(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1 

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

YEGIAZARYAN, AKA EGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–381. Argued April 25, 2023—Decided June 22, 2023*

Respondent Vitaly Smagin won a multimillion dollar arbitration award 

in 2014 against petitioner Ashot Yegiazaryan stemming from the misappropriation of investment funds in a joint real estate venture in Moscow. Because Yegiazaryan has lived in California since 2010, Smagin, 

who lives in Russia, filed suit to confirm and enforce the award in the 

Central District of California pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The District 

Court initially froze Yegiazaryan’s California assets before finally entering judgment against him. The District Court also entered several 

postjudgment orders barring Yegiazaryan and those acting at his direction from preventing collection on the judgment. While the action 

was ongoing, Yegiazaryan himself was awarded a multimillion dollar 

arbitration award in an unrelated matter and sought to avoid the District Court’s asset freeze by concealing the funds, which were ultimately transferred to a bank account with petitioner CMB Monaco.

 In 2020, Smagin filed this civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced 

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which provides a private right 

of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason 

of a violation of” RICO’s substantive provisions. 18 U. S. C. §1964(c). 

As relevant, Smagin alleges Yegiazaryan and others worked together 

to frustrate Smagin’s collection on the California judgment through a 

pattern of wire fraud and other RICO predicate racketeering acts, including witness tampering and obstruction of justice. The District 

Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Smagin had failed 

—————— 

*Together with No. 22–383, CMB Monaco, fka Compagnie Monegasque

de Banque v. Smagin et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
2 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Syllabus

to plead a “domestic injury” as required by RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 346. Smagin’s Russian residency 

weighed heavily in the District Court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit 

reversed. Rejecting the District Court’s rigid, residency-based approach to the domestic-injury inquiry, the Ninth Circuit instead applied a context-specific approach and concluded that Smagin had 

pleaded a domestic injury because he had alleged that his efforts to 

execute on a California judgment in California against a California 

resident were foiled by a pattern of racketeering activity that largely 

occurred in California and was designed to subvert enforcement of the 

judgment there.

Held: A plaintiff alleges a domestic injury for purposes of §1964(c) when 

the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the 

United States. Pp. 5–14.

 (a) The “domestic-injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits 

stems from RJR Nabisco, a case in which the Court was asked whether 

RICO applies extraterritorially. To answer the question, the Court 

applied the presumption against extraterritoriality, a canon of construction that provides “[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application.” 579 U. S., at 335. Guided by concerns of international 

comity and the reasonable discernment of congressional intent, the 

Court distilled the presumption against extraterritoriality into two 

steps. The first asks “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative 

indication that it applies extraterritorially.” Id., at 337. If the answer 

is “yes,” the presumption is rebutted, and the test ends. If the answer 

is “no,” the inquiry proceeds and step two asks whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, which is assessed “by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’” Ibid. Applying this framework, the Court 

assessed the extraterritoriality of RICO’s private right of action, 

§1964(c), and determined that it does not overcome the presumption 

at step one. Proceeding to step two, the Court held that “[a] private 

RICO plaintiff . . . must allege and prove a domestic injury to its business or property.” Id., at 346. Because the RJR Nabisco plaintiffs 

were not seeking redress for domestic injuries, the Court did not have 

occasion to explain what constitutes a “domestic injury.” Pp. 5–7.

 (b) The parties advance competing approaches to the domestic-injury inquiry. Petitioners urge a bright-line rule that locates a plaintiff’s injury at the plaintiff’s residence. They argue that because a private RICO action remedies only economic injuries and a plaintiff 

necessarily suffers that injury at its residence where the economic injury is felt, any cognizable §1964(c) injury is necessarily suffered at the 

plaintiff’s residence. Alternatively, petitioners argue that at least 

when intangible property is concerned, common-law principles locate 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 

Syllabus

the intangible property at the plaintiff’s residence, such that the injury 

is also located there. Smagin defends a contextual approach that considers all case-specific facts bearing on where the injury arises. Pp. 7–

8.

(c) The Court agrees with Smagin and the Ninth Circuit that the 

domestic-injury inquiry is context specific and turns largely on the 

facts alleged in the complaint. Specifically, courts should look to the 

circumstances surrounding the alleged injury to assess whether it 

arose in the United States. Here, that means looking to the nature of 

the alleged injury, the racketeering activity that directly caused it, and 

the injurious aims and effects of that activity.

The context-specific approach is most consistent with RJR Nabisco. 

The Court’s statements in RJR Nabisco that the domestic-injury requirement “does not mean that foreign plaintiffs may not sue under 

RICO,” 579 U. S., at 353, n. 12, and that “application of [the] rule in 

any given case will not always be self-evident,” point toward a casespecific inquiry that considers the particular facts surrounding the alleged injury, id., at 354. That approach also better reflects the requirement’s origin in step two, which assesses whether there is a domestic 

application of a statute by looking to the statute’s focus. RJR Nabisco 

implied that §1964(c)’s focus is injuries in “business or property by reason of a violation of” RICO’s substantive provisions. So understood, 

§1964(c)’s focus is not on the isolated injury but on the injury as a product of racketeering activity. This requires courts to look to the circumstances surrounding the injury to see if those circumstances sufficiently ground the injury in the United States. Pp. 8–10.

(d) The circumstances surrounding Smagin’s injury make clear that 

the injury arose in the United States. Smagin’s alleged injury is his 

inability to collect his judgment. Much of the alleged racketeering activity that caused that injury occurred in the United States. And while 

some of Yegiazaryan’s scheme to avoid collection occurred abroad, the 

scheme was directed toward frustrating the California judgment. Further, the injurious effects of the racketeering activity largely manifested in California. Smagin obtained a judgment in California where 

Yegiazaryan lives, and the rights provided by that judgment exist only 

in California. The alleged RICO scheme thwarted those rights, 

thereby undercutting the orders of the California District Court and 

Smagin’s efforts to collect on Yegiazaryan’s assets in California. Under a contextual approach, Smagin’s allegations suffice to state a domestic injury. Pp. 10–11.

 (e) Petitioners argue that a contextual approach is inconsistent with 

certain common-law principles governing “the situs” of injuries to intangible property. Specifically, petitioners point to the Restatement 

(First) of Conflict of Laws—under which fraud is typically deemed felt 
4 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Syllabus

at the plaintiff’s residence—and to the principle of mobilia sequuntur 

personam—which generally locates intangible property at the domicile 

of its owner—and argue that both principles locate Smagin’s alleged 

injury at his residence. Petitioners fail both to explain the relevance 

of these principles and to show that they were principles settled at 

common law at the time of RICO’s enactment. The core problem with 

petitioners’ reliance on legal fictions concerning the situs of injuries in 

other areas of the law is that the justifications of that approach do not 

necessarily translate to the presumption against extraterritoriality, 

with its distinctive concerns for comity and discerning congressional 

meaning. Indeed, petitioners’ approach generates results counter to 

comity and far afield from any reasonable interpretation of what qualifies as a domestic application of §1964(c). Consider two U. S. businesses targeted by racketeering activity, one owned by a U. S. resident 

and one owned by someone living abroad. There is no evidence that 

Congress intended that only the former business owner can bring a 

§1964(c) suit, especially since doing so runs the risk of generating international discord. Finally, petitioners argue that a contextual approach is unworkable because it does not provide a bright-line rule. 

Such concerns about a fact-intensive test cannot displace congressional policy choices, where a more nuanced test is true to the statute’s 

meaning. Pp. 11–14.

37 F. 4th 562, affirmed and remanded. 

 SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. 

ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, and in 

which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Part I.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 1 

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

Nos. 22–381 and 22–383

_________________ 

ASHOT YEGIAZARYAN, AKA ASHOT EGIAZARYAN, 

PETITIONER

22–381 v.

VITALY IVANOVICH SMAGIN, ET AL. 

CMB MONACO, FKA COMPAGNIE MONEGASQUE DE

BANQUE, PETITIONER

22–383 v.

VITALY IVANOVICH SMAGIN, ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2023] 

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Vitaly Smagin holds a multimillion dollar 

California judgment against petitioner Ashot Yegiazaryan, 

who lives in California. Smagin, who resides in Russia, 

filed suit in the Central District of California alleging that 

Yegiazaryan, with the assistance of petitioner CMB Monaco 

(formerly Compagnie Monégasque de Banque), engaged in 

a pattern of criminal activity, predominantly in and targeted at California, to prevent him from collecting on his 

California judgment, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. 

§§1961–1968. The District Court dismissed the complaint 

after concluding that Smagin had failed to allege a “domestic injury,” as required by RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
2 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Opinion of the Court

Community, 579 U. S. 325, 334 (2016). The Ninth Circuit 

reversed, concluding that Smagin had alleged a domestic 

injury. This Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit.

I 

A 

The essential facts as alleged by Smagin are as follows. 

From 2003 to 2009, Yegiazaryan committed fraud against 

Smagin, stealing his shares in a joint real estate venture in 

Moscow. To avoid a Russian criminal indictment for that 

fraud, Yegiazaryan fled to a mansion in Beverly Hills in 

2010, where he has lived ever since. In 2014, Smagin, who 

lives in Russia, won an arbitration award in London against 

Yegiazaryan for the misappropriation of his real estate investment (London Award). Yegiazaryan refused to pay that 

award, which is over $84 million.

