Message from the Director

I am pleased to announce the achievement of Goal 1 of the National Emergency Communications 

Plan (NECP). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Emergency 

Communications (OEC), within the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of 

Cybersecurity and Communications, developed the NECP in coordination with representatives from 

major public safety organizations to help build capabilities and measure performance for emergency 

communications across all levels of government. 

 

NECP Goal 1 focused on emergency communications in the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) 

regions and was an important step in the Department’s ongoing efforts to assess progress and 

improve interoperable emergency communications across the Nation. To measure NECP Goal 1, 

OEC worked with the Nation’s UASI regions to assess their ability to demonstrate response-level 

emergency communications during a planned event chosen by each region. This approach provided 

the best opportunity for evaluating emergency communications in real-world settings and in an 

economically efficient manner.

Based on the NECP Goal 1 assessments, OEC concluded that all participating UASI regions were 

able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications to varying degrees and have 

instituted the necessary capabilities to achieve interoperability among multiple agencies and 

jurisdictions during large-scale planned events. This success is in part a result of the measurable 

advances in regional governance groups and regular training and exercises in these regions since 

DHS issued its Urban Area Tactical Communications assessments in 2007. Communicationsspecific exercises, which were infrequently held in the past, were found to have been used in almost 

every UASI region since the publication of the NECP. 

As part of the NECP Goal 1 process, OEC worked closely with representatives from the state and 

local community to establish performance measurement criteria that can provide ongoing benefits to 

jurisdictions beyond just demonstrating this Goal. OEC is using the same criteria to assess NECP 

Goal 2 and is encouraging public safety agencies in urban, suburban, and rural jurisdictions to 

continue to focus on the key elements of response-level emergency communications in their future 

planning, operating procedures, training, and exercises. 

The NECP Goal results are providing OEC and DHS with valuable information to better target our 

supporting resources, such as technical assistance offerings, training, and planning efforts. 

Implementing interoperable emergency communications nationwide is a complex process, and OEC 

remains committed to improving emergency responders’ communications capabilities and achieving 

the vision of the NECP: Emergency responders can communicate as needed, on demand, and as 

authorized; at all levels of government and across all disciplines. 

Chris Essid, Director

Office of Emergency Communications
Table of Contents

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................1

Document Scope...............................................................................................................................................1

Approach and Methodology .............................................................................................................................2

Key Findings – Common Policies and Procedures...........................................................................................5

Key Findings – Responder Roles and Responsibilities....................................................................................7

Key Findings – Communications System Quality and Continuity...................................................................9

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................13

Appendix A – Interoperability Continuum and Range of Capabilities ..........................................................14

Appendix B – Levels of NECP Goal Demonstration .....................................................................................15

Appendix C – NECP Goal Demonstration Criteria........................................................................................16
ES-1

Executive Summary

OEC developed the NECP in coordination with more than 150 representatives of the public safety 

community at all levels of government. This includes the SAFECOM Executive 

Committee/Emergency Response Council (EC/ERC) and the National Public Safety 

Telecommunications Council (NPSTC), which are composed of major public safety associations. 

Since its release, the NECP has driven improvements in key areas identified by the public safety 

community as critical to emergency responder communications, including planning, governance, 

operating procedures, and training for responders. In addition to these priority areas, the NECP also 

established performance benchmarks1

• Goal 1: By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the 

UASI can demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour 

for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.

for measuring public safety agencies’ ability to demonstrate 

response-level emergency communications through the three NECP Goals:

• Goal 2: By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions can demonstrate responselevel emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving 

multiple jurisdictions and agencies.

• Goal 3: By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions can demonstrate response-level 

emergency communications within three hours of a significant event, as outlined in 

the department's national planning scenarios.

To measure NECP Goal 1, OEC worked with 60 urban areas—as defined by the Department’s 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 UASI regions—to assess their ability to demonstrate response-level 

emergency communications during a routine event. The NECP defines response-level 

communications as the capacity of individuals with primary operational leadership responsibility to 

manage resources and make timely decisions during an incident.

2

 The events observed by OEC 

included large public gatherings that required participation from multiple public safety agencies and 

jurisdictions to be managed under the National Incident Management System (NIMS). In carrying 

out these assessments, OEC specifically looked at the following components of response-level 

emergency communications:

• Common Policies and Procedures: Shared policies and procedures should exist to allow 

interagency communications to occur in a consistent and structured manner during the event. 

The policies should be designed to avoid confusion, improve operational effectiveness, and 

increase the safety of responders and citizens.

• Responder Roles and Responsibilities: The responsibilities of responders should be clearly 

established and maintained during the event. Specifically, observers evaluated whether NIMS 

Incident Command System (ICS) principles of chain and unity of command, unified command 

(for multi-agency incidents), and a managed span of control were principles being fulfilled.

 

1 The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required that OEC set a date in the NECP, including 

interim benchmarks, for when public safety agencies expect to achieve a baseline level of national interoperable communications. 

