AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

NO. 31 / JUNE 2016

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From violent extremism and insurgency to piracy, 

kidnapping for ransom, attacks on oil infrastructure, 

drug trafficking, and organized crime, Nigeria faces a 

host of complex security challenges. These threats typically involve irregular forces and are largely societally 

based. They are most prevalent and persistent in marginalized areas where communities feel high levels of 

distrust toward the government—often built up over 

many years. At their root, then, these security challenges 

are symptoms of larger failures in governance.

As many of Nigeria’s security threats are domestic 

in nature, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is often the 

primary security interface with the public. However, 

low levels of public trust in the police inhibit the cooperation needed to be effective against these societally 

based threats. 

Seventy-two percent of Nigerians surveyed by 

Transparency International perceived police as corrupt.1

 Police commonly demand bribes in their everyday 

encounters with citizens. Indeed, of the 11,500 people 

Governance, Accountability, and Security 

in Nigeria

By Oluwakemi Okenyodo

u Low levels of trust in the Nigerian police limit public cooperation critical to combatting internal 

security threats from irregular forces such as insurgents, criminal gangs, and extremists.

u Allegations of corruption, heavy-handedness, and politicization have dogged the Nigeria Police Force 

for years. However, a lack of political will has perpetuated a culture of impunity, weak oversight, and 

an unwillingness to absorb lessons learned from previous efforts at police reform.

u Improving the effectiveness of the Nigerian police depends on governance reforms. Depoliticizing the 

appointment and promotion processes for senior police officers and genuinely empowering oversight 

bodies are critical steps to opening a sustainable path to reform and rebuilding trust with local 

communities. HIGHLIGHTS

interviewed by the CLEEN Foundation in its National 

Crime and Safety Survey, 33 percent had paid or had 

been asked to pay a bribe to the police.2 The problem 

of corruption builds on a long legacy. In 2012, then 

Inspector General of Police Mohammed Abubakar acknowledged the depth of the challenge, “The Nigeria 

Police Force has fallen to its lowest level and has indeed 

become a subject of ridicule within the law enforcement 

community and among members of the enlarged public.” 

Furthermore, he noted: 

Police duties have become commercialized.... 

Our men are deployed to rich individuals and 

corporate entities such that we lack manpower 

to provide security for the common man. Our 

investigations departments cannot equitably handle 

matters unless those involved have money to part 

with. Complainants suddenly become suspects 

at different investigation levels following spurious petitions filed with the connivance of police 
Oluwakemi Okenyodo is the Executive Director of 

Partners West Africa — Nigeria: Rule of Law and 

Empowerment Initiative, which focuses on enhancing 

citizen participation and security governance. She is a 

former Executive Director of the CLEEN Foundation. 

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who have not earned their position lose the respect of 

their colleagues, who are then more likely to abandon 

a unit when facing an armed threat. Insufficient understanding or commitment to effectiveness among a 

force’s leadership often results in the neglect of training. 

Problems of police engagement with communities are 

thus perpetuated. 

In short, the culture of corruption and politicization has created a hollowed-out police force—strong on 

paper but ineffective in practice. The quality of internal 

managerial practices directly affects police operations in 

the field.6 For example, a party dissatisfied in a dispute 

might complain and cause the transfer of a divisional 

police officer. This mechanism of informal (and possibly 

inappropriate) accountability contrasts with the lack of 

formal public accountability mechanisms. What officers 

are most acutely aware of, then, is the danger of being 

blamed for something that went wrong outside their 

control. This leads to a minimalist approach. Officers 

would often rather do nothing than make an intervention without explicit orders. 

All of this has implications for citizen security. Corruption and poor leadership divert resources from the 

forces and assets for which these funds were intended. 

Such patterns explain the paradox of increasing budget 

outlays coinciding with weakening force effectiveness. 

For instance, from 2011 to 2016, the country’s police 

budget for overhead and capital expenditures steadily 

increased from NGN 11.9 billion (USD $72.9 million) 

to NGN 25.4 billion (USD $127.6 million). Yet this 

increase in funding hasn’t been matched by gains in 

effectiveness. 

INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE 

GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 

NIGERIA’S POLICE

A number of factors underlie the inability of Nigeria’s police force to effectively respond to domestic 

security challenges and build greater trust at the community level. 

Public Alienation and Corruption

The NPF was founded in the days of colonialism. It 

thus retains a legacy of paramilitary action with limited 

public accountability. Instead of serving and protecting 

the Nigerian people, the colonial-era NPF destroyed 

the fabric of indigenous community-grown systems of 

officers. Our police stations, State [Criminal 

Investigations Divisions] and operations offices 

have become business centres and collection points 

for rendering returns from all kinds of squads and 

teams set up for the benefit of superior officers. 

Our special anti-robbery squads (SARS) have 

become killer teams engaging in deals for land 

speculators and debt collectors. Toll stations in 

the name of checkpoints adorn our highways with 

policemen shamefully collecting money from motorists in the full glare of the public.3

This has broader implications for security. Corruption within the bodies responsible for enforcing the 

law shapes expectations and tolerance of corruption 

in a society more generally.4 In such contexts, citizens 

are more likely to challenge the symbols of authority. 

Violent crime and conflict are more likely to result.

Nigeria’s police also have a reputation for heavyhandedness. Arbitrary arrests and lack of due process 

create an ongoing sense of vulnerability for many citizens. 

In September 2007, then Inspector General of Police 

Mike Okiro famously noted that, in his first 100 days, 

the police had killed 785 robbers in the line of duty 

while robbers had killed 62 officers. The remarks led 

to widespread criticism, both because the violence surrounding mere robbery seemed excessive and because 

the lack of official reports to corroborate the claim suggested evidence of extrajudicial killings.5

Nigeria’s police are also perceived to be politicized. 

Leaders are often appointed based on their political allegiances rather than on their experience or capabilities 

in law enforcement. As a result, the quality of leadership at the helm of the NPF suffers. Appointees under 

such circumstances feel loyalty to their political patron 

rather than to their institutions or citizens. How and 

to whom the law is applied is not consistent. Norms of 

professionalism and ethics are weakened. 

The problem of nonmeritocratic leadership is exacerbated by a command-and-control structure that is 

opaque, centralized, and often chaotic. Police leaders 
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security, justice, law enforcement, and dispute resolution.7

 After Nigeria’s 1967-1970 civil war, police accountability was further limited when the force was 

centralized. The negative consequences of this history 

were compounded by years of military misrule, which 

held back the NPF’s institutional development and left 

it weakened once democratic rule emerged at the end 

of the 1990s. 

This history and the relative absence of functional 

accountability mechanisms have allowed corruption to 

persist within the NPF. Police have been deployed to 

advance the political aims of officeholders, including 

senior police leaders. Such partisan behavior undermines the cohesion, effectiveness, and performance of 

the NPF. The same incentives push some officers to 

compromise their professionalism to curry political favor 

in the hope of future career advancement or patronage. 

All of this has had the effect of alienating the public 

and generating distrust.

Overly Centralized and Nonmeritocratic 

Leadership

The command structure of the Nigeria Police Force 

is highly centralized despite covering a diverse federal 

polity. While allowing for easier interstate cooperation 

than in decentralized police systems, the centralized 

nature of the force also tends to disempower state-level 

commands, hinder service delivery, create bottlenecks, 

and distance citizens from “their” police. It can also lead 

to politicization and lack of professionalism. Centralized 

leadership filters human resources and assets toward the 

center, leaving many frontline units at the state-level 

command under-resourced and nominally supervised. 

Notwithstanding the NPF’s five-tier command 

structure, too many decisions begin and end on the 

desk of the NPF’s top commander, the Inspector General of Police (IGP). This undercuts responsiveness and 

customization of police engagements at the community 

level. The deputy inspectors general who are supposed 

to work with lieutenants and members of the police 

management team only nominally function as heads 

of departments. The offices of the 12 zonal assistant 

inspectors general, who are expected to give leadership 

and strategic direction to state-level commissioners, fare 

even worse in being able to effectively exercise their 

statutory leadership roles. 

Accountability is also centralized and largely 

“upward looking.” For example, as opposed to working closely with district commanders and their local 

citizens and municipal officials, the police leadership is 

answerable primarily to the presidency (which houses 

the Ministry of Interior, the Police Service Commission, 

and the Police Council). 

