National Strategy for 

Aviation Security 

March 26, 2007 

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The National Strategy for Aviation Security 

Prologue 

The security and economic prosperity of the United States depend significantly upon the secure 

operation of its aviation system and use of the world’s airspace by the Nation, its international 

partners, and legitimate commercial interests. Terrorists, criminals, and hostile nation-states 

have long viewed aviation as a target for attack and exploitation. The tragic events of September 

11, 2001 and the Heathrow plot of August 2006 are telling reminders of the threats facing 

aviation and the intent and capabilities of adversaries that mean to do harm to the United States 

and its people. 

In June 2006, building upon the Administration’s successful efforts since 9/11, the President 

directed the development of a comprehensive National Strategy for Aviation Security (hereafter 

referred to as “the Strategy”) to protect the Nation and its interests from threats in the Air 

Domain.1

 The Secretary of Homeland Security, in accordance with National Security 

Presidential Directive-47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-16 (NSPD-47/HSPD-16), 

will coordinate the operational implementation of the Strategy, including the integration and 

synchronization of related Federal programs and initiatives. 

Aviation security is best achieved by integrating public and private aviation security global 

activities into a coordinated effort to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the Air Domain, 

reduce vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of, and expedite the recovery from, 

attacks that might occur. The Strategy aligns Federal government aviation security programs and 

initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, 

State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to provide active layered aviation 

security for, and support defense in-depth of, the United States. 

Through a collaborative interagency effort and with input from aviation stakeholders, seven 

supporting plans will be developed to address the specific threats and challenges identified in 

NSPD-47/HSPD-16. Although the plans will address different aspects of aviation security, they 

will be mutually linked and reinforce each other. The supporting plans are: 

• Aviation Transportation System Security Plan; 

• Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan; 

• Aviation Transportation System Recovery Plan; 

• Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan; 

• International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan; 

• Domestic Outreach Plan; and 

• International Outreach Plan. 

Development of these plans will be guided by the need to revalidate and further enhance current 

aviation security principles. These plans will be updated on a periodic basis in response to 

 

1

 Air Domain is defined as the global airspace, including domestic, international, and foreign airspace, as well as all 

manned and unmanned aircraft operating, and people and cargo present in that airspace, and all aviation-related 

infrastructures. 

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changes in perceived risks to aviation security, the world environment, technology, air transport 

demands, the global aviation system, and national and homeland security policies. Together, the 

Strategy and seven supporting plans present a comprehensive national effort to prevent hostile or 

illegal acts within the Air Domain, promote global economic stability, and protect legitimate 

aviation activities. 

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Prologue .......................................................................................................................................... 2 

Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 5 

Threats to the Air Domain .............................................................................................................. 8 

Threat Originators....................................................................................................................... 8 

Targets and Tactics..................................................................................................................... 9 

Risk Methodology..................................................................................................................... 11 

Strategic Objectives...................................................................................................................... 12 

Deter and Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Acts in the Air Domain............ 12 

Protect the United States and its Interests in the Air Domain................................................... 13 

Mitigate Damage and Expedite Recovery ................................................................................ 14 

Minimize the Impact on the Aviation Transportation System and the U.S. Economy............. 14 

Actively Engage Domestic and International Partners............................................................. 15 

Strategic Actions........................................................................................................................... 16 

Maximize Domain Awareness.................................................................................................. 17 

Deploy Layered Security .......................................................................................................... 18 

Promote a Safe, Efficient, and Secure Aviation Transportation System.................................. 20 

Enhance International Cooperation........................................................................................... 21 

Assure Continuity of the Aviation Transportation System....................................................... 21 

Roles and Responsibilities............................................................................................................ 23 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)................................................................................ 23 

Department of Transportation (DOT)....................................................................................... 24 

Department of Justice (DOJ) .................................................................................................... 25 

Department of Defense (DoD).................................................................................................. 25 

Department of State (DOS)....................................................................................................... 25 

Department of Energy (DOE)................................................................................................... 26 

Department of Commerce (DOC)............................................................................................. 26 

Office of The Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).......................................................... 27 

State, Local, and Tribal Governments ...................................................................................... 27 

Private Sector............................................................................................................................ 28 

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 29 

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Introduction 

“America historically has relied heavily on two vast oceans and two friendly neighbors for 

border security, and on the private sector for most forms of domestic transportation security. The 

increasing mobility and destructive potential of modern terrorism has required the United States 

to rethink and renovate fundamentally its systems for border and transportation security. Indeed, 

we must now begin to conceive of border security and transportation security as fully integrated 

requirements because our domestic transportation systems are inextricably intertwined with the 

global transport infrastructure. Virtually every community in America is connected to the global 

transportation network by the seaports, airports, highways, pipelines, railroads, and waterways 

that move people and goods into, within, and out of the Nation. We must therefore promote the 

efficient and reliable flow of people, goods, and services across borders, while preventing 

terrorists from using transportation conveyances or systems to deliver implements of 

destruction.” 

National Strategy for Homeland Security 

The United States has a vital national interest in protecting its people, infrastructure, and other 

interests from threats in the Air Domain. The differences between ground-based and airborne 

aviation security measures implemented in different jurisdictions throughout the world, the 

volume of domestic and international air traffic, the speed with which events unfold, and the 

complexity of aviation assets make the Air Domain uniquely susceptible to attack or exploitation 

by terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals. 

Adversaries have demonstrated the ability and a continuing desire to exploit vulnerabilities and 

to adapt to changes in aviation security measures by conducting multiple, simultaneous, 

catastrophic attacks against the United States and its global interests. Exploitation of the Air 

Domain by terrorists and hostile nation-states using unconventional attack methods is not a 

recent phenomenon. In the 1970s, overseas militant groups hijacked commercial passenger 

aircraft as a means of garnering international media attention to further their causes. The rise of 

Islamic religious extremism and state-sponsored terrorism spawned further attacks against civil 

aviation, including: the hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847 in 1985; the hijacking of 

Pan Am Flight 73 in 1986 in Karachi, Pakistan; the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over 

Scotland in 1988; and the downing of a French UTA aircraft over Niger in 1989. The attacks of 

September 11, 2001, brought the reality of these methods to the United States; the Heathrow plot 

of August 2006 reminds us of the continuing danger. 

Over the past five years, the security of the aviation sector has been significantly strengthened 

through the efforts of the Federal government working with State, local, and tribal governments, 

the international community, and the private sector. Together these partners continue to 

implement a broad range of aviation security measures through innovative initiatives and by 

leveraging pre-existing capabilities to provide the Nation with an active, layered aviation 

security, and defense in-depth. Such measures include: a federalized Transportation Security 

Officer workforce that screens passengers and baggage traveling on passenger aircraft; hardened 

cockpit doors to prevent unauthorized access to the flight deck; Federal Air Marshals who fly 

anonymously on commercial passenger aircraft to provide a law enforcement presence; enhanced 

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explosives and threat detection technology deployed in hundreds of airports; airspace and air 

traffic management security measures; and a cadre of canine explosives detection teams 

screening baggage, cargo, and increasingly, carry-on items. 