2 Department of Homeland Security, National Emergency Communications Plan, p. 6.
ES-2

• Communications System Quality and Continuity: Land mobile radio and related public 

safety communications systems should ensure that high quality communications are in place 

throughout the event for command and control of responding personnel, including if and when 

primary systems experience failures or disruptions.

Based on the capabilities documented at each event in these 

three components, all 60 UASI regions demonstrated

response-level emergency communications to varying degrees 

in accordance with NECP Goal 1. The demonstrations 

illustrate how the significant organizational and technical 

investments made by the UASI regions have improved their 

emergency communications capabilities in recent years. 

Primary radio systems effectively supported NECP Goal 1 

event responses, and additional voice and data systems 

provided redundancy and increased situational awareness.

While the evaluations of the individual events cannot be used 

to predict the UASI regions’ overall communications under all 

conditions, the NECP Goal 1 results show that the Nation’s 

largest cities have instituted the capabilities needed to achieve 

response-level emergency communications during large-scale

planned events involving multiple agencies and jurisdictions.

The completion of these assessments represents an important 

step toward achieving national interoperability; however, 

significant work remains. The UASI region events 

demonstrated that despite an existing culture of cooperation 

among law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services

and other disciplines, coordination across these disciplines is 

not fully integrated into event planning or consistently carried 

out. Evaluators noted that event planning and execution

approaches that were segmented by discipline raised concerns 

about the ability of UASI regions to achieve similar success 

during a large-scale emergency incident, where the incident 

site is not known and responders’ are facing larger 

requirements for coordination. 

OEC will focus on these cross-disciplinary communications 

issues in future assessments, including NECP Goals 2 and 3, 

and will use the results to better target resources such as 

training, technical assistance, stakeholder coordination, and 

planning. 

Common Policies and Procedures

Plain Language: Agencies are generally 

utilizing plain language during multiagency responses as called for in NIMS 

and included in most UASI Tactical 

Interoperable Communications Plans.

Incident Action Plans (IAP): A 

significant number of UASIs developed 

and utilized IAPs that included Incident 

Radio Communications Plans, but many 

UASIs developed multiple IAPs that 

were segmented by discipline and

inconsistent with one another.

Responder Roles and Responsibilities

Communications Unit Leader: Trained 

Communications Unit Leaders supported 

communications at almost all events; 

however, operational leadership did not 

always effectively utilize the position to 

help plan or manage the response.

Operations Section Chief: Several

UASIs utilized multiple Operations 

Section Chiefs, a practice which runs 

counter to NIMS. UASIs often

segmented this position by discipline and 

did not always coordinate effectively.

Communications System 

Quality and Continuity

Primary and Redundant Systems:

Radio systems successfully supported all 

events and UASIs are using advanced 

data technologies for communications 

redundancy, as well as overall situational 

awareness. 

Inter-Disciplinary Talk Paths: Primary 

operational leadership often used face-toface interaction and cellular phones to 

execute cross-discipline 

communications.

Figure 1 - Key Findings of NECP Goal 1 
1

Introduction

OEC was established to promote emergency responders’ ability to continue to communicate in the 

event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters and work to ensure, 

accelerate, and attain interoperable and operable emergency communications nationwide. As part 

of this mission, OEC completed a comprehensive nationwide planning effort with more than 150 

emergency response stakeholders and published the NECP3 in 2008.

The NECP serves as the first national strategy for interoperability and provides a roadmap for 

public safety personnel and government officials to make measurable improvements in emergency 

communications related to coordination, governance, planning, usage, training, exercises, and 

technology. OEC worked with emergency responders to develop performance-based goals and 

criteria for measuring interoperable emergency communications. The three NECP Goals are 

documented below:

Document Scope 

This report documents the nationwide results of assessing response-level emergency 

communications for NECP Goal 1, which is focused 

on the FY 2008 designated UASI regions (Figure 2). 

This report presents aggregate findings of the 

observations and summarizes the key 

recommendations that OEC has provided to the UASI

regions to maintain and improve their emergency 

communication capabilities. These findings and 

recommendations are intended to support the plans 

and programs of state and local governments to 

improve emergency communications during multijurisdictional and multi-disciplinary emergency 

operations.

 

3 NECP, July 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/national_emergency_communications_plan.pdf

Goal 1: By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the Urban Areas 

Security Initiative (UASI) are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications 

within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.

Goal 2: By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level 

emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions 

and agencies.

Goal 3: By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response- level 

emergency communications within three hours for a significant event as outlined in national 

planning scenarios.

Figure 2: FY 2008 UASI Regions
2

Approach and Methodology

OEC used a two-pronged approach to assess communications in the Nation’s UASI regions, as 

depicted in Figure 3. The observations of planned events provided a snapshot of a UASI region’s 

ability to demonstrate response-level emergency communications at one point in time. To further 

assess the broader environment in which these events were held, OEC asked each UASI region to 

evaluate and report on its overall interoperable emergency communications capabilities. OEC 

based the capability questions on the lanes of the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum (see 

Appendix A for a complete listing of the capability options) and Chapter 2 of the NECP,

4 which 

identifies the key foundational capabilities needed for effective emergency communications. OEC 

directed the UASI regions to assess their capabilities and coordinate the results with their respective 

Statewide Interoperability Coordinators for inclusion in their Statewide Communications 

Interoperability Plans (SCIPs) before submitting them to OEC. 

