Considering 

Russia

EMERGENCE OF A NEAR PEER COMPETITOR

Edited by Matthew R. Slater, Michael Purcell, and Andrew M. Del Gaudio

Foreword by George M. Dallas
Considering Russia

Considering 

Russia

EMERGENCE OF A NEAR PEER COMPETITOR

Edited by Dr. Matthew R. Slater, LtCol Michael Purcell (Ret), 

and LtCol Andrew M. Del Gaudio (PhD)

Foreword by George M. Dallas

Quantico, Virginia

2017
MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

Brigadier General Thomas A. Gorry

President

Dr. James H. Anderson

Vice President for Academic Affairs (VPAA)

Terence K. Kerrigan

Vice President for Distance Learning (VPDL)

Jay L. Hatton

Vice President for Education, Integration, Operations, and Plans (VPEIOP)

Keil R. Gentry

Vice President of Business Affairs (VPBA)

Colonel Scott E. Erdelatz

Chief of Staff

Disclaimer: the views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the organizations for which they work, Marine Corps University, the 

U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. The information contained 

in this book was accurate at the time of printing.

Published in partnership with

Marine Corps University Press

2044 Broadway Street

Quantico, VA

22134

www.usmcu.edu/mcupress
 iii

Contents

List of Illustrations v

List of Tables vi

Chronology vii

Foreword

Col George M. Dallas, USMC (Ret) ix

Preface 

Dr. Matthew R. Slater, LtCol Michael Purcell (Ret), 

and LtCol Andrew M. Del Gaudio (PhD) xi

Introduction

Russia’s Emerging Security Strategy 1

Dr. Matthew R. Slater

Chapter 1

Russian Military Reform, Exercises, and Current Operations: 5

Indicators of Future Actions?

Maj Jason C. Armas

Chapter 2

Baltic Flashpoint: Collective Defense for the Twenty-First Century 15

Maj A. J. Goldberg

Chapter 3

Cold War Redux: Shaping the Arctic as Strategic Maneuver Space 40

Maj Stephen E. DeTrinis
iv | Contents

Chapter 4

The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare 54

Maj Anthony Mercado

Chapter 5

Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare: 72

Comprehension and Response 

Maj Isaac D. Moore

Chapter 6

Key Strategic Terrain of the Baltic: The Role of Geography 84

in Shaping the History of War

LtCol Andrew M. Del Gaudio (PhD)

Suggested Further Reading 95

Glossary 97

Index 103
 v

Illustrations

Figure 1. Arctic sea routes 3

Figure 2. Map of Baltic Sea 17

Figure 3. Map of Russia’s military districts 19

Figure 4. Russia’s nuclear arsenal 28

Figure 5. Arctic Sea ice cap comparison 41

Figure 6. Mackinder’s geographical pivot 45

Figure 7. Phases of Russia’s ambiguous warfare 81

Figure 8. NATO flanks and member nations 86

Figure 9. Map of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia 89
vi 

Table

Table 1. Estimated global nuclear warhead inventories, 2016 28
 vii

Chronology

1990–91: Mikhail S. Gorbachev served as the eighth and final president of the 

Soviet Union

1991: Fall of the Soviet Union and end of Cold War 

1991–99: Boris N. Yeltsin served as first president of Russia with Vladimir V. 

Putin as prime minister (1999–2000) 

1999–2000: Yeltsin resigns, names Putin as acting president; Putin subsequently 

wins early presidential election

2003: Rose Revolution, Georgia; Mikheil Saakashvili assumes presidency

2004: Orange Revolution, Ukraine

2005: Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan

2006–8: Georgian and Russian disputes intensify 

2008: Russo-Georgian War

2008–12: Dmitry A. Medvedev took office as the third president of Russia with 

Vladimir Putin taking the position of prime minister

2012–present: Putin takes office as the fourth president of Russia

2014–present: Crimea annexation and Russian military intervention in Ukraine

 ix

Foreword

Colonel George M. Dallas, USMC (Ret)

I began my service in the U.S. Marine Corps well before the Soviet hammer and sickle flag 

was lowered for the last time over the Moscow Kremlin on 25 December 1991. As an artillery officer who spent his professional youth preparing to engage in large-scale industrial 

war against the Soviet Union, the idea that I, on the 25th anniversary of that earth-shaking 

moment, would serve as the director of the Marine Corps University’s Center for Advanced 

Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) seems unlikely in hindsight. When General James 

N. Mattis, then serving as the commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command (MCCDC), signed the charter that established CAOCL in 2006, his intent was 

to ensure that the essential nature of the human dimension of conflict was never forgotten. 

This publication, which draws on the professionalism of Marine Corps University’s (MCU) 

Command and Staff College faculty, the intellectual curiosity of its students, and CAOCL’s 

regional, linguistic, and cultural expertise, is proof that the Marine Corps continues to benefit from his wisdom. 

This collection of papers helps us understand the implications for strategy and military 

planning behind Russia’s failure to integrate, as was maybe too naively expected, into the 

Euro-Atlantic and global economic and security architecture. To the contrary, Russia’s renewed assertiveness has created what might look like a new adversarial geopolitical context. 

This unexpected reality prompted our authors to analyze once again Russian military capability, tactics, and operational concepts, both through the contemporary filter of events in 

Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, as well as the historical legacy of the Soviet Union. All of the 

authors, whether writing about the idea of hybrid warfare or the potential for conventional 

conflict in the Baltic region, uncover the continuities and novelties of the current situation. 

They also offer recommendations grounded in their professional experience with U.S. security policy as well as the Marine Corps. 

This publication is, in large part, a validation of MCU’s strategic goal of pursuing greater academic outreach to leverage scholarship, research, publishing, and learning opportunities to support the Marine Corps, the broader national security audience, and the general 
x | Foreword

public. While the issues tackled in these pages appear difficult and demanding, it should 

be encouraging to all Marines that the Corps and its supporters have positioned the institution well to adapt and overcome emerging threats. The depth and breadth of the topics 

addressed here, from Russia’s military policy in the Arctic to the history of Soviet partisan 

warfare, are proof that MCU continues to provide all the necessary components to allow 

future leaders to hone their critical and creative thinking skills against the most complex 

challenges that face the Corps today and into the future. 
 xi

Preface

Dr. Matthew R. Slater, LtCol Michael Purcell (Ret), and LtCol Andrew M. Del Gaudio (PhD)

In 2014, the Russian Federation appeared to many Western observers to have reemerged on 

the international stage demonstrating an intent and capability to act as a great power in a 

way that had not been seen since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. This evolution 

began with the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the first one hosted in Russia since the end of 

the Cold War, continued through the invasion and annexation of Crimea, and ended with 

pro-Russian separatists in control of most of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The 

world had largely looked past previous Russian violations of Estonian sovereignty through 

cyberattacks in 2007 and its conventional invasion of Georgia in August 2008; however, as 

the lights faded on the Olympics and “little green men” appeared on the Crimean Peninsula, 

it became clear that increased Russian assertiveness was the new norm. Many Western observers saw both something fundamentally innovative in the way Russia waged “ambiguous 

warfare” in Ukraine and the new cracks in European security architecture. 

Is Russia the new Soviet Union starting another Cold War, as suggested by some analysts? Or is this “new Cold War” a far more dangerous time because the West has forgotten 

how to understand and deal with Russia, and the nuclear dimension of the conflict, in the 

way it did during the Soviet period? It seems clear that, if the West fails to invest the time 

necessary to regain knowledge from 1991, a failure to understand Russia could lead to a dangerous dynamic of escalation and strategic miscalculation. Vladimir Putin once contended 

that the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 

From a Western perspective, there might be some truth to this argument in that it led to 

a sense of apathy about the need to understand and account for Russia’s interests and the 

potential for compromising security in Europe.

In 2015, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., emphasized the need to understand Russia again when he stated, “If you want to talk about a 

nation that could pose an existential threat to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia. 
xii | Preface

If you look at their behavior, it’s nothing short of alarming.”1 Months before, in February 

2015, CNA—with the assistance of retired U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis and 

Brigadier General Michael S. Groen, the director of Marine Corps Intelligence—called together subject-matter experts from inside and outside the Service to discuss recent Russian 

military actions in Crimea and the eastern Ukraine to determine: (1) how the Russians were 

operating and (2) what the Marine Corps should do to prepare for this “new generation” 

warfare. The product of this conference was CNA’s report on Russia’s ambiguous warfare.2

Because of the significance to the Marine Corps specifically, and to policy makers generally, 

the editors of the Marine Corps University Press worked with CNA to republish a revised 

version of the report; the two intended to facilitate the ongoing debate about the meaning 

of Russian General Valery V. Gerasimov’s work, “The Value of Science Is in Prediction,” a 

document that supposedly outlines Russia’s perspective on its use of new generation warfare.3

 In conjunction with the rerelease of the CNA report, the Marine Corps Command 

and Staff College, in collaboration with the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning, and the Marine Corps University Press facilitated a guest 

discussion panel on 7 April 2016. This event allowed the Command and Staff student body 

an opportunity to test the value of the concept of ambiguous warfare against conventional 

and institutional knowledge about the art and science of war.4

 Primarily, the participants 

and observers concluded that ambiguous warfare brought nothing new to the study of war, 

nor could Gerasimov’s work be thought of as the new “Russian doctrine,” despite the desire 

of some in the West to label it as such. In many ways, the collective weight of these efforts 

lit a fire of interest with a generation of leaders who have known nothing but their own 

experiences from the small wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In addition to these efforts, Command and Staff students, in the tradition of Lieutenant General James C. Breckinridge, set forth to, yet again, explore and understand Russia, even as that country’s bombs fell in Syria as part of a new campaign. The body of work 

assembled in this occasional paper is the academic fruit of several individual and collective 

1

 Dan Lamothe, “Russia Is Greatest Threat to the U.S., Says Joint Chiefs Chairman Nominee Gen. Joseph Dunford,” Washington Post, 9 July 2015. 2

 Mary Ellen Connell and Ryan Evans, Russia’s “Ambiguous Warfare” and Implications for the U.S. Marine Corps 

(Arlington: CNA, 2015), republished in MCU Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 30–45, https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj

.2016070102.

3

 Originally published in Russian in Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in Prediction,” Voennopromyshlennyi kur’er (Military-Industrial Courier), 27 February 2013. The English translation can be found in Military Review, January–February 2016, 1. 4

 The Russian ambiguous warfare panel consisted of Maria Snegovaya, Ryan Evans, and Michael Kofman. The 

panel was moderated by LtCol Del Gaudio, then-faculty member of Command and Staff College. 
Preface | xiii

efforts from Command and Staff College. The college’s Advanced Studies Program explored 

Russian actions in the Arctic and northern Europe through the lens of potential future scenarios in the context of Russian strategy and military capabilities. Throughout the course of 

the regular curriculum, many students were drawn to deeper engagement with Russian and 

Soviet history through the elective program and in their own reading. 

As the students learned throughout the academic year, the study of history provides a 

venue to develop judgment for the future, and one observation in this case quickly becomes 

clear to the student of war and history. Current Russian actions are consistent with its past, 

and little it is doing now has not been done already. When considering current Russian actions in Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and Syria, one cannot ignore what Russia has observed at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. In many ways, Russia’s recent campaign 

in Syria highlights interesting similarities to 1936 Germany’s actions in Spain. In Spain, 

Germany once again learned to project and support tactical formations on campaign over 

great distances, skills it needed for the 1939 invasion of Poland. History provides the student 

with an instructive narrative, but responsibility rests with the student to interpret and understand the application of the narrative in the current context. To this end, students of the 

art and science of war are ill-advised to cease their quest to understand the nature of war or 

its ever-changing character.

The contributions of the students contained herein would not have been possible without the excellent mentorship of the military and civilian faculty members of the Command 

and Staff College under the leadership of the director, Colonel Steven J. Grass and the dean, 

Dr. Charles D. McKenna (LtCol, USA, Ret). The efforts of the Advanced Studies Program 

were led by Commander Russell Evans, USN, Lieutenant Colonel Haakon Wahroe of the 

Norwegian Army, and Drs. Anne Louise Antonoff and James Joyner. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning provided essential knowledge and coordination 

with the external academic community to facilitate the Russian ambiguous warfare panel 

for the wider Command and Staff student body. Lastly, many thanks to Dr. Alexandra 

Kindell of Marine Corps University Press, who provided the initial spark and the finishing 

touches to these efforts and brought them to the reader in this current, and most timely, 

edition.

 1

Introduction

Russia’s Emerging Security Strategy

Dr. Matthew R. Slater

For many Americans outside of the foreign policy community, the end of the Cold War 

signified a victory over its only real foe in the post-World War II era. Because the victors 

write history, prior conflicts, such as Vietnam and Korea, could now be freely interpreted 

as triumphs attributable to the West’s strategy of containment. Americans celebrated the 

vindication of democracy, typified by Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man 

(1992), while Russia fell into political and economic disarray. Moreover, new Russian leaders 

implemented reforms to replace the domestically perceived failures of perestroika (rebuilding) and glasnost (openness) that indicated a new and positive direction for U.S.-Russian 

relations. This optimism began to dissipate when Americans met Vladimir Putin, the hawkish, dominating personality serving as its current president. 

Events of the previous 10 years demonstrated that things were not so simple. In 2009, 

during the presidency of Dmitry A. Medvedev, analyst Jeffrey Mankoff noted, “the West 

must get used to dealing with a new, more powerful, and more confident Russia that has not 

entirely freed itself of the baggage accumulated during its imperial and Soviet past.”1

 Since 

then, analysts are even more explicit about the Medvedev-Putin era. In the months prior to 

the publication of this project, former Navy admiral and North Atlantic Treaty Organiza1

 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Middlefield, 

2012), 310.
2 | Dr. Matthew R. Slater

tion (NATO) Commander James G. Stavridis wrote about the “New Cold War” with Russia 

for Foreign Policy and he is not alone in describing the reemergence of the Cold War.2

This occasional paper generally focuses on the reemergence of Russia as a global player 

in terms of its growing military capability, but more importantly the will of its political 

leadership to reestablish a regional sphere of influence. The following papers are written 

from the perspective of students studying at the U.S. Marine Corps University’s Command 

and Staff College (CSC) located in Quantico, Virginia. The authors address how Russia’s 

assertiveness may manifest itself by domination of the Baltic states, expansion in the Arctic, 

and reanimating its Cold War global competition with America. These topics are widely 

covered in the academic forum, but here readers have the opportunity to get insight from 

military leaders who will have to grapple with the new Russia. 

In the first paper, “Russian Military Reform, Exercises, and Current Operations: Indicators of Future Actions?,” Major Jason C. Armas compares views about Russian strategic 

goals. The author argues that President Putin’s strategic end state is to reassert control over 

the “near abroad” and to eventually assume full control of the former Soviet space. If this is 

the case, how should the United States respond to Russia as a new but familiar adversary in 

Europe, and also in other regions throughout the world? 

In contrast to Armas’s discussion, Major A. J. Goldberg, in the second selection, narrows 

the conversation down to the regional level. In “Baltic Flashpoint: Collective Defense for the 

Twenty-First Century,” he warns that Russia is an emerging regional threat, and as a result, 

NATO may need to rediscover quickly its raison d’être. Would NATO risk broader conflict, 

or even a nuclear confrontation with Russia, by defending the Baltic states? If NATO plans 

to defend the Baltic states, what strategies should be employed to deter a potential attack?

Putin’s newly energetic foreign policy likely has ramifications in other regions than the 

Baltics and Eastern Europe. The thinning ice in the Arctic opens new maritime passages 

for commerce, including the Northwest Passage, Transpolar route, and Northern Sea route 

(figure 1). Not only does this create more efficient sea lanes from the Pacific to the Atlantic, 

but it also opens the Arctic seabed for resource exploitation. Major Stephen E. DeTrinis 

explores these issues in his contribution titled, “Cold War Redux: Shaping the Arctic as 

Strategic Maneuver Space.” He offers potential courses of action for how to address Russia’s 

growing presence in the Arctic and other regions.

Security analysts are taking a hard look at the unconventional methods employed 

against Georgia and Ukraine by Russian forces. The final two papers in this volume pro2

 Ibid.; James Stavridis, “Are We Entering a New Cold War?,” Foreign Policy, 17 February 2016; and James Stavridis, 

“Avoiding the New Cold War with Russia,” Foreign Policy, 20 April 2016.
Introduction | 3

vide critiques of these methods referred to as either ambiguous or nonlinear warfare. In 

the first, readers will see how Major Anthony Mercado’s paper, “The Evolution of Modern 

Russian Nonlinear Warfare,” emphasizes the consistency of the Russian appreciation for the 

application of unconventional and other nonmilitary means of coercion from World War 

II through contemporary conflict by exploring the extensive Russian and Soviet history 

of experimenting with and employing what is now often referred to as nonlinear warfare. 

Then, Major Isaac D. Moore shifts the focus in “Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare: Comprehension and Response” by attempting an inclusive anFigure 1. Arctic sea routes

Official U.S. Navy map.
4 | Dr. Matthew R. Slater

swer to the question “How should we perceive and respond to Russia’s military resurgence 

and adoption of nonlinear warfare?” This inquiry leads him to recommend that the United 

States and NATO take immediate action to confront this unconventional threat or risk 

further Russian aggression in the region.

Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Del Gaudio presents a particularly timely argument that, no matter what technological advances are on the horizon, geography and key 

terrain continue to play an essential role in strategy. Del Gaudio argues that nowhere else 

has the meaning of resurgent Russian power in relation to an adversary’s physical geography 

been more important than in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. He then 

guides the reader through a historical overview of how the geography of the Baltics has affected the conduct and outcome of prior conflicts in the region. 

The tone presented by this selection of papers reflects a dramatic worsening in the 

relationship between NATO and Russia as well as the reemergence of Russia as an international actor that can foil U.S. military plans. As a result, U.S. and European hopes for an 

economically liberal and politically democratic Russia constructively integrated into global 

institutions seem naïve in retrospect. Although the prospect of renewed engagement with 

Russia should never be completely dismissed, the West must also consider the implications 

of a possible return to a security environment anchored by the concept of mutually assured 

destruction. In the near term, it seems almost a certainty that Russia will continue to pursue an increased separation of a Russian sphere of influence. These papers provide a broad 

look at how future military leaders perceive the real and potential Russian threat and their 

ideas and recommendations about how the U.S. military should adapt and respond to this 

challenge.
 5

Chapter 1

Russian Military Reform, Exercises, and Current Operations

Indicators of Future Actions?

Major Jason C. Armas

The president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir V. Putin, stated that “The breakup of the 

Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.”1

 This statement may 

illuminate the grand strategy of President Putin, although scholars continue to debate his 

final vision for modern-day Russia. Many scholars, such as Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders, and 

Daniel Antoun, assess the Russian grand strategy as one that includes the return of control 

of ethnic Russian territories and of global superpower status to Russia. They have labeled 

Putin’s current actions as “mobilizing compatriots,” using ethnicity as the link to Putin’s 

grand strategy.2 The Brookings Institution’s Lilia Shevtsova advances this theory by claiming that Russian actions in the former Soviet space are a continuation of the anti-Western 

rhetoric espoused by Putin himself, and that Putin’s Soviet KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi 

Bezopanosti) background explains his ultimate goals.3

 Other scholars, such as Bruce Pitcairn 

Jackson, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and Christopher Marsh, disagree and interpret Putin’s moves 

1

 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation” (speech, Moscow, the 

Kremlin, 25 April 2005).

2

 Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders, and Daniel Antoun, Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia’s Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in 

the Former Soviet Union (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015), 1. 3

 Lilia Shevtsova, “The Russia Factor,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (July 2014): 76–84, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod

.2014.0038.
6 | Major Jason C. Armas

as less of a return to power and more as an attempt to stabilize Russia’s struggling economy.4

They view this as Putin’s attempt to bolster Russia’s current position to avoid collapse. 

To better understand Russia’s potential courses of action in either case, it is important 

to appreciate the evolution of its current military capability. This paper will examine the issue by dividing the resurrection of Russian security forces into three phases: (1) decline and 

reform, (2) implementation of reforms and exercises, and (3) operational application. The 

exploration of recent changes to force structure and doctrine may shed some light on Putin’s 

strategic goals and the tactics he uses to achieve them. As demonstrated in recent military 

actions in Crimea and Syria, these changes have helped Putin and his military leaders create 

a more functional, and thus more potentially dangerous, armed force that increasingly positions Russia as a near-peer competitor with the United States.

Decline and Reform, 1991–2000

To understand the current state of the Russian military, it is important to review the reforms that have taken place since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Armed Forces of 

the Russian Federation were created on 7 May 1992, roughly four months after the collapse 

of the Soviet Union. There were fundamental conceptual and functional problems with the 

military, including mission focus, readiness and command structure, and the possession of 

vast quantities of obsolete equipment. 

The new Russian government inherited a military force designed to fight a war of attrition against NATO on the plains of Europe. The force structure relied on mobilization, so 

as Aleksey Gayday discusses in his study of Russian military reform, “Of those 132 divisions, 

only 20 were kept at about 70 per cent [sic] of their full strength in terms of personnel and 

equipment. The rest were reduced or skeleton-strength formations.”5

 The command structure was extremely top heavy. The majority of true personnel strength was at the command 

structure level, not the troop level, leaving empty ranks led by fully staffed commands. The 

Soviet military had many variations in their tables of equipment, leaving the Russian Armed 

Forces with multiple versions of the same obsolete equipment. Finally, the Russian Armed 

Forces suffered from a lack of capability to maintain the large arsenals and supplies it had 

in storage. Since the Soviet model relied on mobilization, the importance of stockpiling 

equipment and supplies created an abundance of supplies that required a large number 

4

 Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors (Los Angeles: 

CQ Press, 2014), 5.

5

 Aleksey Gayday, “Reform of the Russian Army,” in Dmitri Boltenkov et al., Russia’s New Army, ed. Mikhail 

Barabanov (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2011), 11.
Russian Military Reform, Exercises, and Current Operations | 7

of people and amount of money to maintain, both of which the current structure did not 

have.6

Knowing that they could not address all these issues at once, the Ministry of Defense 

(MOD) and the General Staff of the Armed Forces created the “mobile forces” in the 1990s 

with the intent of moving in the right direction. The mobile force was a motorized rifle 

brigade manned at 95–100 percent strength with a full table of organization of equipment. 

These independent motorized rifle brigades would put an end to relying on mobilization to 

fill the ranks of their military, and the MOD leadership believed this would create a fully 

professionalized military that did not rely on conscription.7

 Despite these efforts, the First 

Chechen War (1994–96) highlighted again the need for military reform after the display of 

Russian military weakness and overall failure of the campaign. By the end of 1996, public 

support in Russia was so low for the Chechen War that the populace wanted an immediate 

withdrawal from the region.8

 Then-President Boris N. Yeltsin led new rounds of reform, 

this time, by making structured changes to the military. This ended in failure again with the 

Second Chechen War (1999–2000), setting the stage for the presidential election of Vladimir 

Putin in 2000 and an agenda that specifically focused on rebuilding Russian Armed Forces.9

Implementation of Reforms and Exercises, 2001–8

The second stage of reforms took place after the election of Putin, who made military reform a top priority.10 Putin began his changes slowly; the military establishment supported him and he knew that radical reforms, such as cutting a large number of high-ranking 

generals in a top-heavy organization, might cause them to withdraw their support. Despite 

Putin’s goal to improve the armed forces, the military was one of the largest obstacles to 

reform. Knowing that the upper echelon of officers had the most to lose, especially with the 

amount of corruption nested in the military elite, Putin had to build his own power base before making major changes. Putin nearly doubled the military budget from 218.9 Rubles to 

6

 Ibid.

7

 David M. Glantz, “The Continuing Influence of Non-Linear Warfare on Russian Force Structuring,” Journal of 

Slavic Military Studies 9, no. 2 (June 1996): 335–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518049608430237. 8

 Mike Bowker, “Conflict in Chechnya,” in Russian Politics under Putin, ed. Cameron Ross (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 255.

9

 Athena Bryce-Rogers, “Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,” Demokratizatsiya 21, no. 3 (July 2013): 342. 10 “[D]iscussions of military reform have been going on in our country for quite a while—but unfortunately, there 

has been little headway in this respect. I hope very much that we will be able to secure positive changes.” Zoltan 

Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2007), 127.
8 | Major Jason C. Armas

573 billion ($3.2–8.6 billion U.S. dollars) in 2001–7, but despite the increase, there was little 

change or improvement to equipment and weaponry.11 Using the results of an MOD audit to 

identify corruption in the ranks of the military elite, Putin embarked on what Russian military experts call the “greatest transformation of the Russian military since the Red Army.”12

Putin’s most crucial reform came in 2004 when he modified defense law and formally 

established the defense minister and the Defense Ministry above the General Staff.13 This 

reform not only established civilian oversight over the General Staff, it legitimized the position of the defense minister and gave him operational command and control of the armed 

forces. As Athena Bryce-Rogers points out in her study of Russian military reform following the Russo-Georgian War (2008), “With the General Staff subordinate to the Defense 

Ministry, the appointment of civilian masters—particularly that of Anatoly Serdyukov in 

2007—became incredibly important for spearheading change.”14 Defense Minister Serdyukov 

represents a significant shift as the selection to this position, mainly due to the fact that he 

was an outsider to the military; Serdyukov’s previous position had been with the tax ministry. As Roger McDermott, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, highlights, “Within 

the first three years of Serdyukov’s appointment, he retired or fired senior officers from 

the top 34 positions on a total of 44 occasions; additionally, three officers within the top 34 

posts remained in their posts.”15 This catalyst for change reached its pinnacle in the 2008 war 

with Georgia; Serdyukov had immediate influence in the Russian military, but the war in 

Georgia eliminated opposition to reform and highlighted the importance and urgency for 

change in the Russian Armed Forces. 

Operational Application, 2008–16

On 7 August 2008, Georgian military forces, after months of exchanging artillery salvos 

with the breakaway region of South Ossetia, drove across the border in an attempt to seize 

the South Ossetia capital of Tskhinvali.16 The Georgian forces were stopped short of the 

capital by the defending forces from South Ossetia. By 9 August, Russian military forces, 

using armor and motorized infantry, were on the move and crossing into Ossetia in support 

11 Bryce-Rogers, “Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,” 343.

12 Ibid., 345.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Roger N. McDermott, Bertil Nygren, and Carolina Vendil Pallin, ed., The Russian Armed Forces in Transition: 

Economic, Geopolitical, and Institutional Uncertainties (New York: Routledge, 2012), 142–45. 16 George Friedman, “The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power,” Geopolitical Weekly, Stratfor.com, 12 

August 2008.
Russian Military Reform, Exercises, and Current Operations | 9

of the South Ossetia defense of the capital. Russia viewed the action as its responsibility to 

respond to Georgian aggression against the inhabitants of South Ossetia. 

Without hesitation, the Russian military responded, as explained by Stratfor Chief Intelligence Officer George Friedman, “over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in 

defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians 

had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.”

17 With the momentum, the Russian forces 

continued their offensive south into Georgia, attacking on two axes, toward the Georgian 

capital of Tbilisi. The Russian forces made it within approximately 40 miles of Tbilisi before 

stopping operations. With the primary objectives of the Russian counteroffensive met, the 

Russians knew their military execution was adept, but the overall execution of the operation 

still relied heavily on outdated Soviet-era tactics. The military success appeared quite shallow in that, should the war have lasted longer than five days or had NATO allies decided to 

commit on the battlefield, the results more than likely would have been drastically different. 

Putin achieved his strategic goals in the 2008 war with Georgia, but at the operational 

and tactical levels, the Russian military could not hide deep-rooted problems that needed immediate and arguably major reforms. In late 2008, the Russian military—fresh off of 

the Georgian battlefield—conducted a full after action report focusing on the problems it 

faced in its latest campaign. Ineffective command and control, lack of combat readiness 

of military personnel, and aging technology presented the Russian military with multiple 

problems in Georgia. If not for Russia’s superior numbers, these issues would have played 

a significant role in the outcome.18 More reforms occurred as a direct result of the Russian 

military’s execution on the battlefield in Georgia. This wave of reforms was the most profound, and transformed a second-tier force to a military capable of projecting power in the 

European Union’s and NATO’s spheres of influence. 

