FILED JULY 11, 2011
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 140603
RANDALL L EE DOWDY, Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
Y OUNG , C.J. We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether homeless sex offenders are obligated to co mply with the registration requirement imposed by the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). 1 Specifically, we consider whether homeless sex offenders have a “residence” or “domicile” such that they can comply with the statute’s registration requirements. We hold that hom elessness is not a bar to compliance with

1 MCL 28.721 et seq . SORA has since been amended, see 17 PA 2011; however, those amendments do not apply to this case. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Robert P. Young, Jr. Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra2 SORA because homelessness does not preclude an offender from entering a police station and reporting to a law enfo rcement agency regarding th e offender’s residence or domicile. The Legislature intend ed SORA to be a comprehens ive system that requires all sex offenders to register, whether homeless or otherwise. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this case for trial.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1984, defendant, Randall Lee Dowdy, pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnapping, five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), and a char ge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 2 Defendant remained incarcerated until
2002. As a consequence of defendant’s CSC-I conv ictions, he is required to register as a sex offender. 3 Defendant signed a form upon being released from incarceration acknowledging that his obligations under SORA had been explained to him. Defendant registered his residence as 430 North Larch, Lansing, Michigan, which is a location of the Volunteers of America (VOA), a homeless shelter. 4 Defendant obtained services at the VOA until the fall of 2006, when the VOA staff discovered that he was a sex

2 MCL 750.349 (kidna pping); MCL 750.520b (CSC-I); MC L 750.227b (felony-firearm). See People v Dowdy , 148 Mich App 517, 518; 384 NW2d 820 (1986). Defendant admitted committing “one vaginal, two oral, and two anal” penetrations of his victim. Id

. at 520.

3 MCL 28.722(e)( x ).

4 The Volunteers of America provides a variet y of services for the homeless, including overnight shelters, free meals, counseli ng services, and employment preparation.3 offender. He left the VOA in accordance with its polic y barring sex offenders from receiving its services. It appears that defendan t was homeless at all times relevant to this

case. In 2006, the Lansing Police Department attempted to verify where defendant was living. According to police records, the last time that defendant reported his residence or domicile, as SORA requires, was in November 2002. In October 2 006, the police visited the VOA in a further attempt to verify defenda nt’s information and de termined that he no longer received services there. On the basis of these facts, the Ingham County Prosecutor charged defendant with viola ting the reporting and notifica tion requirements of SORA. 5 After a preliminary examination, defend ant was bound over to the Ingham Circuit Court, where he filed a motion to dismiss th e charges. Defendant argued that SORA required him to register an address in order to comply with his statutory obligations, but claimed that because he was homeless and did not have an address, he was unable to comply with the obligation to report a “residence” to police under SORA. The circuit court found these arguments persuasive a nd dismissed the charges, holding that defendant’s homelessness rendered it impossibl e for him to comply with SORA. The prosecution appealed, and the Court of Appeals de nied leave to appeal for lack of merit in

5 Defendant was charged with one count of violating MCL 28.729(1 )(a) for failure to notify law enforcement within 10 days after he “change[d] or vacate[d] his . . . residence or domicile” pursuant to MCL 28.725(1) a nd two counts of violating MCL 28.729(2)(a) for failure to comply with his quarter ly reporting requirements pursuant to MCL 28.725a(4)(b).4 the grounds presented. On appe al in this Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. 6 On remand, a Court of Appeals panel a ffirmed. The Court r easoned that homeless individuals have neither a residence nor a domicile as SORA defines those terms. 7 The panel explained that “residen ce” referred to “a place, a dwelling, an abode, where an individual has a ‘regular place of lodging,’” and held that “[t]he provisional location where a homeless person happens to spend the night” does not satisfy the dictionary definitions of “lodging.” 8 Therefore, the panel held th at the statutory language required only those sex offenders with a “residence” or a “domicil e” to notify law enforcement and that, because the homeless have neither, they cann ot comply with the statute’s requirements. 9 We granted leave to appeal to co nsider whether home less sex offenders can comply with SORA. 10

6 People v Dowdy , 484 Mich 855 (2009).

7 People v Dowdy , 287 Mich App 278, 281-2 82; 787 NW2d 131 (2010).

8 Id . at 281, quoting MCL 28.722(g).

9 See id . at 282. Curiously, the Court of Ap peals panel did not address defendant’s quarterly reporting requirement pursuant to MCL 28.725a(4)(b). The Court’s opinion only addressed defendant’s obligation to notify law enforcement of a changed or vacated “residence” or “domicile” pursu ant to MCL 28.725(1).

10 People v Dowdy , 486 Mich 935 (2010).5 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Issues of statutory construction are ques tions of law that are reviewed de novo. 11 “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” 12 Courts must construe a statute in a manner that gives full effect to all its provisions. 13 If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must enforce the statute as written. 14 To the extent that constitutional issues are involved, they are also questions of law reviewed de novo. 15 A district court magistrate’s decision to bind over a defendant and a trial court’s decision on a mo tion to quash an information are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 16
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE SEX OFFEND ER REGISTRATION ACT SORA is a conviction-based registration stat ute that requires individuals convicted of certain “listed offenses” to register as sex offenders. 17 An offender’s registration disclosure includes inform ation regarding where the offender lives, identifying

11 City of Taylor v Detroit Edison Co , 475 Mich 109, 115; 715 NW2d 28 (2006).

12 Drouillard v Stroh Brewery Co , 449 Mich 293, 302; 536 NW2d 530 (1995).

13 People v Francisco , 474 Mich 82, 87; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).

14 Robinson v Detroit , 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).

15 Toll Northville Ltd v Northville Twp , 480 Mich 6, 10-11; 743 NW2d 902 (2008).

16 People v Hamblin , 224 Mich App 87, 91 ; 568 NW2d 339 (1997).

17 MCL 28.722(e).6 information, and a summary of the offender’s convictions. 18 Offenders are also required to sign a form acknowledging their oblig ations as sex offenders under SORA. 19 The Legislature used broad language to de scribe SORA’s scope and intent. SORA is intended to “better assist law enforcemen t officers and the people of this state in preventing and protecting agai nst the commission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted sex offenders.” 20 The Legislature determined that convicted sex offenders— homeless or otherwise—pose a potential serious danger to the safety and morals of the people of Michigan and particul arly to the state’s children. 21 SORA is therefore intended to “provide law enforcement and the peopl e of this state with an appropriate, comprehensive , and effective means to monitor th ose persons who pose such a potential danger.” 22 Consistent with this intent, SORA re quires sex offenders to comply with a variety of statutory obl igations, two of which are at issu e here: (1) the quarterly reporting requirement of MCL 28.725a(4)(b), and (2 ) the notification requirement of MCL 28.725(1). Inherent in both ob ligations is the requirement th at a sex offender inform law enforcement regarding the location of th e offender’s “residence” or “domicile.”

