Middle East Studies

at the Marine Corps University

MES Monographs • No. 8 May 2017

The Jihadist Maritime Strategy:

Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea

Norman Cigar
Middle East Studies

Monograph Series

As part of its mission to broaden US Marine Corps access to

information and analysis through publishing, Middle East Studies at

Marine Corps University (MES) has established different

mechanisms to disseminate relevant publications, including a

Monograph Series. The aim of the MES Monograph Series is to

publish original research papers on a wide variety of subjects

pertaining to the Middle East and South and Central Asia. The focus

of the Monograph Series is on timely subjects with strategic

relevance to current and future concerns of the US Professional

Military Education community.

In the eighth issue of the MES Monograph Series, Dr. Norman Cigar

reviews the often neglected maritime component of jihadist military

strategy. Dr. Cigar’s work deepens our understanding of the evolution

and application of jihadist military strategy at sea. He argues that,

while these organizations have not developed a maritime doctrine

comparable to their land strategy, they are gradually forming a

framework of conceptual thinking for the maritime domain that

should not be ignored. To deal effectively with this challenge, it is

necessary to understand how the jihadists have gradually integrated

operations at sea into a broader strategy to support their strategic and

theater goals. This monograph is intended to stimulate the thinking of

counterterrorism planners and operators in the United States and other

states with maritime interests to help them counter the challenge of

this threat. I thank Dr. Cigar for his continued cooperation with and

support of MES.

The MES Monograph Series is available in print and electronically

through the MES website at www.usmcu.edu/mes and on Facebook

at middleeaststudies.mcu. For information on obtaining print copies,

please contact Mr. Adam C. Seitz, senior research associate for MES,

at adam.seitz@usmcu.edu, telephone number (703) 432-5260.

We welcome comments from readers on the content of the series as

well as recommendations for future monograph topics.

Amin Tarzi

Director, Middle East Studies

Marine Corps University

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do

not reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, the

Department of Defense, the US Marine Corps, or Marine Corps

University.
The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea

by Norman Cigar

INTroduCTIoN aNd TerMS of refereNCe

Jihadists have long presented a threat at sea as well as on land but although jihadist military

strategy has been the object of considerable analysis and writing over the years, it has been the

land-based aspect that has drawn the most attention, while the jihadists’ maritime strategy has been

relatively neglected. The present study seeks to focus attention on and to better understand the

maritime component of jihadist military strategy in order to stimulate thinking and discussion that

will help formulate more effective responses to this threat.

While there are many militant jihadist groups, the emphasis in this study is on al-Qaeda and on the

Islamic State (or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—ISIS) since the latter’s appearance in 2014.

Themselves in a sense coalitions of component organizations, these two groups have been the largest

and most prominent actors, including in the maritime arena, in what has been a global insurgency,

while other significant jihadist groups such as the Taliban or the ones in the Caucus or Turkestan—

not least because of their land-locked geography—have been land-centric and not globallyoriented. To be sure, the focus of effort even of al-Qaeda has been primarily land-based (and even

more so for ISIS), with the maritime component only a supporting effort in their overall strategy.

Nevertheless, jihadists regard the maritime effort as important in terms of its potential to harm its

adversaries, as well as of its benefit to the overall jihad. And, conversely, the West and, in

particular, the United States should also view this facet of the jihadist threat as significant, given

the importance of the maritime factor for international security and economic well-being.

The use of the designation “jihadist” here does not mean that there is a specifically “Islamic” or

“jihadist” operational art in present-day maritime warfighting. Rather, what is meant is that the

actors who have developed and implemented the strategy under study here are “jihadists,” that is

that they have been fighting a global conflict (jihad as they see it) whose ultimate political

objectives and reading of the law of war are informed and legitimated by their extremist

interpretation of Islam. While al-Qaeda and ISIS may differ in detail—and, significantly, in their

projected time horizons and strategies—one would be hard-pressed to find substantive differences

in their belief systems or fundamental goals.

The thesis of the study is that over the years, rather than maritime attacks being random (apart from

some spontaneous lone-wolf attacks), discernible patterns have emerged and that jihadists—and

al-Qaeda, in particular—have developed an increasingly coherent maritime strategy. The intent

here is to provide an analytical reference source for professional military education, as well as to

stimulate thinking and discussion there and in the policy and academic sectors and, at the same

time, to develop ideas on how best to deal with this threat.

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 1
Understanding the challenge at all levels is key to crafting effective policies to deal with the threat.

Specifically, such an understanding entails an analysis of how the jihadist maritime strategy has

evolved both in terms of theory and practice. A useful means to appreciate this process is by means

of an “inside-out” approach, that is by understanding from the jihadists’ own viewpoint what they

believe a war at sea is meant to achieve. Of course, the maritime component of strategy must be seen

within a broader framework of jihadist political goals and of military strategy and policy designed

to achieve those goals, and this study will evaluate the implementation of the maritime aspect

relying on an analysis of past successful and failed events using such matrices as those of

geography, terrain features (natural and artificial), and target sets (military and economic ones) in

order to determine patterns and future vulnerabilities. To be sure, reliable detailed information in

the public domain about past jihadist operations is not always readily available, especially as both

jihadists and the local governments have not always been forthcoming with details or seek to

present versions that are favorable to them or that avoid embarrassment. However, a synthesis of

the jihadists’ conceptual writings, along with reporting by the international and regional media, can

provide sufficient data and perspective to understand the key issues related to the maritime

component of the jihadist war.

The jihadists’ stated intent related to threatened or executed attacks is in itself a valuable indicator

and, while intent has to be combined with capability in order for intent to come to fruition and

constitute a realistic threat, the two factors are interrelated. That is, a recognized general or specific

intent can indicate a strategy to work toward building the capability required to implement that

intent, although of course it often may not be possible to do so because the adversary—whether the

United States or a local player—has been able to prevent that. In that light, even aspirational, at

present unrealistic, jihadist objectives should not be ignored, such as the call by a former spokesman

for al-Qaeda, the American-born convert Adam Yahiye Gadahn (d. 2015), to continue spectacular

maritime attacks. As he put it after the 2014 attack on a Pakistani warship, “it’s just a matter of time

before the lions of Allah make good on their threats and carry out a new Pearl Harbor, with all that

entails in terms of devastating consequences for what is euphemistically called ‘international

stability’ (read Crusader hegemony).”1 Specifically, this study will provide an analysis of

interrelated overlays representing the jihadists’ objectives, their analysis of the adversary,

operational art, target sets, and techniques, as well as the geographic setting, as a framework to

appreciate how the sea fits into their plans. The study will highlight specific past attacks that

illustrate patterns of action within this analytical context, and even foiled plots contribute to our

understanding of a fuller picture of models of thinking and planning for maritime operations.

THe CoNTeXT of JIHadIST STraTeGy: eNdS, WayS, aNd MeaNS

Translating strategic political objectives into actionable military strategies, of course, involves

making decisions and choices based not only on ideology but also on Realpolitik and operational

art. When it works as intended, al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’ operational decisionmaking relies on

analysis that is often as hard-headed and unsentimental as any done anywhere else. Although their

ultimate objectives are shaped by ideology, al-Qaeda and ISIS do think in geostrategic terms and

the strategies they have developed to achieve those objectives have been based to a significant

degree on Realpolitik considerations. Ultimately, as al-Qaeda’s present-day leader, Ayman alZawahiri, saw it, victory would consist of a “political victory,” tantamount to the attainment of

al-Qaeda’s political objectives.

2 Al-Qaeda’s grandiose and unrealistic early objectives were to

convince the United States to leave the Middle East by raising the cost of its presence and by

destabilizing the US economy, intending to thereby pave the way for the downfall of local regimes

and their replacement by an Islamic state.

2 Norman Cigar
3

a Supporting Military Strategy

Al-Qaeda and ISIS have recognized the need to set intermediate political objectives to help achieve

their goals and to neutralize the obstacles that hinder the achievement of their objectives. In turn,

intermediate military operational objectives have had to be developed to support that effort.

Unavoidably, of course, al-Qaeda and, later, ISIS have clashed not only with the United States

(their principal obstacle) but also with local governments they have faced in various operational

theaters—some of whom have been friendly to the United States, while others may have been

neutral or hostile—but which have stood in the way of the jihadists’ achieving their objectives.

In general, jihadists have hoped to contribute to a weakening of US national will as part of an

indirect strategic approach. In effect, for al-Qaeda, the objective of the military strategy needed in

order to overcome such adversaries has been focused beyond that of causing just material damage.

Instead, as a Saudi al-Qaeda theorist stressed, victory would not be measured by the number of

enemy killed or by the quantity of weapons deployed but by “achieving the big strategic

objectives.”3 In fact, for one of al-Qaeda’s most prominent early military thinkers and until his

death head of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Yusuf al-Ayyiri (d. 2003), “victory over

the enemy does not consist in destroying his personnel or his equipment... the definition of the

adversary’s defeat is that you destroy his will to fight... One finds that he who lost a million and

half is the winner while the one who lost fewer than that is the one who was defeated because you

destroyed the enemy’s will and resolve to fight.”4 For al-Zawahiri, too, “breaking the will” (tahtim

al-manawiyat) is a key requirement for defeating an adversary.

5

In particular, al-Qaeda early on recognized the importance of the US economy as a critical

requirement—a factor that the United States needs in order to be able to wage war—and that by

targeting it that the latter could become a critical vulnerability, given the perceived weakness of the

US economy, and that this could contribute to undermining America’s will.

6 At first, projecting

their interpretation of the US experience in Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia, al-Qaeda political

figures often assumed that defeating the United States could be quick and easy. A key assumption

for al-Qaeda’s leadership, at least initially, was that targeting such critical vulnerabilities would

lead quickly to the United States’ defeat, believing the US economy to be fragile and dismissing

US military personnel as inept cowards.

7

In addition, the factor of casualties had been seen initially as key. However, a misplaced optimism

eventually receded, largely as a result of a realization that it was not possible to inflict the number

of casualties needed to have an impact. As Osama Bin Ladin noted in a letter to a senior al-Qaeda

figure in 2010, it had been simply beyond al-Qaeda’s capability to inflict decisive losses, which,

according to his calculations, would have had to be about 100 times greater to reach the proportion

of casualties in Vietnam:

By perusing aspects of America’s history, we would find that despite the fact that it

had become involved in about sixty wars since its creation, the common trait

between some of these wars is that the military actions of its adversaries overseas

were not the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the wars... About 1,000

soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan during eight years, and in Iraq about 4,000

soldiers. This means that the harm has hit only a small portion of them, not enough

to provoke them and make them pressure the politicians to stop the war.

8

Likewise, al-Qaeda had been over-optimistic in the wake of 9/11 that the US economy might be

brought down quickly by such attacks. Indeed, with respect to the 9/11 attacks, the prominent

al-Qaeda strategist al-Ayyiri was to claim in 2003 that “that strike was genuinely successful, as

Jihadist Maritime Strategy
America’s economy was smashed to a great extent. The economy had [already] been languishing

in a recession and was trying to revive the market when, suddenly, it collapsed with the collapse

of the two towers.”9 Typically, Osama Bin Ladin, al-Qaeda’s initial leader, would often come back

to the point that he believed that direct and indirect economic losses to the United States from the

aftermath of 9/11 had totaled $1 trillion and that the 9/11 attacks were responsible for America’s

budget deficits in subsequent years.

10 And, he was confident that “we can target that fragile base

[of US power] and concentrate on the critical vulnerabilities (abraz nuqat al-daf),” so that the

United States could be made to “reel, to shrink back, and abandon its leadership and oppression of

the world.”11 However, such calculations clearly proved to be grossly exaggerated, as the US

economy proved resilient, although al-Qaeda was able to exact a cost, even if indirectly.

As a greater degree of reality set in over time, al-Qaeda policymakers settled for a protracted war

of attrition, as many of al-Qaeda’s military theorists had advocated from the beginning.

Recognizing the vast mismatch in power with its adversaries, al-Qaeda, in particular, has long

emphasized guerrilla warfare in theory and practice as a way to implement this strategy, with

al-Qaeda planners identifying such critical vulnerabilities as casualties, economic cost, and time to

undermine the will of the United States and lead to its defeat. Typically, one writer from Yemen

saw as a given that states with “great military power cannot bear the psychological and economic

strain that results from guerrilla war.”12

In the maritime arena, a similar, more realistic, view also emerged in the work of an al-Qaeda

military thinker, Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir, who noted in 2009 that since it is impossible to destroy

all American warships—or to kill 1 million American troops—al-Qaeda’s objective, rather than

material damage, should be to target the United States’ will by means of such attacks.

13

developing a Maritime Component of Strategy

Not surprisingly, al-Qaeda from an early date looked to the sea as an important operational zone,

stressing, in particular, the defensive and offensive value of operating along the Middle East’s

maritime periphery. If nothing else, the need to counter or neutralize the threat that America’s naval

capability posed forced the jihadists to pay attention to this aspect of war. In particular, in terms of

the importance of seeking sea denial, one apparently senior al-Qaeda strategist had concluded early

that historically the West had ultimately been successful against the Muslim heartland by adopting

an indirect approach on the region’s weak maritime flanks. As he stressed in 1994, “most, if not all,

of the battles are won or lost because of operations on the adversary’s flanks,” noting that the early

Crusaders had failed because they had adopted a direct approach against the heartland of the

Muslim world, whereas with the Age of Discovery “the encirclement of the Islamic world with

military positions on its periphery and seizure of control of the international sea lanes and then

lopping off the more distant parts one after the other [the Crusaders] were successful in finally

reaching the heartland and dominating it completely.”14 As the head of AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi,

also saw it, modern-day Western “Crusaders”—whom he called “pirates from the sea”—had

managed to surround the Arabian Peninsula by controlling the sea.

15 At the same time, according

to Abu al-Walid, the sea also presented an opportunity to strike at the West’s own interests: “I

believe that the most appropriate strategy and the one that should drive the joint effort [for Africa

and Asia]... is activity on the enemy’s flanks with the intent of enabling an advance into the

latter’s own vulnerable areas.”16

Al-Qaeda grudgingly developed a healthy respect over the years for the maritime capabilities that

the United States could deploy against jihadist interests and the impossibility of matching that

4 Norman Cigar
power symmetrically. As Isa al-Awshan, a prominent Saudi figure in al-Qaeda (d. 2004), noted in

1996, it was the United States’ warships, and especially its aircraft carriers, that enabled “the

Crusaders to establish their strategic and sensitive positions in the Arabian Peninsula” and, not

surprisingly, another al-Qaeda strategist also singled out aircraft carriers as a necessary target.

17

Indeed, according to al-Qaeda’s most prolific military thinker al-Ayyiri, it was the Navy that had

enabled the United States to “conquer the world.”18 Moreover, al-Qaeda early on identified the

joint capabilities contained in the United States’ regional facilities, and the ability to mass forwarddeployed forces quickly that that forward presence provided, as key to America’s position in the

Middle East.

19 Indeed, a maritime capability was said to make it possible for the United States to

use naval bases to launch aircraft and to provide logistics support to its ground forces.

20 Bin Ladin,

in particular, saw US naval power as a significant obstacle to al-Qaeda’s objectives, noting that

“Rational people know that if the Mujahidin in Egypt were to become stronger than the present

regime and wanted to topple it and truly institute God’s laws, America would come to [the regime’s]

aid, beginning with the forces positioned in the Mediterranean: the American Sixth Fleet.”21

Al-Qaeda has continued to identify control of the sea as a vital US national interest.

22

The Gap in Doctrinal Literature and a Focus on Practice

A maritime strategy seems to have developed only gradually for al-Qaeda. To be sure, the maritime

jihad holds a distinguished place in the traditional hierarchy of jihad and, as one al-Qaeda legal

authority pointed out, is considered even more laudable than the jihad on land, as operations at sea

are more dangerous, for in addition to the enemy there is also the danger of drowning and one

cannot run away except with one’s comrades. In fact, according to that legist, while a martyr who

dies on the jihad on land has his sins forgiven, one who dies at sea has his debts forgiven as well

as his sins.

23 In practical terms, however, initially the focus on the sea seems to have been as a

source of income, as when al-Qaeda acquired tramp steamers and other sea-going craft in East

Africa for trade.

24

To this day there has been no jihadist naval theorist in al-Qaeda (members of ISIS have not really

written about military theory). Typically, in his 1600-page work on strategy, even the prolific

independent jihadist writer Abu Musab al-Suri mentioned the maritime aspect only in passing, with

a nod to the importance of the major chokepoints abutting Muslim countries and recognizing the

importance of closing them in order to pressure the West into leaving the Islamic world, but did not

propose a strategy to do so.

25 In his work devoted specifically to guerrilla war, he ignored the sea

completely.

26

Perhaps one should not necessarily expect to find a comprehensive jihadist doctrinal manual

dedicated to naval operation. Bin Ladin, like his successor al-Zawahiri, and as was true of all of

al-Qaeda’s military theorists, had been formed by a largely land-centered early personal experience,

whether in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Algeria, the Caucuses, or Central Asia, and they do not seem to

have focused on maritime operations initially. This gap in doctrine is in stark contrast with the

situation for general military theory and, specifically, for ground operations, for which there have

been numerous studies—some of them quite good—by al-Qaeda thinkers. Their land-centered

doctrine had developed as a synthesis between practical experience and the study of foreign

strategists such as Karl von Clausewitz, Mao Tse Tung, Sun Tzu, B. H. Liddell Hart, or Vo Nguyen

Giap, and Western and ex-Soviet doctrinal manuals, whose influence is often made explicitly

evident in the voluminous jihadist military literature, whereas al-Qaeda thinkers do not indicate

that they have even read standard foreign naval writers such as Alfred T. Mahan or Julian Corbett,

proponents of the coastal-focused French “nouvelle école” approach, or even contemporary

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 5
accounts of the exploits of Aruj and Khayr El-Din, the famous 16th century Ottoman naval

commanders operating in the Mediterranean. Only more recently has there been a somewhat more

systematic exposition of jihadist thinking on maritime affairs against both military and civilian

targets, such as was published by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS—a branch established

in 2014) in the inaugural issue of its English-language Resurgence magazine in the Fall of 2014.

Although some early al-Qaeda military thinkers had begun to urge that operations be conducted at

sea and in the air as well as on land, this was largely pro-forma, with granularity devoted only to

ground operations. Even the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 appears to have been intended at the

time as a strike against a visible high-value target as such, a follow-on to the US embassies struck

earlier in East Africa, rather than representing an initial element in a maritime strategy or an

integral element of a wider military campaign.

27 As Bin Ladin’s bodyguard at the time, the Yemeni

Nasir al-Bahri (Abu Jandal, d. 2015) pointed out, the attack on the USS Cole was principally meant

to have a psychological effect or, as he put it, “to raise the Muslims’ morale and to confirm to the

Islamic Umma that its sons can strike the Umma’s enemies wherever the latter are, whether on

land, sea, or in the air.”28 According to Syrian-born Al-Jazeera TV journalist Ahmad Zaydan, who

visited Afghanistan and met with Bin Ladin and other al-Qaeda leaders in October 2000, shortly

after the attack on the USS Cole, al-Qaeda viewed that attack and the earlier ones as “notices to the

Americans that they must leave the Arab region and, in particular, the Arabian Peninsula.”29

Of course, even though there was no comprehensive written doctrinal document and even though

maritime doctrine long remained implicit did not mean that al-Qaeda had not been thinking about,

planning for, and executing sea-related operations even in its early years. Indeed, the successful

attack against the USS Cole in October 2000 was conducted without the existence of any doctrinal

writings or conception of a maritime strategy. In the absence of maritime doctrinal publications, a

study of policy directives by al-Qaeda and an analysis of the latter’s past operations and the

strategy that has evolved is the best way to approach conceptual jihadist thinking about the sea.

Translating Policy into Operational Plans

How al-Qaeda’s strategic objectives have been translated into operational plans for the maritime

arena has varied over time and space. Jihadist activity at sea eventually de facto jelled into a

campaign, with a view to connecting separate attacks (which one could view as engagements) and

their tangible and intangible effects into a pattern in support of a broader strategy with common

objectives. It was the success of the attack on the USS Cole in both material and political terms that

seems to have encouraged al-Qaeda to focus more systematically on the sea. Significantly, in

retrospect, al-Qaeda considered the attack on the USS Cole to have been “a qualitative leap” and

as marking the beginning of its maritime jihad.

30 The fact that the attack had had a high perceived

pay-off for a nominal financial investment made similar attacks all the more attractive and more

likely in the future.

31 Al-Qaeda figures and discussion fora gradually began to reflect an increasing

interest in sustained maritime operations as part of a wider campaign, even if sometimes only in

succinct terms or after the fact.

It was a prominent al-Qaeda military writer, Abu Ubayd al-Qurayshi, who first sought to integrate

the maritime aspect into broader strategy conceptually, even if he did not do so in detail. In 2002,

stressing the importance of freedom of the seas for the US economy and encouraged by the

success of the strike against the USS Cole (noting that that operation had been very cost-effective),

al-Qurayshi called for a revival of the historic “maritime jihad.”32 A later “think piece” by an

al-Qaeda-related outlet, Jihad Press, published in 2008 assessed that the “Crusaders and Zionists”

now only had the sea where they could be dominant and which they could use freely. Therefore, if

6 Norman Cigar
the mujahidin wanted the battle to be global, “the next step must be to control the sea and the

maritime outlets.”33 As that analysis argued, “It is vital to expand the war to the sea. Just as the

mujahidin have succeeded in developing martyr units on land the sea represents the next strategic

step toward dominating the world and reviving the Islamic Caliphate.”34 Much later, in 2014,

AQIS, following its aborted attack on the Pakistan Navy, again highlighted the continuing

importance of the sea, noting that that operation had been “a reminder for mujahideen all over the

world to make jihad on the seas one of their priorities. They should strive to raise the flag of Islam

on the seas and take a decisive step towards the liberation of this Ummah [i.e. Islamic community]

by breaking the Crusader forces’ naval stranglehold on our region.”35 Despite the threat that the

West’s naval power represented for the jihad, Adam Yahiye Gadanh also identified this factor as

a critical vulnerability, characterizing the West’s “navies and international shipping” as its “Achilles

heel.”36

For its part, ISIS, once it emerged, was quick to address the maritime theater, even striving for an

overly-ambitious blue-water capability of its own. In an analysis from March 2015, an ISIS figure

highlighted the naval threat to the jihad, maintaining that “today, Worshippers of the Cross and

the infidels pollute our seas with their warships, boats, and aircraft carriers and gobble up our

wealth and kill us from the sea.”37 However, the audience was urged not to despair, as “thank God,

the descendants of our lions who fought at sea are alive and have established for us an Islamic

state, restoring our pride and glory ... and, after seizing control of the land, God willing, it will also

take to the sea in what is only a matter of a short time.”38 As the Islamic State would expand

toward the sea, “We will hear of the creation of an Islamic fleet by the Islamic State.”39 The

objective was to then to sink the enemy’s “warships and [commercial] ships... and to threaten their

shores and lines of communication... yes, an entire fleet, God willing, not just a single ship.”40

Ultimately, the intent was to “take the battle to the enemy,” since “any nation which was attacked

in its home will be defeated.”41 Indeed, taking to the sea “will bring us closer to conquering Rome

sooner rather than later.”42 To be sure, ISIS remained largely a land-centric phenomenon, with its

center of mass in Iraq and Syria, and such grandiose thinking has been largely aspirational, if not

delusional. Nevertheless, with affiliates in Libya, Somalia, and Yemen with access to the littorals,

such ISIS threats cannot be discounted altogether and the development of even far lesser

capabilities than those desired could cause considerable problems.

WaGING a MarITIMe GuerrIlla War

The jihadi movements, of course, have not developed a blue-water naval force. More sober jihadist

analysts understood that they could not really compete with the United States on the high seas and

as one analyst acknowledged, the latter “controls the oceans.”43 Recognizing that al-Qaeda did not

have a blue-water navy or the ability to seek command of the sea, jihadi strategists therefore

concluded that it was necessary to counter the United States asymmetrically by engaging in the

equivalent of a guerrilla war at sea.

The operational art of Guerrilla War at Sea

Given the existing balance of forces, the jihadists’ focus has been on operations launched directly

from shore similar to the concept used on land. That is, although such operations have at times

been marked by sophisticated planning and execution, operations have taken the form of hit-andrun, small-unit actions against vulnerable targets, not large-scale efforts, as is characteristic of

Mao’s first phase in his insurgency strategy, a strategy which al-Qaeda and ISIS adopted, as

evident in the writings of all al-Qaeda military thinkers, including in those by two prominent SaudiJihadist Maritime Strategy 7
born authors, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and Yusuf al-Ayyiri.

44 Unlike their operations on land, where

at times (as in Iraq/Syria or Yemen) jihadists have gone beyond guerrilla operations, with more

conventional, permanent, mobile maneuver units, operations at sea have never gone beyond the

initial guerrilla phase. Even at that lower end of the spectrum of violence, of course, such

operations have the potential for causing substantial cumulative physical and political damage

disproportionate to the assets expended by the jihadists.

