MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2018 ME	91

Docket: Pen-18-79

Submitted

On	Briefs: June	27,	2018

Decided: July	5,	2018

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF	AMBER	L.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]	 	 Amber	 L. appeals	 from	 the judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court	

(Bangor, Campbell,	J.)	that	terminated	her	parental	rights	to	her child pursuant	

to	22 M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(A)(1)(a),	(B)(2)(a),	and	(b)(i)-(ii)	(2017).

1		The	mother

contests	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 court’s	 findings	 of	

parental	 unfitness.	 	 She	 further	 challenges	 the	 court’s	 determination	 that	

termination	of	her	parental	rights	is	in	 the	best	interest	of	 the	child,	arguing	

that because the	kinship	placement for	 the	child provides	sufficient	stability,

the	 court	 was	 required	 to	 order	 additional	 time	 for	 her	 to attempt	 to

rehabilitate herself and	 reunify	 with	the	 child.	 	 We	 conclude	 that	 clear	 and	

convincing	evidence	supports	the	court’s finding that	the	mother	is	unfit	as	a

 1		The child’s father	had	his	parental	rights	terminated	after	failing	to	appear	at	the	termination	

hearing.		The	father is	not	a	party	to	this	appeal.
2

parent and	 that	 the	 court	 acted	 within	 its	 discretion	 in	 determining	 that	

termination	is	in	the	child’s	best	interest.		We therefore affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		After	a	two-day	hearing	in	early February of 2018,	the	court	found	

that	the	mother	is	unwilling	or	unable	(1) to protect	 the	child	 from	jeopardy	

and (2) to take	responsibility	for	him and that both	of these circumstances are	

unlikely	to	change in	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the needs of	the	child.		

See 22 M.R.S.	§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).		After	carefully	considering	the	record,	

the	court ultimately determined that	terminating	the	mother’s	parental	rights	

was	in	the	child’s	best	interest.		See	22 M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(a).		To	support

its findings	of parental	unfitness	and its best	interest determination,	the	court	

made	the	following	factual	findings	based	upon	clear	and	convincing	evidence	

in	the	record:

In	 this	 case, custody	 of	 [the	 child]	 was	 properly	 removed	

from	the	parents	and	granted	to	DHHS	on	October	21,	2016.

.	.	.	.	

.	.	.	Mother	clearly	loves	[the	child]	very	much,	and	she	has	a	

bond	with	him.		Mother	has	also	made	progress	in	some	areas,	for	

which	she	deserves	credit. For	example, mother	has	consistently	

engaged	in	 supervised	 visits	with	 [the	 child],	 and	 the	 visits	 have	

generally	gone	very	well.		Mother	also	regularly	attends	 [a	clinic]	

for	 replacement	 therapy,	 and	 she	 has	 not	 used	 opiates.	 .	 .	 .	

Unfortunately,	however,	despite	the	progress	mother	has	made	in	
3

some	 aspects	 of	 this	 case,	 many	 of	 the	 very	 serious	 jeopardy	

concerns	remain.

.	.	.	.	

.	 .	 .	 Throughout	 the	 case,	 DHHS	 has	 attempted	 to	 assist	

mother	 with	 her	 substance	 abuse	 and	 mental	 health	 issues.		

Despite	 this,	 mother	 has	 continued	 to	 self-medicate	 with	

marijuana,	and	she	has	been	very	inconsistent	in	her	mental	health	

therapy.		Mother	has	also	continued	 to	make	 very	impulsive	and	

irresponsible	decisions,	and	she	continues	to	maintain	contact	with	

unsafe	people.

.	.	.	Mother	[has]	long-standing	problems	with	a	cannabis	use	

disorder,	 personality	 disorder	 .	 .	 .	 ,	 and	 complex	 post-traumatic	

stress	disorder.	.	.	.	Mother	has [a] limited	ability	to	self-correct	and	

learn	 from	 the	 consequences	 of	 her	 behavior	 and	 acting	 out.	

According	 to	 [the	 court-ordered psychologist],	 without	

appropriate	treatment,	mother’s	ability	to	safely	parent	as	well	as	

reunify	with	her	children	is	guarded.		[The	psychologist]	believes	

that	 mother’s	 mental	 health	 diagnoses	 tend	 to	 be	 resistant	 to	

change	 and	 historically	 require	 long-term	 and	 committed	

involvement	in	treatment.		Mother’s	prognosis	is	further	guarded	

because	of	her	tendency	to	self-medicate	with	marijuana.

.	.	.	.