Other important security activities include: thousands of pilots who voluntarily participate in the 

Federal Flight Deck Officer program, which permits trained pilots to carry firearms; flight crew 

members, including flight attendants who have voluntarily taken the Transportation Security 

Administration’s (TSA) Advanced Flight Crew Self-Defense course; other Federal, State, local, 

and tribal law enforcement officers who travel armed as part of their normal duties; 

establishment of a program to collect and analyze suspicious events; efforts to streamline 

operational coordination on incidents both in the air and on the ground; daily vetting of 

thousands of crew members and passengers on flights to and from the United States; and 

improvement of surveillance and intelligence sharing. In addition, the Nation’s air defense 

mission has been transformed by expanding surveillance and air interdiction efforts inward to 

counter terrorist air threats, as well as by continuing traditional air defense activities against the 

threats from hostile nation-states. 

In today’s global and interconnected economy, the safe movement of people and cargo across the 

open skies is a crucial factor in promoting free trade and advancing prosperity and freedom. 

Defeating the array of threats to the Air Domain requires a common understanding of, and a 

coordinated effort for, action on a global scale. Nations have a common interest to protect global 

air travel. Since all nations benefit from this collective security, the United States must 

encourage all nations to share the responsibility for maintaining aviation security by countering 

the threats in this domain. 

The Aviation Transportation System2 comprises a broad spectrum of private and public sector 

elements, including: aircraft and airport operators; over 19,800 private and public use airports; 

the aviation sector; and a dynamic system of facilities, equipment, services, and airspace. The 

Aviation Transportation System continues to grow rapidly, as more and more passengers 

regularly choose to fly. On a daily basis, thousands of carrier flights arrive, depart, or overfly the 

continental United States, while each year millions of tons of freight and thousands of tons of 

mail are transported by air in the United States. 

The Nation must be capable of stopping terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals 

before they can threaten or engage in attacks against the United States and its international 

partners, including through the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To achieve these 

ends, Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector must take full advantage 

of strengthened intelligence collection, analysis, and appropriate dissemination; increased 

sharing of surveillance and other aviation resources; advances in technology; continued 

enhancements in aviation protective measures; innovations in the use of law enforcement 

personnel; and strengthened alliances within the public and private sector and other international 

cooperative arrangements. Military air defense assets are integrated into those activities to 

provide seamless coverage. 

 

2

 The Aviation Transportation System is defined as U.S. airspace, all manned and unmanned aircraft operating in 

that airspace, all U.S. aviation operators, airports, airfields, air navigation services, and related infrastructure, and all 

aviation-related industry. 

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The Strategy does not alter existing authorities or responsibilities of department and agency 

heads, including their authorities to carry out operational activities or to provide or receive 

information. It does not change or otherwise affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense 

over the Department of Defense, including the chain of command for military forces from the 

President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the military commanders or military command and 

control procedures. 

Three broad principles provide overarching guidance to the Strategy, its objectives, and its 

actions. First, the Nation must use the full range of its assets and capabilities to prevent the Air 

Domain from being exploited by terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals to commit 

acts against the United States, its people, its infrastructure, and its other interests. Second, the 

Nation must ensure the safe and efficient use of the Air Domain. Third, the Nation must 

continue to facilitate travel and commerce. These guiding principles are critical to global 

stability and economic growth and are vital to the interests of the United States. 

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Threats to the Air Domain 

Threats to the Air Domain are numerous, complex, and adaptive. While conventional 

military threats in the Air Domain continue and will likely increase in times of 

international tension or conflict, the greatest current threat, as demonstrated in the 

Heathrow plot of August 2006 reminds us of the continuing danger, and therefore the 

focus of the Strategy, is terrorism. 

Globalization, technological advances, the proliferation of WMD, and the emergence of 

terrorism as a global phenomenon have enabled threats to the Air Domain to extend in 

reach, accelerate in speed, and increase in potential impact. Aviation is a global 

enterprise with a distributed infrastructure and multiple access points. Successful attacks 

in the Air Domain can inflict mass casualties and grave economic damage, and attract 

significant public attention because of the impact on the modern transportation system. 

Intelligence on threats to the Air Domain plays a critical role in assessing terrorist 

groups’ intentions and capabilities and requires regular update and review to ensure that 

Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and the international 

community are taking appropriate measures. However, even the best intelligence will not 

uncover every specific terrorist plot because of terrorists’ efforts at operational secrecy. 

Threats focused on the Air Domain can be analyzed in two ways: by originator and by 

targets and tactics. 

Threat Originators 

There are three main originators of threats: terrorist groups; hostile nation-states; and 

other criminals. 

Terrorist Groups. Terrorist groups are politically, as well as religiously in some cases, 

motivated and use premeditated violence, usually against noncombatants, to affect a 

particular audience. Because of their clear intent to do harm to the United States and its 

interests, terrorist groups remain the most severe threat to America’s security. Their 

ultimate goal in the Air Domain is to conduct multiple, simultaneous, catastrophic attacks 

exploiting the Aviation Transportation System because of its visibility as a symbol of the 

U.S. global presence and economic influence. In addition, the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and other successful or attempted attacks have inspired emulation. 

The terrorist threat is changing in form and intensity as terrorists’ intentions and 

capabilities change and countermeasures are instituted. Their techniques are adapting on 

multiple fronts, including modality of planning, complexity of attack, and style of 

execution. The type, location, and frequency of terrorist attacks cannot be reliably 

extrapolated from historical patterns, and therefore current threats must be regularly 

reassessed. 

Terrorist groups, best typified by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, pose several threats to the 

Air Domain. The most prominent threat is physical attack, discussed at greater length in 

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the Targets and Tactics section of the Strategy. Terrorists might also take advantage of 

the same tactics, techniques, and methods pioneered by criminals to counter immigration, 

customs, and border security measures to move people and materiel. They might deploy 

in regions of political and economic instability where aviation law enforcement is 

stretched thin or readily corruptible, bribe officials, use forged fraudulent documents, and 

make illegal transactions to hide their true intentions. Terrorists might use unsecured air 

transportation routes to transport arms, explosives, or operatives clandestinely to safe 

havens, training sites, or attack-staging locations. Ultimately, terrorists might use these 

access points and routes to transport more dangerous cargo, including WMD and their 

associated components. Such threats are particularly worrisome in areas where 

governments are weak or provide safe haven to terrorists. 

Hostile Nation-States. While most countries have an explicit interest in being able to 

operate safely, effectively, and reliably in the Air Domain, some pose threats, either due 

to actual hostile intent or weak infrastructure safeguards. For example, some countries 

directly sponsor international terrorism, providing training, funding, supplies, WMD and 

related components, and operational direction to surrogates. Other nation-states 

knowingly or unknowingly provide safe havens for terrorists who plan, prepare, or 

facilitate attacks or deploy materiel or operatives through the Air Domain. Some states 

have weak command and control over their aviation infrastructure, such as their internal 

air defenses or airport security apparatus, which terrorists can then exploit. Additionally, 

nation-states could present a military threat, such as cruise missiles, to the United States 

and U.S. interests globally in the Air Domain. 

Criminals. Criminals, including individuals and groups, use the Air Domain to pursue 

objectives that are illegal under U.S. law or international convention. Domestic 

extremists in the United States have not, to date, engaged in organized efforts to attack 

the Aviation Transportation System. However, there are potentially violent domestic 

groups and individuals who have extensive knowledge of the aviation sector coupled with 

a demonstrated expertise in manufacturing and employing targeted-attack techniques, 

including improvised or conventional explosive devices. 

Targets and Tactics 

There are three primary categories of threats: to and from aircraft; to the Aviation 

Transportation System infrastructure; and from hostile exploitation of cargo. 