In particular, jihadist thinkers advised enticing the US Navy into areas where narrow seas and

unfriendly land environments would place the latter at a disadvantage. One al-Qaeda analyst,

probably a Yemeni, argued that by “luring” US fleets into such waters it would then be possible to

“settle scores with America and its allies by striking and sinking their ships.”45 In particular, from

that standpoint, Yemen and Somalia suggested themselves as suitable venues, preferably in a

pincer movement.

46 To create the necessary bait for the maritime trap, proponents recommended

that it was necessary to hijack ships and to encourage pirates.

47 That is, even if pirates are motivated

largely by economic, rather than political, purposes, objectively they can contribute to jihadist

interests. More broadly, as was the case with one prominent jihadist writer, some hoped that such

maritime attacks would lure the United States onto the land, specifically into Yemen and the

Arabian Peninsula, where he hoped it would pay a high cost and suffer a defeat.

48

operational Command & Control

One of the reasons that it may not always be easy to prevent or disrupt jihadist attacks is the

flexible command philosophy that jihadists have developed which favors initiative, surprise, and

adaptation. In many ways, the attack on the USS Cole illustrates the philosophy that al-Qaeda had

developed by which it sought to conduct what it saw as a global war. This approach, necessitated

by the distances and difficulty in communications that al-Qaeda faced in fighting a global

insurgency, was a synthesis of traditional patrimonial/personal loyalties and networks combined

with delegated authority, whereby commanders on the ground would be trusted and expected to use

their own initiative to help achieve strategic objectives as defined by general guidance

communicated from the center. As “Uncle”—a term perhaps referring to Bin Ladin—reiterated in

a letter to Sayf al-Adl, a senior al-Qaeda strategist, in 1993, “The leaders in the field are the best

ones to determine the best methods for operating” and again also to fighters in Africa in 1994,

while a senior advisor, Abu al-Walid al-Masri, in 1994 advised commanders operating in Africa

that “the [African and Asian theaters] must enjoy a significant degree of independent action within

the framework of flexible decentralization in pursuing shared strategic objectives... [such

recommendations] achieve for us jihadist activity having a unified strategic vision.”49

Although, as noted, not yet part of a maritime campaign, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000

illustrated al-Qaeda’s overall command philosophy. The operation—a raid in which greater

central control was possible than in more dynamic extended operations—was carefully planned, as

suggested in the charge sheet by the Office of Military Commissions against Abd al-Rahim alNashiri, the alleged mastermind of the attack, involving detailed analysis, reconnaissance,

coordination, and preparation, including the testing of explosives at al-Qaeda’s headquarters camp.

50

The process was an interactive one between the center and the field commander, with operational

planning and execution in local hands. As Nasir al-Bahri noted specifically in terms of the USS Cole

operation,

Al-Qaeda has a guiding principle that says: centralized decisionmaking and

decentralized execution. The decision is taken centrally but the manner of the strike

and of the execution are tasks for the commanders in the field like those who were

8 Norman Cigar
in Yemen, such as Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and others who took part in the

operation... In the case of the Cole operation, the planning for the concept and

objective were developed and forwarded to al-Qaeda’s higher supervising military

committee which is called the Military Affairs Committee. The latter does not do

planning but only gives the green light [to proceed] and provides support and

financing for operations. The actual planning for the execution and for how the

attack is to be carried out, however, all that is in the hands of the field commanders

in the operational theater.

51

This command philosophy focusing on “mission-type orders” extends to all subordinates. For

example, the veteran jihadist Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who was to become leader of al-Qaeda’s

Jabhat al-Nusra branch in Syria, urged fighters to “cooperate with the [other] combat groups in the

field” and underlined that that “is an order from the general leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra” but, he

added, that they were to apply his guidance “as you see best.”52 Typically, the Moroccan operatives arrested in 2011 for planning a maritime strike had sought guidance from a senior figure in

the al-Qaeda in the Maghrib branch organization, who had suggested in generic terms targets

such as foreign ships operating in Moroccan waters, but apparently left operational details up to the

local cell.

53

Al-Qaeda has operated with this flexible command and control philosophy by relying as much as

possible on a careful selection and appointment of personnel, and on control of the electronic media

to provide guidance, analysis, and a common ideology, reinforced by religious cohesion and

personal loyalty enshrined in the religiously-based baya or oath of allegiance. Typically, when the

Arab Spring erupted, Bin Ladin, in a letter to a senior al-Qaeda figure, spoke of the importance of

putting “some qualified brothers on the ground in their own countries where there is a revolution

in order to seek to direct events in a legal and wise manner in coordination with the [existing]

Islamic forces there.”54 Such a command and control philosophy works best when leaders and

subordinates share a common educational and operational experience, but may not be effective

when local leaders—as had been the case with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq—have neither gone

through al-Qaeda’s educational system nor have been tested or appointed by the organization’s

personnel system. In fact, this command and control relationship is a fragile structure and is most

vulnerable from the inside, as was to occur with the ISIS schism in 2013 in the Syrian theater that

was to split al-Qaeda from top to bottom.

Local branches, whether of al-Qaeda or ISIS, normally have had a great deal of autonomy from the

central decisionmakers and may vary widely in their operational conduct depending on the degree

of subordination to and distance from the center. In the early days, when al-Qaeda policymakers

were concentrated in Afghanistan, decisions typically were made by Bin Ladin, but with analysis

and input from the equivalent of a staff.

55 Greater direct control (and more deliberate planning by

the center) would have been possible for an operation such as the attack on the USS Cole.

However, after 9/11, with the forceful US response and the resulting dislocation of al-Qaeda’s leadership and force structure—perhaps 80 per cent of whom were neutralized at least temporarily—

more decisions by default had to be delegated to the regional branches and field commanders, albeit

with continuing attempts at central guidance and efforts at personnel appointments.

56 The degree

of autonomy of the local branches, in fact, increased significantly under al-Zawahiri, who has lacked

Bin Ladin’s combat credibility, charisma, and authority, and who has had limited scope for

activity.

Very often, maritime operations may be in support of the immediate objectives of local branches

but, in the aggregate, even if indirectly, also support the broader intent and objectives of the

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 9
parent organizations, whether al-Qaeda or ISIS. Subordinate local affiliates often have taken the

initiative even in significant operations. According to Nasir al-Bahri, the 2002 attack on the French

supertanker Limbourg, unlike the earlier one on the USS Cole, had not been initiated by al-Qaeda’s

central authorities. Instead, it was a locally-generated reaction to the killing of an al-Qaeda supporter

in Sanaa, and al-Nasiri later characterized the attack as “a mistake,” as he viewed that the

consequences for the Yemeni population were largely negative, although at the time Bin Ladin

welcomed the attack enthusiastically, probably not least because of al-Qaeda’s bleak situation at

the time, after its ouster from Afghanistan.

57

ISIS, with its senior leadership collocated near the battlefield may have a greater capability of

direct command and control, but the fluid nature of operations on two fronts suggests that ISIS

also has had to rely on flexible delegated authority. Autonomous command relationships may be

most evident, in fact, in areas where there is a potential for maritime operations by ISIS in the form

of its far-flung branches, as in Sinai, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, given the distances involved

from the central leadership. Significantly, as a way to ensure functioning command and control

relationships in such areas as Libya or Yemen, ISIS could rely on its veterans who had gone through

its system in Syria and Iraq, returning home, combined with the personal baya to ISIS’s leader, Abu

Bakr al-Baghdadi, and general guidance from the center.

58 This exercise of command has not

always gone smoothly for ISIS, as when the latter’s appointment of a new leader for the West

Africa-based Boko Haram in August 2016 was resisted by the existing leader.

59

In addition to directed and organized attacks, al-Qaeda and, later, ISIS, have also encouraged

spontaneous lone-wolf operations by cells and individuals—including, specifically, in the

maritime arena—especially once al-Qaeda’s central decisionmakers were constrained in their

activity after 9/11, functionally not unlike Winston Churchill’s call during World War II for

independent resistance activists on the continent to “set Europe ablaze.” There is no real control

over such operations, but anything accomplished that can add to the enemy’s discomfort would

contribute to the greater overall military effort and would be welcomed by al-Qaeda or ISIS

leaders. Even here, there is an attempt to exert some influence through general guidance and

online distance education. While the material impact of such lone-wolf operations mounted by

individuals or small cells may be limited, they can present a special challenge. Those undertaking

such operations, because of their clandestine nature, small footprint, or spontaneity, may be

particularly hard to detect and there may be only limited warning, with few if any telltale signs of

preparation or even of the attackers’ existence.

THe GeoGrapHIC dIMeNSIoN of STraTeGy

It is perhaps not surprising that the majority of maritime operations initiated by jihadist groups

have been concentrated in certain areas or theaters. The focus of operations in a specific geographic

area may result from a combination of factors: an area’s conducive geographic features such as a

suitable coastline or proximity to a chokepoint, whether the environment is benign in terms of the

degree—or lack—of control by the local government, the presence of operatives and the support

of at least part of the population, and the nature of suitable targets (that is whether warships,

commercial traffic, or other maritime targets are present and accessible). Significantly, the Arabian

Gulf has been largely immune up to now to jihadist maritime attacks despite the lucrative

commercial and military maritime targets to be found there, thanks to the hostile environment for

the jihadists on the Iranian shore, and the heavy security on the Arab side, reducing the degree of

access and, proportionately, the level of vulnerability. Success for the jihadists, ultimately, depends

on accessibility, with the need to be able to achieve at least local and temporary sea control even

10 Norman Cigar
if general sea control, given the mismatch of capabilities with their adversaries, is not realistic.

60

That is, jihadists must either control a territory to have a secure land base from which to launch or

they must be able to breach the adversary’s sea control at least temporarily by taking advantage of

a security lapse. A number of theaters offer such advantages and, conversely, represent areas of

greatest likely activity.

Geographic areas of Interest and Zones of Vulnerability

Although a threat can materialize wherever jihadist cells or even “lone wolves” have access to

coastlines, several regions offer jihadists the greatest actual or potential advantages and, conversely,

represent areas of greatest threat for US and international maritime interests. To be sure, the jihadist

presence in general and along the coast in particular even in territories where they have been most

successful has been subject to an ebb and flow depending on the effectiveness of the response by

the international community and by local forces but, in general, in certain areas the jihadists have

remained a persistent factor.

Yemen

Yemen, with a coastline of almost 1400 miles and over 100 islands, has perennially been marked

by weak central control and for the last half century has been beset by often violent confrontations

involving tribes, ideological movements, political and personal factions, and foreign interference,

resulting in weak or absent government control in certain areas and fertile ground for al-Qaeda

activity. In particular, while al-Qaeda has viewed Yemen as a pivot for its maritime strategy over

the years, maritime issues have never been a priority for successive Yemeni governments. Plagued

by few ships, a lack of training, and the phenomenon of “ghost” personnel, the Yemeni Navy and

Coast Guard have never really had adequate assets to control the long seacoast at the best of times.

61

The 2015-17 civil war and ensuing security disarray—exacerbated by the intervention of Saudi

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—contributed to the growth of al-Qaeda (and by now

also ISIS) and to the threat to maritime interests, further compromising coastal security despite the

increased presence of US and other Western naval and air assets in a blockade of the country. The

blockade led to an increase in smuggling by small craft, further complicating maritime enforcement

and no doubt facilitating al-Qaeda’s participation in that traffic to move personnel and arms.

62

Although in May 2016 al-Qaeda withdrew inland from key port towns and the coast that it had

seized, this occurred largely as a result of negotiated agreements by the UAE through local

intermediaries, allowing the jihadists to preserve much of their force structure and to continue to

represent a long-term threat, especially if stability, as is likely, remains elusive.

63 As a case in point,

in August 2016 al-Qaeda mounted an unsuccessful operation using for the first time two bomb-laden

traditional fishing boats to try to penetrate and blow up the port of al-Mukalla, while in November

2016 it set off an explosion at the naval base in that city.

64 Saudi Arabia has also been planning to

build a new canal across its own territory that would terminate on the Arabian Sea in Hadramawt,

Yemen. While this waterway would bypass the risk of potential Iranian hostility in the Strait of

Hormuz, it would provide a potent new magnet for jihadist attacks, with its oil facilities on the

Yemeni sea coast and the expected concentration of tanker and cargo ships it would attract.

65

Somalia

Somalia remains unsettled and insecure despite the internal splits within al-Shabab, the main jihadist

group, and years of security operations by some 20,000 African Union troops and US interventions.

In fact, by 2016, there appeared to be a resurgence of al-Shabab power under new leadership,

including in the heretofore relatively stable semi-independent northeast part of the country,

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 11
Puntland.

66 In October 2016, al-Shabab forces—by then pro-ISIS—seized the port city of Qandala

in Puntland and were only expelled in December, although remaining nearby.

67 With its long coastline on the busy artery of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, Somalia remains a potential maritime,

as well as continental, threat theater.

Libya

The upheaval and ensuing instability resulting from the Arab Spring opened up new possibilities

for jihadist maritime activity in a number countries as local surviving or successor governments

often saw their control weakened, and as local jihadist organizations—both al-Qaeda and ISIS—

were now able to operate with greater freedom. This was certainly the case with Libya where, after

the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime in 2011, a civil war and the subsequent emergence of two

rival governments left sizeable areas of the coast ungoverned. At one point in early 2016, Russian

military intelligence estimated that ISIS controlled some 150 miles of the Libyan coast radiating

from the port of Sirte.

68 Later in 2016, a counteroffensive by forces supporting the UN-brokered

government in Libya seemed on its way to wresting the coastal area from ISIS control, but progress

has been slow and the situation remains tenuous, and it was unclear how permanent such gains

would be.

69

Egypt

The general political turmoil connected to the Arab Spring that led to the fall of the Hosni Mubarak

regime, followed by the July 2013 military coup under General Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi that overthrew

the successor Muslim Brotherhood government (led by Muhammad Mursi) that had been elected

in June 2012, have led to a deterioration of the security situation in the country overall, which has

facilitated the rise of jihadist elements. The Sinai Peninsula, in particular, with its long-standing

grievances towards the Cairo government and its traditional tribal society has become the focus of

much of the instability and jihadist activity. With a coastline at the crossroads of the Mediterranean

and Red Sea, and in proximity of the Suez Canal, as well as of Israel and Saudi Arabia, Sinai has

represented a security concern for the international community as well as for Egypt.

The Straits of Malacca/South China Sea Region

The expansive maritime area bordered by Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

includes the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s most widely-used waterways. The Filipino

Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group and the Jemaah Islamiyah, a transnational jihadist group, which were

both originally aligned with al-Qaeda but subsequently shifted to ISIS, have operated in the area.

70

Local governments and analysts take the threat seriously and devote significant assets to countermeasures.

71 Although the countries affected are stable and secure overall, there are pockets of undergoverned territory in some of the constitutive archipelagos in the Philippines and Indonesia, and the

jihadist groups have been able to mount attacks over the years.

72

Syria/Lebanon

While Syria’s Mediterranean coast has enjoyed relative security despite the on-going civil war, in

May 2016, for the first time there was a series of explosions in the area, which killed over 140

people, including in the port city of Tartus where Russian Navy units are berthed. This development

created concern for the Asad regime of the possibility of a deteriorating maritime situation in that

country’s coast too.

73 And, in mid-summer 2016, there was intense fighting in the country’s Latakia

Governorate, which is on the coast.

74 However, that area is a stronghold of the dominant Alawite

12 Norman Cigar
community and consists of rough terrain, limiting ISIS prospects for seizing it. ISIS and al-Qaeda’s

Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra (which declared its separation from the latter in July 2016) have

both sought, also without success, to establish an outlet to the Mediterranean on the Lebanese coast,

at times fighting each other for control of territory.

75 Although the level of that threat will recede

after ISIS’s recent setbacks in the theater, isolated attacks will continue to be possible.

focusing on Terrain Vulnerabilities

An additional geographical dimension of the jihadists’ focus has been key terrain where maritime

traffic is most vulnerable, whether due to natural features or to artificial ones. Specifically, from the

perspective of geography, Abu Ubayd al-Qurayshi had urged already in 2002 that chokepoints such

as the Bosporus, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the

Bab al-Mandab be made priority target areas.

76 (See Figure 1)

Figure 1. The Strait of Hormuz (renamed in jihadist sources after the Caliph Umar

bin Khattab) as an enduring focal point for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, alLuyuth forum, 2011.

In 2014, AQIS reiterated the enduring importance of the mujahidin’s fortunate proximity to such

key chokepoints for maritime operations.

77 Ports, of course, may also be considered a specific

chokepoint and be a location where ships could be especially vulnerable, as they are stationary or

have limited maneuver space.

Not surprisingly, one chokepoint that has drawn considerable jihadist attention is the Suez Canal.

Although before the Arab Spring the Egyptian authorities were very confident about that waterway’s security, with the upheaval in government and ensuing growth of jihadist strength

following the overthrow of the Mubarak regime in 2011, the situation changed considerably and,

by 2012, Ayman al-Zawahiri felt emboldened enough to call for a stoppage of the flow through the

Canal of US military assets to be used in the Middle East.

78 Despite the heavy security in the Canal

Zone, the waterway is flanked by Sinai, where a jihadist insurgency continues to fester. At least two

small-scale attacks occurred in 2013 involving machine-gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades

(RPG).

79 According to regional sources, several other planned attacks have been thwarted. For

example, a cell in Saudi Arabia with suspected links to al-Qaeda was alleged to have been planning

to blow up a ship transiting the Canal before being arrested in 2012.

80 In 2014, Egyptian security

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 13
seized an RPG just east of the tunnel that runs under the Canal.

81 Again, in 2015, security forces

stopped the driver of an explosive-laden vehicle trying to force his way through a control point on

a road to the Canal.

82 One cell arrested in Egypt belonging to the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis

(Supporters of Jerusalem) organization (then still loyal to al-Qaeda before switching to ISIS)

allegedly even wanted to use a mini-submarine to target ships transiting the Canal.

83 While such

attacks would be unlikely to sink a ship even if successful, they could disrupt traffic, add to

insurance costs, motivate shippers to consider alternate albeit longer routes, and provide jihadists

with a propaganda boost.

As could be expected, given its location, al-Qaeda has long viewed Yemen as a particularly

significant theater of operations. As the 2008 Jihad Press analysis cited earlier underlined, Yemen

is “at the crossroads of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and overlooks the Bab al-Mandab

to the Red Sea, as well as facing on the Indian Ocean.”84 Not surprisingly, according to the same

source, the “Zio-Crusader enemy” had therefore established bases and other forms of a naval

presence in the area.

85 Al-Qaeda studies often reiterated the importance of Yemen, stressing that at

the Bab al-Mandab it could control what it called “the vital highway” through which al-Qaeda

claimed that 30% of the world’s oil transited.

86 Another senior AQAP leader, in a message

addressed to al-Qaeda’s central leadership, stressed that controlling the Bab al-Mandab would be

“a great victory with global impact” and that closing that waterway would “strangle the Jews.”87

Still another writer termed Yemen “a strategic point” necessary in order to pursue a successful

maritime strategy to thereby undercut “the Zio-Crusader enemy’s” land strategy, which relies on

naval bases and mobility at sea.

88

Yemeni authorities, at least before the 2015-17 civil war, were confident that al-Qaeda would not

be able to establish control over the Bab al-Mandab, but nevertheless acknowledged that that group

could still threaten shipping.

89 Significantly, if reports from May 2016 are accurate, al-Qaeda was

said to have shifted forces toward the Bab al-Mandab area after having negotiated with the Saudiled coalition for a withdrawal from the port of al-Mukalla.

90 For a time, al-Qaeda’s Yemeni

leadership hoped that a combined front could be formed with al-Shabab in Somalia “for the

purpose of controlling the sea and the maritime chokepoints,” noting that “al-Qaeda is committed

to controlling the strategic Bab al-Mandab in cooperation with the mujahidin in Somalia.”91

However, working with al-Shabab has always been a challenge for al-Qaeda, which over the years

has accused the latter of providing falsified reports and poor information, and of mistreating

foreign al-Qaeda personnel.

As part of a wider programmatic strategy, ISIS’s maritime component has adopted al-Qaeda’s

thinking on chokepoints, focusing on the Suez Canal with the intent of reducing the Egyptian

government’s badly-needed revenues from ship tolls, as well as for now the largely aspirational

objectives of also carrying out attacks in the Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Gibraltar from

Morocco.

92 And, as has been true of al-Qaeda thinking, ISIS too has highlighted the importance

of seizing territory in order to affect the situation at sea, with one strategist calling for a parallel

effort by jihadists in Yemen, Somalia, and Djibouti to take control of the land areas on both sides

of the Bab al-Mandab in order to then specifically enable the mujahidin to close the Red Sea.

93

deVelopING a TarGeT MaTrIX

This section will categorize maritime operations within a target matrix as an overlay superimposed

on geographic considerations. Essentially, one can identify two general categories of operations:

against a military presence (US, other foreign, and local) including warships, bases, and personnel;

14 Norman Cigar
and against commercial traffic, with the oil sector as a key subsystem (tankers, coastal oil

refineries, oil rigs, export facilities), but also against the general maritime economy (ships, ports,

other littoral assets and activities).

An overview of the operations that jihadists have conducted in the past can help determine likely

objectives and methods for future attacks. Even those operations that have not been successful

provide valuable insights into the conceptualization, intent, and capabilities of jihadist planners and

operators, as well as lessons learned for both the latter and for the intended targets. What to target

has been a factor not only of desirability but also of accessibility and of opportunity when preferred

targets may not have been vulnerable to available jihadist capabilities.

The United States cannot remain indifferent even to attacks against foreign assets, as they also

affect US interests. Not only might such attacks abroad have a global impact, as with the oil and

shipping industries, but there are shared interests in freedom of the seas, and security is mutually

interconnected, and any jihadist success at sea would also represent a victory and boost in prestige

for the jihadist movements overall. The assets of any country that the jihadists deem hostile are at

risk. The jihadists have not targeted Iranian interests at sea up to now, whereas over the years the

Iranian Navy has had numerous encounters with pirates in the course of protecting either Iranian

or foreign vessels. One might attribute this relative immunity to al-Qaeda attacks due to the fact that

many prominent figures in al-Qaeda’s leadership (including Bin Ladin’s family) had crossed into

Iran from Afghanistan while fleeing from the US pursuit after 9/11. Imprisoned in Iran for many

years, they served the function of de facto hostages. Moreover, at least central al-Qaeda (though not

necessarily its Iraqi branch which, however, was land-bound) also sought to prioritize targeting

US/Western and local regimes instead. While ISIS would have no such qualms about Iran, in the

areas where its affiliates have a maritime capability, such as in Libya or Sinai, there is no Iranian

naval presence to target.

Targeting the Military presence

Military targets had the advantage of not involving civilian collateral damage, which could be used

as an accusation against the jihadists. Al-Qaeda’s leadership, in particular, became sensitive to the

image of civilian casualties in the media, and often cautioned planners and commanders to limit

collateral damage among Muslim populations. From that perspective, al-Qaeda saw targeting a

warship as particularly desirable and, as an al-Qaeda figure, Rifai Ahmad Taha (Abu Yasir, d.

2016), noted, in the case of the attack on the USS Cole “no one can condemn it using the excuse

that civilians were attacked.”94

Warships

US, as well as other warships, in particular, are a desirable target for a number of reasons but,

despite their high value, they present a difficult target set, as al-Qaeda recognizes. As one al-Qaeda

analyst noted, while attacks on the US Navy and bases in the region were “not impossible,” he

acknowledged that that might require “a more complex effort.”95 However, the potential pay-off

of such attacks is high, especially because of the political symbolism and the considerable media

coverage that can accompany such attacks, encouraging al-Qaeda to make repeated efforts in that

domain. In addition, such attacks can also contribute to degrading an adversary’s military

capability and threat, at least temporarily. Thus, Sayf al-Adl, a long-time prominent al-Qaeda

figure with a military background, urged the targeting of US aircraft carriers—however

unrealistic that might be—which he considered veritable “floating bases.”96

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 15
United States Warships

The deadliest jihadist attack on a US warship occurred against the USS Cole on 12 October 2000

in Yemen. During a brief routine fuel stop in the port of Aden, a small boat carrying more than 500

pounds of explosives enhanced by a shaped charge detonated alongside the Aegis-class destroyer.

The blast ripped a large hole through the port side of the ship, killing 17 US sailors and injuring 39

more. Strategic surprise contributed to the success of the attack in that, as a Congressional

investigation concluded, there was a “general mindset that tended to discount the likelihood of a

terrorist attack against a US warship.”97 Only considerably later did it become clear that al-Qaeda

was responsible for the attack and that it had previously attempted a similar but less publicized

attack on the US Navy destroyer USS The Sullivans while at anchor in Aden on 3 January 2000.

However, unknown to US authorities at the time, that earlier attack had failed, as the boat was so

overladen that it sank, forcing the operation to be abandoned.

98

After the success of the attack on the USS Cole, al-Qaeda developed high hopes for a vast

expansion of maritime operations against warships. Bin Ladin sought to also put into motion an

attack in the Strait of Hormuz to be carried out by a boat launched from Pakistan, as well as other

attacks, including one by an aircraft against a US warship in Dubai, but, in the post-9/11 atmosphere

of heightened security, as well as logistic obstacles, none of those attacks were to mature.

