### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVILLE May 6, 2003 Session

KAILA B. WILLIAMS S ANDERS, Individually and as N ext of Kin to CATHI D. WILLIAMS , Deceased v. TRA CIE A. TRAV ER, M.D., ALL WOMEN’S CARE , P.C., S HELBY B. SHIVERS , M.D., M ARYVILLE ANESTHESIOLOGI STS, P.C., d/b/a MARYVILLE ANESTHE SIA GROUP, and BLOUNT MEMOR IAL HOSPITAL INCOR PORATED

Appeal by pe rmissio n from the Court of App eals, East ern Sect ion Circuit Court for Blount County No. L-12401 W. Dale Young, Judge

No. E2001-02926-SC-R11-CV - Filed June 19, 2003

In this wrongful deat

h case brought under the Governmental Tort Liability

Act, we address the issue of whether Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.01, wh ich provides the computation of time for
statutes of limitations, is applicable to actions involving gover nmental e ntities. Having determined that the Tennessee Rules of Civi l P rocedure ar e applicable to actions involving governmental e ntities in Doyle v. Fro st , 49 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tenn. 2001), and finding that Rule 6.01 defines, rather than

e xtends, the Governmental Tort Liability Act’s statute of limitations, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not er

r in finding that Rule 6.01 applies to actions brought under the Governmental Tort Liab ility Act. Accordingly , we affirm thejudgment of the Court of Appeals and remand t he case to the trial court for further proceeding s consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed;

Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed

F RANK F. D ROWOT A , III, C. J., del iv ered the opinion of the court, in which E. R IL EY A NDERSON , A DOLPHO A. B IRCH , J R ., J ANICE M. H OLDER , and W IL LI AM M. B ARKER , JJ., joined.

Carl P. M cDo nal d, M aryv il le, Ten nes see , fo r th e ap pel lan t, Blo unt Mem ori al H osp it al, In corporated

. Sidney Gilreath and Timothy Housholder , Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appell ee, Kaila B. Williams Sanders.1 Th e com plaint na med other d efend ants, bu t they are n ot pa rties to this ap pea l.

-2- OPINION

Factua l and Proc

edural Bac

kground The facts of this case are undisputed. The decedent, Cathi D. W illiams, wa s a dmitted to Blount Memorial Hospital (“Blount Memorial” or “the hospital”) on May 26, 1999, for surgery . The decedent died in the hospital on May 28, 1999. The one y ear anniversary

of her death occurred on Su nd ay, Ma y 28 , 2 00 0. Th e fol lo wi ng da y, Monday, May 29, 2000, was Memorial Day, a state and fede ral holida y, and the cour ts were closed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 15-1-101 (providing that Memorial Day is a state holiday and that public offices of t he st at e s ha ll be cl os ed ). On Tu es da y, May 30, 2000, the decedent’s daughter, Kaila B. Williams Sanders (“the plaintiff”) , filed a wrongful de at h a ct io n i n t he Bl ou nt Co un ty C ir cu it Co ur t a ga in st Bl ou nt Me mo ri al , a go ve rn me nt al en ti ty. 1

Blount Memorial filed a motion to dismiss the action, asserting that the complaint had not been timely filed under Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 29-20-305(b), which provides that actions c ommen ced unde r the Gov ernment

al Tort L iability Act (“G TLA” ) must be f

iled within twelve months af

ter the c ause

of action arises. The plaintiff argue d that the action was timely filed under Te nnessee Rule of Civil Proced

ure 6.01 , which pr

ovides,

In computing any

per iod of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by or

der of court, or by any

applicable statute, the date of the act, event or default after which the designated

period of time begins to run is not to be i ncluded. The last day of the period as comput

ed is to be

included unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday , a legal ho li da y, or a day w

hen the clerk's office for

filing is closed, in which event the period

runs un ti l t he en d o f t he ne xt da y wh ic h i s n ot a S at ur da y, a Su nd ay, a l eg al ho li da y, or a day w

hen the clerk's office for

filing is closed....

The trial court, however, granted the motion todismiss, finding that “the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act supercedes and takes precedent over all other statutory provisions and that no special counting of the Statute of L imitations is set forth under said Act.”

