U .S . MARINES IN VIETNAM

THE DEFINING YEAR

1968

by

Jack Shulimson

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard A . Blasiol, U .S . Marine Corps

Charles R. Smith

and

Captain David A. Dawson, U.S . Marine Corps

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U .S. MARINE CORP S

WASHINGTON, D .C.

1997
Volumes in the Marine Corp s

Vietnam Series

Operational Histories Serie s

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954—1964, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1977

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, The Landing and the Buildup, 197 8

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding War, 1982

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1984

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, High Mobility and Standdown, 1988

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970—1971, Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1986

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1971—1973, The War that Would Not End, 199 1

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1973—1975, The Bitter End, 1990

Functional Histories Series

Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962—1971, 1985

Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial By Fire, 1989

Anthology and Bibliography

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954—1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography,

1974 ; reprinted 1983 ; revised second edition, 198 5

Library of Congress Card No . 77—60477 6

PCN 190 0031 3800

For sale by the U.S . Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-049125- 8

ii
Foreword

This is the last volume, although published out of chronological sequence, in the nine -

volume operational history series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietna m

War. A separate functional series complements the operational histories . This book is the

capstone volume of the entire series in that 1968, as the title indicates, was the defining yea r

of the war. While originally designed to be two volumes, it was decided that unity and cohe -

sion required one book .

The year 1968 was the year of the Tet Offensive including Khe Sanh and Hue City . These

were momentous events in the course of the war and they occurred in the first three month s

of the year. This book, however, documents that 1968 was more than just the Tet Offensive .

The bloodiest month of the war for the U .S. forces was not January nor February 1968, bu t

May 1968 when the Communists launched what was called their "Mini-Tet" offensive . This

was followed by a second "Mini-Tet" offensive during the late summer which also wa s

repulsed at heavy cost to both sides. By the end of the year, the U .S . forces in South Vietnam's I Corps, under the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), had regained the offensive. By December, enemy-initiated attacks had fallen to their lowest level in two years .

Still, there was no talk of victory . The Communist forces remained a formidable foe and a

limit had been drawn on the level of American participation in the war.

Although largely written from the perspective of III MAF and the ground war in I Corps ,

the volume also treats the activities of Marines with the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force ,

activities of Marine advisors to South Vietnamese forces, and other Marine involvement i n

the war. Separate chapters cover Marine aviation and the single manager controversy ,

artillery, logistics, manpower, and pacification .

Like most of the volumes in this series, this has been a cumulative history . Lieutenant

Colonel Leonard A. Blasiol researched and wrote the initial drafts of the chapters on Kh e

Sanh as well as Chapters 17, 19, and 21 and the account of Operation Thor in Chapter 26 . Mr. Charles R. Smith researched and drafted Chapters 16, 18, 20, and 22 . Captain Davi d

A. Dawson researched and wrote Chapter 27 . Dr. Jack Shulimson researched and wrote th e

remaining chapters, edited and revised the entire text, and incorporated the comments o f

the various reviewers.

Dr. Shulimson heads the History Writing Unit and is a graduate of the University o f

Buffalo, now the State University of New York at Buffalo . He earned his master's degree i n

history at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Michigan and his doctorate from the

University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland in American studies . Mr. Smith is a senior

historian in the Division and served in Vietnam as an artilleryman and then as a historian

with the U.S . Army. He is a graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara, and

received his master's degree in history from San Diego State University . Lieutenant Colonel

Blasiol is an experienced artilleryman and a graduate of Tulane University, New Orleans ,

Louisiana, with a degree in history, and of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College .

Captain Dawson is an infantry officer now stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina . He

holds a bachelor of arts degree in history from Cornell University, Ithaca, New York and a

master's degree in history from Kansas State University, Lawrence, Kansas .

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U .S . Marine Corps (Retired)

Director Emeritus of Marine Corps History and Museums

iii

Preface

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, The Defining Year, 1968 like the preceding volumes in this

series is largely based upon the holdings of the Marine Corps Historical Center . These

include the official unit command chronologies, after-action reports, message an d

journal files, various staff studies, oral histories, personal papers, and reference collections. In addition, the authors have used the holdings of the other Services and pertinent published primary and secondary sources . Most importantly, nearly 230 reviewers, most of whom were participants in the events, read draft chapters and mad e

substantive comments . They are listed by name in a separate appendix . While some

classified sources have been used, none of the material in the text contains any classified information.

To a large extent, the measurement of this war relied not upon territory occupied ,

but upon casualties inflicted upon the enemy. In enumerating enemy casualties, the

authors are not making any statement upon the reliability or accuracy of these numbers. These are merely the figures provided by the reporting units . They are important in that the U .S . military and national leadership depended in part upon the comparative casualty yardstick to report and evaluate progress in the war .

In any project this large and that involved so many people, the authors are in debt to

several of their associates, past and present, in the History and Museums Division . While it is not possible to list everyone, we would be most negligent if we did not than k

the following. First, Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons, Director Emeritus, provided the vision and backing for the entire series, insisting upon readability and accuracy .

Colonel Michael F. Monigan, Acting Director, gave the impetus for final completion o f

the project. Chief Historian Benis M. Frank, and his predecessor, Henry I . Shaw, Jr., furnished editorial guidance and encouragement . Ms. Wanda J. Renfrow of the Histories

Section and Mr. Robert E. Struder, Head of Editing and Design, read the entire manuscript together with Mr. Frank and prevented several minor errors and some embarrassments. Mrs. Cathy A. Kerns, of the Editing and Design Section, typed the photograp h

captions and the Medal of Honor Appendix . Both Mrs. Kerns and Ms. Renfrow

painstakingly inserted the multitudinous entries for the index, carefully checking th e

index against the text . Finally, Ms. Renfrow patiently and ably made the numerous revisions in the organization of the index . Mr. William S. Hill provided technical direction

for both the maps and insertion of the photographs . Ms. Evelyn A . Englander of the

library was most helpful in obtaining publications. The Archives staff (under the direction of Fred J . Graboske and his predecessor, Ms . Joyce Bonnett), especially Ms. Joyce

M. Hudson and Ms. Amy C . Cohen, cheerfully made their resources available, as did Ar t

Curator John T. Dyer, Jr. The Reference Section under Danny J . Crawford was alway s

most cooperative, especially Ms . Lena M. Kaljot, who assisted in the duplication of mos t

of the photographs. A special thanks goes to Lieutenant Colonel Leon Craig, Jr ., Head

of the Support Branch ; his administrative officer, First Lieutenant Mark R . Schroeder;

and his enlisted Marines, especially Staff Sergeant Myrna A . Thomas and Corporal Jua n

E. Johnson, who assisted in that last push for publication .

Both Mr. Struder and Mr. Hill adroitly handled the liaison with the Typograph y

and Design Division of the U.S. Government Printing Office in the layout of th e

book. Mr. Struder deftly and professionally assisted in the reading of page proofs an d

Mr. Hill meticulously monitored the preparation of charts and maps . The authors als o

appreciate the efforts of Mr. Nicholas M. Freda and Mr. Lee Nance of the Typography

v
and Design Division, Mr. Freda for his careful layout of text and Mr . Nance for th e

final preparation of all maps and charts .

Finally, the authors want to acknowledge the contributions of former members of

the Histories Section who reviewed and commented on several chapters, including

Lieutenant Colonels Lane Rogers and Gary D. Solis, Majors George R . Dunham ,

Charles D . Melson, and Edward F. Wells, and Dr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr.

Special mention and most heartfelt thanks go to various interns who have assiste d

with the preparation of this volume . Naval Academy Midshipman Third Class

Thomas Moninger, who prepared the Chronology of Events, and Maderia School students Ms . Jaime Koepsell and Ms. Sylvia Bunyasi who drafted the initial Comman d

and Staff list. Marine Sergeant Neil A . Peterson, a student at the Citadel, sketche d

over half of the draft maps used in this volume . James E . Cypher, a senior at Loyola

University, in New Orleans, assisted in the tedious but most important final editin g

of the index. Finally, there was Peter M. Yarbo, who as a student at Johns Hopkins ,

for over a year, once a week, took the early morning train from Baltimore to Washington, to assist with the project . Peter prepared several of the charts in the appendices, but even more significantly, he did almost all of the photographic research, saw

that the photos were duplicated, and made the initial selection of photographs, organizing them by chapter. This book could never have been published at this time with -

out his specific assistance and that of the other interns .

The authors are also indebted to Dr . Douglas Pike, who opened up his Indochin a

Archives, then located at the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California ,

Berkeley, for their examination . Mr. Robert J . Destatte, Defense Prisoner of War an d

Missing Personnel Office, U .S . Department of Defense, provided a translation of several published Vietnamese documents. Finally our thanks to those who contributed

comments on the draft and to our colleagues in the other Defense historical offices ,

who assisted with their advice and comments . In the end, however, the authors alone

assume sole responsibility for the content of the text, including opinions expressed

and any errors in fact.

JACK SHULIMSON

vi
Table of Contents

Foreword

Preface v

Table of Contents vii

Map Listing xiii

PART I PRE-TET 1968 1

Chapter 1 A Puzzling War 2

III MAF January 1968 2

MACV and Command Arrangements 3

South Vietnam and I Corps 6

The Enemy 9

Focus on the North 1 1

MACV Vis-a-Vis Marines 1 2

An Ambivalent Outlook 1 5

Chapter 2 The 3d Marine Division and the Barrier 1 8

The 3d Marine Division in the DMZ 1 8

The Barrier 2 1

Chapter 3 The War in the Eastern DMZ in Early and Mid-January 3 2

The NVA in the DMZ Sector 3 2

Operation Napoleon 3 7

Kentucky Operations and the Barrier 40

Operation Lancaster and Heavy Fighting in Mid January 5 2

Chapter 4 Khe Sanh : Building Up 5 8

The Battlefield 5 8

The Early Days 5 9

Protecting the Investment 6 1

The Isolation of Khe Sanh 6 1

The Decision to Hold 65

The Stage is Set 68

Sortie to Hill 881 North 7 0

The Enemy Plan Unfolds 7 2

Chapter 5 The 3d Division War in Southern Quang Tri

and Northern Thua Thien, Operations Osceola and Neosho 7 3

Protecting the Quang Tri Base, Operation Osceola, 1—20 January 1968 7 3

Operation Neosho and Operations in the CoBi-Thanh Tan,

1—20 January 1968 7 8

Operation Checkers 83

Chapter 6 Heavy Fighting and Redeployment :

The War in Central and Southern I Corps, January 1968 84

A Time of Transition 84

The Da Nang TAOR 88

Operation Auburn : Searching the Go Noi 9 1

A Busy Night at Da Nang 97

Continuing Heavy Fighting and Increasing Uncertainty 99

Phu Loc Operations 10 1

The Formation and Deployment of Task Force X-Ray 105

The Cavalry Arrives 107

The Changed Situation in the North 109

vii
PART II THE "TET OFFENSIVE" 11 2

Chapter 7 The Enemy Offensive in the DMZ and Southern Quang Tri ,

20 January—8 February 11 3

The Cua Viet is Threatened 11 3

Adjustment of Forces in Southern Quang Tri Province 11 8

Heavy Fighting Along the DMZ 11 9

A Lull in Leatherneck Square 12 6

The Cua Viet Continues to Heat Up 12 7

The Battle For Quang Tri City 13 3

Tet Aftermath Along the DMZ 13 7

Chapter 8 The Tet Offensive at Da Nang 14 1

Allied Dispositions 14 1

The Enemy Plans His Offensive 142

The Attack 144

The Fighting Continues 149

A Brief Lull and Renewed Fighting 15 8

Chapter 9 The Struggle for Hue—The Battle Begins 164

The Two Faces of Hue 164

The NVA Attack 164

Redeployment at Phu Bai and Marines Go to Hue 168

Chapter 10 The Struggle for Hue—The Second Phase 17 5

More Reinforcements 17 5

The Beginning of the Advance 3—4 February 180

Block by Block 5—8 February 185

Chapter 11 The Struggle for Hue—Stalemate in the Old City 192

A Faltering Campaign 192

Going Into the Walled City 194

The Fight for the Tower 199

Continuing the Advance 201

Chapter 12 The Struggle for Hue—The Taking of the Citadel and Aftermath 204

The Struggle in the Western Citadel 204

An Estimate of the Situation and Mounting the Offensive 20 5

Closing Out Operation Hue City 21 1

A Summing Up 21 3

PART III AFTER TET, KHE SAHN, AND MINI-TET 224

Chapter 13 Post-Tet in I Corps 22 5

The Immediate Ramifications of the Tet Offensive 22 5

Readjustment in I Corps 227

Readjustments in the U.S. I Corps Command Structure 235

Planning for the Future 24 1

March Operations in the -DMZ Sector 24 1

March Operations in the Rest of I Corp 246

Regaining the Initiative 250

Chapter 14 The Siege of Khe Sanh 255

Digging In 255

Opening Moves 258

"Incoming!" 260

The Fall of Khe Sanh Village 261
Reinforcement and Fighting Back 264

Round Two 269

The Fall of Lang Vei 273

The Intensifying Battle 277

Settling the Score 282

Operation Pegasus 283

Chapter 15 The Battle for Dong Ha 291

Why Dong Ha? 291

The Fight for Dai Do, The First Day 293

The Continuing Fight for Dai Do 299

The End of the First Offensive 304

The Second Offensive 307

Chapter 16 Khe Sanh : Final Operations and Evacuatio n

16 April—11 July 1968 312

To Stay or Not to Stay 312

The "Walking Dead" 313

Operation Scotland II 316

Operation Robin 319

Razing Khe Sanh: Operation Charlie 323

Chapter 17 Mini-Tet and its Aftermath in Southern I Corps 328

Going into the Go Noi 328

Mini-Tet and Operation Mameluke Thrust, May 1968 336

Operation Allen Brook Continues 339

Mameluke Thrust Also Continues 343

PART IV THE WAR CONTINUES : OFFENSIVE AND COUNTER-OFFENSIVE 35 0

Chapter 18 3d Division Takes the Offensive 35 1

The Enemy Situation 35 1

The Offensive Takes Shape 35 1

The Eastern DMZ 35 7

The Pressure Continues 35 9

Into the Western Mountains 364

Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien 37 0

Chapter 19 The Third Offensive: Da Nang 37 3

Indicators 37 3

The Storm Breaks 37 5

Counterattack 37 9

Pursuit 381

Typhoon Bess 383

Chapter 20 Autumn Offensive Halted 385

A New Orientation 385

The Eastern DMZ 386

Defeat of the 320th Division 396

Coastal Quang Tri and Thua Thien: A Shift 41 0

Chapter 21 Counteroffensive Operations in Southern ICTZ 414

The Situation in September 414

Operation Maui Peak 41 8

The End of Mameluke Thrust and Renewed Attacks on Da Nang 42 3

Operation Meade River 42 5

Operation Taylor Common 437

ix
Chapter 22 The 3d Division's Labors Bear Fruit 443

Elimination of the Infrastructure 443

Rough Soldiering 45 0

Thua Thien and the End of the Year 45 5

PART V SUPPORTING THE TROOPS 45 7

Chapter 23 Marine Air at the Beginning of the Year an d

Air Support of Khe Sanh 45 8

Marine Air at the Beginning of the Year 45 8

Marine Control of Air 465

Proposed Changes in Command and Control ove r

Marine Air; Operation Niagara, January 1968 47 1

Operation Niagara and Air Resupply in the Defense of Khe Sanh 47 5

Chapter 24 A Matter of Doctrine : Marine Air and Single Manager 487

The Establishment of Single Manager 487

Point, Counterpoint 497

The Continuing Debate 509

Chapter 25 A Question of Helicopters 51 6

Another Debate 51 6

The Need for Lighter Aircraft 51 9

To Keep the Mediums and Heavies Flying 522

Another Look at Helicopter Air-Ground Relations 526

Chapter 26 Artillery and Reconnaissance Support in III MAF 533

Marine Artillery Reshuffles 533

The Guns in the North 537

Mini-Tet and the Fall of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc 54 1

Operations Drumfire II and Thor—Guns Across the Border 543

Fire Base Tactics 548

Marine Reconnaissance Operations 55 2

Chapter 27 Manpower Policies and Realities 55 7

Personnel Turnover 55 7

The Quality Issue and Project 100,000 55 9

Training 561

The Search for Junior Leaders 562

Discipline 565

Morale 566

The Aviation Shortage 569

Filling the Ranks in Vietnam : Too Many Billets, Too Few Marines 57 1

The Deployment of Regimental Landing Team 27 57 2

Reserve Callup? 57 4

The Bloodiest Month, The Bloodiest Year 57 5

Foxhole Strength: Still Too Few Marines 57 6

The Return of RLT 27 57 8

The End of the Year 57 9

The Marine Corps and the Draft 580

The Marine Corps Transformed 581

Chapter 28 Backing Up The Troops 582

A Division of Responsibility 582

Naval Logistic Support 586

Marine Engineers 588

The FLC Continues to Cope 592

x
PART VI OTHER PERSPECTIVES :

PACIFICATION AND MARINES OUTSIDE OF III MAF 595

Chapter 29 Pacification 596

Prelude 596

The Tet Offensives and Operation Recovery 604

III MAF and Pacification 607

Homicide in the Countryside 614

Changing Attitudes 616

The Boys Next Door: The Combined Action Program 617

The Accelerated Pacification Plan 630

Chapter 30 Outside of III MAF :

The Special Landing Forces, Marine Advisors, and Others 63 1

The 9th MAB and the SLFs 63 1

Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) 639

Embassy Marines 642

Individual Marines in Saigon and Elsewhere in Vietnam 644

Chapter 31 1968 : An Overview 652

NOTES 655

APPENDICES

A: Marine Command and Staff List, 1 January–31 December 1968 71 3

B: Chronology of Significant Events, January–December 1968 722

C: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 728

D: Medals of Honor Citations, 1968 735

E: Distribution of Personnel 745

F: Combined Action Program Expansion—1968 75 3

G: NVA/VC Casualties Reported by III MAF Units 75 6

H: Marine Aircraft, Support and Ordnance 760

I: List of Reviewers 761

J: Tables of Organization 764

INDEX 775

xi

Map Listing

Reference Map, I Corps Tactical Zone xiv

Allied Headquarters, January 1968 9

3d Marine Division Areas of Operation and the Strong Point Obstacle System 22

Enemy Order of Battle DMZ/Quang Tri Province 3 3

Major Enemy Units in Northern Quang Tri, January 1968 3 6

Unit Headquarters in Quang Tri Province 43

Allied and Enemy Units in the Khe Sanh Area, January 1968 7 1

Operations Osceola and Neosho, January 1968 7 7

1st Marine Division Area of Operations, Da Nang, January 1968 8 8

Operation Auburn, Go Noi Island, December 1967 January 1968 9 6

Phu Loc, 1 January 1968 102

Task Force X-Ray, 15 January 1968 108

Badger Catch/Saline Area of Operations, January 1968 11 4

Clearing of Route 9, 24—29 January 1968 12 1

The Enemy Offensive in the DMZ & Southern Quang Tri ,

20 January—8 February 1968 135

Tet Offensive at Da Nang, 30 January—February, 1968 15 0

The Fight for Hue, 31 January—February 1968 165

Task Force X-Ray, 31 January 1968 17 0

Copy of Briefing Map and Commentary (Hue) 196

2/5 Area of Operations, 24—27 February 1968 21 2

Post Tet in I Corps, 1968 22 6

Marine and Allied Units at Khe Sanh, February 1968 262

Allied and Enemy Positions, 30 April 1968, in and around Dai Do 295

3/7 Participation in Operation Allen Brook, 15May—18 May 1968 33 1

17 May 1968, Le Nam (1) NVA Ambush 33 2

Operation Mameluke Thrust, May 1968 336

The Third Offensive, Da Nang Area Operations, August 1968 374

Fire Support Bases in Northwestern Quang Tri 400

Photocopy of III MAF Briefing Map (Nov—Dec1968) 41 5

Operation Maui Peak, Opening Moves, 6 October 1968 418

Meade River AO, 20 November—9 December 1968 42 5

Operation Taylor Common, December 1968 438

Fire Support Bases in Southwestern Quang Tri 450

Photocopy of Northern I Corps Briefing Map (Nov—Dec 1968) 454

PART I

PRE-TET 1968
CHAPTER 1

A Puzzling War

III MAF January 1968—MACV and Command Arrangements—South Vietnam and I Corp s

The Enemy—Focus on the North—MACV Vis-a-Vis Marines—An Ambivalent Outloo k

III MAF January 196 8

After more than two and a half years since the

commitment of major U .S . combat forces to the war

in Vietnam, the III Marine Amphibious Force (III

MAF) entered 1968 with portents of a possible climax to the conflict. American intelligence indicated a buildup of enemy forces throughout South

Vietnam and especially in the northern border

region. Regiments from three North Vietnames e

Army (NVA) divisions massed in the Demilitarized

Zone (DMZ) dividing the two Vietnams and in Laos

near the isolated Marine base at Khe Sanh. To

counter this threat, the American command prepared to reinforce the Marines in I Corps Tactica l

Zone (ICTZ), the five northern provinces in South

Vietnam . Although 1967 ended and 1968 bega n

with the usual holiday truces between the opposing

forces (more honored in the breach than in th e

observance), the Marines girded themselves for

future heavy fighting . With its headquarters at the sprawling and centrally located Da Nang base, III MAF at the beginning o f

January 1968 numbered more than 100,000 Marines ,

sailors, and soldiers. Lieutenant General Robert E .

Cushman, Jr., Naval Academy Class of 1935 and Commanding General, III MAF, since the previous June,

had under his command two reinforced Marine divisions, the 1st and 3d; a U.S. Army division, the Americal; the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) ; and the

Force Logistic Command . Supplementing these units

and temporarily attached to III MAF were the nearl y

3,000 Marines of the Seventh Fleet's two special landing forces (SLFs). Part of the U .S. Pacific Command's

strategic reserve, the SLFs each consisted of a Marin e

battalion landing team (BLT), a battalion reinforced b y

supporting elements and a helicopter squadron . In

addition, the III MAF commander had "coordinating

authority" over the four-battalion Republic of Korea

(ROK) 2d Marine Brigade (meaning orders to th e

Koreans took the form of requests). Including the

ROK Marines, General Cushman had available 40

infantry battalions and 23 Marine aircraft squadrons in

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1.9234 7

Marine LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Commanding General,

III Marine Amphibious Force, returns a salute during a ceremony at Da Nang . By January 1968, III MAF, the senior

U.S. command in I Corps, the five northern provinces of South

Vietnam, equalled a field army in size.

the III MAF area of operations, extending some 22 0

miles from the DMZ in the north to the border with I I

Corps Tactical Zone in the south .

The 53-year-old Cushman, commanding nearly a

field army in size, had multiple responsibilities whic h

had grown apace with the expansion of III MAF fro m

the original Marine contingent, the 5,000-man 9t h

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB), which had

landed at Da Nang in March 1965 . As the senior U.S .

general officer in I Corps, General Cushman wore several "hats." As well as Commanding General, III MAF,

he was both the U.S . I Corps "Area Coordinator" and

"Senior Advisor." In one capacity or another he was

responsible for all U .S . forces in the northern five

provinces. 2

Well respected in the Corps, with a reputation fo r

intelligence and political adroitness, General Cushma n

brought a broad background in both military an d

national affairs to his duties at III MAE. The native

Minnesotan, a battalion commander in World War II ,

was awarded the Navy Cross for heroism at Guam . Following the war, he served as an instructor at the Marin e

2
A PUZZLING WAR 3

Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia, and then headed

the Amphibious Warfare Branch, Office of Nava l

Research, in Washington . After two years with the

Central Intelligence Agency and a promotion to

colonel, General Cushman joined the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S . Naval Forces, Eastern Atlanti c

and Mediterranean Fleet, in London, and then returne d

to the United States as a member of the faculty of the

Armed Forces Staff College . In 1956, he commanded

an infantry regiment, the 2d Marines, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the following year became

the assistant for national security affairs to then-Vic e

President Richard M . Nixon.