An opaque leadership appointment procedure with 

little regard for performance makes this centralized decision-making even more problematic. For example, 

in 2012, the perceived illegitimate and undeserved 

promotion of 7 deputy inspectors general and 13 assistant inspectors general led a large cadre of senior 

police officers to threaten to quit en masse. In a statement, the group claimed only two of the seven deputies 

were adequately qualified, and called the remainder of 

the promotions “strange, ridiculous and suspicious, as 

[the nominees] are not the most senior officers from 

their respective geo-political zones.”8 Such behavior 

has consistently denied the NPF the services of its most 

competent officers at important leadership levels. The 

Federal Character Principle, which is aimed at ensuring 

equity in representation of ethnic groups in government institutions, has been exploited as a vehicle for 

nepotism, subjecting the selection process to personal 

and political connections. 

Management Overlap and Weak Oversight

The management mechanisms established for Nigeria’s police suffer from bureaucratic overlap and poor 

implementation of statutory mandates. Three agencies within Nigeria’s executive branch are charged 

with supervision: the Police Service Commission, the 

Ministry of Interior, and the Police Council. There are 

also oversight bodies led by the legislative and judicial 

branches of government. 

Nigeria’s Police Service Commission (PSC) is the 

main civilian supervisory and oversight body of the 

NPF. According to statute, it ought to be one of the 

most powerful such bodies in the world. It is charged 

with responsibility for appointments, promotions, and 

disciplinary action in the NPF. However, a combination 

of factors—political interference, budgetary constraints, 

and inability to set up and maintain a functional investigative unit—have affected its disciplinary functions 

“at their root, these security 

challenges are symptoms of larger 

failures in governance”
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over the NPF, thereby robbing the PSC of its relevance 

and vibrancy. Indeed, the PSC refers all complaints of 

extrajudicial killings back to the NPF for investigation. 

One UN official observed: “[The PSC’s] Quarterly Reports to the President are not published and present a 

dismal chronicle of rubber-stamping decisions taken by 

the police, coupled with inaction in relation to pressing concerns. A radical overhaul of its procedures and 

compositions is warranted.”9

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) has a cabinet-level 

minister charged with directing the IGP. The MoI is 

responsible for the provision of policy, administration, 

logistics, and financial management to the Nigeria Police 

Force. A 2015 restructuring integrated the NPF with 

other agencies the MoI oversees, such as Immigration 

Services, Fire Services, the Security Civil Defence Corps, 

and Prison Services. Yet Ministry supervision of the 

police has been aimless. It has not defined its vision, 

determined its scope of responsibility, or announced its 

intended involvement based on its resources and skills 

in order to realize optimal impact.

The apex of executive branch management mechanisms is the Police Council, which serves as a “board 

of directors” comprising the President, the governor of 

each state, the chairman of the Police Service Commission, and the Inspector General of Police. The Council 

is meant to organize and administer the NPF, provide 

general supervision, and advise the President on the appointment of the Inspector General of Police. However, 

these functions overlap and compete with the mandate 

of the MoI. Moreover, the absence of the Minister of 

Interior and the Attorney General from the Police 

Council effectively fosters parallel command structures. 

Beyond the confounding management arrangements, independent oversight agencies for the NPF often 

have weak and overly restrictive mandates to respond to 

citizen concerns. For example, the Public Complaints 

Commission, which is the ombudsman for the country, 

is restricted from reviewing complaints that are related 

to conduct of the military, police, or other uniformed 

personnel. 

Oversight functions can also by stymied by partisan 

appointments to key management posts. For example, in 

2015 a leaked audiotape implicated a number of senior 

officials—including the Minister of Defence and the 

Minister of Police Affairs—in an electoral fraud plot 

with the incumbent political party to rig a gubernatorial 

election.10 This example reflects how appointees are 

often named based on party association or nepotism 

rather than being publicly advertised with specified selection criteria and defined skill requirements. As such, 

appointees may use their management powers to serve 

partisan interests rather than aggressively pursue their 

oversight mandate.

Finally, key accountability and oversight bodies 

lack the requisite funds to fulfill their functions. For 

example, oversight bodies lack office structures in several states, whereas the NPF has state and divisional 

command offices in all 36 states, the federal capital 

territory, and the 774 local government areas. Even 

in the so-called zonal offices, these oversight groups 

lack basic office equipment, thereby inhibiting their 

professionalism and reach. 

In recent years the NPF has taken certain steps 

to improve public accountability. For example, the 

Complaints Response Unit was established in 2015 

with the mandate to receive complaints from members of the public related to unbecoming conduct by 

any police officer, including the IGP. Members of the 

public can lodge their complaints through one of multiple channels—mobile phones, email, social media, 

traditional platforms—and get a receipt acknowledging 

their complaint that includes a tracking number. Such 

engagement has been found to improve police-civilian 

relations. Another form of engagement that has worked 

is an interactive forum between officers and members 

of the public, such as those organized by the nonprofit 

CLEEN Foundation. Held in each of the country’s six 

geopolitical zones, the forums allow citizens to express 

their safety and security concerns with police. The respective stakeholders can discuss and jointly agree on 

steps that need to be taken, which results in improved 

interactions between the parties and enhanced safety 

in these localities.

Unintegrated Voluntary Policing Groups

The extended ineffectiveness of the Nigeria Police 

Force has given rise to a plethora of voluntary community 

policing groups—a development that has created its 

own security challenges. Such nonstate security actors 

are seen to fill a gap in communities where the NPF 

“the relative absence of functional 

accountability mechanisms have 

allowed corruption to persist within 

the NPF”
5

does not regularly patrol. Composed of members of the 

community, these groups are considered to have a degree 

of legitimacy and are sometimes a welcome substitute 

for the inadequate presence, perceived corruption, and 

lack of trust in the police. Some groups have been recognized for their complementary role by the state. Others 

have assumed a sociocultural identity, claimed service 

toward faith and belief, or maintained a vigilante status. 

However, all of these groups are untrained and more 

prone to engage in abuse or use excessive force while 

carrying out their duties. 

Once organized, some of these voluntary policing 

groups or militias become a law unto themselves. Some 

cross the line and effectively become criminal syndicates 

in their own right—extorting payments from community 

members or using their coercive capacity to take control of certain licit or illicit economic activities. Most 

importantly from a policy perspective, the presence of 

nonstate security actors reflects a governance deficit—as 

does the state’s inability to effectively control them. 

One example is the O’odua People’s Congress 

(OPC) in the South West Zone. The group first emerged 

when it challenged the police, the army, and the federal government over the annulment of the 1993 election. Soon after it formed a vigilante wing to monitor 

neighborhood security. Designed to confront “increasing 

youth restiveness, economic hardship, social tension, 

and insecurity,” the OPC became more feared than the 

criminals it challenged.11 Members used “charms” and 

other nonempirical and nonjudicial methods to determine the veracity of accusations, much to the fear and 

concern of citizens and formal security forces alike.12

Another group, the Bakassi Boys, was established 

in Abia State in the South East Zone to patrol the 

markets and prevent and investigate crime within the 

precinct of Aba, a commercial hub. The reputation of 

the group arose from its vicious activities, propelled 

by rumors and fear that led to a drastic reduction in 

crime in the urban areas. This success led the group to 

expand from the market spaces to communities in Abia 

State, and then beyond to Anambra and Imo States. 

The Bakassi Boys were armed with lethal weapons and 

acted without police authorization and in contravention 

of state laws. They routinely made spectacles of captured suspects, who were paraded naked, often treated 

cruelly and inhumanely, and most times killed. Like 

the OPC, the Bakassi Boys used dubious methods to 

establish guilt, and sometimes resorted to torture and 

extrajudicial killing instead of turning suspects over to 

the police.13 Although the Bakassi Boys succeeded in 

controlling crime in the region, they did not succeed 

in creating an atmosphere of safety. Residents simply 

feared them more than regular criminals. 

Both of these groups originated in response to absent policing. Each then became overly violent themselves and, ultimately, required police intervention. 

OPC leaders Ganiyu Adams and Fredrick Fasheun were 

arrested and charged in 1999.14 Complaints about the 

violence of the Bakassi Boys eventually pitched them 

against the police as well, and in late 2002, the federal 

government raided their operations and disbanded the 

informal security provider. After the OPC leaders were 

arrested, the group remained a vocal political actor 

in the region but no longer remained active in the 

security arena. The security vacuum was then filled 

by the so-called Neighborhood Watch Group, which 

was formed by other vigilantes in cooperation with the 

state governments. The Bakassi Boys were similarly 

replaced by a state-led informal security group after 

being dismantled. These state-led groups benefited from 

closer state supervision and lessons learned from past 

experience. Compared to the vigilante groups, they 

exercised improved management, oversight, leadership, 

and municipal interfacing. 

A third example of the consequences from a lack 

of police presence was the rise of the Civilian Joint 

Task Force (CJTF). Set up by community members in 

Borno State in early 2013, the CJTF’s aim was to protect 

civilians from Boko Haram in support of the official 

interagency Joint Task Force (JTF). The CJTF emerged 

because of civilian distrust of the military, whose campaign against Boko Haram resulted in well-documented 

civilian abuses.15 Over time the CJTF developed informal support from relevant state governments. Though 

equipped only with axes, knives, bows and arrows, locally 

made guns, and other traditional means of weaponry 

and defense, the group proved reputable and successful 

in fighting off major assaults and in raiding the homes 

of suspected Boko Haram members to make arrests and 

hand suspects over to the military. Following the CJTF’s 

successes, the JTF initiated a more formal working relationship with it. 

“the presence of nonstate security 

actors reflects a governance deficit—as 

does the state’s inability to effectively 

control them”
6

There are other government attempts to map, train, 

and coordinate the activities of voluntary policing groups. 

In Enugu State, groups were quickly brought under the 

control of the Ministry of Human Capital Development. In Lagos State, the Rural and Urban Development 

Ministry monitors multiple groups. Overall, however, 

progress in moving these voluntary community policing 

groups toward institutionalization or replacing them 

with official police has been limited.

Even voluntary policing groups set up in collaboration with state governments can at times prove less than 

ideal. For example, a faith-based policing group called 

Hisbah emerged in northern Nigeria to enforce sharia 

law, which was sanctioned as a parallel legal system 

in Muslim-majority states in the early 2000s. Hisbah 

is considered nonstate in that it enforces religious law 

and is separate from the country’s constitutionally defined mainstream policing system. Yet Hisbah is also 

associated with the state in that it was created by the 

Kano State Government. Despite Hisbah’s semiformal 

status, the group’s operations attracted the concern of 

the federal government and the NPF, who sought legal 

redress against Hisbah and the Kano State Government 

on the basis that the new policing outfit was both unconstitutional and improperly intruding upon the NPF’s 

exclusive policing powers. The existence of Hisbah illustrates a troubling disconnect between state and federal 

security priorities, legal authorities, and legitimacy.

In sum, community policing groups in Nigeria 

evolved as a result of state security actors having insufficient capability to provide security consistently throughout 

the country. Hence, local governments and communities 

innovated myriad ways forward. But the corresponding 

controls necessary to improve long-term peace and security 

were rarely instituted.

Failure to Learn Lessons from Past Experience

Previous administrations have raised some of the 

challenges with police effectiveness identified here, 

but reform has rarely followed. The process characteristically begins with the formation of high-level 

committees, members of which are drawn from different spheres of society. Those committees review 

contributing factors, identify gaps in knowledge, and 

recommend strategies. Yet reprehensibly, most times 

the reports of these committees—particularly the ones 

focused on public safety and security—are not accessible to the public (see box). 

In many instances, just accessing information to 

conduct investigations is a challenge. In 2011, the 

government enacted the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) in an effort to reduce the secrecy that has 

shrouded public finance management of the Nigeria 

Police Force. But the NPF and other security institutions can still broadly rely on the Official Secrets Act 

when choosing not to disclose information. With so 

little transparency, including of the very reports meant 

to identify paths to reform, there is diminished scope 

to hold leadership accountable for implementing lessons learned from past experience so as to improve 

future performance. 

IMPROVING POLICE EFFECTIVENESS BY 

IMPROVING GOVERNANCE

Strengthening the effectiveness of the Nigeria Police Force requires improving trust with local communities and better responding to citizens’ security needs. 

Doing so requires systemic reforms in the governance 

and accountability of Nigeria’s police sector. 

Decentralize the Nigeria Police Force. To avoid 

powerful politicization efforts concentrated toward its 

leadership, the NPF should be decentralized. This would 

allow officers to be more engaged at the community level 

and give them flexibility to carry out their duties without 

routine matters facing bottlenecked decision-making at 

the highest levels. It would also enhance communitybased accountability incentives among police, making 

them no longer responsive solely to superiors based far 

R E P O R T S O N N I G E R I A’ S S E C U R I T Y 

SECTOR NOT MADE PUBLIC

 Report of the Presidential Committee on the 

Reform of the Police (2006)

 Report of the Presidential Committee on the 

Reform of the Nigeria Police Force, led by Alhaji 

M.D. Yusuf (2008)

 Report of the Sheik Ahmed Lemu Committee with regard to post-2011 election violence 

(2011)

 Report of the Parry Osayande Committee on 

Police Reform (2012)

 Report of the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution and Security 

Challenges in the North with regard to Boko 

Haram, led by Alhaji Tanimu Turaki (2015)
7

away. This change should be reinforced with a constitutional amendment:

• Section 215(3) of the Constitution and Sections 

9(4)-(5) and 10(1)-(2) of the Police Act should be 

amended to restrict the role of the President, who 

may currently authorize a minister to issue policy 

directives to the NPF. The amendment should 

state clearly and unambiguously that operational 

control of the NPF and its department rests solely 

with the Inspector General of Police or other such 

police commanders as the IGP might authorize. 

• The NPF structure is already made up of five administrative tiers, but decision-making remains 

consolidated at the level of the IGP. It would be 

more practical to decentralize and devolve powers 

and resources to the zone, state, and local government area commands, as well as to the divisional 

tiers to enable them to undertake timely initiatives in concert with host communities. The IGP 

should no longer be involved in operational issues 

that can be delegated, such as parading suspects or 

granting interviews on policing issues at the state 

or divisional levels. Greater financial autonomy 

should also be extended to the state and divisional 

levels. This will enhance accountability, transparency, partnership, and participation. Increased local 

engagement and responsiveness may also limit the 

emergence of nonstate security actors. 

Improve merit-based appointment, promotion, 

and removal processes. Strengthening the quality and 

professionalism of security sector leadership through a 

meritocratic process would allow the sector to complete 

its mission more effectively. 

The process by which the Inspector General of 

Police is appointed should be open, competitive, and 

transparent. The criteria and competence required 

should be clearly articulated. The National Assembly 

and the Police Council should also provide input. The 

appointment of the heads of various security agencies 

should guarantee a term of not more than 5 years or 

within the statutory period of service which is 35 years 

of service or 60 years of age, whichever comes first. In 

order to protect against political influence or capricious 

decision-making by the executive, removal of heads of 

security agencies should be based on a motion in the 

upper chamber and on grounds of evident gross misconduct as defined in Section 143(11) of the Constitution 

or due to incapacitation of mind or body. 

The process of appointing the chairperson and members for the Police Service Commission and all other 

oversight bodies should be made transparent (open to 

public view and comment) and objective (in accordance 

with publicly published guidelines) to ensure that only 

suitably qualified persons are appointed to help actualize 

the mandate of the oversight body. 

Deconflict management bodies. The multiple supervisory bodies and the overlapping mandates of each 

effectively fosters parallel command structures within the 

NPF. This hinders NPF adherence to a clear strategic 

vision and requires the diversion of badly needed resources to internal communication efforts and overhead 

rather than core mission support. 

• The Minister of the Interior and the Attorney 

General should be added to the Police Council 

so that the supervisory bodies can better work to 

complement each other and not exercise needlessly 

duplicative authority. 

Strengthen oversight mechanisms and encourage 

public accountability. Strengthening oversight institutions so they can effectively carry out their responsibilities is key to establishing trust between Nigeria’s 

police and its citizens. This will facilitate greater citizen 

cooperation with police efforts and help ensure that the 

NPF and its promotion processes remain protected from 

politicization or shifts away from meritocracy.

• The PSC and other oversight bodies should be 

provided with adequate resources and skills to support their autonomy and functional service delivery. 

For example, an independent investigative arm 

should be set up for the PSC so it is not reliant 

on the NPF to investigate petitions against itself. 

• The PSC should be empowered to review citizen 

complaints regarding the conduct of the police. 

In the same vein, legislation protecting whistleblowers should be enacted so that those who bring 

valid concerns from within the police force to the 

public or relevant oversight agencies do not have 

to fear retribution. 

• Engaging citizens and civil society organizations 

should be encouraged at all bureaucratic levels 

in order to reduce tensions and strengthen relations between security agencies and members of 

the public. 

Regulate and hold accountable nonstate security 

actors. Nonstate security actors should be screened, 
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

committed to building networks of African, American, European, and 

international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: 

Kate Almquist Knopf

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 20

Fort McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Website: www.africacenter.org

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Director of Research:

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Phone: +1 202-685-6808

Email: SiegleJ@ndu.edu

ISSN 2164-4047 (print)

ISSN 2164-4039 (online)

trained, and (re)certified. This would build confidence on 

the part of the formal security agencies and enable them 

to partner with designated members of the community 

in order to enhance security and accountability. To do 

this, the existing regulatory bodies will need legislative 

reviews to bolster their mandates and enable them to 

spread their current reach beyond the federally established security agencies to state- or community-based 

groups as well. These regulatory bodies should then 

use their dual reach to ensure nonstate security actors 

are adequately trained at federally established facilities 

with approved curricula to the appropriate standard.

Mandate publication of future committee reports 

and strengthen FOIA. Any committee on police or 

security sector reform should be required to publish 

an unclassified version of their report. This recognizes 

that the public is the ultimate stakeholder on security 

issues and needs to have a place at the table. Making 

these reports publicly available fosters dialogue, informs 

the public, and focuses on areas of improvement. An 

independent adjudicator should review FOIA requests 

to ensure that worthy inquiries are not blocked while 

legitimate national security concerns are respected. 

NOTES

1 “People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015 – Global 

Corruption Barometer,” Transparency International Web site, available at <http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/people_

and_corruption_africa_survey_2015>.

2 Oluwakemi Okenyodo, “Public Presentation of Findings of 

the National Crime Victimization and Safety Survey, 2013 by CLEEN 

Foundation,” (Abuja, Nigeria, October 21, 2013) 

3 Patrick Nanadozie Udefuna, Magnus Emeka Madu, Chiedo 

Akalefu, and Fadila Jumare, “Effective Community Policing: A Panacea 

to Inefficiency and Impunity in Nigerian Police,” International Journal of 

Humanities and Social Science 4, no. 4 (2014), 260-267.

4 Institute for Economics & Peace, Peace and Corruption 2015: 

Lowering Corruption – A Transformative Factor for Peace (2015).

5 Emeka Oraetoka, “Opinion: Allegations of Extra-Judicial 

Killings and the Worth of Security Agencies Personnel Lives,” The 

Will, December 17, 2015.

6 Olly Owen, “The Nigeria Police Force: Predicaments and 

Possibilities,” NRN Working Paper No. 15 (Oxford: Nigeria Research 

Network, 2014), 17.

7 Etannibi E.O. Alemika and Innocent C. Chukwuma, Analysis 

of Police and Policing in Nigeria (Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2003).

8 Kingsley Omonobi, “Promotion of DIG’s, AIGs: senior officers 

petition Presidency, NASS,” Vanguard, February 28, 2012.

9 Opportunity for Justice: A Report on the Justice Olasumbo 

Goodluck Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the Apo Six Killings by the 

Police in Abuja (Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2006), 150.

10 “Police Affairs Minister Adesiyan Admits That Brig. General 

Momoh, Obanikoro, Fayose, Omisore Colluded To Rig Ekiti 

Governorship Polls,” Sahara Reporters, February 8, 2015. 

11 Joseph Babatunde Fagoyinbo, The Armed Forces: Instrument 

of Peace, Strength, Development, and Prosperity (Bloomington: Author 

House, 2013), 413. 

12 Adejoh Pius Enechojo, “An Assessment of the Performance 

of Informal Security Structures in Community Crime Control in 

Metropolitan Lagos,” British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 14, no. 

1 (2013), 40.

13 Nigeria: The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and 

Torture 14, no. 5(A) (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2002), 24.

14 Augustine Ikelegbe, “State, Ethnic Militias and Conflict in 

Nigeria,” in The Coming African Hour: Dialectics of Opportunities and 

Constraint, ed. Luc Sindjoun (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 

2010), 194.

15 Nina Strochlic, “Nigeria’s Do-It-Yourself Boko Haram 

Busters,” The Daily Beast, May 16, 2014.