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the Rules of Civil Procedure are applica ble to actions involving governmental entities and that the rules of computation of

time are
notinconsistent with the GTLA. I n so holding, the Court of Appeals relied upon this Court’s decisions in Doyle v. Frost , 49 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tenn. 2001) and Luci us v. City of Memphi s , 925 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1996).

We granted Blount Memorial’s application for pe rmission to appeal, and we now affirm the judgmen t of the Cou

rt of Appe als.-3- Standard of Review Issues of statuto

ry construction and in

terpre tation ar e questio ns of law; thus our r eview is de

novo without any presumption of corr ectnes s. State v. Walls , 62 S.W.3d 119, 121 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co. , 27 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tenn. 2000)). “Our duty in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature.” Id.

Analysis The issue before us is, when the statute of limitations runs on a Sunday and the following Monday is a leg al holida

y, i s t he actio n tim ely under the G TLA when the complaint is filed on Tu es da y?

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that governmental entities may be

sued only upon the termsto which they consent. See Cruse v. City of Columbia , 922 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tenn. 1996). The GTL

A, the act under which the g overnme nt allows itself tobe sued f or tort, p rovides a twelve- month

period in which pot

ential pla intiffs ma y f ile claim s a gainst the government, and, under its own terms, “any

claim for damages must be br ought in s trict com

pliance with the te

rms of this chapter.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c). Blount Memorial argue s that any

extension o f time pas t the twelve month d eadline improper ly exte nds the GTLA's statute of limitations, effectively allowing the governmental entity

to be sued in a

manner to which it did not consent. The plaintiff responds that the Tennessee Rules of

Civil Proce dure g overn GT LA suits and essentially asse rts that Rule 6.01 does not extend the time but merely defines how the twe lve-month statutory period is to b e computed. Thus, accord

ing to the plaintiff, Rule 6.01 allows a claim under the GTL A to be filed on the first day that the cour

t is open following the one-year anniversary of the cause of action arising — in this ca se, the de ath of Cat hi Williams.

In support of its argument, Blount Memorial relies upon Ly nn v. City of

Jackson , 63 S.W.3d 332 (Tenn. 2 001), an d argu es that Ly nn controls in this case. Ly nn , which was not

cited by the Court of Appeals, stands for the proposition that gener al saving s statutesdo not app ly to extend the

time for bringing claims under t he GTLA. I n Ly nn , the plaintiffs sought to bring an action aga inst the City of Jackson under the GTLA; ho wever, t he action was not filed in state court until after the GTLA’s twelve- month statu te of limitations had expired. The plaintiffs asserted that the GTLA’s statute of limitations was tolle d while the ir case was pend ing in fe deral c ourt, pur suant to28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-115. Section 28-1-115 allows one ye ar from the date of d

ismissal fr

om the fe deral c ourt to time ly f ile the action i n state c ourt. ThisCourt, however, recognized that Section 28-1-115 is a savin gs statu te, and th at beca

use soverei gn immunity “precludes lawsuits against governmental entities unless the g overnmental entity hasconsented to be sued,” general “saving s statutes may not be applied to extend the periodwithin which an action
must be filed under the GTLA .” 63 S.W.3d at337. Thus, this Court f ound that t

he claim in Ly nn
was filed after the limitations period and that the trial court rightlydismissed the claim as timebarred. Therefore, Ly

nn has no beari ng on this case unless Rule 6.01 is analogous to a ge neral savin gs statute w

hich exten ds the time

all ow ed by

the GTL

A for filing a cl aim aga inst a go ve rn me nt al en ti ty.-4-

Neither the plaintiff nor the Courtof Appeals address whether Rule 6.01 is a savings statute. Both rely instead on Doyle v. Fro st , 49 S.W.3d 853 (Tenn. 2001), for the proposition that Rule 6.01 applies to GTLA actions. In Doyle , this Court held that another Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 15.03, which pertains to the relation back doctrine, did not impermissibly enlarg e the time periodfor filing suits aga in st gov ern men tal ent it ies . In so holding, this Court first noted th at, “[ t] hou gh t he G TLA requires strict compliance with its terms, it does not require that applicable rules of civil procedure be igno red.” 49 S.W.3d at 85 8. We pointe d out that th e GTL A specif ically providesthat “suit s under its provisi ons may

be in stituted . . . in circu it court, a

nd the Te

nnessee Rules of Civ

il Procedure ‘govern the procedure in the c ircuit and ch an ce ry c ourts of Tennessee.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 1). Furthermore, we explained that