18 See MCL 28.727(1).

19 MCL 28.725a(2).

20 MCL 28.721a.

21 Id

. 22 Id . (emphasis added).7 All sex offenders convicted of one or more listed offenses that ar e felonies have an affirmative obligation to report quarterly to a law enforcement agency for “verification of domicile or residence.” 23 These offenders “ shall report in person ” to the police between the first and fifteenth day of each January, April, July, and October. 24 This quarterly reporting requirement is not con tingent on where an offender resides or is domiciled, and all offenders who are not incarcerated must comply. Additionally, all sex offenders have an ongoing obligation to keep law enforcement apprised of changes to thei r residence or domicile. Specifically, sex offenders “ shall notify the local law enforcem ent agency or sheriff’s department having jurisdiction where his or her new residence or domicile is located or the department post of the individual’s new residence or domicile within 10 days after the individual changes or vacates his or her resi dence [or] domicile . . . .” 25 According to the statute’s plain language, a sex offender’s ob ligation to notify law enforcem ent of a new “residence” or “domicile” is triggered when th e offender changes or vacates the previous “residence” or “domicile,” not when the new “residence ” or “domicile” is established. After an offender complies with the quarterly reporting requirement pursuant to MCL 28.725a(4)(b), the law enforcement agency to whom the offender reports is under

23 MCL 28.725a(4).

24 MCL 28.725a(4)(b) (emphasis added).

25 MCL 28.725(1) (emphasis adde d). This version of the statute took effect on December 1, 2006. See 2006 PA 402. The previous version of MCL 28.725(1 ), which was in effect during part of the period in wh ich defendant was charged with violating it, varied in word order but not in substance.8 an affirmative statutory obligation to veri fy the information pr ovided by the sex offender. 26 MCL 28.725a(8) directs sex offenders to maintain either a valid driver’s license or an official state identification card, either of which may be used as proof of an offender’s residence or domicile for purposes of law enforcement veri fication. However, those are not the exclusive means by which an offender ma y prove residence or domicile to law enforcement. SORA expressly cont emplates sex offenders with an uncommon residence or domicile by providing that Mi chigan State Police “may specify other satisfactory proof of domicile or residence.” 27 Thus, if a sex offender is unable to provide any of the statutorily specified docum ents or the offender’s residence or domicile is difficult to confirm, the Mi chigan State Police is empowe red to formulate alternative methods whereby the offender may provide information to ve rify the offender’s residence or domicile.
B. “RESIDENCE” AND “DOMICILE” To comply with the statute’s registration requirements, sex offenders must provide information regard ing their “residence” or “domicile.” 28 SORA defines “residence” for “registration and voting purposes” as that place at which a person habitually sl eeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lo dging. If a person has more than 1

26 See MCL 28.725a(6). Law enforcement “ shall verify the individual’s residence or domicile and any information required to be reported” under MCL 28.724a. (Emphasis added.)

27 MCL 28.725a(8).

28 See MCL 28.725(1), MCL 28. 725a(4), and MCL 28.725a(8).9 residence, or if a wife has a reside nce separate from that of the husband, that place at which the person resides th e greater part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of this act. [29] Thus, a person’s “residence” under SORA is a combination of three things: that place where a person (1) habitually sleeps, (2) keeps personal effe cts, and (3) has a regular place of lodging. The words that the Legislatur e used to define “residence” have a broad scope and contemplate a wide arra y of “residences.” However, the definition of “residence” does not include every location where a person might sleep , regardless of the length of the stay. A “residence,” for purposes of SORA , is only that plac e where an offender habitually sleeps and establishes regular lodging. The Court of Appeals panel in this case held that defendant was relieved of an y obligation to comply with SORA because “the concepts of habitually and regularity are antithetical to the circumstances of homelessness,” because homeless people do not “have the security of a customary place of lodging” and do not live “within a home.” 30 The Court of Appeals panel erroneously concluded that the homeless were definitionally incapable of ha ving a habitual “residence.” This assumption is belied by the facts of this very case, in which the record shows that, at least for a time, defendant’s “residence” was listed as the VOA. Neverthele ss, the panel’s legal conclusion equating a “residence” with a “home” is inconsistent with the statutory definiti on of “residence” in

29 MCL 28.722(g) (emphasis added).

30 Dowdy , 287 Mich App at 282.10 SORA. Nothing in the relevant statutor y provision suggests that “residence” is synonymous with a home, a specific street address, or even a physical structure. Rather, the definition of “residence” merely contemplates a “place.” 31 Moreover, the Court of Appeals panel presumed that all homeless indi viduals sleep in a different location every night and can never have a regular place of lodging. Such a broad overgeneralization is unjustifiable and factually unsupported, even by the record in this case. It is entirely consistent with SORA for a se x offender to identify, for ex ample, a vacant house or a park as a “residence” if it is, in fact, “that place at which” the sex offender “habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging.” Unlike “residence,” “domicile” is not define d in SORA. Although this Court has, in several circumstances, treated the te rms “residence” and “domicile” as synonymous, 32

31 Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, our discussion of a “place” is not a “judicially derived shorthand definition,” post at 8; rather, it is simply an application of SORA’s plain language. MCL 28.722(g) exp licitly defines “residence” as “that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging.” Thus, far from commi tting an “egregious error,” post at 8, our analysis simply gives effect to the Legislature’s intent by applying the statute’s unambiguous language. The dissent misconstrues SORA; although the dissent believes that some homeless sex offenders can be required to register, the dissent would re quire only those offenders who live in a home, apartment, or homeless shelter to comply with SORA. However, the dissent’s analysis ignores the fact that now here in SORA exists a requirement that offenders live in a home, or, indeed, any structure at all.

32 See, e.g., Gluc v Klein , 226 Mich 175, 178; 197 NW 69 1 (1924) (“In this State, the words ‘domicile’ and ‘residence’ are treated as synonymous terms. In our statutes relating to voting, eligibility to hold office , taxation, probate and administration of estates, etc., no distinc tion is pointed out.”).11 the terms were accorded different meanings under the common law. 33 In SORA, the Legislature used both “residence” and “dom icile” to describe what a sex offender can register. Therefore, construing the two terms as synonymous in this case would effectively render one of the terms nugatory —an outcome courts avoid when construing the language of a statute. 34 Accordingly, it is necessa ry to differentiate between “residence” and “domicile” for purposes of SORA. Michigan courts have defi ned “domicile” as “‘that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.’” 35 Similarly, a domicile is “t he place where a person has his home, with no present intenti on of removing, and to which he intends to return after going elsewhere for a longer or shorter time.” 36 More significant to the instant case is that it has long been the law of this state that “[e] very person must have a domicile somewhere.” 37 A person may have only one domicile, which continues until the person

33 Id . at 177-178 (“Under the common law, th ere was a distinction between ‘domicile’ and ‘residence.’ . . . ‘[A]ny place of abode or dwelling place,’ ho wever temporary it might have been, was said to constitute a re sidence. A person’s domicile was his legal residence or home in contemplation of law.”).