Following promotion to general officer rank and a

tour with the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa as assistant division and then division commander, General

Cushman returned to Washington in 1962 where he

filled the positions of assistant chief of staff for intelligence and then for operations at Headquarters, Marin e

Corps. In 1964, he became commander of Marine

Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, where i n

June 1966 he formed the 5th Marine Division to meet

the increasing manpower demands caused by the Vietnam War. Arriving in Vietnam in April 1967 as

Deputy Commander, III MAF, General Cushman on 1

June 1967 relieved Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt

Army Gen William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, visits a Marine

battalion command post south of Da Nang. Gen Westmoreland is the senior U.S. military commander in South

Vietnam.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371378

as commanding general . Cushman's diverse experience

would serve him in good stead to face the complications of command in Vietnam . 3

MACV and Command Arrangements

As the war expanded, command arrangements, like

the U.S . commitment, evolved over time without a

master plan . Having originated in January 1962 as a

small advisory organization, the U .S . Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), in Januar y

1968 totaled nearly 500,000 and, by that time, had

taken over from the South Vietnamese much of th e

large-unit war. Army General William C . Westmoreland, who became Commander, USMACV, in Jun e

1964, had presided over the buildup and commitment of U.S . troops to battle . A ramrod-straight West

Pointer, and, indeed, former Superintendent of the

U.S. Military Academy, Westmoreland had full

responsibility for the conduct of the war in the south

and for all U.S . forces based there. He, however, exercised this authority through the U .S . chain of cornmand reaching back to Washington . MACV, itself,

was a unified command directly subordinate to th e

U .S . Pacific Command in Honolulu, Hawaii . The

Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CinCPac), Admiral

Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, gave Westmoreland a relatively free hand over ground and air operations in the

south, but retained personal direction of the air campaign over most of North Vietnam .4*

The control of U .S . air activity and forces in Southeast Asia was a complicated affair. While Genera l

Westmoreland directed the bombing in Route Package 1, the southern sector of North Vietnam above th e

DMZ, he shared authority with the U .S . Ambassado r

to Laos for the "Steel Tiger/Tiger Hound" air operations over that country. The Seventh Air Force provided air support for MACV from airfields both in th e

Republic of Vietnam and from Thailand. The 46,000

Seventh Air Force personnel in South Vietnam came

under the operational control of General Westmoreland, while the Thailand units were under U.S . Air

Forces, Pacific, which in turn reported to Admiral

Sharp . General William W. "Spike" Momyer, the

Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, was also th e

MACV Deputy Commander for Air and had overal l

responsibility for the air defense of South Vietnam an d

*U .S . Air Force Historian Wayne Thompson observed that " Washington often dealt directly with Westmoreland and cut out Sharp." Dr.

Wayne Thompson, Air Force History Support Office, Comments on

draft chapter, dtd 23Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File)
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4 THE DEFINING YEAR

air support for Army and allied forces. The 1st Marine

Aircraft Wing, however, remained directly under III

MAF and flew close air support for Marine and allied

units in I Corps.5

In South Vietnam, General Westmoreland controlled his tactical ground forces through three regional commands, roughly corresponding with the corps

areas of the Republic of Vietnam. III MAF was in the

north in I Corps; the U.S. Army's I Field Force, Vietnam, was in II Corps, consisting of the central highlands and central coastal provinces of South Vietnam;

and the Army's II Field Force, Vietnam, operated both

in III Corps, centered around the capital city of Saigon,

and IV Corps, which included the populous Mekong

Delta. All told, MACV ground combat forces, including Marines and "Free World" troops from Korea, Australia, and Thailand consisted of 11 divisions and 14

separate brigades and task forces adding up to 118

maneuver battalions counting both infantry and tank

units. Some 60 Army artillery battalions, two heavily

reinforced Marine artillery regiments, a 500-man New

Zealand artillery battalion, 11 Marine helicopter

squadrons, and 96 Army aviation companies supported these maneuver units.

The Navy and the Army divided the logistic support for U.S. and allied troops in Vietnam. General

Westmoreland retained direct command of the Army

component, the U.S. Army, Vietnam, and had operational control of the naval, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. The latter, through its 22,000-man Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, which included the 3d Naval

Construction Brigade, furnished heavy engineering

and common item supplies for all U.S. and Korean

forces in I Corps. U.S. Army, Vietnam, through its

subordinate engineer and logistic commands, had the

responsibility for the remaining corps areas. Looking

back several years later, General Westmoreland

observed that by the "beginning of '68 we had our

logistic structure finished: ports and airfields were

basically completed

The various U.S. service components in South

Vietnam complicated and occasionally blurred the

command arrangements within MACV. For example,

under the operational control of MACV, General

Cushman also reported directly through Marine

channels to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. "Brute"

Krulak. Krulak retained administrative command

and overall responsibility for the readiness, training,

and logistic support of all Marine forces in the Pacific. Although not in the operational chain of command, General Krulak was not one to deny General
A PUZZLING WAR 5

Cushman the benefit of his advice .* The other service

components also had divisions of authority . General

Momyer's Seventh Air Force reported not onl y

administratively to U.S . Air Forces, Pacific, but operationally to that command for the "Rolling Thunder"

air campaign over North Vietnam . Moreover, th e

question of control of Marine fixed-wing air remaine d

a matter of contention between Generals Momyer and

Cushman, with General Westmoreland often acting

as mediator. 8

Rear Admiral Kenneth L . Veth, Commander, U .S .

Naval Forces, Vietnam, also had multiple responsibilities and mixed channels of command . While under the

operational control of MACV, he reported administratively through the Seventh Fleet chain of command to

the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet . In addition to

his logistic responsibilities, Admiral Veth directed th e

coastal and maritime anti-infiltration campaign and

was the overall commander of the Navy's segment o f

the Mobile Riverine Force operating with an Army

brigade in the Mekong Delta . In this divided jurisdiction, both the senior Army commander and Admiral

Veth permitted the flotilla and brigade commanders

flexibility in making local command arrangements . 9

Obfuscating the command lines even further were

MACV relations with external U.S. commands, the

U.S . Embassy in South Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese themselves. For naval gunfire support and us e

of the Marine Special Landing Forces on board th e

ships of the Navy Amphibious Ready Groups, General Westmoreland had to coordinate with the Seventh

Fleet through CinCPac channels. In addition to the

amphibious forces, MACV also coordinated throug h

the same Navy channels the carrier aircraft of Seventh

Fleet Task Force 77 to supplement the Seventh Air

Force and Marine air support of ground forces in South

Vietnam. Another chain of command existed with th e

*The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M .

Greene, Jr ., in Washington also had his perceptions on the conduct o f

the war. In his comments on the draft of this chapter, General Green e

wrote that he was in daily communication with General Krulak i n

Hawaii . The latter "kept me fully informed and enabled me to efficiently do business with the Joint Chiefs . . . and with the White House

and other echelons." According to Greene, he did not believe the othe r

Chiefs were kept "fully informed by Gen Westmoreland" and that h e

[Greene] personally " briefed the Vice President regularly—once a

week—privately at the White House—at his request—since he was no t

kept properly informed by the Pres[ident] or the White House staff? "

General Greene believed that General Westmoreland "objected to m y

liaison with General Krulak, " but never made an issue of the matter.

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft Ms, dtd 1 10ct9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Greene Comments, 1994 .

Strategic Air Command in order to process requests for

the use of Boeing B—52 Stratofortresses in bombing

missions over the south .l o

General Westmoreland had a unique relationshi p

with the U.S . Embassy. In April of 1967 he had taken

over from the Embassy responsibility for the U .S . pacification assistance program . The newly created Civil

Operations and Revolutionary Development Suppor t

(CORDS) agency became part of MACV and its head ,

the outspoken former presidential advisor, Robert J.

Komer, served as Deputy ComUSMACV for CORD S

under Westmoreland . Yet the MACV commande r

shared overall policy formulation in South Vietna m

with the U.S . Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, a distinguished career diplomat . Ambassador Bunker chaire d

and General Westmoreland was a member of the Mission Council, the central U.S . policy and coordinating

body within the country. Westmoreland and the

Ambassador worked in harmony. The MACV commander later wrote: "My military colleagues and I

gained a staunch supporter in Ellsworth Bunker.

Although his military experience was limited t o

artillery ROTC at Yale University 50 years before, h e

understood the application of power."11 * *

The U.S. relationship with the South Vietnames e

military was a delicate one . General Westmoreland di d

not have command of the South Vietnamese Arme d

Forces and, indeed, rejected the idea of a combine d

U.S./RVN command headquarters. He believed it

important that the South Vietnamese . knew "that I recognized that they were running their own country, that

I was no pro-consul or high commissioner."12 In his

opinion, his role as senior U .S . advisor to the Sout h

Vietnamese Joint General Staff gave him "defacto control over the scope of operations."13 The watchwords

were close consultation and coordination. As one historian observed, the command arrangements for th e

Vietnam War "were not the best they could have been,

but they did work."1 4

**Army historian Graham A . Cosmas observed that the CORD S

relationship with MACV was more complex than it appeared on chai n

of command charts: "The CORDS organization was a part of the MAC V

staff, although in practice it functioned with a high degree of autonomy ." Cosmas also noted that when MACV was established in 1962, the

State Department and Department of Defense "informally agreed tha t

on policy matters the Ambassador in SVN was primes inter pares'[first

among equals}, and this remained the case in 1968 . Bunker was head o f

the US country team, and ComUSMACV while as a field commande r

nominally independent of him, in practice deferred to Bunker on political and policy matters." Dr. Graham A . Cosmas, CMH, Comments on

draft chapter, dcd 23Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
6

THE DEFINING YEA R

South Vietnam and I Corps

Beginning with the French-Viet Minh struggl e

following World War II, Vietnam had been at war

for more than 20 years except for a brief respite during the mid-1950s. After the French defeat at Dien

Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords in 1954 resulted in

the breakup of what had been French Indochina and

divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. The Viet Minh

leader, Ho Chi Minh, established the Democrati c

Republic of Vietnam under the rule of the Communist Lao Dong Party in the north . South of the 17th

Parallel, Ngo Dinh Diem, a strong anti-Communis t

Vietnamese nationalist, became the first president o f

the Republic of Vietnam, displacing Bao Dai, th e

former Vietnamese Emperor under the French .

Through the 1950s and into 1960, Diem consolidated his power in the south against what man y

considered insurmountable odds. He defeated various sectarian armies, suppressed his political enemies, and created a seemingly viable government .

Assisted initially by French and American military

advisory groups, Diem strengthened his armed

forces to meet any armed thrust from the north .

South Vietnam appeared to represent a force for stability against what American policy makers perceived as a Communist drive for domination of

Southeast Asia .

These relatively halcyon days were soon over. By

the early 1960s, Diem and his regime were under

heavy pressure in both the political and military arenas. Frustrated by Diem's refusal to hold joint elections as called for by the Geneva Accords that would

have unified the two Vietnams, the North Vietnamese

began as early as 1959 the sub-rosa campaign to bring

down the southern government . By 1961, the South

Vietnamese were fully engaged in counter-guerrilla

operations against the Viet Gong (VC), a deprecator y

name given to the southern Communists. With the

introduction of U .S . helicopter units and the expansion of the American advisory effort in 1962, the

South Vietnamese started to make measurable gain s

against the Communist forces. Surviving an aborted

coup by a group of "Young Turk" officers in 1960 ,

Diem progressively alienated important segments of

South Vietnamese society. In 1963, South Vietnamese

Buddhists, led by their clergy, took to the streets i n

increasingly violent demonstrations against restrictiv e

measures of the Catholic-dominated Diem government. By November, the South Vietnamese military,

with American knowledge if not consent, threw over

Photo courtesy of Col Edwin S. Schick, USMC (Ret )

South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, wearing

his aviator's scarf is seen greeting Marine officers on a visit

to I Corps. President Nguyen Van Thieu, a South Vietnamese Army general, eventually overshadowed the mor e

flamboyant Ky in the inner circles of the Vietnamese military

who ran the nation.

Diem. South Vietnamese officers killed the deposed

president the day after the coup.

The period after the death of Diem was one of turmoil and disintegration. Military leaders and politicians jockeyed for position with one leader emergin g

and then another. Simultaneously, the Communists

reinforced their forces in the south with regular units

from the north . The war was going badly and Sout h

Vietnam appeared ripe for the plucking .

It was not until 1965 that the situation stabilized .

The infusion of U.S . troops staved off defeat at th e

hands of the North Vietnamese . In June, the Sout h

Vietnamese military ended the political chaos by

assuming full control of the reins of government . A

military council, headed by Army General Nguye n

Van Thieu and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, directe d

.South Vietnamese affairs for the next few years.

By the end of 1967, the South Vietnamese government had established a constitutional claim to legitimacy. Overcoming renewed Buddhist agitation in th e

spring of 1966, the ruling military council held elections for a constitutional convention in Septembe r

1966 . Following the promulgation of the new constitution, the South Vietnamese, in September 1967 ,

elected Thieu and Ky, heading a military slate of candidates, as President and Vice-President respectively o f

the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).1 5

The South Vietnamese military establishment wa s

still the dominant factor in South Vietnam . By January

1968, government decrees, although not yet imple-
A PUZZLING WAR 7

mented, called for partial mobilization, reduction of

student deferments, and increased draft calls . The

Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVNAF)

totaled more than 620,000 men . These included a

small Air Force of 15,000 men, a Navy of nearly

18,000, an even smaller Marine Corps of 8,000, nearly

300,000 in the Army, and another 291,000 in the local

militia, the Regional and Popular Forces (RFs and

PFs). Nominally, all of the service military commanders reported directly to the Chief of the Joint Genera l

Staff, General Cao Van Vien, who also commanded the

Army. In fact, however, the actual control of the military remained with the coalition of senior generals centered around President Thieu who formed the militar y

council that had run the country since 1965 .1 6

Deployed and recruited generally along regional

lines, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

consisted of 10 infantry divisions, two separate regiments, an airborne division, armor and ranger commands, a Special Forces group, and supporting elements. If desertion rates were indicative of efficiency

and morale, the ARVN had made vast strides in 1967

with almost a 30 percent reduction from the previous

year. Part of this dramatic improvement, however,

probably reflected that American forces had largely

taken over the large-unit war while the ARVN concentrated on pacification . With the exception of the

Marines and airborne, who made up the South Vietnamese general reserve, the ARVN units normally con -

fined themselves to operations in their assigned corp s

tactical zones.1 7

The corps tactical zones of South Vietnam wer e

more than military subdivisions; they were also regional and political entities. None loomed larger in importance than the northernmost corps area, ICTZ. With

its military value enhanced by geographic, economic ,

and cultural considerations, as well as the significant

buildup of enemy forces in the DMZ and Khe Sanh

sectors, I Corps had become the focus of the war . In fac t

one Marine commander, Lieutenant General Krulak ,

maintained : " . . . the bulk of the war is in the I Corp s

Tactical Zone . "1 8

If the map of Vietnam resembles the traditional

peasant carrying pole with a rice basket on either end ,

the Red River Delta in the north and the Mekong i n

the south, I Corps lay about in the upper middle of th e

shaft. With a total of 10,800 square miles and less tha n

3,000,000 of the 16,500,000 inhabitants of South

Vietnam, I Corps was the second smallest of the Corp s

tactical zones in area and the smallest in population .

Although no wider than 75 miles at any one point and

35 miles at its narrowest, I Corps contained three distinct regions: the rugged Annamite chain in the west

with some peaks over 6,000 feet, a piedmont area of

densely vegetated hills interlaced by river valleys, and

the coastal lowlands. The central southern coastal lowlands below Da Nang consist of some of the riches t

farm lands and densest concentration of population i n

all of Vietnam. Influenced by the northeast or winte r

monsoon (lasting from October to February), th e

weather in this sector, one of the wettest in all of Sout h

Vietnam, permits two annual growing seasons. The

two major cities in I Corps, Hue, the old imperial Vietnamese capital and major agricultural market center,

and Da Nang, an important seaport, added to the economic worth of the region . Despite its limited size ,

ICTZ was indeed a valuable prize .1 9

Part of what had been Annam in Indochina, I Corp s

had a distinctive regional cast. With their cultural center at Hue, the Annamites traditionally looked dow n

upon both the Tonkinese from the north and the southerners from Saigon and the Mekong Delta . The Buddhist agitation against Diem had begun in I Corps and ,

in 1966, the Buddhist "revolt" against the central government again broke out in Da Nang and Hue after the

removal of the popular I Corps commander, Genera l

Nguyen Chanh Thi . After the suppression of the 1966

"Struggle Movement," I Corps was politically quiescent. Thi's eventual successor, General Hoang Xua n

Lam, having neither the ambition nor the charisma of

his predecessor, exercised his power cautious1y2 0

As in the rest of South Vietnam, the political an d

civilian apparatus in I Corps were intertwined, but distinct from one another. General Lam, as I Corps commander, appointed the five province chiefs, usually

military officers, who in turn selected the distric t

chiefs, again usually military officers. The province and

district chiefs administered their respective domain s

and also controlled the local militia, the Regional and

Popular Forces. Regional Forces operated under th e

province chief while Popular Forces usually confined

their activities to a particular district. Under anothe r

chain of command, General Lam had control of the

regular military forces in I Corps. These consisted of

two divisions, the 1st and 2d; an independent regiment, the 51st; and two airborne battalions from th e

general reserve; totaling some 34,000 troops . Including the Regional and Popular forces, the South Vietnamese mustered some 80,000 men under arms in I

Corps Tactical Zone .2 1

Vulnerable to direct attack and infiltration throug h

the DMZ from North Vietnam to the north and from
8

THE DEFINING YEAR

Abel Collection Photo

South Vietnamese LtGen Hoang Xuan Lam, Commanding General of I Corps, center, is shown in con -

versation with U.S. Marine Corps Commandant Gen Leonard F. Chapman, left, and the III MA F

commander, LtGen Robert E. Cushman, outside of the I Corps Headquarters located in Da Nang.

Laos to the west, I Corps, by January 1968, resemble d

an armed camp with a quarter of a million U.S ., Sout h

Vietnamese, and allied troops deployed within its borders. The 3d Marine Division and 1st ARVN Divisio n

were responsible for the northern two provinces o f

Quang Tri and Thua Thien . Similarly, the U .S . Army's

Americal Division and the ARVN 2d Division operated in the two southern provinces of Quang Tin an d

Quang Ngai. The 1st Marine Division and the 51st

ARVN Regiment provided the protection for the central province of Quang Nam which contained I Corps

headquarters at Da Nang, the Da Nang Airbase, th e

Quang Da Special Sector, and more than 35 percent o f

the I Corps population .2 2

The relationship between the American and Sout h

Vietnamese commands in I Corps paralleled the

arrangement at the national level . As Senior Advisor,

General Cushman had a direct channel to Genera l

Lam. The Marine general later related that he had a

rapport with General Lam, whom he considered a n

excellent administrative and political leader and " a

good general considering his resources . . ." but no

"Julius Caesar or . . . Napoleon."23 As with General

Westmoreland and General Vien, the emphasis was on

advice and close coordination . To facilitate this coordination, each of the American and South Vietnames e

units had its specific tactical area of responsibility ,

where its commander had a relatively free rein . Moreover, in accordance with the combined 1967 plan

worked out by the MACV and Republic of Vietnam

Joint General Staff, the Vietnamese units were takin g

an increased proportion of the pacification and revolutionary development mission. Still the ARVN and

American units had to operate together. The followin g

excerpt from a 3d Marine Division report exemplifie s

the working relations between the American an d

South Vietnamese units in general, and the 3d Marin e

Division and 1st ARVN Division in particular:

The basic concept underlying command relation s

between the division and RVNAF has been one of cooperation and coordination in the conduct of operations. . . . As

a matter of practice, decisions regarding multi-battalio n

combined Marine/ARVN operations are made by persona l

liaison between CG 3d Marine Division and CG 1s t

ARVN Division.

After the two commanders approved a basic concep t

of operation:

the required staff liaison is accomplished and plans are

finalized . When practicable, co-located command post s

are established to facilitate coordination, cooperation ,

mutual assistance, and decision making .

The report concluded :

The 1st ARVN Division is an aggressive, well-le d

fighting force . Its commander is responsive to the desirability of combined/coordinated operations and invariably produces required forces. Numerous operations

have instilled a sense of mutual respect and confidenc e

between 1st ARVN Division and Marine personnel . 24
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A PUZZLING WAR 9

These command procedures worked with the elite

1st ARYN Division, but less so with the average

ARVN unit.

The Enemy

From a Western perspective, the Communist

command and control apparatus appeared complex

and murky, yet there was no doubt about who was in

charge. From the beginning of the Viet Cong insurgency, the North Vietnamese directed the war.

According to recent revelations by North Vietnamese

leaders, the 15th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in 1959 decided on a

determined policy to overthrow by force the government of South Vietnam. In July of that year, men and

material began to flow over the "Ho Chi Minh Trail"

through Laos and Cambodia into the south. The

"Second Indochina War" had started.25
10 THE DEFINING YEA R

The North Vietnamese masked their direct contro l

through a web of cover organizations. In 1960, the

Communists announced the formation of the Nation -

al Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), a

so-called coalition of "democratic forces " to lead the

struggle against the South Vietnamese government

and give the appearance of a popular uprising . Even

within the Communist apparatus in the south, th e

North Vietnamese went to extraordinary lengths to

conceal their participation. In late 1961, the Communists changed the name of their party in the sout h

from the Lao Dong (Worker's Party) to the People' s

Revolutionary Party. Shortly afterward, they create d

the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to

coordinate both the political and military aspects of

the war in the south. Under COSVN, a myriad of

interlocking regional, provincial, and district committees tightly controlled the Viet Cong politica l

infrastructure and military forces down to the hamlet

and village level. Yet, COSVN, itself, reported directly to the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party of Nort h

Vietnam through the Reunification Department wit h

its headquarters in Hanoi.26

The extent of North Vietnamese involvement and

control of the war was more obvious in northern

South Vietnam than elsewhere . Very early, the Communists separated the two northern provinces of

Quang Tri and Thua Thien from their Military Region

(MR) V, which roughly corresponded to I and II

Corps. MR Tri-Thien-Hue, as the new region was

named, came directly under the North Vietnames e

high command rather than COSVN. All told, " three

ill-defined military headquarters " in what had bee n

part of MR V reported directly through North Vietnamese channels. In addition to Tri-Thien- Hue, there

were the B—3 Front, which controlled military operations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam ,

and the DMZ Front, which apparently had command

of all units in the DMZ sector and at Khe Sanh .

Despite denials and elaborate attempts by the Nort h

Vietnamese to cover troop movements through constantly changing unit designations, American intelligence in 1967 identified seven North Vietnamese

Army divisions within South Vietnam, five of these

divisions in I and II Corps.27

By the end of the year MACV held in its order of

battle of enemy forces some 216,000 troops . These

included some 51,000 North Vietnamese regulars,

60,000 Viet Cong main and local forces, and about

70,000 full-time guerrillas . About 35,000 administrative troops rounded out the total . The MACV estimate, however, omitted certain categories such as VC

"self-defense" forces and other irregulars and some

70,000 political cadre. Although extensive disagreement existed within the U.S . intelligence community

over these exclusions and the total strength of th e

enemy, the numbers of regulars and full-time guerrillas were largely accepted . 28 As General Westmoreland

later explained: "Intelligence is at best an imprecis e

science: it is not like counting beans; it is more like

estimating cockroaches. . . . "29 More open to questio n

was the MACV claim that the total enemy strengt h

had diminished .30 *

From an American perspective, the Communists

had suffered only defeats since the U .S . intervention

in the war in 1965 . American units in extensive operations ranging the length and breath of South Vietnam had taken a large toll of enemy forces. The allies

turned back with heavy Communist losses ever y

thrust the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) mad e

from the Ia Drang Valley in the Central Highland s

during 1965 to the hills around Khe Sanh in the

spring of 1967 . For the year 1967 alone, MACV estimated the number of enemy killed in battle as more

than 88,000.3 1

The Communist view of the situation remain s

obscure . In late summer 1967, the North Vietnamese

Defense Minister and architect of the Dien Bien Ph u

victory, General Vo Nguyen Giap, wrote : " . . . the

situation has never been as favorable as it is now . The

armed forces and people have stood up to fight th e

enemy and are achieving one great victory afte r

another. " 32 Yet, apparently there was divided opinio n

among the North Vietnamese leadership as to th e

best course of action. There were the advocates of a

reversion to guerrilla warfare and a protracted wa r

while others argued in favor of taking the offensive

against the allies and especially the Americans on all

fronts. Because of the extraordinary secretiveness an d

paranoia within the higher reaches of both the Lao

Dong Party and the North Vietnamese government ,

neither the extent of these differences nor even th e

makeup of the opposing factions was obvious . Muc h

of the speculation centered around Giap whom various authorities identified with one or the other of th e

cliques or with neither. What is known is that in Jun e

1967 the politburo of the party met to assess the sit-

*Commenting on the MACV perception of the Communist forces,

General Krulak, the former FMFPac commander, recently wrote : "ou r

strategic intelligence was uniformly poor. " LtGen Victor H . Krulak ,

Comments on draft chapter, dtd 310ct94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
A PUZZLING WAR 1 1

uation and to resolve the issues. At this meeting i n

which Giap apparently played a large role, the part y

called for "a decisive blow" to " force the U.S . to

accept military defeat ."3 3

Within a few months, the Communist force s

launched the first phase of their 1967—68 Winter -

Spring Campaign . In a reverse of their usual tactics, th e

North Vietnamese mounted mass assaults lasting over

a period of several days instead of attempting to disen -

gage quickly. During September and early October,

the Marine outpost at Con Thien in the eastern DMZ

sector came under both infantry attack and artillery

bombardment. Firing from positions north of the 17t h

Parallel, enemy gunners employed artillery pieces up

to 152 millimeters. Repulsed at Con Thien, the Nort h

Vietnamese then tried to overrun the district capital o f

Loc Ninh near the Cambodian border in Binh Lon g

Province north of Saigon along Route 13.