Figure 3: Two-pronged Assessment Approach

For the NECP Goal 1 performance observations, the UASI regions selected large-scale planned 

events that occurred within their region and required public safety support from multiple agencies, 

disciplines, and jurisdictions. The type of events included large sporting events, conventions,

parades, marathons, and large public events, including several July 4th celebrations. In total, more 

than 1,000 Federal, state, and local agencies participated in the 60 NECP Goal 1 events.

OEC observation teams evaluated each UASI region’s performance against standard criteria for 

establishing response-level emergency communications at these events (see Appendix C for a 

listing of NECP Goal 1 evaluation criteria). Each OEC team included a lead observer, a member of 

the OEC Federal staff, and two public safety peers who volunteered to serve as observers. All 

observers received specialized training to prepare them for the observations and, when possible and 

where they existed, the assessments included Communications Unit Leaders (COMLs) on the 

observation teams. 

 

4 NECP, pp. 7-8.
3

In accordance with NECP Goal 1, the observation teams assessed each UASI region’s ability to 

achieve response-level emergency communications, which incorporates the critical elements of 

command, control, and communications within an incident response. The NECP defines responselevel emergency communications as the capacity of primary operational leadership to exchange 

information related to resource management and operations without significant technical or 

procedural barriers. Figure 4 illustrates the critical role that primary operational leadership plays in 

connecting the incident leadership with responders in the field.

The fundamental elements required for effective response-level emergency communications are 

present in both crises and planned responses. These elements include common policies and 

procedures, responder roles and responsibilities, and the quality and continuity of communications 

systems as defined as: 

• Common Policies and Procedures: Jointly developed policies and procedures can provide a 

clear, structured way to establish inter-agency communications during an incident. This 

approach can improve operational performance and safety for both the public and 

emergency response personnel. Generally, observers looked for strong implementation of 

IAP and each UASI region Tactical Interoperability Communications Plan (TICP).

5

• Responder Roles and Responsibilities: Familiar, consistent, and clearly defined functional 

command roles during emergencies support response-level emergency communications 

among agencies. DHS promotes the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as the 

framework for collaborative crisis and emergency management nationwide. Within

emergency management operations, the elements and processes of command, control, and

 

5 Each urban area that received FY 2005 UASI Grant Program funding was required to develop a TICP. Most UASI regions 

established after 2005 have developed TICPs.

Figure 4: Primary Operational Leadership 
4

communications are tightly coupled. To evaluate response-level emergency 

communications during planned events, the NECP Goal observations focused on responder 

roles and responsibilities as implemented and performed within the Incident Command 

System (ICS) command structure.

• Communications System Quality and Continuity: Federal, state, and local agencies have 

communicated by radio for nearly a century and are significantly invested in systems used 

for emergency response. Land Mobile Radio (LMR) is the primary wireless communication 

medium for emergency services. NECP Goal observers evaluated the quality, reliability, 

and usability of public safety LMR systems used during the event observations, as well as 

the UASI region’s plans for establishing backup communications in the event of a system 

failure. 

Following each event observation, the observation team developed an After Action Report and a 

site-specific improvement plan that was shared with each UASI region and their respective SWIC. 

Observers summarized their observations and provided recommendations for future improvements

specific to planned events in the regions. Each UASI region received an overall finding aligning 

their response-level emergency communications capability with one of four levels (advanced, 

established, early, or not demonstrated) as described in Appendix B. Every UASI region 

demonstrated this Goal to a varying degree.

NECP Goal 1 – Levels of Demonstration

As explained in the previous section, OEC teams of subject-matter experts and public safety peer 

observers assessed communications at a pre-planned event within each UASI region. Observation 

teams were guided by standard criteria used to assess the UASI regions’ performance against the 

objectives of NECP Goal 1. More than half of the UASI regions demonstrated an Advanced level 

of response-level emergency communications in their event, indicating the presence of strong 

planning and effective command and control (Appendix B provides a general explanation for each 

level of demonstration). Also, more than a third of the UASI regions demonstrated NECP Goal 1 at 

an Established level, indicating that they faced minimal difficulties relating to policies and 

procedures, command and control, or communications equipment.

Based on these results, OEC is providing specialized training and support to address gaps identified 

during the Goal 1 events and the capabilities assessment reports.

6

 OEC has offered the UASI

regions two-day workshops that address the nationwide findings and lessons learned from the 

NECP Goal 1 observation process and a second day of training with the topic(s) to be determined 

by the host UASI region officials. 

The remainder of this report documents the key findings for each NECP Goal 1 observational 

element—common policies and procedures; responder roles and responsibilities’ and the quality 

and continuity of communications—and relevant capability data as reported to OEC by the UASI 

regions.