Seeking to collect, Smagin filed an enforcement action in 

the Central District of California to confirm and enforce the 

London Award under the Convention on the Recognition 

and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 

1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997, as implemented 

by 9 U. S. C. §§201–208. The District Court issued a temporary protective order, followed by a preliminary injunction, freezing Yegiazaryan’s California assets.

In his application for injunctive relief, Smagin informed 

the District Court that Yegiazaryan had been granted a 

substantial arbitration award in an unrelated proceeding 

involving Yegiazaryan and yet another Russian businessman, Suleymon Kerimov (Kerimov Award). At the time, no 

funds had yet been paid to Yegiazaryan in satisfaction of 

that award, but Smagin was concerned that when they 

were paid, Yegiazaryan would take steps to transfer the 

money out of Smagin’s reach.

Smagin’s concerns were justified. In May 2015, 

Yegiazaryan received a $198 million settlement in satisfaction of the Kerimov Award. To avoid the District Court’s 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 

Opinion of the Court

asset freeze, Yegiazaryan accepted the money through the 

London office of an American law firm headquartered in 

Los Angeles. Yegiazaryan then created “a complex web of 

offshore entities to conceal the funds,” App. 56a, and ultimately transferred the funds to a bank account with petitioner CMB Monaco. Yegiazaryan also directed those in his 

inner circle to file fraudulent claims against him in foreign 

jurisdictions, which he would not oppose, in an attempt to 

obtain sham judgments that would encumber the $198 million, thereby blocking Smagin’s access to it.

Around the same time, Yegiazaryan was hiding his assets 

in the United States through a system of “shell companies” 

owned by family members. Id., at 61a. This included a Nevada company, which was owned by his brother and created 

“for the purpose of sheltering [Yegiazaryan’s] U. S. assets 

from his creditors,” including Smagin. Id., at 44a.

Smagin did not learn about the $198 million settlement, 

Yegiazaryan’s efforts to hide it, or the U. S. shell companies 

until February 2016, when Smagin was granted leave to intervene in Yegiazaryan’s California divorce proceedings. 

The next month, the California District Court in the London Award enforcement action granted Smagin’s motion for 

summary judgment on his petition for confirmation of the 

Award and entered judgment against Yegiazaryan for $92 

million, including interest. The court also issued several 

postjudgment orders barring Yegiazaryan and those acting 

at his direction from preventing collection on the judgment.

For failing to comply with those orders, the District Court 

subsequently found Yegiazaryan in contempt of court. To 

avoid having to comply with the contempt order, however, 

Yegiazaryan falsely claimed he was too ill, and submitted a 

forged doctor’s note to the District Court. When Smagin 

notified Yegiazaryan that he would be seeking to depose the 

doctor in question, who resides in California, Yegiazaryan 

used “intimidation, threats, or corrupt persuasion,” id., at

82a, to get the doctor to avoid service of the subpoena.
4 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Opinion of the Court

B 

At issue here is a civil RICO suit that Smagin brought in 

2020 based on the allegations just described. RICO provides a private right of action to “[a]ny person injured in his 

business or property by reason of a violation of” RICO’s substantive provisions. 18 U. S. C. §1964(c). Invoking that 

cause of action, Smagin sued Yegiazaryan and CMB Bank

(the two petitioners here), as well as 10 other defendants, 

in the Central District of California.1 The complaint asserts 

two claims against each: a substantive RICO violation, 

§1962(c), and a RICO conspiracy claim, §1962(d). The 

thrust of Smagin’s allegations is that the defendants 

worked together under Yegiazaryan’s direction to frustrate 

Smagin’s collection on the California judgment through a 

pattern of wire fraud and other RICO predicate racketeering acts, including witness tampering and obstruction of 

justice. For these violations, Smagin seeks not only actual 

damages “no less than $130 million,” App. 100a, but also 

attorney’s fees and treble damages as authorized under 

RICO. See §1964(c).

The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground 

that Smagin had “fail[ed] to adequately plead a domestic 

injury,” id., at 31a, as required by this Court’s decision in 

RJR Nabisco. See 579 U. S., at 346 (“A private RICO plaintiff therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury to its 

business or property”). The District Court “place[d] great 

weight on the fact that Smagin is a resident and citizen of 

—————— 1Only Yegiazaryan and CMB Bank petitioned for this Court’s review.

The other defendants include three family members (Suren Yegiazaryan, 

Artem Yegiazaryan, and Stephan Yegiazaryan); an alleged Russian accomplice (Vitaly Gogokhia); French, Russian, and Luxembourger individuals who have been administrators of the trust holding the $198 million (Natalia Dozortseva, Murielle Jouniaux, and Alexis Gaston Thielen); 

an allegedly corrupt Russian bankruptcy officer (Ratnikov Evgeny Nikolaevich); and a registered company hired by Yegiazaryan (Prestige Trust 

Company, Ltd.) and its U. S. lawyer (H. Edward Ryals).
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 5 

Opinion of the Court

Russia and therefore experiences the loss from his inability 

to collect on his judgment in Russia.” App. 27a (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit reversed. It rejected petitioners’ invitation to follow the domestic-injury approach of the Seventh 

Circuit, “which has adopted a rigid, residency-based test for 

domestic injuries involving intangible property,” such as a 

judgment. 37 F. 4th 562, 568, 570 (2022) (citing Armada 

(Sing.) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp., 885 F. 3d 1090 

(2018)). Under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, which locates an 

injury to intangible property at the plaintiff ’s residence, 

Smagin could not allege a domestic injury because he resides in Russia. See Armada, 885 F. 3d, at 1094. The Ninth 

Circuit instead adopted a “context-specific” approach to the 

domestic-injury inquiry, which it found consistent with the 

approaches of the Second and Third Circuits. 37 F. 4th, at

568–570; see Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 874 F. 3d 806, 809 (CA2 

2017); Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F. 3d 694, 

696 (CA3 2018). Applying that approach, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that Smagin had pleaded a domestic injury because he had alleged that his efforts to execute on a California judgment in California against a California resident 

were foiled by a pattern of racketeering activity that largely 

“occurred in, or was targeted at, California” and was “designed to subvert” enforcement of the judgment in California. 37 F. 4th, at 567–568. 

This Court granted certiorari to resolve the Circuit split. 

598 U. S. ___ (2023). Because a context-specific inquiry is 

most consistent with this Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, 

and because the context here makes clear Smagin has alleged a domestic injury, the Court affirms.

II

A 

The “domestic-injury” requirement for private civil RICO 

suits stems from this Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco. 
6 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Opinion of the Court

There, the question before the Court was whether RICO applies extraterritorially. To answer that question, the Court 

employed the presumption against extraterritoriality, 

which “represents a canon of construction, or a presumption 

about a statute’s meaning, rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.” Morrison v. National Australia 

Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010). The presumption provides that “[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent 

to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only 

domestic application.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 335.

Dual rationales support the presumption against extraterritoriality. On the one hand, it reflects concerns of international comity insofar as it “‘serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other 

nations which could result in international discord.’” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 115 (2013)

(quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 

248 (1991)). On the other hand, the presumption is informed by “the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” Smith v. 

United States, 507 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). In fact, consistent application of the presumption “preserv[es] a stable 

background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.” Morrison, 561 U. S., at 261.

RJR Nabisco distilled the presumption against extraterritoriality into two steps. The first asks “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.” 579 U. S., at 337. If the answer is “yes,” 

then the presumption is rebutted, obviating any need to 

proceed to step two. If the presumption is not rebutted, 

however, then step two asks whether the case involves a 

domestic application of the statute, which is assessed “by 

looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’” Ibid.2

—————— 2 “While ‘it will usually be preferable’ to begin with step one, courts 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7 

Opinion of the Court

Applying this framework, the Court assessed the extraterritoriality of two of RICO’s substantive provisions and, 

as relevant here, its private cause of action. As to the substantive provisions, the Court held at step one that they apply extraterritorially to the same extent that RICO’s predicates do, making it unnecessary to proceed to step two. Id.,

at 340. Regarding RICO’s private right of action, §1964(c), 

however, the Court’s conclusion was different. The Court 

determined that §1964(c) does not overcome the presumption at step one because there is no “clear indication that 

Congress intended to create a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the United States.” Id., at 349. “If 

anything,” the Court reasoned, by “cabining” the private 

cause of action to “injur[ies] to ‘business or property,’” “Congress signaled that the civil remedy is not coextensive with 

§1962’s substantive prohibitions.” Id., at 350. Accordingly, 

in reference to step two, the Court held that “[a] private 

RICO plaintiff . . . must allege and prove a domestic injury 

to its business or property.” Id., at 346.

In announcing this “domestic-injury” requirement, the 

Court did not have occasion to explain what constitutes a 

“domestic-injury,” because the plaintiffs in RJR Nabisco 

had stipulated that they were not seeking redress for domestic injuries. Id., at 354. The question now before the 

Court is whether Smagin has alleged a domestic injury.

B 

The parties advance competing approaches to the domestic injury inquiry. Petitioners urge the Court to adopt a 

bright-line rule, akin to the Seventh Circuit’s, that locates 

a plaintiff ’s injury at the plaintiff ’s residence. Petitioners 

advance two different versions of this rule.

—————— 

have the discretion to begin at step two ‘in appropriate cases.’” WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 

5) (citing RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 338, n. 5). 
8 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Opinion of the Court

As their primary position, petitioners argue that any injury cognizable under §1964(c) is necessarily suffered at the 

plaintiff ’s residence because “the private cause of action 

remedies only economic injuries, and a plaintiff necessarily 

suffers that injury at its residence” where the economic injury is felt. Brief for Petitioners 2. In the alternative, petitioners argue that, at least when the alleged injury involves 

intangible property, such as the judgment here, relevant 

common-law principles locate the intangible property at the 

plaintiff ’s place of residence, such that the injury is also located there. Id., at 2–3, 43–44. On either version of petitioners’ rule, Smagin cannot allege a domestic injury because he lives in Russia.

Smagin, in contrast, defends a contextual approach that 

considers all case-specific facts bearing on where the injury 

“arises,” not just where it is “felt.” Brief for Respondent 9. 

In the context of this suit, Smagin argues that he has stated 

a domestic injury because he has alleged that he was injured in his ability to enforce a California judgment, against 

a California resident, through racketeering acts that were 

largely “designed and carried out in California” and were 

“targeted at California.” Id., at 3, 21.

C 

The Court agrees with Smagin and the Ninth Circuit that 

“determining whether a plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury [for purposes of RICO] is a context-specific inquiry that 

turns largely on the particular facts alleged in a complaint.” 

37 F. 4th, at 570. Specifically, courts should look to the circumstances surrounding the alleged injury to assess 

whether it arose in the United States. In this suit, that 

means looking to the nature of the alleged injury, the racketeering activity that directly caused it,3 and the injurious 

—————— 3The alleged RICO violation must have proximately caused the injury 

in order for the plaintiff to be able to sue under §1964(c). See Holmes v. 

Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268 (1992); 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9 

Opinion of the Court

aims and effects of that activity.

This approach to the domestic-injury requirement is most 

consistent with RJR Nabisco. There, the Court clarified 

that its domestic-injury requirement “does not mean that 

foreign plaintiffs may not sue under RICO.” 579 U. S., at 

353, n. 12. Similarly, the Court explained that “application 

of [the domestic-injury] rule in any given case will not always be self-evident, as disputes may arise as to whether a 

particular alleged injury is ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic.’” Id., at 

354. These remarks point toward a case-specific inquiry 

that considers the particular facts surrounding the alleged 

injury. Petitioners’ bright-line rule, in contrast, dispenses 

with any such subtlety. It makes the location of the plaintiff ’s residence determinative, thus barring all foreign 

plaintiffs, exactly as RJR Nabisco said it was not doing.

A contextual approach to the domestic-injury requirement also better reflects the requirement’s origin in step 

two of the extraterritoriality framework, which assesses 

whether there is a domestic application of a statute by looking to the statute’s focus. RJR Nabisco implied that the 

focus of §1964(c) is injuries in “business or property by reason of a violation of [RICO’s substantive provisions].” 

§1964(c). This focus makes sense because, in the context of 

RICO, “the compensable injury necessarily is the harm 

caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a 

pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission 

of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.” Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 497 

(1985). So understood, §1964(c)’s focus is on the injury, not 

in isolation, but as the product of racketeering activity. 

Thus, in assessing whether there is a domestic injury, 

courts should engage in a case-specific analysis that looks 

—————— 

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451, 457–458 (2006) (describing the proximate causation requirement as a “directness requiremen[t]”). 
10 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Opinion of the Court

to the circumstances surrounding the injury. If those circumstances sufficiently ground the injury in the United 

States, such that it is clear the injury arose domestically, 

then the plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury.

Because of the contextual nature of the inquiry, no set of 

factors can capture the relevant considerations for all cases. 

RICO covers a wide range of predicate acts and is notoriously “expansive” in scope. Id., at 498–499. Thus, depending on the allegations, what is relevant in one case to assessing where the injury arose may not be pertinent in 

another. While a bright-line rule would no doubt be easier 

to apply, fealty to the statute’s focus requires a more nuanced approach.

D 

This suit illustrates well why the domestic-injury inquiry 

must account for the facts of the case, rather than rely on a 

residency-based rule. While it may be true, in some sense, 

that Smagin has felt his economic injury in Russia, focusing 

solely on that fact would miss central features of the alleged 

injury. Zooming out, the circumstances surrounding 

Smagin’s injury make clear it arose in the United States.

Smagin alleges that he “has been injured in his inability 

to collect [his] massive judgment.” App. 38a. Much of the 

alleged racketeering activity that caused the injury occurred in the United States. Yegiazaryan took domestic actions to avoid collection, including allegedly creating U. S. 

shell companies to hide his U. S. assets, submitting a forged 

doctor’s note to a California District Court, and intimidating a U. S.-based witness. It is true that other components 

of the scheme occurred abroad. As Smagin alleges, however, even those “wrongful acts and plans were devised, initiated, and carried out . . . through acts and communications initiated in and directed towards Los Angeles County, 

California,” with the “central purpose of frustrating enforcement of [the] California judgment.” Id., at 45a–46a.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 11

Opinion of the Court

Further, the injurious effects of the racketeering activity 

largely manifested in California. Smagin obtained a judgment in California because that is where Yegiazaryan lives, 

and where Smagin had thus hoped to collect. The rights 

that the California judgment provides to Smagin exist only 

in California, including the right to obtain postjudgment 

discovery, the right to seize assets in California, and the 

right to seek other appropriate relief from the California 

District Court. The alleged RICO scheme thwarted those 

rights, thereby undercutting the orders of the California 

District Court and Smagin’s efforts to collect on 

Yegiazaryan’s assets in California.

