay. 

Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming 

HSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were frivolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrating the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5

Noncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf 

(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy 

court rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re 

Sondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017) 

(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the automatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment precluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged. 

After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to 

the district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra 

Lisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the 

district court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed 

(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review 

with the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment. 

Petition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 

(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017). 

C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court 

Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a 

document accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal 

crimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157. 

Next, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conventionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evidence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora 

moved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief, 

citing HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory” 

record designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary 

reversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpetrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents. 

Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s appeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23, 
6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This 

prompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline 

for Nora’s opening brief on the merits. 

Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing 

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, 

et seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a 

leave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepticism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous 

and dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on 

the merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted 

a three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 

3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did, 

however, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted 

to Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.” 

Id. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for 

other clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4

The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the 

Lisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC 

 

3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA violations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her 

deadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D. 

Wis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wisconsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or 

maliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 

909 N.W.2d at 164. 

4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,

e.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time 

that she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigating, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”). 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7

Bank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (unpublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017, 

HSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane 

County Circuit Court. 

With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5, 

2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017 

WL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclusive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated 

Nora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided 

HSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed 

Chapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded 

the “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit 

and was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the district court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse 

v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL 

840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion 

provided “no basis ... to reconsider its decision”). Sondra 

Lisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court. 

After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the 

eve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses returned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of motions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before 

 

5 It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.

BANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.

6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a motion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]” 

the Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for 

“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and confirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains 

pending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.). 
8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

her opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay 

pending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The 

district court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding 

“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable 

foreclosure through every legal artifice available both in state 

and federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 

3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46. 

Characterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly 

seek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure 

action] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court 

brought separately by husband and wife,” the district court 

stated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent 

efforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy 

appeal further. 

The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora 

moved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more 

than 16 months after she filed it. 

D. Sanctions in the District Court 

The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it 

did not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the 

district court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should 

not be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, appeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc 

(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora 

asked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleging that the order violated due process and that the district 

court had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The 

district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9

judge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, District Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7 

Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an answer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack 

of notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge 

Conley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the 

constitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to 

participate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page 

“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to 

show cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,” 

objecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the 

court could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceedings. 

The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show 

cause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It 

grouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inappropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litigation conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for 

lengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals 

then failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order 

at 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. 

Wis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s 

advocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too 

many times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11. 

The district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from 

appearing in new matters in the Western District for six 

 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a 

good-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage 

Nora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3, 

Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018), 

ECF No. 88. 
10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

months, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora 

submitted another improper filing. Id. 

Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs 

and attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 

U.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the district court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally 

liable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC 

Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018), 

ECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the 

suspended fine discussed above. 

About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued 

a decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for conduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law license for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against 

Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D. 

Wis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice 

in the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was restored. 

E. Appeals in this Court 

Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her individual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30, 

 8 Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, possesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name. 

Martinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016). 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11

2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora 

instead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We 

pushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when 

that date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension 

motion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to 

September 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening 

brief late. 

Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests 

for Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of 

various documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition 

transcripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s 

requests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as motions judge) published an opinion explaining why the 

requests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 

905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose 

judicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief. 

... There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the 

attention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”). 

When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike 

portions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued 

HSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure 

action and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which 

 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension 

“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made 

to appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did 

not exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been, 

known earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and 

extending time). 

10 Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days, 

and before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for 

two more days. 
12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

had been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impossible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court 

to stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The 

court denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her 

by docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although 

our order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for 

further time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the 

next day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the 

court “to restore her full word count limitation ... and to allow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief ... .” Motion 

for Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order 

at 11. We denied that motion too. 

After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for 

damages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s 

appeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the motion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against 

HSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives, 

Nora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this 

court denied again. 

II. Discussion 

Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court, 

although her briefs meld them together. First, Nora challenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order 

holding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to 

HSBC for $1,837.50 under FED.R.BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order suspending her from practice in the Western District of 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13

Wisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on 

appeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she 

should have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of 

HSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve 

HSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED.R.