Threats to and from Aircraft. Aircraft can be disaggregated into four categories of 

threats:

• large passenger aircraft; 

• large all-cargo aircraft; 

• small aircraft, such as aircraft used primarily to transport small numbers of people or 

to provide unique services, including light private and corporate aircraft, and 

helicopters; and 

• non-traditional aircraft, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ultra-light aircraft, 

gliders, and aerial-application aircraft. 

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These categories might be susceptible to, or could pose a threat from, similar basic 

tactics: explosives; stand-off weapons including man-portable air defense systems 

(MANPADS); hijackings; WMD delivery and dissemination; and smuggling of terrorists 

and instruments of terror. 

Large passenger aircraft. Historically, large passenger aircraft have been at the 

greatest risk to terrorism because terrorists perceive that such aircraft have great 

potential to inflict catastrophic damage and are likely to disrupt the Aviation 

Transportation System. Two tactics have appeared to date. First, aircraft and 

passengers have been used as targets, such as the detonation of a bomb onboard – as 

was central to the Heathrow plot of 2006, the taking of hostages, traditional hijacking, 

and attack from stand-off weapons including MANPADS. Second, aircraft have been 

used as weapons, most notably seen during the September 11, 2001, attacks. The 

Nation must closely monitor other tactics as they emerge. 

Large all-cargo aircraft. Absent more attractive targets, such as large passenger 

aircraft, terrorists might seek to take advantage of the varying degrees and 

sophistication of security measures employed for all-cargo aircraft. If terrorist tactics 

adapt in this way, large all-cargo aircraft are likely more attractive as weapons, such 

as through a hijacking to attack ground-based targets or as conveyance mechanisms, 

rather than as targets. These aircraft also remain at risk from attacks using 

MANPADS or other stand-off weapons. 

Small aircraft. As with large passenger aircraft, small aircraft face two varieties of 

threats: as the target of attack; or as weapons used to attack other targets. Small 

aircraft are relatively unattractive as targets because they carry few passengers, and 

thus would have less dramatic impact if attacked. As weapons, however, there are 

several potential threat scenarios. Terrorists might use a wide range of small aircraft, 

such as business jets or helicopters, to destroy a critical asset or portion of 

infrastructure. The most serious threat stems from terrorists using small aircraft to 

transport or deliver WMD or related materiel. The Nation must be especially 

watchful for terrorists adopting this tactic. Transnational criminal elements employ 

small aircraft to conduct illicit activities in the Air Domain, including smuggling of 

persons and contraband. 

Non-traditional aircraft. While ultra-lights, remote-controlled aircraft, gliders, aerialapplication aircraft, and UAVs have limited potential as targets, terrorists might 

employ these non-traditional aircraft as weapons or as a means to disseminate WMD. 

For example, terrorists might use them for missions that are of limited range, require 

limited accuracy, and have a specific and small target. Adoption of this tactic 

deserves very close monitoring. 

While attacks against the Air Domain and the United States and its interests are currently 

more likely to originate from terrorists, the threat posed by military aircraft of hostile 

nation-states, such as long range strategic aviation, air-to-air missiles, long-range air-tosurface missiles, or cruise missiles must be considered. 

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Threats to the Aviation Transportation System Infrastructure. Reported threats to 

Aviation Transportation System infrastructure, which comprises airports and those 

facilities and systems that are used to provide Air Navigation Services (ANS) and other 

important related services needed to support air operations in U.S. airspace, are relatively 

few. In part, this is due to the relatively low public profile of ANS infrastructure such as 

Air Traffic Control facilities and systems, the robustness and resilience of these systems 

due to many layers of redundancies, and the Nation’s likely capacity to recover rapidly 

and thus limit the psychological or economic impact of any attack. 

There is a range of potential threat scenarios at different types of airport facilities that 

require vigilance. Terrorists might target passenger concentrations at commercial 

airports, recycling tactics from many years ago. They might place explosives near or 

inside passenger facilities. Terrorists might target multi-use airports, such as those 

combining commercial and military operations or commercial and general aviation 

operations, where unrelated security authorities and dissimilar security procedures often 

co-exist. 

Other Aviation Transportation System-related threats are less likely to materialize. For 

example, general aviation airports have relatively few passengers in transit and an attack 

on one would present limited opportunities for causing major symbolic or economic 

damage. In addition, facilities that process high volumes of cargo have great redundancy 

and involve few people relative to the commercial passenger aviation system. 

Threats from Hostile Exploitation of Cargo. The air-cargo industry is highly dynamic 

and encompasses a wide range of users, making it subject to potential exploitation by 

terrorists. Many users are regulated, from large all-cargo carriers, such as express 

consignment carriers that operate complex sorting operations at major hubs for timedefinite cargo delivery, to small regional carriers, such as those that move high-value 

cargo or service rural areas. Since the adoption of enhanced security measures at 

airfreight terminals following September 11, 2001, threats such as stowaways aboard air 

freighters and the use of explosives for detonation have waned. However, the regulatory 

framework for cargo systems is not immune to exploitation, especially to methods that 

have been used by criminals for years. For example, terrorists may infiltrate the cargo 

handling system to transport people, conventional or WMD, or weapon components.

Risk Methodology 

The Strategy will use a risk-based, cross-discipline, and global approach to aviation 

security to ensure that resources are allocated to those Federal, State, local, and tribal 

governments and private sector aviation security efforts with the greatest potential to 

prevent, detect, deter, and defeat attacks, and to mitigate the consequences if an attack 

occurs. The risk methodology used is outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan (NIPP) and defined in more detail by the NIPP Transportation Sector-Specific Plan 

(TSSP). These plans define risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 

The United States Government will regularly conduct formal assessments of the risks to 

the Aviation Transportation System. 

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Strategic Objectives 

The Strategy describes how the United States Government will enhance the security of 

the Air Domain while preserving the freedom of the domain for legitimate pursuits. The 

Strategy recognizes the critical importance of the Air Domain to the United States and the 

global economy, and is flexible enough to anticipate the dramatic growth in U.S. air 

traffic and infrastructure as well as emerging threats. 

Today’s terrorists have demonstrated the capability and intent to inflict a level of damage 

once reserved exclusively for nation-states. The nations of the world have a shared 

interest in maintaining and strengthening global aviation security by adopting 

comprehensive and cohesive policies, programs, and procedures. The Nation reserves its 

inherent right to self-defense and its right to act to protect its essential national security 

interests while protecting the United States and its interests. Defending against enemies 

is a fundamental responsibility of the United States Government. 

In keeping with the principles from NSPD-47/HSPD-16, and consistent with the National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism, that provide overarching guidance to the Strategy, and 

in accordance with the values enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and applicable domestic 

and international law, the following objectives will guide the Nation’s aviation security 

activities: 

• deter and prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts in the Air Domain; 

• protect the United States and its interests in the Air Domain; 

• mitigate damage and expedite recovery; 

• minimize the impact on the Aviation Transportation System and the U.S. economy; 

and 

• actively engage domestic and international partners. 

Deter and Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Acts in the Air 

Domain 

The United States will prevent terrorist attacks and other criminal or hostile acts in the 

Air Domain by maximizing shared awareness of domestic and international airspace, 

aviation infrastructure, and those who have access to the system. International and 

foreign airspace may also be of national security interest. The United States will work to: 

detect adversaries before they strike; deny them safe haven in which to operate 

unobstructed; block their freedom of movement between locations; stop them from 

entering the United States; identify, disrupt, and dismantle their capacities, including the 

capacity to possess and access weapons and financial infrastructure; use all means of 

attribution for maximum legal accountability including criminal prosecution; and take 

decisive action to eliminate the threat they pose. These actions are addressed in separate 

executive orders and directives and other presidential guidance. 