In sum, Smagin’s interests in his California judgment 

against Yegiazaryan, a California resident, were directly 

injured by racketeering activity either taken in California 

or directed from California, with the aim and effect of subverting Smagin’s rights to execute on that judgment in California. On the Court’s contextual approach, those allegations suffice to state a domestic injury in this suit.

III

 Petitioners argue that a contextual approach is inconsistent with certain common-law principles, which instead 

favor their bright-line rule. According to petitioners, because Smagin has alleged an “economic injury” or an “injury 

in intangible property,” Brief in Opposition 15–16, courts 

should look to common-law principles governing “the situs” 

of such injuries, when determining whether those injuries 

are foreign or domestic. Specifically, as to economic injuries, petitioners point to the Restatement (First) of Conflict 

of Laws §377 (1934), from which they discern the principle 

that “a fraud plaintiff suffers an economic loss at the plaintiff ’s domicile.” Brief for Petitioners 36; see also Sack v. 

Low, 478 F. 2d 360, 366 (CA2 1973) (Under the First Restatement, “loss from fraud is deemed to be suffered where 
12 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Opinion of the Court

its economic impact is felt, normally the plaintiff ’s residence”). As to intangible injuries, petitioners further rely 

on the principle of mobilia sequuntur personam, which they 

claim “generally locat[es] intangible property at the domicile of its owner.” Brief for Petitioners 44. Both principles, 

they argue, locate Smagin’s alleged injury at his residence.

Petitioners fall short, however, when explaining the relevance of these principles. They do not clearly explain why 

choice-of-law principles are germane here, let alone why the 

First Restatement dictates those principles.4 Meanwhile, it 

is far from clear that petitioners’ gloss on the principle of 

mobilia sequuntur personam was as well established or as 

wide sweeping as petitioners take it to be, in light of the 

many twists and turns in the doctrine across a range of contexts. See A. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 48 N. Y. U. J. 

Int’l L. & Pol. 259, 270–292 (2015). In short, at the time of 

RICO’s enactment, both principles were hardly “settled . . . 

at common law.” Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S. 494, 500 (2000). 

The core problem with petitioners’ approach is that it is 

unmoored from the presumption against extraterritoriality. 

While legal fictions regarding the situs of economic injuries 

and intangible property have their justifications in other 

areas of law, those justifications do not necessarily translate to the presumption against extraterritoriality, with its 

distinctive concerns for comity and discerning congressional meaning.

—————— 4Although the First Restatement was in effect in 1970, when RICO 

was enacted, numerous jurisdictions had by then moved away from the 

First Restatement’s methodology and toward a “‘most significant relationship’” test, which resembles “the kind of ‘multi-factor’ analysis the 

Court of Appeals conducted here.” Brief for George A. Bermann as Amicus Curiae 15. This shift was reflected in §145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which superseded the First Restatement the 

following year in 1971. Thus, even assuming choice-of-law principles are 

relevant, petitioners’ identification and application of those principles is 

questionable.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 13

Opinion of the Court

Indeed, it is because petitioners’ view invokes these fictions that it generates results so counter to comity and so 

far afield from any reasonable interpretation of what qualifies as a domestic application of §1964(c). On petitioners’ 

primary view, a business owner who resides abroad but 

owns a brick-and-mortar business in the United States cannot bring a §1964(c) suit even if an American RICO organization burns down her storefront. Perhaps aware of how 

odd this seems, petitioners offer a fallback rule for intangible property. That rule fares no better. It provides that if 

racketeering activity targets the intangible business interests of two U. S. businesses, one owned by a U. S. resident 

and one owned by someone living abroad, only the former 

business owner can bring a §1964(c) suit. There is no evidence Congress intended to impose such a double standard, 

especially because doing so runs its own risks of generating 

international discord. These implausible consequences are 

strong evidence that petitioners have gone astray in assessing the focus of §1964(c) and, thus, the meaning of “domestic injury” as contemplated by RJR Nabisco. 

Finally, petitioners, as well as the dissent, post, at 5 

(opinion of ALITO, J.), argue that a contextual approach is 

unworkable because it does not provide a bright-line rule. 