APP. P. 38. 

A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order 

A district court may “award just damages and single or 

double costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivolous. FED.R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western 

Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power 

to sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is 

frivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s 

argument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst., 

732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill. 

Nat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)). 

Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable 

for “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation 

conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanctions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635 

 11 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20, 

2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force 

should Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District. 

12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear 

that district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bankruptcy appeals that FED.R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED.R. BANKR.

P. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recognizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with 

frivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts, 

bankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”). 
14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

F.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P. 

8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018) 

(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 

Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 

the district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing 

a monetary sanction on Nora. 

1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P. 

8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous. 

The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of 

thwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That 

conclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584, 

588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion 

when its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle 

or a clearly erroneous factual finding). 

Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating 

the debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a 

debtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts 

for repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON, 

BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central 

thesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate 

future income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER 

ON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer 

eds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by 

the requirement that the debtor begin making payments to 

the trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan, 

even before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The 

basic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his 

creditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913 

F.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15

428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter 

13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from 

harassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”). 

A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for 

cause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C. 

§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992); 

8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C. 

§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good 

faith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s historical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard 

prevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful 

purposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed 

his petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed 

only when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on 

the totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re 

Smith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending 

home foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although 

Chapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mortgage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it 

expressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his 

principal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON 

BANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus, 

may use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on 

his mortgage through regular payments to the lender, preventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings 

Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993). 

But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the 

bankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was 
16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

not to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, instead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora suggested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust 

account (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency 

[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for 

the determination of the identity of the real party in interest 

entitled to the payment or proceeds ... .” Such an effort to 

relitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in statecourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter 

13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter 

13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise 

nondischargeable income tax debt ... was not one of the intended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. ... [T]he bankruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erroneous.”). 

In the district court, Nora never presented any argument 

about why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination 

was clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief 

on the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in 

the district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d 

754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not 

even try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no prospect of success.”). 

Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a 

forgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous. 

This only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that 

Nora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather 

than to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy 

HSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously informed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal 

courts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’ 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17

defenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential 

Funding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleging that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding allowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state 

court, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to 

review and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of 

her property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246 

F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously explained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);

Spencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at 

*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the 

validity of endorsements and notes in state court but that 

“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing 

in the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498 

B.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s 

alleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that defendant Bank of America is now asserting ... Many other 

courts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a 

litigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subsequent case.”). 

Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly 

attacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter 

13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She similarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction 

her due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on 

both counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established 

HSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure 

judgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point 

to object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a) 

(providing that any “party in interest may object to 
18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

confirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a 

“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter 

11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress 

adopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giving the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a 

plan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant 

to the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery, 

until the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment, 

HSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.

Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to 

challenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court decided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss 

the petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re 

Terry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307, 

a court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own motion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993) 

(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C. 

§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (suggesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power 

to dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that argument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones 

Lang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting 

arguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to adequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without citing any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G. 

Skinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845 

F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped 

arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by legal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—

amidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate 

an appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding 

sanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19

arguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classified that way). 

Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment 

in bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud accusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852 

F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits 

federal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a 

state-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora believed she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state 

courts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments. 

WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judgments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l 

Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to 

state court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay, 

there was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case 

rather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676 

(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own 

integrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disappointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13 

 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misunderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting 

that Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such 

that Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “appeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in 

this case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates. 
20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28

U.S.C. § 1927. 

Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who 

“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 

vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith 

is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanctions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc., 

861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objective bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably 

careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v. 

BSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial 

judges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation conduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927 

power. Id.

Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how 

this litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally 

delaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position. 

Nora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven 

Lisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts 

in her brief, her strategy worked: 

The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court] 

concludes that attorneys’ fees should be 

awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby 

the Lisses have maintained possession of their 

home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have 

remained in possession of their home for over 

eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure 

began and they are still in possession of their 

home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21

that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inevitable.” 

Appellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17, 

ECF No. 24. 

Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litigation ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another jurisdiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The 

Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of 

the briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious 

litigation. ... We can think of no other reason for this [mortgagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obstinancy.”). 

The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only 

by the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive 

merit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the 

plan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for 

Sondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial 

proceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment 

HSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with 

HSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably 

careful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity 

with bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of 

conduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr 

v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit 

is not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in 

merit ... that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to 

harass.”). 

Nora then compounded the delays caused by these meritless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute motions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in 
22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

Steven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three motions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a 

16-month delay before the district court refused any further 

extensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss 

the appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation behavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objective bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion. 

B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice 

In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against 

both Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two district court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora. 

First, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500 

and suspended her right to practice in the Western District for 

six months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora committed another violation. 

Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 

suspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on 

April 13, 2018, the district court issued another order suspending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR 

83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal discipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits 

the attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [district court’s] discipline.” 

Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018 

disciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order 

awarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.

P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an independent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23

currently prohibited from practice in the Western District as 

reciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14

Nora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline. 

District courts are permitted to rely on state-court disciplinary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before 

them. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case 

shows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline automatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to challenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the 

procedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate federal hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486 

(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to statecourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th 

Cir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a 

due process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some 

other grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled 

to the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the 

onus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify 

or vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources diverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court proceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15 

 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its 

March 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct 

in this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect 

should Nora be reinstated. 

15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R. 

46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018, 

this court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed 

to demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No. 

D-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018). 
24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court 

warrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent authority to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstanding and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985); 

see also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.) 

(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all 

Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and 

for the respectability of the profession”). 

Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings 

by a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to 

postpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings. 

Nora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aberration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650, 

654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and 

we are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. ... [W]e 

suspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to 

gum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home 

Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1 

(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals appeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted 

state court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for 

this conduct before, but apparently she has not received the 

message that it will not be tolerated. 

Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her 

treatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censurable. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by 

name) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as 

well as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim. 

She repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appellants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25

Bank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge 

and court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts, 

the district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel 

against her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable 

civil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and federal criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp, 

2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora contends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false 

findings on the public record in order to support the falsely 

made allegations against her former client ... to make false 

findings of fact concerning matters which had never been adjudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”); 

In re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D. 

Wis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13 

clearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief 

from stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and accused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”). 

Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud 

by opposing counsel and court officials demean the profession and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.

In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical 

standards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.

STANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other 

Counsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad 

motives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the 

profession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impropriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment. 

Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process 

through frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofessional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension 

of her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was 
26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

entitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter. 

Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no 

fault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from 

practice in the Western District of Wisconsin. 

C. Further Appellate Sanctions 

We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for additional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal 

frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary 

and appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to 

harass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389 

(7th Cir. 2017). 

Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she 

pressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court 

concluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora previously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a 

litigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no reasonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, harassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That 

aptly describes Nora’s present appeals. 

Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous, 

she also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice before this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our 

ruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we 

denied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivolous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four 

separate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging 

this court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these requests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why 
Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27

they were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905 

F.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018). 

We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant 

HSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested 

$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion. 

Although such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not submitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support 

them. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to 

“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the 

damages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843 

F.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanctions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its damages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting 

of their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days. 

For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a 

separately filed motion” in compliance with FED.R. APP. P. 38, 

we deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees. 

Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against 

Nora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings” 

by Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but 

suspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora submits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667. 

Given Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the suspension of our previous monetary sanction. 

III. Conclusion 

Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsibly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886 

F.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible 

counselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle 

is lost and advising the client how to best handle that 
28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 

outcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory 

tactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing 

counsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal 

courts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of acceptable conduct for attorneys in this circuit. 

For these reasons, we order as follows: 

1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March 

22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora 

jointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED; 

2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March 

20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison 

Nora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District 

Courts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an 

additional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED; 

3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.

APP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an 

accounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these 

appeals within 15 days; 

4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and 

Costs of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is 

DENIED; and 

5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction imposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a 

check payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60 

days of the date of this opinion. 

The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH 

SANCTIONS.