34 Omelenchuk v City of Warren , 466 Mich 524, 528; 647 NW2d 493 (2002).

35 In re Servaas , 484 Mich 634, 679; 774 NW2d 46 (2009) (M ARKMAN , J., dissenting), quoting Henry v Henry , 362 Mich 85, 101-102; 106 NW2d 570 (1960).

36 Hartzler v Radeka , 265 Mich 451, 452; 251 NW 554 (1933).

37 Beecher v Common Council of Detroit , 114 Mich 228, 230; 72 NW 206 (1897); see also Gluc , 226 Mich at 179.12 acquires a different one. 38 Thus, the essential characteristi c of a “domicile” that separates it from a “residence” is th at, under Michigan law, every person has a “domicile.” 39 Even if a homeless sex offender with transient sleeping arrangements cannot establish a “residence” as SORA defines it, the offender is still capable of reporting sufficient information regardin g where the offender lives for purposes of identifying a “domicile.” Although it may be difficult to ve rify where an offender is domiciled, as noted, difficulties in verifying an offender’s information do not excuse the offender from complying with SORA’s requirements. Moreov er, SORA enables th e Michigan State Police to respond to such situations by empo wering it to “specify other satisfactory proof of domicile or residence.” 40 Indeed, the Mich igan State Police ha s exercised this statutory authority by promulgating an orde r that permits homeless sex offenders to register their domicile as “123 Homeless.” 41 An offender thus satisfies the offender’s statutory obligation by appearing at a law enforcement agency and advising the authorities of where the offender lives. Purs uant to SORA and the Michigan State Police

38 Beecher , 114 Mich at 230, quoting Cooley, Taxation (2d ed), p 369.

39 The dissent’s critique of our “dom icile” analysis is erroneous. In Beecher , the issue was whether the petitioner’s residence wa s located in Detroit or Negaunee. Beecher , 114 Mich at 229. Thus, far from equatin g domicile with a street address, Beecher described domicile in terms similar to th e Michigan State Police order cited in note 41 of this opinion: by reference to a c ity. Additionally, the dissent conflates “residence” and “domicile” although the Legislature plainly us ed the terms in the disjunctive, indicating that the Legislature sought to gi ve the terms discrete meanings.

40 MCL 28.725a(8).

41 Michigan State Police, Official Or der No. 79, April 27, 2007, p 2.13 order, the law enforcement agen cy can accept as “satisfactor y proof” of the offender’s “domicile” the state, city, zip code, and county in which the offender lives and must add that information to the “123 Homeless” desi gnation in the registry. Thus, when the homeless sex offender’s “domicile” is registered as “123 Homeless” in the city in which the offender lives, that is the offender’s statutory domicile for purposes of SORA. 42 Therefore, homelessness in no way prevents a sex offender from complying with the notification obligation pursuant to MCL 28.725(1) either beca use every person must have a legal domicile or, for practical purposes, because the Michigan State Police has promulgated an order to accommodate home less sex offenders for the purposes of registration. The Michigan State Police order does not contravene SORA, and the dissent’s arguments to the contrary misapprehend the order’s purpose. Although “123 Homeless” is not an actual address, an offende r does not violate MCL 28.727(6) when law enforcement records the offender’s address in this manner. 43 The offender complies with

42 Our analysis simply explains how homeless sex offenders may comply with their registration obligations under the framework created by SORA . Regardless of whether a homeless sex offender is nomadic or has a c onsistent place of residence, SORA ensures that the homeless sex offender is capable of providing sufficient in formation to comply with SORA’s registration requirements. Ou r construction is consistent with SORA’s stated purpose of creating a comprehensive system to monitor se x offenders and is far more faithful to the statute th an the dissent’s construction, which would defeat this basic goal by categorically allowing offenders who merely claim homelessness to opt out of complying with SORA. The dissent w ould clearly incentivize this conduct.

43 MCL 28.727(6) provid es that “[a]n individual shall not knowingly provide false or misleading information concerning a re gistration, notice, or verification.”14 SORA when the offender truthfully reports to the appropriate law enforcement agency that the offender is homeless. The law enforcement agency, in turn, records the reported information in a manner that facilitates the st atutorily mandated verification obligation so that the offender’s residence or domicile can be confirmed later. Thus, the Michigan State Police order does not subject homeless se x offenders to further prosecution. The order is both authorized by and in compliance with SORA. The Court of Appeals panel did not addr ess whether defendant had a domicile. Instead, the Court noted that “[ d]omicile is not an issue in this case because the parties agree that as a homeless person, defendant has no ‘true, fixe d, principal, and permanent home.’” 44 Because this Court has long acknowle dged that “[e]very person must have a domicile somewhere,” 45 it was error for the panel below to conclude otherwise. Because the determination of where an individual is domiciled is generally a question of fact, 46 we cannot determine where defendant was domic iled and leave this qu estion for resolution on remand. The offender’s obligation is to truthfully inform polic e regarding where the offender’s residence or domicile is located, and the police have the separate obligation of verifying that information. 47

44 Dowdy , 287 Mich App at 281, quoting Bl ack’s Law Dictionary (8th ed).

45 Beecher , 114 Mich at 230.

46 See, e.g., Servaas , 484 Mich at 680 (M ARKMAN , J., dissenting).

47 We recognize the practical difficulties of registering an offender who is homeless, claims to be homeless, or otherwise has a n ontraditional residence. That any of these circumstances exist, however, does not provide license for an offender to flout the mandates imposed by SORA. Additionally, as noted, the burden of accommodating these15 IV. APPLICATION A. THE QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENT Defendant argues that he is categorically excused from the statutory obligation because it is “impossible for homeless offenders to comply” with SORA, as homeless sex offenders conclusively lack either a “residen ce” or a “domicile.” Defendant also argues that prosecuting him for failing to comply with an impossible obligation violates his constitutional right to due pr ocess of law. We conclu de that both arguments are unpersuasive. Defendant has made no compelling clai m that his homelessness rendered it impossible for him to comply with MCL 28. 725a(4)(b). This provision requires sex offenders, such as defendant, to perform the physical act of repor ting in person to law enforcement four times per year. This pr ovision in SORA is unconditional and contains no exceptions or exclusions for homelessne ss. Moreover, it applies regardless of the stability of where an offender resides or is domiciled. This absolute reporting obligation arises from the offender’s st atus as a sex offender and th e potential danger the offender poses to the people of Michigan. 48 Therefore, defendant was re quired to repo rt in person to a law enforcement agency four times per year and to provide the authorities with truthful information. atypical circumstances and veri fying the offender’s information falls on the governmental body charged with ensuring that an offender who seeks to comply with his registration and notification requirements can, in fact, do so.