99 That

more attacks on US warships have not materialized can be attributed to a great extent to the

enhanced security measures introduced, based on lessons learned from the USS Cole incident,

although other near-misses have been reported, as was the case of a rocket attack directed at US

warships in Jordan’s port of Aqaba in 2005.

100

Foreign Warships

Pakistani Warships

On 6 September 2014, elements of AQIS for the first time targeted a warship of the Pakistani Navy.

The precise details of the incident remain murky, as the local media and official sources provided

incomplete and often contradictory accounts. Apparently, a number of jihadist militants were able

to board a frigate, the Zulfiqar, at its Karachi naval base. That ship was scheduled to sail that day

for maneuvers with the US Navy and the attackers were said to have planned to meet additional

reinforcing personnel at sea with the intent of then using the ship’s armaments to fire on US

vessels.

101 However, naval commandos from a nearby base succeeded in subduing the attackers

before the latter’s plan could be carried out.

102 While the Pakistani authorities, for political reasons,

claimed that the ultimate target had been the Pakistani Navy, the communique that AQIS issued

stated that “the real target... was the American Naval fleet in the Indian Ocean, which was to be

targeted using Pakistani warships.”103 In fact, according to an al-Qaeda analysis, the plan had been

to seize control of two Pakistani warships, both the aforementioned Zulfiqar and another frigate,

the Aslat.

104 Al-Qaeda claimed to actually have taken control of both Pakistani frigates and that the

ensuing firefight on board the Zulfiqar took place at sea, not in port.

105 The intent was to then

target a US Navy oiler as well as Indian Navy warships. Al-Qaeda, in fact, has identified oilers not

only as more vulnerable than fighting ships but also as a crucial capability needed to support the

US Navy’s extended operations and power projection.

106

Significantly, al-Qaeda’s communique identified the US Navy as a key capability—if not an

operational center of gravity—for the United States’ global reach, claiming that it was the Navy that

enabled the United States to control commerce and carry out military operations in the Muslim

world. At the same time, the communique identified those maritime geographic points that

16 Norman Cigar
al-Qaeda considers important in relation to US maritime strategy:

It is because of their naval strength that America and its allies have been able to

impose a military and economic stranglehold on the Muslim world, especially the

land of Makkah and Medina. America’s naval-military capability represents the

backbone of its global empire of oppression. Using its seven naval commands,

America rules the seas and oceans of the world; and in this way, America is able to

control vital maritime trade routes and straits in the Muslim world and pillage the

resources of the Ummah. These same resources are then employed by America to

perpetuate its aggression against the Muslim world.

107

Such attacks could also inspire lone wolves among military personnel. In fact, according to the

spokesman of AQIS, when the latter launched its 2014 attack, one of the benefits was said to be that,

“This mutiny should also inspire those officers and soldiers who have for years suppressed their

bitter disagreement with the pro-American policies of the [Pakistani] armed forces to stand up in

defiance against this deliberate subservience to America and offer their blood for the defense of

Islam.”108 What must have been of even more concern was that this attack, as earlier ones in

Pakistan, was against a secure naval base and could not have been implemented without inside

assistance. Even if not all the attackers were commissioned officers as al-Qaeda claimed, apparently

at least one or more current or former members of the Pakistani Navy were implicated.

109

Egyptian Warships

In Egypt, in November 2014, a patrol boat was also the target of an attack by jihadist elements. The

group held responsible was one operating mostly in Sinai, originally known as Ansar Bayt

al-Maqdis, most of which by then had sworn allegiance to ISIS and had renamed itself the Sinai

Province of the Islamic State. Official and media details of the attack remain vague, with two

versions of the event, and, as is typical, despite promises of additional information once an official

investigation was completed, the Egyptian authorities did not release any other details apart from

the statements at the time of the incident. According to one version, during a patrol in the

Mediterranean some 40 miles north of Damietta, three (other reports said four) fishing boats sent

out a distress signal, subsequently ambushing the responding patrol craft as it approached and, in

the ensuing firefight which included RPGs and Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGM), the latter was

set on fire and sank.

110 The local media reported that the attackers had engaged the patrol craft from

multiple directions, and were described as having been “very professional” and of having shown

“a high level of training,” having apparently engaged in long-term observation of naval movements

and conducted effective planning.

111 The attackers were said to have come from within Egypt itself

rather than from a foreign country.

112 However, the local media was anxious to suggest that the

attackers must have received help in the form of training, weapons, money, and planning from

some unnamed foreign country.

113

In another version—the one that the attacking organization itself claimed—members of the jihadist

group had hijacked the patrol boat—whose name the group provided as the 6 October—while it was

still in port before it set out to sea.

114 That group’s official account claimed that the hijacked craft

succeeded in attacking with its guns an Egyptian troop transport in Rafah, the Egyptian town on the

eastern border with the Gaza Strip, and intended as its next objective an Israeli naval craft in order

to seize its crew to use as a bargaining chip for the release of Palestinian prisoners.

115 Israeli sources

also reported sea-based energy facilities as the attackers’ possible intended targets.

116

In the first scenario—the fishing boat attack version—loyal Egyptian forces, including aircraft,

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 17
ships, and special forces, were dispatched from Damietta and subdued the attackers, sinking all the

attacking boats. As a result of the incident, 8 of the crew of 13 in the targeted patrol boat were

listed as missing in action, while of the reported original 65 attackers, about 30 were said to have

been captured and the rest killed.

117 In the second scenario, media reports from elsewhere in the

region suggested that two Egyptian F-16s were dispatched and succeeded in sinking the

commandeered boat after the latter had not responded to communications from the home base.

118

The follow-on Egyptian response was to mount raids ashore, as support for whichever scenario

was the actual one had clearly originated in Egypt itself, leading to the arrest of at least 18

suspects.

119

In a subsequent incident, Egyptian forces foiled another potential attack when they arrested a cell

in Sinai in December 2014, when they found scuba diving gear and suggested that another attack

on a warship was being planned.

120 Another attack, in July 2015, was somewhat better documented,

not least thanks to photographic evidence provided by the attackers, the same group that had been

involved in the previous strike. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2. Projectile fired from the Sinai shore at the Egyptian ship, Islamic State

online, 16 July 2015.

This case involved the hitting of an Egyptian patrol vessel operating off the Sinai coast near Rafah

and setting it ablaze by what may have been an ATGM fired from the shore. Egyptian forces have

often used such ships to ferry personnel and equipment to Sinai to avoid the hazardous land route,

although it is not clear what the stricken ship’s mission was that day.

121 The Egyptian response was

to raise the security level in the area and to seek the attackers on land, using helicopters and ground

forces, apparently unsuccessfully.

122

Other Warship Attacks

Elsewhere, in the Libyan port of Benghazi, in November 2014, during the fighting between

al-Qaeda and a Libyan warlord, General Khalifa Haftar, a naval vessel was sunk in port by artillery

fire from al-Qaeda.

123 There have also been other, unsuccessful, attempts to target warships. In

Morocco, three Saudi members of an al-Qaeda sleeper cell were arrested in 2002 before they could

put their plan into action of enlisting suicide bombers willing to run explosives-laden Zodiac

rubber boats into US warships transiting the Strait of Gibraltar.

124 Again, in 2012, the Algerian

18 Norman Cigar
19

authorities likewise arrested an al-Qaeda cell planning a suicide attack against a US warship.

125 In

2011, al-Qaeda again tried to ram a warship, this time a Yemeni one, with an explosives-laden

boat, although unsuccessfully, off the Abyan coast in Yemen, and although the boat approached the

warship, it was driven off by gunfire from the latter.

126 In Somalia, in 2012, land-based al-Shabab

fighters and a Kenyan warship offshore the port of Kismayo traded machine gun and missile fire,

apparently forcing the ship to leave its station.

127 According to Singaporean authorities, the Jemaah

Islamiyah jihadist group, which has links to al-Qaeda, in the past also explored attacks against

warships in Singapore.

128

Attacks on Military Maritime Facilities

Another target set, that of maritime military facilities, is also attractive, as it has the potential of if

not crippling at least obstructing the adversary’s military capability, not to speak of the potential

political and propaganda impact. Pakistani naval facilities had first been the target of jihadist attacks

in 2009, apparently by al-Qaeda, and again in 2011 at the hands of the Pakistani Taliban and

al-Qaeda, but those attacks appear to have targeted Pakistani and US military personnel and

equipment rather than having a specific maritime objective, although in the latter attack a naval

patrol aircraft was also destroyed.

129 Likewise, in the port city of Derna, Libya, a satchel bomb was

set off in a Libyan naval facility in 2014.

130 In Yemen, al-Qaeda in 2013 claimed to have destroyed

a government facility which also housed a monitoring post for shipping that the United States also

used.

131 Also in Yemen, more recently, ISIS launched a deadly attack involving three car bombs

against the Yemeni Coast Guard base at al-Mukalla.

132 Other attacks have been thwarted before

their intent was made clear, as when the Kenyan Navy in 2011 intercepted al-Shabab boats

seeking to infiltrate into Kenyan waters with unknown objectives.

133

Naval personnel have also been targets. While only key personnel might have a major impact on

maritime operations, the propaganda value of any such strikes could still be considerable. To be

sure, at times the fact that such personnel belong to a naval service may not be the motivating

factor but merely a coincidence, as the intent is simply to target any military personnel at hand.

Thus, in Yemen, al-Qaeda claimed in 2012 to have ambushed a vehicle in the port town of

al-Hodeida carrying US trainers for the Yemeni Coast Guard. In France, at least two plans by small

cells to attack the naval base at Toulon and take hostages were foiled in their early stages by the

authorities in 2015.

134 And, again in Yemen, al-Qaeda attackers were more successful in gunning

down the head of Yemen’s Navy and Coast Guard intelligence in August 2015.

135

The economic War at Sea

As part of its strategy, al-Qaeda has often suggested an indirect approach against the United States

by targeting the global economy, which al-Qaeda has long identified as a critical requirement for

Western and US power, including for its military power. Not surprisingly, al-Qaeda has viewed the

sea as a key component within that strategy and, as an al-Qaeda analyst addressing economic

warfare against the United States stressed, al-Qaeda should “seek to establish itself in the world’s

maritime passageways and threaten to strike only those commercial ships flying the American

flag,” which he believed would raise insurance rates and transportation costs, with oil tankers being

an especially desirable target, given their visibility and value.

136 Al-Qaeda strategists, of course,

were especially encouraged to target commercial shipping after the successful USS Cole attack, with

calls to expand such operations to the trade routes not only in the Middle East but also in East Asia

in order to strike at global trade.

137

In particular, as one would expect, given the world economy’s dependence (though reduced in

Jihadist Maritime Strategy
20 Norman Cigar

recent years) on energy imports from the Middle East and from other Muslim countries, al-Qaeda

came to place a high value on targeting the world’s oil supply. At first, whether to strike at the oil

sector in Muslim countries apparently gave rise to some qualms within al-Qaeda, as the negative

economic and environmental consequences also could affect ordinary Muslims. Bin Ladin himself,

in declaring the jihad against the United States in 1996 had urged the mujahidin to avoid attacking

the oil sector, arguing that it was the Muslims’ asset and part of their power.

138 Ultimately, an

al-Qaeda legal expert drafted a long legal opinion on striking such targets as oil tankers, offshore

drilling platforms, and land-based oil facilities, concluding that such attacks were permissible, but

only if the damage caused to the infidel exceeded the damage caused to the Muslims.

139 In fact, he

noted that “oil is the basis of modern industry, a pillar of the economy of the industrial infidel

countries; thanks to oil, America was able to impose its control over the world once it had

occupied the oil sources in Eastern Arabia, in Iraq, and elsewhere.”140 In that vein, military expert

Sayf al-Adl suggested targeting oil tankers and other sea-borne traffic, hoping—however

unrealistically—that this would help bring US industry to a standstill.

141

In October 2002, a small explosive-laden boat rammed the French oil supertanker Limbourg in

Yemeni territorial waters, causing significant damage and some casualties.

142 Bin Ladin described

the attack as a major success, striking “the line of supply and nourishment to the artery of the

Crusader bloc and reminding the enemy of the heavy cost in blood and losses that it would incur

for its continued aggression against our Umma.”143 Again, in August 2010, a suicide boat-bomb

rammed the Japanese super tanker M. Star as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz, but only

caused limited damage.

144 Shore-based oil-related facilities have also been targeted, as was the case

in 2004 when members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, then led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, staged an attack

by several speedboats against oil facilities in Basra harbor, although the group claimed that the real

targets had been the oil tankers in port.

145 Jihadists have also suggested striking Western workers

in the oil industry in the Muslim world, as well as oil terminals and pipelines.

146

While targeting the oil industry infrastructure had long since become a standard practice, it was a

short document in the inaugural issue of Resurgence magazine in the Fall of 2014 by AQIS that

presented the most extensive assessment and rationale for such attacks and synthesized past

experience.

147 That study analyzed the global energy system and emphasized the desirability of

striking at the maritime transportation network as part of the economic campaign, “targeting the

super-extended energy supply line that fuels their [i.e. the Western countries’] economies and helps

to sustain their military strength,” and characterized the maritime transportation network as “the

Achilles heel of the oil industry.”148 The study expected that by striking at what it termed “the

energy umbilical cord” the resulting “sustained disruption in this supply system would not only

increase insurance costs for international shipping, but also affect the price of oil globally, making

the theft of our petroleum resources an expensive venture for the West.”149 ISIS, too, has seen the

oil industry as a lucrative target and, as a case in point, in January 2016, ISIS operatives mounted

an attack from the sea against oil export terminals on Libya’s western coast.

150

In addition, jihadists have also set their sights on various other aspects of maritime-dependent

industries, whether non-oil seaborne commerce, tourism, or port earnings. While warships, at least

at sea, have felt fairly secure, and larger ships now often carry their own security details, smaller

vessels are at greater risk, with Italy, for example, especially concerned about its unarmed fishing

boats and ferries as potential targets of jihadist attacks, as others also are about luxury yachts

plying the Mediterranean.

151 More concretely, in 2011, Moroccan authorities detained an al-Qaeda

cell planning attacks on foreign ships in that country’s territorial waters and ports using

unspecified methods.

152 Algerian commercial ship traffic, in fact, had to modify its routes in the

Eastern Mediterranean in late 2015 due to threats of ISIS attacks from Libya.

153 Ships in difficulty
near coasts where there is a jihadist presence can also present targets of opportunity, as was the case

with a Kenyan cargo ship that ran aground in Somalia in 2014, although in that case al-Shabab

soon released the crew as they were East African Muslims.

154

Simply disrupting the support infranstructure for maritime traffic at sea or in port, as in Yemen,

where local security sources reported that al-Qaeda had plans to target foreign experts working in

the country’s ports, could also cause significant economic damage.

155 Again in Yemen, members

of ISIS gunned down the supervisor of the dock workers for the port of al-Mukalla in May 2016.

156

Even more worrisome is the possibility of cooperation by sympathizers inside the shipping

industry, who could leak information or introduce cyber viruses into operating systems, a concern

that is not far-fetched and that is taken seriously by the security services in some countries.

157

Particularly disturbing would be the recruitment by a jihadist organization of personnel with

expertise in the maritime field with the professional skills and knowledge to provide advice in

planning and executing attacks at sea or in port. As a case in point, in 2016, a recent graduate of a

course for deck officers in the United Kingdom joined ISIS.

158

The possibility of attacks by jihadist scuba divers has also been a concern and, in 2003, French

security arrested an individual trained in scuba diving, who had links to al-Qaeda and who had

been recruiting other divers originally from the Middle East.

159 Such concerns continued, and the

US Department of Homeland Security in May 2004 issued an alert for potential attacks by al-Qaeda

scuba divers, although at the time there was no specific information to that effect. The charge sheet

of a prominent Saudi al-Qaeda figure arrested in 2005, likewise, included an allegation that he had

sought to recruit divers for attacks on unspecified foreign ships in the Red Sea.

160 On another

economic aspect, in March 2013, Egyptian naval forces detained a fishing boat off the coast of

Alexandria carrying three divers who were said to be planning to cut the internet sea cable which,

if it had succeeded, could have caused significant disruptions to communications.

161 The

Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Islamist group has had a long and continuing history of seaborne

attacks intended to kidnap local personnel and foreign tourists and, more recently, also crews of

small commercial ships, holding them for ransom.

162 It was also held responsible for the 2004

bombing of a ferry boat in the Philippines that left over 100 people dead.

163

Attacks, or even the potential of attacks, can have a tangible impact on the most fragile aspects of

the maritime economy, such as the tourist trade on which the economies of many regional

countries depend. Seen as a luxury by its patrons, the tourist industry is particularly vulnerable to

threats of attack. For example, in 2015, at least some of those who attacked two tourist hotels on

the Tunisian coast arrived to the site by a rubber Zodiac.

164 Likewise, in January 2016, the

terrorist attack on a hotel in the Egyptian Red Sea resort town of Hurghada, which left a number

of foreign tourists wounded, was mounted from the sea.

165 Al-Qaeda in the Maghrib operatives

who in 2016 attacked a beach resort in the Cote d’Ivoire frequented by the country’s elites and by

expatriates also arrived by boat, bypassing security forces on land.

166 In such cases, an approach

from the sea can contribute to surprise, as was clearly the case in the Tunisian attack.

167

In some cases, cities have lost their international status as tourist ports of call due to inadequate

security against maritime terrorism, with a loss of income for the countries involved, as was the case

in 2016 for Trogir, on Croatia’s Dalmatian coast, which relies heavily on the summer

maritimetraffic.

168 As a policy, cruise ships at times have been reluctant to face the higher risk of

terrorism, as when the Norwegian Cruise Lines cancelled its port calls in Turkey for 2016 due to

security concerns.

169 In the case of Algeria, the latter declined a Tunisian offer to open a cruise line

between the two countries, citing security concerns.

170 In fact, principally as a result of terrorism,

Egypt’s tourism industry—much of it based on its coasts—which is a major pillar of the national

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 21
economy, has collapsed.

171 Likewise, in Algeria, there has been an opportunity cost for tourism, as

the maritime terrorist threat has prevented the development of some coastal tourist sites.

172 Of

course, other economic facilities on the coast can also become targets, as was the case when

Mogadishu airport was attacked by a gun-boat in 2015.

173

The jihadist threat could also undercut the economies of local states if their port or waterway

security is shown to be deficient. Some ports around the world are known to lack adequate but

expensive security capabilities, which may lead to the avoidance of such facilities by commercial

firms, resulting in losses of badly-needed revenue for struggling countries.

174 Indicative of the

overall insecurity of the port of Aden, for example, in 2016 there was an attempt to hijack the

national refinery company’s only sea-going tug in order to sabotage planned fuel deliveries from

the UAE. The attempt was foiled only with the help of unspecified—very likely Western—air

observation after the tug was well out to sea on its way to Somalia.

175 Just a potential threat can have

a tangible cost, causing countries to divert significant assets as a precaution to deal with the

situation. In financially-strapped Egypt, security concerns along the Suez Canal resulted in the

Army’s having to build an expensive wall along part of the waterway in 2014.

176

Maritime states could also be forced to devote additional military assets to counter the threat, as

occurred when fear of explosive-laden boats against oil tankers spread to Mediterranean ports, such

as Trieste, leading to increased air and naval patrols.

177 Often, such military deployments could be

for the long term in the form of forces on station, committed and in support, entailing significant

costs in time, money, and increased operational tempo.

178 This has been the case, for example, with

a significant French air and naval task force deployed to the Mediterranean in late 2015 that was

intended to protect against ISIS (including with strikes against land-based targets), or the

longer-term increased forward-deployed presence in the Middle East as a key part of the US Navy’s

current maritime strategy.

179

Observers often conflate piracy and jihadist warfare but, while there is some overlap, they are

distinct phenomena insofar as both objectives and techniques. However, although pirates are

essentially motivated by financial gain rather than politics or ideology, governments have long

worried that jihadists and pirates might cooperate for mutual benefit and there have been

indications that that may have happened on a local basis, such as in Somalia, even if not

extensively.

180 Al-Qaeda itself, nevertheless, has been skeptical of cooperation with Somali pirates,

noting that the latter have their own tribal protection networks and worried that, rather, the

international community might see the pirates as a tool not unlike the Sahwa tribal militias in Iraq

to be used against the mujahidin.

181 At times, in fact, as was reported to have occurred in 2008, there

has been noticeable tension between the pirates in Somalia and the jihadists.

182

The Intangible effects of Maritime attacks

Beyond the strictly material impact of maritime strikes, less tangible but no less important factors

also come into play. Significantly, jihadists have viewed the political impact and the related

symbolic and media value as equally, if not more, important than the concrete damage caused.

Specifically, the high visibility and value of maritime targets and the ensuing media coverage (and

even more so nowadays with instantaneous social media) can have a political and psychological

benefit in terms of publicity and recruitment efforts and, conversely, damaging an adversary’s

image as being weak and ineffective. That is, maritime attacks can be seen as achieving a

cumulative political impact and psychological sense of insecurity even if they cannot deliver a

decisive blow against the enemy’s economy or to the latter’s military potential.

22 Norman Cigar
Typically, in the attack on the M. Star oil super tanker in 2010, in addition to the intended economic

objective (“to weaken the infidel global system, which plunders the Muslims’ riches”), the

al-Qaeda-affiliated attackers also claimed to be retaliating for the incarceration of Shaykh Omar

Abd al-Rahman in the United States on terrorist charges.

183 (See Figure 3)

Figure 3. Al-Qaeda boasted widely in its media of the attack on the Japanese oil

tanker M. Star, Kata’ib Abd Allah Azzam website, 2010.

Characteristically, with respect to the attack on the USS Cole, the prominent Saudi al-Qaeda thinker

Luways Atiyat Allah highlighted psychological shock as perhaps the key benefit of this type of

attack.

184 Al-Qaeda, as one could expect, was anxious to publicize this attack and, although because

of a timing error, the al-Qaeda operatives were unable to shoot a video of the actual attack, the

organization subsequently produced a video with a reenactment in order to gain maximum

publicity.

185 Drawing media attention may have been the intent when a senior al-Qaeda leader in

2004 suggested to operatives in Turkey that they target an Israeli ship visiting that country,

although an operation never materialized.

186Likewise, the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India,

reportedly by Lashkar-e-Taiba (a Pakistani group loosely associated with al-Qaeda), that targeted

several hotels was apparently intended to take hostages and to garner media attention. The latter

attack involved an approach from the sea as, according to media reports, the attackers departing

from an undetermined location commandeered an Indian trawler at sea, and had then deployed to

the shore in rubber dinghies.

187

Publicity stemming from maritime operations can also enhance a jihadist organization’s image

among sympathetic or neutral regional publics, which is especially important now in the context

of the al-Qaeda-ISIS war. Just reports of threats or rumors can enhance al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’s

prestige and have a psychological impact which can be amplified by media coverage even if no

attacks materialize, as when precautionary alarms were sounded in Aden in 2012 due to fears of

attacks from the sea.

188 Simply establishing a jihadist “presence” and the panic and the visible

defensive precautions that governments and the private sector have to devote to guard against the

threat can equate to a political success, magnifying a jihadist group’s image, boosting recruitment

efforts, and entailing economic costs to affected governments, companies, and individuals. As a

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 23
case in point, an apparently false alarm of a bomb on a ferry boat traveling from Genoa to Tunis

in 2015 caused considerable public consternation, while in the case of another ferry traveling to

Algeria a false bomb alert at the very least caused additional cost and public concern when the ship

was obliged to turn back to its point of departure in France.

189

THe Sea aS a JIHadIST aSSeT

In addition, for jihadists, the sea is not only a theater for attacks against high-value maritime

targets, but also represents a positive asset in terms of supporting their own conventional operations

and serving as a source of income.

The Sea as an avenue of approach

The sea can serve as an avenue of approach for attacks against the land as well as a line of

communication for the combat service support element integrated at the operational level, being

used to transport personnel and equipment for current or future land operations. To actualize this

asset requires a degree of at least temporary local sea control and, from a military perspective, local

control of the sea is an interactive process for the jihadists, with the sea being used to support

various land theaters to then, in turn, use the latter as additional secure bases for further maritime

operations.

An al-Qaeda strategist, having concluded that “defended positions on the coast are relatively

neglected from the direction of the sea,” was an early proponent of ship-to-shore attacks.

190 In fact,

jihadists have often mounted attacks from the sea and have used the sea as a route for maneuver

and withdrawal for tactical combat operations. Most jihadist attacks conducted from the sea have

been small raids typical of guerrilla operations, many of which may often be unreported in the

media. For example, in Yemen, in 2012, al-Qaeda mounted at least two amphibious operations,

successfully outflanking Yemeni Army positions and seizing the latter’s artillery and in both cases

causing casualties.

191 Likewise, a raiding party in a boat attacked a manned observation tower on

the Algerian coast, wounding some of the personnel before eluding a government reaction force

despite exchanging fire with the latter.

192 In March 2016, Somalia’s al-Shabab were able to shift 700

fighters by sea to the heretofore relatively secure Puntland region who, although checked, could not

be eliminated completely.