 

6 This information was included in each State’s SCIP Implementation Report.
5

Key Findings – Common Policies and Procedures

To assess this aspect of response-level emergency communications, observers generally looked for 

strong implementation of standard operating procedures (SOPs), event-specific IAP, and the UASI

region’s TICP, which documents the resources and operational procedures needed to implement 

interoperable emergency communications within urban areas. In general, a TICP details 

agreements among agencies for joint communications governance structures, technology 

configurations, and usage policies and procedures, including the use of plain language for 

interoperable emergency communications. The NECP Goal 1 assessments produced findings that 

were unique to each UASI region’s use and implementation of policies and procedures. In addition, 

two major findings—specifically the use of plain language and an IAP—are relevant nationwide.

The UASI regions implemented shared policies, practices, and organizational structures during the 

planned events and used plain language for joint communications to achieve NECP Goal 1. 

Observers also noted some inconsistencies regarding the use and implementation of event policies 

and procedures, and noted that many of the TICPs did not appear to have been regularly updated 

since the Department issued its tactical communications assessment in 2007. Finally, evaluators 

expressed some concern about the ability of emergency services to address larger crises or 

emergencies in UASI regions that did not operate from a single unified plan.

Observation: NIMS requires that all written and spoken emergency communications during an 

incident take place in plain, not coded, language – with the exception of some special operations. 

This approach ensures information disseminated across disparate agencies and disciplines is clearly 

understood by intended recipients. While coded language (e.g., 10-codes) originated in an effort to

protect public safety personnel and the community at large, it can sometimes be an obstacle to 

shared understanding and operational effectiveness in joint operations as agencies move toward 

higher levels of interoperability. As a general guideline, operational codes should not be used and 

acronyms should be avoided during operations involving multiple organizations. 

Observers generally found that agencies participating in the UASI region events used plain 

language for interoperable emergency communications among commanders; a procedure that was 

documented through their TICPs. At some events, personnel provided reminders about the use of 

plain language prior to and during the event, and some agencies included plain language reminders 

in pre-event briefings. Observers did note some situations in which responders used discipline- and 

agency-specific coded language, but did not note any instances where those coded substitutions 

significantly impacted operations.

Common Policies and Procedures

Key Finding: Plain Language

Agencies are generally using plain language during multi-agency responses as called for in 

NIMS and included in most UASI regions’ TICPs.
6

General Recommendations: 

• Public safety agencies should continue implementing common policies and procedures;

including regular joint planning, exercises, and use of plain language and standardized common 

talk groups and channels. 

• UASI regions should keep their TICPs current and usable, as well as implement and exercise 

procedural agreements, to establish planning and procedural coherence among public safety 

agencies in the UASI regions. The use of plain language and other standard operating 

procedures may increase and improve overall coordination during emergency responses. 

Observation: Formal governance structures for interoperable emergency communications can help 

UASI regions build relationships among participating localities and agencies and improve overall 

decision-making. Strong governance can facilitate the development of operating procedures and 

planning mechanisms that establish and communicate 

priorities, objectives, strategies, and tactics during 

response operations.

7

 This includes the development 

and use of IAPs,

8 which can drive a consistent, 

coordinated effort to meet planned objectives and 

coordinate all responder actions under one joint-agency 

strategy. Without an IAP, the use of informal, 

unwritten procedures can sometimes increase the risks 

of inefficiency during a crisis response or large events. 

For the NECP Goal 1 events, almost all UASI regions 

used written IAPs, and most included a written Incident 

Radio Communications Plan within their IAP.

9

 Based on the capability reports, all UASI regions 

additionally reported having established formal governance structures for emergency 

communications activities. Most UASI regions reported having established SOPs for interoperable 

emergency communications in the region, with a majority of the UASI regions reporting that they 

are working toward use of common SOPs by all agencies during multi-jurisdictional events;

however these efforts are still evolving in some cases. However, observers noted that several sites 

operated from multiple, independently developed and executed plans that were usually separated by 

discipline. These plans sometimes showed inconsistencies. 

 

7 National Incident Management System National Standard Curriculum Training Development Guidance 

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/nims_training_development.pdf

8 Some UASI regions referred to these as Event Action Plans. The Term “Incident Action Plan” is used throughout this report.

9 NIMS ICS Form 205; http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/Forms.htm

Common Policies and Procedures

Key Finding: IAPs

In many cases the event agencies had developed multiple IAPs that were segmented by discipline 

and not consistent with one another.
7

General Recommendations: 

• UASI regions should implement standardized NIMS ICS planning and command practices for 

multi-disciplinary operations, integrating multiple plans into a single IAP using standard NIMS 

forms. This approach effectively aligns all participants to one shared set of incident objectives 

and can reduce the risk of miscommunication that impairs command and control or degrades

operational effectiveness. 

• UASI regions use their TICPs to develop Incident Response Communication Plans (IRCP), 

which are more commonly known as ICS 205 forms. The TICP can provide a valuable, reliable, 

and common starting point for avoiding system conflicts and identifying available 

communication talk paths. Using the TICP as a source document when building an event IRCP 

can also improve planning efficiency.

Key Findings – Responder Roles and Responsibilities

The NECP recognizes that the elements and processes of command, control, and communications 

are tightly coupled within emergency management operations. The command structures formed to 

implement operations are complex combinations of people and plans. DHS adopted NIMS as the 

framework to provide a common template for collaborative crisis and emergency management 

nationwide. 