48 MCL 28.721a.16 Despite this clear mandate , there is no evidence su ggesting that defendant ever complied with his obligation to report in pers on each January, April, July, and October, even during the time defendant’s registered residence was at the VOA. 49 In fact, the record shows that 16 quarters passed without defendant ever having complied with the quarterly reporting requirement. Defendant has never claimed that it was impossible for him to appear in person at a police station. Defendant’s pe rceived difficulty, it seems, concerns the quality of info rmation he contends he would have given to the police had he made an in-person appearance. Howeve r, any difficulty verifying the truthful information provided by defendant is the resp onsibility of law enfo rcement and does not negate defendant’s responsibility to appear to report in th e first instance. The lower courts erred by ignoring the mandatory nature of SORA’s quarterly reporting requirement. B. THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT When the police attempted to verify defendant’s re gistration information in October 2006, the investigating officer dete rmined that defendant no longer received services at the VOA. Becau se defendant had registered his residence as the VOA in Lansing, and because defendant was no longer permitted to receive services there, his “residence” had been “vaca te[d]” or “change[d].” 50 From the date defendant no longer

49 Counts II and III of the Information charged defendant with failing to comply with his quarterly reporting duties in July 2006 and October 2006, when defendant’s registered residence was at the VOA in Lansing.

50 MCL 28.725(1).17 resided at the VOA, he had 10 days to notify the Lansi ng Police, the Ingham County Sheriff, or the local post of the Michigan St ate Police that his registered residence or domicile was no longer accurate. According to the record, afte r leaving the VOA, defendant never made any atte mpt to notify a law enforcem ent agency of the change. Even if defendant had difficulty in identifyi ng his new residence or domicile, he was nevertheless obligated to notify the aut horities that his residence or domicile had changed. Nothing in the text of SORA sugge sts that homelessness is an excuse for an offender’s failure to comply w ith the act. Therefore, because it was certainly possible for defendant to notify law enforc ement that he had changed hi s residence or domicile, and because defendant made no effort to do so, the lower courts erred by dismissing the charges. We note further that there is no evidence in this case that defendant attempted to comply with his reporting or notification obl igations and was prosecuted for failing to provide sufficiently specific information. In fact, the cont rary is true. At defendant’s preliminary examination, the following exchange occurred: The Court : So you’re telling me that [d efendant] went [to the police station] and tried to report that he wa s homeless and they wouldn’t take the report? [ Defense Counsel ]: No, Your Honor, I’m sayi ng he does not have an obligation to report anything if he doesn’t have an address to report. This case would be different if defendant had gone to a law enforcement agency, attempted to notify or report that he was a homeless sex offender, and was turned away and subsequently prosecuted. That did not occur here. Our holding that homeless18 offenders must comply with the statute’s reporting and notification requirements, combined with the record evidence indicating that defendant made absolutely no effort to comply with either requirement, is sufficient to resolve the present case. The dissent would permit a sex offender to escape any obligatio n to comply with SORA if the offender merely claims homelessness. The dissent argues that, as a matter of law , defendant could not comply with any of his obligations under SORA. The practical and egregious conseque nce of this conclusion is that if an offender unilaterally decides that he is homeless, that offende r can simply ignore SORA and is no longer required to comply with MCL 28.725a(4)(a) or (b) 51 or MCL 28.725(1). 52 Because the dissent would relieve homeless sex offender s of the obligation even to enter a law enforcement agency and inform the authorities that the offender is homeless, there is no way for law enforcement agencies to confir m the veracity of th e offender’s claim— creating an incentive for nonc ompliant sex offenders to claim homelessness once law enforcement ultimately finds them. 53 Indeed, in the months immediately following the

51 MCL 28.725a(4)(a) and (b ) require an offender to report to local law enforcement or to the State Police annually or quarterl y depending on the offender’s crime.

52 MCL 28.725(1) requires an offender to report to local law enforcement or to the State Police within 10 days after the offender changes or vacates the offender’s residence or domicile.

53 The dissent argues that our opinion enables offenders with a home to falsely report as homeless. However, one need only read SORA’s language to conclude that the dissent’s claim lacks merit. If an offender dishonestly reports to law enforcem ent that the offender is homeless, the offender has “knowingly pr ovide[d] false or misleading information concerning a registration, notice, or veri fication” and has violated SORA. MCL 28.727(6). Our opinion applies SORA’s requirement that all sex offenders must report19 release of the Court of Appeals’ decisi on, the number of sex offenders claiming homelessness increased by 62 percent. 54 As noted previously, the stated purpose of SORA is to enable law enforc ement and the public to monito r sex offenders. Applying a “modicum of common sense,” 55 it is difficult to imagine a conclusion that does more harm to this purpose than to enable the very pe ople targeted by SORA to determine for themselves whether they must comply with the statute’s requirements. 56
V. CONCLUSION By enacting SORA, the Legislature create d a broad, comprehensive registration statute. The lower courts failed to give effe ct to the plainly expressed intent of SORA, which is to enable law enforc ement and the public to mon itor sex offenders. All sex offenders can, and therefore mu st, comply with the reporti ng obligations and notification requirements outlined in the stat ute. An offender’s homelessne ss in no way prevents that offender from physically entering a law enfo rcement agency and truthfully reporting to the authorities information regarding the offende r’s residence or domicile. It was clear

and that they must report truthfully. Far fr om incentivizing false reporting, our opinion requires all sex offenders to comply with SO RA and to do so truthfully.

54 See McVicar, Since court ruled homeless sex offe nders don’t have to register, number claiming homelessne ss jumps 62 percent , Grand Rapids Press, available at <http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/inde x.ssf/2010/05/since_court_ruled_home less_sex.html> (accesse d July 7, 2011).

55 Post at 7.

56 SORA is only “purge[d]” of “any meaning,” post at 18, when the targets of the registration scheme—sex offenders—are perm itted to determine whether they will comply with SORA’s mandatory requirements.20 legal error for the lower courts to excuse defendant’s comple te failure to comply with SORA. Therefore, because the Court of A ppeals panel interpreted SORA in a manner contrary to the plainly expre ssed intent of the Legislature and because defendant made no effort to comply with his repor ting obligations, we revers e the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand defendant’s case to th e Ingham Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. ZahraS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 140603
RANDALL L EE DOWDY, Defendant-Appellee.

M ARILYN K ELLY , J. ( dissenting ). At issue in this case is wh ether defendant, a homeless person who is subject to the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), 1 violated the act when he failed to report a residence or domicile. The majority co ncludes that homelessness does not prevent compliance with SORA. Accordi ngly, it reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held that homeless individuals have ne ither a “residence” nor a “domicile” as those terms are used in SORA. 2 For the reasons I will detail, I believe the Court of Appeals

1 MCL 28.721 et seq . On April 12, 2011, the Legisl ature amended SORA, including the definition of “residence” germane to this appeal. See 2011 PA 17. However, those amendments do not apply to this case given that defendant was charged with violating SORA in its previous form.