Although	 the	 [termination	 petition]	had	already	been	 filed,	

mother	did	not	follow	through	with	her	therapy	[provider].		Rather	

than	 seeing	 her	 [therapist]	 twice	 a	 week,	 mother	 met	 with	 [her	

therapist	 twice between	 August	 and	 November	 of	 2017].	 .	 .	 .		

Although	 [her	 therapist]	 reports	 that	mother	 has	made	 progress	

since	 November	 3rd,	 mother	 still	 does	 not	 regularly	 attend	 her	

appointments.	 .	 .	 .	 Mother	 has	 only	 attended	 her	 [dialectical	

behavioral therapy]	 groups	 three	 times,	 twice	 in	 December	 and	

once	in	 January.		Mother	attended	individual	 therapy	 twice,	once	

on	December	11,	2017, and	once	on	January	29,	2018.
4

Mother’s	 level	 of	 commitment	 is	 unacceptable.	 	 [Her	

therapist]	 testified	 that	 mother	 still	 has	 a	 lot	 of	 work	 to	 do.		

According	 to	 [her	 therapist],	 mother’s	 [dialectical	 behavioral

therapy]	will	take	a	year	from	November	3,	2017.		(This	assumes	

that	mother	will	be	fully	committed	to	her	therapy,	which,	at	this	

point,	has	not	been	the	case.)		[Her	therapist]	believes	that	mother’s	

individual	therapy will	take	longer. .	.	.

The	 court	 is	 very	 concerned	 about	 mother’s	 continuing	

pattern	of	engaging	in	unsafe	relationships	with	[the	father	of	her	

other	children]	and	her	former	fiancé. .	.	.	Mother	has	had	numerous	

and	 consistent	 police	 contacts	 resulting	 from	 family	 fights,	

threatening	 behavior,	 protection	 order	 violations,	 mental	 health	

crises,	and	other	incidents	involving	[her	former	partners].		Rather	

than	 demonstrating	 stability	 through	 her	 behavior,	 mother	 has	

consistently	been	unstable in	her relationships	and	behavior.

.	.	.	.	

.	 .	 .	 Mother	 clearly	 has	 a	 long-standing	 substance	 abuse	

problem.		She	has	continued	to	use	marijuana	throughout	the	time	

that	 this	 case	 has	 been	 pending.	 	 This	 is	 not	 a	 situation	 where	

mother	smokes	occasionally	to	relieve	anxiety.		According	to	[the	

psychologist	in	this	case],	this	is	a	situation	where	mother	abuses	

her	 methadone	 and	 marijuana	 to	 get	 intoxicated	 as	 a	 way	 of	

self-medicating. .	.	.

.	.	.	.	

.	.	. [The	child] has	special	needs,	and	he	requires	a	high	level	

of	care.		He	needs	a	safe	and	stable	home.		It	is	very	important	that	

he	receive	permanency	as	soon	as	possible.		Unfortunately,	mother	

is	unable	to	provide	permanency	for	[the	child].
5

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶3]		“We	review	the	trial	court’s	factual	findings	that	a	parent	is	unfit	and	

that	termination	of	parental	rights	is	in	the	child’s	best	interest	for	clear	error	

and	 the	 ultimate	 decision	 to	 terminate	 parental	 rights	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	

discretion.”		In	re	Child	of	Kelcie	L.,	2018	ME	57,	¶	3,	--- A.3d	---.

A. Parental	Unfitness

[¶4]		We	will	reverse	a	finding	on	parental	unfitness	“only	if	there	is	no	

competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 to	 support	 it,	 if	 the	 fact-finder clearly	

misapprehends	the	meaning	of	the	evidence,	or	if	the	finding	is	so	contrary	to	

the	credible	evidence	that	it	does	not	represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.”		

In	re	Cameron	B.,	2017	ME	18,	¶	10,	154	A.3d	1199 (quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶5]	 	 The	 mother	 does	 not	 dispute the	 finding	 that	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	

hearing, roughly	fifteen months	after	the	child	was	removed	from	her	custody,	

she could	not provide	the	child	with	permanency.		Instead,	she	asserts	that	the

circumstances causing her	 parenting	 deficits	 are	 likely	 to	 change	 in	 a	

reasonable	 time.	 “Although	 the	 [mother]	contends	 that	 [she]	made	progress	

towards	 rehabilitation,	 the	 evidence	 was	 sufficient	 to	 support	 the	 court’s	

finding,	 by	 clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 of	 at	 least	 one	 ground	 of	 [her]	

parental	 unfitness.”	 	 In	 re	 Child	 of	 Kelcie L.,	 2018	 ME	 57,	 ¶ 5,	 --- A.3d	 ---.		
6

Competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record,	 particularly	 the	testimony	 of	 the	 mental	

health	 professionals, fully supported	 the	 court’s findings that the mother’s	

parenting	deficits pose	jeopardy	to	the	child	and are not	likely	to be resolved

absent	intensive,	long-term	mental	health	treatment.		See	id.;	In	re	Mathew	H.,	

2017	ME	151,	¶ 5,	167	A.3d 561.		The	court,	as	a	result, did	not	clearly	err	by

finding	 that	 mother’s	 circumstances	 are	 unlikely	 to	 change	 within	 a	 time	

reasonably	calculated to	meet	the	child’s	needs.

B. Best	Interest	of	the	Child

[¶6]		Although	the	court	granted	the	mother’s two motions	to	continue

the	 termination	hearing over	objections	by	 the	State, the	mother argues that

the	 child	 protection	 statute’s prioritization	 of “family	 rehabilitation	 and	

reunification,”	22	M.R.S.	§ 4003(3)	(2017),	and the absence	of record evidence

suggesting that	 prolonging the kinship	 placement would	 harm	 the	 child,

required the	court	to	provide her with	additional	time	to attempt	to rehabilitate	

herself	and	reunify	with	the	child, see 22	M.R.S.	§ 4055(2)	(2017).		The	mother	

further	argues	that	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	“overstates	
7

the	 concept	 of	 permanency” in	 defending	 the	 court’s	 termination	 of	 her	

parental	rights.

[¶7]	 	Among the	 general	 purposes	 for	 the	 child	 protection	 statute,	 the	

Legislature has	 given	 priority	 to “family rehabilitation	 and	 reunification.”

22 M.R.S.	§	4003(3).		The	Legislature,	however, has	qualified	that general intent	

with	the	competing	goal	to	“prevent	needless	delay”	in	achieving	permanency	

for	the	child.		Id.		In	the	statutory	provisions	setting	out	the specific purposes of

terminating	parental	rights,	the	Legislature	has	further	emphasized	its	intent	

to	“[e]liminate	the	need	for	children	to	wait	unreasonable	periods	of	time	for	

their	parents	to	correct	the	conditions	which	prevent	their	return	to	the	family.”	

See	 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4050(2) (2017).	 	 Although we	 have recognized that

“[p]ermanency	is	 a	 dynamic	 concept	 that	must	 be	 fashioned	 from	 the actual	

circumstances	and	needs	of	the	child,”		In re	Child	of	Kelcie	L.,	2018	ME	57,	¶ 7,	

--- A.3d	 --- (quotation	 marks	 omitted), “[i]nstability	 is	 antithetical	 to	

permanence.”		In re Marcus S.,	2007 ME 24,	¶ 11,	916	A.2d	225.

[¶8]		The	court’s	best	interest	analysis	relied	on competent	evidence	of	

the	“mother’s	pattern	of	instability,	her	erratic	behavior,	and	her	continuing	to	

maintain	relationships	with	unsafe	people,”	as	well	as competent	evidence	of

her	“long-standing	 substance	 abuse	 problem”	 and	 “significant	 mental	 health	
8

issues	 that	 will	 take	 an	 extended	 period	 of time	 to	 treat.” Contrary	 to	 the	

mother’s	 contention, the	 court	 was	 not	 required	 to	 base	 its	 best	 interest	

determination	on	evidence	of	harm	to	the	child	resulting	from	additional	time	

for	 the	 mother	 to	 further attempt	 rehabilitation and	 reunification	 with	 the	

child.		Pursuant	to	the	Legislature’s	mandate,	the	court	deemed in	this	case	that	

further delay	of permanency is contrary	 to the	 child’s	best	interest,	 existing	

attachments,	 and	 physical	 and	 emotional	 needs.	 	 See 22 M.R.S.	 § 4055(2);

In re Cameron	B.,	2017	ME	18,	¶ 13,	154	A.3d	1199;	In re	Dakota	K., 2016	ME 30,	

¶¶ 8-10,	 133	 A.3d	 257.	 	 The	 court’s	 findings	 are	 supported	 by	 competent	

evidence	 in	 the	 record;	 the	 court’s	 determination	 that	 termination	 of	 the	

mother’s	 parental	 rights	was	in	 the	 child’s	 best	interest	was	well	within	 the	

court’s	discretion.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Erik	T.	Crocker,	Esq.,	Farrell,	Rosenblatt	&	Russell,	Bangor,	for	appellant	mother

Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of	

the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human	

Services

Bangor	District	Court	docket	number	PC-2016-80

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY