The Modern Volunteer Army Progr

The Benning Experiment, 1970-19

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY 

THE MODERN VOLUNTEE

ARMY PROGRAM: 

THE BENNING EXPERIMENT

1970-1972 

by 

Brigadier General Willard Latham 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 2010 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-600334 

First Printed 1974-CMH Pub 90-2 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 

U.S . Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
py yg y 

in mid-1973 placed the United States Army on a volunteer footing 

the first time since 1948. In preparation for this challenge, the Arm

had initiated the Modern Volunteer Army Program two and a half ye

earlier to attract and increase the enlistment of able men and wom

raise the quality of Army life, and improve professionalism througho

the rank and file. An important part of the program was Project VOLA

a field experiment conducted at selected Army installations from 19

to 1972 to develop methods and procedures for achieving the program

objectives. The methods and procedures that survived this extens

testing and critical evaluation are now being applied Army-wide w

significant benefit as the Army makes its transition to a volunteer for

In the continuing task of maintaining and improving a thorough

professional, highly motivated volunteer force, the Army stands to pro

from knowledge of the VOLAR experiment, its failures as well as 

successes. To record the experience, the Army has prepared a series 

monographs, each an objective and comprehensive account of a partic

lar phase of the experiment, and each prepared by a senior officer w

played an important VOLAR role. These studies should contribute to t

historical record of the Army and provide the American public with 

performance report on an institution it has so long and so well supporte

Brigadier General Willard Latham is eminently qualified to wr

the account of the VOLAR service school experiment at Fort Bennin

Georgia. Stationed there from 1 January 1971 to 30 June 1972, he fi

commanded the 197th Infantry Brigade, and later served as Chief 

Staff and Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Infantry Center. Und

his command, the 197th Infantry Brigade carried out an intensive p

sonnel procurement program with such success that it became the fi

Regular Army brigade in recent history to be fully manned by voluntee

In earlier assignments, General Latham during the Korean War serv

as a platoon leader in the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Di

sion. He also has been a company commander in the 31st Infan

Division and 2d Armored Division, and has commanded battalions 

the Berlin Brigade, the 1 st Infantry Division, and the 9th Infantry Di

sion in Vietnam. At present, General Latham is the Assistant Divisi

Commander of the 3d Infantry Division in Germany. 

Washington, D.C. 20 December 1973 

Ul 

VERNE L. BOWER

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant Gene

y y y pp

in Project VOLAR, the field experiment undertaken at selected A

posts between January 1, 1971, and June 30, 1972, to develop, 

evaluate, and refine new concepts and initiatives in support of Mo

Volunteer Army (MV A) Program goals of reduced reliance upon 

draft, increased professionalism, enhancement of Army life, and 

development of a modern personnel accession system. 

Unfortunately, the experiment to create an environment condu

to raising a volunteer Army was misunderstood; in the minds of m

the term "VOLAR" conjured up images of undisciplined, unkempt, l

haired soldiers riding motorcycles emblazoned with peace symbols 

swilling beer in the barracks. Obviously these images did not mirro

MVA concept, which stresses the maintenance of military order, 

cipline, and mission capability. Neither did they typify the Infantry Ce

experience at Fort Benning, where VOLAR became a vehicle for prog

measured in terms of significant improvements in troop morale 

discipline and military bearing and appearance and also in terms of 

recruiting and re-enlistment goals that were repeatedly exceeded. 

The principal elements in the Fort Benning Plan for conducting 

VOLAR experiment were improvements in living and working 

ditions and increased job satisfaction on the part of the indivi

soldier. An evaluation process that used the services of the Human 

sources Research Organization provided continuous monitoring of 

actual implementation of the Benning Plan and served as a vital con

mechanism. Scientifically conducted objective surveys of troop attit

and reactions were fundamental in determining whether or not the 

was on target, what was succeeding and what was not, and what 

soldiers, NCO's, and officers thought about each part of the prog

The VOLAR experiment brought a number of significant cha

to Fort Benning. Over 70 percent of first-term re-enlistees stated 

the experiment had influenced them to stay in the Army. The ratin

Fort Benning by first-term soldiers as "one of the best Army posts

which they had ever been assigned increased by 21 percent. Soldier

enlisting for their current duty assignments increased from 55.7 per

to 72.2 percent. Absent without leave rates dropped from twenty

to fourteen per thousand. Furthermore, over 3,100 young men w

v 
gy 

on these pages. 

Washington, D.C. 

VI 

WILLARD LATHAM 

Brigadier General, U .S. 
I. ANTICIPATING THE NEED 

Project Volunteer . . . . . 

Project PROVIDE . . . . 

Special AssistantJor the Modern Volunteer Army 

II. DEVELOPING THE REQUIREMENT 

The Scene . .. . . 

Control and Evaluation 

Target Areas . . . . 

The Measure oj Success 

Evaluation Techniques . 

Initial Changes . . . . 

SAMV A and the Benning Plan 

III. EXECUTION 

Overcoming Obstacles . 

Publicity. . . . . . 

Personal D~velopment . 

197th InJantry Brigade 

Mechanical Problems. 

Change Is Progress . . 

Improved Medical Care 

Two Dilemmas . . . 

Settling Down 

IV. EXPANSION AND REVISION 

Educational Projects . . . . . 

Modern Educational Techniques . 

Working Conditions . . . . 

Fiscal rear 72 Benning Plan 

Unit-oj-Choice Recruiting . . 

Civic Adventures. . . . . . 

Fiscal rear 73 Benning Plan 

vii 
Effect on Discipline 

Results oj Analysis 

Interpreting the Results 

Specific Findings . . 

General Conclusions 

Delayed Successes . 

VI. THE OVERVIEW 

Verification oj Success . 

Lessons Learned . . 

Views oj the Future 

Appendixes 

A. PRQPOSED ACTIONS OF BENNING PLAN, NO

VEMBER 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 

1. Actions jor Which Immediate Implementation Has Been 

Directed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. Actions Considered jor Implementation in Immediate 

Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Actions Which Require Further Study, Additional Personnel, or Relief From Restrictions . . . . . 

4. Actions Requiring Additional Resources . . . . . 

B. KEY EVENTS OF PROJECT VOLAR, 1970-1972 

C. ORGANIZATION AND MANNING . . . . . . . 

1. Principal Command and Staff During the M V A Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. The Injantry Center ... . . . . . . . . . 

D. A CONUS COMMAND IN THE SEVENTIES . 

General 

The Challenge . 

The Problem 

Corrective Action 

Subordinate Units . 

The Staff . . . . 

Control: Organization and Evaluation 

Areas oj Special Emphasis. . . . . 

Results. . . . . . . . . . . . 

Creating a Successful Command Environment. 

Vlll 
3. MVA Control Group Organization 

4. Career Intentions as Measure of Effect of Benning Plan . 

5. Expressed Career Intentions (Baseline) 

6. Funding: Fiscal Year 1972 . . . . . . . 

7. 197th Infantry Brigade Recruiting Cycle. 

8. Expressed Career Intentions (Final) . . . 

9. Expressed Career Intentions: First-Term Enlisted 

10. Re-enlistmen ts: First-Term Enlisted Men . . . . 

11 . Re-enlisting and Separating Interviews. . . . . 

12. Re-enlistments: Present Duty Assignment Option 

13. First-Term Enlisted Ratings of Fort Benning 

14. The MVA Cycle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

III ustra tions 

Conversation Between Richard M. Nixon and Melvin R . 

Laird Led to MV A Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . 

General William C. Westmoreland Addresses AUSA. . . 

Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe Visits Fort Benning 

" Watch Out for the Distinct Brand" . . . . . 

Major General Orwin C. Talbott Gathers Ideas 

"It'll Never Work". . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Information Program Presents Facts About VOLAR 

VOLAR Is Advertised in a Variety of Ways . . 

Adventure Training Supports VOLAR Concept 

Benning Plan Directs Attention to Drug Problem 

Benning House Provides Group Therapy 

Seminars Support Race Relations Program 

"But Where Are the Cokes and Burgers?" . 

MV A Mess Hall Accommodates the Soldier 

Civilian KP Reduces Soldiers' Menial Chores 

Semiprivate Rooms Approach College Living Conditions. 

PX Hours Are Extended . . . . 

Fabric Shop Provides New Service . . . 

PX Keeps Pace With Life-Styles . . . . 

". . . And He Will Make House Calls" 

NCO Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Credibility Gap . . . . . . . . . . . 

Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator 

USAIS Learning Center . . . . . . . . . 

IX 
"Very Good" . . . . . . . . . 

Benning Mall Under Construction 

Artist Concept of Benning Mall . . 

Illustrations are from Department of the Army files. Cartoons a

Charlotte Londot. 

x 
THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY 

PROGRAM: THE BENNING 

EXPERIMENT. 1970-1972 

pg 

The Volunteer Anny program (VOLAR) of the Modern Volunte

Anny (MV A) concept was an experiment to reach the stated nation

goal of a zero draft. VOLAR and MVA are two acronyms that a

surrounded by misconceptions and arouse often-heated pros and co

from service personnel. Some like the concepts; others think they ha

damaged the military. Many do not agree with a volunteer force at a

while others believe the concepts were either too slow or too fast 

appearing. 

To gain an understanding of why VOLAR was conceived and ho

it was applied at Fort Benning, Georgia, certain events and actions 

higher headquarters that contributed to the initiation of Project VOLA

must be made known. As early as September 1967 the Anny stated 

DA Pamphlet 600-12 that its goal was "to rely on volunteers to me

the Anny's needs insofar as possible . ." and "to induce hig

caliber personnel, in sufficient numbers to voluntarily pursue the milita

profession as a career. ." In the context of the times, the stat

ment was idealistic and unrealistic; but the thought was there and 

would not die out. Although movement was initially slow, the goal ha

been set. 

Project Volunteer 

Slightly over one year later, on 15 November 1968, the Defen

Department inaugurated a study to develop "a comprehensive and ba

anced program designed to meet anticipated future quantitative an

qualitative military manpower requirements, to the greatest extent po

sible, without reliance upon induction." The Assistant Secretary of D

fense directed that particular emphasis be placed on policies an

programs that were concerned with the procurement of initial volun

teers; and that personnel management practices and procedures an

military working conditions be reviewed "to identify those factors whic

may adversely affe·ct recruitment and retention, and which are capab

of management improvement without adverse impact on military effe

tiveness." Retention of personnel was already receiving close attentio

by a number of other studies at the time. The policies and program

devised by the study group were to consider both the qualitative an
assumptions that proposed programs would go into effect after a V

wind-down, that the Selective Service System would be retained 

used, and that policies and programs developed would not be 

by existing statutory authorities. It recognized that no single in

or approach would accomplish the objective of sharply reducing r

upon the draft, but that any successful plan would necessarily 

a wide range of policy and program improvements. These improv

and innovations would affect each of the five areas of personne

agement: procurement, distribution, training and education, s

ment, and separation. Areas covered in the Project Volunteer 

included recruiting service operations, recruitment options and ince

military compensation, improvement in other service benefits and 

conditions, and programs to improve morale and job satisfactio

VOLAR concept for personnel retention evolved primarily wit

programs to improve morale and job satisfaction. 

Project PROVIDE 

Shortly after his inauguration in January 1969, President Rich

Nixon requested Department of Defense action on an all-volunteer 

force. The President also fonned the Advisory Commission on 

Volunteer Force (Gates Commission) to develop a comprehensiv

for eliminating the draft. 

A direct outgrowth from both Project Volunteer and the Pre

all-volunteer anned forces initiatives was the Anny's Project Vo

in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE) study, initiated on 17 

1969. The purpose of the study was to "determine how the An

meet its manpower requirements under alternate force levels an

ditions short of total war by means of an all-volunteer Army." 

topics included personnel management, quality, quantity, cost, and 

economic implications. Presumably, any plan of action developed 

study would be implemented when major redeployments from V

started. The PROVIDE study was to assume that there woul

continued threat of limited conflict after Vietnam and that the S

Service System would be retained but not used except in emerg

Various levels of assumed unemployment rates were also to be cons

For any studies on an all-volunteer Anny to be valid, the plann

to have an idea of how the American public viewed the Army. A

ingly, in June 1969, an opinion survey on the Anny's image wa

available to the PROVIDE group. Significantly, the survey o

before the My Lai incident and several other events that infl
NIXON-LAIRD CONVERSATION LED TO MVA CONCEPT 

public opinion against the Anny. In 1969 the over-all attitude tow

the anned services was favorable. The general public tended to r

Anny service as less attractive than Air Force or Navy service. The stu

revealed that civilians believed the Anny helped develop charac

gave "a sense of satisfaction in perfonning a patriotic duty," and p

vided a chance to learn a trade for civilian life. As a career, the Anny w

not highly rated, especially for enlisted personnel, mainly because of l

salaries, lack of opportunity, and the war in Vietnam. The survey 

dicated that better pay and a period of peace were the two main 

provements that would make an Anny career more attractive in relat

to a civilian job. At the time, the Vietnam conflict did not adversely 

fluence the public's opinions of the Anny. The survey also reported t

the existing draft system was unpopular and that the public prefer

either a lottery system or an all-volunteer Anny. Not only did the sur

support the view that the public wanted an all-volunteer Anny, bu

stated that such an Anny could become a reality, if service life were m

more attractive. 

Continued high-level interest in attaining an all-volunteer Anny w

evidenced throughout 1969 by a number of briefings presented by stu

groups, agencies, and commissions on the status of their projects. 

June 1969, Department of Defense officials briefed the Presiden
highlight some of the problems peculiar to the Army in the contex

all volunteer force." The briefings concerned Army organization, t

of reserve forces, and differences between the Army and other se

The differences stressed were in the areas of manpower require

procurement, draftees, officer sources, individual training, distrib

uniformed women, sustainment, and retention. 

In August 1969, General William C. Westmoreland, Army C

Staff, was briefed on the PROVIDE study. General Westmorela

proved the concept in principle, but cautioned that cost and other 

aspects had to be studied in detail. The Army position on support

all-volunteer service was approved, as were recommendations tha

apparatus be retained to provide a means of meeting sudden in

in manpower requirements due to emergencies. The transition to 

volunteer force was envisioned as a three-phase movement. Firs

grams and policies to reduce reliance upon the draft that required 

additional direct costs nor new legislation would be developed and 

mented. The next step would be to initiate policies and programs o

existing budgetary and legislative constraints that were considered 

tial to rapid advancement toward an all-volunteer Army. The thi

final phase would be to re-examine and re-evaluate actions that h

been implemented because of legislative and monetary restrictions, 

the first two phases fail to provide the quality and quantity of volu

required. The PROVIDE study was not immediately released, a

eral Westmoreland wanted recommendations on reserve forces 

included. At the same time he directed that the Army Staff and 

priate commands examine the study in great detail and develop pro

to implement the concepts and aspects in the study. These program

to remain within the Army's current capability and were to conce

on improving morale and welfare. The Chief of Staff also stated th

Army should develop a positive public relations image concerning 

volunteer force. 

That the PROVIDE study was getting down to specific details 

trated by a briefing received by General Westmoreland in October 

at which a number of recommended actions that required funds 

legislation were presented. These proposals included increasing the b

of the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) b

million, authorizing reserve components $10 million in advertising 

and civilianizing the mess attendant program, at an estimated 

$136.7 million. The possible use of civilians to perform KP du

indicative of the constant expansion of the volunteer Army co
task force to plan, coordinate, and implement recommendations o

PROVIDE study. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel assu

responsibility for the task group. No completion date was establishe

Task Group PROVIDE, but it was directed to fulfill its objectiv

rapidly as plans were developed and approved. 

President Nixon's message to the Congress on 23 April 1970, 

lining actions and proposals toward ending the draft, once again 

firmed his decision to develop an all-volunteer Army. As stated by 

President, "the objective of this Administration is to reduce draft ca

zero, subject to the overriding considerations for national security.

further this objective, he stressed the need for pay increases for all ra

especially for enlisted members with less than two years of service. H

priority was also to be given to the development of programs and ac

to increase enlistments and retention rates in the services. Service 

had to be improved by a combination of pay increases and enha

benefits; neither could do the job alone. As a first step toward an 

volunteer armed force, President Nixon directed his attention tow

draft reform by eliminating most deferments and by proposing a lo

system to select men for service. 

Task Group PROVIDE forwarded the first proposals to incr

career attractiveness in July 1970. The task group forwarded action

they were developed, rather than inundating the Department of the A

Staff with a large number at one time. In all, some 228 actions were 

posed. The list was compiled from study reports from the Gates Com

sion and Project Volunteer among others. The proposals concerned 

subjects as eliminating reveille, adopting a five-day work and trai

week, eliminating the requirement to sign in and sign out when 

ordinary pass, and contracting with civilian firms to have KP and p

level custodial services performed by civilian labor. The majority o

proposals could be implemented at little or no cost. As improvemen

tions developed, programs involving policy changes and large amoun

additional funds were proposed. Forty-two of the proposed actions 

been implemented by 8 October 1970, and 154 more were being con

ered. The forty-two accepted proposals were mainly low impact ac

that required little or no additional funds and were not concerned 

statutory legislative changes. Most dealt with improving USAREC 

icies, procedures, and practices to increase the effectiveness of procu

volunteers. At this point, few bold changes had been carried out, and 

soldiers were aware that actions had been taken, since they did not 

the effects of the changes. 
y (

) p

problems that faced the Army as it moved toward a zero draft. H

that enlistments and re-enlistments had to be doubled or tripled. He 

that the Reserve Components were going to become increasing

portant as the active forces decreased in size. Efforts had to be m

increase the number of volunteers in the Army Reserve and Na

Guard as the prime enlistment motivation, the draft, was removed

eral Westmoreland cautioned that how the Army managed the tran

to a smaller force would playa large role in attracting future volu

If it appeared that the Army was indiscriminately releasing men wh

established a professional commitment and ability, the credibility 

Army as a secure career would be greatly weakened. At the same tim

noted, opportunities for advancement had to be maintained to a

and retain young talent. General Westmoreland outlined four area

required a concerted effort in order to achieve an all-volunteer 

He charged the officers in positions of high responsibility to ge

command emphasis to the task through their own vigor, imaginatio

dedication. Second, he pointed out that unnecessary irritants and 

tractive features of Army life had to be eliminated, while at the sam

professionalism had to be maintained and increased. The third ar

pended on Congress: the need for money. Funds were needed for pa

housing and for actions to increase service attractiveness. The fourt

concerned the support of the American people, both by opinion a

willingness to pay for the type of Army required. General Westmo

committed the Army to the achievement of the first two objective

stated that it would emphasize its educational opportunities and in

the size and quality of its recruiting effort. He concluded by ch

officers throughout the Army, at all levels, "with the responsibility 

creasing the retention of good people, both by improving the living 

ards of their men and families and by an intensive effort to capital

the many attractive features of Army service." 

A little over two weeks later, 28 October 1970, General West

land established the position of Special Assistant for the Modem 

unteer Army (SAMV A) and appointed Lieutenant General Geo

Forsythe to fill it. The mission given ' General Forsythe was to d

and manage the Modem Volunteer Army program. The MV A pr

was to achieve the following goals: 

(1) Establish conditions which contribute to increasing the effecti

of the Army as a fighting force while concurrently reducing as rap

possible prime reliance on the draft as a means for producing forces 

active Army and its reserve components. (2) Raise to the maximum 
GENERAL WESTMORELAND ADDRESSES AU SA 

possible the number and quality of enlistments and reenlistments in 

the active Army and the reserve components. (3) Assist in increasing se

attractiveness and career motivation for both officer and enlisted person

( 4) Make provisions for a standby draft law to meet national emergen

General Forsythe was given both the authority commensurate to 

mission and the direct liaison and communications channels necessar

accomplish his duties. Besides serving as the Special Assistant for 

Chief of Staff, General Forsythe acted as the co-ordinator of M

matters for the Secretary of the Army. 
Anny. The basic premise that sufficient numbers would volunte

Army service when the service afforded opportunities equal to or 

than civilian life had been developed and accepted at high policy-m

levels. The Nixon administration and Congress had responded 

creasing military salaries. The Anny now had to improve its attractiv

internally. 
Organizations do not run people. The larger the organization, h

ever, the more difficult becomes the process of self-correction. At so

point people must step outside the organization in order to achiev

major change of course. Ad hoc committees, study groups, and spe

assistants are means for attaining this objectivity. General Forsy

introduced his concept of the four-part Modern Volunteer Army miss

at a seminar at Fort Benning on 2 November 1970. He informed p

headquarters that Fort Benning was designated as one of three p

posts to test VOLAR concepts and as such would take actions desig

to enhance the attractiveness of Army service. He stated that each of 

three posts would develop and implement actions pertinent to its uni

mission (in Fort Benning's case, that of a school center). Any meas

that might improve the service could be tried at any of the three p

and, if successful, would be employed at other installations. 

Proposed actions would be categorized under three types, Gen

Forsythe continued, those that could be carried out within Fort Bennin

resources, those requiring additional funds and resources, and th

necessitating a change or moratorium of existing regulations. The 

period was to start on 1 January 1971 and last six months. Forsy

directed that a plan of action be drawn up by 19 November cover

the test period and suggested that seminars be held at Fort Benning w

representation from a cross section of post personnel as a means of id

tifying and developing proposed actions. 

The Scene 

Major General Orwin C. Talbott, Commanding General, Uni

States Army Infantry Center, initiated a study to develop actions t

would move Fort Benning toward a Modern Volunteer Army by 

proving the attractiveness of the service. In considering possible acti

to be taken, the study group followed General Westmoreland's guida

on the volunteer Army. "Nothing is considered sacrosanct except wh

military order and discipline-the soul of the Army that insures succ

on the battlefield-are jeopardized." The planners could thus undert

their work without being inhibited by tradition or existing regulati
GENERAL FORSYTHE VISITS FORT BENNING 

and procedures, and could scrutinize every facet of Army life to 

mine its relationship to the new concepts. 

Based on General Forsythe's guidelines, the development 

Benning Plan proceeded under the assumption that $5 million wo

provided in additional funds during the six-month test period an

additional military personnel and equipment would be available 

port key actions. Fort Benning would also be authorized to mod

suspend Department of the Army policies and regulations not re

by law which were felt to be unduly restrictive. 

At this time Fort Benning was facing many of the same pr

being encountered by other stateside posts, such as absences withou

(A WOL), racial disturbances, and violations of law and order. A 

example of a unit with these problems was the 197th Infantry B

The primary mission of the 197th was to support the U.S. Arm

fantry Center (USAIC), which included the U.S. Army Infantry 

(USAIS). At the beginning of 1970, the typical soldier from the 

was a sullen, unenthusiastic, and unhappy individual. Morale and 

de corps were low, absences without official leave were excessive 

forty men per thousand), and there was a strong undercurrent of 

tension. Military discipline, as indicated by personal appearance, co
and response to orders, was unsatisfactory. Dissident groups were gaini

popularity. 

The causes of the conditions found among the troops were manifol

Ninety percent of the brigade's soldiers had recently returned from Vie

nam; the great majority of them were "short-timers" having less th

six months left in their Army careers. Many felt that they had clone the

part by going to Vietnam and looked on their present garrison duty an

life as unimportant and a great waste of time. Because of the high pe

centage of short-timers, personnel turbulence aggravated unit integrit

Ur;tit integrity was often destroyed by the constant personnel changes 

the 197th; the ultimate effect in many cases was that squad leaders d

not know the names of their men and vice versa. The nature of much 

the short-timer's work also influenced his feelings about the brigade an

his mission. As a member of a troop unit, he spent over eighty hours 

week doing work that was often considered degrading, such as polici

trash along the roads, opening ammunition boxes for officer candidate

and raking gravel around bleacher sites. Too often the soldier was r

quired to be in position or ready to work several hours before his actu

task started. 

Many of these conditions had been improved over the course of th

year through a vigorous course of action that included emphasis on lea

ership, physical fitness, athletics, social and spiritual activities, and ima

improvement, but the basic causes were still present in early Novemb

1970 when the SAMVA mission came to Fort Benning. To many, th

Army was often viewed as an unnecessarily restrictive, irritating organ

zation that seemed to exist to make life miserable for the individual. Th

attitude was shared by young enlisted soldiers in every unit at Fort Be

ning, as well as by a large percentage of company grade officers. N

only was retention of these soldiers growing increasingly difficult, b

under such conditions, inducing sufficient numbers of high-quality volu

teers would be hard. This, then, was the situation at Fort Benning 
On 3 November 1970, Colonel William B. Steele, Director, Lea

ship Department, was appointed as the United States Army Infa

School (USAIS) project officer for the Volunteer Army program st

That afternoon Colonel Steele briefed personnel selected as member

the planning group staff and study group leaders. The members list

to a tape recording of General Forsythe's seminar and discussed br

storming techniques. Study groups of approximately six men each w

established to represent all categories of personnel assigned to USAIS

cluding faculty and staff, Noncommissioned Officer Course students, 

students in the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. The s

groups began work on 4 November under the direction of study gr

leaders. The groups were assigned specific areas of interest but were 

restricted to them. 

The next day, in close co-ordination with and at the recommenda

of the assistant commandant, Brigadier General John T. Carley, Jr.

USAIS project was assimilated into the larger USAIC program. Gen

Talbott detailed Colonel Steele as the chairman of the Benning 

Study Group with the responsibility of preparing the plan for the en

Fort Benning installation. The plan would "assure maximum suppo

the Army's effort to obtain a modem volunteer Army." Colonel S

and the study group were charged with soliciting ideas from all segm

of the Fort Benning population, selecting the feasible and useful id

and organizing them into projects to be accomplished. All ideas w

to be categorized according to whether or not they could be accompli

without outside assistance. Actions and projects that required finan

support were to be determined and approximate costs estimated. Fin

schedules of actions and realistic completion dates were to be establis

In addition to the previously organized USAIS study group, the s

efforts of other Fort Benning major commands and activities were 

solidated under Colonel Steele's direction. 

The Benning Plan Study Group ccnsisted of a headquarters, tw

substudy groups, and six committees. (Chart 1) The substudy gr

contained two groups from the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOB

and one each from the Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC)

Noncommissioned Officer Course, the USAIS staff and faculty, the 1

Infantry Brigade, the Headquarters Command, the Aviation Comm

the Medical and Dental Command, the 931st Engineer Group, enl

men's wives, and officers' wives. The six committees dealt with an

sis and research, costing, evaluation, writing, the control plan, 

the evaluation plan. Each substudy group was assigned areas of res
GENERAL T ALBOTI GATHERS IDEAS FROM ALL LEVELS OF THE CHAIN 

COMMAND 

sibility (for example, the IOBC groups dealt with treatment of offic

and services and conveniences), but were not restricted solely to the

areas. 

Proposed actions derived from three sources: study groups, su

gestions contributed by individuals, and ideas contained in vario

documents. These documents included memorandums given to Gene

Forsythe by the senior Fort Benning representatives during the semin

reports of the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities to t

Chiefs of Staff Forum, a Franklin Institute Study on junior officer rete

tion, and 300 suggested actions from the Department of the Army. 