193

At a higher level, for propaganda purposes, jihadists have at times portrayed the sea as only a weak

defensive barrier for Europe, as was the case with a Tunisian ISIS figure, who threatened France

that “Between us and you is [only] the sea. By Allah’s permission, the march is advancing towards

you. And insha’allah, your women and children will be sold by us in the markets of the Islamic

State,” while the Islamists’ flag would fly over that country’s presidential palace.

194

As part of the mass migration phenomenon that has developed in recent years, European Union

authorities have well-founded fears that ISIS and al-Qaeda will also use the flow of migrants by sea

to infiltrate their own personnel—whether for immediate attacks or as sleeper cells—into Europe,

a concern validated by anecdotal reporting.

195 An ISIS figure in Libya, in fact, envisioned using such

migrations to create “hell” in southern Europe, citing the ease of reaching Europe by sea from

Libya under this cover, and suggested tasks such as targeting ships once jihadist personnel arrived

at their destination.

196 What is more, in his posting, he provided a graphic suggestion as to where

the best preliminary landing sites would be (See Figure 4)

24 Norman Cigar
Figure 4. Abu Irhim al-Libi, Suggested landing sites from Libya, 26 January 2015.

Such fears of jihadist fighters aboard the migrant-carrying boats, especially prevalent in southern

Europe, have been voiced both by government officials and by the media.

197 Not surpisingly, Italy,

with its long coastline and moderate distances from poorly-controlled areas across the

Mediterranean, has felt particularly vulnerable to such maritime threats, not only as the point of

entry of choice for the maritime infiltration of potential jihadists but also for sea-based attacks.

198

Italian intelligence, in fact, is convinced that ISIS, has controlled much of the migrant flow from

Libya.

199 With the intesification of the campaign to retake the Libyan port city of Sirte from ISIS

in August 2016, the Head of Italy’s Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee voiced

increased alarm that fleeing ISIS elements would seek to blend in with migrants coming to Italy by

sea.

200 Or, ISIS might encourage mass migrations to Europe simply to create economic and social

difficulties in the latter, as its Libyan branch has threatened to do to Italy if it is subjected to

military strikes.

201

The Sea as a line of Communication

More practically, jihadists have used the sea as a line of communication to move equipment and

personnel routinely, often viewing it as a more reliable and faster route than ones on land. Al-Qaeda

has relied on this mode of transportation from the beginning, as one can see from the narrative of

one al-Qaeda operative, originally from the Comoros Islands, as he and his companions were able

to travel easily around East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula by boat during the less-well

monitored early years.

202 Al-Qaeda in Yemen has long used the sea to receive men and equipment

by way of East Africa, including arms originating from Syria and Iraq.

203 In 2016, a French frigate

intercepted a fishing boat carrying small arms reportedly destined for al-Shabab in Somalia.

204 In

2014, Egyptian authorities foiled an attempt by ISIS operatives to infiltrate the Port Said area by

sea.

205 Again in Egypt, explosives used in a major attack by ISIS in Sinai in 2015 were reportedly

shipped there from the mainland using a fishing boat.

206

In Libya, too, the sea has played an operational role for jihadists’ logistics, as air strikes and naval

patrols by government forces have had to deal numerous times with boats seeking to bring arms and

munitions to the jihadists either from abroad or from one part of the country to another.

207 And, in

July 2015, Libyan aircraft sank one vessel and damaged another near Benghazi as they were

reportedly carrying personnel, arms, and munitions for the jihadists.

208 Libyan press accounts

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 25
suggested that it was foreign frogmen who in March 2016 blew up two fishing boats in

Misrata harbor being used to smuggle arms.

209 This means appears to have been used again in

October 2016 when another two supply vessels belonging to an ISIS affiliate were sunk quay-side

in Misrata harbor.

210 Also in 2016, the Libyan Air Force attacked off Benghazi a barge carrying

heavy arms (including armored vehicles) allegedly bound for ISIS forces.

211 ISIS apparently has also

relied on foreign-flagged ships to smuggle arms to Libya, a number of which were being tracked

during the summer of 2016 after leaving ports in Turkey.

212

At the same time, the sea can serve as line of communication for jihadist personnel mobility. When

Fahd al-Qus al-Awlaqi, a Yemeni al-Qaeda leader, was asked whether it was possible that Yemeni

mujahidin would be sent to Somalia, he replied: “The sea is wide open to American and Crusader

warships, and it will not be off limits [either] for the Muslims to sail on it to all locations, thanks

be to God.”213 In Algeria, al-Qaeda has used fishing boats to transport fighters to various places

along the coast.

214 Not surprisingly, one of the tasks of Egyptian Navy patrols is to prevent jihadist

fighters from transiting by sea between Gaza and Sinai.

215 In Yemen in 2015, during fighting against

military units loyal to the country’s former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, al-Qaeda used the sea to

bring reinforcements from the coastal town of al-Mukalla to Aden.

216 Significantly, in Yemen, large

numbers of jihadist fighters returning from Syria to Yemen in 2014 reportedly took an indirect

route, reaching Africa by air to then infiltrate home by boat.

217 Elsewhere, ISIS fighters returning

from Syria to Libya have also relied on cargo ships as transportation home.

218 Tunisian recruits are

said to embark in the country’s Kerkennah Islands for Libya, while Tunisian fighters returning

from Syria and Iraq are said to first travel to Libya, from where they take boats for the last leg to

Tunisia, passing through the same islands.

219 In one case, would-be recruits for ISIS even planned

to set off from Australia in a boat to Indonesia on the first leg of their trip but were intercepted

before they could depart.

220

At other times, jihadists have used the sea as an escape route. For example, in 2012, fleeing

al-Shabab fighters reached safety in Yemen by boat and, conversely, Somali fighters returned home

when military pressure increased in Yemen.

221 This has also been the case frequently for jihadist

fighters in Yemen over the years, who have withdrawn tactically by sea from unfavorable combat

situations.

222 Similarly, in 2014 the Libyan Coast Guard seized a boat carrying escaping al-Qaeda

fighters.

223 During combat operations in Libya in 2016, ISIS used the sea not only as a route to

bring arms and reinforcements to Benghazi during the fighting, but also as an escape route when

the tide of battle became unfavorable.

224

The Sea as an economic asset

In addition, the sea can be used to generate income for jihadist organizations. In Libya, for

example, in 2014 the local Ansar al-Sharia, at the time still allied to al-Qaeda, was reported to be

earning money—as well as receiving arms—through a sea-based smuggling operation.

225 Also in

Libya, ISIS and al-Qaeda, in league with local tribes and coastal towns, were said to be earning

money by smuggling people to Europe across the Mediterranean.

226 The central ISIS has also

relied on sea shipments, even if through intermediate parties, to sell its oil abroad, as was the case

with sales to Bulgaria and Italy.

227 In Yemen, when it controlled part of the coast during 2015-16,

al-Qaeda profited from fees it levied on ships using the ports of al-Mukalla and al-Shihr.

228 In fact,

Yemeni authorities estimated that at its height al-Qaeda was also earning $150m a month from the

oil trade, which depended on its access to the sea.

229

26 Norman Cigar
lookING aHead: aN adapTIVe adVerSary

War, of course, is an interactive process, with an adversary’s skill likely to affect and limit the

effectiveness of the other(s). From this perspective, jihadists have been adaptive in their planning

and operational art, displaying a willingness to experiment with and use a variety of tactics,

techniques, and procedures, depending on their availability and the likelihood of success. There

are additional techniques that jihadists have not yet used but that could prove challenging to the

international community’s maritime security. One can expect future options and operations at sea,

as on land, to be governed by the law of war as it has been developed by al-Qaeda and other jihadists

rather than by conventional international law of war practice, governed by traditional legal

considerations. This means a very flexible, permissive, framework, where mission success is the

priority, with minimal constraints on the jihadists in such matters as neutrality, national borders, the

distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the treatment of prisoners, the types of

weapons used, or proportionality.

Since jihadists have been skillful at integrating lessons learned and new technology, the

international community therefore must wargame and prepare for new potential threats. While some

ideas, such as the use of a mini-submarine against ships using the Suez Canal thought up by a cell

arrested in Egypt, as noted earlier, may seem far-fetched, such “out-of-the-box” thinking is

nevertheless worrisome, as it indicates a willingness to innovate and experiment. Other potential

options and innovations, moreover, may be more realistic.

The first potential future option is simply one of horizontal escalation, that is extending current

operations to new areas wherever possible. As noted above, that had been an objective in Syria and

Lebanon, but other areas, such as West or East Africa, could become involved depending on the

local political situation.

The second potential option is that of expanding the target matrix to include new target sets. For

example, causing an explosion on a liquid natural gas transporter, either by having hijacked it or

by ramming it with another vessel, could be disastrous to a port or a waterway such as the Suez

Canal. There have already been at least two attempts to cause explosions in the port of Balhaf in

Shabwa Province, home to Yemen’s major liquid natural gas liquefaction facility and export

terminal. In 2013, the Yemeni Coast Guard managed to blow up and sink a bomb-laden boat

heading for the port, but in December 2016 al-Qaeda did set off an explosion there in a gas

pipeline.

230 And, in October 2016, there was an attempt against the Spanish Galicia Spirit liquid

natural gas carrier near Bab al-Mandab, but the explosives aboard the attacking skiff apparently

detonated before the skiff could reach the ship.

231 Of particular concern, the numerous nuclear

reactors that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states plan to build over the coming years—many of them

on the sea coast—will present new potential doomsday targets at least theoretically vulnerable from

the sea.

A third potential option is the extension and adaptation of tried techniques. For example,

explosive-laden remote-controlled maritime or airborne drones could be used in strikes. ISIS and

al-Qaeda have already used drones for battlefield reconnaissance and their reconfiguration for

maritime use could be fairly simple. Even if airborne drones might carry only an explosive

package of limited weight, the political impact of a successful attack might matter more than the

material damage caused. Although not part of the groups dealt with in this study, but underlining

the feasibility of such an approach, an engineer with links to the Gaza-based Hamas organization

who was developing a drone submarine was assassinated in Tunisia in December 2016, probably

by Israeli agents.

232

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 27
A fourth potential option consists of the use of sea mines, in essence transferring the capability

already widely displayed by jihadist operatives in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

as a land weapon. While they can be viewed as a defensive weapon in tactical terms, in operational

and strategic terms one can also view them as an offensive weapon due to their potential effect at

higher levels, achieving not only sea denial but having political impact. The adaptation of such

IEDs for maritime use could be relatively simple and their use could cause disruption of

navigation, especially in narrow sea approaches and ports. In fact, a prominent al-Qaeda figure,

Yunis al-Mawritani, detained in Pakistan in 2011, reported that the organization’s “technical workshop” within the Military Committee of which he had been head was interested in developing

remote-controlled devices in preparation for strikes against large US cargo ships.

233 Significantly,

in 2015, Egyptian security reportedly foiled a plan in the Sinai for divers to lay sea mines, although

it was not clear from the local media whether the case involved ISIS, Hamas, or the Muslim

Brotherhood.

234 And, in October 2016, the authorities in Yemen’s port city of al-Mukalla defused

in time remote-controlled mines consisting of explosive-laden canisters powerful enough to destroy

the harbor infrastructure and halt navigation.

235 Moreover, such weapons could become increasingly

lethal, as we know that jihadists have been interested in developing new more potent explosives to

use against ships.

236

A fifth potential technique that apparently has never been attempted is that of a booby-trapped

shipping container, of which millions enter not only the United States but virtually every other

maritime country.

237 So far, as seen, jihadist attacks have been ones of “direct fire” from a coast,

and there has been no evidence of a real power-projection capability. However, the use of

containers as a ship-borne vehicle for an explosive device would represent a form of powerprojection, with a strike potentially occurring against out-of-area targets, whether port facilities or

ships, at a distance from the original launch site. Jihadist thinkers have discussed such a

possibility, at times with fanciful twists. One writer even suggested modifying a container to carry

a rocket launcher that would apparently be set off remotely.

238 Of even greater concern would be

a vertical escalation in force with the use of WMD in such containers, not least for the political and

psychological impact of such weapons. Al-Qaeda strategists have long considered such options,

with one prominent writer suggesting in 2003 that the United States, for example, viewed nuclear

devices as “a nightmare,” although the method he considered for introducing such a device into the

country was on trucks entering the United States from Mexico.

239 To shift the delivery vehicle to

a ship-borne container would be a natural conceptual adaptation. To be sure, as the same writer

observed, obtaining and handling nuclear material is no easy matter.

240

A sixth potential option is that of the use of cyber technology, which one expert has identified as

“a key concern” for the shipping industry, although the target could also be military.

241 Cyber

attacks could cause business disruptions to shipping and accidents, raising costs. Jihadists have long

thought about the utility of cyber attacks, with one prominent al-Qaeda writer in 2003 arguing that

such attacks are cheap, require few people, and could be executed secretly, with considerable

effect.

242

A final potential option to consider here is a functional expansion. For example, jihadists could

expand their economic sea-borne activity by increasing their cooperation with organized crime and

moving into more commodities. In fact, in 2014, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin

Zayed al-Nahyan expressed his apprehension that ISIS might develop such ties to criminal

networks and, “therefore, we must stop them before their activities reach the sea.”243 In particular,

drug trafficking could become a lucrative option that should be of considerable concern for the

international community. Of course, drug trafficking also involves land routes, but this activity has

often been combined with maritime routes as well, including by jihadists—whether as an

28 Norman Cigar
organization or as individuals—lured by high profits and indifference to harm caused to their

enemies. In terms of sea traffic, the areas that are especially vulnerable to being used for such a

purpose include Yemen and the Horn of Africa (primarily to the Gulf countries and beyond), Libya,

and the Southeast Asian basin. In West Africa, where jihadists have already established connections

with organized crime, jihadists benefit at least indirectly from the sea route from Latin America and,

more directly, on to Europe.

244 There are indications that such links with networks in Europe may

be expanding, which could then be used to further any form of seaborne traffic, be it involving

migrants, arms, or drugs.

245 Potentially, Lebanon could also become involved if the jihadists should

ever establish an outlet to the sea there, although the likelihood of that has decreased significantly

over the past year. In such cases, law enforcement agencies in European countries must play a key

role in disrupting any links with local crime networks.

CoNCluSIoNS aNd IMplICaTIoNS

dealing with a Complex Threat

Although many, and perhaps most, jihadist maritime attacks so far have been thwarted, this should

not be a cause for complacency. There is an understandable temptation to focus on the failure of such

operations to draw satisfaction. Typically, a retired senior Egyptian intelligence officer categorized

the attack against the patrol boat off the coast of Damietta noted above as “a great success” for the

armed forces, as it highlighted the latter’s preparedness to deal with emergencies.

246 Likewise,

Pakistani officials (and the Western media) dismissed cavalierly the 2014 Karachi attack against the

Pakistani Navy as a “dismal failure.”247 However, not only have such attacks revealed gaps in some

countries’ defenses, including disturbing instances of potential sympathizers inside their armed

forces, but a bit of additional luck here or there for the attackers could have made the difference

between an operation’s failure and significant material, human, and political damage for the targeted

country. Based on the preceding study, one can draw several conclusions and related implications

that may suggest what may contribute to dealing with the challenge that the jihadist threat at sea

presents.

As General Alfred Gray, the distinguished former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, assessed,

maritime security is “a vital interest” but acknowledged that there is “no easy solution, no textbook

solution” to this threat.

248 Dealing with a complex threat characterized by a wide range of potential

targets, methods, and areas as in the case here suggests that that there is no one template as a

solution. Instead, the alternative may be for individual governments, alliances, and private

companies to develop and maintain multiple capabilities to wage a complex political-military

“maritime counterinsurgency” within an overarching flexible strategy. For the United States,

specifically, addressing the jihadist challenge at sea could be structured as a three-tier strategy

designed to deter and prevent, respond, and defeat, elements that are not necessarily sequential or

exclusive, but that may co-exist in time and be mutually reinforcing.

fostering the Necessary political and Military Counterfunctions

Certain political and military activities (some may call them “lines of operation,” in the functional

rather than geographic sense) will be key to a successful strategy in countering the jihadist maritime

threat at any level and must remain, or become, a focus of effort. This common set of capabilities

will be useful at whatever level of war the United States is operating in addressing the jihadist

maritime threat, as well as in the effort against the overall jihadist threat, since the maritime aspect

is nested within the overarching general jihadist strategy.

249

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 29
Actionable Intelligence

Actionable intelligence is essential in narrowing the window of vulnerability to prevent (and respond

to) the maritime threat. As is most often the case and given the wide range of the threat, all-source

intelligence is required, whether visual data provided by UAVs, communications traffic

monitoring, or human intelligence (HUMINT). Admittedly, providing adequate warning against

jihadist maritime attacks will continue to be a challenge, with physical evidence often able to

provide indicators for only tactical warning of impending attacks and hostile actors often having

only a small footprint. That is, many of the components in the jihadists’ arsenals—such as trawlers,

dinghies, scuba gear at a resort, or GPS systems—reveal no visible difference between military and

civilian equipment and use. While other components to be used in maritime attacks, such as

explosives, anti-tank missiles, or small arms are more transparent indicators of intent, they may be

present in such limited quantities that they, too, may not be readily detectable. In particular, it may

be very difficult to identify and interdict small-scale jihadist maritime operations, which perhaps

represent a quite literal version of Mao’s dictum that guerrillas must be able to swim among the

people as a fish swims in the sea. That is, jihadist assets and activities at sea can blend in easily with

legitimate (or at least non-jihadist) maritime activities, such as trade, fishing, transportation of goods

and passengers, or commercial smuggling. For example, a group of sailors in Algeria who

supported al-Qaeda by delivering dynamite to them by boat also used that item routinely in

fishing.

250 Likewise, also in Algeria, locals routinely used their fishing activities as a cover to

transport personnel and supplies for al-Qaeda.

251 Economic need, rather than ideology, may drive

cooperation between arms smugglers and jihadists, as with the fishermen in Egypt—who have over

4000 sea-going trawlers—bringing in weapons from international suppliers.

252 In fact, auxiliaries,

as in the preceding cases, may only be involved part-time with the jihadists, as during the lull in

fishing in the winter in Egypt. In such an environment, HUMINT becomes all the more important

in order to track jihadist networks.

Multilateral Cooperation

Bilateral and multinational cooperation is a key element in dealing with any aspect of the jihadist

maritime threat, as the challenge extends across national borders and requires more resources than

any one country can devote. Although most maritime attacks have been generated by local al-Qaeda

or ISIS branch organizations, the planning and preparation for some, such as the USS Cole

operation, with its planning and training in Afghanistan and additional training and execution in

Yemen, illustrates also a potential international dimension. Moreover, even operations planned intheater can extend across national borders, as with the plans to involve Israeli ships as part of the

naval attack on the Egyptian Navy, or Indian and US ships in the case of the attack on the Pakistani

Navy, or potential cross-Mediterranean operations launched from Libya. Or, more routinely, as

seen earlier, jihadist maritime operations can also involve multiple countries, as in the case of the

transport by jihadists of arms and personnel between Libya and Tunisia or into Libya from the

Eastern Mediterranean, or the intercepted arms shipments to Somalia’s al-Shabab from unknown

destinations, not to mention ISIS-managed sea travel of migrants to Europe. Incidents at sea

involving jihadists can easily take on a multinational aspect with attendant jurisdictional and

security complications and the need for coordination and deconfliction. That is, a ships’ origin of

departure and destination, route, identity of employer, its registry and ownership, crew nationality,

and insurance coverage, may consist of a conglomerate of nationalities, while operations on the

high seas, including interdiction or hot pursuit, can complicate the situation still further in terms of

legal jurisdiction and responsibility.

253

30 Norman Cigar
The United States, of course, must continue to play a major role in this counterinsurgency, given

its unique capabilities and its global presence. International cooperation, whether in the form of

exercises with the participation of the United States (as was the case with the ASEAN Maritime

Security and Counter-Terrorism Exercise in May 2016) or the multinational sea patrols by local

forces in the Strait of Malacca region that were spurred by a kidnapping carried out by Abu Sayyaf

in 2016, can be a deterrent, as well as create a more effective response capability.

254 Elsewhere,

Combined Maritime Force 150, a multi-national naval partnership whose command is rotated, has

a counterterrorist mission in an area of operation which covers the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian

Ocean and Gulf of Oman. Not only is multilateral cooperation in such matters as combined sea

and air patrols, exercises, and intelligence sharing a force multiplier, but it can also alleviate the

burden on US forces and resources, permitting broader security coverage.

In addition, the United States should continue its activity in helping at-risk nations build their

security capacity by providing equipment, advice, and training. This approach can be costeffective and has the additional advantage that local actors have a permanent presence and may

know the local environment best. This, of course, is already being done, and should be continued

or even increased. For example, the US Navy has restored cooperation in terms of exercises and

equipment transfers with the Egyptian Navy following a hiatus caused by the military coup that

brought that country’s current regime to power.

255 Likewise, US Special Forces can also play a

significant role building up other countries’ littoral capabilities as, for example, has been the case

with US Special Operations Command Africa in Kenya, which has provided the latter such aid as

patrol boats and training, enabling Kenya to set up a Special Boat Unit, and there are similar plans

by the European Union to also train Libya’s Coast Guard.

256

In the international sphere, given the significance of the jihadist challenge, more nuanced political

approaches by the international community might also have positive results. For example, even

Iran, despite significant policy differences with the United States and other countries, shares a

similar interest in maritime security, and could be viewed in certain situations as a co-belligerent

against the jihadist threat. De facto, this has been the case with the Iranian Navy’s participation in

the fight against piracy, which has included coming to the aid of other countries’ commercial ships

on more than one occasion. A policy reconsideration might also mean accepting a degree of

out-of-area presence by the Iranian Navy if the latter’s objective is clearly that of countering the

jihadist threat, as in responding to any attack at sea by al-Shabab.

Forward Presence

A forward presence can be a significant factor in the ability to provide a deterrent and a timely and

effective response, and the United States has already done much in recent years to develop access

overseas, including in areas that are relevant for addressing the maritime threat, such as in East

Africa. These facilities can range from a significant base such as at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti,

with over 4000 personnel, to bare-bones positions (the numerous so-called “lily-pads”),

strategically-located skeleton facilities with infrastructure that can provide the nucleus for a rapid

expansion as needed, most often in conjunction with existing host-country bases.

257

In addition to the deterrent factor, naval basing and task forces in theater can provide a potent

combat capability against not only direct maritime threats but also against the jihadists’ strategic

depth on land in a timely manner. Intelligence collection from land sites or ships (whether by drones,

manned flights, HUMINT, or electronic methods), personnel familiarization with the area of

responsibility, more frequent and intense sea and air patrols, or strikes (whether the platforms are

manned aircraft, ships, or drones or as launch sites for strikes by Special Forces or US Marine

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 31
Corps forces afloat) can all be better supported by the timeliness that is most easily generated by

being in-theater.

258 In this respect, a further development of sea basing, the capability to perform at

sea combat support functions that would otherwise have to be performed on land, can also make a

valuable contribution in this type of war, complementing land-based facilities for naval,

amphibious, and other joint operations.

259 In circumstances where, for political or security reasons,

there is no access to adequate land-based facilities, sea basing can enable a timely response and an

extended presence that would not otherwise be possible, whether for deterrence, response, or large

follow-on operations. Not to be neglected, at the same time, is also the opportunity to support

training for host-country forces from these forward positions, as at Camp Simba, a Kenyan naval

base, and elsewhere.

260

Soft Power

It is important to also integrate “soft power,” the term coined by Professor Joseph Nye to describe

“the ability to attract and co-opt” rather than using coercion, in the effort against the maritime threat.

Of course, as the maritime aspect of the threat is part of a single battle against the greater jihadist

challenge and, while some soft power initiatives may be tailored to maritime issues, many others

will also overlap with measures intended to address the more general threat. In particular, the

systematic development and application of state-to-state diplomacy, the provision of economic aid

to affected countries, the activation of legal mechanisms (whether the conclusion of treaties, the

harmonization of legislation, or the codification of regulatory practices), and coordination with the

maritime industry can all play a role. Such initiatives can contribute to degrading the viability of

the operational environment in which maritime jihadists operate by preventing territorial sanctuary,

reducing popular support, and enabling quicker and more effective US and multinational responses.

In this arena, civilian US government agencies may have the lead, in coordination with the military,

as well as with other countries and the private sector, the media, NGOs, or, in particular, the

commercial shipping industry.

An information (psychological operations) effort can also play a supporting role in the campaign

against al-Qaeda and ISIS, including in the maritime sphere. Even though this may ultimately be a

war of ideas, one should not exaggerate what psychological operations can do and, ultimately, it is

necessary to defeat the jihadists themselves. While the nucleus of a movement may be relatively

impervious, requiring its physical defeat, a more positive effect may be possible with the

periphery, although even here the impact is most likely a dependent variable of the situation. That

is, it is difficult to argue with success, and unless they are coupled with the infliction of tangible

failure for jihadists on the ground, psychological campaigns may not be effective. Nevertheless,

such campaigns to delegitimize the jihadists could help complicate the latter’s operational

environment by degrading support among active and potential sympathizers locally and worldwide

on whom jihadists rely for support functions—such as logistics, intelligence, or force protection.