The basis for effective prevention measures – operations and security programs – is 

shared awareness and sharing of risk assessment information, along with credible 

deterrent and interdiction capabilities. Without effective shared awareness of activities 

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within the Air Domain, crucial opportunities for prevention or an early response can be 

lost. Advance warning grants time and distance to counter adversaries whether they are 

planning an operation or are en route to attack or to commit an unlawful act. 

Effective prevention requires close cooperation between Federal, State, local, and tribal 

governments, the private sector, the international community, and the general public to 

gain shared awareness and increase security in the Air Domain while minimizing the 

impact of security measures on daily operations. This collaborative effort serves as a 

force multiplier against adversaries. 

Protect the United States and its Interests in the Air Domain 

Criminals and terrorists have and will continue to consider the use of the Air Domain as a 

means to attack the United States. The Nation must therefore continuously monitor, and 

exert unambiguous control over, its airspace and access to it. Security measures, 

combined with enhanced surveillance coverage, information collection, shared 

awareness, dissemination of information, and a ready response capability, will allow the 

United States to seize the initiative and influence events before adversaries can cause 

harm. 

The security of the United States also depends on the security of the Aviation 

Transportation System’s critical infrastructure, including physical and cyber networks. 

Complicating the security challenge is the fact that major metropolitan areas within the 

United States not only have airport and other Aviation Transportation System facilities, 

but these areas are in close proximity to other critical infrastructure such as military 

facilities, power plants, refineries, nuclear facilities, chemical plants, tunnels, and 

bridges. 

Maintaining the integrity and viability of the Aviation Transportation System critical 

infrastructure is essential for the free movement of passengers and goods throughout the 

world. Some physical and cyber assets, as well as associated infrastructure, also function 

as defense critical infrastructure, the availability of which must be constantly assured for 

national security operations worldwide. Beyond the immediate casualties, the 

consequences of an attack on a node of critical infrastructure may include disruption of 

entire systems, significant damage to the economy, or the inability to deploy military 

forces. Protection of infrastructure networks must address individual elements, 

interconnecting systems, and their interdependencies. 

The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall 

national effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure. However, public and 

private sectors must work together to improve national security by: sharing threat 

information; conducting prudent risk assessments; working to implement essential 

upgrades; and investing in protective measures such as staff identification and 

credentialing, access control, and physical security of fixed sites. 

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Mitigate Damage and Expedite Recovery 

The Nation must take actions to mitigate damage and expedite recovery from an attack on 

the Air Domain. The fundamental key to effective recovery is pre-event planning and 

established coordination, in conjunction with exercising national mitigation and recovery 

options. Mitigation and recovery actions promote resilience by preserving life, property, 

social, economic, and political structures, as well as restoring order and essential services 

for those who use the Air Domain for their livelihood. However, the Aviation 

Transportation System will not be shut down as an automatic response to an aviation 

incident; instead, the United States will be prepared to minimize the impact on the system 

by isolating particular portions of the Aviation Transportation System, and implementing 

contingency measures to ensure public safety and continuity of commerce. 

The response to incidents will be in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP), 

which incorporates the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The NRP 

provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational 

coordination for domestic incident management. Pursuant to HSPD-5, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security serves as the principal Federal official for domestic incident 

management. 

A terrorist attack or other disruptive incident involving the Aviation Transportation 

System can cause severe ripple effects on other modes of transportation as well as 

adverse economic or national security effects. From the onset of such an incident, 

Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, along with private sector entities, require 

the capability to assess the human and economic consequences in affected areas, and to 

rapidly estimate the effects on other regional, national, or global interests. These entities 

must also develop and implement contingency procedures to ensure continuity of 

operations, essential public services, and the resumption or redirection of commercial 

aviation activities, including the prioritized movement of cargo to mitigate the larger 

economic, social, and potential national security effects of the incident. For example, the 

public and private sectors must be ready expeditiously to: detect and identify potential 

WMD agents; react without endangering first responders; treat the injured; contain and 

minimize damage; rapidly reconstitute operations; and mitigate long-term hazards 

through effective decontamination measures. 

Minimize the Impact on the Aviation Transportation System and the U.S. Economy 

The Aviation Transportation System demands extremely high standards of security 

implemented in an efficient manner. Security measures should be balanced with 

commercial, private, and trade requirements, the safe and efficient movement of cargo 

and people, and economic and market competition drivers, and should protect privacy 

and other legal rights. To support the accelerating growth of global commerce and 

associated U.S. interests, security concerns and measures should, to the extent possible, 

be: aligned and embedded with business practices; implemented by private sector 

stakeholders, including air operators and related industries; optimized through the use of 

information technology; and implemented with the minimum essential impact on 

commercial and trade-flow costs and operations. The Strategy will require new and 

14
enhanced partnerships, as well as cost-sharing and burden-sharing between the public and 

private sectors. 

To accomplish the aforementioned initiatives, the Nation must develop security measures 

that can be integrated with the unique needs of the aviation sector and provide a high 

degree of protection, while minimizing the impact to the efficient flow of people and 

goods through the system. The Nation must depend on new and emerging technologies 

to assist in this effort, such as the enhancement of biometric solutions for access control 

initiatives. This effort must also be supported by building and strengthening partnerships 

between the government and the private sector to: facilitate the continued 

implementation of security measures; maximize collaborative planning; and coordinate 

operational responses to incidents. 

The effects of response and recovery efforts should also reflect aviation sector needs. On 

September 11, 2001, the National Airspace System was completely shut down, causing 

significant operational and economic impacts to the aviation sector. Recognizing the 

need for diverse and flexible options that allow for an effective response, the United 

States Government has developed plans allowing for the selective suspension or 

restriction of air traffic on a local or regional basis as necessary. Plans such as the 

Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic and other available tools and resources 

provide government leaders with options for the closure and the reconstitution of the 

system and include identifying the steps necessary to prevent the recurrence of an event. 

Efforts such as these will allow the government to continue to provide the security 

required to protect the Aviation Transportation System while minimizing the impact of 

those actions on the system and the U.S. economy. 

Actively Engage Domestic and International Partners 

Effective aviation security includes efforts at home and abroad. Active engagement 

among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and private sector stakeholders 

during the planning process and subsequent follow-up actions is vital for success. 

Maintaining transparency in the planning effort and promoting dialogue will help 

increase the effectiveness of risk mitigation actions and reduce burdens on the private 

sector. 

In addition to strengthening relationships among Federal, State, local, and tribal 

governments, the private sector, and the general public, the Nation must forge 

cooperative partnerships and alliances with other nations, as well as with public and 

private stakeholders in the international community. To foster this cooperation, a 

coordinated policy for United States Government aviation security activities with foreign 

governments, international and regional organizations, and the private sector must be 

achieved. Such coordination can help solicit support for improved global aviation 

security while furthering United States Government policies and goals. Through these 

domestic and international efforts, the Nation can inculcate common security measures 

throughout the global aviation community. 

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Strategic Actions 

The differences in ground-based and airborne aviation security measures enacted by the 

nations of the world, the volume of international air traffic, and the speed of aviation 

operations make the Air Domain uniquely susceptible to exploitation and disruption by 

individuals, organizations, and states. Individuals and groups hostile to the United States 

have demonstrated the ability, and a continuing desire, to exploit vulnerabilities and to 

adapt to changes in aviation security measures to attack the Nation and its global 

interests. 