During the NECP Goal 1 demonstrations, observers assessed the implementation and performance 

of responder roles and responsibilities utilizing the ICS command structure. This included the 

Operations Section Chief, who plays a key role in facilitating the exchange of information among 

agencies and across disciplines, and the COML, who is responsible for establishing and maintaining 

communications interoperability for responding agencies. 

In general, observers found that multidiscipline collaboration was demonstrated well in most UASI

regions, but not all of them implemented standard NIMS ICS components. In some cases, regions

diverged from NIMS by assigning multiple Operations Section Chiefs. In addition, most UASI

regions successfully integrated the COML position into planned multi-agency operations, although 

in some instances, it did not appear that operational leadership maximized the full potential of the 

position during the response. 

The increased use of communications-focused exercises in recent years has been critical to progress 

in developing greater understanding of responder roles and responsibilities. Almost all UASI 

regions reported that agencies within their regions are now holding communications-specific 

exercises, and about half of them reported that the agencies are holding exercises on a regular 

schedule. 

• This Goal 1 finding represents significant progress over similar results from the DHS Tactical 

Interoperable Communications Scorecard Report, which assessed the maturity of tactical 

interoperable communications capabilities in 75 urban/metropolitan areas. 

• On the issue of exercises, the 2007 TICP report found that “almost no [UASI] region had 

completed a communications-focused exercise before the TICP validation exercise, which 
8

meant that the areas had no specific practice using their interoperable communications 

capabilities.”10 

Observation: Public safety radio systems are configured for reliable, effective, and secure 

communications. Poorly implemented connections to other systems can impair or disable critical 

resources and increase risks to people and property in an emergency. Knowledgeable, skilled 

individuals are often needed to conduct the necessary planning to reliably and effectively build and 

link communications talk paths for multi-agency operations. Trained COMLs, in particular, can 

offer strong general knowledge of radio technology and practical use. Their experience and 

knowledge of the locality can help maximize 

communications capabilities at multi-agency events.

During the NECP Goal 1 events, 58 UASI regions 

assigned DHS-trained COMLs to the responsibility of 

planning and implementing multi-system

communications. The Department’s formal COML 

training class (developed in part as a response to the 

gaps identified in the 2007 DHS TICP Scorecards) 

effectively prepared COMLs to plan, implement, and 

maintain successful joint communications links and overcome unexpected technical problems. For 

some events, pre-event briefings contained detailed information related to COML duties and guides

that helped prepare all users for the event, including who to go to if any communications difficulties 

arose in the field.

Despite the widespread use of COMLs at these events, in some cases, the COML was assigned 

other significant duties that did not allow him or her to perform the COML role appropriately. For 

example, NECP Goal 1 observation teams noted instances where:

• COML skills were underused during events in which the Incident Commander was not familiar 

with the position and did not effectively integrate it into event planning and execution.

• The COML role was spread among multiple individuals for the event.

General Recommendations: 

• UASI regions should continue using DHS-trained All Hazard COMLs and further integrate 

these COMLs into event planning and operations. Well-trained, qualified, and experienced 

COMLs can serve as highly effective resources during the planning phase of an event and can 

bring significant expertise to the event operations. 

 10 DHS Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecard Report, January 2007, p.iii.

Responder Roles and Responsibilities

Key Finding: COML

Trained COMLs supported communications at almost all events; however, operational leadership 

did not always effectively utilize the full potential of this position to help plan and manage the 

response.
9

• Public safety agencies should designate a COML and define responsibilities of the 

Communications Unit in the pre-event planning process.

Observation: The Operations Section Chief plays a pivotal role in facilitating command efficiency 

and effectiveness during emergency operations. In addition to managing tactical activities, this 

position is also critical for facilitating the exchange of information and communications among 

agencies and across disciplines. Many of the NECP Goal 1 events operated with multiple 

Operations Section Chiefs, often segmented by discipline. In addition, command personnel from 

different disciplines and agencies generally exchanged information face-to-face, and this type of 

communications primarily occurred at the Incident Command Post. 

In some cases, event planners did not designate an Operations Section Chief for the event, which 

created operational complexity. Without a single, designated Operations Section Chief, all 

information flowed in and out of a command post along agency-specific information lines. This 

approach increased the number of conversations needed to share information across disciplines and 

therefore increased the risk of misunderstanding. Multiple Operations Section Chiefs and IAPs 

were observed in some cases, which complicated efforts at coordination.

General Recommendation:

• UASI regions should continue to work to implement standardized NIMS ICS practices and 

positions in all multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency operations, including NIMS requirements 

for the Operations Section Chief.

Key Findings – Communications System Quality and Continuity

LMR is the primary wireless communication medium for 

emergency services across the Nation. The quality, reliability, 

and usability of public safety LMR systems play a vital role in 

achieving effective emergency operations. For example, LMR 

allows all authorized users to monitor broadcasts on a defined 

channel or talk group, while most current cellular systems do not 

provide that feature. Emergency responders transmitting 

information over an LMR command net can be heard by all 

authorized subscribers, quickly delivering information to those who need it. Perhaps most 

significantly, only emergency services personnel can access a closed LMR system, while public 

networks are open to a carrier’s entire customer base in the area. Also, during an emergency or 

times of high call volume, commercial networks can quickly become overloaded while public safety 

networks remain operational.