The analysis and research committee received the proposals, initiat

appropriate staffing, identified regulations applicable to each propos

action, and determined if any changes of pertinent regulations w

required. Actions which required funding were then forwarded to t

costing committee, while all others went directly to the evaluation co

mittee. The costing committee determined estimated dollar costs of p

posed actions, including civilian personnel costs and military person

requirements. The committee .also prepared detailed funding justificati

The evaluation committee, composed of highly skilled representativ

from the evaluation division of USAIS, the Human Resources Resear
Administration t-----t 

Study 

Groups Writing 

Evaluation Control 

Plan 

Eval

P

Organization, and the Infantry Human Research Unit and the 

tion adviser from USAIS, received proposed actions from the a

and research and the costing committees and determined the fea

and applicability of the actions. Only the head of the study group 

reject any proposed action. 

The writing committee edited all proposed actions and also h

task of writing the actual Benning Plan. The control plan and eva

plan committees were not initially concerned with the proposed a

but developed plans for supervision and evaluation of the actions 

the implementation phase of the Benning Plan. 

Key figures in the study group which formed the Benning Pla

Colonel Steele; Lieutenant Colonels Leon R. Livingston, Don

Shannon, Wilbur J. Thiel, Arnold E. Tyndall, George E. Chap

Jim I. Hunt, Thomas P. Hensler, Louis A. Harris, and Che

Christie; and Majors Bohdan A. Barylak, Kenneth Kaplan, 

Howe, Robert T. Ariyoshi, Gordon M. Hunt, William T. Cargo, H

M. Smith, James I. O'Brien, Donald R. Kelsey, Robert M. H

Donald R. West, Robert E. Ward, III, and John T. Bowden. 

Target Areas 

The substudy groups considered over three hundred possible a

The informal, small group organization proved to be highly succe

creating an atmosphere conducive to the free and uninhibited ex

of ideas. Even though the attitude prevailed that all feasible ide
evaluation committee, the majority of which were concerned with elim

nating irritants of service life that impinged on the dignity, person

freedom, and well-being of the individual. All study groups had a feeli

of urgency about the volunteer Army program in that they felt th

improvements could not wait for further study but needed immedia

implementation. Each proposal was evaluated to see if it met the criter

established by the evaluation committee. To be accepted, a propos

action had to be feasible for implementation at Fort Benning and al

had to enhance the volunteer Army program in a definite manner. 

During the initial stages of the development of the Benning Pla

a philosophy toward the volunteer Army emerged that prevailed throug

out the experiment. The planners expressed this philosophy by attemp

ing to focus on human needs and by classifying these needs in five cat

gories to facilitate identification, qualification, analyses, and subseque

evaluation. These categories were physiological and human maintenanc

stability and security, human relations in organization and family li

self-esteem, and advancement and challenge. By implementing actio

that enhanced these categories, the Army would increase its attractivenes

Under the category of physiological and human maintenance we

such basic human needs as food, clothing, and shelter. These we

translated into specific actions in the Benning Plan, such as improv

ments in billeting arrangements and messing facilities. The category 

stability and security included job security, organizational managemen

and the elimination of irritants such as menial tasks not related to t

job. The matter of human relations in organization and family life h

to do with such factors as the quality of associates, privacy, job oppo

tunity, and family involvement. Self-esteem pertained to human dignit

individual identity, and job esteem. The final category of advanceme

and challenge dealt with such factors as participation in goal-settin

work methodology, and education and training. Within these categorie

146 proposed actions were suggested which made up the original Benni

Plan. (See Appendix A .) 

The final proposed actions were rearranged in four groupings a

cording to cost and regulatory limitations. Forty-three actions supporti

the VOLAR concept and already being implemented were in the fi

group. They were no- or low-cost actions which had been determin

as fulfilling the VOLAR philosophy and were or could be implement

at General Talbott's direction. While the majority did not require a

proval by higher headquarters, the few actions that did need Arm

regulation exceptions were undertaken and carried on as far as possib

pending final approval. 

The second group consisted of forty-nine actions which were bei
y q

pp

included elimination of the need to use the Armed Forces Liber

for overnight passes during a normal duty week, elimination 

check, and elimination of sign-in and sign-out requirements at co

level. 

The third group included actions which the study group felt re

further consideration because of the need for additional perso

relief from restrictions imposed by regulation or both. The twent

actions in this group covered such items as beer in the barrac

of bank-type credit cards in the post exchange (PX) and comm

and expansion of PX inventories to include major appliances, fur

and a full range of sporting goods. 

The final group consisted of thirty actions that could not be fi

within Fort Benning's current money allocations. Most of thes

considered "high impact" projects, or actions that would aff

soldier in a direct and noticeable way. They included free qu

cleaning service for departing families, civilian KP in unit messes, 

labor to perform menial work details, and dental care for m

dependents. 

A standard format was used for each group. Every proposed 

was assigned a number for reference and designated to a specified 

agency for implementation. A rationale for each action was in

along with the suspense date and remarks, when applicable. All 

actions were further broken down by item and explained in de

cluding the problem area addressed by each specific item. This pro

later proved most useful in evaluating the Benning Plan, when 

tions were implemented and conditions improved. In addition to d

the problems, each funded action was justified in terms of the ex

results. Finally, each funded action was given a consolidated co

mary estimate and personnel requirement estimate. The cost su

was broken down by the funding authority (for example, Ope

and Maintenance, Army [OMA], and Military Construction, 

[MCA] and by requirement (such as personnel, equipment, and 

ties). This detail was necessary to present a solid argument to app

headquarters, besides giving them the necessary data on which 

their decisions. In the relationship among human needs, costs, a

jective areas for improvement, each action was designed to mee

need, directed at a target area, and grouped by fund require

(Chart 2) 

The Measure of Success 

The Benning Plan Study Group developed control measur

were used to monitor the implementation and execution of the p
Need Living Working Job Categories Conditions Conditions Satisfacti

1 

Psychological and 2 VOLAR 

Human Maintenance 3 

4 

1 

Stability and 2 Actions Security 3 

4 

1 

Human Relations in 2 Organization and and 

Family Life 3 

4 

1 

Self-Esteem 2 Items 3 

4 

1 

Advancement and 2 

Challenge 3 

4 

Cost Group 

1. No Cost 

2. No Cost Policy Change 

3. Internal Cost With Approval 

4 . Additional Funds 
: 

Assistant 

Commanding 

General 

Commandant t---J------/ 

Chief of 

Staff 

Control 

Element 

2 Officers 

Control Group 

Headquarters 

2 Noncommissioned Off

1 Civilian 

Evaluation 

Element 

2 I 

Officers ,I 1 Noncommissioned Officer 

1 Civilian 

I 2 

2 Officers I C· '

I IV

I I 

L-------T-------~ I 

Major Unit 

Quality Control 

Officer 

facilitate the necessary supervision, the MV A Control Group, cons

of a headquarters, a control element, and an evaluation element

established and made directly responsible to the commanding ge

(Chart 3) 

The control group headquarters monitored both the implemen

of the plan and the evaluation of the results. Besides supervisin

control and evaluation elements, the control group headquarters 

solidated monthly reports from all commands and briefed the comm

ing general on the status of actions. The control group also deve

and implemented co-ordinated staff liaison visits to the various comm
value of each action implemented, specify actions recommended 

continuation, and enumerate actions recommended to the Departm

of the Anny for implementation at other installations. New act

recommended for implementation would also be included. Furthenn

the final report was to estimate funding requirements to support 

program during fiscal year 1972. 

The study group, in addition to spelling out the organization of 

MVA Control Group, established procedures to be followed by all u

and activities involved in the Benning Plan. Each commander or 

director was to review the plan to detennine which proposed act

were his responsibility, and develop a detailed step-by-step plan for 

plementing each action. Actions judged to be counterproductive w

to be identified and reported. After the plans of the units and ac

ties were approved, a monthly status report would be forwarded to 

MVA Control Group. Major commands and activities were requ

to appoint a quality control officer to monitor the execution of the 

tions at the unit level and to serve as the unit or activity point of con

for the control group. 

The study group further established that any changes to actions 

cluded in the plan could not be made without the specific approva

the commanding general. Any request for changes or modifications w

to be fully justified and submitted to him through the MV A Con

Group. The control group was also permitted direct co-ordination w

quality control officers and was authorized to make unannounced 

visits to all levels of command. However, no reports could be rende

until the quality control officer concerned was infonned of the find

of such visits. 

The evaluation plan committee of the Benning Plan Study Gr

developed procedures to detennine whether the actions taken under 

Benning Plan influenced attitudes toward Army life, career intentions

images of the Anny. These three areas could be affected by local even

Fort Benning which directly resulted from implementation of the Benn

Plan; by local events at Fort Benning which were independent of 

plan; and by events outside Fort Benning which were Anny-wide, nat

wide, or worldwide. The effect could be visualized as a series of c

centric circles or spheres of influence. (Chart 4) Individual ca

intentions and the image of the Army could be influenced by the res

of each separate action implemented during the Benning Plan, bu

actions were taken simultaneously, the noticeable or measurable chang

attitudes could be the cumulative effect of all actions. To detennine 
CHART 4---CAREER INTENTIONS AS MEASURE OF EFFECT 

OF BENNING PLAN 

curately how much each separate action influenced attitude shi

not feasible. A small number of major areas were therefore to be th

focus of evaluation. Whether the combination of actions included 

one area had any effect on career intentions and attitudes towa

Army and whether one area had a greater impact than anothe

would be stated in terms of informed human judgment. This jud

would represent a concensus among the members of the MV A C

Group and would be supported, where possible, by data produced 

evaluation procedures described below. 
ning committee, for use by the evaluation element of the MV A Con

Group throughout the implementation of the Benning Plan. These w

questionnaire surveys, statistical trends, interviews, special activities, a

the Benning Plan after action report. 

The questionnaire survey was a paper-and-pencil form using multip

choice, rating-scale, and open-end-item formats. Personnel data w

obtained in order to describe the individual in terms of background a

current status in the military. The individual's career intentions and g

eral attitude toward the Army were measured. Finally, the survey de

mined the degree of attention given each of the major areas by 

Benning Plan actions. The baseline survey was in effect a control agai

which all future surveys could be compared. The same survey was adm

istered at Fort Knox, which was used initially as a comparison post

total of some 3,500 questionnaires was administered for the baseline s

vey, 2,600 at Fort Benning and 900 at Fort Knox. The questionnaire w

administered anonymously under group testing conditions, followin

brief orientation on the questionnaire's purpose and the importance 

honest and thoughtful responses. Automatic data processing (AD

procedures were employed to obtain raw frequencies of responses to s

arate items, percentages, and average ratings for single items and 

selected groups of items. In addition selected chi-square analyses w

performed. (A chi square is the sum of the quotients obtained by divid

the square of the difference between the observed and theoretical val

of a quantity by the theoretical value.) Stratified sampling techniq

were used on the Fort Benning and Fort Knox population based on gr

and duty assignment. 

The questionnaire survey established the percentages of person

who planned to leave the Army, those who were undecided, and th

who planned to stay in the Army. (Chart 5) The survey also determin

the percentages of those who generally were favorable toward the Arm

those who were generally unfavorable, and those who were mixed 

their attitudes toward the Army. The questionnaire was also design

to measure the satisfaction, irritation, or indifference toward each of 

five human-need categories. Individuals responded with their views 

how Army life met each category. The questionnaire survey was admin

tered at later times during the test period to a total of some 10,000 F

Benning servicemen and some 3,000 Fort Knox servicemen, there

providing a comparison showing the effectiveness of the experiment. 

Statistical trends provided a basis for comparison with questionna

and interviews. Selected data already available within the installat

managerial system were identified. The data included such discipline a
Group Date 

1a 2b 30 4 d 

First-term enlisted .. . .. .. ... . . Nov 70 1.4 4.9 12.0 81.6 

First-term officer ...... . . ...... Nov 70 7.3 14.3 20.1 58.3 

Extended-term enlisted ....... Nov 70 71.2 9.6 8.6 10.5 

Extended-term officer ... . .... . Nov 70 77.9 12.4 4.9 4.7 

Which of the following best describes your Army career intentions? 

a1. I will remain in the Army until retirement_ 

R

b2. I will remain in the Army for a while longer, but have not yet decid

staying until retirement. 

03. I am undecided about my Army career intentions. 

d4. I will leave the Army upon completion of current obligation. 

Note: The lower the group mean, the more favorable the response. 

mean of 1.00 would indicate that everyone within that group intends to r

the Army until retirement. 

morale factors as AWOL's, accident rates, and courts-mart

enlistment rates; junior officer retention rates; and resignations 

missions. These were compiled by the installation comptrol

submitted to the MV A Control Group_ In order to establish tren

data for each discipline and morale indicator available were co

in order to facilitate comparison over a period of time. In add

being used as a comparison with other procedures and as a tren

cator, the statistical data also served as a control procedure so th

was an accounting for events that were outside the sphere of in

of the actions being taken at Fort Benning_ 

The interviews of the evaluation procedure were administ

ten interviewers who were trained both in the necessary intervie

nique and in the evaluation method. A structured format was f

for each interview, wherein the interviewer presented each q

verbatim from the form in a fixed sequence and summarized 

sponses to each question in writing during the interview. 

The interviews generally lasted thirty minutes and were co

from June 1971 through May 1972. Those interviewed were pe

who were on post during the months when the Benning Plan 

effect. Interviewees were randomly selected according to thei

security account numbers and were divided into two primary 

separatees and re-enlisteeS. The separatee group consisted of pe

pending discharge one week subsequent to their interview, w

re-enlistee group was composed of personnel who had re-enlisted 
need areas. 

Special activities, which included individual recruiting, attempts 

impress favorably the attitudes of youth groups, environmental impro

ments off post, and miscellaneous post-community relations proje

were to be undertaken by units and agencies at Fort Benning. The des

nated units and agencies employed project managers and action offic

to arrange, conduct, and evaluate all the special activities. Evaluat

consisted of subjective interviews and special questionnaires. The eva

ation element of the MV A Control Group provided assistance in 

preparation of the evaluating techniques. The results from the spec

activity groups were used to ascertain any appreciable change in 

expressed attitudes of the respondents toward the Army and were th

compared with the other major elements of the evaluation methodolo

The fifth evaluation technique was the after action report develop

by the study group. This report was a documented reference point wh

recorded the scope of activity, the specific methodology and procedur

and the means of refining the data and the concepts of further operatio

The after action report also served as a means of historical documentati

and as a vehicle for recording the parameters and the rationale of 

Benning Plan. 

The MV A Control Group placed the results of the evaluative tec

niques in their proper perspective and reached valid conclusions about t

effectiveness of the Benning Plan actions after weighing the availa

information. The five human-need areas were likewise ranked in ter

of their relative impact on the military community. 

Initial Changes 

The Fort Benning Plan for Movement Toward a Modern Volunte

Army as prepared by the Benning Plan Study Group consisted of f

sections. Section I presented general information on the purpose, bac

ground, philosophy, and concepts of the plan. Sections II and III list

the 146 proposed actions and enumerated the agencies responsible 

implementation and the programed data of implementation. Any per

nent remarks concerning any action were also included. Sections IV a

V listed the control and evaluation procedures developed for the Benni

Plan, including the control group concept and organization. 

The funded portion of the plan was presented to General Talb

and his staff on 12 November 1970 and delivered to General Forsyth

staff on 15 November 1970. A briefing for the Fort Benning staff on t
to General Forsythe by Colonel Steele on 19 November 1970, 

was approved by General Talbott. The following day Colonel Ed

Kennedy was appointed chief of the MV A Control Group an

responsibility for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the 

in the Benning Plan. 

Comments from Headquarters, United States Continenta

Command (CONARC), on the Benning Plan arrived at Fort B

on 28 November 1970. CONARC concurred in the concept of t

but had a number of comments on specific actions, all of whic

funded or required additional personnel. Comments on funded 

included warnings on selling scout equipment, as such an activit

infringe on civilian economy and authority. Changes in the 

authority for free laundry service were urged. The advantages 

term contracts for KP and labor details were noted. In addition, 

requirements and the impact on manpower of the full-time qual

trol officer in each major unit were mentioned as needing furthe

ation. Significantly, CONARC denied an increase in personnel 

following proposed actions: creation of a student affairs division 

Office of the Secretary, USA IS ; instruction on enlightened and 

porary leadership problems for all officers and noncommissioned 

publication of a weekly one-page student news bulletin for offi

dents; and a manpower increase for the MVA Control Group. CO

felt that all personnel requirements for these actions could be me

the current manpower assets and staff organization of Fort B

Additional data, study, and evaluation were urged on the fo

proposals: more senior lieutenants as OCS (Officer Candidate 

tactical officers; tactical officers for advanced and basic courses; ex

legal assistance services; more telephones at medical department 

(MEDDAC) appointment desks; and civilians for garbage and 

collection. A number of other actions were noted as having pe

requirements that could not be determined at the time. These 

included a maintenance program, free quarters-cleaning for de

families, dependent dental care, and the establishment of a w

center and central processing facility. 

In addition to making specific comments on proposed 

CONARC cautioned against eliminating implemented actions. 

ARC pointed out that although routine annoyances might ha

accepted at one time, once they were eliminated for testing and 

tion, irritation would be more pronounced if they were reinstated
between SAMV A and Fort Benning was authorized. 

SAMV A and the Benning Plan 

On 14 December 1970, SAMVA published a conference mem

dum for the record which summarized the results of a working co

ence on Project VOLAR-7l that was attended by representatives 

CONARC, Forts Benning, Carson, and Ord, and the Army Staff. 

onel Steele was Fort Benning's representative. In addition to consid

all proposals from each of the three test posts, the committee disc

funding and personnel requirements. Military space problems that c

not be resolved at CONARC would be settled by the Department o

Army. Funding was also discussed; at this point the allocation categ

were still unclear, but the $5 million figure for Fort Benning rema

in effect. The conference was concerned only with actions that req

funds or regulatory changes. 

Funded actions submitted as part of the Benning Plan that wer

proved included improved shuttle bus service; extension of commi

hours; extended hours at the quartermaster store; improved lounge 

in ·company-Ievel dayrooms; contract for civilian KP in unit me

and purchase of labor-saving devices. No-cost actions that were appr

included eliminating the requirement at Fort Benning to wear ha

privately owned vehicles; creating a student affairs division in the O

of the Secretary of USAIS; clarifying regulations on award proced

eliminating mandatory quotas for the suggestion awards program; e

nating sign-in and sign-out requirements at company levels; remo

restrictions on travel during off-duty time; eliminating the require

to use the Armed Forces Liberty Pass for overnight passes during 

normal duty week; conducting a block of instruction on enlight

leadership and contemporary leadership problems for all commissi

and noncommissioned officers; reorganizing the 2d Student Batta

The School Brigade, to strengthen its supervision of officer stud

modifying annual general and command maintenance managemen

spections to obtain a more realistic measure of unit capability; pe

ting soldiers to have beer in barracks; changing policy to eliminat

requirement to salute when either one or both persons were riding 

vehicle or when either one or both persons were wearing civilian clo

publishing weekly one-page student news bulletins for officer stud

instituting mandatory counseling at least once during each six-m
nating the scheduling of examinations on days following night in

tion; providing more "open time" in the Infantry Officer Basic C

and OCS by lengthening courses or by eliminating some instructio

really essential; and increasing the number of telephones at MED

appointment desks. 

The following funded items were approved after the staff had 

sidered comments or objections: the hiring of civilians to serve as a 

labor force, to maintain and police roads and grounds, and to 

refuse and garbage. All hiring was to be done by contract instead 

a civil service basis. As for hiring civilians and purchasing nec

equipment to improve preventive maintenance, the Office of the 

of Legislative Liaison and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Lo

(DCSLOG), were to prepare construction guidance for the pos

secure legislative approval where necessary. DCSLOG did not con

free quarters-cleaning on permanent change of station moves bu

outvoted. Implementation, control, and evaluation costs for VO

establishment of a welcoming and processing center, and establis

of a reception booth at the airport were all approved. Conversion 

existing building into a nightclub for E-l's through E-4's was app

as long as it did not involve conversion of existing service club fac

A number of funded actions were approved at the SAMV A c

ence that were eventually eliminated as being low-priority, low-i

items relative to cost. These included construction of a cocktail l

on the porch of the Officers' Supper Club, construction of a n

adjacent to the commissary, and free transportation from the Colu

Airport to the base. 

One no-cost action that was approved after consideration w

elimination of the requirement that OBV -2 (obligated volunteer) o

purchase the Army blue uniform and that those below the rank of c

wear it at social functions. Approval was only for Fort Bennin

specifically for the test period. 

The following proposals were approved as modified: the red

of the work load of table of organization and equipment (TOE) 

to enable them to move toward a forty-hour week, and the exp

of services offered by the Legal Assistance Office to include repre

tion in civil courts, review of legal documents, and tax return assis

The first proposal was modified to read "5-day week" instead of 

hour week. This change guaranteed two days off as determin

mission requirements. The second proposal was approved with the u
tion was deferred until the necessary statutory or regulatory autho

tion was obtained: contracting transportation to selected recreation a

providing partitions in barracks; contracting for local motel facil

changing AR 210-65 limiting class VI package stores' discount of 

prices; expanding PX inventory to include major appliances, furni

and a full range of sporting goods; authorizing the PX to sell Boy S

and Girl Scout uniforms and accessories; adding a fabric shop at the 

and adding nine holes to the special service goH course. 

A number of proposed actions were not approved. Free laundry 

all enlisted men was turned down on the grounds that this proposal 

been made to Congress several times in the past and had always 

refused. The use of PX credit card purchases or the use of bank-

credit cards in the PX and commissary was also rejected "as congress

disapproval was certain. Congress had recently opposed a similar 

posal, because it felt that interest paid by the individual and the se

charges paid by the PX and commissary would discount advant

of the PX and commissary system. 

The final category of decisions covered proposed actions that 

deferred for further study. The proposed rewarding of outstanding sol

was deferred since the rewards could not be paid by using appropri

funds and more time was needed to determine the availability of 

appropriated funds. The construction of a thirty-unit guest house 

likewise deferred as it could not be completed during the test pe

Leasing of facilities during the test period was approved however. 

The idea of assigning more senior lieutenants as OCS tactical off

was withdrawn by Fort Benning. The ninety~day notification period 

personnel involved in a permanent change of station was dropped s

it was already an Army Department policy that would be re-emphasi

A number of proposals were not discussed at the 2 December wor

conference but were believed to have sufficient merit and to des

further study. The SAMV A office was to incorporate these action

its "idea bank" and to act on the most appropriate ones at a later d

These actions included reimbursement for use of privately owned veh

to meet military transportation requirements; issuance of a multipur

identification card ; organization of a recruiting team for the 197th In

try Brigade; expanded dental care for dependents; invitation to 1

college ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) cadets to tour 

Benning for one week during the summer; and the authority to pro

summer training with pay for 200 high school ROTC cadets an
SAMVA and by the Department of the Army. At this point the 

hindrance to implementation of the VOLAR actions was obviously 

to be the availability of funds. CONARC and the Department 

Army were indeed willing to follow General Westmoreland's guid

as evidenced by the rapid change of long-standing regulations an

ditions, such as the elimination of reveille, of travel restrictions wh

pass, and of signing in and signing out at company level. In less 

twenty-one days a good plan had been developed; Fort Benning no

to insure its success. 
VOLAR did not suddenly appear on the morning of 20 Nove

1970, the day after the Benning Plan was published. Just as the dev

ment of MV A principles and concepts had gradually been determ

over a period of time, so the implementation of VOLAR at Fort Ben

had vague anteceden~ and a gradual but steady growth, interspersed 

spurts of activity. Whife a good portion of the Benning Plan was init

during November and December of 1970, many of the actions had 

in effect at Fort Benning for some time. Commanders of various units 

previously defined problem areas and had attempted t6 alleviate t

as much as their resources and authority allowed. These innovations 

been discussed and evaluated by the study group during the develop

of the Benning Plan, and many of them were incorporated into the 

in order to make implementation uniform throughout the post. The 

fantry School was attempting to improve its image by updating 

modernizing equipment and techniques. The 197th Infantry Brigade 

already initiated a Totally Involved Leadership Program which 

ported the VOLAR concept. What happened on 20 November wa

fact, a mobilization of piecemeal efforts and consolidation of va

philosophies into a single concept. Now vigorous efforts would be requ

to surmount the obstacles that still remained. 

The greatest barrier was resistance to change. There were many 

sons for this resistance, not the least.of which were misconceptions a

the MV A concept, especially the VOLAR phase. These misconcep

were held by both career soldiers, who thought discipline would bec

nonexistent, and by first-tour enlistees and draftees, who did not be

VOLAR existed except on paper at higher headquarters. They were 

that it was a temporary measure and that soon the Army would re

to its previous policies. A situation developed, by no means uniqu

Fort Benning, in which a number of career soldiers were actively "h

ing the line" against further "damaging" changes and a group of first

soldiers were generally apathetic toward VOLAR. Overcoming t

attitudes became a monumental task. 

Another factor which made the acceptance of VOLAR difficult 

the difference of opinion between career and first-tour soldiers over 

jects which were actually extremely minor in light of the total prob
Even length of hair became an exaggerated issue for both sides. Thi

tortion and conflict clouded and disrupted the VOLAR movemen

creating unfavorable publicity and spreading misconceptions. The 

tions of the opposing groups were symptomatic of the prevalent fe

among career soldiers that discipline was weakening and among 

tour soldiers that promises were not being kept. 

Added to these problems was the over-all apathy. The Fort Be

population was not too excited about anything "Army" during the i

stages of the Benning Plan. Most of the young soldiers had recent

turned from Vietnam feeling they had done all that was required of 

They had less than six months remaining in the service and wer

too concerned about improvements in a life they would soon be le

forever. 

Overcoming Obstacles 

General Talbott recognized these obstacles and involved his m

unit commanders in a series of critical first steps designed to gai

attention of every individual, civilian and military. Measures were 

to establish direct, responsive internal lines of communication and 

same time embark on an information program capable of rapid, c

able publicity for VOLAR progress. In swift succession to these 

came realignments of priorities and definite policies on the resourc

be used by VOLAR programs. 

Communications from the commander at each echelon direc

the soldiers were established simply by implementing the MV A Co

Group concept. The Quality Control Organization consisted of the M

Control Group, headed by Colonel Kennedy, and the quality contro
fulfillment of VOLAR actions entailed a multitude of tasks. Thes

cers maintained close and continuous liaison with the MV A Co

Group. They were responsible for surveying the soldiers on the effe

the actions and participating in other surveys by the MV A Co

Group. The quality control officers often conducted daily visits and 

views. They were a prime source of information for the soldiers con

ing VOLAR actions, past, present, and future, and were also ava

to assist in correcting grievances and problems. The expertise deve

while on the job enabled them to settle quickly and effectively m

questions concerning VOLAR. 

Some commands established an S-5 office to handle the quality 

trol duties. As time went on and other related programs grew out o

VOLAR concept, such as race relations, drug abuse, and unit-of-c

recruiting, they were often incorporated in this office. The 931st Eng

Group even developed an S-6 in response to the need to deal with 

ple problems." 

A close working relationship was maintained throughout the ex

ment between the postwide MV A Control Group and individual 

trol officers, and the organization was retained in a modified form 

the actual VOLAR trial period ended. At that time the control g

was reduced to a special staff, but the unit qualIty control officer conti

in the same capacity. 

As the MV A Control Group was the eyes and ears of the comm

ing general in VOLAR matters, the respective quality control officer

formed a similar service for each major unit command throughou

post. Contrary to some concern that this system might be a spy netw

the Quality Control Organization proved to be an effective techniqu

dissemination of accurate and timely information up and down the c

of command and came to be strongly supported by all the comman

Publicity 

From the beginning, planners recognized the vital role playe

civilians in the daily operation of an Army installation, and thus rea

that they would also have a key role in the success or failure of the 

Indeed, almost every facet of the plan was concerned in some way 

the civilians who worked at Fort Benning and lived in adjacent 

munities. Civilians were included as members of the original study g

and also in the control group. Most of the high-impact funded ac

such as KP and refuse pickup, involved civilians to the extent that si

cant numbers were offered employment opportunities. Civilians 
personnel can have a definite debilitating effect on troop morale w

such attitudes are encountered on a continuous basis. Because the v

of a soldier's wife are often critical in his decision to remain in the A

the civilian must be helpful and understanding in dealing with 

pendents. General Westmoreland stated, "Their (DA Civilians) c

eration is absolutely necessary to our success in the (MV A) progr

General Talbott emphasized that civilians working at Fort Benning 

extremely important to the Benning Plan by personally conducti

series of briefings for all civilian employees in early December 

These briefings explained the Modern Volunteer Army concept an

objectives of the plan. His intention was "to have every civilian emp

understand VOLAR and identify his own interest with the objectiv

the Benning Plan." In addition to making personal appearances, he 

distributed television tapes of these briefings which further publicize

MV A program. The effect was gratifying as outstanding general su

was apparent from civilian employees throughout the post. 

Special emphasis was placed on a continuing information progra

keep military and civilian employees and the public abreast of VO

actions. Not only were details of the actions disseminated, but e

were made to publicize the goals to be achieved by these actions. Th

formation program played an important role in closing credibility 

that arose when various measures failed to affect everyone simultane

or affected people <.J.ifferently or simply took some time to complete 

Fort Benning's command information program was present

many different forms. Incoming personnel were immediately made a

of VOLAR upon their arrival at the processing center. In additi

receiving a briefing on the project, they were also presented with a w

size introductory VOLAR card that explained the experiment conc

A postwide VOLAR information program was instituted down to 

pany level. This program specified that VOLAR be the subject of "

mander's call" at least once monthly, that units maintain bulletin b

displaying pertinent information on VOLAR, and that the comm

make maximum effort to include his noncommissioned officers in su

of the VOLAR program. All students of the Infantry School were 

plied with progress pamphlets that dealt with the carrying out of v

Benning Plan actions. Furthermore, all students in the leadership co

were given detailed briefings on VOLAR so that the spirit and 

of the entire program would be conveyed directly to other Army 

throughout the world upon reassignment. A vigorous poster projec

also initiated. Colorful, contemporary posters were displayed throu

the post, highlighting VOLAR achievements already accomplishe
INFORMATION PROGRAM PRESENTS FACTS ABOUT VOLAR 

advertising the responsibilities of the individual as well as forthcom

changes proposed in the Benning Plan. The weekly post newsp

featured extensive articles and pictures of completed actions under 

VOLAR program. In addition, an eye-catching column consisting 

box score of information on the Benning Plan progress was made a re

lar feature. 

Although no formal public information office was set up, Gen

Bruce C. Clarke (retired), during a visit, emphasized the importa

of the civilian news media. General Clarke also suggested innova
VOLAR Is ADVERTISED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS 

and highly effective ways to demonstrate the Army's living and w

conditions to the public, such as allowing platoons to operate in o

civilian communities. His expert advice was especially effective in 

ing civilian support for the recruiting effort. This effort contin

expand throughout the e·xperiment. 

The adjacent civilian communities were informed on the 

being undertaken to attract responsible soldiers. The local news

and radio and television stations all displayed the greatest co-op

in informing the public about the VOLAR program. In the first 
in the local newspapers. National attention was focused on the Benn

Plan by both Army Magazine and Army Times. 

In the area of community relations, efforts were made to impr

the life of the soldier in the community and to promote hannoni

living between the local citizen and the soldier in order to achiev

better community. In addition to the public information which reac

the local citizens through the mass media, Fort Benning leaders activ

sought speaking engagements in order to explain the Modern Volun

Army concepts and the specifics of the Benning Plan to the public 

to infonned opinion leaders. These engagements took place at vari

chambers of commerce and at many civic and service clubs, such as 

YMCA, Rotary, and Lions. 

In addition to infonnation programs designed to educate all p

personnel on the factual aspects of the MVA project and the Benn

Plan, a seven-hour block of instruction entitled "Enlightened Leadersh

was developed. All penn anent party personnel in the grade of E-5 

above received the course, which was also incorporated into the lead

ship programs that were given to all Infantry School students. T

enlightened leadership course did not present new material but review

proven tenets of leadership and re-emphasized their importance in 

movement toward a Modern Volunteer Anny. 

Another means of advertising VOLAR actions was the construc

of 3' x 5' blue and white VOLAR project signs. These signs identi

various projects under construction and gave the title of the project 

the estimated completion date. They served as constant reminders 

the soldier that positive and tangible efforts were being made for 

benefit. Whatever means were used to infonn the military and civi

communities, the best publicity came from satisfied soldiers. The adv

tising about accomplishments had to be truthful, and care was ta

not to exaggerate the effects of future actions. 

Personal Development 

Although the thrust of command emphasis and publicity was m

initially toward improving working conditions, certain immediate po

changes were required to insure that work priorities were promot

job satisfaction. Credibility gaps in this area would, in the final analy

undennine all the accomplishments in the areas of living and work

conditions, especially if the individual believed that his work was bor

at best, or useless, at worst. Learning how to do a job, unlearning co

terproductive social attitudes, and being committed to the exercise 
provide a regular opportunity to apply them. Therefore, the comm

had to be sure that training and educational programs were ope

fully and were receiving an appropriate share of manpower partici

in them. One particular management policy in the 197th In

Brigade, known at the time as the 20-20-60 concept, had perha

greatest impact on preventing imbalance in the distribution of 

power. Simply stated, the policy required that in a given work 

20 percent of the available work force would always be enga

some form of training or education, for example, race or drug sem

field exercises, and military occupational speciality applications

or equipment maintenance would receive 20 percent of the av

manpower for the same period, and the remaining 60 percent wo

committed to mission requirements of the moment. This innovative 

was used primarily by the 197th Infantry Brigade; however, it affec

entire post. The school and center could no longer cause the over

tion of the 6,000 men in the brigade. Job satisfaction, which came 

easily to the school and center agencies, had now been introduced 

support elements. Even more important, however, this policy emph

tQ every level of command that priorities were not a simple matter 

projects first, but a matter of all projects functioning accord

weighted effort. The concept of 20-20-60 had established the w

Within the brigade, training programs took on new importance. 

tion seminars on drug abuse and race relations became viable pro

Unproductive social attitudes could be exposed and treated cont

in a way that no longer was competing with the day-to-day dem

heavy support commitments. With the proper management of res

the whole man could now receive serious attention. 

One program that had been in use at Fort Benning some time 

,the Benning Plan was the concept of "adventure training." Even 

it had not been considered in the plan, adventure training sup

the VOLAR concept in a number of ways. It supported the B

Plan philosophy by providing challenge, appealed to the type of 

the Army wanted to recruit and retain, and improved morale an

integrity among small units who participated in the training. A

sioned in the 197th Brigade, adventure training periodically re

the soldier from the humdrum monotony of repetitive, unexcitin

which afforded slight chance for job satisfaction. By providing t

that was different, exciting, demanding, and potentially dangero

soldier had the opportunity to do something new and challengin

soldier had fun, his knowledge and military proficiency were inc
ADVENTURE TRAINING SUPPORTS VOLAR CONCEPT 

and his morale improved. By emphasizing small unit adventure trai

projects, teamwork and camaraderie were developed. 

Adventure training had been initiated in 1970 by the 197th Bri

and had proven useful in alleviating some of the many attitude p

lems at the time. With the advent of VOLAR, the concept gained 

impetus and spread to other major units on post. The training w

good as the commander's imagination and ranged from a week

platoon float trip down the Chattahoochee River to an exercise in w

mortar men worked with artillery. In addition to reaping imme
BENNING PLAN DIRECTS ATTENTION TO DRUG PROBLEM 

benefits from the commanders, it became a very salable feature in 

VOLAR experiment and helped attract new recruits. 

Another program furthering total involvement developed aroun

drug abuse program. The original Benning Plan proposed a program 

the treatment and rehabilitation of drug users, based on the ratio

that assistance with drug problems could encourage the retentio

soldiers who wanted help and, when cured, would be productive m

bers of the military community. As a result of this idea, existing effo

drug rehabilitation were expanded. The "Benning House," as the 

gram was named, further expanded in scope to include alcohol a
BENNING HOUSE PROVIDES GROU.P THERAPY 

The Benning House was based on the well-known "half-way ho

concept, whereby personnel undergoing treatment continued at 

jobs and received professional treatment and counseling after work 

at other specially scheduled times. Persons requiring intensive hel

mained at the Benning House overnight. When VOLAR funds be

available, three buildings were converted from two-story, 32-man s

ing barracks into necessary treatment facilities. The modifications 

vided for a total of twenty-four two-man sleeping cubicles on the se

floor and twelve soundproof therapy units on the first floor. 

Besides returning soldiers to useful jobs, the Benning House pro

added credibility to the concept of developing and caring for the "w

man." The program affected the entire military structure by concer

itself not only with drug users but with alcohol abusers, who tend

be older and were often career soldiers. In this particular area, the A

was well ahead of private industry in helping personnel who suf

from these problems. 

Continuing in the area of social involvement, extensive thought 

time had already been put into the development of a comprehensive 

relations program. The Benning Plan neutralized a major obstacle t

program in that manpower could now be committed to the pro

without competing with troop labor needs. Seminars, which were 

prime vehicle of the race relations program, could now be regu

filled. However, the seminar was only one facet of a four-point pro

which began with the orientation of all new arrivals at Fort Ben
SEMINARS SUPPORT RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM 

The orientation eplicitly outlined command support of equal opport

policies and emphatically established that discrimination agains

minority group would not be tolerated. Points two and three of the 

gram were education and indoctrination, with seminars as the ma

strument for presenting new material, such as black studies and 

studies. The seminar also presented a forum for exposing human atti

as well as real or imagined grievances. The fourth point was the reh

tation of individuals who became ineffective due to attitudes incomp

with the program. Rehabilitation consisted of firm counseling, occa

job reassignment, and disciplinary measures if appropriate. A Race 

tions Co-ordinating Group monitored unit programs and taught mo

tors how to manage seminars, which were run twice month

companies, at least monthly in battalions, and quarterly in brigades

co-ordinating group was organized and functioned in a manner si

to the MVA Control Group. 

The race relations program, like adventure training and drug a

was not an explicit part of the Benning Plan, but as the plan beg

affect every part of the soldiers' lives, they, through co-ordination 

VOLAR programs, became in the minds of all a part of the M

concept. 
g py, 

a varying state of completion. In order to provide an accurate and und

standable account of what occurred during the first months of 1

when six major commands were each trying to put over one hund

projects into effect, representative actions and units have been sele

to illustrate the entire process. While factors such as type of uni

agency, mission, and personalities all played a role, each unit gener

went through the same basic problems and trials and errors as the o

unit with much the same success. The 197th Infantry Brigade served 

an excellent example of a unit in which VOLAR benefits were im

mented primarily for the young single enlisted soldier and the yo

officer. 

The first actions to be carried out generally were concerned w

removing irritants and easing regulatory policies that did not invo

additional costs. USAIC Circular 600-67, 4 December 1970, was 

primary document in the initial weeks of Project VOLAR. The effect

this circular were felt immediately throughout Fort Benning. The soldi

military life was further improved throughout the month of Decem

as additional directives and policy changes were received. 

By the beginning of the new year the typical soldier every morn

could look forward to a day that was considerably changed from a mo

before. From the time he arose to the time he retired in the even

every facet of his life was affected by the Benning Plan. He no longer 

to stand reveille but just had to be present at the later work call. Sold

who were off-duty on that day were not awakened for the morn

cleanup, but were allowed to sleep. The married soldier who lived 

post spent less time traveling to work because of the improvements in 

traffic flow. While in his often low-roofed automobile, he did not h

to wear his hat; he was thus spared the possibility of receiving a re

mand and allowed to drive in greater comfort and often with increa

visibility. Simply being treated as a responsible adult created more 

time for the soldier who met that responsibility. 

Even though there was no change in the 197th Brigade's prim

missions, the soldier's job conditions were markedly improved dur

December 1970. He could look forward to a five-day week; even thou

he might still have to work long and hard hours, he was assured 

getting time off periodically. Furthermore, compensatory time was gi

for those soldiers who were required to work on weekends or on holida

When it did not interfere with his mission, the soldier could wear civi

clothes while performing duty on Saturdays. A soldier who worked o

of-doors found that he was no longer arriving hours before the star
a detail and then standing around. Elimination of wasted time cu

on his over-all hourly workweek and helped him feel his time wa

spent. These actions required more planning and greater co-ord

in order to maintain effectiveness. The problem was to accomp

assigned tasks and still maintain the five-day week. The 20- 20-

cept was a major factor in this respect and the workweek develop

a five-day average over a monthly period. When the soldier und

the problems involved, he willingly worked seven or eight days 

cession knowing he would receive compensatory time as soon as p

The soldier also found changes in uniform policies. He was no 

required to have all badges and awards on his fatigues or field 

Even though only the name tape, the U.S. Army tape, rank, i

and present unit patch were required, most soldiers continued 

all authorized patches and badges. They were proud of their 

plishments and wanted to display them. There was no loss of dis

and work efficiency increased. A clerk-typist found that he no lon

to type and retype correspondence now that legible and neat pen-

changes were acceptable. This change was especially helpful at co

and battalion level where competent typists are always at a prem

When the 197th soldier went to the mess hall for his noo

he was able to buy 3.2 beer with his meals and obtain free so

problems arose with beer drinking. In the two years of allowing 

the mess hall and barracks, not one instance of misuse was r

at Fort Benning. However, contracting companies eventually r

most of the beer vending machines from the mess halls because th

losing money. The soldier preferred a soft drink with his meal
MVA MESS HALL ACCOMMODATES THE SOLDIER 

he drank beer, it was a casual affair with a group or in his room a

usually purchased from the dayroom vending machines. Longer m

hours were available to the soldier on weekends and holidays, allow

him to do with his free time as he wished and at the same time to s

money. Instead of sleeping late on Sunday and then having to buy bre

fast at a snack bar, he could sleep late and eat in the mess hall. 

Mter duty hours the soldier noticed the largest number of chang

He no longer had to sign in and sign out at the company for overnig

weekend, or three-day passes. He no longer had to have an Armed For

Liberty Pass for overnight passes during a normal workweek. Additi

ally, he was no longer bound by travel restrictions. The maps with 

cles denoting travel limitations were removed from bulletin boards a

the responsibility placed upon the individual soldier for returning 

time. The policy of conducting the nightly bed check was eliminat

except when a soldier was undergoing punishment. The Army was 

effect telling the soldier that after doing a day's work, his time was f

without qualifications. For the soldier who had visitors and no place 

put them up overnight, the guest house was available. Information 

free military airlift comman'd flights was widely disseminated as 

additional service to the soldier. 

Mechanical Problems 

January 1971 saw a continuation of efforts to lDluate VOLA

activities, including some very high cost projects. These were much m
CMLIAN KP REDUCES SOLDIERS' MENIAL CHORES 

complicated than the no-cost projects in December, often for the 

reason that they could not be accomplished overnight and that the 

were not shared simultaneously by the soldiers. However, durin

ary 1971 the typical soldier did see his life further improved 

VOLAR experiment. 

The highest impact item was elimination of kitchen police 

'duties. To the young soldier this improvement was the most im

VOLAR action. Turning duties over to civilians was closely follo

securing a civilian labor force to perform work details that did no

to soldier missions. Civilians were hired and equipment purcha

maintaining and policing roads and grounds, including collecting g

and refuse throughout the post. 

The benefits to the average soldier from these innovation

numerous and sometimes complex. He no longer believed that m

his time was spent doing tasks he considered demeaning without 

uting toward mission accomplishment. His morale improved 

Army gained valuable selling points for recruiting. By freeing 

from menial tasks, more man-hours of mission support and traini

obtained. Not only were more men available to fulfill commitmen

lessening the work load for all, but the soldiers were better train

motivated while performing their jobs. 
SEMIPRIVATE ROOMS ApPROACH COLLEGE LIVING CONDITIONS 

A number of improvements were also made in the soldiers' living c

ditions, as a better preventive maintenance program for troop billets 

under way. Troop barracks were partitioned into smaller semipriv

rooms; and furniture for these rooms, such as scatter rugs, lamps, 

refinished desks and chairs, were procured. In addition, soldiers w

granted permission, on an individual basis, to purchase small item

furniture and then to decorate their individual living areas accord

to their own tastes. This practice allowed the soldier to live more in 

life-style of his contemporaries in college or in civilian jobs. 

Unforeseen problems did arise from the partitioning of rooms. Issu

keys was vital and took much planning and co-ordination. Moving 

diers from platoon to platoon or causing them to switch rooms co

rapidly destroy any decorating incentive, which they then saw as wa

effort. Security of valuables such as TV's, radios, and stereos was ano

problem. All of these difficulties had to be worked out by unit command

and they illustrated the complexity of what on the surface appeared 

be a simple action. 

The 931st Engineer Group was responsible for the actual const

tion of all temporary partitions. In spite of myriad problems, such 

funding, requisitioning materials, and developing specifications, the 

gineers completed the project with skill and enthusiasm. 

Most of these projects took time to complete since many invol

hiring hundreds of additional personnel for low-salary, low-skill jobs 
doubts among the men, notwithstanding the information progra

command emphasis. 

Change Is Progress 

Up to this point the effect of VOLAR on the young single 

soldier who lived in the barracks has been emphasized. The marr

dier was likewise the benefactor of these actions as there were nu

projects that affected his life-style by affecting his dependents. 

pendents benefited from VOLAR, but special attention here wa

to the dependents of a major target group, the young first-termer

effort to induce more of them to remain in the Army. 

Great emphasis was placed on the Army community services 

program. The ACS program started conducting orientations 

incoming student classes. Army wives were actively recruited to 

ACS volunteers and more staff and facilities were supplied by 

fantry Center. The Army Emergency Relief (AER) area wa

more pleasant and the processing of AER loans was greatly exp

Wives' organizations received formal orientations, and each wives

appointed liaison representatives with the ACS. 

Soldiers and their dependents found the post commissary a

PX more pleasant and convenient. All civilian employees whos

brought them in contact with the military community attended cu

relations courses. The Civilian Personnel Division integrated 

hour block of instruction on customer relations into the quarterl

Supervisor's Course and the Middle Managers Course. Enliste

were no longer referred to as "EM's," but were addressed as "so

The longstanding policy of priority checkout lines for persons in u

was retained and expanded. Newcomers to Fort Benning recei

information packet that provided them with the locations and h

operation of each service-oriented facility on post. In order to insu

service facilities were abiding by the new changes, a part-time 

control group conducted unannounced visits at least twice a mo

For the soldier unable to get to the PX during the day, the 

time was extended to 2100 hours once a week. The married soldi

cially appreciated this action, because he now had a chance to g

ping with his family. In late January 1971 , a fabric shop and 

center addition to the PX was opened. Congressional approval 

material by the yard or bolt was well received by the wives. 

Commissary hours, however, were not extended until later bec

funding complications involved in salaries for additional personn

need for the extension was recognized, however, and to explain w

the PX hours were lengthened was difficult. Credibility suffered 
PX HOURS ARE EXTENDED 

FABRIC SHOP PROVIDES NEW SERVICE 
PX KEEPS PACE WITH LIFE-STYLES 
cost actions continued to be initiated. Payday activities now includ

half-day off to attend to personal affairs. The work load in units was m

evenly distributed by eliminating the "exempt from duty" status f

the duty roster. The feeling was that no soldier was so indispensible 

he could not pull his fair share of extra duties. (Appendix D discu

problems and changes in one unit at Fort Benning.) 

Improved Medical Care 

Great strides were also made in medical care. The commander of 

Benning's Martin Army Hospital, Colonel H. Haskell Ziperman, su

vised VOLAR programs in medical services. A program called We C

was initiated by the medical department activity (MEDDAC) in 

early months of 1971 and was a comprehensive action to improve 

services offered at the hospital and the several clinics located through

Fort Benning. 

Professional medical care was not the object of the We Care progr

since the quality of medicine practiced by MEDDAC was already re

nized as outstanding. We Care was instead directed toward the ser

aspects of MEDDAC. By minimizing numerous irritants and probl

associated with serving large numbers of patients, over-all service att

tiveness was improved. 

Emphasis was placed on the individual as a person, not merely 

case. Attempts were made to establish mutual respect between med

service personnel and the patients. The multifaceted program was 

signed to convince patients that not only were they receiving good med

care, but also that they were receiving it in a way that did not deper

alize or degrade them. 

Medical service personnel from doctors to janitors became involve

orientations, briefings, and meetings to indoctrinate medical perso

with the feelings expressed in the "Ten Commandments of a Good H

pital." This set of guidelines stressed the concept that a hospital exi

only to make sick people well, and that, therefore, the patient was 

most important person in the hospital, deserving of the best service 

attention possible. Efforts were made to convince ancillary personnel 

most patients were emotionally upset by their iliness and were not t

because they wanted to be but because they had to be. They therefore 

quired and deserved more sympathetic handling than healthy peopl

Besides improving the general attitude of the staff toward the 

tients, a number of tangible improvements were made. Additional 

sonnel were assigned to the various clinics to reduce the patients' wai

time. Increased emphasis was put on appointments, rather than the f
dialed. If a particular number was busy, the call would automatical

shunted to another number until an open line was reached; in the 

all lines were busy, the busy signal was given. Qualified personnel 

assigned to circulate through the waiting rooms, explaining reason

delays, giving assurances to distraught patients, and by their phy

presence demonstrating the We Care philosophy. 

Numerous minor physical improvements were also undertaken. W

ing rooms were redecorated to create a more pleasant atmosphere

creased and improved directional signs were installed, which did mu

alleviate problems caused by a confusing multitude of doors, corri

sections, clinics, and rooms in outpatient areas. Security lighting 

generally. improved night lighting were installed. All of these rather 

ple improvements increased the convenience and comfort of the pat

Open sick calls were established at troop clinics, allowing a so

to report to the clinic when he was ill rather than at predesignated t

Senior officers and noncommissioned officers were allowed to mak

pointments at troop clinics during the afternoon hours, in additi

the regular walk-in patients. Brochures detailing medical services 

widely distributed. Opinion samplings of patients were conducte

detennine what additional improvements were desired. Patients f

the quality of food improved, and a popular short-order menu be

available. Not only was the We Care program directed at the me

services personnel, but the military community was also encourag

co-operate in making it a success. The advantages of an appointment 

a long wait were pointed out, along with the use of the emergency 

for emergencies only. 

As time progressed and VOLAR funds became available, large-

innovations, such as dependent dental care and a family doctor con

were initiated. The Family Ambulatory Care System was an effort t

prove medical care by establishing a orogram in which all membe

a soldier's family would always be treated by the same physician. 

of the medical staff was grouped into teams which paralleled the m

command organization. For example, the 197th Brigade had five do

who treated all members of the brigade and their dependents. In effec

arrangement was similar to a clinic composed of five family doctors

the physicians thus became more familiar with their patients' me

histories and problems. One doctor was also available after duty h

for telephone consultation, which took a big load off the emergency 

and afforded the patient a quick response. This family care program 

extremely well received, especially by dependent wives. 
Two Dilemmas 

During the development and execution of the Fort Benning P

participation by noncommissioned officers was highly sensitive and 

quired careful monitoring. The noncommissioned officer at platoon l

was soon confronted with a very real dilemma. What he had believe

be correct procedure for years had now been cast aside. The reveille 

mation which was an inherent part of his daily routine was now 

necessary. Years of conditioning had ingrained in him that short h

was good grooming. To inform him that longer hair could also be g

grooming was sometimes upsetting. Thus, a degree of uncertainty touc

his daily decisions. Reinforcing his uncertainty was the impression t

permissiveness was now the order of the day. Factually untrue, the 

of discipline was a popular illusion. Irritating control devices had b

removed from the system and greater individual freedom awarded 

soldiers as a right. The traditional tools of NCO authority were modif

The platoon sergeant no longer was the recommender of class A pas

and thus his disapproval was no longer a threat to the platoon memb

Many platoon NCO's thought themselves without leverage for correct

minor infractions of discipline. Other than nonjudicial punishment, th

seemed to be little left but counseling as a tool for correcting substand

appearance, punctuality, or responsiveness. In short, the NCO had 

feeling that the rug had been pulled out from under him. While 

situation was by no means an explicit negative reaction on the par

all NCO's, it nonetheless described a general dilemma in which the sm

unit leader found himself during the early months of VOL

implementation. 
By the end of the first nine months, most NCO's discovere

their position was not untenable. They learned that the need for a

plication of counseling was real and effective. The leader whose p

had been to stand on the comer and shout four-letter words contin

have problems, but for the most part small-unit leaders adjusted a

vised techniques to fit the new scheme. While highly favorable resu

been achieved on a practical basis, the early prejudices remained 

ject requiring periodic attention on the part of commanders. U

resolution of the dilemma would not occur until the all-volunteer 

became an established fact and substandard leaders were elimina

Gradual implementation, especially of the more expensive 

actions, caused another serious dilemma during the initial months 

experiment. The problem of establishing and maintaining credibi

the entire project became very real and required a concerted effor

all levels of command. Before the initiation of the Benning exper

planners realized that unkept promi~es would deal a serious blow 

entire MV A concept. Great care had to be taken to prevent prem

publicity of proposed actions in case unforeseen circumstances pre

their execution. In spite of the concerted information program, som

conceptions about VOLAR programs developed. Soldiers often 

pated broader changes than were actually warranted. When the 

programs fell short of what was expected, a feeling of having been 

developed, and a credibility gap resulted. 

The action that contributed most to the credibility gap w

construction of barracks partitions. This large-scale project was so 
sive that it took many months to complete. The individual sol

involved in the immediate and daily problems associated with livin

an open barracks bay, was not interested in construction schedu

requisition of material, and other similar matters. He was concer

that his buddies in the building across the street had semiprivate ro

while he did not. The time lag involved in completing this very vis

high-impact project caused many soldiers to become cynical about 

entire MV A effort. The extensive information program was abl

counteract a good deal of the credibility gap. The problem was fin

resolved by continuing to complete the partitions as fast as possible 

letting the results speak for themselves. 