Again forced to pull back after several days of fighting and suffering extensive losses, the enemy the n

struck in the Central Highlands at Dak To near the

junction of the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders. After 22 days of bloody combat in

November, the North Vietnamese forces withdrew

after once more taking staggering casualties .34

By the end of December, 1967, the enemy

appeared to be ready to make a fresh assault in north -

western South Vietnam at Khe Sanh . Following a

period of relative calm since the battles earlier tha t

spring near this isolated Marine base, America n

intelligence picked up reports of North Vietnames e

troop movements in the sector. Although experiencing only limited combat activity at Khe Sanh i n

December, one Marine company commander

declared that he could "smell" the enemy out there .3 5

To MACV, the North Vietnamese strateg y

appeared clear. It was an attempt to draw the allied

forces into remote areas where the enemy had the

advantage and then move to a "mobile War of Decision ."3 6 To Lieutenant General Krulak at FMFPac ,

the enemy's intent was also apparent . Quoting General Giap, he later wrote : "The primary emphasis [is]

to draw American units into remote areas and there -

by facilitate control of the population of the lowlands." According to Krulak, the people were th e

final objective .37

Focus on the North

The increasing pressure by the North Vietnamese Army in late 1967 continued the pattern

of large-unit operations in the border regions o f

South Vietnam that had characterized the war,

especially in the north, since 1966 . With the first

incursion of enemy regulars in the summer of that

year, III MAF shifted forces north . Forced to fill

the gap left in southern I Corps, MACV in Apri l

1967 reinforced the Marines in I Corps with the

Army's Task Force Oregon, which later became th e

Americal Division . After this northward deplo y

ment, the DMZ sector and Khe Sanh became th e

focus of allied concern .3 8

Given the emphasis on the northern battlefield ,

the Marines at the direction of General Westmoreland in April 1967 began the erection of the strong

point obstacle system (SPOS) along the DMZ to pre -

vent North Vietnamese infiltration. Dubbed the

"McNamara Line," after the U .S . Secretary of

Defense Robert S. McNamara, this so-called "barrier" was to consist of three parts: (1) a linear-manned

obstacle system in the eastern DMZ sector extending

some 34 kilometers to the sea and consisting of

barbed wire, a 600-meter-wide cleared trace, mine -

fields, and electronic and acoustic sensors; (2) a serie s

of strong points to the Laotian border built alon g

obvious avenues of approach from the north wit h

Khe Sanh as the western anchor; and (3) in Laos, th e

seeding of suspected infiltration routes with sensors

monitored and supported by aircraft . Strong enemy

opposition and shortages of men and material slowed

the progress of the SPOS . By mid-September the 3 d

Marine Division had only completed the clearing of

the trace from Con Thien to Gio Linh, a distance o f

13 kilometers. Faced with mounting casualties,

General Westmoreland approved a modification to

his original plans. In essence, the division was to halt

all construction of the trace until "after the tactica l

situation had stabilized," and continue only with th e

work on the strong points and base areas . By the end

of 1967, the Marines had completed work on the

four strong points and all but two of the base areas .

In the western sector of the barrier, only the base at

Khe Sanh existed .3 9

With the 3d Marine Division tied down in fixe d

positions along the eastern DMZ and at Khe Sanh ,

manpower considerations became an overriding concern for both III MAF and MACV. Earlier in the year,

during the spring, General Westmoreland ha d

requested an increase in his authorized strength . Asking for a minimum of 80,000 more men (his optimum figure being nearly 200,000), he planned to

reinforce the Marines in I Corps with at least two
12 THE DEFINING YEAR

Army divisions. Fearful that these new numbers

would necessitate a call-up of the Reserves, Washing -

ton in the summer of 1967 cut Westmoreland 's

request nearly in half and established a new authorize d

force ceiling of 525,000 men for July 1968. This represented an increase of less than 46,000 personnel .

MACV was hard pressed to reinforce I Corps at all . 4 0 *

As the war intensified throughout Vietnam i n

late 1967 General Westmoreland persuaded President Lyndon B. Johnson to establish earlier arriva l

dates for units already scheduled to deploy to Vietnam . The deployment of the 101st Airborne Division and the 11th Infantry Brigade in Decembe r

provided General Westmoreland some room fo r

maneuver. Keeping the 101st and the 1st Cavalry

Division (Airmobile) as a general country-wide

reserve, he attached the 11th Brigade to the Americal Division in southern I Corps. III MAF began t o

shuffle its units north to reinforce both Khe San h

and the DMZ sectors .4 1

MACV Vis-a-Vis Marine

While reinforcing the Marines in I Corps with

Army units and concentrating his forces in the

north, General Westmoreland had growing doubt s

about the ability of the Marine command to handl e

the developing situation . Since 1965, senior Marine

generals conducted a " sotto voce" debate wit h

MACV over the direction of the American combat

effort. Both Generals Krulak and Greene criticized

the MACV emphasis upon the large-unit major war,

which they believed failed to provide for populatio n

security and, moreover, involved the U .S. in a war of

attrition, which in their opinion, favored the Communists. They voiced their concerns directly t o

General Westmoreland and through the comman d

channels open to them .

*The question of the total number of American troops required to

wage the war in South Vietnam was a continually sensitive issue i n

Washington, especially since larger numbers probably involved the

call-up of Reserve units. General Wallace M . Greene, Jr., the Marine

Corps Commandant, recalled that sometime in the late 1965 or earl y

1966 time-frame he advocated "that a major increase be made in the

number of U .S . troops " in South Vietnam. According to an estimate

that his staff made at the time, it would take approximately 595,00 0

American troops five years to conclude a successful end to the war.

According to the analysis, " the number of men of military age becoming available each year " in North Vietnam as contrasted to the Communist casualty rate would permit the North Vietnamese "to continu e

the war indefinitely " at the then-level of American troop commitment .

Greene Comments, 1994 . For further discussion of manpower constraints upon Marine forces see Chapter 27 .

Although differing in minor details, the two

Marine generals in essence advocated increased pressure upon North Vietnam and basically an "ink blot "

strategy in South Vietnam. Both Marine general s

recommended in the north the targeting of ai r

strikes against North Vietnamese heavy productio n

facilities and transportation hubs and a blockade of

the North Vietnamese major ports includin g

Haiphong . Greene and Krulak emphasized for th e

south a combined U.S.-South Vietnamese campaig n

in targeted areas to eradicate the Communist infrastructure in the countryside and replace it with on e

loyal to the South Vietnamese government . This

pacification campaign would consist of a centralize d

combined allied command structure employing military action together with civic action, and th e

enhancement of the local South Vietnamese militia

forces and government structure . The concept was

that initial success would provide the momentum ,

much as a spreading inkblot, for the linking together of the pacified sectors. While not neglecting the

enemy's main forces, both viewed this war as secondary. As General Krulak stated : "The real war is

among the people " and not in the hinterlands. He

would engage the Communist regulars for the most

part only "when a clear opportunity exists to engag e

the VC Main Force or North Vietnamese units o n

terms favorable to ourselves." 4 2

While the two Marine generals received a hearing

of their views, they enjoyed little success in influencing the MACV strategy or overall U .S policy towar d

North Vietnam . According to General Greene, the

Joint Chiefs were interested in his proposal for a

coastal pacification campaign but "Westmoreland

wasn't and being CG MACV his views of the 'big pic -

ture,' the 'broad arrow' prevailed ." In November

1965, General Krulak wrote directly to Secretar y

McNamara, whom he knew from his days as specia l

assistant for counterinsurgency to the Joint Chiefs

during the Kennedy administration, hinting at some

divergence between the Marine "saturation formula "

and the Army "maneuver formula ." While allowing

that both techniques were sound and maneuver ha d

its place in the sparsely inhabited highlands, h e

pointedly observed that in the heavily populated are a

south of Da Nang you "cannot shoot everything tha t

moves ." He then continued : "We have to separate th e

enemy from the people . " According to the Marin e

general, the Defense Secretary told him that the "in k

blot" theory was "a good idea but too slow." Bot h

Generals Greene and Krulak would continue to offer
A PUZZLING WAR 1 3

their counter-view to the MACV perspective, bu t

with little effect either in Washington or Saigon . 4 3

In Vietnam, from the very inception of its

responsibility for I Corps, III MAF, the. Marine

command, first under General Walt and then b y

General Cushman, had placed a great deal o f

emphasis on the small-unit war in the villages . The

Marines had developed several new pacification

programs to win over the people in the hamlets to

the government cause. These included : a vigorous

civic action effort to meet the needs of the local villagers, cordon and search "County Fair" operation s

with psychological warfare overtones in the ham -

lets, coordination of pacification through the I

Corps Joint Coordinating Council (ICJCC), an d

perhaps most significant, the Combined Actio n

Program. This latter program involved the assignment of a squad of Marines to a Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon . The premise was that this integration of the Vietnamese militia with the Marine s

would create a bond of understanding and mutual

interest with the local populace . The Marines maintained that with the villagers on their side, they

could, as General Cushman stated, "break the connection between the guerrillas and the infrastructure, and the enemy main forces . . . ."44

Despite the III MAF efforts, General Westmoreland and his staff continued to perceive the principa l

mission of the U .S . troops to be the defeat of the

enemy main forces. The U.S .-South Vietnames e

1967 Combined Plan basically reflected the MACV

concept: the South Vietnamese now had responsibility for pacification while the U.S . forces were to conduct the large-unit war. General Krulak, the FMFPac commander, expressed the Marine displeasure i n

July 1967, declaring : "We have seen what we sincerely believe to be a maldeployment of forces, a misapplication of power . . . ." 4 5 Years later the Marine

general wrote that these differences between th e

Marines and Westmoreland over pacification wen t

"to the heart of the war." 4 6

Despite their differences, the dispute betwee n

the Marines and MACV never came to a head .

Although the 1967 Combined Plan called for the

Americans to take over most of the war against th e

enemy's conventional forces, there was "no clear-cu t

division of responsibility" with the ARVN in thi s

area or in pacification. 47 Moreover, III MAF still

operated under its 6 March 1966 Letter of Instruction which gave the Marine command a broad all -

inclusive mission to carry out operations "in support

of and in coordination with CG I ARVN Corps an d

in other areas of RVN as directed by ComUSMAC V

in order to defeat the VC/NVA and extend GVN

control over all of South Vietnam ." 4 8 Rather tha n

directly challenge the authority of the Marine commanders, General Westmoreland preferred to issu e

"orders for specific projects that as time passe d

would gradually get the Marines out of their beachheads." 4 9 While continuing the "discussion" wit h

MACV over pacification, General Cushman als o

wanted no controversies. He remembered, "I soo n

figured out how Westy [General Westmoreland]

liked to operate and tried to operate the same way,

and get on with the war and not cause a lot of friction for no good reason . "5 0

In spite of the efforts of both Westmoreland and

Cushman to keep relations on an even keel, substantiv e

differences continued to exist, and not only over pacifi -

cation. The "McNamara Line" was a constant irritant .

General Cushman recalled that he :

really got in a fit with some of the engineer colonels tha t

would come roaring up from Saigon to see how th e

fence was doing and . . . I'd say "Well it's doing fine, go

up and take a look," which they did . Always had a few

people around, but we just weren't going out getting

everybody killed building that stupid fence . 5 1

In what appeared to be an inconsistency, MACV ,

on the one hand, criticized III MAF for lack of mobil e

operations in the rest of I Corps, while, on the other,

placed a Marine division in fixed positions along th e

DMZ and at Khe Sanh. Major General Rathvon McC.

Tompkins, the soft-spoken but blunt commander of

the 3d Marine Division, voiced the opinion of most

Marines when he later called the entire barrier effor t

"absurd." He pointed out that the original design wa s

to stop infiltration, but by the time actual construction began, the North Vietnamese were in strength i n

the DMZ "supported by first class artillery." Tompkins caustically observed, "it was perfectly obvious

that if there would be an incursion, it would be by

NVA divisions and not by sneaky-peekies coming

through at night."5 2

Unhappy about the Marine defensive measure s

in northern I Corps, General Westmorelan d

believed that General Cushman and his staff "were

unduly complacent ."53 Westmoreland may have

had some justification about the Marine defenses .

Major General Raymond L . Murray, Cushman's

deputy and a highly decorated veteran of both

World War II and Korea, remarked that th e

Marines were an offensive organization, and "often
14 THE DEFINING YEAR

we don't do well in organizing defenses ." Murray

commented that "in many units, the concept of a

defensive position seemed to be a big long trenc h

and just put a bunch of Marines there and shoot at

any thing that came along rather than truly organizing the defense in some depth . "54 °

Logistics was another area where the Marines and

MACV had their problems. The Marine experience

with the M16 rifle was a case in point . In December

1967, Marine inspectors found 75 percent of 8,41 3

rifles in the 3d Marine Division with pitted chambers, which could result in misfirings . Marine logisticians planned an extensive replacement of these

M16s with ones equipped with chromed chambers .

Another logistic complicating factor was the temporary closing in December of the two LST ports in th e

north, Tan My in Thua Thien Province and Dong Ha

in Quang Tri Province, because of bad weather an d

silting in the shipping channels . If MACV was to

reinforce the Marines with further Army units, General Westmoreland had obvious reasons for concern .

Still, the Marines believed that MACV put undu e

logistic burdens upon them . At the end of the year,

III MAF and FMFPac protested a MACV requirement for a reduction in the level of stockpiled supplies. General Murray called such peacetim e

accounting economies in Vietnam part of a "balance

sheet war." Although acknowledging that these procedures "may have saved on waste," Murray maintained they also " took an awful lot of time and effort

that a military man felt would be better spent i n

other ways.

"5 5

A myriad of elements compounded the difficulties in the relationship between MACV and III

MAF, not the least of which were personality traits

and service considerations. As General Tompkin s

observed, some Army and Marine rivalry was natur-

*Other Marine officers also commented about Marine deficiencies

relative to digging bunkers. Colonel John C. Studt recalled that whe n

he was operations officer of the 9th Marines General Westmorelan d

was unhappy "with inadequate Marine bunkers " and directed that the

Marines send representatives to the U .S. Army 's 1st Division " to lear n

how to construct bunkers. As humiliating as this was for Marines, Ge n

Westmoreland was absolutely right : Marines didn't have a clue how t o

construct good bunkers. We taught hasty field fortification and that

was it ." Col John C. Studs, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 22Nov9 4

(Vietnam Comment File). Major Gary E. Todd, who served on the 3d

Marine Division staff, observed that field fortifications "seemed to end

up with as much of the thing above ground as below, filling sandbag s

with soil to raise walls and parapets. " Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments o n

draft chapters, dtd 280ct and ?Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), here -

after Todd Comments.

al, "it's the dog and cat business . . . nothing Machiavellian or anything else . "56 Army generals spok e

about Marines using unimaginative tactics, eithe r

putting their heads down and charging or sittin g

tight on "top of Semper Fidelis. "57 Marines replied

that they trained from the same manuals as th e

Army and employed basically the same infantry tactics of fire and maneuver.58 For their part, many

Marines believed that their performance in Vietna m

would determine the survival of their Corps . General Krulak remarked that the war would not last for -

ever and "as soon as it is over, and perhaps before ,

the Marines are going to be faced with the sam e

problems that has faced us after every conflict . . .

self-defense ." The Marines would require "a fund o f

irrefutable facts which portray our combat effectiveness, our competence, and most of all our readines s

to fight when the whistle blows."5 9

General Westmoreland hardly endeared himself

to the Marines when inadvertently he becam e

involved in the succession for the Commandancy of

the Marine Corps. Both Generals Krulak and Walt,

the former III MAF commander, were leading candidates to succeed General Greene . A newspaper

account in late November 1967 carried the story tha t

General Westmoreland supported General Walt an d

had recommended him to the President . General

Westmoreland later wrote that in making out General Walt's fitness or efficiency report in 1966, h e

had observed "that General Walt was fully qualified

to be Commandant of the Marine Corps," and tha t

this was not meant to be an endorsement of Walt's

candidacy. 6 5 With the selection of Lieutenant General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., then Chief of Staff at

Headquarters Marine Corps, as the new Commandant, the furor soon blew over.

In more germane matters relating to the war, th e

differing personalities and styles of Generals Westmoreland and Cushman impacted upon th e

MACV—III MAF command relations. A large bulky

man, the bespectacled Cushman offered a sharp contrast to the rigid military bearing of Westmoreland ,

who appeared to be "standing at attention while o n

the tennis court."6 1 The MACV commander insisted

on detailed plans of operations with no loose ends .

On the other hand, General Cushman maintained a n

informal staff structure, confiding in few persons an d

relying largely on his chief of staff, Brigadier General Earl E . Anderson . Although concerned about the

enemy buildup in the north, reinforcing Khe Sanh i n

December with another battalion, Cushman was
A PUZZLING WAR 1 5

Abel Collection Photo

LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Pacific, left, visits with Gen Leonard F .

Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps, in the Commandant's office in Washington, D.C., in May

1968 . LtGen Krulak had a strong influence in the development of Marine pacification concepts and had

been a leading candidate, together with Gen Chapman and LtGen Lewis W. Walt, for the Commandancy.

confident that he had the situation under control .

General Westmoreland, however, worried abou t

what he perceived as the Marine command's "lack of

followup in supervision," its employment of helicopters, and its generalship . By January 1968, th e

MACV commander seriously considered making a

change in the command relations in the north . 62 *

An Ambivalent Outlook

Despite the signs of an enemy buildup and concerns about the Marine command, General Westmoreland just earlier had voiced his optimism abou t

the course of the war. Called back to Washington i n

mid-November 1967, ostensibly for consultation,

*General Anderson mentioned that since his arrival in Decembe r

1967, he "participated in every conference or meeting held by General

Cushman during my tenure in Da Nang . Our relationship could not

have been closer . . . ." Anderson allowed that on the III MAF staff there

were some weak links in that "General Cushman was one prone t o

accept the personnel sent to him by higher headquarters without complaining, so consequently certain senior staff members had to fill thi s

void ." Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 18Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File). Another III MAF staff officer described General Cushman as a " perceptive gentleman [who) was content to soldie r

without comment as long as Westy [Westmoreland) didn 't try t o

maneuver subordinate units in ICTZ (as he did in other Corps areas) and

left Marine air under Marine control . " LtCol John F. J. Kelly, Comments

on draft chapter, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

but more to shore up public support for the administration's Vietnam policy, he assured his audience s

that the end was in view and that the "ranks of th e

Vietcong are thinning steadily." 63 Reflecting this

same optimism in his directives, Westmoreland

advised his subordinate commanders that the situation was "conducive to initiating an all-out offensive

on all fronts : political, military, economic, and psychological. "64

In drawing up plans for 1968 operations, the

MACV staff accentuated this emphasis on th e

offensive. The 1968 Combined Plan with the Vietnamese continued to assign to the U.S . units the

primary mission of destroying the NVA and VC

main forces. American planners called for a threepronged campaign : large-unit operations to keep

the enemy off balance, destruction of the enem y

base areas, and expanded "territorial security ." General Westmoreland and his staff expected to launch

"multi-brigade offensives" against enemy strong -

holds "not previously invaded ." American contingency planning included possible operations in

such enemy sanctuaries as Cambodia, Laos, an d

even an amphibious operation north of the Demilitarized Zone .6 5

Notwithstanding the flurry of contingency planning, General Westmoreland realized that administra-
16 THE DEFINING YEAR

tion policy would confine his operations within th e

borders of South Vietnam . His Northeast Monsoon

Campaign Plan for the period October 1967-March

1968 centered around the 1st Cavalry Division . He

wanted to use the division as a "theater exploitatio n

force " in areas where the weather favored helicopterborne tactics. His original concept delineated a fourphased campaign . The 1st Cavalry was to conduct th e

first three phases in III Corps and then, as the weathe r

improved, move north to I Corps. The objective in I

Corps was the enemy 's Do Xa base in western Quang

Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces and the suspected

headquarters of Military Region V. This fourth phas e

was given the code name "York ."66

By the end of the year, with one eye on the growing enemy strength in the north, the MACV staff

modified the York plans. York, itself, was to be a fourphased operation . As part of a larger task force, the 1st

Cavalry Division was to penetrate the western Do X a

in York I. Completing that phase of the operation, th e

division was then to be inserted into the A Shau Val -

ley in western Thua Thien Province and the site of a

former U.S. Special Forces Camp overrun by the NVA

in the spring of 1966 . Following York II, the 1st Cavalry, in Phase III, was to conduct operations furthe r

north in western Quang Tri Province and sweep to th e

Laotian border. In the fourth phase, the Army divisio n

would return to the Do Xa . III MAF was to be responsible for the planning of York II and III and Genera l

Murray, the III MAF deputy commander, was to command the A Shau Valley operation . General Westmoreland later wrote that the purpose of the York

campaign was to set the "stage for the invasion of Lao s

that I hoped a new administration in Washington

would approve ." 67

While planning for offensive actions in 1968, III

MAF and MACV had to counter the enemy threat i n

the northern border regions . As early as October, General Westmoreland reinforced the Marines with a

brigade from the 1st Cavalry in the Que Son secto r

south of Da Nang which permitted General Cushman

to move one regiment, the 1st Marines, from the D a

Nang area to Quang Tri Province . The arrival of the

Army's 11th Infantry Brigade in December allowed a

further realignment of III MAF units. General Cushman began to implement this repositioning of forces in

Operation Checkers which called for the deployment of

the entire 3d Marine Division to either the DMZ fron t

or Khe Sanh. The 1st Marine Division was to shift

what was in essence a two-regiment task force unde r

the assistant division commander to Phu Bai in Thua

Thien Province and cover the western approaches t o

Hue City. 68

By the end of 1967, Operation Checkers was in ful l

swing. The Americal Division began to take over fro m

the Korean Brigade the TAOR (tactical area of operational responsibility) south of Chu Lai . In turn, the first

Korean battalions moved to the Hoi An sector south o f

Da Nang, relieving units of the 5th Marines . On 20

December, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines deployed

north of the strategic Hai Van Pass to the Phu Loc area

of Thua Thien Province. All plans were complete . The

1st Marine Division was to activate Task Force X-Ra y

in early January and the remainder of the 5th Marines

was to go to Phu Bai . At that time, the 3d Marine

Division was then to transfer its command post (CP)

from Phu Bai to Dong Ha in the eastern DMZ. Later

in the month, the 1st Marines at Quang Tri was t o

return to its parent division by taking over from th e

4th Marines the CoBi/Than Tan Sector at Camp Evan s

in Thua Thien Province . The 4th Marines would the n

rejoin the 3d Division along the DMZ. Thus as 1968

approached, III MAF was in a state of flux as units

began to displace .69

The signs of progress in I Corps were mixed .

Action had flared up in early December throughou t

the Corps area . On the 5th, the enemy overran a district headquarters in Quang Ngai Province . Along the

DMZ, the North Vietnamese launched a series o f

company-strength attacks on Marine positions in th e

northeast sector above the Cua Viet River. The 1st

Marine Division at Da Nang in its southern TAO R

engaged strong enemy forces while the Americal Divi -

sion units and the attached brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division encountered resistance from the 2d NVA

Division in the important Que Son Valley along th e

border of Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces . By

the end of the month, the NVA and VC took a more

defensive stance toward the American units and

turned on the ARVN and local forces in hit-and-ru n

actions. Although sustaining heavy casualties in thes e

attacks, the enemy "was successful in penetrating an d

damaging several positions ."7°

Despite the heavy fighting in December, various

indicators pointed to some success in the village war i n

I Corps. After a dropoff in pacification measurements

during the first half of 1967, there was a marke d

increase in the figures for the rest of the year. In

December, approximately 75 percent of the villag e

chiefs were living in their home villages as opposed t o

50 percent in January 1967 . Other categories—the

conducting of village censuses, establishment of
A PUZZLING WAR 1 7

defense plans, and functioning of local governments—

showed similar, if less dramatic, improvement.

According to Marine Corps criteria, 55 percent of th e

population in I Corps in December lived in secur e

areas, ranging from a high of 80 percent in the Phu Bai

sectors to a low of 34 percent at Duc Pho . The Marines

credited several factors for this upsurge, not the least of

which was the insertion of Army units in southern I

Corps to take up the slack left by the departure of th e

Marines for the northern battle sector. Yet III MAF

believed that its innovative pacification technique s

accounted for much of the progress.7 1

With the coming of the Christmas and New Yea r

season, the war continued on its ambivalent course . The

holiday truce periods symbolized the cross-currents of

the conflict. Giving vague hints of peace, the Communists agreed to a 24-hour truce over Christmas and a

slightly longer, 36 hours, respite over the New Year's

celebration. Taking advantage of the cease-fires and the

halt in U.S . air operations, the North Vietnamese

moved supplies to their forward units . Over Christmas,

American air observers spotted some 600—800 vehicle s

and boats hauling and landing military provisions an d

equipment in southern North Vietnam. MACV reported 118 enemy violations—40 of them major—ove r

Christmas, and 170 63 major—during the New

Year's truce period . The New Year's violations resulte d

in 29 allied soldiers dead and 128 wounded, with two

South Vietnamese troops listed as missing in action. In

turn, the allies killed 117 of the enemy . The American

command called both standdowns a "hoax" and recommended that any cease-fire for the Vietnamese Tet or

lunar new year be as short as possible.n *

U.S . leaders worried over the Communist intention s

for the new year. In a departure from the optimisti c

public rhetoric of his administration about the war,

President Johnson privately warned the Australia n

Cabinet in late December of "dark days ahead ."73 Much

evidence indicated that the enemy was on the move .

American intelligence reported two North Vietnames e

divisions near Khe Sanh and a third along the eastern

*Major Gary E . Todd, who served as an intelligence officer on the

3d Marine Division staff, commented that the " the last shot fired

before the 'cease fire' took effect was like a starter's pistol to the Nort h

Vietnamese, crouched down and tensed to explode into a sprint" t o

resupply their forces in the south . Todd Comments.