The United States recognizes that, because of the extensive global connectivity among 

businesses, governments, and populations, its aviation security policies affect other 

nations, and that significant local and regional incidents may have global effects. 

Success in securing the Air Domain will not come from the United States acting alone, 

but through a coalition of nations maintaining a strong and united international front. 

The need for a strong and effective coalition is reinforced by the fact that most of the Air 

Domain is under no single nation’s sovereignty or jurisdiction. Additionally, increased 

economic interdependency and globalization, made possible by air passenger and cargo 

transportation, underscore the need for a coordinated international approach. The United 

States recognizes that the vast majority of actors and activities within the Air Domain are 

legitimate. The security of the Air Domain can be accomplished only by employing all 

instruments of national power in a fully coordinated manner in concert with other nationstates. 

Aviation security is best achieved by combining public and private aviation security 

activities on a global scale into a comprehensive and integrated effort that addresses all 

aviation threats. Aviation security crosses disciplines, builds upon current and future 

efforts, and depends on scalable, layered security to minimize single points of 

vulnerability. Full and complete national and international coordination, in concert with 

cooperative intelligence and information sharing among public and private entities, is 

required to protect and secure the Air Domain. 

The broad principles that provide overarching guidance to the Strategy have been used to 

direct the development of five strategic actions, which collectively advance the strategic 

objectives. The Strategy recognizes that collectively these strategic actions support 

strategic objectives: 

• maximize domain awareness; 

• deploy layered security; 

• promote a safe, efficient, and secure Aviation Transportation System; 

• enhance international cooperation; and 

• assure continuity of the Aviation Transportation System. 

Domain awareness is a critical enabler for all strategic actions. Deploying layered 

security addresses not only prevention and protection activities, but also the integration of 

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domestic and international security. Clearly, international cooperation is vital to 

enhancing the effectiveness of each of the other strategic actions. 

The Strategy and appropriate supporting plans should ensure bridging toward achieving 

the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS). NGATS provides an overall 

and integrated view of future operations beyond the Strategy that will integrate key 

transformation activities by coordinating applicable policies, procedures, research and 

development with participating departments and agencies from today’s operations into 

the Aviation Transportation System of 2025. 

Maximize Domain Awareness 

Maximizing Air Domain awareness is critical to achieving all of the strategic objectives 

including deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, as well as protecting the United 

States and its interests in the Air Domain and mitigating the effects of an attack. 

Achieving shared awareness of the Air Domain is challenging and certain threats to the 

Air Domain are difficult to detect and interdict. The complexity of aircraft registration 

and ownership processes, as well as the fluid nature of these activities, offer additional 

challenges. 

To maximize domain awareness the Nation must have the ability to integrate surveillance 

data, all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and relevant open-source data 

from public and private sectors, including international partners. Domain awareness is 

heavily dependent on advanced information collection, analysis, and sharing of that 

information, and requires unprecedented cooperation and action among the various 

elements of the public and private sectors, both nationally and internationally, while 

adhering to laws protecting U.S. civil liberties. 

To maximize domain awareness, the United States must leverage the diverse capabilities 

of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to collect, analyze, integrate, and 

disseminate timely intelligence to provide a shared awareness for United States 

Government agencies and international partners. 

Additionally, the Nation must refine ongoing efforts to develop shared situational 

awareness that integrates intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, flight, and other 

aeronautical data, navigation systems, and other operational information. To ensure 

effective and coordinated action, access to this domain awareness information must be 

made available at the appropriate classification level to agencies across the U.S. 

Government, other local government actors, industry partners and the international 

community. The Nation will continue to enhance the capabilities of current information 

systems and develop new capabilities and procedures to locate and track aviation threats 

and illicit activities. Initiatives to maximize domain awareness include: 

• The United States Government will maximize its capability to detect and monitor 

aircraft within its airspace, from large commercial aircraft to low-altitude, lowobservable manned or unmanned aircraft, as well as the area contiguous to U.S. 

airspace and other airspace that might be of national security interest. Priority for 

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surveillance will be given to those assets and those regions identified in specific 

national level documents. 

• The United States Government will enhance its situational awareness through 

monitoring to include the combination of information sources regarding a flight (for 

example, airframe characteristic, onboard sensors, crew, passengers, Federal Air 

Marshals onboard, Federal Flight Deck Officers and domestic and foreign law 

enforcement). 

• The United States Government will develop and encourage regulatory and private 

sector initiatives to enhance supply chain security practices and advance robust 

information collection for persons and cargo. 

• The United States Government will work with international partners to develop 

agreements that promote enhanced visibility into the aviation supply chain and the 

movement of cargo and passengers and will participate in international coalitions to 

share aviation situational awareness, as protocols permit, on a timely basis. 

• The United States Government will continue to improve and invest in an analytic 

work force, enhanced sensor technology, human intelligence collection, and 

information processing tools to persistently monitor the Air Domain. 

• The United States Government will enhance the global aviation intelligence 

capability to strengthen intelligence analysis, coordination, and integration. 

• The United States Government will enhance the Aviation Transportation System to 

provide shared situational awareness to disseminate information to both public and 

private users at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels. 

• The United States Government will support transformational research and 

development programs in information fusion and analysis to advance to the next level 

of threat assessment. 

• The United States Government, with the cooperation of its foreign partners, will 

monitor those aircraft, cargo, and persons of interest from the point of origin, 

throughout the route of flight, to the point of entry, to ensure the integrity of the 

transit, to manage aviation traffic routing, and if necessary, to interdict and/or divert 

aircraft for law enforcement or defensive action. 

Deploy Layered Security 

Deploying layered security will be a critical enabler for strategic objectives such as 

deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, protecting the United States and its interests in 

the Air Domain, and mitigating damage and expediting recovery. The ability to achieve 

aviation security is contingent upon an active, layered aviation security and defense indepth that integrates the capabilities of public and private sector entities acting in concert 

and using diverse and complementary measures, rather than relying on a single point 

solution. At a minimum, a layered approach to aviation security means further applying 

some measure of security to each of the following points: transportation; staff; 

passengers; conveyances; access control; cargo and baggage; airports; and in-flight 

security. Together, as one integrated system, these measures allow for resilience against 

expected and unexpected attack scenarios. Not only does each layer add to security, but 

its combination serves as a force multiplier. This layered security deters attacks, which 

otherwise might be executed in a multiple, simultaneous, catastrophic manner, by 

continually disrupting an adversary’s deliberate planning process. The implementation of 

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a new security layer must be cost effective, both in absolute terms and relative to other 

possible measures, and must protect information privacy and other rights provided by 

law. Initiatives to enhance layered security include the following: 

• The United States Government will further integrate and align all aviation security 

programs and initiatives into a comprehensive, cohesive national effort of scalable, 

layered security. 

• The United States Government will enhance its capabilities and procedures to 

identify, intercept, and defeat aviation threats in the air or on the ground. 

• The United States Government will expand domestic partnerships with the public and 

private sector to train and equip domestic security forces, consistent with their 

jurisdiction and legal authority, to provide physical security for key assets and critical 

infrastructure to detect, identify, interdict, and defeat aviation threats on the ground. 

• The United States Government will conduct and sponsor further development, and 

where appropriate, encourage implementation of new and emerging technologies 

including both aircraft-borne and ground-based systems for detection of WMD, as 

well as for reducing susceptibility/vulnerability or increasing survivability of aircraft 

to these and other terrorist threats. 