The two dilemmas were indicative of the long-term problems 

the MV A project would continue to face. Another such long-ra

problem area likely to develop might best be expressed as the "what-h

you-done-for-me-lately" syndrome. The soldier coming into the ser

and not knowing what improvements had been achieved would no

appreciative of the VOLAR actions. He would not be concerned w

how much better things were, since he would be unable to relat

the old program. Whether or not this syndrome needed correction ~o

depend on how well the MV A kept living conditions, working 

ditions, and job satisfaction in tune with the social standards of 

society from which the recruits were drawn. 

Settling Down 

On 14 January 1971, Fort Benning forwarded the first "Bi-Mon

Status Report on the Modem Volunteer Army" to the Third Un
actions already implemented, with brief remarks on each; it also p

out that Project VOLAR was still too new to be evaluated in a me

ful manner and that no results would be submitted at the time. 

The actions that had been carried out were treated in five se

sections. Items designated by General Westmoreland as high 

items composed the first section. They had been included in 

December 1970 "Modem Volunteer Army Directive Number 1." 

fifteen items were mainly concerned with reduction and elimina

irritating Army policies. The second section dealt with Continenta

Command directions and dealt for the most part with recruiting 

enlistment policies arid community relations programs. Third 

seven directives were in the third section. The last two section

actions that had been started by Fort Benning, both funded an

funded. A number of requests for policy changes on promotions a

enlistments were also submitted, along with detailed justificatio

these proposals. 

The bimonthly report concluded by saying that the Benning P

originally submitted was considered a starting point. Constant r

and modification of actions would be necessary to the success 

VOLAR experiment. Capitalizing on the experience gained as the 

progressed would be an excellent means of developing new or m

actions. 
Expansion and Revision 

Once the proposals of the original Benning Plan were well u

way, the post turned inward in its search for additional innovat

From this point on, most of the MVA items were actually an expan

of ideas and projects whose value had previously been recognized 

whose implementation had been prevented by lack of funds. From 

time the original Benning Plan was published in November 1970 

August 1972, ten revisions were forwarded for approval. These revi

ranged from those concerned with four or five proposed action

those which provided an annual updating of the plan. In all case

revisions were aocepted virtually intact; the few actions turned d

by the Departmen·t of the Army were due to funding restrictions ra

than to opposition on regulatory grounds. 

On 1 December 1970, less than two weeks after the MVA Co

Group was established, the first revision to the Benning Plan was 

warded to SAMV A, followed on 24 December 1970 by the second 

sion. Both of these revisions dealt with funded actions and alloc

of funds. As an illustration of the type of change found in the two 

sions, $200,000 was redistributed from the original proposal to p~rc

labor-saving devices, to provide tuition assistance for college entr

fees, and to increase the funds available for collection of refuse 

garbage. 

SAMV A approved all actions with several very minor modifica

on 8 January 1971. The approval was not authorization for additi

personnel, however; all the actions had to be implemented within exi

personnel limitations. 

The first revision that contained policy changes for the center 

published on 15 January 1971 in theform of the New Actions Adden

to the Benning Plan. These actions were all unfunded and were ca

out either by changes to USAIC directives or by DA messages. S

of the actions contained in this addendum were the elimination to 

maximum extent possible of exemption from quty status of junior 

diers on the duty rosters, and a policy that the maximum numb

military personnel be given a half-day off on payday to attend to 

sonal matters. This first policy revision was the continua:tion of 
processes started by the study group and carried forward by the 

Control Group. It did not contain actions that indicated a chan

direction from the VOLAR philosophy or any actions that wer

sidered to be high-impact items. 

Educational Projects 

Up to this point the emphasis had been on living conditions, w

conditions, and job satisfaction that affected the life-style and p

sionalism of the post as a whole. While students were already af

by most of these actions, the belief was that the VOLAR concept 

be applied directly to the Infantry School. Not only would im

ments be made in the classroom, but these changes would also even

affect all soldiers, as the students spread the concept througho

Army. 

The mission of the United States Army Infantry School (US

was to train and educate young combat leaders, both officers and 

commissioned officers, to carry out effectively whatever mission 

might be given. A number of courses were offered by USAIS, i

ing Officer Candidate School (OCS), Infantry Officer Basic C

(IOBC), Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC), Noncommis

Officer Education System (NCOES), and the Ranger and Ai

courses. USAIS and Fort Benning had a great influence on in

officers since usually twice in a career a young officer would be as

to Fort Benning, in probably the most formative periods of his m

life. Not only was the knowledge gained while at Fort Benning v

the officer, but the attitudes and views developed during his tenure 

Infantry School would influence his entire attitude toward the 

and his role in it. 

The professionalism and motivation of officer students attendin

Infantry School was a matter of concern before the initiation of VO

late in 1970. The staff and faculty felt that the atmosphere at U

and Fort Benning did not promote proper student motivation

desire to gain professionally from the academic experience and 

professional while doing so was lacking. There was a general fe

on the other hand, among the officer students that assignment to 

Benning was undesirable and that the instruction was not up 

standards they expected and needed. The end result of these impres

whether warranted or not, was constant petty griping about rea

imagined problems. This practice of continually complaining was 

from class to class and tended to undermine the professiona

academic atmosphere. Most officers were hard-pressed to avoid 

adversely influenced to some degree by this negative thinking. 

In order to create better student motivation and a more profes
ments made before VOLAR included the electives program for of

courses, peer instruction when applicable, the introduction of comp

assisted instruction (CAl) and fully automated multimedia instruc

systems, and the development of blocks of instruction on contem

rary problems faced by young leaders. No studies had been don

determine the value of the improvements in the eyes of the stud

and the lack of statistical data made later findings during the evalua

of VOLAR difficult to interpret. 

The Infantry School became a full-fledged participant in the VOL

experiment with the publication of the first major revision to the orig

Benning Plan- the Education and Training Addendum of 18 Febr

1971. This was USAIS's unique contribution to the MVA effort, 

only at Fort Benning but at the other pilot posts as well. All pilot p

would naturally have large areas of duplication as they applied 

VOLAR concept, but only Fort Benning and, more specifically, US

would be concerned with the service school aspects of VOLAR

such, USA IS's actions in the VOLAR experiment were an impor

part of the over-all efforts to contribute to the continued growth 

development of the soldier leader, professionally and educationally

he progressed through the system. VOLAR implementation in the sc

was a natural and necessary part of the Benning Plan. 

Modern Educational Techniques 

The Education and Training Addendum maintained that educa

and training in today's Anny must be directed toward producing i

viduals qualified in military occupational specialties (MOS). This tr

ing must be carried out in an educational environment conduciv

producing soldiers who not only were qualified but also fitted in 

organization. The educational effort must keep student goals in line 

those of the Anny. Inherent in this training and education concept 

the need to move directly toward individual and self-paced instruc

To attain this kind of personal instruction, which had gradually eme

at leading civilian institutions, a completely new philosophy and adm

istrative framework for Anny eQucation.had to be developed. Traditi

types of classrooms, procedures, instruction, evaluation methods, 

general configurations of facilities and equipment required dra

change. This approach also involved a realistic reappraisal of the n

for additional resources in funds, personnel, facilities, and equipm

Furthermore, Anny policy for the classification and reassignment of 
divided into three sections. The first had twenty programs of instru

advanced instructional techniques, and specialized procedures alre

use which supported the VOLAR concept. A total of thirty actions

grams of instruction, and techniques approved for enhancement 

VOLAR concept were in the second section. The final section con

of actions to provide assistance to VOLAR tests at Fort Ord an

Carson. Of these fifty-nine actions, forty-six were retained for moni

or evaluation or both during the VOLAR 1972 test period. The th

items not carried into fiscal year 1972 were either completed or in

rated into other projects, considered one-time actions, or absorbe

the operation of the Infantry School. 

The addendum proposed to use terrain models as training dev

teach command and control of airmobile operations, since the pl

felt that this would be a tremendous improvement over more c

tional instruction techniques. A rudimentary model had been dev

in March 1969 for a special Vietnam officers orientation course a

presented to selected IOAC students on a test basis the followin

However, real progress was achieved during the initial VOLAR t

riod when VOLAR funds were used to upgrade the program, now 

as the combined arms tactical training simulator (CA TIS) . A fif

classroom was divided into five student training sections, four of 

contained terrain models and platform-mounted mock-ups of a 

equipped with locally fabricated simulations of an AN/ASC- 1

mand and control communications console. Each terrain model pr

different battle ground environments. The fifth station was u

familiarize students with the simulators and the terrain model a

ployed a combination tape, slide, and color TV setup for condu

premiss ion briefing. The program was offered as an elective in 

qualified students could develop scenarios for presentation to the

temporaries. A distinct advantage of the simulator as a training 

was its adaptability to peer instruction. This technique reduced th

of students to instructors and eased the strain caused by in

limitations. 

The CA TIS proved superior to the more conventional mean

struction, since it effectively reduced the degree to which a stude

imagine or simulate the situation and the environment. Equa

portant, active student participation generated by the CA TIS in

motivation, interest, and proficiency in executing tactical operatio

sults of studies conducted by the MV A Control Group showed a 

cant increase in the student's confidence to command and contro

bile operations. CA TIS also promoted greater personal involve
COMBINED ARMS TACTICAL TRAINING SIMULATOR 
surveys in which both the IOAC students and the USAIS staff and f

favorably rated this item as contributing to increasing professio

and creating a more favorable attitude toward the Army. 

An electives program in IOAC was another innovation in effect 

the VOLAR test period. This program was expanded during th

period and modified to provide graduate studies for IOAC student

a baccalaureate degree. The electives program, administered in 

junction with the diagnostic testing program, eliminated unnec

repetition. It gave students an opportunity to enhance their indi

education during duty hours and also to meet USAIS and branch 

by offering seven undergraduate- and three graduate-level college 

courses, nine noncollege credit courses, and five independent 

programs each term. 

Surveys confirmed that this program was favorably received 

students and USAIS staff and faculty and was viewed as contri

to the VOLAR objectives. An advanced-instruction electives pr

in IOBC was also favorably received, although the short nine

course presented administrative and scheduling problems. A simila

tive studies program for OCS students did not tum out as well 

extensive changes in the entire OCS program just as the elective pr

was initiated. This caused erratic student participation, and the e

program had to be reviewed. 

In addition, the Infantry School significantly expanded its pr

on the contemporary problems facing today's leaders. Instruction o

relations, dI1lg abuse, and prevention of AWOL was given to all l

ship students. Although race relations instruction had been implem

before VOLAR, it was expanded during the test period. The o

program had been keyed to black-white relationships, but durin

test period it was upgraded and expanded to include the views of 

minority groups. Drug abuse instruction increased from one to 

hours. In both this program and the one concerning prevent

AWOL, a continual effort was made to present the most up-to-da

useful information possible. All three courses were favorably re

by students and faculty as contributing to the objectives of incr

professionalism and creating a more positive attitude toward the 

Another course that supported the VOLAR objectives wa

management instruction presented to IOAC students. This blo

instruction, also implemented before VOLAR, was more than do

during the test period, from twenty to forty-two hours. The exp

program emphasized general management procedures and used th
agement techniques, work flow, distribution, and other similar prac

to Army units. 

Two programs, although desirable, had to be eliminated when 

straints on programs of instruction caused a cutback in the experime

IOBC course from twelve to nine weeks in May 1971. One was a 

evaluation program designed to provide each student with a leader

profile and enable him to capitalize on strengths and correct weakne

The other was a four-hour instructional program on the subject of rele

problems encountered by the newly commissioned officer. 

Under the broad category of other actions, the Infantry Sc

curtailed certain practices which did not contribute significantly t

objectives and which were often considered to be unnecessary irrit

by the students. The elimination of the requirement for students to s

at attention at the beginning of each class until a status report was g

and to remain standing until commanded to "take seats" was one 

ample. This action did not sacrifice discipline or courtesy and did impr

student morale. Instructors were not permitted to make deroga

remarks about classes or to compare one class with another, as stud

desired to be treated as professionals. Examinations were not sched

on days following night instruction, and classes did not begin be

0900 on days following night training that ended after 2200 ho

These two actions were rated by students as among the most impor

innovations of the VOLAR test period. The actions did not me

grant compensatory time; they allowed a more professional acade

atmosphere by affording the students an opportunity to be adequa

prepared and alert for morning classes and for examinations. Ano

action that reduced student irritation was the order that all perso

refer to officers as "officer students" rather than "student officers." 

IOBC students felt that the term "student officers" was derogatory 

implied that they were not yet commissioned. All of the above act

were implemented during the VOLAR test period and, through su

quent evaluation, were found to support the MV A concept with

lessening or eroding discipline. 

By far the most expensive VOLAR action undertaken by the 

fantry School was the construction and refinement of a test model le

ing center. Over $280,000 was spent developing a facility that offer

variety of instruction through the use of various electronic teaching 

chines. After its inception in March 1971, the Indi'/idual Learning Ce

(ILC) steadily increased its capacity (from 50 carrels to 135) and ca

bility. The ILC used syncronized cassette tapes with 35-mm. sli
USAIS LEARNING CENTER 
inventory consisted of 184 programs for a total of 200 hours of inst

tion. The four subject matter categories included military subjects 

reinforced classroom instruction; enrichment subjects that complemen

classroom instruction; decision problems that tested the student's ab

to apply techniques and principles learned; and selected guest spe

presentations. 

The learning center met the criteria established by VOLAR's e

cation and training philosophy in that it allowed active student p

ticipation while reducing student anxiety and increasing motivat

Furthermore, the instructional pace was geared to the individual, w

the subject matter logically developed and performance oriented. T

program was particularly appropriate for students with lower than des

levels of knowledge; it also provided students with a facility in wh

to explore areas of interest not covered in courses they were attend

Students have responded well to the learning center and it served bot

improve their professional knowledge and to contribute to the VOL

concept. 

An important section in the Education and Training Addendum d

with actions providing assistance to VOLAR tests at Fort Ord and F

Carson. In this way USAIS provided an important link between the th

VOLAR pilot posts. Training liaison teams were dispatched to Fort 

and Fort Carson on a periodic basis; USAIS provided advisory as

ance to Fort Ord in its basic combat training (BCT) and infantry 

vanced individual training (AIT). Command response to these v

indicated that they were useful in providing assistance to Fort 

personnel involved in the Experimental Volunteer Army Training P

gram. As part of its continuing mission, USAIS gave Fort Ord as

ance in updating the Army subject schedules included in the revised B

program and sent to the field for review. USAIS also assisted Fort 

and Fort Carson by providing additional training to USAIS gradu

en route to these posts. The additional training consisted of distribu

of information packets, VOLAR briefings, and additional maintena

training for selected students assigned to Fort Carson. Initially a spe

leadership class on contemporary problems was also given. The prog

was well received; however, as Fort Ord and Fort Carson began VOL

programs, much of the information was duplicated. Because of this 

plication, plus the inclusion of contemporary leadership problems in 

regular program of instruction, the additional training was discontin

Several other programs were originally envisioned which were not 

plemented due to unnecessary duplication or because the anticip

need did not develop. 
definite co-ordinated impetus given to major revisions but, for th

time, detailed evaluations of attitudes, opinions, existing practice

implemented actions were accomplished. The consensus of the e

tors, validated by opinion surveys, was that the collective actions 

mented by the Infantry School in support of the Benning Plan 

fact accomplish their stated objectives of upgrading the excellence 

Infantry School as an educational institution, of enhancing the 

sionalism of the staff and faculty, and of providing specific me

which better trained, motivated, and influenced young combat 

to choose the Army as a career. 

Working Conditions 

Four days after the emergence of the Education and Trainin

dendum, a list of fiscal year 1971 VOLAR projects was forwar

Third Army in response to a CONARC message of 3 February 

giving funding guidance to the three VOLAR pilot posts. The li

tained thirty funded items with a total cost of $1,297,870, rangin

$2,000 for a clerk-typist to process re-enlistment and reassignment 

expeditiously, to nearly $408,000 to improve and upgrade televis

cilities available at USAIS. According to instructions from CON

all the projects were to be funded under Operation and Mainte

Army (OMA) . 

Department of the Army approved completely twenty-one 

thirty proposed additional VOLAR projects; seven were approve

slight modification; and two were disapproved. The modifications 

to bring the proposed expenditures within the legal guidelines estab

for OMA funds without countering the rationale behind the prop

The proposal to spend $15,000 to purchase equipment necessary to 

a classroom capable of presenting fully automated instructional pro

was turned down until the automated system under consideration p

to be cost effective. The other disapproved action called for an ex

ture of $100,000 to conduct field training exercises and opera

readiness training by the 43d Engineer Battalion and 568th En

Company and was turned down as not being an appropriate expen

of VOLAR funds. 

A complete update of the Benning Plan's action was provid

9 March 1971 when Change Number 1 to the Benning Plan wa

lished. The change was concerned only with the sections that con

proposed actions; the sections on general information and contro

evaluation procedures and the numerous inclosures remained 
The format remained the same, as did the rationale behind the acti

suspense dates, and action agencies. The update provided by Chan

Number 1 was necessary in order to provide all units and key person

engaged in the MV A movement with a relevant and workable docume

Parts of the original plan became outdated due to the rapid progres

the first three and one-half months; the change represented an effor

correct this situation. 

The plan was revamped with the realization that funding was criti

Reaction from the Department of the Army indicated that there was 

problem in changing regulations and policies to carry out actions, but t

lack of funds could and would prevent implementation. As a result, 

the actions were reorganized into two cost groupings-those that co

be enacted within resources available to Fort Benning and those wh

still require additional funds. (See Chart 2.) 

The number of proposed actions in the Benning Plan was greatly 

duced as a result of progress already made. The MVA Control Group w

able to combine several of the original proposals into more meaning

and broader actions. Other actions contained in the Benning Plan w

removed by Change Number 1 for a variety of reasons. Actions that h

been either disapproved or deferred by the SAMV A conference of 14 D

cember 1970 were deleted. Some were eliminated because of low prior

and lack of funds. Other proposals taken out were those which had b

one-time actions and no longer required monitoring and evaluation. T

sum total of the changes from these actions reduced the original 

proposed actions to 100. (See Appendix A.) 

Besides updating the Benning Plan, Change Number 1 was a re

tion to the realization that Fort Benning's role as a pilot post was 

going to end after six months but would continue for at least another 

year. A revised plan of action based on experience factors was vital to 

continuing success of the VOLAR experiment. Change Number 1 wa

major step in developing such a plan. 

Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan 

Nearly three weeks after Change Number 1 was published, "T

Fort Benning Plan for Movement Toward a Modem Volunteer Arm

Fiscal Year 72," was presented for approval to higher headquarters. T

Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan was considerably changed in format fr

the original plan, but actions contained in it showed definite progress. 

mention was made of background information or control and evaluat

procedures, but the Fiscal Year 72 plan was much more complex and 

tailed than the previous version., The working portion of the plan w

divided into two major sections. The first was composed of the unfund

part of Change Number 1 and the Education and Training Addendu
actions and included detailed cost projections, recapitulations by 

authority, and explicit justification of each funded action. 

The Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan was a realistic portrayal 

would be accomplished during the first six months of the VOLAR 

iment and what could be done in the following twelve months. T

was based on a perspective developed during approximately four 

of work toward the VOLAR objectives, and contained only acti

programs that would further the MV A concepts. The plan, wit

tailed justification and funding requirements, gave Third Ar

SAMVA a realistic picture of what was to take place at Fort B

The emphasis on funded actions was a clear indication that they 

key to the continued success of VOLAR. The initial emphasis h

on removing unnecessary irritants; now the emphasis was on con

improvement of the soldier's life-style. These improvements wer

ably costly, and the funds required for fiscal year 1972 totaled ne

million for sixty-three proposals. 

In order that the status of the funded actions could be easily d

they were broken down into sections based on priority of imp

tion and funding authority. The first section contained twenty-fi

approved for implementation in fiscal year 1971 which could 

tinued in fiscal year 1972 within VOLAR funding guidelines. Al

items were OMA financed and totaled $7.5 million. Such pr

civilian KP, USAIS maintenance of the learning center, and the 

preventive maintenance program were contained in this high 

category. (Chart 6 ) The second section consisted of thirteen 

financed items that had been started under the original Benning 

could not be continued in fiscal year 1972 unless $1.3 million 

vided. These items included personnel benefits and supplies for 

hired in support of the VOLAR program and the 197th Infa

gade's unit-of-choice recruiting plan. Items that had been appr

implementation in fiscal year 1971 but had not been started due t

OMA funds composed the third section. These seven projects 

payment of the cost of operating bachelor officers' quarters (BO

of maintaining two coffee houses. The last section involving OM

contained eleven new VOLAR actions, costing an estimated $

for which approval was sought from higher headquarters. 

The fifth section covered one project that was funded by th

housing management account (FHMA). Refuse collection and 

which had been implemented under the Benning Plan, required 

for fiscal year 1972. Three non appropriated fund (NAF) activiti

had also been initiated but required more money made up 
CHART 6

Priorities Sufficient Insufficie

Funds for 1972 

Agent .......... . . .. OMA . .. ..... . .. . OMA . ... . ..... N

Millions of dollars . 7.5 ........ . . . ... 1.3 .. .... ..... . 0

Principal action .... Kitchen police UOC in 197th F

and preven- Infantry 

tive mainte- Brigade 

nance pro- 

gram 
section. The seventh and final category contained three projects f

by Military Construction, Anny (MCA). Construction of an auto

craft shop on main post was in this group. 

Each of the sixty-three proposed actions was then presented in 

The current status of each implemented item was given along w

justification and the number of personnel, both military and civil

quired to support it. Included was a breakdown of the estimate

under such categories as personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, 

rary duty, and contracts. The detailed presentation of each actio

vided a ready reference for all pertinent infonnation on the acti

allowed for more meaningful evaluation at higher headquarters. 

provided commanders at all levels at Fort Benning with an ex

status report of the VOLAR experiment and the direction in wh

concept was headed. 

Third U.S. Anny (TUSA) comments on the Fiscal Year 7

arrived at Fort Benning on 15 April 1971. All but six of the sixt

funded actions proposed were approved. The six disapproved pr

were new actions for fiscal year 1972 and were turned down as no

appropriate for expenditure of VOLAR funds, even though the n

such actions was recognized. 

CONARC was more critical of the plan than Third Anny, ma

the area of fund allocations. In addition to concurring with all of T

disapprovals, CONARC turned down two more new actions. On

out of eleven new proposals were accepted, an indication of tig

purse strings. CONARC approval of the Fiscal Year 72 plan 

planning purposes only; it did not constitute authorization to obli

expend funds; neither did it relieve Fort Benning of the requirem

follow established channels in seeking technical review and appr

final caution added that detailed justification of additional person

required before final approval. 

SAMVA concurred with all of CONARC's recommendations

several legal questions which precluded immediate implementa

certain projects, such as contracting an off-post motel as a guest 

commented on fund allocations for several actions, and made sugg

on how other proposed allocations might prove more acceptable. S

infonned Fort Benning that specific funding instructions would 

ceived in late June 1971 for all VOLAR projects, and that the D

ment of the Anny would provide requested family housing mana

account (FHMA) funds to continue ongoing projects falling 

this category. SAMVA also reiterated the requirement to wait for 

approval before spending funds or filling additional personnel slo

though the actions had been approved. 

The Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan was revised in August 1971

on guidance received from higher headquarters. Whereas the Fisc
pj

cost VOLAR actions that had already been implemented was upd

and shortened by consolidating a number of related items and elimina

those that were by then standard Fort Benning policy and required 

further monitoring. Several new actions recommended by the Dep

ment of the Army were also added. The list of cost actions submitte

the Fiscal Year 1972 plan was included, with each action annotate

indicate whether higher headquarters had approved, disapproved

modified it. The revision noted that actual implementation of fun

items would be determined by future release of funds. Which act

would receive money and in what amounts was not fully known at 

time. A shortened version of the Education and Training Addendum 

also included in the fiscal year 1972 revision. 

Eventually Fort Benning was able to carry out thirty-four of the si

six proposed funded actions contained in the Fiscal Year 72 plan, ba

on the funds and instructions received from the Department of the Ar

Only OMA and FHMA funds were provided, nearly $3 million 

than was requested. The thirty top-priority OMA-funded actions w

implemented in fiscal year 1972, thus allowing Project VOLAR to 

tinue to expand and make its improvements felt. 

Unit-of-Choice Recruiting 

The Fiscal Year 72 plan specifically mentioned, for the first t

unit-of-choice (UOC) recruiting. This was an enlistment option 

veloped to support MVA whereby an enlistee was guaranteed an ass

ment to a unit of his choice. 

Recruitment by Major Units, as the program was initially ca

came to Fort Benning's attention on 22 December 1970, when noti

tion was received that the 197th Infantry Brigade had been selecte

participate in a test of the program. The initial concept designated m

units to conduct recruiting programs for combat arms !ioldiers in t

local areas. The recruiting efforts would be co-ordinated with the Un

States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). Enlistees under 

option ~ould be guaranteed assignment to the selected unit for a spec

period of time, after completing basic combat training and advanced 

dividual training. Initially the. guarantee was for twelve months but 

soon extended to sixteen months after which the enlistee was subje

an overseas tour. 

The guidance included a suspense date of 1 February 1971 for im

mentation of the program and required each selected unit to prepa

synopsis of its activities and history in order to make the unit more att
VSC was autoed, wtoatocopes oacoespo

to be provided to the appropriate intermediate headquarters. 

Two days later, 24 December 1970, CONARC reported that Ge

Westmoreland had approved the concept of VOC recruiting. Addi

authorization and guidance on direct co-ordination between the 

recruiting districts, and main stations were received. Primary ma

ment responsibility for the VOC program was assigned to the VSA

commanding general. In anticipation of detailed instructions to be i

no later than 10 January 1971, the recruiting districts concerned 

to establish and maintain effective liaison with the 197th Brigad

to assist with technical advice as well as with publicity and inform

concepts relevant to recruiting operations. 

Detailed instructions from the Department of the Army arriv

6 January 1971 setting forth a six-month test period, effective 1 F

ary 1971. Each unit was required to designate a project officer w

mission was to co-ordinate all the activities related to the VOC prog

Screening and selection of the soldiers who were to be the recruiting 

resentatives had to be completed before 10 January. In order tha

unit re-enlistment program would not be adversely affected by the V

program, the suggestion was made not to use career counselors a

time. The Army Recruiting Command was to fulfill the administr

and funding requirements, leaving the units free to get out and sell t

selves. Itineraries for training team orientations and liaison visits we

up. The area of recruitment for each unit was within a radius of 1

150 miles of the home base. The message concluded by informing the 

ticipants that there would be no additional funds for the duration o

trial period. Provisions for reporting results of the test program wer

included. 

The final guidance from the Department of the Army befor

start of the test program arrived on 11 January 1971. This message m

fied the VOC concept by stipulating that while an enlistee was prom

an assignment to the unit of his choice, he was not guaranteed tha

assignment would immediately follow completion of basic combat 

ing and advanced individual training. The assignment might n

available until completion of an overseas tour. The message also n

that the radius of recruiting was to be considered only as a guide, le

the decision on an area of operation for the commands to make ac

ing to productivity and funds. Once again the lack of specific fund

the program was reiterated, leaving the 197th Brigade in the positi

initiating a vigorous and imaginative program on an austere budge

The 197th Brigade had no previous experience in recruiting, b
UNIT-QF-CHOICE RECRUITING AREAS 

accord with instructions from higher headquarters, contact was m

with the recruiting command and a close working relationship was s

established. Participation in the UOC program became a high prio

mission of the 197th Brigade. A workable and successful concept 

operation was implemented, as derived from advice of the recruiters a

from brainstorming sessions held in the brigade. The recruiting area w

originally determined as consisting of Georgia, Alabama, and Flori

South Carolina was added later. Monthly meetings of the recruiting 

trict and main station commanders were held with the brigade. In ad

tion, USAREC personnel were on duty full time at the 197th Brig

Headquarters, and 197th personnel were assigned to each main stat

in the recruiting area. 