Reply Brief 17–18. An approach is not unworkable, however, merely because it directs courts to consider the casespecific circumstances surrounding an injury when assessing where it arises. While “the ease with which [petitioners’] bright-line rule can be applied gives it some surface appeal,” Humphrey, 905 F. 3d, at 709, a look beneath 

the surface quickly reveals that the test is inconsistent with 

RJR Nabisco, the presumption against extraterritoriality, 

and the thrust of §1964(c) itself. Concerns about a fact-intensive test cannot displace congressional policy choices, 

where a more nuanced test is true to the statute’s meaning.
14 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

Opinion of the Court

* * * 

A plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury for purposes of 

§1964(c) when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States. Smagin alleges that he 

was injured in California because his ability to enforce a 

California judgment in California against a California resident was impaired by racketeering activity that largely occurred in or was directed from and targeted at California. 

Those allegations state a domestic injury. The judgment of 

the Ninth Circuit is affirmed, and the cases are remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

Nos. 22–381 and 22–383

_________________ 

ASHOT YEGIAZARYAN, AKA ASHOT EGIAZARYAN, 

PETITIONER

22–381 v.

VITALY IVANOVICH SMAGIN, ET AL. 

CMB MONACO, FKA COMPAGNIE MONEGASQUE DE

BANQUE, PETITIONER

22–383 v.

VITALY IVANOVICH SMAGIN, ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2023] 

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, and 

with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins as to Part I, dissenting.

These are the first cases in which we have been required 

to decide when injury to intangible property that a civil 

plaintiff attributes to a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) qualifies as a 

“domestic injury” and may therefore provide the basis for 

recovery under 18 U. S. C. §1964(c). See RJR Nabisco, Inc.

v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 346–354 (2016). 

This question has divided the lower courts, but the Court’s 

decision resolves very little. It holds only that ascertaining 

the site of intangible injuries for purposes of civil RICO requires a court to consult a variety of factors and that two 

factors it identifies show that respondent has suffered a domestic injury. This analysis offers virtually no guidance to 

lower courts, and it risks sowing confusion in our extraterritoriality precedents. Rather than take this unhelpful 
2 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

ALITO, J., dissenting

step, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 

granted.

I 

We granted certiorari “to resolve [a] Circuit split” between, on the one hand, the Third and Ninth Circuits, 

which embrace a totality-based inquiry like the one the 

Court adopts here, and, on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit, which has held that RICO injuries to intangible property are sited at the plaintiff’s residence. Ante, at 5; compare Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F. 3d 694, 

706–707 (CA3 2018), and 37 F. 4th 562, 567–568 (CA9 

2022) (case below), with Armada (Sing.) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol 

Int’l Corp., 885 F. 3d 1090, 1094–1095 (CA7 2018).* The 

Seventh Circuit’s decision, however, contains little analysis 

and simply declares that “[i]t is well understood that a 

party experiences or sustains injuries to its intangible property at its residence.” Id., at 1094; see also Czyzewski v. 

Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U. S. 451, 471 (2017) (THOMAS, J., 

dissenting) (referring to a dearth of “reasoned opinions . . . 

from the courts of appeals” regarding “a novel and important question”). The Third and Ninth Circuits, for their 

parts, did not coalesce around any common set of factors to 

guide the civil RICO domestic-injury inquiry for intangibleproperty claims. See Humphrey, 905 F. 3d, at 706–707; 37 

F. 4th, at 567–568. And no court of appeals has even 

broached the possibility that different categorical rules 

might be available for different types of intangible property 

(e.g., perhaps there could be a rule that injuries to trademark rights should be sited in the country that provided the 

trademark). “[W]e would greatly benefit from the views of 

—————— 

*The Second Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule that RICO injuries 

to tangible property are sited at the location of the property. Bascuñán

v. Elsaca, 874 F. 3d 806, 818–824 (2017). The Second Circuit’s holding 

is not implicated in this split, nor did that court offer any analysis of 

intangible property relevant to these cases.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

additional courts of appeals on this question.” Czyzewski, 

580 U. S., at 472 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

Bringing clarity to this area of the law is not an easy task, 

and I must conclude that the Court falls short. It cites petitioners’ domestic racketeering conduct and the California 

rights conferred by the California judgment Smagin has obtained to enforce his London arbitral award, but it gives no 

indication of the relative import of each of these factors. 

Ante, at 10–11. And while the Court appears to envision a 

long list of factors that might be relevant to this inquiry, 

see ante, at 10, it mentions none other than these two. Nor 

does it say anything about the circumstances that would 

call for consideration of additional factors, when such factors might outweigh one or both of the ones it mentions, or 

what these other factors might be.

Of course, under the majority’s all-factors-considered approach, many other features of this very suit could be relevant, such as the history and location of the underlying dispute, where any relevant business relationships were 

formed, Smagin’s residence, and the existence of the London arbitral award. Are future courts to infer that these 

matters have no import? It is difficult to come to any other 

conclusion given that the Court pays them no heed in undertaking what is ostensibly an examination of all relevant 

“contex[t].” Ante, at 8–10. But it is equally difficult to see 

why they are irrelevant (especially in light of the Court’s 

unexplored acknowledgment that “in some sense, . . . 

Smagin has felt his economic injury in Russia,” ante, at 10),

or what room the Court is leaving for additional factors to 

be identified if none of these counts. And because the Court 

sets aside the factors that would favor petitioners, it also 

provides no guidance on how to weigh competing considerations that do not all point toward the same result.

One might additionally think that the nature of the intangible property itself could be relevant under the majority’s approach, such as whether the property is a debt, a 
4 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

ALITO, J., dissenting

stock, a trademark, etc. In these cases, however, the relationship between the California judgment Smagin has obtained and the underlying arbitral award that that judgment confirmed is uncertain, so the precise property at 

issue is another aspect of this suit that is shrouded in confusion. Smagin acknowledged at oral argument that even 

though he has obtained multiple judgments confirming the 

arbitral award, he can collect on only one. See Tr. of Oral 

Arg. 49. There is thus at least some relevant relationship 

between the California judgment and the London arbitral 

award—the latter of which is not “domestic” in any way—

but the Court does not address this point, either.

Even with respect to the two factors it focuses on, the 

Court engenders confusion. It offers no hint which of the 

two might be more important (should they point in different 

directions), whether either or both are necessary, or 

whether either is sufficient. And the Court acknowledges 

that there was also substantial foreign conduct in these 

cases, but writes that off because it was “‘initiated in and 

directed towards’” the United States. Ante, at 10. Once 

more, I am unsure of the origin or scope of this rule. If domestic conduct is “initiated in” a foreign nation, does that 

make it foreign? What exactly does it mean to direct conduct “towards” the United States? All in all, were I a lowercourt judge, I would struggle to apply today’s decision to 

any set of facts other than the precise combination present 

here. In my view, it is not worth our deciding a case when 

we provoke so many more questions than we provide answers. That is especially so now that the lower courts must 

additionally decide whether and how today’s cryptic decision binds them, rather than continuing to think through 

unencumbered when intangible-property injuries are the 

basis of a domestic application of civil RICO.

II

It is not just that we are contributing little by deciding
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

these cases, however; we are also risking significant harm, 

particularly to the uniformity of our case law. A thrust of 

our international-comity jurisprudence is that we should 

not lightly give foreign plaintiffs access to U. S. remedial 

schemes that are far more generous than those available in 

their home nations. See RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 347–

348; F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 

U. S. 155, 166–167 (2004). In light of RICO’s unusually 

plaintiff-friendly remedies, that concern applies in spades 

here. See RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 348. But in today’s 

decision, the Court countenances that the plaintiff’s residence may play no role at all in the civil RICO extraterritoriality inquiry. The Court justifies this result with the assertion that favoring U. S. plaintiffs’ access to American 

courts over that of foreign plaintiffs “runs its own risks of 

generating international discord,” ante, at 13, a concern 

that the Court directly rejected in RJR Nabisco, see 579 

U. S., at 361 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in relevant part).

Additionally, we have placed a premium on workability 

in our extraterritorial-application cases. The Court 

acknowledges that a bright-line rule would be preferable

here, but essentially shrugs: RICO is too “nuanced” for that. 

Ante, at 10, 13. Our cases do not let us off the hook so easily. 

Compare Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 

U. S. 247, 258–259 (2010) (“There is no more damning indictment of the [Second Circuit’s] ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’

tests than the Second Circuit’s own declaration that ‘the 

presence or absence of any single factor which was considered significant in other cases . . . is not necessarily dispositive in future cases’”), with ante, at 10 (“[N]o set of factors 

can capture the relevant considerations for all cases”).

Perhaps there is a reason why RICO justifies these departures from our customary rules, but I have no confidence 

in reaching that conclusion now (let alone sub silentio). 

RJR Nabisco was relatively recent, and there have been 
6 YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN

ALITO, J., dissenting

only a small number of court of appeals decisions implementing it, and even fewer with respect to intangible property. Moreover, unlike in our typical extraterritoriality 

case, we have received no input here from the sovereign 

states our rules will affect, including the U. S. Government. 

RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 348; Morrison, 561 U. S., at 269; 

F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U. S., at 167–168.

* * * 

The only rule of law that the Court announces today is 

that there is no rule, and despite offering such minimal 

guidance regarding how to site a RICO injury, the Court 

nonetheless manages to sow confusion regarding our 

broader law of extraterritoriality. Respectfully, the most 

we could contribute to this issue at this juncture is to stay 

away from it. I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.