2 To the extent that the Court of Appeals’ holding can be cons trued as definitively precluding application of SORA ’s registration and reporting requirements to all homeless sex offenders, I believe that it erred. Howe ver, the majority commits the same error by reaching the opposite conclusion—that SORA ’s registration and reporting requirements categorically do apply to all homeless sex o ffenders. The more nuanced question in this appeal is whether this defendant could be criminally ch arged for his alleged failure to comply w ith SORA.2 properly held that, as a matter of law, de fendant could not have complied with SORA’s registration and reporting requireme nts. Accordingly, I dissent.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1984, defendant pled gu ilty of kidnapping, first-de gree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), and felony-firearm. Under the terms of his plea agreement, he was sentenced to a mandatory two-year term for the felony-fir earm conviction, followed by concurrent 10- to 20-year terms for the kidnapping and CSC I convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 3 When defendant was released from pris on in November 2002, he signed a form that set forth his reporting obligations unde r SORA. He provided “430 North Larch, Lansing, Michigan” as his address, which is the location of a homeless shelter operated by Volunteers of America (VOA). Apparently , defendant never resided at the VOA. Rather, as the senior manager for social serv ices at the VOA testified, defendant was at the shelter only for meals. When the manage r became aware that defendant had listed the VOA as his address for purposes of SORA registration, she advised him that he was ineligible for VOA services. Defendant did not return to the VOA, and he remained homeless at all times re levant to this case. Law enforcement agencies often run ve rification tests to determine whether persons required to register and report unde r SORA have complied. In 2006, Lansing police performed such a test and learned that defendant had failed to report as required.

3 People v Dowdy , 148 Mich App 517; 384 NW2d 820 (1986).3 An officer visited the VOA in an attempt to verify defendant’s location, but was told that defendant had “moved out.” Consequently, defendant was charged with fi ve criminal counts alleging failure to comply with SORA. No twithstanding that th e complaint and an en try on a preliminary data sheet show defendant as “homeless” and with “no address,” the information lists his address as the VOA’s Larch Street address. Following the preliminary examination, the Ingham Circuit Court bound him over on the charged offenses. De fendant then filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that his homelessness rendered him incapable of complying with SORA’s require ment that he report a “res idence” to law en forcement. The trial court agreed with hi m and dismissed the charges. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal for lack of merit. But we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted. 4 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. 5 It held that, because defendant had neither a residence nor a domi cile at which to register, he could not comply with the reporting requirements of SORA. 6 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the location where a nomadic homeless person spends the night does not fall within the ambit of SORA’s definition of “residence.” The Court concluded that the Legislature had written SORA’s reporting requirements for pers ons who have a domicile or residence. It

4 People v Dowdy , 484 Mich 855 (2009).

5 People v Dowdy , 287 Mich App 278; 787 NW2d 131 (2010).

6 Id . at 281-282.4 urged legislators to consider changes to SO RA to make it possible for the homeless to comply. We granted the prosecution’s ap plication for leave to appeal. 7

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL BACKGROUND Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a moti on to quash an information is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 8 However, the trial court’s ruli ng in this case was based on its interpretation of SORA, which ra ises an issue of statutory interpretation. The proper interpretation of a statute presents a que stion of law, which we review de novo. 9 It is not often that the Legislature expre ssly includes the purpose of an act in its provisions. Yet it did just that in writing SORA, providing in MCL 28.721a: The legislature declares that [SOR A] was enacted pu rsuant to the legislature’s exercise of the police po wer of the state w ith the intent to better assist law enforcement officers and the people of this state in preventing and protecting against the co mmission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted sex offenders. The legislature has determined that a person who has been convicted of comm itting an offense covered by this act poses a potential serious menace and danger to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state. The registration requirements of this act are intended to provide law enforcement and the people of th is state with an appropriate, comprehensive, and effective means to monitor those persons who pose such a potential danger.

7 People v Dowdy , 486 Mich 935 (2010).

8 People v Thomas , 438 Mich 448, 452; 475 NW2d 288 (1991).

9 Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co , 487 Mich 289, 297; 791 NW2d 897 (2010).5 When we interpret a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 10 The first step in ascertaining its inte nt is to consider the language of the statute itself. Generally, the words prov ide the most reliabl e evidence of the Legislature’s intent, and, as far as possible, we give separate meaning to every phrase, clause, and word. 11
At issue in this case is th e scope of SORA’s provisio ns mandating registration and reporting. Specifically, defendant was charge d with violating SORA by failing to notify law enforcement of a change in his residenc e or domicile. He wa s also charged with failure to comply with SORA’s quarterly re porting requirements. Those requirements are set forth in MCL 28.725 and MCL 28.725a. During most of the period in which de fendant was charged with violating MCL 28.725(1), it provided, in relevant part: Within 10 days after any of th e following occur, an individual required to be registered under th is act shall notify the local law enforcement agency or sheriff’s department havi ng jurisdiction where his or her new residence or domicile is locate d or the [state police] department post of the individual’s new residence or domicile: (a) The individual changes or vaca tes his or her residence, domicile, or place of work or education . . . . [12] MCL 28.725a(4) provided, in relevant part:

10 Brown v Detroit Mayor , 478 Mich 589, 593; 734 NW2d 514 (2007).

11 Petersen v Magna Corp , 484 Mich 300, 307; 773 NW2d 564 (2009).

12 This provision was amended effective Dece mber 1, 2006; however, the amendment did not affect the substantive requirements applicab le to defendant in this case. See 2006 PA 402.6 [F]ollowing initial verification . . . or registration . . . , an individual required to be registered under this act who is not incarcerated shall report in person to the local law enforcem ent agency or sheriff’s department having jurisdiction where he or she is domiciled or resides or to the department post in or nearest to the county where he or she is domiciled or resides for verification of domicile or residence as follows: * * * (b) If the person is registered fo r 1 or more felony listed offenses, not earlier than the first day or later th an the fifteenth day of each April, July, October, and January following initial verification or registration. Thus, defendant’s potential cr iminal liability under SORA hi nges on whether he changed, or failed to quarterly report, a residence or domicile.
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A “RESID ENCE” FOR PURPOS ES OF SORA The majority errs in its interpretation of SORA in numerous re spects. First, it erroneously concludes that defendant, who was homeless at all times relevant to the charges that he failed to report, had a “res idence” for purposes of the act. SORA specifically defines “residence” at MCL 28. 722(g) as “that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging.” Thus, to establish a “residence,” all three pa rts of the definition must be satisfied. As to the first, “habitual” is define d as “of the nature of a habit[.]” 13 A “habit” is (1) “an acquired pattern of behavior that has become almost involuntary as a result of frequent repetition,” (2) “customary practice or use,” or (3) “a particular practice, custom, or usage[.]” 14 The second and third parts are self -explanatory in that they require a

13 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).

14 Id

.7 “residence” to be a regular place of lodgi ng where a person keeps his or her personal effects. Defendant was unable to satisfy any part of the definition, let alone all three. When one applies the dictiona ry definitions of these terms and a modicum of common sense, it becomes obvious that defendant had no “residence” as that term is used in SORA. He had no habitual place at which to sleep. He had no place at which he kept his personal effects. Nor did he ha ve a regular place of lodging. A park bench, highway underpass, or st eam grate may qualify as a place where a homeless individual sleeps, but they hardly qualify as a “regular place of lodging” under the statute. As the Court of Appeals astutely observed, the concepts of habitually and re gularity are antithetical to the circumstances of homelessness. If th ere is anything “habitual” to the sleeping arrangements of the homeless, it is that it is customary for them not to have the security of a custom ary place of lodging. If there is anything “regular” about the place wher e a homeless person lives, it is that it is not within a home. [15] The majority misinterprets this passage as equating a “residence ” with a home. It does no such thing. The Court of Appeals merely pointed ou t that the homeless generally do not have a place at which they habitually sl eep, keep their pers onal belongings, and customarily lodge. Hen ce, they often lack a “residence” under SORA. 16 To the extent

15 Dowdy , 287 Mich App at 282.

16 I do not believe that all homeless sex o ffenders are incapable of registering and reporting under SORA. For example, homeless sex offenders may have a “residence” or “domicile” pursuant to SORA if th ey stay at the home of a rela tive, friend, or at a shelter. These offenders might easily be considered homeless in that they lack what is traditionally considered permanent housi ng. But their accommodations would nevertheless satisfy SORA’s definition of “residence.”8 that these criteria are traditionally associat ed with a home, the Court of Appeals was simply applying the Legislature’s chosen definition of “residence.” The majority commits an even more egregi ous error by stating that “the definition of ‘residence’ merely contemplates a ‘place.’” 17 This judicially derived shorthand definition aids the majority in holding that a vacant house or park qualifies as a residence under SORA. But the term “place,” standing alone, is not found within the relevant provisions of the act. Instead, SORA enumerates three criteria that must be satisfied for a “place” to be considered a “residence.” Thos e are the criteria that the majority fails to faithfully apply. Simply put, applying MCL 28. 722(g) as written, de fendant did not have a “residence.”
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A “DOMIC ILE” FOR PURPOS ES OF SORA The majority next errs by perverting th e legal definition and application of the term “domicile.” The word “domicile” is not defined in SORA . However, because

The majority claims, ante at 10 n 31, that I “would require only those offenders who live in a home, apartment, or homeless shelter to comp ly with SORA.” That is manifestly incorrect, as evid enced by my preceding analys is. Unlike the majority, I would apply MCL 28.722(g) in its entirety a nd require registration for those offenders who have a “residence” as defi ned by SORA as “[a] place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effect s, and has a regula r place of lodging .” (Emphasis added). Whether a “residence” is a “hom e, or, indeed, [a] structure at all,” ante at 10 n 31, is immaterial. And contra ry to the majority’s reading of my dissent, nothing I have written here stands for the proposition that, to be subject to SORA’s requirements, an offender must live in a home or structure. I have simply applied the unabridged definition of “residence” as provided by the Legislature.

17 Ante at 10.9 “domicile” has acquired a peculiar meaning unde r the law, we should construe and apply the word according to that meaning. 18 Numerous cases have discussed the concept of domicile. In fact, for more than 160 years, the Court has defined “dom icile” as a person’s “permanent home.” 19 This definition is consistent with Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed), which defi nes “domicile” as “the place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, pr incipal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.” As the majority acknowledg es, the terms “domicile” and “residence” have often been used interchangeab ly and synonymously. 20 In Campbell v White , this Court approvingly quoted the following passage:

18 See MCL 8.3a, which provides: All words and phrases sh all be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construe d and understood ac cording to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.

19 See, e.g., In re High , 2 Doug 515, 523 (Mich, 1847) (“ Domicile has been defined to be the place where a person has his true, fi xed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, wh enever he is absent, he has th e intention of returning[.]”); Henry v Henry , 362 Mich 85, 101-102; 106 NW2d 57 0 (1960) (“[A domicile is] that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either pe rmanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

20 See, e.g., Cervantes v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co , 478 Mich 934, 936 (2007) (M ARKMAN , J., dissenting); Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch , 404 Mich 477, 495; 274 NW2d 373 (1979).10 “Ordinarily one’s residence and do micile (if they do not always mean the same thing) are in fact the same, and where they so concur they are that place which we all mean wh en we speak of one’s home. And it may safely be asserted that where one has a home , as that term is ordinarily used and understood among me n, and he habitually resorts to that place for comfort, rest and relaxation from the cares of business, and restoration to health, and there abides in the intervals when busine ss does not call—that is his residence, both in the common and legal meaning of the term.” [21] The majority trumpets the proposition th at every person has a domicile. Under our centuries-old caselaw, that woul d be true only if every pe rson had a permanent home. Unfortunately, that postulation is belied by re ality, and, what is more important in the context of this case, SORA makes no such a ssumption. In support of its analysis, the majority selectively cites one sentence from Beecher v Common Council of Detroit 22 for the proposition that every person has a domic ile, while omitting the next sentence. In its entirety, the relevant portion of Beecher provides: Every person must have a domicile somewhere. The domicile is acquired by the combination of residence and the intention to reside in a given place , and can be acquired in no other way . The residence which goes to constitute domicile need not be long in point of time. If the intention of permanently residing in a place exists, a resi dence in pursuance of that intention, however s hort, will establish a domicile. [23]

21 Campbell v White , 22 Mich 178, 197 (1871), quoting Chaine v Wilson , 14 NY Sup Ct 673; 8 Abb Pr 78 (1858).

22 Beecher v Common Council of Detroit , 114 Mich 228; 72 NW 206 (1897).

23 Id . at 230 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In In re High , this Court wrote that “every man must have . . . a national domicile somewhere.” High , 2 Doug at 523 (emphasis added). In other words, one cannot be a man without a country. But the Court recognized that a domicile wa s “defined to be the habitati on fixed in any place without any present intention of removing therefrom[.]” Id . Therefore, domicile must be established through residence, but residence “i s not indispensible to retain domicile after it has been once acquired[.]” Id . Thus, the Court recogniz ed a distinction in scope between domicile and residence.11 Hence, to establish a domicile, a pers on must first establish a residence. 24 Thus, the case the majority cites for the pr oposition that every person mu st have a domicile made the proposition contingent on the underlying assumption that the person first had a residence. And as previously discussed, given that de fendant did not have a residence, then by definition he did not have a domicile as that word is used in SO RA. Consequently, the majority’s claim that defendan t must have a domicile for purposes of SORA is legally unsupported. 25 Perhaps more alarming, the majority does not engage in an analysis of whether defendant has a “domicile” under a ny definition of that term. Ra ther, it states as an ipse

24 The majority’s chosen defin ition of “domicile” supports this conclusion. For example, it states that Michigan courts have define d “domicile” as “that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.” Ante at 11 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Abode” is defined as “a place in which a person resides; resi dence; dwelling; home.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). Thus, there is a two-step process to establishing a domicile, the first of which is establishing a residence.

25 The majority also claims that the Michigan State Poli ce order allows the police to “accept as ‘satisfactory proof’ of the offender’s ‘domicile’ th e state, city, zip code, and county in which the offender lives . . . . Thus, when the homeless sex offender’s ‘domicile’ is registered as ‘123 Homeless’ in the c ity in which the offender lives, that is the offender’s statutory domic ile for purposes of SORA.” Ante at 12-13. This is simply false. The Michigan State Po lice order provides, in relevant part, “If the offender is homeless, the generic address of ‘123 Homele ss’ shall be entered into the computerized database, along with the offender’s city, stat e, zip code, and county code.” Michigan State Police, Official Order No . 79, issued April 27, 2007 (MSP Orde r), p 4. The order does not state that this information constitute s an offender’s domicile (or residence). Nor is there any authority, be it caselaw, statute, or othe rwise, that establishes that a state, city, zip code, and county constitute a domic ile. Therefore, those generic locations may furnish evidence of an offender’s location, but the order cannot trump our binding legal definitions of “domicile.”12 dixit that defendant must have a domicile. It then makes a leap in logic by concluding that “123 Homeless” qualifies as a domicile . This conclusion is unsupported by the majority’s cited (but not applied) definitio n of “domicile” as “the place where a person has his home, with no present intention of removing, and to which he intends to return after going elsewhere for a longer or shorter time.” 26 As further explained later in this opinion, a fictitious address does not satisfy a ny definition of “domicile.” The majority opinion is devoid of a meaningful legal anal ysis with respect to defendant’s domicile or lack thereof. Even assuming, arguendo, that all pe rsons do have a domic ile, defendant still could not comply with SORA ’s registration and reporti ng requirements. The written form that each convicted se x offender must tender upon registration, Michigan State Police Form DD-004, requires the submission of general offender information (name, date of birth, height, weight, etc.), offens e information (offense da te, place of crime, conviction type, etc.), a nd address information. 27 Under the address heading, a convicted sex offender is required to lis t a “Current Primary Address.” The form provides space for two address lines, an apartment or lot num ber, city, state, zip code, county, and a telephone number. The form al so provides for the name of a penal institution if the offender is incarcerated.

26 Ante at 11 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

27 Michigan State Police Form DD-004 (12/2007), available at <http://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/dd- 004_218346_7.doc> (a ccessed July 7, 2011); see also Michigan State Police Form DD-004 R (12/2007), available at <http://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/dd- 004R_218341_7.doc> (a ccessed July 7, 2011).13 Not only was defendant incapable of pr oviding a current primary address pursuant to the form’s instructions, bu t he was incapable of listing a residence or domicile. Those terms are absent from the form, wh ich also fails to instruct an offender how to register if he or she does not have a residence. And given that “residence” and “domicile” have often been considered synonym ous in the eyes of the law, this Court cannot reasonably expect the homeless to discer n a difference between them. 28 The majority ignores this practical real ity by stating that “difficulties in verifying an offender’s information do not excuse the offender from complying with [SORA].” 29 This distinguishes between verification of a “residence” or “domicile” and compliance with registration and reporting re quirements. SORA does not make this distinction. I ask the majority to explain how defendant could have adequately completed the registration form when he had no residence or domicile as the majority itself defines those terms, i.e., as “the place where a person has his home . . . .” 30 This is not a rhetorical question, and its lack of a legally defensible answ er should give th e majority pause.

28 I further question whether SORA, as applie d in this case, is unconstitutionally vague for lack of objective standa rds or guidelines. Arguably, SORA did not give defendant notice of what conduct was required of him with respect to registration as a homeless individual. See, e.g., Santos v State , 284 Ga 514; 668 SE2d 676 (2008), in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that a statutor y sex-offender-registra tion requirement was unconstitutionally vague as applie d to homeless sex offenders w ith no street address for a residence. However, because I believe this case can be resolved on statutory grounds, I do not reach this const itutional issue. See Smith v Curran , 267 Mich 413, 418; 255 NW 276 (1934) (indicating that ques tions of constitutionality should not be decided if a case can be disposed of on other grounds).

29 Ante at 12 (emphasis in original).

30 Ante at 11 (citation and quotation marks omitted).14 THE MICHIGAN STATE POLICE ORDER CONTRAVENES SORA
Defendant’s lack of a “residence” or “ domicile” aside, the majority relies on the fact that MCL 28.725a(8) empowers the Mi chigan State Police to “specify other satisfactory proof of domicile or residence” to facilitate compliance w ith SORA. In what was likely an attempt to remedy the problem of homeless sex o ffenders who lack a residence or domicile, the Michigan State Polic e issued an official order indicating that, “[i]f [an] offender is homeless, the generic address of ‘123 Homeless’ shall be entered into the computerized database , along with the offender’s city , state, zip code, and county code.” 31 The majority seizes on this order as proof that defendant could indeed have complied with SORA by telling police that he was homeless. In turn, the police could then have entered “123 Homeless” in the regist ry on his behalf. There are several critical flaws in this reasoning. An agency order is unlawful if it is ba sed on an erroneous interpretation of a
statute. 32 Although this Court accords due defere nce to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we grant no deference to an interp retation that contravenes the language of a
statute. 33 Furthermore, when interpreting statutes , we give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpreta tion that would render any part of the statute

31 MSP Order, p 4.

32 Ass’n of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity v Pub Serv Comm , 219 Mich App 653, 659; 557 NW2d 918 (1996).

33 Ludington Serv Corp v Acting Ins Comm’r , 444 Mich 481, 505; 511 NW2d 661 (1994).15 surplusage or nugatory. 34 Under SORA, two provisions preclude the listing of 123 Homeless as an offender’s address. The first is MCL 28.727(6 ), which provides that “[a]n individual shall not knowingly provide false or mi sleading information concerni ng a registration, notice, or verification.” Without question, the generi c address 123 Homeless would be a false and misleading address because that a ddress does not exist in Michigan. 35 Thus, listing 123 Homeless, which cannot be ve rified as an address, would violate MCL 28.727(6). Moreover, it would subject those who list it , including a police officer who does so on behalf of a homeless offender, to criminal pr osecution. For purpos es of MCL 28.727(6), it does not matter if an offender honestly info rms the police that he or she is homeless. Even if the offender is homeless, a police officer may not lawfully enter into the SORA registry an address that does not exist. Accordingly, the Michigan State Police order contravenes SORA. The second statutory provision that re nders the Michigan State Police order unlawful is MCL 28.725a(8). It requires “indi viduals . . . registered under [SORA to] maintain either a valid [drive r’s] license . . . or an offici al state personal identification card . . . with the individual’s current address .” (Emphasis added.)