Battalion areas of operation were established in the four-state ar

Recruiting emphasis was placed on high school seniors. A recruit

approach was developed wherein young soldiers in the ranks of E-5 a

below and company grade officers were used as active recruiting age

By capitalizing on youth-to-youth credibility, the prevalent distrust 

the older generation was neutralized. This concept was incorporated i

a recruiting cycle which worked well. 

The first step was to get the attention of the prospective rec
LOCAL RECRUITER MARKETS DOC OPTION 

through appearances in his home town, in school, at youth activit

fairs, or at any place where young people congregate. A num

attention-getting devices were used, complemented by the prese

selected young soldiers who were from the local area. Equipme

plays, speaking engagements, and domestic actions were used to c

the message that the 197th Brigade was an excellent assignmen

that such an assignment was guaranteed under the DOC pro

A big selling point to thc high school student was the fact that he 

serve close to home and would be able to return often on weeke

on three-day passes. Credibility was added by the presence of the 

soldiers who had no recruiting quotas to meet and no mission othe

to "tell it like it is." 

Follow-up action was a combination of efforts by the local re

and contact teams. As the recruiter completed processing each new 

the contact teams personally filled the prospective soldier in 

brigade and answered fully and accurately any questions he had. Pr

tive recruits who showed interest were invited to visit Fort Benni

see for themselves. The recruiter then enlisted the volunteers an

them to receive basic combat training. For a large number, even adv

individual training was given by the 197th Brigade at Fort Bennin
• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

. . 

.~ .... • . -

THEN SEE YOUR ARMY RECRUITER AND 

BE GUARANTEED • A 

THE 

97 INF. BDE 

FORT BENNING, GEORGIA III ~TATt (OAT 

THE PRODUCT SELLS ITSELF 
Equipment 

displays, 

speaking 

engagements, 

domestic action 

projects, 

buddies 

1 

recruiting cycle was .completed when selected young soldiers recr

under DOC returned to their home towns to act as canvassers or p

speakers. (Chart 7) 

As with any new concept, implementation of DOC recruiting w

first slow and seemingly unsuccessful and excessively expensive. 

first two months of the DOC test period saw only twenty-nine volun

using this option, at a cost to Fort Benning of nearly $1,000 per 

April and May 1971 were not much better, but the necessary gro

work had been laid and success was just around the corner. From 

to December of 1971 DOC recruiting provided the 197th Brigade 

almost a full quota of combat soldiers. At this point, recruitment 

vacancies in all authorized positions, E-4 and below, was begun. 

this time on, DOC recruiting filled the brigade's personnel requirem

at a cost per recruit of less than $85. 

A similar program adopted by the 931st Engineer Group on 1 

1971 was well received. Following much the same approach a

197th, the 931st Engineer Group was also able to fulfill its pers

requirements. 

Feelings expressed by commanders who had UOC soldiers in 
gy 

g

job performance. The VOC soldiers were generally pleased to be at 

Benning. They did not feel they had been "sold a bill of goods" by 

recruiters, and the majority indicated they would follow the same co

if they could do it over again. They willingly recommended Fort 

ning to their friends at home. 

Civic Adventures 

VOC recruiting became a major impetus behind the developme

two related VOLAR improvements, the domestic actions program 

adventure training. Domestic actions were a means of presenting 

Army in a favorable light before the public's eyes. These joint civilian 

military projects demonstrated that in addition to protecting the coun

units can help their civilian neighbors to help themselves by buil

parks and recreational areas and engaginG' in other worthwhile proj

The impact on the self-image of the young soldier was as productiv

the impact on the public image. Home town news releases were stre

and for the first time in a long while, soldiers felt the pride of "John

comes-marching-home. " 

Adventure training was conceived to make service life more satisfy

In addition to relieving the monotony of daily Army life by presen

training that was different, challenging, and enjoyable, it became a us

contribution to the total community. At the same time, adventure tr

ing was regularly used to depict the Army as a desirable way of life. 

vanced individual training platoons performed their end-of-course 

exercises near the civilian communities from which they were recrui

At the completion of the exercise, soldiers would be allowed to go 

the community for limited recreation, usually provided by some c

group or local reserve unit. Such actions accomplished four object

in one operation. Although training was the primary objective, by o

ating in the civilian areas, favorable publicity was generated wh

contributed to job satisfaction, recruiting credibility was reinforced, 

recreation was made available to round out the operation. 

Civic actions specifically designed to contribute to a community 

came real e~amples of the adventure training concept. Projects w

carefully selected in order to prevent the program from becoming an 

tension of government welfare. The criteria for accepting a project 

the degree of civic involvement which could be generated by the tro

commitment. Greenville, South Carolina, was an illustration. The 

was about to lose a federal grant because it was unable to match gov

ment funds for playground projects in an underprivileged area of the 
MEMBERS OF 1ST BATTALION, 29TH INFANTRY, ASSIST CITIZ

By committing a platoon for ten days to the construction of these 

parks, an entire urban community became mobilized. The dow

merchant's association paid the hotel bills for all the soldiers; loc

taurants fed the soldiers two free meals a day; the local reserve unit 

neer company) performed all operations requiring heavy equip

and the local ROTC and high school students sent out volunteer g

to assist the final grooming of the playground areas. The catalytic 

of the platoon of soldiers enabled the city to earn the federal gran

actual cost of little more than $6,000. The climate of co-operation 

strong during this period that every soldier, by his own choice, w

uniform with pride both on and off duty. 

Fiscal Year 73 Benning Plan 

In January 1972, the process for fund requisition was again 

ated, this time for fiscal year 1973. In addition to requesting th

fiscal year 1972 VOLAR projects be continued, eight additio

Project VOLAR were recommended, at a total cost of $10.4 m

The Fiscal Year 73 plan, which was published in August 1972, fo

much the same format as the 1972 revision. It contained fifty-tw
\1'111\\ JI)7th 1"f,,"11'\ Bdl'. 

, ilt" \~~i~1 III (it) PI ;'jl "' I~ 

Benning unit to aid 

in loca l renovations 

.R1 

. Army plan

lake clean-

CIVIC ADVENTURE IMPROVES ARMY'S IMAGE 
pj

section. As with the 1972 revised plan, funding authorization 

come under separate correspondence as the Department of the 

received funding instructions from Congress. 

The eighteen months from January 1971 to June 1972 sa

Benning settle down into a sustained effort to accomplish those 

which had been formulated during the first half-year of Project VO

By carefully establishing priorities, the momentum generated by 

tial trial period was maintained in the face of lessening financial s

The considered ordering of priorities was made possible only by c

evaluations conducted throughout Project VOLAR which id

the high-impact actions. 
More Than the Sum of the Parts 

The combat power of armored infantry is greater than the simple 

of infantry firepower plus mechanized mobility plus tank firepower. 

additional power beyond the sum is known as the synergistic ef

Much the same effect can be attributed to the items contained in 

Benning Plan. 

Throughout the entire VOLAR trial period an evaluation pro

was conducted that paralleled the implementation of the Benning P

actions. The continuous evaluation of Project VOLAR filled a num

of important requirements. Scientific credibility was gained for the 

periment by the reduction of subjective analysis based on emoti

responses. Objective interpretation of data gathered by accepted eva

tive techniques provided a factual framework upon which the en

project was based. The evaluative process provided continuous moni

ing of the actual implementation of the Benning Plan and served 

vital control mechanism. The relative impact of actions was identif

thus enabling the MV A Control Group to established funding priori

Another basic contribution of the evaluation was the gathering of 

statistical data. This data was necessary to establish trends, measure 

titude shifts, determine how the human need categories were affe

by Project VOLAR, and counter any misconceptions which arose d

ing the period of the experiment. Finally, the collection of the d

provided important historical documents, which were of sufficient de

to be useful and valid to an interested reader or agency. 

MethodoLogy 

Under the original concept for an evaluation plan, the Benn

group planned five methods of evaluation, including an after ac

report. While personal interviews, performance statistics, and spe

actions were used extensively, surveys were the primary measuring te

niques used to determine how the Benning Plan was affecting perso

career intentions. 

The evaluation of Project VOLAR was based on criteria at 

levels. At the more general level, there was a need to make the mili

service interesting, challenging, and rewarding to the widest poss
desirable, both for short-term involvement and long-term caree

had to be done, however, without sacrificing mission capability

specific level, the criteria for evaluation of VOLAR would be 

or combinations of actions which produced improvement, in ord

future resources could be allocated in areas having the greatest 

on military personnel. Opinion surveys therefore became parti

critical. 

After the initial November 1970 survey of soldier attitudes, fol

surveys were administered in June 1971, August 1971, Novembe

February 1972, and May 1972. While the first two were identic

later ones were modified to delete actions which were not imple

initially or which were discontinued at the end of fiscal year 197

sonnel surveyed represented a random sample of the post popu

stratified within broad limits of rank and tour status. The sa

procedure used the last four digits of each potential subject's 

security nwnber. Quotas and sampling procedures, based on the p

age of the total post population represented in each of the broa

gories of personnel, were given to the quality control officer in e

Fort Benning's major commands. The quality control officers w

sponsible for administering the surveys within their organizations a

ing to detailed instructions provided by the VOLAR evaluation el

The surveys were carried out under strictly enforced control con

and supervised by post VOLAR control and evaluation elements

Objectivity was the main emphasis throughout the entire eva

process. Many conclusions drawn from Project VOLAR were ex

to be controversial and would require extensive supporting docu

tion to gain acceptance. The supporting documentation had to b

to be worthwhile. A number of proven evaluation techniques we

ployed to gain the required objectivity. A control post was used to p

a standard against which the impact of VOLAR could be me

All surveys, samples, and measurements were conducted obje

using random selection and insuring the anonymity of the subjec

raw data were made available. There was never any attempt to 

data fit preconceived conclusions; rather, conclusions were draw

the facts. The knowledge that the VOLAR experiment was bein

cally examined by others caused the evaluation element to ben

backwards in insuring that conclusions were substantiated and obj

Progress in Perspective 

A total of six evaluative reports were made by Fort Benning 

nel during the twenty-month VOLAR experiment. The first such 
actions than an evaluation of them. 

The Second Status Report, rendered on 12 March 1971, continu

in the same vein. General Talbott's cover letter detailed a number 

problems faced by Fort Benning in March 1971, such as the hesitan

of potential civilian employees to accept VOLAR-based jobs due to 

uncertainty of continued employment. He stressed the predomin

attitude toward VOLAR, which at the time was one of wait and 

The development of a receptive atmosphere was more important 

the Benning Plan, as the open-minded acceptance of changes was critic

General Talbott pointed out that there were a number of irritants a

unsatisfied needs that were outside the scope of the plan. At this ea

point, although no single action of the Benning Plan might be import

enough to influence a career decision, the cumulative tendency of 

innovations to overcome the resistance factor was recognized a

expressed. 

In March 1971 the frequency of the MVA reports was chang

from bimonthly to quarterly. The third report was therefore given 

July 1971 and continued the trend established by the previous repo

It devoted considerable effort to a summary and progress analysis 

Benning Plan actions and presented statistical indicators, including int

pretation of developing trends. 

The report provided insight into a number of new problems fac

Project VOLAR, such as the fact that the VOLAR audience then fou

at Fort Benning was not an ideal test group. It was mainly composed 

Vietnam returnees with less than six months of their service obligat

remaining. Unit-of-choice recruiting eventually solved this situati

Another problem area encountered was the wide discrepancy betwe

attitudes and statistical indicators pertaining to discipline. A stro

feeling that discipline had deteriorated because of VOLAR was d

covered, especially among senior noncommissioned officers. A thorou

investigation into discipline was initiated at this time. 

The 'report also mentioned Fort Knox as a comparison post; ho

ever, few conclusions could be drawn between posts due to limitatio

in data collected at the Armor School. Observed differences did sugg

that soldiers at Fort Benning felt the Army was becoming more concern

with the individual. This view in tum improved their receptiven

toward Project VOLAR. Nevertheless, although the Benning Plan w

felt to be a step in the right direction, at this point the degree of succ

still could not be accurately determined nor could valid projections 

made on the effect of an expanding and continuing program. 
Installation Evaluation Report, which contained a more detail

cussion and evaluation of Project VOLAR during the first six 

of 1971. The stated objective of the evaluation was to assess the 

ing three areas: expressed career intentions and attitudes towar

Benning; general attitudes toward the Army and military servic

attitudes toward the specific VOLAR actions implemented a

Benning. A questionnaire survey had been administered to a large 

of enlisted and officer personnel at Fort Benning and Fort Knox 

the start of Project VOLAR and again in June 1971. Difference

in the responses between the two surveys aided in assessing the 

of VOLAR on attitudes. However, the data to distinguish b

attitude changes attributable to local VOLAR actions and those 

utable to extraneous factors at Fort Knox became confused 

Knox began to incorporate its own VOLAR actions. Fortunat

trends established at Fort Benning continued throughout the expe

and the control post comparison was not really necessary. 

When attitudes toward specific VOLAR actions were assess

finding was that the VOLAR program had a very distinct impact 

attitudes of all military personnel at Fort Benning, both enlist

officer. (Chart 8) The experimental actions with the highest 

were generally found to be those which reduced the amount of 

work that was not a part of a soldier's military occupational sp

provided more privacy and freedom in troop barracks, decrea

amount of control exercised over the soldier during nonduty tim

produced evidence that the Army was concerned with equitabl

ment of the soldier. 

Analysis of attitudes toward the Army and military service in

that in general there were favorable changes, though slight, 

attitudes of officers and enlisted men at both Fort Benning an

Knox; thus, these changes could not be attributed to the Bennin

Evaluators felt that Army-wide VOLAR actions had influence

attitude changes to varying degrees. Analysis of career intentions r

that Fort Benning presented a somewhat more favorable pictu

Fort Knox, but as yet there was not a corresponding increase in 

re-enlistments. 

The evaluation concluded that the Benning Plan was headed 

right direction and, within the constraints imposed by author

funds, had done well considering the short period of the expe

Feelings regarding basic inequities among younger enlisted soldi

changed favorably; the soldiers were cognizant and appreciative 

changes. The most important factor affecting re-enlistment, howev
Group Date Mea

1· 2~ 3" 44 respo

First·term enlisted ... ..... . ... Nov 70 1.4 4.9 12.0 81.6 3

Jun 71 2.1 7.5 13.3 77.1 3

Nov 71 3.6 10.7 17.7 68.0 3

May 72 3.8 16.1 28.2 52.0 3

Nov 72 8.2 16.3 22.0 53.5 (c) 3

First·term officer ... . .......... Nov 70 7.3 14.3 20.1 58.3 3

Jun 71 10.1 12.9 14.3 62.7 3

Nov 71 12.1 20.9 16.5 50.5 3

May 72 9.5 16.7 21.4 52.4 3

Nov 72 11.4 27.1 19.8 41.7 (c) 2

Extended·term enlisted . . . .. .. Nov 70 71.2 9.6 8:6 10.5 1

Jun 71 64.5 12.5 10.3 12.7 1

Nov 71 65.9 12.7 7.5 14.0 1

May 72 64.0 13.0 8.7 14.3 1

Nov 72 64.2 12.6 9.4 13.8 . (c) 1

Extended·term officer ... ...... Nov 70 77.9 12.4 4.9 4.7 1

Jun 71 78.8 11.8 3.9 5.4 1

Nov 71 76.6 15.1 4.4 3.9 1

May 72 78.4 10.8 7.4 3.4 1

Nov 72 73.3 17.5 6.3 2.9 (c) 1

Which of the following best describes your Army career intentions? • 1. I will remain in the Army until retirement. ~ 2. I will remain in the Army for a while longer, but have not yet deci

about staying until retirement. 

"3. I am undecided about my Army career intentions. 

44. I will leave the Army upon completion of current obligation. 

Note: The lower the group mean, the more favorable the response. A group m

of 1.00 would indicate that everyone within that group intends to remain in 

Army until retirement. 

a need for security. This need was translated by the report into pay co

cerns and was cited as one of those extraneous factors beyond the sco

of the Benning Plan. 

Effect on Discipline 

In contrast with the initial period of the VOLAR experiment wh

saw a flurry of reports and evaluations, the next six months had o

one evaluation. The Semi-Annual VOLAR Evaluation Report was pu

lished in January 1972 and, notwithstanding the title, covered the f

twelve months of the Benning Plan. The report was over five hundr

pages long and was divided into two basic sections. Approximately o

fifth of the January 1972 evaluation was devoted to a subjective su
mary and progress analysis of Fort Benning MVA projects, wh

rest of the report concentrated on an assessment of the USAIS edu

and training innovations, statistical indicators of morale and disc

and an over-all evaluation of the program. 

The evaluation concluded that during the period of the VO

experiment at Fort Benning, there were massive positive changes 

attitudes of first-tour personnel, who were the primary targets of VO

actions. These positive changes occurred in respect to specific VO

actions, basic attitudes toward the Army, and expressed career 

tions. There was no evidence that these highly significant change

been accompanied by either decreased military discipline or re

mission capability. Conversely, there were objective indications th

cipline either remained stable or improved during the experiment. 

Because Fort Knox had become a fiscal year 1972 experiment

and ceased being Fort Benning's control post, evaluators could n

conclusively that any specific action or group of VOLAR actions c

these positive changes. Although there were indications, evaluators 

not determine if these attitude changes were in part responsible f

rising re-enlistment rates. The report did conclude that, based o

available evidence, VOLAR actions, both at Fort Benning and 

partment of the Army level, had within the space of a year achie

major success, that great progress had been made towald the attai

of VOLAR goals, and that the promise of continued progress t

these goals was a reasonable expectation. 

As with all the evah,lative reports, the semiannual report pre

statistical evidence which substantiated its conclusions, including m
Results of Analysis 

The Final Evaluation Report of July 1972 was the culminatio

the previous twenty months' evaluative efforts. This 737-page re

dealt with the entire period of Project VOLAR at Fort Benning. It 

cluded a detailed discussion of the findings and conclusions of the M

Control Group on all aspects of the experiment. All collected raw d

were presented, thus providing the source material upon which the f

ings and conclusions were based. A detailed report on military discip

was included as were a number of other specific areas of interest, suc

attitudes of dependents. Evaluation of actions undertaken by US

received considerable attention, as did a sumrnary and progress anal

of funded and nonfunded MV A projects. The Final Evaluation Re

provided the entire picture of Project VOLAR from the evalua

standpoint. 

Findings concerning the impact of VOLAR actions seemed to c

flict at some points. When data from November 1970 were compa

with data from May 1972, the attitudes of both officers and sold

(particularly first-tour) toward specific VOLAR actions showed c

siderable positive impact. On the other hand, comparisons from 

vember 1971 to May 1972 showed fewer significant changes, and e

some significant negative changes. Furthermore, if the four general 

titude areas (need for security, pride in service, understanding lea

ship, and equitable returns from military service) were considered, 

impact appeared measurably lower. While the comparisons for first-

enlisted personnel were positive and significant in all four areas fr

November 1970 to May 1972, similar significant gains were not m

even among these personnel from Noven:tber 1971 to May 1972. Furth

extended-tour personnel, both enlisted and commissioned, showed at l

some important negative changes in these four need areas in all c

parisons. Finally, in comparison from November 1971 to Novem

1972, commissioned personnel uniformly showed negative change in 

areas though these changes were not significant. 

Contradictions were found in the data regarding expressed ca

intentions and actual career decisions. Among first-tour enlisted 

sonnel, there were substantial gains in expressed career intentions, 

pecially during the last evaluation period. There was also evidenc

increases in actual re-enlistments in this group. However, obligated 

unteer officer rates of request for retention and for voluntary indefi

status were lower in calendar year 1972 than in either 1970 or 19
regular Army appointments were larger in calendar year 1972 th

1970 for obligated volunteer officers and in 1971 for voluntary ind

officers. 

There were many posSiple explanations for these apparently 

flicting results. For example, most of the positive attitude changes to

specific actions seemed to occur primarily during the first six mon

the VOLAR experiment, with little additional change in the foll

twelve months. On the other hand, the possibility existed that the 

ficial effect of some VOLAR actions had eroded. Moreover, a su

tial number of the personnel surveyed in May 1972 might simpl)

lacked the necessary experience with the pre-VOLAR life at For

ning to be able to provide a valid comparison. 

There was little concrete basis in the data for choosing among 

several possibilities. There were, however, many clues in the data

ticularly in some of the supplementary material, such as that ob

in the structured interviews with re-enlisting and separating enliste

sonnel. These clues were used to construct a frame of reference to 

interpret the results of both the over-all evaluation and the interim r

preceding it. 

One of the most important observations was that the level of sa

tion changed rapidly and significantly. The first semiannual surve

lowing implementation of the VOLAR experiment found that 

changes had already occurred. However, the change found in g

attitudes toward the Army (pride in service, security, leadership

inequities) was not dramatic and, in fact, was very small. Further

changes in career intentions were not statistically significant, ev

first-tour enlisted personnel, though a positive trend was apparent 

data. Finally, the change in actual re-enlistment was not signi

though a positive trend was also apparent. 

In subsequent evaluations, general attitude changes for firs

enlisted personnel became significant and large. Career intentions u

went slower change, with the improvement noted in the May 

evaluation being the most dramatic single change to have occurr

first-tour enlisted personnel. Actual career behavior was also mov

a positive direction, with some data from the re-enlisting and sepa

study suggesting that the actual level of VOLAR impact on re-enlist

might have been accelerating. Thu~, the general picture was that of 

impact on attitudes toward specific VOLAR actions, a somewha

change in general attitudes, an even slower change in expressed 

intentions, and the slowest change in actual re-enlistment behavior
Given these findings concerning first-tour enlisted personnel, an 

planation for some of the apparent contradictions mentioned earlier c

be deduced. A change in the level of satisfaction caused by a con

VOLAR action could be expected to occur rapidly. For example, 

soldier were working a seven-day week and then suddenly began to w

a five-day week, he could reasonably be expected to immediately re

greater satisfaction with the length of his workweek. However, 

change would not necessarily increase his satisfaction with the A

or his intention to re-enlist. Satisfaction with the Army, a more gen

kind of attitude, was undoubtedly the result of the soldier's balan

many factors against one another, the length of his workweek being 

one. A balance among many factors would require that he reasses

experience with all of them; therefore, more time would be needed 

for the assessment of a single area. Similarly, the decision to re-enlis

evidenced in either career intentions or actual behavior, would su

involve even more factors, requiring an even longer time to achie

clear-cut balance. 

The apparent contradictions in the data, at least insofar as 

tour personnel were concerned, could therefore be explained at 

in part by the probability that different kinds of attitudes change

different rates. The more concrete and simple the attitude was, 

more rapidly it could change as a result of a VOLAR action. The m

complex and the greater the number of factors on which it depen

the more slowly it was likely to change. Decisions concerning re-enlistm

behavior were clearly among the most complex measured in these eva

tions and probably the slowest to change. From this point of view

change found in data on first-tour enlisted personnel was all the m

encouraging. The strong implication was that VOLAR at Fort Ben

could be expected to produce even greater future change than wa

ready noted, if the level of VOLAR support continued. 

Insofar as first-tour personnel were concerned, a second process 

also occurring which explained at least a part of the lag in intent

and actual re-enlistments. In all likelihood, most soldiers viewed 

onset of VOLAR with some skepticism. A typical attitude might 

been, "It sounds good, but will it last?" Soldiers perceived that progr

such as VOLAR can become perishable when key senior officers cha

but the re-enlistment term was permanent, once it was undertaken. M

soldiers most likely had a wait-and-see approach during the early mo

of VOLAR. 
two factors had probably worked simultaneously to produce the 

The first factor was the increasing percentage of active-duty-for-t

officers in the surveyed first-tour officer group during the latte

surveys. In the May 1972 data, the percentage was very substanti

surprisingly, surveys including these officers would show an in

to leave the Army since their plans to return to civilian life wer

well established from the outset of their current tour of active 

Examination of the answers by officers in this category, as oppo

all other first-tour officers in each survey, showed that this su

had been largely responsible for the negative changes in expressed 

intentions among first-tour officers, and probably the negative c

in general attitudes toward the Army. In other words, attitudes 

the Army and career intentions had probably not changed neg

Rather, the proportion of first-tour officers who had negative a

and negative career intentions had most likely increased. 

However, this explanation was probably not .the only one. 

was, at the same time, an increase in obligated volunteer officer r

for release from active duty. Quite likely this activity was a r

the reduction in force that occurred earlier in fiscal year 1972, 

suggested that young officers were willing to sign up for a care

vided they could be sure that their careers would not be prem

terminated. In this light, the findings on first-tour officers reflected 

which were relatively independent of the VOLAR experiment. 

The patterns of change among extended-tour personnel we

attributed to factors outside VOLAR. For extended-tour personne

in Army service decreased along with feelings that Army service b

security and along with confidence in Army leadership competen

understanding. (These are November 1970 to May 1972 compar

That these changes were significant, while changes from Novemb

to May 1972 were not, suggests that the largest part of these n

changes occurred before the data was collected in November 1

this time a reduction in force had taken place and more string

enlistment requirements for senior noncommissioned officers ha

initiated. Changes in general attitudes were considered to be a re

of these factors and were not directly related to VOLAR. 

Specific Findings 

Some principal conclusions were reached from the results of th

all evaluation and from their explanations. First, the VOLAR p

at Fort Benning had clearly had a massive positive impact on f
also evidence that these last two categories, although slow to ma

would have even greater impact in the future if VOLAR support 

maintained. 

A second finding was that VOLAR either had not influenced 

other groups studied (first-tour officers, extended-tour officers, 

extended-tour enlisted personnel) or had inadequate influence to c

teract other factors, such as the reduction in force and the more strin

re-enlistment requirements. This finding was not surprising since VOL

actions were mainly targeted toward first-tour enlisted men. (M

actions of the U.S. Army Infantry School had been highly accept

to officer students however.) 

Third, among the four general attitude areas (pride, security

equities, and leadership), security and pride were more strongly rel

to expressed career intentions than were inequity and leadership. F

ings in the re-enlisting and separation interviews identified the st

relationship between security and career intentions. This relation

explains the substantial number of re-enlisting married soldiers 

dependents. The study further showed that a feeling of pride in o

service was important for both married and unmarried soldiers. 

Fourth, all data, including interviews with enlisting and separa

personnel, suggested areas in which further beneficial actions coul

taken. Since the re-enlisting soldier was likely to be married with fa

responsibilities, action to enhance the quality of his family life w

probably make the Army more appealing to him. For both the first-

officer and the unmarried soldier, a feeling of satisfaction and prid

daily activities was a necessity. Without the compelling pressures of fa

responsibilities which led to a desire for financial security, the unmar

soldier had to enjoy what he did, or he would seek more desirable ca

pursuits. Inequities, therefore, seemed to have been well addressed 

VOLAR, although leadership development and pride in service requ

additional effort. 

Before leaving the specific conclusions of the experiment, a no

caution might be appropriate. Two general reasons were explore

explain the relatively slow development of positive career-oriented 

havior among first-tour enlisted soldiers. The first was the very lo

delay in changing complex attitudes. The second was the likelih

that soldiers might have been engaging in wait-and-see behavior. In 

regard the dramatic improvement in expressed career intentions and 

accelerating re-enlistment behavior reflected a closing credibility 

More soldiers were believing that VOLAR was "for real." In the 
a very long time to bridge. 

General Conclusions 

The general findings were that Fort Benning was successful in a

ing the stated objectives of Project VOLAR. The general human 

categories explicitly designed into the experiment supported these 

ings, but complementing a.ctivities, such as adventure training and re

ing efforts, contributed to success. Graphic portrayal of specific fin

showed a significant, favorable change in expressed career inte

of first-term enlisted personnel at Fort Benning over the period 

experiment. (Chart 9) First-term re-enlistment performance was als

encouraging, especially in later months. Except for a short per

time when re-enlistment procedures were being revised under the Q

tative Management Program, Fort Benning consistently exceeded 

term re-enlistment objectives. (Chart 10 ) Surveys of firs

re-enlistees conducted to determine what influence the VOLAR e

ment had on their decision to re-enlist revealed that the exper

had influenced over 70 percent of them to stay in the Army. (Cha

Perhaps the most persuasive indicator available, which ref

the success that Fort Benning achieved during Project VOLAR

the number of soldiers who re-enlisted for their present duty assign

For example, a significant percentage of soldiers in the grades o

or below with less than nine years' service who re-enlisted did so to r

in their present duty assignment. (Chart 12 ) In other words, 

soldiers liked Fort Benning, their units, and their jobs enough tha

elected upon re-enlistment to remain at Benning, in their specific 

and in their current job. During the first six months of the exper

(January- June 1971), an approximate monthly average of some 

percent elected this option; during "July- December 1971, this ap

mate monthly average increased to 71.8 percent; and during the 

six months of the experiment, the soldiers re-enlisting to stay a

Benning increased again to 72.2 percent. This percentage was 

optimum in order to provide both stability and promotion flow. 

80 percent, for example, would be too stable and would not provi

Army-wide manpower requirements. 

The first-term soldiers' rating of Fort Benning as a military po

also significant. (Chart 13) The observable 21 percent increase 

group's expressed opinions that Fort Benning was "one of the best 

posts" to which they had ever been assigned further clarified the att

and feelings of Fort Benning soldiers. 
80 

70 

CII 60 Q) 

CII 

c: 

o 

0. 

CII & 50 

'0 

Q) 

~ 40 -

c: 

Q) 

~ 

cf 

30 

20 

10 

o Retentions and Undecided Leave for S

• D D D 

Nov 70 Jun 71 Aug 71 Nov 71 Feb 72 May 
130 

120 

110 

100 

90 

80 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

CHART 10-RE-ENLISTMENTS

A 

~~ 

" /

~ 0 .3 % of Total 

Enlisted Operating 

Strength 

01 1 1 1 1 1 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun J
Vl 

Q) 

Q) 

~ Q) 

"> 

~ 

Q) 

..... 

c: 

.... 

0 

Q) 

no 

113 

..... 

c: 

Q) 

u 

~ 

Q) 

a.. 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

o 

Some or Strong 

Influence to Stay 

o 

No Influence 

II 

Some or Strong 

Influence to Leav

First-Term Re-enlistees First-Term Separatees Career Re-enliste
100 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

CHART 12-RE-ENLISTMENTS: PRESEN

(Percentage who 

less than ni

O. I I I I I I 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul A
Rating of Fort Benning as "One of the Best Posts" 

60 

VI 

Q.) 

VI 50 c:: 

0 

0. 

VI 

Q.) 

0::: 

~ 40 > '-

:? 

en 

"0 

Q.) 

... 

VI 30 

c:: 

LLJ 

E 

'-Q.) 

I- 20 

..:. 

VI 

'-

u:: 

..-

0 

Q.) 10 

OIl 

ro 

... 

c:: 

Q.) 

u 

'-

Q.) 

a.. 0 Nov 70 Jun 71 

The supporting programs all.contributed to these results. The dece

tralized training policy had been enthusiastically supported at all lev

of command. This policy reaffirmed confidence in the dedication, jud

ment, and professionalism of the officer corps by placing the responsibil

for training at a level where it could be most efficient. Through the 

hicles of adventure training and civic action, the personnel at the low

echelons were challenged. They were eager to participate in training th

focused sharply on key mission requirements, which in turn provid

greater job satisfaction. This approach not only developed junior lead

but also provided the latitude, challenge, and satisfaction required 

retain young men of quality in the Anny. 

Considerable progress was made at Fort Benning in the unit-
direct result of the MVA program. Over two thousand young m

listed for this unit during a sixteen-month period, and the brigad

recruited eleven hundred soldiers for other units or other enli

options. Without question, the biggest recruiting success was the 

soldiers of the 197th Brigade. They liked what they were doing

liked the way they were being treated and they liked the challe

their duties sufficiently well to talk to and enlist their buddies an

temporaries in large numbers. Early results of the 931st Engineer 

unit-of-choice program, which began on 1 May 1972, indicated 

parable success for this unit's recruiting program. Nearly six hundr

fifty men, over half of the group's vacancies, were recruited for the 

Engineer Group in a sixty-day period. 

These changes were accomplished with no losses in either m

discipline and order or mission capability. On the other hand, 

morale rose to a high degree. The experimental period proved 

exciting and interesting. By no means had all of the answers been 

to the problems inherent in converting the Army into a truly profe

all-volunteer force. The actions taken during Project VOLAR, ho

represented a major step in the right direction and were well-re

particularly by the first-term enlisted soldier. On the other hand, 

contained in the Final Evaluation Report pointed out a continuin

to further improve leadership, job satisfaction, and pride in servic

Delayed Successes 

The full impact of eighteen months under the MVA concept h

yet been completely realized. Projects and programs initiated duri

experimental year of VOLAR were still generating successful sec

reactions and impacts on the military community. Areas worthy o

ticular note were the expansion of unit-of-choice (VOC) recrui

station-of-choice recruiting, the impact of VOC on Reserve and Na

Guard enlistments, the contribution of improvements to family en

ment, and the effects of NCO leadership development program

Expansion of the recruiting effort to station of choice would 

the entire post to enjoy the benefits of positively oriented soldiers

with correct guidance, would be responsive to the needs of the 

munity as well as the mission. Their arrival alone would contrib

good discipline and morale simply by the stability they represente

the motivation that brought them to the post. Furthermore the 

wide influence of these VOC personnel is just beginning to be r

as initial participants leave post units after their stabilized tour. 
BENNING MALL UNDER CONSTRUCTION 

ARTIST CONCEPT OF BENNING MALL 
National 

Climate 

The Fort Benning mall shopping center, midway in constructio

the end of the experiment, would make an impact on the domestic n

of the military family. The shopping facility would lessen negative h

pressures which often drove out the undecided. Finally the full im

of new leadership development courses had not yet been fully rea

within the commands. The products of co-ordinated NCO developm

programs held great potential for maintaining the momentum of 

MVA concept even as enthusiasm and newness wore off. The ju

leader who had "made it" would be the closing segment in the cyc

events that made up the all-volunteer concept. Many factors contrib

to the success of the cycle, but the satisfied customer was the best sales

for the product and was most likely to perpetuate its continuance s

he was the prime recipient of its benefits. (Chart 14) 

Fort Benning was fortunate to have been designated by the Dep

ment of Army as one of the initial VOLAR posts. As an early sta

Fort Benning was able to develop ideas and principles which he

change the Anny's public image for the better. These changes parall

new and innovative approaches to recruiting. The population at 

Benning not only reflected the success of unit-of-choice recruiting 

by virtue of its success, developed into an audience receptive to fur

change. The impact on career intentions had been clearly demonstr

by increased re-enlistments and by positive trends toward reserve fo
greatly improved and re-enlistments and enlistments had signific

increased. The MV A concept was more than this, however; it wa

synergistic effect of total involvement. 
The Overview 

Fort Benning with the rest of the Anny faced significant pro

in the late 1960s. Vigorous programs and leadership solved mo

those problems concerning mission fulfillment and day-to-day pers

management. However, to arrive at more than improvised solution

beyond Fort Benning's scope. Project VOLAR increased authorit

resources to the extent that Fort Benning was able to go directly 

roots of problems and achieve broader solutions. As a result, the situ

at Fort Benning became healthier. Soldiers enjoyed being assigned 

and this happy condition was a direct result of the post's involvem

the MV A concept. 

The Fort Benning VOLAR plan was an experiment. The pu

of the experiment was to produce an environment which would co

ute to raising a volunteer Army. At the same time discipline, mi

order, and mission capability could not be weakened. The Benning 

accomplished its goal. With emphasis · on fundamental military p

ples, imagination, and innovation, the Benning Plan strengthened 

fessionalism, enhanced Army life, and revitalized the accession sy

The vast majority of the actions initiated during the experimental 

proved to be extremely valuable and became an integrated part of 

Benning's continuing program to build a volunteer force. 

An over-all analysis of the Benning Plan shows that the most si

cant actions were those which reduced the time spent on relatively m

chores that were not part of the soldier's professional job, made no ob

contribution to training, or did not promote the accomplishment o

unit's mission. Actions to improve the life-style of the soldier by prov

more privacy and comfort in his living area were also significant. T

collectively, the improvements by the Infantry School in support o

Fort Benning Plan accomplished the intended objectives of upgr

education, enhancing the professionalism of the school's staff and fa

and providing specific measures which better train, motivate, an

fluence young leaders to choose a career in the Anny. 

Verification of Success 

Perhaps the most persuasive indicators available which reflecte

success that Fort Benning achieved during the MVA experience 
joyed their jobs, their units, and Fort Benning enough to elect as thei

enlistment option to remain at Fort Benning, in their specific units, 

in their current jobs. Furthermore, they were willing to go out and enc

age their contemporaries to enlist. 

The actions taken at Fort Benning were clearly a major step in 

right direction. Both the Army and the public realized that to incr

enlistments and re-enlistments, two steps had to be taken: increase 

and improve the attractiveness of service life. The three-pronged 

phasis in improving living conditions, working conditions, and job s

faction was directed at the root of many distasteful and unnecessary, 

tating elements of service life, and it did improve the attractivenes

Army life. 

The apprehension that increased enlistments and re-enlistments wo

compromise quality for quantity proved to be unfounded. Command

at Fort Benning viewed the unit-of-choice soldier most favorably. So

typical comments included : "performance of unit of choice soldier

better than that of non-UOC soldiers" and "generally, I have found 

average Unit of Choice soldier to be highly interested and easily m

vated." The unit-of-choice program was easily able to fulfill its g

even when the enlistment standards for this option were raised. 

High standards were also maintained for re-enlistment. Re-enlistm

quotas were continually exceeded during the VOLAR experiment, i

cating that sufficient quantities of qualified soldiers would continue to 

enlist without having to lower these high standards. 

The sum total of information on military discipline during the per

of the MV A experiment showed that military order and discipline w

not jeopardized by MV A innovations. Generally all morale and discip

indicators remained relatively stable or improved during the experim

and for the last six months of the experiment the number of repo

crimes declined. The abrupt reversal in crime trends at Fort Benning 

accomplished without modification of MV A policies and procedures

The successful completion of the experimental phase did not me

however, that all the answers to problems inherent in converting 

Army into a professional volunteer force had been found. The results 

dicated that the steps were in the right direction but, at the same ti

pointed out areas which still needed much thought and action. Mos

these areas would have to be dealt with at a higher level than an A

post, as money was usually critical for these future projects. Areas t

deserved close scrutiny as future action areas included the moderniza

of personnel management services and techniques. Army finance
takes would not have a devastating effect on pay envelopes. N

due" might be correct accounting, but it was not particularly good 

agement at either the soldier, administrator, or commander leve

source management would also become increasingly importan

smaller Anny. Mess management deserved thorough study and im

ment. A basic need that required continuing study and action wa

ership and the programing of its development. A quicker me

eliminating nonproductive soldiers and officers was necessary. Ther

other basic areas needing improvement, and they all had one th

common-they were costly. The Benning Plan showed that such 

were important to the soldier and if improvements were made, he 

respond favorably, namely, by re-enlisting or getting others to enl

Lessons Learned 

One of the most basic and fundamental lessons learned fro

entire experiment was that the commanders must become per

involved to have a successful program. General Talbott's person

continuing involvement in the experiment set the tone for the 

post chain of command and clearly demonstrated that Project VO

was not a lip-service commitment. Acceptance of MVA as a majo

sion allowed the amount of time and expertise necessary for succes

devoted to the program. High priority status precluded the pos

of the program's fading away due to the diversion of resources to 

missions judged more important. The success of the Quality C

Organization in implementing and controlling the Benning Plan 

further indication of the importance of the commander's involv

The arrangement whereby the MV A Control Group worked d

with the commander and his staff provided a powerful means of ca

out projects and innovations. At the lower command levels, th

quality control officer provided a direct link between his comm

the soldiers, and the MV A Control Group. In fact, the quality 

concept proved to be so worthwhile that it was retained after the 

ment ended in June 1972. The unit quality control officers wor

conjunction with the MVA office to insure that continuing projec

not interrupted and that there was no subtle return to pre-V

policies. 

Another lesson learned was that the Benning Plan was much 

than a list of actions; it was the embodiment of a concept. The 

enjoyed by Fort Benning cannot be attributed to selected specific 

developed during the course of the experiment. Even the most p
ing conditions, and job satisfaction were noticeably improved b

combination of actions did the Benning Plan start to get results. E

though the inclusion of anyone action into the plan defied anal

the exclusion of some actions had a definite impact. This effect 

especially noticeable when the target group felt such an action had b

promised, or when an action was discontinued after implementation

this case it was comparable with salt in a stew. No one could disting

the salt when it was present, but its absence was discernible to al

Once a program was announced, it had to be carried out or probl

of credibility would develop. Soldiers were not interested in prom

what they believed in were actual results. When the expected results 

not appear, cynicism rapidly set in and an attitude developed that 

missed the program as merely another whitewash project to fool 

soldier. Fort Benning generally was able to avoid this problem. Sim

keeping the soldiers honestly informed did much to prevent disillus

ment. However, individual actions did not cause extensive problem

credibility; the problem was that at first the entire MV A concept 

viewed with disbelief by the soldiers. How could disillusionment 

over something like the slowness involved in building partitions in 

racks, when nobody believed the project would happen at all? When

the future of established MV A projects was in doubt, such as civil

ization of KP, the soldiers at Fort Benning developed an attitude 

the end of MV A was near and soon everything would be back to w

it was in 1970. Thus the major problem of credibility was to inst

sense of permanency about the MVA concept. Even after two years t

was some feeling that the whole MV A program, as exemplified 

Project VOLAR and the Benning Plan, would eventually erode aw

Informed involvement of the noncommissioned officer was nee

early in programs such as the Benning Plan. Lack of knowledge ab

the project contributed to the development of misconceptions ab

what was happening to the Army. The impact of the eliminatio

traditional NCO control devices, such as the granting of a pass, cre

an undesirable emotional reaction against Project VOLAR. Fort B

ning's efforts to involve the NCO in the experiment and to make 

aware of what was actually happening did much to aid in the suc

of the Benning Plan. Even with the realization that problems existe

this area, solutions required continuing emphasis. 

Views of the Future 

In light of the success of the Benning Plan in favorably influen

attitudes toward the Army and Fort Benning in terms of increa
concept will continue to increase enlistment and re-enlistment rat

with all programs whose main concern is change, progress and im

ments must be continued when the need and opportunity appe

become static while society and the MV A target group continue to c

will spell disaster to the MV A program. The Army must keep pac

changes in society in order to attract qualified volunteers and at th

time maintain good military order and discipline. 

Another view for the future is that the unit-of-choice rec

program is quite possibly the key to the MV A program. The u

choice program embodies the flavor and meaning of the MV A c

more than any other action, and its progress can be graphically pres

As the enlistment option is disseminated throughout the Army

discover that their most credible and effective advertising come

satisfied soldiers who en joy their jobs and assignments. On the 

hand, disgruntled soldiers will effectively hinder unit-of-choice rec

as a means of procuring volunteers. However, taken in conjunctio

the entire MV A program, the already-demonstrated success of th

of-choice program indicates it may become the single most infl

suceess indicator that a post or unit can have. 

In the final analysis one fact stands out above all else-the 

concept at Fort Benning worked. It worked to such an extent that

the Modem Volunteer Army is still a sought-after goal, it is no 

a wispy mirage on a distant horizon but rather a distinct possib

has been created at least at one post, and it is within the entire A

grasp. 
Proposed Actions of Benning Plan, November 197

ApPENDIX A-I-AcTIONS FOR WHICH IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATIO

HAs BEEN DIRECTED 

1. Establish a quality control system with a full-time quality con

officer in each major unit reporting to the unit commander. 

2. Take appropriate action to slow down work pace. Establish real

suspense dates and eliminate Saturday, Sunday, and holiday duty

3. Establish junior enlisted men's council (similar to Junior Offi

Council) under the control of the post's command sergeant major 

the Chief of Staff, USAIC. 

4. Insure pressure is not put on military wives to join wives' clubs, att

coffees, or participate in other similar activities. This practice coul

explained in initial arrival orientation. 

5. Permit pen-and-ink changes to be made on typewritten paperw

if the corrections are understandable (on paperwork not going out

installation headquarters). 

6. Eliminate reveille. Establish first daily formation to be work 

Allow soldier to report to work under his own responsibility. Comm

muster as required. 

7. Establish a policy to prohibit inspections during weekends or on 

immediately following weekends or holidays. 

8. Do not require those on KP or other details to arrive for duty ea

than they are needed. Whenever military personnel are required, c

manders must insure that appropriate schedules are established 

followed. 

9. Establish policies and procedures that eliminate the practice of w

ing soldiers for morning cleanup when they are off duty. (This po

applies to soldiers who are on pass, on compensatory time, or on o

similar status.) 

10. Prevent commanders from requiring individuals to buy two 

of personal items, one for display and one for use. Make items of inte

on annual general inspections and inspector general inspections. 
offduty time. 

13. Grant permission, on an individual basis, for soldiers to pu

small items of furniture and decorate individual areas according t

own tastes (when partitions or rooms are provided) . 

14. Re-emphasize to commanders that individuals should not b

criminated against for visiting the inspector general. 

15. Eliminate the requirement for officers to sign statements cer

an action has been completed (as feasible and where Army regu

permit). 

16. Make optional the wearing of badges on the fatigue unifor

quire only rank, branch insignia, "US Army" tape, name tape

unit patch. Make wearing of such items optional to the individual

17. Permit shirt to be worn without blouse in administrative ar

all buildings. 

18. Eliminate the requirement at Fort Benning to wear hats in pri

owned vehicles. 

19. Give officer-student class leaders more representation in post 

making and planning groups and on USAIS academic review b

20. Provide an area where officer students may eat lunches brough

home. Use a classroom if necessary. 

21. Initiate an optional civilian dress policy for personnel who 

on Saturday (except where duties require the wearing of the unif

22. Eliminate requirement for students to stand at attention 

beginning of each class until a report is rendered and they are giv

command "take seats." 

23. Consolidate at brigade and battalion level as many company

additional duties to officers as possible. 

24. Direct that unit weekend and holiday detail rosters for soldi

published at least three days in advance. 

25. Establish program for treatment and rehabilitation of drug ab

Provide treatment locally, with assurance that volunteers will n

prosecuted. CONARC Fact Sheet 4- 70 (May 1970) and AR 3

apply (AR 600-32 to be published 1 December 1970) . 

26. Allow soldiers to take refreshments into all areas of the service 

27. Change unit mess hall meal hours on weekends and holidays to 

soldiers to sleep late and still be able to eat breakfast. Adjust styl
) ppgy 

ever necessary and feasible. 

28. Conduct a customer relations course for all PX employees a

Department of the Army civilians who deal in services. 

29. Provide wall lockers or coat racks in physical examination areas. 

30. Initiate a part-time quality control group to conduct unannounc

visits to service facilities, such as the PX, commissary, laundries, ban

and housing officer, to insure that courteous, quality service is being giv

to customers, and to report deficiencies. 

31. Expand PX inventory to include major appliances, furniture, and 

full range of sporting goods. Publicize and promote customer serv

and publish a mail order catalog. Stock athletic uniforms (as feasib

get Army regulation exception) . 

32. Authorize the post exchange to sell Boy Scout and Girl Scout 'uniform

and accessories (as feasible, get AR exception) . 

33. Add a fabric shop and sewing center at the PX. 

34. Authorize construction of an additional nine holes for the Sand H

golf course. (Have DF AE get site and prepare paperwork). 

35. Attempt to schedule Ranger, Airborne, and Infantry Officer Ba

courses so as to reduce time lags between courses. 

36. Eliminate scheduling of classes before 0900 on days following nig

training which terminates after 2200. 

37. Insure that support troops are not moved into the field too far ahe

of time during training programs, and insure that these troops are i

formed as to the nature of the training. 

38. Review USAIS weapons instruction (practical work) to insure th

work groups are small enough to allow ample hands-on training by 

students. 

39. Insure that instructors do not make derogatory remarks about clas

or compare one class with another. Instructors who violate prescrib

standards should be immediately reassigned. 

40. Refer to officers attending USAIS courses as "officer students" 

stead of "student officers." 

41. Conduct some joint classes including students from the Infant

Officer Advanced Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Officer Cand
42. Insure that all students coming to USAIS receive up-to-date in

tion packets before they report to Fort Benning. 

43. Incorporate an NCO panel discussion into IOBC on NCO-

relations. 
1. Establish and publish short- and long-term goals for the Infa

Center and show how they relate to the individual goals of each sol

2. Create a student affairs division in the Office of the Secretary, USA

The mission of this division is to watch over actions and proced

affecting student motivation, assist staff and faculty co-ordinatio

actions involving students' recommendations to the assistant comm

dant, and publish a weekly student news bulletin. 

3. Review and revise regulations to clarify guidance on awards to m

sure that subordinates know that an individual does not have to be ab

a certain grade to be eligible for an award. 

4. Eliminate coercion in fund drives, savings bond campaigns, and 

ilar activities by establishing campaign organizations which do not 

allel existing chains of command. 

5. Eliminate mandatory quotas for the suggestion awards program. 

6. Establish a "Follow Me" team to recognize outstanding soldier

Fort Benning. Five selected soldiers will spend one day with either 

commanding general, assistant commandant, or other senior staf

department head. 

7. Eliminate policy for both the commandant and assistant comman

to close IOAC and IOBC classes (either assistant commandant or c

mandant could close) . 

8. Schedule post athletic teams to play against local amateur civ

teams. 

9. Use command newspapers and local television to increase cove

of the accomplishments of lower ranking soldiers. 

10. Establish a more viable program of communications between civ

and military police. 

11. Provide detailed information on policies, pay, and benefits to 

military personnel on a regular basis. 

12. Eliminate hurry-up-and-wait situation. Commanders at all le

must make a constant effort to plan ahead. Avoid overreacting to V
qg p) 

15. Permit the wearing of duty uniform off-post during nonduty 

For example, other blue collar workers are free to shop and to visi

bars and other establishments in work clothes. 

16. Establish sponsor program with IOAC students sponsoring I

students. 

17. Insure that orientation for all newly commissioned officers atte

IOBC includes sufficient information on customs of the service 

standards of dress. 

18. Insure that students are issued all manuals and other study ma

they are required to use. 

19. Establish a policy within IOBC to rotate the student chain of 

mand, except for student company commanders, on a periodic ba

20. Eliminate the requirement for IOBC officer students to mar

and from classes on the main post. 

21. Initiate informal, small-group discussions of unit activities 

levels. 

22. Remove restrictions on travel during off-duty time. 

23. Eliminate the requirement for use of the Armed Forces Libert

for overnight passes during normal duty week. 

24. Give each soldier the day off on payday, mission permitting. 

25. Provide compensatory time off during the week for personn

quired to perform weekend details. 

26. Establish an equitable work schedule in motor pools for m

and civilian personnel. 

27. Emphasize use of accelerated promotions as an incentive for en

men. Publicize these promotions. 

28. Allow personnel to pick up their paychecks in the company are

time during the day on payday (or provide pay by mail to those 

desire it). 

29. Provide training for unit administrative personnel in order to 

dite processing of hardship discharge and compassionate reassig

requests. 

30. Assign more senior lieutenants as OCS tactical officers. 

31. Insure distribution of information packets on location and 

of operation of post facilities to all incoming personnel. 
33. Conduct additional dances and other activities for unmarried 

listed men in service clubs and invite high school seniors and college-

girls to attend. 

34. Insure that soldiers are informed of procedures for lodging co

plaints with the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board and 

Better Business Bureau (against local businesses). 

35. Brief all newly assigned personnel and their wives on services av

able at Martin Army Hospital. This briefing should be accomplish

on a weekly basis in conjunction with an orientation by the Army Co

munity Services Offices. (See Item 81.) 

36. Assignment by MEDDAC of a doctor or Medical Service Co

officer on a duty roster basis at Martin Army Hospital and the annex 

make continuous checks on outpatient waiting areas. 

37. Review the current system for issuing certificates of nonavailabil

of quarters, with the goal of equitable opportunity for off-post living 

all bachelor students. 

38. Organize a Fort Benning Enlisted Men's Wives' Club similar to 

Officers' and NCO Wives' Clubs. 

39. Initiate a general orientation program for wives of military perso

nel, to include briefing on service activities, distribution of an inform

tion pamphlet, and explanation of post organization and missions a

attendance at selected USA IS presentations. (See I tern 75. ) 

40. Contract with a civilian taxi service to provide on-post transpor

tion for a flat rate. 

41 . Provide information to personnel pertaining to all Military Air

Command flights leaving Fort Benning and nearby Army and Air For

bases (telephone service) . 

42. Permit sponsors to take more than one dependent on hunting tr

at Fort Benning. 

43. Study existing traffic patterns with the goal of allowing traffic dir

access to exit the post during early morning hours. 

44. Have PX remain open until 2100 at least one or two nights a we

45. Establish PX-operated coin washer-dryer facilities in troop are

46. Provide an Officers' Club facility geared toward the single IOB

student and other unmarried junior officers. 
48. Schedule c

ass put to eate te stuatowcequ

lOBe 'cadre company to process a new class in and process an ol

out simultaneously. 

49. Establish small discussion group classes (seminars) and increa

of peer instruction technique on a subject case-by-case basis. 
a forty-hour workweek. This action will require more detailed study 

determine 

a. minimum USAIC and USAIS personnel support requirements 

achieve the desired quality standards; 

b. those requirements which can only be filled by soldiers train

in their military operational specialties; 

c. those requirements which can be filled by additional civili

staffing; 

d. troop strength increases needed; 

e. additional civilian labor strength needed and the cost involve

2. Conduct a block of instruction on enlightened leadership and co

temporary leadership problems for all commissioned and noncommi

sioned officers assigned and incoming. 