Not surprisingly, such campaigns would be most effective using trusted key communicators and,

specifically, local religious ones. A number of Middle East countries are already engaged in such

information efforts, both in broader terms and, as the occasion may warrant, with a particular

maritime focus, as was the case when al-Azhar, Egypt’s traditional Islamic religious and educational

center, condemned the attack on Egypt’s Navy in 2015, and international coordination efforts could

prove synergistic in this sphere.

261

Implementing a Complex approach

These and other capabilities can be leveraged asymmetrically, applying the advantages—both

kinetic and non-kinetic—that the United States and the international community have over the

32 Norman Cigar
jihadists in dealing with the latter’s sea-base guerrilla war.

262

Deter

Forecasting, deterring, and otherwise preventing jihadist maritime attacks from occurring can

require many mutually-reinforcing methods, especially given the wide range of environments,

potential targets, and of the adversaries’ techniques that are involved.

Many measures, of course, are obvious and have been implemented, although not uniformly, not

completely, or not effectively around the world. In this respect, ships, ports, and other maritime

infrastructure in the United States are safer than those in most countries, thanks not only to

technology and security measures and the assets to respond to disasters allocated, but also thanks

to the buffer provided by the distance from where there is a significant al-Qaeda or ISIS presence,

either in the same country or nearby. In addition, the nature of the domestic “human terrain” would

not provide the advantages of mobility, force protection, or logistics that might be available to

jihadists in some Middle East countries. Nevertheless, US and foreign targets and interests

overseas remain vulnerable.

Preventive measures should focus on “hardening” of potential targets to make them less

vulnerable by preventive measures that can include changing navigation routes, bolstering

inspection regimes, adding security procedures for equipment or personnel, securing information

flows, or increasing security forces. Naval and air patrols in areas of greatest vulnerability can play

a major role in reducing the likelihood of surprise. Controlling the internet is a significant

defensive measure, since al-Qaeda, in particular, as part of its effort at distance learning, has long

distributed on the internet the military literature it has produced. Even if such steps cannot always

prevent an attack from occurring, they may be able to reduce the damage an attack may cause.

Of course, the allocation of what are always limited assets entails risk management, as no nation

has the military resources to defend everywhere at all times. Key potential targets should be

defended insofar as possible but, since the threat can take different forms and occur in different

places, realistically, one cannot defend everything everywhere without overextending one’s finite

resources and weakening one’s posture overall. Significantly, for example, the US Navy’s 6th Fleet

headquartered at Naples must increasingly worry about multiple security concerns and, in

particular, that from Russia, thereby diluting its ability to focus on ISIS.

263 In fact, al-Qaeda has seen

inducing the United States to generate multiple maritime operations in various theaters as a means

to “stretch their [i.e. the US Navy’s] resources further in this global war.”264 To an extent, the

international community must accept a degree of risk management, weighing the likelihood of an

attack in a particular area or by a particular method against the importance of the potential target.

Respond

The ability to respond rapidly is necessary in order, if possible, to prevent an attack or to react

quickly and effectively if deterrence fails. This approach could include pre-emptive measures such

as the arrest of leaders or cells or strikes against jihadist physical assets and personnel, the rescue

of hostages, intervention in an on-going attack, or hot pursuit of the attackers.

While all maritime operations are ultimately dependent on land, this is especially so for jihadist

maritime forces, given the short range of their power projection capability, so that control of

territory to deny safe-haven and a gateway to maritime targets becomes key for defeating jihadist

maritime attacks. Al-Qaeda is clearly aware of this relationship between control of the land and

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 33
control of the sea. As one al-Qaeda analyst observed realistically with respect to the Bab al-Mandab

waterway, even “a rapid comparison of the naval force that America has in the waters of the

Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Arab Gulf, and especially in the Gulf of Aden, and that which

the Organization [i.e. al-Qaeda] has reveals the almost total impossibility of controlling that

chokepoint [by al-Qaeda].”265 Instead, he suggested that it would make more sense to seize the land

area that controls the Bab al-Mandab, including in Somalia, from which it would then be possible

to dominate traffic through that chokepoint.

266

In effect, all jihadist operations so far have been almost “direct fire” ones from land in what, as seen

earlier, one can categorize as a maritime variant of guerrilla warfare. As in traditional guerrilla war,

success for such operations requires a benign operational environment on land, whether thanks to

permanent control of a territory by the jihadists or the ability to exercise temporary control,

something that is only possible on territory where control by an adversary is weak or incomplete.

Key to ensuring control of the sea is the ability to also control the land. Control does not require a

permanent presence on the ground, which may be impossible for political or logistical reasons.

Rather, what may be sufficient in countering the jihadist maritime threat is functional control, that

is the ability to intervene at least temporarily in a potentially hostile environment (such as Libya,

Somalia, Yemen) as needed to prevent attacks from materializing.

Instability or a lack of effective governance is a major contributor to the ability of jihadists to

operate, whether on land or at sea, and the likelihood of an area being the source of sustained and

organized attacks is inversely proportional to the degree of security and government control of its

own territory. This means control not just of the immediate coastal area, but also of territory

further inland or even countrywide. Symptomatically, the increased instability in some countries

affected by the Arab Spring, such as Libya and Egypt, or by civil war such as Yemen, also led to

increased jihadist activity, including at sea.

To be sure, as history has shown, maritime threats can also develop in friendly states—even those

with relatively good security—as well as where direct foreign intervention may not be welcome.

Although a multinational effort is optimal for dealing with this persistent and potentially

significant threat, the United States will remain the central player thanks to its unique command and

control, logistics, and intelligence capabilities, and there is no other friendly country that is able to

mount sustained out-of-area operations. The US military effort will most likely be a joint one,

although that, of course, does not mean that all services need participate in every situation. Given

the wide range of the threat and the different theaters involved, one service or other may have the

lead or be the supporting one. While deployment from bases abroad can provide an important

advantage, the availability of such bases may not always be possible due to political or security

reasons. The US Spectial Operations Command (USSOCOM), with its ability to provide small,

agile, and stealthy expeditionary forces in the form of flexible force packages with multiple

capabilities that can act quickly, can make an especially substantial contribution in such

situations.

267

However, follow-on operations on land may well be necessary. In situations where greater force is

required on the ground in an expeditionary mode, the US Navy-Marine Corps team, with its unique

capabilities to respond quickly and in force not only after an attack but also to prevent one, will be

especially relevant to countering the jihadist maritime threat. The US Marine Corps, in effect, is the

only US service that currently has the capability to mount an amphibious operation against a

defended shore in a hostile environment and then carry out sustained follow-on operations inland

as an organically “joint” Marine Air-Ground Task Force. At the same time, given the extent of the

jihadists’ capabilities at sea, naval warfare will be in the littorals and narrow seas, presenting the

34 Norman Cigar
US Navy specific challenges that require different organization, command and control, training,

platforms and equipment, and doctrine than in open ocean warfare.

268

In addition, there is also a significant role for the civilian sector’s capability to provide the assets

and training to implement an effective maritime disaster response and recovery effort if the need

arises in the aftermath of an attack, whether it be dealing with a stricken ship, oil spills, or the

effects of WMD.

Defeat

As important as it assuredly is to be able to deter and react to attacks if they occur in order to

frustrate the jihadists’ maritime strategy, policy cannot only be defensive. What is also needed is

an emphasis on the initiative, with a pro-active policy aimed at neutralizing potential threats by

defeating the jihadists and by dealing at the source of such threats as well as at the end-point.

The ultimate objective should be to defeat the jihadist maritime strategy and to achieve victory.

One, of course, has to ask what “to defeat” and “victory” mean in such a situation and what

measures of success to use. The maritime threat, as noted in this study, is only an aspect of a greater

jihadist challenge and cannot be seen in isolation. That is, it may not be possible reach the ideal

objective, that of eliminating the maritime threat completely without also eliminating completely

the overall jihadist threat, something that itself may be difficult to achieve quickly, and is unlikely

barring systemic political and social changes, especially in the Middle East. A more realistic goal

for the near-term horizon may be to manage the maritime threat, preventing most attacks—

especially large ones—while seeking to bring security levels in the Middle East and Africa closer

to those in Europe or the United States.

Ideally, one would want to use a direct method against the jihadist maritime threat by neutralizing

the leadership (the strategic center of gravity of the jihadist movement), but that may be difficult

and, instead, it may be necessary to opt for an indirect longer-term approach to defeating the

jihadists’ military (the jihadists’ operational center of gravity) by degrading its capabilities, thereby

neutralizing the jihadist leadership’s power and ability to carry out threats and implement its

strategy. The indirect approach does not mean targeting only those aspects of the jihadist

movements connected specifically with maritime issues. Rather, as it is a single battle, eliminating

or degrading a jihadist movement’s leadership, logistics, or safe areas in general will also have an

impact on its ability to present a threat at sea. At a preliminary level, it is necessary to take away

even temporary sea control from the jihadists to prevent or weaken potential attacks. In addition,

as seen, jihadists also use the sea as an asset for their own ground operations and as a source of

income. Even though this aspect may not pose an immediate threat to US assets, it does represent

a longer-term threat by supporting the broader jihadist war effort and therefore requires attention

to interdict or at least disrupt such jihadist maritime traffic.

Over the long run, the objective should be to help stabilize states in the affected land area, if

possible while avoiding a large-scale US commitment if that adds to long-term instability. Specific

strategies, of course, will vary by theater. In Yemen, for example, rather than a direct major ground

combat presence, US diplomacy to end the civil war, including by pressuring regional US allies who

are involved to seek a political solution instead of seeking an elusive military victory, can have a

positive impact on security by reducing the security vacuum in which jihadist elements thrive.

Dealing with the instability or defective governance that can enable jihadist activity in a country

can be a long and complex process requiring the application of multiple national and international

elements of power. To be sure, in such a situation, the military can serve as the “shield” to provide

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 35
the necessary security and time for the real “sword”—political, economic, and social measures—

which alone can ensure the long-term and enduring success of a counterinsurgency to be

implemented. Without such basic changes, best brought about by a joint and multinational effort

of government and non-governmental agencies, military success may be temporary, with insurgent

movements likely to endure and regenerate in some form, including in the maritime arena.

------------

36 Norman Cigar
Notes:

1 “An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahiye Gadahn,” Resurgence, Summer 2015, 81. (hereafter Gadahn, Resurgence)

2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fursan taht rayat al-nabi [Knights under the Prophet’s Banner], 2nd. edition, part 1, (Al-Sahab, 2010), 138.

3 Luways Atiyat Allah, “Al-Nizam al-duwali al-jadid bi-qalam Usama Bin Ladin” [The New World Order As Osama Bin Ladin Sees

It], 15 April 2007, www.alsaha.com/users/415647119/entries/35460.

4 Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Harb al-isabat [Guerrilla War], (Al-Tahaddi, 1435/2014), 10.

5 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fursan taht rayat al-nabi [Knights under the Prophet’s Banner], 1st. edition, 2001, 111.

6 As one al-Qaeda analysis noted of the US economy, “It is the main pillar of overwhelming American military power ... as well as

an important element which America uses to implement its foreign policy.” And, this analysis concluded that “the collapse of the

economy means the collapse of the state ... it is very possible that the [U. S.] economy will collapse.” Nazif al-khasair al-amrikiya

[The Attrition from American Losses] (Markaz al-dirasat wa-l-buhuth al-islamiya, October 2003), http://taw7ed.110mb.com/

Nazeef.htm. The publishing entity was an al-Qaeda think tank.

7 Norman Cigar, “Al-Qaida’s Theater Strategy,” in Norman Cigar and Stephanie E. Kramer, eds., Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War,

(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2012), 40-41 and, more generally, 35-53.

8 Letter from “Zamray,” that is Bin Ladin, to Shaykh Yunis al-Mawritani, probably 2010, US Department of Justice, United States

Attorney, Eastern District of New York, United States v. Abid Naseer, Criminal Docket No. 10-19 (S-4) (RJD), filed 15 February

2015, http://kronosadvisory.com/Abid.Naseer.Trial_Abbottabad.Documents_Exhibits.403.404.405.420thru433.pdf.

9 Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Amrika wa’l-suud ila al-hawiya [America Moving Toward the Precipice], [2003], www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=zxq0rb5q.

10 For example, interview from 21 October 2001 with Osama Bin Ladin by Taysir Alluni, “Al-Nass al-kamil li’l-liqa’ al-suhufi” [The

Complete Text of the Interview], Al-Arab Niuz (Egypt), 29 March 2002, www.alarabnews.com/alshaab/GIF/29-03-2002/Usama.htm,

and Osama Bin Ladin, “Risala bad thalathat ashhur ala al-darabat al-mubaraka” [Letter Three Months after the Blessed Strikes],

11 December 2001, Jehad Archive, www.jarchiv.net/b/details.php?item_id=4706, and Osama Bin Ladin, “Al-Risala al-thaniya ila

ahl Al-Iraq khassatan wa’l-muslimin ammatan” [The Second Letter to the People of Iraq Specifically and to the Muslims in

General, 1 October 2003, Al-Arshif al-jami li-kalimat wa-khitabat imam al-mujahidin al-shaykh Usama bin Muhammad Bin Ladin

ka-ma nushirat wa-bi’l-tartib al-zamani [The Complete Archive of the Interviews and Speeches of the Imam of the Mujahidin Shaykh

Osama bin Muhammad Bin Ladin as They Were Released and in Chronological Order] (7 Jumada II 1427/3 July 2006), 154.

11 Osama Bin Ladin, Tawjihat manhajiya (2) [Programmatic Guidance (2)], 1423/2002-03, www.tawhed.ws/r?i=yiqgogik.

12 Hamil al-Misk, “Fi Al-Aqsa naltaqi: sinariyu inhiyar al-nizham al-hakim” [We Will Meet in Jerusalem: A Scenario for the

Collapse of the Dominant System], Sada al-Malahim, number 9, Jumada I 1430/April-May 2009, 31.

13 Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir, Al-Taqyim wa’l-taqwim fi al-amaliya al-jihadiya [Assessments and Estimates in Jihadist Activity], (AlSumud, Dhu al-qada 1430/December 2009), 150-51.

14 Abu al-Walid [al-Masri ?], Five Letters to the Africa Corps, AGFP-2002-600053, Letter 3, [1994], Arabic text, , in Combating

Terrorism Center, Harmony and Disharmony; Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities, (West Point: United States

Military Academy, 2006), 13-14. (hereafter Abu al-Walid, Five Letters)

15 Nasir al-Wuhayshi, “Yamkuruna wa-yamkuru Allah’ [And God Is the Best Deceiver], Al-Malahim, n. 8, Rabi I 1430/FebruaryMarch 2009, 5.

16 Abu al-Walid, Five Letters, 13-14.

17 Isa Al Awshan, Risala qabl fawat al-awan [A Message before It Is Too Late], 1996, 3-4, and Hazim al-Madani (Hani al-Awfi alHarbi), Hakadha nara al-jihad wa-nuriduhu, [This Is How We See and Want the Jihad], 2002, 26. (hereafter Al-Mandani, Hakahdha

nara)

18 Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Haqiqat al-harb al-salibiya al-jadida [The Truth about the New Crusade], 2nd edition, Rajab 1422/SeptemberOctober 2001, 135.

19 “Al-Wujud al-amriki fi al-Khalij... tarkikh wa-dalalat” [The American Presence in the Gulf: History and Indications], Sawt alJihad, number 2, Shaban 1424/September-October 2003, 6-7.

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 37
20 Osama Mahmood, al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent spokesman, Press Release, “Operation against the American Navy by the

Mujahideen; Reasons and Objectives,” 16 September 2014, in Resurgence, number 1, Fall 2014, 9.

21 Letter from Osama Bin Ladin to Yunis al-Mawritani, ca. May 2010, 10-CR-019 (S-4) (RJD), www.jihadica.com/new-abbottabaddocuments.

22 Fadil al-Tamimi, “Suriya masrahan alamiyan fi munatafat al-al-suqut wa’l-suud” [Syria As a World Theater in Twists of Fall and

Rise], Majallat al-Balagh, number 2 [March 2013], 19. (hereafter Al-Tamimi, “Suriya”)

23 Yusri bin Atiya Al Salih (Abu Hajir al-Filastini), Qaidat al-jihad ila rabb al-ibad [The Rules of the Jihad for the Lord of the

Believers], (Mu’assasat al-Jihad li’l-Intaj al-Ilami, 2009), 53. Other legal writers also were intent on showing how strongly Islamic

tradition and legal arguments support a maritime jihad, Muhajir100, “Fadl ghazw al-bahr” [The Merit of Maritime Campaigning],

Shabakat al-Luyuth al-Islamiya forum, 13 April 2011, http://66.225.155.72/leyothin/vb.

24 Report from Sayf al-Adl, 17 January 1994, Harmony documents, www.ctc.usma,edu/v2-content/uploads/2013/10/A-Report-fromSaif-Al-Adl-Translation.pdf, and William K. Rashbaum and Benjamin Weiser, “A Nation Challenged: Al Qaeda’s Fleet; A Tramp

Freighter’s Money Trail to bin Laden,” The New York Times, 27 December 2001, www.nytimes.com/2001/12/27/world/nationchallenged-al-qaeda-s-fleet-tramp-freighter-s-money-trail-bin-laden.html?pagewanted=all.

25 Abu Musab al-Suri (Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nassar or Umar Abd al-Hakim), Dawat al-muqawama al-islamiya

al-alamiya [Call for a Global Islamic Resistance], (Shawwal 1425/December 2004), 1384. Moreover, as Ayman al-Zawahiri

explicitly made the point, al-Suri had never belonged to al-Qaeda and, as a free-lancer, he would have had little impact on

translating ideas into plans, unlike such al-Qaeda military thinkers as Yusuf al-Ayyiri or Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who were also in

charge of actual military operations. In fact, al-Suri’s work is largely bypassed in other jihadist military writings.

26 Abu Musab al-Suri, Idarat tanzhim harb al-isabat [The Conduct of the System of Guerrilla War], (Al-Tahaya li’l-Ilam al-Jihadi,

1435/2014), transcript of a lecture series.

27 See Norman Cigar, “Al-Qaida’s Strategic Decisionmaking and 9/11: The ‘Trap’ Theory Revisited,” Journal of South Asian and

Middle Eastern Studies, xxxvii, 3, Spring 2014, 35-36. (hereafter Cigar, “Al-Qaida’s Strategic Decisionmaking”)

28 Interview with Nasir al-Bahri (Abu Jandal), “Al-Murafiq al-sabiq li-zaim al-Qaida Abu Jandal: Zawwajt Bin Ladin min fatat

yamaniya” [Al-Qaeda Leader’s Former Bodyguard Abu Jandal: I Arranged Bin Ladin’s Marriage to a Yemeni Girl], originally in

Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), reprinted in Dunya al-Watan (Gaza), 3 August 2004, www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2004/08/03/

7956.html. (hereafter Nasir al-Bahri, “Al-Murafiq al-sabiq”)

29 Ahmad Zaydan, Bin Ladin bila qina; Liqa’at hazhzharat nashraha Taliban [Bin Ladin Unmasked; Meetings Whose Publication

the Taliban Banned], (Beirut: Al-Shirka al-Alamiya li’l-Kitab, 2003), 51.

30 Abu Jandal al-Azdi (Faris al-Zahrani, executed 2016), Usama Bin Ladin mujaddid al-zaman wa-qahir al-amrikan [Osama Bin

Ladin the Renewer of This Age and the Conqueror of the Americans], 1424/2003, 348, www.archive.org/download/ozoooK/4.doc.

(hereafter Al-Azdi, Usama Bin Ladin mujaddid al-zaman)

31 Ibid.

32 Abu Ubayd al-Qurayshi, “Kawabis Amrika” [America’s Nightmares], Al-Ansar, 13 February 2002, 17. (hereafter Al-Qurayshi,

“Kawabis Amrika”)

33 “Al-Irhab al-bahri darura istratijiya” [Maritime Terrorism Is a Strategic Necessity], Jihad Press, 26 April 2008, Hanin Forum,

www.hanein.info/vbx/showthread.php?t=64498.

34 Ibid.

35 Al-Qaeda on the Subcontinent, “This Was Not an Attack on the Naval Dockyard,” 27 September 2014, Shabakat al-Jihad alAlami site, http://shabakat.com/vb/showthread.php?t=40526.

36 Gadahn, Resurgence, 81.

37 “Al-Battar al-Muhajir,” “Taraqqabu al-quwwa al-bahriya li’l-dawla al-islamiya” [Expect the Islamic State’s Naval Force], AlMinbar al-Ilami al-Jihadi forum, 17 March 2015, www.mnbr.info/vb/showthread.php?t=85104.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

38 Norman Cigar
40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid. Another ISIS spokesman, likewise, focused on the importance of controlling the Libyan coast as the springboard for the

conquest of Rome, Gharib al-Ikhwan, “Ahammiyat Sirt al-libiya fi istratijiyat tanzhim al-Dawla al-Islamiya” [The Importance of

Sirte in Libya in the Islamic State’s Strategy], Al-Islamiyun website, 30 October 2015, http://islamion.com/news. (hereafter Gharib

al-Ikhwan, “Ahammiyat Sirt”)

43 Fadil al-Tamimi, “Suriya,” 19.

44 Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Dawrat al-tanfidh: Harb al-isabat [A Practical Course for Guerrilla War], trans. and analysis Norman

Cigar, (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2009), and Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Harb al-isabat [Guerrilla War], (Al-Tahaddi, 1435/2014). ISIS has

not produced any military theorists of its own but, implicitly, has also followed the Maoist strategy.

45 Shaylub, “Hal ahkamat al-Qaida al-bahr kaminan?” [Has al-Qaeda Mastered How to Use the Sea as a Trap?], Ana Muslim forum,

19 November 2008, www.muslim.org. (hereafter Shaylub, “Hal ahkamat al-Qaida”) There is a similar argument is in “Li-nafham

ma yahdath min amal qarsana li’l-sufun alayna awwalan al-ijaba ala su’alayn” [In Order to Understand What Is Happening to Ships

from Pirate Operations We Have to Ask Two Questions], Shabakat al-Mujahidin al-Iliktruniya, 19 November 2008, http://

majahden.com/vb/showthread.php?t=15222. (hereafter “Li-nafham ma yahdath min amal qarsana li’l-sufun”)

46 “Ibid.

47 Ibid. Others also saw Yemen as a desirable theater in which to engage the United States for that purpose, Gharib al-Ikhwan, “AlMahq al-azhim: Dirasa iqtisadiya –Kayfa yumkin li’l-Qaida al-ijhaz ala Amrika” [The Great Devastation: An Economic StudyHow al-Qaeda Can Finish Off America], Al-Minbar al-Ilami al-Jihadi forum, 3 March 2013, http://178.63.156.188/~aljahad/

vb/showthread.php?t=28693.

48 Ibid.

49 “Uncle” [Osama Bin Ladin?], letter to Sayf al-Adl, Letter 1, 30 September 1993, Abu al-Walid, Five Letters, 73.

50 “Continuation Sheet - MC FORM 458 JAN 2007, Block II. Charges and Specifications in the case of UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA v. ABD AL RAHIM HUSSAYN MUHAMMAD ALNASHIRI” www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alNashiri2/

Al%20Nashiri%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf.

51 Nasir al-Bahri, “Al-Murafiq al-sabiq.”

52 Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Ahla al-Sham fadaynakum bi-arwahna” [Oh People of Syria, We Are Willing to Die for You],

(Mu’assasat al-Manara al-Bayda’: Safar 1434/December 2012), transcript by Fursan al-Balagh li’l-Alam, 6.

53 Ridwan Hafiyani, “Al-Qaida khattatat li-istihdaf sufun ajnabiya bi’l-miyah al-maghribiya” [Al-Qaeda Planned to Target Foreign

Ships in Moroccan Waters], Al-Sabah (Casablanca), 4 October 2011, www.assabah.press.ma/index.php?option=com_content&view=

article&id=16297:2011-10-04-14-41-50&catid=67:cat-nationale&Itemid=600. (hereafter Hafiyani, “Al-Qaida khattatat li-istihdaf

sufun”)

54 Letter from Osama Bin Ladin to Atiya Abd al-Rahman, 26 April 2011, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, SOCOM-2012-

0000010-arabic, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/socom-2012-0000010-arabic.

55 Cigar, “Al-Qaida’s Strategic Decisionmaking,” 6-9.

56 On al-Qaeda’s losses, see a spokesman for the latter, Asad al-Jihad 2, “Istratijiyat tanzhim al-Qaida fi 11/9/2008 wa-bad’

mukhattatih al-azhim” [Al-Qaeda’s Strategy as of 11 September 2008 and the Start of Its Great Plan], Al-Thughur forum, 30

September 2008. http://althoghor.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=3004. While some personnel were killed, most were

neutralized by being arrested by Iran or Pakistan.

57 Nasir al-Bahri, “Al-Murafiq al-sabiq,” and Osama Bin Ladin, “Bayan min Usama Bin Ladin wa-tanzhim al-Qaida ila al-umma

al-islamiya” [Communique from Osama Bin Ladin and al-Qaeda to the Islamic Umma], 12 October 2002, 7, www.tawhed.ws.