DMZ. Further south, prisoner interrogations revealed

the possible presence of a new enemy regiment in Thu a

Thien Province. American commanders believed Hu e

was a major enemy objective although the 1st ARVN

Division could not "credit the enemy with 'the intent '

nor the ` capability' to launch a division-size attack "

against the city.7 4 At Da Nang, III MAF received information that the 2d NVA Division was shifting its area

of operations to Quang Nam Province .75 Capture d

enemy documents spoke of major offensives through -

out South Vietnam . One in particular observed "that

the opportunity for a general offensive and general

uprising is within reach . . . ," and directed the coordination of military attacks "with the uprisings of the

local population to take over towns and cities."76

By January 1968, a sense of foreboding and uncertainty dominated much American thinking about the

situation in Vietnam and the course of the war.7 7

According to all allied reports, Communist forces had

taken horrendous casualties during the past few

months, causing one senior U .S . Army general to wonder if the North Vietnamese military command was

aware of these losses.78 Yet, all the signs pointed to a

major enemy offensive in the very near future .

Although captured enemy documents spoke of assaults

on the cities and towns, General Westmoreland

believed the enemy's more logical targets to be th e

DMZ and Khe Sanh, while staging diversionary

attacks elsewhere . He thought the Communist objectives to be the seizure of the two northern provinces o f

South Vietnam and to make Khe Sanh the American

Dien Bien Phu .79* *

While planning their own offensive moves, MACV

and III MAF prepared for a NVA push in the north .

General Cushman reinforced Khe Sanh and in Operation Checkers began to deploy his forces toward th e

northern border.

**Army Lieutenant General Philip B . Davidson, the MACV intelligence officer, commented that General Westmoreland stated his expectation of the coming enemy offensive "in broad terms as a result of series o f

war games conducted by and at MACV headquarters . It was considered a s

nothing more than a ' probable course of enemy action ' . . . . " Davidso n

contends that the MACV commander was open "to consideration of other

possible forms of the enemy offensive right up to the initiation of the Te t

offensive . " Davidson observed also that General Cushman "concurred "

with the MACV expectations. LtGen Philip B. Davidson, Jr . (USA), Comments on draft chapter, dtd 25Oct6S (Vietnam Comment File) .
CHAPTER 2

The 3d Marine Division and the Barrie r

The 3d Marine Division in the DMZ—The Barrie r

The 3d Marine Division in the DMZ

The war in the north was largely the responsibility of the 3d Marine Division . Since the summe r

of 1966, the division had parried several successiv e

North Vietnamese Army thrusts in Quang Tri

Province, both in the northeast and in the west near

the Marine base at Khe Sanh. Commanding one of

the largest divisions in Marine Corps history, Majo r

General Rathvon McC. Tompkins had more tha n

24,000 men under him organized into five infantry

regiments, one artillery regiment, and supporting

elements. U .S . Army artillery units and Navy logistic forces, including Seabees, supplemented th e

Marines. Two of the regiments of the 1st ARVN

Division also reinforced the 3d Division. The division's forward command post was at Dong Ha som e

eight miles below the Demilitarized Zone.

Although one regiment, the 4th Marines, remained

in Thua Thien protecting the western approaches

to Hue, the bulk of the 3d Division was in Quang

Tri Province, mainly facing north, to counter th e

expected enemy onslaught.

Quang Tri Province contains some 1,800 squar e

miles, extending about 45 miles north and south and

40 miles east and west . Its rugged interior rises to

the west with jungled canopied peaks reaching

heights of 1,700 meters near the Laotian border.

Eastern Quang Tri is characterized by a narrow

coastal plain and a piedmont sector of rolling hills.

In the north, the Ben Hai River marked the boundary with North Vietnam. The six-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone followed the trace of the river for 3 0

miles inland and then went in a straight line to the

Laotian border. Despite some relaxation of the U .S.

rules of engagement in the DMZ south of the Be n

Hai, both the Demilitarized Zone and Laos offered a

sanctuary for the North Vietnamese Army to mass its

forces and position its artillery.

These terrain and political considerations largel y

determined the enemy's avenues of approach an d

the 3d Marine Division dispositions in the DMZ

sector. The North Vietnamese made their base areas

in the Demilitarized Zone and Laos and tried t o

infiltrate their forces into the river valleys an d

coastal plain to cut the allied lines of communications. Route 1, the main north and south highway,

connected the Marine bases of Dong Ha and Quang

Tri in the north to Phu Bai and Da Nang furthe r

south . The Cua Viet River provided the division its

chief logistic artery, running from the Cua Vie t

Facility at its mouth to Dong Ha . Little more tha n

a mountain path in its western reaches, Route 9

linked Dong Ha with Khe Sanh . Since August

1967, however the North Vietnamese had success -

fully severed Route 9 west of the Marine outpost a t

Ca Lu, isolating the Marines at Khe Sanh and permitting resupply only by air.

East of Khe Sanh, the 3d Division was strung out

in a series of outposts and bases that allowed protection for Route 9, the important Cam Lo River Valle y

which extended to Dong Ha, and the coastal plain.

The most significant of these were : Ca Lu, 10 mile s

east of Khe Sanh ; the Rockpile, a sheer 700-foot out -

cropping, eight miles further north ; followed by

Camp Carroll, 10 miles to the east; and then the heralded "Leatherneck Square, " the quadrilateral outlined

by Cam Lo, Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha .

For purposes of delineation and control, the division divided this extensive area into a series of regimental and battalion operational areas with designated code names. For example, the 1st Amphibia n

Tractor Battalion in Operation Napoleon was responsible for keeping open the Cua Viet waterway. Furthe r

north, the 9th Marines, in Operation Kentucky,

manned the defenses in the Leatherneck Square sector. In Operation Lancaster, the 3d Marines screened

the area from Cam Lo to Ca Lu. Scotland was the code

name for the 26th Marines operations at Khe Sanh .

To the south, the 1st Marines in Operation Osceola

guarded the approaches to the provincial capital and

the secondary Marine base near Quang Tri City. The

1st ARVN Division was responsible for the secto r

east of Route 1 and south of Dong Ha . With its command post at Dong Ha, the 12th Marines, th e

artillery regiment, supported all of these operation s

18
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER 1 9

from firing positions at Dong Ha, Camp Carroll, Gi o

Linh, Khe Sanh, and Quang Tri . *

By the end of 1967, the DMZ front symbolized the

frustrations of the American war in Vietnam. The

bloody battle for the outlying hills surrounding Kh e

Sanh in April and later the struggle for Con Thie n

highlighted the fighting for the year. As casualty figures mounted on both sides senior commanders voice d

their concern. At the height of the fierce contest for

Con Thien, General Krulak observed that in September the Marines had suffered 956 casualties and for the

year nearly 5,000 dead and wounded in the DMZ

alone . Both General Krulak and Admiral Sharp concluded that such a rate could not be sustained and that

"the operational benefits now being achieved in the

area . . . are not consistent with the losses incurred ." I

As early as July, General Krulak had warned

about the disadvantages of waging the war in th e

DMZ sector. He told American commanders that

they must face " the brutal facts" that the Marines

were "under the enemy's guns ." Krulak believed the

enemy's purpose was :

. . . to get us as near to his weapons and to his forces a s

possible, drench us with high angle fire weapons ,

engage us in close and violent combat, accept willingly

a substantial loss of life for the opportunity to kill a lesser number of our men, and to withdraw into his Nort h

Vietnam sanctuary to refurbish . 2

In a message on 23 September, General Krulak

outlined to General Cushman the limited options o n

the northern front available to the Marine command .

III MAF could withdraw its forces to defensive positions further south, out of the range of the North Vietnamese artillery north of the Ben Hai. Krulak rejected this move, although tactically sound, as carrying

"too large a price." The enemy could claim a propaganda victory, and moreover it meant abandoning the

barrier and strongpoint obstacle system . He noted

"whatever criticism may have been directed at th e

concept before, it is now an official U .S ./GVN

endeavor, and to back away from it now could not con -

ceivably be identified with progress in the war. "

Another alternative was to invade North Vietnam ,

which also was not feasible, because of logistic an d

political ramifications. Krulak believed the only

*Lieutenant General Louis Metzger noted that the operationa l

names had little significance for the Marines who were there : " It was

all one big battle . For most of us, one so-called operation looked just

like another. " LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft chapter, dt d

17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments .

remaining viable choices were the reinforcement of

the 3d Division in Quang Tri and the intensificatio n

of American air and artillery bombardment of th e

enemy in and immediately north of the DMZ . 3

General Krulak's message more or less reflected th e

thinking of both General Westmoreland at MACV

and General Cushman at III MAF of the situation i n

the north . None of the American commanders seriously considered the abandonment of the U .S . positions

north of Dong Ha or Route 9 . General Westmoreland

established a small group in his headquarters to examine the possibility of an amphibious landing in con -

junction with an overland sally through the DMZ int o

North Vietnam. These deliberations, however, went n o

further than the planning stage .4 Thus, left with rathe r

a Hobson's choice, Westmoreland and Cushman elected their only remaining courses of action. General

Westmoreland in early October reinforced III MAF

with a brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division, which

permitted General Cushman to redeploy the 1st

Marines from Da Nang to Quang Tri City. At the same

time, III MAF received the bulk of available B—5 2

strikes and naval gunfire support . By 12 October, General Westmoreland reported to Admiral Sharp that

"our successful application of firepower through B—5 2

strikes, tactical air, and extensive artillery fires has

caused the enemy to suffer heavy casualties which cou -

pled with increasing flood conditions to his rear renders his massed posture in the vicinity of Con Thien n o

longer tenable."5

Although the action in the DMZ sector abated

somewhat during October and November, the situation was again tense by the end of the year. Just before

Thanksgiving 1967, General Krulak alerted Genera l

Cushman that the enemy was once more moving men

and material into the Demilitarized Zone, improvin g

his artillery, and "preparing the battlefield ." 6 At

MACV Headquarters, General Westmorelan d

expressed his concern in early December about th e

enemy buildup. He disagreed with President Thieu's

assessment that the North Vietnamese were creating " a

diversionary effort" in the DMZ to mask their real

objective, the Central Highlands. Westmoreland

believed that the next enemy move would be in th e

northern two provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thie n

Provinces.? On 16 December, he once more directe d

that I Corps for the next 30 days receive priority of th e

B—52 Arclight strikes. At the same time, he ordered

the immediate preparation of contingency plans to

reinforce III MAF with Army troops and the development of logistic facilities to accommodate those forces .8
20 THE DEFINING YEA R

At III MAF Headquarters, General Cushman als o

made his adjustments to reinforce the northern battle -

field . In late December, he implemented Operatio n

Checkers which would eventually result in the 1st

Marine Division taking over responsibility for al l

operations in Thua Thien Province so that Genera l

Tompkin's 3d Division could concentrate its ful l

resources in the DMZ and Khe Sanh sector. By January 1968, elements of the 1st Division's 5th Marine s

had deployed into the former 3d Division TAOR

south of Phu Bai. Both divisions had established

timetables for the phased placement of their regiments and battalions into new operating areas. In sort

of hop, skip, and jump movements, hence the nam e

Checkers, the units were to displace one another. For

example, the 4th Marines was to assume control o f

Operation Lancaster in the central DMZ from the 3 d

Marines. In turn, the 3d Marines was to go to Quan g

Tri and relieve the 1st Marines. The 1st Marines the n

was to replace the 4th Marines at Camp Evans in Thua

Thien Province and return to the operational contro l

of the 1st Division . Both the 9th Marines and the 1s t

Amphibian Tractor Battalion would continue with

their respective operations, Kentucky and Napoleon .

The 2d ARVN Regiment would stay tied in with the

9th Marines on the right and take over more of th e

strongpoints of the barrier system. On 15 January,

General Tompkins planned to transfer his command

post from Phu Bai to Dong Ha .9

General Tompkins was relatively new to the Vietnam War. He assumed command of the 3d Division

in November after the unexpected death of his predecessor, Major General Bruno A . Hochmuth, in a

helicopter crash. Holder of the Navy Cross, Silve r

Star, and Bronze Star, General Tompkins was a veteran of the island campaigns of Guadalcanal,

Tarawa, and Saipan in World War II . He had the 5t h

Marines in Korea after the signing of the armistic e

and oversaw the implementation of its terms in hi s

sector. During the Dominican crisis of April—Ma y

1965, he commanded the Marine forces ashore . While Commanding General, Marine Corps

Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, h e

received his orders to Vietnam .l o

Regarded in Marine Corps circles as one of its bes t

tacticians, General Tompkins was thought the idea l

candidate to take charge of the DMZ War. Vietnam

was to be a unique experience for him . Colonel James

R. Stockman, his operations officer who had served

with him on Saipan, recalled that when General Tompkins arrived he asked one question: "Tell me about the

operational folklore in the division 's area of operations. "

According to Stockman, he told the general that from

his point of view it "was a bad war, highly inhibited by

MACV restrictions . . . [and) political considerations

emanating from Washington . " t l

General Tompkins soon became well acquainte d

with the "operational folklore " of the 3d Marine Division. He learned quickly that a regiment may have

responsibility for a sector but have none of its battalions under its command . For example, the 9th Marine s

in the five-battalion Operation Kentucky only had on e

of its original battalions, the 2d Battalion with onl y

two of four companies, participating in the operation .

The other four battalions came from the 1st Marines,

3d Marines, and 4th Marines. According to Colone l

Stockman, General Tompkins "caught on fast to the

term 'opcon' [operational control) " which permitted

the interchange of battalions from regiment to regiment without the relinquishment of administrative

responsibility.

12 *

This tasking of units, as one Marine historica l

analyst, Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons,

observed, "demonstrated the interchangeable natur e

of Marine battalions and gave the division commander great flexibility."15 Yet this flexibility had a

price. Command lines were somewhat blurred an d

tactical integrity was more difficult to maintain .

Simmons noted "One regimental commander estimated that it took about two weeks of working with

a new battalion to iron out problems of procedure s

and communications. " 1 4 * *

Two other aspects of the "operational folklore" of th e

3d Marine Division impinged upon General Tompkin s

as 1967 drew to a close. One was Khe Sanh and the

other was the strongpoint system or barrier. Although

ordered to reinforce Khe Sanh with a battalion i n

December by both Generals Westmoreland and Cush -

*Colonel Vaughn R . Stuart, who served both as executive office r

and later commander of the 3d Marines, commented that Genera l

Hochmuth believed that regiments were "capable of controlling an y

number of battalions ." The regimental headquarters would be located

in the important areas . . . and the principal tactic was in the shifting

of the maneuver battalions to various regiments as the situation dictated ." Col Vaughn R . Stuart, Comments on draft chapter, dc d

20Dec1994 (Vietnam Comment File) .

**Lieutenant General Metzger, the 3d Marine Division assistan t

division commander in January 1968, remarked that General Tompkins wanted to bring "the tangle of battalions and regiments into som e

sort of order; to the extent possible, aligning the battalions with thei r

parent regiments. " Metzger believed that Tompkins "was faced with

nearly an impossible situation, fighting the battle with an inadequat e

force for the assigned missions . " Metzger Comments.
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER 2 1

The Barrier

Abel Collection Phot o

LtGen Robert E. Cushman, left, CG III MAF, pins the

Distinguished Service Medal on MajGen Rathvon McC .

Tompkins at an award ceremony at Da Nang. Gen Tompkins, who served as CG 3d MarDiv, and later as Gen

Cushman's deputy, was very much involved in the buildin g

of the barrier and its problems.

man, General Tompkins was more concerned about th e

situation he confronted in the DMZ sector. * In 1976 ,

he wrote that he still did not understand why the

North Vietnamese "did not contain" the base at Khe

Sanh "and sideslip the rest of their formations" toward s

the coast and more lucrative targets. "

The barrier or "McNamara Wall " was the other

feature of the war in the north that overrode most

other considerations confronting the 3d Marine

Division. It determined both the disposition and th e

tactics of the division along the DMZ . According to

Colonel Stockman, both Khe Sanh and the barrie r

had become "sacrosanct" by the end of the year and

that the latter "could not even be discussed, much

less argued, when I was G—3 . . . ." Stockman

claimed that the barrier "became an objective i n

itself, causing field commanders to be committed t o

an unattainable act of juggling real tactical considerations and {barrier} requirements ."1 6

*General Metzger observed that General Westmoreland did no t

give a direct order to General Tompkins to reinforce Khe Sanh .

Although the MACV commander " became perilously close" to violating the chain of command " on his many visits with comments an d

suggestions " he never " bypassed III MAF." Metzger Comments.

Although credited to Secretary of Defense Robert

S . McNamara, the concept of a defensive "barrier "

between the two Vietnams had many authors. As early

as the late 1950s, President Diem asked his senio r

U.S . Army military advisor, Lieutenant General

Samuel T. Williams, to assist in building "a series of

strongpoints (concrete) each to hold an infantry squad ,

across from the sea to Laos just below the DMZ ."17 A

few years later, in the fall of 1961, General Maxwel l

Taylor, President Kennedy's Special Military Representative, on a visit to South Vietnam, directed

Brigadier General Edward F. Lansdale, the Air Force

counterinsurgency expert who accompanied him on

the trip, "to do a study of fortifying the DMZ."18 In

early 1965, before the commitment of major U .S .

units to the Vietnam War, Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, proposed sending a "multinational four-division force . . . to man defensive positions south of the DMZ and to overwatch the Laotia n

border area to the west, thereby impeding the movement of enemy forces from the north ."1 9

The Defense Department, however, only began to

give serious consideration to a DMZ barrier in the

spring of 1966 when Secretary of Defense McNamara raised the question with the Joint Chiefs . He then

directed the establishment of a special study group to

examine the technical feasibility of such a plan . Sponsored by the Institute of Defense Analysis, 67 scientists participated in the study and released their findings, known as the Jason Report, on 30 August 1966 .

The report concluded that a unmanned air-supporte d

barrier could be established in a year's time . This barrier was to consist of two parts—one aimed at individuals on foot and the other against vehicles . The

former was to be along the southern edge of the DM Z

while the latter was to extend into Laos . Both parts

were to contain gravel mines (small mines with th e

purpose of crippling legs and feet on detonation),

button bomblets (mines designed only to make a

loud noise which could be picked up by an acousti c

sensor) and both acoustic and seismic detectors (sensitive to sound and ground vibrations). Patrol and

strike aircraft were to monitor and support the

ground barrier.

Although many of the military had serious reservations, especially CinCPac, Admiral Sharp, Secretary

McNamara believed the proposal had merit. He

appointed Army Lieutenant General Alfred Starbird t o

head a joint task force within the Defense Department
I

I

———I

BEN HAl RIVER CON THIENe ALPHA3

(C$O

'bCHARLIE 4 ALPHA 4 a LINH) s 0-CUAVIET DMZ - - -

- CHAR)_IE 2A o

ALPHA 1 CHARLIE 1'

- , OCHAJLIE 2 '. ,> NAPOLEON 0

• I

I

• CHARLIE3AQ ' • CHARLIE 3Q ' -

' HA COMBAT BASE

CAMLOO

- -' %0 ROCKPILE o '- KENTUCKY /

I 0- —— I 0 CAMPCAHROLL, ' SCOTLAND' --' - QIJANG TRI

- LANCASTER • COMBATBASE'

QCALU '-- OSCEOLA

— — I O 3D MARINE DIVISION

RHE SANH

COMBAT BASE AREAS OF OPERATION AND THE

STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM

LAOS'- JANUARY 1968

0 5 10 I- Kilometers '

22 THE DEFINING YEAR

to study the possibilities of implementing the Jason

Report recommendations. The Starbird task force was

to devise an anti-infiltration system based on airdropped munitions and electronic sensors that would

slow, if not stop, the flow of men and material from the

north into the south. This entire planning effort was to

have the code name "Practice Nine."

General Westmoreland had mixed feelings about

the barrier proposal. He was well aware of the disadvantages of any barrier. In a message to General Starbird, he observed that the North Vietnamese, "will be

able to harass a fixed barrier at selected times and places

both during and after the construction phase . . . The

enemy will make full use of the 'bait and trap' technique in attempts to lure friendly elements into prepared ambushes." Westmoreland concluded with an

analysis of the North Vietnamese: "Our enemy is selfconfident, determined, ingenious and uses terrain and

weather to his advantage. His solutions to problems are

usually elemental, simple and practical from his view

point." Despite these doubts about a barrier, he himself, was thinking of building a "strongpoint obstacle

system" that would "channel the enemy into welldefined corridors where we might bring air and

artillery to bear and then hit him with mobile ground

reserves." He saw the Starbird project as an opportunity to institute his own concept.2°

On 3 October 1966, the MACV commander

ordered his own staff to come up with a study of the various defensive options in the DMZ sector and report

back to him in six days. In its preliminary findings, the

MACV planning group recommended a mobile defense

behind a barrier system. The MACV planners suggested a linear barrier extending from Dong Ha Mountain

to the sea. This linear barrier would consist of a 1,000-

meter wide "trace" with barbed wire, minefields,

remote sensor devices, bunkers, watch towers at periodic intervals, all tied together with an extensive communications network. The original scheme called for an

ARVN armored cavalry regiment to man, screen, and

provide depth to the defense. III MAE would be prepared to provide reinforcements or blocking forces as

the situation might demand. West of the trace, the plan

would have a strongpoint defense centered around

strategic defiles in the mountainous terrain. The western strongpoint system would consist of 20 outposts

manned by a Republic of Korea division and reinforced

by artillery and air. This preliminary plan would go

through several transitions, but would be the basis of all

subsequent discussion and planning efforts.
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER 2 3

The day after receiving his briefing, 11 October

1966, General Westmoreland met with Secretar y

McNamara in Vietnam . He recommended his alternative to the Washington plan . The Secretary, after flying

over the DMZ, was receptive to the Westmoreland

proposal. He directed that MACV should continue

with its planning effort and at the same time charge d

General Starbird's Washington group with the production and delivery of the munitions and sensors t o

support these measures. Planning would also continu e

on the development of air-delivered munitions an d

sensors in Laos to augment the anti-infiltration system

to be constructed in South Vietnam. The Seventh Air

Force would be responsible for the aviation aspects

while III MAF together with the MACV Comba t

Operations Center were to draw up the designs for th e

barrier and strongpoints within South Vietnam .

Despite their wishes, the Marine command would

be at the center of the barrier developments. Very early,

Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, then III MAF commander, made known his unhappiness with the barrie r

concept. It was his belief and that of his commanders

that if he had the additional forces projected by the barrier planners, "a far better job of sealing the DMZ coul d

be accomplished without the barrier itself." It was the

Marine position that a barrier defense " should free

Marine forces for operations elsewhere not freeze suc h

forces in a barrier watching defensive role ." With their

objections overruled, the Marine commanders had n o

choice but to comply with their directives.2 1

III MAF submitted its formal operational plan for

the barrier at the end of December 1966 and MACV

incorporated the Marine concepts, with some modifications, in its Practice 9 Requirements Plan of 26 January 1967. The Marine plan had established a deadline

of 1 August 1967 for the construction and manning b y

an ARVN regiment of the eastern portion of the barri -

er. III MAF would have started work on a road networ k

and the dredging of the Cua Viet to support the project. A Korean division was to assume responsibility fo r

the area west of Dong Ha Mountain on 1 August 1967

as well, and the 3d Marine Division would then be free

of the barrier defense . MACV, in its changes, pushe d

back the final completion date of the eastern section t o

1 November and postponed the entry of additiona l

forces into the western defile area until November. The

original plan had called for a deadline of 1 Novembe r

for the building of the western strongpoints, which

MACV changed to read, "the remainder of the syste m

in this area will be completed subsequent to 1 November 1967." Marines, however, were to construct a

strongpoint at their Khe Sanh base . MACV did make

some cosmetic revisions in wording : anti-infiltration

system was substituted for barrier, since the latter had

the connotation of an impregnable defense . More

importantly, MACV requested an additional divisio n

and regiment specifically earmarked for the strong -

point system in the Demilitarized Zone, to supplement its forces already in Vietnam.2 2

Despite not acting upon Westmoreland's request fo r

additional units for the barrier, which became caugh t

up in the Washington review of overall MACV man -

power needs during the spring of 1967, Secretary

McNamara approved in early March the basic MAC V

strongpoint proposal. He authorized General Starbird

to procure the necessary material to build and equi p

the strongpoints and base camps for a 10-kilometer

"trace" in the eastern DMZ. The Secretary also ordered

work to begin on the improvements of Route 1 and th e

ports near Hue and on the Cua Viet. At the same time,

the State Department arranged with the South Vietnamese Government to discuss the necessary land purchases and the resettlement of the civilian populatio n

in the area of the trace .

In aerial photograph, Strongpoint A—4 at Con Thien is marked by the cross hairs. Less than 160 meters

high and located two miles south of the DMZ, Con Thien still dominated the surrounding flat terrain.

Photo from 12th Mar ComdC, Jan69
24 THE DEFINING YEA R

General Westmoreland soon passed his directives on

to III MAF. He ordered General Walt to prepare a plan

in coordination with the South Vietnamese I Corps

commander, General Lam, for the Strongpoint Obstacle System. The Marine command was to confine its

discussions with the South Vietnamese only to the eastern sector. No mention was to be made of the wester n

strongpoint defile or of the air-supported system i n

Laos. Even with the lack of a formal plan, Marine engineers in early April began clearing the terrain betwee n

Gio Linh and Con Thien under the guise of clearin g

fields of fire and building modest field fortifications.

By mid-April, the barrier for III MAF had becom e

a reality, and not to the liking of senior Marine commanders. On 19 April, General Westmoreland told

General Walt that "the mission of establishing a

strongpoint/obstacle system south of the DMZ initially will be given to the U .S . Marines. "23 In his reply,

General Walt protested that this order assigned hi s

entire 3d Marine Division to the barrier. In effect, the

division would be confined to fixed positions and to

the construction and the manning of the strongpoint

system. The III MAF commander argued that unless

he received reinforcements in the north he would not

be able to conduct offensive operations there . General

Westmoreland had no additional forces to give him ,

but indicated that he would reinforce the Marines as

troops and units became available . General Krulak, the

FMFPac commander, was quick to point out to the

Commandant, General Greene, "that we are alread y

embarked on a form of Practice Nine ." He observed

that the reinforcement of Army troops in Task Forc e

Oregon at Chu Lai had "been counterbalanced b y

MACV assigning III MAF the barrier mission ." Krulak asked General Greene "to demonstrate at the Join t

Chiefs and the Department of Defense levels" tha t

Marine resources were going into the strongpoint system "with only a presumptive basis for assuming we

will be compensated ."24

Notwithstanding this unified front on the part o f

the Marine Corps, III MAF, again, had little alternativ e

but to continue with its planning and building of th e

strongpoint system . In May, during Operation Hickory, the 3d Division moved some 11,000 civilians fro m

the construction sites to a resettlement village at Ca m

Lo. The 11th Engineer Battalion cleared the terrai n

while one or two infantry battalions provided the security. On 18 June, III MAF finally published its operation plan which outlined the eastern strongpoint obstacle system. According to the plan, a cleared trace

would extend from a strongpoint (A—5), some six kilometers west of Con Thien, for over 25 kilometers to it s

eastern terminus at another strongpoint (A—1), som e

six kilometers east of Gio Linh . The "trace" would be

supported by six company strongpoints, labeled A— 1

through A—6. Gio Linh was Strongpoint A—2 and Con

Thien was Strongpoint A-4 . Behind the strongpoints

were to be three battalion base areas, designated C— 1

through C—3 . An ARVN regiment was to man Strong -

points A—1 and A—2 and Base Area C-3 . A Marine

regiment was to be responsible for the strongpoints

and base areas west of Route 1 .

The plan called for the work to be completed in tw o

phases. In Phase 1, a 600 meter-wide trace was to b e

built from Con Thien to Strongpoint A—1 . Four of the

strongpoints, A—1 through A-4, as well as all of th e

base areas were to be finished by 1 November 1967,

the deadline for Phase 1 . III MAF, at the same time ,

would improve the road network to include Routes 9,

1, and 561 . The latter road was to connect Con Thien

to its combat support bases and Route 9. The 3d

Marine Division base at Dong Ha was to be the logistics center of the entire effort. It was hoped that by the

onset of the monsoon season that the barrier obstacle

system of mines, radars, towers, barbed wire, and sensors, would be in place along that part of the trace from

Con Thien to Gio Linh. In the second phase, at the end

of the monsoon season, III MAF would finish the construction of the two strongpoints west of Con Thie n

and complete the extension of the trace and its obstacle system from Strongpoint A—1 to A—5. The entir e

project would be over by July 1968 .2 5

The III MAF barrier plan proved to be overly optimistic . By the end of July 1967, Marine engineer an d

construction units had accumulated an impressive set

of statistics pertaining to the number of man and

equipment hours devoted to the project, yet progress

was relatively slow. The 11th Engineer Battalion committed nearly 50 percent of its total resources to th e

construction of the trace at a loss of 15 tractors and two

dump trucks. As Marine units extended their efforts,

North Vietnamese resistance increased . The same

infantry battalions that were assigned to constructio n

projects also had security missions. More than one bat-

*General Metzger wrote that the original Dyemarker plan did no t

contain the A—1 strongpoint: " It was only after the 3d Marine Divisio n

emphatically pointed out the area in which A—1 was finally located wa s

the 'rocket belt' from which the enemy, after crossing the Ben Ha i

River, set up rockets and fired them into the Dong Ha Base . It was

essential that this terrain be denied the enemy, thus A—1 . " Metzge r

emphasized the need for tactical plans to be developed by those wh o

are closest to the situation . Metzger Comments.
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER 2 5

talion commander complained about the strain on his

men to build the barrier at the same time they fough t

the war. Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the 3 d

Marine Division Assistant Division Commande r

(ADC), several years later wrote that the "Marines

required to do the construction work were exhauste d

from protracted combat and the so-called security missions were in fact heavy combat ."2 6

The Marine command began to view Dyemarker,

the new codename for Practice Nine, as an albatross

around its neck . Originally, although not happy wit h

the barrier concept, General Krulak in June 1967

thought that it might be feasible to extend the trac e

from the sea some 25 kilometers inland and deny th e

enemy "a direct north-south route into the populous

areas."27 General Cushman, who had assumed command of III MAF in June, also thought that the completion of the strongpoint obstacle system would fre e

his forces along the DMZ for operations elsewhere .28

By the end of July, both men had second thoughts. In

messages to the III MAF commander and to Genera l

Greene, the FMFPac commander voiced his concerns .

Krulak radioed Cushman: "I am fearful, that, unless we

call a halt, that MACV is going to nibble us to death

in the Dyemarker project." He stated that he understood Cushman's problems: "You must get as much of

the job done as possible in advance of the monsoon an d

you need help to do it ."29 In his message to General

Greene, General Krulak remarked on the slow progres s

and the high costs of the barrier program . He reminded both men that the original barrier concept called fo r

specific forces to take over the barrier, and he now

feared that MACV was hedging on this support .30

These considerations started to come to a head i n

August. III MAF briefed General Greene on the Dyemarker situation during the Commandant's visit t o

Vietnam in the early part of the month . The III MAF

briefers observed that the original MACV concep t

called for a minimum of 7,691 additional men including an infantry brigade, construction battalions, truck

companies, and other support units to reinforce the

Marines in Dyemarker. None of these units had yet

been forthcoming . The III MAF staff ended its presentation with the observation that the "Enemy activity i n

northern Quang Tri . . . greatly exceeded that assumed

. . .," yet the Marines were under directives "to accomplish the tasks within available force levels."3 t

On 16 August, General Cushman appealed directl y

to General Westmoreland . He made much the same

argument that he had in the briefing for Genera l

Greene. The III MAF commander reiterated that he

had not received any of the additional forces supposedly specified for the Dyemarker project . He emphasized

that the buildup of enemy forces in the DMZ made th e

original estimate of minimum forces for the barrier

now hopelessly out of date. Cushman then explained

that the seven battalions that he had up in the north

"cannot accomplish that task up forward and at th e

same time construct, man, and operate and defend the

Strongpoint/Obstacle System . . . to their rear." He

remarked that the only way "to get on with the job, "

was to shift an Army brigade from Chu Lai to Da

Nang, and then move a Marine regiment from the D a

Nang TAOR to the DMZ sector. General Cushma n

then asked General Westmoreland to consider this latter alternative .32 Cushman received assurances that h e

could deploy his forces as he saw fit, and on 30 August

directed his 1st Marine Division to prepare plans fo r

the movement of two battalions north to the DMZ. He

explained to the division commander, Major General

Donn J. Robertson, "everyone has to strain during

Dyemarker. "3 3

At this point, the North Vietnamese took matters

into their own hands. In early September, they began

an artillery bombardment of Marine positions alon g

the strongpoint system and Marine rear areas fro m

positions above the DMZ . On 3 September, more tha n

40 rounds of mixed caliber shells struck the overcrowded Dong Ha base. An ammunition storage area

and the bulk fuel farm went up in flames. The Marin e

helicopter squadron at the Dong Ha Airfield sustained

damage to 17 of its aircraft, already in short supply.

From as far away as 50 miles, Marine pilots aloft could

see billowing smoke rising over Dong Ha . Considering

the extent of the explosions and fires, Marine casualtie s

were relatively light—no one killed and 77 wounded ,

and only one man seriously. The impact upon Marine

logistics in the north and upon the III MAF capabilit y

to continue the Dyemarker project was another matter.

In a message to General Westmoreland, General Cush -

man laid out the implications of the losses of materia l

as a result of the attack on 3 September, and continuing with the barrier under the guns of the enemy. He

observed that the destruction of the Dong Ha ammunition supply point "had a direct impact on my abilit y

to proceed with Dyemarker." The III MAF commander then remarked that "We are rapidly approachin g

the time when a decision must be made as to . . . installation of the Strongpoint Obstacle System ." Cushman

related again the effort that his forces had been makin g

despite shortages in material for Dyemarker and with -

out the promised troop reinforcements for the project.
26 THE DEFINING YEA R

Both the ports of Cua Viet and Dong Ha as well as th e

troops working on Dyemarker were under the "same

fan of guns " that had blown up the ammunition dump .

According to the barrier plan, nine Marine infantry

battalions and the 11th Engineer Battalion were committed to the project. Seven of the nine infantry battalions provided a protective screen while the engineer s

and remaining infantry units installed the obstacle system and completed the strongpoints. General Cushman estimated that this work would take another six

weeks. During that time, troops putting in the obstacle system would be in the open and vulnerable t o

enemy fire . Cushman stated that he was ' ready to

implement this part of the plan if certain minimu m

requirements were met . He wanted more artillery, air,

and naval gunfire support, as well as a higher proportion of B—52 Arclight strikes. III MAF also needed

additional supply, trucking, and engineering units .34

Concerned about the increasing enemy strength and

the progress of the barrier, General Westmoreland me t

with General Cushman on 7 September to make his

own appraisal of the situation . After listening to the III

MAF commander, Westmoreland asked Cushman to

estimate the cost in both casualties and in material of

continuing the emplacement of the obstacle syste m

within the trace. Obviously expecting that the pric e

tag would be too high, the MACV commander also

ordered the Marine general to begin preparation of an

alternative plan, based on the assumption of "no continuous obstacle . . . along present trace . " III MAF's

estimates of the consequences of adhering to the sched -

ule of installing the obstacles caused the inevitable

revision of the entire project. The Marine staff projected more than 700 men killed and at least 4,00 0

wounded, including both U.S . and ARVN troops, if

the present course of action were to be followed . On 13

September 1967, General Westmoreland approved a

new III MAF barrier plan .3 5

The new Marine barrier plan postponed all work fo r

the time being on the trace and emphasized instead the

construction of the strongpoints and the base areas .

Strongpoints A—5 and A—6 were eliminated while a

new base area, C-4, was added just north of the Cu a

Viet. The ARVN was to construct the easternmost

strongpoint, A—1, while the 3d Division was to remai n

responsible for the other strongpoints and the bas e

areas. The plan called for the 2d ARVN Regiment to

man all of the strongpoints eventually, while th e

Marines provided a mobile reserve force . In the western

defile system, the Marine division would establis h

seven combat operating bases including Khe Sanh, Ca

Lu, the Rockpile, and Camp Carroll . These four operating bases as well as all of the eastern strongpoint s

were to be completed by 1 November. As far as the

trace was concerned, the plan only read that th e

Marines were to install "the anti-infiltration system i n

such manner as to provide the option of further development of the obstacle system . . . ."3 6

The enemy and nature were to combine to frustrat e

the new Marine time schedule. Through Septembe r

and early October, North Vietnamese artillery, occasionally reinforced by ground forces, in effect, lai d

siege to the Marines at Con Thien . NVA artilleryme n

maintained an average of 200 rounds per day on th e

Marine strongpoint . On 25 September, more tha n

1,200 shells fell upon Con Thien . In a 10-day period ,

18—27 September, the enemy gunners fired more tha n

3,000 rounds of mortars, artillery, and rockets at th e

embattled forward positions. Even as the enemy gun s

blasted away at the Marines, some of the heaviest rain s

in years fell on northern I Corps resulting in widerange flooding . Swollen streams and rivers rose abov e

Portrait photograph of MajGen Raymond L. Murray, a

highly decorated veteran of both World War 11 and the Korean War, who in early 1968 served as Deputy CG 111 MAF.

Gen Cushman, CG III MAF, placed Gen Murray in

charge of the barrier project .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A414537
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER 2 7

Photo courtesy of Col Lee R . Bendell, USMC (Ret)

Into 1968, Gen Westmoreland continued to show command interest in completing the barrier. He is

seen here, left, with LtGen Cushman, CG III MAF, center, and Marine BGen John R . Chaisson,

who headed the MACV Combat Operations Center, visiting Marine Base Area C-2 .

their banks and the onrushing waters washed away

bunkers and trenches and made a quagmire of muc h

of the barrier area . Although the enemy artillery was

relatively silent in mid-October, the building of the

strongpoints and base areas was at a standstill . In late

October, after a period of benign neglect during the

struggle for Con Thien and the monsoon rains ,

MACV again put on the pressure to continue with th e

strongpoint system. The assistant division commander, General Metzger, much later observed that there

was a constantly "changing emphasis" on the Dye -

marker project . There would be high interest followed

by periods of low interest "with no materials availabl e

and response, direction, and guidance from highe r

headquarters either slow or non-existent ." Metzge r

noted that "Those on the lower levels of the military

hierarchy became very expert at reading the indicators" of both high and low interest.37

Aware of the difficult circumstances under whic h

the Marines on the DMZ labored, General Westmore -

land still believed that General Cushman and his staff

should have had better control of the situation . On 22

October, he radioed Cushman that he was unhapp y

with the "quality control" maintained by III MAF ove r

the construction of the Dyemarker facilities . The

MACV commander stated that the project had "no t

been accorded a priority consistent with its operational

importance ." He noted that he was "on record with

higher headquarters to meet a fixed time schedule ." He

realized that the schedule could be adjusted but "an y

slippage . . . must be supported by factors recognized

as being beyond our control . . . ." Westmoreland then

directed General Cushman "to take immediate steps t o

correct deficiencies in the construction of the strongpoints and to institute a positive system of quality control over construction and installation of the entire

Dyemarker system ." The strongly worded message

concluded with a reaffirmation that "Project Dye -

marker is an operational necessity second only to combat emergency. " 3S
28 THE DEFINING YEA R

General Cushman, in turn, was to relay this ne w

emphasis on the barrier to his subordinate commanders.

In transmitting the MACV message to Major General

Hochmuth, then the Commanding General, 3d Marin e

Division, Cushman remarked the "screws are bein g

tightened. " He then told Hochmuth : "This was no t

unpredictable and I am well aware of the factors

involved . . . Nevertheless we must give this our closest

personal attention and insure that we are taking all possible action within our capabilities and resources. "39

The III MAF commander's first action was to

appoint a completely separate staff under his deputy

commander, Major General Raymond L . Murray, t o

oversee the entire barrier effort . General Murray 's Dyemarker staff reevaluated the efforts relative to the barrier and came up with yet another plan. In this new

version of Dyemarker, the drafters reinstated Strongpoint A—5 and eliminated any hedging about th e

installation of the obstacle system along the trace . This

latter feature was to be an integral component of the

eastern sector of the barrier. Except for Strongpoint

A—5, emphasis remained on completion of all of th e

eastern strongpoints by the end of the year. According

to the new schedule of completion, the 2d ARVN Regiment would take over four of the strongpoints i n

1968. The Marines would remain responsible for manning Strongpoint A—5 and the combat operating bases,

except for C—1 . In the western defile system, the pla n

called for construction to begin only at the Ca Lu combat operating base during the monsoon season4 0

Despite the elaborations of his staff on the barrie r

concept, General Murray had serious reservations abou t

the entire project. He later revealed that he never really obtained a handle on the situation. Much of the Dyemarker material had been siphoned off by various commands for their own purposes . Many of the original

timbers for the bunkers were green and untreated and

began to rot under the pervasive dampness of the monsoon period . The Marines had much the same proble m

relative to the enormous number of sandbags required

for the bunkers, and their rotting caused a "constan t

replacement problem." General Murray was able to

obtain promises from General Starbird's group i n

Washington of new timbers and of replacement items ,

but his troubles continued . The III MAF deputy commander partially blamed some of his problems on his

own lack of authority. He believed that the Dyemarker staff should not have been separate from the III MAF

staff. Murray stated he was not in a position "to directly order anybody to do anything with relation to Dyemarker." As one of the most decorated Marine commanders during World War II and Korea, Murra y

instinctively "sympathized with the division commander whose primary mission was the tactical handling of

his troops . . . rather than build the damn line that

nobody believed in, in the first place . " The seizure of

the site for Strongpoint A—3 in early December confirmed Murray's doubts about Dyemarker : "How i n

the hell were you going to build this thing when you

had to fight people off, while you were building it ."4 1

Notwithstanding the handicaps under which the y

worked, the Marines had made significant progress by

the end of the year. The 11th Engineer Battalion ,

under wretched weather and physical conditions,

resurfaced Route 561 with rock and partially sealed i t

with asphalt. The battalion also worked on the layin g

of the subbase for Route 566 . Route 561 connecte d

Route 9 with Con Thien while 566 was to run parallel

to the trace and link the strongpoints . Assisted by th e

engineers and Navy Seabees, the Marine infantry had

built 167 bunkers with another 234 ready, except fo r

overhead cover. * More than 67,000 meters of tactica l

wire had been laid and 120,000 meters of minefield s

emplaced. Strongpoint A—1 in the ARVN sector was

finished as was the combat operating base C—2, sout h

of Con Thien. The remaining positions in the eastern

strongpoint area were about 80 percent completed . I n

the western defile system, the work at the Ca Lu

strongpoint had proceeded with little difficulty wit h

nearly 70 percent of the bunkers and material in place .

With the expected arrival of additional supplies in th e

near future, the Marines expected to finish in February

the installation of the obstacle system along the trace .

The cost of these gains was dear. Not including th e

lives lost and the men wounded in trying to build Dye -

marker, Marines spent 757,520 man-days and 114,51 9

equipment-hours. More than $1,622,348 worth of

equipment had been lost to enemy action in establishing the barrier up to this point in time .4 2

The bickering, nevertheless, over the strongpoin t

system continued. Engineer inspectors from th e

MACV Dyemarker staff made several visits while th e

* One Marine battalion commander, Colonel John F. Mitchell, who

commanded the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, which occupied Con Thie n

in the fall of 1967, remembered that he had a detachment of engineer s

" under my protection and operational control " for the building of Dyemarker. According to Mitchell, the engineer detachment worked "during daylight hours, mostly, in the open with heavy equipment . . . an d

showed enormous courage setting an example for all of us." Mitchell

stated that the detachment suffered a higher percentage of casualties

than his infantry Marines. Col John F. Mitchell, Comments on draft

chapter, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File) .
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER 2 9

work progressed and made several criticisms ranging

from the size to the color of the bunkers. During two

trips to the DMZ sector in December, General Westmoreland expressed his dissatisfaction . He was particularly unhappy about the fortifications at Con Thien . Westmoreland observed that the bunkers there wer e

built to house a 900-man Marine battalion rather tha n

the 400-man Vietnamese battalion which was scheduled to take over the positions in the spring . Venting

his frustrations in his personal journal, he wrote :

I have had no end of problems with the strongpoin t

obstacle system. The reason seems to be that the Marine s

have had little experience in construction of fortifications and therefore lack the know-how to establish the m

in the way I had visualized . I thus have been remiss in

taking for granted that they had the background ; hope -

fully it is not too late to get the project on a solid track 4 3

In a formal message to General Cushman, the

MACV commander laid out in detail what he wante d

relative to the barrier. He stated at the outset that a

strongpoint was " to be virtually an impregnable defensive position. " Westmoreland noted that it was to be

emplaced so that an ARVN battalion with supporting

arms could withstand an attack by an enemy division .

He wanted the primary defense to be based on " twoman fighting bunkers, that are hardened, mutuall y

supporting, [and] protected by a dense field of defensive wire and mines." Radars, sensors, night observation devices, and searchlights would complement the

defenses. General Westmoreland finally reminded the

III MAF commander that he could consult Army Field

Manuals 7—11 and 7—20 for further guidance on

preparing defensive positions.44

The Marine command, on the other hand, viewed

the MACV staff and General Westmoreland's criticisms as unjustified. Marine generals saw the barrier

largely as an impediment to fighting the war. Building

the fortifications for the strongpoints was a case i n

point. The 3d Division looked at the bunkers as livin g

areas able to withstand "a certain amount of enem y

attention ." 4 5 The actual fighting positions were outside

the bunkers themselves. General Murray recalled that

when General Westmoreland visited the positions, he

called them foxholes and directed the building of covered emplacements for the fighting positions an d

bunkers with loopholes for rifles and automati c

weapons. The Seabees then built for the Marines a half

dozen of the new types of bunkers which the MACV

commander personally inspected . Murray remembered

that Westmoreland spent most of the visit discussing

the comparative virtues of a sloping front as compared

with those of a solid front. According to Murray, h e

later often wondered why a MACV commander was

concerned with "such trifles. "4 6

The 3d Division ADC, Brigadier General Metzger,

laid much of the difficulties with the barrier directly a t

the feet of MACV. He remarked on the changing plans

"verbally and informally, by General Westmoreland

and seemingly on the whim of various staff officers. "

Several years later, Metzger remembered that th e

MACV commander constantly altered requirements .

At Con Thien, "the 'bursting layer' on top of the

bunkers was originally required to stop a mortar shell ,

that was soon increased to stop a 105mm shell ." The

Marine general personally suspected that the "Arm y

would not be unhappy if the Marine Corps did no t

accomplish a first class job on Dyemarker, and is 'nitpicking' with the hope of establishing a background o f

'Marine Corps incompetence ."' He believed that "at

least some of the problems with MACV Headquarters

are motivated by such a feeling . "47

Thus as 1968 began, the 3d Marine Division ,

under heavy pressure from higher headquarters, continued with its efforts to complete the strongpoin t

system according to the new guidelines. The division ,

on 31 December 1967, issued a detailed operational

order, complete with overlays, charts, deadlines, an d

bunker designs. Based on the III MAF Dyemarker

order of November 1967, the 3d Division directiv e

specified the missions for each of the individual units .

The 9th Marines had responsibility for most of the

eastern strongpoint system. Its tactical area include d

all of the proposed strongpoints except for A—1 in th e

ARVN sector and A—5, a site not yet selected . Wit h

support of the engineers, the regiment was to complete construction of the strongpoint at Con Thie n

and the three combat operating bases, C—2, C—3, an d

C—3A, strung along Route 566 . To the west, the 3d

Marines was to start on Strongpoint A—5 when so

instructed and to finish the strongpoint at Ca Lu in

the western defile system . The 2d ARVN Regimen t

sector contained the easternmost strongpoint, A—1 ,

and the C—1 Combat Operating Base . On the coast ,

the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was responsible

for the C—4 Combat Operating Base.4 8 This emphasis

from above had limited impact on the actual units,

except for the issuance of additional directives . On 22

January, the 9th Marines published its operationa l

order on the barrier. 4 9 At the troop level, Dyemarker

remained, nevertheless, only a vague concept except

for the building of the bunkers. The Marine infantrymen's concern was the ability to defend themselves
30 THE DEFINING YEA R

Top illustration is Department of Defense (USMC) photo A801126 and bottom is from 12th Mar ComdC, Jan6 9

Aerial views take in Strongpoint A—1, Gio Linh, top, and Base Area C—3, bottom. Marine BGe n

Louis Metzger, the 3d MarDiv assistant division commander, noted the triangular shape ofA—1

and compared C—3 to "an octagonal French Fort."
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER 3 1

from their positions including bunkers, fighting

holes, trench lines, wire, and minefields against th e

enemy with as few men as possible .5 0

Bunkers and fighting holes were still subjects of dis -

cussion among MACV, III MAF, and the ARVN 1s t

Division . General Metzger observed that the ARVN -

built bunkers varied greatly from the Marine . He compared the A—1 Strongpoint on, the coast to "an immigrants' wagon train deployed in concentric circles to

fight off an Indian attack ." According to Metzger, C— 1

looked like "an octagonal French Fort," and he

described the Gio Linh strongpoint as "basically triangular in shape." The ARVN, he maintained, insisted

that the bunkers "were not only for living, but also for

fighting."51 By 14 January 1968, the MACV staff an d

ARVN staff members together with General Murra y

had worked out an agreement on the organization of th e

defenses. The ARVN accepted the concept of three-man

fighting bunkers as opposed to 14-man living bunkers

for primary defense . These fighting bunkers would be

mutually supporting and connected by communicatio n

trenches. U.S . Seabees and engineers would prepare

small prefabricated concrete fighting bunkers as soon as

possible . Strongpoint A—1 would be redesigned and the

engineers would install new fighting bunkers a t

Strongpoints A—2 at Gio Linh and A—3 .52

Work on the bunkers, minefields, and wir e

emplacements continued until the end of the mont h

when " tactical requirements took precedence over Dyemarker."S3 Earlier, on 20 January 1968, General Cush -

man and General Westmoreland agreed to suspend the

installation of the linear obstacle system along the trace

"pending clarification of the enemy situation in Quan g

Tri Province. " 54 For all practical purposes this was to

end the command emphasis on the barrier. As General

Cushman later admitted, he " just quit" building what

he termed the " fence," and "Tet came along and peopl e

had something else to think about ."55 Yet, as General

Tompkins concluded :

Dyemarker was a bete noire that influenced almos t

everything we did and they wouldn't let us off the hoo k

. . . . The 3d Division was responsible for Dyemarke r

and if we were responsible for Dyemarker . . . then we

had to have Carroll, we had to have Ca Lu, we had t o

have Con Thien, we had to have Khe Sanh . These are al l

part of this bloody thing . . . it had a great deal to d o

with the 3d Division being tied to static posts. s6 *

* General Earl E. Anderson, who in 1968 was the III MAF Chief o f

Staff as a brigadier general, commented that he and General Cushma n

agreed with the opinion expressed by General Tompkins that Dye -

marker influenced the entire tactical situation for the 3d Marine Division. Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 18Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File) .
CHAPTER 3

The War in the Eastern DMZ in Early and Mid-January

The NVA in the DMZ Sector—Operation Napoleon—Kentucky Operations and the Barrie r

Operation Lancaster and Heavy Fighting in Mid January

The NVA in the DMZ Secto r

As 1968 began, III MAF looked for the enemy to

renew his initiative in the north . According to

Marine intelligence, elements of nine North Vietnamese regiments belonging to three different divisions were in or below the Demilitarized Zone .

These regiments operated either under their paren t

divisions or directly under the DMZ Front Headquarters. In 1967, the North Vietnamese had created

this relatively new command, separate from the Tri

Thien Hue Military Region, to coordinate NVA operations in and just south of the DMZ . All told, the

Front controlled some 21,000 troops including divisions, regiments, and separate battalions and companies. In its annual report, MACV observed that the

establishment of the North Vietnamese DMZ Front

Headquarters "was a significant strategic move by the

enemy." The North Vietnamese had succeeded i n

tying down a large allied force in the border area an d

were in position to mount a major offensive in northern Quang Tri Province . '

In its December 1967 enemy order of battle, III

MAF identified elements of three regiments of th e

324B NVA Division—the 812th, the 803d, and

90th—and two of the regiments of the 325C NVA

Division—the 29th and 95th operating south of th e

Demilitarized Zone . The Marines believed the head -

quarters of the 325C Division and the 95th Regiment

to be five to ten miles northwest of Khe Sanh . The

29th NVA regimental headquarters and two battalions remained in the southern sector of the DMZ

about 20 miles north of Khe Sanh, but with one battalion, the 8th, located only five miles north of the

Marine base . 2

In the eastern DMZ, FMFPac intelligence officer s

placed the 324B Division Headquarters five miles north

of the Ben Hai River. The 812th NVA Regiment, with

all three of its battalions, was in the southern DMZ

below the river, about five miles north of Camp Carroll. Both the 803d and 90th regimental headquarters

were supposed to be collocated just above the Ben Hai .

According to the FMFPac order of battle, which differed in some details from the III MAF, the 803d had

only one battalion with the regimental headquarters .

Contrary to being above the DMZ as III MAF showe d

in its monthly report, FMFPac indicated the other two

battalions, the 1st and the 3d, operated inside Sout h

Vietnam—the 1st, north of Con Thien, and the 3d,

near the flat, coastal area east of Gio Linh despite its

lack of cover and concealment. 3

The 90th NVA Regiment also posed problems fo r

the Marine intelligence community. FMFPac in its

December summary displayed all three battalions ,

the 7th, the 8th, and the 9th, together with the regimental headquarters above the Ben Hai in the DM Z

north of Con Thien . III MAF, however, had evidenc e

that two battalions of the 90th had departed the regimental area, using elephants as pack animals, an d

moved west into Laos. The enemy units then entered

South Vietnam south of Khe Sanh and traveled northeast. Following the Mientay, "The Road to the West, "

in this case actually the road to the east, one 600-ma n

battalion ended up about five miles southwest o f

Quang Tri City. According to agent reports, the othe r

battalion, about 400 men, infiltrated south into Thu a

Thien Province . To confuse matters even more, this

intelligence indicated that the 90th was now unde r

the operational control of the 312th NVA Division

rather than the 324B Division. This appeared to be

unlikely, however, since the 312th had not been in the

DMZ region since 1966 and no other reports made

reference to this division 4 *

In addition to the 324B and the 325C Divisions,

FMFPac intelligence officers reported another division ,

the 341st NVA, located in the Vinh Linh District of

southern North Vietnam and obviously prepared t o

reinforce the enemy forces in the DMZ and in Quang

*Major Gary E . Todd, who served as an intelligence officer on th e

3d Marine Division staff, commented that the North Vietnames e

changed their unit designations " to frustrate our intelligence collectio n

efforts against them, much like a criminal uses aliases to elude police . "

Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 280ct94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Todd Comments.

32
Map from Marine Operations in Vietnam, Dec67 ,

Tri Province. The FMFPac order of battle also held 130mm field guns with a range of over 27,00 0

another 5,000 enemy troops operating in southern meters easily reached Dong Ha, about 15 kilometers

Quang Tri that could be brought up to support the south of the Ben Hai . 6

enemy forces in the DMZ sector. These included the Dependent upon a relatively rudimentary supply

5th and 9th NVA Regiments, as well as elements of the system, however, the enemy failed to sustain a high

6th and the 27th Independent Battalions.5 rate of fire, seldom reaching a level of 1,000 rounds

While building up their infantry strength in the per day. From April through December 1967, NVA

DMZ sector, the North Vietnamese maintained a American-made 105mm howitzers and 81mm/82mm

credible artillery threat to the allied forces in the mortars accounted for the largest amount of enemy

north. With some 100 artillery pieces, rockets, and artillery expenditure . Over 13,000 of the mortar shells

mortars ranging from 60mm mortars to 152mm and slightly more than 5,000 105mm rounds impactfield guns, the North Vietnamese had all of the ed in or near American defensive positions, mostl y

major Marine bases in the central and eastern DMZ around Con Thien or Gio Linh . These latter two allied

well within their artillery fan . Their Soviet-built bases were the only ones that were within the range of
34 THE DEFINING YEAR

the 105s. Although concerned about the enem y

130mm field guns, Major General Raymond L. Murray, the III MAF deputy commander recalled, " . . .

they were an annoyance far more than an effectiv e

weapon. I don't think we lost very many people fro m

them, and certainly we lost no territory as a result o f

them but it was a constant annoyance . . . ." During

the April-December period, the North Vietnames e

fired fewer than 500 rounds from the big guns a t

allied targets in the south . Brigadier General Louis

Metzger, a former artillery officer and the 3d Marin e

Division assistant division commander, observed tha t

the enemy artillery followed certain patterns . Usuall y

his bombardments occurred around 0600, at noon,

and at 1700 with relatively little shelling at night .

Whenever enemy use of the heavier calibers lessened ,

his employment of mortars rose. Metzger gave th e

North Vietnamese gunners generally only fair grades.

Despite their employment of forward observers, the

North Vietnamese artillerymen's readjustment fires

on American positions were often inaccurate . Yet,

Metzger conceded that the enemy gunners and rocketeers had little difficulty in targeting Dong Ha whe n

they wanted.7 "

Notwithstanding that the North Vietnames e

artillery units operated on a logistic margin, Marin e

commanders could hardly dismiss the danger they

posed to the American defenses in the DMZ sector .

Mortars and artillery rounds caused more than 7 0

percent of the allied dead and wounded in the north .

For example, from 3—10 December, enemy shellin g

*Major Gary E . Todd elaborated in his comments somewhat further on the effectiveness of the North Vietnamese artillery. Whil e

acknowledging that the volume of artillery fire was light compared t o

other wars, he emphasized that "this situation was different from other

wars and this fire went beyond what we would call H&I [harassing an d

interdiction] fire." He observed that the North Vietnamese guns ofte n

fired on Dong Ha, for example, " when aircraft were landing or taxiin g

to take off. By preregistering their fires on the airstrip their first

rounds might give them the bonus of one of our aircraft, along wit h

passengers and crew. " He noted, nevertheless, that the North Vietnamese gunners were selective in their firing so as not to give awa y

their positions. Todd wrote that the Notch Vietnamese usually had a

logical reason for their bombardment of Dong Ha—to keep voters

away from the polls during an election or knowing that a few round s

at the Dong Ha base may explode an ammunition dump . According to

Todd, "At any rate, the NVA artillery attack represented clever an d

cost-effective use of their assets ." Todd Comments. Colonel Edwin S .

Schick, Jr., who commanded the 12th Marines in 1968, remarked tha t

the North Vietnamese gunners had the benefit of the excellent military

maps they had appropriated from the French and that " any point that

they wanted to hit, they could ." Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr., Taped .Comments on draft chapter, n .d . [1994] (Vietnam Comment File) .

resulted in 124 Marine casualties from 727 round s

that fell in or around the Marine defenses . Although

the artillery fire from the north diminished toward s

the end of the month, the NVA could increase th e

pressure whenever it elected to do so . 8

With the guns massed into two major groupings ,

the North Vietnamese artillery belt extended west -

ward some 15 kilometers from the Cap Mui La y

coastal region to a finger lake area just above the Be n

Hai River. The belt contained about 130 interconnected artillery sites with each site capable of holding

one to four guns. Reinforcing their artillery with a sizable antiaircraft concentration including nine SAM— 2

(surface-to-air missile) sites and a mix of heav y

machine guns and antiaircraft guns up to 57mm, th e

North Vietnamese impeded American air strikes

against the gun positions and hampered air observation for effective counter-battery target acquisition . 9

Both Generals Westmoreland and Metzger confessed at different times that American commanders

lacked the detailed accurate information to determin e

the damage U .S . air and artillery inflicted upon the

enemy defenses in the DMZ. Several years later, General Metzger observed that the American estimates o n

the number of enemy guns in the DMZ were derive d

from the III MAF enemy order of battle . According

to Metzger, all the order of battle officer did was to

take "all the identified enemy units known to be in a

certain area and multiplies the weapons known to be

in those battalions, regiments, and divisions . The

actual numbers can be significantly greater or smaller." Metzger claimed that the North Vietnamese

moved their artillery pieces almost nightly from position to position, playing a kind of "moving shel l

game" with American intelligence officers, gunners,

and aviators. At best, the North Vietnamese offere d

only fleeting targets for the U .S . forces. On 6 January,

the 9th Marines reported that the NVA had constructed three new artillery positions north of th e

DMZ, each consisting of two guns and supported b y

an antiaircraft unit. 1 0

While building up their infantry and combat arm s

in the north, the North Vietnamese also strengthened

their logistic network and combat support capability.

According to Marine intelligence estimates, th e

North Vietnamese had "demonstrated a remarkabl e

degree of ingenuity" in overcoming U .S . air efforts to

interdict their lines of communication . They quickl y

repaired roads and built pontoon or cable bridges to

replace those damaged by American bombs . Major

roads remained open to through truck traffic, but
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 3 5

were subject to delays because of the numerous

bypasses, fords, ferries, and damage caused by the

bombing. As a result, the enemy often substitute d

bicycles and porters for trucks. A man on a bicycle

could transport about 500 pounds while porters

could carry some 50 to 60 pounds.* The NVA supplemented its human pack carriers with mules, horses, and even elephants. A horse or mule could bear

about 150 to 300 pounds while an elephant could

take about 1,000 pounds on its back . An animaldrawn bull cart could hold up to 1,500 pounds.

These alternate modes of transportation were slower,

but more maneuverable than motor vehicles. Nevertheless, where and when they had the opportunity ,

the North Vietnamese continued to rely on both

trucks and shipping to bring their supplies into th e

DMZ sector. "

The enemy lines of communication in the Nort h

Vietnamese panhandle from Dong Hoi south to th e

DMZ consisted of 16 interconnecting roads, five

waterways, the national railroad, and an extensive

trail network. At Dong Hoi, North Vietnamese

stevedores unloaded the cargo of seagoing vessels fo r

transfer either to river craft or trucks for transhipment south . The enemy then impressed ships of 80 0

tons or less, or fishing junks, to ply the deeper waters

and occasionally the open sea . Small shallow-draft

canoe-like craft called pirogues with attached out -

board motors were used on the more restricte d

inland water passages, such as the Ben Hai and the

Ben Xe Rivers. Although the railroad was not functioning, its railbed served as a roadway for foot and

bicycle traffic . The main north-south road arteries ,

Routes 101, 102, 103, and IA, connected the thre e

main North Vietnamese base areas in and above the

*The notion that a man either on a bicycle or walking a bicycle

could move a load of 500 pounds may very well be hyperbole. Colone l

Frederic S. Knight, a member of the 3d Marine Division staff, recalle d

a conversation that he had with news columnist Joseph Alsop : "he

talked and I listened. " According to Knight, Alsop presented the case

of the bicycle and the 500-pound load . The Marine officer recalled he

told Alsop that "such an assertion was unmitigated nonsense ; add a

120-pound man to the 500-pound load and the weight of the bicycle

itself and you get an unmanageable vehicle . I doubt it could be ridden ,

and if it could, it would have to be down a gently sloping very smoot h

paved road . Imagine pushing it up rutted muddy mountainous jungl e

trails and trying to brake that load on the way down . And if the bicycle fell over, how would one man ever restore equilibrium . " Knigh t

remembered that Alsop "did not address my objection beyond sayin g

that he was privy to certain recondite research that indicated it was

possible . " Knight concluded, however, that this " datum go into the

folklore category. " Col Frederic S . Knight, Comments on draft chapter,

dtd 10Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File)

DMZ to one another and to the infiltration corridor s

further south.L 2

The northernmost base area, Base Area (BA) 510 ,

40 kilometers southeast of Dong Hoi, contained som e

19 installations, including general storage areas, a

warehouse, a POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants)

facility, and an ordnance depot. Located near the junction of Routes 101 and 103, which run southeast and

southwest, respectively, towards the DMZ, the junglecanopied base provided a relatively safe harbor for both

troops and supplies destined for the forces further

south. The largest of the base areas, BA 511, some 10 0

kilometers in area and at one point only 10 kilometers

southeast of BA 510, extended to the northern edge o f

the DMZ. Its confines accommodated three bivoua c

areas, six troop-staging areas, and logistic storag e

depots. Lying astride the junction of Routes 101 and

IA, the base area served as the gateway for the Nort h

Vietnamese units moving south to attack the position s

in the eastern DMZ sector.1 3

The North Vietnamese also moved supplies and

troops from both Base Areas 510 and 511 to the

westernmost base area, BA 512, situated in th e

DMZ where North Vietnam, South Vietnam, an d

Laos all joined together. This base area included a

large staging complex consisting of both under -

ground shelters and surface structures. Moreover,

with Route 103 traversing its lower sector, BA 51 2

was a major transhipment point for both men an d

equipment prior to infiltration into the south . As

1967 ended, III MAF received disturbing intelligence that NVA units coming down the "Santa F e

Trail," the eastern branch of the "Ho Chi Minh" Trail

in Laos that paralleled the South Vietnamese-Laotia n

Border, were entering the Khe Sanh sector rathe r

than skirting it as they had in the past . In both the

eastern and western rims of the DMZ sector, th e

enemy appeared to be on the move .1 4

At the end of the year, American commanders and

intelligence officers attempted to assess the enemy

intentions. Although the North Vietnamese Army ha d

suffered heavy casualties in the DMZ sector, some

10,000 dead according to Marine sources, and had

obviously been hurt, it was still a formidable adversary.

General Westmoreland recognized the obvious advantages that the situation provided the enemy He late r

remarked that the proximity of I Corps to North' 'Vietnam was "always frightening to me ." Indeed, he

declared that "it was more frightening to me than it

was to . . . [Lieutenant General Robert E .] Cushman, "

the III MAF commanding general .15
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36 THE DEFINING YEAR

Marine commanders and staffs, nevertheless, shared

some of Westmoreland's concerns. At the beginning of

the year, the headquarters of the Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific in Hawaii prepared a 92-page "Estimate of the

Enemy Situation, DMZ Area, Vietnam, 1 January

1968." In this detailed study, the FMFPac intelligence

staff outlined both the perceived NVA strengths and

weaknesses, the options available to the NVA commanders, and their most likely courses of action.'6

According to the FMFPac staff, the North Vietnamese Army was "one of the best in Southeast Asia.

The NVA adapted well to the DMZ situation

where they knew the exact location of the American

positions and were generally more familiar with the

terrain than the Marines. Although limited for the

most part to movement by foot, the North Vietnamese

soldier also gained a singular leverage from this apparent liability. As the Marine report noted, "This is certainly a slow mode, but due to this circumstance he

[the NVA soldier) is restricted only from those areas

which are virtually impassable to foot movement."

Acknowledging the relative high morale and dedication of the North Vietnamese Army, the FMFPac staff

writers observed that one of the enemy's major attributes was that he viewed "the present conflict as one

which has existed for two generations, and he has no

great expectations that it will end soon, thus all of his

actions are tempered by patience."7

The enemy, nevertheless, had obvious vulnerabilities.

His troops lacked technical and mechanical training and

experience. North Vietnam's "archaic logistical support

system" depended upon a large reservoir of manpower

and the NVA "continually revealed an inability to exploit

any tactical opportunity calling for the rapid deployment

of units and material." Moreover, the lack of modern

communications often prevented senior NVA commanders from influencing decisions at critical moments once

the battle was joined, handicapped by their limited capability to coordinate and control their units in rapidly

changing situations. Prisoner interrogation also revealed

that the high morale of the NVA soldier deteriorated "the

longer he remains below the Ben Hai River."18

Balancing the assets and debits of the NVA forces in

the north, the FMFPac staff officers then evaluated the

most likely stratagem that the enemy would adopt in

the DMZ sector. According to the Marine analysis, the

North Vietnamese had various feasible alternatives, the

most likely being:

1. a division-strength attack into northeastern

Quang Tn to establish temporary control of selected

areas2. conduct multi-battalion or regimental-size attacks

against "multiple" allied targets between Highway 9 antI
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 3 7

the DMZ using forces both in eastern Quang Tri and nea r

Khe Sanh. Might attempt " to hold Khe Sanh at least

temporarily . . . because of its remoteness . . . . ;

3. continue the present "pattern of harassing friendly forces with hit and run attacks, interdiction of line s

of communication with battalion-size forces . . . . ;

4. continue the present pattern and also fortify areas

and ambush sites in Quang Tri to trap friendly forces

and "dissipate our efforts and to inflict heavy personne l

casualties and equipment losses on friendly forces . . . . ;

5. withdraw all forces north of the Ben Hai an d

strengthen defenses . 1 9

Given these choices, the FMFPac report conclude d

that the North Vietnamese would probably elect a

combination of options 1 and 2, while at "the sam e

time harass friendly forces with hit and run attacks,

mining, and interdiction of lines of communications. "

Despite the NVA's recent reverses in the DMZ, the

FMFPac staff members believed that the North Vietnamese leadership, "imbued with a Dien Bien Phu

mentality," wanted to inflict a series of tactical defeat s

and heavy casualties among U.S. forces that would

demoralize the American "home front" and make continued U.S . participation in the war politically untenable . On 13 January, General Cushman, the III MAF

commander, radioed General Westmoreland, "An

immediate enemy threat to III MAF forces is poised

west of Khe Sanh . Additional heavy enemy concentrations are indicated in the A Shau Valley as well as in

and north of the DMZ." At this point, both MACV

and the Marine command perceived northern I Corp s

as the most likely setting for any major enemy push .20

Operation Napoleon

Along the DMZ, much of the war was indistinguishable from the preceding year. Work on the barrier continued and the same politically based rules o f

engagement applied to the DMZ . U.S . ground force s

could not cross the Ben Hai River, but were allowed t o

conduct operations in the Demilitarized Zone south of

the demarcation line and return fire across the line .

Artillery, naval gunfire, and air missions were permitted against valid targets in the north . MACV insisted ,

however, that the Marine command notify it of every

action against the North Vietnamese under thes e

ground rules. Marine units remained in the identical

sectors, each with its designated operational name ,

that they had manned in December.2 1

In the DMZ, the 3d Marine Division maintained

three distinct tactical areas designated by operationa l

codenames, Napoleon, Kentucky, and Lancaster. Lieu -

tenant Colonel Edward R. Toner's 1st Amphibian

Tractor Battalion was responsible for the Napoleo n

Area of Operations, extending some three miles abov e

and two miles below the Cua Viet waterway and two

miles inland from the coast. The battalion's missio n

was to safeguard the vital Cua Viet Port Facility and

Navy LSTs (landing ship, tank) and smaller seagoing vessels could be unloaded at the Cua Viet Por t

Facility in the DMZ Sector, and transhipped to the main Marine base upriver at Dong Ha .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801124
38 THE DEFINING YEA R

companion logistic support facility as well as protec t

the river supply route to Dong Ha.

With the establishment at the mouth of the Cu a

Viet of an LST (landing ship, tank) ramp in Marc h

1967, ships' cargoes could be unloaded onto LCUs

(landing craft, utility) and LCMs (landing craft, mechanized) for the trip upriver to Dong Ha. As Marine

forces and facilities expanded in northern Quang Tri ,

the Cua Viet supply channel became even more crucia l

to the Marine command . By the end of the year, the

Navy Cua Viet Port Facility could accommodate tw o

LSTs, three LCU's, and three LCM's, and move 94 0

short tons daily through to Dong Ha . 2 2

The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had transferred from the Da Nang TAOR to its new command

post at the Cua Viet Port Facility at the end of Apri l

1967 to provide general support for the 3d Marine

Division . At the same time, the commanding officer of

the amphibian tractor battalion became the Cua Vie t

installation coordinator and responsible for both the

defense and administration of the Cua Viet area . In

November, the 3d Marine Division divided Operatio n

Kingfisher, the codename for the division campaign in

the DMZ eastern sector, into the three operations o f

Lancaster, Kentucky, and Napoleon . In Operation

Napoleon, Lieutenant Colonel Toner remained respon -

sible for roughly the same area that the "Amtrackers "

had been operating all along .23

The battalion had the additional duty to construct

the C—4 Combat Operating Base, about 2,000 meter s

north of the Cua Viet, and to assist the adjoining

ARVN 2d Regiment to build the A—1 Strong Point ,

another 3,000 meters to the northwest . The A—1 and

C—4 positions marked the eastern terminus of the barrier. While helping with the work on the barrier i n

December, Toner's Marines on the 11th engaged i n

some of the heaviest fighting of the month . In the sand

dunes and scrub pine growth near the fishing village o f

Ha Loi Toi just north of C-4, the battalion in a daylong battle killed 54 of the enemy at a cost of 2 0

wounded Marines. Five days later the Cua Viet Facility came under artillery and rocket attack which resulted in 5 Marines killed and 31 wounded . Through the

end of 1967, according to Marine statistics, Operatio n

Napoleon accounted for 87 enemy dead and the capture of 2 prisoners at a loss of 10 Marine dead and 4 8

wounded and evacuated .2 4

In January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Toner's battalion consisted of his Headquarters and Support Company, Companies A and B, and an attached infantry

company, Company C, from the 1st Battalion, 3d

Marines. A platoon of six LVTH—6s (an amphibia n

tractor with a turret-mounted 105mm howitzer) from

the 1st Armored Amphibian Company, attached to th e

2d Battalion, 12th Marines, provided artillery support.

A mortar section of three 4.2 mortars from the 12th

Marines reinforced the fires of the howitzers .25 =

With its flat sandy coastal plain and the Cua Vie t

waterway, the Napoleon area of operations was idea l

terrain for Toner's battalion . The battalion commander

had at his disposal 64 troop-carrying LVTP—5s (landing vehicle tracked, personnel), 6 command and control tractors, 4 LVTEs (landing vehicle tracked, engineer) used for mine clearing, and 2 LVTR—ls (landin g

vehicle tracked, retriever) for repair purposes . These

lightly armored amphibian tractors afforded mobility

both on land and water. Within minutes, the Marines

could reinforce any trouble spot within the TAOR .2 6

Early January was a relatively quiet period for th e

amtrac Marines. They busied themselves with civi c

action in the nearby fishing village of Gia Hai, working on C-4, and building revetments for the tractors .

Marine Sergeant Ron Asher with the attached Company C, 3d Marines at C—4 wrote his mother in December 1967 that he spent most of his "'down time' fro m

patrols filling sandbags, and getting the amtracs and

tanks dug in."27

During a visit to the battalion on Christmas Day,

General Westmoreland had expressed his dissatisfaction about the lack of protection for the amphibia n

vehicles. In relaying this concern to Lieutenant Colone l

Toner, the 3d Division commander, General Tompkins, suggested that the battalion use steel revetments

combined with oil drums and ammunition boxes fille d

with sand to safeguard the LVTs .2 8

It was not until mid-month that the North Vietnamese made any serious attempt to probe anew th e

Marine positions in Napoleon . On 14 January, a

Marine patrol, about 2,500 meters south of the Cua

Viet near the coast, came across a design drawn in the

sand, consisting of four circles with a huge arrow in th e

*A later successor to Lieutenant Colonel Toner as battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Walter W. Damewood, observed that th e

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion in 1968 "had to be one of the mos t

unique Marine battalions of the time in terms of personnel and equipment structure ." He noted that in addition to its normal complement

of personnel and equipment, the battalion had attached to it : Marin e

combat engineers, Marine infantry and tanks, and reconnaissance elements as well as Army armored personnel, and South Vietnamese Popular Force troops . He noted that the members of the battalion becam e

known as "Am Grunts" because of the infantry role and missio n

assigned to them . LtCol Walter W. Damewood, Jr., Comments on draft

chapter, dtd 31Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID JANUARY 3 9

Top photo from 12th Mar ComdC, Jan69 ; bottom photo courtesy of Ron Ashe r

Combat Base Area C—4 appears in the top photo, while the bottom picture displays a typical bunke r

at C—4 in January 1968 . The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion in Operation Napoleon had the

main responsibility for the construction of C—4 as well as the protection of the Cua Viet sector.
40 THE DEFINING YEAR

center pointing northwest towards the battalion command post . Making the obvious conclusion that this

was a crude aiming stake for enemy mortars, the

Marines changed the direction of the arrow so tha t

any rounds fired from that site would fall into the sea .

That same night, about 1,000 meters to the south -

west, a Marine squad ambush from Company B, 1st

Amphibian Tractor Battalion, just outside the village

of Tuong Van Tuong, saw nearly 50 enemy troop s

moving on line towards them from the southeast . The

Marine squad leader immediately called for artillery

support. Within two minutes, the 105mms on the

LVTH—6s dropped more than 100 rounds upon th e

advancing enemy. The NVA soldiers regroupe d

twice, but "broke each time under fire ." A Marine

looking through his starlight scope observed a number of enemy troops fall, but when two reinforced

Marine platoons from Company B checked the are a

the following morning there were no bodies .

Throughout the DMZ sector, the enemy appeare d

once more attempting to infiltrate into and behind

the allied positions .29

Kentucky Operations and the Barrie r

Aligned along both sides of Route 1, the 2d

ARVN Regiment filled in the gap between the

Napoleon and Kentucky area of operations. Part of the

highly rated 1st ARVN Division, the regiment occupied in December both the A—1 and A—2 Strong

Points of the barrier and the C—1 base area. Major Vu

Van Giai, the regimental commander, whom th e

Marines described as "an impressive officer with a

good command of English," established his comman d

post at C—1, located just west of the railroad and

Route 1, about 6,000 meters south of Gio Linh . Giai

kept one battalion at the C—1 base and deployed tw o

battalions forward, one at A—1, near the destroye d

fishing village of An My, about 2,000 meters below

the DMZ, and the other at A—2, just above Gio Linh.

On 3 January, Giai moved his reserve battalion, the 2d

Battalion, 2d ARVN, from below Gio Linh to ne w

positions north of the Cua Viet in the vicinity of Don g

Ha. As a result of this relocation, the regiment and th e

9th Marines in Operation Kentucky readjusted thei r

boundaries. Nominally, the A—2 stronghold at Gio

Linh, although manned by the ARVN, remained i n

the 9th Marines TAOR. According to the barrie r

plan, the ARVN eventually were to take over also the

A—3 Strong Point, located halfway between Gio Lin h

and Con Thien, when it was finished .30

Until that time, however, the defense and building of

the barrier lay with the 9th Marines in Kentucky.

Encompassing "Leatherneck Square, " the approximately six-by-eight-mile area, outlined by Gio Linh an d

Dong Ha on the east and Con Thien and Cam Lo on th e

west, the 9th Marines area of operations included three

of the five strong points of the "Trace " and two of the

combat operating bases of the barrier, C—2 and C—3 . The

terrain in Kentucky varied from low-lying hills interspersed by woods and rice paddies in the northern sector

to the cultivated Cam Lo River Valley in the sout h

extending from Cam Lo to Dong Ha . Route 1 connected Gio Linh to Dong Ha and Route 561 extended fro m

Con Thien to Cam Lo. Route 605 in the north linked

the strong points along the trace to one another whil e

Route 9, south of the Cam Lo River, ran from Dong H a

into Laos. All of these lines of communication, except for

Route 1, required extensive engineer roadwork, including paving, widening, and resurfacing, to meet th e

logistical requirements of the barrier effort .

Although Operation Kentucky officially began o n

1 November 1967, the 9th Marines was no stranger i n

its area of operations. The regiment remained responsible for the same ground and positions that it hel d

during the previous operation, Kingfisher. For all practical purposes, the change of designation only served t o

provide a convenient dividing line to measure with th e

body-count yardstick the relative progress of the DM Z

campaign. The identical concept of operations continued in effect: the 9th Marines was to hold on to Leatherneck Square, protect Dong Ha, build the barrier, an d

throw back any North Vietnamese forces attemptin g

to infiltrate into the I Corps coastal plain.3 1

In January 1968, Colonel Richard B . Smith, who had

assumed command of the regiment the previous September, controlled from his command post at Dong Ha

four infantry battalions and part of another, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. Except for the two companies of th e

2d Battalion, all of the other battalions belonged administratively to other regiments, the 1st, 3d, and 4th

Marines. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines defended the

A—4 Strong Point at Con Thien ; the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines worked on the fortifications of the A—3 Strong

Point with three companies; the 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines screened A—3 from positions on Hill 28, nort h

of the trace ; and the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines occupied

the C—2 and C—2A combat operating bases on Route

561 . Further south, the two companies of the 9th

Marines protected the Cam Lo Bridge where Route 56 1

crossed the Cam Lo River and the 2d Battalion, 12th

Marines artillery positions on Cam Lo Hill, the C—3
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 4 1

combat operating base . The remaining rifle company of

the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Company M, attached t o

the 12th Marines, guarded the provisional Marin e

artillery battalion situated at the Gio Linh fire suppor t

base, south of the ARVN in the A—2 Strong Point .32

A sea-going Marine during World War II and a n

infantry company commander during the Korean

War, Colonel Smith had definite ideas about the war

in the DMZ. He later observed that the Marines were

"sitting in defensive positions up there playing strictly defensive combat . . . ." Smith believed that th e

troops required training in defensive warfare . He

claimed that was an unpopular viewpoint sinc e

"Marines are always supposed to be in an assault ove r

a beach, but this just isn't the name of the game ou t

there ." The emphasis was on good defensive position s

and clear lines of fire.33 *

With the command interest in the barrier at th e

beginning of the year, the strong points and comba t

operating bases in the 9th Marines sector took on eve n

more importance . Anchoring the western segment of

the cleared trace, the A—4 Strong Point at Con Thie n

continued to play a major role in the regiment's defensive plan.** Located less than two miles south of th e

DMZ, Con Thien, although less than 160 meters high ,

dominated the surrounding terrain . Colonel Smith

observed that if the enemy had held the position, "he

would be looking down our throats" at Dong Ha .36

Lieutenant Colonel Evan L. Parker, Jr.'s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines had taken over the responsibility o f

the Con Thien defense in mid-December. A 1st

*There is dispute among some officers who served with the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines attached to the 9th Marines, whether there were

standing operating procedures relating to restrictions on patrolling . A

former company executive officer recalled that there were definite limitations on how far platoons and companies could move from their parent unit, 250 yards for platoons and 500 yards for companies. On th e

other hand, a former battalion commander and company commande r

with the 3d Battalion recalled no such limitations . The author foun d

no listing of such restrictions in the 9th Marines Command Chronology for January 1968 . The consensus seems to be that if there were suc h

restrictions they were not always enforced and perhaps not eve n

known . For the various viewpoints see Chambers Intvw and Maj Justice M . Chambers, Jr ., Comments on draft chapter, dtd 17Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); LtCol Otto Lehrack, Comments on draft chapter,

dtd 29Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File); and Col Robert C . Needham,

Comments on draft chapter, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Needham Comments.

**Lieutenant General Metzger observed that Con Thien and Gi o

Linh had been French forts, which indicated very early that both sites

were recognized as key terrain . LcGen Louis Metzger, Comments o n

draft chapter, dtd 17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments.

Marine Division unit, the battalion quickly learne d

the differences between the DMZ war and the pacification campaign further south. In contrast to the lightly armed and elusive VC guerrillas in the south, th e

North Vietnamese here often stood their ground, supported by heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery.

By the time the battalion occupied Con Thien, it had

accommodated to the DMZ environment. "

The Marines of the 2d Battalion in December

worked feverishly on the A—4 Strong Point defenses .

During the Christmas truce period the battalion adde d

11 bunkers and dug a new trench along the forward

slope . The troops then sandbagged the bunkers with a

"burster layer" in the roofs, usually consisting of airfield matting "to burst delayed fuse rounds." They

then covered the positions with rubberized tarps to

keep the water out. By the end of the year, all of th e

new bunkers had been sandbagged and wired in wit h

the new razor-sharp German-type barbed wire . Protected by a minefield to its front, surrounded by wire ,

and supported by air, artillery, and tanks, the 2d Battalion lay relatively secure in its defenses at the exposed

Con Thien outpost.3 6

As the new year began, the Con Thien Marine s

enjoyed a small reprieve from the shooting war. Both

sides more or less adhered to the terms of the shaky hol -

iday truce, despite a small enemy probe of a Marine listening post on the perimeter. According to a Marine

reporter, on New Year's Day, a Marine forward artiller y

observer at Con Thien looking through his binoculars

at enemy forward positions across the Ben Hai suddenly spotted a large NVA flag with its single star emblazoned on a bright red background waving "in th e

breeze atop a rather crude flagpole . . . ." Other Marines,

mostly young infantrymen, crowded around to take

their turn to see for what most of them was their first

tangible symbol of the enemy.*** Secure in their convic -

tion that the Marines would adhere to the cease-fire, th e

NVA deliberately taunted the American troops . Impatiently the Marine gunners waited the few hours for the

***According to Lieutenant Colonel Otto Lehrack, who was a

company commander with the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, it was not s o

unusual to see a NVA flag north of the Ben Hai River " just about any

time you were on the cliffs near Gio Linh ." He does concede, however,

that the truce period may have been the only time that the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines may have had an opportunity to see the North Vietnamese banner. LtCol Otto Lehrack, Comments on draft chapter, dt d

29Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Lehrack Comments . Se e

also Otto J. Lehrack, No Shining Armor, The Marines at War in Vietnam ,

An Oral History (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1.992),

pp . 211-12 .
42 THE DEFINING YEA R

Top photo courtesy of Col Joseph L . Sadowski, USMC (Ret), and bottom photo courtesy of Col Lee R . Bendell, USMC (Ret)

The Marine base at Con Thien (A—4) is seen at top, with Marines constructing bunkers at A—4 in

photograph at bottom. Col Lee R. Bendell, whose 3d Battalion, 4th Marines served at Con Thien

in 1967, observed that NVA artillery fire "necessitated overhead protection ."
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THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 43

"false peace" to come to an end. As the time for the

truce expired, the Con Thien guns opened up on the

approaches to the defensive perimeter. The defenders

then plotted a fire mission to take out the flag. Minutes

before the artillerymen fired the first round the NVA

hauled down their colors. In a way, this incident mirrored many of the frustrations of the Marines in the

DMZ. The average 19-year-old manning the defenses

at Con Thien and his commanders had diffIculty understanding the validity of such artificialities as demilitarized zones that were not demilitarized, and cease-fires

that appeared only to benefit the enemy.37

The war soon resumed for the 2d Battalion at Con

Thien. Although the intensity of combat never reached

the level of September and October, the North Vietnamese persisted in their probes and occasional bombardment of the Marine outpost. The incoming mortar, artillery, and recoilless rifle rounds soon reached the

level experienced by the defenders' immediate predecessors. As recorded in the battalion's monthly report,

the "incoming was more harassing than destructive in

nature 38 On 5 January, the NVA gunners

mortared Con Thien in groups of three to five bursts

between 0945 and 1015. A total of 37 rounds, including five 120mm shells, fell on the Marine positions,

with a direct hit on the battalion command post. This

resulted in one Marine killed, and eight wounded,

including Lieutenant Colonel Parker, the battalion

commander. Both Marine air and artillery attacked the

suspected enemy firing positions, but the Marine command had no way of knowing the effectiveness of these

efforts. After the medical evacuation of Lieutenant

Colonel Parker, Major James T. Harrell III, the executive officer, was named acting commander of the battalion. On 9 January, Lieutenant Colonel Billy R.

Duncan officially relieved Lieutenant Colonel Parker as

battalion commander and Harrell resumed his duties

as executive officer. The enemy shelling of Con Thien

remained sporadic, averaging about 30 rounds on

those days the NVA chose to fire.39

On the ground, the North Vietnamese had taken

advantage of the holiday truce period to bring up fresh

units and continued the pressure on the Marine outpost.

The 803d NVA Regiment relieved the 90th NVA in the

positions facing Con Thien. Almost daily, small patrols

from the 803d tested the Marine defenses. For example,

on 10 January, Company H reported in the early morning hours that "it had spotted three men, by starlight

scope, moving in a westerly direction." The Marines

*Duringjanuary, the enemy fired on Con Thien 22 of the 31 days

in the month. 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p. 11—4.
44 THE DEFINING YEA R

fired three M79 grenade rounds and later checked th e

area "with negative results. " Later that night, about

2100, a Marine squad from Company F on the north -

eastern perimeter picked up enemy movement on its

radar scope and called in a mortar mission . A Marin e

platoon patrol that went out to investigate the results of

the action "blundered into [a} friendly minefield" an d

sustained three casualties, one dead and two wounded4 0

A few days after this incident, the night of 14 January, Con Thien Marines heard an explosion in th e

minefield directly to the north of their defenses . The

Marines fired illumination and saw a wounded NVA

soldier lying in the minefield and other North Vietnamese troops withdrawing . A Marine squad

equipped with a starlight scope then attempted t o

recover the wounded man. By the time it reached the

area, the Marines found no one there . Shortly afterward, a Marine outpost sighted about four to five NVA

entering the battalion's perimeter apparently t o

retrieve their injured comrade. Another mine went off

Lieutenant Colonel Duncan sent a platoon out to check

for any enemy casualties . About 0120 on the morning

of the 15th, the Marine patrol as it neared the mine -

field "heard whistling and a great deal of noise," evidence of a large enemy force nearby. Both sides with -

drew under covering fires. The NVA used recoilless

rifles, small arms, and 60mm mortars to make goo d

their retreat while Marine artillery and mortars targeted the enemy escape routes. Two Marines received

minor wounds. About 1000 that morning a Marine

patrol returned to the area where the enemy was last

seen and found a pick, a wrench, a poncho "with fragmentation holes and large blood stains." a l

For the Marines of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines i n

January, their tour at Con Thien, like the units befor e

them, was their "time in the barrel." As Lieutenant

Colonel Duncan many years later recalled, the North

Vietnamese artillery destroyed much of the northwest

minefield protecting the Marine outpost "as well as th e

forward trenches and bunkers in that area . Casualties

were mounting . The hospital bunkers exceeded capacity with wounded on stretchers." The battalion commander remembered that one of the chaplains "broke

under stress and attempted suicide ."4 2

Route 561, running north and south, was the lifelin e

for Con Thien. To keep this road open, General Metzger

remembered that Marine engineers in 1967 "straightened out the route by cutting a `jog' in the road that

went to a by-then deserted village which reduced the

length to Con Thien and simplified security." Despite

this improvement, other complications arose . According

to Metzger, once the torrential rains came the wate r

washed out the road . It took the engineers an extended

time to obtain sufficient rock until they could build " a

suitable roadbed" to carry the heavy traffic 43

The Marines also established two combat operating

bases, C—2 and C—2A, to protect Route 561 . About

2,000 meters southeast of Con Thien, the C—2A bas e

overlooked a bridge spanning a stream which intersected the road there . The Marines nicknamed the area th e

"Washout, " because in heavy rainstorms, the waters

flooded the low-lying ground . Another 3,000 meters to

the southeast was the C—2 base which contained bot h

artillery and infantry fixed positions. The terrain alon g

Route 561 between Con Thien and Cam Lo consiste d

of low-rolling hills, numerous gullies, and waist-high

brush. From both the C—2A and C—2 bases Marin e

patrols ventured forth "to keep the NVA off the road ."44

In January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A .

Deptula's 1st Battalion, 4th Marines occupied both

the C—2 and C—2A positions, having just relieved

the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines in the sector. Lieutenant Colonel Deptula established his command

post at C—2 with Companies A and B . His executive

officer, Major John I. Hopkins, formed a second

command group and with Companies C and D hel d

C—2A. Throughout the first weeks of the month, the

battalion ran numerous squad- and platoon-sized

combat patrols out of both C—2 and C—2A for distances of 1,500 meters from each of the bases and

from Route 561 . Actually the most significan t

action in the battalion's area of operations involved

another unit. On 10 January, a small patrol from th e

3d Reconnaissance Battalion came across three NV A

in a palm-covered harbor site, about 3,000 meters

east of C—2 . The reconnaissance Marines killed tw o

of the enemy, took one prisoner, and captured all

three of their weapons .4 5

As part of the barrier system, the central effort a t

C—2 in early January was the completion of the bunke r

defenses. Several support units, including engineers,

artillery, and tank and antitank detachments, share d

the base area with the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines .

Although the engineers ran daily mine sweeps alon g

Route 561 to Con Thien to keep the road open, they ,

as all the tenant units, assisted with the constructio n

effort. On 10 January, a "Dyemarker" (barrier) tea m

visited the C—2 site to inspect the defenses . According

to the 1st Battalion's monthly chronology, "None of

the bunkers could be considered complete . Maximum

effort was later directed at bunker completion in keeping with the tactical situation. "46
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 4 5

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A1.90200 and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190197 .

Marine engineers with a bulldozer are building ammunition storage bunkers at Combat Base Are a

C-4, top, and a Marine platoon from the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines is seen at work building a

bunker emplacement at C—4 with sandbags for overhead cover in January, bottom .
46 THE DEFINING YEA R

Colonel Smith, the regimental commander, late r

explained some of the handicaps that the Marine unit s

worked under in getting the work on the barrier completed. Few of the units had "backhoes" to assist in

digging foxholes or bunker foundations. He observed

that the machines could "do in two hours what it

takes a whole battalion to do in two days. " Despite

scarcity of equipment, Smith also partially blamed

Marine training for not teaching the troops "proper

bunkering procedures—sandbagging ." He compared

sandbagging technique to laying out bricks "with

headers and stretchers." The regimental commande r

remarked that he saw more wasted effort with the

sandbags "because the man doesn't know what he i s

doing and the NCO supervising him doesn't kno w

any more about it than he does so the wall gets to be

six-feet high and collapses . . . and there goes three

days' work gone to Hell ." Overcoming the limitation s

imposed by its own inexperience in constructin g

bunkers and the lack of heavy earth-moving equipment, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines would complete

47 of the scheduled 81 bunkers in the C—2 base sit e

by the end of the month . 4 7

South of Deptula's 1st Battalion in Kentucky wer e

a small command group and two companies of Lieu -

tenant Colonel William M. Cryan's 2d Battalion, 9th

Marines. In December, just before Christmas, the 2d

Battalion had moved from positions north of A—3 in

Operation Kentucky to Camp Carroll in the 3d

Marines' Lancaster area of operations . A few days later,

Lieutenant Colonel Cryan detached his Companies F

and G and placed them under his executive officer,

Major Dennis J. Murphy. While Cryan and the rest o f

the battalion remained at Camp Carroll, Murphy an d

his command returned to the Kentucky area of operations and relieved the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines at Cam

Lo. Company F occupied the C—3 Cam Lo artiller y

position, 1,000 meters above the Cam Lo River on

Route 561, while Company G protected the Cam L e

Bridge (C—3A) on Route 9 at the river. 48

In the Cam Lo sector, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines

patrolled Route 561 to keep the main supply route

open to Con Thien and the farming villages above th e

river. At the C—3 base, Company F, together with supporting artillery and engineers, worked on the

improvement of the Dyemarker defenses. On 15 January, the Marines at C—3 completed the bunker requirements on schedule . During this period, the Marine

patrols encountered few enemy troops. In fact, during

the first two or three weeks of the month, the enemy

limited his activity to a mining incident on Route 561

on 2 January and to infiltrating the hamlets above the

Cam Lo River at night . In these nocturnal visits, Vie t

Cong guerrillas recruited or kidnapped villagers and

demanded food and other supplies. During the first

two weeks of January, one Popular Force unit west o f

the hamlet of An My on three separate occasions

ambushed VC troops trying to enter the village ,

killing at least three of the enemy. By the end of the

third week, the 2d Battalion reported, however, "it wa s

clear that there was a large amount of movement i n

and out of these villages, particularly to the east ." In

their patrolling of the hilly brush terrain in the Cam

Lo northern area of operations, 2d Battalion Marines

by mid January made contact with more and mor e

North Vietnamese regulars coming down 49

To the northeast of the 2d Battalion at C—3 an d

C—3A, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Needham's 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines concentrated on finishing th e

last of the strong points along the "Trace," A—3, in th e

9th Marines sector. In November, Marine engineers,

later reinforced by a Seabee battalion, had begun work

on the strong point. Designed according to ARVN

specifications, A—3 was to consist of 30 18 x 32 fee t

bunkers, heavily timbered and sandbagged and covered by dirt. These were to sleep up to 18 ARVN

troops on three-tiered wooden bunks . By Christmas,

the Seabees and engineers had completed the raising of

the timbers of the bunkers and departed, "leaving t o

the infantry the task of finishing the sandbagging ." Up

to this point, the Special Landing Force (SLF) Alph a

battalion, BLT 1/3, had been attached to the 9th

Marines and assigned to the A—3 position . At the end

of December, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines with thre e

companies moved from the Cam Lo sector to the A—3

position and relieved the SLF battalion, which was to

join the 1st Marines at Quang Tri .50a

*General Metzger commented that A—3 was a special situation :

"first we had to fight to clear the ground of the enemy. Then as Christmas approached General Westmoreland suggested we withdraw unti l

after Christmas and abandon the positions 'so there would be no casualties during the holidays.' We resisted to the maximum, pointing ou t

that the enemy would occupy the position in our absence . . . the casualties in retaking the position would far exceed those which we migh t

sustain in completing the position . In order to avoid abandoning the

partially completed position we guaranteed that it would be complete d

before Christmas. A—3 was given the highest priority. Bunker materia l

was flown in by helicopter and maximum effort was expended whic h

was completed well before Christmas ." Metzger Comments. Colone l

Robert C. Needham, who commanded the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines a t

the time, remembered "the stringing of defensive wire and emplacin g

AP mines around the perimeter was, for all intents and purposes, completed when 3/3 relieved SLF 'A' (1/3) at A-3 . " Needham Comments.
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 4 7

Although the Seabees with their heavy equipmen t

had left, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines had much work

to do at A–3 . The rains had come during December

and the only fill for the sandbags was "sticky mud . "

A–3 still required defensive wire and some 30,00 0

mines to be laid . The battalion supported by engineers

dug four-man fighting holes . Using mechanical

ditchdiggers, the Marines and engineers trenched

around the entire position . By 12 January, the 3d Battalion had erected an observation tower and nearly

completed the entire project . According to Colonel

Smith, the A–3 Strong Point "was a model for this sor t

of installation. This is the only one in the AO that had

a plan to begin with . The others `just grew' under hal f

a dozen different commanders. "51 *

Although subject to enemy artillery, the 3d Battalion took very few casualties at the A–3 Strong Poin t

because of NVA shelling. The battalion's Company M

protecting the American gun positions south of Gi o

Linh, on the other hand, sustained three killed and tw o

wounded on 9 January as a result of enemy mortar fire .

These were more casualties than Lieutenant Colonel

Needham's remaining companies suffered at the hand s

of the enemy for the entire month .52

The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines did come under fir e

from an unexpected source in January. In his monthly

chronology, the battalion commander, Lieutenan t

Colonel Needham, reported: "On 13 separate occasions a total of 54 friendly artillery rounds were

received in or near the inner perimeter of A–3 and

Hill 28 [just to the north of A–3} ." On 5 January, fo r

example, a white phosphorous shell landed inside th e

3d Battalion's perimeter. The 9th Marines and the 2 d

Battalion, 12th Marines investigated the matte r

which resulted in the relief of the battery commander .

Six days later, the battalion was on the receiving end

of six 105 rounds within its wire, followed on th e

13th by 24 rounds. At the same time, a short round

fell on Hill 28 and killed two Marines and wounded

six others. Other "friendly fire" incidents occurred o n

15 and 19 January. In its monthly report, the artillery

battalion, the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, made n o

mention of the mishaps but remarked, "considerable

difficulty was experienced with computer hot lines t o

the firing batteries due to the unreliability of radi o

relay." It then contained the statement that staff visits

*Lieutenant Colonel Otto Lehrack, who commanded a company i n

the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, wrote that the battalion's operations officer, Major Raymond F. Findlay, "who designed and supervised the system" deserved the credit for A-3 . Lehrack Comments.

to liaison officers and forward observers "have resulted in better communications on the conduct of fire

nets." Lieutenant Colonel Needham, a former artiller y

officer himself, remembered several years later that

"the situation got top-level attention and quick resolution when I finally told [the 9th Marines) that I

refused any further support from the 12th Marines ,

and prefer no artillery to what I was getting." In his

monthly report, he wrote that "corrective action

appears to have been initiated and a definite improvement in this regard has been made during the latte r

part of the month ."53* *

Just north of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Lee R. Bendell's 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines screened the approaches to the A–3 Stron g

Point. On 26–27 December, Bendell's battalion

deployed from C–2 and relieved the 1st Battalion, 4t h

Marines on Hill 28, a slight rise about 600 meters

north of A–3 and just forward of the trace . Bendell

expanded his battalion's perimeter and moved his

companies off the top of the hill to new position s

lower down . Marine engineers bulldozed the growth

and trees immediately to the west, which provided

the battalion better observation of the surroundin g

terrain and improved fields of fire . Low rolling hills

with secondary scrub and thick brush, broken by flat ,

wet rice paddies of 75 to 150 meters, lay to the north

and east. Wide rice paddies also were interspersed

with the woods to the west . To the south, the Marines

had a clear line of sight to the A–3 Strong Point an d

the trace which marked the battalion's souther n

boundary. The northern boundary extended to the

southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone, less tha n

1,000 meters from Hill 28 .54

Close to the DMZ and with elements of the 90th

NVA Regiment believed to be in his sector, Lieutenan t

Colonel Bendell insisted on alertness. He deployed his

battalion into a three-company perimeter, leaving on e

company in reserve . Bendell used the reserve company

for night ambushes and listening posts (LP) and as a

reaction force during the day. According to the battalion commander, he maintained four to six ambushe s

* *Colonel Needham observed in his comments that it was obvious

to him "that the friendly fire we received was due to basic breakdown s

at the firing battery/FDC (fire direction center) levels . " Needham

Comments. Lieutenant General Louis Metzger believed that the problem was that the main division headquarters was still at Phu Bai i n

early January 1968 and the " need for fire control elements was at Dong

Ha." He believed the situation was alleviated when the division late r

in the month moved the main headquarters elements to Dong Ha .