• The United States Government will enhance procedures for identifying and 

designating flights of interest, as well as coordinating procedures for any subsequent 

operational response. 

• The United States must have well-trained, properly equipped, and ready ground-based 

aviation security response forces from State, regional, local, and tribal law 

enforcement agencies, in addition to a Federal response force ready to detect, deter, 

interdict, and defeat any potential adversary. 

• The United States Government will further collaborate with State, local, and tribal 

governments and the private sector to assess and prioritize critical facilities, 

resources, infrastructure, and venues that are at greatest risk from hostile or unlawful 

acts. 

• The United States Government will enhance and expand its capability to assess risks 

posed by individuals with access to the Air Domain. 

• The United States Government, using a risk-based methodology, will continue to 

develop measures for the prevention and detection of MANPADS or other stand-off 

weapon attack on domestic commercial aircraft. 

Integrating diverse aviation security layers not only requires a clear delineation of roles 

and responsibilities but also a mutual understanding and acceptance of the supporting 

nature of overlapping authorities and capabilities of U.S. Government departments and 

agencies. In particular, to achieve unity of effort and operational effectiveness, aviation 

security assets must have a high degree of interoperability, reinforced by joint 

interagency and international training and exercises to ensure a high rate of readiness. 

Coordination protocols must define procedures for ensuring national execution of 

aviation security policy for specific threats or incidents. 

The integrated planning and management of Federal, State, local, and tribal resources, 

reinforced with regular exercises, is essential for an effective response. Therefore, 

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agencies will further coordinate training, planning, and other resources, where practical 

and permissible, to standardize operational concepts, develop common technology 

requirements, and coordinate budget planning for aviation security missions. Interagency 

acquisition and logistics processes must support the continuous assessment of all 

requirements to optimize the allocation of appropriate resources and capabilities. 

Cooperative research and development efforts, coupled with reformed acquisition 

processes with coordinated requirements, funding, and scheduling, along with 

management, will identify current and future needs. 

Promote a Safe, Efficient, and Secure Aviation Transportation System 

Promoting a safe, efficient, and secure system will help meet the strategic objectives of 

protecting the United States and its interests in the Air Domain and minimizing the 

impact on the Aviation Transportation System and the U.S. economy. Potential 

adversaries will attempt to exploit existing vulnerabilities, choosing the time and place to 

act according to the weaknesses they perceive. Private owners and operators of 

infrastructure, facilities, and resources are the first line of defense and should undertake 

basic facility security improvements. Defenses against terrorist attacks and criminal acts 

can be improved by embedding scalable security measures that reduce systemic or 

physical vulnerabilities. The elimination of vulnerabilities depends upon incorporating 

best practices and establishing centers of excellence, including feedback mechanisms for 

lessons learned, and open avenues for internal and external stakeholders to propose and 

develop security innovations, as well as a periodic review of each country’s security 

standards for mutual compatibility. Initiatives to promote a safe, efficient, and secure 

Aviation Transportation System include the following: 

• The United States Government will assume the function, currently performed by the 

airlines, of checking passenger information against terrorist watchlist information 

maintained by the United States Government and vetting such information before the 

departure of any regularly scheduled commercial flight for which the place of 

departure, the place of destination, or any scheduled stopping place is within the 

United States (a “U.S. Flight”). The United States Government will also determine 

the security utility of performing such function with respect to flights that only pass 

through U.S. airspace and, if necessary, develop a system by which this function will 

be performed for such flights. 

• The United States Government will continue to collaborate with domestic and 

international partners to identify options to enhance risk-based screening of 

passengers, including, the checking of passenger information against terrorist 

watchlist information for regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights that 

overfly the territorial airspace of the United States. 

• The United States Government, in coordination with public and private partners, will 

establish requirements for the continued implementation of air cargo transportation 

security measures, including all-cargo carriers, combination carriers, and indirect air 

carriers operating to, from, or within the United States. 

• The United States Government will develop requirements for the improvement of 

airspace and air traffic management-related security measures. 

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• The United States Government and the private sector will continue to conduct 

vulnerability assessments to identify security measures that require improvement. A 

consistent risk management approach, which requires a comprehensive assessment of 

threat, likelihood, vulnerability, and criticality, will allow the private sector to invest 

in protective measures as a supporting business function. 

• The United States Government will encourage the private sector, by means of 

outcome-based security standards, incentives, and market mechanisms, to conduct 

comprehensive self-assessments of its supply chain security practices. 

• The United States Government will recommend measures to strengthen the 

prevention of entry by, and detection of, individuals with malicious intent who 

possess or seek to possess clearance or credentials that permit entry into secure or 

restricted areas within the Aviation Transportation System. 

Enhance International Cooperation 

Enhancing international cooperation will be a critical enabler for strategic objectives such 

as protecting the United States and the Air Domain, actively engaging domestic and 

international partners, as well as deterring and preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or 

hostile acts. The United States supports enhancing cooperation among nations and 

international organizations that share common interests regarding the security of the Air 

Domain. New initiatives are needed to ensure that all nations fulfill their responsibilities 

to prevent and respond to terrorist or criminal actions with timely and effective 

enforcement, including: 

• The United States Government will work with foreign partners to enhance 

international mechanisms to improve transparency in the registration of aircraft, 

identification of aircraft owners, and transparency of the cargo supply chain. 

• The United States Government will further cooperate with foreign partners to 

enhance and encourage adoption of international standards and best practices as well 

as to align regulation and enforcement measures. This will include initiatives pursued 

through international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), that include industry participation. 

• The United States Government will enhance cooperative mechanisms for 

coordinating international responses to aviation threats that may span national 

boundaries and jurisdictions. The United States will continue to work closely with 

other governments and international and regional organizations to enhance the 

aviation security capabilities of other key nations by offering aviation and airport 

security assistance, training, and consultation. 

• The United States Government will promote the implementation of the international 

anti-air piracy conventions and other international aviation security arrangements and 

initiatives. 

Assure Continuity of the Aviation Transportation System 

Assuring the continuity of the Aviation Transportation System will be a critical enabler 

for strategic objectives such as mitigating damage and expediting recovery, as well as 

minimizing the impact on the Aviation Transportation System. The United States will be 

prepared to maintain vital commerce and defense readiness in the aftermath of an attack 

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or other similarly disruptive incident that may occur within the Air Domain. Threats in 

the Air Domain are dynamic and adaptive; therefore, prevention and protection efforts 

cannot be relied upon to prevent all attacks. Resiliency of the Aviation Transportation 

System and response and recovery efforts are important to minimize the consequences of 

a disruption within the system and U.S. economy. This requires: a common framework 

with clearly defined roles for those charged with response and recovery; ready forces that 

are properly trained and equipped to manage incidents, especially those involving WMD; 

carefully crafted and exercised contingency plans for response, recovery, and 

reconstitution; and extensive coordination among public, private, and international 

communities. Initiatives to assure the continuity of the Aviation Transportation System 

include: 

• The United States Government will develop response and recovery protocols, 

consistent with the NIMS, to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national effort. 

Ultimately, these efforts will also need to be aligned with the National Preparedness 

Goal (NPG), which will establish readiness priorities, targets, and metrics. 

• The United States Government will enhance the emergency preparedness for the 

Aviation Transportation System. This will include pre-staging of resources as 

necessary, coordinating, and planning exercises with first responders, and planning 

for restoring the function of the Aviation Transportation System in the event of an 

incident. 

• The United States Government will develop protocols, mechanisms, and processes to 

mitigate the operational and economic damage from an attack, including the 

possibility of temporarily suspending or restricting flight operations in select areas of 

the National Airspace System. 

• The United States Government, in coordination with public and private sector 

partners, will establish near-term and long-term recovery strategies to support the 

Aviation Transportation System in the event of an attack. 

• The United States Government will identify gaps in recovery option capabilities and, 

working with our State, local, and tribal government, private sector, and international 

partners, develop appropriate operational and technical solutions to address those 

gaps. 

The direct and indirect costs associated with a prolonged and systemic disruption of the 

Aviation Transportation System can be significantly reduced by following the provisions 

of in-place contingency and continuity plans. These plans for assessment, recovery, and 

reconstitution must prioritize local, regional, and national interests, as well as manage 

risk and uncertainty within acceptable levels. These contingency and continuity plans 

must be developed and exercised in a coordinated fashion by the public and private 

sectors. 

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Roles and Responsibilities 

Because of the complexity and global nature of the Aviation Transportation System, 

responsibility for preventing, responding to, and, if necessary, recovering from attacks in 

the Air Domain extends across all levels of government and across private and public 

sectors. No single entity alone can prevent or mitigate the impact of an attack in the Air 

Domain. 

The entities below have roles and responsibilities that fulfill executive orders or statutory 

responsibilities for Air Domain activities. Given the unique operating environment of the 

Air Domain, any of these entities may need to perform a specific lead or supporting 

functional role based on the threat scenario and the outcome desired by the United States 

Government. In determining whether a specific entity is suitable to perform this role, the 

following criteria will be considered: 

• existing law; 

• desired outcome; 

• response capabilities required; 

• asset availability; and 

• authority to act. 

To the maximum extent feasible and appropriate, Federal departments and agencies must 

coordinate their activities with other Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well 

as law enforcement and emergency response agencies. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

In accordance with NSPD-47/HSPD-16, the Secretary of Homeland Security is 

responsible for closely coordinating United States Government activities encompassing 

the national aviation security programs including identifying conflicting procedures, 

identifying vulnerabilities and consequences, and coordinating corresponding interagency 

solutions. In support of these responsibilities, the Secretary of Homeland Security: 

• will conduct regular reviews of national aviation security programs to identify 

conflicting procedures, identify changes to threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting 

consequences, and coordinate corresponding interagency mitigation measures; 

• will inform Federal government departments when there have been fundamentally 

significant recommended or actual changes resulting from regular reviews of national 

aviation security programs; 

• will undertake additional initiatives, as appropriate, to maximize aviation security for 

the United States and its interests; 

• is responsible for aviation security law enforcement operations and enforcement and 

investigation of criminal law violations within the jurisdiction of its law enforcement 

components; 

• is responsible at borders and ports-of-entry for inspection, determining admissibility, 

and monitoring of persons, conveyances, and cargo traveling via air to ensure 

compliance with all U.S. laws, including those designed to prevent terrorists, 

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criminals, and terrorist weapons and contraband from entering or exiting the United 

States; for securing the transport of passengers and cargo by air through domestic and 

international screening of passengers, baggage, and air cargo; for issuing regulations 

and security directives necessary to ensure the security of commercial and general 

aviation aircraft and airport operations; for deployment of law enforcement on U.S. 

flagged commercial flights; and for coordination of airport access control and other 

security measures; 

• is responsible for directing law enforcement activity related to the safety of 

passengers onboard aircraft that are involved in acts of hijackings and air piracy from 

the moment all external doors of the aircraft are closed following boarding until those 

doors are opened to allow passengers to leave the aircraft; 

• is responsible for collaborating with State, local, and tribal governments and the 

private sector to assess and prioritize critical facilities, resources, infrastructure, and 

venues that are at greatest risk from hostile or unlawful acts; 

• is responsible for developing technologies to protect assets in the Air Domain against 

threats such as WMD, MANPADS, and carry-on/cargo weapons (but not high-end 

military threats like cruise missiles, which are the purview of the Department of 

Defense (DoD)), and developing other technologies that facilitate protective measures 

such as voice and data communications with Federal law enforcement officers; 

• is responsible for operational coordination with other United States Government 

departments and agencies, as well as with foreign governments, in the prevention of 

and response to aviation security incidents;

• is responsible for advancing common security interests in the Air Domain; and

• is responsible for effecting information sharing related to aviation security in support 

of an improved global aviation security network.

Department of Transportation (DOT) 

The Secretary of Transportation, whose Department includes the country’s civil aviation 

authority and air navigation services provider, is responsible for the regulation and 

operation of the National Airspace System (NAS). As an integral part of his 

responsibilities, the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for protecting the nation 

and U.S. interests in the Air Domain by conducting a broad range of national defense, 

homeland security, law enforcement, and crisis response related activities, including, but 

not limited to the following: 

• the safe, efficient, and, in cooperation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and 

Defense, and other key stakeholders, secure operation of aircraft flying within the 

country’s airspace and that airspace that has been delegated to the United States for 

the purposes of air navigation services; 

• coordinating and managing the air navigation services, regulatory activities, and 

related functions to support national defense, homeland security, law enforcement, 

and crisis response missions undertaken by Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, 

including the imposition of temporary flight restrictions and provision of Air Traffic 

Control support; 

• ensuring the safety of aviation security driven modifications to U.S. registered aircraft 

and of other aviation security systems, which could affect civil air traffic and the 

country’s air navigation services; 

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• the security of the NAS’s critical infrastructure, including Air Traffic Control 

facilities; and 

• designated leadership of NGATS/JPDO development, responsible for coordinating of 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DHS, DoD, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, Department of Commerce, and the Office of Science and Technology 

Policy participation. 

Department of Justice (DOJ) 

The Attorney General is responsible for: 

• the ground-based tactical response to resolve or defeat a hijacking, air piracy, or other 

terrorist threat; 

• the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or 

groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, 

where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States; 

• enforcement and investigation of criminal law violations within its jurisdiction that 

occur in the Air Domain, and all Federal prosecutions arising from these incidents; 

• coordinating the activities of other members of the law enforcement community to 

detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States; and 

• intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence sharing under 

guidelines established in statute and policy. 

Department of Defense (DoD) 

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for: 

• deterring, defending against, and defeating aviation threats to the United States and its 

global interests; 

• airborne response and resolution of nation-state threats within the Air Domain; 

• the operational response to actual or potential airborne threats in U.S. airspace or the 

air approaches to the United States, until the threat has either been resolved or 

defeated; 

• taking a lead or supporting role for response to aviation terrorist threats globally as 

part of the United States Government’s active, layered defense of the Nation; 

• conducting defense support of civil authorities as directed by the President of the 

United States or the Secretary of Defense; and 

• advising Federal civilian agencies on possible technology development solutions to 

capability gaps and shall consider collaborative development efforts where 

appropriate. 

• DoD is a formally designated partner in NGATS/JPDO initiative through its 

leadership of the Shared Situational Awareness Integrated Product Team (IPT). 