58 One ISIS spokesman, for example, notes that the head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had personally dispatched a governor to

Libya to wrest control from the rival al-Qaeda, Gharib al-Ikhwan, “Ahammiyat Sirt,” and Rukmini Callimachi, “How a Secretive

Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers,” The New York Times, 3 August 2016 , www.nytimes.com.

59 “Al-Shaykh Abu Musab al-Barnawi wali Gharb Ifriqiya” [Shaykh Abu Musab al-Barnawi Is the Governor of West Africa], AlNaba’ , no. 3, August 2016, 8-9, and Ruth Maclean and Isaac Abrak, “Isis Tries to Impose New Leader on Boko Haram in

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 39
Nigeria,” The Guardian (London),4 August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/05/isis-tries-to-impose-new-leaderon-boko-haram-in-nigeria.

60 For a succint overview of maritime concepts and terminology, see Milan Vego, “On Naval Power,” Joint Force Quarterly

(Washington, DC), Issue 50, 3rd Quarter, 2008, 8-17.

61 “Al-Yaman: Sawahil bila himaya” [Yemen: A Coast with No Defense], Bab al-Mandab Post (Yemen), 26 March 2013, http:/

bablamandabpost.com/index.php/melaha/item/19-2013-04-02-05-35-08, “Qiyadi fi al-hirak al-yamani li’l-Sharq: Al-Amn yasa

li-taslim Adan ila al-Qaida” [A Leader in The Yemeni Movement to Al-Sharq: Security Is Working to Transfer Aden to al-Qaeda],

Al-Sharq (Najran), 25 April 2012, www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/04/25/241952, and “Wazir al-dakhiliya al-yamani: Nuid kull yawmayn

100 athiyubi ila biladhim” [The Yemeni Minister of the Interior: Every Two Days We Repatriate 100 Ethiopians], Asir News (Abha),

14 March 2013, www.3seer.net/22314.

62 Faruq al-Kamali, “Intiash al-tahrib wast ajwa’ al-harb fi al-Yaman” [An Upsurge of Smuggling in the Context of the War in

Yemen], Al-Arabi al-Jadid (London), 5 September 2015, www.alaraby.co.uk.

63 Samir Hasan, “Hal kharaj tanzhim al-Qaida niha’iyan min Zinjibar al-yamaniya?” [Has al-Qaeda Left Zinjibar in Yemen for

Good?], Al-Jazira TV (Doha), 10 June 2016, www.aljazeera.net.

64 “Ihbat hujum irhabi ala mina’ al-Mukalla wa-itiqal arbaa min al-munaffidhin” [Terrorist Attack against the Port of al-Mukalla Foiled

and Four of the Perpetrators Captured], Al-Yemen al-Said (Taizz), 2 August 2016, www.yemensaeed.com/news66142.html, Bassam

al-Qadi, “Al-Qaida khattat li-tafjir mina’ al-Mukalla” [Al-Qaeda Planned to Blow Up the Port of al-Mukalla], Al-Sharq al-Awsat

(London), 4 August 2016, http://aawsat.com/node/705936, and “Infijar anif yahuzz mintaqa askariya yaqa biha muaskar li’l-bahriya

bi’l-Mukalla” [A Violent Explosion Rocks the Military Zone Where the Navy’s Base in al-Mukalla Is Located], Aden al-Ghad, 3

November 2016, http://adenalgd.net/printpost/228124.

65 Mitib al-Awad, “Mashru al-qarn al-saudi qanat tarbut al-Khalij bi-Bahr al-Arab badilan li-Hurmuz” [The Project of the Saudi

Century Is a Canal That Will Link the Gulf with the Arabian Sea Instead of Hormuz], Ukaz (Jeddah), 19 April 2016,

http://okaz.co/bwKOddFpA.

66 Sudarsan Raghavan and Craig Whitlock, “Despite U.S. Efforts, Al-Shabab Rising Again,” The Washington Post, 2 March 2016,

A12, Kevin Sieff, “Somalia’s Dysfunction Allows a Resurgence of Al-Shabab,” The Washington Post, 11 April 2016, A1, A5, and

Harun Maruf, “Intelligence Official: Islamic State Growing in Somalia,” Voice of America, 5 May 2016, www.voanews.com/content/intelligence-official-islamic-state-growing-in-somalia/3316326.html.

67 “Ihbat hujum bahri li’l-quwwat al-sumaliya al-murtadda sharq al-Sumal” [Maritime Attack by Apostate Somali Forces in Eastern

Somalia Repelled], Al-Naba’ [ISIS], November 2016, 3, “Puntland Forces Clash with ISIL Fighters near Qandala,” Shabelle Media

Network (Mogadishu), 20 December 2016, www.shabellenews.com/2016/12/puntland-forces-clash-with-pro-isil-fighters-nearqandala, and “ISIL Militants Kidnap Four Men in North-east Somalia,” Shabelle Media Network, 28 January 2017,

www.shabellenews.com/2017/01/suspected-isil-militants-kidnap-5-people-northeast-of-somalia.

68 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Vystuplenie nachal’nika Glavnogo upravleniya Genshtaba VS RF Sergeiya

Afanaseva na temu ‘Destrultivnoe vozdeistvie terrorizma na regional’nuyu bezopasnnost’” [Statement by Head of the General Staff’s

Main Directory of the Defense Forces of the Russian Federation on the Subject of “The Destructive Impact of Terrorism on Regional

Security”], Russian Federation Ministry of Defense site, 28 April 2016, http://mil.ru/pubart.htm?id=12084066@cmsArticle&_

print=true.

69 Hamdi Alkhshali, Tim Lister, and Angela Dewan, “Libyan Forces Taking Back ISIS Stronghold,” CNN (Atlanta), 11 June 2016,

www.cnn.com/2016/06/11/world/isis-libya-sirte-offensive, and “Tahrir Sirt: hasm mu’ajjal wa-khasa’ir mutazayida” [The Liberation of Sirte: Postponed Decision and Mounting Casualties], Al-Wasat (Tripoli), 23 July 2016, http://alwsat.ly/ar/news/libya/112551.

70 Speech by Wong Kan Seng, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs at the Launching Ceremony for RSS Stalwart,”

9 Dec 2005, Singapore Ministry of Defence site, www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/sp/2005/09dec05_

speech.print.noimg.html, and Neil Chatterjee, “Singapore, Shippers Raise Security over Malacca Threat,” Reuters, 5 March 2010,

www.reuters.com/article/malacca-threat-idUSSGE62409F20100305.

71 Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, xxx, 6, 2007, 541-

61, (hereafter Teo, “Target Malacca Straits”), and speech by Minister of State for Defence, Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman, at the

Simultaneous Special Session 4 on “Regional Security in the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific,” India Global Forum, 9 November 2014,

Singapore Ministry of Defence site, www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/sp/2014/09nov14_speech.print.img.

html.

72 Teo, “Target Malacca Straits.”

40 Norman Cigar
73 “Al-Irhab yadrib Tartus li-awwal marra” [Terrorism Strikes Tartus for the First Time], Al-Thawra (Damascus), 24 May 2016,

http://thawra.sy/_View_news2.asp?FileName=290907202016052401234.

74 “Istimrar al-maarik bi-rif al-Ladhiqiya wa’l-jaysh yuhbit hujuman” [Continuing Fighting in Latakia’s Countryside and the Army

Repels an Attack], Tasnim News Agency (Tehran), 18 July 2016, www.tasnimnews.com/ar/news/2016/07/18/1133218.

75 “Qahwaji: DAISH aradat manfadhan bahriyan” [Qahwaji: ISIS Wanted an Outlet to the Sea], Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 11 October 2014,

www.al-akhbar.com/print/217416, “DAISH yatamaddad fi Arsal: Al-Hadaf al-wusul ila al-bahr?” [ISIS Expands in Arsal: Is the

Objective to Reach the Sea?], Al-Hadath (Beirut), 31 January 2016, www.alhadathnews.net/archives/171374, and Da’ud Rammal,

“Khaliyata Akkar wa-Sayda: Manfadh bahri wa-ahdaf masihiya wa-askariya” [The Akkar and Sidon Cells: An Outlet to the Sea and

Christian and Military Targets], Al-Safir (Beirut), 3 June 2016, http://mobile.assafir.com/Article/497368.

76 Al-Qurayshi, “Kawabis Amrika, 18.

77 Hamza Khalid, “On Targeting the Achilles Heel of Western Economies,” Resurgence, number 1, Fall 2014, 104. (hereafter Khalid,

“On Targeting the Achilles Heel”)

78 Sama’ Nassar, “Mudir idarat al-milaha bi-Qanat al-Suways: Al-Iqarat al-mutilla ala mamarr al-Qanat taht al-saytara” [The Director

of Navigation Administration for the Suez Canal: The Buildings Overlooking the Canal’s Passageway Are Under Control], AlSharq al-Awsat, 11 April 2009, http://archive.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=514646&issueno=11092, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Risalat

al-amal wa-l-bishr li-ahlina fi Misr [Letter of Hope and Good News to Our People in Egypt], part 9, (Mu’assasat al-Sahab li’l-Intaj

al-Ilami: Rabi II 1433/February 2012), transcript by Nukhbat al-Ilam al-Jihadi, 7

79 “Misr taqbid ala athnayn ta’amaru li-shann hujum fi Qanat al-Suways” [Egypt Detains Two Who Were Plotting an Attack in the

Suez Canal], Al-Nahar (Cairo) 21 March 2012, www.alnaharegypt.com/t~65643, Asma Alsharif, “Egypt Arrests Three

After Gun Attack on Ship in Suez Canal: Source,” Reuters, 1 September 2013, www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-suezidUSBRE98005820130901, and Stephen Starr, “Are Terrorists Targeting the Suez Canal?” USA Today (Tyson, VA), 4 November

2013, www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/04/suez-canal-terrorism/3285881.

80 Nasir al-Haqbani, “Al-Saudiya: ‘Khaliyat al-tasmim’ khattatat li-ightiyal qiyadi wa-tafjir safina fi Qanat al-Suways” [Saudi

Arabia: The “Poisoner Cell” Planned to Assassinate a Leader and to Blow Up a Ship in the Suez Canal], Al-Hayat (London), 8

January 2012, http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/348144; also, Starr, “Are Terrorists Targeting the Suez Canal?”.

81 “Dabt RPG qurb nafaq Ahmad Hamdi wa-istihdaf mahattat kahraba’ al-Nubariya” [An RPG Seized Near the Ahmad Hamdi

Tunnel and the al-Nubariya Power Station Attacked], Al-Ahram (Cairo), 21 July 2014, www.ahram.eg/NewsQ/306559.aspx.

82 Hazim Abu Duma, “Ihbat hujum irhabi ala kamin askari: Qutil al-intihari” [A Terrorist Attack against a Military Checkpoint

Foiled; The Suicide [Driver] Was Killed], Al-Ahram, 16 July 2015, www.ahram.org.eg/News/121602/25/414662.

83 Mahmud Nasr, “”Nanfarid bi-nashr itirafat al-muttaham al-khamis fi tanzhim Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis” [Exclusive: The Confession

of the Accused Number Five in the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis], Al-Yawm al-Sabi (Cairo), 14 May 2014, www.youm7.com/story/

0000/0/0/-/1664944.

84 “Al-Irhab al-bahri darura istratijiya” [Maritime Terrorism Is a Strategic Necessity], Jihad Press, 26 April 2008, Hanin Forum,

www.hanein.info/vbx/showthread.php?t=64498. (hereafter “Al-Irhab al-bahri darura”)

85 Ibid.

86 Osama al-Sayyad, “Madiq Bab al-Mandab bayn al-huthiyyin wa’l-Sisi” [The Bab al-Mandab Strait between the Houthis and

Sisi], Shabakat Arin al-Mujahidin, an al-Qaeda forum, 12 March 2015, https://al3aren.com/vb/showthread.php?t=8620.

87 Abu Sufyan al-Azdi (Said al-Shihri), “Radd al-udwan al-salibi” [Repelling the Crusader Aggression], transcript by Nukhbat alIlam al-Jihadi, 8 February 2010, 2. (hereafter Al-Azdi, “Radd al- udwan”)

88 “Al-Irhab al-bahri darura.”

89 As assessed by Yemen’s then-foreign minister, “Al-Yaman: Al-Qaida la tastati al-saytara ala Bab al-Mandab” [Yemen: Al-Qaeda

Cannot Control Bab al-Mandab], Al-Bawwaba (Sanaa), 23 February 2010, www.albawaba.com.

90 Al-Mi’at min anasir al-Qaida yasilun Bab al-Mandab wa-yabda’un nasb al-madafi” [Hundreds of al-Qaeda Personnel Arrive at

Bab al-Mandab and Begin to Set Up Artillery], Khabar News Agency (Sanaa), 10 May 2016, http://khabaragency.net/

news60152.html.

91 Interview with Abu Basir al-Wuhayshi by Abd al-Ilah Haydar Shai, “Tanzhim al-Qaida fi Jazirat al-Arab, wa’l-qaba’il wa’l-Sumal:

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 41
Hiwar” [Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Tribes, and Somalia: An Interview], Al-Shabab’s al-Qimma site, 11 February 2010,

http://al-qimmah.net/showthread.pho?t=14116, Al-Azdi, “Radd al-udwan,” 4, and Khalid al-Hammudi, “Amrika al-yawm faqira”

[Today America Is Poor], Sada al-Malahim, no. 13, April-May 2010, 26.

92 “Al-Jundi fi jaysh al-Dawla ala aqida salima” [The Soldier in the Islamic State’s Army Follows a Sound Doctrine], 8 April 2014,

https://justpaste.it/f0xe.

93 Ibid.

94 Rifai Ahmad Taha, Darb al-mudammira Cole: Al-Durus wa’l-ibar [The Strike against the Destroyer Cole: Lessons and

Considerations], [November 2000], www.tawhed.ws.

95 “On Targeting the Achilles Heel,” 103-04.

96 Sayf al-Adl, Al-Sira wa-riyah al-taghyir, [The Struggle and the Winds of Change], part 3, Qaidat al-Jihad, 14 October 2013, 255.

97 Investigation into the Attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Report of the House Armed Services Committee, May 2001, Executive Summary,

www.bits.de/public/documents/US_Terrorist_Attacks/HASC-colereport0501.pdf.

98 Ibid, and 9/11 Commission Report; Authorized Edition, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 180. (hereafter 9/11

Commission)

99 Department of Defense, Headquarters, Joint Task Force Guantanamo U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Memorandum

for Commander, United States Southern Command, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued

Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP, 8 December 2006, Judicial Watch website,

www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/alNashiri.pdf.

100 U.S. Department of Defense, USS COLE Commission Report, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 9 January 2001), and

Megan K Stack and John Hendren, “Rockets Miss U.S. Ships at Port in Jordan,” Los Angeles Times, 20 August 2005,

http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/20/world/fg-rockets20.

101 Syed Shoaib Hasan, Saeed Shah, and Siobham Gorman, “Al Qaeda Foiled in Raid on Pakistan Frigate,” The Wall Street Journal

(New York), 17 September 2014, A7.

102 Syed Reza Hasan and Katharine Houreld, “In Al Qaeda Attack, Lines between Pakistan Military, Militants Blur,” Reuters, 30

September 2014, www.reuters.com.

103 Osama Mahmood, al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent spokesman, Press Release, “Operation against the American Navy by the

Mujahideen; Reasons and Objectives,” 16 September 2014, Resurgence, number 1, Fall 2014, 8. (hereafter Mahmood, “Operation

against the American Navy”)

104 Al-Qaeda on the Indian Subcontinent statement, “This Was Not an Attack on the Naval Dockyard,” 2 October 2014, Al-Sahab

Agency, Al-Jihad al-Alami forum, http://shabakat.com/vb/showthread.php?t=40526.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Mahmood, “Operation against the American Navy,” 9.

108 Ibid., 8.

109 Zahir Shah Sherazi, “Navy Officials Arrested in Connection with Dockyard Attack,” Dawn (Karachi), 12 September 2014,

www.dawn.com.

110 Louisa Loveluck, “Terror Attack on Egypt Naval Boat Leaves Eight Servicemen Missing,” The Telegraph (London), 12 November 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk, “Anasir ajnabiya sharakat fi al-hujum ala lansh al-quwwat al-bahriya” [Foreign Elements Participated in the Attack on the Navy’s Patrol Boat], Al-Ahram, 14 November 2014, www.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/338722.aspx, and

“Masadir: Ilan nata’ij al-tahqiqat ma muttahami al-hujum ala al-quwwat al-bahriya fawr al-intiha’ minha” [Sources: The Results of

the Interrogation of Those Accused of the Attack against the Naval Forces to Be Announced As Soon as It Concludes], Al-Misri alYawm (Cairo), 13 November 2014, www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/571213.

111 “Masadir askariya: Al-Irhabiyun istahdafu al-quwwat al-bahriya bi-khuda” [Military Sources: The Terrorists Targeted the Naval

Forces by Treachery], Al-Misri al-Yawm, 13 November 2014, www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/571317, and “Al-Tafasil

42 Norman Cigar
al-kamila li’l-hujum al-irhabi ala lansh sawarikh al-quwwat al-bahriya; 4 balansat sayd tattabat al-lansh min Bur Said hatta Dumyat

wa-hasarata bi-asliha thaqila wa-sawarikh; 13 dhabit wa-saff wa-mujannad qatalu 65 musallahan; isabat 5 wa-8 mafqudin” [The

Complete Details of the Terrorist Attack on the Navy’s Missile Patrol Boat; 4 Fishing Boats Followed the Patrol Boat from Port

Said to Damietta Then Surrounded It with Heavy Weapons and Rockets; 13 Officers, Petty Officers, and Crew Fought against 65

Gunmen; 5 Wounded and 8 Missing], Al-Yawm al-Sabi, 13 November 2014, http://youm7.com. (hereafter “Al-Tafasil al-kamila

li’l-hujum”)

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., “Ra’is al-mukhabarat al-bahriya al-asbaq: Al-Irhabiyun talaqqaw tadribat bi’l-kharij li-istihdaf al-lansh al-bahri” [The

Former Chief of Naval Intelligence: The Terrorists Were Trained Abroad to Target the Patrol Boat], Akhbar al-Yawm (Cairo), 13

November 2014, http://akhbarelyoum.com/News/Print?ID=341438, and “Masadir: Al-Hujum ala lansh al-bahriya tamm bi-asliha

haditha wa-bi-dam min dawla ajnabiya” [Sources: The Attack on the Navy Patrol Boat Involved Advanced Weaponry and Support

from a Foreign Country], Al-Mashhad (Cairo), 14 November 2014, http://almashhad.net/Articles/911486.aspx.

114 Abu Amina al-Ansari, “Tafasil al-amaliya al-bahriya allati naffadhha usud al-khilafa fi Misr” [Details about the Naval

Operation That the Caliphate’s Lions Carried Out], Al-Minbar al-Ilami al-Jihadi, 13 November 2014, www.alplatformmedia.com/vb/

howthread.php?t=68975.]

115 Significantly, at least one Egyptian press account also reported this version, “Tahqiqat ma taqim al-safina al-Madbuta bi-muhit

‘hujum Dumyat’” [Interrogation of the Crew of the Ship Detained in the Area of the “Damietta Attack”], Al-Misri al-Yawm, 15

November 2014, www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/572992.

116 “Egyptian Navy Thwarted Islamic State Attack on Israeli Targets Last Month,” i24 TV (Tel Aviv), 1 December 2014,

www.i24.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/53047-141201-egyptian-navy-thwarted-islamic-state-attack-on-israeli-targets-lastmonth.

117 “Al-Tafasil al-kamila li’l-hujum.”

118 “Al-Mudun takshif asrar amaliyat Dumyat: Ikhtaraqat DAISH al-bahriya al-misriya?” [Al-Mudun Reveals Secrets about the

Damietta Operation: Did ISIS Penetrate the Egyptian Navy?], Al-Mudun (Beirut), 14 November 2014, www.almodon.com

/arabworld/cd5ae7d8-ff20-4b7e-8205-eccbcd0c31f6.

119 Muhammad Salah, “Hujum yastahdif al-bahriya al-misriya” [An Attack Targeting the Egyptian Navy], Al-Hayat, 13 November

2014, http://alhayat.com.

120 Muhammad Muqallid, “Dabt 5 anasir irhabiya min Bayt al-Maqdis kanat tukhattit li-istihdaf al-quwwat al-bahriya” [Five

Terrorist Elements from Bayt al-Maqdis Detained Who Were Planning to Attack the Navy], Al-Watan (Cairo), 28 December 2014,

www.elwatannews.com/news/details/628609.

121 ISIS provided a brief account and photographs on one of its sites, “Tadmir firqata li’l-quwwat al-bahriya bi-jaysh al-ridda al-misri

fi al-Bahr al-Mutawassit” [The Destruction of a Frigate Belonging to the Apostate Egyptian Military’s Navy in the Mediterranean],

16 July 2015, http://isonline.ga2h.com/2015/07/forkata. Also see Hamza Hendawi, “Egyptian Navy Vessel Targeted by Militants

off Sinai’s Coast,” Associated Press, 16 July 2015, http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/ML_EGYPT?SITE=

AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT, and Erin Cunnningham, “Islamic State Claims Bold Strike on Egyptian Navy

Vessel,” The Washington Post, 17 July 2015, A11.

122 Mustafa Sanjar, “Ta’ahhub amni bad istihdaf zawraq bahri fi Rafah” [Security Alert in Rafah Following the Targeting of a Naval

Vessel], Al-Shuruq (Cairo), 16 July 2015, www.shorouknews.com, and Muhammad Ahmad Tantawi, “Al-Mutahaddith al-askari:

Hujum irhabi ala lansh bahri fi al-Bahr al-Mutawassit qubalat Rafah wa-la khasa’ir fi al-arwah” [The Military Spokesman: A

Terrorist Attack on a Patrol Craft in the Mediterranean Off Rafah But No Casualties], Al-Yawm al-Sabi, 16 July 2015,

www.youm7.com.

123 Mahmud Abd al-Wahid, “Harb shawari bi-Binghazi wa-gharq firqata harbiya bi-sabab al-ishtibakat” [Street Fighting in

Benghazi and the Sinking of a Frigate Due to the Clashes], Al-Jazira TV, 4 November 2014, www.aljazeera.net.

124 Jean-Marie Pontaut, “L’Opération Gibraltar d’Al-Qaeda” [Al-Qaeda’s Operation Gibraltar], L’Express (Paris), 13 June 2002,

www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/l-operation-gibraltar-d-al-qaeda_498790.html, and « 3 minhum yahmilun watha’iq saudiya »

[Three of Them Have Saudi Documents], Al-Jazira (Riyadh), 20 June 2002, www.al-jazirah.com/2002/20020620/du13.htm.

125 Lee Ferran and Pierre Thomas, “Al Qaeda Affiliate Targets US Ships,” ABC News, 24 January 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/

Blotter/al-qaeda-affiliate-targets-us-ships-report/story?id=15432482.

126 “Al-Bahriya al-yamaniya tuhbit amaliya irhabiya fi Abyan” [The Yemeni Navy Thwarts a Terrorist Operation in Abyan], Ukaz

(Jeddah), 29 August 2011, www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20110829/PrinCon20110829442048.htm.

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 43
127 “Kenyan Warship, Shabaab Trade Fire in Kismayo,” Somalia Report (Mogadishu), 29 May 2012, www.somaliareport.com/

index.php/post/3403/Kenyan_Warship_Shabaab_Trade_Fire_in_Kismayo.

128 Speech by Wong Kan Seng, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs at the Launching Ceremony for

RSS Stalwart,” 9 December 2005, Singapore Ministry of Defence site, www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_

releases/sp/2005/09dec05_speech.print.noimg.html.

129 “Attack on Naval HQ Foiled; Two Killed,” 3 December 2009, Dawn, www.dawn.com/news/856344/attack-on-naval-hq-foiledtwo-killed, and Salman Masood and David E. Sanger, “Militants Attack Pakistani Naval Base in Karachi,” The New York Times, 22

May 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/asia/23pakistan.html?_r=0.

130 “Tafjir mabna li’l-bahriya dakhil mina’ Darna” [An Explosion in a Building Belonging to the Navy Inside the Port of Derna],

Al-Wasat (Libya), 9 June 2014, www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/21884.

131 AQAP communique “Iqtiham wa-tadmir maqarr qiyadat al-mintaqa al-thaniya bi-Hadramawt” [Penetration and Destruction of

the Second District Headquarters in Hadramawt], 3 October 2013.

132 “13 qatilan bi-hajamat didd al-jaysh al-yamani bi’l-Mukalla” [13 Dead from the Attacks against the Yemeni Military in AlMukalla], Al-Arabiya TV (Abu Dhabi), 12 May 2016, www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2016/05/12/3.

133 “Kenyan Navy Sinks Suspected Al-Shabab Boat,” Voice of America, 4 November 2011, www.voanews.com/content/kenyannavy-sinks-suspected-al-shabab-boat—133290508/147708.html.

134 Christophe Cornevin, “Un attentat déjoué contre des sites militaires françaises” [A Plot against French Military Sites Thwarted],

Le Figaro (Paris), 15 July 2015, www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/07/15/0106-20150715ARTFIG00367-un-attentat-dejouevisait-des-installations-militaires.php, and Christophe Cornevin, “Attentat déjoué à Toulon: le profil du commanditaire se précise”

[Attack in Toulon Thwarted: The Sponsor’s Profile Becomes Clearer], Le Figaro, 11 November 2015, www.lefigaro.fr/actualitefran ce/2015/11/10/01016-20151110ARTFIG00433-un-attentat-contre-des-militaires-dejou-a-toulon.php.

135 “Al-Qaida yatabanna [sic] ightiyal aqid fi al-bahriya al-yamaniya” [Al-Qaeda Claims Responsibility for Killing a Captain in the

Yemeni Navy], Al-Hayat, 26 August 2015, www.alhayat.com.

136 Gharib al-Ikhwan, “Al-Mahq al-azhim”. When ISIS was established, Gharib al-Ikhwan left al-Qaeda and joined the latter.

137 Al-Azdi, Usama Bin Ladin mujaddid al-zaman, 348.

138 Osama Bin Ladin, “Ilan al-jihad ala al-amrikan al-muhtallin li-Bilad al-Haramayn” [Proclaiming the Jihad against the

Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places], 1996, www.jarchive.info/b/details.php?item_id=4715.

139 Abd al-Aziz bin Rashid al-Anazi, Hukm istihdaf al-masalih al-nifitya [Ruling on Targeting Oil Assets], (Markaz al-Dirasat

wa’l-Buhuth al-Islamiya, ca. 2003), 56-57. Markaz al-Dirasat wa’l-Buhuth al-Islamiya was al-Qaeda’s early think tank.

140 Ibid., 3.

141 Sayf al-Adl, Al-Sira wa-riyah al-taghyir, [The Struggle and the Winds of Change], part 3, Qaidat al-Jihad, 14 October 2013,

254-55.

142 Frédéric Vézard, “Attentat contre un pétrolier français au Yémen” [Attack against a French Oil Tanker in Yemen], Le Parisien,

7 October 2002, www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attentat-contre-un-petrolier-francais-au-yemen-07-10-2002-2003466672.php, and

Ricassin, “Gitmo Prisoner Charged for Bombing Petronas Oil Tanker,” Petro Global News (Charlottesville, VA), 10 February 2014,

http://petroglobalnews.com/2014/02/gitmo-prisoner-charged-for-bombing-petronas-oil-tanker.

143 Osama Bin Ladin, “Bayan min Usama Bin Ladin wa-tanzhim al-Qaida ila al-umma al-islamiya” [Communique from Osama Bin

Ladin and al-Qaeda to the Islamic Umma], 12 October 2002, 7, www.tawhed.ws.

144 Robert F. Worth, “Tanker Damage Caused by Attack, Inquiry Finds,” The New York Times, 6 August 2010, www.nytimes.com/

2010/08/07/world/middleeast/07tanker.html?_r=0.

145 Jason Burke, “Suicide Boats Attack Iraq Oil Port,” The Guardian, 24 April 2004, www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/25/iraq2,

and communique by al-Qaeda in Iraq, “Ghazwat qahir al-salibiyin al-shaykh Yusuf al-Ayyiri rahimahu Allahu” [The Raid in

Memory of the Conqueror of the Crusaders Shaykh Yusuf al-Ayyiri, May God Have Mercy on Him], 26 April 2004, Al-Ahibba fi

Allah forum, www.ala7ebah.com/upload/showthread.php?t=3346.

44 Norman Cigar
146 Khalid, “On Targeting the Achilles Heel,” 103.

147 Ibid., 94-104.

148 Ibid., 102, 103.

149 Ibid., 95.

150 “Ihbat hujum li-DAISH ala mahatta naftiya shimal Libiya” [Attack by ISIS on an Oil Terminal in Northern Libya Thwarted],

Al-Fajr (Cairo), 11 January 2016, www.elfagr.org/1992132.

151 Flaminio Spinetti, “Il terrorismo islamico vuole colpire anche sul mare” [The Islamic Terrorism Wants to Also Strike at Sea],

Il Giornale (Milan), 13 September 2014, www.ilgiornale.it/news/mondo/terrorismo-islamico-vuole-colpire-anche-sul-mare1051402,html, and Mark Hookham, “Yachties at Risk as Isis Takes to the Sea,” Sunday Times (London), 22 February 2015,

www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Europe/article1522137.ece?shareToken=0af65447474c848ef7bf1d93935f37d9.

152 Hafiyani, “Al-Qaida khattatat li-istihdaf sufun.”

153 Muhammad Bin Ahmad, “DAISH yuhaddid naqilat al-bitrul fi al-Mutawassit” [ISIS Threatens Oil Tankers in the Mediterranean],

Al-Khabar (Algiers), 24 October 2015, www.elkhabar.com/press/article/93055/#sthash.GpwP4H4y.dpbs.

154 Mursal, “Crew Members of Stranded Kenyan Ship released after a Week in Custody,” Harar24 (Harar, Ethiopia), 19 July 2014,

http://harar24.com/?p=13738.

155 “Qal innahu kan yahdif li’l-saytara ala al-Mukalla wa-tanfidh hajamat ala adad min al-mawani’” [He Said He Had Planned to

Seize al-Mukalla and to Launch Attacks on Several Ports], Akhbar al-Yawm (Sanaa), 8 August 2013, www.akhbaralyom.net/

nprint.php?sid=69879.

156 “DAISH tahuzz ra’s mushrif al-ummal bi-mina’ al-Mukalla” [ISIS Kills the Supervisor of al-Mukalla Port Workers], Yemeni Press

(Sanaa), 9 May 2016, www.yemenipress.net/archives/42826.

157 For example, in Malaysia, Aliza Shah and Hariz Mohd, “Moles in Shipping Industry?” New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 18

April 2016, www.nst.com.my/news/2016/04/139808/moles-shipping-industry.

158Omar Wahid, Mark Nicol, and Tahira Yaqoob, “UK Navy Officer Joins ISIS: Defence Experts Warn of Terror Attacks on Ships

as Highly Skilled Sailor Turns from Playboy into Jihadi after Watching Videos of Assad’s Atrocities in Syria,” Daily Mail

(London), 7 May 2016, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3578888/Navy-officer-trained-British-college-joins-ISIS.html#

ixzz4ATKJcpBt.

159 “France: Les démons de l’islamisme” [France: The Demons of Islamism], part 6, Aujourd’hui le Maroc (Casablanca), 29

October 2004, http://aujourdhui.ma/special/france-les-demons-de-lislamisme-6-93551.

160 “Buq al-Qaida: Sijill aswad fi al-tafjir wa’l-tajnid wa’l-ightiyal” [Al-Qaeda’s Treachery: A Record of Explosions, Recruitment,

and Assassinations], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 4 January 2016, http://aawsat.com/node/535696.

161 “Bad al-hujum ala lansh al-yawm taarraf ala ashhar hawadith al-irhab al-bahri” [Apart from Today’s Attack on the Patrol Boat,

Here Are the Other Most Notorious Incidents of Maritime Terrorism], Al-Watan, 16 July 2015, www.elwatannews.com/news/

details/770931.

162 Thomas Fuller, “20 Kidnapped From Malaysian Resort Island,” The New York Times, 25 April 2000, www.nytimes.com/

2000/04/25/news/25iht-malay.2.t_3.html, Richard Shears, “Al Qaeda-linked Gunmen Storm Luxury Hotel on Paradise Island in

Malaysia Killing a Policeman and Kidnapping Another Officer,” Daily Mail, 13 July 2014, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2690353/Tourists-flee-paradise-island-resort-Malaysia-Al-Qaeda-linked-gunmen-storm-hotel-shooting-dead-one-policemankidnapping-second-officer.html, “Third Tug Attacked by Pirates in Sulu Sea,” Maritime Executive (Fort Lauderdale, FL), 22 April

2016, www.maritime-executive.com/article/third-tug-attacked-by-pirates-in-sulu-sea, and Yenni Kwok, “The Indonesian Sailors

Kidnapped by Philippine Militants Are Back Home,” Time (New York), 2 May 2016, http://time.com/4313815/indonesian-sailorskidnapped-philippines-abu-sayyaf/#4313815/indonesian-sailors-kidnapped-philippines-abu-sayyaf.

163 Marichu Villanueva, “SuperFerry Sinking a Terrorist Attack,” Philippine Star (Manila), 12 October 2004, www.philstar.com/

headlines/2004/10/12/265927/superferry-sinking-a-terrorist-attack.

164 Al-Munji al-Saidani and Kamal Bin Yunis, “Al-Irhab yastahdif al-siyaha fi Tunis mujaddadan wa-yahsid 37 qatilan wa-asharat

al-jarha” [Terrorism Targets Tourism in Tunisia Again and Leaves 37 Dead and Dozens of Injured], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 27 June 2015,

http://aawsat.com/node/392996. (hereafter Al-Saidani and Bin Yunis, “Al-Irhab yastahdif al-siyaha”)

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 45
165 “Al-Qahira tu’akkid ihbat ‘hujum irhabi’ fi al-Ghardaqa” [Cairo Confirms Thwarting a “Terrorist Attack” in Hurghada], AlJazira TV, 8 January 2016, www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/1/8.

166 “Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique revendique l’attaque en Côte d’Ivoire” [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib Claims the Attack in

the Côte d’Ivoire], Francetv info (Paris), 13 March 2016, www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/cote-d-ivoire-fusillade-en-cours-dansun-hotel-de-la-station-balneaire-de-grand-bassam-frequentee-par-des-occidentaux-suivez-notre-direct_1357907.html.

167 Al-Saidani and Bin Yunis, “Al-Irhab yastahdif al-siyaha.”

168 Dražen Gudić, “Trogir ‘žrtva’ terorizma - izgubio status međunarodne luke” [Trogir a “Victim” of Terrorism: It Has Lost Its Status As an International Port], Slobodna Dalmacija (Split), 11 May 2016, www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/novosti/hrvatska/clanak/id/

312188/trogir-zrtva-terorizma—izgubio-status-meunarodne-luke.

169 Fran Golden, “Norwegian Cancels All Turkey Visits by Three Brands for 2016,” USA Today, 22 January 2016,

www.usatoday.com/story/travel/cruises/cruiselog/2016/01/22/norwegian-regent-seven-seas-oceania-cruises-cancels-all-turkey-portcalls-2016/79130430.

170 “L’Algérie refuse l’ouverture d’une ligne maritime touristique avec la Tunisie pour des raisons sécuritaires” [Algeria Refuses to

Open a Maritime Tourist Line with Tunisia Due to Security Reasons], Radio Mosaïque Fm (Tunis), 19 June 2013,

http://archivev2.mosaiquefm.net.

171Ahmed Feteha, “Egypt’s Tourism Collapse Stretches from the Pyramids to the Beach,” Bloomberg (New York), 1 February 2016,

www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-01/egypt-resorts-become-ghost-towns-as-tourist-arrivals-plummet.

172 Samira Awwam, “Shawati’ Seraidi taht rahmat al-nahibin wa’l-jamaat al-irhabiya” [The Seraidi Coast Is at the Mercy of

Bandits and Terrorist Groups], Al-Fajr (Algiers), 19 November 2016, www.al-fadjr.com/ar/index.php?news=157444?print.

173 “Somalia: Mogadishu Airport Comes under Seaborne Fire,” Shabelle Media Network, 14 November 2015,

www.shabellenews.com.

174 Sam Jones, “Europe’s Ports Vulnerable as Ships Sail Without Oversight,” Financial Times (London), 4 February 2016,

www.ft.com/cms/s/2/4d71dc5e-c8ec-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0.html#axzz48rumKrnf.

175 “Masafi Aden tattahim jihat nafidha bi-muhawalat sariqat al-qatira al-bahriya Nur Aden li-tatil wusul ighathat al-wuqud

al-imaratiya” [Aden Refineries Accuses Political Interests of the Attempted Hijacking of the Sea-going Tug Nur Aden Intended to

Obstruct the Delivery of Emirati Fuel Aid], Shabwa Press (Ataq, Yemen), 1 June 2016, http://shabwaahpress.net/news/35376.

176 Muhammad Muqallad, “Al-Jaysh yunhi 70% min sur ta’min Qanat al-Suways” [The Army Completes 70% of the Suez Canal

Security Wall], Al-Watan, 13 June 2014, www.elwatannews.com/news/details/502808.

177 “Allarme Isis a Trieste: si teme un attacco con barchino-bomba” [ISIS Alarm in Trieste: An Attack By an Explosive-Laden Boat

Is Feared], Il Gazzettino (Venice), 10 September 2014, www.ilgazzettino.it/home/trieste_allarme_isis_terrorismo_barca_bomba_

petroliere-583115.html.

178 David Larter, “CNO: Cruises Shortening from ‘Unsustainable’ Lengths,” Navy Times (Springfield, VA), 30 March 2015,

www.navytimes.com/story/military/careers/navy/2015/03/30/deployment-lengths-budget-cuts-seven-months-sustainable/70480660.

179 “La France engage contre Daech un groupe aéronavale particulièrement puissant” [France Deploys an Especially Powerful Air

and Naval Task Force against ISIS], Mer et Marine (Nantes), 18 November 2015, www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/la-franceengage-contre-daech-un-groupe-aeronaval-particulierement-puissant, and Marcus Weisberger, “Navy to Increase the Number of

Deployed Ships to the Middle and East, Asia,” Defense One (Washington, DC), 13 March 2015, www.defenseone.com/

management/2015/03/navy-increase-number-deployed-ships-middle-east-asia/107472/?oref=d_brief-nl.

180 Jonathan Saul and Camila Reed, “Shabaab-Somali Pirate Links Growing: UN Adviser,” Reuters, 20 October 2011,

http://af.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleID=AFJOE79JoG620111020.

181 Abu Ammar al-Khusti, “Al-Qarasina: Majalis al-sahwa al-sumaliya!” [Pirates: Somali Sahwa Councils], Qadaya Jihadiya,

number 4, Dhu al-hijja 1429/November-December 2008, 10-12.

182 “Tasaud al-tawattur bayn al-qarasina wa’l-musallahin al-islamiyin” [Growing Tension between the Pirates and the Islamist

Gunmen], BBC Arabic (London), 23 November 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/world_news/newsid_7743000/7743858.stm.

183 Justin McCurry, “Japanese Oil Tanker Hit by Terrorist Bomb, Say Inspectors,” The Guardian, 6 August 2010,

46 Norman Cigar
www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/06/japanese-oil-tanker-terrorist-explosives, and communique by the Kata’ib Abd Allah

Azzam, “Ghazwat al-shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman” [The Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman Raid], 2 August 2010.

184 Luways Atiyat Allah, “Al-Jihad abqariya wa-ilham: Al-Qaida namudhajan” [The Jihad Is Genius and Inspiration and al-Qaeda

Is the Model], Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad site, 2 April 2009, www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_2596.html.

185 9/11 Commission, 191.

186 “Muhakamat Istanbul: Abu Hafs al-Misri iqtarah tanfidh amaliya fi Turkiya qabl hajamat sibtimbr” [Istanbul Trials: Abu Hafs

al-Misri Suggested Carrying Out an Operation in Turkey before the September Attacks], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 23 November 2004,

www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=267178&issueno=9492.

187 “How Mumbai Attacks Unfolded,” BBC, 30 November 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7757500.stm.

188 “Istinfar amni fi Aden tahassuban li-hajamat li’l-Qaida an tariq al-bahr” [Precautionary Security Alert of al-Qaeda Attacks from

the Sea], Baraqish Net (Sanaa), 23 April 2012, www.barakish.net/news02.aspx?cat=12&sub=11&id=29238.

189 “Genova, psicosi terrorismo: falso allarme bomba sul traghetto,” (Genoa, Terrorism Psychosis: False Bomb Alarm on the Ferry

Boat], Libero Quotidiano (Milan), 21 November 2015, www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/italia/11851362/Genova—psicositerrorismo—falso.html, and “Un ferry algérien dérouté vers Marseille après une alerte à la bombe” [An Algerian Ferryboat

Diverted to Marseilles Following a Bomb Alert], Mer et Marine, 17 December 2007, www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/un-ferryalgerien-deroute-vers-marseille-apres-une-alerte-la-bombe.

190 Al-Madani, Hakadha nara, 65.

191 “Al-Qaida tubaghit al-jaysh bi-hujum bahri wa-tastawli ala batariyat al-difa al-sahili wa-maarik dariya bi-Dufas” [Al-Qaeda

Surprises the Army with a Maritime Attack and Seizes Coastal Defense Batteries; Ferocious Battles in Dufas], Baraqish Net, 4

March 2012, http://barakish.net/news.aspx?cat=12&sub=11&id=26837, and “Tafasil amaliyat al-Qaida bi-Abyan: Sayyara wa-ziyy

askari wa-hujum” [Details of al-Qaeda’s Operation in Abyan: A Vehicle, Military Uniforms, and an Attack], Yemen Nation (Sanaa),

19 October 2012, www.yemennation.net/print.php?id=13542.

192 Radwan Uthmani, “Ihbat hujum irhabi ala burj muraqaba bi-Annaba” [Terrorist Attack on an Observation Tower in Annaba

Foiled], Waqt al-Jaza’ir (Algiers), 28 July 2015, http://wakteldjazair.com/?p=11447.

193 “Bad am min ilan DAISH fi al-Sumal: al-tatawwurat wa’l-ma’alat” [A Year After ISIS Was Proclaimed in Somalia: Developments and Consequences], Somali Times (Mogadishu), 1 December 2016, www.somalitimes.net/2016/12/01/%d8%a8%d8%

b 9%d 8%a f-%d 8%b 9%d 8%a 7%d 9%8 5 -%d 9%8 5%d 9%8 6 -%d 8%a 5%d 8%b 9%d 9%8 4%d 8%a 7%d 9%8 6 -

%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b9%d8%b4-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-

%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b7%d9%88%d9%91.

194 “Interview with Abu Muqatil,” Dabiq, 8, Jumada II 1436/March-April 2015, 62.

195 Mylène VandenCasteele, “Michèle Coninsx (Eurojust): ‘Les traffics de migrants à travers la Méditerranée sont infiltrés par l’Etat Islamique” [Michèle Coninsx (Eurojust): “The Migrant Traffic across the Mediterranean Is Infiltrated by the Islamic State”],

L’Express (Watermaal-Bosvoorde, Belgium), 7 July 2015, www.express.be/joker/fr/platdujour/michele-coninsx-eurojust-les-traficsdimmigrants-a-travers-la-mediterranee-sont-infiltres-par-letat-islamique/214448.htm, and Gilgamesh Nabeel and Jabeen Bhatti

“Refugees in Europe Say They Fear Terrorists Are among Them,” USA Today, 14 July 2016, www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/

2016/07/14/refugees-europe-say-they-fear-terrorists-among-them/87008334. Eurojust is the European Union’s coordinating body

on terrorism, crime, and fraud. Also, see Nick Paton Walsh, “ISIS on Europe’s Doorstep; How Terror Is Infiltrating the Migrant

Route,” CNN, 26 May 2016, www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/middleeast/libya-isis-europe-doorstep/index.html.

196 Abu Irhim al-Libi, “Libiya al-bawwaba al-istratijiya li’l-dawla al-islamiya” [Libya: The Islamic State’s Strategic Gateway], Abu

Irhim al-Libi’s blog, 26 January 2015, http://libi4.blogspot.com/2015/01/blog-post_26.html.

197 Mario Valenza, “Alfano: ‘Terrorismo e barconi? Nessuno è immune’” [Alfano: “Terrorism and Fishing Boats? No One Is

Immune”], Il Giornale, 11 November 2015, www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/alfano-terrorismo-e-barconi-nessuno-immune1193278.html, Gian Micalessin, “Il terrore arriva col gommone: rischiamo la ‘bomba umana’” [Terrorism Will Arrive By Rubber

Dinghy; We Risk a “Human Bomb”], Il Giornale, 18 February 2015, www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/i-tagliagole-battono-litalia2-0-e-vincono-sul-fronte-1095517.html, and Michel Colomès, “Terrorisme: alerte en Méditerranée” [Terrorism: Alert in the

Mediterranean], Le Point (Paris), 7 April 2015, www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/michel-colomes/terrorisme-alerte-en-mediterranee21-03-2015-1914669_55.php.

198 Piero Messina, “Terrorismo, chi sono gli 800 pronti a colpirci” [Terrorism: Who the 800 Ready to Hit Us Are], L’Espresso

(Rome), 15 January 2015, http://espresso.repubblica.it/plus/articoli/2015/01/14/news/terrorismo-chi-sono-gli-800-pronti-a-colpirciJihadist Maritime Strategy 47
1.195148?refresh_ce, and “Terroristi Isis sui barconi, cresce l’allarme” [ISIS Terrorists Aboard the Boats, the Alarm Level Rises],

La Sicilia (Catania), 18 February 2015, www.lasicilia.it/articolo/terroristi-isis-sui-barconi-cresce-l-allarme-la-libia-sar-la-nostraporta-d-ingresso.

199 Francesco Grignetti, “Uomini dell’Isis dietro i flussi dei migranti dalla Libia” [ISIS Individuals behind the Flow of Migrants to

Italy], La Stampa (Turin), 4 August 2016, www.lastampa.it/2016/08/04/italia/cronache/uomini-dellisis-dietro-i-flussi-dei-migrantidalla-libia-IzihUagr92IqBfUZkLEoNI/pagina.html.

200 “Allarme del Copasir: ‘Terroristi in arrivo tra i profughi sui barconi’” [Alarm by Copasir [Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight

Committee]: “Terrorists Coming among the Refugees in Boats], La Repubblica (Rome), 13 August 2016, www.repubblica.it/cronaca/

2016/08/13/news/is_allarme_copasir_terroristi_barconi-145928571/?refresh_ce.

201 Lucio Di Marzo, “La minaccia dell’Isis: ‘Se ci colpite vi mandiamo 500 mila migranti’” [ISIS Threat: “If You Hit Us We Will

Send You 500,000 Migrants”], Il Giornale, 17 February 2015, www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/minaccia-dellisis-se-ci-colpitemettiamo-mare-500mila-1094992.html.

202 Fadil Harun , Al-Harb ala al-islam [The War against Islam], part 1, (Markaz Dirasat Qadaya al-Alam al-Islami, 1433/2011-

2012), https://archive.org/details/WarAgainstIslamP1.

203 For example, “Masdar muqarrab min al-hukuma al-yamaniya: Al-Bahriya ajiza an waqf tadaffuq al-Qaida abr al-bahr” [A Source

Close to the Yemeni Government: The Navy Is Incapable of Stopping al-Qaeda’s Pouring In Across the Sea], Al-Sharq al-Awsat,

4 June 2012, www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12242&article=680304, “Anba’ an wusul imdadat li’l-musallahin

abr al-bahr” [Reports That the Gunmen Received Reinforcements by Sea], Ma’rib Press, 5 January 2012, http://marebpress.net/

nprint.php?sid=39408, and “Tanzhim al-Qaida yuazziz tawajudahu fi janub al-Yaman bi’l-asliha wa’l-mutafajjirat” [Al-Qaeda

Reinforces Its Presence in South Yemen with Arms and Explosives], Shahara Net (Shahara, Yemen), 1 April 2014,

www.shaharah.net/2010/print.php?id=17142.

204 “La frégate Provence saisit un véritable arsenal en océan Indien” [The Frigate Provence Seizes a Veritable Arsenal in the Indian

Ocean], Mer et Marine, 25 March 2016, www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/la-fregate-provence-saisit-un-veritable-arsenal-en-oceanindien.

205 “Nanshur tafasil ihbat al-jaysh muhawalat anasir DAISH dukhul Misr an tariq Bur Said” [We Publish the Details of the

Thwarting by the Military of an Attempt by ISIS Operatives to Enter Egypt by Way of Port Said], Al-Shuruq (Cairo), 12

November 2014, www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=12112014&id=58ab4799-4c5b-4e4a-8b8a-5160dc28175b.

206 “Asrar hujum al-Arish al-irhabi: Qarib sayd naqal al-mutafajjirat qabl usbuayn” [Secrets about the al-Arish Terrorist Attack: A

Fishing Boat Transported the Explosives Two Weeks Ago], Al-Mashhad (Cairo), 15 February 2015, http://al-mashhad.com.

207 For example, Salim al-Ubaydi, “Al-Bahriya tastahdif jarafa qubalat sawahil Sidi Khalifa bi-Binghazi” [The Navy Targets a

Trawler Off the Coast of Sidi Khalifa in Benghazi], Al-Wasat (Tripoli), 6 June 2014, www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/21473, Salim

al-Ubaydi, “Silah al-jaww yaqsif jarafa qubalat sawahil al-Maqrun” [The Air Forces Bombs a Trawler Off the Coast of al-Maqrun],

Al-Wasat, 5 June 2014, www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/21212, and Khalid Mahmud, “Irtifa hasilat ishtibakat Haftar wa’lmutatarrifin fi Binghazi wa-anba’ an asra” [Growing Casualties Resulting from Clashes between Haftar and the Extremists in

Benghazi and Reports of Prisoners], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 June 2014, www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=775942&issueno=12985.

208 Ayman al-Warfalli, “Libyan Planes Sink Ship, Attack Another near Benghazi—Spokesmen,” Reuters, 20 July 2015,

www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/20-security-idUSL5N0ZZ0JO20150720.

209 “Masdar: Tafjir jarraftayn fi mina’ Misrata tustakhdaman li-tahrib al-asliha ila Binghazi” [Two Fishing Boats Used to Smuggle

Arms to Benghazi Blown Up in Misrata Port], Al-Wasat, 31 March 2016, www.alwasat.ly/news/libya/10107, “Fi-ma al-asliha

tatadaffaq ala al-irhabiyin min al-bahr; maqtal dawaish tunisiyin fi Sirt” [Weapons Flow to the Terrorists by Sea; Tunisian

Members of ISIS Killed in Sirte], Al-Shuruq (Tunis), 18 February 2016, www.alchourouk.com/160906/675/1, and “Masdar: Tafjir

jarraftayn fi mina’ Misrata tustakhdaman li-tahrib al-asliha ila Binghazi” [A Source: Two Fishing Boats Used to Smuggle Arms to

Benghazi Blown Up in Misrata Harbor], Al-Wasat, 31 March 2016, www.alwasat.ly/news/libya/10107.

210 Bulletin number 50 by the Shura Council of the Revolutionaries of Benghazi, 27 October 2016, Ana Muslim website,

www.muslim.org/vb/showthread.php?562837.

211 “Manfur: Qasf maqtura bahriya muhammal bi-dabbabat qurb Binghazi” [Manfur: A Sea-going Barge Loaded with Tanks Was

Attacked Near Benghazi], Iwan Libya, 19 March 2016, http://ewanlibya.ly/news/news.aspx?id=6784.

212 “Daech: des bateaux chargés d’armes traqués en Méditerranée,” [ISIS: Ships Loaded with Arms Tracked in the Mediterranean],

Le Figaro, 16 June 2016, www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/06/16/01003-20160616ARTFIG00270-daech-des-bateaux-chargesd-armes-traques-en-mediterranee.php.

48 Norman Cigar
213 Interview with Fahd al-Qus al-Awlaqi by Abd al-Razzaq al-Jamal, transcript in Al-Malahim, 13 September 2011, 5.

214 “15 sana sijnan li-muttaham bi-naql al-irhabiyin abr al-bahr bayn Tizi Ouzou wa-Bu Mirdas” [15 Years in Prison for the One

Accused of Transporting Terrorists by Sea between Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes], Al-Nasr (Algiers), 12 June 2012,

www.annasronline.com.

215 Muhammad Mahmud Fayid, “Al-Quwwat al-musallaha tuwasil mudahamat awkar al-anasir al-irhabiya bi’l-Shaykh Zuwayd”

[The Armed Forces Continue Their Raids against the Terrorist Elements’ Dens in al-Shaykh Zuwayd], Akhbar al-Yawm (Cairo),

10 July 2015, http://akhbarelyom.com/article/559fd990995f720025d3bd21.

216 “Al-Qaida yastakhdim al-bahr li-naql musallahih min al-Mukalla li-qital al-jaysh fi Aden” [Al-Qaeda Uses the Sea to Transfer

Its Fighters from al-Mukalla to Fight the Army in Aden], Khabar News Agency, 9 May 2015, www.khabaragency.net/

news25028.html and interview with an al-Qaeda leader in Yemen, “Al-Masra fi hiwar jadid ma al-qa’id Sad bin Atif al-Awfi”

[Al-Masra in a New Interview with the Leader Sad bin Atif al-Awfi], Al-Masra, Number 9, 4 April 2016, 4. Al-Masra is AQAP’s

official publication.

217 “Tashdid al-ijra’at fi sawahil al-muhafazhat bad tasallul 500 min muqatili al-Qaida fi Suriya” [Tougher Measures along the

Provincial Coasts Following the Infiltration of 500 al-Qaeda Fighters from Syria], Al-Yemen al-Yawm (Sanaa), 17 June 2014,

www.yemen-today.net/DetailsNews.aspx?Id=14285.

218 “Libye: Une dizaine de Français dans les rangs de Daech” [Libya: About a Dozen Frenchmen in ISIS’s Ranks], Le Journal de

Dimanche (Paris), 21 February 2016, www.lejdd.fr, and M. A., “Turkiya tusahhil ubur DAISH ila Libiya li-darb al-Jaza’ir waTunis” [Turkey Is Facilitating the Travel of ISIS to Libya in Order to Strike at Algeria and Tunis], Anba’ Tunis, 21 October 2016,

www.kapitalis.com.

219 “Qarqanna: Shabaka li-tasfir al-irhabiyin nahw Libiya abr al-bahr” [Kerkennah: Network to Send Terrorists to Libya by Sea],

Al-Jarida al-Tunisiya (Tunis), 2 April 2015, https://www.aljarida.com.tn.

220 James Dowling, Renee Viellaris, and Grace Mason, “Five Arrested over Alleged Jihadi Plot,” The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 11

May 2016, www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/crime-and-justice/five-arrested-over-alleged-jihadi-plot/news-story/

76fe3c65c730fb9ab4a7956c3674dde4?nk=a74a9330a57dff960032ea1806dd4e9e-1463622169.

221 “Bad farar anasir muwaliya li’l-Qaida min al-Sumal al-Yaman tata’ahhb li-itirad 300 qaidi abr al-bahr” [Following the Escape

of Elements Loyal to al-Qaeda from Somalia Yemen Prepares to Resist 300 al-Qaeda Members from Across the Sea], Al-Hudayda

Net, 27 February 2012, www.hodeidah.net/index/php?act=Show&id=4520, and “Maqtal ajanib baynhum saudiyun yantamawn

li-tanzhim al-Qaida fi amaliyat al-jaysh didd al-Qaida fi al-Yaman” [Foreigners, Including Saudi Members of al-Qaeda, Killed in

the Army’s Operations against al-Qaeda in Yemen], Nun Agency (Baghdad), 2 February 2013, http://non14.net.

222 “Maqtal 11 mutashaddidan wa-farar zaim al-Qaida fi al-Yaman” [11 Extremists Killed and al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Leader Flees],

Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 11 June 2012, www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=56867&y=2012, “Anasir tanzhim al-Qaida bada’at bi’lhurub abr al-bahr ila al-Sumal” [Al-Qaeda members Have Begun to Flee across the Sea to Somalia], Aden Free, 7 May 2014,

www.adenfree.com/50971, “Fi kalima lahu amam tullab kulliyat al-shurta ra’is al-jumhuriya: Talabat al-kulliyat al-askariya wa’lamnniya kanu simam aman khilal azmat 2011” [In His Speech to the Cadets at the Police Academy, the President of the Republic:

The Cadets at the Military and Police Academies Were the Safety Valve during the 2011 Crisis], 26 September (Sanaa), 22 August

2013, http://26sep.net/news_details.php?sid=94624, and “Tanzhim al-Qaida yu’ammin tariq khuruj li-muqatilih abr al-bahr” [AlQaeda Secures an Exfiltration Route for Its Fighters by Sea], Yamanat (Sanaa), 2 November 2014, www.yemenat.net/

news51075.html.

223 “Al-Qabd ala bad muntasibi shura Binghazi hawalu al-hurub abr al-bahr” [The Seizure of Some Members of the Shura Council

of Benghazi As They Were Trying to Escape by Sea], Qurina al-Jadida (Benghazi), 16 December 2014, www.qurynanew.com/

64947.

224 “Al-Jaysh yaqtahim akhir maaqil al-irhabiyin fi Binghazi’ [The Army Penetrates the Terrorists’ Last Stronghold in Benghazi],

Al-Dustur (Cairo), 6 June 2016, www.dostor.org/1086341, and “Jarrafat qadima an tariq al-bahr ala matniha muqatilun wa-asliha”

[Fishing Trawlers Coming by Sea with Fighters and Arms on Board], Al-Fajr (Algiers), 16 June 2016, www.al-fadjr.com/ar/

index.php?news=308908.

225 Nizar Muqni, “Qiyadi fi Katibat al-Qaqa li-Al-Sabah News: Hadhihi khuttatna al-askariya li-muharabat al-takfiriyin fi Libiya”

[A Commander in the al-Qaqa Battalion to Al-Sabah News: This Is Our Military Plan to Fight the Takfiris in Libya], Al-Sabah

News (Tunis), 19 May 2014, www.assabahnewsws.tn/print/85887.

226 “Mas’ul libi: Musallahu DAISH yuharribun li-Uruba fi qawarib al-muhajirin” [A Libyan Official: ISIS Fighters Smuggle to

Europe Using Refugee Boats], Al-Shuruq (Cairo), 18 May 2015, www.shorouknews.com, and “Libya Coastal Towns Earning

Millions from People Trafficking Says EU,” Libya Herald (Tripoli), 7 December 2016, https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/12/07/

libya-coastal-towns-earning-millions-from-people-trafficking-says-eu.

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 49
227 “Goriva ot IDIL t’rsyat v nashi benzinostantsii” [They Are Looking at Fuel from ISIL in Our Gas Stations], Trud (Sofia), 29

February 2016, www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=5334948, and Fausto Biloslavo, “Anche l’Italia finanzia l’Isis così; compriamo

il petrolio” [Italy Also Finances ISIS; This Is How We Buy Oil], Il Giornale, 12 February 2015, www.ilgiornale.it/news/

politica/anche-litalia-finanzia-lisis-cos-compriamo-petrolio-1200505.html.

228 Faruq al-Kamali, “Al-Yaman: Al-Qaida yuwassi masadirha al-maliya fi al-Mukalla” [Yemen: Al-Qaeda Expands Its Financial

Resources in al-Mukalla], Al-Arabi al-Jadid, 1 October 2015, www.alaraby.co.uk, and “Anasir al-Qaida ma zalat tajni makasib min

wuqud muharrab bi’l-Yaman” [Al-Qaeda Elements Are Still Collecting Profits from Fuel Smuggled into Yemen], Al-Sharq alAwsat, 28 May 2016, http://aawsat.com/node/650906.

229 Faruq Kamali, “Tahrib al-wuqud yumawwil al-Qaida bi’l-Yaman bi-150 mliyun dular shahriyan” [The Smuggling of Fuel Earns

al-Qaeda in Yemen 150 Million Dollars a Month], Al-Arabi al-Jadid, 6 February 2016, www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2016/2/6.

230 “Ihbat hujum bi-qarib mufakhkhakh istahdaf mina’ tasdir al-ghaz fi Shabwa” [Attack by Bomb-Laden Boat Targeting the Gas

Export Port in Shabwa Thwarted], Akhbar al-Saa (Sanaa), 22 November 2013, www.hournews.net/news-24402.htm, and “Tanzhim

al-Qaida yufajjir unbub al-ghaz fi mintaqat al-Ayn mudiriyat Rudum muhafazhat Shabwa” [Al-Qaeda Blows Up a Gas Pipeline in

the al-Ayn Area of the Rudum District of Shabwa Governorate], Al-Mashhad al-Janubi al-Awwal (Yemen), 6 December 2016,

www.salmashhad.com/news/10247.

231 Jonathan Saul, “Boat That Attacked Gas Tanker off Yemen Carried Explosives: Shipowner,” Reuters, 3 November 2016,

www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-shipping-attack-idUSKBN12Y2L3.

232 Nissim Behar, “Assassinat d’un expert en drones tunisien : l’ombre du Mossad” [The Assassination of a Tunisian Drone Expert:

The Shadow of the Mossad], Libération (Paris), 18 December 2016, www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/12/18/assassinat-d-un-experten-drones-tunisien-l-ombre-du-mossad_1536168, and “Hamas Engineer Was Developing Remote-controlled Subs in Tunisia,”

Yediot Ahronot (Tel Aviv), 18 December 2016, www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4894550,00.html.

233 Interview with Yunis al-Mawritani, “Mutaqal mawritani yakshif qiyadat al-Qaida ma bad Bin Ladin” [The Detention of a

Mauritanian Reveals al-Qaeda’s Leadership after Bin Ladin], Al-Akhbar Agency (Nouakchott), 27 November 2014,

www.alalkhbar.info/news/6942-2014-11-27-15-36-01.html.

234 “Mukhahttat al-irhabiyin li-darb al-bahriya ala sawahil al-Arish” [Terrorists’ Plot to Strike the Navy off the Coast of al-Arish],

Al-Sabah (Cairo), 18 April 2015, www.elsaba7.com/NewsPrint.aspx?Id=136466.

235 “Al-Harb ala al-irhab taud li’l-muwajaha fi Hadramawt” [The War against Terrorism Resurfaces in Hadramawt], Al-Mushahid

(Aden), 7 October 2016, http://almashahid.net/news.php?id=776.

236 “Li-nafham ma yahdath min amal qarsana li’l-sufun.”

237 For background on related issues, see the chapter on “Container Security,” in Yonah Alexander and Tyler B. Richardson, ed.,

Terror on the High Seas: From Piracy to Strategic Challenge, vol. 1, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), 176-85. (hereafter

Alexander and Richardson)

238 Muhajir100, “Rajimat sawarikh bahriya fi rihlat naql badai’ tastahiqq al-dirasa” [A Naval Rocket Launcher on a Trip Carrying

Cargo Merits Study], Al-Luyuth forum, 2 August 2012, http://81.2.216.12/vb/showthread.php?34718.

239 Al-Azdi, Usama Bin Ladin mujaddid al-zaman, 347.

240 Ibid.

241 Sean L. Kline, Director, Maritime Affairs, Chamber of Shipping of America, “Maritime Security: Quo Vadis?” seminar, Potomac

Institute for Policy Studies (Arlington, VA), 23 May 2016.

242 Al-Azdi, Usama Bin Ladin mujaddid al-zaman, 348.

243 “Wazir kharijiyat al-Imarat yadu li’l-hidhr min wusul tahdidat tanzhimat al-irhab ila al-bahr” [The UAE Foreign Minister

Cautions of the Threat from Terrorist Organizations Reaching the Sea], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 30 October 2014, http://aawsat.com/

nonde/211441.

244 M. Mhamid, “Irhabiyun jaza’iriyun dimn shabakat tahrib al-mukhaddirat al-sulba bi-Mawritania” [Algerian Terrorists Part of the

Hard Drug Smuggling Network in Mauritania], Al-Jaza’ir News (Algiers), 28 February 2010, www.djazairnews.info, “Security

Council, Adopting Resolution 2195 (2014), Urges International Action to Break Links between Terrorists, Transnational Organized

Crime,” United Nations Security Council meeting, 19 December 2014, www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11717.doc.htm, David E.

Brown, The Challenge of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human Security in West Africa, (Carlisle, PA: SSI,

50 Norman Cigar
2013), and “Mawritania tufakkik akbar shabakat al-mukhaddirat yatara’’asha najl ra’is sabiq” [Maritania Breaks Up the Largest

Drug Network Headed by the Son of a Former President], Al-Arabiya TV, 6 February 2016, www.alarabiya.net/ar/north-africa/

mauritania/2016/02/06.

245 Mark Townsend, “Is Cosa Nostra Now Selling Deadly Assault Weapons to Islamist Terrorist Groups?” The Guardian, 23 July

2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/23/cosa-nostra-assault-weapons-islamist-terror-group.

246 “Al-Tafasil al-kamila li’l-hujum.”

247 Dean Nelson, “Al-Qaeda India Branch’s First Attack Ends in Dismal Failure as Jihadists ‘Raid Wrong Ship,’” The Telegraph, 12

September 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/11092387/Al-Qaeda-India-branchs-first-attack-ends-indismal-failure-as-jihadists-raid-wrong-ship.html, and Syed Reza Hasan and Katharine Houreld, “In Al Qaeda Attack, Lines between

Pakistan Military, Militants Blur,” Reuters, 30 September 2014, www.reuters.com.

248 “Maritime Security: Quo Vadis?” seminar, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 23 May 2016.

249 For an authoritative reference on maritime security issues, see Alexander and Richardson, including for the roles and missions

of the US military services and civilian government agencies, 197-356.

250 “18 bahhara min mina’ay Zammuri wa-Ayn Timushant amam al-qada’” [18 Sailors from the Two Ports of Zemmouri and Aïn

Témouchent in Court], Akhir Saa (Algiers), 5 June 2011, www.akhersaa-dz.com.

251 M. Radwan, “Bahhara yanqulun irhabiyyin fi qawarib sayd” [Sailors Transport Terrorists in Fishing Boats], Akhbar al-Yawm

(Algiers), 13 June 2012, www.akhbarelyoum.dz.

252 Mustafa Shahin, “Al-Zaman tarsud mafiya tuharrib al-silah abr al-bahr” [Al-Zaman Follows the Maf ia Smuggling Weapons by

Sea], Al-Zaman (Cairo), 18 January 2017, www.elzmannews.com/mt~51033.

253 Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, and David S. Ortiz, Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability,

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 39-68.

254 Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Joint Sea Patrols Likely After Suspected Abu Sayyaf Kidnappings,” The Straits Times (Singapore), 22

April 2016, www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/joint-sea-patrols-likely-after-suspected-abu-sayyaf-kidnappings, and Yeo Sam Jo,

“Nations Team Up against Terrorism at Sea,” The Straits Times, 9 May 2016, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/nations-team-upagainst-terrorism-at-sea.

255 Christopher P. Cavas, “CNO Greenert Reconnects with Egyptian Navy,” Defense News (Springfield, VA), 12 July 2015,

www.defensenews.com.

256 Kathryn Whittenberger, “Naval Special Warfare Assists In Building Kenyan Special Boat Unit,” Naval Special Warfare Group

4 Public Affairs, 10 June 2010, www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=53967, Oscar Nkala, “Kenya Gets US Funds for Counterterror War,” Defense News, 6 August 2015, https://www.google.com/search?q=nkala+kenya+gets+us+funds&hl=en&gbv=

2&oq=nkala+kenya+gets+us+funds&gs_l=heirloom-serp.3..30i10.1601648.1608305.0.1608653.25.16.0.5.0.2.340.3094.2j5j6j2.

15.0....0...1ac.1.34.heirloom-serp..17.8.1460.9_QXqgoj7GA, and “Tawqi mudhakkirat tafahum bayn Libiya wa’l-Ittihad al-Urubbi

li-tadrib quwwat khafar al-sawahil” [Memorandum of Understanding between Libya and the European Union to Train the Coast

Guard], Ayn Libiya (Tripoli), 23 August 2016, www.eanlibya.com/archives/92638.

257 Joseph Trevithick, “This Small Airstrip Is the Future of America’s Way of War,” Reuters, 5 January 2016, http://blogs.reuters.com/

great-debate/2016/01/05/this-small-airstrip-is-the-future-of-americas-way-of-war, (hereafter Trevithick, “This Small Airstrip”),

Nick Turse, “Under the Cover of Humanitarian Aid: The U.S. Military Is All over Africa,” Salon (San Francisco), 21 November 2015,

www.salon.com/2015/11/21/americas_secret_military_bases_in_africa_partner, Tomi Oladipo, “Why Are There So Many Military

Bases in Djibouti?” BBC, 16 June 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33115502, and James Kitfield, “Inside America’s Shadow

War on Terror—and Why It Will Never End,” National Journal (Washington, DC), 15 May 2014, http://go.galegroup.com/ps/

i.do?id=GALE%7CA368477209&v=2.1&u=fairfax_main&it=r&p=PPMI&sw=w&asid=515c0852e5c982a0ce17422fcbe1086d.

(hereafter Kitfield, “Inside America’s Shadow War on Terror”)

258 US Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, “Naval Aviation Forces Now Striking ISIL from Two Theaters as USS Boxer

Harriers Join the Fight,” 16 June 2016, www.cusnc.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/805613/naval-aviation-forces-nowstriking-isil-from-two-theaters-as-uss-boxer-harriers, James K. Sanborn, “Marines Poised for Crisis Response Mission in Yemen,”

Marine Corps Times (Springfield,VA), 20 January 2015, www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/01/20/marine-corpsstands- poised-for-crisis-response-in-yemen/22052069, and Jim Michaels, “U.S. Military Team Deploys to Yemen to Help Rout AlQaeda Militants,” USA Today, 6 May 2016, www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/05/06/united-states-military-team-yemen/

84032856.

Jihadist Maritime Strategy 51
259 Sam J. Tangredi, “Sea Basing: Concept, Issues, and Recommendations,” Naval War College Review, lxiv, 4, Autumn 2011, 28-

41.

260 Kevin J. Kelley, “Pentagon to Boost Its Kenya, Djibouti Military Bases,” The East African (Nairobi), 19 November 2013,

www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Pentagon-to-boost-its-Kenya-Djibouti-military-bases/-/2558/2079606/-/st6lq5z/-/index.html, and

Trevithick, “This Small Airstrip.”

261 “Al-Azhar yudin istihdaf irhabiyyin li-zawraq bahri fi Rafah” [Al-Azhar Condemns the Terrorists’ Attack on the Naval Craft in

Rafah], Al-Misri al-Yawm, 17 July 2015, www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/776367.

262 For a discussion about the balance of these two elements in dealing with insurgencies, see Sebastian L. v. Gorka and David

Kilcullen, “An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference between COIN and Counterinsurgency,” Joint Forces

Quarterly (Washington, DC), 60, 1st Quarter 2011, 14-18.

263 David Larter, “Navy 6th Fleet Ramps Up to Face Russia, ISIS,” Navy Times, 19 October 2015, www.navytimes.com/story/

military/2015/10/19/foggo-russia-mediterranean-security-fleet-isis/74017748, and Seth Cropsey, “Restore the U.S. Sixth Fleet,”

National Review (New York), 2 November 2015, www.nationalreview.com/article/426369/restore-us-sixth-fleet-seth-cropsey.

264 Khalid, “On Targeting the Achilles Heel,” 104.

265 Subhi Jad Allah, “Al-Qaida wa’l-saytara ala madiq Bab al-Mandab: darbat muallim... law tamm al-tanfidh!” [Al-Qaeda and

Control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait: A Master Stroke ... If It Is Carried Out!], Ana Muslim website, 9 February 2010,

www.muslim.org.

266 Ibid.

267 Kitfield, “Inside America’s Shadow War on Terror.”

268Although there are many writings on this topic, particularly insightful overviews are those by Milan Vego, “On Littoral Warfare,”

Naval War College Review, lxviii, 2, Spring 2015, 30-68, and Robert C. Rubel, “Capital Ships, the Littoral, Command of the Sea,

and the World Order,” Naval War College Review, xlviii, 4, Autumn 2015, 46-62.

52 Norman Cigar
Norman Cigar is a Research Fellow at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia,

from which he retired as Director of Regional Studies and the Minerva Research Chair. He

is also a Research Fellow at the Potomac Insitute for Policy Studies. Previously, he was on

the staff of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and of the Marine Corps School

of Advanced Warfighting, where he taught military theory, strategy and policy, military case

studies, and regional studies. In an earlier assignment, he was Director of the Army’s

Psychological Operations Strategic Studies Detachment responsible for the Middle East

and Africa at Fort Bragg. He also spent seven years in the Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief

of Staff for Intelligence as the Army’s senior political-military intelligence analyst in the

Pentagon responsible for the Middle East, and supported the Secretary of the Army, the

Chief of Staff of the Army, and Congress with intelligence, and represented the Army on

national-level intelligence issues in the interagency intelligence community. During the Gulf

War, he was the Army’s senior political-military intelligence staff officer on the Desert

Shield/Desert Storm Task Force.

He is the author of numerous works on politics and security issues dealing with the Middle

East and the Balkans, and has been a consultant at the International Criminal Tribunal for

the former Yugoslavia at the Hague. He has also taught at the Defense Intelligence College

and was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, George Mason

University.

Among his writings are Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons: How Do Countries Think about

the Bomb?; Iraq’s Shia Warlords and Their Militias; Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the

Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq's Unstable Triangle; and Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine

for Insurgency.

Dr. Cigar holds a DPhil from Oxford (St Antony’s College) in Middle East History and

Arabic; an M.I.A. from the School of International and Public Affairs and a Certificate from

the Middle East Institute, Columbia University; and an M.S. in Strategic Intelligence from the

Defense Intelligence College. He has studied and traveled widely in the Middle East.

About the Author

This study is dedicated to the late CDR Bruce Watson, USN, PhD, mariner, consummate

expert on the Soviet Navy, mentor, and friend.

Dedication
Middle East Studies

at the Marine Corps University

Although jihadist military strategy has been the subject of considerable analysis and writing over

the years, it has been the land-based aspect that has drawn the most attention while the jihadists’

maritime strategy has been relatively neglected. This monograph begins to address that gap.

Maritime operations constitute a significant element of the threat that jihadist movements pose—

principally from al-Qaeda and, since 2014, from the self-identified Islamic State (also referred to

as ISIS or ISIL). To deal effectively with this challenge, it is necessary to understand how the

jihadists have gradually integrated operations at sea into a broader strategy to accomplish their

strategic and theater goals. The intent of this study is to deepen understanding of the evolution and

application of this strategy and to provide the basis of an approach for US planners and operators

to counter this challenge.

The Jihadist Maritime Strategy

Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea

Norman Cigar

MES Monographs • No. 8 May 2017