Russian Defense Minister Serdyukov unveiled his military reforms on 14 October 2008. 

He claimed they were the most radical reforms since the end of World War II and began 

them with the changes he felt would take the longest to accomplish.19 “First, increasing 

professionalism by overhauling the education of personnel and cutting the number of conscripts; second, improving combat-readiness with a streamlined command structure and 

additional training.”20 Upgraded military technology, or rearmament, would be a long-term 

17 Ibid.

18 Gregory P. Lannon, “Russia’s New Look: Army Reforms and Russian Foreign Policy,” Journal of Slavic Military 

Studies 24, no. 1 (February 2011): 39, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2011.549037. 19 Bryce-Rogers, “Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,” 355.

20 Gustav Gressel, Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution, and What It Means for Europe (London: European Council on 

Foreign Relations, 2015), 3.
10 | Major Jason C. Armas

goal of the MOD, but not a priority in the initial phases of the reforms facing the Russian 

military. Officer ranks, both at the staff officer and general staff levels, were greatly reduced, 

focusing on a structure that reduced the number of decision makers at the top and created 

more line officers at the lower echelon. The professionalism of the officer corps continued 

to grow with an increase in officer pay coupled with a greater demand for management, 

leadership, and commitment from these officers. The goal was a combat-ready professional 

force of elite forces, paratroopers, naval infantry, and special forces instead of a large, mobilized, conscripted force.21

Removing the “paper tiger” units was the second focus. From 1991 to 2008, the Russian 

military still required mobilization to fill its ranks in times of crisis. As a result, divisions 

maintained a staff at 50–70 percent, typically with multiple regiments left unmanned. This 

would require cobbling units together by using “patchwork” to fill enough personnel until 

the mobilization of the main force was complete. The current reforms require high combat 

readiness of the combat brigades; these brigades have a strength of approximately 5,500 personnel focused on independent and flexible operations for a shorter deployment period and 

trained to face the more common asymmetric battlefield of today. The Russians converted 

203 divisions to 83 fully manned and equipped brigades by 2009, drastically reducing the 

size of the overall force but exponentially increasing capacity.22

The final step in the streamlining process was to turn the traditional military districts 

into true joint force commands. The new structure gave the military districts control over 

ground, air, and naval forces and removed competing levels of hierarchy.23 These joint force 

commanders created unity of command across all services and removed the coordination 

issue that caused so many problems during the Russo-Georgian War in 2008.24

Proof of Concept: Crimea and Syria

The two most recent Russian conflicts—the annexation of the Crimea and support operations in Syria—validate Russian efforts to reform its military. The offensive in Crimea was 

far from a sudden emotional reaction to protect ethnic Russians. The growth of the Black 

Sea Fleet and the Russian naval influence in the Mediterranean are two important parts of 

Putin’s strategic agenda, making Russian control of Sevastopol crucial. As it stood, the Russians were unable to increase the size of their naval forces in Sevastopol without Ukrainian 

21 Ibid. 

22 Lannon, “Russia’s New Look,” 39–40.

23 Gressel, Russian’s Quiet Military Revolution, and What It Means for Europe, 4. 24 Ibid.
Russian Military Reform, Exercises, and Current Operations | 11

approval. Throughout 1990–2000, Russian influence in Crimea was strong, and critical government actors were sympathetic to Moscow. This influence began to wane throughout the 

2000s and was reaching a critical tipping point in 2013 as the political situation in Ukraine 

moved toward European Union (EU) inclusion. The EU and the United States characterized the color revolutions as peaceful prodemocratic protests, though the Russians contend 

that these “revolutions” were a subversive move by the West to undermine Russian regional 

influence. The West’s enthusiastic support of regional political change worked in Putin’s 

favor by supporting his victimization narrative. Many credit nonlinear warfare tactics for 

Russian success in the Crimea that included the use of “partisan teams . . . in unmarked 

uniforms . . . to take control of key infrastructure. . . . [and] information warfare techniques 

were applied to persuade Ukrainian forces to switch sides.”25

Crimea’s importance is tied directly to the Russian Black Sea Fleet and an increase 

in the Russian influence on the near abroad and beyond through the use of naval forces. 

Dmitry Gorenburg, a prominent analyst of Russian strategy, states that “In March 2013, 

Vladimir Putin announced plans to establish a Mediterranean naval task force, with up to 

10 combat ships permanently operating in the region. The core of this force, including the 

command element, is expected to come from the Black Sea Fleet once that fleet has been 

modernized.”26 Less than a year later, in February 2014, Russia annexed Crimea through a 

smartly executed plan that started with the disruption of the current Crimean government, 

followed quickly by Russian separatists rising up, and finally, concluding with Russian naval 

infantry and special forces seizing control of key infrastructure. 

Following the blueprint in Crimea, Russian military action in eastern Ukraine began 

with an asymmetric, or hybrid, counteraction. These well-placed pro-Russian separatist 

forces were well synchronized with conventional forces, working toward the ultimate goal 

of preventing the consolidation of a pro-Western government in Ukraine. The success of the 

Crimean operation had and continued to place the Baltic states on alert. As Gorenburg observed, “Baltic leaders see Russia’s intervention in Ukraine as a potentially serious precedent 

for future Russian actions against the Baltic States.” 27 Russia’s vow to protect ethnic Russians abroad generated particular concern because of large Russian minority populations in 

Estonia and Latvia. Subsequent naval maneuvers in the Baltic Sea were interpreted by Baltic 

states’ governments as a method to place pressure on their countries. 

25 Connell and Evans, Russia’s “Ambiguous Warfare” and Implications for the U.S. Marines Corps, 9–10. 26 Dmitry Gorenburg, “The Impact of the Crimea Annexation on Russian Naval Interests,” Russian Military Reform (blog), 25 September 2014. 27 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Reassuring the Baltic States,” Russian Military Reform (blog), 1 October 2014.
12 | Major Jason C. Armas

The outcome of the military campaign in Syria is very different from that in Ukraine 

and Crimea, but still aligned with Russia’s long-term strategic goals. The Syrian campaign 

served the purpose of being a vetting process for the Russian military’s reforms and demonstrated its capacity to conduct expeditionary operations and likely boost international sales 

of Russian defense equipment. The campaign validated years of reform for the Russian 

Armed Forces. The Syrian campaign, though small in scale, displayed a significant increase 

in the Russian military’s capability and capacity to conduct complicated military operations 

far from its borders. 

Creating the regional command structure enabled the Russian military to conduct 

well-planned and coordinated actions with coalition partners. The Russians have displayed 

exceptional capability and capacity to conduct a high operational tempo air campaign in 

support of Syrian and Iranian forces operating on the ground. This deconfliction and coordination of indirect fires, including surface and subsurface launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) from the Caspian Sea, demonstrates the advanced capabilities of the Russian 

military command and control system. The creation and implementation of the National 

Defense Control Center enabled real-time information flow from operational theaters to 

leaders in Moscow, enhancing the speed of decision making throughout the Syrian conflict.28

Since the Georgian conflict in 2008, the Russians made great strides in the use of 

advanced weaponry in the Syrian area of operations. The Russian military employed aircraft-launched precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and surface and subsurface LACMs with 

success. Russian forces were targeting with the help of friendly Syrian forces and unmanned 

aerial vehicles. Aircraft platforms, such as the Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback strike fighter and Su-37 

Flanker multirole, all-weather fighter, provided 24-hour support that conducted up to 127 

sorties per day by the end of 2015.29 Russia demonstrated a new strike capability when it 

launched Kalibr LACMs from diesel submarines in the Mediterranean Sea that were coordinated with Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, Tu-95MS Bear-H strategic bombers, and 

Tu-22M3 Backfire C bombers, dropping both Kh-555 and Kh-101 cruise missiles and gravity 

bombs on targets in Syria.30 Similar to the Germans in the 1930 Spanish Revolution, the 

Russians used this area of operations as an opportunity to test and evaluate the past decade 

of reforms—a capstone event for the Russians. 

Expeditionary operations were not historically part of Russian military doctrine, so the 

28 Ibid.

29 In mid-November 2015, the Russian government announced additional 37 Su-34 and Su-27 aircraft, which 

allowed it to increase the number of daily sorties to 127. Dmitry Gorenburg, “What Russia’s Military Operation in Syria Can Tell Us about Advances in Its Capabilities,” PONARS Eurasia, March 2016.

30 Gorenburg, “The Impact of the Crimea Annexation on Russian Naval Interests.”
Russian Military Reform, Exercises, and Current Operations | 13

Syrian intervention represents a significant change. For example, the Soviet military was 

dependent on rail transportation. The Russians used the majority of their large transport 

aircraft and naval vessels for the operation, but also turned Turkish commercial vessels into 

Russian navy ships by leasing and reflagging them.31 To support future operations, the Russians retained their naval base at Tartus and an air base at Latakia, both in Syria, as well as 

opening two more bases to support their efforts in Syria.

Future Developments

More than 20 years of efforts to reform Russia’s military is beginning to bear fruit. The simultaneous success and failure of the Russian campaign in Georgia was the catalyst for the 

most current military reforms within Russia. Though ultimately successful at the strategic 

level, the operation showcased many failures at the operational and tactical levels and weakened the credibility of the Russian military. Putin’s push to modernize, professionalize, and 

streamline the Russian military was both carefully planned and intelligently implemented. 

Every change and every reform pushed through by Putin has been carefully thought out and 

crafted toward accomplishing a greater Russian vision—a return to great power status. The 

reforms resulted in a more Western-style, leaner force with highly trained units ready for deployment within 24 hours. Detailed planning and coordination between Russia, Syria, and 

Iran prior to the start of Russian operations displayed the ability of Russia to incorporate 

multinational support.32 Russia’s creative logistical solutions worked for the Syrian operation, but Russia has likely taken note of any shortcomings and other lessons learned and 

will work to increase their expeditionary capability in the near term. Russia’s military has 

demonstrated its increased capability to conduct complex operations that span the range of 

military operations. From expeditionary operations in Syria to covert operations in Crimea 

and Ukraine, Russia has displayed an incredible leap forward with its military, making it a 

near peer to the United States in many military functional areas. 

Retired three-star Air Force General David A. Deptula summed up Russian operations 

in Syria: “Essentially, Russia is using their incursion into Syria as an operational proving 

ground.”33 The vetting of capabilities and technologies in Syria has demonstrated to the 

international security system that Russia has both the capability and will to project its influence beyond the near abroad. The success of recent operations has another added benefit 

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Steven Lee Myers and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground, and West Takes Notice,” 

New York Times, 14 October 2015.
14 | Major Jason C. Armas

for Russia that can be summed up by the expression “everybody loves a winner.” Due to the 

string of military and foreign policy successes, Russia is elevating its status to a competitor 

and, therefore, an effective counterbalance to U.S. hegemony. This not only bolsters Russia’s 

diplomatic prestige, but also energizes Russia’s lucrative arms export industry.
 15

Chapter 2

Baltic Flashpoint

Collective Defense for the Twenty-First Century

Major A. J. Goldberg

Twenty-five years after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 

NATO must reorient itself to the threat of Russian aggression in Northern Europe. Planning to defend against an invasion of the Baltic states is a particularly difficult task. While 

it is debatable whether current Russian activity supports a call for immediate military response, the potential threat remains significant enough to warrant deliberate planning to 

shape the environment and provide deterrence. The United States and its NATO allies 

must understand the reasons for Russian aggression and how it could manifest in the Baltic 

region. This understanding will provide a basis for developing practical solutions to defend 

against such contingencies. 

NATO can implement three concepts to better defend the territory and sovereignty of 

the Baltic countries. First, Baltic security forces must be able to offer a credible deterrent to 

Russian ambitions. Second, NATO should provide support by building a security network 

between its members and partners in the High North (specifically Finland, Sweden, and 

Norway) to garner efficiencies and ensure a unity of effort should there be a confrontation 

with the Russians. Third, NATO support to deterrence must be designed to deny Russia a 

“quick victory.”

This paper will provide reasoned support to the preceding recommendations by examining the scope of the challenge, the historical legacy of Baltic-Russian relations, likely 

Russian methods for influence or aggression in the Baltics, and the resulting implications 

for conventional and nuclear deterrence and escalation strategies. 
16 | Major A. J. Goldberg

NATO and the Baltics: The Scope of the Challenge

From the Arctic to the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia is probing the standing geopolitical 

order to gauge where opportunities exist to reassert itself as a global superpower. Due to a 

combination of geography, proximity, and historical precedence, the Baltic states seem particularly vulnerable to Russia’s effort to challenge NATO’s security guarantee to its eastern 

members. Russia likely views the Baltic states as the Achilles heel of the NATO alliance 

due to their small national defense forces, the limited footprint of NATO personnel in 

Northern Europe, and the logistical challenges of moving forces into the area from Western 

Europe. Nonetheless, based on the concept of collective defense as stated in Article 5 of the 

Washington Treaty, other NATO member states are obliged to consider “an attack against 

one ally” as an attack against all allies.1

 Thus, deterring and defending against Russian aggression in the Baltic states is an essential, though difficult, task for NATO if it wants to 

retain its credibility in providing for the collective defense of Europe (figure 2).

The dilemma facing the alliance is that if NATO waits until Russia crosses a formal red 

line, it will not have time to mount an effective defense of the Baltic region. The challenge, 

therefore, is to find not only a convincing and credible deterrent but also, in the event of 

the Russians overrunning the Baltic states, to establish an effective capability for retaking 

the territory. 

NATO will have a very limited amount of time to respond to an initial Russian attack 

due to the lack of natural boundaries and short distance between the Baltic states and Russia. During a series of recent wargames conducted by the Rand Corporation, analysts determined that Russia could overwhelm Baltic defense forces and press upon the Estonian and 

Latvian capitals within 60 hours.2

 Other estimates forecast an even swifter Russian advance 

upon the Baltic capitals. Czech General Petr Pavel, the acting NATO military committee 

chairman, states that Moscow would be able to conquer the three Baltic states—Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania—within 48 hours.3

The authors of the Rand report determined that such a swift defeat would leave 

NATO with three undesirable options: (1) recapture Baltic territory through a long and 

difficult counteroffensive, (2) escalate the conflict, or (3) “concede at least temporary defeat” 

1

 “Collective Defense–Article 5,” NATO.int, North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, 16 December 2015. 2

 David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of 

the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2016), 1, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1253. 3

 Jeremy Bender, “Incoming NATO Military Committee Chairman: Russia Could Occupy the Baltics in 2 Days 

if It Wanted To,” Business Insider, 28 May 2015.
Baltic Flashpoint | 17

Figure 2. Map of Baltic Sea

Courtesy of Norman Einstein.
18 | Major A. J. Goldberg

and accept the “disastrous” implications for the NATO alliance and Baltic citizens.4

The new European front to face Russia—the “Nordic five” (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, 

Norway, and Sweden), the Baltic states, and Poland—is known collectively by the acronym 

NBP9.5 Though all countries in the NBP9 are exposed to Russian intimidation, the Baltic states are most vulnerable to interference by the Russian government. Russia’s Western 

Military District, located in St. Petersburg, can prepare five brigades for combat operation 

within a week of notification, with six more brigades ready within a month (figure 3). The 

rapid mobilization of Russian forces so close to the Baltic region is partially facilitated by 

the majority of the Russian population living west of the Ural Mountains.6

 Additionally, 

Russia’s Western Military District can be reinforced easily with personnel and equipment 

from the Central and Southern Military Districts, “or by calling up mobilization reserves.”7

The Kremlin’s renewed fondness for large-scale military exercises has focused on improving 

joint operations and a rapid response against a “highly-equipped adversary.”8

 Russia will 

likely continue to improve its conventional capability over the next decade with the aim of 

creating a “modern, well-equipped military force by 2020.”9

 The current threat posed by Russia, combined with its military modernization and reform program, gives NATO a narrow 

window of opportunity to address its deficiencies in responding to a Russian move against 

the Baltic states. While Russian forces are actively participating in campaigns in eastern 

Ukraine and Syria, NATO has the opportunity to prepare for potential future Russian 

aggression in Europe’s High North. Deterrence of a Russian incursion into Baltic territory 

can only be achieved if NATO is serious about defending its member states with a credible 

and capable conventional force. 

Moscow will likely continue to challenge NATO with the concerted use of “nontraditional military and security operations” as well as conventional forces.10 Russia’s recent 

campaigns in its near abroad demonstrate its comfort operating close to its own borders 

or in the proximity of long-standing military bases, as with the case of Syria. The Baltic 

4

 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, 1. 5

 Edward Lucas, The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report (Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, 2015), 1.

6

 Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin, ed., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2013

(Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2013), 58.

7

 Ibid., 58.

8

 Ibid., 45–47.

9

 Ibid., 145.

10 Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, The Baltic States: The United States Must Be Prepared to Fulfill Its NATO Treaty 

Obligations, Backgrounder #3039 on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2015), 4.
Baltic Flashpoint | 19

countries’ proximity and historic significance to Russia make them an attractive target for 

aggression to a regime that might need to rally Russian nationalistic pride, in part, by embarrassing NATO to distract its citizens from domestic problems. An understanding of past 

Baltic-Russian connections between identity and foreign policy highlights their historic 

antagonism and can assist in predicting future conflict in the region. 

The Historical Legacy of Baltic-Russian Relations

On the premise that war is an act of force to compel a competitor to bend to one’s will, 

this section provides the necessary attempt to gauge the will of the participants in a BalticRussian confrontation based on historical relationships and antagonisms.11 Starting in the 

early eighteenth century, the Russian Empire slowly conquered the present-day Baltic territories through a series of military actions and land acquisitions. The Russian victory over 

the Swedes in 1710 provided Peter the Great with the warm-water ports of Riga in Latvia 

11 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Elliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1989), 75.

Figure 3. Map of Russia’s military districts

Courtesy of Stratfor.com, a geopolitical intelligence platform.
20 | Major A. J. Goldberg

and Reval (modern-day Tallinn) in Estonia.12 Further Russian partitions of Poland in 1772 

and 1795 incorporated most of the Baltic peoples within the Russian Empire.13 During the 

late eighteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became less secure, while 

Latvia and Estonia as sovereign nations had not yet come into existence.14 Though Baltic 

territories were under Russian rule, German intellectual influence permeated Baltic culture and “supplied the intellectual underpinnings of the Baltic national movements.”15 Baltic national movements “were therefore directed towards achieving equality for the Baltic 

languages and cultures with those of other European peoples.”16 These early Baltic national 

movements aligned with Western values and shunned Eastern authority. The initial formations of Baltic national movements eventually blossomed into the drive for statehood after 

the turmoil of World War I, with the world community recognizing Estonian and Latvian 

sovereignty in 1921 and Lithuanian sovereignty in 1922.17

Though Russia has a history of Baltic conquest that predates the Second World War, 

the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states on the eve of World War II sets the stage for the 

strenuous relations the Baltic states share with present-day Russia. Both the Russians and 

the Baltic states have constructed historical narratives about the events between 1940 and 

1945 that are used to galvanize the populations of their countries. For Russian foreign policy, 

this aspect has become known as the humanitarian dimension, which is based on “the principle of controlling the post-Soviet region by non-military, but quite aggressive tools” which 

includes “media manipulation” to broadcast an exclusively Russian portrayal of past events.18

The Russian focus on providing a reinterpreted historical narrative through media outlets 

to influence events—or in their view, the protection of their historical virtuousness—was directly included in their 2008 foreign policy concept, which stated that Russia must protect 

against “attempts to rewrite history using it to build confrontation and provoke revanchism 

in global politics and to revise the outcomes of World War II.”19 This point creates an enormous amount of friction between Russia and the Baltic states, as the Russians promote the 

12 “1710–1918—Russian Estonia,” Global Security.org, 11 June 2012.

13 James D. White, “Nationalism and Socialism in Historical Perspective,” in The Baltic States: The National SelfDetermination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ed. Graham Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 13. 14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 19.

16 Ibid., 21.

17 Ibid., 35.

18 As quoted in Nerijus Maliukevičius, “Tools of Destabilization: Kremlin’s Media Offensive in Lithuania,” Journal 

of Baltic Security 1, no. 1, (2015): 118. 19 Ibid.
Baltic Flashpoint | 21

idea that the Red Army was a liberating force from the Nazis during World War II, while 

most Baltic citizens continue to see the Soviets as having been occupiers.

20

Under Russian President Putin’s revised nationalistic version of history, he is also 

emphasizing and exaggerating the idea that the Baltic people were Nazi sympathizers.21 A 

more balanced approach in viewing the predicament of the Baltic region during the Second 

World War is that the Baltic states were caught between Adolph Hitler’s Third Reich and 

Joseph Stalin’s Red Army in their struggle for continental dominance. During this time 

period, the Baltic states fell into an area “where the power and the malice of the Nazi and 

Soviet regimes overlapped and interacted.”22 The Baltic states, in effect, had to resist the 

expansionist plans of both the Germans and Soviets.23 In June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied the newly independent Baltic states and quickly implemented a series of harsh measures against political and religious figures and groups associated with active opposition.24

The most dramatic tactic used by the Soviets was large civilian purges, which transplanted 

Baltic citizens throughout the USSR. On the night of 13 June 1941, massive deportations 

began in all three Baltic states.25 The Lithuanian political scientist Aleksandras Štromas 

writes, “It is estimated that Soviet repression and evacuations to the USSR in 1940–41 cost 

Lithuania 39,000, Latvia 35,000, and Estonia 61,000 citizens.”26 The indiscriminate nature of 

Soviet repression galvanized much of the Baltic population against Soviet rule. Many Baltic 

citizens were eager to take up arms against Soviet forces stationed on Baltic territory after 

the German invasion of the USSR. Tens of thousands of Baltic resistance fighters revolted 

against their Soviet occupiers and effectively used guerilla tactics to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet formations.27

In spring 1944, the Red Army’s counterattack against Nazi Germany was fully underway, and it quickly conquered lands that it had ceded three years prior. Alexander Statiev, 

a Russian historian, describes Soviet forces as they approached the Baltic states: “the for20 Karsten Brüggemann and Andres Kasekamp, “Identity Politics and Contested Histories in Divided Societies: 

The Case of Estonian War Monuments,” in Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration, ed. Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 51. 21 James S. Corum, The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies, The Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press), 13.

22 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 384. 23 As quoted in Aleksandras Štromas, “The Baltic States as Soviet Republics: Tensions and Contradictions,” in 

The Baltic States, 90. 24 David Kirby, “Incorporation: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,” in The Baltic States, 76–79. 25 Štromas, “The Baltic States as Soviet Republics,” 86–87.

26 Ibid., 87.

27 Ibid., 89.
22 | Major A. J. Goldberg

ests were full of people who had demonstrated their hostility toward the Soviet regime 

and who believed that this left them no option but to fight.” As the Red Army closed in 

on Estonia, an anti-Communist militia known as the Omakaitse (home guard) dissolved 

into the wilderness, choosing to engage the Soviets with guerrilla tactics. Similarly, the 

SS Jagdtverband Ostland, a composition of guerrilla units formed by the Germans from the 

Latvian Wafen-SS, became the core of resistance against the Soviets in Latvia. This was a 

common theme throughout the Baltics as “national guardsmen and German collaborators 

made the core of resistance in the Baltic provinces.”28 From 1944 to 1952, insurgencies continued against the Soviets in the Baltic states. The resistance fighters operated primarily in 

the large wilderness of the Baltics and received almost total support from the public. The 

Soviets enacted harsh penalties against urban areas of support. Soviet deportations were 

commonplace, with an estimated 600,000 natives relocated to Siberia during 1945–51. The 

guerrilla campaign eventually slowed in 1952, and an acceptance of the Soviets as occupiers 

of the Baltic nations became the status quo.29

The following 40 years of Soviet authoritarian rule over the Baltic states did not quell 

the deep-seated animosity against Soviet occupation or the longing for national identity 

that filled the hearts of Baltic citizens throughout the period of the Cold War. Further exasperating the divide was Soviet immigration policy toward the Baltic states. Russians were 

urged to migrate to the Baltic states to work, thus changing the ethnic makeup of the Baltic 

region.30 As reported by author Marina Best, “By the time of the fall of the Soviet Union in 

the early 1990s, the number of ethnic Russians was extremely high: Estonia with 474,843, 

or 30.3 percent of the total population, Latvia with 906,000 or 34 percent, and Lithuania 

with 344,500, or 9.4 percent.”31 The influx of Russian ethnic minorities into the Baltic region 

during the Cold War has had lasting implications that complicate the current relationship 

between the Baltic states and Russia.

Though the Baltic states gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the 

Baltic-Russian relationship continues to be turbulent socially as well as politically. In the 

book Identity and Foreign Policy, Elena Fofanova and Viatcheslav Morozov assess that Russia 

likens the Baltic states to the “black sheep of the European family” due to their long list of 

28 Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2010), 98.

29 Štromas, “The Baltic States as Soviet Republics,” 93.

30 Marina Best, “The Ethnic Russian Minority: A Problematic Issue in the Baltic States,” Verges: Germanic & Slavic 

Studies in Review 2, no. 1 (2013): 34. 31 Ibid.
Baltic Flashpoint | 23

alleged misbehaviors revolving around the historic narrative of the Second World War.32

Putin has brought forth a catalog of grievances against the Baltic states, which include infringing upon the “rights” of Russian ethnic minorities, perpetuating pro-Nazi narratives 

that downplay the significance of the Soviet victory against the Germans, and refusing to 

abandon “territorial claims” on Russia. By emphasizing supposed Baltic transgressions, Russia hopes to promote itself as “an essential defining part of European civilization” and bar 

the assimilation of Baltic states into Western Europe.33 In contrast, the Baltic states base 

their European identity on a rejection of Russian values. Therefore, both the Baltic states 

and Russia refute each other’s “Europeaness,” which plays a continuous role in their worsening political relations.34

Further aggravating the situation, the three Baltic states became full members of 

NATO and the European Union (EU) in 2004. Western policy makers viewed the decision 

to expand the alliance as a method to “stabilize the new Europe” and to induce former 

Soviet states to accept economic and social reform.35 To the Russians, NATO enlargement 

was humiliating. The Baltic states had rejected Russian offers of a security guarantee in 

1997 and fiercely resisted inclusion in a Russian sphere of influence.36 This rejection by the 

Baltic states represented compounded denunciation coupled with the perceived disregard 

of Russian advice and interests in the prosecution of the Kosovo War (1998–99) and the 

U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003), while the United States’ 2002 abandonment of the 30-year-old 

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was an embarrassment to Russian foreign policy and the country’s credibility as a great power.37 It was this series of events that finally convinced Russians 

that the international system was no longer bipolar, as it had been during the Cold War, 

and that they would have to aggressively pursue their interests from a position of weakness. 

Russia realized its demotion in world politics when it could no longer expect deference to 

its demands from the West as it pursued its own vision of the future of Europe.38 NATO enlargement and the dismissal of Russian power fueled the Russian worldview that interprets 

32 Elena Fofanova and Viatcheslav Morozov, “Imperial Legacy and the Russian-Baltic Relations: From Conflicting Historical Narratives to a Foreign Policy Confrontation?,” in Identity and Foreign Policy, 28. 33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 29.

35 Christopher Coker, “The West and Russia: The Challenge of Starting Anew,” in Northern Security and Global 

Politics: Nordic-Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-Unipolar World, ed. Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää (New 

York: Routledge, 2014), 44–45.

36 Corum, The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies, 15. 37 Coker, “The West and Russia,” 45.

38 Viatcheslav Morozov, “Aimed for the Better, Ended up with the Worst: Russia and International Order,” Journal on Baltic Security 1, no. 1 (2015): 26–36.
24 | Major A. J. Goldberg

the geopolitical landscape as “conspirological,” an idea that there is “always some hidden 

truth behind politics.” This uniquely Russian premise extols continuous cynicism about the 

nature of man, believing that all action is driven by greed, vanity, and a lust for power.39

Time has passed, resentment has grown, and Russia now wants to remind the world that it 

is still a relevant, if not essential, force in geopolitics. 

The Art and Possibilities of Russian Provokatsiya (Provocation)

Russia’s decision whether or not to destabilize the Baltics through ambiguous or traditional 

methods of warfare is dependent upon the foreign policy objectives of President Putin. 

Russia wants to rebuild its traditional sphere of influence in the near abroad; however, this 

is not Putin’s only objective. According to Russian scientist and political activist Andrei 

Piontkovsky, Putin seeks “the maximum extension of the Russian World, the breakdown 

of NATO, and the discrediting and humiliation of the US as the guarantor of the security 

of the West.”40 Another dynamic that may prompt Putin into mounting aggressive action 

against the Baltic states is the drive to increase nationalist pride as a means to distract the 

Russian populace from domestic economic woes.41 The Baltics represent a logical forum for 

Putin to pursue the above objectives because he can limit risk by using ambiguous tactics. 

The Russian president undoubtedly does not want to trade Moscow for Washington, DC, 

in a full-scale thermonuclear war. Rather, Putin will likely weigh risk against potential gain 

and only act when he is certain he possesses the advantage. An indistinct start to low-level 

activity in the Baltic region provides the Russian government with a variety of options to 

control the tempo and escalation of operations. Each decision Russia makes can be enhanced with additional capabilities or diluted to arrive at a course of action that provides 

Russian policy makers with the appropriate level of risk that they are comfortable accepting. If the initial salvo of low-level subversive activity can effectively shape the environment 

to Russia’s advantage at a low cost, Russia may be emboldened to act more aggressively. The 

Kremlin’s ability to gauge the degree of NATO’s resolution to maintain Baltic security in a 

phased approach allows Russia to limit its risk. When preconditions are met, Russia has the 

option to introduce massive conventional forces that can rapidly outpace the NATO decision-making process, which according to Czech General Petr Pavel “are not synchronized to 

allow for a split-second response.”42

39 Ibid., 32.

40 Andrei Piontkovsky, “Putin’s Russia as a Revisionist Power,” Journal on Baltic Security 1, no. 1 (2015): 10. 41 Michael Carpenter, “Baltic Defense & Security After Ukraine–Panel 1,” Jamestown Foundation video, 37:16, 

from the Baltic Defense & Security After Ukraine: New Challenges, New Threats conference, 30 April 2015. 

42 Bender, “Incoming NATO Military Committee Chairman.”
Baltic Flashpoint | 25

For this reason, Russian low-level action represents the most likely scenario in the Baltics. Low-level activities can be effective if they appear to be a prequel to further escalation. 

The Baltic states may be obliged to acquiesce to Russian demands if it appears subversive 

acts are just a prelude to invasion, particularly if Russia masses forces in Kaliningrad or on 

the Baltic’s eastern border while simultaneously initiating ambiguously disguised provocative action, sometimes called hybrid warfare, within the Baltic states. This would be very 

similar to Russian tactics in the Ukraine during 2014. Security policy advisor to the president of Estonia, Merle Maigre, describes Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine as “a 

combination of regular and irregular forces, economic sanctions, energy blockades, political 

destabilization, information warfare, financial pressure, and cyber-attacks.”43

When imagining a possible Russian-Baltic confrontation, an alarming scenario for military planners involves Russian aggression aimed to protect its small enclave of Kaliningrad 

on the Baltic Sea. Kaliningrad is nestled between Lithuania to the north and east and Poland to the south. Historically part of former German East Prussia, Kaliningrad was to be 

“administered” by the Soviet Union after the Potsdam Conference of 1945. Throughout the 

Cold War, Kaliningrad was a heavily militarized district of the Soviet Union and was the 

homeport for parts of the Soviet Baltic Fleet.44 Today, Kaliningrad remains a part of the 

Russian Federation, surrounded by NATO members. Kaliningrad continues to serve as the 

home to Russia’s Baltic Sea Fleet as well as the Chernyakhovsk and Donskoye air bases; it 

is of tremendous strategic importance to the Russian Federation.45 The small land mass is 

considered a Russian semi-exclave because, although it lacks a land connection with Russia, 

it does have access to the sea throughout the year.46 Because Kaliningrad is a Russian island 

within the Baltic region, it is dependent upon imports from Russia that are largely delivered 

by rail. Russia also is dependent upon the port of Kaliningrad to export fossil fuel and other 

goods to client countries. Roughly 90 percent of all crude oil, refined oil products, coal, 

and fertilizers delivered by rail from Russia are ultimately exported from Kaliningrad.47 The 

railways, which deliver Russian lifeblood to Kaliningrad, depend upon Lithuania for safe 

passage. This is a status quo that is likely bothersome for the Russians.

43 Merle Maigre, Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience and Recommendations for NATO, Policy 

Brief (Washington, DC: German Marshal Fund of the United States, 2015).

44 Kilian Strauss, “Crossborder Cooperation in Kaliningrad: Integrating the Russian Enclave of Kaliningrad into 

the Sub-Regional Structures of the Baltic Sea” (unpublished paper, Paris, 30 April 1998), 4–5.

45 Tony Wesolowsky, “Kaliningrad, Moscow’s Military Trump Card,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 18 June 

2015.

46 Artur Usanov, External Trade of the Kaliningrad Oblast, no. 21 (Turku, Finland: School of Economics, PanEuropean Institute, 2009), 4.

47 Ibid., 43–44.
26 | Major A. J. Goldberg

To Russia, any act or probable threat of action against its vital supply routes to Kaliningrad would require a response. Russia has many options available to create a pretext for Russian forces to secure their lines of communication into Kaliningrad. The most likely method 

would be by staging what is well known in Russia as a provokatsiya. In English, the concept of 

provocation is typically used in the context of interpersonal relations in the sense of doing 

something to provoke a general response of anger or frustration. For Russians, provokatsiya 

is almost exclusively used in a political context wherein a state or intelligence agency undertakes a deliberate, often covert, action to elicit a self-defeating response from an adversary 

state or opposition group. For example, the provision of support to Lithuanian ultranationalist groups combined with a disinformation campaign that exaggerates the influence of 

ultranationalists, typically compared to Nazis, in Lithuania. Such groups potentially could 

be manipulated into sabotaging critical railroad junctions within Lithuania, thus, directly 

attacking Russian economic national interests. Russia could then seek to exploit any inconsistencies or inadequacies in Lithuania’s response as justification for a conventional military 

intervention in defense of the vital economic interest of maintaining a secure transit corridor to Kaliningrad. For good measure, Russia also could claim it was “assisting” the Lithuanian government to root out subversive actors who threaten regional peace. 

Without rapid NATO intervention, it is fairly certain that the Baltic states would 

quickly fall to the occupation of Russian forces. A 2014 Russian military exercise in the 

Central Military District demonstrated their capability to mass 65,000 troops, 177 planes, 

56 helicopters, and 5,500 military vehicles within 72 hours.48 Setting the invasion scenario 

aside, the mere mobilization of such a force on the border of the Baltic region potentially 

could force the United States to make uncomfortable concessions to the Russian government to gain explicit assurances that an incursion was not imminent.

Thus, if Russia seriously threatens or commits to a conventional military thrust in the 

Baltic states, it would dominate the escalation ladder by putting the onus on NATO to 

move to a higher and more dangerous level of response (i.e., the use of nuclear weapons 

or kinetic action within sovereign Russian territory).49 The lack of NATO preparation to 

adequately defend the Baltic states from a Russian assault would likely compel NATO to 

broaden the conflict to areas outside of the Baltic territory. Initiating strikes inside Russia 

would no doubt be a dire decision for the United States, as events could quickly escalate to 

a nuclear confrontation. The decision would be complicated by domestic political concerns, 

48 Maigre, Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare, 3. 49 Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From 

Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 763.
Baltic Flashpoint | 27

as it is unlikely that the majority of American people would consider the defense of the 

Baltic states worth jeopardizing the safety of U.S. population centers. Russia understands 

the difficulty American leaders face in maintaining both domestic and alliance unity in the 

face of localized aggression and may seek to exploit this vulnerability in the near future. 

Unfortunately, Russia’s relative success using ambiguous techniques in recent years, such as 

provocations, without incurring a significant conventional response may have desensitized 

all parties to the dangers of escalation that could lead to larger conventional conflicts in the 

future.

Subverting the Power of Provokatsiya

The United States stands at the crossroads of escalation dominance and credible deterrence. American reluctance to use nuclear weapons to stop a Russian invasion of the Baltics 

places the United States in the losing position on the escalation ladder. According to the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Operations publication, “Deterrence should be based on capability 

(having the means to influence behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of believability 

that the proposed actions may actually be employed), and communication (transmitting 

the intended message to the desired audience) to ensure greater effectiveness.”50 The United States cannot rely solely on its nuclear forces or its ability to launch deep conventional 

strikes to deter Russia from invading the Baltics because the credibility of employment is 

questionable. Historian John Lewis Gaddis writes, “Deterrence, ideally, should involve expressing determination without actually having to exhibit it,” yet the risks of global nuclear 

war are so great that they inherently detract from the credibility of any response.51 Although 

the United States continues to maintain a “first use” policy, meaning that it would consider 

initiating nuclear strikes in response to non-nuclear aggression, Russia’s volatile presence in 

Georgia and Ukraine supports a belief that America is not likely to risk global nuclear war 

without facing a direct threat to its population. The United States, in conjunction with its 

NATO and European allies, must have more options available to deter and, if necessary, 

defeat a large-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic region. 

50 Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), V-39. 51 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 244.
28 | Major A. J. Goldberg

Table 1. Estimated global nuclear warhead inventories, 2016

Country Warheads

United States 7,100

United Kingdom 215

France 300

Israel 80

Pakistan 140

India 110

Russia 7,300

China 260

North Korea 8

Compiled from Arms Control Association data.

Figure 4. Russia’s nuclear arsenal

CIA Factbook, adapted by MCUP.

After examining how the United States and its NATO allies dealt with past Russian 

threats, it is possible to extract useful strategies to handle present-day challenges of Baltic 

security. Certainly, the Soviet Union tested their resolve during the Cold War, especially in 

the 1960s. During that time, NATO stared down an impressive Soviet war machine poised 
Baltic Flashpoint | 29

to storm across the Fulda Gap into West Germany. The Soviet onslaught never came and the 

Cold War ended without a direct engagement between the Soviets and NATO. What prevented the Soviets from attacking? One factor seems to have been the U.S. policy, promoted 

by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, to prevent the “nuclear threshold” from being 

passed and to rely on conventional means to defend Europe.52 The roughly 250,000 American servicemembers stationed in West Germany during most of the Cold War likely gave 

the Soviets pause before mounting an invasion.53

European leaders, however, were not entirely sure they could hold back Soviet aggression with purely conventional means. War studies professor Lawrence Freedman explains

that NATO countries’ leaders were resistant to an entirely conventional response to Soviet 

action and that “[m]ore robust conventional forces for NATO might deny the Soviet Union 

a victory but the cost of failure to the Kremlin would be slight; Soviet territory itself would 

remain unscathed.” Therefore, when the Russians did not need to worry about a nuclear 

threat, “Soviet risk calculations would be dangerously simplified.”54 European leaders feared 

the Soviets would be tempted to wage conventional war if the United States’ nuclear guarantee was not on the table. Additionally, European governments sought to avoid increasing 

defense expenditures and conscription service lengths, both required to maintain a sizable 

conventional force in Europe.55 Thus, in 1967, “a compromise was reached” when “NATO 

adopted the strategy of flexible response.”56

The concept of flexible response holds that NATO forces would “attempt” to drive back 

a Soviet invasion using solely conventional means if achievable. If NATO’s conventional 

forces were routed, a “gradual nuclear response” would be initiated to signal NATO’s resolve to defend Western Europe. If this failed, a continuous climb on the escalation ladder 

hopefully would persuade one side or the other to cease hostilities before mutually assured 

destruction occurred.57 In his book Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis describes 

flexible response (often referred to as symmetrical containment) as a method to provide policy makers with a wider array of options, rather than depending upon a binary choice between either escalation or embarrassment. Though the premise of flexible response provides 

varying levels of reaction, it lets the adversary decide the “nature and location” of combat. 

52 Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” 769.

53 Tim Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003, Center for Data Analysis Report #04-11 (Washington, DC: 

Heritage Foundation, 2004).

54 Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” 770.

55 Michael Carver, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 786.

56 Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” 771.

57 Carver, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” 786.
30 | Major A. J. Goldberg

Gaddis notes, however, that the United States has not been able to use this method well: 

“Despite expansionist economic theory, the United States in practice has never been able 

to generate the means necessary to support symmetrical containment over an indefinite 

period of time. Attempts to do so, as in Korea and Vietnam, have only led to frustration, 

disillusionment, [and] exhaustion.”58

And yet mainly through the policy of flexible response, and perhaps some luck, the 

United States was able to deter a Soviet incursion into Western Europe during the Cold 

War. In his 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (a.k.a. Star Wars), President Ronald W. Reagan proclaimed, “[W]e must remain constant in preserving the nuclear 

deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response.”59 This statement displays 

the longevity of the flexible response policy and shows how it remained part of the security 

vernacular throughout the Cold War. While the policy of flexible response had several tenets, its main focus was to limit warfare to the conventional realm; holding nuclear weapons 

as an insurance policy in the event of crossing a subjective line. Michael Carver writes that 

if war “is to be limited in its effects, it must, as [Carl von] Clausewitz recognized, be limited 

in its aims.”60 The United States and the Soviet Union acknowledged limits during the Cold 

War, prompting both sides to develop their conventional forces as the first and, hopefully, 

only method of engagement if war materialized.

Assuming world leaders are rational players in the game of geopolitics, the first use 

of nuclear weapons in practice is likely considered what military theorist Clausewitz portrayed as “something pointless and devoid of sense.”61 In Henry A. Kissinger’s book Diplomacy, he describes how French President Charles de Gaulle pinpointed the core of the nuclear 

problem, stating, “The potential risk of using any nuclear weapons was so exorbitant that 

its avoidance tended to drive various players to assume highly national and self-serving 

postures.”62 As we examine collective security for the Baltic states, it would be tempting in 

a time of fiscal constraint to rely on a reversion to massive retaliation. The global trend, 

however, seems to be avoiding the first use of nuclear weapons at all costs. Even though 

avoiding strategic nuclear war remains the priority, tactical nuclear weapons may remain 

an option for commanders who are faced with overwhelming odds. It is, therefore, too 

risky to depend on escalation models to limit the employment of nuclear weapons; once 

58 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 353. 59 Ronald W. Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security” (speech, nationwide radio and 

television broadcast, 23 March 1983). 

60 Carver, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” 814.

61 As quoted in ibid.

62 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 611.
Baltic Flashpoint | 31

nuclear weapons are employed, the many variables of conflict make large-scale nuclear war 

a not-so-improbable outcome. If a war is fought over Baltic sovereignty, policy and process 

should prioritize keeping it conventional. This requires that the nuclear guarantee be emphasized as a credible deterrent to a Russian escalation outside of the Baltic theater of operations. Ultimately, NATO requires a consolidated approach of complementary methods to 

fight and win a war contained strictly to the Baltic region.

Recommendations

The recommendations provided below include three steps, feasible both politically and militarily, that NATO can implement to better defend the territory and sovereignty of its Baltic 

countries.

Bolstering Organic Deterrence in the Baltic States

A Russian conventional incursion into the Baltic states would obviously require a conventional NATO response. If Russia uses ambiguous warfare techniques, however, to start 

operations in the Baltics, then a whole-of-society approach—relying on a unified Baltic 

population—would be the most effective counter. Uniting Baltic citizens to passively resist 

Russian incitement will help neutralize ambiguous warfare techniques, as it takes away Russia’s freedom of action to manipulate the population. The ability of Russia to use various 

portions of the population, through ethnic or economic incitement, to bring about political 

turmoil, as it attempted to do in Ukraine, is a tactic that can only be countered with Baltic 

efforts to better assimilate their Russian ethnic minorities. If ethnic Russians living inside 

the Baltic states can be better included in the national identity of the region, then as political scientist Maciej Bartkowski highlights in his work, the application of “non-violent civilian based defense” efforts would yield the response needed to counter Russian belligerence.63

Though the Russian minority has dwindled in each Baltic state since the end of the 

Cold War, Russians still represent a sizable minority with more than 25 percent in Estonia 

and Latvia and 6.4 percent in Lithuania.64 Since the Baltic states have gained independence, 

Russian ethnic minorities in the Baltic region have experienced difficulty gaining citizenship, particularly in Latvia and Estonia. A Stratfor global intelligence report indicates that 

“roughly 7 percent of Estonia’s total population and 13 percent of Latvia’s are non-citizens 

63 Maciej Bartkowski, Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter Russian Hybrid Warfare (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, 2015), 5–6.

64 Best, “The Ethnic Russian Minority,” 34.
32 | Major A. J. Goldberg

and barred from voting in national elections.”65 Though each Baltic government is seeking 

to better appease its ethnic minorities through cultural concessions, there would be no 

better way to galvanize the population than to offer easier paths to citizenship. This is the 

model Lithuania accepted with the “jus soli principle of citizenship or the ‘right of the soil’ 

principle.”66 This policy provides citizenship to every person born in the country, regardless 

of parental nationality. Differing from the more inclusive Lithuanian policy, Estonia and 

Latvia enacted the policy of “jus sanguinis, or the ‘right of blood’ principle.”67 Through this 

policy, citizenship is determined by the origins of the parents and not by the location of a 

child’s birth. The successful initiatives undertaken by the Lithuanian government may instill 

a sense of nationalism into all of its natural-born residents. A similar program initiated in 

Estonia and Latvia would help integrate ostracized Russian minorities into society. A populace in solidarity denies Russia a mechanism to generate social unrest and better facilitates 

passive resistance techniques to take hold against ambiguous Russian aggression. 

More than just creating unified national identities, Baltic governments and NATO officials also must organize these efforts. NATO must encourage Baltic defense officials to work 

with local Baltic community organizers and activists “to develop ground mechanisms for the 

rapid deployment of thousands of volunteers to create ‘living walls’ of unarmed people to 

defend local administrations . . . to block major railways, road arteries, or runways.”68 Bartkowski concedes that such brazen actions would likely cause civilian casualties. Unarmed 

civilians, however, would not die in vain if “civil resistance actions can create a moral and 

political outrage not only among the troops of the adversary but also among its public and 

the international community.”69 For this type of civil resistance to work, Russian minorities 

living within the Baltic states must be active participants in the peaceful demonstrations 

to deny Russia the justification of taking actions to protect its ethnic interests. The notion 

of Baltic Russian minorities supporting an anti-Moscow agenda is not far-fetched. During 

2014, a newly formed group calling themselves European Russians in Latvia was created with 

the aims of “counterbalancing” extremist elements of the Russian community and supporting Latvia’s “orientation toward the West.”70 Continued immigration reform and more inclusive policies by the Baltic governments will promote a more truly heterogeneous society 

65 “The Baltic Countries Respond to Russian Minorities,” Stratfor.com, 21 May 2014.

66 Best, “The Ethnic Russian Minority,” 35.

67 Ibid.

68 Bartkowski, Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter Russian Hybrid Warfare, 20.

69 Ibid.

70 “The Baltic Countries Respond to Russian Minorities.”
Baltic Flashpoint | 33

capable of implementing passive resistance to effectively respond to Russian provocations 

and manipulations.

A Baltic desire to build a multicultural society based on trust and common citizenship 

will not only establish a first-line defense against foreign powers, it will serve as a respectable gesture to the Russian government as to the value of contributions of Russian heritage 

in the forging of a new national identity. In a best-case scenario, Putin may view Baltic 

reconciliation efforts as an acknowledgment of continued Russian relevance, providing the 

emotional reassurance he would need to deescalate hostilities. If Baltic-Russian relations deteriorate to the point of open hostilities, then civil passive resistance techniques can be developed independently of more traditional kinetic defense options, and “NATO could wage 

them at different times depending on whether it faces a hybrid or conventional assault.”71 It 

is in the best interests of NATO to promote passive civil defense techniques, as it provides 

the alliance with a tactic that can stand alone or be integrated into an overlapping network 

of defensive methods for the Baltics. NATO’s director of intelligence, Rear Admiral Brett C. 

Heimbigner, suggested that through key leader engagements and closer cooperation NATO 

could foster the environment necessary for greater political inclusion and regional stability 

that serves to enhance collective defense.72 Progressive reforms undertaken by the Baltic 

governments will likely garner world commendation and set the conditions necessary for 

passive civil defense to flourish. These actions can deny Russia the tempestuous environment required to launch hybrid warfare and halt initial Russian provocations before they 

escalate into violent action.

Creating Unity of Effort in Northern Europe

The threat of Russian aggression extends beyond the Baltic states and potentially threatens 

the sovereignty of all countries within the NBP9. Fortunately, the combined gross domestic 

product (GDP) of the NPB9 is $2.3 trillion, which exceeds the Russian GDP by approximately $600 billion.73 These countries have the means, resources, and technology to defend 

against a Russian assault. This essential core of nations, however, is split “into NATO and 

non-NATO, EU and non-EU” that are both “heavy spenders on defense and free riders.”74

The United States increased its efforts to merge disparate interests in the High North with 

the founding of the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE) in 2003 to focus 

71 Bartkowski, Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter Russian Hybrid Warfare, 21. 72 RAdm Brett C. Heimbigner, comments to author, 3 March 2016.

73 Lucas, The Coming Storm, 1. 74 Ibid.
34 | Major A. J. Goldberg

on “cooperative security,” “healthy societies,” and “vibrant economies.”75 While the United 

States’ establishment of e-PINE improved engagement with the member states of Denmark, 

Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, the “forum for policy 

coordination” has not produced the tangible security requirements necessary to assure allies 

and deter aggression.76

Despite these obstacles, a successful multilateral arrangement between the Nordic nations has produced tangible steps toward implementing a cooperative defense that seeks 

long-term solutions to complex problems. The structure called Nordic Defense Cooperation 

(NORDEFCO) is comprised of five Nordic nations—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 

and Sweden—with the main purpose being “to strengthen the participating nations’ national 

defense, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions.”77 The essence 

of NORDEFCO is to garner efficiencies through commonality in acquisitions, procedures, 

and intelligence sharing.78 NORDEFCO promotes flexibility in that members have a certain 

degree of “self-differentiation” to decide to which activities they want to contribute.79 Since 

the founding of NORDEFCO in 2009, the organization has made tremendous strides in 

harmonizing the efforts of member states to produce concrete results. The successful development of the Swedish-Norwegian artillery system, known as Archer, saved each procuring 

nation 50 million euros “due to sharing the development, acquisition and life cycle support 

costs.”80

A current concept known as Battalion Task Force 2020 (BNTF 2020) will explore 

the modularization of a “generic Nordic battalion structure, formed around the main 

battle tank Leopard 2 and the combat vehicle CV-90, which can be deployed in whole or 

in segments in national or multinational configurations over the whole spectrum of conflict.”81 According to NORDEFCO, the BNTF 2020 concept was tested in Exercise Cold 

Response in 2016.82 The BNTF 2020 is a tailor-made program designed to rapidly respond to 

75 The e-PINE mission statement can be seen at “Cooperative Security,” State.gov, U.S. Department of State 

website.

76 Mark Evans, “The US-North European Partnership: Advancing Democracy beyond the Baltics” (keynote address, University of Washington, Seattle, 26 May 2005).

77 “About NORDEFCO,” Nordefco.org.

78 Pauli Järvenpää, “Nordic Defense Cooperation: NORDEFCO and Beyond,” in Northern Security and Global 

Politics: Nordic-Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-Unipolar World, ed. Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää (New 

York: Routledge, 2014), 218–20.

79 Ibid., 216.

80 Ibid., 223.

81 Ibid., 220.

82 The NORDEF MCC Action Plan: 2014–17 (Denmark: Nordic Defense Cooperation, 2013), 7.
Baltic Flashpoint | 35

a Russian conventional assault due to its lethality and common employment model among 

like-minded nations. A cooperative endeavor, similar to the NORDEFCO structure, should 

be replicated by NATO to include its Nordic members and partners, the Baltic states, and 

Poland to forge the NBP9 into a regionalized hub for security collaboration.

For Sweden and Finland, NORDEFCO provides defense cooperation with neighboring 

countries “without having to confront the messy and complex issues of membership” within 

NATO.83 Both countries have been members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program 

since 1994, but have not applied to be full participating members of the alliance.84 Despite 

reluctance to join NATO, both countries are increasing their military cooperation within 

NORDEFCO and their Baltic neighbors. In 2015, Sweden proposed to NORDEFCO that 

“the feasibility of assembling a modular-style Nordic-Baltic Battle Group (NBBG)” be examined to better safeguard the stability of the Arctic and Baltic region.85 The integration 

of Finland and Sweden into a smart defense of the Baltic region would have serious consequences for Russian offensive plans. Within the maritime realm, Sweden and Finland preside over the strategically important Gotland and Åland Islands within the Baltic Sea. These 

islands are strategically located and can be used to cover the forcible entry of NATO forces 

in a Baltic-Russian war scenario.86 Furthermore, these islands can potentially host an array 

of lethal systems to include surface-to-air missiles, naval mines, and antiship cruise missiles 

to counter the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability that emanates from the Russian semi-exclave of Kaliningrad. NATO should encourage greater participation by Finland 

and Sweden in security cooperation endeavors, offering the flexible terms inherent in the 

NORDEFCO memorandum of understanding. NATO implementation of a NORDEFCO 

model to bind the NBP9 countries in a cooperative framework, one that allows “countries 

to pick and choose the activities and forms of cooperation they find most appealing,” will 

further advance “interoperability” and “cost efficiency” to enable unity of effort in facing 

the Russians.87

Denying Russia the Quick Victory

A smart defense for the Baltics requires planners to use the principle of economy of force to 

withstand Russian superior numbers and advantageous logistic footing. The hard reality fac83 Ann-Sofie Dahl, NORDEFCO and NATO: “Smart Defence” in the North?, Research Paper no. 101 (Rome: NATO 

Defense College, 2014), 10.

84 “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document,” NATO.int, 10 January 2012.

85 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Sweden Proposes Aggressive Nordic Defense,” Defense News, 10 February 2015. 86 Coffey and Kochis, Baltic States, 14. 87 Dahl, NORDEFCO and NATO, 11–12.
36 | Major A. J. Goldberg

ing NATO is that permanently garrisoning foreign troops in Baltic territories will violate an 

international treaty signed between the alliance and Russia in Paris. Basing rights are a “delicate question” as the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation maintains “permanent foreign troops” will not be 

stationed in new NATO member states.88 Any NATO diminishment of the Founding Act 

may encourage Russia to further militarize the conflict by prepositioning additional forces 

near the Baltics. Additionally, failing to honor the treaty will negate all hopes of lowering 

tensions with Russia. Even if NATO is comfortable with placing troops in the Baltics on a 

rotational basis, there is still the question of materializing the sizable force required to deter, and if necessary defeat, Russian forces in a budget-constrained and -stretched alliance. 

The recent deployment of a rotational U.S. armored brigade to Poland bolstered NATO’s 

commitment to Baltic security; however, it is likely not feasible for NATO to match Russia’s conventional capability in the region. Renewed focus must center on strengthening the 

Baltic states’ organic defense forces in combination with increasing NATO troop rotations 

to the Baltics.89

The Baltic states have been active partners within the NATO alliance. All three countries have sent military forces to Iraq and have participated in NATO operations in Afghanistan. Though each country’s GDP is relatively small, the Baltic states strive to meet the 

NATO mandate that all alliance members spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Estonia 

currently meets the 2-percent expenditure requirement, with Latvia recently pledging to 

increase its defense expenditures to 2 percent and Lithuania committing to 1.5 percent of 

its GDP.90

 Understanding that they lack the budget and infrastructure to support an air force, 

each of the Baltic states cedes air defense responsibilities to stronger regional NATO allies. The Baltic states actively make up for their deficiencies in air policing by regularly 

participating in NATO “out-of-area operations.”91 When it comes to defending their sovereign territory, the Baltics should take a similar approach and relinquish the procurement 

of heavy mechanized forces to larger NATO countries. In place of matching Russian armor 

formations with comparable force, the Baltic states must develop asymmetrical capabilities 

focused on territorial defense to counter the larger Russian force.

88 Karoliina Honkanen, “NATO in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Focus on the Baltic Allies and Article 5,” in Northern Security and Global Politics, 183. 89 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, 1. 90 Coffey and Kochis, Baltic States, 2; and “Baltics Boost Defense Spending as Russian Threat Looms,” American 

Interest, 30 July 2015. 91 Honkanen, “NATO in the Nordic-Baltic Region,” 173–74.
Baltic Flashpoint | 37

The Baltic defense forces are keenly aware of the Russian military’s success during their 

conflict with Georgia in 2008. Specifically, Baltic defense officials are reviewing how Georgian armor fared against Russian forces. The highest percentage of Georgian military equipment destroyed by the Russians during the conflict was tanks.92 Georgian armored units 

suffered for a variety of reasons, including a lack of trained tank crews and poor maintenance. Another factor that contributed to Georgian tank losses was the effective use of light 

antitank weapons by the Russians and local militias within South Ossetia (a now de facto 

independent state within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders). At the beginning 

of the conflict, South Ossetia forces destroyed three Georgian tanks with rocket-propelled 

grenades, specifically RPG-7s.93 Further on in the conflict, Russian airborne forces operating two stalled BMP-1 vehicles delayed an entire Georgian engineer convoy with the use of 

RPG-7s and the BMP-1’s small 73mm cannons.94 What the Baltic states are learning from the 

battle “is that they need lots of anti-tank missiles.”95 In 2013, the three Baltic states spent a 

combined $63 million to purchase M3 Carl Gustaf 84mm antitank rockets from Sweden.96

The Baltic states also are acquiring U.S.-manufactured antitank FGM-148 Javelin missiles, 

with Estonia purchasing $55 million worth of these missiles in 2014 and Lithuania seeking to 

purchase $55 million in missiles in 2016.97 NATO training efforts in the Baltics must expand 

on the strides the Baltic states have already made in preparing their light infantry to face 

off against Russian armor.

Reasonable estimates figure it would take approximately 10 days for NATO heavy armor to reinforce the Baltic states from Grafenwöhr, Germany.98 If the Baltic states prepare 

for a war fashioned on mobile strikes and guerrilla action, it would be feasible to delay 

Russian forces from capturing the entire Baltic territory, giving NATO reinforcements the 

toehold needed for a counteroffensive. To do this, the Baltic states will have to accept the 

unpleasant planning assumption that the Baltic population centers may suffer heavy dam92 Robert Beckhusen, “To Beat Russian Tanks, the Baltic States Study the Georgia War: 2008 Conflict with Russia Proves that Anti-Tank Missiles Rule,” War Is Boring (blog), 24 October 2014. 93 Anton Lavrov, “Timeline of Russian-Georgian Hostilities in 2008,” in The Tanks of August, ed. Ruslan Pukhov 

(Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010), 54.

94 BMP-1 is a tracked infantry fighting vehicle, and the acronym stands for Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty 1. It is 

similar to the American Amtrac used by the Marine Corps. See Lavrov, “Timeline of Russian-Georgian Hostilities in 2008,” 71.

95 Beckhusen, “To Beat Russian Tanks, the Baltic States Study the Georgia War.”

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.; and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Lithuania-Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units,” 

news release, 18 December 2015. 98 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, 8.
38 | Major A. J. Goldberg

age or occupation. To mitigate this risk, however, Baltic forces could follow the partisan 

model used during the Soviet occupation, establishing bases of operation in the Baltic wilderness and using guerrilla tactics to delay the Russians. This would cede Baltic territory to 

the Russians in exchange for the ability of the Baltic military to continue to operate.

Another facet of this strategy that may be difficult for the Baltic states to accept is 

they will likely bear the initial brunt of casualties for the NATO alliance. This is not to say 

that NATO forces will be absent during the opening days of war; however, NATO ground 

operations would be limited in scale, likely involving special operations forces to assist with 

forward air control missions and intelligence collection. Whatever rotational conventional 

NATO troops might be present would serve more as a political deterrent signaling NATO’s 

commitment rather than a decisive combat force. Significant NATO reinforcements could 

only come after much of the Baltic territory is presumably occupied by Russian forces. 

While accepting the costs of a mobile defense would be difficult for the Baltic political leadership, the alternative may be even more damaging. Asking NATO to hold Russian forces 

firmly outside the borders of the Baltic states would require deep strikes within Russia with 

either conventional, or worse, tactical nuclear weapons. If this occurred, it is safe to assume 

Russia will respond in kind in the Baltics or beyond. An asymmetric defense of the Baltics 

would be violent and destructive; however, implementing this strategy will make the opening days of conflict equally painful for Russian forces while giving NATO the time required 

to mount an adequate counterattack.

Conclusion

For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that the first use of nuclear weapons in a 

conflict between NATO and Russia is unacceptable for either side. Thankfully, there seems 

to be historical precedent for this statement as no nation has employed nuclear weapons 

since the Second World War. The policy of flexible response provided Western leaders with 

scalable options to deter Soviet aggression that did not automatically default to a nuclear 

strike, while still allowing for that option if necessary. Likewise, a present-day NATO defense of the Baltics cannot mean the inevitable employment of nuclear weapons against 

Russian forces. In a Baltic-Russian war scenario, the threat from either side to employ nuclear weapons would alert Russian and NATO strategic forces and risk a general nuclear war.

Western politicians would likely find it difficult to convince their constituents of the 

value of risking New York and London for the sake of Tallinn, Estonia, and Riga, Latvia. 

Although the Baltic states may be dismayed by this reluctance, the reality of the situation is 

that Western leaders would likely try to contain any Baltic-Russian conflict squarely within 
Baltic Flashpoint | 39

the Baltic region to avoid escalation and reduce risk to their own populations. If NATO 

were to unambiguously threaten all-out nuclear war against a Russian incursion into Baltic 

territory, it may effectively deter Russia. If Russia, however, calls the Western bluff and invades, NATO is left with the sole grim option of responding with nuclear weapons or losing 

credibility. It is very likely that Western powers, and their populations, will be unwilling to 

initiate the first use of nuclear weapons or even conduct conventional attacks into sovereign 

Russian territory. Even if the West does conduct strikes (conventional or nuclear) into Russia, we can assume that the Baltic states would be devastated by Russian retaliatory strikes.

Thus, NATO planners must accept the premise that preparing a smart defense is the 

best way to defend the Baltics and will involve several overlapping layers of protection, 

below the nuclear threshold, to deter or defeat Russian aggression within Baltic territory. 

The solutions provided here—passive civil resistance, unity of effort with regional partners, 

and mobile (guerrilla) defense—give NATO customizable options to defend against Russian 

aggression. Using these three solutions in combination creates an effective network of defense and increases deterrence.

There does not appear to be a lack of determination on the part of the Baltic populations of all three states to resist any infringement upon their respective national sovereignty. 

For the Baltic citizens’ fight to be effective against foreign occupation, however, their efforts 

must be organized in a congruent manner to establish a smart defense of the Baltic region. If 

NATO countries intend to honor their Article V commitments and protect Baltic independence, then they must be prepared to fight and win inside the Baltics. Expansion of fighting 

outside of Baltic territory must be a response option for NATO only after Russia decides 

to broaden the conflict. NATO’s ability to defeat Russian forces within the Baltics places 

the burden of escalation upon the Russians and will ultimately cause them, in accordance 

with deterrence theory, to abandon any territorial ambitions they might have in the Baltics.
40 

Chapter 3

Cold War Redux

Shaping the Arctic as Strategic Maneuver Space

Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

With 2015 as the hottest year ever recorded in the Arctic, ice melt in the region has increased at unprecedented rates, resulting in improved nautical navigation for longer periods 

(figure 5). Over the long term, competition within the Arctic region will increase because 

of the resources it contains and the expanded military maneuver space it provides.1

 In both 

respects, the Arctic will confer geopolitical advantages on those prepared to exploit it. For 

the near term, global and European turmoil and economic instability offer Russia’s leaders 

an opportunity to increase regional and global influence. 

Increased navigability in the Arctic may significantly change the geopolitical balance 

within Europe’s High North and on the surrounding seas. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is 

key to the Russian Federation achieving its strategic goals since it would allow the control of 

an important trade route connecting the North Pacific to the North Atlantic (see figure 1). 

By exerting indirect influence over trade between Europe, China, and the U.S.’s West Coast, 

Russia would be able to fulfill a geopolitical vision first realized during the Soviet era. The 

1

 Decreases in summer polar ice will likely allow for more options when exploring for oil and gas in certain 

offshore areas. Similarly, shrinking glaciers onshore could expose land containing valuable deposits of gold, iron 

ore, or other minerals that were previously covered by glacial ice. Currently, areas offshore of Alaska encompass 

more than 1 billion acres and more than 6,000 miles of coastline—more coastline than the rest of the United 

States combined—and are considered to have potential for energy development. These Arctic regions include the 

Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, the Bering Sea, Cook Inlet, and the Gulf of Alaska. Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the 

Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 25. 
Cold War Redux | 41

Figure 5. Arctic Sea ice cap comparison

NASA Earth Observatory, images courtesy of Jesse Allen.
42 | Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to compare the continuity between Russian and Soviet strategic culture; second, to investigate the role of the Sever Joint Strategic Command 

North (JSCN) within Soviet and Russian strategy; and third, to recommend an operational 

concept that provides NATO with reliable deterrence against potential Russian aggression.2

The consideration of geopolitics combined with a nationalist ideology are central themes 

behind the Russian Federation’s strategic calculus and must be accounted for in future U.S. 

and NATO operational concepts. By looking at the general principles and specific concepts 

governing the Arctic’s role in Russian strategy, we can better understand the requirements 

for NATO’s response. Geopolitical vulnerability and ideological destiny are ingrained in 

Russian culture and provide analysts a framework for understanding why Moscow behaves 

the way it does and what strategic actions it might take next.

Soviet-Russian Strategic Culture

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 did not relieve the Russian 

people of the burden of their history and geography. Perceived geopolitical and ideological 

hostility is as relevant to Moscow’s strategy as it was during the peak of the Cold War. The 

ideological and geopolitical influences in Russian identity help explain the central role of 

conflict, and the JSCN, in Russian grand strategy. To analyze Russia’s current policy on the 

Arctic JSCN, the continuity between Soviet and Russian strategy, doctrine, and politics 

must be considered. Key documents exist that demonstrate how Russia’s nationalist ideology complements its current strategic and military thinking. In this section, we will review 

some of the most relevant documents that show the nationalistic character of both Soviet 

and Russian policies, and how this reoccurring pattern influences Russian decision making 

in the Arctic. 

Corollaries between Russia’s past and present exist, in part, because many current political and military leaders began their professional careers during the last decade of the Cold 

War. Thus, key concepts from the Soviet worldview help us better understand the Russian 

Federation’s strategic aims. In Vasily D. Sokolovsky’s influential work, Soviet Military Strategy, published during the apex of Soviet power in 1963, the centrality of Marxist-Leninist 

theory to Soviet strategy, military strategy, and doctrine is clear. In addition to Sokolovsky’s 

work, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy provides evi2

 For a detailed explanation of the Russian government’s establishment of the new military region see, “Arctic 

Strategic Command: Sever (North) Unified Strategic Command (USC),” GlobalSecurity.org, 7 November 2017; 

and “Russian Military Map: The Joint Strategic Command ‘North’,” SouthFront.org, 7 August 2015.
Cold War Redux | 43

dence supporting Vladimir Lenin’s proclamation that “war is part of the whole, and this 

whole is politics.”3

Lenin’s conception of the relationship between war and politics remains a foundation 

of the Russian Federation’s national identity and is key to understanding the cultural differences between East and West views on war.4

 Both Lenin and Putin seem to understand war 

to be the status quo among states, whereas the West views war as an abnormal condition. 

The Soviet Union’s animosity toward the West is apparent in Sokolovsky’s assertion that 

“the main source of the military threat today is the aggressive course of American Imperialism, which reflects the striving of US capitalist monopolies for world domination.”5

We can see the combination of past and present in current policy documents. For example, “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy” (2015) explains that strategic 

national priorities are “the most important areas of safeguarding national security.” The 

document describes the Arctic’s significance to its overall strategy and simultaneously identifies perceived threats posed by NATO and the West.6

 Analyst Olga Oliker points out the 

similarities between Soviet and Russian views when she states that the strategy “presents a 

Russia focused on increasing its influence and prestige and cementing its national unity; a 

Russia that believes it is accomplishing its aims, but which simultaneously feels threatened 

by the United States and its allies.”7

 Appreciating the return to a Russian nationalistic ideology and its relationship to the development of national strategy, as Oliker indicates, is key 

to determining Russia’s strategic and operational concept for the Arctic JSCN. 

More important, Russian thinkers and leaders seem to consider war an acceptable 

means to an end. In Soviet Military Strategy, Sokolovsky explains, “Politics is the reason, war 

is the tool.”8

 Early Russian and Soviet definitions of national strategy, military strategy, and 

3 Vasily D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, ed. and trans. Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, 1968), 

173; and Ghulam D. Wardak, comp., The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy, vol. 1 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989).

4

 Ibid., 173.

5

 Ibid., 185.

6

 The strategy document states, “The competition between states is increasingly encompassing social development values and models and human, scientific, and technological potentials. Leadership in exploiting the 

resources of the world’s oceans and the Arctic is acquiring particular significance in this process. An entire 

spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have [sic] been set in motion in the 

struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services’ potential.” Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 683, “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy” 

(translated), 31 December 2015. 7

 Olga Oliker, “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 7 January 2016.

8

 Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, 14.
44 | Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

military doctrine help analysts understand that the nature of military strategy is dependent 

on politics and takes economic, political, and scientific technical factors into account. The 

Soviet Union, in particular, when considering the implications of nuclear weapons on military strategy, was preoccupied with studying the conditions under which a future war may 

arise, including the deployment of armed forces and the methods of delivering the first 

strike and conducting the first operations in addition to the strategic utilization of the 

armed forces.9

 “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy” document maintains 

the primacy of military doctrine in national strategy, stating that military doctrine sufficiently covers “Russian goals and plans.”10

Assessing the relevance of historic Russian and Soviet teachings and worldviews requires an analyst to understand the generational ideological and geopolitical culture that 

nurtured Russia’s current leadership. Sokolovsky proposed that, “The nature of military 

strategy is often influenced by such factors as general historically accumulated national and 

political traditions of a country.”11 He goes on to observe that Russian tradition holds that 

the geographical location of a country and the national characteristics of its population 

influence the content and nature of its military doctrine.12 It is almost impossible to understate the significance of ideology and geopolitics in Russian strategic calculus regarding 

politics and war.13

Western strategists once viewed the Arctic as an obstacle to the geostrategic advantage 

provided by Russia’s central position on the Eurasian steppe; this is also known as the “geographical pivot” area defined originally in 1904 by one of the founders of the new field of 

“geopolitics,” Sir Halford J. Mackinder, an English geographer (figure 6).14 At the height of 

Imperial Russia’s power, Mackinder anticipated the need for the containment doctrine later 

articulated by George F. Kennan vis-à-vis the Soviet Union after World War II. Mackinder’s 

pivot constituted the “heartland” of Eurasia, which he also called the “World Island.” By 

projecting forces from East to West across the heartland, the most powerful inhabitants of 

Eurasia for many centuries had managed to dominate not merely the interior of the continent but, more important, its southern littoral. 

9

 Ibid., 8–10.

10 Oliker, “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy.”

11 Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, 17. 12 Ibid., 39.

13 For instance, see Richard W. Harrison’s treatment of the topic in The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 

1904–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 14 Caitlyn L. Antrim, “The Next Geographical Pivot: The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-First Century,” Naval War 

College Review 63, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 18; and H. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical 

Journal 23, no. 4 (April 1904): 421–37.
Cold War Redux | 45

In the modern era, dominance of the heartland would enable any of the industrialized 

great powers also to become the largest maritime power of all. Thus, as Mackinder reformulated his concept in 1919, he fixed his understanding of central position’s criticality stating, 

“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the 

World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.”15 First the British Empire 

and then, in its wake, the United States would, therefore, have to lead a global coalition to 

apply counterpressure along the flanks of this expansive power. In the 1940s, Yale University 

professor Nicholas J. Spykman considered the Arctic a critical component of any strategy 

to contain the Soviet Union.16 Thus, opening the Arctic to commercial and military activity 

may empower the Russian Federation in a way that would challenge global stability.

The question arises as to whether Russian Arctic ambitions support Russian economic 

15 H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (London: Constable and 

Co., 1919), 194.

16 Antrim, “The Next Geographical Pivot,” 18.

Figure 6. Mackinder’s geographical pivot

Originally printed in “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23, no. 4 (April 1904): 435.
46 | Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

interests or national defense, or is intended for offensive operations. When answering this 

question, it is important to remember that current Russian leaders formed their worldviews 

under the tutelage of the Soviet Communist system. They were versed in anti-West rhetoric, 

read antagonistic literature concerning the competition between Communism and capitalism, were unsupportive of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and were embittered by the 

diminishment of the Russian Federation. Soviet mentorship also fostered a complementary 

analytical model that divided Soviet military art into strategy, operational art, and tactics, 

accounting for economic, political, and scientific technical factors.17 Moreover, the importance of geography in strategic calculus provides Westerners with context to analyze and understand Soviet strategic culture and offers a framework to interpret Soviet national-level 

documents. It also enables analysts to understand the genesis of Soviet-Russian geostrategic 

thought and culture because of Moscow’s return to viewing itself as “the crossroads of power 

between East Asia and Western Europe,” which captures the strategic potential of Arctic 

domain control.18 Mackinder helps contextualize the importance of the Russian near abroad 

and the Arctic by stressing the criticality of ocean access to strategic mobility and maneuverability and the core belief that Russia can “strike on all sides and be struck from all sides, 

save the north.”19 This geopolitical context may help analysts and planners conceptualize the 

value Russia places on key access points, such as the Bering Strait, and support to operations 

along its flanks.

Geopolitics helps analysts develop a comprehensive understanding of the connections 

between Soviet and Russian deterrence, defense, and preparation for conflict with the West 

that is culturally necessary because of the military-geographic factors in relation to the 

flanking position of NATO countries.20 The emergence of the idea of Eurasianism shows 

the influence of geopolitics on Russian intellectual and strategic thinking. This theory 

stresses “Russia’s uniqueness and argues that Russia need not Westernize in order to modernize.”21

The historical impact of Russia’s geographic position on the Eurasian landmass has 

played a significant role in its national identity that is evident in its national strategy, mil17 Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, 7–8. 18 Antrim, “The Next Geographical Pivot,” 17. 19 The Russian near abroad refers to the newly independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” 436. 

20 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, 66–73. 21 Charles Clover, “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs, March/

April 1999. See also Marlène Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 2008).
Cold War Redux | 47

itary strategy, and military doctrine. Marxist-Leninist theory posits that “All of man’s existence . . . was a product of impersonal historical forces. Understanding these objective forces 

would enable one to manage global, national, and personal problems.”22 Analyzing the significance of the JSCN requires combining an understanding of Russia’s ingrained sensitivity 

to real and perceived threats to its geostrategic and ideological position relative to the West. 

Russia could dominate the entire Arctic by controlling key access points if NATO and the 

United States do not deter it. Control of the Arctic provides the Russian Federation with 

uncontested maneuver space and an important advantage along NATO’s vulnerable northern and eastern flanks. 

The Russian Federation’s national-level documents reinvigorate the Russian nationalist 

identity and its belief that it is geopolitically vulnerable. Caitlyn Antrim addresses Mackinder’s pivot area and the impact of increased navigability of the Arctic on Russia’s geostrategic views as well as on its evolution to a power based on both land and sea. Antrim posits 

that Russia’s interests in the Arctic are determined by its level of investment across four key 

factors: technology, economics, climate, and law.23 Analysts must consider Moscow’s stated

goals for the Arctic with their perceived geopolitical and ideological competition with the 

West in conjunction with Russia’s level of investment in the Arctic region, which provides a 

glimpse into Russia’s potential operating concept for the NJSC. This holistic understanding 

can result in concerned Arctic nations rapidly increasing the military competition in an 

arena that could stimulate a “new Cold War.”

The Russian Federation’s goals in the Baltic and its military operations in Crimea, 

Ukraine, and Syria provide insight into the tactics and operational construct available to 

them. The strategic context and long-term aims remain debated; however, each conflict area 

provides the Russian Federation access to, and control of, other sea lines of communication 

(SLOC) choke points, including the eastern Mediterranean Sea. These choke points facilitate the Russian military, predominately a land power, implementing sea denial from the 

land with aviation and ground-based combined arms in the form of A2/AD assets. All of 

these SLOC and choke points have a bearing on the JSCN and Russia’s national strategy. 

Understanding the Arctic east-west SLOCs within the context of existing Russian areas for 

sea denial increases the importance of countering Russia’s militarization and control of the 

Arctic passages in the mid- and long terms. Left unchecked, the Russian Federation could 

counterbalance its vulnerable geopolitical position and relative weakness in naval power 

through land and air dominance of a key SLOC. Moscow could then support its long-term 

22 Peter Vincent Pry, War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 53. 23 Antrim, “The Next Geographical Pivot,” 24. 
48 | Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

goals through combined effects of ambiguous operations along NATO’s vulnerable flanks, 

sea denial from the Kola Peninsula with access to the Barents Sea, and diplomatic assurances with an increasingly aggressive China along the far eastern edge of the NSR. Without 

NATO deterrence, the Russian Federation would possess the capability to escalate tensions 

through the threat of economic exclusion in the NSR and the ability to increase the level of 

coercion in the High North or the Baltic region.

The NSR poses both opportunity and threat to the Russian Federation. An ice-free 

NSR could expose Russia’s large Arctic coastline to attack. The huge area would prove difficult to defend. As an opportunity, however, the NSR is central to Russia’s long-term goals 

to destabilize NATO and increase its global influence. The NSR has strategic implications 

for whoever controls it because it significantly reduces the shipping distance from China to 

Europe. A Chinese freighter, the Yong Sheng, took 35 days to sail from Dalian, China, to Rotterdam, Netherlands; however, using the Suez Canal would have taken two weeks longer.24

As such, in its maritime policy, Russia highlights “the crucial role of the Northern Fleet for 

the defense of the state of marine and ocean areas, as well as the increasing importance of 

the Northern Sea Route for sustainable development of the Russian Federation.”25

No Assurance Along NATO’s Flanks

Russia’s strategic views on the Arctic are substantially different from those of the United 

States because of the area’s relevance to global affairs. Russia’s perspective is fundamentally 

different for a variety of reasons. First, Russia views the Arctic as critical to national defense 

because it provides maneuver space for conventional forces and key terrain for control of 

vital sea lines. Second, the Soviet-Russian perception has long been that geopolitics and 

ideological differences with the West force it into a persistent state of conflict. Because of 

this self-imposed security-centric view, Russian leadership views all foreign influence and 

presence in the Arctic primarily as a threat first. Finally, if war was to occur, Russia views 

the Arctic as necessary to escalation dominance in the critical early phases of conflict. A 

comprehensive understanding of Russian strategic aims in the JSCN is therefore key to 

deterrence and potentially to victory in future conflict. Russia’s national security strategy 

highlights its realist worldview: “The competition between states is increasingly encompassing social development values and models, and human, scientific, and technological potentials. Leadership in exploiting the resources of the world’s oceans and the Arctic is acquiring 

24 Sergei Blagov, “Russia Eyes New Arctic Shipping Route for Trade with China,” Asia Times, 1 March 2016. 25 Vladimir Putin, Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2020, PR-1387 (St. Petersburg: Ministry of Defense,

2001), 11.
Cold War Redux | 49

particular significance in this process.”26 This statement demonstrates how even economic 

and social dimensions of the Arctic are regarded as elements of state competition. The Russian perspective puts the JSCN in the category of a node within the Russian system, and the 

Russian state’s role is “to safeguard the sovereignty, independence, and state and territorial 

integrity and to protect the rights of compatriots abroad.”27

Recent aggressive acts by Russia are linked to that nation’s broader view of competition 

with the United States. In recent years, General Valery V. Gerasimov links the “Arab Spring 

and other ‘color revolutions’ . . . with military capability development” and insists that the 

West commits “transgressions against the post-Cold War international order.”28 Gerasimov 

maintains that the United States executes a global strategy that violates national sovereignty. 

At the May 2014 Moscow Conference on International Security, Gerasimov highlighted U.S. 

military operations in Iraq (1991), Yugoslavia (1999), Iraq (2011), and the ongoing campaign 

in Afghanistan to prove that the United States acts as though it is the only superpower. His 

explanation of the current politico-military situation emphasizes that competitiveness for 

geostrategic space and economic and natural resources as well as the U.S. aspiration toward 

global dominance. Throughout the development of his argument, Gerasimov asserts Russia’s 

reticence toward NATO and U.S. cooperation and the fear that NATO and the United 

States will continue its trend of inciting “color revolutions” that threaten ethnic Russians 

living in the federation’s near abroad.29 Russian anxiety related to the opening of the Arctic 

translated into an increase in their military capability. Currently, Putin is spending $700 

billion to upgrade existing facilities and increase Russia’s Arctic military presence. 

Consequently, if Russia can dominate the Arctic, the United States and NATO will 

necessarily be more vulnerable. Russia could exploit the Arctic maneuver space to attack 

its contiguous neighbors more easily. To challenge this advantage, NATO and the United 

States must increase Russia’s potential risk by fully committing to regional engagement, 

assurance, deterrence, and compellence along NATO’s flank.30 Currently, Russia maintains 

26 “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy,” 4.

27 Ibid., 3.

28 Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review (January–February 2016): 30–38. 29 The three color revolutions, a term coined by the press, were the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. See Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia 

and the ‘Color Revolution’: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West,” Center 

for Strategic & International Studies, 28 May 2014.

30 Public policy professor Thomas C. Schelling, in Arms and Influence, explains compellence in opposition to deterrence, so that instead of discouraging an adversary from acting it “involves initiating an action” and to compel 

means that “one gets up enough momentum . . . to make the other act to avoid collision.” See Schelling, Arms and 

Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 71–72. 
50 | Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

a significant advantage in conventional force strength along its border in former Warsaw 

Pact nations and the Baltic countries. Conversely, the economic and political strength of 

NATO and the European Union provides numerous opportunities to help defend and assure the sovereignty of NATO partners by removing low-end, deniable, and ambiguous 

options from Russia. 

The United States must develop an operational concept for NATO that provides assurance to its allies and deters additional Russian aggression in the region. Based on wargame 

findings that focused on the defense of NATO’s Eastern Flank, David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson concluded that a future concept must be “sufficient to mount a sustained 

defense of the region . . . achieve NATO’s ultimate end state of restoring its members’ territorial integrity,” and “change the strategic picture as seen from Moscow.”31 Shlapak’s and 

Johnson’s stated requirements identify the significant threat Russia poses to the vulnerable 

Baltic states, but fail to take into account the altered strategic circumstances as compared 

to the Cold War. For example, how does a diminished NATO and U.S. military presence in 

Europe affect their options? How does contemporary European military geography affect 

its defense? In contrast, the implementation of the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle strategy 

occurred during an era of large NATO military budgets. Further, AirLand Battle assumed 

defensive and offensive maneuver space in Germany that far exceeds what is available in the 

Baltic states.32

The challenge for the West, therefore, is to develop a solution consonant with today’s 

operating environment, while meeting the reality of the Russian threat. Maintaining open 

Arctic SLOCs is a long-term, strategic challenge with impacts across all components of 

national power. It includes, however, a near-term requirement for the United States and its 

allies to deter aggressive actions in vulnerable nations, such as the Baltic flank, with credible 

military solutions. 

Recommendations

The Special Operating Forces (SOF) Phase 0–Shape activities provide ideal instruments to 

counter Russia’s ability to institute ambiguous warfare, including activities related to foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), security force assistance (SFA), as 

well as host nation and partnered forces training to improve cross-domain synergy within 

the host nations and partnered forces. Assignment of permanent and rotational U.S. and 

31 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, 2. 32 For more on the AirLand Battle concept, see Douglas W. Skinner, Airland Battle Doctrine (Alexandria, VA: 

CNA, 1988).
Cold War Redux | 51

NATO SOF to vulnerable NATO countries to train national defense forces reduces the opportunity for Russia to recruit and train potential insurgents or rebels in an unconventional 

warfare environment. The loss of sympathetic elements in the host nation’s military eliminates Russia’s ability to use deniable, low-cost forces to sow disunity and confusion. This 

denies any aggressor a soft target and increases the cost of operating in NATO territory. 

Any concept that addresses the complex, multidomain operational problem posed by 

Russia must address how the federation intends to maximize its Arctic advantage and sea 

denial capability. Many analysts assume that, in the long term, the Arctic ice will continue 

to melt and the NSR will become a key geographic area similar to the Panama Canal or the 

Strait of Hormuz. When international commercial traffic starts using the NSR with greater 

frequency, Moscow could continue its aggressive and provocative behavior by threatening 

to close or limit access to the NSR. Russia will likely combine this with harassing and destabilizing activities beneath the legal and popular thresholds necessary for opposition to 

respond with armed forces.

Increasing the amount of SOF in theater by one Operational Detachment Bravo or Marine Raider Company equivalent would enhance the assigned special forces units in theater 

with immediate impact forces and organic command and control, doing so without changes 

to existing doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 

improvement cycles. Additionally, the commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 

could receive the East Coast Expeditionary Strike Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ESG/

MEU), which would still be able to support contingency operations in U.S. Africa Command, which exceeds the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force’s capability. The 

commander of EUCOM would task the assigned forces with increasing vulnerable NATO, 

European Union, and partner countries’ capability to deter, deny, and defend their territories through FID initiatives, military-to-military engagements, and bilateral/multinational 

exercises. 

Finally, in partnership with the U.S. Department of State, NATO must ensure vulnerable border nations receive defensive and offensive missile capability, such as integrated, 

ballistic missile defense systems, commensurate with Russia’s sovereign Arctic offensive 

capability. The additional, concentrated capability would expand NATO’s Smart Defence 

initiative and reduce Russia’s operational options. The assigned and rotational forces would 

incorporate the enhanced capability into the previously mentioned continuum and plan 

for its use during denial and offensive operations against a determined adversary. All of the 

proposed options would assure NATO partners and deter Russia by eliminating its ability 

to accuse the West of initiating color revolutions. The elevated cost reduces Russia’s opera-
52 | Major Stephen E. DeTrinis

tional maneuver space between low-level incursions and nuclear conflict with NATO in the 

near term, transferring the focus to the Arctic in the long term.

During the past 15 years, U.S. operating concepts have focused on understanding, preparing for, conducting, and supporting wars of insurgency and counterinsurgency. In recent 

years, a renaissance of concepts has emerged to solve the evolving threats posed by A2/AD 

and the challenge of operating in denied littorals, such as in Joint Forcible Entry Operations 

(JFEO) and Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).33 The JFEO explains, “To be credible 

both as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy enforcement, the Armed Forces 

of the US must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographical areas 

controlled by forces hostile to US interests.”34 The JOAC concept explains how the Joint 

Force will achieve cross-domain synergy and stresses a greater degree of integration across 

domains to maintain tempo.35 While these existing concepts define the challenging environment and direct the Joint Forces to address predictable issues, they leave gaps because 

they lack the clarity of a defined, near-peer adversary against which to organize, train, and 

equip. Moreover, they do not direct the Services to organize, train, and equip in support of 

Geographic Combatant Command priorities.36

The type of threat that Russia poses does not call for profound changes to platforms or 

force structure, but it does provide the opportunity to revisit the deployment of our conventional forces and develop a forward basing infrastructure to better support our strategic 

policies. During the Cold War, the United States recognized how the Soviet Union posed 

a nuclear threat to NATO allies and provided operational and tactical solutions to counter 

it within such strategic and military doctrinal publications as the National Security Council’s NSC-68 and the Army’s field manual, Operations.

37 These documents outlined wholeof-government strategies, including containment and joint operational concepts such as 

AirLand Battle. 

With NATO and the United States facing the resurrection of a globally ambitious Eurasian land power, it is imperative that the West develops new combinations of multidomain 

capabilities as creative solutions to an old problem. A joint Special Operations Command 

33 Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Joint Publication 3-18 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012); and Joint 

Operational Access Concept (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012). 34 Joint Forcible Entry Operations, vii. 35 Joint Operational Access Concept, foreword.

36 The Department of Defense currently supports U.S. geographic commands: Africa, Central, European, Northern, Pacific, and Southern.

37 Executive Secretary, A Report to the National Security Council (Washington, DC: White House, 1950); and Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993).
Cold War Redux | 53

(SOCOM), Navy, and Marine Corps solution could provide an effective balance of Phase 0 

activities, including FID, SFA, and COIN at the low end of the range of military operations 

(ROMO), with the ability to conduct operational maneuver from the sea and forcible entry 

operations, such as lodgment and strike operations. Reallocating the East Coast MEU to 

the EUCOM commander is a return to pre-Global War on Terrorism employment concepts 

that presupposed a defined state adversary in the Soviet Union. This return to historic MEU 

employment is critical to including credible U.S. deterrence and strike capability within 

NATO Smart Defence and globalizing the partnered strike concept.

Conclusion

The Russian Federation’s aggressive foreign policy and use of deniable, scalable tactics to 

destabilize bordering nations threatens NATO’s flanks, specifically the Baltic and Nordic 

countries. The militarization of Russia’s own Arctic flank provides it a near-term operational advantage in the application of military power along its borders and a long-term strategic 

advantage through denial of east-west SLOCs. The United States and NATO must seize 

the initiative by increasing the cost and decreasing the viability of ambiguous and unconventional options across multiple domains. Additional U.S. and NATO SOF, conventional 

units, and ballistic missile capability would help deny Russia the ability to exploit internal 

lines and the Arctic maneuver space. Persistent Phase 0 forces would develop NATO flank 

countries’ internal defense capabilities, improve NATO conventional capabilities, and prepare the environment to deny Russia the ability to manage force escalation. These types 

of actions would enhance NATO’s Smart Defence initiative and deny Russia’s capacity to 

destabilize the alliance, forcing its leaders to adopt costlier, long-term operational and strategic options and minimize the Russian Federation’s near- and mid-term advantages in the 

Arctic. These solutions must be combined and joint, utilizing existing capabilities across 

multiple domains, to provide a creative solution to the emerging Arctic problem, where increasing navigability is enhancing the strategic significance of the region while intensifying 

the operational risk to the United States and NATO within Europe. 
54 

Chapter 4

The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare

Major Anthony Mercado

For more than 15 years, the U.S. Armed Services have been focused on the limited conflicts 

of Iraq and Afghanistan and counterterrorism operations. During this time, many Russian 

military leaders were observing U.S. operations, considering Russian lessons learned from 

recent conflicts, and mining works from master strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz, 

Georgii S. Isserson, and Alexander A. Svechin. Their purpose was to prepare Russian Armed 

Forces for what they saw as the future operational environment. The key conclusion they 

came to is that it is increasingly essential to coordinate and apply all facets of government 

power in the pursuit of national objectives. This paper critically examines Russia’s extensive 

history of experimenting with and employing what is now often referred to as nonlinear 

warfare, a Russian concept involving the simultaneous application of military and nonmilitary means to achieve political goals in a newly dynamic information environment. This 

investigation shows the consistency of the Russian application of unconventional and other 

nonmilitary means of coercion from World War II to contemporary conflicts. 

The United States and its Western allies seemed surprised by the success of the Russian military in Ukraine and Syria as well as its innovative cyberoffensives in Estonia and 

Georgia. During these conflicts, Russia demonstrated a style of warfare that more effectively 

leverages diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power (DIME). This application of a “system of systems” has allowed Russia to minimize or avoid deploying combat 

troops while still achieving its political objectives. Russia’s recent successes will likely lead 

to an increasing number of state and nonstate actors trying to incorporate nonlinear warfare techniques into their military doctrine and operations. As these tactics proliferate and 

diversify, it is critical for military thinkers, politicians, and strategists to understand the 
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 55

Russian history of partisan warfare to fully grasp modern Russian warfare. Since World War 

II, Russia has been willing to use political, economic, and social coercion to accomplish its 

objectives when military force has not been the best tool, adding to the complicated nature 

of postwar global security. The acceleration toward an increasingly complex environment 

challenges military leaders around the world, maybe most pressingly in Eastern Europe.

While the nature of war may be consistent, the character of war changes with time; both 

state and nonstate actors change their tactics, techniques, and procedures in the planning 

and execution of military operations to respond to an evolving, dynamic environment. It is 

apparent that Russia is currently pursuing its foreign policy goals through the coordinated 

and simultaneous employment of multiple military and nonmilitary state tools. In practice, 

this method relies on an effective information operation (IO) campaign supplemented by 

coordinated special forces conducting unconventional warfare (UW) throughout the entire 

spectrum of the conflict.1

 While this type of warfare is currently referred to by a variety of 

terms, such as hybrid or ambiguous, we will use the term nonlinear as recently coined by Russian General Valery Gerasimov in his seminal article on the subject, “The Value of Science 

Is in the Foresight.”2

The Soviet Partisan Movement of World War II 

and the Modern Roots of Nonlinear Warfare

The great Russian military thinkers of the 1930s—Major General Alexander Svechin, Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, and Brigade Commander Georgii Isserson—shaped how the Soviet military perceived war. It was no longer conceived of as a

series of interrupted encounters with the outcome of the entire war decided by one decisive 

battle. Instead, war was considered a continuous chain of synchronized combat efforts in 

space and time throughout the depths of the battlefield.3

 This concept was put into action 

during World War II when Soviet partisans fought against Axis powers in the Soviet Union 

1

 According to Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), unconventional warfare (UW) is defined in joint doctrine as “activities 

conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or 

occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” 

Central to irregular warfare (IW), which involves “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant population(s),” UW involves external parties aiding indigenous actors against 

governments.

2

 Gen Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the 

Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Military Review (2016): 1. 3 BCdr Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art, trans. Bruce W. Menning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2013), 5.
56 | Major Anthony Mercado

and Poland. The Soviet partisan movement played a vital role in this unconventional fight 

by facilitating the transition between deep and close fights, while simultaneously affecting 

German rear operations. Additionally, the partisan movement was pivotal in the ultimate 

success of the Soviets against the German Army of World War II and, therefore, has left 

a lasting imprint on the thoughts and methods of Russian military leaders. It is not surprising, then, that the Russians employed partisans in Crimea to conduct IO, subversion, 

and sabotage while simultaneously employing cyberpartisans to influence and organize via 

social media. The term cyberpartisans is used here to make clear the connection between the 

Soviet Partisan Movement (1941–44) and those substate actors who participate in modern 

cyberwarfare.

The Soviet Partisan Movement established itself during the onset of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia during World War II in 1941. This undertaking used 

elements of past resistance movements coupled with recent advances in communications, 

transportation, and weapons to create havoc in the German rear. During this first phase, its 

early members were small in number and consisted of scattered Red Army unit remnants 

led by their former officers and commissars, all who were bypassed by the advancing German Army.4

 These elements attacked supply chains, field hospitals, and rear guard units, 

which forced the Germans to divert more resources to deal with the partisans instead of 

advancing. In response to the partisans, the Germans mobilized a reservist force of World 

War I veterans and contracted local home guards to act as a rear area security force. In addition to the resistance movement, the Red Army used airborne operations behind enemy 

lines (on occupied Soviet soil) to conduct sabotage, espionage, and reconnaissance missions. 

These forces provided supplies and other support to partisan operations. Soviet agents 

were tasked with damaging or destroying German and Romanian infrastructure, such as 

rail lines, bridges, roads, and pipelines, to create panic; with identifying Soviet citizens 

who collaborated with the Germans; and with demoralizing German troops. Many of these 

missions were carried out by relatively small six- to eight-man units whose members came 

from the districts in which they were operating, giving them an inherent advantage over 

the enemy and increasing their will to accomplish the mission in defense of their homeland. 

Unfortunately for the Soviets, these units were poorly trained, were too often inaccurately inserted, and consequently saw marginal success.5

 Still, they contributed to the overall 

achievements of the Red Army and reinforced and validated the ability of the Communist 

Party to manage complex tasking. The Soviets continued to adapt and better organize the 

4

 Edgar M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956), 43. 5

 Ibid., 63.
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 57

partisan movement and increase its effectiveness, and thus learned the value of government 

support for a centrally directed irregular movement.

The Communist Party directed its members, in conjunction with the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (known then as NKVD and later as KGB), to infiltrate enemy 

lines and establish and lead a partisan force to conduct sabotage operations, foment rebellion, and dissuade those who were, or thought of, assisting the occupying force in any way.6

During this second phase of the movement, partisan membership increased dramatically 

and the groups were more organized. Additionally, the NKVD established destroyer battalions (истребители) whose primary missions included internal security of the Russian 

rear, defense against German airborne attack, and the destruction of all installations not 

destroyed by the Red Army in the case of retreat. In the event these destroyer battalions 

found themselves facing a German advancement, they would allow themselves to be passed 

by and operate as part of the partisan unit in the German rear, conducting sabotage operations and enforcing Soviet loyalty among local residents. The subversive nature of NKVD 

operations, a unit of the state government not accountable to its citizens, set a precedent 

that likely encourages the authoritarian methods of the contemporary Russian government.

As the Germans had penetrated far into the Soviet Union, their harsh occupation policies encouraged greater organic resistance in the vast area of German-occupied Soviet territory. The NKVD recruited, trained, and led partisan forces with the help of Communist 

Party cells. In a famous radio broadcast, USSR dictator Joseph Stalin detailed his “scorched 

earth” policy and directed that in “areas occupied by the enemy, partisan units, mounted or 

on foot, must be formed; sabotage groups must be organized to combat the enemy units, 

to foment partisan warfare everywhere, blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and 

telegraph lines, set fires to the forests, stores, and transport.”7

 Here was an appeal to partisan warfare from the head of state, emphasizing the importance and eventual familiarity 

of this act to the Russian cause. Additionally, the Russian leader announced that he had 

established a State Committee of Defense to stiffen the resistance of the entire nation at all 

levels.8

 The Partisan Movement matured in capacity and capability, ultimately playing a key 

role in the Soviet defeat of the Germans in World War II.

The Soviet government and military formalized the training, employment, and oversight 

of the partisans in occupied territories. Central oversight provided synergy and formed the 

6

 Ibid., 45.

7

 Joseph Stalin (radio broadcast, 3 July 1941).

8

 Arthur Rothstein, trans., Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War: Document and Materials, vol. 2, January 1 

1944–December 31, 1944 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1946), 21–24.
58 | Major Anthony Mercado

partisans and Red Army into something much greater than the sum of their parts, but also 

required the Soviet government to view the operating environment as a multidimensional 

entity. This allowed the Soviet government to view the assigned area and forces as a single, 

fused entity in relation to time, events, space, and purpose. Furthermore, the Soviet government could connect the effects of its forces to all aspects of the operational environment, 

enabling it to assess all the kinetic and nonkinetic effects of the partisan and Red Army’s actions. Partisan members filled positions on the staffs within the Red Army field commands 

and Soviet Army intelligence, while NKVD counterintelligence personnel were attached to 

partisan staffs to control all Soviet intelligence operations in German-occupied areas. These 

attached personnel also assisted the partisans with sabotage, reconnaissance in support of 

combat operations, reconnaissance of base security, and political espionage. In addition, 

partisan units received guidebooks covering such topics as political espionage, intelligence 

gathering, antipartisan tactics, partisan propaganda, German use of native personnel, and 

methods of recruitment.9

 Additionally, the partisans reestablished the Communist Party in 

the German rear to unite the people, enhance anti-German/pro-Communist fervor, prevent 

further defection of Soviet citizens.

Resurrecting the Communist Party in the German rear also served as a self-sustaining 

partisan recruitment tool and set the conditions for a return of Soviet control. These 

Communist Party groups organized the locals to support the partisans by collecting food, 

clothing, and transportation in support of missions. They were then supplied with training and equipment to support the Soviet propaganda machine. Individuals were trained 

as editors, writers, printers, and artists to broadcast and disseminate propaganda material 

in German-occupied areas and over the illegal partisan radio stations. The selective subject 

matter consisted of Red Army and partisan victories, German intentions to reduce Russia 

to colonial status, stories of German atrocities, the German slave labor program, and the 

promise that the Red Army would prevail. The targets of the propaganda were primarily 

native (Soviet citizen) units serving under the Germans. By late spring 1942, these units saw 

considerable defections, and therefore, hampered German security and intelligence operations.10

Through this massive partisan operation, the Russians gained extensive knowledge and 

experience in diverse UW activities, such as establishing, training, supporting, and tasking 

a partisan force and the interoperability of that partisan force with formal military and intelligence operations. The movement helped develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for 

9

 Ibid., 51. 

10 Mao Tse-tung, The Turning Point in World War II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1968).
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 59

the conduct of UW, which assisted Russian political and military leaders in future conflicts, 

and more important, in conjunction with political instruments and overt military action. 

Specifically, the Russians used their experience to deal with the anti-Soviet resistance in 

Lithuania. 

Countering Anti-Soviet Resistance in Lithuania

On 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 

(or German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact) just days prior to the beginning of World War II. 

Eastern Europe was divided into German and Soviet spheres of influence. Finland, Estonia, 

Latvia, and Bessarabia were apportioned to the Soviet sphere by the “secret protocols.”11 Poland was to be divided with the areas east of the Narev, Vistula, and San rivers going to the 

Soviet Union, while Germany would occupy the area west of the rivers. On 28 September 

1939, the three Baltic states were given no choice but to sign a pact of “Mutual Assistance,” 

which permitted the Soviet Union to station troops in their countries.12 The same day, a 

supplementary German-Soviet directive transferred most of Lithuania from the German 

to the Soviet sphere of interest. This pact gave the Soviet Union the land buffer it desired 

in the west, prevented the Soviet Union from entering the war against Germany, and kept 

Germany from fighting a war on two fronts. A puppet Lithuanian government voted unanimously to join the Soviet Union on 21 July 1940. Although Lithuania disappeared from 

the map of Europe, the majority of Western countries did not recognize the annexation (as 

is the situation with Crimea today). Lithuanian national resistance to Soviet domination 

and brutality grew steadily from a largely political and social movement into an organized 

partisan movement. 

The Soviet Union, aware of the civil unrest caused by the annexation, focused its efforts 

on identifying and tracking political figures and other potentially influential anti-Soviet 

individuals. These people often faced imprisonment, torture, or deportation to Siberia.13

Despite Soviet persecution of dissidents, numerous underground organizations formed 

throughout the country, although they lacked a centralized, cohesive chain of command. 

The most prominent of these early partisan groups was the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) 

headquartered in Berlin. When German Army invaded the USSR, the LAF organized a revolt on the 22 June 1941 and formed a short-lived provisional government. In many villages, 

11 A secret protocol was appended to the original public pact on the same date, which divided Eastern Europe, 

while a second protocol was signed on 28 September 1939, clarifying Lithuania’s borders.

12 See “Pact of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Estonia,” Lituanus 14, no. 2 (1968): 94–96. 13 Mao, The Turning Point in World War II, 25.
60 | Major Anthony Mercado

Nazi occupation was supported in response to promises of sovereignty. Almost immediately 

after seizing the Lithuanian capital, the Germans attempted to mobilize Lithuanians for 

assistance in their war against the Allies. The Lithuanians, however, eventually resisted these 

attempts and successfully prevented the establishment, unlike the other Baltic states, of a 

Lithuanian SS formation in the service of Germany, despite some support for the Germans’ 

anti-Semitic program by a minority of Lithuanians. Ultimately, by the end of 1944, the Red 

Army returned and regained control of Lithuania.

During the Soviet reoccupation of Lithuania, the cruel actions of the Soviets—murder, 

torture, execution of civilians, and the destruction of private property—provoked the resistance movement into violence.14 In the first year of partisan warfare, while World War II 

was still ongoing, approximately 10,000 Lithuanians were killed by the Soviet government, 

about half of the total deaths the nation suffered in the war. Men avoided conscription to 

the Red Army; instead, they hid in the forests and joined the Lithuanian partisans. The 

most active organizer of partisan recruitment and resistance during the Soviet reoccupation 

of 1944 was the Lithuanian Liberation Army (LLA). The LLA mission was to mobilize the 

resistance, defend the country, obstruct the formation of occupying bodies, and resist Red 

Army conscription to hold democratic parliamentary elections and reestablish the sovereign nation of Lithuania. They had a formal chain of command and rank structure, required 

partisans to take an oath of loyalty to the country and the partisan movement, possessed an 

ability to train and equip partisans, and even had military uniforms. These newly formed 

Lithuanian troops, who displaced themselves to the forests to train, plan, rest, and refit became known as the Forest Brothers.15 By spring 1945, about 30,000 Lithuanians were actively 

fighting Soviet rule. Their leadership was partly comprised of former Lithuanian Army officers with combat experience in World War I or II. The resistance force’s discipline, training, 

and support of the local people caused the Russian Red Army and NKVD to refine their 

tactics to more effectively collect information and conduct operations against the partisan 

movement. 

Initially, apparently having learned nothing from the failure of the Germans, Soviet 

countermeasures were heavy-handed. In 1944, Red Army commanders seriously considered 

14 Juozas Daumantas, Fighters for Freedom: Lithuanian Partisans versus the U.S.S.R., 1944–1947 (New York: Manyland 

Books, 1975), 33.

15 Daniel J. Kaszeta, “Lithuanian Resistance to Foreign Occupation, 1940–1952,” Lituanus 34, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 5–32.
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 61

a proposal to deport the entire Lithuanian population to Siberia.16 The Soviet leadership 

ignored all recommendations for less aggressive measures to deal with the partisans and 

ordered the execution of civilians suspected of supporting the resistance and burned their 

farms and villages. Soviet soldiers carried out these orders and committed atrocities in the 

process. By 1947, the Soviets had to admit their measures were as ineffectual as they were 

cruel. If anything, they only made the partisans stronger by increasing their civilian support. 

To counter Soviet aggression and increase efficiency, the partisans decentralized their command and control by organizing into smaller groups and dividing their area of operations 

into districts. The Soviets previously had called upon loyal operatives who had experience in 

WWII partisan warfare and had then successfully suppressed revolts in western Ukraine to 

do the same in Lithuania. One such man was Major A. M. Sokolovov of the Soviet Ministry 

of Internal Affairs, or MVD (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del, formerly the NKVD secret police), 

an infamous counterinsurgency specialist.

The biggest problem in Lithuania, Russian experts decided, was the lack of reliable 

intelligence. Russian agents who attempted to infiltrate the partisan bands were quickly 

captured and killed by the wary Lithuanians. To counter this, the MVD turned to captured 

former Lithuanian insurgents who were amenable to being bribed, retrained, and sent to 

rejoin active partisan groups. Their knowledge of partisan jargon and ability to pass loyalty 

tests made them more useful. Eventually, the MVD organized fake partisan bands that engaged in staged battles with Soviet troops. The survivors of the engagement (MVD agents) 

fled to genuine partisan bands, which welcomed them as battle-tested reinforcements. Additionally, these MVD partisan groups would liberate MVD-held prisoners and deceptively 

obtain information on partisan meeting places, link up procedures, and more. Using this 

newly acquired information, these groups then made contact with partisan units and killed 

them and their families acting in the name of partisans.17 These agents, who received training in surveillance, interrogation, and torture from a special Soviet secret police school, 

were known as spetsgruppa (special forces groupings) by the Soviets and stribai (destroyers) 

by the Lithuanians. They were extremely effective. Information recently uncovered in the 

Soviet archives reveals that, by 1949, the spetsgruppa had infiltrated partisan units to their 

very highest levels. Soviet agents identified insurgent leaders and their civilian supporters, 

and even penetrated Lithuanian expatriate organizations in the West. 

16 Arvydas Anušauskas, The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States (Lithuania: Genocide and Resistance Centre 

of Lithuania, 1999), 27.

17 Ibid., 31.
62 | Major Anthony Mercado

These operations spread paranoia and provoked counterproductive partisan reprisals 

against suspected collaborators. The partisans responded by organizing reprisal actions 

against the collaborators with the Soviets. It is estimated that the partisans killed 19,000 

such collaborators.18 This aspect of the partisan warfare allowed the Soviets to portray the 

guerrilla fighters as “murderous bandits.” This led to the sharp decline of the partisan movement’s effectiveness and recruitment in Lithuania. The Soviets declared that organized partisan resistance had been completely destroyed by 1952. The Soviets had successfully refined 

and implemented the lessons learned during their WWII partisan operations in unconventional warfare to successfully counter the Lithuanian partisan movement from 1946 to 1952, 

including a full understanding of partisan tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Russians 

used an emphasis on political views to identify threats, to infiltrate the partisan units causing distrust, and to allow the guerrillas to turn on themselves—a divide and conquer tactic. 

Unfortunately for the Soviets, the lessons learned during WWII did not carryover to their 

conflict in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

Russian military involvement in Afghanistan has a long history, going back to Tsarist expansions in the so-called “Great Game” between Russia and Britain. This interest in the 

region continued on through the Soviet era, with billions in economic and military aid 

sent to Afghanistan between 1955 and 1978. Few in the West, however, took notice until 

the Soviets took the city of Kabul in 1979. This was the first time in several decades that the 

Russians fought an unconventional war against an enemy that used guerrilla-style tactics. 

Up to this point, the Russians had successfully conducted and thwarted unconventional 

means of warfare. Moreover, during the Soviet-Afghan War, the Russians made significant 

mistakes, including a failure to review past lessons learned and to prepare for the type of 

war they would be fighting. This ultimately led to a strategic defeat.

After World War II, the Soviet Union made a concerted effort, often in competition 

with Western powers, to win over Afghanistan and bring it into the Soviet sphere of influence. As of 1946, the Afghan government could be characterized as a limited democracy 

headed by a monarch but governed under a parliamentary structure.19 In 1953, Lieutenant 

General Mohammad Daud Khan assumed the office of prime minister and worked to internally modernize the country and broaden its international economic ties by propositioning 

18 V. Stanley Vardys, “The Partisan Movement in Postwar Lithuania,” Lituanus 15, no.1 (Spring 1969). 19 I. Mironov and G. Polyakov, “Afghanistan: The Beginning of a New Life,” International Affairs, no. 3 (March 

1979): 54.
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 63

the Soviet Union to engage in talks with Afghanistan regarding economics and security. 

The relationship eventually flourished, and in 1956, the Soviet Union agreed to train and 

equip the Afghan Army. Additionally, the Soviet Union improved the infrastructure of the 

country, spending in excess of $1 billion U.S. dollars by the mid-1970s.20

Intense opposition from factions of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daud’s regime and the 

death of a leading PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber, in April 1978.21 The mysterious circumstances of Khyber’s death sparked massive anti-Daud demonstrations in Kabul, which 

resulted in the arrest of several prominent PDPA leaders.22 On 27 April 1978, the Afghan 

Army, which had been sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executed Daud along 

with members of his family as a part of what is typically called the Afghan Spring Revolution. Nur Muhammad Taraki, secretary general of the PDPA, became president of the 

Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the newly established Democratic Republic 

of Afghanistan (DRA).

Prime Minister Taraki agreed to a more concrete and long-term relationship between 

the DRA and the Soviet Union. Political turmoil ensued as power struggles among political 

parties erupted, fracturing the government and splintering the population. Then, Turaki’s 

key rival, Hafizullah Amin, seized power in September 1979. The Soviet leadership placated 

Amin through general political talks but did not trust him. Amin perpetuated a policy of 

rapid modernization along socialist principles, antagonizing an already uncertain population that remained devoted to the Muslim way of life.23

The agreed-upon purpose for the eventual Russian intervention was to assist the Afghan 

people and the DRA in their efforts to suppress the revolution of mercenary bandits and 

their foreign sponsors (United States, China, and several Islamic states).24 The Soviet Union 

viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as a very limited insurgency that could be defeated with 

minimal Soviet involvement. The plan was to destroy the insurgency while the DRA army 

was being resuscitated, and then have the DRA army take over and claim victory over the 

insurgency. The invasion also provided the opportunity for the Soviet Union to install a 

20 Robert Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Leavenworth Papers No. 20 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies 

Institute, 1993), 129.

21 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1983), 72–73. 22 A. Z. Hilali, “The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies

18, no. 4 (2005): 709, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040500354984.

23 J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University, 1986), 24.

24 Ibid., 132.
64 | Major Anthony Mercado

pro-Soviet government. Very quickly, the Soviets realized that the populations’ dislike of the 

current government was fueling an insurgency that dwarfed the DRA army’s capacity and 

resources. Paradoxically, the Soviet intervention intensified the struggle by providing a fragmented and unorganized resistance with a common focus and enemy, just as the Germans’ 

offenses had inspired unity among Soviet peoples in World War II. Additionally, the Soviet 

intervention denied the DRA the credibility necessary for DRA legitimacy and survival. 

Ignoring past successes in dealing with resistance movements—specifically knowing the type 

of war being fought and knowing the enemy—the Soviets made a number of assumptions 

based on “like” areas of operation they had studied, specifically making fallacious comparisons with Iran. The higher staffs and political leaders failed to use their ties with their 

Afghan allies and Russian personnel on the ground to answer specific questions about the 

enemy (e.g., disposition, motivation, organization, size, and source of support).

Russian heavy-handedness with the local populace caused a violent reaction and further support for the insurgency as it had with the Lithuanian partisans decades before. The 

military and diplomatic strategies for increasing DRA military capacity and infrastructure 

improvements had minimal positive effect compared to the enormous efforts put forward 

by the Soviet Union. Another important lesson, which emerges from the early years of 

Soviet operations against the insurgency in Afghanistan, was that the inflexibility of the 

lower-level commanders to adapt to the unconventional and nonstandard tactical solutions 

was a critical weakness. This is attributed to the conventional orientation and rigid training 

of both the troops and officer cadre, which have little utility in a fluid counterinsurgency 

scenario. Although the Russians made early tactical adjustments to their strategy, they continued to employ large military formations according to the rules of conventional warfare 

without effect and with the hopes of winning through overwhelming military force.25

Soviet journalist A. Bovin, writing for the publication Izvestiia in December 1988, 

summed up the situation best when he wrote that “the overall effect of the presence of 

Soviet troops and their participation in combat operations clearly proved negative. We ourselves handed the counter-revolutionary forces some powerful means of influencing public 

perceptions. The foreign intervention stirred patriotism, and the appearance of ‘infidels’ 

spawned religious intolerance. On such a field, even a tie would have been miraculous.”26

The Soviets were slow in devising a counterinsurgency strategy to meet the growing threat 

in Afghanistan. More often than not, the response was reactive rather than proactive. There 

25 Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), 34. 26 A. Bovin, “A Difficult Decade,” translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 40, no. 51 (1988): 10–11. Originally published in Izvestiia, 23 December 1988.
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 65

were deficiencies in Soviet employment philosophy, which was based on a rigid command 

and control structure and rigid reactions. Under this system, the Soviet forces were no 

match for the decentralized and agile insurgents. The Russians increasingly relied on their 

special forces (spetsnaz) and had initial successes; however, they failed to adequately adapt to 

the Afghan tactical situation. While Afghanistan proved a profound disaster for the USSR, 

hastening the demise of the country, lessons were learned. The experience helped convince 

military strategists that using a holistic unconventional approach to defeating adversaries is 

essential to success in all conflicts. The first real subsequent employment of this idea was in 

Russia’s invasion of Georgia.

The Invasion of Georgia

Following Georgian independence in 1991, secessionists seeking to remain part of Russia 

seized control, amid armed conflict with the central Georgian government, of the majority 

of Abkhazia and portions of South Ossetia before ceasefire agreements were reached in 

1992 and 1994.27 These conflicts remained unresolved and formed the roots for the five-day 

war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Although the Russian Army eventually 

invaded Georgia’s territory outside of Abkhazia and Ossetia, responsibility for initiating 

hostilities at that time is still debated. What is not debated is that there were numerous 

coordinated Russian cyberattacks that accompanied the military campaign. This represents 

the first instance of a large-scale computer network attack conducted in conjunction with 

major ground combat operations. The cyberattack had a significant informational and psychological impact on Georgia; it effectively isolated Georgia, if only briefly, from the outside world. The Russians used cyberpartisans to digitally infiltrate behind enemy lines and 

conduct sabotage operations to dismantle enemy command and control capabilities and set 

the conditions for employment of ground forces.

On the surface, cyberpower would not appear to be particularly useful in a war with 

Georgia at that time. Only 7 percent of the citizens used the Internet daily, which might 

cause one to disregard Georgia’s critical cybervulnerability.28 Like partisan warfare of 

the past, however, aggressors can use the cyberspace domain as a means to gain an advantage—military, economic, or political—over an adversary to set the conditions for follow-on actions. More than half of Georgia’s 13 Internet connections to the outside world 

passed through Turkish or Azerbaijani Internet service providers, many of which were in 

27 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts,” CNN Library, 31 March 2016.

28 Eneken Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified (Tallinn, Estonia: Cooperative Cyber 

Defence Centre of Excellence, 2008), 5. 
66 | Major Anthony Mercado

turn routed through Russia.29 Georgia’s Internet infrastructure suffered from a lack of internal connections known as Internet exchange points.30 Consequently, a Georgian user’s 

request for a Georgian website would more than likely be routed through Russia.31 As a 

result, pro-Russian forces and offensive Russian cyberpartisans could employ cyberwarfare 

to affect a large percentage of Georgia’s access to, and use of, the Internet. Lacking control 

of the infrastructure required for external or internal Internet use, Georgia could neither 

disperse network traffic nor cut Internet connectivity from abroad as defensive measures 

without ceding the cyberadvantages of Internet access if the state came under cyberattack.32

This gave the Russians instant access to the public to spread pro-Russian and anti-Georgian 

propaganda and control the information going to the international community. Additionally, the Russians interrupted Geocell, the Georgian cell phone service provider, cutting off 

command and control capabilities for the Georgian military. The Russians also monitored 

Georgian leadership’s cell phone conversations. Targeting cyberinfrastructure as a valued 

and vulnerable political asset reveals Russia’s appreciation of lessons learned from past partisan activities.

Initially, Russian hackers primarily launched distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to prevent the use of legitimate computer resources. One way to categorize DDoS 

attacks is to differentiate between semantic and brute force attacks. A semantic DDoS takes 

advantage of either a feature or bug in some software on the target system. A brute force (or 

flooding) DDoS attack occurs when the target system receives more Internet traffic than it 

can handle, which exhausts the command and control resources of the server, rendering it 

unavailable.33

The DDoS attacks were carried out primarily by botnets or groups of computers on the 

Internet (termed bots or zombies) that have been infected with a piece of software known as 

malware.34 The malware allows a “command and control” server to issue commands to these 

bots. Often, botnets launch spam email campaigns, but they can also be used to launch 

wide-scale DDoS attacks. The hijacking of the zombie computers typically occurs in the 

same manner as infections with other viruses (e.g., email scams, fake websites, infected documents). The communication from the command and control computer to the zombies is 

29 “Georgia, Russia: The Cyberwarfare Angle,” Stratfor.com, 12 August 2008. 

30 Ben Arnoldy, “Cyberspace: New Frontier in Conflicts,” Christian Science Monitor, 13 August 2008. 31 Ibid.

32 Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, 5. 33 Ibid.

34 John Bumgarner and Scott Borg, Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign Against Georgia in August of 

2008, Cyberwar Resources Guide Item #138 (U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, 2009), 2–3.
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 67

conducted over seemingly innocuous channels on the network (i.e., a channel normally used 

for Internet chat) to prevent discovery. Criminal organizations, such as the Russian Business Network (RBN), use and lease botnets for various purposes; the botnets used in the 

onslaught against Georgian websites were affiliated with Russian criminal organizations, 

including RBN, meaning Russia used any means necessary and all available assets to conduct 

war.

The attacks primarily targeted Georgian government and media websites with DDoS 

incidents. The Georgian networks, due to their fragile infrastructure, were more susceptible to flooding than the Estonian networks that Russian hackers attacked a year earlier. 

In the second phase, Russian cyberoperations expanded to inflict damage on more targets, 

including financial institutions, businesses, educational institutions, Western media (BBC 

and CNN), and a Georgian hacker website.35 The assaults on these servers not only included 

DDoS, but defacements of the websites as well (e.g., pro-Russian propaganda on government 

sites, such as a picture comparing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to Adolf Hitler).36

In addition, several Russian hackers used publicly available email addresses of Georgian politicians to initiate a spam email campaign. These actions displayed the technical prowess of 

the Russian government and further demonstrated the importance of harnessing all forms 

of national power in the pursuit of military and political success.

In conjunction with an effective cyber campaign, the Russians had stoked local discontent among ethnic Abkhaz and South Ossetians for many years prior to the invasion 

to make it harder for Georgia to pursue peaceful reconciliation. In this way, Russia empowered the regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and pursued aggressive information 

operations in both territories to strengthen the perception of Georgia as an enemy among 

the local population. Additionally, Russia bolstered peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia to discourage the spread of the color revolutions that had been successful in 

other parts of the former Soviet Union. In July 2008, these peacekeeping forces conducted 

an exercise dubbed Caucasus 2008 consisting of at least 8,000 troops, 700 military vehicles, 

and more than 30 aircraft. According to Russian officials, the main purpose of the exercise 

was to train for antiterrorism operations and to practice peace-enforcement operations in 

zones of conflict.37

The overall success of the conflict was due, in part, to the preparation of Russian general 

35 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.”

36 Capt Paulo Shakarian, “The 2008 Russian Cyber Campaign against Georgia,” Military Review, November–

December 2011.

37 Carolina Vendil Pallin and Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences,” Small 

Wars & Insurgencies 20, no. 2 (2009): 400–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310902975539. 
68 | Major Anthony Mercado

staff. Their detailed operational planning, coordination, and effective implementation of 

all facets of government power, with a focus on strategic surprise, kept the war at a limited 

level to make politics decisive. Nonetheless, the Russian Armed Forces’ conventional performance was subpar.Ruslan Pukhov, the director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and 

Technologies in Moscow, said that “the victory over the Georgian army . . . should become 

for Russia not a cause for euphoria and excessive joy, but serve to speed up military transformations.”38 The Russians heeded Pukhov’s advice, and evidence of this transformation was 

found in the invasion of Crimea.

The Invasion of Crimea

The 2014 Russian operation in Crimea was an impressive demonstration of the effective employment of strategic communication, covert operations, tactical information operations, 

and political subversion. This successful nonlinear campaign resulted in the Ukrainian military surrendering all of their 190 bases without a shot fired.39 Instead of relying on a mass 

deployment of tanks and artillery as in wars of the past, the Russians deployed fewer than 

10,000 assault troops, mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea. These naval units 

were backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and spetsnaz—all denying they were 

Russian soldiers—against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel.40

Russia pursued political subversion through the use of mass media outlets for information operations, the encouragement of underground partisans, and highlighted government 

corruption. For example, components of Russia’s foreign policy in Ukraine, specifically to 

support and increase the number of Russian speakers in the region and the number of 

Ukrainian citizens who identify with the Russian culture, are part of a long-term strategy 

of political subversion. Additionally, the surreptitious organization of pro-Russian demonstrations in the city of Sevastopol in February 2014 is another example. The use of proxies 

was emphasized in subsequent efforts with a step up in intensity through cyberattacks, the 

seizure of local government buildings, arming and training the underground resistance, and 

the employment of certain special operations forces to conduct unconventional warfare. 

Additionally, the Russians initiated the surreptitious introduction of heavy weapons to the 

resistance force and the integration of these forces into a Russian command structure, similar to how Soviet partisans during World War II functioned under the NKVD umbrella. 

38 Christian Lowe, “Georgia War Shows Russian Army Strong but Flawed,” Reuters, 20 August 2008. 

39 Jānis Bērziņš, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper 

no. 2 (Riga, Latvia: National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, 2014), 4.

40 Ibid., 5.
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 69

On 27 February 2014, a pro-Russian resistance force assisted by spetsnaz captured several 

government buildings, including the parliament in Simferopol on the Crimean Peninsula.41

Russia conducted this aggression under the coercive cover of its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s 

nuclear threats and large-scale regional military exercises support this type of coercion. Dr. 

Philip Karber, president of the Potomac Foundation and a frontline observer of the war in 

eastern Ukraine, argues that as the level of intensity increases in nonlinear warfare, a shift 

occurs from covert operations to overt operations; however, covert operations are continuous. Although Karber’s argument sounds linear in nature, it is actually a nonlinear process. 

Before the commencement of boots-on-the-ground military operations, Russia led with a 

strong and effective information operations campaign.

Russia’s information operations and use of cyberwarfare in Ukraine can be characterized by a high level of sophistication, orchestration, and planning, far superior to operations 

in Georgia but equal in sophistication (based on the technology of the time) to that of the 

Partisan Movement during World War II. Rather than adopting a singular, uniform information operations strategy for all audiences, Russia deployed a well-planned information 

operations strategy within Ukraine while simultaneously employing a different information 

operations approach outside of Ukraine against Western media. Inside Ukraine, Russia’s 

investment in supporting Russian identity, including the promotion of Russian language 

and culture during the previous decade, essentially expanded the audience they could influence. Russia subsequently targeted this section of the Ukrainian population with information operations using the full spectrum of media outlets (e.g., Internet, radio, television, 

social media, and even direct SMS messaging to individual Ukrainian soldiers) to secure 

the population’s support for military actions in Ukraine.42 To disrupt the Western narrative condemning Russia’s actions, the combination of disinformation and criticism through 

various media outlets was delivered in multiple languages, such as English, Arabic, French, 

Spanish, German, and other popular dialects. As a result, Russia was able to use media outlets to create an information space supporting military operations in Ukraine well before 

there were Russian boots on the ground. Simultaneously, the Russians exploited cyberspace 

to influence, cripple, and demoralize the Ukrainian leadership, military, and society. This 

level of subversive activity is generally unfamiliar to U.S. military leaders who tend to delineate the start of hostilities by the employment of conventional forces. In this way, and 

even compared to Georgia, the cyberattacks in Crimea and parts of the Ukraine are more 

sophisticated and commenced years before the actual military conflict.

41 Amanda Macias, “A Detailed Look at How Russia Annexed Crimea,” Business Insider, 24 March 2015. 42 Nicole Gaouette, “Sanctions-Strapped Russia Outguns the U.S. in Information War,” Bloomberg, 2 April 2015.
70 | Major Anthony Mercado

During the Ukrainian revolution and Russian invasion, the head of Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team, Nikolay Koval, stated that cyberattacks rose in parallel 

with ongoing political events in both number and severity.43 In 2012, Russian (or pro-Russian) hackers vandalized Ukrainian government websites with politically motivated digital 

graffiti. In 2013, Ukrainian network defenders discovered new and more menacing forms 

of malware, such as RedOctober, MiniDuke, and NetTraveler. In 2014, hacktivist groups 

(e.g., CyberBerkut) published stolen Ukrainian government documents, though counterintuitively; there was minimal proxy use by the Russians during the cyberwarfare campaign. 

Additionally, in Crimea, attacks ranged from cutting network cables to commandeering 

satellites. In eastern Ukraine, cyberespionage such as the use of location data from mobile 

phones and Wi-Fi networks aided in targeting Ukrainian Army units, a technique not used 

during the Georgia crisis. Additionally, the region was isolated from the rest of Ukraine by 

Internet censorship and regular forensics checks on citizens’ computers and mobile devices. 

In the past, the Russian (and Soviet) military as a whole has taken a heavy-handed 

approach by using large troop formations to deal with host-nation populations and antiRussian groups, as previously mentioned during the partisan movement in Lithuania and in 

Afghanistan. However, recent Russian behavior shows a tendency to avoid overt military action when possible. These objectives include causing chaos and disrupting civil order, while 

seeking to provoke excessive responses by the state’s security organs, and thus delegitimizing 

the Ukrainian government in Kiev. The change in approach reflected an effective use of a 

population centric mindset. These smaller, specialized forces focused on engaging the population and winning over hearts and minds to garner support for the Russian government. 

These specialized forces were considered polite and professional as they worked with the 

population, encouraged Ukrainian soldiers to defect, and only fired their weapons in the 

air to deter individuals from traveling along certain lines of communication. Additionally, 

to reduce civilian intimidation and to give Russia plausible deniability at first, the spetsnaz 

wore no unit or national insignia.

This change in tactics is best explained by General Valery Gerasimov in his previously 

mentioned article, when he states that one of the major changes in conducting war is the increasing application of political, diplomatic, economic, and other nonmilitary means with 

coordinated military effort.44 Informational resistance opens a plethora of asymmetrical 

possibilities to reduce the combat potential of an enemy. He goes on to quote the great 

43 Kenneth Geers, ed., Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2015), 55. 

44 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” 24.
The Evolution of Russian Nonlinear Warfare | 71

Soviet war theorist Brigade Commander Georgii Isserson, who said, “War in general is not 

declared. It simply begins with already developed military forces. Mobilization and concentration are not part of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in 

1914 but rather, unnoticed, proceed long before that.”45 This purposeful obfuscation reveals 

Russia’s willingness to see warfare as the totality of conflict, something defined as extending 

beyond a call to arms. 

Conclusion

Russia is employing a variety of military and nonmilitary methodologies in an unprecedented manner that continues to surprise the international community. The methods are not 

new, however—only the technology that supports them is new. States have used propaganda, 

unconventional warfare, economic warfare, information operations, and other elements of 

warfare as long as they have existed. As U.S. Army historian Edgar Howell wrote in 1956, 

“The Soviet Partisan Movement which was established in the wake of the German armies invading the USSR in 1941 was, in both conception and scope, the greatest irregular resistance 

movement in the history of warfare.”46 It combined the elements of resistance movements of 

the past with modern technology of the day (1941), such as communications, transportation, 

and weapons, to aid the Red Army in the defeat of the Nazi onslaught.

Due to the recent success of Russia in Georgia and Crimea, an increasing number of 

state and nonstate actors will likely incorporate nonlinear warfare into their military doctrine and operations. As these threats multiply during a time of fiscal constraints and diversify as increasingly hybrid, asymmetric, and ambiguous, it is critical for military thinkers, 

politicians, and strategists to further their understanding of Russian warfare. The United 

States inaccurately labels new techniques of war, however, as hybrid war and unrestricted

war. The United States needs to discontinue the use of trendy terminology to classify the 

ancient practice of war as something new, as it creates undue confusion and friction across 

the Services and the government, which in turn makes it difficult for military leadership to 

develop the right strategy to serve policy. This challenge has long roots and is in full relief 

today. Russians see this evolution clearly, and so now must the West.

45 Ibid., 29. 

46 Howell, Soviet Partisan Movement, 203.
72 

Chapter 5

Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare

Comprehension and Response

Major Isaac D. Moore

The purpose of this paper is to help answer the question: How should we perceive and respond to Russia’s military resurgence and adoption of nonlinear warfare? There has been a 

decrease in the number of U.S. servicemembers stationed in Europe from 300,000 when the 

Cold War ended in 1991 to 30,000 today, which was prompted by an expectation that the 

demise of the Soviet Union would necessarily lead to a more stable security situation in Europe.1

 Unfortunately, Russia has increasingly demonstrated the intent, will, and capability 

to expand its influence through both an evolving nonlinear warfare methodology as well 

as high-end conventional capability. General Joseph Dunford, U.S. chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, emphasized this reality in his confirmation testimony before the U.S. Senate in 2015, stating, “If you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat 

to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia.”2

 Based on this assessment, it is essential 

that the United States understand how Russia might see its renewed military capability as 

a viable method to reach the aggressive national goals articulated in its recently updated 

national security strategy, signed by Vladimir Putin on 31 December 2015, that updated 

1

 Daniel Wiser, “U.S. General: We Have ‘Hugged’ the Russian Bear for Too Long,” Washington Free Beacon, 7 January 2016. 2

 Matthew Rosenberg, “Joint Chiefs Nominee Warns of Threat of Russian Aggression,” New York Times, 9 July 

2015.
Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare | 73

Russia’s National Security Strategy out to 2020.3 Specifically, the rapid evolution of Russia’s approach to adapting warfighting methods to the ever-expanding information sphere 

requires a detailed investigation if we are to gain an understanding sufficient to effectively 

counter any further aggressive plans.

Although the term nonlinear warfare has no specific definition, it is generally characterized by an increased reliance on nonmilitary levers of national power, such as political, economic, informational, and sociocultural. This activity is supplemented by military means 

of a concealed character; for example, information operations (IO) and declared military 

action seen only in the final stages of conflict. Russia has applied nonlinear warfare successfully in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine. The increasing complexity of the operating 

environment will likely make these tactics more common in the future and thus require a 

more deliberate response.

Russian Military Reform after the Cold War

Russia’s adoption of nonlinear warfare is driven both by its overall relative weakness in 

comparison to NATO forces in the post-Soviet period and its long historical familiarity and 

proficiency with unconventional warfare techniques. Despite the U.S. military’s drawdown 

in Europe and prioritization of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia remained 

militarily weak compared to the United States and NATO in Europe for the two decades 

following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia during the past eight years, however, has 

significantly transformed its military. One of the major goals of the transformation was 

to reduce the size of the military, through a rapid and bold rearrangement of forces that 

included firings, staff “flattening,” and consolidating commands from 1.3 to 1 million total 

personnel. In essence this was “the de facto renunciation of a mass mobilization army in 

favor of a more professional and combat-ready outfit.”4

 The ultimate goal was to reinvigorate its military by creating a smaller but more efficient and flexible force along the lines of 

Western professional militaries. 

This was no small task because, since the end of the Cold War, the Russian military 

has been characterized by skeleton units that relied on a long recall and build-up process 

to become operationally ready. In the article “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees 

for Russia,” Putin bluntly assessed the situation in 1999: “When gangs of international ter3

 Carl Schreck, “Putin Signs New Security Strategy Warning of Heightened Risks from West,” Radio Free Europe 

Radio Liberty, 31 December 2015. 4

 Mikhail Barbanov, Konstantin Makienko, and Ruslan Pukhov, Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army (Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, 2012), 15. 
74 | Major Isaac D. Moore

rorists directly attacked Russia, we found ourselves in a tragic situation. To put together 

a 66,000-strong task force, we had to scrape it up, literally, piece by piece, with composite 

battalions and detached companies.” Moreover, he found that “the personnel of the Armed 

Forces exceeded 1,360,000. Yet we had practically no combat-ready units that would be 

prepared to go into action without additional preparations.”5

 The idea of having a 1.3-million-man military that was in reality not combat ready was rooted in both historical precedent and bureaucratic, social, and economic limitations. The Soviet Union also had planned 

to mobilize several million personnel, but only maintained about 20 percent in a state of 

permanent readiness. In this scenario, there would be time to mobilize and mass forces. This 

seems a sound strategy in response to a major conventional threat preceded by indications 

and warnings, but when the Cold War ended, this bloated-but-hollow structure persisted.

Putin signaled his intent regarding comprehensive military reform in 2007 when he 

appointed Anatoly E. Serdyukov, who had served in the tax services rather than the military, to the position of minister of defense. There have been many failed attempts to reform 

the Russian military since the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of which met resistance for 

myriad reasons, such as corruption, entrenched interest groups who fought change, lack of 

financial resources, and lack of political will. Despite nearly nonstop reforms since 1992, the 

main problems inherited from the Soviet era remained more than a decade later. In reality, 

Putin, Serdyukov, and others had been working aggressively toward significant military 

reforms for several years and were making progress; however, poor Russian military performance in the five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 served as a catalyst that enabled 

bold and comprehensive reforms in quick order. Russia had been embarrassed and its leadership seized the moment.6

The primary goals of the reforms were to

• shrink the armed forces to 1 million by 2012 (down from 1.35 million); 

• eliminate 200,000 officer positions to make the military less top-heavy;

• eliminate permanently understrength units;

• streamline command structures by replacing the traditional divisional model with 

flexible brigades under four strategic territorial commands;

• improve training and enhance the military education system; and 

• modernize weapons systems.7

5

 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 February 2012. 6

 Bryce-Rogers, “Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,” 355.

7

 Alexander Golts and Michael Kofman, Russia’s Military: Assessment, Strategy, and Threat (Washington, DC: Center on Global Interests, 2016), 4.
Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare | 75

Serdyukov announced the reforms in October 2008, and by December 2009, Russia had 

implemented “the most radical transformation of the country’s military since the creation 

of the Red Army in 1918.”8

 Significant progress was made in decreasing the focus on mass 

and conscription, in favor of a smaller, but more professional and ready conventional force 

along with expanded special forces capable of fighting limited-scale conflicts and of influencing the local populace before and after armed conflict occurs.

The reforms also significantly increased the amount of money spent on technological 

capabilities required for the smaller and more specialized forces. In support of the transformation, Russia’s State Armaments Program 2020 allocated $616 billion (U.S. dollars) to 

weapons and technology purchases between 2011 and 2022.9

 One of the top priorities of the 

program was to improve the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The increased focus on building a command and control system, which facilitated the type of decentralized execution Western 

militaries have long been capable of, demonstrates that Russian leaders are prioritizing the 

development of specialized elements capable of multiple simultaneous and complex operations over traditional conventional forces.

Although Russia still calls for the containment of NATO through strategic nuclear 

deterrence, the outcome of Russia’s military reform has been a more adaptable and flexible Russian force capable of employment in more limited and unconventional ways. The 

reformed military has evolved and morphed along with Russia’s national military strategy 

during the past few years. As the military has transformed, so have new ideas about how 

best to employ it as a means to achieve national strategy. In 2013, President Putin’s handpicked Russian chief of the general staff, Valery Gerasimov, gave these new ideas structure 

and called for continued refinement of a new type of warfare.

Russian Information Operations Theory and Practice

On 27 February 2013, an important, but unassuming, article appeared in Russia’s MilitaryIndustrial Courier (Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er) entitled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight.”10 The article outlines dynamic and creative methods for a nation to impose its will 

through a combination of nonmilitary and military means. In hindsight, Gerasimov provided a clear picture of how Russia viewed both military and nonmilitary uses of force and 

how they could be applied in the current and future operating environments. Although the 

8

 Barbanov, Makienko, and Pukhov, Military Reform, 7. 9

 Ibid., 3.

10 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight.” 
76 | Major Isaac D. Moore

article received little attention at the time, Russia’s military resurgence and subversive activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have subsequently made the article notorious among 

those debating the future of warfare. 

In both Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Russia employed the theories and practices explained by Gerasimov. Indeed, one can read Gerasimov’s article and match the major concepts with specific events within Russian operations in winter and spring 2014 in Crimea 

and Ukraine, respectively. The rest of this section provides a description of how Russia 

executed Gerasimov’s intent in Crimea and Ukraine, and a brief discussion of what lessons 

Russia learned that may yield implications for the West.

Gerasimov began with the thought that “In the 21st century we have seen a tendency 

toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared 

and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.”11 This statement is significant as Russian leaders initially denied involvement in Crimea, about a year after Gerasimov published his ideas, and continued to behave as if it was not an active participant in 

the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In both cases, Russia never declared war. Gerasimov goes on 

to state that effective methods include “the broad use of political, economic, informational, 

humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest 

potential of the population.”12 It is noteworthy that in Crimea, the annexation, though military personnel were involved, was almost a bloodless affair due to Russia’s use of political, 

informational, and other nonmilitary tactics. While it is true that in Crimea Russia enjoyed 

the advantages of a shared language, ethnicity, and Soviet political legacy, many other diverse countries, particularly in Central Asia, present similar conditions to varying degrees. 

Nonetheless, the level of language, regional expertise, and culture capability that Russian 

forces enjoyed in Crimea can never be achieved outside of the former Soviet space and, 

therefore, limits the applicability of similar methods elsewhere. 

There is a tendency to view nonconventional tactics as new when they are employed 

in novel and challenging ways and in unique contexts. It should be noted that Russia has a 

long history of using political, informational, and nonmilitary measures as well as leveraging 

partisan activity in conjunction with conventional forces. Russian history reflects a tradition of dynamic and ever-changing applications of force, both military and nonmilitary, to 

achieve strategic goals.13 Renowned scholar David M. Glantz describes that what the West 

refers to as nonlinear warfare is rooted in Russian military traditions of pragmatism and 

11 Ibid., 24. 

12 Ibid.

13 Glantz, “The Continuing Influence of Non-linear Warfare on Russian Force Structuring.” 
Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare | 77

adaptation and is more of a continual evolution of warfare than an entirely new form of war. 

He believes that “beneath the surface appearance of apparent chaos and confusion in military affairs, Russian military thought remains remarkably vibrant and imaginative.” Glantz 

emphasizes “continuing debates within the Russian military-theoretical community over 

the nature of future war and the shape and form of forces necessary to conduct it” and that 

this has been true since the early 1900s.14 Gerasimov demonstrates this understanding when 

he quotes Russian and Soviet military leader and thinker Aleksandr Svechin (1899–1938): 

“It is extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war it is necessary to 

work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, demanding the 

establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template.”15

Despite this continuity, in his article, Gerasimov describes a type of warfare that represents a significant departure from that employed by Russia in the past century. Specifically, there are aspects of Russia’s nonlinear warfare that are new. More than any other 

nation state, Russia has developed and implemented the tenets of netwar, a concept defined 

recently by Robert Brose as consisting “of intentional activities to influence the domain of 

human perception via either overt or hidden channels, in which one or more actors seeks 

to impose a desired change upon the perception of another actor, in order that this change 

facilitate second- and third order effects of benefit to them.”16 They have exploited the rapid 

evolution of the information environment by effectively fusing this focus on the societal 

struggles most often associated with low-intensity conflict with cyber, diplomatic, and covert military actions. They also demonstrate an understanding of the idea that the ratio 

of nonmilitary to conventional military methods has been extremely imbalanced toward 

nonconventional tactics. Gerasimov states that “the role of nonmilitary means of achieving 

political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases they have exceeded the power of 

force of weapons in their effectiveness.”17 This statement shows that the head of the Russian 

military believes that the future of warfare is changing; indeed, the article highlights some 

of the methods he intends on employing to keep pace with an evolving world.

Some of the more effective methods of nonlinear warfare—and the ones most challenging for a conventional military force to counter—are old methods combined with new 

technology. IOs are enabled through the Internet, social media (including Twitter and Face14 Ibid., 336–37.

15 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” 29.

16 Robert Brose, “Cyberwar, Netwar, and the Future of Cyberdefense,” in 2015 7th International Conference on Cyber 

Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace, ed. M. Maybaum, A. M. Osula, and L. Lindström (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO 

CCD COE Publications, 2015), 26. 

17 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” 24.
78 | Major Isaac D. Moore

book), and the proliferation of mobile phones. Russia demonstrates the will and the vision to seek the most effective ways to use technology in support of its national objectives. 

Effective IO is central to Russia’s nonlinear warfare—spetsnaz infiltration and agitation, 

state-run media, cyberattacks, and a network of “trolls” enable and contribute to all other 

methods of nonlinear warfare. Although it is a contentious question as to how effective 

Russia’s IO campaign is, it continues to explore new methods and channels.

Russia’s operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine proved the effectiveness of modern 

IO. The Russian military uses slightly different terms to categorize, understand, teach, and 

conduct IO than the United States and its NATO partners. The large volume of competing 

definitions and well-developed IO theories in Russian military debates shows how important it is to Russian political and military strategy. According to Jolanta Darczewska of the 

Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies, there are two main influencers of thought within 

Russia regarding IO—Igor Panarin and Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin. Both advocate comprehensive and practical approaches to executing IO and assume the United States and NATO 

are Russia’s likely adversaries.18

Panarin is a professor and political scientist focused on information warfare, geopolitics, 

and psychology who is influential with the Russian security and diplomacy communities. 

His early writings formed what would become the fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s information warfare doctrine. In a book titled Information World War III: War Against 

Russia, he claimed that “all the so-called ‘colour’ revolutions in the former Soviet space and 

the ‘Arab Spring’ were a product of social control technology and information aggression 

from the United States.”19 The Panarin school of thought believes the best way for Russia to 

execute IO is through a centralized planning mechanism he refers to as the Information KGB, 

who then task and employ Information Spetsnazes, with their activities being broken down 

into the following categories: 

Propaganda (black, grey and white), intelligence (the service which collects information about the opponent), the analytical component (media monitoring and current situation analysis), the organizational component (coordination and steering 

channels, secret agents influencing the media which shapes the opinion of politicians and mass media to take the shape desired by the state involved in information 

warfare, and other combined channels, including special operation forces (sabotage 

18 Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation; A Case Study (Warsaw: 

Centre for Eastern Studies, 2014), 7. 

19 Ibid., 14.
Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare | 79

operations conducted under a foreign flag).20 Most, if not all, elements of this IO 

school of thought were employed during Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Dugin is an influential revanchist political scientist. Similar to Panarin, Dugin suggests 

that the color revolutions were “artificial processes plotted in the West aimed at destabilizing entire regions in the post-Soviet area,” with an ultimate goal of the “disassembly of 

Russian statehood.”21 Dugin publicly supports the idea that the Internet, social media, and 

technology form an important new dimension to engage in conflict with an adversary. The 

main way in which the two intellectuals differ is primarily in the nuance of how they believe 

Russia’s netwar mechanism should be structured. Ultimately though, like Panarin, Dugin 

argues for the importance of creating what he calls the Eurasian Network to wage netwar 

on the Atlantic Network.

The Russian president, in his own writings and public statements, has appeared to embrace parts of both Panarin’s and Dugin’s ideas. In 2012, with Russia’s military reforms underway, Putin’s article “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia” reported 

that “We need to learn to look ahead, ‘over the horizon,’ and estimate threats for 30–50 years 

ahead. It is a serious task that requires that we mobilize the resources of civilian and military science and algorithms of reliable long-term forecasting.” And he asked, “What kind of 

weapons will the Russian Army need? What kind of technical requirements will our defense 

industry have?” Putin also emphasizes that “information and communications technology, 

has fundamentally changed the nature of armed conflict” and that the “military capability 

of a country in space or information countermeasures, especially in cyberspace, will play a 

great, if not decisive, role in determining the nature of an armed conflict.”22

With what at a minimum is at least indirect official permission, Panarin and Dugin 

inspire, coach, and lead a network of IO practitioners, often referred to as trolls. Russia’s 

troll army reportedly consists of hundreds of paid bloggers who work shifts, maintaining 

operations 24 hours a day. These trolls flood Internet forums, comments sections, and social 

networks, often working in teams through proxy servers to spread propaganda that praises 

Putin and Russia’s domestic and international policy, and seeks to discredit the West or at 

least pollute the information environment to Russia’s advantage. This strong focus on IO is 

fundamental to Russia’s current method of nonlinear warfare.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 17.

22 Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia.”
80 | Major Isaac D. Moore

Nonlinear Warfare Case Study: Crimea

In 2014, Russia put its IO theories into practice and achieved impressive results. In the 

annexation of Crimea, Russia used its state-run media to first deny involvement and then 

spread disinformation to build public support within Russia for the annexation. Simultaneously, Russia used IO and netwar within Crimea to foment unrest within ethnic Russian 

communities and among Russian sympathizers. This resulted in a nearly bloodless annexation of Crimea and demonstrated Russia’s successful employment of nonlinear warfare.

In the span of nine days, a crisis occurred, a decision was made, and military forces 

had occupied and annexed Crimea—that is, if one believes that the process started on 23 

February 2014. There is likely more to the story than the official timeline of events offered 

by Putin and officials in the Kremlin. Indeed, Gerasimov’s article, and the way of waging 

war that he outlined, describes the importance of preparatory and shaping operations when 

executing an adapted form of nonlinear warfare. An objective look at the timeline of events, 

informed by Gerasimov’s article, leads to the conclusion that Russia was engaged in nonlinear warfare in Crimea well before the operation was executed (figure 7). 

The model shows direct military action only occurs in Phase 3 when conflict actions 

begin. This implies that, on 23 February, when Putin oriented his commanders to take back 

Crimea, the two phases of “hidden/unnoticed emergence” and “sharpening” were possibly 

already underway in Crimea. Even if one believes that Russia was not involved in shaping 

and preparing Crimea prior to 23 February 2014, then one must be rightfully impressed by 

the speed and flexibility with which Russia’s military can decide, communicate, and execute 

nonlinear operations.

True to the teachings of Panarin and Dugin, Russia dominated the narrative of what 

was actually happening in Crimea. Russia waited to admit its involvement in Crimea until 

its forces had firm control of the region, was certain that events would remain peaceful, and 

was clear that NATO would not become militarily involved. Only then did Russia admit its 

involvement, and even then Russia never admitted to the full extent of its operations there. 

Instead Russian IO pushed disinformation, spread rumors and falsities, and made counteraccusations against the West, in keeping with usual practices.

Nonlinear Warfare Case Study: Eastern Ukraine 

With such success in Crimea, due in large part to the effectiveness of IO, Russian operations in eastern Ukraine offer some glimpses into the shortcomings of nonlinear warfare. 

At this point, despite Russia achieving its objective of creating instability in Ukraine to 

prevent its integration with Western institutions, eastern Ukraine is far from under Russian 
Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare | 81

control. In eastern Ukraine, events on the ground certainly demonstrated the lethality and 

effectiveness of Russian nonlinear and conventional warfare; however, Ukraine’s successful 

resistance so far against Russia’s efforts offers insight into ways to resist nonlinear warfare.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea was, relatively speaking, an efficient and effective event. 

Overall, the conflict resulted in very little actual violence or loss of life. This was not the 

case, however, when Russia became involved in eastern Ukraine. Russian involvement in 

both Crimea and eastern Ukraine is essentially a part of the same overall operation, with 

Figure 7. Phases of Russia’s ambiguous warfare

Adapted from Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 8, 27 February 2013, by MCUP.
82 | Major Isaac D. Moore

Russia’s primary objectives being to gain influence and even territory while preventing 

Ukraine from aligning with what Russia sees as a U.S./NATO/Atlantic sphere of influence.23

It is instructive, therefore, to examine some of the reasons for nonlinear warfare’s varying 

levels of success between Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas Region.

There were many factors that prevented Russia’s operations in Ukraine from achieving 

full success; nevertheless, it is clear that Ukraine’s timely and kinetic response was significant in disrupting the efforts of pro-Russian separatists, Russian agents, and conventional 

forces (both “little green men” and designated forces just east of the Russian border).24 Within three days of the pro-Russian separatists seizing key terrain, Ukraine’s leaders vowed to 

retaliate with force, and did so nine days later. This timely response, though plagued with 

challenges, missteps, poor coordination, and at times excessive force, blunted the initiative 

and momentum of the pro-Russian separatists. This success, in turn, served as a catalyst for 

Russia to deploy more overt and conventional military forces in Ukraine.

National security expert Phillip Karber, after a year in Ukraine researching the conflict, 

noted that “although weakened by two decades of force structure decline, lack of modernized technology, and abject neglect of readiness, the Ukrainian Army conducted the 

largest counter-mobilization of any European army since the end of World War Two.”25 This 

case study shows that conventional defensive actions act as an effective deterrence against 

nonlinear warfare tactics. This is a lesson that should not be lost on NATO. Military force 

capabilities, size, and proximity to the initiation of conflict mattered in Ukraine. 

Conclusion

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concurrent end to the Cold War, the United States and most of the international community hoped that Russia would eventually 

become an open, democratic, and nonthreatening nation. This is reflected in the massive 

U.S. withdrawal from Europe of 300,000 troops down to 30,000. The point of this paper is 

neither to criticize this hope nor the action of the large drawdown of forces; but rather, it 

is to shed light on the reality that Russia’s recent behavior indicates that it does not share 

this vision and the techniques it uses to promote its aggressive agenda should be thoroughly 

understood and actively countered. Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia has steadily 

sought to strengthen its military, and his success is evidenced by the strikingly swift and 

23 Zakem, Saunders, and Antoun, Mobilizing Compatriots. 24 Connell and Evans, “Russia’s Ambiguous Warfare and Implications for the U.S. Marine Corps.” 

25 Phillip A. Karber, “Lessons Learned” from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Personal Observations (Vienna, VA: Potomac 

Foundation, 2015), 33. 
Russia’s Military Resurgence and Adoption of Nonlinear Warfare | 83

broad-reaching military reforms that began in 2008. A pattern of overt aggression in Georgia and Ukraine and subversive activities in the Baltics, Central and Eastern Europe, and 

even the United States provide further evidence of Putin’s malicious intent. 

Along with the military reforms came the evolution of nonlinear warfare in Russia. 

This is less of an entirely new type of warfare, and more of a combination of familiar tactics 

with new technology in a new environment. Nonetheless, Russia’s use of nonlinear warfare 

continues to evolve. With the recent success in Crimea, and operations in eastern Ukraine 

and Syria creating unwanted outcomes for Russia’s competitors, it is logical to believe Gerasimov and Putin will continue to employ nonlinear warfare along Russia’s periphery. Russia’s continuing development and use of nonlinear warfare—including broad IO activities, 

infiltration, agitation, and undeclared troops—is a real challenge for the West. Hoping it just 

stops and goes away, however, is not a responsible course of action. The West is capable of 

defeating this threat, and it is time to implement logical, responsible actions. Russia’s use of 

nonlinear warfare is alarming, but it can, and should, be defeated.
84 

Chapter 6

Key Strategic Terrain of the Baltic 

The Role of Geography in Shaping the History of War

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Del Gaudio (PhD)

In 1904, Halford J. Mackinder published his now-seminal work, “The Geographical Pivot of 

History” (see figure 6).1

 A decade before the First World War, Mackinder’s work demonstrated the connection between the history of Eurasia and strategic considerations of physical 

geography essential to prosecuting a military campaign. A modern reading of Mackinder’s 

work forces the reader to consider what has been widely forgotten regarding the connection 

between war and geography. Historically, belligerents have sought to satisfy strategic ends 

informed by policy through the use of their tactical means. The environment of military 

operations is defined by the influence of geographic space over the course of a set period of 

time. The timing of military operations is further affected by climate. Therefore, the science 

of war comprises elements of other scientific disciplines, including physical geography and 

climatology, which, with the variable of time, define the space of the conflict. These ancillary sciences inform those who must manipulate the environment when they employ the 

creativity of the art of war, and they must tread cautiously as they do so. Indeed, the experience of military professionals around the world in the last 15 years clearly highlights the 

connection of physical geography with the use of technology to influence strategic decision 

making through tactical military actions. Traditionally, it has been at the tactical level that 

military leaders have considered the importance of taking advantage of the environment 

to control key terrain, a location that gives them an advantage over their adversaries. Yet, 

1

 Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” 421–37.
Key Strategic Terrain of the Baltic | 85

recent events continue to demonstrate that key terrain is as important strategically as it is 

tactically, as evidenced by Russia’s activities just beyond its borders.

While Western powers expended tremendous resources and manpower attempting to 

control chaos in their recent wars, a newly awakened Russia showed the world, quite vividly 

in 2014, an ability to create chaos through military operations on the Crimean Peninsula. 

Nowhere else has the meaning of resurgent Russian power in relation to an adversary’s 

physical geography been more important than in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania. Long before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Baltic states were 

made keenly aware of their geography and how it influenced the history of conflict in the 

region, particularly during the wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The zenith 

of geographic study in relation to military operations occurred during the period of Baltic 

independence following the First World War, yet the importance of geography on its own, 

or in combination with other aspects, has not declined in significance for military leaders. 

As the wars of the twentieth century in the Baltic were dominated by operations on the 

land, sea, and air, study of Baltic terrain from this period yields informative thought about 

potential conflict in the twenty-first century that will include operations in cyberspace and 

space. In relation to the geography of Europe in a potential future conflict, Scandinavia and 

the Arctic comprise the Northern Flank and potential maneuver space for military formations, and the Black Sea region forms the Southern Flank, as they were in the Second World 

War (figure 8). This leaves the Baltic region in the central position, becoming key strategic 

terrain. While the term key terrain is typically associated with the tactical employment of 

formations, it should be argued that terrain also can have strategic properties that can yield 

disaster if not attacked or defended. An examination of the Baltic nations during the conduct of past military operations in the region shows the relevance of Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania as key strategic terrain.

Estonia 

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several countries took an active interest in learning more about the physical geography of the Baltic region. Contained in a 

document uncovered at the Estonian National Defence Academy in Tartu, evidence makes 

it abundantly clear that the Estonians knew the Russians and Germans understood more 

about Estonian terrain than most Estonians did.2

 This important and extensively translat2

 Nikolai Reek, Eestimaa Sõjageograafia [Estonian military geography], General Staff Holdings No. 29199 (Tartu: 

Estonian National Defence Academy, 1921). This document was translated with the assistance of Capt Rene 

Toomse of the Estonian Defence Forces. 
86 | Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Del Gaudio

ed work, Estonian Military Geography, was written, compiled, and edited by then-Colonel 

Nikolai Reek in 1920–21.3

 A little-known figure outside of Estonia, Reek was central to the 

Estonian military reform effort following the Estonian War of Independence (1918–20).4

 This 

144-page document details Estonian physical geography as understood prior to 1921 and who 

the main contributors were. Reek did not act alone in the creation of this document. He 

makes it clear in the document’s introduction that he tasked students of the Higher Command and Staff Studies Course (and, at times, senior general staff officers going through the 

Estonian War College) to assist in the collection of information relating to Estonian terrain. 

In the first sentence, Reek states that “All authors writing about Estonian geography agree 

there is not enough material written in Estonian about our homeland. Many of the most 

important works have yet to be written, because they could not be appreciated at the higher 

levels.”5

 In this statement, Reek recognized the need for a document making use of strategic 

and operational considerations of terrain. Continuing to highlight the fact that other coun3

 Ibid., 1. 

4

 August Traksmaa, ed., Eesti Vabadussõda [Estonian war for independence], 1918–1920 (Tallinn, Estonia: Vabadussõja Ajaloo Komitee, 1939), 468. 

5

 Reek, Eestimaa Sõjageograafia, 1. 

Figure 8. NATO flanks and member nations

Encyclopedia Britannica.
Key Strategic Terrain of the Baltic | 87

tries knew more about Estonia than its residents did, Reek wrote, “In German, one can find 

many important works written about the Baltic states, including works on Estonia. However, the German publications are old, while newer works are published abroad making them 

difficult to obtain.”6

 Reek expanded on this point by explaining:

This is the situation with general Estonian geography. It is even worse with Estonian military geography. The Russian and German General Staffs have secret 

publications on the Baltic countries and one can find data on Estonian military 

geography, but the data from those sides is enlightened to suit either the German 

or Russian General Staffs from their perspective. On the other hand, data which 

concerns the state and economics are completely aged. Thirdly, names and descriptions do not correlate to names in Estonian. Lastly, the works are difficult to obtain 

because they are secret.7

It would be no secret how the Soviets were going to break the German hold on Leningrad. Thoughts developed about Baltic terrain during the interwar years that were reflections on actions from the Napoleonic, First World War, and Russian Revolutionary 

periods; combatants refined for action in the Second World War based on advances in 

armored warfare. Soviet forces delivered a crushing attack to Germany’s Army Group North

ending the siege of Leningrad lasting nearly 900 days in January 1944.8

 The Soviet Leningrad 

Front sought to drive a wedge between the German Eighteenth and Sixteenth Armies, the 

major subordinate commands of Army Group North. The goal of Soviet leadership was to 

isolate and destroy German units, while blocking critical avenues of approach for German 

reinforcements attempting to relieve the pressure on the isolated units.9

 To this end, Soviet 

operational plans called for a direct attack across the Narva River in Estonia onto the Narva 

Isthmus during the coldest winter months to avoid losing the tempo of their attack to de6

 Ibid. 

7

 Ibid.

8

 For a full treatment of the siege of Leningrad, see Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad 

(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969). 

9

 To examine Soviet tactical progression in the latter course of the Second World War, see Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, CMH Publication 30-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Center of 

Military History, 1968).
88 | Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Del Gaudio

ploy assault bridging.10 The Soviet leadership also was painfully aware of the German methods of defending in depth where German forces sought to trade physical geographic space 

for time while destroying enemy formations.11 As the Soviets approached Estonia, they confronted German formations occupied in positions along the “Panther Line” along the Narva 

River and Lake Peipus in Estonia.12 Dogged defensive battles allowed the Germans to keep 

the Soviets at bay until the water features were no longer frozen enough to be crossed by 

armor. The combined defensive strength of the Narva River and Lake Peipus eventually 

forced the Soviets to attack Estonia from the south, allowing the Germans the opportunity 

to retrograde precious combat power from the Narva area, following south through Dorpat 

(modern-day Tartu) and into Latvia.13 The Soviets broke the Germans’ control of Estonia by 

September 1944 as they continued their attack from the Estonian mainland into the Estonian Islands, the linchpin of the Baltic states. 

The Soviet advance toward the Baltic islands of Ösel (Saaremaa), Moon (Muhu) and 

Dagö (Hiiumaa) in 1944 was not the first time in the twentieth century the islands would 

be fought over by the Germans and the Russians. During the First World War, in fall 1917, 

the German advance on the eastern front was stopped at the gates of Riga along the Düna 

(Daugava) River (figure 9). As the situation on the western front continued to deteriorate, 

Germany desperately desired to force Russia out of the war to free up combat power to 

be applied on the western front. Loading troops from the 42d German Infantry Division 

aboard transport ships in Libau (Liepaja), Germany conducted a successful amphibious 

attack, code named Operation Albion, on Ösel to operationally envelop Russian forces 

10 The sequencing of Soviet forces in late 1943 through the end of the war makes clear that the Soviet Union’s 

leaders had a clear pattern for how to attack, considering strategic ends in the form of war termination criteria 

along with the terrain and time of year for attack. Kiev and the Ukraine were retaken in fall 1943, while the 

breakout of Leningrad was executed in January 1944. Strategically, the Southern Flank and the ability to feed the 

Soviet people was necessary to enable Soviet forces to quickly secure the Baltic states without the use of precious 

assault bridging. Securing both flanks set the conditions for the Soviet main effort attack into Poland in summer 

1944 that concluded with the destruction of Berlin in April 1945. 

11 Evolving during the new leadership of LtGen Erich Ludendorff and the 1916 publication of The Principles of 

Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare by Col Bauer and Capt Geyer, this technique became the accepted German doctrine of defense. The objective of defense in depth was to force the attacker to expend energy 

and resources while the defender reserves strength. For more on the German defensive concept, see Timothy T. 

Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War, Leavenworth 

Papers No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), 1–36.

12 See GenMaj Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand et al., Retrograde of Army Group North during 1944, Foreign Military 

Studies Department P-035 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1950) for more information on actions in the 

Kurland pocket and operations in Estonia. 

13 Throughout the course of this work, the use of the old German name is followed by the modern native name 

for the same place.
Key Strategic Terrain of the Baltic | 89

operating along the Düna River in Latvia, while strategically placing pressure on St. Petersburg, the Russian capital city.14 Russia, soon after the invasion of Ösel, left the war due to 

the October Revolution (Bolshevik Revolution). There is little evidence to support claims 

Russia left the war as a direct result of this military operation. More likely, it was simply a 

product of coincidence.

Ösel again found itself on the front line of a world war in 1941 with the advance of 

German Army Group North into the Baltic with Operation Beowulf.15 Like the First World 

War, the Germans saw the Baltic islands, in particular Ösel, as key strategic terrain. In 

contrast to the First World War, Germany now held naval superiority over the maritime 

domain of the Baltic Sea. Ösel’s southernmost Sõrve Peninsula would become the scene of 

heavy fighting in fall 1944, as the remnants of two understrength German infantry divisions 

14 For the Russian appreciation of operations against Ösel in the First World War, see Nikolai Reek, Saaremaa 

kaitsmine ja vallutamine a. 1917 [The defence and conquest of Saaremaa in 1917] (Tallinn, Estonia: Tallinna Eesti 

Kirjastusühisus, 1937). 15 The Campaign Against the Soviet Union in the Northern Sector of the Eastern Front, 1941–1945, Foreign Military Studies Department P-114a (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1952), 162. 

Figure 9. Map of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia

Global International Waters Assessment, adapted by MCUP.
90 | Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Del Gaudio

destroyed four Soviet infantry divisions along with two armored divisions in a delay and 

defend mission.16 In fact, Ösel could be seen as providing a German engagement area to 

shape and attrite Soviet forces in their attack on the Sõrve Peninsula. As demonstrated by 

the Soviet history of the Baltic states in the Second World War, the significance of the Sõrve 

Peninsula is not the island of Ösel, but rather the ability to influence the Strait of Irbe, and 

entrance to the Gulf of Riga:

According to enemy actions it was clear he was firmly keeping their hands on the 

Kurland Peninsula and Northern Prussia. We [Soviet forces] must press against 

those two directions with as many Soviet soldiers as possible. At the same time, the 

Fascist command was trying to hold the Sõrve Peninsula. 

On the Sõrve Peninsula, behind the narrow neck of the isthmus, behind deliberately prepared defensive positions, German units comprised of two infantry divisions and more than six Naval Infantry battalions were supported by naval artillery 

fire from the sea. 

Such a persistent defense of the Sõrve Peninsula was dictated by enemy’s desire 

to keep Irbe Strait. 

Simultaneously holding Kurland Peninsula with its military-naval bases of 

Ventspils and Liepaja, Hitlerists created advantageous conditions for a significant 

defense of their own lines of communication in the Baltic States and for counteraction against Soviet troops attempting to land on the north shore of the Kurland 

Peninsula.17

The Soviet history above demonstrates the important relationship of physical terrain with 

military actions; the art of employing a joint force must yield to the science of geography 

and its effects on the physical domains of the land, sea, and air. The geographic intersection 

of the land and sea domains in the Baltic states is clearly at the Kurland (Kurzeme, or Courland in English) Peninsula creating a central position militarily in Latvia. 

Latvia

As the Baltic states represent the central position across the entirety of what is now NATO’s 

Eastern Flank, Latvia represents key strategic maritime terrain, chiefly the Gulf of Riga, 

16 The most comprehensive work on German operations in the Baltic islands during the First and Second World 

Wars is Walther Melzer, Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln, 1917–1941–1944 (Stuttgart, Germany: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft, 1960).

17 Борьба за Советскую Прибалтику в Великой Отечественной Войне, Книга третья [Battle for Soviet Baltic 

states during the Great Patriotic War, vol. 3] (Riga, Latvia: Liesma Publishing House, 1969), hereafter Battle for 

Soviet Baltic States, 10.
Key Strategic Terrain of the Baltic | 91

which acts as a maritime base of operations with several port facilities in the vicinity. The 

Gulf of Riga is separated from the Baltic Sea by the Kurland Peninsula in the west and the 

Düna River to the east. Without a doubt, the Kurland Peninsula has been historically the 

most important piece of key strategic terrain in the Baltic states. Actions late in 1944–45 

demonstrate the importance of the Kurland Peninsula. Heavy contact with Soviet forces, 

since the beginning of 1944, yielded a disintegration of Army Group North’s combat power in 

the retreat through Estonia. Yet Germany continued to believe in the defense of the Baltic 

states as a mechanism to defend eastern Prussia and Germany writ large, while maintaining 

relationships with Finland and Sweden across the Baltic Sea.18 With Finland signing a separate peace treaty with the Soviet Union in September 1944, Germany had lost its northern 

defensive position, hastening the Soviet offensive against the Baltic states. The Soviet history of operations in the Baltic region during the Second World War captures the relative 

strength of the German defense on the Kurland Peninsula as follows:

After conducting successful offensive operations against Memel [Klaipeda] and 

Riga by Soviet forces [10–15 October 1944], more than 33 divisions of Fascist troops 

appeared on Kurland Peninsula cut off from Northern Prussia and pressed against 

the sea. Those were units of 16th and 18th Armies and Kampf Group “Kleffel” who 

had withdrawn from the area of Riga bridgehead. Enemy troops on the Kurland 

Peninsula, were united under Army Group North, in the first line of front defense, 

spread across 218 kilometers were 23 divisions, while in the rear, more than 10 divisions, including 3 tank divisions. Operational density of the enemy defense was 

quite tough. On average, a [German] division held around 7 kilometers of front.19

Locally, within the Baltic states, the Kurland Peninsula represented a strong shoulder strategically, with German tactical formation able to use the Gulf of Riga and the Baltic Sea 

as tactical terrain to anchor its defense. As a result of combining strong tactical positions 

in the land domain with total control of the maritime flanks, the Soviets were not able to 

break the German hold of Army Group Kurland, despite fighting six separate battles to 

capture the Kurland Peninsula.20 While the Soviets were capable of investing the Kurland 

Peninsula from the south with the attack and total destruction of the then-Prussian city of 

Memel (now the Lithuanian city of Klaipeda), their attack through Lithuania was bounded 

18 The German Liaison Officer with the Finnish Armed Forces, Foreign Military Studies Department P-041bb (Carlisle, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, 1952). 

19 Battle for Soviet Baltic States, 9. 20 For details on the six battles for Kurland, see Franz Kurowski, Bridgehead Kurland: The Six Epic Battles of Heeresgruppe Kurland (Winnipeg, MB: J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2002). 
92 | Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Del Gaudio

by the powerful Niemen River, the importance of which was remembered from actions 

predating the First World War.21

Lithuania

The defensive strength of the Niemen River was first observed during the campaigns of 

Napoléon Bonaparte and has continued to attract attention by military historians and strategists. Theodore Ayrault Dodge, a Union officer from the American Civil War who later 

became a historian, indicated the importance of the Neimen’s geography when he wrote, 

“Roughly speaking, the Russian frontiers ran from the Baltic [sea], north of the Prussian 

fortress of Memel, to the Memel [Niemen] River half-way to Kovno [Kaunas], up river to 

Grodno, down the Bobr and up to Brest-Litovsk and beyond, and thence along the border 

of Galicia.” He then captured the essence of the Niemen’s strength both tactically and strategically: “That portion of the Niemen [river] from Grodno to the sea was the scene of the 

most important early part of this [Napoléon’s Russian] campaign. Its channel is sunk, and 

there are not many places where it can be crossed, even with pontoons.”22 

Dodge’s statement points to the natural “L” made by the flow of the Niemen River east 

to west from Kaunas, Lithuania, to the Baltic Sea and south to north from Grodno, Belarus, 

to Kaunas that combined well with the naturally marshy area surrounding the river, creating an ideal terrain for defensive military operations. This terrain would again figure into 

both German and Russian plans during the First World War. 

In Topography and Strategy in the War, Douglas W. Johnson considers German and Russian actions on the eastern front and reminds readers of the natural military advantages 

afforded by the Niemen River.23 In the wake of the Russian failures at Tannenberg and 

Mazurian Lakes in summer and fall 1914, Russia was forced onto the defensive. After its 

attempt to crush East Prussia on the way to Warsaw, Poland, Russian troops then had to 

engage the Germans recently fortified with fresh combat power. Johnson described the consequences—seen by winter 1915—for the Russians when he wrote, “The sudden arrival of new 

German forces in February compelled another Russian retreat to the defensive line of the 

Niemen, Bobr, and Narew.”24 Appreciation of modern combat methods has not lessened the 

requirements of modern land forces to gain mobility in the areas in and around the Niemen 

21 For more information on the destruction of Memel in English, see Prit Buttar, Battleground Prussia: The Assault 

on Germany’s Eastern Front, 1944–45 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 46. 22 Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Great Captains: Napoleon, vol. 3 (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin, 1907), 454. 23 Douglas Wilson Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War (New York: Henry Holt, 1917). 24 Ibid., 66.
Key Strategic Terrain of the Baltic | 93

River, nor has it lessened our need to understand the effects of changes in the political geography. 

With the destruction of Memel in 1944 and the long-standing German dream of an empire in eastern Prussia, the Soviet Union recognized its need to solidify a hold on the Baltic 

states as a buffer from the West. The Soviet Union laid claim to Königsberg, Germany, and 

with the end of the Second World War, changed the name of the historic East Prussian 

capital to Kaliningrad. It remains Russia’s strategic observation post in the heart of NATO’s 

Eastern Flank. Strategically, with Kaliningrad in the west and Belarus in the east, the portion of Lithuania in between becomes a potential target for future Russian aggression, even 

with the Niemen River creating a formidable obstacle in the north and in the east. The loss 

of Lithuanian territory between Kaliningrad and Belarus would mean that accessibility of 

the Baltic states to other NATO countries would only be achievable from the Baltic Sea. 

 

Conclusion

The intentions of nations are difficult to forecast at best, but their ability to use military 

force to pursue those interests will always be bounded by the restrictions of physical geography. During the last 200 years, Eastern Europe and Russia have seen the suffering and 

death of millions as a result of military conflict. Napoléon, Kaiser Wilhelm the Second, and 

Adolf Hitler all failed to understand not only the will of the Russian people but also their 

ability to negotiate the realities of the physical terrain of Eastern Europe. The Baltic states 

have proven themselves to be an essential pivot point of conflict between West and East for 

centuries, and their security continues to be precarious. If the past is any metric to forecast 

the future in the Baltic region, optimism about the Baltic nations’ quick assimilation into 

a more stable Euro-Atlantic economic, political, and security community should be tempered. While technology can hasten the rapidity of action in time and space, both physical 

and virtual, it does not yet provide an escape from the constraints of physical geography. No 

attempt to understand the environment of likely future conflict is complete without a deep 

understanding of the physical realities of the environment. The history of war in the Baltic 

region has a clear constant: the limited maneuver space and restricted terrain facilitate the 

survival of a force that can mass, can be supported in multiple domains, and can survive, but 

will eventually lose out to a larger foe.25 This lesson—that the effective use of key strategic 

terrain throughout the Baltic region can allow a smaller force to buy the vital time required 

25 See R. G. S. Bidwell, “The Five Fallacies: Some Thoughts on British Military Thinking,” Journal of the Royal 

United Service Institute 112, no. 645 (February 1967): 53–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071846709420378.
94 | Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Del Gaudio

to generate more combat power—is certainly relevant for the NATO alliance as it contemplates how to guarantee the sovereignty of its Baltic members. Ultimately, contemporary 

military and political leaders should adhere to the advice of General Reek and understand 

the physical environment of the Baltic before planning military operations in the region. 
 95

Suggested Further Reading

Articles of Interest

Bukkvoll, Tor. “Russian Military Power: Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and 

Donbas.” Parameters 46, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 13–21.

Connell, Mary Ellen and Ryan Evans. “Russia’s Ambiguous Warfare and Implications for 

the U.S. Marine Corps.” MCU Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 30–45. https://doi.org

/10.21140/mcuj.2016070102.

Del Gaudio, LtCol Andrew M. “Russian Reflections and Military Renaissance: The Breckinridge Legacy.” Marine Corps Gazette 100, no. 9 (2016).

Glantz, David M. “Force Structuring: The Continuing Influence of Non-Linear Warfare on 

Russian Force Structuring.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 9, no. 2 (1996): 335–75. 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518049608430237.

Golts, Alexander, and Michael Koffman. “Russia’s Military: Assessment, Strategy, and 

Threat.” Center on Global Interests, June 2016.

Hoffman, Frank. “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War.” 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength. Heritage 

Foundation, 2015.

McDermott, Roger N. “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?.” Parameters 46, no. 2 

(2016): 97–105. 

Milevski, Lukas. “Strategy & Policy: Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea.” Parameters 44, 

no. 2 (2014): 23–35. 
96 | Suggested Further Reading

Renz, Bettina. “Russian Military Power: Why Russia Is Reviving Its Conventional Military 

Power.” Parameters 46, no. 2 (2016): 23–36.

Votel, Joseph L., Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin. “Unconventional 

Warfare in the Gray Zone.” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (2016): 101–9.

Books

Kalb, Marvin. Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War. Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution Press, 2015.

Mazarr, Michael J. Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict. Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015. 

Menon, Rajan and Eugene Rumer. Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War 

Order. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015. 

Simons, Greg. Mass Media and Modern Warfare: Reporting on the Russian War on Terrorism. 

Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010.
 97

Glossary

Ambiguous warfare This term has no proper definition and has been used 

within U.S. government circles since at least the 1980s. 

Generally speaking, the term applies to situations in 

which a state or nonstate belligerent actor deploys troops 

and proxies in a deceptive and confusing manner with 

the intent of achieving political and military effects while 

obscuring the belligerent’s direct participation.

Asymmetric In military operations, this is the application of dissimilar 

strategies, tactics, capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting 

its weaknesses.1

Battalion Task Force 2020 

(BNTF 2020) A Nordic Defence Cooperation concept exploring the 

ability to generate a common Nordic Battalion Task 

Force and providing common tactics, techniques, and 

procedures as a basis for common ground combat arms 

training, deployments, and procurements.

Color revolutions An informal name commonly applied to political opposition movements demanding greater transparency and 

accountability of governments in countries in the former 

Soviet Union and eastern bloc (i.e., countries accused of 

not having sufficiently consolidated democratic reforms). 

The most notable of these so-called revolutions have been 

associated with a flower or color, such as the 2003 Rose 

1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
98 | Glossary

Revolution in Georgia, the December 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in 

Kyrgyzstan. Russian security and political elites and their 

allies often use the term pejoratively to imply that these 

movements are not organic domestic movements but 

rather instigated and supported by American or Western 

European governments. 

Compellence A form of coercion that forces another state into action, 

typically by threat or demonstration of violence. The 

term is usually associated with the work of American 

economist Thomas C. Schelling and his work Arms and 

Influence (1966).

Cyberpartisans A term applied to those actors in the cyber realm who 

support government agendas through hacking or other 

cyberattacks without obviously being in its employ or 

direct control. The term intentionally recollects the Soviet Partisan movement of World War II and the indirect methods of state control and support to sympathetic 

forces behind enemy lines. 

Deterrence A form of coercion in which a state creates unacceptable 

costs to prevent another state from taking a particular 

action. In the nuclear age, the term has largely been associated with the concept of mutual deterrence, a situation 

in which nuclear states are prevented from attacking one 

another due to unacceptable risk that the targeted state 

would retain the capability and will to inflict an equally 

grave retaliatory strike. 

Denial of Service (DoS) 

attack An attempt to deny legitimate users Internet services or 

the ability to access information, typically by flooding a 
Glossary | 99

computer, server, or network with a volume of requests 

large enough to overwhelm the capacity of the system. 

Distributed denial of service 

(DDoS) attack A denial of service attack launched from a distributed 

network of computers, usually by exploiting security 

vulnerabilities to remotely control “botnet” computers without the owner’s knowledge or consent. The use 

of additional computers makes this type of attack more 

powerful, harder to diagnose, and more difficult to defeat 

than a standard DoS attack. 

Enhanced Partnership 

in Northern Europe (e-PINE) A cooperative framework advanced by the United States 

to promote a safe, secure, and supportive environment in 

Northern Europe to pursue common interests with the 

Nordic and Baltic nations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 

Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The 

three broad areas of focus for cooperation under e-PINE 

include cooperative security, healthy societies, and vibrant economies.

Flexible response A defensive strategy developed in the 1960s by the John 

F. Kennedy administration and designed to control escalation toward a general nuclear strike in stages. Initially, 

the United States and NATO would attempt to blunt 

a Soviet conventional attack with a direct defense with 

conventional forces. In the case that the Soviets gained an 

unacceptable conventional advantage, the United States 

and NATO would respond through deliberate escalation 

and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The final resort 

would be a general nuclear response and would involve a 

massive nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union and 

its allies. 
100 | Glossary

Geographical pivot of history The title of an article by Sir Halford John Mackinder in 

1904, who is credited with the idea of extending geopolitical analysis of the effect of human and physical geography 

on international politics to the entire globe. Mackinder, 

in particular, posited that control of the center of Eurasia 

(from the Volga to Eastern Siberia) was the key “pivot” of 

global power. 

Gray zone warfare Competitive interactions among and within state and 

nonstate actors that fall between the traditional war and 

peace duality. They are characterized by ambiguity about 

the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, 

or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.2

High North Although not a precise term, it generally refers to those 

parts of the Nordic countries and Russia in the Barents 

Euro-Arctic Region, the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, 

and the southern parts of the Polar Sea.

Hybrid warfare An abstract term generally used to describe aggression 

that includes a combination of conventional and irregular activities and usually implies an effort by the aggressor 

to avoid attribution used in combination to achieve a political objective. Although the use of the term is still debated, it continues to have resonance for the U.S. military 

as it wrestles with the idea that many, or most, potential enemies will seek an asymmetric advantage through 

means that would be considered illegitimate by U.S. legal 

and moral norms (e.g., terrorism and criminal networks). 

NATO’s Flanks A term that has been used to refer to the Northern, 

Eastern, and Southern borders of the NATO alliance 

2 The Gray Zone, USSOCOM White Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2015).
Glossary | 101

countries, reflecting the post-Cold War confusion about 

NATO’s actual orientation and purpose. 

NATO Smart Defence Force A NATO concept for cooperatively and efficiently building a collective defense capability by coordinating requirements, development, procurement, and operations. 

NATO seeks to act as an intermediary to help member 

nations align national and country priorities, encourage 

deliberate national specialization, and share development 

costs for complex capabilities. 

NBP9 An acronym used to refer to the Nordic states (Iceland, 

Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland), the Baltic 

states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), and Poland. The 

term is typically used in the context of the countries most 

vulnerable to Russian aggression. 

Netwar An evolving concept reflecting the pace at which technology amplifies the strength of networks generally consisting of intentional activities to influence the domain of 

human perception via either overt or covert channels, in 

which one or more actors seeks to impose a desired change 

upon the perception of another actor. This is done to facilitate second- and third-order effects of benefit to them. 

These activities utilize cyber and social systems as infrastructure and exploit the ambiguity of cyberidentities. 

Nordic Defense Cooperation 

(NORDEFCO) A cooperative arrangement established in 2009 and 

among the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 

Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) focusing on bilateral and 

multilateral activities related to security policy, operations, training and exercises, capability development, and 

armaments. 
102 | Glossary

Nonlinear warfare Although the term is fluid, it is generally characterized 

by an increased reliance on nonmilitary levers of national power, such as political, economic, informational, and 

sociocultural factors, supplemented by military means of 

a concealed character, such as covert direct action and 

information operations. The term was popularized after 

appearing in a short story by Kremlin ideologist Vladimir 

Surkov about a fifth world war, the “first non-linear war” 

in a dystopian future in which it would be “all against 

all.”3

Nuclear threshold The point in a conflict where nuclear weapons are, or 

would be, brought into use. 

Provokatsiya A Russian concept wherein a state or intelligence agency undertakes a deliberate, often covert, action to elicit a 

self-defeating response from an adversary state or opposition group. The most famous example is probably the 

Soviet Trust Operation of the 1920s, when enemies of the 

Bolsheviks living abroad were lured home to their deaths 

by a fake resistance organization created by the secret 

police. 

Scorched Earth Policy A military tactic employed during a withdrawal or retreat 

to destroy anything that could be of use to a pursuing enemy force, including civil infrastructure and food sources. 

3

 Nathan Dubovitsky, “Without Sky,” Russian Pioneer, no. 46 (May 2014). Surkov writes under the pen name 

Nathan Dubovitsky.
 103

Index

Afghanistan, xii, 36, 49, 54, 62–65, 70, 73

See also Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)

aircraft

Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback strike fighter, 12

Sukhoi Su-37 Flanker all-weather fighter, 12

Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire C bomber, 

12

Tupolev Tu-95MS Bear-H strategic 

bomber, 12

Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack bomber, 12

AirLand Battle strategy, U.S. Army, 50, 52

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), 35, 47, 52

Arctic, 2–3, 16, 35, 40–53, 85

See also geopolitics, High North, 

NATO Flanks

Arctic sea routes, 3

Armas, Jason C. (Maj), 2, 5

Army, German, 56, 59–60

Army Group North, 87, 89, 91

Sixteenth Army, 87

Eighteenth Army, 87

Baltic Sea, 11, 17, 25, 35, 89, 91–93

Baltic states, 2, 4, 11, 15–39, 50, 59–60, 85, 87–88, 

90–91, 93, 101

See also Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

Battalion Task Force 2020 (BNTF 2020), 34, 97

Black Sea Fleet, 10–11

Breckinridge, James C. (LtGen), xii

Center for Advanced Culture Learning 

(CAOCL), ix, xii–xiii

Chechen War

First (1994–96), 7

Second (1999–2000), 7

Clausewitz, Carl von, 30, 54

Cold War (1947–91), xi, 1–2, 22–23, 25, 28–31, 

40–53, 72–75, 82

color revolutions, 11, 49, 51–52, 67, 79, 97–98

Orange (2004), 49fn29, 98

Rose (2003), 49fn29, 97–98

Tulip (2005), 49fn29, 98

Command and Staff College (CSC), ix, xii–xiii, 2

commands, U.S.

Africa Command (AFRICOM), 51

European Command (EUCOM), 51, 53

Geographic Combatant Command, 52

Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM), 52–53

Communist Party, 56–58 

compellence, 49, 98

counterinsurgency (COIN), 50, 52–53, 61, 64

Crimea, xi–xii, 6, 10–13, 47, 56, 59, 68–71, 73, 76, 

78–83

See also nonlinear warfare

Crimean Peninsula, xi, 85

cyberpartisans, 56, 65–66, 98

de Gaulle, Charles, 30
104 | Index

Del Gaudio, Andrew M. (LtCol, PhD), xiifn4, 4

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), 

63–64

denial of service (DoS), 98–99

Denmark, 18, 34, 99, 101

See also e-PINE, NBP9, Nordic five, 

NORDEFCO

Deptula, David A. (Gen, USAF), 13

deterrence, 15, 18, 27, 31–33, 39, 42, 46, 48–49, 53, 

75, 82, 98

DeTrinis, Stephen E. (Maj), 2

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power (DIME), 54

distributed denial of service (DDoS), 66–67, 99

Dunford, Joseph F. (Gen), xi, 72

Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe 

(e-PINE), 33–34, 99

Estonia, xi, 4, 11, 16, 20–22, 25, 31–32, 34, 36–38, 

54, 59, 85–91, 99, 101

See also e-PINE, NBP9

European Union (EU), 9, 11, 23, 33, 50–51

exercises, 18, 26, 51, 69

Caucasus 2008, 67

Cold Response (2016), 34

Finland, 15, 18, 34–35, 59, 91

See also e-PINE, High North, 

NORDEFCO, Nordic Five

flexible response, 29–30, 38, 99

foreign internal defense (FID), 50–51, 53

foreign policy, Russia, 2, 14, 19–20, 23–24, 53, 55, 

68

Forest Brothers, 60

See also Lithuania

Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security (1997), 36

Fukuyama, Francis, 1

geographical pivot, 44–45, 100

geopolitics, 24, 30, 42, 44, 46, 48, 78

Georgia, ix, xi, 2, 8–10, 12–13, 27, 37, 49fn29, 54, 

65–71, 73–74, 83

Gerasimov, Valery V. (Gen, Russia), xii, 49, 55, 

70, 75–77, 80, 83

glasnost (openness), 1

global nuclear war, 27–28

Goldberg, A. J. (Maj), 2

gradual nuclear response, 29

Grafenwöhr, Germany, 37

Groen, Michael S. (BGen), xii

hacktivist, 70

Heimbigner, Brett C. (RAdm, USN), 33

High North, 15, 18, 33–34, 40, 48, 100

See also Finland, Norway, and Sweden

Hitler, Adolph, 21, 67, 93

ice cap, Arctic Sea, 40–41

Iceland, 18, 34, 99, 101

See also e-PINE, NORDEFCO, Nordic 

Five

information operations (IO), 55–56, 67–69, 71, 

73, 75–83, 102

Iran, 12–13, 64

Iraq, invasion of, xii, 23, 36, 49, 54, 73

Isserson, Georgii S. (BCdr, Russia), 54–55, 71

See also nonlinear warfare

Joint Chiefs of Staff, xi, 27, 72

Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), 52

Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), 52

Joint Operations (JP 3-0), 27
Index | 105

Kaliningrad, Russia, 25–26, 35, 93

Kennan, George F., 44

key terrain, 4, 48, 82, 84–85

See also geopolitics

KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopanosti), 5, 

57, 78

Khan, Mohammad Daud (LtGen, Afghan 

Army), 62–63

Khyber, Mir Akbar, 63

Kissinger, Henry A., 30

Kosovo War (1998–99), 23

Kremlin, Moscow, ix, 18, 24, 80

land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), 12

Latvia, 4, 11, 16, 19–22, 31–32, 34, 36, 38, 59, 85, 

88–92, 99, 101

See also e-PINE, NBP9

Latvian Wafen-SS, 22

Lithuania, 4, 16, 21–22, 25–26, 31–32, 34, 36–37, 

59–62, 64, 70, 85, 89, 91–93, 99, 101

See also e-PINE, NBP9

Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF), 60

Lithuanian Liberation Army (LLA), 60

little green men, xi, 82

Mackinder, Halford J. (Sir, UK), 44–47, 84, 100

See also geographical pivot

Marine Corps, U.S., ix, xii, 53

East Coast Expeditionary Strike 

Group (ESG), 51, 53

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 51, 

53

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force (SPMAGTF), 51

Marine Corps Intelligence, xii

Marxist-Leninist theory, 42, 47

Mattis, James N. (Gen), ix, xii

McNamara, Robert S., 29

Military Districts, Russia, 10, 18–19

Medvedev, Dmitry A., vii, 1 

military doctrine, 6, 12–13, 42–44, 47, 51, 54, 

55fn1, 71

containment, 1, 29–30, 44, 52

Ministry of Defense (MOD, Russia), 7–10

missiles

antiship cruise missile, 35

antitank missile, 37

FGM-148 Javelin missile, 37

Kh-555 cruise missile, 12

Kh-101 cruise missile, 12

land-attack, cruise missile (LACM), 12

M3 Carl Gustaf 84mm antitank missile, 37

precision guided munitions (PGMs), 12

surface-to-air, 35

mobile forces, 7

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact), 59

Moore, Isaac D. (Maj), 3–4

Moscow Conference on International Security 

(2014), 49

Mutual Assistance Pact, 59

National Security Council, 52

National Security Strategy, Russian Federation, 

43–44, 48–49, 72–73

NBP9, 18, 33, 35, 101

near abroad, 2, 11, 13, 18, 24, 46, 49

netwar, 77, 79–80, 101

See also information operations (IO), 

warfare

Nordic-Baltic Battle Group (NBBG), 35

Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), 

34–35, 101
106 | Index

Nordic five, 18

See also Denmark, Iceland, Finland, 

Norway, and Sweden

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

1–2, 4, 6, 9, 15–19, 23–29, 31–33, 35–39, 

42, 46–53, 73, 75, 78, 80, 82, 86, 90–91, 

93–94, 99–101

NATO’s Flanks, 48–50, 53, 86, 100–1

Northern Sea Route (NSR), 2–3, 40, 48, 51

Northwest Passage, 2

Norway, 15, 18, 34, 99, 101

See also e-PINE, High North, NBP9, 

NORDEFCO, Nordic Five

nuclear threshold, 29, 39, 102

nuclear warheads, inventories, 28

October Revolution (Bolshevik Revolution), 89

Omakaitse (home guard), 22

Operations, U.S. Army field manual, 52

operations

ambiguous, 48

Albion, 88–89

Arctic, 43

Baltic, 31

Barbarossa, 56

Beowulf, 89

counterterrorism, 54

covert, 13, 26, 68–69, 77, 102

expeditionary, 12–13

information, 55, 67–68, 71, 73, 75–82

intelligence, 58

joint, 18, 27

military, 47, 49, 53, 55, 64–65, 69, 71, 

84–85, 89, 92, 95

NATO, 36, 38, 42, 51

nonlinear, 80

nontraditional military, 18

sabotage, 57, 65

security, 18

Syria, 13

paper tiger units, 10

Partnership for Peace, 35

See also NATO

Pavel, Petr (Gen, Czech), 16, 24

People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs 

(NKVD), 5, 57–58, 60–61, 68, 78

See also KGB

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 

(PDPA), 63

Perestroika (restructuring), 1

Poland, xiii, 18, 20, 25, 35–36, 55–56, 59, 88fn10, 

101

See also NBP9

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 20

Potsdam Conference (1945), 25

provokatsiya (provocation), 24, 26–31, 102

Putin, Vladimir V., xi, 1–2, 5–11, 13, 21, 23–24, 33, 

43, 49, 72–75, 79–80, 82–83

Reagan, Ronald W., 30

Red Army, Soviet Union, 8, 21–22, 56–58, 60, 

71, 75

See also Stalin, Joseph

Reek, Nikoli (Col, Estonia), 85–87, 94

reforms

Baltic, 33

immigration, 32–33

military, Russia, 1, 5–14, 18, 73–83

Russian Armed Forces, 6–8, 12, 54, 68

Russo-Georgian War (2008), 8, 10

scorched earth policy, 57, 102

See also Stalin, Joseph

sea lines of communication (SLOC), 47–48, 50, 53

security force assistance (SFA), 50, 53
Index | 107

Sever Joint Strategic Command North (JSCN), 

42–43, 47–49

Smart Defence, NATO, 51, 53, 101

Sochi Winter Olympics (2014), xi

Sokolovov, A. M. (Maj, Soviet Union), 61

South Ossetia, 8–9, 37, 65, 67

Soviet Partisan Movement, 55–60, 62, 69, 71, 98

See also nonlinear warfare

Soviet Union, ix, xi, 5–6, 21–22, 25, 28–30, 42–48, 

52–53, 55–64, 67, 72–74, 82, 85, 88fn10, 

91, 93, 97, 99

Spain, xiii

Special Operating Forces (SOF), 50–53

Marine Raider Company, 51

Operational Detachment Bravo, 51

spetsgruppa (special forces group), 61

spetsnaz (special forces), 65, 68–70, 78

SS Jagdtverband Ostland, 22

Stalin, Joseph, 21, 57

State Armaments Program 2020, Russia, 75

See also reforms

Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), 30

Strategies, Russia

military, 42–44, 65, 75, 78

national, 43–44, 46–47, 75

Stavridis, James G. (Cdr), 1–2

stribai (destroyers), 61

Svechin, Alexander A. (MajGen, Russia), 54–55, 

77

Sweden, 15, 18, 34–35, 37, 91, 99, 101

See also e-PINE, High North, 

NORDEFCO, Nordic Five

symmetrical containment, 29–30

See also flexible response

Syria, ix, xii–xiii, 6, 10–13, 18, 47, 54, 83

tanks, 37, 68, 91

Leopard 2, 34

Third Reich, Germany, 21

treaties

Anti-Ballistic Missile, 23

Washington, 16

Tukhachevsky, Mikhail N. (Marshal, Soviet 

Union), 55

Ukraine, ix–xi, 2, 11–13, 18, 25, 27, 31, 47, 49fn29, 

54, 61, 68–70, 73, 76, 78, 80–84, 88fn10

vehicles, combat, 26, 67

BMP-1, 37

CV-90, 34

unmanned aerial vehicle, 12

warfare

ambiguous, xi, xii, 24, 31, 50, 55, 81, 97

asymmetric, 10–11, 36, 38, 70–71, 97

cyber, 56, 66, 69–70

gray zone, 100

economic, 71

hybrid, ix, 25, 33, 55, 100

information, 11, 25, 78

irregular (IW), 55fn1

nonlinear, 2–4, 11, 54–83, 102

partisan, x, 57, 60–62, 65

unconventional (UW), 51, 55, 62, 68, 

71, 73

unrestricted, 71

Warsaw Pact (1991), 42, 50

World War

First (1914–18), 20, 60, 84–85, 87–89, 

90fn16, 91–92

Second (1939–45), 3, 9, 20–21, 23, 38, 44, 

54–60, 62, 64, 68–69, 82, 85, 87, 

89–91, 93, 98

Yeltsin, Boris N., 7
MARINE CORPS

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