Department of State (DOS) 

The Secretary of State is responsible for: 

• coordinating United States Government initiatives that involve foreign governments 

and international organizations, including regional aviation security cooperation; 

• visa adjudication; 

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• giving foreign policy guidance on the U.S. response to actual or potential airborne 

threats in the air approaches to the United States if those threats are in foreign or 

international airspace and this is possible in the time available; 

• notifying international partners of measures that may affect the exercise of rights 

under bilateral or multilateral aviation agreements; 

• conducting global diplomatic coordination in support of aviation operational threat 

response, including coordination with foreign states to obtain required authorizations 

for operations and to facilitate United States Government assistance to operational 

threat response activities within the jurisdiction of those states, when requested; 

• leading operational threat response public affairs activity when it is decided to take an 

action or refrain from an action based primarily on considerations of foreign policy, 

and in these cases, the Secretary of State shall also coordinate with other applicable 

agencies in developing public statements regarding the operational threat response 

activities and in relaying appropriate press guidance to agencies requesting it; 

• evaluating and granting flight clearance into the United States and its territories for 

foreign military and government-owned aircraft along with any aircraft chartered to 

transport a cabinet minister or other senior foreign government official, or other 

official delegation intending to land in, or overfly, the U.S. and its possessions; 

• enhancing multilateral nonproliferation controls on MANPADS, and other stand-off 

weapons systems that pose a threat to civilian and military aviation, and engaging 

states to seek their adherence to and implementation of those controls; 

• implementing MANPADS destruction programs to reduce the global availability of 

these weapons and provides training and assistance to help states fulfill their 

MANPADS counter-proliferation obligations and combat illicit arms trade and 

trafficking within and across their borders; and 

• administering and authorizing sanctions that could be applied to governments, 

entities, or individuals that engage in the proliferation of WMD, MANPADS and 

other stand-off weapons systems, when those activities meet the statutory and 

regulatory criteria. 

Department of Energy (DOE) 

The Secretary of Energy is responsible for: 

• providing scientific and technical expertise in nuclear weapons design and specially 

equipped teams to conduct search, support response, and assist in recovery, and 

consequence management operations during any radiological or nuclear incident; 

• providing radiation detection systems and associated training at foreign border 

crossings, airports, and seaports to detect and deter illicit trafficking in nuclear and 

other radioactive materials across international borders; and 

• coordinating radiologically contaminated debris management associated with 

disposition of WMD-related materials and aircraft that may be affected by such 

materials or attacks. 

Department of Commerce (DOC) 

The Secretary of Commerce is responsible for: 

• providing aviation industry and trade policy expertise in both interagency policy 

efforts and international negotiations; 

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• engaging in cooperative efforts on aviation trade issues in numerous international 

bodies and fora, including ICAO, the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) with 

Canada and Mexico, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Asia Pacific 

Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; 

• providing analysis of the impact of domestic regulations and international trade 

agreements on the aviation industry and the broader economy; 

• providing the scientific and technical expertise necessary to measure and verify that 

devices, equipment, and technologies meet or exceed the requirements necessary to 

maintain and advance the security of the Air Domain; 

• providing weather forecast and analysis services integral to the operations of the 

Aviation Transportation System; 

• providing harmonization of U.S. and international standards that are necessary for 

facilitation of aviation-related commerce; and 

• participating in the NGATS initiative through its leadership of the Weather IPT. 

Office of The Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 

The Director of National Intelligence is responsible for: 

• developing, sustaining, and continually strengthening a unified Intelligence 

Community enterprise that supports Federal, State, regional, local, tribal, and private 

sector entities by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating accurate, timely, and 

relevant all-source intelligence for the safe and effective use of the air, related 

transportation, and other threat domains; 

• defining, creating, and propagating the business rules, policies, and technical 

standards for an Intelligence Community enterprise environment for information 

sharing and intelligence integration across the air related transportation, and other 

threat domains; 

• overseeing the primary organization in the U.S. Government for analyzing and 

integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government 

pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, except intelligence pertaining 

exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism; and 

• overseeing National Intelligence Program activities that support transportation 

security, including in the Air Domain, by leveraging innovative collection and 

analytical techniques, developing and employing effective counterintelligence 

measures that preserve the integrity of aviation security information, and respecting 

the civil liberties and privacy of all Americans. 

State, Local, and Tribal Governments 

Some of the Nation’s aviation infrastructure is owned and operated by State, local, and 

tribal governments. State Governors and/or homeland security agencies, in addition to 

local and tribal governments, hold a leadership position to address specific aviation 

security needs or issues and response. During extraordinary circumstances, the Federal 

government may assume lead security responsibility. Typically, except for cross-border 

traffic, lead responsibility will remain with the States, localities, or tribes. Specific 

responsibilities of State, local, and tribal governments are discussed in the NIPP and 

corresponding TSSP. State, local, and tribal governments are currently working with the 

Federal government to identify critical transportation assets, conduct the necessary 

27
vulnerability assessments, and develop security plans to protect those assets. They are 

also developing their response and recovery capabilities to address terrorist attacks and 

other disruptive incidents, and to meet the NPG. 

Private Sector 

Substantial segments of the Nation’s aviation transportation infrastructure are owned and 

operated by private sector entities. As such, an effective national aviation security 

strategy must be supported by a private sector that internalizes a strong security culture, 

embedding best practices and government requirements into day-to-day operations. It is 

the responsibility of private sector owners to conduct and execute business continuity 

planning, integrate security planning with disaster recovery planning, and to actively 

participate with Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to improve security in the 

aviation sector. 

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Conclusion 

The Strategy presents a vision for aviation security that seeks to secure the people and 

interests of the United States. Moreover, it underscores the Nation’s commitment to 

strengthening international partnerships and advancing economic well-being around the 

globe by facilitating commerce and abiding by the principles of freedom of the airways. 

The sheer magnitude of the Air Domain complicates the arduous and complex task of 

maintaining aviation security. The United States confronts a diverse set of adversaries 

fully prepared to exploit this vast domain for nefarious purposes. The Air Domain serves 

as the medium for a variety of threats that honor no national frontier and that seek to 

imperil the peace and prosperity of the world. Many of these threats mingle with 

legitimate commerce, either to provide concealment for carrying out hostile acts, or to 

make available weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials 

to nations and non-state actors of concern. 

In this ambiguous security environment, responding to these unpredictable threats 

requires teamwork to prevent attacks, protect people and infrastructure, minimize 

damage, and expedite recovery. The response necessitates the integration and alignment 

of all aviation security programs and initiatives into a far-reaching and unified national 

effort involving Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector 

organizations. Since September 11, 2001, Federal departments and agencies have risen 

uncompromisingly to the challenge of ensuring aviation security. The challenges that 

remain ahead for the Nation, the adversaries it confronts, and the environment in which it 

operates compel the United States to strengthen its ties with international partners and to 

seek new relationships with others. Therefore, international cooperation is critical to 

ensuring that lawful private and public activities in the Air Domain are protected from 

attack and hostile or unlawful exploitation. Such collaboration is fundamental to 

worldwide economic stability and growth, and it is vital to the interests of the United 

States. It is only through such an integrated approach among all aviation partners, 

governmental and non-governmental, public, and private, that the United States can 

improve the security of the Air Domain. 

Thus, effective implementation of the Strategy requires greater cooperation. It requires 

deeper trust and confidence, not less. It requires a concerted application of collective 

capabilities to: increase awareness of all people, activities, and events in the Air Domain; 

enhance aviation security frameworks domestically and internationally through constant 

innovation; deploy an active, layered aviation security and defense in-depth based on law 

enforcement authorities, military capabilities, and private sector partners’ competencies; 

pursue transformational research and development to move to the next level of 

information fusion and analysis and WMD detection technologies for qualitative 

improvements in threat detection; improve our response posture should a threat emerge; 

and enhance our recovery should an incident occur. 

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