[t]he savings statute cases cited by the Court of Appeals focus upon whether governmentalentities are subject to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105 (1999), which all ows comme ncement of a new action wi thin one y ear af ter a non suit, dismiss al withou t prejudice, reversal, or arrest; or Te nn. Code Ann. § 28-1-115 (1999), which all ows comme ncement of a new action in state court

within one year after a federal court dismisses a ca se for lack of jurisdiction.

***

There is, however, a

fundame ntal difference between filing a second lawsuit and amending an orig inal, timely- filed co mplaint.

49 S.W.3d at 859 (citations omitted).

For similar reasons, we find Blount Memorial’s arguments unpersuasive. As stated in Doyle
, t he GTLA doe s no t re qui re c our ts to ign ore app li cab le r ul es o f ci vi l p roc edu re. The GTLA specific ally

allows suits to be filed in circuit court, where the Rules of

Civil Procedure apply. He re,
as in Doyle , there is a fundamentaldifference between a sa vings statute, which effectively extends the twelve-month GTLA statute of limitations, and Rule 6.01, wh ich merely de fines the statutory period.

Moreover, as the pla intiff points out, Rule

6.01 def ines the tw elve-mo nth perio d consiste ntly withTenness ee Code A

nnotated sectio n 1- 3-102, relating to “Construction of Statutes,” which declares

§ 1-3-102. Computa

tion of days. The time w ithinwhich any a ct provided by law is to be done , shall be

computed

by e xcluding t

he first d ay

and inclu ding the last, unless the last day is a Saturday , a Sunday, or a le gal holiday , and then it shall also be excluded.

Rule 6.0 1 an d S ect io n 1- 3-1 02 a re n ear ly id ent ica l. In fact, the Compiler’s Notes to Section 1-3-102 indicates that the section “may be superseded in part by

. . . Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.0 1.” We ag ree with-5-

the plaintiff

that, just a s Secti on 1-3 -102 appears in the “Construction of Statutes” Chapter and defines time periods, Rule 6.01 also serves to define, not extend, the period provided by statutes of limitations

. Rule 6.01 is not analogous to a “savings statute.” Therefore, Ly nn is no t cont rolli ng.

Blount Memorial

further argue s that t

he GTLA’ s specific twelve-month statute of limitations takes precedence over provisions of general statutes, and that

Ru le 6. 01 sh ou ld th er efor e n ot ap pl y. However, “only

statutes inconsistent

with specific provisions of the GT LA a re not ap plicable to suits filed against local governments.” Lucius v. City of Memphi s , 925 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn. 1996) (emphas is in origi nal). Sinc e the GTL A has no sp ecific p

rovision d irecting how to com

puteth e d ays for the twelv e-month s tatute of limitati ons, Rule 6.01 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 1-3- 102 may be applied to de

fine the statutory per

iod. Therefore, we ag

ree with the Court of

Appeals that Rule 6.01 does not im

permissib ly e

xtend the GT

LA’stwelve- month statu

te of limita

tions. Suits under the GTLA normally are governed by

the Tennessee Rules of

Civil Procedure, see Doyle , 49 S.W.3d at 858, and Rule6.01, which defines the tw el ve -m on th pe ri od , i s n o e xc ep ti on . A cc or di ng ly, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed.

Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, this Court finds that a complaint is timely filed under the GTLA’s twelve month statute of limitations if it is filed pursuant to the computation of time set forth in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.01. Since the one y ear anniversary

of the accrual of the cause of action occurred on a Sunday, and the following Monday was a

legal holiday , the complaint was timely when filed on the following Tuesday . We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc., fo r w hi ch ex ec ut io n m ay i ss ue if ne ce ss ar y.

__________________________________________

FRANK F . DROWOTA, II I, CHIEF JUSTICE