Responder Roles and Responsibilities

Key Finding: Operations Section Chief

A significant number of UASI regions utilized multiple Operations Section Chiefs, which does 

not conform to NIMS. In these instances, the role of the Operations Section Chief was most 

commonly segmented by discipline.
10

The NECP recognizes that state and local agencies have communicated by LMR for nearly a 

century and are significantly invested in these radio systems for communications during routine and 

emergency response. The NECP emphasizes the need for agencies to maintain communications in 

the event of damage to or destruction of their systems and recommends that agencies “identify 

procedures used to trigger and implement backup communications solutions if primary systems and 

solutions should become unavailable.”11 

During the NECP Goal 1 demonstrations, OEC observers documented two major nationwide 

findings for system quality and continuity related to the ability of a UASI region to respond and 

recover from system failures. First, resources used by emergency services to provide voice radio 

communications generally performed well nationwide. The few sites that experienced difficulty or 

a failure of a primary interoperable emergency communications connection had backup systems 

immediately on hand and maintained continuity of operations. 

Second, observers expressed concern about the widespread use of commercial technologies by 

operational leadership, rather than establishing command talk paths over public safety radio systems 

that would support wide-area communications with deployed resources. Observers noted that 

maintaining a coordinated command structure through face-to-face communications would be

impractical if command personnel were spread across a wide geographic area. They encouraged 

responders to provide for the establishment of a command channel and redundant command talk 

paths using public safety-grade systems to reduce any risks of disruption. 

Observation: LMR systems are the primary method for transmitting mission-critical voice 

communications among public safety personnel and emergency response agencies. Responders rely 

on analog, digital, conventional, and trunked LMR technologies to provide push-to-talk voice 

communications with sub-second call setup times, high levels of call completion, and geographic 

coverage and availability. An increasing number of agencies are 

also using mobile and fixed data services to improve situational 

awareness, assist with in-field reporting, and to support strategic 

and administrative functions during responses. 

During the NECP Goal 1 demonstrations, almost all of the UASI

regions successfully implemented interoperable emergency 

communications on LMR systems in their jurisdictions, often 

through the coordinated use of multiple radio systems. Most 

UASI regions had specific alternative or backup communications 

 

11 NECP, Page 22.

Figure 5 –

Primary Interoperability Method

Communications System Quality and Continuity

Key Finding: Primary and Redundant Systems

Radio systems successfully supported communications during all events, and many agencies in 

the UASI regions are using data technologies for communications redundancy as well as overall 

situational awareness.
11

pathways identified in their IAPs. In the few instances when a primary system experienced a 

failure, alternatives and backup connectivity were available and operations were not disrupted. In 

many cases, incident leaders used commercial communications technology—mainly cellular 

telephones—in addition to their primary LMR systems.

According to the UASI regions’ capability reports, more than 75 percent of the UASI regions are 

using shared channels or systems as their primary means of interoperability, which simplifies multiagency communications. Also as shown in Figure 5, 26 percent reported implementing and using 

Project 25 (P25) standards-based systems, which are designed to allow interoperability regardless of 

equipment vendor. The implementation of P25 systems has been a key focus of DHS grant 

guidance in recent years, including the joint DHS and Department of Commerce Public Safety 

Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant program started in 2007.

In addition, more than a quarter of the UASI regions 

indicated in their capability assessments that responders 

use cellular phones during most or all of their public 

safety responses, and overall the UASI regions reported 

using cellular technologies almost 60 percent of the time 

on average during responses. However, this finding does 

not indicate that responders are using cellular technology 

as their primary communications method or in the place 

of their LMR systems, and OEC observation teams 

addressed this issue with the UASI regions given that 

commercial services can be unreliable methods for

communications during large-scale incidents. 

In addition to the use of LMR and cellular technologies, 

the NECP Goal 1 evaluations noted the widespread use 

of mobile data—both low-speed private networks and 

commercial broadband technology—to support command 

and control applications at NECP Goal 1 events. As 

reported in their SCIP Implementation Reports, public 

safety agencies in UASI regions use mobile data in more 

than 65 percent of responses on average.

NECP Goal 1 observers noted that mobile data systems, including computer-aided dispatch, 

incident command software, helicopter video downlink, Web-based patient tracking, geographic 

information systems mapping software, and social-networking sites, were heavily used for 

situational awareness in a number of the events. These landline and wireless methods of data 

communications increased the common operating picture for command staff and provided an 

additional means of communications should their primary systems be disrupted.

General Recommendations: 

• Public safety agencies should continue to implement and improve their technical system backup 

capabilities, including (where possible) the ability to communicate on different systems that are 

not subject to common points of failure. 

Figure 6: Average UASI 

Responses Using Non-LMR 

Technologies
12

• Agencies should work to improve awareness of and the ability to use backup communications 

effectively through thorough planning and information sharing among all public safety 

personnel. 

• Agencies should continue to integrate mobile data applications into their response plans, 

including considerations of the potential unavailability of these systems during a major disaster.

Observation: Face-to-face interaction is one of the most reliable and effective forms of 

communications during incident response, particularly at the incident leadership level. It is 

commonplace for multiple disciplines to establish a Unified Command by co-locating personnel and 

sharing oversight responsibility through face-to-face communications. During most NECP Goal 1 

demonstrations, Command Staff were generally assigned LMR talk paths as designated in the IRCP, 

or ICS Form 205. In addition, the Command Staff used additional methods to coordinate such as 

face-to-face interaction and commercial technologies and networks. While these non-LMR 

approaches proved effective during most events, in a limited number of instances, command staff 

seemed unaware of their assigned LMR talk path when it became necessary to use that path. 

The use of mission-critical talk paths is necessary to prepare for unplanned problems during events, 

including the overloading of commercial technologies or the physical separation of co-located 

command personnel. Furthermore, while commercial technologies can be an additional means to 

augment communications, these methods lack the security, flexibility, and reliability necessary to 

serve as primary emergency services talk paths in critical operations. 

General Recommendation: Event leadership should prepare for the possibility that face-to-face 

communications and cellular technologies may not be available during a significant incident or 

large-scale disaster. To address this contingency, mission critical communications talk paths should 

be available and documented in the IRCP, and event leadership should be familiar with the 

assignments. 

Common Policies and Procedures

Key Finding: Inter-Disciplinary Talk Paths

Use of face-to-face interactions and commercial technologies for cross-disciplinary 

communications at the primary operational leadership level should be accompanied by identified 

public safety-grade redundancies in preparation for the possibility that command personnel 

become geographically separated. Mission critical LMR communications must be identified and 

documented to ensure an effective backup if face-to-face communications are not possible at the 

primary operational site.
13

Conclusion 

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 illustrated the need for national interoperability, and significant 

improvements have been made over the past several years toward that objective. Marked progress 

has been made on several issues first identified in the 2007 TICP scorecards, and as the Goal 1 

study shows, the Department of Homeland Security and its partners have accomplished a good deal 

in a short period. More than 85 percent of the NECP milestones have been achieved to date, and 

progress is evident in all of the NECP priority areas, including governance, training, and 

coordination.

More specifically, since the TICP Validation Exercises of 2007, key improvements have been made 

by UASI regions in the area of emergency communications. These include: 

• Wider adoption of NIMS, including the use of ICS forms such as Incident Radio 

Communications Plans (ICS 205).

• COML training has resulted in more than 3,500 responders, technicians, and planners being 

trained to lead communications at incidents across the Nation. 

• The use of plain language has been widely adopted and documented in UASI TICPs, which 

will reduce the risk of miscommunication during incident responses. 

• More than 45,000 copies of the National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) 

have been distributed to public safety agencies since OEC began distributing this reference

guide in 2007. The NIFOG contains radio frequency information to assist those establishing or 

repairing emergency communications in a disaster area.

• Communications-specific exercises, which were not prevalent in 2007, were found to have 

been used in almost every UASI region. 

All of these improvements are important steps in developing response capacity and progressing 

toward interoperability across the Nation. While the results of individual evaluations cannot be 

used to predict the overall communications capabilities of the UASI regions under all conditions, 

the results of the NECP Goal 1 assessments show that the Nation’s UASI regions have invested in 

response-level emergency communications capabilities that greatly increase their ability to establish 

and maintain emergency communications during large-scale planned events. 

OEC and its Federal partners will use the NECP Goals assessments to better target internal 

resources, such as training, grant guidance, technical assistance, and planning for improving 

interoperable emergency communications nationwide. This approach recognizes that establishing 

emergency communications is not solely a technology problem that can be solved with just the 

“right” equipment or the “right” communications system. All of the critical factors for a successful 

interoperability solution must be addressed—governance, standard operating procedures, training 

and exercises. Implementing nationwide interoperability is a complex process, and OEC will 

continue to support responders at all levels of government to ensure to achieve the long-term vision 

of the NECP, in which emergency responders can communicate as needed, on demand, as 

authorized, at all levels of government and across all disciplines. 
14

Appendix A – Interoperability Continuum and Range of Capabilities

Governance

Area decision-making 

groups are informal and 

do not yet have a 

strategic plan to guide 

collective 

communications 

interoperability goals 

and funding. 

Some formal agreements 

exist and informal agreements 

are in practice among 

members of the decision 

making group for the area; 

strategic and budget planning 

processes are beginning to be 

put in place.

Formal agreements outline 

the roles and responsibilities 

of an area-wide decisionmaking group, which has an 

agreed upon strategic plan 

that addresses sustainable 

funding for collective, regional 

interoperable communications 

needs.

Area-wide decision making 

bodies proactively look to 

expand membership to 

ensure broad representation 

from public support disciplines 

and other levels of 

government while updating 

their agreements and 

strategic plan on a regular 

basis. 

SOPs

Area-wide interoperable 

communications SOPs 

are not developed or 

have not been 

formalized and 

disseminated.

Some interoperable 

communications SOPs exist 

within the area and steps 

have been taken to institute 

these interoperability 

procedures among some 

agencies. 

Interoperable communications 

SOPs are formalized and in 

use by all agencies within the 

area. Despite minor issues, 

SOPs are successfully used 

during responses and/or 

exercises.

Interoperable communications 

SOPs within the area are 

formalized and regularly 

reviewed. Additionally, NIMS 

procedures are wellestablished among all 

agencies and disciplines. All 

needed procedures are 

effectively utilized during 

responses and/or exercises.

Training & 

Exercises

Area-wide public safety 

agencies participate in 

communications 

interoperability 

workshops, but no 

formal training or 

exercises are focused 

on emergency 

communications.

Some public safety agencies 

within the area hold 

communications 

interoperability training on 

equipment and conduct 

exercises, although not on a 

regular cycle.

Public safety agencies within 

the area participate in 

equipment and SOP training 

for communications 

interoperability and hold 

exercises on a regular 

schedule.

Area public safety agencies 

regularly conduct training and 

exercises with 

communications 

interoperability curriculum 

addressing equipment and 

SOPs that is modified as 

needed to address the 

changing operational 

environment.

Usage

First responders across 

the area seldom use 

solutions unless 

advanced planning is 

possible (e.g., special 

events).

First responders across the 

area use interoperable 

solutions regularly for 

emergency events and in 

limited fashion for day-to-day 

communications.

First responders across the 

area use interoperability 

solutions regularly and easily 

for all day-to-day, task force, 

and mutual aid events.

Regular use of solutions for 

all day-to-day and out-of-theordinary events across the 

area on demand, in real time, 

when needed, and as 

authorized.
15

Appendix B – Levels of NECP Goal Demonstration

1. Advanced Demonstration: Response indicative of UASI region’s capability to consistently 

provide response-level emergency communications during routine incidents and events 

involving multiple jurisdictions, disciplines, and agencies and effectively address a significant 

incident were it to occur. Indicators may include:

o Jurisdictions demonstrated strong communications planning using established policies and 

procedures;

o Communications systems were effectively utilized and back-up solutions were available if 

needed; and

o Operational leadership was able to manage resources and make timely decisions without 

communications impediments.

2. Established Demonstration: Response indicative of UASI region's capability to consistently 

provide response-level communications during routine incidents and events involving multiple 

jurisdictions, disciplines, and agencies. Indicators may include:

o Jurisdictions demonstrated some communications planning using policies and procedures, 

whether documented or ad hoc.

o Communications systems were utilized with few difficulties and backup solutions were 

available if needed.

o Operational leadership was able to manage resources and make timely decisions without 

significant communications impediments.

3. Early Demonstration: Response indicative of UASI region's capability to consistently provide 

response-level communications for planned events, but communications and coordination were 

largely ad hoc, with few documented plans or procedures. Other indicators may include:

o Communications systems faced technical difficulties, and little consideration was given to 

reliable back-up methods.

o Operational leadership was able to manage resources and make decisions despite 

communications impediments.

4. Not Demonstrated: The jurisdictions involved did not demonstrate response-level emergency 

communications during the observed event due to communications impediments arising from a 

lack of planning, established policies and procedures, technical solutions, or a combination 

thereof.
16

Appendix C – NECP Goal Demonstration Criteria

Common Policies and Procedures

Criteria 1 Interagency communications policies and procedures were common or consistent 

amongst all responding agencies.

Criteria 2 Established interagency communications policies and procedures were followed 

throughout the incident.

Criteria 3 Interagency communications policies and procedures across all responding agencies were 

consistent with NIMS.

Criteria 4 A priority order for use of interagency communications resources was followed as 

established in standard operation procedures or plans, such as the TICP.

Criteria 5 A primary interagency operations talk path was clearly established by procedure or 

communicated to responders early in the incident.

Criteria 6 Common terminology and plain language were used in all interagency communications.

Criteria 7 Clear unit identification procedures were used.

Criteria 8 Common channel names were used for designated interoperability channels.

Responder Roles and Responsibilities 

Criteria 9 Multiple organizations with inherent responsibility for some portion of the incident were 

present and joined in a unified command with a single individual designated with the Operations 

Section Chief responsibilities.

Criteria 10 Span of control was maintained amongst the primary operational leadership: The 

Operations Section Chief and first-level subordinates.

Criteria 11 Communications Unit Leader (COML) roles and responsibilities were carried out by the 

Incident Commander (IC)/Unified Command (UC) or designee. 

• Necessary communications resources were effectively ordered using documented procedures. 

• A communications plan was established by procedure or developed early in the incident. 

Communications System Quality and Continuity

Criteria 12 No more than 1 out of 10 transmissions was repeated among the primary operational 

leadership due to the failure of initial communications attempts.

Criteria 13 Upon failure or overload of any primary communications mode, a back-up was provided. 

Criteria 14 Primary operational leadership communicated adequately to manage resources and make 

timely decisions during the incident or event.