3. Reorganize the 2d Student Battalion, The School Brigade, 

strengthen its ability to supervise officer students. The concept for r

organization includes direct supervision of IOAC and IOBC class

through separate detachment chains of command. IOAC and IOB

detachment commanders (lieutenant colonels or majors) will be direct

responsible to the battalion commander and will supervise cadre com

pany commanders and tactical officers ( majors or captains). There w

be one tactical officer for every three IOAC classes and one tactic

officer for each IOBC class. Tactical officers will be responsible for dire

supervision of students. 

4. Modify annual general and command maintenance management in

spections to obtain a more realistic measure of unit capability. 

5. Change existing policy which requires unrealistic submission dates fo

awards. 

6. Permit soldiers to have beer in barracks. 

7. Change Army Regulation 210-65 limiting class VI package store

discount of local prices. Allow discount to be keyed to good financi

management at the installation level. 

8. Change saluting requirements to eliminate the salute when either o

both persons are riding in a vehicle or when either or both persons ar

wearing civilian clothes. 
Army green uniform or civilian clothes to be worn as a substitute. (

possibility of eliminating Army blue uniform completely. ) 

10. Publish weekly one-page student news bulletin for officer stu

11. Obtain from the Department of the Army an assured ninet

notification period for personnel involved in permanent change of st

12. Institute mandatory counseling at least once during each six-m

period and when efficiency reports are rendered for junior leaders th

grades 0-3 and E-6. 

13. Permit use of bank-type credit cards in the PX and commissa

14. Expand services offered by the Legal Assistance Office to in

representation in civil courts, review of legal documents, and tax r

assistance. 

15. Improve automotive craft facilities on post through the addit

adequate automotive testing equipment. Install heating and air-c

tioning systems. 

16. Eliminate scheduling of examinations on days following 

instruction. 

17. Provide more "open time" in 10BC and OCS by lengthening c

or by eliminating some instruction not really essential. 

18. Expand PX inventory to include major appliances, furniture, 

full range of sporting goods. Publicize and promote customer servic

publish a mail order catalog. 

19. Authorize the post exchange to sell Boy Scout and Girl Scout uni

and accessories. 

20. Add a fabric shop and sewing center at the PX. 

21 . Authorize construction of an additional nine holes for the San

golf course. 

22. Increase the number of telephoJ.le3 at MEDDAC appointment 

23. Authorize construction of a new cocktail lounge on existing 

of Fort Benning Open Officers' Mess and Supper Club. 

24. Authorize construction of a service bar addition to Fort Be

Open Officers' Mess and Custer Terrace Annex. 
g(pg) 

2. Organize recruiting teams for the 197th Infantry Brigade to recr

in their home towns. 

3. Provide funds for implementation, control, and evaluation of t

Modem Volunteer Army Program. 

4. Contract for civilian KP in unit messes postwide. 

5. Hire civilian detail labor force to perform menial work details th

do not relate to soldier missions. 

6. Authorize civilian hiring and purchase of equipment for maintaini

and policing roads and grounds. 

7. Authorize hiring of civilians and purchase of equipment for colle

ing refuse and garbage. 

8. Enhance preventive maintenance program for troop billets and fam

quarters. 

9. Provide partitions in troop barracks postwide. 

10. Provided free laundry service for all enlisted men postwide. 

11. Provide free quarters-cleaning service for departing families. 

12. Contract charter bus service free of charge for enlisted men to a

from Columbus, Georgia. 

13. Extend commissary hours on main post and Custer Terrace. 

14. Purchase labor-saving devices. 

15. Expand dental care available to military dependents. 

16. Issue multipurpose embossed identification caros to servicemen a

their wives. 

17. Contract transportation between Fort Benning and selected recre

tion areas on weekends. 

18. Reimburse use of privately owned vehicles to meet military tran

portation requirements. 

19. Extend operating hours of the Quartermaster Clothing Sales Sto

20. Improve post shuttle bus service. 
g py g

cadets. 

23. Invite 1,000 college ROTC cadets to tour Fort Benning f

week during the summer. 

24. Establish a welcome center and central processing facility. 

25. Establish a reception booth at the local airport and provide 

portation to the post. 

26. Improve lounge areas in company-level dayrooms througho

post; include beer vending machines. 

27. Convert an existing building into a nightclub facility excl

for enlisted men E-l through £--4. 

28. Convert a building near the main commissary for use as a n

for commissary and PX patrons. 

29. Construct a thirty-unit guest house for the use of families arriv

or leaving the post. 

30. Contract for local civilian facilities to provide guest house a

modations while a similar facility is being constructed on post. 
Key Events of Project VOLAR, 1970-1972 

November 1970 

December 1970 

January 1971 

February 1971 

March 1971 

May 1971 

June 1971 

July 1971 

August 1971 

November 1971 

December 1971 

January 1972 

February 1972 

May 1972 

June 1972 

Fort Benning is designated as a VOLAR co

post. 

Implementation of numerous no-cost actio

begun. 

Project VOLAR is initiated; civilian KP is sta

construction of partitions is begun. 

Unit-of-choice recruiting is started in 197th 

fantry Brigade. 

Up-or-out criteria is established for all grade

enlisting. 

Adventure training is formalized by the Comb

Arms Training Board. 

Money and authority are granted for continua

of Project VOLAR. 

Data returns establish initial positive trends. 

MOS test scores and high school education bec

criteria for re-enlistment. 

Advanced individual training at Fort Bennin

begun for UOC volunteers. 

Fort Benning's honor guard marches in Or

Bowl. 

First aII-UOC volunteer company is formed. 

Civic action operation takes place in Greenv

South Carolina. 

Unit of choice is expanded to include 931st 

gineer Group. 

Ground is broken for Benning Mall; Pro

VOLAR is terminated. 
App

Organizatio

ApPENDIX C-I-PRINCIPAL COMMAND 

Position 1 November 1970 

Commanding General Maj. Gen. Orwin C. 

Commandant Talbott 

Assistant Commandant Brig. Gen. John T. 

Carley 

Deputy Commanding Col. Jim D. Keirsey 

General-Chief of Staff 

MV A Control Group Col. Edwin L. Kennedy 

197th Infantry Brigade Col. Willard Latham 

931st Engineer Group Col. Robert J. Standley 

MEDDAC Col. H . Haskell Ziperm

USAIC Aviation Col. Robert M. Grow 

Command 

The School Brigade Col. Frank L. Garrison 

Human Resources Dr. Thomas Jacobs 

Research Office 
r I 

197th Headquarters Infantry Command Brigade 

ApP

Center Staff 

I 

931st 

Engineer 

Brigade 

r---

Infantry 

Agency 

(COG) 

____
A CONUS Command in the Seventies 

A Report by Colonel Latham to General Talbott 

General 

The purpose of this paper is to report observations and expe

gleaned from command of a CONUS brigade from February 1

November 1971. These observations are presented in the hope th

will be helpful for other leaders as a reference in preparing for com

of CONUS units, especially at battalion and brigade level. Al

there are a multitude of things to do well if a command is to su

emphasis in this paper is on concepts and techniques which we

most important in producing successful results in the current enviro

The organization of the 197th Infantry Brigade varied throu

the period from seven battalions, three separate companies, and 

scout dog training detachment to four battalions and three separat

panies. The strength varied from 7500 to 3700 men. During most 

time, 90 percent of the enlisted personnel in the brigade were V

returnees, with 80 percent having less than six months before thei

of service expired. The units of the brigade were stationed in thr

arate locations throughout Fort Benning, some five to ten miles 

There was an assumption that the brigade existed only for the p

of supporting the Infantry School and all operational concept

oriented on that premise; however, there were other important m

Leadership is still the key to successful command. There is very 

if anything, new in the art of command or leadership. Commandi

197th Infantry Brigade provided me with an opportunity to apply 

learned from twenty-two years of observation, education, and expe

Factors which worked and influenced each situation were simply th

old principles that have been taught for years. The application o

principles is what counts. 

There was no single course of action to solve the myriad pro

in this large command. The successful solution of the many compl

which existed invariably involved a mosaic of actions, concept

programs. There were, of course, many conflicting pressures and d

from higher headquarters, adjacent commands, and subordinates

with its own interest to serve. Despite these conflicts, the command

successfully proceed if he does so in the following manner: first, 
is to be done, and then relentlessly move toward the goal. 

The Challenge 

I assumed command of the 197th Infantry Brigade on 7 Febr

1970 and immediately proceeded to analyze the condition of the c

mand. The following emerged as the significant problems of the brig

Morale. Over-all morale and esprit de corps of the brigade was 

The brigade and its personnel were spoken of in derogatory terms 

erally by other personnel on post, and brigade personnel had a 

opinion of themselves, their jobs, and their unit. Chapel attendance 

virtually nonexistent. Unit participation in brigade and post activ

was lackadaisical. There was a sullen, unenthusiastic attitude prev

throughout the brigade. 

Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL). The incidence of AW

was excessively high, at a rate of 42.5 per thousand. 

Racial tension. During the months of February, March, and A

1970 there were twenty-one incidents which seemed to stem directly f

racial disharmony. For white soldiers to move about in the brigade 

after dark was considered unsafe. All incidents of robbery and assau

the brigade area during the months of February, March, and April 

by groups of black soldiers against one or two white soldiers. There 

three instances of white soldiers being dragged from their bunks du

the night and beaten. 

Military discipline. Military discipline, courtesy, and bearing 

below acceptable standards. Soldiers did not willingly salute, wear 

uniforms properly, or maintain minimum acceptable standards of 

pearance, particularly in haircuts. When corrected, the soldier's resp

was slow, insolent, and bordered on insubordination. Orders by ju

and noncommissioned officers were routinely ignored, and this cond

was accepted by these leaders. 

Vehicle maintenance. The status of vehicle maintenance was al

need of improvement. The deadline rate for track vehicles was 23 

cent, and for wheeled vehicles 17 percent, both excessively high. M

of the more than one thousand vehicles in the brigade did not hav

assigned driver on a full-time basis, although the brigade at the time 

personnel assigned commensurate with its authorized strength. The b

log of third-echelon deadline wheeled vehicles was ninety~four. An acc

able rate would have been ten to fifteen vehicles. 

Manpower utilization. The brigade was making a massive effo

meet all troop requirements; however, requirements routinely exce
hour workweek did not include the workweek averages of the ap

mately four hundred soldiers who were routinely away from Fort Be

for three weeks at a time in support of the Infantry School at the r

camps in Dahlonega, Georgia, and Eglin Air Force Base in Flori

these daily averages had been included, the over-all workweek 

have been somewhat higher than eighty-four hours. 

Dissident activities. There was a pronounced attempt by local dis

groups to discredit the military establishment and especially the po

brigade command structure. The principal tool was a local underg

newspaper called RAP. The technique was to emphasize any unfavo

local conditions and to dramatize any and all conditions of soldier d

using both half-truths and prevarications. Although dissident activi

not in itself especially disruptive, it contributed to and highligh

general picture of discontent. 

These several areas were the major problems to be resolved

brigade staff was set to a crash program of analyzing these cond

with a view toward developing a comprehensive program of corr

action. 

The Problem 

As might be expected, there was no single condition or factor 

alone was responsible for the conditions previously described. The 

were multiple, indicating that the solution should embrace a tot

proach to command. There were some principal conditions that req

immediate correction or understanding. 

Unit integrity. The brigade staff found that in order to me

requirements of the various commitments placed upon the brigade, 

tive unit integrity, which had disappeared, had to be restored. Batt

and companies functioned as personnel and equipment pools. If a 

of twenty-five men was required, twenty-five "bodies" were gat

and sent out. Squad leaders often did not know the names of men in 

squads, and squad members did not know the names of their lead

Personnel turbulence. The breakdown of unit integrity was a

vated by tremendous personnel turbulence. Ninety percent of the brig

soldiers were Vietnam returnees, with 85 percent having less tha

months of Army service left. In 1970-1971 with an average stren

4,520, 29,000 men passed through the 197th Brigade. This tur

could not be prevented but did require consideration in other ac

((Vietnam syndrome." The 90 percent of assigned personnel 

were Vietnam returnees exhibited a pronounced attitude of "I've 

my part," reflecting their belief that they had spent the year in Vie
Leadership impact. The Vietnam syndrome was also manife

the attitude of soldiers toward their leaders. Lieutenants and junior 

commissioned officers who had not been to Vietnam were hel

especially low esteem because they did not know "where it's at" and 

considered, at best, as "peers." Battalion and brigade commanders 

Vietnam were frequently remembered as the "SOB 2,000 feet up 

helicopter telling me to hurry." To find an assigned leader actually 

ing was uncommon. Squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon le

were infrequently in their units in a leadership role. The leadersh

the brigade was not totally involved in its direction. To quote a y

soldier's description, "After 1700 hours the brigade was turned ov

the SP5's while NCO's went to their moonlighting jobs and officers 

to their off-duty education classes or just went home." 

Working conditions. The soldier's attitude toward the brigade 

his mission was heavily influenced by the nature of the work. As previ

described, the brigade-committed soldier spent approximately eighty

hours a week on the job; much of his work he considered degrading, 

as policing trash along the roads, opening ammunition boxes for 

candidates, raking gravel around bleacher sites, and filling sandbag

revetments. These conditions were aggravated by the requirement 

in position often several hours in advance of the time he was act

needed for support. 

Lenient disciplinary policy. There was a general atmosphere p

lent among both leaders and soldiers that instances of indiscipline 

not promptly, effectively, and fairly punished. There was dissatisfa

with the military justice program of the brigade and with the deci

of military courts. Interestingly enough, the effectiveness of the mi

courts was distrusted by both leaders and soldiers. Leaders believed 

the courts were lenient and that military judges did not understan

problems of command, and soldiers believed that military court ju

with few exceptions, was administered by young, inexperienced ju

Corrective Action 

After considering the problems and their apparent causes, the bri

staff determined that the first thing to be done was to restore ord

the brigade area and confidence in the chain of command. A m

effort was required to make personnel of the brigade feel importan

needed. A number of steps were taken. 

Mission statement. In order to determine what the brigade was 

posed to do and to establish priorities, a comprehensive mission s
units to the highest possible degree. Later, three other mission

deduced and added to the lists: participate in the Volunteer Army 

ect, conduct unit-of-choice recruiting, and conduct advanced indi

training. 

Brigade objectives. In order to focus talent and emphasis, b

objectives were established in relative order of priority for the subor

commands as follows: reduce AWOL; improve race relations; im

morale, esprit, and efficiency of the brigade ; insure a high level of 

support to the Infantry School and the Infantry Center; and eli

crime and dissident activities. Later, as conditions improved, three 

objectives were added: recruit 4,500 soldiers by June 1973; re-e

maximum number of first-term Regular Army and AUS personne

eliminate drug abuse. 

Leadership standards. The next step in implementing the cor

program was to re-establish discipline-the prompt, intelligent, an

ing obedience to leaders. This step was begun by requiring, w

exception, the total involvement of every leader in the task. Min

but essential leadership standards were announced. Commande

leaders who did not meet these standards would be unacceptable i

tions of authority. These principles are summarized below. 

Each leader at his appropriate echelon will lead in person at al

unless excused by proper authority, and this exception will be use

sparingly. This statement meant that the squad leader or the p

leader, for example, was always expected to be with his unit. Unit in

was mandatory. 

Each leader will set a proper example. There were three pr

areas in which the brigade commander paid close and continuous 

tion to the example set by the subordinate commanders, who, in 

were expected to pay the same attention to leaders and comm

subordinate to them. Each commander and leader was expec

epitomize dedication to the brigade's mission and objectives. 

manders and leaders of the brigade were expected to attain the h

degree of physical fitness, and their example was to be reflected 

fitness and confidence of their men. This physical fitness must len

to active demonstration before and with the troops. The comm

and leaders must exemplify reverence, respect, and participation i

grams for development of moral and spiritual attributes. The high 

of moral and spiritual fitness of commanders and leaders is to be re

in their language, bearing, and conduct at all times. 

Commanders and leaders at the company level and below 
effective; such availability was difficult and demanding but fully 

pected. Commanders and leaders must make sure that leaders with 

ability and wisdom to act decisively are available and on the scen

all times when a crisis could conceivably occur. 

Commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the brigade w

expected to know more about individual tasks of their subordinates t

any of the subordinates; and until that knowledge was achieved

other outside influence, other than family and religion, had a legitim

call on the leader's time. 

Leadership programs. In order to encompass every aspect of 

brigade's problems and challenges, the following programs were de

oped as the means by which the leadership standards announced for 

brigade would be exercised: leadership improvement, physical fitn

athletics, social activities, spiritual activities, and image improvem

Subordinate commands were needed to develop courses of action dire

related to achieving dynamic effect and improvement in each prog

area. Subordinate commanders were allowed and expected to take m

mum initiative in developing their individual unit program subjec

the following guidance. 

The leadership improvement program was to include, as a minim

a constant leadership evaluation and counseling technique concern

the effectiveness of unit leaders. Although the range of techniques am

battalions varied, the most effective was the continuous counseling 

grams developed for officers and noncommissioned officers. A m

contribution was also made to the brigade's leadership program by 

initiation of the Enlightened Leadership Course of Instruction develo

by the Infantry School and conducted at Fort Benning. This co

consisted of a week of concentrated instruction concerning several a

of special importance, particularly race relations. 

In the area of physical fitness, each subordinate unit was requ

to have a program designed to raise the physical capabilities of e

individual to the highest possible level. There were to be dynamic 

grams for all age groups as well as for the overweight and perso

with physical limitations. There were numerous activities inspired 

brigade level, such as semiannual officer physical combat proficie

tests in which demanding standards of achievement were required, 

frequent prescribed feats, such as taking the brigade on long run

more than five miles and forced marches of twelve miles or more. 

these activities were conducted in a competitive atmosphere. With 

approach, senior officers and NCO's were required to meet phys
,: 

" 

: 

them daily by their ability to lead physically. 

In the athletics program, each subordinate unit was expected t

maximum participation in all athletic programs authorized at th

The athletic program was designed to be part of and compleme

physical training. The program was aimed at developing the will t

In the social activities program, commanders were expected 

velop an active, pleasant, and rewarding social atmosphere for all 

bers of their units, including families. Social activities were 

monitored, first, to insure that there was an active program, and s

to insure that the activities were appropriate and enjoyable. Em

was placed on activities that brought all ranks together. 

The spiritual activities of the brigade were at a virtual zero, 

program had to start with basics. Accordingly, the approach 

incorporate the expectations of high leadership qualities and th

for an active community life in a positive way into the spiritual pr

developed by the brigade. Actions include chapel choirs, social 

a children's church program, and a midweek folk-type religious pr

aimed primarily at young soldiers. All these measures were com

with the expectation that leaders are to provide appropriate sp

example and chaplains are expected to exemplify the highest sta

of leadership, including dynamic participation in troop activitie

as physical training and all arduous types of duty. This progra

with considerable resistance and awkwardness at first; however, 

period of months it became a productive element in the total com

picture, especially for families. 

The image improvement program was designed to change bo

brigade's and the public'S minds concerning the image of the s

The soldier must be seen as a positive, competent protector of the 

and a constructive participant in the community. The public m

convinced that the soldier is not only a fighter but also a good nei

This program was required to have, as a minimum, an active sc

of domestic action projects, which meant participation in local aff

assisting in worthwhile community projects, such as repair or co

tion of playgrounds in underprivileged areas. There was also a pr

for constant identification of substandard soldiers and leaders, wit

tive programs of rehabilitation or elimination for those who cou

be corrected. 

All of these programs were designed to touch every major a

brigade life and to create conditions conducive to the developm

an enthusiastic, progressive unit and community spirit. The brigade 
Subordinate Units 

Commanders of battalions and separate companies were giv

letter of instruction which stated the objectives to be achieved and 

lined the broad programs to be followed. This guidance provided a fra

work and, at the same time, allowed subordinate commanders maxim

flexibility in implementing the programs. Although all commander

cluded the prescribed programs as a minimum, details of the prog

varied greatly among battalions, each reflecting the different battal

situation and the personality of the commander. All programs wer

quired to be oriented toward achieving the announced objectives. H

ever, they could he and often were expanded at the discretion of 

subordinate commanders. Subordinate commanders briefed the bri

commander monthly on the progress of programs under way in 

battalions. 

The Staff 

The key to successful supervision of the brigade was the opera

of the staff. The staff was subject to the same turbulence prev

throughout the brigade. Accordingly, a strong executive officer ha

train and supervise the staff in its duties. The staff had the routine f

tions organic to any staff. However, there were other critical areas wh

assuming reasonable efficiency in the routine areas, made the differ

between success and failure of the major programs of the brigade

order to insure dynamic staff supervision of these key areas, som

the traditional staff alignments had to be bypassed. This situation 

particularly true in the intelligence and S-5 (domestic affairs 

VOLAR activities) areas. 

In the S-l (Personnel) office, the adjutant was required to dev

imaginative concepts to enhance morale and community spirit. Of 

ticular importance were projects designed to bring brigade personnel 

their families together in an enjoyable atmosphere. To this end, bri

and battalion picnics, parties, and field days were encouraged and 

ported. These affairs were imaginatively conceived in such a way 

encourage maximum participation by all ranks and their families

cluding children. The S-l was to he especially attentive to the so

club system in the brigade area. A club sponsorship concept was 

veloped which encouraged soldiers to spend more of their entertainm

time in the brigade area. Another critical area of S-l concern was 

streamlining of military justice and elimination procedures to in
the areas most likely to result in disastrous consequences if not pr

handled was S-2 (Intelligence). In addition to his routine dut

security, the S-2 officer in charge was directly responsible for pro

to combat drug abuse, monitor dissident behavior, improve we

security, and . monitor the brigade area in anticipation of racial 

and violations of law and order. Furthermore, he was directly in c

of the brigade's correctional custody facility. In these areas, the S-

expected to provide an effective information network which would 

the brigade commander to take prudent action in advance of real tr

The encouraging progress of these programs was largely due to the s

of the intelligence effort. The corrective custody facility was alw

sensitive area requiring the highest degree of skill and professio

on the part of all people concerned in order to obtain the desired re

rehabilitation of errant soldiers. Its major contribution was its r

siveness to military justice requirements of speedy punishment for 

offenses. 

The S-3 (Operations and Training) developed and was ch

with the supervision of six major areas of emphasis in addition 

routine functions. They were the 20-20-60 concept, a technique of 

lishing a ratio of time and effort to be spent in maintenance, tra

and troop support for the Infantry Center and the Infantry Schoo

five-day workweek; the personnel accountability system; work and 

equalization between subordinate units and between other units a

Benning; adventure training, a concept for providing stimulatin

exciting training, to be conducted in connection with the 20-20-6

cept; and energetic supervision of the brigade's physical training 

gram. The supervision in all of these areas had to be carried ou

the right amount of energy and discretion so as not to restrict the 

mand prerogatives and flexibility of subordinate commanders b

to insure that the programs and desires of the brigade commander 

followed. 

The major challenge of the S-4 (Maintenance and Logistics

to create a system which would allow for the development and con

tion of a high state of maintenance in a period of changing insp

concepts. The command maintenance management inspection (CM

system was thankfully discontinued, which released the command 

the convulsive periodic efforts to become ready for inspections. An 

native was required that would achieve a high state of maintenance 

out the debilitating impact of the CMMI system. The result w

development of the "maintenance meter" approach, a concept o
unit had difficulty, the brigade inspection team remained with the 

until the necessary standard was reached. A further refinement of 

system was the imposition of a type of operational readiness test for 

unit. As the units routinely announced their own maintenance sta

which was a part of the maintenance meter approach-they were su

to deployment in the field on an unannounced basis to operate f

period of approximately one week. Whatever the subordinate comma

had announced as his maintenance capability was expected to be dem

strated in the operational readiness test. 

The 5-5 (VOLAR and Unit-of-Choice Activities) was a staff se

created with the implementation of the Volunteer Army con

(VOLAR) at Fort Benning. This section's responsibilities cut a

many former activities of the other primary staff sections. It was espec

responsible for actions designed to make dynamic improvement in 

quality of Army life, for the attitude of the civilian community conc

ing the Army, and for the over-all evaluation of the Volunteer A

projects in the brigade as a part of the Fort Benning VOLAR prog

It was the primary staff section for domestic action projects which 

designed to influence favorably public opinion toward the Army 

to co-ordinate the unit-of-choice recruiting activities of the se

battalions. 

Although a special section under the supervision of the S-l staff

religious program received direct guidance from the brigade comma

due to the total absence of an effective religious program at first. 

program was considered necessary to the development of a complete c

munity atmosphere. It was an extremely delicate area which was 

to respond. The obstacles ranged from apathy to resistance. The chap

were charged not only with developing inspirational and stimula

spiritual programs but also with fUQctioning as effective staff office

their supported units. They were expected to be particularly informa

and helpful to the commander in the resolution of AWOL and race 

tions problems. They were required to maintain attitude surveys 

continuous estimates of morale. In order to make their programs effe

and responsive to the over-all military environment, chaplains ha

follow the same standards as commanders in presenting example

personal qualities in nonspiritual areas. 

Control: Organization and Evaluation 

The brigade initially consisted of an organization of seven battal

and four separate companies with an authorized strength of 7,500 
the standard table of organization for the brigade. The brigade w

thorized a lieutenant colonel as the S-3 officer and a lieutenant colo

the brigade executive officer. These two grade authorizations wer

verted into deputy commander positions, and two task forces were c

within the brigade. Task Force Alpha consisted of the tank batt

mechanized infantry battalion, and an artillery battalion with tw

arate companies attached. Task Force Bravo consisted of two in

battalions, an artillery battalion, and a support battalion with tw

arate companies and a scout dog detachment attached. The d

commanders were given a letter of instruction which gave them res

bilities amounting to command of a task force. They were charged 

the direction, supervision, and implementation of the various progra

the brigade and the achievement of the brigade's announced obje

The arrangement allowed the brigade commander to control effec

the organizations whose composition of companies exceeded fort

The plan of control carefully delineated responsibilities to the d

commanders, while at the same time brigade command policy, guid

and decisions were passed through the brigade staff. Staff super

continued to be exercised by the brigade staff. The staff would 

sponsive to the needs of the deputies but responded directly to the b

commander. In other words, the deputy commanders could not 

themselves between the staff and the brigade commander. 

An equally important facet of controlling an organization th

of the 197th Infantry Brigade is the ability to evaluate progress 

lack of it toward achievement of announced objectives. To perfor

evaluation, a technique of analysis had to be developed that was s

cally directed toward the achievement of the brigade's major obje

and programs. Developing such a technique was a particularly de

operation in view of much of the current criticism in today's m

environment concerning statistical evaluation. The key here is to 

enough objective evaluation to be able to spot adverse and fav

trends in time to take appropriate action and, at the same time

vince subordinates that they are not being judged solely on a stat

basis. They must be convinced that they are more than numerical ci

The objective evaluation must be supplemented with a subjective fe

the situation, especially in matters of morale and esprit. The deputy 

manders were invaluable in this subjective evaluation. The evalu

program was especially helpful in counseling subordinate comma

regarding the effectiveness of their organizations. However, in the 

analysis, there is no substitute for a personal observation of the 

mander, who should see for himself-and be seen-as often as h
objectives of the brigade. Their impact was such that their status ha

be uppermost in the mind of the commander at all times. These 

areas were dedication and motivation of leaders, development of p

in the individual and his unit, race relations, orientation of new perso

into the brigade, and the volunteer army project. 

Dedication and motivation. The dedication and high motivatio

all leaders is vital to the success of a dynamic program, but such lea

ship can by no means always be assumed. The brigade staff qui

found that the total involvement of leaders in their roles left much t

desired. Many noncommissioned officers routinely expected to be 

to take outside jobs. Many officers and noncommissioned officers 

expected as a matter of course to be able to participate in off-duty ed

tion, either as teachers or students. Other outside influences, suc

civilian community activities if the leader lived off-post, all had a de

tating effect. These influences often quickly began to exert an overri

influence on the dedication of the leader. All distractions of this 

tended to create an environment which militated against the leader 

saw his unit, and the soldiers whom he led, as first priority. The lax 

tude was summed up by a young lieutenant who announced that sinc

was a college graduate, he was too well educated and his time was 

valuable to have to look after substandard people. Outside influe

must be vigorously resisted by the commander. Concurrent with the de

opment of a complete community environment within the military 

the outside involvement of key personnel should be restricted, if neces

or personnel unwilling to make the total involvement should be remo

from positions of responsibility. 

Development of pride. Individuals and units must be made to 

special pride in themselves because of who they are and what they 

Special means must be developed to promote this feeling. A dyn

physical fitness program was an ideal first step within the brigade. W

a man begins to feel vigorous and healthy, he eventually perceives a 

ference between himself and other men not so involved. The prog

must be both aggressive and progressive so that the man clearly re

nizes he is advancing his own abilities and welfare. The idea of wh

some competition can be introduced into almost any field of mil

endeavor and should be. Training must be tough, demanding, exci

and enjoyable. Routine operations must be approached with the ide

accomplishing something worthwhile. The worthiness of these endea

must be a matter of constant indoctrination to the individual an

units. In the 197th Brigade, domestic action projects and adven

training added just the right degree of stimulation, excitement, 
individual soldiers and units the realization that the work they were 

in support of the school and center was appreciated and necessary

Race relations. In the current social environment of the U

States today, the existence of good race relations cannot be ass

Good race relations can, however, be achieved. The developme

good race relations begins with a hard assessment of the racial situ

to determine the local problem. The key rests in the credibility of le

The leader's approach must be open and honest. He must be pre

and indeed he should seek out opportunities to involve himself. In 

he must demonstrate his fitness as an individual sensitive to racia

ters. He must announce his policy in terms understood by the av

soldier. He must live up to his terms and standards. In the 197th Br

the announced policy was that all individuals were to be treated eq

Each man was required and expected to do his best; any incide

tween two people of different ethnic backgrounds, even a traffic acc

would be treated as a racial incident until it had been thoro

investigated, conclusions had been drawn, and a decision had been 

by the responsible commander concerning the racial aspects 

incident. This procedure had been occasionally considered as ove

tion; however, it was extremely effective in achieving the conf

of both black and white soldiers and convincing them that their in

were being looked after at the highest echelon. 

An active program of orientation, indoctrination, and educat

race relations must have continuing priority. This program has 

especially important with newly assigned personnel. According

addition to regular race relations seminars, all new personnel re

a series of race relations orientations and a seminar during the

week in the brigade area. The purpose of these orientations was 

much to convince the men, as it was to alert them to the concern 

commander and to the extent of the race relations program, so tha

would recognize the full program as it came their way. Soldiers 

a,dvised that they were expected not only to participate in but t

tribute to the over-all race relations improvement program. 

Orientation, indoctrination, education. Because of a high deg

personnel turbulence, the attitude of newly arrived personnel t

the brigade and Fort Benning was influenced early. According

aggressive program of orientation, indoctrination, and educatio

implemented which finally resulted in the development of the C

Training Command. This command had the task of orienting a

personnel coming into the brigade in such vital matters as race rel
All leaders at the grade of captain or below attended a one-w

orientation and education course at the training command in such m

ters as those previously mentioned plus intensive consideration of lea

ship case studies concerning problems they could expect to encou

in the brigade. This instruction was conducted by the brigade c

mander, deputy commanders, battalion commanders, and the key brig

staff officers only. The training command also conducted special lea

ship courses for selected noncommissioned officers of the grade 

who were being moved into leadership positions that were higher t

their grade called for. The instruction for this course was provided 

the command sergeants major of the brigade and the battalions. Emph

during these courses of instruction was on the practical aspects of lea

shi~the hands-on, this-is-how-you-handle-it instruction. 

In addition, the Central Training Command had subunits resp

sible for training specific leaders in drug abuse matters and for cond

ing the rehabilitation of drug users. The approach here was to fin

technique for the leader to use in handling personnel who have a d

problem. The training command also conducted refresher training 

soldiers found deficient in military ability or attitude. The refre

training consisted of activities associated with the Expert Infantry Ba

qualification. Soldiers selected for this training were required to 

until they successfully graduated. The training command was also 

marily responsible for the development and principal conduct of 

vanced individual training for personnel recruited for the brigade un

the unit-of-choice recruiting program. 

VOLAR. In December 1970, the 197th Brigade was notified o

selection to participate in the Volunteer Army project (VOLAR). 

brigade plan, developed as a part of the over-all Fort Benning prog

called the Benning Plan, envisioned major improvements in three m

areas of Anny life: living conditions, working conditions, and job s

faction. The idea was to create an environment that would sell i

to aggressive, intelligent young people. Comprehensive improvem

made in each one of the areas included semiprivate living accommo

tions; relaxed sign-in, sign-out, and reveille policies; five-day workwe

and more meaningful work assignments. Additionally, a positive divi

of available manpower was developed. Of the personnel available 

support and unit training, 20 percent were always involved in mai

nance, 20 percent in adventure and MOS (military occupational 

cialty) satisfaction training, and 60 percent in support missions for 

Infantry Center and the Infantry School. 
School. In the mission priorities of the brigade, the policy was t

the VOLAR mission as first among equals. Thus the VOLAR pr

was to receive first consideration in the allocation of resources, al

there were times when exceptions had to be made in order to s

priority projects of the Infantry Center and the Infantry School

exemptions were made on a case-by-case basis, always with careful 

tion to the condition of announced VOLAR projects. The VOLA

gram tended to exert a decisive influence on all other brigade m

and on most of its announced objectives. As VOLAR began to su

dramatic improvement and progress were reflected in such ind

as re-enlistments, unit-of-choice recruiting, AWOL, race relation

disciplinary posture. 

Results 

The preceding discussion has been an attempt to specify co

programs, and techniques that produced successful results in the b

However, some of the concepts and statements perhaps emerge as 

what lofty, and, although true, they may not be explicit enough to 

the point intended. What happens at the nitty-gritty level of lead

determines final success or failure. In order to change the enviro

of the brigade, questions such as the following had to be answ

"I'm 40 years old-do you really expect me to run five miles?" 

expected to shine the buttons on my uniform and all of my ins

"Do you really expect me to come in to my company at 0200 

morning to meet a newly arrived soldier?" "Am I expected to 

church?" "Am I expected to attend social functions?" In order to 

a successful command environment, the answer to such questions 

be "yes." The trick is to find the right way to say it, that is, to 

point across and explain the reasons why. In the final analysis, t

words are "example" and "inspiration." Personnel who cannot 

spired by instruction and example and are thus unable or unwil

meet leadership standards must be asked to lay down the burden o

responsibilities and make room for leaders who are responsive. 

As the environment changed, improvement began to be eviden

AWOL rate went from 42.5 per thousand to a rate of 12 per tho

and generally remained at this level to the present time. Personn

continued to have AWOL leanings usually had multiple instan

misbehavior on their record, generally indicating their unsuitabi

further military service. 

As the credibility of the command was established as being se

to race relations, incidents involving racial tension were drama
civilian communities, the brigade remained relatively undisturbed. 

Incidents of violations of law and order were reduced. Occasion

robbery and theft were sharply curtailed. There was a change in 

attitude concerning drug abuse. Whereas soldiers fonnerly would 

assist in the apprehension of drug users and pushers, they now be

to identify both. Dissident activity virtually disappeared. Re-enlistm

status improved from a point where previously 80 percent of re-enlis

had wanted to leave the brigade, now 80 percent wanted to stay. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by creating a desirable 

productive environment that would sell itself, the brigade was abl

make dramatic progress in the Volunteer Army program of recrui

its soldiers from the civilian community. In less than twelve mon

time the brigade recruited all the combat anns soldiers that its authori

strength would pennit. If the program continues at the same rate, 

brigade will have a complete all-volunteer force within the next 

months. 

Creating a Successful Command Environment 

The following are the decisive factors in a successful comm

program in the CONUS at this time. They are the factors a comman

must influence, because they establish the environment in which a t

command program can grow and flourish. 

Mission. The Infantry Center commander clearly established 

the mission of the commander of the 197th Brigade was to develop 

finest unit of the U.S. Army and to establish objectives and set 

necessary priorities to accomplish this mission. Action was immedia

taken to infonn all levels of command within the brigade of the mis

and to assign them their roles in its accomplishment. 

The leadership principle. An initial prime consideration in c

manding the 197th Brigade was the general adverse attitude of sold

of all ranks toward leadership. The soldier's attitude toward his lead

must be favorably influenced by leaders at all echelons who provide 

spiration. Leaders who cannot or will not provide this kind of leaders

should be replaced. · Success · of -the leadership endeavor requires 

development of a program whereby the leadership abilities of subo

nates can be directly observed and evaluated. 

Total involvement. The principle of leadership by example requ

complete dedication of all leaders to the mission. Such dedication me

total involvement in all phases of the brigade'S community life. In ar

where a complete community environment in the brigade does not ex
Unit integrity. In order to develop the military community spir

absolute integrity of units must be observed. All units, from fire 

through battalions, must be committed as integral units. Violat

this principle should require personal approval by the brigade 

mander. All leaders should routinely be with their units. The impo

of this factor is demonstrated by the observation that in all cases w

197th unit had major problems of morale and discipline, the unit int

principle had been violated. 

Personnel accountability. In order to make the unit integrity 

ciple work, all personnel must be continuously accounted for. Thus 

leaders, platoon leaders, and company commanders must know 

times the whereabouts and activities of their personnel during duty 

This knowledge requires dynamic and constant supervision in or

account for everyone without jeopardizing leadership flexibility 

management of personnel. For example, soldiers must be allowed 

tend to personal business, at the PX or snack bar for example, b

supervisor must know about it. 

Leadership and management. In thinking back over my com

experience of the past twenty-two years, and the last twenty-two m

in particular, certain aspects of command and leadership have re

a critical point. For some years, there has been a dialogue going 

the Army concerning the relationship of leadership to management

military leader has been characterized as the charismatic man on 

back, whereas the manager has been typified as the cool, efficient, 

tionless man of statistics. The Army has generally taken the position 

a good commander must be a good manager. However, over the pa

years, particularly with the advent of the systems analysis technique, 

has been an ever-growing acceptance and respectability for the 

ager image in military affairs. 

The increasing admiration for the cost effective analysis in de

with problems and concurrently the managerial approach put less 

on the shoulder-to-shoulder, eyeball-to-eyeball contact by the le

manager. This situation, combined with the use of highly efficient 

munication and transportation resources such as the helicopter

allowed commanders to directly influence operations without being 

sonally involved. This trend started a chain reaction, for as brigad

battalion commanders tended to operate from helicopters and chart

thus to see less of their troops, company commanders, platoon lea

first sergeants, and even platoon sergeants--taking their cue from 

example-also began to see less and less reason to be personally invo

Avoidance of personal contact became fashionable. 
began to feel that they were unimportant cogs in the "great gr

machine." By definition, there is little inspiration in management, 

the necessity to inspire is an organic part of leadership. 

The whole command-manager relationship needs to be clarified o

cially for the Army's leadership structure. The Army should accept a

emphasize the three stages of military supervision described by Gene

Bruce C. Clarke in his writings, "The Army supervises by leadersh

commandership and generalship," with management being implici

all three but clearly requiring responsibility for inspiration from 

leader. 

126,131,136 

Accidents, rates: 24 

Actions proposed, considered, needing 

study : 17,67,107-18 

Advanced individual training. See Training programs and policies. 

Adventure training: 38,77,92, 97, 130, 

133,135 

Advisory Commission on an AlI-Volunteer Force: 4 

After-action reports: 25,81 

Air travel: 45 

Airborne training : 58 

Ainnobile training: 60 

Airport service: 28 

Alcohol abuse: 40-41 

Ariyoshi, Major Robert T .: 16 

Armor School: 83 

Armored infantry, combat power: 81 

Anny, Department of: 27,30,57,66-67, 

70-72, 80,86 

Army, image and attitude toward: 4-5, 

13, 21, 23, 77, 84, 86-91, 100, 

102- 103, 128, 131 

Army Emergency Relief: 48 

Army life. See Career intentions and decisions; Living condi tions. 

Army Magazine: 37 

Anny Reserve. See Reserve components. 

Army Times : 37 

Army Staff: 6,27 

Assistant Secretary of Defense : 3 

Association of the u.S. Anny: 8 

Athletics programs: 13,127-28. See also 

Physical fitness program. 

Automatic data processing systems : 23, 

59,66, 103-104 

Aviation Command: 14 

Awards program: 27,29 

Barracks, privacy in: 29, 47-48, 54-55, 

84, 102, 105, 135. See also Living 

conditions. 

Barylak, Major Bohdan A.: 16 

programs and policies. 

Bed checks: 18, 45 

Beer in barracks: 18,27,44-45 

Benefits, studies to improve : 4 

Bowden, Major John T .: 16 

Brainstonning sessions: 14, 73 

Bus service: 27 

Career intentions and decisions: 4

7-8,10,17,21-22,43,68,81,8

92,97-98,100,103 

Cargo, Major William T. : 16 

Carley, Brigadier General John T ., J

14 

Central Training Command: 134- 35 

Change, resistance to : 31 

Changes of station: 29 

Chapin, Lieutenant Colonel George 

Jr.: 16 

Chaplains: 131 

Chief of Legislative Liaison: 28 

Chief of Staff, U .S. Anny. See We

moreland, General William C. 

Chief of S taff Forum: 16 

Christie, Lieutenant Colonel Chester 

16 

Chronology of VOLAR: 119 

Civic actions: 77, 97,128,131 

Civilian clothes: 27,43 

Civilian employees: 33-34, 48, 68, 

Clarke, General Bruce C.: 35-36, 1

Clerical work: 44 

Clothing, improving : 17 

Clubs: 28, 129 

College credits: 62 

Combat readiness training: 66, 82, 

102,131 

Combined anns tactical training simu

tor: 60 

Command and staff, VOLAR: 120-

Command maintenance management 

spection : 130 

Command reports: 84 

Commanders,roleof: 104,137-38 
g

Community activities: 25,35-37,56,77, 

98, 128-29, 133, 137-38. See also 

Social activities. 

Community services, Army: 48 

Computer systems: 23, 59, 66, 103-104-

Continental Army Command: 26-27,30, 

56,66,70,72 

Control group and processes: 18-22,26, 

32, 58, 60, 66-67, 81-82, 84, 87, 

104,131-32 

Cost effective analysis, results of: 138-39 · 

Costs. See Funding. 

Counseling: 27,53-54,127 

Courts-martial: 24. See also Military 

justice system. 

Craft shops: 28, 70 

Credit cards: 18,29 

Crimes, incidence: 12, 103, 123, 126, 

130,137 

Dayrooms: 27 

Deadline rates : 123 

Dedication, importance of: 133, 137-38 

Defense, Department of: 3-6 

Definition, VOLAR: 3,102,137 

Dental care. See Medical and dental 

"care. 

Dependents: 18,26,29,48,87,91 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics: 28 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel: 7 

Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities: 16 

Discipline, status and policies: 12-13, 

23-24, 32, 44, 53, 63, 83, 85-87, 

98,102-103, 106, 123, 125-26, 136, 

138 

Discrimination, racial. See Equal opportunity policies; Racial relations and 

disorders. 

Dissident activities: 13, 124, 126, 130, 

137 

Draft, reliance on: 4-6, 82 

Drugs, illicit use: 33,38,40-41,62,126, 

130, 135, 137 

Education programs: 17, 38, 57, 58-66, 

86,102,134-35 

Electives program: 62 

gp, 

, , 

98 

"Enlisted men" designation: 48 

Enlistments and re-enlistments: 

72, 84, 86-92, 100-101, 1

136. See also Recruiting. 

Environment, improvements in: 

Equal opportunity policies: 42 

Esprit. See Morale status. 

Evaluation processes and repo

23-25,66,81-101,131-33 

Examinations, scheduling: 28,63 

Expansion of VOLAR mission: 

57-80 

Expert I nfantryman qualificati

Family life: 17,43,48,68,70

98, 100 

Field training exercises: 38, 66 

Finance management: 103-104 

Firepower, infantry : 81 

Fiscal Year 72 Plan: 67-71 

Fiscal Year 73 Plan : 78-80 

Food, improving: 17 

Forsythe, Lieutenant General Ge

8-9,11, 25-27, 30,5~ 68, 

Fort Benning, designated pilot : 

Fort Carson: 27,60,65 

Fort Knox: 23,83-84,86 

Fort Ord : 27,60,65 

Franklin Institute: 16 

Funding: 12, 18, 21,25-27,30

71,78-80 

Furniture, personal: 47 

Future, outlook for: 105-106 

Gates Commission: 4 

Golf course: 29 

Greenville, S.C. : 77-78 

Guest house : 29, 45, 70 

Hair styles: 32,53 

Harris, Lieutenant Colonel Lou

Hats, wearing: 27, 43 

Headquarters Command: 14 

Hensler, Lieutenant Colonel Th

16 

Herrick, Major Robert M.: 16 
Howe, Major James: 16 

Human relations: 17 

Human Resources Research Organization: 16 

Hunt, Major G<>rdon M.: 16 

Hunt, Lieutenant Colonel Jim I. : l6 

Identification card: 29 

Implementation of program : 31-32,53-

55, 83, 86, 88-89, 91-92, 98, 102, 

104-105 

Individual Learning Center: 63-65, 68 

Indoctrination program: 134-35 

Industrial management: 63 

Inequities, eliminating: 84,88,91 

Infantry Brigade, 197th: 12-13,29,31, 

38-39, 43-45, 52, 68, 71-76, 98, 

122-39 

Infantry firepower : 81 

Infantry Human Research Unit : 16 

Infantry officer courses: 14, 26, 28, 

58-66 

Infantry School and Center: 12, 14, 16, 

26-27,31,34,37,48,57-66,87,9l, 

102,122,130,134-35 

Information program : 32-37,57,71-72, 

105 

Inspection systems: 27,130-31 

Installation evaluation report: 84 

Intelligence collection: 130 

Interviews, use and results: 23-25, 33, 

81,88 

Job satisfaction : 17, 37-38, 82, 84-92, 

97-98,101-103,105-106, 135 

Judge Advocate General: 29 

Kaplan, Major Kenneth : 16 

Kelsey, Major Donald R. : 16 

Kennedy, Colonel Edwin L.: 26,32 

Kitchen police, civilianizing: 6-7, 18, 

26- 27,33,46,68, 104 

Labor-saving devices: 57 

Labor services. See Housekeeping services. 

Laundry service : 26, 29 

104,122-23,125-29,135-39 

Legal assistance: 28-29 

Lessons learned: 104-105 

Liaison procedures: 20-21, 33, 65

Liquor stores: 29 

Living standards: 4,7-8,21,37,43

82, 84, 101-103, 105, 131, 

See also Barracks, privacy in. 

Livingston, Lieutenant Colonel Leon 

16 

Maintenance and repair: 26, 28, 38

123,130-31,135 

Management, policies and practices

38,62-63,138-39 

Manpower procurement, retention 

use: 3-4, 6-7, 10, 23, 27, 38

46,123-24 

Married soldiers: 91 

Martin Army Hospital : 51-52 

Medical and dental care: 18, 26, 2

51-52 

Medical and Dental Command: 14 

Mess management: 17,44-45,104 

Military Airlift Command: 45 

Military Construction, Army (MC

18, 70 

Military justice system: 125, 129-30

also Courts-martial. 

Military occupational specialities: 

38, 59, 84, 135. See also S

development of. 

Mission capability. See Combat r

ness training. 

Mission statement : 3, 102, 125-26

Modern Volunteer Army, definition 

mission : 3, 8-9 

Moonlighting : 133 

Morale status: 4, 6, 12-13, 23-24

46, 63, 86, 91, 98, 103, 126, 

131, 133-34, 136, 138 

Morality, exemplifying: 126 

Motels : 29, 70 

Motivation, importance of: 133 

My Lai incident, effect of: 4 

National Guard. See Reserve 

ponents. 
system: 14, 27-28,58 

Noncommissioned officers: 34, 53-55, 

83, 90, 98, 100, 105, 133, 135 

Nursery: 28 

O'Brien, Major James I. : 16 

Off-duty time. See Pass privileges. 

Officer Candidate School: 26, 29, 58, 

62 

Officers, procurement and retention: 6, 

16, 24, 87-S8, 90 

On-the-job training: 135 

Operations and Maintenance, Army 

(OMA): 18,66,68,71 

Organization, changes in: 6, 25-27, 132 

Orientation program: 134-35 

Pass privileges: 7, 18, 27, 30, 45, 53, 

105 

Pay and allowances: 4-5, 10,85,87,103 

Peer evaluation and instruction : 63 

Personal affairs policies: 51,57, 138 

Personnel. See also Manpower procurement, retention and use. 

management of: 3-4,6,59-60, 102-

104,124--27,138 

turbulence in : 13, 124 

Physical fitness program : 13, 126-28, 

130, 133 

Planning groups: 14 

Post exchange services: 18, 29, 48 

Preventive maintenance. See Maintenance and repair. 

Pride, developing. See Morale, status; 

Professionalism, developing and 

main taining. 

Processing center: 26, 28 

Professionalism, developing and maintaining: 8, 58, 62, 97-98, 102 

Progress reports: 55-56, 70 

Project Volunteer in Defense of the 

Nation. See PROVIDE Project. 

Promotion, policies on: 56 

Proposals submitted: 17,67,107-18 

PROVIDE Project: 4--7 

Public opinion: 4-6, 8, 34 

Publicity programs: 33-37, 54, 71-72, 

77 

Quarters. See Barracks, priva

Housing programs. 

Questionnaire surveys: 23-25, 

also Surveys. 

Racial relations and disorders: 

38, 41-42, 62, 123, 126, 

134, 136-37 

Radio pUblicity: 36-37 

Ranger training: 58 

RAP (newspaper): 124 

Reaction to VOLAR: 31-32,53

86, 88-S9, 91-92, 98, 102, 1

Recruiting Command: 6,71- 73 

Recruiting programs: 3- 4,7,25,

56,71-77,92,97-98,100,12

See also Station-of-choice 

Unit-of-choice plan. 

Reduction in force, 1972 : 90-91 

Re-enlistments. See Enlistments 

enlistments; Recruiting. 

Refuse collection and disposa

Housekeeping services. 

Regulations, amending: 18, 27, 

Religious activities: 123, 127-2

Reserve components: 6, 8, 78, 9

101 

Reserve Officers' Training Corp

78 

Resignations: 24 

Resources management: 104,136 

Results of VOLAR: 98-101, 1

Reveille policies: 7, 30, 43, 53, 13

Revisions in VOLAR plan: 

57-80 

Saluting: 27 

Scout equipment: 26 

Security, financial. See Job satis

Pay and allowances. 

Security measures: 47,52, 130 

Selective Service System : 4 

Separations procedures: 104,128 

Service life. See Career intentio

decisions. 
ices. 

Signing in and out: 7, 18, 27, 30, 45, 

135 

SkiIls, developing: 37-38,59 

Smith, Major Horace M.: 16 

Snack bars: 45 

Social activities: 13, 127-29. See also 

Community activities. 

Society, changes in: 106 

Soft drinks : 44-45 

Soldier, typical : 12-13 

Special activities : 25, 81 

Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army. See Forsythe, Lieutenant 

General George I. 

Staff operations and grades: 129-32 

Station-of-choice plan: 98 

Statistics, uses and trends in : 23- 24, 81, 

132 

Status reports: 83 

Steele, Colonel William B.: 14, 16, 

26-27 

Student affairs division: 26-27 

Students, officer. See Education programs; Training programs and 

policies. 

Study Group: 14-18,21,25- 27,31 

Suggestion programs: 16-17,27 

Surveys, use of: 4-5, 81-82 84. See also 

Questionnaire surveys. 

Synergistic effect: 81, 10 I 

Table of organization, modified : 132 

Talbott, Major General Orwin C.: 11, 

25-26, 32, 34, 83, 104, 107 

Target areas: 16-18 

Task F'orces Alpha and Bravo : 132 

Tax assistance : 28 

Teaching machines: 63-65 

Teaching methods. See Education programs; Training programs and 

policies. 

Telephone service: 26,28,52 

Television, ule in training: 60, 65-66 

Television publicity : 34,36-37 

Terrain models: 60 

Thiel, Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur J.: 16 

Third Army : 55-56, 66, 68, 70 

Transportation service: 28-29 

Travel restrictions: 27,30,45 

Troop units. See Manpower proc

ment, retention and use. 

Tuition assistance: 57 

20- 20-60 concept : 38,44, 130 

TyndaIl, Lieutenant Colonel Arnold 

16 

Unemployment rates: 4 

Uniform regulations: 28, 44 

Unit integrity : 13, 124, 126, 130, 

Unit-of-choice plan : 33,68, 71-77, 

97-98, 100, 103, 106, 131, 135

United States Air Force : 5 

United States Army, attractiveness. 

Army, image and attitude towa

Career intentions and decisions. 

United States Navy : 5 

Vehicle maintenance : 123 

Vietnam veterans: 4, 13, 32, 83, 

124-25 

VOLAR 

actions proposed, considered, need

study: 107-18 

chronology: 119 

command and staff: 120-21 

definition and mission: 3, 102, 1

26,137 

expansion and revisions: 25-27, 57

Fiscal Year 72 Plan : 67-71 

Fiscal Year 73 Plan: 78-80 

future, outlook for : 105-106 

implementation and reaction to: 

32, 53-55, 83, 86, 88-89, 91-

98, 102, 104-105 

lessons learned: 104-105 

results: 98-101, 102-104 

Volunteer force 

Army position approved: 6 

manning. See Manpower procu

ment, retention and use. 

philosophy developed : 17 

public preference for: 5 

transition to: 6, 8 

Volunteer Project : 3-4 
West, Major Donald R. : 16 

Westmoreland, General William C.: 6-

8, 11, 34, 56,72 

Wives' groups: 14, 34, 48 

Women in service : 6 

Youth groups and programs: 25

73- 76 

Ziperman, Colonel H . Haskell: 5

Zero-draft problems: 8 

PIN: