The Alaska Earthqua;ke 

March 27, 1964 . ·· 

Investigations and Reconstruction 

~ 

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GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 541 
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THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, 

MARCH 27, 1964: 

FIELD INVESTIGATIONS AND 

RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT 
.lerial vie\>-, looking east, of part of !Jhrnagain Heights slide, Anchorage, shortly after earthquake. 
The Alaska Earthquake 

March 27,1964: 

Field Investigations and 

Reconstruction Effort 

By WALLACE R. HANSEN, EDWIN B. ECKEL, WILLIAM E. SCHAEM, 

ROBERT E. LYLE, WARREN GEORGE, AND GENIE CHANCE 

An introduction to the story of a great earthquake-its geologic setting and effects, the 

field investigations, and the public and 

private reconstruction efforts 

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 541 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

STEWART L. UDALL, Secretary 

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

William T. Pecora, Director 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1966 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
FOREWORD 

In the lab afternoon of Friday, March 27, 1964, one of 

the most violent earthquakes of tall time mked southern 

Alaska. Suddenly 114 people were killed, thousands were 

left homeless, more than 50,000 square miles of the State 

was tilted to new altitudes, and the resulting property damage disrupted the State's economy. 

The response to alleviate the effects of the disaster was 

immediate. The military forces in Alaska rushed to the 

aid of the civilian community, providing emergency communications, food, water, and housing. Within 24 hours 

bhe U.S. Geological Survey had a team of three geologists 

in Alaska to begin a reconnaissance survey, and they were 

but the vanguard of many who arrived to conduct scientific 

and engineering investigations and to advise on the reconstruction effort. The day after the earthquake the President 

declared Alaska to be a major disaster area and a wide 

range of relief hnd reconstruction work began, much 'of it 

sponsored by the Office of Emergency Planning. The Corps 

of Engineers was given responsibility for large parts of 

the reconstruction effort. Within a week the President by 

Executive Order established the Federal Reconstruction 

and Development Planning Commission for Alaska to 

coordin'ate the efforts of many Federal agencies; task forces 

and field teams moved into action. 

At the time of the disaster it was difficult to envision 

any good proceeding from it, but the unprecedented cooperative efforts of many agencies and institutions, federal, 

state, land private, and many individuals have en'abled the 

State to recover in large measure and even to move forward. This volume contains the story of the earthquake 

and the succeeding field investigations and reconstruction 

efforts in which the Geological Survey is proud to have 

taken part. 

W. T. PECORA: 

Director. 
Photograph credits : 

U.S. Army: frontispiece, figures 16, 25, 27, 33, 34, 41, 43, 45-59. 

U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs: figures 60-66. 

George Plafker: figures 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 31, 32, 56, 37. 

J. E. Salter, courtesy of Arctic Institute of North America: figure 6. 

M. G. Bonilla : figures 7,22,24,30. 

H. W. Coulter : figure 12. 

Arthur Grantz : figures 19, 20. 

Reuben Kachadoorian: figures 26, 29. 

W. R. Haasen : figures 21, 28. 

U.S. Navy: figure 35. 

C. D. Weingaard: figure 38. 

Genie Chance : figures 65-67. 
CONTENTS 

FOREWORD, by W. T. Pecora. 

A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF 

THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE-ITS 

SETTING AND EFFECTS, by 

Wallace R. Hansen and Edwin 

B. Eckel---_-_------------- 

Introduction- _ - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Time and magnitude -----_- 

Epicenter- - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - 

Duration and extent ------- 

Aftershocks- - - _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - 

Previous Alaskan earthquakes----_----_------- 

Physiographic and geologic 

setting of the earthquakeAlaska-Aleutian Province - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - 

Aleutian Range- - - 

Alaska Range- - - - _ 

Coastal Trough Province - - - - - - e - - - _ - - - - 

Cook InlebSusitna 

Lowland- - - - - _ _ 

Talkeetna Mountains- - - - - - - _ _ - - 

Copper River Lowland- - - - - - - _ _ - - 

Wrangell Mountains-- - - - - - - - - - Pacific Border Ranges 

province- - - - - - - - - - - 

Kodiak MountainsKenai - Chugach 

Mountains- - - - - 

Gulf of Alaska 

coastal section- - 

St. Elias Mountains 

and Fairweather 

Range- - - - - - - - - 

Tectonic effects- -- -------- 

Effects on communities- - - - Damage to transportation 

facilities- --- - - - - _ - - - - - - - 

The Alaska Railroad. - - 

Highways- - - - - _ - - _ _ _ - 

Airports-- - - - _ - - - - - - - - 

Ports and harbors- _ _ - - 

Atmospheric effects --__ _ _ -- 

Possible magnetic effects- - - 

Biologic effects- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE 

ALASKA EARTHQUAKE-Con. 

Damage outside Alaska- _ _ _ 

INVESTIGATIONS BY THEGEOLOGICAL SURVEY, by Wallace 

R.Hansen_____-____--_----- 

THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC 

AND ENGINEERING TASK 

FORCE-EARTH SCIENCE APPLIED TO POLICY DEClSIONS IN 

EARLY RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION, by Edwin B. Eckel 

and William E. Schaem --_-__ 

Introduction-- - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ 

Immediate response of the 

Federal Government-- _ _ - 

Federal Reconstruction and 

Development Planning 

Commission for Alaska- - _ Makeup and functionsDuties and accomplishments- - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ Estimates of damage-----------_ 

Special legislation - 

Reconstruction 

plans and scheduling- - - - - - - - - - 

Long-range economic planningFederal financial assisb 

ance- - - - - _ - - - - - - - - _ Termination of the 

Commission- - - - - - - - 

Scientific and Engineenhg 

Task Force and its Field 

Team- - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - 

History and objectivesActivities and methodsBoundaries of activities- - - - - - - - _ _ - - - _ - 

Task Force recommendations- - _ _ _ - - _ - 

Anchorage- - - - _ _ _ _ 

Homer- - - - _ - - _ _ _ - 

Seward- - - - - - - - _ - _ Kodiakand ValdezReactions of Federal 

agencies and local 

officials - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ 

Public relations- - - ____ 

Page 

36 

38 

46 

46 

46 

47 

47 

48 

48 

49 

49 

50 

50 

5 1 

5 1 

5 1 

53 

54 

57 

57 

61 

63 

64 

65 

65 

THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC 

AND ENGINEERING TASK 

FORCE-CO~~~~U~~ 

Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force and its Field 

Team-Continued 

Evaluation of Task 

Force effort -__------ 

ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS OF ENOINEERS--CLEANUP AND EARLY 

RECONSTRUCTION, by Robert 

E. Lyle andwarren George-- - 

Introduction- -- _ - - - - _ _ _ - _ - 

Damage surveys- - - - __ - - -- Cleanup and restoration_-- - Anchorage- - _ - _ - - - _ - _ - 

Seward- - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - Valdez - - - - _ - - _ _ _ - _ - - - 

Cordova - - - - - - - - - _ - - - 

Homer- - - - _ - - _ - _ - _ -. - 

Seldovia- - - _ - - - _ - _ - - - - 

Whittier- - _ - - - - - - - - - - 

Other communities- - - - 

RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS 

OF ENGINEERS-METHODS AND 

ACCOMPLISHMENTS, by Warren 

George and Robert E. Lyle--- 

Introduction-- - - - - _ - _ - _ - - - 

Anchorage. -. - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - 

Seward.--------_--_------ 

Valdez - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - - - - - 

Cordova- - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - 

Seldovb. _ - - _ - - - - - - - _ - - - - - 

Homer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Other communities- - -- _ _- -

THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION, by Genie Chance ---- ..-- Introduction- _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - 

Seward--.--_------------- 

Homer_--_-_-_____-___--- 

Kodiak - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Native villages--- - - - - - - -- 

Cordova - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Valdez------------------- 

Whittier- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Girdwood- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Anchorage..----------..--- 

The Federal Government 

aids the people of AlaskaSELECTED REFERENCES- --. . - - - - 

Page 

68 

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79 

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ILLUSTRATIONS 

FIGURES 

Page Page 

34 

35 

41 

Frontispiece. Aerial view of part 

of Turnagain Heights slide, Anchorage, shortly after earthquake. 

1. Physiographic setting of 

south-central Alaska2. Earthquake belts of the 

17. Scarp at the subsidence 

trough of the Fourth 

Avenue slide, Anchor36. Uplifted sea floor at 

Cape Clear, Montague 

Island- - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - 

37. Tectonically elevated 

shoreline of Latouche 

Island- _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - 

38. U.S. Geological Survey 

research vessel Don J. 

Miller - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - 39. Map of high- and nominal-risk portions of 

Anchorage and vicinity----------------- 

40. Map showing classification of earthquake 

risk areas, Anchorageage- _ - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - 

18. Damage to 1200 L Street 

apartment building in 

Anchorage- _ - - - - - - - - world- - - _ - _ _ - .. - _ _ _ _ 

3. Epicenters of major 

Alaskan earthquakes4. Major physiographic divisions of Alaska- -- - - 

5. Rock avalanche on Surprise Glacier- _ _ _ _--- 

6. Debris flow on Upper 

Miles Glacier ---- -_-- 

7. Clastic dikes intruded 

into near-surface sediments and overlying 

19. Alaska Sales and Service Building, Anchorage _ - - - - - - - _ - _ - - - - - 

20. Store building in Anchorage--_---_------ 

21. Toe of Turnagain 

Heights landslide exposed at low tide- - - - 

22. Wooden fence at toe of 

L Street slide, Anchorage_--____-_____ 

41. Aerial view of damage in 

Anchorage - - _ - _ - - - - - 

42. Map showing land classification, Homer and 

vicinity- _ - _ - - - - - - - - - 

43. Inundation of Homer 

snow and ice- _ - 

8. The Hanning Bay fault 

scarp, Montague Is23. Rail and highway net of 

south-central Alaska24. Railroad near head of 

Turnagain Arm--- _ _ - Spit _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - 

44. Map showing high- and 

nominal-risk areas of 

part of Seward- - - -- - 

45. Collapse of Fourth Aveland------.-------..- 

9. Shaded relief map of 

south-central Alaska 

showing epicenter, 

major aftershocks, 

and areas of tectonic 

land-level e - - - 

10. Drowned spruce tr~es on 

25. Railroad yard and warehouse damage at 

Seward.. - - - - - - _ - - - - - 

26. Potter Hill slide, An- nue---------------- 

46. Aerial view of Fourth 

Avenue slide after 

cleanup- - - - - - - - - - - - - 

47. Turnagain Heights landslide before and after 

cleanup- - - - - - - - - - - - - 

48,49. Aerial views of Valdez before and after 

earthquake- - - - - - - - 

50. Partial cleanup of petroleum tank farm 

chorage..---..__-_--_ 

27. Fissure in Seward Highway near Alaska Rail- gravel spit in hrrection Bay -_------- 

11. Uplifted sea flwr at 

Cape Clear, Montague Island, in area 

road station at Portage - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - 

28. Richardson Highway 

near mile 69 -----. --- 

29. Million Dollar Bridge- - 

30. Twentymile River 

Bridge near Turnagain Arm-_ --_----- 

uplift- - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ - 

12. Transverse fissure in 

Valdez at corner of 

McKinley St. and 

Keystone Ave- ------ 

area--. - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

51. Alaska Railroad dock, 

Seward, after cleanup52. Main street of Seldovia-with sandbags 

to keep it from float31. Effects of violent surge 

waves at Whittier---- 13. Breakdown of earth32. Damaged runway at quake damages in 

Alaska- - - - - - - - - - - - - Cordova Airport-- - -. 

33. Fire, wave, and sub- ing-_----_-__------- 

53. Petroleum tank farm at 

Whittier after wave 

14. Remains cd native ellage of Chmega- - - - _ 

15. Damage to railroad 

marine slide damage 

at Whittier ----_---- and fire damage----- 

54. Government Hill slide- - 

55. New dock and harbor at 

Valdez - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - 

56. New school at Valdez - - 

57. New site of Valdez and 

yards wd petroleum 34. Fire and wave damage 

tank farm at Seward- to Seward port facili16. Hinchinbrook Coast 

GW doek raised 35. Vessels washed into 

above all but the heart of Kodiak by 

highest tides- - - - - - _ _ tsunamis- - - - - - - - - - - dock facilities - - - - - - - 

VIII 
Page 

58. New boat basin on 

Homer Spit ---_----- 88 

59. New boat basin at 

Kodiak _------------ 93 

60. Chenega, a native fishing 

village ---_---------- 95 

61. Remains of a native 

village --._---------- 95 

62. Old Harbor, an Aleut 

village ________------ 96 

63. Old Harbor, a year after 

the quake ___-------- 96 

64. New homes at Tatitlek- 97 

Page, 

65. House rehabilitated in 

place, Anchorage _ - - 100 

66. House moved to a safe 

haven, Anchorage--_- 101 

67. House at the toe of the 

L Street slide, Anchorage -- 102 

TABLES 

Page 

1. Summary of earthquake damages to Alaskan communities .................... 19 

2. Summary of estimated damages, August 12, 1964 ........................... 49 

3. Estimated Federal assistance to Alaska after March 27, 1964, earthquake- - - - - - 50 

THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964: MELD INVESTIGATIONS AND 

RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT 

A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE-ITS SETTING 

AND EFFECTS 

By WALLACE R. HANSEN and EDWIN B. ECKEL 

INTRODUCTION 

One of the greatst geotectonic 

events of our time occurred in 

southern Alaska late in the afternoon of March 27, 1964. Beneath 

a leaden sky, the chill of evening 

was just settling over the Alaskan 

countryside. Light snow was falling on some communities. It was 

Good Friday, schools were closed, 

and the business day was ending. 

Suddenly without warning half 

of Alaska was rocked and jarred 

by the most violent earthquake 

to occur in North America this 

century. 

The descriptive summary that 

follows is based on the work of 

many investigators. A large and 

still-growing scientific litemture 

has accumulated since the earthquake, and this literature has been 

freely drawn upon here. In particular, the writers have relied 

upon the findings of their colleagues in the Geological Survey. 

Some of these findings have been 

published, but some are still being 

prepared for publication. Moreover, some field investigations are 

still in progress. 

TIME AND MAGNITUDE 

Seismologic events such as 

earthquakes are normally recorded in the scientific literature 

in Greenwich mean time. Greenwich time provides a worldwide 

standard of reference thlat obviates the difficulties of converting 

one local time to another. The 

Alaskan earthquake of 1964 thus 

began at about 5 :36 p.m., Friday, 

March 27, 1964, Alaska standard 

time, but its onset is officidly 

recorded in the seismological literature as 03 :36 :11.9 to 12.4, Saturday, March 28, 1964, Greenwich 

mean time (U.S. Coast and Gmdetic Survey, 1964, p. 30). 

This earthquake has become renowned for its savage destructiveness, for its long duration, and 

for the great breadth of its damage zone. Its magnitude has been 

computed by the U.S. Coast and 

Geodetic Survey as 8.3-8.4 on the 

Richter scale. Other observatories have calculated its magnitude 

as 8.4 (Pasadena) and 8.5-8.75 

(Berkeley). These computations 

indicate something of the great 

size of the earthquake. Few 

earthquakes in history have been 

as large. In minutes, thousands 

of people were made homeless, 

114 lives were lost, and the economy of an entire State was disrupted. Seismic sea waves swept 

the Pacific Ocean from the Gulf 

of Alaska ,to Anbardica; they 

caused extensive damage in British Columbia and California and 

took 12 lives in Crescent City, 

Calif., and 4 in Oregon. Unusually large waves, probably 

seiches, were recorded in the Gulf 

of Mexico. The entire earth 

vibrated like a tuning fork. 

EPICENTER 

The epicenter of this great 

earthquake has been located in 

a forlorn wilderness of craggy 

peaks, glaciers, and fjords at the 

head of Prince William Sound, 

on the south flank of the rugged 

Chugach Mountains, about 80 

miles east-southeast of Anchorage 

(fig. 1, next page). Computations 

by the Coast and Geodetic lSurvey 

fix the epicenter at lat 61.1' N., 

long 147.7" W.2 15 km. The hypocenter, or point of origin, was 

at a depth of 20-50 km. However, 

it is not meant to imply that the 

earthquake had a point source: 

During the quake, energy was released from a broad area south 

and southwest of the epicenter underlying and adjacent to Prince 

William Sound and the '~ulf of 

Alaska (U.S. Coast and Gwdekic. 

Survey, 1964, p. 31; Grantz and 

others, 1964, p. 3). Epicenters of 

most aftershocks were dispersed 

throughout an area of about 

100,000 square miles, mainly along 

the continental margin of the 

Aleutian Trench between Prince 
2 

59 " 

57 " 

TRINITY ISLANDS 

THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27 , 1964 

OF 

oCEAN 

0 25 50 75 100 MILES 

C a pe Saint Elias 

M iddleton 

Is land 

ALASKA 

LOCATION MAP 

!.- Physiographic setting of sout h-cen tra l Alaska, including the area principally in volved in the Alaska earthquake of 1964. 

The epicenter of the ma in shock is near the n orth end of Prince Willi am Sound. 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

William Sound and the seaward 

side of Kodiak Island (fig. 9). 

This area coincides with a zone 

of tectonic uplift (Plafker, 1965). 

DURATION AND EXTENT 

The total effect of the earthquake was intensified by the long 

duration of strong ground motion. 

The elapsed time oan only be 

surmised from the estimates of 

eyewitnesses, inasmuch as no recording instruments capable of 

measuring the duration of the 

shock were in the affected area 

at the time. Several such instruments have since been installed. 

Some witnesses timed the quake 

by wrist or pocket watch, and 

their timings ranged from 1v2 

to 7 minutes or more. Most such 

timings ranged from 3 to 4 

minutes, whether measured at 

Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, or 

elsewhere. By comparison, the 

great San Francisco earthquake 

of 1906 is said to have lasted 

about 1 minute. 

Several factors besides ' the 

human element may influence the 

variation from place to place of 

the estimated duration of the 

shock. Shocks are more intense 

in some geologic settings than in 

others; the character and amplitude of seismic waves passing 

through one medium are unlike 

those passing through another 

of different elastic properties. 

Ground motion is more intense 

and sometimes more prolonged 

over thick unconsolidated fills as 

at Anchorage or Valdez than over 

firm bedrock, as in the Chugach 

Mountains. Under certain ground 

conditions the intensity of ground 

motion may be amplified by resonance. Motions are stronger in 

high buildings than in low ones, 

so an observer in a tall building 

is likely to record a longer duration than an observer in a low 

building. And under certain conditions, shaking may be prolonged 

locally after direct seismic motion 

has stopped : for example, if landslides or avalanches, triggered by 

the earthquake, are in progress 

in the vicinity. A% any rate, even 

the shortest estimates indicated 

an earthquake of unusual duration, a duration that had marked 

effects on the behavior of earth 

materials and manmade structures and on their susceptibility 

to damage. 

The main shock was reportedly 

felt throughout most of Alaska, 

including such remote points as 

Cape Lisburne, Point Hope, Barrow, and Umiat on the Arctic 

slope of Alaska and at Unimak 

Island beyond the tip of the 

Alaska Peninsula-points 600-800 

miles distant from the epicenter. 

The earthquake was recorded 

by seismographs throughout the 

world. It caused significant 

damage to ground and structures 

throughout a land am of about 

50,000 square miles and it cracked 

ice on rivers and lakes throughout an area of about 100,000 

square miles (Grantz land others, 

1964, p. 2). Marked fluctuztions 

of water levels in recording wells 

were noted at places as far distant as Georgia, Florida, and 

Puerto Rico (Waller and others, 

1965, p. 131). 

Effects of so great an earthquake hold the utmost interest 

of scientists and engineers. Few 

earthquakes have had such marked 

effects on the crust of the earth 

and its mantle of soil. Perhaps 

the effects of no earthquake 

have been better documented. 

Early investigation has provided 

a clear picture of much that 

happened, but years will pass 

before all the effects are understood. In hct, secondary effects 

are still in progress. In the 

fjords and 'along the shores at 

tectonically disturbed tidal zones, 

wholesale extermination of sessile organisms has been followed 

by a slow restoration of the biotic 

balance. Narine shellfish are now 

seen attaching themselves to the 

branches of drowned spruce trees 

(Hanna, 1964, p. 26). Rivers are 

regrading their channels to new 

base levels. Long-term effects 

on glaciers, shorelines, and the 

ground-wlater regimen will bear 

further watching. 

But despite its magnitude and 

its impressive related tectonic 

effects, the earthquake ranks far 

below many other great natural 

disasters in terms of property 

damaged and lives lost. Less 

violent earthquakes have killed 

many more people. The reasons 

are many: The damage zone of 

the Alaskan quake has a very low 

population density; much of it is 

uninhabited. In Anchorage, the 

one really populous area in the 

damage zone, many modern buildings had been designed and constructed with the danger of earthquakes in mind. 

The generative area of the 

earthquake was also sparsely inhabited, and the long-period seismic vibrations that reached the 

relatively distant inhabited areas 

wreaked heavy damage on tall 

and wide-area buildings but 

caused mostly light damage to 

small one-family dwellings of the 

type prevalent in Alaska (Steinbrugge, 1964, p. 71). According 

to White (1965, p. 91), attenuation of sinusoidal seismic waves 

at low frequencies should vary 

as the square of the frequency. 

Thus, destructive short - period 

vibrations presumably were attenuated to feeble amplitudes not 

far from their points of origin, 

Most residential buildings, moreover, were cross-braced woodframe construction, and such 

buildings usually fare well in 

earthquakes. 
THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

Severe earthquakes during last 1,100 years, and resulting 

casualties 

[After Hill, 1965, p. 501 

Year Place Deaths 

856 -_--___ Corinth, Greece -_-__---_- 45,000 

1038 -_-___ Shansi, China ------------ 23,000 

1057 ---___ Chihli, China ------------ 25, 000 

1170 ---_-_ Sicily __--_------------..- 15,000 

1268 __-___ Silicia, Asia Minor -__--_-- 60,000 

1290L -___ Chihli, China- - -- --- -- --- 100,000 

1293 -_____ Kamakura, Japan- ------- 30,000 

1456 --_-_- Naples, Italy ------------- 60,000 

1531 -_____ Tisbon, Portugal --_------ 30,000 

1556 --____ Shenshi, China -__-___---- 830,000 

1667 --_.-_ Shemaka, Caucasia ------- 80,000 

1693 --___- Catania, Italy ------------ 60, 000 

1693 --__-- Naples, Italy ------------- 93,000 

1731 _-____ Peking, China -----_------ 

1737 --____ Calcutta, India ------_---- 

1755 _-____ Northern Persia ---_------ 

1755- - _ _ _ _ Lisbon, Portugal- - _ - - - - - - 

1783 --____ Calabria, Italy _---__-_-_. 

1797 _-____ Quito, Ecuador -_----_---- 

1811-12-_ _ New Madrid, Missouri, 

U.S.A. 

1819 -__-_- Cutch, India --------_---- 

1822 -_____ Aleppo, Asia Minor ___---- 

1828 -____- Echigo (Honshu) Japan ---- 

1847 --____ Zenkoji, Japan ---__--- --- 

1868 _-____ Peru and Ecuador _-_----- 

1875 ------ Venezuela and Columbia- - 

1896 ______ Sanriku, Japan ---_____-_- 

1897 ------ Assam, India ------_----- 

1898______ Japan--_-----------__----- 

1906 _-____ Valparaiso, Chile --------- 

1906 --___- San Francisco, U.S.A- - - -- 

1907 --_--- Kingston, Jamaica --_--_-- 

1908 _-___ _ Messina, Italy- - - - - ------ 

1915_-- -. - Avezzano, Italy ---- --- --- 

1920 --___- Kansu, China -_--___---_- 

1923-__--- Tokyo, Japan------..----- 

1930 _-___.. Apennine Mountains, 

Italy. 

1932- - - _ _ - Kansu, China-- - - - -- - - - - - 

1935 -__.-- Quetta, Baluchistan ------ 

1939- __-- _ Chile ---_-_------------- 

1939 --____ Erzincan, Turkey --------- 

1946- _ _ _ _ _ Alaska-Hawaii, U.S.A--- - - 

1948_-_-..- Fukui,Japan------------ 

1949_-_-__ Ecuador----------------- 

1950 -__--- Assam, India ------------ 

1953 -_____ Northwestern Turkey ----- 

1954-__ __ _ Northern Algeria- ------ -- 

1956 _----_ Kabul, Afghanistan ------- 

1957 _--___ Northern Iran- - _ -_ ---- -- 

1957 -__--- Western Iran- - - _ - ------- 

1957 _----- Outer Mongolia -------_-- 

1960 --___, Southern Chile ----------- 

1960 _-____ Agadir, Morocco _--_----- 

1962 --___ _ Northwestern Iran ___--- - - 

1963 --___- Taiwan, Formosa -__------ 

1963 ____-- Skopje, Yugoslavia ------- 

1964- _ _ _ _ _ Southern Alaska, U.S.A- - - 

1 Principally from seismic sea wave. 2 Does not include 12 deaths in California and 4 deaths in I Oregon, by drowning. 

The timing of the earthquake 

undoubtedly contributed to the 

low casualty rate. It was a holiday; many people who would 

otherwise have been at work or 

returning from work were at 

home. Schools were closed for 

the holiday. In coastal areas the 

tide was low; had tides been high, 

inundation and destruction by sea 

waves would have been much 

more severe. Nevertheless, sea 

waves caused more deaths than 

all other factors combined. 

Hill (1965, p. 58) has compiled 

a chronological list of severe 

earthquakes dating back more 

than 1,100 years. Her list, reproduced at left, places the Alaskan 

earthquake of 1964 in a proper 

perspective so far as deaths are 

concerned. 

Throughout history, earthquakes have ranked high among 

the causes of sudden disaster and 

death, but many other causes 

have added as much or more to 

the misfortunes of mankind. 

Some of these, such as dam failures, for example, man has 

brought on himself. Others he 

has not. The great epidemics of 

the past are not likely to recur, 

but disease, famine, floods, and 

landslides all still take huge tolls. 

Single tornadoes in the American 

midcontinent have taken more 

lives than the Alaska earthquake 

of 1964 ; so have mine explosions. 

In East Pakistan, thousands of 

lives were lost in 1965 to floods 

and hurricanes ("cyclones"). It 

would be irrelevant to enl'arge 

here on natural and manmade 

disasters. Hill, however, has 

compiled another table that sheds 

pertinent further light on some 

of the causes of human misery in 

the past 600 years, other than 

earthquakes. Wlars have been 

omitted. 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

Deaths (rounded) front some of the wortd's worst 

mads accidents and natural disasters 

[After Hill, 1965, P. 571 

Date What and where Deaths 

Bubonic plague in Europe 75,000,000 

and Asia. 

Influenaathroughoutthe 22,000,000 

world. 

Famine in China -_--_.__ _ - -_ -_ 9,500,000 

Flood in China -_-- - _. _ -. - -. -- 900,000 

Earthquake in China -__---_ - - 830,000 

Typhoon in Indochina- - - - - _ -- 300,000 

Eruption of Mount Pelee, 40,000 

West Indies. 

Eruption of Krakatoa, near 36,000 

Sumatra. 

Snow avalanche in Peru __-__. 

Overflow of Vaiont Dam in 

Italy. Mine explosion Manchuria- _ _ -- 1 1,500 

Sinking of the Titanic___ - _ _ _ - - 2 1,500 

Forest fire, Wisconsin-_- _ _ - _ _- 1,000 

Tornado in south-central 700 

United States. 

Train stalled in Italy -__--_---- 3 500 

Collapse of St. Francis Dam, 500 

California. 

1 Actual count 1,549. a Known dead 1.613. 

Airliners collided over New 4 134 

York City. 

3 Passengers suffocated when the train 

Including casualties on the ground. 

Some of the tolls listed in Hill's 

tables differ substantially from 

those reported by other authorities for the same disasters. Perhaps this difference is not surprising in view of the chaos and lack 

of communication that generally 

accompany great natural disasters and the varying casualty estimates, therefore, that appear in 

the subsequent literature. Hill 

did not cite the sources of her 

data, and the some of her figures 

are questionable; she lists 143,000 

deaths in the Tokyo earthquake 

of 1923, for example, whereas 

Richter (1958, p. 561, citing 

Imamura) lists 99,331. For the 

Messina earthquake of 1908 Hill 

lists 160,000 deAhs, whereas other 

authors list from 82,000 to 100,- 

000. Nevertheless, used with caution, Hill's tables help to equate 

the magnitudes of past tragedies, 

and they provide some basis for 

comparing one disaster with another. Compared with the eruption 

of Mount Pelee in 1902, for examwas caught in a tunnel; actual count 521. 

ple, or the sinking of the Titanic 

in 1912, the Alaska earthquake of 

1964 took a small toll of lives. In 

view of the magnitude of the even.t, 

the relatively small size of the toll 

is in some 15-ays remarkable. 

AFTERSHOCKS 

The long series of aftershocks 

thak followed the main A1,aska 

earthquake gradually diminished 

in frequency and intensity over 

s period of several months. 

Within 24 hours the initial shock 

was followed by 28 aftershocks, 

10 of which exceeded Richter 

magnitude 6. The epicenters of 

these shocks were disposed in a 

zone 50-60 miles wide reaching 

from Prince William Sound 

southwest to the Trinity Islands 

area south of Kodiak (fig. 9). 

Fifty-five aftershocks with magnitudes greater than 4 were recorded within 48 hours (after the 

m a i n earthquake, including a 

shock of magnitude 6.7 on March 

29 at 4:18 p.m. (March 30, 

02 :18 :05.6 Grrrt). Within a week 

75 shocks with magnitudes greater than 4 had been recorded by 

the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (1964, table 2). In the 45 

days following the a~lthquake, 

728 aftershocks were recorded 

(Jordan and others, 1965, p. 

1323). According to Press and 

Jackson (1965) about 12,000 

aftershocks with magnitudes 

equal to or greater than 3.5 probably occurred in the 69-day period after the main shock, and 

several thousand more were recorded in the next year and a half 

(U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 

1965a, p. 44). 
6 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27 , 1964 

INDIAN OCEAN 

160 

0 

t?" 0 

PACIFIC OCEAN 

0 

0 

0 0 

0 

E X PLANATION 

Magnitude 

0 5.3-5.9 

0 6.0- 6.9 

0 7.0-7.7 

0 7.75-8.5 

Filled circles 

=hypocenter> 50 KM 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 7 

PREVIOUS ALASKAN 

EARTHQUAKES 

Southern Alaska and the adjoining Aleutitan Island chain 

together constitute one of the 

world's most active seismic zones. 

Extending from Fairbanks on the 

north to the Gulf of Alaska on 

the south, the Alaskan seismic 

zone is but a part of the vast, 

near-continuous seismically aotive 

belt that circumsoribes the entire 

Pacific Ocean basin (fig. 2). Figure 3 shows the distribution of 

earthquake epicenters of magnitude 5.3 and greater recorded in 

Alaska since instrumental measurements began, through 1961. 

Between 1899 and May 1965, seven 

2 (left) .-Earthquake belts of the 

(world. These belts coincide with the 

earth's orogenic zones and contain 

most of the earth's active volcanoes. 

Alaska earthquakes have equaled 

or exceeded Richter magnitude 8, 

and more th'an 60 have equaled 

or exceeded magnitude 7 (Davis 

and Echols, 1962). According to 

Gutenberg and Richter (1949, table 7) about 7 percent of the seismic energy released annually on 

the globe originates in the Alaskan seismic zone. 

This highly active zone is circumferential to the Gulf of Alaska and parallel to the Aleutian 

Trench. It embraces the rugged 

mountainous region of southern 

Alaska, Kodiak and the Aleutian 

Islands, the continental shelf, and 

the continentral slope of the Aleutian Trench. Most of the earthquakes originate at shallow to 

intermediate depths-mostly less 

3 (left).-Epicenters of major Alaskan 

earthquakes, 18!38-1961. Reproduced 

from Davis and Echols (1982). More 

recent earthquakes include the 

Alaska earthquake of 1964 (magnitude 8.3-8.4) and the Rat Islands 

earthquake of 1965 (magnitude 7.75). 

231-821 -2 

than 50 km-between the Aleutian 

Trench and the Aleutian Volcanic 

Arc. Foci lare generally deeper 

aw'ay from the trench toward the 

arc (Gutenberg and Richter, 1949, 

fig. 7). 

PHYSIOGRAPHIC AND GEOLOGIC SETTING OF THE 

EARTHQUAKE 

It was noted above that the 

earthquake was felt throughout 

nearly all of Alaska, although for 

various reasons it was not felt in 

certain lmal areas distant from 

the epicenter. The level of intensity diminished appreciably 

northward f r o m mountainous 

southern Alaska 60 the intermontane plateaus of the interior. Damage, moreover, was restricted 

generally to an 'arcuate area within about 150 miles of Prince William Sound (Grantz and others, 

1964, fig. 1). This area coincided 

approximately with the (area of 

tectunic land-level change. The 

cardinal geographic setting of the 

earthquake, therefore, was southern Alaska south of the Alaska 

Range, west of the "Panhandle," 

and east of the Alaska Peninsula. 

The four major physiographic 

divisions of Alaska are shown in 

figure 4. Each division is a northvesterly extension of a major 

physiographic division of Canada 

and conterminous United States. 

Tectonic effects of the earthquake 

and significant damage were confined largely to the southernmost 

division of Alaska, the Pacific 

Mountain System. 

Physiographic d i v i s i o n s of 

Alaska are definitively described 

and summarized by Wahrhaftig 

(1966). They are outlined concisely by Wahrhaftig and Gates 

(1964, p. 27). Those parts of 

Alaska principally involved in the 

earthquake have been described by 

Miller, Black, Barnes, and Wahrhaftig in a summary volume 

4.-Major physiographic divisions of Alaska. 
8 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 

"Landscapes of Alaska," edited by 

Howell Williams (1958). The 

geotectonic setting and structural 

history of Alaska have been outlined by Gates and Gryc (1963) 

and by Gates (1964). Most of the 

information that folio\\-s is abstracted from the several reports 

noted above. The physiogmphic 

nomenclature is that of Wahrhaftig, who followed and elaborated 

the early nomenclature of Brooks 

(1906, 1911). 

The Pacific Mountain System 

extends from the southern part of 

the conterminous United States 

north through British Columbia 

and Yukon into Alaska. Not surprisingly, therefore, subdivisions 

of the system in Alaska have geologic and physiographic counterparts in the conterminous States. 

In mainland Al'aska the Pacific 

Mountain System forms a broad 

arc, concave toward the south. 

Two mountainous belts are separated by a discontinuous belt of 

lowlands-t h e Alaska-Aleutian 

Ranges on the north, the Coastal 

Trough province in the center, 

and the Pacific Border Ranges on 

the south. The Alaska-Aleutian 

Ranges are analogous to the Cascade-Sierra Nevada Ranges of 

Washington, Oregon, and California-these provinces contain 

eugeosynclinal suites of gaywacke, argillite, and volcanic 

rocks that are variably metamorphosed, are intruded by batholithic plutons, and (are surmounted in 

places by Pleistocene and Recent 

volcanoes. The Comtal Trough 

province of Alaska is analogous 

to the Puget Sound-Williamette 

Valley-Great Valley of California lowland-these provinces contain thick fills of Cretaceous and 

Tertiary sedimentary rocks. The 

Pacific Border Ranges of Alaska 

are analogous to the Olympic 

Mountains and Coast Ranges. 

They contain suites of graywacke, 

slate, and phyllite tightly folded 

and intruded by silicic to ultramafic plutons. 

The Pacific Mountain System in 

Alaska is a region of dramatic 

physiographic contrasts-glacierclad mountains, active volcanoes, 

lake-dotted lowlands, great rivers, 

fjords, and waterfalls framed in 

a setting of primeval forest on the 

one hand and trackless tundra on 

the other. Local relief in some 

places is astonishing: Mount McKinley at 20,269 feet, the highest 

summit in North America, looms 

above lowlands only a few hundred to 3,000 feet above sea level. 

In the nearby Wrangell Mountains, 12,000- to 16,000-foot peaks 

rise above the floor of the Copper 

River valley at an altitude of less 

than 1,000 feet. The abrupt relief of the St. Elias Range to the 

southeast is legendary-Mount St. 

Elias, visible from tidewater, is 

18,008 feet high; Mount Fairweather, only 15 miles from the 

Gulf of Alaska, is 15,300 feet 

high. 

ALASKA-ALEUTIAN PROVINCE 

The Alaska-Aleutian province, 

a region of extreme seismic-tectonic activity, includes the Aleutian Island chain, the contiguous 

Aleutian Range on the Alaska 

Peninsula, and the Alaska Range 

(figs. 1 and 4). Together they 

form a great sigrnoid wall concave northward on the west (the 

Aleutian Arc) and concave southward on the east, altogether tobaling about 3,200 miles in length 

and averaging, on land, about 60 

miles across. 

ALEUTIAN RANGE 

The Aleutian Range and its seaward extension, the Aleutian Islands, surmount a partly submerged ridge 20-60 miles wide extending 1,600 miles from Mount 

Gerdine west of Anchorage to Attu Island at the west end of the 

chain. About 80 Quaternary volcanoes, some deeply dissected but 

many of them historically active 

(Coats, 1950)) stand 2,000 to more 

than 12,000 feet above sea level. 

Mount Gerdine, the highest peak 

(but not a volcano), stands 12,600 

feet above sea level at the north 

end of the arc. The volcanoes 

themselves rest on a pllatform 

made up largely of deeply eroded 

volcanic rocks of Tertiary age, interbedded with sedimentary rocks 

of volcanic provenance, all cut by 

dikes and irregular bodies of gabbro, diorite, and granite (Powers, 

in Williams, 1958, p. 61). 

Although the Alaska earthquake 

of 1964 was felt throughout much 

of the Aleutian Range, tectonic 

and geomorphic effects apparently were negligible. Reportedly, 

there was ground breakage on the 

flanks of Augustine Island volcano (R. M. Waller, oral commun., 1964). Landslides were triggered along steeper slopes as far 

south as Mount Iliamna. There 

was extensive ground cracking in 

the alluvial flats of most rivers 

and some lake deltas, and ice 

cracked in all the larger lakes. 

ALASKA RANGE 

The Alaska Range forms a 

great semicircular barrier about 

600 miles long that mer,aes imperceptibly with the Aleut~an Range 

on the southwest and with the 

Wrangell and St. Elias Ranges on 

the southeast. Its faulted northern slope is one of the most abrupt 

mountain fronts in the world 

(Reed, 1961, p. A3). Despite its 

height and formiddble aspect, 

however, the Alaska Range is 

breached by several low passes and 

river valleys utilized for transportation routes. The crestline of the 

range is mostly 7,000-9,000 feet 

high. Isolated massifs of great 
jagged peaks r1se much higher, 

each the center of extensive systems of icecaps· and valley glaciers. The two icy summits of 

Mount McKinley (19,370 and 20,-

269 ft) and their sister peak, 

Mount Foraker (17,280 ft), dominwte the range. McKinley and 

Foraker both are visible on clear 

days from Anchorage, 130 miles 

to the south. About 140 miles east 

of Mount McKinley a second 

group of high peaks culminates in 

Mount Hayes (13,700 ft) . 

Internally the Alaska Range 

consists of a great synclinorium 

flanked by large longitudinal 

faults (Brooks, 1911, p. 111). In 

general, Cretaceous rocks along 

the center of the fold are bounded by Paleozoic and Precambrian 

rocks in the limbs. All are intruded by bodies of granitic rock, 

some batholithic in size. Most of 

the higher peaks, including the 

Mount McKinley group, consist 

of granitic rock. The north peak 

of Mount McKinley is slate and 

graywacke (Reed, 1961, fig. 2). 

ITS SETTLNG AND EFFECTS 

The Alaska Range was mostly 

outside the area markedly affected by the earthquake. Strong 

ground motion was felt well north 

of the range, however, and releveling suggests possible uplift of 

nearly a foot (U.S. Coast and 

Geodetic Survey, 1965a, p. 16). 

COASTAL TROUGH PROVINCE 

The Coastal Trough province 

sustained severe damage in the 

March 27 earthquake. Damage to 

properties and manmade structures was related especi,ally to the 

relatively high local population 

density and to the behavior 'Of 

c e r t a in Pleistocene formations 

that underlay parts of the area. 

Landslides, ground cracks, subsidence, and vibration were the chief 

causes of damage. The province 

consists of two main lowland 

belts, the Cook Inlet-Susitna Lowland and the Copper River Lowland, separated by the Talkeetna 

Mountains. On the east, the Wrangell Mountains project deep into 

the Copper River Lowland. Wahr9 

haftig has divided the Coastal 

Trough province into several sections on the basis of aeolouic and b E> 

physiographic distinctions. 

COOK INLET-SUSITNA LOWLAND 

The Cook Inlet-Susitna Lowland is a deep structural basin 

more than 200 miles l'Ona and b 

aJbout 60-70 miles across. It is 

bounded by the Alaska and Aleutian Ranges on the west and north 

and by the Kenai, Chugach, and 

Talkeetna Mountains on the east. 

Its surface is mostly less than 500 

feet above sea level, and much of 

it is submerged beneath the Cook 

Inlet. It contains such well-known 

subdivisions as the populous Anchorage Lowland, the agricultural 

Matanuska Valley, and the petroleum-rich Kenai Lowland. It is 

underlain by thick sequences of 

poorly consolidated coal-bearing 

rocks of Tertiary age mantled 

with glacial, glaciofluvial, and 

glaciomarine deposits, and flanked 

by hard-rock mountains on the 

east and west. Parts of the area 

5.-A rock avalanche on the Surprise Glacier near Harriman Fjord, about 50 miles east of Anchorage. Photograph taken 

May 29, 1964. 
10 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

6.-Debris flow (avalanche) and Upper Miles Glacier, in the Chugach Mountains near mouth of the Copper River. View east 

from 6,300 feet, April 19, 1964. The flow is approximately 2 kilometers long. 

have been described by Capps 

(1916) and by Martin, Johnson, 

and Grant (1915). The Quaternary geology has been described in 

debail by Karlstrom (1964). 

TALKEETNA MOUNTAINS 

The li6tle known Talkeetna 

Mounhains are a dissected highland of diverse topography and 

geology, about 100 miles long 

north to south and 60-70 miles 

across west to east. Extremely 

rugged glacier-covered peaks and 

ridges in the central part, standing 6,000-8,000 feet above sea 

level, are carved from a large 

Jurassic batholith that has intruded older Jurassic volcanics 

and pre-Jurassic rocks. On the 

south a large fault (Lake ClarkCastle Mountain fault) separates 

the hard rocks of the mountains 

from the softer Cretaceous and 

Tertiary rocks of the Matanuska 

Valley. The southeast part of the 

Talkeetna Mountains consists of 

soft Jurassic and Cretaceous 

sandstones and shales overlain by 

t h i c k Tertiary basalt flows 

(Brooks, 1911, pl. 9; Capps, 1940, 

pl. 2; Grantz, 1961). During the 

earthquake the southern part of 

the range subsided as much as 9 

feet (U.S. Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey, 1965a, p. 16). Avalanches and landslides were triggered in the upper Matanuska 

Valley and doubtless occurred in 

the mountains also. 

COPPER RIVER LOWLAND 

The Copper River Lowland as 

here described includes all the area 

between the Alaska Range on the 

north, the Wrangell Mountains on 

the eask, the Chugach Mountains 

on the south, and the 'I'alkeetna 

Mountains on the west. As thus 

limited, it includes marginal areas 

called the Gulkana Upland in the 

northwest part of the area and 

the Lake Louise Plateau in the 

west (Wahrhaftig, 1966). Thus 

delineated, it is drained not only 

by the Copper River itself, but 

also by the Susitna, which arise:., 

in the Alaska Range, flows south 

into the lowland, then west across 

the Talkeetna Mountains, and by 

the Delta River, which heads in 

the Gulkana upland and flows 

north across the Alaska Range to 

the Tanana River. A low pass at 

the south end of the Talkeetna 

Mountains connects the Copper 

River Lowland with the Cook Inlet area by way of the Matanuska 

Valley. The surface of the lowland ranges in altitude from less 

than 1,000 feet above sea level 

where the Copper River enters 

the Chugach Mountains at Wood 

Canyon (alt 581 ft at Chitina) to 

more than 3,500 feet in the Gulkana Upland. Most of the area is 

underlain by perennially frozen 

ground, and the surface oonse- 
quently is dotted with shallow 

lakes. Several large lakes are of 

glacial origin. Bedrock in the 

northern and western parts of the 

lowland consists chiefly of greenstone and other metavolcanic rocka 

of late Paleozoic and Triassic age. 

In the southern part of the lowland, bedrock consists chiefly of 

sedimentary rock of Mesozoic age. 

Most of the lowland, however, is 

mantled with unconsolidated deposits of Pleistocene age. On the 

east is the volcanic pile of the 

Wrangell Mountains. 

ITS SETTT.NG AND EFFECTS 

The earthquake caused avalanches, landslides, and ground 

breakage in the Copper River 

Lowland. Several buildings were 

s h i f t e d on their foundations. 

Throughout the lowland, ice was 

cracked on lakes and rivers. 

WRANGELL MOUNTAINS 

The Wrangell Mountains, austere and beautiful, dominate the 

landscape of the Copper River region. They are a cluster of great 

ice-capped volcanoes crowded 

into an area about 100 miles long, 

northwest to southeast, and 60 

11 

miles across, northeast to southwest. To the southeast they merge 

with the St. Elias Range. Several 

volcanoes exceed 14,000 feet in 

altitude, including Mount Blackburn ( 16,523 ft) the highest in the 

range, and Mount Sanford ( 16,-

208 ft). Historically active Mount 

Wrangell (14,163 ft) still emits 

steam and vapors. At least a 

dozen summits exceed 12,000 feet. 

The volcanoes rest on a base of deformed Paleozoic and Mesozoic 

sedimentary and volcanic rocks. 

During the earthquake the apparent subsidence was less than a 

7.- 0lastic dikes composed of sand and silt were intruded along fissures into near-surface sediments and overlying snow and 

ice in the delta of Snow River, Kenai Peninsula. The dikes were left in relief when the snow and ice melted. 
12 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

foot at the southwest front of the 

range. Extensive ground crack^ 

formed in the alluvial flats of the 

larger rivers in the IScCarthy 

area. 

PACIFIC BORDER RANGES 

PROVINCE 

The Pacific Border Ranges 

province contains the epicenter of 

the March 27 earthquake and most 

of the land areas of major tectonic 

deformation. It consists of several mountain ranges, most of 

which merge laterally with one 

another. Including some of the 

world's most rugged mountains, 

the province forms the mountainous and adjacent coastal lowland border of the Gulf of Alaska, an arcuate belt about 1,000 

miles long and 20-110 miles across 

stretching from Kodiak Island 'on 

the southwest to Sitka Island on 

the southeast. Included as subdivisions are the Kodiak Mountains, 

Kenai-Chugach Mountains, Gulf 

of Alaska coastal section, St. Elias 

Mountains, Fairweather Range, 

and the mountains of the western 

part of the Alexander Archipelago (Wahrhaftig and Gates, 1964, 

p. 27). Only the Kodiak Mountains, Kenai-Chugach Mountains, 

and the Gulf of Alaska coastal 

section, described below, were significantly involved in the earthquake, although a large clay-silt 

mudflow was triggered on Admiralty Island in the Alexander 

Archipelago near Juneau, 480 

miles from the epicenter (oral 

commun., Keith Hart, Alaska Department of Highways, to Robert 

D. Miller, U.S. Geological Survey, 1965). 

KODIAK MOUNTAINS 

The Kodiak Mountains (Wahrhaftig, 1966) are a structuraltopographic continuation of the 

Kenai-Chugach Mountains. They 

form a rugged northeast-trending 

divide 2,0004,000 feet high along 

the crestline of Kodiak Island 

and slope abruptly to the southeast and more gradually to the 

northwest to an irregular coastline modified by many fjords and 

islands. The mountains mnsists 

mostly of argillite and graywacke 

of Mesozoic age intruded along 

the main divide by an elongate 

granitic batholith of Tertiary age 

(Dutro and Payne, 1957). Eocene sedimentary rocks along the 

southeast border of Kodiak Island and in the Trinity Islands to 

the south are downfaulted against 

the older rocks. Most of Kodiak 

Island subsided during the earthquake, but a narrow zone along 

the southeast coast had no displacement, and the outermost 

headlands on the southeast coast 

tains 5 to 10 miles on a side and 

3,000 to 6,000 feet high, separated by 

a reticulate system of through valleys and passes % to 1 mile wide that 

are eroded along joints and cleavage. 

The entire range has been heavily 

glaciated and the topography is characterized by horns, aretes, cirques, Ushaped valleys and passes, rock-basin 

lakes, and grooved and mammilated 

topography. The south coast is deeply 

indented by fiords and sounds, and 

ridges extend southward as chains of 

islands. The north front is an abrupt 

mountain wall. 

The Kenai-Chugach Mountains are 

composed chiefly of dark-gray argillite 

and graywacke of Mesozoic age [some 

of these rocks are now known to be 

of Tertiary age (George Plafker, written commun., 1985)], mildly metamorphosed and with a pronounced vertical cleavage that strikes parallel to 

the trend of the range. In the Prince 

William Sound area large bodies of 

were elevated. Other effects of the greenstone are associated with the argillite and graywacke. A belt of Mesoearthquake landslides zoic and Paleozoic schist, greenstone, 

and avalanches on the steeper chert, and limestone lies along the 

slopes, local subsidence and cracking of many unconsolidated deposits, and the cracking of lake 

ice (Reuben Kachadoorian and 

George Plafker, written commun., 

1966). 

KENAI-CHUGACH MOUNTAINS 

The Kenai-Chugach Mountains 

form the landward closure of 

Prince William Sound. The 

greater part of this region subsided during the earthquake, 

although part of it was elevated. 

L a n d s 1 i d e s , avalanches, and 

ground cracks were abundant 

(Hackman, 1965, p. 608; Ragle 

and others, 1965; Post, 1965; Tuthill and Laird, 1966). Wahrhaftig's description (1966, p. 40) of 

the general topography and geology is quoted as follows: 

The Kenai-Chugach Mountains form 

a rugged barrier along the north coast 

of the Gulf of Alaska. High segments 

of the mountains are dominated by extremely rugged east-trending ridges 

7,000 to 13,000 feet high. Low segnorth edge of the Kenai and Chugach 

Mountains. All these rocks are cut by 

granitoid masses. 

All the higher parts of the range 

are buried in great icefields, from 

which valley and piedmont glaciers 

radiate. Many glaciers on the south 

side of the mountains are tidal. 

Although the earthquake caused 

many snow and rock- slides that 

avalanched onto glaciers in the 

Kenai-Chugach Mountains, thers 

were relatively few slides that 

seemed to be large enough to 

materially alter the regimens of 

the glaciers in the manner pmposed by Tarr and Martin (1912 ; 

Ragle and others, 1965, p. 31,42). 

Tarr and Martin attributed rapid 

advances of glaciers in southeastern Alaska in the first decade of 

the 20th century to avalanching 

caused by the great Yakutat 

earthquakes of 1899, a view disputed recently by Post (1965). 

The long-term effect of the snow 

added to the surfaces of the glaciers in the Chugach Mountains, 

however, will require years to 

ments consist of discrete massive moun- evaluak. 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 13 

8.-The Hanning Bay fault scarp, Montague Island, looking northeast. Vertical displacement in the foreground, in rock, is 

about 12 feet; the maximum measured displacement of 15 feet is at the beach ridge near trees in background. 
14 THE ALASKA EARTHQUm, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

Rock avalanches were more 

numerous in the Chugach Mountains than in the Kenai Mountains (Ragle and others, 1965, p. 

31). A notably large one fell onto 

the Sherman glacier near Cordovn 

(Post, 1965 ; George Plafker, oral 

commun., 1965). 

From a study of aerial photographs, Hackman (1965, p. 609) 

identified 1,958 avalanches and 

snow slides, 58 combined snow and 

rock slides, and 20 rock slides in 

the mountainous areas ad joining 

Prince William Sound after the 

March 27 earthquake. It is not 

known what the normal incidence 

of spring avalanching is in the 

Chugach Mountains adjacent to 

Prince William Sound, or how 

m a n y of the avalanches were 

caused by the earthquake, but 

Hackman suspected that most of 

them were caused by the earthquake. 

GULF OF ALASKA COASTAL SECTION 

Wahrhaf tig (1966) describes 

the Gulf of Alaska coastal section 

as an area of diverse topography 

carved in Tertiary rocks. It extends about 340 miles along the 

coast in a strip 2-40 miles wide 

from the vicinity of Cordova on 

the west to Icy Point on the east, 

between the Gulf of Alaska to the 

south and the high Chugach and 

St. Elias Mountains to the north.. 

It is basically a coastal plain 

marked by beach and dune ridges, 

belts of morainal topography, outwash plains, marine terraces, and 

enormous piedmont glaciers. It is 

deeply indented locally by large 

fjords and by the valley of bhe 

Copper River but, for the most 

part, its coastline is less irregular 

than that of the rest of southern 

Alaska. The largest of the piedmont glaciers, the Malaspina, 

covers an area the size of Rhode 

Island. The Bering Glacier is 

almost as large. 

Large thrust faults separate the 

Tertiary rocks of the coast from 

the older rocks in the mountains. 

During the earthquake the western part of the section was tectonically elevated ; the eastern 

part was li%tle affected. Uplift 

died out between the Bering Glacier and Yakataga (Plafker, 

1965, p. 1679). Other great earthquakes have centered in this area 

in the past, including the great 

Y a k u t at earthquake of 1899 

(Richter magnitude 8.6) and the 

Lituya Bay earthquake of 1958 

(magnitude 8), the latter remembered for the giant waves generated by avalanching of rock into 

Lituya Bay (Miller, 196Q). As a 

result of the March 27, 1964, 

earthquake, slides and slumps occurred as far east as Yakataga; 

unconsolidated deposits cracked 

and slumped eastward to Yakutat 

Bay and lake ice cracked as far 

east as Lituya Bay. 

ST. ELIAS MOUNTAINS AND 

FAIRWEATHER RANGE 

The colossal St. Elias Mountains and Fairweather Range are 

largely peripheral to the region 

affeded markedly by the earthquake but they have had a long 

history of seismic activity. Iceclad and drained by glaciers, they 

are the highest coastal mountains 

in the world. Among them also 

are some of the highest and most 

impressive peaks in North America, including Mount Logan (19,- 

850 ft) entirely in Canada, Mount 

St. Elias (18,008 ft), Mount Vancouver (15,700 ft), Mount Hubbard (14,950 ft) , and Mount Fairweather (15,300 ft), all along the 

international boundary and all 

visible from tidewater (Bostock, 

1948, p. 92). Many other peaks 

range in height from 12,000 to 17,- 

000 feet. Little is known of the 

geology. The Alaska part of the 

mountains is topographically continuous with the Chugach Mountains and is geologically similar. 

The St. Elias Mountains also 

merge with the Wrangell Mountains and also contain volcanic 

rocks. Remnnaissance in the Fairweather-Yakutat Bay area indicates bedded sedimentary and volcanic rocks of Paleozoic and Mesozoic age intensely folded and 

faulted. Many of the higher peaks 

are carved from granitic intrusive 

rocks (Miller, in Williams, 1958, 

p. 21). 

TECTONIC EFFECTS 

Tectonic effects of the Alaska 

earthquake of 1964 have (been 

studied and described in detail by 

Plafker (1965). Crustal deformation associated with the earthquake was more extensive than 

any known deformation related to 

any known previous earthquake. 

From the Wrangell Mountains at 

the northeast to the Trinity Islands south of Kodiak, the zone 

of land-level changes extended 

southwest through the epicenter 

a distance of more than 500 miles 

(Plafker, 1965, fig. 5). From 

northwest to southeast it extended art least from the west shore of 

Cook Inlet to Middleton Island in 

the Gulf of Alaska, a distance of 

about 200 miles. Crustal warping 

may have extended inland as far 

as the Alaska Range and seaward 

out onto the continental slope 'of 

the Aleutian Trench (U.S. Coast 

and Geodetic Survey, 1965a, p. 

15-16). East along the Alaska 

coast, deformation died out somewhere between the Bering Glacier 

and Yakataga (Grantz and others, 

1964, p. 5). An area of at least 

70,000 square miles and possibly 

110,000 square miles or more was 

tectonically elevated or depressed 

during the earthquake (fig. 9). 

Areas of uplift and subsidence 

are separated by a zero line or 

axis of tectonic tilting that trends 

southwestward from the vicinity 
ITS SETT~G AND EFFECTS 15 

,. I ' 

57 

0 

9.-Map of south-central Alaska, showing epicenter of March 27, 1964, earthquake, major aftershocks, and areas of tectonic 

l-and-level changes. Most aiters·hocks centered in the 'area of uplift along the continental margin of the Aleutian Trench 

between the Trinity Islands and the epicenter of the main shock. Data chiefly from reports by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (1004, 1965a) , Grantz, Plafker, and Kachadoorian (1964), and Plafker (1965) . 

ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

of the epicenter to the seaward 

side of Kodiak and the Trinity 

Islands (fig. 9). East from the 

epicenter the zero line passes 

approximately through Port Valdez fjord, trends along Heiden 

Canyon east of Valdez (H. W. 

Coulter, written commun., 1965), 

and crosses the Copper River Valley about 50 miles {above the mouth 

(Plafker, 1965, fig. 5; Coulter and 

Migliaccio, 1966). Areas north and 

northwest of the hingeline subsided; areas south and southeast 

arose. A line of maximum subsidence about coincided with the 

mountain axes of the Kenai Peninsula and Kodiak Island, where 

downwarping exceeded 6 feet; uplift over wide areas of Prince Wil10 (left) .-Reddish-brown FNC~ tr~ 

in foreground were drowned when 

gravel spit in Resurrection Bay area 

subsided about 3 feet. 

liam Sound exceeded 6 feet and, 

in an area of surface rupture on 

Montague Island, locally exceeded 

30 feet (Plafker, 1965). This uplift deleteriously affected shipping 

lanes and harbor facilities in parts 

of Prince William Sound; docks 

at Cordova and elsewhere were 

left high and dry during times of 

low tide. 

Southwest from Montague Island, where bottom soundings 

show seaward continuations of 

new fault scraps along old fault 

lines on the island, the sea bottom was uplifted locally more 

than 50 feet (Malloy, 1964, p. 

11 (left).-Uplifted sea floor at Cape 

Clear, Montague Island, in the area 

of greatest recorded uplift on land 

(33 feet). The white coating, about 

a quarter of a mile wide, consists of 

the remains of calcareous marine organisms that were killed by dessit8- 

tion when their sea-floor home was 

lifted above high tide. 

1048). Inferred large-scale uplift 

of the continental shelf and slope 

southeast of Montague Island 

probably generated the seismic 

sea waves that spread across the 

Pacific Ocean (Van Dorn, 1964, 

p. 186; Plafker, 1965, p. 1680). 

Much, if not all, of the uplift 

probably accompanied the few 

minutes of most violent ground 

shaking during the earthquake 

(Plafker, 1965, p. 1680). 

Tectonic changes, both up and 

down, caused extensive damage 

to the biota in such areas as coastal forests, migratory-bird nesting 

grounds, salmon spawning waters, 

and shellfish habitats. These effeots 

are described further in subseq u e n t paragraphs. Land-level 

changes at Alaskan coastal communities are shown in table 1 

(P. 19). 

EFFECTS ON 

COMMUNITIES 

Earthquake damage to the cities, 

towns, and villages of southern 

Alaska was caused by direct seismic vibration, ground breakage, 

mud or sand emission from cracks, 

ground lurching, subaerial and 

sulbmarine landslides, fires, sea 

waves, and land-level changes 

(Grantz and others, 1964). Not 

all these factors caused damage in 

every community. Some communities were devastated by only 

one; the village of Chenega, for 

example, was destroyed by a sea 

wave. Overall, landslides probably caused the most damage to 

manmade structures and property, but sea waves took the most 

lives. 

Effects of one factor cannot 

always be separated from effects 

of another. Thus, at Seward 

(Grantz and others, 1964, p. 15; 

Lemke, 1966) the waterfront was 

racked by vibration, slides, sea 

w a v e s , fires, subsidence, and 

ground cracks. All these factors 

contributed significantly to the 

havoc, and all in oombination 

wiped out the economic base of the 

town. Compartxble damage at 

Valdez, plus the threat of recurrent damage in the future, forced 

relocation of the village and abandonment of the present townsite 

(Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966). 

Most of the small coastal villages in the earthquake zone were 

damaged chiefly by sea waves, 

subsidence, or both (Kachadoorian, 1965). Among the larger 

towns, only Cordova was significantly damaged by uplift, but 

the native village of Tatitlek and 

several canneries and residences 

at Sawmill Bay on Evans Island 

were also adversely affeded by 

uplift. 

Direct vibratory damage was 

significant chiefly in Anchorage 

and Whittier, although minor vibratory damage was widespread 

through the area of intense shaking. At Anchorage several buildings were destroyed by vibration, 

and nearly all multistory buildings were damaged (Berg and 

Stra6ta, 1964; McMinn, 1964; National Board of Fire Underwriters and Pacific Fire Rating 

Bureau, 1964; Hansen, 1965). A& 

Seward, Valdez, and Whittier, 

ground vibrations ruptured oil 

storage tanks, and the spilled petroleum quickly caught fire. 

Ground breakage caused extensive damage in Anchorage, Seward, Whittier, and Valdez, not 

only to buildings but also to 

buried utilities such as water, sewer, gas, electric, and telephone 

lines. Cracked ground msulted 

from the passage of sinusoidal 

seismic waves through the soil, 

from lurching, from lateral 

spreading of soils under gravity, 

especially near the heads of landslides, and from differential settlement of alluvial and artificial 

fills. 
18 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

Mud and sand were pumped 

from ground cracks throughout 

the damage zone where water 

tables were shallow in saturated 

granular soil. At Valdez, and to 

a lesser extent at Seward (Forest 

Acres), large volumes of sediment 

were ejected from cracks into cellars and crawl spaces (Coulter 

and Migliaccio, 1966 ; R. W. Lemke, oral commun., 1965). 

Submarine and subaerial landslides triggered by the earthquake 

caused spectacular damage in Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, Whittier, and Homer (Engineering 

Geology Evaluation Group, 1964; 

Grantz and others, 1964; Shannon and Wilson, Inc., 1964; Hansen, 1965; Lemke, 1966; Coulter 

and Migliaccio, 1966 ; Kachadmrian, 1965; Waller, 1966). Four 

large slides in built-up parts of 

Anchorage were caused by failures along bluff lines in soft, sensitive silty clay whom water content at critical depths exceeded 

ilts liquid limit. Failure ict Anchorage was mostly subaerial, 

although the large Turnagain 

Heights slide failed partly below 

sea level and slipped pafi way 

down the mudflat into Knik Arm 

of Cook Inlet. At Valdez and 

Seward, violent shaking spontaneously liquified granular deltaic materials; slumping which 

initiated well below sea level carried away the waterfronts of both 

towns. The seaward slopes of the 

deltas, moreover, were left less 

stable after the earthquake than 

they were before. 

Estimates by the Federal Reconstruction a n d Development 

Planning Commission for Alaska, las of August 12, 1964, indicated that total property damage 

bo Alaska by the earthquake exceeded $311 million (fig. 13). 

This figure does not include 

loss of personal property or in12 (above) .-Transverse flme in Valdez at corner of McKinley St. and 

$1 63 MILLION Keystone Ave. Note damage to cinderblock building where the main dssure, foreground, intersects it. Similar ground fractures, with or without 

sand and mud spouts caused much 

damage to streets, utilities, and buildings in many parts of the earthquake 

affected area. 

FEDERAL STATE AND PRIVATE 

LOCAL PROPERTY 

(Does not include 

of per- 13 (left) .-Blarthquake damages in 

sonal property Alaska. From estimates by the Ob- or income) flee of BYmergency Planning (1964a). 

$77 MILLION $71 MILLION 

r 

Schools 

Utilities 

H~ghways 

Airports 

Mil~tary Bases 

Railroads 

Hydropower 

Hospitals 

Streets 

Sewers 

Homes 

Boats 

Bus~nesses 

lndustr~es 

Fisheries 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

come. Not only was the economic 

base of entire communihies destroyed, but the resultant loss of 

income severely crippled the economy of the whole State and deprived Alaska of a major share of 

its tax base at the time when 

funds were most needed to aid in 

restorahion. 

As also pointed out by the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission, the 

disaster struck at the heart of 

the State's economy, inasmuch as 

nearly half the people of the State 

reside in the stricken area. About 

100,000 of the Stah's estimated 

265,000 people live in the greater 

Anchorage area alone. Anchorage, because of its size, bore the 

brunt of property damage, but the 

per capita damage and the actual 

death toll were much greater in 

many smaller towns. Although 

the combined population of Chenega, Kodiak, Seward, Valdez, and 

Whishtier is less than 9,000 people, 

each of these communities lost 

more lives than Anchorage. 

Despite the extensive damage 

at Anchorage to residence and 

business properties, utilities, and 

transportation, a large segment of 

the economy was intact, and recovery was relatively rapid. But 

at many small towns and villages, 

where virtually entire populations 

were dependent on one or two industrial enterprises-fisheries, for 

example-the effects of the earthquake were staggering. Whole 

fishing fleets, harbor facilimties, and 

canneries were destroyed. 

The native villages of Chenega, 

Kaguyak, Old Harbor, and Afognak, all remote waterfront fishing 

villages, were nearly or completely destroyed by waves, especially 

Chenega, population 80 before the 

earthquake. There, 23 lives were 

I&, and only the schaolhouse remained of the village's buildings. 

Six homes were left standing 

Old Harbor, where there had been 

about 35. There were nine homes 

in Kaguyak and a Russian Orthodox Church; all were carried 

away or destroyed. At Afognak, 

four homes, the community hall, 

and the grocery store were carried 

away by waves; several other 

homes were moved partly off their 

foundations (Alaska D e p art . Health and Welfare, 1964b) ; and 

subsidence made the townsite uninhabitable. The sites of Chenega, 

Kaguyak, and Afognak have been 

abandoned in favor of new townsites. 

Earthquake damages to communities of Alaska are summarized in table 1. 

TABLE 1.-Summary of earthquake damages to Alaskan communities 

Place 

Afognak ...--...---.. Anchorage ..--.-...-- Cape St. Eli~ ..--.-. Chenega -.----....--- Chugiak ---..- ....-- Cordova ---.------..- Cordova FAA sirport. - .-. ...----- -- Eagle River ...------ Ellemar- - ----------- Qirdwood ...-------. Home -- - -- Hop --------------- Ka iak Fisheries 

Cannery .--.-.-.-. Kaguyak -..-.---..-- Kodiak ...---.-.---.. MoCord- -.-------- -- Old Harbor ..-...-..- Ouzinkie --..--.----- Point Nowell -..-.--- Point Whitshed ...... Portap.. -.--- - - .-. Port shton 

Port Nellie Juan.-..- 

Seldovia --....------- 0--- -- Tatitlek -...-.----. .. ------ 

hi- ------ 

I Alaska Depart. Health and Welfare (1864). 8 4,788 including personnel at Kodiag Naval Station. 2 82,W including military personnel. 

I Principal causes of damage Townsite acreage Premises Type of structures damaged (estimated) (estimated) 

U - Landslides - 

190 

244,237 

4 

80 

51 

1,128 

40 

130 1 

63 

1,247 

44 

2 

36 

82,628 

8 

193 

214 1 ---.----.. 71 .---..-----...-...- 3 

460 

1,891 .....---.. 1,000 

70 

-- 

0 

9 

1 

23 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-- 3 

16 .-.... 

0 

0 

1 

1 

0 

1 

3 

o 

13 ------ 31 

13 

X 

-- 

--.-.. 

....-. 

--.... 

- 

----.- 

-- 

X 

X 

X 

x 

- 

X 

.----- 

--.-.- 

X 

.-..-. 

--..-. 

X 

-..-.. 

x 

X 

------ 

X 

X 

- .---...--.-- X 

-..-.- 

X 

-- 

..-.-- 

X 

..---- 

------ 

------ 

-- 

--.--- 

--..-- 

-..... 

----.. 

X 

- 

----.- 

.-.--. 

-- 

x 

...-.. 

X 

X 

---.-- 

--.-.- 

.----- 

- 

---.-- 

------ 

.-.-.. 

.--.-. 

..---- 

-- 

-.-.-- 

----.- 

------ 

.----. 

-- 

-- 

------ 

.-.--. 

-- 

------ ..--...--.-. -.-.-. 

-- 

-----.----.--.....-------.---- -..-.. 

-..-... 

--.--. 

--.--. 

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- 

----.. 

--.--. 

-----. 

X 

.--... 

----------.---.--..----- -- ------------..-.-.-.--.--.-.-- ---... 

-----. 

..-.-- 

------ 

-- 

-- .................................... ...-.- 

-.-.-- 

X 

------ 

X 

X 

X 

..- 

.-.-.. 

--.-.- 

X 

X 

---.-- 

.----- 

X 

-- 

--.--- 

-- 

-----. 

------ 

---.-- 

------ 

-- 

X 

----.- 

---.-. 

X 

------ 

X 

-- 

X ..--.-- - .-.-.. 

.---.. 

-- 

X 

-.--.- 

------ 

..---. 

X 

.--.-- 

X 

-- 

X 

----.. 

....-- 

-.---- 

-- 

.---.. 

-....- 

.....- 

-- 

------ 

- 

X 

X 

.-...- 

X 

X 

.-..-- 

X 

----.- 

.-.... 

.--.-. 

---.-. 

---..- 

-.--.. 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

x 

------ 

X 

X 

-..-.. 

X 

------ 

X 

X 

------ 

------ 

------ 

----.- 

--.--- 

------ 

------ 

------ 

------ 

.-.-.- 

.----. 

.-.--- 

-- 

--.--- 

------ 

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-- 

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..-.-- 

-..--- 

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---.-. 

X 

------ 

X 

X 

20 

4,500 

20 ---.---- 

200 

-..--.-- 20 -------- 

----.-.. 

---.-.-- 10 

-.------.---..--..------.. 15 

285 ......-. 30 

50 ----..-- 

-------- 

------.. ------------------- ..-.---- 

.-..-.-. 

400 -------. 300 

30 

2 

700 

20 --..- - 20 

- .-.. - 

1 ----.- 

---..- 

---... 3 

.--.-- 

31 ----.- 

--..-. 

- 

---... 

-----. 

.-..- 

---.. 

..... 

40C 

.---. 

30C 

10 

-- 

10 

14 

100 -.-.-- 

10 

--..-. 6 -----. 

..-.-- 

.-.--- 

30 

--.--. 

11 ...--- 

.--.-. 

10 .-.-.- 

20 

- .-.-- 

.---- 

100 

----- 

100 

35 

38 

15,000 

20 

0 

400 

.--.---. 0 - .....-. 

--.----- 

-------. 

.--..-.. 

15 

15 

1,100 .------- 38 

38 

1 -------- 

-- ------------- --.-.--- 

.-.----- 

700 -------- 200 

10 

23 

750 

20 

0 

40 

-..--- 0 -..--- 

--.--. 

.--.-. 

10 

15 

130 ----.- 

35 

6 

1 

10 -- 0 

0 ----.- 

200 

------ 40 

X 

X ............................................................

X 

-- 

X 

X 

--.. 

---. 

X 

.-.. 

X 

15XX 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

--.- 

X 

X 

---- 

X 

8XX 

X 

X 

.-.-.. 

-- 

X 

X 

....-- 

X 

X 

X 

-.-..- 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

--.-.- 

.--.-- 

X 

-.-..- 

X 

X 

------ 

X 

_ 

.--. 

X 

.-.. 

-- 

..-. 

-- 

.-.. 

---- 

..-. 

---- 

.-.- 

-.-- 

---- 

X 

---. 

.--- 

---- 

--.. 

-.-- 

-- 

X 

-.-- 

X 

---- 

.-.. 

X 

X 

.-.. 

-- 

X 

- 

.--- 

---- 

.--- 

X 

..-- 

-.-- 

X 

.--- 

X 

X 

.--- 

---. 

- 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

XXX 

X 

X 

.-.--- 

X 

X 

X 

X 

------ 

-----. 

..-.-. 

X .. 

XX ..-.-. 

X 

------ 

X 

------ 

.-.-.. 

...--. 

0 ------..-.-------..-.--.-.-..----..- ------ 

..---- 

X 

------ 

X 

-_- 

0 

X 

-.---. 

--.--- 

X 

X 

-...-- 

------ 

..---- 

.-.--. 

-.---- 

X 

-.-.-- 

X 

-- .--- 

0 

------ 

--.--. 

...--- 

------ 

------ 

---.-- 

X 

------ 

X 

X 

W 

X 

X 

--.- 

.-.- 

---- 

X 

-.-- 

---- 

---- 

X 

-.-- 

..-- 

X 

.-.- 

---- 

---- 

.--. 

..-. 

X 

---- 

---. 

X 

---- 

X 

XX 

4 

---- 

X 

..-- 

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---- 

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.-.- 

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---- 

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X 

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---- 

X 
20 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, BMRGH 27, 1964 

14 (left).-hains of the Native village of Chenega, Prince William 

Sound, after devastation by waves. 

Guard dock, raised above all bat the 

highest tides by regional uplfft in 

Prince wimam Sound. Docks at 

Cordova and elsewhere were also 

made weless by the came upldft. 

1 16 (upper right) .-Hinchinbrook Coa& 

16 (below).-Damage to railroad yard 

and Detroleum tank farm at S@rward, 

loold& northwe&. The extensive 

&inage at &ward, as at Whittier 

and some other towns, was caused by 

I a combination of submarine slides, 

waves and ftre. 
17 (below).-Scrap at the subsidence trough or graben of the Fourth Avenue slide, Anchorage. The graben dropped 11 feet in 

response to 14 feet of horizontal movement of the slide block. 
18.4e 1200 L Street apartment building in Anchorage thae was eve rely damaged by shaking during %a mnqualre. Noh 

X-shaped fraotures caused by vertiml ska.r. 
ITS SETTLNG AND EFFECTS 23 

1.9.-The Alaska Sales and Service building in Anchorage, which was under construction, partially collapsed during the earthquake. The building was constructed of prestressed concrete roof T's which rested on preca·st reinforced concrete T-columns; it had precast reinforced concrete walls. 

20.-Store building in Anchorage wrecked by seismic shaking. 
21.-Toe of Turnagain Heights landslide exposed at low tide as viewed from new bluff line, looking northeast toward Anchorage waterfront. Trees that formerly stood 70 feet above sea level were swept downward and outwa.rd into Knik Arm 

by mass movement of landslide. 

22.-A wooden fence which lay •athwart the toe of the L Street landslide, Anchorage, was buckled and shortened 

by compression. 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

DAMAGE TO TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES 

THE ALASKA RAILROAD 

Damage to The Alaska Railroad, totaling about $27 million 

(OfKce of Emergency Planning, 

1964a1, has been desoribed briefly 

by Grmtz, Plafker, and Kachadwriain (1964, p. 24). It has been 

investigated more fully by McCulloch and Bonilla. Most of the 

damsge was dong the 150 miles of 

trackage between the terminal at 

Seward and Anchorage (fig. 24). 

Damage to the terminal and marshaling yards at Seward (described by Lemke, 1966), was 

caused by submarine slumping and 

waves. Two railroad docks valued at $4 million were completely 

destroyed, together with $2 million 

of freight and 50 freight caps. 

Between Seward and Anchorage, 

damage was caused by direct seismic shaking, landslides, subsidence, ground cmks and lurching, 

and inundation by high tides. 

Seventeen bridges were damaged 

or destroyed. Ground slumping 

along the right-of-way was severe 

at Kenai Lake and at Pdter. Inundation and current scour were 

severe near Portage. Snow avalanches covered trackage along 

Turnagain Arm. At Anchorage, 

%.-Rail and highway net d 801pth-cmtral Alaska. Damage to these routes was heaviest between Anchorage and Sewrtrd. 

Heavy damage was szlstained also along the Oorpper Wver Highwag atst of Oordova. 
24 (above) .-The rails in this approach 

to a bridge near the head of !Pumagain Arm were tom from their tie8 

and buckled laterally by streamward 

movement of the riverbanks. 

a6 (left).-Railroad yard and warehouse damage at 8eward oaneed by 

submarine &ide&t. waves and flm. 

hh of Anchorage light damage 

was reported as far as Hurricane. 

Trackage just south of Matanuska waa inundated by high tides. 

The spur line from Portage to 

Whittier was also severely damaged. The port facility at Whittier was destroyed (Kachadaorian, 

CappeF River by the earthquake, and the other truss spam were Mted on their piers. 

L 30.-Twentymile River Bridge near Turnagain ARU of Cook Inlet. The bridge fell into the river and some of the wood piles 

were driven throngh the reinforced concrete deck. The adjacent steel railroad bridge (upper right) survived with only I. 

A minor damage. Both bridges were founded on thiak aepmits of mft alluvium and tidal flat mud and were sdjected, to 

severe sairsunfc vibratiom. 
The partly completed Copper 

River Highway was severely damaged from Allen glacier to Cordova. Nearly every bridge along 

the route was seriously damaged 

or destroyed, including the famous Million Dollar Bridge. 

North from Anchorage the 

Glenn Highway received mostly 

minor damage. Part of the highway, however, was inundated by 

high tides near Eklutna, and the 

piers of the Knik River Bridge 

were damaged. Damage was light 

on the Sterling Highway between 

Moose Pass and Homer, except 

that ,a bridge was destroyed 

across the outlet of Kenai Lake 

(McCulloch, 1966). At Homer, 

about 4% miles of road along 

Homer Spit was inundated by 

high tides and damaged by waves 

and currents. Homer Spit subsided 4-6 feet during the earthquake (Waller, 1966; Stanley in 

Waller, 1966). 

Near Kodiak, highways were 

severely damaged by sea waves 

and by tectonic subsidence. 

ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

AIRPORTS 

Damage to airports was relatively minor, although loss estimates totaled about $3.3 million 

(Alaska Construction Consultants 

Committee, 1964). Greatest damage was at Anchorage International Airport, where a life was 

lost when the control tower collapsed under sustained seismic 

vibration and where minor damage was sustained by other buildings. Also, 20,000 barrels of aviation fuel was lost from a ruptured 

storage tank. Runways and taxi 

strips were only slightly damaged. 

At Elmendorf Air Force Base 

just north of Anchorage, the control tower was damaged by cracks 

from its base to a height of about 

15 feet. In Cordova, Homer, Kodiak Naval Station, Seldovia, Seward, and Valdez, damage to runways and taxi strips was mostly 

light. 

31 (right) .-An indication of the violence of the surge-waves that struck 

Whittier. 

32 (below) .-Ground cracks damaged runway at Cordova Airport. Similar cracks formed on the taxiways. 

29 
30 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 27, 1964 

33.-Fire, wave, and submarine slide damage to railroad and port facilities at Whittier. 

PORTS AND HARBORS 

Water transportation is one of 

Alaska's vital links with the outside world and is the base for one 

of her major industries, commercial fishing. Many Alaska communities can be reached only by 

water or air. The severe damage 

to port and harbor facilities, therefore, was a staggering blow to the 

State's economy and health. Moreover, destruction of The Alaska 

Railroad terminal and port facilities at Seward and Whittier, 

coupled with the destruction of 

the highway port at Valdez, deprived Alaska of any ice-free, allweather ship terminals. 

Ports and harbors sustained 

heavy damage from several different causes. Damage by direct seismic vibration generally was subordinate to other secondary causes. 

Submarine slides, sea w a v e s , 

ground cracks, fires, subsidence, 

and uplift all took large tolls. 

Hardest hit in terms of port and 

harbor facilities damaged or destroyed were Seward, Valdez, Kodiak, Whittier, Cordova, and Homer. Listed below are estimated 

major damage losses to ports and 

harbors; these figures have been 

gathered from several sources, but 

mainly from estimates by the 
I ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 3 1 

Alaska Construction Coasultal~t 

Committee (1964). 

Community Damage 

Seward ----_ -- -- -- - - $15,375, 000 

Valdez ---------_--- 3, 585, 000 

Kodiak (excluding 

Naval facilities) - - - 2, 165, 000 

Whittier-- _-_------ 1 5, 000, 000 

Cordova ----_------ 1,645, 000 

Homer ------------- 2 460, 000 

Woody Island FAA 

Station ___--- ----- 158, 000 

Seldovla ------------ 25, 000 

Kodiak Naval Station- - - - -- -- --- - - ll, 000, 000 

1 Total damage-port facilities not itemized 

separately. 

2 Excludes 51,250,OM) estimate for new small-boat 

harbor. 

3 Estimated cost of raising canneries oommeroial 

buildings, and boardwalk is additionai 51,750,MX). 

Submarine sliding at Sewrtrd, 

Valdez, and Whittier generated 

large local waves that added to 

the destruction already caused by 

the slides and shaking (Kachadoorian, 1965; Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966 ; Lemke, 1966). Except at Whittier, subsequent damage was then caused by seismic 

sea waves generated in the Gulf 

of Alaska or possibly by seiches 

(standing waves : Van Dorn, 1964, 

p. 166 ; Plnfker, 1965 ; l'lafker 

and Mayo, 1965). When seismic 

vibration sundered petroleum storage tanks in Sen-ard, Valdez, and 

Whittier, the contents quickly 

caught fire and added to the devastation. At Seward and Vnldez, burning oil that was swept 

into the bay by submarine sliding 

was carried back across the waterfront by the returning surge of 

water; docks, piers, and smallboat harbors mere thus destroyed 

by water and fire. At Seward, 

tugs, fishing boats, and a tanker 

were n-ashed ashore. At Valdez, 

more llla~l 40 boats were smashed. 

At Whittier, the railroad port facilities were swept away. 

At Kodiak, damage mas caused 

mostly by a succession of huge 

seismic sea waves, intensified by 

tectonic subsidence of 5-6 feet. 

Forty percent of the business district and many homes were 

destroyed, as well as 30 percent of 

the fishing industry facilities and 

most of the fishing fleet (Tudor, 

1964, table 1 and p. 41). Some 

vessels were washed several city 

blocks inland where they collided 

with buildings and houses like 

great battering rams. At Kocliak 

Naval Station more than $11 million damage wns inflicted on 

buildings, materials, and equipment by 30-foot sea waves and by 

subsidence (Tudor, 1964, fig. 3). 

Piers were covered by 10 feet of 

water, and the buoyed-up suparstructure of the cargo pier shifted 

off its pilings. Boat-repair shops, 

gear-storage buildings, and warehouses mere damaged or swept out 

to sea (Stroll, 1964, p. 254). 

Port and harbor facilities at 

Cordova were damaged chiefly by 

tectonic uplift of about 6 feet and 

subordinately b y s e a w a v e s . Although the immediate effect of 

uplift was to minimize wave 

I 34.-Fire and wave damage to Seward port facilities. 
32 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

damage, it placed docks and piers 

beyond reach of shipping during 

low tides. Boats were grounded in 

the small boat harbor, Orca Inlet 

shoaled, and passages through the 

adjacent islands became unnavigable. 

Facilities at Homer were damaged by subsidence and submarine 

landsliding. Wave damage was 

minimal (Waller, 1966). T 11 e 

small-boat harbor disappeared into a "funnel-shaped" pool, and a 

lighthouse that had been on the 

harbor breakwater subsided into 

40-50 feet of water (Grantz and 

others, 1964, p. 24). Homer Spit, 

a gravel bar that extends 5 miles 

into Kachemak Bay and on which 

various commercial buildings and 

storage tanks mere placed, subsided 4-6 feet, partly by local compaction and lateral spreading and 

partly by regional tectonic lowering (Grantz and others, 1964). 

During subsequent high tides, facilities on the bar were inundated. 

Facilities at Seldovia sustained 

damage chiefly from subsidence. 

At Vroody Island FAA facility 

outside Kodiak, docks and storage 

tanks were damaged by seismic 

sea waves and subsidence. A cannery at Shearwater Bay was 

thrown off its foundations by the 

earthquake and later destroyed by 

waves. At Cape St. Elias lighthouse, about 135 miles southeast 

of the epicenter, a coastguardsman was injured by a rocksIide 

and later drowned by seismic 

waves (Grantz and others, 1964, 

P. 6). 

The Port of Anchorage was 

damaged by ground displacements 

along fractures and by direct seismic shaking. The main p i e r 

lurched laterally 5-19 inches. It 

sustained large longitudinal and 

transverse cracks, and several 

buildings were cracked. Gantry 

%.-Tsunamis washed many vessels into the heart of Kodiak. A section of the harbor and partly submerged breakwater can 

be seen in upper left. 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

cranes on the pier were damaged 

when they jumped their tracks. 

Approach roads settled as much 

as 18 inches. Cement-storage 

tanks were toppled. Bulk petroleum tanks were ruptured, and 

large quantities of fuel were lost 

(Berg and Stratta, 1964, p. 44). 

Throughout coastal areas of the 

damage zone many fishing vessels 

and other small craft were destroyed by direct wave action or 

by being battered against docks 

or the shore. Boaits in harbors or 

tied to docks were hit hardest; 

vessels underway in deep water 

were generally undamaged ; one 

fishing boat was sunk with all 

hands while underway in shallow 

waters near Kodiak. 

ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS 

Widespread atmospheric effects 

are sometimes associated with 

large earthquakes ; some have 

been documented (Richter, 1958, 

p. 128; Benioff and Gutenberg, 

1939, p. 421; Van Dorn, 1964, p. 

1'74). An atmospheric pressure 

wave attributed to the Alaskan 

earthquake wlas recorded by microbarographs at Scripps Institute of Oceanography at La Jolla, 

Calif., more than 2,000 miles from 

the epicenter, and at the University of California at Berkeley 

(Van Dorn, 1964, p. 174; Christensen 'and Bolt, 1964, p. 1208). 

This wave must have passed unnoticed at many other stations. 

It resembled air waves previously 

recorded from the detonation of 

large nuclear explosions. The 

wave traveled at acoustical velocity, reaching La Jolla 3 hours 

and 19 minutes after the onset of 

the earthquake (at 06:55 Gmt, 

March 28, 1965) ; it was, therefore, the atmospheric counterpart 

of the seismic sea waves generated 

in the Gulf of Alaska. Like the 

seismic sea waves, the air wave 

must have been caused by the tectonic uplift of the sea floor and 

the overlying water column. To 

displace the atmosphere in the 

form of a pressure wave, uplift 

must have been very rapid over a 

very large area, and must have 

coincided with the time of the 

most violent earth tremors (Van 

Dorn, 1964, p. 173-174; Plafker, 

1965, p. 1680). 

The earthquake also generated 

ordinary sound waves of very low 

subaudible frequencies in the atm0sphere.l These sound waves 

were recorded by the National 

Bureau of Standards at microphone stations in Washington, 

D.C., Boulder, Colo., and Boston, 

Mass. Sound waves were radiated 

by the earthquake at the epicenter 

and by seismic waves passing 

through the earth remote from 

the epicenter, exciting the atmosphere with their passage. Thus, 

the Rocky Mountains and the Mississippi delta were local sources 

of sound as they vibrated with the 

passage of the shock. In addition, Rayleigh waves (surface 

seismic waves) crossing the continent displaced the ground surface about 2 inches in the wnterminous United States and pro- - duced strong subaudible sound - 

waves that traveled vertically upward to the ionosphere, amplifying greatly as they ascended. The 

ionosphere, in turn, oscillated up 

and down at a rate of several 

hundred yards per second in motions that were d~ed (by means 

of reflected radio waves broadcast 

from one ground station to 

another. 

Atmospheric waves coupled to 

surface seismic waves were also 

recorded by a barograph at Berke- 

=Reported by. J. M. Young and R. K. 

Cook in papers presented at the meeting 

of the Acoustical Society of America in 

Washington, D.C., June 2-5, 1965. 

ley. These waves started at Berkeley about 14 minutes after the 

onset of the quake and lasted 

about 4 hours (Christensen and 

Bolt, 1964, p. 1208). 

Localized atmospheric effects in 

Alaska were related to avalanches 

triggered by the earthquake in the 

Chugach Mountains (Tuthill and 

Laird, 1966). Around the peripheries of large snow avalanches, 

trees were toppled by pressure 

blasts as the snow plummeted 

downward. Air blasts commonly 

accompany 1 a r g e fast-moving 

avalanches, whether such avalanches are triggered by earthquakes or not. The chief prerequisite is a large cross section of 

dense swiftly traveling snow (OF 

rock), and the accompanying blast 

may be caused both by the frontal 

thrust of the snow and the vacuum 

created by its passage (Church, 

1942, p. 135). Another local effect 

was a distribution of dust as thin 

coatings on glaciers adjacent to 

rock avalanches throughout the 

Prince William Sound region. 

POSSIBLE MAGNETIC 

EFFECTS 

Magnetic disturbances that began 1 hour 4 minutes before the 

earthquake momentarily increased 

the magnetic field at Kodiak by as 

much as 100 gammas (Moore, 

1964, p. 508). Moore has inferred 

a possible causal relationship between the magnetic disturbances 

and the earthquake, and a possilble means, therefore, of predicting major earthquakes by magnetic monitoring. Why abrupt 

magnetic disturbances should precede an earthquake is unknown, 

but "one possibility is that the 

magnetic events which preceded 

the Alaska earthquake resulted 

from piezomlagnetic effects of 

rocks undergoing a change in 

stress" (Moore, 1964, p. 509). 
34 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 

36.-Uplifted wave-cut sea floor at Cape Clear, Montague Island. Shows white coating of dessicated calcareous marine 

organisms and brown stripes or "stalks" of kelp. The stalks are about 2 feet long. 

BIOLOGIC EFFECTS 

Probably few earthquakes have 

so strongly affected the fauna and 

flora of a region as did the Alaska 

earthquake of 1964. Moreover, because of the complex interrelations of one organism to another, 

the total biologic effects will not 

be known for a long time. In the 

littoral zones of the Prince William Sound region, of the Kenai 

Peninsula, Kodiak and elsewhere, 

large communities of organisms 

were adversely affected when pronounced crustal changes completely altered the ecologic setting of 

the shore. Broad expanses of 

shore and sea botrtom were elevated above tide water in Prince 

William Sound, and innumeraNe 

m a r i n e ·organisms were exterminated. Effects were equally 

marked in the subsided upper end 

of Turnagain Arm near Girdwood 

and Portage, where coastal marshlands and forest were inundated 

by salt water-areas that formerly had provided winter forage for 

moose and nesting grounds for 

migratory birds. Extensive forested and grassland areas on Kodiak 

and A f o g n a k Islands were 

drowned, also. 

Hanna (1964, p. 24) has summarized the biologic effects of the 

earthquake in the littoral zone of 

Prince William Sound, and he 

portrays the extent of the depopulation in the following passage: 

The exposed areas spread out before 

the observer are many hundreds of 

square miles, once densely ,populated 

by a varied fauna and flora, now completely desolated. Many of the great 

array of marine animals that you read 

about when you study zoology are 

dead. There is now no littoral zone 

anywhere that the land went up 10 

feet or more. Most of the soft-bodied 

creatures had decomposed or had become food for birds by the time of our 

visit, 2 months after the earthquake, 

so the odor was not overpowering. 

The great array of living marine plants, 

so conspicuous along most coastlines, 

was gone. The Fucus had turned black 

from thirst ; the calcareous algae were 

bleached white and so were the many 

species of green algae. The great 

fields of big brown kelp were gone, 

but the individual stalks left their 

stems and holdfasts, black and bent 

over, a menace to the unwary footman. 

In many places there were great accumulations of dried starfish; and in 

one, the dried necks of clams formed a 

solid mass covering about a square 

yard. We left to speculation the manner in which these objects came to 

congregate. In some places a shovel 

could have been used to collect almost 

pure concentrations of small shells. 

Bleached remains of Bryozoa and cal-
careous algae were so white that the 

rocky beaches rivalled the snow covvered adjacent mountains in brightness. 

During studies that are still in 

progress, G. D. Hanna and George 

Plafker jointly examined the distribution of tectonically disturbed 

zones of sessile organisms. Some 

of these organisms, such as barnacleS and various algae, grow in 

response to rigorous water-depth 

controls, and their postearthquake 

vertical distribution above or below mean high-tide level provides 

a reliable measure of land displacement where geodetic control 

is unavailable (Tarr and Martin, 

1912, p. 29; Plafker, 1965). 

Other deleterious effects on organisms were caused by sea waves. 

ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

In addition to the enormous direct 

destruction caused by the waves 

themselves, salt water invaded 

many coastal lakes and destroyed, 

at least temporarily, the freshwater habitat. Spawning beds for 

salmon in some instances were destroyed by siltation in river deltas. 

Direct kills of eggs and fry were 

caused by disturbance of the 

gravel beds of streams (Alaska 

Dept. Fish and Game, 1965). 

Fish populations were also destroyed when streams and lakes 

temporarily lost water i n to 

ground cracks, or when streams 

w e r e dammed by landslides 

(Alaska Dept. Fish and Game, 

1965). On the other hand, subsidence in some areas opened 

miles of new spawning habitat by 

35 

inundating previously impassable 

falls and velocity barriers m 

coastal streams. 

The salmon fishery is one of 

Alaska's foremost resources, and 

the full impact of the quake on 

this fishery will not be realized 

until the matured 1964 hatch returns from the sea to spawn. 

Spawning areas for pink and 

chum salmon, which are intertidal 

spawners, received major damage 

in nearly all coastal sections 

affected by sea waves, uplift, or 

subsidence (Thorsteinson, 1965a). 

On Kodiak and Afognak Islands, 

moreover, the waves struck at a 

critical time when pink salmon 

fry were just moving from the 

spawning beds into the stream 

estuaries. Spawning areas for red 

37.-Tectonically elevated shoreline, Latouche Island, Prince William Sound. Heavy white encrustation of barnacles, topped 

by reddish-brown fucus, marks former mean high-water line. Uplift was about 10 feet. 
[E ALASKA EARTHQUA=, MARCH 27, 

and silver salmon were little 

affected by the earthquake (Alaska Dept. Fish and Game, 1965). 

Sport fisheries, including salmon, trout, char, and smelt, all 

were damaged by environmental 

disturbances, chiefly by subsidence, emergence, and salt-water 

pollution, especially in spawning 

areas. 

Vast numbers of red snapper 

(red rock cod) were exterminated 

in Port Valdez, Port Wells, and 

in the area between Knight Island, Chenega Island, and Evans 

Island, possibly by turbulence or 

sudden upwelling associated with 

submarine slumping, or perhaps 

by sudden pressure changes 

caused by the passage of highamplitude surface waves (H. W. 

Coulter, written cornmun., 1965). 

Countless thousands of these fish, 

which normally are bottom dwellers in deep water, were left floating dead at the surface (Grantz 

and others, 1964, p. 13; Hanna, 

1965, p. 25; Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966). 

Mortalities of dungeness crab 

were noted in the Copper River 

delta area ahr the earthquake, 

but the commercial mtch appears 

to have been unaffected. King 

Crab, a deeper water species, apparently was not significantly 

affected by lthe earthquake. 

Although the total crab population itself was not markedly 

affected by the earthquake, the 

crab industry was severely damaged by the loss of boa@ gear, 

harbor faoilities, and canneries. 

The loss of fishing vessels amounted to about $7 million and of related facilities to about $13 rnillion. To some extent the loss was 

offset on the market by unusu~ally 

heavy catches of crab during the 

1964 season, so that the crab 

harvest was actually larger than 

usual (Office .of Emergency Planning, 1964a, p. 23). 

Much of the commercial clam 

habitat in Prince William Sound 

and in the Copper River delta 

was damaged or destroyed (Alaska Dept. Fish and Game, 1965, p. 

52). The estimated total loss of 

clam habitat in the sound was 43 

percent, and the reduotion in the 

amount of commercially accessible clam habitat was 31 percent. 

(More recent observations by G. 

D. Hanna, oral commun., 1965, 

led him to believe that the clam 

mo&ality was closer t~ 90 percent.) In the Copper River delta 

and vicinity there was a high 

mortality of mzor clams, duck 

clams, and cockles. At the Cordova small-boat harbor, for example, the loss of commercial size 

cockles was about 3.6 per square 

foot. Razor clams were exterminated on the higher bars of the 

Copper River delta. The mortality of duck clams was as high as 

324 per square foot in the Martin 

River Slough on the east side of 

the Copper River delta. Duck 

clams are an important food for 

sea ducks, divers, and other birds, 

as well as for the starry flounder. 

Recovery of clams as a commercial resource is expected lto )be 

slow. Many of ;the new beach 

areas are now unsuited for clam 

habitat. In suitable areas, moreover, reseeded clams will require 

8 to 12 years of growth before 

reaching commercial size (Alaska 

Dspt. Fish and Game, 1965, p. 

52). 

The effects of the earthquake 

on terrestrial wildlife are mixed, 

and some sho~-term effects have 

even been beneficial. Aein, only 

time will disclose the long-term 

effects. In the mountains, some 

mountain goats lare reported to 

have been killed by avalanches, 

and there probably was some 

mortality among mountain sheep, 

deer, and maw. Although uplift 

adversely affeated shellfish habitats, it favorably altered nesting 

hab:tats of ducks, geese, and 

trumpeter swans by eliminating 

flood dangm. The long-term ecology may be less favorabl+a new 

balance will be established as 

brush gradually invades upland 

areas and emergent vegetation 

spreads over former mudflab; 

nesting places will shift accordingly (Olson, 1964; J. W. Brooks, 

Director, Div. Game, Alaska Dept. 

Fish and Game, written commun. 

to U.S. Bureau Commercial Fisheries, Jan. 12, 1965). In tectonically subsided areas where extensive fresh-water marshlands 

and meadows have been invaded 

by salt water, populations of 

mdose and other grazing animals 

will have to readjust downward 

to lthe new restricted food supply. 

DAMAGE OUTSIDE ALASKA 

Secondary damage effects of the 

earthquake reached far bey6nd 

Alaska as seismic sea waves generated on the continental shelf in 

the Gulf of Alaska spread rapidly 

across the Pacific Ocean to 

Hawaii, Japan, and Antarctica. 

The source mechanism of the 

waves has been investigated by 

Van Dorn (1964), who concluded 

that the waves were caused by the 

sudden displacement of water in 

the Gulf of Alaska, accompanying the uplift of thousands of 

square miles of sea floor. A maximum wave height of 4 feet was 

reported in the Ankrotic Peninsula (Palmer Peninsula), but 

heights in Japan %ere only a foot 

or so (Van Dorn, 1964, p. 187). 

Hilo, Hawaii, had a 7-foot wave, 

but received only minor damage. 

Apparently the source was directional, the mves radiating preferentidy souItheastward. Wave 

heights thus were greater along 

the North American coast than 

they were in the Aleutian Islands 
ITS SETTING AND EFFECTS 

at comparable distances from the 

sourw. 

As the train of sea waves advanced southward it spread damage in British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and California. 

Heavy damage was localized in 

Alberni and Port Alberni, B.C., 

in Hot Springs Cove, B.C., and in 

Crescent City, Calif. (U.S. Coast 

and Geodetic Survey, 1964a, p. 

40). At Alberni and Port Alberni, damage to houses and a forestindustries complex totaled several 

million dollars; 260 houses were 

damaged, 60 heavily. Of the 17 

homes at Hat Springs Cove, 5 

were washed away and 10 were 

heavily damaged. 

The ooast of Washington was 

damaged lightly. In Grays Harbor County, the waves destroyed 

a bridge across the Copalis River 

and overturned several trailer 

houses (Tudor, 1964, p. 4). 

The Oregon coast was struck 

by 10- to 14-foot waves. Damage 

was concentrated in estuaries; a 

family of four was drowned at De 

Poe Bay. A4t Seaside, where a 

trailer park was flooded as water 

backed up the Necanicum River, 

damaged totalled about $250,000. 

At Cannon Beach, damages totalled $250,000; power and telephone 

services were cut off and several 

houses were toppled off their 

foundations. At Gold Coast, docks 

and small boats were smashed in 

the Rogue River (Tudor, 1964, p. 

4). A6 Bay, an initial wave 

10 feet above mean high water 

was attenuated by crossing wide 

tidal flats before it reached Pony 

Point 7 miles up the channel, but 

at Florence an 8-foot wave traveling up a narrow channel was 

negligibly dissipated (Schatz and 

others, 1964, p. 231). 

In California, minor harbor 

damage was sustained as far south 

as San Diego where small craft 

were destroyed and dock installations were damaged. In San 

Francisco Bay, water surging 

through the Golden Gate set 

adrifi a ferry boat and a house 

boat, and caused about $1 million 

damage to small boats and berthing facilities at San Rafael. At 

Santa Cruz, a 35-foot floating 

dredge was set adrift and a 38- 

foot power cruiser was crushed 

(Tudor, 1964, p. 4). 

At Crescent City, which bore the 

brunt of wave damage in California, 12 lives were lost despite 

a 1-hour tsunami warning. Eight 

boats were sunk, 3 are unaccounted for, and 15 capsized. Docks, 

harbor facilities, and the seawall 

were heavily damaged. Fiftyfour homes were destroyed, 13 

were heavily damaged, and 24 

were slightly damaged. Fortytwo small business buildings were 

destroyed, 118 were heavily damaged, and 29 were slightly damaged. Fires were started by the 

rupture and explosion of 5 bulkstorage oil tanks (Tudor, 1964, 

p. 61-64). 

The fifth seismic sea wave to 

arrive at Crescent City caused 

most of the damage and took all 

12 lives. After the first wave 

cre4ed at 14.5 feet above mean 

low low water (MLLW), a second wave slacked off ts 12 feet, 

followed by two much smaller 

waves. The townspeople, thinking thak the tsunami was over, 

had begun to return to the flooded area when the fifth wavecoming in on a high tide-crested 

at 20.5 feet above MLLW. 

Seiches were generated in various places remote from Alaska by 

amplification of direct seismic vibrations (Donn, 1964, p. 261). In 

the Gulf of Mexico off Texascompletely separated physically 

from any possible effects of tsumanis-waves as much as 6 feet 

high damaged small craft. In 

addition, water was agitated in 

many swhing pools in Texas 

and Louisiana (U.S. Coast and 

Geodetic Survey, 1964, p. 41). Surface-water gages recorded fluctuations in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, A 1 a b a m a, Georgia, and 

Pennsylvania (Waller and others, 

1965, p. 130). 

The ground-water regimen was 

affected throughout much of 

North A m e r i c a. Water-level 

fluctuations were noted in wells 

t h r o u g h o u t the conterminous 

United States and at pints as 

distant as Puerto Rico, the Virgin 

Islands, and Denmark. Fluctuations of as much as 6 cm were recorded in wells in Denmark (R. 

C. Vorhis, w r i t t e n mmrnun., 

1965). The maximum reported 

fluctuation was 23 feeh in a well 

at Belle Fourche, S. D. Fluctuations apparently were greatest in 

a broad belt extending southeast 

from Sou6h Dakota and Wisconsin, through Missouri and Illinois, 

and on through Georgia and 

Florida to Puerto Rico (Waller 

and others, 1965, p. 131). Most 

level changes in wells were temporary, but some were permanent. 

The water in some wells was temporarily muddied. 
THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

By WALLACE R. HANSEN 

Within hours after the March 

27 Alaska earthquake, the Geological Survey had begun to assemble a force of scientists at the 

scenes of the disaster in southcentral Alaska. To cope with the 

many problems produced by a 

disaster of such magnitude, a wide 

spectrum of capability was needed, and the energies of many agencies-public and private-were 

called into play. A sizable need 

could be filled only by geologists, 

whose background and training 

equipped them to solve problems 

outside the competence of other 

professional aroups. In addition P to the massive purely scientific 

effort called for, geologists were 

able to assist the stricken Alaskans not only during the emergency of the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, but also 

during the more time-consuming 

tasks of restoring long-term economic health. Specialized knowledge was needed to help evaluate 

damage in terms of geologic environments and to assure adequate remedial measures when restoring damaged properties. Areas 

of enduring geologic hazard or ptential future hazard had to be 

outlined so that, within the limits 

of human judgment, recurrences 

of the March 27 disaster could be 

avoided. 

Quick answers were needed to 

questions whose diversity spanned 

the width and breadth of the 

geological sciences. Much reconstrucltion work hinged on proper 

solutions to many geologic problems and proper answers to such 

geologic questions as: What was 

the pattern of sea-level changes 

throughout coastal southern Alaska, and how would it affect, for 

example, the restoration of harbor facilities? What was the 

outlook for fisheries? What were 

the short-term and long-term 

effects on water supply, both surface and underground ? How was 

devastation related to ground conditions, and how could past mistakes be avoided in the future? 

What soil environments were 

susceptible to landsliding, could 

existing slides be stabilized, and 

could future slides be avoided? 

Whalt areas could be considered 

safe for restoration or repair? 

In slide areas? Along waterfronts? What safeguards were 

needed to proteot the Federal 

Government in granting emergency repair loans? What steps 

were needed to restore damaged 

railroad facilities ? Highways 

and bridges? Where could suitable supplies of embankment 

material and riprap be obtained? 

These and countless other questions pressed on the minds of 

geologists and laymen alike. 

For Gwlogical Survey personnel headquartered in Alaska or 

already assigned to Alaskan research, the earthquake investigation was in some ways a logical 

extension of their program. But 

in other ways, and to other participants, the earthquake meant 

postponing important but less 

pressing duties. 

George 0. Gates, former Chief 

of the Alaskan Branch of the 

Survey, was early named coordinator at the Washington level of 

all Geological Survey studies on 

the earthquake. He shuttlsd 

between Washington, Alaska, and 

his headqua~ters in Menlo Park, 

Calif., until the fall of 1964, coordinating intra-Survey groups, 

keeping in touch with other Federal agencies, and, in particular, 

planning the activities of farflung field parties in Alaska. 

When the Survey's activities had 

progressed to .the stage of report 

preparakion, his coordination duties mere transferred to Edwin 

B. Eckel. 

As described in "The Work of 

the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force: Earth Science Applied to Policy Decisions in 

Early Relief and Reconstruction," 

(p. 46), the Geological Survey 

played an important part in the 

Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission 

for Alaska, from ilts inception 

until October 1964. G. Donald 

Eberlein and Ernest Dobrovolny 

served as Geological Survey representatives on the Commission's 

Scientific and Engineering Task 

Force in Washington, and Dobrovolny and Eckel served on the 

Task Force's Field Team in 

Alaska, with Eckel as chairman 

of that group. Though paid and 

supported by the Geological Survey, these men were directly responsible to the chairman of the 

Commission. With their colleagues from ,the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers and the U.S. 

Coast land Geodetic Survey, they 

played significant roles in advising all Federal agencies involved 

in the problem as to where Federal funds should or should not 

be spent on reconstruction or on 

land stabilization. 
INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 39 

Survey personnel headquartered 

within the damage zone of Alaska, after seeing to the safety and 

~velfare of their families, faced 

the tasks of cleaning house and 

picking up after the earthquake; 

at the same time they attempted 

to meet the formidable challenges of the earthquake itself 

and the increased level of operations necessitated by the earthquake. For some personnel this 

meant finding new office space to 

replace quarters destroyed by the 

quake. 

By Monday morning following 

the earthquake, the administrative staff of T. B. Ball, management officer at Anchorage, had 

contacted all local units of the 

Geological Survey, had obtained 

estimates of the situation from 

each, and had provided Washington with an evaluation of damage to property and facilities. A 

local base of operations was established in one of the undamaged 

offices, temporary space was obtained as needed, and salvage 

operations were begun. Throughout the succeeding months, Ball 

and his staff and the staff of the 

local Ground Water Branch provided administrative support for 

all Geological Survey visitors and 

assignees, plus the Field Team of 

the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force of the Federal Reconstruction and Planning Commission for Alaska. 

Even while cleanup work was 

in progress, technical investigations were underway. On Monday 

following the earthquake, a start 

was made on a continuing program of water-well monitoring 

throughout the damage zone. J. 

L. Morgan visited and reset all 

automatic water-level recorders in 

the Anchorage area. Three of 

seven recorders were out of operation. Markod drops in artesian 

pressure levels were noted. On 

Tuesday, daily water-level measurements were started in Anchorage, Chugiak, and the Matanuska 

Valley. Surface Water Branch 

personnel stationed in Palmer verified streamflow losses at Anchorage, and on Wednesday, reconnoitered streams and lakes in the 

Chugach Mountains for possible 

earthquake effects. 

Less than 24 hours after the 

earthquake, Arthur G r a n t z , George Plafker, and Reuben 

Kachadoorian arrived at Anchorage to begin a reconnaissance 

study of the whole stricken area. 

These geologists had many years 

of experience in southern Alaska 

and a detailed knowledge of 

much of the affected area. 

Their investigations took them by 

plane, helicopter, car, and boat to 

virtually all parts of the affected 

area. Their study was directed 

toward outlining the entire problem in such a way that a preliminary view of the effects of the 

earthquake would be readily available on which to base later 

and more detailed investigations. 

Their reconnaissance thus provided first-hand information for 

subsequent workers, and their preliminary report, "Alaska's God 

Friday Earthquake, March 27, 

1964" (U.S. Geol. Survey Circ. 

491), published one month after 

the earthquake, mas immediately 

in great demand. The first printing mas quickly exhausted and 

several subsequent printings were 

necessary. 

Grantz, Plafker, and Kachadoorian were the vanguard of 

a staff of geologists who soon 

began to arrive. Roger M. Waller assumed the duties of 

Field Coordinator of Geological Survey activities at Anchorage. Harold E. Thom,as and 

Charles H. Hembree reconnoitered the hydrologic effects. 

Ernest Dobrovolny and Robert D. 

Miller made an extended stay at 

Anchorage. Henry W. Coulter 

went to Valdez and Richard W. 

Lemke went to Seward. A very 

brief reconnaissance of Valdez had 

already been made by Robert M. 

Chapman of Fairbanks. George 

W. Moore arrived at Kodiak to 

begin a study of earthquake effects 

on Kodiak Island. 

Roger Waller, as Field Coordinator, had gained through previous administrative experience in 

Alaska extensive knowledge of 

Alaska geology, hydrology, and 

geography. While in charge of 

the Ground Water Branch office in 

Anchorage, Waller had prepared, 

or shared authorship on, several 

reports on the geology and 

ground-water conditions in the 

greater Anchorage area. During 

and after his tour of duty as Field 

Coordinator, Waller made hydrologic studies of the stricken area 

and studied the overall effects of 

the earthquake on the community 

of Homer on the Kenai Peninsula, 

where slides and subsidence had 

curtailed the sea- and touristbased economy. 

Robert Miller and Ernest Dobrovolny had written a Geological 

Survey bulletin on the surficial 

geology of the anchorage area, 

published in 1959, in which earthquake warnings were sounded and 

potentially unstable areas were 

noted. Dobrovolny also had previous experience in the Chilean 

earthquake. While in Anchorage, 

Miller and Dobrovolny attended 

many open meetings with local 

groups and officials, issuing reassurances or words of caution, as 

appropriate. They served as 

informal consultants to many 

groups and agencies, including 

homeowner groups, urban planners, structural engineers, the 

Bureau of Land Management, the 

Bureau of Reclamation, and the 

Air Force. Meanwhile, they 
THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

Manuel G. Bonilla and David S. 

McCulloch arrived at Anchorage 

to begin studies of earthquake effects along the heavily damaged 

Alaska Railroad. Bonilla had 

studied earthquake effects in California and McCulloch had previously done geologic mapping in 

Alaska. Their findings were made 

immediately available to The 

Alaska Railroad agency. They 

examined nearly all the railroad 

bridges between Anchorage and 

Seward, studied several landslides 

along the route, and mapped 

ground cracks in the area between 

Portage and Seward. Their work 

also included surveys of materials 

for riprap and roadbed fill, studies 

of compaction along the right-ofmay, and various independent 

studies unrelated to the railroad at 

such places as Campbell Bluff line 

south of Anchorage, the Seward 

Highway at Moose Pass, the 

- - - Eklutna Power Station, and 

Kenai Lake. They made measbegan their own study of land- to the contractors of the Corps of urements at Kenai Lake to deterslides and the relmationships be- Engineers. mine the extent of slumping into 

tween ground conditions and prop- Henry Coulter, having recently the lake, the extent and character 

erty damage in the devastated finished mapping the geology of of high waves generated by landparts of Anchorage. the Valdez quadrangle, evaluated slides, and the extent and characRichard Lemke, who had made tjhe earthquake damage at Valda ter of seiching. 

earthquake evaluation studies in and made recommendations to the Immediate heavy demands were 

south-central Chile, began com- local authorities for reconstruction placed on the Public Inquiries and 

prehensive studies in Seward and redevelopment. The damage Map Sales Offices of the Geologiwhere slides, sea waves, fires, and at Valdez was very similar to that cal Survey in Alaska. For weeks 

ground cracks had practically at Sewar(& the problems wem after the earthquake these dewiped Out the much the same. Codterjs rwom- mands were met entirely by the 

little geologic work had been rnendations led to plans to relocate Alaska Distribution Section in 

done in the Seward area, and in in a more geologic Fairbanks. Sales offices and 

order to evaluate earthquake effects at Seward, Lemke first had setting on the north shore of Port agencies in Anchorage, Kodiak, 

to reconnoiter the general geologic Valdez fiord, about 4 miles west of Seward, and Valdez were put out 

=tting of seward before he could the present townsite. These plans of operation by the earthquake, 

map in detail the geology of the are now being carried out. Coul- and all their orders had to be 

city itself. During his stay at ter also studied the causes and ef- filled at Fairbanks. Map sales at 

Seward, Lernke was an informal fects of sea waves in Port Valdez. Anchorage had been made from 

consultant to the city, the Alaska One giant wave destroyed build- the Public Inquiries Office in the 

Department of Highways, and the ings on shore and left high-water Cordova Building-a building so 

Corps of Engineers. He also lines 170 feet above the fiord 10 damaged structurally that it had 

served as an advisor to urban miles west of Valdez at the Cliff to be evacuated. A temporary 

planning and renewal groups and mine. sales office was set up by Margaret 
INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 41 

I. Erwin in a vacant grocery 

store. Even at Fai11banks, ma'ps 

and supplies were scattered all 

over the floor. when racks and 

shelving were overturned by the 

earthquake. Demands were particularly heavy for maps and reports that would be helpful in 

assessing land and c o a s t a l 

changes, in evaluating damage, 

and in planning rehabilitation of 

stricken areas. 

Reuben Kachadoorian in the 

meantime started a regional study 

of earthquake effects on land. 

With a background of 12 years 

experience in the engineering 

geology of Alaska, he made detailed studies of virtually all 

major highways in south-central 

Alaska, including part of the 

Denali Highway and the Seward, 

Glenn, Richardson, Edgerton, and 

Sterling Highways. He and 

George Plafker examined the 

Copper River Highway and the 

Copper River delta. He studied 

the highway net on Kodiak Island, the Matanuska flats, the 

Robe River flats, the Portage 

area, part of the Kenai Lowland, 

Whittier, and Kodiak. Kachadoorian and Plafker also examined the Cape Hinchinbrook Lighthouse Station. Kachadoorian 

gathered information on geology, 

damage to bridges and roadbeds, 

the water regimen, subsidence, 

fractures, areas of ejected sand, 

eyewitness accounts, and the direction, duration, and type of seismic motion. He did reconnaissance in the Chugach, Kenai, and 

Talkeetna Mountains, and in the 

mountains near Katalla. 

The U.S. Geological Survey 

research vessel Don J. Miller, 

which was wintering in Seattle, 

was hurried to Alaskan waters for 

geological, geophysical, and submarine studies in Prince William 

Sound and Resurrection Bay. A 

party headed by George Plafker 

undertook a systematic study of 

all earthquake effects along the 

shorelines of the sound and of 

Resurrection Bay. The ll!ille1' 

served as the base of operations 

from mid-May to early July. 

The party included J . E. Case, L. 

R. Mayo, S. L. Robbins, and 

William Bastian, all of the Geological Survey. Studies were 

made of vertical displacements 

along the shorelines resulting 

from crustal warping, ground 

breakage (surface rupture) by 

faults, submarine slides, the effects 

of destructive waves along the 

shorelines, distribution and nature 

of ground cracks, landslides and 

avalanches, and seismic shock 

damage sustained at the smaller 

communities and habitations 

throughout the sound area. Plafker later extended these studies 

on a reconnaissance basis to the 

outer coast of the Gulf of Alaska between Yakutat and Seldovia 

and to the coast of the Kodiak 

Islands group, using a helicopter 

38.- Immediately after the earthquake, the U.S. Goological Survey's research vessel, the Don J. j}fi ller, sailed to Prince 

William Sound. 
42 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKJC, MARCH 27, 19 64 

and seaplane for logistic support. 

Concurrently with the work in 

Prince William Sound, Case and 

Robbins made a reconnaissance 

gravity survey of the entire area. 

G. Dallas Hanna, marine biologist of the California Academy of 

Science, spent 3 weeks with the 

party in Prince William Sound 

studying the effects of the earthquake on the ecology of intertidal 

fauna and flora. Changes in distribution of the fauna and flora 

were related in turn to tectonic 

changes in level of the land. 

Investigations of the tectonic 

deformation by the Geological 

Survey resulted in locating the 

only known surface faults that 

accompanied the earthquake, and 

in delineating a zone of crustal 

warping that for 500 miles extends parallel to the coast of the 

Gulf of Alaska. Within this 

zone, uplifts of as much as 33 feet 

and subsidence of as much as 7% 

feet were noted. These investigations, supplemented by the U.S. 

Coast and Geodetic Survey's releveling inland from the coast and 

measurement of land-level changes 

at tide-gage stations, showed that 

crustal warping extends over an 

area of at least 70,000 square 

miles. Information on the changes 

in land level was made immediately available to the U.S. Bureau 

of Commercial Fisheries and the 

Alaska Department of Fish and 

Game in order to aid in an appraisal of the long-range effects of 

the deformation on salmon spawning grounds and commercial clam 

beds. It also provided a basis for 

planning remedial measures by 

The Alaska Railroad, the Alaska 

Department of Highways, and 

private groups that would be required to protect or restore the 

usefulness of shoreline structures 

and installations. The data on 

the permanent crustal warping 

and surface faulting are of vital 

scientific interest to geologists and 

seismologists who are concerned 

with the cause and mechanism of 

the earthquake and the destructive 

seismic sea waves it generated. 

The findings were promptly made 

available in a press release and in 

oral reports to scientific groups. 

James E. Case, who boarded the 

Don J. Miller to record gravity 

variations, found a large positive 

anomaly nearly parallel to the 

zero isobase and probably associated with outcrops of lower Tertiary greenstone. In late June, 

Captain Fair Bryant of the U.S. 

Coast and Geodetic Survey ship 

Surveyor invited David I?. 

Barnes aboard the Surveyor 

while the Coast and Geodetic 

Survey was investigating the seaward end of the Montague Island 

fault. During the month of July, 

Barnes thus had an opportunity 

to study the seaward extension of 

the Knight Island anomaly. 

(During early 1965 he assisted 

Richard Malloy of the Coast and 

Geodetic Survey in preparing the 

reports on the project.) Barnes 

reoccupied several preearthquake 

gravity stations later in the summer of 1964 and found that the 

earthquake had caused measurable gravity changes. 

Widespread damage to the 

coastal parts of southern Alaska 

was caused by submarine landslides and locally generated 

waves. Damage initiated by 

sliding was compounded by the 

backwash of the resulting waves, 

commonly while the earthquake 

was still in progress. Much property u-as thus destroyed and many 

lives were lost. The effects of the 
INVESTIGATIONS BY TRE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

sliding at the port cities of Seward, Valdez, and Homer were 

recognized in the initial reconnaissance phase of the investigation. More detailed studies of 

shoreline damage carried out 

aboard the Miller indicated that 

submarine landslides and their 

accompanying destructive waves 

were widespread phenomena. The 

13 deaths and the damage at the 

port of Whittier also were caused 

by local waves generated by submarine landslides. The effects of 

comparable local waves, some of 

w h ic h reached altitudes of 170 

feet along the shoreline, were 

noted throughout the sparsely 

settled Prince William Sound 

area and the south coast of the 

Kenai Peninsula. 

In early July, Gene A. Rusnak, 

a marine geologist of the Geological Survey, equipped the JliZler 

with precision electronic sounding gear, bottom-sampling apparatus, and seismic equipment (sonoprobe) and began a program of 

submarine geological and geophysical study of the slide areas 

and their resulting deposits on the 

sea floor. He was assisted in the 

investigations, which were carried 

out in July and August, by D. S. 

McCulloch, L. R. Mayo, and L. L. 

Benton, Jr. 

Clifford A. Kaye and Wallace 

R. Hansen joined the field team 

at Anchorage. As a consultant to 

the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force of the Federal Reconstruction and Planning Commission for Alaska, Kaye contributed 

his special knowledge of soil 

mechanics and clay properties. 

He also collaborated with Hansen 

and Miller in landslide studies. 

Edwin B. Eckel followed shortly 

to take over the leadership of the 

field team of the Task Force, a 

position which Dobrovolny had 

held on an interim basis. Dobrovolny and Eckel now devoted full 

time to their fast-increasing duties on Task Force Nine. 

To obtain quantitative evaluations of landslides and ground 

displacements, Arthur Gervais, 

Jack R. Helm, and Alfred B. 

Dodd, topographic engineers, 

spent 3 weeks at Anchorage working closely with Hansen and Miller; they surveyed precision profiles across landslides, prepared 

planetable maps, and established 

ground control for photogrammetric mapping. Large-scale topographic maps of the Turnagain 

Heights, Government Hill, and 

Native Hospital landslides were 

subsequently prepared in Denver, 

Colo., by photogrammetric methods. 
44 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 27, 1964 

Regional effects of the earthquake in the Cook Inlet area were 

analyzed by Thor PIT. V. Karlstrom, assisted by Helen L. Poster. Karlstrom had a detailed 

knowledge of this area, having 

spent many seasons of study along 

Cook Inlet in connection with his 

Alaskan terrain and permafrost 

studies. His earthquake evaluations covered all phases of the 

problem as related to that area. 

He made detailed studies of 

ground breakage in the Kenai 

Lowland and did widespread 

reconnaissance elsewhere in the 

inlet, noting different types of 

behavior in different types of materials. He related the regional 

pattern of fracturing to inferred 

and mapped tectonic elements, 

and he studied ground failures in 

sea bluffs and associated changes 

in shoreline geomorphology. 

Miss Foster collaborated mainly 

in the Kenai Lowland. Previously, she had investigated and reported on the Fukui, Japan, earthquake of 1948. 

The sparsely settled Copper 

River basin, northeast of Prince 

William Sound, sustained relatively light, but nevertheless significant, earthquake damage. 

This area was examined by Oscar 

J. Ferrians, Jr., by aerial, ground, 

and aerial-photograph reconnaissance. Buildings, highways, and 

bridges in the lowland areas were 

damaged by vibrations, subsidence, and ground cracks. Landslides were triggered along slopes 

and bluff lines, avalanches and 

rockslides in the mountains. 

Ephemeral cracking was widespread on frozen lakes, rivers, 

muskegs, and flood plains. 

Effects of the earthquake on 

glaciers in southern Alaska have 

been studied by Austin S. Post, 

as part of a continuing glaciological investigation that began in 

1960. In 1960, 1961, 1963, and 

1964 Post examined nearly all the 

glaciers in Alaska and western 

Canada by visual aerial inspection and on aerial photographs. 

He found that the earthquake 

produced some rockfalls but no 

significant snow and ice avalanches on glaciers. Recent evidence, according to Post, fails to 

support the widely accepted earthq~~ake-advance theory of Tarr 

and Martin that earthquake-triggeered avalanches have caused 

rapid short-lived surges in Alaskan glaciers in the past. 

Other photogeologic studies 

\$-ere made by Robert J. Hackman, who reviewed all available 

~ostearthquake aerial photographs and prepared reconnaissance maps showing slides and 

avalanches. 

The earthquake had widespread 

remote hydrologic effects at places 

as far distant from the source as 

the southeastern conterminous 

United States, Puerto Rico, and 

even Denmark ; both surf ace and 

underground water supplies were 

affected. Marked level changes 

were recorded in many wells and 

in surface-water bodies. Robert 

C. Vorhis undertook a study of 

such effects and found that Inany 

ground-water instruments faithfully recorded the earthquake, in 

detail comparable to that recorded 

by highly sophisticated strain 

seismographs. Vorhis also noted 

two types of "permanent" groundwater level changes-instantaneous and gradual. 

An outcome of early postearthquake reconnaissance was a decision to document on 16-mm color 

motion-picture film all geologic 

phases of the earthquake. Hal G. 

Stephens photographed geologic 

evidence of subsidence, emergence, 

compressive and tensive forces, vibration, and wave action. He recorded types and amounts of damage to buildings, docks, and various other structures, and related 

the damage to such causes ;as vibration, landslides, seismic and 

locally generated sea waves, and 

submarine slides. All significant 

parts of the damage zone were 

photographed from the ground or 

from the air. This zone included 

Anchorage and vicinity, the highway between Anchorage and Valdez, Waldez and vicinity, the Copper River valley, Cordova, Homer, the Kenai Peninsula, KOdiak, Portage, Prince William 

Sound (where the evidence of 

emergence was most striking), 

Seward and vicinity, and Whittier. An edited, narrated film has 

been prepared. 

,4s the start of a long-term 

project to monitor crusbal changes 

in southern Alaska, Robert C. 

Foley and Arthur Gervais established n network of permanent 

bench marks on the shores of 17 

large lakes within about a 500- 

mile radius of Anchorage. These 

bench marks were referenced to 

the water levels of the lakes, so 

that the direction and amount of 

any tilting clan be obtained from 

~eriodic monitoring. Thus each 

lake surface is analogous to a 

giant spirit level. Bench marks 

were set at the following lakes: 

Ugashik, Becharof, Naknek, Iliamna, Kontrashibuna, and Clark 

on the Alaska Peninsula; Karlnk 

on Kodiak Island; Crescent, 

Chakachamna, and Beluga at the 

north end of Cook Inlet; Kenai, 

Skilak, and Tustumena on the 

Kenai Peninsula ; and Eklutna, 

George, Tazlina, and Klutina in 

the Chugach Mountains. 

One of the Geological Survey's 

functions, under its Branch of 

Waterpower Classification, is to 

appraise potential hydroelectric 

powersites on the public lands. 

Several such sites on the Kenai 

Peninsula and in the Talkeetna 

Mountains had been studied by 
INVESTIGATIONS BY THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 45 

Russell G. Wayland and David 

L. Gaskill some years prior to the 

1964 earthquake. After the earthquake, these sites were reexamined 

by Wayland and Harold L. 

Pumphrey to determine if the 

earthquake had caused any obvious ground changes, such as landslides, that might alter t 11 e i r 

classification status. The more 

accessible sites were visited on the 

ground, but others were reexamined only from the air, it 

being recognized that, in any 

event, detailed ground studies 

would be needed before any site 

could be developed. Wayland concluded that none of the sites mas 

so modified by the earthquake as 

to invalidate the earlier preliminary examinations. 

Geological S u r v e y investigations of the great Alaska earthquake of 1964 are still in progress 

and will continue for several 

years. New data are still being 

collected and processed, and new 

concepts are being tested and 

evaluated. Many level lines and 

bench marks must yet be resurveyed by the 1-.S. Coast and Geodetic Surrey, and several years, 

therefore, may pass before a really syiloptic view of regional crustal change can be obtained. Many 

geophysical data must yet be interpreted and related to geologic 

cause and response. Hydrologic 

changes are still in progress. 

Some time must pass before the 

permanent effects of the earthquake on ground-water aquifers 

can be screened out from the 

t r a n s i e n t effects. Long-term 

effects on glaciers-minimal on 

most glaciers, perhaps, but great 

on some-mill be watched with 

great interest. Along the rivers 

and on the deltas, in the bays and 

inlets, and along the shorelines, 

geomorphic changes will continue ; 

studies of effects in these areas 

have only started. A clear picture of ecologic effects is coming 

into focus, but many yerars will 

pass before all ramifications of 

new plant and animal relationships are clearly apparent. Finally, corollary studies are underway 

in Anchorage, Juneau, and in all 

coastal towns of southern Alaska 

to underline possible hazards-of - 

the kinds generated by past earthquakes-to the future security of 

these communities. Aided by experience gained from the 1964 

earthquake, these studies will help 

to establish a better relationship 

between local geologic settings and 

urban planning, zoning, and industrial development in the State. 
46 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE-EARTH 

SCIENCE APPLIED TO POLICY DECISIONS IN EARLY RELIEF AND 

RECONSTRUCTION 

By EDWIN B. ECKEI, and WILLIAM E. SOHAELI' 

INTRODUCTION 

The prompt and direct application by tlle Federal Government 

of knowledge drawn from earth 

scientists and engineers to the 

problems of reconstruction that 

resulted from the Alaska. earthquake of March 27, 1964, was unique in the history of disasters. 

Consequently, the story of 11011- 

this kno~~yledge \\.as applied deserr-es to be put on record, if only 

for study by those involved in 

future problems of the same sort. 

The Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force, an arm of the Federal 

Reconstruction and Developnlent 

Planning Commission for Alaska, 

was the vehicle for gathering engineering and earth-science informati011 from all available 

sources, for interpreting it, and 

for making recommendations to 

Federal agencies 011 matters that 

involved the stability of buildings 

or their foundations. 

The Federal Government's part 

in tlle reconstruction effort must 

be described briefly in order to 

put tlle work of the Task Force in 

proper perspective, for the part 

played by the Federal Government in aiding Alaskans, beginning with the first throes of disaster and continuing throughout 

the reconstructioil period, was 

very great. 

The full story of government 

participation would require several volurnes, but the following 

Structural engineer, Office of Chief of 

Engineers, Department of the Army. Washington, D.C. 

summary of the immediate response by military and civilian 

agencies and of the mork nccomplislled through n novel commission established by the President 

to coordinate the work of all Federal agencies will serve to give the 

necessary background here. Much 

of the material in the following 

paragraphs is based on, or quoted 

from, a bighly significant report 

entitled "Response to Disaster," 

prepared by the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska 

(1964). 

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OF 

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 

While the Federal Government 

was organizing its relief effort, the 

military gave immediate aid to the 

civilian community and supplemented the help given by State 

and local groups and by individuals. Most communications systems had, of course, been disrupted. The first word from outlying 

areas, and to the rest of the 

United States, was sent out 

througll a patchwork system of 

radio stations belonging to ham 

operators, fishing vessels, oil companies, and various State and 

Federal agencies. Within minutes 

after the earthquake, the U.S. 

Army Alaskan Command and the 

Elmendorf Air Force Base at 

Anchorage started the task of restoring regular telephone and 

radio communications among the 

stricken towns and between them 

and the rest of the United States. 

Within 3 hours, miIitary water 

tanks began supplying water in 

Anchorage, and less than 48 hours 

later water-purification units had 

I~een flown in to Anchorawe other 9 ' relief supplies were airlifted to 

isolated communities. Fort Richardson and Elmendorf Air Force 

R a s e provided guard troops, 

served thousands of meals, and 

offered emergency housing. 

At Kodilak the Navy provided 

meals, blankets, and many tons of 

supplies, plus the services of more 

than 1,000 men for emergency 

mork. Similar military aid went 

to nearly every inhabited place 

that had been hit by the earthquake or by its aftermath of fire 

and flood. 

The day after the earthquake, 

in response to a request from the 

Governor, the President declared 

Alaska to be n major disaster area. 

This declaration meant different 

things to different people-ranging from apprehension to wild 

hopes of immediate and complete 

relief-depending on their prior 

experiences and the degree of 

shock that they had already experienced. Actually it merely 

vide the immediate financial and 

nleslnt that governmental machinery could be set in motion to promaterial help that was needed. 

Thus began a series of unprecedented emergency measures executed or financed by the Office of 

Emergency Planning (OEP) . Under Public Law 81-8'75, OEP had 

the major responsibility for assisting State or local units in disaster- 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 

stricken areas to make emergency repairs and to restore public 

facilities. Theauthority provided 

hy the law and substantial funds 

available from the President's Disaster Relief Fund were used 

speedily and effectively by OEP. 

The philosophy adopted was to 

provide assistance as broadly and 

flexibly as possible within the 

spirit and intent of Public Law 

81-875. 

h wide range of relief and reconstruction v-ork began at once, 

much of it at the request of, and 

erentudly repaid by, the Office 

of Emergency Planning, and some 

by other Federal agencies using 

t lz e i r regular autlzorities and 

fnnds or special ones made available by the President's designation of a disaster area. 

The Army Corps of Engineers 

contracted for debris cleanance, 

restoration of public utilities, and 

repair of docks and other coininunity facilities in Anchorage, 

Seward, Valdez, Whittier, and 

elsewhere. Tlie Navy's Bureau of 

Yards and Docks aided Kodialc 

in the same may. The Alaska 

Railroad of the Department of the 

Interior assessed its damages and 

began repairs. The Bureau of 

Pnblic Roads of the Department 

of Commerce 11-orked with the 

,ilaska Department of Hi,olz~~-ays 

to restore the Iiighmay system. 

The Departments of Health, Education and Welfare, Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce, the Caast 

Gnarcl of the Treasury Department, and several independent 

agencies also took part in the 

early recovery effort. 

These government actions, both 

State and Federal, were essential, 

but much of the success of the 

early work xTas due to fraternal, 

social service, religious, civic, and 

private business organizations and 

to individuals. These g r o u p s 

lV o r k e d effectively, unselfishly, 

and in complete cooperation wit11 

governmental units, yet wit11 the 

heart\~arming spirit of independence and self help so characteristic 

of the people of Alaska. 

F E D E R A L RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 

PLANNING COMMISSION 

FOR ALASKA 

MAKEUP AND FUNCTIONS 

Soine ineans had to be fouild 

to coordinate nnd streamline the 

efforts of the inany Federal ngencies that had parts to play in the 

relief and rebuilding of stricken 

-ilaska. On April 2, 1964, Iess 

than a week after the earthquake, 

President Johnsoiz issued Executire Order 11150 (Federal Register Doc. 6&3378), establishing the 

Federtll Recoilstruction and De- 

~elopment Planning commission 

for Alaska. This group, hereafter 

called the Reconstruction Commission, or more simply the Com- 

~nission, was directly responsible 

to the President. It was composed 

of the heads of all Departments 

and independent agencies that had 

any direct financial or technical 

parts to play in the reconstruction 

effort. Members were : 

Senator Clinton P. Anderson, 

Chairman 

Secretary of Defense 

Secrehry of the Interior 

Secretary of Agric~llt~lre 

Secretary of Commerce 

Secretary of Labor 

Secretary of Health, Educntion, and Welfare 

Director, Office of Emergellcy Planning 

Administrator, Federd Sviation Agency 

Chairman, Federal Power 

Commission 

Administrator, Housing and 

Home Finance Agency 

Administrator, Small Business Administration 

Dwight A. Ink was lent to the 

Commission by the Atomic Energy Commission to serve as Executive Director, Frank C. DiLuzio 

of Senator ,111derson's staff was 

named as assistant to the Chairman, and TVilmot L. Averill of the 

Office of Emergency Planning 

was made Deputy Executive Director. The remainder of the 

small staff, which never numbered more than 25 people, was 

recruited for full or part time 

from the staffs of Senator Ander- 
48 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

son's Senate Committees or from 

some of the Commission's constituent agencies. 

The Reconstructioii Commission established the Alaska Field 

Committee, coinposed of 1*9preseiitatives of those agencies on the 

C"ommission which had offices in 

Alaska. Burke Riley, Regional 

Coordinator, Department of tlie 

Interior, was chairman of the 

Field Committee. This group provided effective coordination at 

field level for problems ~vhich cut 

across agency lines. The Alaska 

Field Committee also worked 

closely and to advantage with the 

parallel State group established 

by tl~e Governor-the Alaska Reconstrt~ction and Development 

Planning Comiilissioll, l~cacted 

by ,Joseph H. Fitzgernlcl, 

Coordinator. 

Tlie Commission was unique in 

several significant respects. First, 

it was tlie first Federal commission of this kind that combined 

the legislative and executive arms 

of government. Second, by its 

very composition as well as by 

the wording of the Executive 

order, decisioi~s reached by the 

Commission had the effect of 

Presidential orders on all constituent agencies. Lastly, t h e 

Commission probably set n record by terminating its existence 

as soon as its major tasks mere 

accomplished. Established 

on April 2, 1964, it mas completely dissolved 6 months Iater by 

Executive Order 11182 on October 6, 1964. 

Tlie functions of the Commission, as defined by the Executive 

order were as follows: 

Sec. 2. Functions of the Commission. 

(a) The Commission shall develop co- ordinated plans for Federal programs 

which contribute to reconstruction 

and to economic and resources development in Alaska and shall recommend appropriate action by the Federal Government to carry out such 

plans. 

(b) When the Governor of Alaska 

has designated representatives of the 

State of Alaska for purposes related 

to this order, the Commission shall 

cooperate with such representatives in 

accomplishing the following : 

(1) Making or arranging for surreys and studies to provide data for 

the development of plans and programs 

for reconstruction and for economic 

and resources development in Alaska. 

(2) Preparing coordinated plans for 

recoi~struction and economic and resources development in Alaska deemed 

appropriate to carry out existing statutory responsibilities of Federal, State, 

and local agencies. Such plans shall 

be designed to promote optimunl benefits from the expenditure of Federal, 

State, and local funds for consistent 

objectives and purposes. 

(3) Preparing recommendations to 

the President and to the Governor of 

Alaska with respect to both shortrange and long-range programs and 

l~rojects to be carried out by Federal, 

State, or local agencies, including recommendations for such additional Federal or State legislation as may be 

deemed necessary and appropriate to 

meet reconstruction and development 

needs. 

DUTIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 

The Reconstruction Commission's varied duties and accomplishments can be grouped under 

four general headings: (1) estimates of damage and the work 

required for reconstruction, (2) 

drafting of special legislation, 

(3) initiation, scheduling, and coordination of reconstruction and 

financial relief, 'and (4) longraiige economic planning and recommendations. 

ESTIMATES OF DAMAGE 

First estimates of the amount 

and nature of damages sustained 

by Alaska were made by many 

State, Federal, and local :agencies 

within a few hours or days after 

the earthquake. These estimates 

were soon followed by more comprehensive ones. In addition to 

analyses of their own installations 

made by such agencies as the Department of Defense, the Alaska 

Department of Highways, and 

The Alaska Railroad, a broad 

study was made by the Alaskan 

ConstructionConsultants Committee-a group appointed by the 

chairman of the Commission. This 

committee, whose members were 

drawn from the Associated General Contractors of America and 

the International Union of Operating Engineers, inspected the 

damage to private and public 

property, reviewed the manpower 

situation, and reported its estimates of damage to the Commission (Alaskan Construction Consultant Comm., 1964). The Alaska State Housing Authority cooperated with the Fedeml Housing and Home Finance Agency in 

estimating damages to private 

real property. Under sponsorship 

of the Commission, the American 

Iilstitute of Architects and the 

Engineers Joint Council also 

established a team to advise the 

Commission and the Governor 

both as to reconstruction phns 

and the long-range development 

program (Am. Inst. Architects 

and Engineers Joint Council 

Comm., 1964). 

Based on these and other 

sources, the Commission's estimate of damages, as of August 

12, 1964, is shown in table 2. 

In addition to estimates of the 

dollar values of damaged properties, it was essential to the planning of a rebuilding program that 

the nature of the landslides and 

submarine slides that had caused 

much of the damage be understood in detail. To this end the 

Office of Emergency Planning 

financed and greatly expedited an 

intensive program of soils investigations. The prognam was conducted by the Corps of Engineers 

in Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, 

and Homer. The results of these 

studies, plus the results of the 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 49 

TABLE 2.--Summary of estimated damages, August 12, 1964 

[Condensed from Federal Reconstruction and Devel. Plan. Comm. Alaska, 1964, p. 111 

Public Property : 

Federal: 

Military ___---_____------____ $35, 610,000 

Nonmilitary ---_____---------- 35, 641, 000 

Non-Federal : 

State and local _____ _____. _ ___ _ 107,373,000 

Highways _----_____------____ 55,568,000 

$234, 192, 000 

Private property : 

Real ---_____----___----____ 77,000,000 

Total damage, excluding personal property and 

loss of income- _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 31 1, 192,000 e 1 Includes all highways on Federal-aid system; highways to be restored to preearthquak condition. Estimated cost of highway construction to 1964 design standards is $65,088,000. 

seismic engineering and geologic 

inrestigations that were carried 

on by the 1J.S. Coast and Geodetic 

Survey and the U.S. Geological 

Survey, respectively, formed the 

basis for the recommend a t' lolls 

made to the Commission by the 

Scientific and Engineering Task 

Force, whose activities are described below. 

SPECIAL LEGISLATION 

It was apparent that Alaska 

~vould require even more aid than 

could be provided under existing 

programs or legislative autliorities. The Commission, theref ore, 

took a. leading part in ~vorking 

114th the Bureau of the Budget, 

\\-it11 its own constituent agencies 

and those of the State, and with 

the Congress in preparing needed 

legisl~ition. 

Two principal legislative accomplishments resulted. The first 

accomplishment was a request 

from the President for extension 

of his authorization to provide 

transitional grants to Alaska. 

When Alaska became a State in 

1959, Congress provided transitional grants of $28.5 million to 

help the State assume the responsibilities for public services that 

llad earlier been provided to the 

Territory by the Federal Government. It was obvious that earthquake damages mould lead directly to cuts in tax bases and other 

sources of revenue. The Congress 

agreed 1vit11 the need for continuailce of the transitioaal-grants 

policy and appropriqated about $41 

million, for the period ending 

June 30, 1966, to be used to carry 

on essential State and local services. 

The Commission's second large 

accoinplisllnlent in the legislati\-e 

field was the drafting of the Alaska Omnibus Bill (S. 2881 and 

H. R. 11438, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.), 

~~hich was transmitted to the 

Congress on May 27. 1964. mas 

later passed ~~itll several significailt amendments, and became 

la\\- 011 August 19, 1964. 

The Omnibus Bill provided for 

many changes in existing laws so 

that a maximum of disaster aid 

could be provided in a minimum 

of time. Among the more significant items mere the following : 

1. The Bedexal share of Bederalaid highway costs was increased from 50 percent to 

94.9 percent. 

2. The Corps of Engineers was 

authorized to modify civil 

works projects, such as expansion of small-boat harbors, to meet prospective future requirements. 

3. Certain lending agencies mere 

authorized to adjust the indebtedness of borrowers. 

4. The Housing and Home Finance Administration was 

autllorized to contnact for 

as much as $25 million for 

urban renewal projects; the 

Federal share of the participation was increased from 

75 percent to 90 percent. 

5. The Fedeml Government was 

authorized to purchase as 

much as $25 million of State 

of Alaska bonds. 

6. The President mas autl~orized 

to grant a total of $5.5 million to the State, on a 50- 

50 matching basis, to adjust 

or retire mortgage obligations on family dwellings. 

RECONSTRUCTION PLANS AND 

SCHEDULING 

The Commission also played a 

leading part in drawing up plans 

and schedules for reconstruction, 

in coordinating the work of Federal, State, and local agencies, 

ancl in expediting actual work 

schedules. The plans hacl to take 

cognizance of the fact that the 

normal constructiol~ season in 

,Uaskn is very short and that 

there vere immediate needs that 

must be met. On the other hmd, 

it \\-as considered undesirable to 

pnt all reconstructiol~ work on n 

crash basis, for this would have 

tended tom-nrd price inflation *and 

importation of non-Alaskan labor, 

both of ~vl~ich would have weakened the Alaskan economy. For 

these reasons, efforts were made 

to compromise between the needs 

for immediate high-priority work 

and the desire to stretch out the 

recoi~structioi~ on projects of 
50 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 

lower priority. Despite these compromises, however, the Commission emphasized speed throughout 

its work, both in releasing a flow 

of funds to bolster the economy 

and in the physical reconstruction 

of facilities. 

Emergency repairs to utilities 

and highways were of course 

given first, priority. The extensive geologic and soils investigations that were needed as a basis 

for recoilstruction plans at hchorage, Seward, Valdez, and 

elsewhere were next in priority. 

Eilgineering design of reconstruction projects followed closely; 

preliminary designs, indeed, paralleled basic soils investigations in 

some places. Finally, bids were 

examined and contracts awarded. 

In addition to aiding in the reconstructioi~ of utilities and other 

public properties, it was essential 

that, the Federal Government help 

strengthen the State's economy by 

providing all possible aid and encouragement to private individuals and business groups-from 

the individual homeowner to the 

lending institutions. In this work 

the Commission again played an 

important part. Normal disasteraid policies were liberalized and 

expedited; longer term loans :at 

lower interest rates were permitted, and owners who had lost 

their properties or suffered extensive damages were released 

from all or part of their debts to 

the Federal National Mortgage 

Association, the Veterans Administration, and the Small Business Administration. Further relief was provided by income-tax 

deductions and rebates based 011 

property losses. Rebates were expedited by the Internal Revenue 

Service by the use of the risk 

maps prepared by the Scientific 

and Engineering Task Porce, described below, that is, properties 

within the "high-risk" areas, as 

designated by the Task Force, 

were automatically assumed to 

have suffered losses ; hence rebates 

could be made immediately and 

without further investigation. 

LONG-RANGE ECONOMIC PLANNING 

Even though the Gommission 

was preoccupied with immediate 

problems of reconstruction, it 

could not lose sight of the longterm needs of Alaska. To this 

end, and to the extent possible 

under applicable lam, it gave its 

backing to construction of facilities that were more modern, 

larger, or safer than would have 

been called for by reconstruction 

of facilities merely to their preearthquake condition. For example, it recommended the reconstruction of rail facilities at Seward, the rebuilding of highways 

to modern design standards, the 

complete relocation of the town 

of Valdez, and the enlargement of 

several small-boat harbors. 

The Commission also made a 

series of strong recommendations 

for more research on scientific and 

engineering subjects, designed to 

aid in the prediction and understanding of earthquakes and their 

effects, hence to provide better 

safeguards to the public in the 

e v e n t of future earthquakes, 

whether in Alaska or elsewhere. 

FEDERAL FINANCIAL 

ASSISTANCE 

The Federal financial assistance that was made available by 

the Alaska Omnibus Bill and by 

existing legislation is shown in 

table 3. 

TABLE 3.-Estimated Federal assistance to Alaska after March 27, 1964, 

earthquake 

[Slightly co~lde~lsed from Federal Reconstructioll and Devel. Plan. Comm. Alaska, 

1964, p. 201 I\.lillions ofdollars 

Federal aid to State and local governments: 

Disaster relief- -- ____.___________.___

60- 70 

Transitional grants -_-._________----------17- 23.5 

Highways 43- 63 

Urban renewal grants.._ _ - _-_ -_ - _- -- --- -. - -- - -- - 25- 40 

Purchase of Alaska bonds ______________-~------ 10- 25 

Planning advances- - -_ _ __ --_ -_-_-_-_ - - -- - --- -. .3- 0.5 

155.3-222.0 

Federal aid to private individuals and groups: 

Loans by Small Business Administration, Depts. of 

Interior, Agriculture .......................... 60 - 70 

Forgiveness and other adjustments on outstanding 

loans__-_----------..-_--..-------------------- 7 - 10 

Tax refunds and offsets -_------- ------- 20 - 30 

87 -110 

Restoration of Federal facilities and direct Federal operations : 

Defense facilities ---______---------------------- 35.6 

The Akaska Railroad .___--_---_--------------27.0 

All other Federal agencies ------------..---------- 19.6 

82.2 

Total (rounded) .-____--------------------325-414 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 

The fact that the estimated 

funds made available for reconstruction by the Federal Government exceed the estimates of dam- 

:\ge caused by the earthquake is 

in part due to the provisions to 

upgrade some f acilities-such as 

liigh~vays and small-boat basinsto better than preearthquake condition. In part it also means that 

the damage estimates do not include losses of personal property 

and income, whereas these were 

covered in various ways in anthorizations for assistance. Whatever the specific reasons, however, 

it. is generally recognized that the 

Federal Government must continue to aid in Alaska's economic 

development for some years to 

come. Tlie earthquake of 1964, 

disastrous though it was, can thus 

be thought of as actually having 

given impetus to government policies and philosophies that were 

already in being. 

TERMINATION OF THE 

COMMISSION 

Tlie Reconstructio~l Commission mas dissolved by Executive 

Order 11182 (Federal Register 

Doc. 64-10178) on October 6,1964. 

In its place the President established a Federal Field Committee 

for Development Planning in 

Alaska, to be headquartered in 

Alaska, and a President's Review Committee for Development 

Planning in Alaska, with the 

Secretary of Commerce designated 

as Chairman. The same Executive 

Order transferred to the Director of the Office of Emergency 

Planning the residual functions 

of the Reconstruction Commission 

with respect to earthquake reconstruction. So long as the President's declaration of a m~ajor 

earthquake disaster remained in 

effect, the Office of Emergency 

Planning was given responsibility 

of "developing coordinated plans 

for Federal programs \vhich contribute to recoi~structioi~ in Alas1i:i ancl appropriate action by the Federal Governnlcnt to carry out such plans." 

SCIENTIFIC AND EN GINEERING TASK FORCE 

AND ITS FIELD TEAM 

HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES 

From the standpoint of the 

earth sciences ancl their application to the reconstruction problems of Alaska, one of the most 

significant of the Commission's 

actions was the establishment of 

the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force. On April 7, 1964, 

shortly after the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska was 

eskablished, it appointed eight 

special task forces; later it added 

a ninth one, which is the subject 

of this section. Each task force 

was composed of representatives 

from selected Federal agencies 

and each was to assist the Cominission in developing coordinated 

plans in a single area. of study. 

The original bask forces were : 

1. Comm~ulity facilities 

2. Economic stabilization 

3. Financial institutions 

4. Housing 

5. Industrial development 

6. Natural resources 

7. Ports and fishing 

8. Transportation 

It became evident that a. ninth 

task force was needed to advise 

the Col~lillission on those *aspects 

of geglogy, soils, and related engineering knowledge that bad a 

bearing on reconstruction plans. 

On April 23, 1964, the Commission's chairman, Senator Anderson, established the Scientific and 

Engineering Task Force. This 

group, which became better and 

more simply known in Alaska and 

Washington as Task Force 9, was 

one of the more active among the 

Commission's task forces. Its recommendations played a significant 
52 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 1964 

part in guiding reconstruction decisions in Anchorage, Seward, 

Homer, Valdez, and Kodiak. Its 

basic charter follo~vs : 

The first objective of the Scientific 

and Engineering Task Force is to advise the Commission immediately as 

to the physical parameters in Alaska 

which should be considered in connection with reconstruction, on the basis 

of information available now. These 

recommendations will be submitted to 

the Commission in a form applicable 

to reasonable, practical and economiral reconstruction. 

The second objective for the Scientific and Engineering Task Force is to 

participate in the conduct of a scientific study. While it is recognized 

that a decision has not been made as 

to the manner in which the longrange scientific study of Alaska will be 

made, this task force fully endorses 

the need of such a study for the following reasons : 

This earthquake, one of the major 

ones of history, provides a unique 

opportunity to obtain and make widely 

knon-n reliable scientific and technical 

data concerning the cause and effect of 

seismic disturbances. Concerted effort in the scientific and engineering 

investigation of the Alaska earthquake 

and its related phenomena should be 

executed. The study should include 

such things as methods to predict the 

initial shock and after shocks of future earthquakes, a better understanding of the geologic and geomorphic factors affecting earthquake damage, the 

development of more efficient seismological equipment, better understanding of the generation and propagation 

of seismic seawaves, better understanding of the engineering aspects of 

earthquakes, improvement and application of structural engineering criteria for earthquake-resistant structures, and the improvement and application of techniques for minimizing 

destruction and loss of life in the future. 

In practice, t,he urgencies of the 

situation were such that the Task 

Force had to devote nearly all of 

its energies to the first of the ttvo - 

objectives described above. It did, 

however, make definite recommendations to the Commission concerning the need for long-range 

scientific studies (Federal Reconstruction and Devel. Plan. Comm. 

Alaska, 1964, p. 54-58), and many 

of the ideas of its members have 

borne fruit in the plans for 

further scientific studies by the 

7T.S. Coast *and Geodetic Survey, 

the U.S. Geological Survey, and 

other public and private agencies. 

The Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force saw the need for a 

field element, stationed in Alaska, 

to meet its immediate requireinents for geological, earth mechanics, and engineering inforination relative to zoning and 

reconstruction problems. On 

April 30, 1964, it established a 

Field Team and assigned it two 

primary duties. The first was to 

develop and coordiilate the execution of specific plans for field 

studies pertinent to reconstruction. The second duty was to 

recommend to the Task Force, 

and through it to the Commission, 

those areas suitable for reconstruction and to establish interim 

zoning and design criteria to 

guide construction in this ea~th- ., 

quake-prone region. 

The Task Force was authorized to draw on the talents of 

Federal agencies and their consultants as required to augment 

memberships in both Task Force 

and Field Team. Also, in compliance with Executive Order 

11150, the Field Team was required to work very closely with 

State, local, and Federal representatives in the field. 

All members of Task Force 

and Field Team were paid and 

supported by their parent organizations. The U.S. Geological 

Survey in Anchorage provided 

a secretary and office facilities 

and services, and the Alaska District Engineer's office, Corps of 

Engineers, was extremely generous in providing facilities for 

press conferences, reproduction 

facilities, and many other aids to 

the Field Team's work. 

By courtesy of Senator Ernest 

Gruening, the Field Team was 

stationed in his office in the Federal Building, Anchorage. This 

address was not widely known, 

but the door was always open to 

officials or private citizens. 

Personnel of the Task Force 

and Field Team are listed below : 

Scientific and Engineering Task Force 

S. Theodor Algermissen, Data Analysis and Research Branch, Coast and 

Geodetic Survey, Commerce 

Ernest Dobrovolny, Engineering Geology Branch, Geological Survey, Interior 

G. Donald Eberlein, Alaskan Geology 

Branch, Geological Survey, Interior 

Robert H. Nesbitt, Civil Works, Office of Chief of Engineers, Department 

of Army, Defense 

William E. Schaem, Military Construction, Office of Chief of Engineers, 

Department of Army, Defense (Chairman) 

Charles A. Whitten, Office of Physical Sciences, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Commerce 

(Note: Because he was also assigned 

to Anchorage with the Field Team, 

Dobrovolny played only a small part 

in direct Task Force work.) 

Field Team 

Ove Carstensen, North Pacific Division, Corps of Engineers, Department 

of Army, Defense 

William K. Cloud, Seismological 

Field Survey, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Commerce 

Ernest Dobrovolny, Engineering Geology Branch, Geological Survey, Interior 

Edwin B. Eckel, Special Projects 

Branch, Geological Survey, Interior 

(Chairman) 

W. Harold Stuart, North Pacific 

Division, Corps of Engineers, Department of Army, Defense 

In addi,tion to these members, 

Karl V. Steinbrugge, a consultant to the Coast and Geodetic 

Survey, worked effectively with 

the Field Team and added greatly 

to i,ts strength. On occasion, 

other members of the Coast 'and 

Geodetic Survey, the Geological 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 53 

Survey, and the Corps of Engineers took part i11 some of the 

Field Team's conferences and 

meetings. They also supplied it 

with needed faots and opinions 

based on their own field observations. Dwight A. Ink, executive director of the Commission, 

kept in close personal touch ~vikl~ 

both Task Force and Field Team, 

and gave them constant strong 

support, as did members of his 

staff. In particular, Colonels 

Harry PIT. Tufts and William J. 

Penly, who alternated between 

Alaska and Washington, provided 

direct liaison between Task Force, 

Field Team, and various governmental agencies. These men 

\\-ere helpful in many ways and 

added greatly to morale during 

some trying moments. 

The degree of detachment from 

their parent organizations varied 

\\-idely among the participants of 

both Task Force and Field Team. 

Some were completely detached, 

and were thus able to give full attention to their duties for the Commission, whereas others were 

expected to perform these duties 

in addition to full-time regular 

duties for their parent organizations. The responsibilities of khe 

Task Force and its Field Team 

\\-ere so demanding that those 

members who mere nearly or quite 

relieved of regular duties provided most of the continuity and 

performed, perhaps, a disproportionate share of the work. 

Credit for the choice of such a 

group of experts and specidists 

and for their release from other 

duties must go to the foresight 

of the heads of their parent agencies. However, the fact that 

mewbers, despite great differences 

in technical backgrounds and 

personslities, could work together 

as a 11-ell-bxlancccl team must be 

 scribed to chance. Whatever the 

causes, the results were good. 

The Task Force was dlissolved 

on October 6, 1964, at the same 

time as its parent Commission. 

The Field Team had already teased to function as a unit at khe 

oonclusion of its final reports on 

Anchorage and Homer, dated 

September 8, 1964. Individual 

members of both Task Force and 

Field Team continued to carry 

sollie responsibilities intermittently for a few months, chiefly 

by responding to queries from 

various citizens or agencies as to 

the application of the Task Force 

recommendations. Even though 

there was no longer any effective 

enforcement mechanism, a11 recommendations with respect to 

land classificatioii and use were 

still being folio\:-ed by Federal 

;~gencies at the time this report was 

sent to the printer. 

ACTIVITIES AND METHODS 

As it evolved, the principal 

responsilbility of the Task Force 

and its Field Team mas to make 

firm recommendations to the Commission anci its constituent agencies as to TI-here Federal funds 

should or should not be spent for 

ground stabilization, for repair of 

damage, or for complete reconstruction or relocation of structures and facilities. Despite this 

seeming preoccupation with financial matters, all members of t.he 

Task Force and Field Team kept 

constanctly in mind that their 

primary responsibility was for the 

public safety. This fact doubtless led to recommendations that 

were more conservative than they 

other\\-ise might have been. 

By the time the Task Force 

was organized, the Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, had 

already been designated by the 

Office of Emergency Planning as 

the responsible agency for developing most of the basic information that was essential for final 

recommendations. This situation 

called for tbhe closest possible cooperation between the users land 

gatherers of basic data-thalt is, 

between the Task Force and Field 

Team on the one hand and the 

Corps of Engineers and its consultants and contractors on the 

other. Much of the credit for khe 

cordial and friendly cooperahion 

that ensued belongs to Col. Kenneth T. Sawyer, Alaska District 

Engineer, and to Warren R. 

George, Chief, Engineering Division, Alaska District Office. 

The Field Team participated in 

thorough discussions of the soilsexploration program of the Corps 

of Engineers when it was being 

formulated and scheduled wit11 

the contractor firm of Shannon 

and Wilson, Inc. All suggestions 

and requests made by the Field 

Team were accepted by 'the District Engineer, and the responsibility for carrying them out was 

added to the conkractor's job. 

These suggestions included the 

drilling of several additional holes 

and testing of samples therefrom, 

the electric logging of some exploratory holes and geologic examination of samples, and the 

completion and equipment of a 

few holes as observation wells for 

future studies of the groundwater regime. 

Members of the Task Force and 

the Field Team and scientific colleagues from their parent argailizations were \-+-elcome at all 

times to follow the progress of 

the exploratory 1~-ork, to examine 

records or samples, to view lalboratory or field tests, or to discuss 

inutual problems with members of 

the Corps or its contractors and 

consultants. Except for thorough 

reviews of the formal interim reports, however, such contacts 

were deliberately kept to a minimum in order to avoid interfer- 
54 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, lMARCH 27, 1964 

ence with the progress of the soilexploration program. 

I11 all its series of recoinmendatioils on parts of A%ncl~orage, the 

Field Team adhered to a rigid 

schedule that paralleled a similarly rigid schedule of reports on 

its soils investigations by the 

Corps of Engineers and its contractor, Shannon and Wilson, Inc. 

By joint decision of the Commission, the ,4laska District Engineer, and the contractor, the results 

of 'the soil program were reported 

in segments and on specified dates. 

It is to the credit of the Shannon and Wilson firm and the 

Corps of Engineers that each of 

the deadlines was met, despite 

the fact thaft the entire schedule 

called for the telescoping into a 

very few weeks of work that 

would have ordinarily required 

many months. 

For each segment of the reportand-recommendation process, the 

Shannon and Wilson firm presented both written and oral reports to the Alaska District 

Engineer and his staff. Consultants retained by both the contractor firm and ists sponsor took 

part in the discussions either in 

person or by telephone. The 

Scientific and Engineering Task 

Force Field Team shared in all 

the presentations and therefore 

had an opportunity to make suggestions, ask questions, and understand fully the basic facts that 

had been gathered land the meaning of the recommendations made 

by Shannon and Wilson, Inc., to 

the Corps of Engineers. 

Af;ter each initial presentation, 

the Field Team commonly met 

with Corps of Engineers personnel, and generally wit11 one or 

more of the Corps consultants, to 

discuss the maltter more fully and 

to translate the findings from the 

soil-exploration program, first 

into a set of official engineering 

decisions (by the Corps of Engineers and finally into a map that 

divided 'the area under study into 

various categories of risk from 

the standpoint of reconstruction. 

At this point the Field Team 

drew on the specialized knowledge of its own members or on 

the knowledge of their colleagues 

who were engaged in field studies 

sponsored by the parent organizations. 

The final recommendations and 

risk maps thus represented the 

combined judgment of a large 

group of scientists and engineers, 

each of whom was a specialist, 

in one or more facets of the immediate problem. The Task 

Force, which presented the recommendations 'to the Commission for 

approval, and the Field Team, 

which reported the final decisions 

to city officials and the public, 

necessarily assumed primary responsibility for their validity. 

I11 conference with the Alaska 

District Engineer, his staff, and 

col~sultai~ts to the Corps of Engineers, the Field Team commonly 

drafted a press notice. The text 

was dictated to the Task Force 

chairman in Washington by telephone, and accompanying maps 

were either sent by airmail or 

were described in detail by telephone. The Task Force in Washington studied each proposed 

release, revised it as necessary, 

and obtained approval of the Federal Reconstruction Commission. 

This approval, whether given by 

its executive officers or by the 

full Commission, constituted a 

firm policy decision by the Federal Government !that applied to 

all agencies involved in financing 

the reconstruction efforts. 

When word of Commission 

approval of a given set of reoommendations reached Anchorage, 

the Alaska District Engineer's office and the Field Team met with 

the mayor and other cilty and 

State officials ; representatives of 

all local news media were invited. 

The District Engineer and his 

staff and consultants explained 

the recent fiindings of the @oilexploration program, and the 

chairman of the Field Team announced and explained the Task 

Force recommendations that had 

been adopted by the Commission. 

Copies of the press notices and 

maps, issued jointly by the Task 

Force and the Corps of Engineers, were distributed, and the 

availability of extra copies for 

interested individuals or groups 

mas announced. The conferences 

commonly lasted several hours, 

providing ample opportunity for 

questions, discussion, explanation 

of details, and expressions of 

opinion. As a general rule, the 

Anchorage City Council met 

shortly after #the close (of the press 

conference and made its own decisions concerning the impact of 

the Task Force recommendations 

on the City's activities. 

BOUNDARIES OF ACTIVITIES 

The Task Force mas concerned 

almost ,exclusively with the land 

stability and reconstruction problems of Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, Homer, and, to a lesser degree, of Kodiak. Many other 

towns and cities had also suffered 

severe damage, but it was not of 

a nature that called for the special skills or knowledge of Task 

Force members in assessing damage or in planning reconstruction. 

Damage by waves or fire, for instance, was due to transitory 

causes; tihere was little that .the 

Task Force could contribute other 

than to encourage long-range studies aimed at better prediction of 

earthquakes or their effects, such 

as tsunamis. Cordova, which had 

been affected by tectonic uplift 

and consequent withdrawal of the 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 55 

sea, suffered great losses. So also 

did towns like Kodiak, where 

tectonic downdrop and sea waves 

drowned port facilities or the entire ton-11. Because of our present inability to predict earthquakes and their tectonic effects, 

such changes in land and sea level - 

can only be considered as permanent or semipermanent in 

terms of human time. Reconstruction had to be planned and 

conducted on this basis with little 

or no interpretation of local geologic or seisinic conditions. 

Structural engineers, including 

those on the Task Force and Field 

Team, recognized very early after 

the earthquake that, except in the 

areas of ground failure, those 

structures designed in accordance 

with sound design criteria for 

seismic areas and constructed in 

tion practices generally withstood 

the temblor without major damage. The Task Force, therefore, 

tended to ignore seismic damage 

to specific structures. Instead, it 

directed most of its efforts toward 

problems of land stability-that 

is, to determining which parts of 

the several cities were unstable or 

might be made so by another great 

earthquake. It was the belief of 

the Task Force, supported by the 

Conlniission, that decisions to rebuild or to raze specific damaged 

structures-so long as they stood 

on stable ground-were the responsibility of city officials ancl 

private engineers and architects. 

The responsibilities of the Task 

Force were more general than 

this, and were in part discliargecl 

by its continual stress on the recommendation that the construc1-econstruction of earthquake-damaged structures must be in strict 

conformity with the requirements 

of the latest edition of the Uniform Building Code for Seismic 

Zone 8 (Internat. Conf. Bldg. 

Officials, 1964). 

Similarly, but for other reasons, 

the Task Force played only a 

small part in reconstructioii plans 

for airports, railroads, or highways. These three kinds of facilities were separately funded, 

largely by the Federal Government, so there was little need for 

recommendations from the Task 

Force to guide the Reconstructioil 

Commission or its constituent 

agencies. Only at Seward ancl 

Anchorage, where The Alaska 

Railroad's reconstructioii problems were linked inextricably 

with those of the cities, did the 

Task Force and Field Team act as 

accordance with sound construc- tion of all new buildings or the advisors to railroad officials. 
THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

150°00' 55' 149" 50' 

EXPLANATION 

Nominal-risk area 

Little likelihood of landslides except for small 

slumps, largely in artificialfill. In aU other 

respects risks are no grater than is norzally 

ezpected in the cmurtruetia idwhy. Current 

Uniform Building Code, as identified with 

Seismic Zone 3, applies 

High-risk area 

Requires further study before final determinatias can be made as to stability 

39.-Alap showing high- and nominlal-risk portions of Anchorage and vicinity, generally excluding military lands. This 

map and an accompanying press notice were issued May 19, 1964, by the Scientific and Engineering Task Force 

as the first of a series of interim rwommendations to the Federal Reconstruation and Development Planning Commission for Alaska. 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 57 

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 

ANCHORAGE 

The first set of Task Force recommendations on Anchorage was 

made by the Field Team to city 

officials and the public on May 19, 

1964. Figure 39 is ,z simplified 

and greatly reduced version of the 

map that accompanied the press 

announcement. The base for this 

map and those which accompaniecl 

later releases on Anchorage consisted of parts or' all of the U.S. 

Geological Survey topographic 

map of Anchorage and vicinity 

at a scale of 1 : 24,000, with a 20- 

foot contour interval. Later determinations of "risk" lines were 

also plotted on a much larger scale 

for office use so that the relations 

of risk lines to individual properties could be determined where 

needed. 

The May 19 map, from 11-hich 

military lands were generally excluded, divided Anchorage into 

two categories-areas where risks 

were considered "nominal,?' and 

those where risks were considered 

"high" and mere to be studied 

further before final determinations could be made as to stability. 

The intent of this first map was to 

"release" as much of Anchorage 

and its surroundings as possible 

so that reconstruction and repair, 

financed wholly or in part by Federal agencies, could go ahead. 

The boundaries of the high-risk 

*areas were drawn conservatively, 

in the hope that they would not 

have to be enlarged later with 

consequent damage to public faith 

and morale or to changes in the 

Federal lending agencies' plans. 

With one or two minor exceptions, 

where new information from the 

soils-exploration program made it 

necessary to expand the high-risk 

areas slightly to protect the public 

safety, this hope was realized. 

Delineation of the areas to be 

classed as high risk was based on 

the Field Team's knowledge of the 

underlying geology as drawn from 

an earlier report by Miller and 

Dobrovolny (1959), on personal 

observations by Field Team members nand their professional colleagues, and on the maps prepared 

by the Engineering Geology 

Eraluation Group (1964). In the 

first, as in all lntsr recommendations, the Task Force made it clear 

that an? new buildiilg or repair 

work, regardless of the risk classification of specific properties, 

should be iin strict conformity ~--itll 

the requirements of the Unif orin 

Building Code for. Seismic Zone 3 

(Internat. Conl-'. Bldg. Officials, 

1964). 

After the first report of May 

19, four other interim Task Force 

reports successively reduced the 

Anchorage areas classified as 

"high risk, subject to further studies." These reports were basecl 

primarily on the Shannon and 

Wilson explorations, and the resultant recommendations, hence, 

followed closely the reporting 

schedule that had been established 

for the soils studies. The Task 

Force recommendations of June 

26, 1964, dealt entirely with the 

Fourth Avenue slide area, that of 

July 8 with the LK Street slide 

area and the relatively undamaged downtown part of Anchorage that lies between the Fourth 

Avenue ,and the LK Street slides. 

The Turnagain Heights slide area 

was treated in the Task Force report of July 14, 1964, and a miscellaneous group of smaller but 

significant slides were covered in 

the report of July 27. This latter 

group included the Romig Hill, 

Government Hill, First Avenue 

(including the Alaska Native 

Hospital), and Chester Creek 

areas. The general location of all 

these areas is indicated on figure 

39. 

In all the interim reports just 

mentioned, additional intermediate categories, other than "nominal risk" and "high risk" were introduced. Generally these were 

aimed at identifying areas where 

the land was considered unsafe 

for building unless certain stabilization procedures recommended 

by the consultants to the Corps 

of Engineers were put into effect 

The term "provisional nominal 

risk" was used for such areas with 

or without subcategories to define 

land on which special restrictions 

should be applied even where stabilization was effected. This detailed land classification had its 

value in formulating plans for 

stabilization and in the search for 

legal and financial means of doing 

so, but in practice the Federal 

lending agencies adopted only two 

classifications to guide their decisions. That is, land classified as 

"nominal risk" by the Task Force 

mas open to Federal aid ; all other 

lands, regardless of the qualifying 

adjectives used by the Task Force, 

were classed as LLhigh risk" for 

loan purposes. 

The final report of the Task 

Force was made to city and State 

officials and to the public on September 8, 1964. It was based on 

the final comprehensive report to 

the Corps of Engineers by Shannon and Wilson, Inc., and on thorough discussions in Anchorage by 

Corps of Engineers staff and consultants, several members of the 

Commission staff, and most members of both the Task Force and 

its Field Team. The joint release 

announcing the final recommendations is reproduced below, and the 

map that accompanied it is shown 

in fi,pre 40, next page. 
THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

EXPLANATION 

Nominal-risk area 

Little likelihood of landslides except for small slumps, largely in 

artificial fill. In all other respects risks are no greater than 

is normally ixpected in the construction industry where structures are built on a thick sequence of unconsolidated sediments. 

Current Unifwm Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 applies 

both to new buildings and to plans for rehabilitation of earthquake-damaged structures. Special engineering consideration 

should be given to constmtwn near the top, at the base, and on 

steep slopes,especially wherever the Bootlegger Cove Clay is 

present. No filling, cutting, or construction should be permitted that will steepen or increase the load on or above these 

slopes 

Provisional-nominal-risk area 

Reclassification to "nominal-risk" in these areas is contingent 

on stabilization of adjacent slide areas or stabilization within 

the areas themselves. lfstabilization is not effected, land will 

be "high-risk" class.ification 

Unstable area 

Land considered unstable in the event of future earthquakes 

unless stabilization is attained. No new construction and 

only limited rehabilitation is recomwnded unless stabilization, 

is attained. It is recommended that after stabilization new 

buildings on Fourth Avenue, L-K Streets, and Government 

Hill slides be limited to light structures not over two stories 

high. No buildings are recommended on the Turnagain 

Heights slide between the blzGff and tidewater, nor on the First 

Avenue slides, even dter stabilization. If stabilization is not 

effected, land will be "high-risk" classification 

40.-Map showing classification of earthqualie risli areas, Aincl~orage ;1nd vicinity. This nlap and a press notice released September 8, 1964, represent the final recomlnendations i11 risk classificatioii of Anchorage by the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force. 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 59 

Fiml Reconzrnendatiolzs on Ris7; 

Classi$catione, Anchorage and 

Vicinitu 

For Release September 8, 1964 

Task Force 9 made its final recommendations on earthquake-risk classifications to the Alaska Reconstruction 

Commission. 

All parts of Anchorage and vicinity 

are ilojv classified as "Nominal Risk" 

or "Provisional Nominal Risku-subject to successful stabilization of adjacent slide areas. Even if stabilization is effected certain restrictions on 

construction or rehabilitation in these 

areas are considered necessary. Federal, State, and City officials are inrestigating technical means of stabilization and exploring the possibility of 

financing the needed work for stabilization. 

At joint meetings held in Anchorage 

over the past several days, members 

of the Task Force from Washington 

and its Alaskan counterpart field team 

studied the final comprehensive report to the Corps of Engineers on soil 

studies by the firm of Shannon and 

Wilson, Inc. Findings of these investigations were discussed in detail with 

experts of the Corps, Shannon and 

Wilson, Inc., and outstanding consultants to both organizations. Based 

as they are on the best professional 

judgements of all concerned, these 

recomnlendations represent joint concurrence by Task Force 9 and the 

Corps of Engineers. 

For those parts of the 4th Avenue, 1st 

Avenue, L-K Streets, Turnagain Heights 

and Government Hill areas that actually slid during the Good Friday earthquake, certain stabilization measures 

are considered necessary to assure the 

future safety of these and adjacent 

areas. It is believed that even though 

these areas are reasonably safe under 

normal static conditions, dynamic 

stresses from future similar earthquakes would cause renewed disastrous movements either in the disturbed areas or in adjacent land. In 

general, stabilization will probably 

take the form of regrading of the surface, drainage, some form of buttressing, or some combination of these. It 

is not within the responsibilities of 

the Task Force to make specific recommendations as to the methods of 

stabilization to be applied. These technical and economic questions are under 

study by Federal, State, and City 

officials and decisions are expected in 

the near future. 

Fourth Svel~ue. Specific designs for 

stabilization of the Fourth Avenue area 

between Barrow Street on the east 

and I Street on the west are now being completed under the supervision 

of the Corps of Engineers. When the 

stal~ilization work is completed, all of 

that area will be returned to Nominal Risk. In the slide area below 

Fourth Avenue and between Barrow 

and E Streets, however, construction 

should be limited to parks, parking 

areas, and light occupancy structures 

not over two stories in height. Even 

for such structures, certain restrictions must be imposed on depths of excavations or fills and on weights of 

buildings to prevent an unbalance of 

the buttress which could impair or 

destroy its effectiveness. 

In all of the Fourth Avenue slide 

area between Barrow and I Streets 

and bounded on the south by a line 

running from Barrow Street to F 

Street midway between Fifth and Sixth 

Avenues and along Fourth Avenue 

1)etween F Street and I Street, it is 

anticipated that normal consolidation 

of the underlying soils will result in 

some rertical and horizontal movement. Because this condition can be 

expected to result in localized diffeerential movement, both horizontal and 

vertical, particular attention must be 

given to the design of structures and 

their foundations so that such movements may be accommodated without 

undue damage to the building. 

L-I{ Slide Area. .4dditional studies 

in the 1,-K Slide A4rea have resulted 

in the conclusion that a significant 

portion of the area may be returned 

to Sominal Risk classification if certain stabilization action is taken. These 

measures may be a combination of 

slope flattening, drainage, and buttressing. Stabilization would permit the 

area landward of the graben to be returned to Nominal Risk. In the remaining area toward Knik Arm (seaward), it is anticipated that stabilization, if undertaken, may require removal of some existing buildings. The 

extent of such removal cannot be forecast until detailed designs for stabilization are completed. 

The same design precautions should 

be applied in the area above the 

graben line as are outlined for the 

Fourth Avenue Slide area. In the 

area below the graben line and toward 

Knik Arm construction should be limited to light occupancy structures not 

over two stories in height. 

Turnagain Slide. The Turnagain Area 

has been classified as "Provisional 

Nominal Risk Area." The area above 

the present bluff is recommended for 

unrestricted residential construction 

after its stability is assured by 

strengthening of the slide. Because 

of the complex nature of the slide, no 

construction other than drives or walks 

should be permitted on the slide area. 

The area west of Turnagain Heights 

shown as "High Risk Final Classification" on the 27 July risk classification map has been included in the Provisional Nominal Risk Area. Among 

the methods being considered for stabilization are a series of underground 

charges and sand drains to disturb 

and cause consolidation of weak clays 

to provide a buttress, or freezing of a 

belt of clays for the same purpose. The 

buttress provided by either of these 

methods, or a combination of the two, 

would be located in the slide area below the present scarp (bluff). A test 

section will be required to determine 

the most effective method and establish technical criteria for the final design. 

First A~ettue-Native Hospital. The 

First Avenue slide, close to the Native Hospital, occurred on a hillside 

that had probably been oversteepened 

by excavation at the toe in past years. 

Recommended remedial measures, all 

of them comparatively minor, include 

slope flattening, buttressing and improved surface drainage. If this work 

is done, the area occupied by the Natire Hospital, as well as nearby land, 

would be classed as Nominal Risk. 

So buildings are recommended in this 

actual slide area even if stabilization is accomplished. 

KO stabilization measures are considered necessary for the area between Barron7 Street and the Native 

Hospital but similar restraints on the 

use of steep slopes are applicable there. 

Government Hill. It is believed that 

the slide at Government Hill School 

can be stabilized in its present extent 

by means of simple grading and drainage. If it is desirable to restore the 

toe of the slide to its pre-earthquake 
60 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 

-H .-Aerial view of Turnagain slide area shortly after earthquake, looking east toward Seward Highway; Northern Ligh ts 

Boulevard in upper right. The Scientific and Engineering Task Force recommended that stabilization measures be applied 

to land broken by landslides, but that no building be permitted in this area even if stabilization is effected. With such 

stabilization, the remainder of Turnagain Heights area would be classed as nominal risk, even though many homes and 

utilities were slightly damaged during the earthquake. 

JlOSition. thi~ can be done by means of 

a relati\·eJy small buttres~. If stabilization is effected.· the land near 

and aboYe the slide would be cia. sed 

as Xominal Risk. Construction on the 

regraded or buttressed slope should be 

restricted to light buildings not more 

than two stories in height, and special 

attention given to their design because 

of the danger of settlement that can be 

expected. 

Romig Hill. A small rotational landslide deYeloped on the slope of Romig 

Hill just north of West Anchorage 

Hio-h SchooL Minor regrading is recommended to stabilize the slope. While 

no other slopes on either side of Chester Creek failed during the earthquake 

and no remedial measures are necessary, it is recommended that no fill 

be placed on the top of the slopes and 

that meandering of Chester Creek be 

kept under surveillance to insure the 

stream does not undercut the hill. 

Other than the areas discussed above, all other parts of Anchorage and 

vicinity are classified as "Nominal 

Risk. " This means that the Task 

Force considers there is little likelihood of landslides except for small 

slumps, largely in artificial fill. In 

all other respects, r isks are considered 

to be no greater than is normally ex-
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 6 1 

pected in the construction industry 

in seismic areas where structures are 

built on a thick sequence of unconsolidated sediments. Special engineering consideration should be given to 

design and construction on any steep 

-lope or near the top or base of such 

slope. Examples of such slopes, some 

of which were earlier classed as "High 

Risk," are the Point Campbell and 

Rabbit Creek bluffs along Turnagain 

Arm, the Point Woronzof bluffs, Romig 

Hill, the steep slopes on both sides 

of Ship Creelr, and the steep slopes 

between the City Docks and the top 

of Government Hill. No filling, cutting 

or construction should be permitted on 

these or similar slopes that will steepen them or increase the loads on or 

above them. 

In all areas, design and construction 

for both reconstruction and new structures should be in strict accordance 

with the provisions of current edition 

of the Uniform Building Code for 

Seismic Zone 3. Particular attention 

should be given to the foundation conditions existing at each specific site 

and due recognition talren of design 

requirements that are imposed by such 

conditions. 

The Task Force 9 Field Team was 

formed to rate areas of Anchorage and 

other qualre-damaged cities for the 

Alaska Reconstruction Commission 

as a guide in developing insurance and 

loan policies of Federal lending agencies. Its findings are to be considered 

as advisory but by no means mandatory to City officials. Throughout its 

work, protection of human life, as 

well as of property, has been parainount in the Field Team's considerations. Based on the history of 

earthquakes in Alaslra the possibility 

of another major earth shocl; cannot 

be overlooked. With the present state 

of knowledge, the year, the month, the 

day. the hour or the location cannot 

I)e predicted. Prudence, however, dictates that the public should be protected against another disastrous earthquake, should one occur at any time. 

For these reasons the field team firmly 

believes that stabilization and strict 

adherence to the requirements of good 

design and construction practice for 

active seismic zones represent minimal 

safeguards for the public. 

Fzcturc Observations. The Task Force 

strongly endorses recommendations by 

the Shannon and Wilson firm that a 

continuing program of technical observations be carried on by local and 

other authorities. Such observations 

might provide knowledge of natural 

stabilization of underlying clay strata 

and might ultimately serve as a basis 

for gradual relaxation of building restrictions. These recommendations include the following. Many piezometers 

(to measure level and pressures of 

water in the clays beneath the City) 

were installed during the soils studies. 

These should be observed on a continuing basis in order to detect changes 

due to future earthquakes, large or 

small. Similarly, slope indicators that 

have been installed to measure even 

slight land movements should be observed regularly. When regrading and 

stabilization for the various slide areas 

is put into effect, a system of accurate 

horizontal and vertical surveys should 

be instituted in order to determine 

changes due to settlement of artificial 

ground or to movements caused by 

future earth shocks. Enlargement of 

the strong-motion seismograph recording net in the Anchorage area, particularly to study the effects of earthquakes on the soft clays that underlie 

the city, is already being undertaken 

by the Federal Government. 

With these final recommendations to 

the Alaska Reconstruction Commission. 

Task Force 9 and its field team have 

completed their responsibilities in the 

Anchorage area. Final reports on 

Seward, Valdez, Kodiak, and Homer 

have been made to the Commission. 

The Task Force 9 Field Team includes Edwin B. Eckel, Chairman, and 

Ernest Dobrovolny, both of the U.S. 

Geological Survey, Denver ; Harold 

Stuart, Division geologist, and Ore 

Carstensen, structural engineer. both 

of U.S. Army Engineer Division, North 

Pacific, Portland; William I<. Cloud, 

seismologist, U.S. Coast and Geodetic 

Survey, San Francisco. William E. 

Schaem, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Washington, D.C.. is Chairman 

of Task Force 9, which, like the Field 

Team. is made up of professionals 

loaned by the Corps of Engineers, the 

Geological Survey, and the Coast and 

Geodetic Survey. 

Consultants to the Alaska District, 

Corps of Engineers, are: Dr. Ralph 

B. Peck, Professor of Foundation Engineering, University of Illinois ; Mr. 

Thomas F. Thompson, consulting engineering geologist, Burlingame, California ; Dr. Laurits Bjerrum, Director 

Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, Oslo, Norway. 

Consultants assisting Shannon and 

Wilson, Inc., are: Dr. Harry B. Seed, 

Professor of Civil Engineering, University of California; Dr. Neil TwelIier, consulting engineer, Seattle ; Dr. 

Richard Meese, University of Washington : Mr. Robert Spence, consultant, 

Tancouver. 

The Corps of Engineers studies have 

been under the direction of Colonel 

Kenneth T. Sawyer, until recently 

District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer 

District, Alaska, and his successor Colonel Clare F. Farley, and Mr. Warren 

George, Chief, Engineering Division. 

Alaska District. 

Copies of the comprehensive final 

Shannon and Wilson, Inc., report on 

the soil studies in the Anchorage area, 

dated 28 August 1964, have been deposited with City officials by the Alaska District Corps of Engineers. Copies 

are also available for public inspection at the Office of the District Engineer, Elmendorf Air Force Base. Copies 

of the final report will be available to 

the public upon further printing at 

cost. 

HOMER 

Task Force recommendations on 

Homer \\*ere released to the 

town's Mayor on September 8, 

1964, and to Anchorage news 

lnedia the follo~v~ing day. Although the Corps of Engineers 

was deeply involved in plans for 

restoring damaged harbor facilities, it had not had to schedule 

subsurface soil explorations as at 

Ainchorage, Semard, and Valdez. 

For this reason, the announcement 

\\-as not made jointly with the 

Corps, although the Field Team 

had discussed its findings with 

the Distriot Engineer. Aside 

from several brief visits by members of the Field Team, the recommendations were based almost 

entirely on reports by Roger M. 

Waller, a member of the U.S. 

Geological Survey who had been 

assigned to follow up his earlier 

studies of the area's ground-water 

resources with a study of earthquake damages. Wmaller's com- 
62 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, 

R. l4 W. 

EXPLANATION 

D 

Stable area 

Risks no greater than normally expected i-n the construction industry. 

Current Uniform Building Code 

fo·r Seismic Zone 3 applies both to new buildings and to plans for 

rehabilitation of earthquakedamaged sh·uctures 

Area subject 

-to moderate 

erosion or inundation 

High tides, on Homer Spit; moderaW 

w<tve erosion, bluffs along sections 

24, 19, and 20; potential earthflow, 

sectionslO, 17, and 18. Considered 

safe for new construction or 

repairs only if adequate provision 

is made for indicated hazards. 

Current Uniform Building Code 

for Seismic Zone 3 applies both to 

new buildings and to plans for 

rehabilitation of earthq uakedarnaged structures 

Area subject to accelerated 

erosion 

Accelerated bluff erosion, south of 

Pnlrner Oreek and near Millers 

Landing. New construction or 

repair of existing structures not 

recommended 

Area subject to high tides and 

potential slides 

Area subject to high tides and potent slides, pending artificial filling and clarification of submarine 

slope stability. New construction 

or repair of existing structttres, 

other than highway, not recommended 

Note: Classification of areas on 

Homer Spit should be conside red 

as temporary, pending observation 

of results of natural or artificial 

changes in shape and height of 

Homer Spit 

1964 

N 

KA C HEMAK BAY 

C 0 0 K 

1 MILE 

L_--~----~----------_j 

42.-::\Iap sho\\·ing land classification, Homer and vicinity; released to Homer officials on September 0, 1964, by the Scientific 

and Engineering 'J'ask Force. 

43.-Homer Spit. 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 63 

plete report appears as a chapter 

in USGS Professional Paper 542. 

sho~vn in figure 42, the 

Task Force report adopted different risk classifications for Homer 

tllan had been applied in Anchorage and other cities. Instead of 

such terms as "nominal," "provisional nominal," and "high risk," 

it classified areas of Homer as 

"stable," "subject to moderate 

erosion or inundation," "subject 

to accelerated erosion," and ''sub- 

,ject to high tides and potential 

slides." Only for the last two 

categories did the Task Force recommend against new construction 

or repair of existing structures. 

The difference in trea'tmeat of 

the risk categories at Homer was 

due to the fact that most of the 

danger of renewed earth movements there was related to eavthquake-induced subsidence of the 

area and consequent increased erosion by wave action, or to danger 

of further submarine landslides 

off the tip of Homer Spit. Moreover, it was realized that any 

risk classifications at Homer 

might well be less permanently 

valid than those at Anchorage, 

Valdez, and elsewhere. There 

was not enough offshore information available to permit firm 

judgements as to the stability of 

the end of Homer Spit. Also, 

further uncertainty existed because the future shape and character of the spit cannot be 

determined until a. new pattern of 

erosion and deposition of spit 

materials is established. The 

first of these uncertainties was 

resolved within a few months as 

a, result of intensive studies off 

the end of the spit by the Corps 

of Engineers. These studies produced sufficient evidence that 

there is little danger of disastrous submarine slides even in the 

event of another earthquake. Accordingly, late in 1965 the District 

Engineer recommended that the 

restrictions be removed. Former 

members of the Task Force and 

Field Team were asked to review 

these recommendations and concurred in them informally. 9 

long-term study of beach-erosion 

processes mas begun in 1964 by the 

Corps of Engineers. When its 

results become available it may be 

possible for the town of Homer 

to relax even further the restrictions recommended by the Task 

Force in 1964. 

SEWARD 

The Task Force made two sets 

of recommendations to the Commission on Seward; these recommendations were based on visits 

to the town by Field Team members, on detailed geologic reports 

by Richard Mr. Lemke of the U.S. 

Geological Survey, and on a soils 

report to the Corps of Engineers 

by Shannon and Wilson, Inc. 

The first report, released to the 

Mayor of Se~vard on July 17, 

1964, and to Anchorage news 

media the following day, had to 

do wit11 the suburrban subdivisions 

of Clearview and Forest Acres 

;tad the Eads site at Lowell Point. 

Inasmuch as the Corps of Engineers \\-as not involved in exploration in these areas, the recom- 

~nendations were made solely by 

the Field Team and Task Force, 

\\it11 only informal consultation 

with Corps of Engineers officials. 

The Clearview and Forest Acres 

subdivisions were classified in two 

categories - "nominal risk," in 

\~-hich the hazards from another 

earthquake mere considered no 

greater than are normally expected in the construction industry, and "limited risk." This 

latter classification included the 

land that had been strongly fractured by the earthquake. Within 

such areas, it was recommended 

that all new foundations be of 

reinforced concrete and that all 

concrete or masonry work be reinforced and interconnected. On 

the basis of Richard W. Lemke's 

findings that Lowell Point had 

incurred damage from waves 

only, none from ground fractures 

or submarine slides, that area, on 

\vhicll it was desired to build a 

marine way, was placed in the 

nominal-risk category. These subnrban areas are the more fully 

described by Ilemke in a chapter 

in USGS Professional Paper 542 

of this series. 

Recommendations on Seward 

proper were made in a joint 

Corps of Engineers and Task 

Force report, released to 'the Mayor of Seward on July 24, 1964, 

and to news media in Anchorage 

on July 25. These recommendations were based on the findings 

of Sh:ulnon and Wilson (1964b), 

on the opinions of consultants 

to the Corps of Engineers, and on 

the geologic investigations of 

Lemke, \vho was considered for 

this p~uposc to be n member of the 

Field Tenrn. 

The greater part of Sew~~rcl was 

c~lassifiecl as "nominal risk," \.;it11 

consequent eligibility for Federal 

:lid, providing that the current 

Ihiform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 \\-as followed in all 

design 2nd construction work (fig. 

44, next page). The waterfront 

area, carefully defined in det a1 '1 011 

the map n as c.lxssed as "high risk," 

nncl the fir111 recommendation was 

made that it be reserved for 

parks or other uses that do not 

involve large congregations of 

people. The waterfront land 

within the high-risk line is fractured and weakened as a result 

of the submarine landslides that 

destroyed the Seward dock faoilities, and the Field Team and 

Corps of Engineers believed that 

another large earthquake might 

cause further submarine sliding - 

wiehin bhe area designated as 
64 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

Nominal-risk area 

Little likelihood of landslides except for 

small slumps, largely in artificial fill. 

In all other respects risks are no greater 

than is normally expected in the cmstrmetwn industry. Current Uniform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3 applies both 

to new buildings and to plansfor rehabilitation of earthquake-damdged structures 

EXPLANATION 

MLLW 

High-risk area Mean lower low water line 

Land considered unstable, particularly in 

event of future earthquakes; no economically feasible means of stabilizatim 

known. No repair, rehabilitation, m new construction involving use of Federal 

funds is recommended, except for grading and light fill 

44.-Map showing high- and nominal-risk areas of a part of Seward; released to Seward city officials on July 25, 1964, by the 

Scientific and Engineering Task Force. 

high risk. The line between highand nominal-risk areas was based 

in part on the distribution of 

visible earth fractures, but in 

greater part on differences in the 

underlying geologic materials. 

KODIAK AND VAI.DEZ 

Recommendations on both KOdiak and Valdez were made to 

the Commission, but because they 

were merely endorsements of 

reconstruction plans that were 

already adopted and had been 

publlicized, no public announcements were made by the Task 

Force. 

Kodiak was visited on May 20, 

1964, by members of the Field 

Team, who conferred with city 

and U.S. Navy officials and inspected most of the damaged areas 

from the air or on the ground. 

A brief report by George W. 

Moore of the U.S. Geological 

Survey was also studied. 

Damage at and near Kodiak 

n7as caused by tectonic subsidence 

and flooding by nonbreaking sea 

surges, plus a small amoun~t of 

subsidence due to compaotion of 

sediments. Except for harbor 

facilities, most Navy and civilian 

buildings were founded on bedrock. Short of another major 

earthquake which could cause tectonic uplift, renewed subsidence, 

or seismic sea waves, there are no 

apparent reasons to expect further 

trouble. The Field Team, therefore, endorsed plans that were 

already under way for reoonstruction and relocation of town and 

harbor facilities, subject 60 its 

usual requirements that all design 

and construction be in strict accordance with the Uniform Building Code for Seismic Zone 3. 

The Task Force agreed with these 

recommendations and transmiitted 

them to the Commission on May 

28, 1964. 

The Field Team visited Valdez 

on May 17, 1964, inspected the 

existing devastated town and the 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 65 

proposed relocation site, and conferred mith city and Corps of 

Engineers officials. The Field 

Team also had access to thorough 

geologic information, both on and 

off shore, that was being assembled by Henry W. Coulter, U.S. 

Geological Survey, and Ralph R. 

Migliaccio, Alaska Department of 

Highways. Their detailed report 

on Valdez and its environs appears as a chapter in TJSGS Professional Paper 542. 

The destruotion of nearly all of 

Valdez, the long history of floods 

from the Valdez glacial stream, 

and the obvious instability of the 

shoreline, all argued strongly for 

:~bandonment of the townsite. 

A\ccordingly, Coulter and Migliaccio had early recommended to city 

and Federal officials that it would 

be safer to rabuild town and dock 

facilities at the "old" townsite, 

4 miles northwest of Valdez. The 

geologic and topographic conditions there were considered to be 

far superior to those of the present town, an opinion that was 

subsequently reaffirmed by the 

soils explorations of Shannon and 

IVilson, Inc. The Task Force 

agreed with these recommendations, which had already been 

adopted by the city, and transmitted them to the Commission. 

11s usual, the endorsement was 

made subject to the requirement 

that design and construction conform to the current edition of the 

TTniform Building Code for Seisinic Zone 3. 

REACTIONS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 

Reactions of the principal Federal agencies to recommendations 

by the Task Force were uniformly favorable. All its recommendations were adopted as policy 

mith (but little debate and without essential change. There was 

some tendency to soften the policies, such as by permitting loans 

for repair of buildings within 

zones designated as 'Lhigh riskno Federal funds recommended." 

This softening was not unexpected. The prime mission of the 

Reconstruction Commission, hence 

of the Task Force, was to put 

Federal dollars and skills to work 

in helping rebuild Alaska quickly 

and safely. 

Local offices of the main agencies mere given policy guidance 

quickly and firmly by their parent 

agencies and bureaus. Nearly all 

fell into line at once and welcomed the guidance provided 

them. -4 few local officials at first 

seemed reluctant to depart from 

long-established routine procedures of letting contracts, authorizing loans, reviewing reports, and 

similar activities. Such instances 

mere rare, and none resulted in 

delays of more than a day or two 

in adopting the new policies, for 

the Commission was alert and 

issued unmistakable orders for 

compliance from the highest levels 

of the agencies involved. 

As was true of the Federal 

agencies, the mayors and other 

city officials of all the towns involved were uniformly cooperative and receptive toward the Task 

Force and its work. Such cooperation might have been expected because all +he towns mere 

necessarily dependent on the Federal Government for funds and 

for much of the actual reconstruction work, but cordial cooperation went far beyond the 

necessities that were SO imposed. 

The city officials gave freely of 

their time and services and they 

gracefully accepted Task Force 

decisions--even those that mere 

disappointing. 

At all times the Task Force 

took care to make it clear that its 

responsibility was only to the 

Commission and that it had 

neither right nor desire to dictate to local communities or iadi1-iduals. The Task Force's firm 

recommendations as approved by 

the Commission became binding 

on its constihent Federal agencies. These same reoommendations, however, mere in effect only 

advisory to local officials with 

respect to zoning, applications of 

building codes, issuance of building permits, or even to requests 

for Federal financial aid in initiating ground stabilization measures. 

PUBLIC RELATIONS 

Coverage of announcements by 

the Task Force and Field Team 

by Alaskan news media-newspaper, radio, and television-was 

uniformly superb. This reaction 

was particularly welcome hause 

it was so contrary to widely held 

beliefs among technical people to 

the effect that "reporters garrble 

everything and seek only for sensationalism." It also fostered a 

receptiveness on the part of hhe 

public that would have been lacking had the news media, inadvertently or otherwise, created a 

less favorable climate for the 

work of the Field Team. 

Not bhe least of the departures 

from normal governmental practice mas the fact hhat a11 formal 

decisions made by the Task Force 

were transmitted to the Commission in the form of proposed press 

notices. When approved, (these 

were ready for distribution as 

policy guides to the Federal agencies, and were also ready .for release to the public. News media 

representatives were present at all 

report conferences between city 

and State officials, the Corps of 

Engineers, and Che Field Team. 

At each such meeting, the latest 

set of recommendations was explained and press notices and 
66 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 

accompanying risk maps \\-ere distributed. 

The Task Force findings were 

immediately and fully reported to 

the public by all news media, 

often by means of extra editions 

of the newspapers or by special 

broadcasts. In addition to complete news stories, plus occasional editorial comment, each of the 

texts and accompanying maps 

mas reproduced in full by local 

newspapers, and the maps were 

exhibited on television. 

This prompt, complete, straightforward, and sympathetic reporting of the Task Force 

reoommendations by all news 

media had much to do with 

a calm and generally favorable 

acceptance by the public. There 

were dissidents, of course, for each 

set of decisions perforce contnined bad news for some property 

owners, investors, or others. But 

nearly all the public accepted the 

bad medicine with the good, 

gracefully if not happily. 

Suoh reliance on the part of 

the public could not have been 

achieved without the kind of 

treatment that was accorded by 

the news media. This treatment, 

in turn, was apparently based on 

a firm conviction on the part of 

the news media representatives 

that they were getting the complete truth, good and bad, from 

the Task Force and its Field 

Team, and (that the decisions 

were based on their best judgnlents of real facts, scientifically 

and objectively evaluated. 

In Anchorage there n7as one 

long and undesirable hiatus in 

public information. This extended from the release of the initial Task Force report of Mag 

19, 1964, to the report of June 26, 

1964, on the Fourth Avenue slide 

area. This period of silence, 

which lasted more than a month, 

covered the time that it took the 

Corps of Engineers to mobilize 

its soils-exploration program, to 

test the samples recovered by 

drilling, and to interpret the results. The public, however, wanted and needed more information 

and reassurance than it received 

during this period. The situation 

was possibly even worse at Seward. After the initial cleanup 

operations there, when funds were 

spent freely and employment was 

at a peak, there followed a long 

period of apparent governmental 

inaction when local business and 

employment fell toward the vanishing point. As ,at Anchorage, 

the reason for this hiatus in activity and in public information mas 

the necessity of waiting for 

adequate scientific and technical 

information on which to base reconstruction plans. 

For Homer :and Seward, the 

Field Team first conferred with 

the mayor of each town, discussing the recommendations and 

their possible impact and giving 

him copies of the pertinent press 

notices and maps. First announcements were made by the 

mayors through local radio and 

newspaper media. On the day 

following such releases, press 

notices were given to Anchorage 

news media for broader distribution, and impromptu conferences 

were held with individual reporters who requested further information. 

Recommendations on Valdez 

and Kodiak were made by the 

Task Force to the Commission, 

but inasmuch as they were merely 

corroborations of decisions that 

had already been made by the 

town officials, ,and had been widely 

publicized, there was no need to 

make news announcements to the 

public. . 

The favorable reaction of press 

and public was quite different 

from that accorded the early reports and recommendations of the 

Anchorage Engineering Geology 

Evaluation Group. As suggested 

in an understatement by Schmidt 

(1964), the initial reactions of 

both news media and public to 

the Group's work were marked by 

strong tones of dismay and cries 

that might be aptly paraphrased 

as "Geologists and other scientists, 

go home !" The entirely different 

public reactions to work of the 

Task Force and its Field Team 

can perhaps be attributed to four 

factors : (1) passage of time that 

had allayed some of the earlier 

panic, (2) a conviction reached 

by the news media and t~ansmitted to the public that the Task 

Force decisions were honest and 

objective, (3) the local group, 

competent and objective as it was, 

was at a disadvantage simply because "a prophet is without honor 

in his own country," and-perhaps most important- (4) the 

fact that the Task Force progressively reduced the areas classified 

as high risk, whereas the Evaluation Group had recommended 

complete evacuat,ion of all unstable areas. 

Successful public relations were 

not attained as easily as the foregoing paragraphs would make it 

appear. In fact, there were factors working against the Task 

Force of which its members were 

not even aware until long after 

it had disbanded. For an understanding of these factors, we cannot do better than to quote 

directly from a discerning member of the press. Genie Chance, 

an editorial reporter for one of 

the Anchorage radio and television strations, who covered all the 

activities of the Task Force, was 

asked to review the manuscript 

of this paper. Parts of Mrs. 

Chance's letter to one of the writers are quoted below, with her 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 67 

In your report. you refer to a ''long 

and undesirable hiatus in public inforniation" that lasted from May 19, 

1964. to the report of June 26, 1964. 

You give good reasons for this hiatus 

and for the one at Seward. Actually, 

ho\vever, the lack of understanding of 

Federal Government activities prior to 

your first report of May 19 had already created difficulties with respect 

to public acceptance of the Task 

Force and its findings. 

The problem mas this: On March 

28, 7964, President Johnson declared 

this a disaster area. The initial reaction of the people was shock. Everrone knew we had been hit hard, but 

they had no conception of what it 

mas to be declared a disaster area. 

This is something you read about hap+ 

pening other places, not at home. Apprehension gave way to hope-the first 

real hope that there would truly be a 

tomorro~v-with the explanations that 

the declaration merely set the machinery into motion for the Federal Government to move swiftly to give help. 

This meant that red tape could be cut 

and the affected communities would 

be back on their feet in short order. 

Of course, people who are already 

in a state of shock when they are 

promised immediate help have an entirely different concept of the term 

"immediate help" than those who are 

giving the assistance. Consequently, 

when each day brought news about 

the arrival of a different group of 

Federal officials or specialists, the hope 

for quick action blossomed. But each 

group soon left Alaska after making 

n quick tour of damaged areas and 

after making glowing promises to the 

public as to the aid that would be 

forthcoming quickly. After their departure, the fulfillment of their promises appeared to bog down in red 

tape-the very thing that we had been 

told would not happen. In retrospect. 

we realize that the Federal agencies 

were moving more rapidly and were 

streamlining their procedures more 

than ever before. But their speed had 

to be 1)roperly balanced with caution 

lest precedents be set that could be 

abused in the future. But to the victims who were adrift in a sea of uncertainty, the slightest delay seemed 

like an eternity. Initial cleanup and 

rescue operations had been done erpeditiously and effectively, and basic 

utilities had been restored, but the 

public wanted to know what the future 

had in store for them-whether they 

could rebuild their damaged homes 

and stores, or whether, indeed, large 

parts of their towns and cities would 

be abandoned and rebuilt elsewhere. 

Employers worried about meeting payrolls and feared that each day of indecision pushed them closer to the 

brink of bankruptcy. Disillusionment 

and bitterness took root. 

And then, Task Force Nine slipped 

silently into town. The word was 

around that you were here-but nobody cared. Everybody had already 

learned about these groups of specialists from Outside. But they soon 

found out that this group was different. After a long and continuous 

diet of platitudes it was rather hard 

to swallow the bitter truth. And yet, 

Task Force Nine, unlike the others 
68 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

who had preceded them, was prescribing just this. Of course, there was an 

outcry. And it became even worse 

when there were no progress reports 

for another five weeks. The silence 

made the Task Force activities suspect. This created an attitude among 

the citizens that had to be corrected. 

You must have public confidence before 

you can get public cooperation. 

This need to get the public on your 

side was strange to scientists who are 

unaccustomed to conducting investigations and studies under constant public 

scrutiny. It mas against all your training as scientists and engineers to say 

anything to the public until the final 

decision had been reached. It seemed 

logical to you to assume that unfounded rumors would spread if anything were said in the interim. 

However, rumors did spread during 

the periods of official silence. They 

mere the kind of speculations that undercut public confidence in the studies. 

d people who are emotionally and economically distraught and frustrated 

quite often will believe anything--even 

those who are quite reasonable under 

liormal circumstances. And since there 

was official silence, unfounded rumors 

had a fertile field. 

During this period, background information could have been periodically 

released that would have kept the people informed on the project without 

giving any reason to speculate on the 

results. 

For example, the members of Task 

Force Nine could have been presented 

to the public as individual human beings. Their previous experiences could 

be highlighted to give prestige and 

importance to the project at hand. 

This would have built up public confidence in the individuals so that their 

findings would be more readily accepted. 

These "human-interest" stories on 

the scientists and engineers could be 

interspersed with stories on each type 

of study being made in the overall 

project-how the procedure was developed, where it has been used before, 

why it is necessary or desirable, how 

its results will be used in relation to 

other tests. In the Task Force press 

conferences, these techniques were explained simultaneously with the release of the results. It was too much 

to absorb at one time. If the procedures and techniques are understood 

in advance, the results are a little less 

startling. Some of the descriptions 

of Anchorage landslides and what 

caused them, as described by Shannon 

and Wilson would have made good 

full-page picture stories in the newspapers or could have been used on TV 

stations with explanatory commentary. 

This could be done in advance of the 

announcement of the test results and 

recommendations. And this could be 

used to occupy the minds of the public 

while the scientists and engineers are 

performing their studies. This would 

also release them from much public 

pressure. 

We of the news media were probably 

greatly at fault in this area. We could 

have dribbled this information out 

during the periods of lull. But it was 

a new experience for us, too. And you 

mill very seldom go into a disaster 

area and find yourself dealing with 

local people experienced in dealing 

with such matters. When everything 

mas released at once, the most important part was the result and recommendation of the Task Force. Naturally, we went into this thoroughly. 

But, by so doing, we minimized the 

story of how the results were obtained. Hereafter, I recommend that 

the horse be put before the cart---create 

interest in the personnel and the procedures first. Then the findings of the 

scientists and engineers and the procedures will bear more credence. And, 

too, this method would leave little 

time for the public to wonder what's 

going on and to start rumors. 

My suggestions are not an indictment of Task Force Nine, the Field 

Team, or any other agency, But, 

perhaps, ' this review of some of the 

obstacles your group faced and conquered will help forestall similar problems in any such assignment in the 

future. 

There was a job of great magnitude 

and unprecedented diftlculty to perform, and it was handled admirably. 

Although the work was begun in a 

climate of resentment, the Task Force 

and Field Team very successfully overcame public suspicion and bitterness. 

And this was no easy task. 

EVALUATION OF TASK FORCE 

EFFORT 

In the certain knowledge that 

the Federal Government will one 

day be called on for massive assistance in similar disasters somewhere in the United States, it 

seems well to record our thoughts, 

positive and negative, as to the 

concept and accomplishments of 

the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force. 

We feel that the Task Force 

was a very wonthwhile component of the Government's reconstruction effort, both in concept 

and accomplishment. This view 

is perhaps prejudiced, based as 

it is on the opinions of two writers who were intimately awciated with the venture from its 

inception. But the validity of 

our personal opinions gains substance from the favorable reactiions of the Commission and its 

chairman, and those of the Federal agencies, local officials, and 

the public. The greatest single 

factor in the success of the Task 

Force concept was the unfailing 

support that was accorded it by 

the Reconstruction Commission 

and its constituent agencies. 

Some of the shortcomings that 

marked the Task Force operations were unavoidable, in that 

they resulted from the hurry and 

confusion that would characterize the early recovery period after 

any great natural disaster. Thus, 

there were many times when the 

Field Team and Task Force 

wished for more basic data, for 

more time to study the data that 

were available, or for more opportunity to make their own independent field observations. Time 

schedules simply did not permit 

the realization of these wishes, 

so that final judgments represented the best possible compromises between available knowledge 

and available t t' me. 

As described above, the Task 

Force early adopted a guiding 

policy of basing all its decisions 

and recommendations on scientific 

and engineering grounds-and of 

avoiding economic, political, or 

emotional ones so far as possible. 
WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 69 

This general policy is to be recommended to any similar future organization, together with a 

warning as to the pitfalls that 

may develop if the policy is ignored. 

Good and continuous relations 

with the press, ,and through it 

with the public, are considered 

essential to the success of any future Task Force effort of the sort 

described here. The experience of 

the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force was excellent in this 

regard. Even so, there were some 

shortcomings in public relations, 

and future groups might do well 

to heed the lessons learned in 

Alaska. These are described in 

the section LLPublic Relations" (p. 

65). 

The direct assipn~ent of Task 

Force and Field Team members 

to the Reconstruction Commission, with freedom from administrative or technical control by 

their parent agencies, was largely 

beneficial. It permitted m u c h 

faster actions than ~~ould have 

been possible had decisions required coordination and transmittal through the several parent 

agencies. The fact that the Task 

Force \\-as free to call on services 

and knowledge from its parent 

organizations also gave it strength 

and breadth that it would not 

have had otherwise. The availability of this help was well 

known .to the Task Force, and 

was drawn on freely. Field personnel of the parent agencies, 

llo\vever, were possibly too poorly 

informed as to (the responsibilities 

and restrictions imposed on the 

Task Force and Field Team. ,411 

such personnel were happy to 

contribute freely of their knowledge or services. Some of them, 

ho\vever, did not fully realize that 

the Task Force was only advisory 

to the Commission, hence were 

disappointed that it took less than 

positive action at times. This 

kind of minor misunderstanding 

might have been avoided by improved lines of communication. 

The desirability of an advisory 

group of scientific and engineering specialists, separate from the 

group charged with gathering the 

requisite basic information, may 

be open to some debate. There is 

much to be said in favor of providing for independent objective 

jud,ments, which would be difficult to obtain from those involved 

in the pressures of day to day 

operations. But such pyramiding 

of advisory and research groups, 

aside from its overtones of bureaucracy, adds 011s or more delaying steps in reaching decisions, 

and it could conceivably have led 

to confusion, contention, or jealousies. None of these eventualities occurred during the Alaska 

earthquake studies, largely because of the good will of all those 

involved. 

Both Task Force and Field 

Team were of about optimum 

size and composition for efficiency and responsiveness to needs. 

I11 view of the emphasis on soils 

engineering that ciharacterized the 

exploratory program, it might be 

argued that soils-engineering talent should have replaced some of 

the geologic skills directly represented on the Task Force and 

Field Team. This argument, however, mould lead to fruitless discussion as to the overlapping 

fields of soil mechanics and engineering geology; such a discussion is not appropriate here. The 

fact is that the best knowledge 

available in both fields was 

brought to bear on all problems, 

through the Corps of Engineers, 

its contractor and consultants, and 

the Task Force Team and its own 

advisors. 

The abrupt early termination of 

the Reconstruction Commission 

and its Task Forces had both 

good and bad effeots. It served to 

relax or remove the pressures of 

Federd dictation and control #as 

soon as practicable, freeing the 

people of Alaska to shoulder most 

of their own burdens in their own 

way. On the other hand, it left 

dangling a series of firm Task 

Force recommendations with no 

very clear plans for enforcement. 

Moreover, there were no procedures set up for adjusting the 

recommendations or of relaxing 

restrictions after ground stabilizabion measures are effected. 
70 THE! ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS-CLEANUP AND EARLY 

RECONSTRUCTION 

By ROBERT E. LYLE~ and WABREN GEOBGE 

INTRODUCTION 

The Alaska earthquake, which 

occurred at 5:36 p.m. on Good 

Friday, March 2'7, 1964, was the 

greatest single disaster in the 

State's history. The joint military-civilian effort in cleaning up 

the debris, providing emergency 

facilities, and going on to rebuild 

permanent replacement facilities 

I\-as one for which all participants 

may be justly proud. 

This paper concerns the activities of the U.S. Army Engineer 

District, Alaska, of the Corps of 

Engineers (referred to hereinafter as the "Alaska District") 

in connection wit11 their assigned 

responsibilities in solving the complex problems resulting from the 

catastrophe. The responsibilities 

of the *4laska District in reconstruction activities mere directed 

by Colonel Kenneth T. Sawyer, 

District Engineer until August 

22, 1964, at mhich time he was relieved by Colonel Clare F. Farley, 

the succeeding District Engineer. 

Colonel Byron M. Kirkpatrick 

was Deputy District Engineer until June 1965, and Mr. Warren 

George was Chief of the Engineering Division during the full 

restoration period. 

The Corps of En,' allleers was 

formally requested to assume the 

responsibility for repair and restorative work in the disaster area 

within the purview of Public Law 

Project Engineer, Emergency Restoration, Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, 

U.S. Army. 

Chief, Engineering Division, Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, U.S. drmy. 

875 by letter dated March 31, 

1964, from the Director, Office of 

Emergency Planning, Executive 

Office of the President, Washin!- 

ton, D. C. The Corps of En@- 

neers proceeded with the repair 

and restorative work through its 

own personnel and by contract, 

11 e r e necessary, immediately 

upon receipt of individual requests from Office of Emergency 

Planning. The requests were initiated as a result of appeals for 

aid from public entities and were 

relayed to the Alaska District for 

action through the North Pacific 

Division of the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. The Office of 

Emergency Planning received requests for aid from the State of 

Alaska; the cities of Anchorage, 

Seward, Valdez, Homer, Cordova, 

Seldovia, Kenai, Girdwood, and 

Whittier; the Palmer and Anchorage school districts; and the 

Spenard Public Utility District. 

The requests were transmitted to 

the Alaska District for necessary 

action. The Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning 

Commission was extremely active 

during the reconstruction phase, 

and it was for Task Force Nine 

of this commission that the Alaska District undertook the extensive soils investigation in the Anchorage, Seward, and Valdez 

areas. Similar requests were received from the Department of 

Interior's Alaska Railroad, the 

Alaska State Housing Authority 

acting for the Urban Renewal 

Administration, &he Alaskan Air 

Command, and the U.S. Army, 

Alaska. 

The scope of tho work accomplished under the provisions of 

PL 8'75 generally falls in the following categories : (1) performing protecitive and other work essential for the preservation of life 

and property on both public and 

private lands; (2) debris and 

wreckage clearance ; (3) 'temporary repair to and temporary replacement of public facilities, except as reserved to other Federal 

agencies ; and (4) furnishing 

technical assistance, execution of 

surveys, and submission of recommendations and reports to Office 

of Emergency Planning relative 

to PL 875 activities. 

The District operations in connection with PL 8'75 were conducted primarily as civil-works 

activities. Admlinistrative a n d 

professional judgments are required in determining the eligibility of projecits under this law, 

particularly as it relates to emergency repairs and temporary replacement. PL 8'75 was interpreted as intending to provide Federal 

assistance to alleviate damage, 

hardship, and suffering occasioned 

by disaster, but not to provide for 

improvement or betterment. 

The work specifically assigned 

the Corps of Engineers consisted 

of demolition and debris clearance ; emergency restoration of 

public utilities; 'and the rebuilding of docks, schools, hospitals, 

and other essential facilities in 

most of the damaged areas of the 

State. 
CLEANUP BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 71 

The Carps of Engineers participates in restoration of channels, 

breakwaters, and harbors through 

funds appropriated annually under the "reliabilitation" category. 

This was the source of funds utilized in restoration or rehabilitation of the ICocliak and Seldovia 

llarbors as well as dredging of the 

original Cordova harbor. These 

three ha~bors were still intact 

after the earthquake and thus 

quailifiecl for reliabilitation funds. 

At Homer, Seward, and Valdez, complete new harbors were 

required ; consequently recon~t~ruction of new harbors equivalent to 

The previous installations was accomplished under PL 875. Expansion was also desired and economically justified ; therefore, the 

Corps of Enginees, with funds 

appropriated by Congress in the 

supplemental A 1 a s k a Omnibus 

Hill, financed the expansion part 

of tliese three harbors and also the 

expansion work at Cordova harbor. 

I11 addition to the work listed 

above, PL 87-99 funds were utilized by the Corps in furnishing 

the engineering support requested 

by the Office of Emergency Planning for that phase of the program. This large item included 

snperoision and administration 

costs for construction contracts 

and support for all other types of 

PL 875 work. 

The Alaska District organized 

three new Resident Engineer 

Offices, at Anchorage, Valdez, and 

Seward, aiicl a number of project 

offices at tlie smaller towns to 

maintain close contaot with the 

coinn~nilities in developing proj - 

ects. Contracts were awarded for 

clelbris clearance, demolitions, and 

such emergency repairs to sewers, 

water supplies, communications, 

:tnd power-distribution systems as 

were necessary for minimum 

standards of health, safety, ancl 

the conduct of business. Concur4.5.-Collapse of Fourth Avenue near C Street, Anchorage, due to landslide caused by the earthquake. 
72 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

rently, some 65 engineers in emergency disaster teams were sent to 

Alaska from the Walla Walla, 

Seattle, and Portland Districts of 

the North Pacific Division, to develop the scope of specific projects and make cost estimates for 

work requiring more deliberate 

design. 

The Alaska District negotiated 

many contracts with architect-engineer firms to design projects defined by the survey teams. A sizeable cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 

was negotiated with a master architect-engineer firm to augment 

the engineering staff of the Alaska District to insure that the designs conformed to standards and 

met community needs. All contrack with specific architect-engineers were negotiated by the 

Alaska District engineering staff. 

To as large an extent as possible, 

local and Alaska architect-engineer firms were used to accomplish 

the design in order to utilize local 

resources as much ae possible in 

helping the damaged economy, to 

effect closer control of the work, 

and to speed up the construction 

effort. T h i s architect-engineer 

effort required a great deal of criteria assembly, definition of scope, 

and close contract control to insure appropriate end results. 

One of the major problems in 

every community, and particularly in the smaller ones, was the 

serious disruption of the local 

economy. Destruction of established businesses reduced employment drastically and threw people out of work when they could 

least afford it. To provide urgently needed employment and to 

channel as much of the restoration work as possible to the hardhit local residents, construction 

contracts were sized to allow the 

maximum participation by local 

bidders. Utility contracts were 

put out in successive increments. 

This approach had an added advantage in allowing the architectengineers to produce bidding 

documents earlier than if large 

segments of the utility system 

were included in one contract; it 

was also effective in shoring up 

the local economies and at the 

same time accomplishing the assigned mission quickly. 

DAMAGE SURVEYS 

The immediate problem posed 

by the earthquake was to determine the extent of damages to 

civilian communities, to military 

installations, and to transportation facilities, including rivers 

and harbors. Engineer disaster 

teams were organized on a crash 

basis to survey the damages and 

furnish guidance for emergency 

restoration to insure public safety, maintain heal,th, and to restore 

communications and economic intercourse. Within a few days all 

areas had had reconnaissance coverage by these groups. Survey 

teams used light aircraft and 

wheeled surf ace vehicles in their 

checkup. Particular emphasis was 

placed on damage assessment of 

the affected schools and hospitals 

in all the communities. Many 

schools suffered severe structural 

damage and were declared unsafe 

in part or whole. Undamaged or 

lightly damaged schools were reoccupied only after a very close 

verification of the structural adequacy by the Alaska District. 

Actually, owing to the seriousness 

of follow-on shocks, each building was checked at least twice 

and some were checked three 

times. 

A vital and most important 

part of the program \.as the assembling of adequate technical information to serve as s basis for 

engineering decision making. As 

stated, engineering firms were employed by contract to help in thls 

work. Several of the contracts 

were for inspection of water and 

sewer systems and underground 

and overhead electrical distribution systems, to obtain data on 

which to base the design for restoration and reconstruction. Obviously, detection of all damage 

could not be done quickly with assurance of complete coverage, 

without special equipment. It 

was, therefore, necessary to depend upon visual inspection for 

accomplishment of the more urgent repairs on an emergency 

basis. Provisions for testing certain water mains were included in 

the contracts for inspection, and 

test requirements were established 

on the same basis as would be used 

for new construction. Acceptance 

of lines tested on this basis gave 

the communities assurance that 

the repaired system would be as 

trouble-free as possible. 

In the interim before temporary 

water lines could be laid, or emergency repairs made to the permanent water systems, the furnishing 

of potable water to the inhabitants was a major consideration. 

The U.S. Army, Alaska, set up 

water points in all the areas of 

waterline damage. This procedure 

assured a safe chlorinated supply 

of drinking water until surface 

lines were laid or permanent lines 

repaired. 

The determination of the location of damage and the delineation of repair methods for sewer 

restoration were more complex 

than for the water-distribution 

system. Damage to sewers was 

not confined to slide areas, nor 

was it obvious at the ground surface las breaks in the water mains 

often were. Photographic and direct visual inspection of the sewers was employed to determine the 

location and nature of individual 

line breaks. Manholes were inspected at the same time that cam- 
CLEANUP BY TRE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 73 

era crews were using them for 

access to the sewer. Photographs 

were made at %foot intervals 

*along the pipe in all storm and 

sanitary sewers less than 24 inches 

in diameter where damage w as 

suspected to exist, and direct visual inspection was undertaken in 

all such sewers 24 inches and 

larger. 

Approximately 700,000 linear 

feet of storm and sanitary sewers 

was inspected by contract in the 

Anchonage area alone during the 

summer of 1964. Photography 

was of two types, one being the 

"inspectoline" process, in which a 

16-mm single-frame automatic 

camera with stroboscopic flash 

equipment was used. This equipment is suitable for pipelines 8 

inches and larger, and it was 

found that color film gave better 

results than black and white film. 

The other method utilized a 30- 

mm double-frame stereoscopic automatic camera, equipped with 

stroboscopic flash equipment and a 

heating device to prevent lens 

fogging ; this method produced 

black and white stereo-paired 

photographs of excellent quality. 

CLEANUP AND 

RESTORATION 

ANCHORAGE 

Anchorage, the largest city in 

Alaska, has a metropolitail population of approximately 100,000. 

It is on a bluff overlooking Knik 

,4rm, a part of Cook Inlet. 

Principal damage to the Anchorage area was caused by landslides, ground subsidence, and fisqnres resulting from the earthquake. The city was not affected 

by tidal 11-aves. The major destruction occurred in the main 

business district along Fourtl~ 

Avenue, in the Ii-L Street area 

west of the business district, in 

the Government Hill area, adjoining Elmendorf Air Force 

Base on the north side of the 

city, and in the Turnagain 

Heights residential area overlooking Cook Inlet south of the city. 

Priority attention was given to 

debris clearance and utility repair. The emergency design was 

characterized by on-the-spot derelopment, initiation of work by 

letter contract, and control by a 

field force into which a design 

and cost capability was integrated. Emergency repairs were 

made to the utilities on a temporary basis until more definite 

information could be gathered on 

which to base the final remedial 

solution. 

Tlle USAF Hospital at Elmendorf Air Force Base, \rhich was 

evacuated immediately after the 

earthquake, \\-as reoccupied in a 

week. The Presbyterian Hospital also was evacuated to permit 

cleanup but \\-as reoccupied in a 

shorter time period. The Proriclence Hospital, located in an area 

less affected by the quake, continued in operation. These last 

two hospitals are privately manawed facilities. Tlle public psy- -. chlatric hospital, in the same area 

as the Proridence Hospital, continued in operation. 

Emergency work \\-\-as completed on the municipal dock, on 

the backup storage area, and on 

other damaged port facilities including cons~ruction of :L temporary petroleum offloading facility 

in the Anchorage harbor. 

SEWARD 

Sen-ard, on tlic Kenaj Peninsula about 80 miles south of Anchorage, has a population of only 

3,000 in the city and surrounding 

district, but occupies an important place in the economy of the 

State. It has an ice-free harbor 

and is the southern terminus of 

The Alaska Railroad and the Anchorage-Seward Highway. 

The city's preearthquake economy was to a considerable extent 

dependent on its transportation 

industry wl~ich included extensive railroad yards and freight 

staging areas. Fish-processing 

plants and storage facilities for 

petroleum products were also a 

part of the economy. All were 

located in the waterfront area. 

Massive destruction of facilities 

along the waterfront was inflicted 

by submarine slides and tidal 

waves. An immediate result of 

the seismic shocks was the rupture 

of fuel storage tanks. The fuel 

quickly caught fire and flames 

spread over half a mile of waterfront. Submarine 1 a n d s 1 i d es 

caused the subside~~ce of about 4,- 

000 feet of the waterfront into 

Resurrection Bay, and took with 

them storage tanks and other 

waterfront facilities including the 

municipal dock. 

Tidal waves generated by the 

earthquake to a height of 30 feet 

destroyed the railroad docks and 

leveled the remaining facilities 

along the waterfront. Buildings, 

boats, and railroad cars were 

added to the debris already deposited by ground shocks and 

slides. The industrial area along 

the waterfront was completely destroyed and the petroleum offloading facilities, canneries, and docks 

were swept away. The standby 

powerplant was destroyed and the 

small-boat harbor was rendered 

useless. 

Emergency repairs to utilities 

were initiated by letter contracts 

and were so programmed that 

they mere progressively operational in a very short time. An initial 

contract for emergency debris 

cleanup was issued early in April 

1964, and additional contracts 

have been issued periodically. 
74 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27 , 1964 

46.-Aerial view of Fourth Avenue slide ·area, Anchorage, after initial cleanup of debris, looking northwest; Westward Hotel 

in top center. 
47.-Turnagain Heights landslide before and after partial cleanup by Carps of Engineers. Arrow marks same house in 

both views. 
76 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, NARCH 27, 19 64 

48.-Aerial view of Valdez showing waterfront and city before the earthquake, looking northwest. Note the dike built around 

the tom to protect it from floods of the Valdez glacial stream. 
CLEANUP BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 77 

4!).-Aerial view of Valdez showing waterfront and city after the earthquake, submarine slides, and waves. looking northwest. 

Sate conlplete removal of docks and recession of shoreline. Texnporary dock (lower right) was built after the earthquake. 
50.-Partial cleanup of petroleum tank farm area, Seward, looking northwest. 

51.- The Alaska Railroad dock, Seward, after initial cleanup of damaged warehouse and debris, looking north. 

---~ 

-- -::::-- ----~ 

-------- "":..- --- -- ---- -- ---- - --
By the spring of 1965, the wterfront was cleared of all unsalvageable material. The ~alav~ageable 

material \~xs stockpiled or transported away from the waterfront. 

At Seward, debris clearance done 

was a major task, costing more 

than $2.5 million. 

VALDEZ 

Valdez, a sm~all fishing port 

with a population of about 600, is 

120 miles east of Anchorage and is 

the southern terminus of the Richardson Highway which extends 

northward to Fairbanks. 

Damage to Valdez was the result of both tremors and tidal 

waves. Ground shocks cracked 

CLEANUP BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 79 

buildings, opened fissures in the 

streets, and ruptured waterlines 

and sewerlines. Waves generated 

by the slide were followed by a 

series of tidal waves, the fourth 

and highest completing the dsvastation of the harbor, the waterfront area, and half of the downtown business area. The smallboat harbor, fuel storage terminal, 

and piers were destroyed, as well 

as the entire fishing fleet except 

for two boats that were out at 

SW. 

The location of Valdez after 

the earthquake was considered a 

high-risk area, subject to future 

waterfront slides and tidal flooding. It was declared unsuitable 

for rehabilitation and a new site 

was selected in a safer location 

about 4 miles west of the old site. 

A minimum amount of repair 

work !\--as performed at the old site 

to pro\-ide emergency services for 

the inhabitjants until accornmodations could be provided at the new 

site. 

Debris was removed from the 

old town and emergency repairs to the city, hospital, school, 

and utilities completed. A temporary barge terminal to serve the 

immediate needs of the city was 

constructed and has been in use 

since June 1964. 

.ST-Main bueiness "street" of Seldovia. Region'al subsidence due to earthquake caused flooding by high tides; sandbags were 

placed along boardwalk to prevent it from floating. 
53.-Petroleum tank farm at Whittier after wave and fire damage, looking west. 

CORDOVA the hospital and a new elementary WHITTIER 

Cordova is a fishing port of 

about 1,100 inhabitants and is 

about 45 miles southeast of Valdez. 

Damage resulted from an earthquake-induced uplift of about 6 

feet, local fracturing of the 

ground, and a tidal wave which 

floated away houses and boats 

along the waterfront and damaged 

canneries and pier and dock facilities. Emergency work by the 

Alaska District consisted of 

removal of debris and wreckage 

attributable directly to the earthq~~ake, and restoration of essential 

public utilities. 

HOMER 

The fishing community of Homer has about 1,200 inhabitants and 

is on Kachemak Bay at the southwest end of Kenai Peninsula. It 

is the terminus of the Sterling 

Highway, which runs northward 

to connect with the AnchorageSeward Highway. Its deep-water 

ice-free port accommodates cargo 

freighters and barges. The earthquake caused some damage to 

downtown Homer, principally to 

- 

school. A combination of general 

land subsidence and high water 

inflicted severe damage to port 

facilities and made the docks and 

canneries unusable. The sinallboat-harbor protection works in 

part were severely damaged. 

Emergency work by the Alaska 

District consisted of cleaning up, 

in tlie interest oC safety, health, 

and sanitation, the debris and 

refuse caused by the earthquake. 

SELDOVIA 

Seldovia, a fishing community 

of about 550 inhabitants, is 20 

miles across Icacilemak Ray from 

Homer. L:~ilcl subsidence, a result 

of the eartl~qu~~lie, lowered the 

\vaterfront about 3 feet xncl eu1)oscd struc>nres along the boardn-alk to flot~ling dr~rillg the Itigller 

tides. Enlergent.~ work consisted 

of (1) furnisliillp and placing 

sandbitgs on the hi~rdwalk to keep 

it in place during liigh tides and 

(2) miscella~leous work in connection with repairs to streets, 

utilities, and airfield. 

Whittier is an ice-free seaport 

and a terminus of The Alaska 

Railroad located on Prince William Sound approximately 60 

miles southeast of Anchorage. 

Emergency work consisted of the 

removal of debris caused by the 

earthquake. Much of the commercial petroleum industry at the 

port was severely damaged and 

burned, as were the railroad-carunloading facilities of The Alaska 

Railroad. 

OTHER COMMUNITIES 

The Alaska District personnel 

accomplished inspections, emergency repairs, and miscellaneous 

work pertaining to earthquake-incurred damages at Chugiak, Dillingham, Fire Island, Girdwood, 

Glennallen, Hope, Kenai, King 

Salmon, Klawock, Kodiak Island, 

Larson Bay Village, Moose Pass, 

Nikishh, Ninilchik, Orca Inlet, 

Soldatna, Spenard, and Tatitlek. Reconnaissance and reports 

were also made concerning damage to the Seward and Sterling 

Highways, the Cooper Lake transmisfion line, and the intake section 

of the Eklutna Power Projext. 
TH3 ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS-METHODS 

AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 

By WABBEN GEORQE' and ROBERT E. LYLE 

INTRODUCTION 

Because of the short construction 

season and the severity of Alaska 

winters, careful ittention had to 

be given to coordination of the 

project planning for permanent 

restoration or for reconstruction 

of facilities damaged or destroyed by the Alaska earthquake. A 

studied pattern was followed during reconstruction planning to insure a sound rehabilitation and 

reconstruction program. First, 

emergency repairs to the essential 

facilities such as utilities and 

transportation were made. Second, extensive geologic and soils 

studies were made to determine 

where facilities should be permanently reconstructed. Third, 

the projects were designed, sometimes concurrently with the soilstudy program. Finally, the projects were advertised and contraots were atvarded for construction. 

Urban-renewal project plann,ing, which became an influence 

in some of the reconstruction effort, was incorporated with the 

rest,orat!ion of facilities at Anchorage, Cordova, Se'ldovia, Seward, 

and Valdez. The TJrban Renewal 

Administration, the Alaska Housing Authority, the several communities, and the 1J.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska, of the 

Corps of Engineers (hereafter referred to as the "Alaska District") 

Chief, Engineering Division, Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. 

Project Engineer, Emergency Restoration, Alaska District, Corps of Engineers, 

U.S. Army. 

cooperated very closely in order to 

coordinate and satisfy long-range 

urban development needs. The ultimate objectives of the urbanrenewal projects, tt-hich are to provide earthquake-damaged communities with better land utilization, to rehabilitate blighted areas, 

and to provide more effective traffic patterns, had consideration in 

this effort. Urban-renewal application and planning procedures 

were expedited in order to meet 

the urgent community needs. 

Because of the extensive earthquake-induced slides, it mas felt 

that a major soils, geology, and 

foundation study of these landslides in over seven areas of Anchorage would )be needed. Prime 

aerial photographs were secured 

by three flight agencies on March 

28 and 29; these have proved to 

be very valuable. 

An investigation of the landslides and other earthquake damage was initiated on March 29, 

1964, by the Anchorage Engineering Geology E v a 1 u a t i o n 

Group under authorization of 

the Alaska Housing Authority 

and the city of Anchorage. As 

part of this early effort, Arctic 

Alaska Testing Laboratories, Anchorage, conducted borings, field 

measurements, and laboratory 

tests in the principal slide areas 

and generally throughout the 

city. 

To meet the need for a major 

study in the soils, geology, and 

foundation fields of the landslideaffected areas in Anchorage, an 

operational organization was selected which consisted of an architect-engineer group to function 

under supervision of the Alaska 

District's Engineering Division 

for the investigation and reports, 

plus a board of consultants for 

advice, monitoring, and review. 

Authority to proceed in this manner, requested early in April 

from higher authority, was received on April 16. 

The soils-mechanics and foundations firm of Shannon and Wilson, Inc., of Seattle was selected and a fixed-price contract 

covering such work at Anchorage, Seward, and Valdez was 

negotiated on April 25, 1964. This 

contract required Shannon and 

Wilson to provide comprehensive 

soils- and geological-engineering 

assistance to the Alaska District, 

to begin field investigations within 10 days at Anchorage, to cover 

each of five principal slide areas 

as a separate entity and adjacent 

areas in the city of Anchorage 

as well, and to determine: (1) 

the mechanics of tihe slide movements, (2) existing static stability of affected areas, (3) stability 

of affected areas if su~bjected to 

future shocks, (4) static and 

dynamic stability of areas not 

affected, and (5) methods for 

improving the stability of existing or potential landslide areas. 

Separate work was also assigned at Valdez and Seward, 

Alaska. Because of the value of 

the property affected by the 

landslides and the need for 

financing reconstruction, all work 

at Anchorage was programmed 
82 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

for completion in units on a rigorous schedule which dovetailed 

with the Alaska District's assigned responsibilities and which 

also took cognizance of the urgent need for reliable engineering and geologic information by 

other Federal agencies, tihe city, 

the State of Alaska, and the 

private sector. 

At the same time, the Alaska 

District engaged, as a board of 

consultants group, Ralph Peck of 

the University of Illinois, Laurits 

Bjerrum, Director of the Norwegian Geological Institute, and 

Thomas F. Thompson of Burlingame, Calif. This group of 

eminent soils and geology experts 

was constituted to monitor the 

progress and direction of the 

soils and geology studies of the 

Alaska District and its soils, 

geology, and foundations contractor, Shannon and Wilson, Inc., to 

recommend needed changes ; to 

review reports and findings; and 

to advise the District Engineer 

on his courses of action in participation with Federal, State, 

and city officials concerned with 

planning recovery from the disaster and reconstruction of public 

facilities. 

Shannon and Wilson, Inc., 

commenced work on May 4 1964, 

and within 48 hours had three 

soil-sampling (drilling) rigs together with supply and inspection services in operation. On 

May 11 the firm established its 

Anchorage field office, at which 

time seven rigs were in operation 

nearly around the clock on two 

slide areas, a bucket auger was 

digging man-sized-access holes for 

geologic inspection of critical underground areas, a group was installing piezometers and slopemovement indicator assemblies, 

and another group was taking 

seismic measurements in the slide 

areas. By May 29 most of the 

geophysical exploration had been 

completed, Shannon and Wilson's 

slide-project leaders had each 

reviewed his slide area or areas, 

subsurface data collection was 

proceeding with 15 drilling rigs 

functioning in the field, two laboratory groups were clarifying 

and testing samples, and the 

slope-indicator, vane-shear, and 

piemmeter-installation crews were 

well along in bheir work. 

Work programs were reviewed 

on May 28 and 29 by the consultant board. Cihanges made included : more emphasis on bucketauger inspection holes, additional 

piezometer installations and vane 

shears, improved sampling techniques, more inquiry into the 

earthquake vibrational spectrum, 

and acceleration of dynamic triaxial testing. 

The work of the investigation 

was voluminous and of great variety, and it resulted in comprehensive engineering data on each 

slide and surrounding area. Subsurf ace profiles were developed 

from some 150 borings, including undisturbed sample borings, 

vane-shear borings, and bucketauger holes. Geophysical and 

geological explorations were undertaken, piezometers w e r e 

installed, and observations of 

earthquake-induced ground movement were made. Comprehensive 

laboratory investigations were 

conducted on undisturbed and reconstituted samples, including dynamic-strength tests, mineralogical and paleontological studies, as 

well as conventional classification, 

consolidation. and strength tests. 

Laboratory strength tests showed 

the weak zone of the Bootl-gger 

Cove Clay (Pleistocene) to have 

shear strength in the range of 0.35- 

0.40 ton per square foot and sensitivities in the range of 25- 

50. Special dynamic strength 

tests, in which specimens were 

subjected to pulsating triaxial 

loads, showed that 50 cycles of 

stress could result in failure of 

the clay at a stress level approximately 60-80 percent of the static strength. Similar tests on 

loose sands from the same stratum indicated that failure would 

occur at cyclic stress levels of bhe 

same order of magnitude. 

On June 24, 1964, Shannon and 

Wilson delivered its first preliminary report on the Fourth Bvenue 

slide area to the Alaska District, 

its board of consultants, the city of 

Anchorage, the Office of Emergency Planning, and representatives of the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning 

Commission for Alaska, including 

the Scientific and Engineering 

Task Force ("Task Force Nine"). 

This report enabled Task Force 

Nine, the engineering group of 

the Planning Commission, to revise risk-area classifications for 

the Fourth Avenue slide areas and 

other areas of greater Anchorage. 

Shannon and Wilson delivered 

its remaining preliminary reports 

in the same manner, to about the 

same group of officials, on the following dates : 

Date 

Report of slide at- I Oral I Written 1 presentation preliniinary I report 

- 

Each of these timely presentations gave factual engineering 

data concerning the causes and 

effects of the landslides that had 

occurred during the earthquake, 

together with recommendations 

for remedial measures including 

design criteria. Task Force Nine 

immediately assigned suitable risk 

classifications, which were published in the newspapers along 

L Street. .-..-...... 

Turnagain -.......... 

Oovenunent Hill, 

First Avenue, 

Romig Hill. .. ..... 

June 29.1964 

July 6,1964 

July 20,1964 

July 6,1964 

July 11.1964 

July 25,1964 
RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGIN EERS 83 

with a semitechnical explanation 

of the Alaska District's findings 

concerning stability and restoration of the landslide area. The 

Office of Emergency Planning and 

the District Engineer also quickly utilized the reports as background for important engineering 

decisions as to restoration of public facilities and stabilization in 

each landslide area. 

Early in August, Shannon and 

Wilson compiled .all data into a 

final written report which on 

August 10 land 11 was given a 

thorough review by the board of 

consultants and by representatives 

of the Alaska District, of the 

North Pacific Division, and of the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers. 

The report was printed and issued 

on August 28, 1964. It presents 

the results of the investigation in 

detail, gives explanations as to 

what occurred, and makes final 

recommendations as to design 

criteria for remedial measures and 

land uses. The report concluded 

that (1) the strong ground-motion 

waves from the earthquake-generated shear stresses in the upper 

critical soils of the Bootlegger 

Cove Clay, which underlie parts of 

Anchorage, caused failure in these 

soils and permitted horizontal 

sliding toward the bluffs in locations where height, declivity, and 

other physical parameters were 

most unfavorable to stability; 

(2) though all slide areas are stable under present static conditions, all may be expected to experience additional movements of 

varying magnitudes in another 

great earthquake; (3) all areas 

which failed can be stabilized 

against another earthquake of 

similar magnitude and duration 

by means of slope flattening, buttressing, improvement of subsurface drainage, and other wellestablished procedures ; (4) settlement of the ground surfaces, in 

and adjacent to the slide areas, 

will occur over a period of years 

due to consolidation of the slidedisturbed clay and sand strata, 

especially within the gmhen and 

pressure-ridge parts; (5) many 

of the bluff slopes in the vicinity 

of Anchorage underlain by the 

Bootlegger Cove Clay are of masginal static and dynamic stability, 

and oversteepening or overloading 

of existing slopes by excavations 

at the base or by construction of 

fills or heavy structures near the 

crest or on the slope may result in 

localized 1,andslides ; and (6) 

ground motions during earthquakes will likely be greater near 

the crest of such slopes than elsewhere. 

ANCHORAGE 

Restoration of schools that were 

not in slide areas as initiated immediately after the spring semester. All the schools that had 

light to moderate damage \mere 

carefully investigated by architect-engineer firms and repaired 

by construction contract in time 

for the beginning of the fall semester in .1964. Repair of two of 

the more seriously dam age d 

schools, Denali Elementary and 

West High School, took much 

longer. Denali was made available for use at the beginning of 

the second semester. Government 

Hill Elementary was destroyed 

and could not be rebuilt in the 

same location because of unstable 

soil conditions. A new school was 

designed and \\-as ready for occupancy in August 1965 on land 

made available to the school district by the U.S. Air Force. After 

determination that the important 

West Anchorage High School, 

which was very heavily damaged, 

was in a nominal-risk area, studies were made to evaluate its restoration. Design and construction proceeded in three separate 

phases. In phase 1 the moderately damaged auditorium wing was 

restored, in time to allow use by 

the school district for the first semester of 1964. Phase 2 consisted of the restoration of the severely damaged classroom w i n g , which was turned over to the 

school district for use at the beginning of the second semester. 

In phase 3, a new one-story classroom wing to replace the original 

second story will be constructed; 

this project scheduled for completion by the beginning of the 

fall term, September 1, 1965, In 

order to accomplish these schedules, school-repair contracts required double shifting of work 

by the contractor and specified 

high liquidated damages. These 

measures were effective in procuring completely usable structures in 

time for the start of school. 

School-repair contracts a 1 o n e 

totaled $5.6 million. All considered, the school program was carried on quite well, but some double shifting of students was necessary. 

Repair of underground utilities, 

as well as the restoration of 

schools, had priority. S u r f a c e 

waterlines were laid immediately 

after the earthquake to provide 

service in the major slide areas 

where underground lines were 

seriously damaged. Water pipe 

f o r the permanent restoration 

mas purchased while designs were 

still being developed, and the procurement lead time was thus cut to 

an absolute minimum. Essential 

permanent restoration of water 

service in all areas was completed 

well before freezeup, and the surface lines were then dismantled. 

The 24-inch wood-stave supply 

main from the treatment plant to 

the city \\-as extensively damaged along part of its route. A 

mile and a half of this line ms 
84 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 1 9 6 4 

bypassed by laying a new cast-iron 

main. This line and the new wells 

drilled to replace those destroyed 

assure a continued dependable 

water supply. A detailed pitometer .survey of the water system revealed additional points of important leakage outside of the various slide areas; these were repaired. Repair of structural damage at the municipal water-treatment plant completed the permanent restoration of the water-supply system. 

After emergency work to restore tJ.he sewer system to a reasonably workable condition, a 

major effort was made to photograph all lines with known or 

suspected damage. This was 

done to be sure all breaks were 

properly identified and repaired. 

Repair contracts were developed 

progressively as photography revealed the need. All essential 

sewer repair was accomplished 

before freezeup, and less critically needed restoration was de-

£erred until 1965. Work under 

contract to be finished in 1965 

completed the restoration of all 

Anchorage and Spenard Public 

Utility District sewers. 

The municipal electrical distribution system, both overhead and 

underground, was damaged extensively. An effective tool for 

examination of underground 

ducts was a television camera 

lent, complete with crew, by the 

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 

This loan enabled the Alaska 

M.- Govemment Hill s'iide area, Anchorage, showing damage to elementary school. Photograph !Ja.ken shortly after earthquake, looking northwest. Undamaged far corner of school was !)reserved for future use when remainder of school was 

razed. Alaska Communication Service toll building and microwave tower (right) were undamaged. 
RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGINE 

District to pinpoint damage in 

ducts and eliminate the need for 

a "find-and-fix" type contract. 

All work essential to restoration 

of an operable system was completed before the normal heavy 

winter electrical loads. 

Most of the damage to the 

municipal telephone system was 

in the slide areas. Necessary repairs were made early by city 

crews. The television camera 

was again effective in locating 

damage to ducts. Repair of the 

system was completed in the 

spring of 1965. 

Street repairs were deferred 

until 1965 because utility repair 

required the removal of pavement in many areas late in the 

fall. All pavement restoration 

was completed by August 1965. 

Many utility and street-repair 

contracts were required to complete hhe work. 

Public buildings belonging to 

the city of Anahorage had minor 

to moderately heavy damage and 

were repaired before winter. 

The State Mines and Minerals 

Building was located in the 

Fourth Avenue slide area and 

consequently was completely destroyed. A new facility was 

scheduled for completion by August 1965. 

After completion of the sails 

investigation and the review by 

the board of consultants, it was 

apparent that stabilization of the 

major slide areas would be essential, not only to restore the 

areas to use, but also to protect 

adjacent property. Accordingly, 

a buttress system was designed 

for the Fourth Avenue slide area. 

Funds for this project were made 

available by the Urban Renewal 

Administration bhrough the Alaska Housing Authority. The project was expanded to include the 

1:onstruction of a complete new 

utility system and a street system. 

Design was completed and construction started in 1965 as soon as 

real estate became available. This 

major undertaking will be one of 

great importance to the downtown 

business area. 

In the Turnagain slide area, 

testing was initiated in the fall 

of 1964 to determine the most 

feasible method of stabilization. 

Both blasting and mechanical 

distunbance of the sensitive clay 

developed drawbacks Zihat made 

use of these stabilization methods 

unattractive. Electro-osmosis 

treatment lwas also explored. A 

test model consisting of 22 railroad rails as probes introducing 

direct current at varying voltages 

and amperages to the clay has 

been successful in increasing soil 

strength. 

Although the results of some of 

these experiments mere promising, 

it became apparent that the slide 

material had spontaneously regained most of its original 

strength. Accordingly, the Alaska District decided in mid-1966 

that stabilization measures, other 

than protection of the shoreline, 

were unnecessary. 

SEWARD 

The permanent restoration of 

the utilities and the public 

schools of the city of Seward 

was completed in 1964. Additional restoration under way included the State Court and Office 

Building, the City Maintenance 

Shop, and replacement of the 

3000-kw standby electrical-generation facility. All the facilities 

are being funded by the Office of 

Emergency Planning except the 

powerplant, which is funded 

jointly 'by the Office of Emergency Planning and hhe city. 

The publicly owned and operated waterfront facilities, which 

include a small-boat basin, city 

dock, and associated facilities are 

being reconstructed under the 

authority of the Office of Emergency Planning and the Corps 

of Engineers. These waterfront 

facilities represent a most important part of the economy of 

Seward because of its fishing and 

recreational activities. 

Facilities for The Alaska Railroad, which include a dock suitable for berthing two 600-foot 

vessels and allied offloading storage facilities and marshaling 

yard, are being constructed at the 

northerly end of Resurrection 

Bay where the shore area is 

being raised by using material 

dredged to deepen the harbor in 

the vicinity of the docks. These 

facilities also have great economic 

importance to the town and to the 

railroad. 

VALDEZ 

The permanent reconstruction 

effort in Valdez is unique in that 

the decision was made to relocate 

the entire city in an area which is 

not subject to instability in the 

event of a future earthquake. The 

reconstruction project is being undertaken under the joint sponsorship of the Office of Emergency 

Planning, the Urban Renewal Administration, and the Corps of 

Engineers, The new city encompasses an area of approximately 

200 acres. The general city planning was done by the Alaska 

Housing Authority under the 

sponsorship of the Urban Renewal Administration ; the design and 

construction of the streets and 

utilities, high school, elementary 

school, and municipal building 

are being accomplished by the 

Alaska District under the sponsorship of the Office of Emergency Planning. The utility and 

street systems in the new townsite represent a sizable investment, 
55.-Doek and boat harbor under construction at new site for Valdez, looking east; winter of 1964-65. 

56.-Elementary school constructed during the autumn of 1964 at new site for Valdez, looking northeast. 
RECONSTRUCTION BY TKE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 87 

67.-New site of Valdez and dock facilities (foreground). Old Valdez, devastated by the earthquake is at cenkr (left) at 

head of Port Valdez. Loss of the Valdez waterfront by submarine slides, extensive earthquake damage throughout the 

town, and the ever-present danger of flooding by Valdez glacial stream (note dikes around town) led to recommendations 

by U.S. Geological Survey geologists to abandon the town and to rebuild T'aldez on the flat near Mineral Creek. The Scientific and Engineering Task Forc~ concurred in this recommendation. Bedrock ridges along shore protect the new townsite 

and also mean that there is no danger of offshore slides. 

funded jointly by the Office of 

Emergency Planning and the 

Alaska Housing Authority. 

The sea-oriented economy of the 

city is being reconstructed at the 

new townsite. The facilities completed or under construction are 

a city dock and two dry-storage 

warehouses and a small-boat har231-821 -7 

bor. Waterfront facilities, funded by the Office of Emergency 

Planning and the Corps of Engineers also comprise major installations. The two new scl~ools and 

the city hall replace structures 

badly damaged. 

A complex consisting of a State 

Highway District Headquarters 

office building and maintenance 

depot shops and ,a state hospital 

with beds for 150 mentally retarded patients and 15 acute patients is being constructed on a 

30-acre tract adjacent to the new 

city limits. These facilities are 

important additions to tlie return 

of the economic health of the city. 
88 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 

CORDOVA 

At Cordova, the land rose 

rather than settled, as at most 

other coastal communities, so the 

small-boat harbor was rendered 

useless for anchorage of small 

craft. Basically, the problem was 

to deepen the old small-boat harbor and expand it to provide 

moorage for the boats which, 

prior to the earthquake, moored in 

bays and inlets surrounding t h e 

Cordova area. In execution the 

operation became somewhat complicated. It was necessary to provide moorage for small boats within the harbor, to provide a new 

ferry terminal, and to maintain 

access to two canneries while 

dredging was in progress. The 

total effort represents a major 

project jointly supported by the 

Office of Emergency Planning and 

the Corps of Engineers. 

The quake severely damaged the 

wood-s t :ave water-supply line 

bringing water to the city from a 

distant source, and some sewage 

facilities were wrecked. Total 

utility repairs represent a sizable 

investment. 

SELDOVIA 

Structural damage to the town 

of Seldovia was comparatively 

light. The major problem here was 

that the whole area settled about 

3Vz feet, and put in serious jeopardy the business district of the 

town. The business district is primarily on docks :along the boardwalk, which runs the full length of 

the waterfront. The tsunami broke 

floats loose from within the smallboat harbor but did very little 

other damage. The first order of 

business after the earthquake was 

to raise the breakwaters for the 

harbor 4 feet to their original 

height. Other work consisted of 

restoration of damaged utilities 

and reconstruction of the airfield 

by raising the runway above high 

tide. A number of contracts to 

effect this restoration were necessary. 

The Alaska Housing Authority 

developed an urban-renewal project for rebuilding and raising the 

complete waterfront area. This 

project consisted of demolition of 

the boardwalk and other structures :along the waterfront, the 

construction of a breakwater, with 

fill to form new land upon which 

property owners could rebuild 

canneries and other businesses. 

vVork was accomplished in stages 

in 1965 and 1966 to allow removal 

of cannery equipment and rebuilding with a minimum of down time. 

This unusual project required 

much detailed effort and coordination. It was jointly funded by the 

Alaska Housing Authority and the 

Office of Emergency Planning. 

HOMER 

The town of Homer itself had 

only light damage, but the 

Homer Spit, site of the city dock 

and the small-boat harbor and 

other commercial facilities, subsided 6 feet; heavy damage resulted. It was impossible to 

reconstruct the harbor in its 

original location, so a new harbor 

has been constructed within the 

Spit. A new main breakwater 

was required, and a part of the 

old breakwater was utilized as an 

entrance breakwater. Inner harbor facilities and a new city dock 

completed the waterfront facil58.-Partially completed new boat basin on Homer Spit, looking south. Former basin destroyed by subsidence and submarine 

slides was near new riprapped breakwater on left side of spit. Land's End Hotel is at extreme end of spit. 
RECONSTRUCTION BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 89 

ities for Homer. These were 

major efforts. The access to these 

facilities will be provided by a 

Federal road system which will 

require extensive reconstruction. 

The Alaska District conducted 

an investigation, funded by the 

Office of Emergency Planning, 

to determine the long-term effect 

of the quake on the Homer Spit. 

A report WSLS completed in August 1965. 

OTHER COMMUNITIES 

Restoration and reconstruction 

of harbor facilities were accomplished at Kodiak and Orca Inlet 

and the harbor at Tatitlek was 

dredged. These were major contracts. Other communities in 

whioh restoration of public 

buildings and utilities was accomplished are Moose Pass, Kenai, 

Chugiak, Palmer, Glennallen, 

Girdwood, Hope, Whittier, and 

Klawock. Work was not great 

in terms of funds spent but 

restoration effort in each place 

was of large importance to the 

community concerned. 
THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 

By GENIE CHANCE ' 

INTRODUCTION 

During those first dark, cold 

hours after the Alaska earthquake of March 27, 1964, it was 

difficult to visualize any good 

coming out of such tragedy. But 

a new and better Alaska has risen from khe rubble. 

Alaska was a young Statebarely 5 years old. Newly 

formed boroughs had been in 

existence for less than 3 months. 

(A borough is an intermediate 

governmental district similar to 

a county or a parish in other 

States.) The organization of the 

boroughs had been slow and 

cautious. No budgets had been 

set-no taxes collected. Alaskans 

were deliberate in setting up 

another government entity. As 

one resident said, "They were 

just trying to set up shop when 

they had to cope with this emergency-they hadn't even learned 

how to cope with the ordinary 

day-to-day stuff yet." The town 

of Homer was to have been incorporated just 5 days after the 

earthquake. There could hardly 

have (been a more difficult period 

for new, inexperienced city officials to take office. 

The Federal Government's 

transitional grants to assist Alaska's move from territorial status 

to Statehood were almost at 

an end. At Juneau, the State legislature was trying to trim the 

proposed $75.9-million budget 

during the final days of its annual session. So much was need- 

? Radio news commentator and publicrelations consultant, Anchorage, Alaska. 

ed, and yet the tax base was so 

limited. 

Most State revenues came from 

south-central Alaska where many 

coastal towns and villages sustain seafood industries, where 

metropolitan Anchorage burgeons 

with 100,000 people, and where 

the ports of Seward and Whittier 

handle freight for interior Alaska via The Alaska Railroad. 

Tax revenues from this area dictated to a large degree the 

amount that could be spent on 

State government functions during the next fiscal year. 

First with a gentle roll and 

then a sudden jolt, nature made 

the proposed budget a morthless 

piece of paper. The entire State 

would suffer from the losses sustained in the quake-stricken area. 

Miraculously, fen- people were 

killed, but valuable, taxable property lay in ~vorthless heaps of 

rubble, and the State's economy 

was crushed. 

SEWARD 

Seward, a community of about 

2,000 people, lies at the foot of 

3,200-foot Mount Marathon at the 

head of Resurrection Bay. It was 

settled at the turn of the 20th 

century when a private company 

attempted to build a railroad into 

interior Alaska. Although that 

venture failed, Seward was kept 

alive when the U.S. Government 

began to build The Alaska Railroad in 1914. Seward is the ocean 

terminus of the 540-mile long railroad, and the community's economic mainstay for the past 50 

years had been longshor~ng. 

In recent years there htad been 

speculation that S e w a r d w a s 

doomed to become a ghost town 

because of her dependence on a 

declining water-oriented c o m - 

merce and the railroad. Since the 

19507s, more and more freight was 

being trucked into the State via 

the Alaska Highway. The population of Seward slowly dwindled as disenchanted r e s i d e n t s 

sought greener pastures. 

However, in 1963 an energetic 

group of civic leaders determined 

to put new life into their town. 

Through their enthusiasm and 

tenacity, Seward won the coveted 

"A11 American City'' award. A 

big celebration was planned for 

April 4, 1964. 
THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 

Buton March 27, earthquaketriggered submarine landslides 

destroyed most of the waterfront 

and flames from ruptured petroleum storage tanks were swept into 

town by tsunamis. Thirteen people lost their lives before the rest 

of the townspeople fled to the safety of higher ground. Seward was 

desolate. Some thought Seward 

was dead. 

One year later, the visitor was 

impressed with Seward's spirited 

determination to live. Federal 

funds, of course, were essential to 

the reconstruction of public facilities in the town, and the decision 

of the many Federal agencies to 

"Save Seward" was welcome news. 

Seward herself valiantly joined in 

the fight. 

With the loss-of the docks, the 

railroad, and the fish canneries, 

the only immediate source of income was employment on the Federal reconstruction projects. 

Mayor Perry Stockton said 

that, although a few people had 

to move elsewhere to find work, 

the city as a whole did not suffer 

financially in the year following 

the quake. Realizing that financial support from the "crash" construction program would end by 

1966, the city leaders concentrated 

on attracting industry. The city 

applied to the State government 

for title to about 70 acres of reclaimed tidelands that had been 

filled with materials dredged from 

the harbor. Using $36,000 from 

capital improvement funds, the 

city built a cold-storage plant 

adjacent to the new city dock. 

The facility was then leased to a 

private fishing cooperative under 

an agreement which would amortize the investment within 5 years. 

Seward's fishing fleet resumed 

operations when the plant opened 

in June 1965. 

Before the quake a bond issue 

had been approved to pave many 

of the city streets. The work was 

postponed until 1965 so that underground water and sewer lines 

could be repaired by the Corps of 

Engineers. 

About one-fourth of Seward 

was unsafe for the uses to which 

it had been put before the quake. 

The Urban Renewal Administration negotiated the acquisition 

and redevelopment of the unstable land, and by March 1965 an 

estimated 95 percent of it had 

been purchased from the private 

owners. About three-fourths of 

the displaced families relocated 

within the town; their relocation 

was made possible by the cash 

purchase of their properties by 

Urban Renewal. The $1.9-million project calls for redevelopment of the 148-acre waterfront 

area for light industrial and recreational uses. 

Several homes were rebuilt with 

private capital during the first 

summer after the earthquake. 

By Marc11 1965, six new homes, 

a new church, and a parsonage 

were under construction. 

As for the future, Mayor 

Stockton said, "We are doing 

everything possible to entice industry. Even if it's one that will 

only create two jobs, we will do 

anything me can to assist them." 

In June 1965, Stockton reported 

that a second fish-processing 

plant was negotiating a lease in 

the newly reclaimed tidelands near 

the small-boat harbor. Restaurants, recreational facilities, and 

equipment-repair shops were interested in leasing additional lots 

on a long-term basis. 

In Seward the year of decision 

had also been a year of action. 

HOMER 

Homer, Alaska, is a small community on the soubhwest coast of 

the Kenai Peninsula. Homer is 

often called the "Cape Cod of 

Alaska." The population of 

about 1,500 people depends primarily on commercial fishing and 

;i seasonal tourist trade for its 

livelihood. Nestled along a bluff 

line, Homer faces Cook Inlet on 

the west and Kachemak Bay on 

the south. A gravel bar 4% 

miles long, extends from the foot 

of the bluff out to deep water. 

It \\-as on this natural pier, nomknown as the Spit, that the town 

of Homer was first established 

in 1896. The original colony of 

75 people, representing the Alaska Gold Mining Co., was headed 

by Homer Pennock. The community was named in his honor. 

Long before the town was 

created, the area had been exploited by Russian fur traders 

and an English coal mining 

company. 

As the town itself moved to 

the bluff, the Spit was used for 

recreation and industry. On the 

extreme tip of the Spit stood 

Land's End Hotel, a favorite of 

tourists and commercial fishermen. Next to the hotel was the 

city dock where fishermen unloaded daily catches of king crab 

and where freighters and tankers 

deposited fuel and supplies. A 

petroleum tank farm sat near the 

center of the Spit. A small-boat 

harbor and three seaf ood-processing plants nearby were focal 

points of the local economy. 

On Friday, March 27, 1964, 

Glen Sewell and some friends 

were putting finishing touches on 

a new restaurant, the Porpoise 

Room. The grand opening was 

to be next day, a symbol of triumph over disaster for Sewell 

and all who knew him. When 

the original Porpoise Room had 

burned down a few months earlier, it was only partly covered 

by insurance. With the assist- 
92 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

ance of friends and family, 

Sewell had built the attractive 

new structure on the Spit. The 

ground floor, made of concrete 

blocks, contained storage rooms, 

refrigeration units, kitchens, and 

an apartment for the owner. 

Exterior stairways led patrons to 

a wide observation platform and 

unobscured views of Cook Inlet, 

Kachemak Bay, and the surrounding mountains. The Porpoise Room would be a popular 

tourist attraction. 

As the Porpoise Room began 

to shake, Sewell ran outside. 

From across bhe Spit to the 

southwest, a huge crack moved 

toward him and between his feet 

before he could move. His 

brother ran from the building 

and fell into another crack. As 

the two struggled to their feet, a 

man's voice shouted, "Look at the 

boat harbor!" In a great vortex 

the water suddenly withdrew 

from the harbor floor. Boats 

sank into the mud, and the rock 

jetty surrounding the hafibor disappeared. The Porpoise Room 

staggered and settled as 6 feet of 

mud filled the ground floor. No 

one realized then that the whole 

Spit had subsided several feet. 

The waters of the bay rushed 

back in. The city dock shuddered, and erratic tides coursed 

the main floor of Land's End 

Hotel. 

The town of Homer itself had 

relatively minor damage, but it 

was virtually cut off from the rest 

of the world. Investigators announced that the Spit had sunk 

as much as 6 feet and it would 

be inundated regularly by high 

tides. The canneries, Homer's 

major industry, stood in the water 

-4heir expensive machinery ruined by salt water. But without 

a harbor and a dock, the fishing 

fleet could not operate anyway. 

Homer, moreover, could not receive fuel and freight from marine 

carriers wibhout a dock and without the Spit's access to a natural 

deep-water harbor. S u p p 1 i e s 

could not be trucked in because 

the highway to Anchorage, 160 

miles to the north, had been destroyed. Tourism was curtailed. 

Because other communities had 

sustained far more sensational 

damage, Homer's plight went virtually unnoticed. There were 113 

businesses in the Homer area, 

most of them operating with very 

limited capital. The 1964 tourist 

season was out of the question and, 

with the future of water-oriented 

industries in grave danger, Homer 

faced slow economic strangulation. 

One year later Homer Thompson, local real estate broker and 

civic leader, said that the Federal 

Small Business Administration 

and the Army Corps of Engineers' projects financed by the 

Office of Emergency Planning had 

kept the town's economy from collapse. The Small Business Administration made disaster loans 

to hard-pressed business men, and 

the Corps of Engineers began reconstruction of the city dock and 

small-boat h a r b o r . Thompson 

estimated that a total of more than 

$3 million was spent in public and 

private reconstruction in Homer 

during the first 12 months following the earthquake. 

Material dredged from a new 

small-boat harbor was used to 

raise the land around it. With a 

loan from the Small Business Administration, Glenn Sewell rebuilt 

the Porpoise Room on the newly 

filled location. It was open for 

business in May 1965 in time for 

the tourist season. The owners of 

two fish-processing plants also began reconstruction adjacent to the 

small-boat harbor. 

The Alaska Highway Department announced plans for a 

$1 million project that would reconstruct and raise the road along 

the Spit to a level 2 feet above the 

new high tides. 

Residents of Homer sought to 

broaden the economic base of the 

town. Japanese industrialists interested in establishing a pulpchip plant on the Kenai Peninsula 

were impressed with the possibilities of Homer. Negotiations were 

under way for a proposed $3.5- 

million plant. It would be built 

on the Spit near the small-boat 

harbor and would ship 16,000 to 

18,000 tons of pulp chips annually 

from Homer to Japanese paper 

mills. The operation would utilize timber on the Peninsula and 

would furnish year-round employment for about 70 persons. Homer 

officials indicated that an Arnerican firm was also interested in 

such a plant if Japanese plans do 

not materialize. 

In addition, local development 

corporations were investigating 

the possibilities of a 36-unit motel 

with a large convention hall and 

dining rooms, three more seafoodprocessing p 1 a n t s , a freighthandling business, a sawmill, a 

restaurant, a supermarket, and 

several equipment-repair shops. 

Considerable research was being 

conducted on other diversifications 

such ss agriculture, meat producing and processing, and forest 

products. 

KODIAK 

Kodiak was first established 

by Russian fur traders in 1792 

on the southwest coast of Kodiak 

Island. Eight years later it was 

relocated on the northeast tip of 

the island where it stands today. 

Kodiak has the distinction of being the oldest existing Alaskan 

community established by white 

settlers. 

In 1964 an expanded influx of 

tourists was expected with the 
59.-New boat basin at Kodiak looking northwest. Fmr basin was destroyed by bsunarni and subsidence. 

new service of the State ferryliner that mould link Kodiak 

with the mainland. During and 

after World War I1 the United 

States Navy base new the town 

of Kodiak contributed to the 

economy of the area, but the 

most important industry was 

fishing and seafood processing. 

Kodiak had one of the most productive king-crab industries in 

south-central Alaska, producing 

some 17 million pounds in 1963. 

The crab fleet was working 

when the earthquake struck. 

Captains at first thought that 

lines had become entangled in 

their propellers. Vessels at dock 

were helpless as the harbor first 

overflowed, then drained dry, 

only to be refilled with a huge, 

rushing wave. People in town 

struggled to evacuate buildings 

along the waterfront. Survivors 

headed for high ground where 

they watched as boats, harbor 

buoys, and drifting dock decking~ battered houses, stores, canneries, and garages that just 

moments before had been blocks 

from the shoreline. 

By 3 a.m., the waves had subsided. At dawn the town began 

counting its losses. All but one 

cannery had disappeared. The 

rock jetty protecting the smallboat harbor was destroyed. The 

waves had washed into the town, 

sweeping away everything in 

their paths and depositing the 

debris as far as five blocks inland. 
94 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

One year lawr, however, KOdiak was a bustling little city. 

The Office of Emergency Planning financed the reconstruction 

of publicly owned waterfront 

facilities. The small-boat harbor, completed by the end of 

February 1965, was packed with 

fishing vessels-many of them 

replacements of those destroyed 

by the tsunami. The city fathers 

were planning a big expansion 

program to accommodate a larger fleet. Although the 1964 season showed a drop to about 12 

million pounds of king crab at 

Kodiak, the processing plants 

were forging ahead with improvements. Owners of all plants 

destroyed had either rebuilt or had 

announced intentions of doing so. 

Kodiak residents were cheered by 

the expected arrival of a new 

floating crab cannery that planned full operations during the 

entire 1965 season. 

Virtually the entire downtown 

area-34% acres-was being redeveloped through an $%million 

Urban Renewal program. By 

spring of 1965 most of the land 

parcels in a planned commercial 

core facing the boat harbor had 

been allocated to purchasers. 

Utilities had been installed, but 

paving of streets and sidewalks 

had not yet begun. Construction 

had begun on the first privately 

owned structure within the urban 

renewal area. 

Before the earthquake a housing development of about 300 

units stood practically empty on 

the outskirts of the town. One 

year bter all units were filled 

and would-be residents had to 

place their names on a 6-months 

waiting list. At Kodiak Naval 

Station the construction of 170 

housing units was anticipated. 

The State ferry was making 

weekly calls at Kodiak, tourism 

had increased, and accommodations for visitors were adding 

rapidly to the skyline. Two new 

motels, complete with restaurant, 

coffee shop, and lounges were 

built with a total investment of 

about $700,000. The Beachcomber, a former Canadian 

cruise ship, had been turned into 

a seaside hotel. The city was 

weighing the possibility of attracting the convention trade. 

During the 12 months following the earthquake, Kodiak also 

received increased freight service 

from Alaska Steamship CO.'S 

freighters and from the vanships 

of Sea-Land, Inc., which operate 

also between Anchorage and 

Seattle. The innovation of vanship service provided aid to Kodiak's canneries and fish-processing 

plants. Refrigerated vans were 

parked beside the processing 

plants, the finished products were 

moved directly from Dhe plants 

to the vans, and then aboard ship ; 

thus the expense of rebuilding new 

warehouse space was eliminated. 

The Kodiak Island Improvement Corp., organized under the 

Small Business Administration's 

community development program 

(commonly called the "502" program), was an economic stimulus 

to the community. Through this 

program more commercial and 

industrial enterprises were anticipated. Some of those proposed 

are three additional fish-processing plants (which would give the 

town more production capacity 

than it had before the earthquake), an electrical supply and 

contracting firm, a marine supply 

and equipment company, two recreational resorts, a small-craf t 

repair facility, service stations, 

garages, a telephone company, and 

a bus company. Also anticipated 

in bhe near future was the private 

construction of a complete marineways to handle repairs to any size 

ship working in Alaskan waters. 

As proposed, it would be comparable to any such facility on the 

west coast of the United States 

and would eliminate long voyages 

to Seattle or San Francisco for 

repairs. 

NATIVE VILLAGES 

Chenega (fig. 60) was a native 

fishing village of about 80 persons. 

Living on a small island in the 

southwest part of Prince William 

Sound, the villagers had no 

tsunami warning. Within minutes after the onset of the earthquake, a wall of water swept across 

the shoreline, took 23 lives and left 

hardly a scrap of wood to mark 

the site. The survivors huddled 

throughout the cold night on a 

snow-covered hillside. The next 

day they were airlifted to Cordova 

across the sound where the village 

council held a general meeting in 

the temporary shelter of a Cordove 

church and decided unanimously 

not to return to Chenega. Within 

a few days the villagers agreed to 

settle at Tatitlek, another native 

village where they had relatives 

and where land 71--as available for 

homes. Sixteen new homes were 

built for Chenegans by the Bureau 

of Indian Affairs (fig. 64). Fishing and hunting equipment pnrchased with disaster funds enabled 

the men to resume their occupations %s fishermen and seal hunters. 

Kaguyak and Old Harbor, two 

native villages on the east coast 

of Kodiak Island, also were devastated by waves. Several lives 

were lost at Kaguyak and all the 

village's 9 homes were destroyed. 

Old Harbor was more fortunateno deaths, but 29 out of 35 homes 

were lost. No one wanted to 

return to Kaguyak. Seven families joined relatives at Alihk, a 

village on the southwest side of 

Kodiak Island. Five familie 

went with Old Harbor residents 

to rebuild that village. 
60.-Chenega, a small native fishing village on the coast of Prince William Sound. 

61.-The day after the earthquake, scattered pieces of scrap lumber and an occawional stump were all that 

remained of everal native villages. 
96 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

62.-Just moments before the earthquake, the school teacher at Old Harbor snapped 

this picture of the quiet little Aleut village. -4s villagers ran to the safety of a 

nearby hilltop, they saw huge waves wash away all their worldly possessions. 

Afognak, on an island of the 

same name, was a village of 38 

homes, one store, a 2-story schoolhouse, a community hall, and a 

sawmill, all lined up single file 

along three-quarters of a mile of 

bay. For centuries the Aleuts had 

made their livelihoods from the 

sea. When the earth shook, the 

older people remembered stories 

told by their grandfathers about 

walls of water that could swallow 

whole villages-they headed for 

the hills, and were saved. But 

when the waters rushed into their 

"protected" bay, 23 homes were 

destroyed or damaged beyoncl repair. The general store floated 

inland and stopped against trees 

almost half a mile from shore. 

As the water rushed out, fishing 

boats crnnchd on the !bottom of 

the harbor. The sawmill and the 

community hall floated out to sea. 

Soon, exceptionally high tides 

began to flood the townsite: when 

it became clear that the island of 

Afopak had subsided, the village 

colxncil decided t'hat tthe town 

must \be relocated. Problems and 

uncertainties immediately arose. 

Legally, the agencies that work 

with the native villages could only 

rebuild the 23 destroyed homes. 

The 15 families whose homes still 

stood could expect no assistance 

in building new homes at the new 

site. The villagers were afraid 

to remain at Afognak, but they 

didn't want to be divided, either. 

Lions International, 49th District, came to the rescue with 

needed supplies augmented by 

lumber donated by firms in 

Washington and Oregon. In 

appreciation the villagers voted 

unanimously to name the new 

settlement Port Lions. The native 

men labored beside skilled workers from the Mennonite Disaster 

Service who volunteered their 

services for reconstruction. On 

December 12,1964, the first bargeload of people and possessions 

moved into Port Lions. 

One year after the disaster, residents of Port Lions could look 

out into a peaceful cove and smile 

at the sight of fishing boats bobbing gently in the waves. Each 

family had a comfortable home, a 

generator produced electricity for 

each house, and sewer and water 

systems were being built. A 3- 

mile access road led to a 2,600-foot 

landing strip. The new seh001 

scheduled for construction in the 

summer of 1965 would ma.ke the 

community building (used temporarily for classes) available for village affairs. All this was made 

possible by the determined hard 

11-ork of the villagers, Bureau of 

Indian Affairs, U.S. Public Health 

Service, Department of Education, Federal Aviation Agency, 

Alask,a Division of Lands, Lions 

International, Red Cross, Mennonites, Salvation Army, and a 

host of others. 

63.-Old Harbor a year after the quake. The story was the same in the 

For the fiwt time the villages were 

enjoying the comfort and convenience other villages. Forty-one new 

of community light, water, and sewer 110mes sparkled in the sun at Old 

systems. Ha~bor, 7 ne~v homes at Alitak 
THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 

&.-At Tatitlek, new homes were built to modem st~andards, with villagers furnishing 

much of the tabor. Community utilities were installed to upgrade living conditions in the seven affected native villages. 

sheltered the villagers from Kaguyak, and 14 new homes were 

built at English Bay-dl this 

quite a change to people whose 

previous experience with running 

water had (been confined to rivers 

nid streams. 

CORDOVA 

Cordova, a fishing community 

of about 1,200 year-round residents, was once a busy port on 

Prince William Sound. It was 

settled in 1904 as ocean terminus 

for the Copper River and Northwestern Railway of the MorganGuggenheim syndicate. From 

1904 to 1938, $48 million in highgrade copper ore was delivered 

from the Kennecott mine, 193 

miles northeast in the Chitina Valley, to Cordova for shipment to 

the continental United States. 

Since 1938, when the mine was 

closed, the town of Cordova has 

depended wholly on salmon, clam, 

shrimp, ancl crab fisheries and 

processing. During the height of 

the fishing season each summer, 

the population would double. 

As the only major community 

in south-central Alaska without a 

lanci-link to the rest of the State, 

Cordova sought continually to 

have a highway built along the 

old abandoned railroad bed. Residents felt that this would open 

the way to a broader economy by 

creating access to still-rich mineral deposits, timlber, and potential 

agricultural development in the 

Copper River valley. By 1958 

some 39 miles of the needed road1%-ay had been completed. 

Fire razed an entire city block 

in downtown Cordova on May 1, 

1963, and completely destroyed 

business houses and the dwellings 

of 27 families. Less than 1 year 

later, earthquake and tsunamis 

wreaked havoc once again-tihis 

time along the waterfront. In 

the two disasters about 100 family 

dwellings had been destroyed, and 

the housing situation was critical. 

But the earthquake was even 

more critical in its impact on the 

waterfront facilities and fishing 

industry. Fifteen - foot waves 

moved the dock off its pilings, 

and washed away the sawmill, 

boat landings, and homes. Tectonic forces that uplifted the 

shoreline left Cordova without 

deep water during low tides. 

Even thouah fish canneries sus- 9 tained relatively light damage to 

buildings and equipment, they 

began to close down or move out 

because the boats couldn't come in 

to unload. Sloughs around the 

town that had yielded rich catches 

of salmon were high and dry. 

One year later Cordova was still 

struggling. Only one out of nine 

canneries was operating. It processed crabs on a limited basis. 

Very little construction was taking place in private housing, but 

the Corps of Engineers was moving fast ahead with a new harbor 

and dock. 

The city applied to the State 

for title to 4y2 acres of reclaimed 

tidelands adjacent to the new city 

dock. The area had been filled 

by the Corps of Engineers during 

dredging operations of the harbor. 

Several small businesses that had 

been displaced by the expansion 

of the harbor temporarily relocated in the filled area until details 

of a proposed Federal Urban Renewal program could (be worked 

out. A spokesman for the city 

indicated that another 2 to 3 years 

would pass before the land would 

be stable enough for heavy industrial and commercial use. 

But plans for the future were 

being made. Through the Small 

Business Administration's "502" 

program, a $218,000 loan mas 

granted to Theodore Seafoods, 

Inc., for a freezer ship. The 

new firm would employ new concepts in processing and marketing 

that hopefully would increase the 

5-month fishing season to a yearround business. 
98 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

A proposal was made by the 

newly organized Cordova Hydroelectric Corp. to build a plant 

on Power Creek just outside the 

town. A contract was signed 

whereby the city would purchase 

the power to supplement the 

municipally owned system. The 

facility would also provide storage for the city's water system. 

Financing was being sought 

through the Small Business Administration and the Rural Electrification Association. 

Other anticipated projects included a shopping center, two 

more fish-processing plants, a 

sawmill, a facility for boat repairs, and a 50-space trailer 

park. 

VALDEZ 

Valdez was a quaint little 

town of about 1,200 people. At 

the head of long, narrow Faldez 

Arm off Prince William Sound, 

it lay beneath towering snowcapped mountains. Large glaciers filled nearby valleys in the 

Chugach Range. The beauty of 

the area was renowned. 

Valdez came into being in the 

1890's as an entry for gold rushers headed for the Klondike. It 

was the coastal point nearest to 

the United States and to the interior of Alaska. To eliminate 

the necessity of crossing Canadian territory, the United States 

Army built a military trail from 

the port town to the Yukon. 

After accommodating military 

units and adventurous fortuneseekers, the Valdez trail eventually became the Richardson 

Highway. Valdez thrived as the 

ocean terminus of the 363-mile 

land link with Fairbanks deep 

in the heart of Alaska. 

Like most coastal towns in the 

49th State, Valdez depended on 

water-oriented commerce and industry for its existence. In 1958 

the community hit an economic 

low when much of the freight 

shifted to the port of Seward 

for delivery by The Alaska Railroad. Since that time it was 

mainly supported by a State 

mental hospital, a division of the 

State highway department, a relatively small fishing industry, 

and the summer tourist trade. 

Good Friday, 1964, had been a 

joyous reminder at Valdez that 

spring was near. A festive air 

greeted the arrival of the steamship Chen~ at the city dock. 

Merchants, parents, and children 

rooked on with interest as longshoremen and deck hands prepared to unload. 

The sudden convulsions of the 

earthquake turned the pleasant 

scene into incredible cataclysm. 

The dock quickly broke to pieces 

and---with its warehouses and 

every man, woman, and child on 

itdisappeared from sight. The 

steamship Chena lurched. Her 

bow rose 30 feet on an incoming 

wave, then crashed down where 

the dock had stood moments before. The waters of Valdez Arm 

surged furiously through the 

town as the earth opened in 

crazy-quilt cracks. Survivors 

fled up the highway as flames 

from wrecked oil tanks engulfed 

the remains of their town's 

waterfront. 

The outside world rushed to 

the aid of these valiant people 

as they began to pick up the 

pieces, but there was one more 

blow yet to come: geologists announced that the entire townsite 

had subsided, and that the unstable ground was subject to 

further slippage toward the sea. 

In April 1964--just a few days 

after the quake-Valdez residents voted to move their townsite. On the advice of geologists, 

a location was selected on a 125- 

acre tract 4 miles away, where 

Mineral Creek empties into Valdez Arm. 

In the fall of 1964, the new 

elementary school was dedicated. 

It was the only structure in the 

new townsite, and children were 

transported by bus 4 miles from 

their homes to their classrooms. 

Meanwhile, the Corps of Engineers, with funds from the Office 

of Emergency Planning, began 

building the new harbor and 

dock. 

Realizing that the move to the 

new townsite must be made in 

stages, the people first patched 

up their old town. Some homes 

offered temporary protection with 

only minimum repairs. Mobile 

homes were utilized by others, 

but the critical housing shortage 

caused the population to dwindle 

to about 850 people. Businessmen wiped out by the. disaster 

signed on with constructioll 

crews. 

Work continued on federally 

financed harbor, dock, and warehouse facilities throughout the 

winter. Other federally financed 

construction such as the underground water and sewer systems, 

the municipal powerplant and 

distribution system, streets and 

curbs, and a high school, municipal, and State buildings had 

to await the spring thaw. 

Until public facilities had been 

restored, the residents could 

scarcely think of building homes 

and businesses at the new townsite. At first it was hoped that 

private construction could be 

started by the spring of 1965, 

but such expectations proved unreasonable, and the big move was 

postponed. 

The city planning commission, 

with the cooperation of the 

Alaska Housing Aubhority, had 

completed a preliminary layout 

for the new town in September 

1964. In the months that fol- 
THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 

lowed, details were worked out 

for city planning, zoning and 

subdivision ordinances, and building, electrical, plumbing, and 

housing codes. Advisory bodies 

to the city council prepared 

modern regulations. Public hearings were held to assure that the 

new rules were equitable and just, 

and would assure orderly growth. 

By March 27, 1965, the first anniversary of the earthquake, all the 

new codes, regulations, and ordinances necessary for systematic construction of a new city had been 

adopted by the voters of Valdez. 

During this time, also, negotiations were under way with the 

Federal Urban Renewal Administration for disposition of property within the old townsite. The 

proposal for the entire site was to 

develop it into a recreation area. 

The capital gained by property 

owners in the sale of their land to 

Urban Renewal was to aid them in 

buying new sites in the Mineral 

Creek location. 

Residents formed the Valdez 

Development Corp. to assist business and industrial enterprises 

through the Small Business Administration's "502" p r o g r la m . Through this program, o t h e r 

local residents organized the Valdez 0 ce a n Products, Inc., to 

build a proposed $750,000 seafood-processing plant in the new 

townsite. The plant was designed 

to incorporate the latest techniques in seafood processing, including vacuum sealing in plastic 

containers, ultracold freezing, and 

automatic controls. In June 1965, 

$400,000 of common stock was 

offered for sale to citizens of the 

State. The VaZdea Breeze reported that the remainder of the capital would be sought from the 

Small Business Administration 

through the Valdez Development 

Corp. 

Although this project was the 

only such actually underway by 

June 1965, 17 other proposals 

were anticipated. These represented all types of service facilities, 

including those for fisheries, tourism, and recreation. 

With the completion of the city 

dock and one of two warehouses 

by the Corps of Engineers, the 

Alaska Steamship Lines scheduled a freighter visit on July 8, 

1965-the first such ship to visit 

Valdez since the fateful arrival 

of the Ohena. 

WHITTIER 

The ice-free port of Whittier 

was built as a military installation during World War 11. Lying 

at the head of the Passage Canal 

on the west end of Prince William Sound, it had been virtually 

shut down in recent years. Al, 

though it was ravaged by tsunami and fire on March 27,1964, it 

mas utilized by The Alaska Railroad during the following year 

as its port of entry for freight 

bound for other parts of southcentral and central Alaska. 

A private corporation p u r - 

hased and renovated an abandoned apartment complex to develop a recreational resort, the 

Chenega Inn. Though its operations were limited, the Chenega Inn opened in the summer of 

1964. By the middle of May 

1965, it was in full-scale operation with accommodations ranging from dormitories and singles 

to family arrangements. Visitors 

could enjoy the new cafeteria, a 

luxurious dining room, and a rustic-style lounge. 

Full facilities for small boats 

were available, as well as rental 

vessels ,and other necessities for 

boating, fishing, and hunting. A 

70-passenger yacht offered daily 

7-hour cruises through some of 

the finest scenery in the world, 

giving a view of 18 glaciers, 8 of 

which enter tidewater. Via railroad, boats, and small aircraft, 

tourists traveled to Whittier, a 

vital community once more. 
100 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 1964 

GIRDWOOD 

Girdwood, a hamlet of 80 residents, sat on the shore of Turnagain Arm beside the towering 

Chugach Mountains. It subsided 

during the earthquake, and relocation was necessary. Residents 

preferred to remain near their 

year-round industry, the Mount 

Alyeska ski resort. Federal land 

was selected farther up the valley, 

available under the statehood land 

withdrawal program. 

Within the next 12 months the 

new city boasted a school (about 

half the population are children), 

a library, a community center, a 

grocery store, post office building, 

a small cafe, a new church, and *a 

new community water well. And 

for the first time in its history, 

Girdwood had electric lightsthree of them. City officials had 

requested land for development as 

a municipally operated trailer 

park. Twenty-six lots had been 

released for private ownership, 

and the city was pushing for more 

so that their community might 

grow in the future. 

ANCHORAGE 

Anchorage is Alaska's largest 

city. Born as a tent town in 1914 

at the mouth of Ship Creek on 

Cook Inlet, it was a supply base 

for construction of The Alaska 

Railroad. The follozving year, a 

312-acre tract on the higher area 

south of the creek was cleared 

and surveyed. In the original 

townsite 100 lots were reserved 

for Federal $nd municipal purposes, and 887 lots were auctioned 

for private use. Prom a population of 2,000 people in 1915, Anchorage had grown to approximately 50,000 within expanded 

city limits covering 15 square 

miles in 1964. An estimated 100,- 

000 reside in the greater Anchorage area. 

65.-Some homes were repaired on their original sites despite advice to move them. 

This house, tilted off its foundation in earthquake-triggered landslide8 along the 

bluff line, was rehabilitated in place by the owner-occupant. 

The period of greatest growth 

was between 1950 (11,200) and 

1964. This was also the time of 

the building boom that added 

millions of dollars worth of new 

homes, apartment buildings, 110- 

tels, shopping centers, office buildings, hospitals, schools, stores, and 

bank buildings and a university. 

Growth in the private sector 

was matched by more millions of 

dollars spent on new public facilities. Multimillion-dollar structures were built by the State to 

house the Shte court system and 

a psychiatric hospital. The cityowned port, an $8-million project 

commenced in 1959, was dedicated 

on July S, 1961. The $1.5-million 

Public Safety Building, dedicated 

in August 1961, prorided a combined headquarters for the police 

and fire departments. A $1.8-million water-filtration plant was 

dedicated on June 30, 1962. 

The discovery of oil and gas on 

the Kenai Peninsula, south of 

Anchorage, led to optimism of 

rising prosperity as the city became the service center for one 

more industry. Anchorage was 

building toward a greater future 

when the earthquake struck. 

Property owners lost tens of 

millions of dollars; much of tho 

loss cannot be evaluated in dollars 

and cents alone. It represented 

years of planning, personal sacrifice, and labor on the part of the 

owners and their families. If Anchorage was to rebuild, these very 

people would have to d e c i d e 

whether to reinvest in an uncertain future. Answers were not 

easy, but they were made quickly : 

Rebuild ! And the recovery period 

was almost as dramatic and 

breathtaking as the earthquake. 

The plight of those w h o s e 

homes were destroyed by landslides was well publicized. But 

many more people whose homes 

were not destroyed but were declared unsafe for human occupancy faced critical decisions and 

financial disaster in the months 

that followed. Many of these 

homes had sustained relatively little damage, but because of their 

location near slide areas, Federal 

lending agencies could not provide money for repairs. The city 
THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 

66.-A home moved from a hazardous area to a safe haven. 

ordered their removal to safer locations, and the owners, already 

facing big mortgages, faced additional investments in new lots, repairs, new utilities, and a11 the 

other expenses of building n 

home. 

A few could afford to repair 

their homes and risk remaining 

on their original sites (fig. 65), 

but many others accepted the offer 

by the Corps of Engineers to 

move their homes to safety without charge. The city provided 

temporary home sites until the 

owners could obtain permanent 

locations. Some houses still stood 

in the temporary spots a ye a r 

later. 

A typical story is that of a 

beautiful home in an exclusive 

neighborhood called Turnagainby-the-Sea. Before the earthquake, the house was several 

blocks from the bluff. After the 

quake, the new bluff line was just 

a few feet from the door. The 

preearthquake valuation of the 

house was $72,000 and the mortgage on it was $21,000. Its 

postearthquake value was set 

at $3,000; the lot was valued 

at $900. Just 3 months before 

the earthquake, the lot next 

door had been sold for $15,000. 

After the owner purchased land 

south of the city, built a basement, and had the house moved 

to its new location by the Corps 

of Engineers, he reported that he 

had spent more than the original 

investment to return the house to 

its preearthquake condition. 

Although Federal funds mere 

not available for repairs to properties within the L Street slide 

z o n e in downtown Anchorage, 

private money mas used. Owners 

reasoned that they could not abandon properties that represented 

their life savings, and, defying 

the warning that they stood in 

danger of destruction in the event 

of another earthquake, they proceeded with repairs even though 

some of the ground had moved as 

much as 14 feet laterally. 

In the private sector, damaged 

businesses were rebuilt with speed 

a n d imagination-some rebuilt 

with Federal aid land some without. Many new businesses were 

launched soon after the earthquake and were carried along by 

the momentum generated by the 

reconstruction boom. Spectacular 

gains were noted in many areas of 

business. The following are but 

a few examples. 

In the downtown area, a 14- 

story 450-room hotel that was 

being enlarged at the time of the 

earthquake, though significantly 

damaged, was repaired and reopened for business only a few 

weeks behind schedule. New facilities include an impressive 

penthouse restaurant which affords unobstructed views of Cook 

Inlet and the Chugach Mountains. 

Another large hotel, nine stories high, was still on the drawing board at the time of the 

earthquake. It was started in 

August 1964 and was completed 

the following June. Construction 

proceeded throughout the 1 o n g 

Alaskan winter. 

Several attractive motels were 

built in the srea between downtown and Anchorage International Airport. Plans were 

announced in June 1965 for construction of a large hotel near the 

airport. 

Two automobile agencies north 

of downtown were rebuilt with 

finanical backing of the Small 

Business Administration. Lessons learned from the earthquake 

v7ere applied to the new designs. 

A downtown grocery store, destroyed by the quake, reopened at 

a new location south of town and 

enjoyed the best business year in 

its 25-year history. 

A five-story downtown department store, which had been damaged beyond repair, was replaced 

on the same site by a new building three stories high but of twice 

the ground space, and a new auto- 
102 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

mobile service department was 

planned for 1966. 

A damaged bank building was 

dismantled down to its steel 

frame and completely rebuilt. 

One year later, assets of the bank 

had increased almost $8.5 million. 

Another bank, formerly a drivein bank, was enlarged to nine 

stories. Two new theater buildings replaced one that was 

destroyed in the 4th Avenue landslide. 

The Anchorage Natural Gas 

Corp., a private utility that delivers gas from the Kenai Peninsula, sustained about $1 million 

damage. Repairs were completed 

before the following winter, and 

on June 15, 1965, the board of directors voted a capital investment 

budget of an additional $1 million. 

All the activity in the downtown area did not overshadow the 

fact that the city continued to 

edge out from the bluff line along 

Ship Creek and Knik Arnz and to 

reach toward the foot of the 

Chugach Mountains. New motels, 

restaurants, a creamery, n medical 

center, a bank, office buildings, and 

other services appeared along 

Northern Lights Boulevard about 

a mile south of downtown Anchorage. New homes stood in 

areas that had been tlie "boondocks" a few months earlier. 

Construction of a large shopping center at Northern Lights 

and Minnesota Drive, just a few 

blocks from the newly rebuilt 

West High School, began in May 

1965. Just east of that, a housing 

development was being moved to 

make room for the growing 

Northern Lights Shopping Center. 

Developers planned to triple its 

size. 

Still farther east, at the intersection of Northern Lights Boulevard and Seward Highway, land 

clearance signaled tlie beginning 

67.-A few homes situated at the toe of the L Street slide remained precariously 

perched on makeshift foundations 15 months after the earthquake. 

of another shopping center covering 20 acres. Plans were announced for another large shopping center a short distance away 

at the corner of Seward Highway 

and International Airport Road. 

These are but a few of the incredible stories of accomplishments in Anchorage, the city that 

refused to give up, but they are 

typical of the optimistic attitude 

f o u n d throughout the area. 

Achievement and expansion were 

the key words with the city government too. A record-breaking 

sum of $34,548,678 was spent by 

tlie city of Anchorage by December 31, 1964. Only about $6y4 

million of this went into earthquake repairs and replaceme~zt 

projects. As new projects in the 

c a p i t a 1 improvement program 

were completed, design work proceeded on others. 

V o t e r s overwhelmingly approved a bond proposition to expand the telephone system which 

already served 2'7,098 customers. 

Approval was also given to issue 

bonds for $1,750,000 for the construction of a petroleum tanker 

dock and an extension of the 

existing dock at the port of An- 

chorage. The port showed a profit of $218,115 in 196Gthe first 

time in its 4-year history it was 

out of the red. During the year, 

800,000 tons of cargo mas handled 

by the city dock-an increase of 

820 percent over the year 1963. 

And these figures do not include 

the cargo handled by three private docks nearby. 

This growth was due to several 

factors. When other port fa

cilities in south-central Alaska 

were wiped out, oil companies 

moved operations to Anclzorage 

where the port was operational. 

Many tons of emergency supplies 

went over the city docks in the 

early months of recovery. And on 
THE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 

May 10, 1964, the cargo ships of 

Sea-Land Services, Inc., began a 

weekly schedule from Seattle to 

Anchorage. The winter of 196P 

65 was the first time that the port 

of Anchorage had been used yearround. 

The Anchorage International 

Airport, operated by the Alaska 

Division of Aviation, launched a 

four-stage multimillion-d o 1 1 a r 

building program. The Federal 

Aviation Agency, .operator of the 

control tower at the busy terminal, spent approximately $850,000 

for the construction of a new 

building. The old one had collapsed, killing one man. The new 

0-design tower-one of the first 

of its type to be built by the 

agency-went into operation in 

February 1965. 

A $900,000 two-story building 

wzs planned by the State to provide space for agencies directly 

i n v o 1 v e d with international 

flights. Another $300,000 project mould provide an enlarged 

parking area. The present terminal building had been enlarged, 

and a $750,000 satellite building 

is scheduled for construction. 

Five-sided in design, it will provide badly needed parking for 

five giant jets, which eventually 

will be refueled through outlets 

to eliminate fuel-truck traffic. 

The Federal Government has 

granted stopover privileges in 

Anchorage to four foreign airlines that fly regular routes between Europe and the Orient. 

This means that the foreign tourist trade can be cultivated. 

The year 1965 was a record 

year for tourism in A 1 ask a. 

Many people who had planned to 

visit the 49th State in 1964 had 

been discouraged by the earthquake, but airlines, travel agencies, and other tourist services reported that 1965 was the biggest 

money-making year in history. 

23b8210-616--8 

This was good news to Alaska. 

Although her vast natural resources were being slowly and 

solidly developed for stable economic growth, she could count 

also on unexcelled natural beauty 

to attract the tourist dollar. 

The petroleum industry had 

already made a sizable contribution to the economy of south-central Alaska and to the State as a 

whole. Explorations continued at 

a rapid pace. In the spring of 

1965 it was anticipated that $20 

million more mould be expended 

in petroleum activity in the corning year. 

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AIDS THE PEOPLE 

OF ALASKA 

Even before March 1964, giant 

steps had been taken toward the. 

fulfillment of Alaska's promise, 

but Alaska could not fulfill it 

alone. 

Within a fern days after the 

earthquake, after emergency relief measures had been taken, the 

President established the Federal 

Reconstruction and Development 

Planning Commission for Alaska 

and ,appointed Senator Clinton P. 

Anderson chairman. On the recommendations of the Commission, 

Congress approved $23.5 million 

in additional transition grants to 

supplement the $28.5 appropriated in 1959 to assist the new 

State in assuming responsibilities 

carried by the Federal Government when the area was a territory. These funds were needed 

immediately in Alaska to maintain essential public services and 

to help State and local governments overcome their loss of revenue. 

On the advice of the Commission, many other changes were 

made to further expedite assistance in the reconstruction and upgrading of highways and harbors. 

Federal agencies were empowered 

to adjust mortgages they held or 

insured. Long-term, low-interest 

loans were made available to the 

private sector. Federal participation in urban renewal programs 

was raised to a limit of $25 million for the entire State. Federal 

purchase of Alaskan capital-improvement bonds was authorized. 

The director of the Office of Emergency Planning described the 

entire legislative package as a 

"landmark in Federal aid after 

natural disaster." 

Tne Army Corps of Engineers 

and the Navy Bureau of Yards 

and Docks were designated by the 

Office of Emergency Planning to 

act as agents for the restoration 

and reconstruction of public facilities. The Bureau of Yards 

and Docks concentrated on the 

city of Kodiak. The Corps of 

Engineers handled the Office of 
104 THE ALASKA EARTHQUARE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

Emergency Planning projects in 

Anchorage, Seward, Homer, Valdez, Seldovia, Cordova, Girdwood, and Whittier. The Federal Bureau of Public Roads assumed responsibility for most of 

the highway and road projects 

under its own authorities. 

The Alaska Highway Department estimated that p r o j e c t s 

totaled $84.9 million for the fiscal 

year ending June 30, 1965. Much 

of this sum came under the Federal-aid highway program, and 

more than half of it was spent in 

the earthquake-affected part of 

the State. 

Most of the projects involving 

airports were assigned to the Federal Aviation Agency. Close to 

$1.3 million would be expended 

when all projects were completed. 

Additional millions were to be 

programed by the State for expansion and improvement of 

State-operated airports. 

The Alaska Railroad, operated 

by the U.S. Department of the 

Interior, sustained heavy damage 

to 186 of its 536 miles of tracks 

and bridges, and about 300 units 

of rolling stock were total losses. 

The job of laying new track began the morning after the earthquake, and within a few weeks 

trains began to operate cautiously over the line. On April 20, 

1964, the first sea-train barge was 

unloaded at Whittier and the cargo was delivered by rail to way 

points north. On September 14, 

a triumphant crew brought the 

first train into Seward since the 

earthquake. 

In the first 12 months following 

the earthquake, the railroad had 

spent $20 million in specially appropriated emergency funds for 

repairs. Another $3 million had 

been re q u e s t e d of Congress. 

Bridges were replaced. The roadbed in subsided areas of Turnagain Arm had to be rebuilt above 

high tides. Some 150 units of 

rolling stock had been replaced. 

The Alaska Railroad had been 

self-supporting in its operations 

since 1941, and had been independent as far as capital improvements were concerned since 1955. 

During the year following the 

earthquake, its income was down 

a million dolhrs from the loss of 

three petroleum-haul contracts, 

because two oil companies had 

moved their operations to Anchorage when their Whittier 

facilities were wiped out. However, railroad officials instituted 

economies and announced their 

intention to remain within the 

railraad's income. 

The Small Business Administration streamlined procedures to 

make loans available to hardhit homeowners and businessmen. 

Required bank participation in 

loans was reduced from 20 to 10 

percent. Disaster loans were made 

to cover expenses of relocating 

buildings. Loans to homeowners 

were made on longer terms and at 

lower rates of interest than previously. The loan ceiling to businessmen was raised from $100,000 

to $250,000. 

As of March 31,1964, the Small 

Business Administration had accumulated loans in Alaska 

amounting to $22,249,000. This 

figure included applications that 

were later withdrawn, refunded, 

or paid in full. Little more than 

a year later, at the close of the 

business day on April 9, 1965, 

home and business loans approved 

in Alaska totaled $74,869,420. 

These loans covered the State 

from Barrow on the Arctic Ocean 

to Unalaska in the Aleutian Islands, and from Nome on the 

Bering Sea to Ketchikan in 

southeastern Alaska. 

Through the Small Business 

Administration's Community Development Program, local development corporations were established throughout the State by 

the middle of June 1965. These 

organizations could borrow money 

from the Small Business Administration to finance business, commercial, and industrial ventures 

of benefit to the communities. 

Prior to the earthquake only one 

such corporation was in existence 

in Alaska, and it had not been 

active. By the middle of June 

1965, the Small Business Administration was doing business with 

'48 concerns. Not only cities such 

as Anchorage benefited, but also 

smaller towns and some 17 native 

villages. A spokesman for the 

S m a 11 Business Administration 

anticipated that within the second 

postearthquake year, the loans approved for the creation, diversification, and improvement of industries would exceed $20 million. 

Additional loans of more than 

$1 million were approved by the 

Department of the Interior to aid 

the fisheries. 

The Federal Housing Administration held mortgage insurance 

on 93 homes that were totally destroyed in Anchorage. There were 

no FHA mortgages in the other 

communities struck by the earthquake and tsunamis. Aside from 

h o m e s totally destroyed, 596 

FHA-insured homes were suitable 

for rehabilitation on their original sites; 70 were moved to safer 

locations. As of May 1, 1965, an 

estimated 25 homes were still on 

their originial sites, neither repaired nor occupied. By that date, 

only 35 homes had been returned 

to the FHA by the mortgagors. 

The "1200 L," a 14-story apartment building with an estimated 

$1 million damage, and its downtown twin, the Mount McKinley 

Building, were returned to FHA. 

Each one had an existing mortgage of about $1.5 million. In 
June 1965, the "1200 L" was sold 

to high bidder for $575,000. The 

new owners anticipated it would 

be ready for partial occupancy 

within 90 days. The Mount McKinley Building had not been put 

up for bid. 

The value of the FHA-insured 

properties that were lost in the 

disaster amounted to $6,234,897. 

Between April 1964, 'and March 

31, 1965, commitments for a total 

of $25,256,850 had been issued by 

the FHA for 938 housing units. 

To further assist the State's recovery, special congressional legisTHE YEAR OF DECISION AND ACTION 

lation authorized Federal purchasers a total of $25 million of 

State bonds, or a loan in that 

amount. In addition, the Housing 

and Home Finance Agency was 

authorized to purchase $7.2 million in State bonds for completion of Alaskan capital-improvement programs. 

When the Federal Government 

moved to the aid of the 49th 

State, it mas protecting an investment made 100 years earlier. 

Through the years the $7 million 

purchase price of Alaska has been 

repaid manyfold to the nation. By 

the end of the 19th century, more 

gold than the original purchase 

price had been mined in Alaska 

and sent to the United States. 

Gold mining was negligible by 

1964 but the State boasts of many 

still-rich mineral deposits, and 

other natural resources and growing industries promise to make 

continuing contributions to the 

national wealth. 

During the year of decision and 

action, resolute Alaskans, with the 

generous aid of their Nation, 

worked with quiet determination 

toward a brighter future. 
THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 27, 19 64 

SELECTED1 REFERENCES 

Most of the significant technical 

and semitechnical reports of the 

Alaska earthquake of March 27, 

1964, that had been published or 

were in press when this volume 

was sent to the printer are listed 

below, as are all citations to the 

geologi'cal literature in the present 

paper and some additional earlier 

publications that may be useful 

as background material. The litera t ure on the earthquake is 

already voluminous, and will 

Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 

1965, Post - earthquake fisheries 

evaluation; an interim report on 

the March, 1964 earthquake effects 

on Alaska's fishery resources: Juneau, Alaska, 72 p. 

Alaska Department of Health and Welfare, 1964a, Good Friday earthquake called on resources of all 

in State: Alaska's Health and 

Welfare, v. 21, June 1964, p. 5-7. 

1964b, Preliminary report of 

earthquake damage to environmental health facilities and services in Alaska: Juneau, Alaska 

Dept. Health and Welfare, Environmental Health Br., 46 p. 

Alaska Department of Highways, 1964, 

Annual report, 1964 : Juneau, Alaska, 41 p. 

Alaskan Construction Consultants Committee [1964], Reconstruction and 

development survey of earthquake 

damages in Alaska: Prepared for 

Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for 

Alaska, 98 p. 

Alexander, R. L., 1964, Where the architect stands on the team : an introduction to aseismic design, in 

The Alaskan earthquake : Am. Inst. 

Architects Jour., v. 42, no. 6, p. 39- 

42. 

American Institute of Architects and 

Engineers Joint Council Committee, 1964, The restoration and development of Alaska-Report prepared for the Governor of Alaska: 

Anchorage, Alaska, Federal Reconstruction and Devel. Planning 

Comm. for Alaska, 61 p. 

become more so in the years to 

come. This interim bibliography 

is necessarily incomplete ; however, 

it may lead researchers to many reports that were written while the 

earthquake was fresh in mind, but 

which appeared in ephemeral, obscure, or limited-edition publications. 

The staff of the Alaskan Earthquake Committee of the National 

Academy of Sciences contributed 

Anderson, L. O., and Liska, J. A., 1964, 

Wood structure performance in an 

earthquake in Anchorage, -4laska, 

March 27, 1964: U.S. Forest Service Research Paper FPL 16, 12 p., 

illus. 

Barnes, D. F., 1966, Gravity changes 

during the Alaska earthquake : 

Jour. Geophys. Research, v. 71, no. 

2, p. 451456. 

Becker, J. C., 1965, Roadway damage, 

pt. 2 of Highway destruction in 

Alaska: Am. Highways, v. 43, no. 

4, p. 27-29, Washington, D.C., Am. 

Assoc. State Highway Officials. 

Benioff, Hugo, and Gutenberg, Beno, 

1939, Waves and currents recorded by electromagnetic barographs : 

Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc., v. 20, p. 

421426. 

Berg, Eduard [1964], The Alaskan 

earthquake of March 1964 : Alaska 

Univ. Geophys. Inst. Ann. Rept., 

1963-64, p. 69-82. 

1965, The Alaskan earthquake, 

its location and seismic setting, in 

Science in Alaska, 1964: Alaskan 

Sci. Conf., 15th, College, Alaska, 

1964, Proc., p. 218-232. 

Berg, G. V., and Stratta, J. L., 1964, 

Anchorage and the Alaska earthquake of March 27, 1964: New 

York, Am. Iron and Steel Inst., 

63 P. 

Bolt, B. A., 1964, Seismic air waves 

from the great 1964 Alaska earthquake: Nature, v. 202, no. 4937, 

p. 1095-1096. 

Bonilla, M. G., and McCulloch, D. S., 

1965, Engineering geologic effects 

of the March 27, 1964, earthquake 

greatly to this bibliography. This 

group, led by Earl F. Cook and 

William L. Petrie, Division of 

Earth Sciences, made determined 

efforts to track down :a11 pertinent 

commenbaries on all aspects of the 

earthquake. Copies of the papers 

collected, as well as bibliographic 

references to them, were made 

available to Geological Survey 

personnel for use in preparation 

of their reports. 

on The Alaska Railroad Cabs.] : 

Geol. Soc. America Spec. Paper 82, 

p. 15-16. 

Bostock, H. S., 1948, Physiography of 

the Canadian Cordillera, with special reference to the area north of 

the 55th parallel: Canada Geol. 

Survey Mem. 247, pub. 2483, 106 

P. 

Bredehoeft, J. D., Cooper, H. H., Jr., 

Papadopulos, I. S., and Bennett, 

R. R., 1965, Seismic fluctuations 

in an open artesian water well: 

U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. Paper 

5254, p. 51-57. 

Brevdy, June, 1964, Alaskan project, 

1964 : Target vulnerability studies, 

recovery research ; San Francisco, 

U.S. Naval Radiol. Defense Lab. 

TR-751, 106 p. 

Britt, R. H., 1965, Earthquake damage 

repair at Sitkinak Loran Station: 

The Engineer's Digest (U.S. Coast 

Guard). CG-133, no. 149, p. 35-37 

(0ct.-Nov.-Dec. 1965). 

Brooks, A. H., 1906, The geography 

and geology of Alaska, a summary 

of existing knowledge: U.S. Geol. 

Survey Prof. Paper 45, 327 p. 

1911, The Mount McKinley region, Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survey 

Prof. Paper 70, 234 p. 

Burton. L. R., 1966, Television examination of earthquake to underground 

communication and electrical systems in Anchorage, in Logan, M. K., 

Effect of the earthquake of March 

27, 1964, on the Eklutna hydroelectric power system, Anchorage, 

Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. 

Paper 545-A, 30 p. (I11 press.) 
SELECTED REFERENCES 

California Department of Water Resources, 1965, The Alaskan earthquake : California Dept. Water Resources Bull. 116-5, 64 p. 

Canadian Institute of Mining and 

Metallurgy, 1964, Future prediction of earthquakes? : Canadian 

Mining Metall. Bull., v. 57, no. 626, 

p. 658. 

Capps, S. R., 1916, The TurnagainKnik region: U.S. Geol. Survey 

Bull. 642-E, p. 147-194. 

-- 1940, Geology of The Alaska 

Railroad region: U.S. Geol. Survey 

Bull. 907, 201 p. 

Case, J. E., and others, 19f56, Gravity 

survey and regional geology of the 

Prince William Sound epicentral 

region: U.S. Geol. Survey, Prof. 

Paper 543-C, 12 p. 

Christensen, M. N., and Bolt, B. A., 

1964, Earth movements-Alaskan 

earthquake, 1964: Science, v. 145, 

no. 3637, p. 1207-1216. 

Chugach Electric Association, Inc. 

[1964], Survey of damage caused 

by the great Alaska earthquake: 

Anchorage, Alaska, 35 p. 

Church, J. E., 1942, Snow and snow 

surveying; ice, in Meinzer, 0. E., 

Hydrology : New Pork, Dover Pub., 

Inc. p. 83-148. 

Coats, R. R., 1950, Volcanic activity in 

the Aleutian arc: U.S. Geol. Survey Bull. 974-B, p. 35-49. 

Cook, I. P., 1965, 1964 earthquake damages to The Alaska Railroad : Am. 

Railway Eng. Assoc. Bull. 593, p. 

750-755 ( June-July 1965) 

Cooper, H. H. Jr., Bredehoeft, J. D., 

Papadopulos, I. S. and Bennett, 

R. R., 1965, The response of wellaquifer systems to seismic waves : 

Jour. Geophys. Research, v. 70, p. 

3915-3926. 

Coulter, H. W., and Migliaccio, R. R., 

1966 Effects of the March 27, 1964, 

earthquake at Valdez, Alaska: 

U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. Paper 542- 

C, 36 p. 

Craft, C. M., 1964, Rehabilitation helps 

rebuild Alaska : Rehabilitation 

Record, v. 5, no. 5, p 1-3. Alaska 

Office of Vocational Rehabilitation. 

Crimmin, Eileen, 1965, One year later 

-what happened in Alaska: Science Digest, v. 57, p. 42-46 (March 

1965). 

Davies, Kenneth, and Baker, D. M., 

1965, Ionospheric effects observed 

around the time of the Alaskan 

earthquake of March 28, 1964: 

Jour. Geophys. Research, v. 70, 

no. 9, p. 2251-2253. 

Davis, T. N., and Echols, Carol, 1962, 

A table of Alaska earthquakes 

1788-1961 : Alaska Univ. Geophys. 

Inst., Geophys. Research Rept. 8 

[UAG-R1311, 43 p. 

Donn, W. L., 1964, Alaskan earthquake 

of 27 March 1964: remote seiche 

stimulation: Science, v. 145, no. 

3629, p. 261-262. 

Donn, W. L., and Posmentier, E. S., 

1964, Ground-coupled air waves 

from the great Alaska earthquake : 

Jour. Geophys. Research, v. 69, no. 

24, p. 5367-5364. 

Dutro, J. T., Jr., and Payne, T. G., 

1957, Geologic map of Alaska : 

U.S. Geol. Survey map, scale 

1 :2,500,000. 

Engineering Geology Evaluation Group, 

1964, Geologic report-27 March 

1964 earthquake in Greater Anchorage area : Prepared for Alaska 

Housing Authority and the City of 

Anchorage, Anchorage, Alaska, 34 

p.. 12 figs., pls. 1-17. 

Fay, G. T., 1964, The big breakup: 

FAA Horizons, May 1964, 11. 4-7, 

Federal Aviation Agency. 

Federal Aviation Agency, 1965, Alaska 

takes on new look : FAA Horizons, 

March 1965, p. 14-15. 

Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for 

Alaska, 1964, Response to disaster, 

Alaskan earthquake, March 27, 

1964: Washington, U.S. Govt. 

Printing Office, 84 p. 

Ferrians, 0. J., Jr., 1966, Permafrost 

map of Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survey 

Misc. Inv. Map 1445. 

Fisher, W. E., and Merkle, D. H., 1965, 

The great Alaska earthquake: Air 

Force Weapons Lab., Kirkland Air 

Force Base, N. Mex., Tech. Rept. 

AFWLTR-65-92, 2 vols., 412 p., 

including 296 ills. 

Fitch, E. Rf., 1964, The Alaska Railroad meets its greatest challenge: 

Our Public Lands, v. 14, no. 1, p. 

12-15. 

Foley, R. E., 1964, Crescent City: tidal 

waves: Shore and Beach (Jour. 

Am. Shore and Beach Preservation Assoc.) v. 32, p. 28. 

Ford, Nancy, 1966, The Alaska Railroad: Modern Railroads, v. 20, no. 

12, p. 72-84. 

Gabert, G. M., 1965, Groundwater-level 

fluctuations in Alberta, Canada, 

caused by the Prince William 

Sound, Alaska, earthquake of 

March 1964: Canadian Jour. Earth 

Sci., v. 2, no. 2, p. 131-139. 

Gates, G. O., 1964, Geologic and tectonic setting in Mineral and water resources of Alaska: U.S. 

88th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Comm. 

Interior and Insular Affairs, Comm. 

Print 31-068, p. 32-39. 

Gates, G. O., and Gryc, George, 1963, 

Structure and tectonic history of 

Alaska, in Childs, 0. E., and Beebe, 

B. W., Backbone of the Americas: 

Am. Assoc. Petroleum Geologists 

Mem. 2, p. 264-277. 

Grantz, Arthur, 1961, Geologic map 

and cross sections of the Anchorage (D-2) quadrangle and northeasternmost part of the Anchorage 

(D-3) quadrangle, Alaska : U.S. 

Geol. Survey Misc. Geol. Inv. Map 

1342, scale 1 :48,000. 

Grantz, Arthur, Plafker, George, and 

Kachadoorian, Reuben, lM, Alaska's Good Friday earthquake, 

March 27, 1964--a preliminary 

geologic evaluation : U.S. Geol. 

Survey Circ. 491, 35 p. 

Graves, W. P. E., 1964, Earthquake! 

Natl. Geog. Mag,, v. 126, no. I, p. 

112-139. 

Gutenberg, Beno, and Richter, C. F., 

1949, Seismicity of the earth and 

associated phenomena : Princeton, 

N. J.. Princeton Univ. Press, 273 

P. 

Hackman, R. J., 1965, Photointerpretation of post-earthquake photographs, Alaska : Photogrammet~ric 

Eng., v. 31, no. 4, p. 604-610. 

Hanna, G. D., 1964, Biological effects 

of an earthquake: Pacific Discovery, v. 17, no. 6, p. 24-26. 

Hansen, W. R., 1965, Effects of the 

earthquake of March 27, 1964, at 

Anchorage, Alaska : U.S. Geol. 

Survey Prof. Paper 542-A, 68 p. 

Hill, Clair A., and Associates, 1964, 

Potter Hill Slide investigation for 

The Alaska Railroad : Redding, 

Calif., 20 p. 

Hill, M. R., 1965, Earth hazards-an 

editorial : California Div. Mines 

and Geology Mineral Inf. Service, 

r. 18, no. 4, p. 57-59. 

International Conference of Building 

Officials, 1964, Uniform Building 

Code: 1964 ed., v. 1, 503 p., Los 

Angeles, Calif. 

Jordan, J. N., Lander, J. F., and Black, 

R. A., 1965, Aftershocks of the 

4 February 1965 Rat Island earthquake : Science, v. 148, no. 3675. 

p. 1323-1325. 
108 THE ALASKA EARTHQUAKE, MARCH 2 7, 19 64 

Kachadoorian. Reuben, 1965, Effects of 

the earthquake of March 27, 1964, 

at Whittier, Alaska : U.S. Geol. 

Survey Prof. Paper 542-B, 21 p. 

Kachadoorian, Reuben, and Plafker, 

George, 1966, Effects of the earthquake of March 27, 1W a.t Kodiak 

and other communities on the 

Kodiak Islands : U.S. Geol. Survey. 

Prof. Paper 5424, 41 p. 

Karlstrom, T. N. V., 1957, Tentative 

correlation of Alaskan glacial 

sequences, 1956: Science, 8. 125, 

no. 3237, p. 73-74. 

1964, Quaternary geology of 

the Kenai Lowland and glacial 

history of the Cook Inlet region, 

Alaska: U.S. Geol. survey Prof. 

Paper 443, 69 p. 

Karo, H. A., 1964a, Coast and geodetic 

surveys of earthquake effects: The 

Military Engineer, v. 56, no. 372, 

p. 251-253. 

1964b, Emergency charting of 

the Alaska earthquake disaster 

area : United Nations Regional 

Cartographic Conf. for Asia and 

the Far East, 4th, Manila, Nov. 21- 

Dec. 5, 1964, 20 p. 

Kasperick, Dan, 1964, In the wake of 

Alaslra's earthquake : All Hands, 

July 1964, p. 10-14, U.S. Navy 

Bur. Personnel. 

Kerr, P. F., and Dren-, I. af., 1965, 

Quick clay movements, Anchorage, 

Alaska; a preliminary report: Air 

Force Cambridge Research Lab. 

(AFCRL-66-78), 133 p. 

Kunze, W. E., Sbarounis, J. A,, and 

Amrhein, J. E., 1965a, Behavior of 

prestressed concrete structures 

during the Alaskan earthquake : 

Portland Cement Assoc., 33 West 

Grand Ave., Chicago, Ill. 

1965b, The March 27 Alaskan 

earthquake--effects on structures 

in Anchorage: Jour. American 

Concrete Inst., v. 62, p. 635-649. 

Landen, David, 1964, Alaska earthquake, 27 March 1964: Science, r. 

145, no. 3627, p. 74-76. 

Lantz, Bill, and Kirkpatrick, Mildred, 

1964, Seward quake: Good Friday 

1964 : Selvard, Alaska, Kirkpatrick 

Printing Co., 36 p. 

Lemke, R. W.. 1966, Effects of the 

earthquake of March 27, 1964, at 

Seward, Alaska : U.S. Geol. Survey 

Prof. Paper 542-E. (In press.) 

Leonard, R. S., and Barnes, R. A,, Jr., 

1965, Observation of ionospheric 

disturbances following the Alaska 

earthquake : Jour. Geophys. Research, v. 70, no. 5, p. 1250-1253. 

Light, H. C., 1964, Which buildings 

fail? in The Alaska Earthquake: 

Am. Inst. Architects Joar., v. 42, no. 

6, p. 37-38. 

Lindemuth, I. W., 1965, Earthquakes 

and Cape Hinchinbrook Light Station, Alaska : The Engineer's 

Digest (U.S. Coast Guard), CG133, no. 149, p. 3742 (0ct.-Nov.- 

Dec. 1965). 

Logan, M. R., 1966, Effect of the earthquake of 3Iarch 27, 1964, on the 

Eklutna hydroelectric power system, Anchorage, Alaska : U.S. Geol. 

Survey Prof. Paper 545-A, 30 p. 

(In press.) 

McCulloch, D. S., 1966, Slide-induced 

waves, seiching, and ground fracturing caused by the earthquake of 

March 27, 1964, at Kenai Lake, 

Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. 

Paper 543-A, 41 p. 

McDermott, E. A., 1964, The role of the 

Office of Emergency Planning in 

the Alaskan earthquake ; Reconstruction plans and progress, a 

report to the President: Office of 

Bmergency Planning, Washington, 

D.C., 21 p. 

McGarr, Arthur, 1965, Excitation of 

seiches in channels by sdsmic 

waves : Jour. Geophys. Research, 

v. 70, no. 4, p. 847-854. 

McMinn. J. H., 1964, The verdict of 

Anchorage--good structural design 

survived : Eng. News-Record, v. 

172, no. 15, p. 22-25. 

Malloy, R. J., 1964, Crustal uplift 

southwest of Montague Island, 

Alaska: Science, v. 146, no. 3647, 

p 1048-1049. 

Martin, G. C., Johnson, B. L., and 

Grant, U.S., 1915, Geology and 

mineral resources of Kenai Peninsula, Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survey 

Bull. 587, 243 p. 

Martin, K. K., and Beasley, C. A., 1965, 

Post-earthquake attitudes on building materials-Science in Alaska, 

1964: Alaskan Sci. Conf., 15th, 

College, Alaska, 1964, Proc., p, 

280-283. 

Matthews, D. H., 1964, Earthquake in 

Alaska 28 March 1964 [notes] : 

Polar Record., v. 12, no. 78, p. 309- 

322. 

Migliaccio, R. R., 1965, Earthquake 

damage to highways in the Valdez 

district, Alaska: Highway Research Record 91, p. 64-72, Highway Research Board, Washington, 

D.C. 

Miller, D. J., 1960, Giant waves in Lituya Bay, Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survery Prof. Paper 354'2, p. 51-86. 

Miller, R. D., and Dobrovolny, Ernest, 

1959, Surficial geology of Anchorage and vicinity, Alaska: U.S. 

Geol. Survey Bull. 1093, 128 p. 

Miller, W. D., and Reddell, D. L., 

1964, Alaskan earthquake damages 

Texas High Plains water wells: 

Am. Geophys. Union Trans., v. 45, 

no. 4, p. 659-663. 

Montgomery, Porter, 1964, Effects of 

Alaskan earthquake on water levels in the Edwards underground 

reservoir in Bexar County: South 

Texas Geol. Soc. Bull., v. 4, no. 8, 

p. 6-10. 

Moore, G. W., 1964, Magnetic disturbances preceding the Alaska earthquake: Nature, v. 203, no. 4944, p. 

508-509. 

National Board of Fire Underwriters 

and Pacific Fire Rating Bureau, 

1964, The Alaska earthquake, 

March 27, 1964: Distributed by 

American Insurance Assoc., 465 

California St., San Francisco. 

Calif., 35 p. 

Nielsen, L. E., 1965, Earthquake-induced changes in Alaskan glaciers: Jour. Glaciology, v. 5, no. 42, 

p 865-867. 

Noerenberg, W. H., and Ossiander, F. J., 

1964, Effecbs of the March 27, 

1964, earthquake on pink salmon alevin survival in Prince 

William Sound spawning streams : 

Alaska Dept. Fish and Game 

Informational Leaflet 43, 10 p. 

Northrop, John, 1965, T phases from 

80 Alaskan earthquakes, March 

28-31, 1964: Seismol. Soc. America Bull., v. 55, no. 1, p. 5943. 

Oakeshott, G. B., 1964, The Alaskan 

earthquake : California Div. Mines 

and Geology, Mineral Inf. Serv., 

v. 17, no. 7, p. 119-124, 125. 

Office of Emergency Planning, 1964a, 

Impact of earthquake of March 

27, 1964, upon the economy of 

Alaska : Prepared for Federal 

Reconstruction and Development 

Planning Commission for Alaska, 

27 p. 

1964b, The Alaska earthquake, 

279 days of Federal reconstruction effort : 45 p. 
SELECTED REFERENCES 

Olson, S. T., chief [1964], Reconnaissance of Copper River Delta following the March 27, 1964, earthquake: U.S. Forest Service Br. 

Wildlife Management, Region 10, 

6 P. 

PB\vB, Troy, 1964, Good Friday earthquake, Alaska: Geotimes, r. 8, no. 

8, p. 9-10, 22-23. 

Pittelko, H. P., 1965, Vertical forces 

in the Alaska earthquake: Civil 

Eng. v. 35, no. 1, p. 56-58. 

Plafker, George, 1965, Tectonic deformation associated with the 1964 

Alaska earthquake : Science, v. 

148, no. 3678, p. 1675-1687. 

Plafker, George, and Mayo, L. R., 1965, 

Tectonic deformation, subaqueous 

slides and destructive waves associated with the Alaskan March 

27, 1964, earthquake-an interim 

geologic evaluation : U.S. Geol. 

Survey open-file report, 21 p. 

Poirot, J. W., 1965, Utilities for a 

relocated town in Alaska: Civil 

Eng., v. 35 no. 3, p. 50-53. 

Post, A. S., 1965, Alaskan glaciersrecent observations in respect to 

the earthquake-advance theory : 

Science, v. 148, no. 3668, p. 366- 

368. 

Powers, J. R., 1965, The Alaskan earthquake: [U.S.] Air Force Civil 

Engineer, v. 6, February 19G, p. 

2-5. 

Press, Frank, 1965, Displacements, 

strains and tilts at teleseismic 

distances : Jour. Geophys. Research, v. 70, no. 10, p. 2395-2412. 

Press, Frank, and Jackson, David, 

1965, Alaskan earthquake, 27 

March 1964-Vertical extent of 

faulting and elastic strain energy 

release: Science, v. 147, no. 3660, 

P. 867-868. 

Prestressed Concrete Institute, 1964, A 

report on the behavior of structures employing prestressed concrete during the Alaskan earthquake: PC Items, v. 10, no. 6, p. 

2-7. 

Ragle, R. H., Sater, J. E., and Field, 

W. O., 1965, Effects of the 1964 

Alaskan earthquake on glaciers 

and related features: Arctic, v. 18, 

no. 2, p. 135-137; also ifi Awtic 

Inst. North America Research 

Paper 32. 

Railway Age Weekly, 1965, Alaska 

Railroad ; comeback from disaster : 

v. 158, no. 1, p. 19-22, 27, 44. 

Reed, J. C., Jr., 1961, Geology of the 

Mount McKinley quadrangle, Alaska: U.S. Geol. Survey Bull. 110% 

A, p. A1-A36. 

Reimnitz, Erk, and Marshall, N. F., 

1965, Effects of the Alaska earthquake and tsunami on recent deltaic sediments: Jour. Geophys. Research, v. 70, no. 10, p. 2363-2376. 

Rexin, E. E., 1964, Alaskan earthquake 

excites Nunn-Bush well : Earth 

Sci., r. 17, no. 4, p. 152-156. 

Rice, E. F., 1964, The Alaska earthquake: Civil Eng., v. 34, no. 5, 

p. 5246. 

Richter, C. F., 1958, Elementary seismology: San Francisco, W. H. 

Freeman and Co., 768 p. 

Rogers, G. \V., 19Ga, Comments on the 

impact of the Good Friday earthquake on the Alaskan economy: 

Arctic, v. 18, no. 1, p. 3-6. 

l965b, Impact of the Good Friday earthquake on Alaska's economy, ia Science in Alaska, 1964: 

Alaskan Sci. Conf., 15th, College, 

Alaska, 1964, Proc., p. 259-267. 

1965c, The impact of the 1964 

Good Friday earthquake on the 

Alaska economy ; preliminary report and suggested research: Alaska Univ. report to Panel on Geography, Comm. Alaskan Earthquake, Natl. Acad. Sci., Jan. 24, 

1965, 34 p. 

St. Amand, Pierre, 1957, Geological and 

geophysical synthesis of the tectonics of portions of British Columbia, the Yukon Territory, and 

Alaska: Geol. Soc. America Bull. 

v. 68, p. 1343-1370. 

Saroff, J. R., and Schoop, E. J., 1964, 

Planning in Anchorage after the 

earthquake : Jour. American Inst. 

Planners, r. 30, no. 3, p. 231-233. 

Sater, J. E., 1964, Effects on glaciers of 

Alaskan earthquakes of March 

1964: Arctic, v. 17, no. 3, p. 211. 

Saverenskiy, Ye. F., Starovoyt, 0. Ye., 

and Fedorov, S. A., 1964, Long period Rayleigh waves of the Alaskan earthquake on March 28,1964 : 

Akad. Nauk SSSR Izv. ser. geofiz. 

12, p. 1826-1831. 

Sawyer, K. T., 1964, The Alaska earthquake--effects, reaction, and recovery: The Military Engineer, v. 

66, no. 372, p. 246-249. 

Schaem, W. E., 1965, Structural design problems associated with the 

Alaskan earthquake, in Science in 

Alaska, 1964: Alaskan Sci. Conf., 

15th, College, Alaska, 1964, Proc., 

p. 253-258. 

Schatz, C. E., Curl, Herbert, Jr., and 

Burt, W. V., 1964, Tsunamis on 

the Oregon coast; The Ore Bin, v. 

26, no. 12, p. 231-232, Portland, 

Oregon Dept. Geol. and Mineral 

Industries. 

Scheffer, J. A., 1964, Miracle in Alaska : 

Qualified Contractor, May 1964, 

Washington, Natl. Elec. Contractors Assoc. 

Schlicker, H. G., Deacon, R. J., and 

Twelker, N. H., 1964, Earthquake 

geology of the Portland area, Oregon: The Ore Bin, v. 26, no. 12, 

p. 209-230, Portland, Oregon Dept. 

Geol. and Mineral Industries. 

Schmidt, R. A. M., 1964, Geology in a 

hurry : Geotimes, v. 9, no. 3, p. 

13-15. 

Schmidt, R. A. M., Bedford, B., Caldenvood, K. W., Ganopole, G., Hamilton, J. A., Helmuth, D. N., Moening, H. J., and Richter, D. H., 1965, 

Earthquake-triggered landslides in 

the Anchorage area, March 27, 

1964, in Science in Alaska, 1964: 

Alaskan Sci. Conf., 15th, College, 

Alaska, 1964, Proc., p. 239-252. 

Scott, J. S., and Render, F. W., 1965, 

Effect of an Alaskan earthquake 

on water levels in wells at Winnipeg and Ottawa, Canada: Jour. 

Hydrology, v. 2, no. 3, p. 262-268. 

Seed, H. G., and Wilson, S. D., C19661, 

The Turnagain Heights landslide 

in Anchorage, Alaska : California 

Univ. (Berkeley) Dept. Civil Engineering, Soil Mechanics and Bituminous Materials Research Laboratory, 37 p. 

Shannon and Wilson, Inc., 1964, Preliminary report to U.S. Army Corps 

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