34 Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co , 468 Mich 702, 714; 664 NW2d 193 (2003); see also Grimes v Dep’t of Transp , 475 Mich 72, 89; 715 NW2d 275 (2006).

35 A cursory Google Maps search indicates that the only street in the United States named “Homeless Road” is in Kitts H ill, Ohio. Ironically, it does a ppear that there are homes on that street. In any event, even if 123 Homeless did exist in Michigan, it would still be a false address if an offender who registered it did not live there.16 However, to obtain a driver’s license or st ate identification card, the Secretary of State requires an applicant to provide at leas t two documents “with [his or her] name and Michigan residence address.” 36 Hence, by the Secretary of State’s own requirements, an individual cannot obtain a stat e identification card absent a valid residential address, which defendant did not have. Nor does the major ity, the Michigan St ate Police, or the prosecutor indicate how a homeless sex o ffender like defendant could obtain an identification card without a permanent address, much less change an address to reflect transient accommodations. This analysis is further supported by th e Michigan State Po lice order—the very order flaunted by the major ity as proof that defendant c ould have registered 123 Homeless as his address. The order provides: The address on the [sex offender registry] record must match the address on the Michigan driver license or Personal Identification Card. If the address does not match, the me mber shall give the offender the opportunity to immediately visit the near est Secretary of State branch office for the necessary address change and re turn to the post to verify their address before taking enforcement action. [37] Thus, if an offender cannot ve rify his or her address upon re gistration, the order requires that the offender be directed to the Secretar y of State for an iden tification card with a valid address. Why? Because MCL 28.725a( 8) mandates that the address entered in the sex offender registry match the address on an offender’s identification card. But as

36 See the Secretary of State’s form “Applyi ng for a license or ID?” available at <http://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/ Applying_for_lic_o r_ID_SOS _428_222146_7 .pdf> (accessed July 7, 2011).

37 MSP Order, p 4 (emphasis added).17 demonstrated earlier, a homeless offender can not obtain such a card because 123 Homeless is a bogus address. Accordingly, the Michigan State Police order further undermines the majority’s analysis. Applying MCL 28.725a(8) to the facts of this case, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the address 123 Homeless will never be sufficient for purpos es of SORA. That address cannot match the address on a homele ss offender’s identification card because a homeless person cannot obtain an identificati on card to comply with SORA. This Catch22 highlights the facile nature of the majo rity’s analysis. SORA does not permit registration using 123 Homele ss. The majority is unabl e to refute this fact. The majority speculates that the approach taken in my dissent would incentivize sex offenders who do have a home to report that they are homeless. 38 It fails to recognize that its opinion is equally susc eptible to this conundrum. The majority opines that an offender need report on ly that he or she is homeless. The police will in turn record that information and enter “1 23 Homeless” into the sex offender registry. As indicated in MCL 28.721a, SORA was designed to assist law enforcement and residents of this state in preventing and protecting against the commission of criminal

38 The online article the majori ty cites in support of th is claim does not offer any verifiable statistics of an increase in allege dly homeless sex offenders. Rather, the article merely credits this increase to the opinion of a single police o fficer. In fact, the article states that “[p]olice aren’t sure how many of Michigan ’s 260 sex offenders who list themselves as homeless are using the law to avoid registering . . . .” McVicar, Since court ruled homeless sex offenders don’t have to register, number claiming homelessness jumps 62 percent , Grand Rapids Press, available at <http://www .mlive.com/news/grandrapids/index.ssf/2010/05/since_ court_ruled_homeless_sex.html > (accessed July 7, 2011). In any event, absent real st atistics, the majority ’s claim remains me rely speculative.18 sexual conduct by convicted sex offenders. SORA’s registration requirements are intended to provide a comprehensive and eff ective means to monitor those persons. The registration of a legitimate address that cons titutes a residence or domicile that can be verified by law enforcem ent furthers this goal. Likewise, the public is able to monitor the address of convicted sex offenders by visiti ng the online sex offender registry, which provides a comprehensive database of offenders’ addresses. 39 But by validating th e Michigan State Police order and effectively mandating that homeless sex offenders who do not have a residence or do micile register with 123 Homeless, the majority purges SORA of any meaning. As of today, any convicted sex offender who wishes to keep secret his or her whereabouts may be registered at the fictitious address 123 Homeless. Registration at this fictiti ous address is tantamount to, and in fact more misleading to the public than , an utter failure to register. Families with young children who visit the online sex offende r registry will not be able to learn the whereabouts of these offenders. But they will be able to disc ern the consequences of this Court’s approval of the registration of a fic titious address when they are left wondering where 123 Homeless is. Complia nce for compliance’s sake is worthless if it provides no valuable practical information. 40 Thus, the majority’s critic ism of the consequences of this dissent applies with eq ual weight to its own opinion. 41

39 The Michigan Public Sex Offe nder Registry is available at <http://www.mipsor.state.mi.us/> (accessed July 7, 2011).

40 This is especially true in light of the majority’s misinter pretation and misapplication of “residence” and “domicile” as those terms are used in SORA.

41 The majority mischaracterizes my dissent by claiming that I would allow homeless offenders “to opt out of complying with SORA.” Ante at 13 n 42; see also ante at 18.19 In sum, because the Michig an State Police order contravenes the language of SORA, it is unlawful. The majority’s relian ce on that order lacks a meaningful basis in the law and renders two provisions of the act utterly meaningless.
CONCLUSION I dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Not having a residence or domicile, as those terms are used in SORA, is often a sad reality of the homeless. Had they a place where they ha bitually slept, kept their personal belongings, and regularly lodged, th ey would no longer be homeless. Because defendant did not have a residence or dom icile under SORA, he could not be held criminally liable for failure to register or re port. Therefore, the tr ial court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’ s motion to quash the information. The majority construes my interpretati on of SORA as rendering imperfect the tracking of homeless sex offenders. To the ex tent that it does so, my interpretation is

Nothing in my opinion allows all homeless o ffenders to opt out of SORA registration. Rather, I would hold that this defendant, as a matter of law, could not have complied with SORA because he did not have a “residence” or “domicile” as cont emplated by the act. The majority further errs by claiming, ab sent any authority, that “SORA ensures that [a] homeless sex offender is capable of providing sufficient in formation to comply with SORA’s registrati on requirements.” Ante at 13 n 42. The majo rity does not cite any statutory language in support of this naked a ssertion because there is no such language in the act.20 steadfastly faithful to the langua ge of SORA. The majority’s is not. It defies SORA, the Michigan State Police order, and common sense.

Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh Diane M. Hathaway