Metzger Comments.
48 THE DEFINING YEAR

Photo courtesy of Col Robert C . Needham, USMC (Ret )

Col Richard B. Smith, second from left, the 9th Marines commander, is seen visiting Strongpoint

A—3 in January 1968 and in conversation with LtCol Robert C. Needham, to the right of Col

Smith, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines commander, and two of his officers: Maj Raymond F. Findlay, Jr., the 3d Battalion operations officer, is to the left of Col Smith, and Captain Robert R . Beers,

the commander of Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, is to the right of LtCol Needham.

and LPs on any particular night. During the day, the

battalion patrolled constantly, with as many as tw o

companies out at a time .

Lieutenant Colonel Bendell reinforced the infantr y

companies with four 106mm recoilless rifles, two .50-

caliber machine guns, and six of the battalion's 81m m

mortars. He had left the two remaining mortars back

in the base camp so that the extra men from the 81mm

mortar platoon could " . . . hump . . . additional ammo,

if we had to move out ."55 The 2d Battalion, 12th

Marines provided direct artillery support and the 1st

MAW, close air support.

The "Thundering Third," as the battalion calle d

itself, was no stranger to the DMZ war. It had been at

Con Thien in July through early September 1967 during some of the heaviest fighting and bombardmen t

around that strong point . Lieutenant Colonel Bendell ,

who had assumed command that July, remembered that

the battalion "had actively patrolled the surroundin g

area" that summer and helped establish strong points a t

C—2, C—3, Cam Lo Bridge, and the "Washout," and als o

deployed a detachment to Gio Linh .56

Soon after the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived o n

Hill 28, it again found itself engaged with the enemy.

On the morning of 30 December, Company M, commanded by Captain Raymond W. Kalm, Jr., on patro l

to the southwest of the battalion perimeter came across

six empty NVA bunkers facing east, about 2,00 0

meters from Hill 28 . After destroying the enem y

bunkers, the company advanced toward the northwest .

About 1330 that afternoon near a small stream about

1,500 meters west of Hill 28, the Marines ran into an

enemy rear guard of about 4 to 10 men . In the resulting exchange of fire, Company M sustained casualties

of one killed and four wounded. Captain Kalm called

in artillery and 81mm mortar missions. After the skirmish the Marines found the body of one North Vietnamese soldier.5 7

On the following morning, Lieutenant Colone l

Bendell sent out Captain John L. Prichard's Company I into roughly the same area that Company M ha d

met the NVA. Prichard's company moved out fro m

Hill 28 in platoon columns. As Bendell explained ,

this formation discouraged the troops from stringing
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 49

Photo courtesy of Col John D . Carr, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Lee R. Bendell, the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, center, poses wit h

the company commanders of the "Thundering Third." From left are Capt John L . Prichard (Company I), Capt John D . Carr (Company L), Bendell, Capt Raymond W. Kalm, Jr. (Company M),

and Capt Edward O. Leroy (Company K)

out and permitted the company commander "t o

deploy fire power immediately to the front." Following a trail near the destroyed village of Xuan Ha i

where the DMZ boundary made a northward hump

on the map, 1,800 meters northwest of Hill 28,

Prichard's point, Staff Sergeant C . L. Colley, spotted

four to five North Vietnamese troops to his front .

The company commander ordered two platoons forward to a slight rise in the ground and brought his

third platoon in behind the CP (command post)

group to protect the rear. In the initial exchange, the

North Vietnamese had the advantage, but th e

Marine company soon had the upper hand . Moving

rapidly back and forth across the Marine line ,

Prichard and his officers and NCOs rallied thei r

troops and "India Company rather shortly gained

fire superiority. "58

At that point, around noon, the Marines observed

a second group of NVA maneuvering to reinforce the

first. The company brought the reinforcements unde r

60mm mortar and small-arms fire and forced the

enemy to lie low. A half-hour later, the Marines,

themselves, came under heavy enemy 82mm-mortar

bombardment from their right flank, generally to the

northeast. By this time, it was apparent that the

enemy was in "strong bunkered positions all across

the front and right front of India Company . "5 9

Despite marginal flying conditions because of 500 -

to 1,000-feet cloud ceilings and reduced visibility, an

aerial observer (AO) arrived over the scene . Giving his

call sign "Smitty Tango," the AO made radio contac t

with Prichard and adjusted the company's 60mm

counter-mortar fire. The Marine mortars knocked out

one of the enemy tubes and "caused the others to ceas e

fire ." With this success to his credit, the AO pulled off

and the company called in an artillery mission, hittin g

the enemy positions with mixed caliber rounds. The

Marine shelling "threw [NVAJ bodies in the air as
50 THE DEFINING YEA R

India [Company I] walked 155mm [fire] toward s

friendly lines. "60

The Marine company sustained four wounded an d

had begun to take fire from its right front . One of the

wounded was one of the company's snipers who had

moved too far forward and lay exposed to enemy fire .

A corpsman attempted to rescue the man, but was hi t

himself and forced to turn back . With his gunnery

sergeant laying down a base of fire, Captain Prichar d

rushed forward and carried back the seriously wounded Marine to the company positions . A Marine helicopter from HMM—163, in a medical evacuatio n

(MedEvac) mission, flew the wounded out from an

improvised landing zone just to the company's rear i n

a defilade area. 6 1

Although the enemy attempted to jam the Marine

radio net, "Smitty Tango" remained in communicatio n

with Captain Prichard and Second Lieutenant Albert B.

Doyle, the company 's attached forward artillery observ -

er. At 1350, the AO checked the artillery fire and called

in two Marine "Huey" (Bell UH—1E helicopter) gun -

ships from Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 6

that had covered the landing of the evacuation helicopter. The gunships made several passes at the enemy

mortar positions in open bomb craters near the Marine

positions. When the air arrived, several NVA soldiers

"actually [were] standing up in their holes, only a 100

to 150 meters away from India Company and firing

both at the AO and the aircraft as they conducted

strikes upon them." As the lead Huey, piloted by Majo r

Curtis D. McRaney, came in on its first run, its gun s

jammed. According to McRaney's copilot, Majo r

David L. Steele, "one of the NVA must have noticed

this because he stepped out of his hole and began firing

at us with his automatic weapon on our next pass. " This

was a mistake . As Steele observed, "on successive passes . . . we were able to cover the crater area with rocket s

and machine gun fire, killing most of the enemy." The

AO reported that he saw the North Vietnamese "dragging eight bodies into a tunnel."62

After the air strikes, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell ,

who had been monitoring the radio traffic, decided t o

pull India Company back to Hill 28. By this time,

the North Vietnamese had brought up further reinforcements and Bendell believed, "There was no need

to assault the [NVA] position ." According to Bendell, Marine supporting arms, both artillery and gun -

ships, would have "a real desired effect upon th e

enemy . . . . "63

As Company I broke contact and started to with -

draw, the troops saw a large NVA unit, apparently

dressed in Marine uniforms,* closing in . The Huey

gunships then laid down extensive covering fire and

then the artillery took over. By 1530, the company had

returned to Hill 28 . Colonel Smith, the 9th Marine s

commander, personally greeted " the men of the Hungry I" with a deserved "well done. " The company,

while sustaining casualties of only four wounded, ha d

accounted for 27 enemy dead, not including the eigh t

NVA taken out by the helicopters, or the unknow n

number of enemy killed by the artillery. Lieutenant

Colonel Bendell recommended Captain Prichard fo r

the Navy Cross; he received the Silver Stara

For the next few days, the 3d Battalion, 4t h

Marines had a relatively uneventful time in their forward position. In the early morning hours of 6 January, however, a listening post heard movement jus t

outside the battalion's perimeter. The Marines opened

fire with both small arms and M79 grenade launchers.

One of the defenders saw something fall, but an

attempt to check the area drew enemy fire . In dayligh t

hours, the Marines found no evidence of any enem y

bodies. It was apparent to the battalion, however, that

its quiet period was over. G5

On the following day, 7 January, the Marines on

Hill 28 began to take sniper rounds from an enemy -

held ridgeline about 800 meters to their front and situated just to the south of the DMZ boundary . Lieutenant Colonel Bendell ordered Captain John D. Carr,

the commanding officer of Company L, to flush ou t

the sniper who had already wounded one Marine. Carr

sent out that morning two six-man teams from his 1st

Platoon . The two teams approached the enemy-hel d

ridge from both flanks and then linked up into a

squad-size patrol. As the squad moved over the ridgeline, enemy AK—47s and machine guns opened up .

Positioned in well-entrenched defenses dug out of the

numerous American-made bomb craters pocketing the

side of the ridge, the NVA gunners killed one Marine

and wounded another. Unable to advance or withdraw,

the Marines took what cover they could and returne d

the fire . In radio contact with the squad and aware o f

its plight, Captain Carr ordered the remainder of the

1st Platoon to reinforce the entrapped Marines.

*Major Gary E . Todd, a former 3d Marine Division intelligenc e

officer, wrote that he doubted that the NVA were dressed in Marin e

uniforms: " there were several instances when Marines mistook NV A

for other Marines, due to the similarity of uniforms . They [the NVA]

wore utilities of almost the identical color to ours, and often wor e

Russian-style steel helmets, frequently with a camouflage net . . . . We ,

of course, had cloth camouflage covers on our helmets . . . . From a distance . . . the helmets were hard to distinguish ." Todd Comments.
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 5 1

Although the platoon reached the embattled squad

about 1530 that afternoon, it too found itself in a n

untenable position. The North Vietnamese had good

clear fields of fire and also had brought up reinforcements . Employing M79 grenade launchers, hand

grenades, and rifles, the 1st Platoon fought off th e

NVA and called for further assistance 6 6

Captain Carr then led the rest of Company L to th e

base of the ridge and flanked the enemy positions .

Although unable to link up with its 1st Platoon o n

the forward slope, the company laid down a base of

fire and Carr called in artillery to prevent the enem y

from making any further reinforcements. Despite a

slight drizzle and a low-lying cloud cover, the company commander made radio contact with an aerial

observer who was able to adjust the supporting arms

including the company's 60mm mortars. With the

increased fire support, the 1st Platoon managed to

hold out but with evening fast approaching the situation remained serious. 6 7

At this point, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell ordered

Captain Carr to have the 1st Platoon "to break contact

and pull back across the ridgeline ." To cover the platoon's withdrawal, the aerial observer called in ai r

strikes and artillery within 100 meters of the Marines .

The battalion commander also deployed two platoon s

of Company K to high ground about 1,000 meters

west of Company L . Despite these protective measures ,

the enemy took a heavy toll of the Marines of the 1st

Platoon as they disengaged and rejoined the rest of th e

company. Since its first elements made contact wit h

the enemy, Company L sustained casualties of 6 dea d

and 36 wounded, 28 of whom required evacuation .

Captain Carr asked for a MedEvac helicopter to tak e

out the worst of the wounded . 6 8

As the Marines waited, a CH—46D Boeing Verto l

"Sea Knight" helicopter from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164), piloted by Captain Richard G. Sousa, took off from Phu Bai to carry

out the evacuation mission . Because of the rain and

heavy winds, Sousa flew low to the ground. As the

helicopter approached the improvised landing zone ,

the Company L Marines fired illumination flares t o

guide the pilot "out of the darkness." Tracers from

NVA machine guns made the situation literally

"touch and go." After the aircraft landed, the enliste d

crewmen immediately jumped out and helped th e

infantry load their casualties on board . The helicopte r

then lifted off, still under fire and unable to use its

M60 machine guns because the North Vietnames e

were too close to the Marine company.69

With the safe evacuation of most of its wounded

and under cover of supporting arms, Company L

made its way to Company K's forward positions with -

out taking any further casualties. Lieutenant Colone l

Bendell explained that he had placed Company K's

two platoons on the high ground for psychologica l

reasons as much as for tactical: "If you can pass

through friendly lines when you are half-way back, it's

a big morale boost to the troops, and also covers th e

rear of the force returning to the battalion perimeter. "

On the whole, Bendell praised Carr's handling of a

difficult situation: "We committed early, the company commander made good time up there, and was

able effectively to employ his supporting arms ." Otherwise, the battalion commander believed "this on e

platoon would have been cut off and destroyed ." As it

was, in the confusion of the evacuation of the dead and

wounded, the Marine company left a body of a 1st

Platoon Marine on the ridgeline.7 0

On the following day, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel l

sent Company L out to recover the missing Marine.

Bendell ordered Captain Carr to delay the mission

until noon because of the continuing rain and low ceiling. The battalion commander wanted an aerial

observer overhead to cover the Marine company. As

Company L advanced toward its previous day 's position, the AO spotted the body of the Marine and abou t

12 NVA in the vicinity. The North Vietnamese had

dragged the dead man into the DMZ . Believing "tha t

the body was being used as a bait for a trap," Bendel l

recalled the Marine company to Hill 28 and then saturated the area with artillery and air. 7 1

Lieutenant Colonel Bendell then decided upon a

new tactic. He and his staff worked out plans for a

three-company operation, supported by air and

artillery, into the Demilitarized Zone to bring back th e

body. Instead of approaching the objective straight on ,

the battalion would leave one company in blockin g

positions on high ground northwest of Hill 28, sout h

of the DMZ. The other two companies were first t o

move northeast, then wheel due north into the DMZ,

and then advance in a southwesterly direction, comin g

upon the enemy from the rear and the flanks.7 2

After a preliminary artillery bombardment an d

ground-controlled TPQ radar air strikes all along the

eastern DMZ front so as not to give away the route of

march, at 0500 on 11 January, the battalion move d

out as Lieutenant Colonel Bendell remembered, "with

strict radio silence."73 As planned, Captain Carr's

Company L occupied the ridgeline to the northwest.

Under the cover of darkness and fog, the two attack
52 THE DEFINING YEA R

companies, Companies K and M, with Company K i n

the lead, and Bendell 's command group sandwiched

between the two companies, advanced in a northeasterly direction toward the DMZ. After about 1500

meters, the battalion veered north and penetrated 50 0

meters into the southern half of the Demilitarize d

Zone . Once in the DMZ, according to plan, the two

companies swung in a southwesterly direction along

parallel paths, separated by a fallow rice paddy. Company M, with the battalion command group ,

remained still somewhat behind Company K, protecting both the battalion rear and left flank . With

the lifting of the morning haze about 0900, the firs t

of a trio of 3d Marine Division aerial observers arrive d

overhead . At about the same time, Captain Edwar d

O. Leroy 's Company K came across the first of several

NVA bunkers near the abandoned and largel y

destroyed village of An Xa . Employing both artillery

and air support, the company easily overcame scattered enemy resistance . At one point, Captain Kalm,

the Company M commander, saw what appeared to

be, at first blush, three bushes, but turned out to b e

well-camouflaged NVA soldiers, maneuvering to th e

rear of his company column . He directed machine

gun fire in that direction "and then started callin g

artillery fire and the three bushes were seen to disappear over the hill to our rear."74

For the next three hours, the two Marine companies remained in the DMZ . In and around An Xa ,

Company K blew up some 25 bunkers and captured

about 10 weapons including one machine gun, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG), and severa l

AK—47s and other rifles. The Marines also confiscat -

ed or destroyed cooking utensils, pieces of uniform

and equipment, food, and documents that identifie d

the North Vietnamese unit in the sector as the 2 d

Company, 7th Battalion, 90th NVA Regiment . In their

haste, the NVA troops left cooked rice still in the po t

and still warm. Further to the south, Company M

protected Company K's exposed southern flank an d

recovered without incident the body of the missin g

Marine from Company L . By afternoon on the 11th,

both companies had passed through Company L's

blocking positions and returned to the battalion CP

on Hill 28. The Marines sustained only two casualties,

both wounded, and only one of whom had to be evacuated . According to Marine accounts, they killed a t

least 15 NVA and probably inflicted more casualtie s

with artillery and air.7 5

According to Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, by

"achieving surprise . . . moving during darkness," he

and his operations officer, Major Richard K . Young,

believed the sweep of the southern DMZ was a successful demonstration of coordination between th e

infantry on the ground and supporting arms. On two

occasions, the aerial observers called in air strikes o n

NVA troops in the open attempting to flank th e

Marine companies. Young, who stayed behind at th e

battalion combat operations center (COC) on Hill 28 ,

later stated : " . . . we were able to have artillery on 30

seconds before air got there and then we could run ai r

strikes and then turn on the artillery . . . [we) had

some type of fire on the enemy almost the entire duration of the operation." The operations officer remembered: "Several times when artillery wasn't gettin g

there fast enough, the company commander woul d

jump on the battalion tac [tactical radio net) and ge t

in touch with myself back at the COC." Young woul d

then "get 81mm fire out there to fill the void i n

artillery or get with my artillery liaison officer or m y

forward air controller and get this continuous fire

while the troops were advancing along the bunke r

complex. " Shortly after the return of the battalion ,

Lieutenant Colonel Bendell briefed the 3d Marin e

Division staff and the Commandant of the Marin e

Corps, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., who was on

a visit to Vietnam, at the Dong Ha headquarters o n

the successful completion of the operation . 7 6

With the termination of the DMZ sweep, th e

sojourn of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on Hill 2 8

was about over. The completion of the A—3 Stron g

Point reduced the need for a forward battalion t o

protect the approaches. On 12 January, Bendell's

battalion began its move to a new position along the

trace near the abandoned village of An Phu and closer to Con Thien.* For the 9th Marines in Operation

Kentucky, the strongpoint system was about as complete as it was ever going to be . Still, as Lieutenan t

Colonel Bendell several years later observed : "there

was evidence of an NVA build up throughout the

DMZ sector."”

Operation Lancaster and

Heavy Fighting in Mid-January

By mid January, the North Vietnamese began t o

intensify their efforts to cut Route 9 especially alon g

*Lieutenant Colonel Lehrack who was with the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines at this time noted that even with the reduced need for a forward battalion and after the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines departed Hil l

28, his battalion placed two companies on the hill and kept them ther e

for several months . Lehrack Comments.
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 5 3

Top photo courtesy of Col Gorton C . Cook, USMC (Ret) and bottom is from the 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68 .

Route 9 is seen looking south from a Marine outpost located on the northern end of the Rockpile, top ,

and an aerial photograph shows the Marine base at Ca Lu, bottom . In January 1968, Ca Lu for

the Marines was the western terminus of Route 9 since the road was cut between there and the Marin e

base at Khe Sanh . LtCol Gorton C. Cook's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines manned both the Rockpile

and Ca Lu posts.
54 THE DEFINING YEA R

the tenuous supply route to Ca Lu . Since Novembe r

1967, Colonel Joseph E. Lo Prete's 3d Marines had

conducted Operation Lancaster protecting the west -

ern flank of the 9th Marines in Kentucky. The Lan -

caster area of operations contained the key Marin e

bases of Camp Carroll, an important artillery position, the Rockpile, and Ca Lu . The Rockpile, a 700-

foot sheer cliff outcropping, dominated the nearby

terrain. Perched on its top, Marine observers had a

clear view of the most likely approaches into the

Cam Lo River Valley and of Route 9, the two most

strategic east-west arteries in the DMZ sector . About

12,000 meters below the Rockpile and part of th e

Dyemarker system was Ca Lu, in effect the souther n

terminal of Route 9 since the North Vietnamese ha d

effectively cut the road between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh ,

about 20,000 meters to the west . An obvious way station for any relief effort of Khe Sanh, Ca Lu, at th e

junction of the Quang Tri River and Route 9, als o

provided the Marines an outpost to warn of enemy

infiltration into the Lancaster area from the west ,

southwest, and from the Ba Long Valley to the south -

east. Similar to much of the terrain in the DMZ area ,

the Lancaster area of operations consisted of rollin g

hills rising into jungle-covered mountains of

700—800 feet with tree canopies reaching up to

heights of 20 to 60 feet. Fifteen-foot elephant grass

and dense brush vegetation restricted movement eve n

in the relatively low regions.

Like Colonel Smith and the 9th Marines, Colone l

Lo Prete was tied to his base areas. With only two

infantry battalions, and one of those battalions having

only two companies, the 3d Marines commander had

to make do with limited resources and manpower . Lo

Prete maintained his command post at Camp Carrol l

which was also the home for Lieutenant Colone l

William M. Cryan's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines . Cryan

with only his Companies E and H under his operational control kept Company H at Carroll and positioned Company E about 3,000 meters southeast of

Camp Carroll where it protected a main supply route.

Lo Prete assigned his other battalion, Lieutenan t

Colonel Gorton C. Cook's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,

the responsibility for the defense of both Ca Lu and th e

Rockpile area. Cook and three of his companies

remained in the Thon Son Lam sector just below the

Rockpile while he placed his Company L at Ca Lu. An

article in the battalion newsletter at the time note d

that the sector was "pretty quiet now except for some

sporadic ambushes between here and our company -

sized outpost at Ca Lu."78

Artillery and tanks reinforced the infantry in Lancaster. Three 105mm howitzer batteries and one

155mm howitzer battery all under the 1st Battalion ,

12th Marines at Carroll provided direct support to the

infantry battalions. An ad hoc battery of mixed caliber

guns, Battery W, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, was

with Company L at Ca Lu . Company B, 3d Tank Battalion maintained two platoons of M48 medium gu n

tanks and one heavy section of M67A2 flame tanks a t

Carroll. For the most part, the tanks bolstered th e

defenses at Camp Carroll and furnished protection fo r

road convoys to Ca Lu. An attached U.S . Army

artillery unit, Battery C, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery

(Automatic Weapons, Self Propelled) also augmente d

the Marine fire power. The Army M42s or "dusters "

armed with twin 40mm antiaircraft guns employed a s

machine guns gave added protection to Marine convoys and to the Marine fixed defenses .79

The Marines worried most about their relativel y

exposed position at Ca Lu . There, the isolated garriso n

numbered about 625 Army, Navy, and Marine personnel including the Marine infantry company. Navy

Seabees and Marine engineers had nearly completed

the permanent facilities required for the Dyemarke r

project. While not directly attacking the Marine outpost, the North Vietnamese had mined Route 9 occasionally in December and ambushed one Marine convoy on a return trip from Ca Lu to the Rockpile.

Despite a relative lull during the first two weeks of

January, Marine intelligence indicated that North

Vietnamese forces were on the move .80

A division "Stingray" reconnaissance team operating in the general area of the Ca Lu base soon con -

firmed the presence of enemy troops in the genera l

area .* On 12 January, about 1415 in the afternoon,

Reconnaissance Team 2C3, using the codename "Blu e

Plate" and operating in the mountains about 4,000

meters southwest of Ca Lu below the Quang Tr i

River, radioed back that it was being followed by five

NVA "wearing black pjs and carrying automati c

weapons." The "Blue Plate" Marines fired upon th e

enemy but missed . For a time all was quiet and the

Marines continued upon their way. About two hours

later, the Marines came back on the air to report that

they were surrounded by about 30 North Vietnames e

troops armed with AK-47s. Marine gunships

appeared overhead and provided covering fire while

*Stingray patrols usually consisted of a small Marine reconnaissance unit, usually squad-size, which called artillery and air on target s

of opportunity.
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 5 5

another helicopter extracted the Marine team. The

reconnaissance Marines sustained only one casualty,

one wounded man .8 1

The incident on the 12th was only a harbinger o f

what was to come . On the following day, the North

Vietnamese sprang an ambush on an engineer convoy

bringing Dyemarker supplies and equipment to C a

Lu. Under an overcast sky and a slight drizzle, abou t

1120 on the morning of the 13th, the 20-vehicle

convoy departed the Rockpile area . Marine artillery

had already fired 15-minute preparation fires at suspected ambush sites. With two tanks in the lead, the

convoy consisted of 10 six by six trucks intersperse d

with two more tanks in the center of the column, fou r

"low boy" tractor trailers, and two of the Army

"dusters" bringing up the rear. The vehicles carried

about 200 men including engineers, drivers, the

M42 crews, support personnel, and Company I, 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines.82

About 1150, approximately 3,000 meters abov e

the Ca Lu, enemy gunners took the convoy under fir e

with rocket-propelled grenades, small-arms fire, and

mortars. At the same time, the NVA ambushers detonated a command mine which set two trucks on fire ,

one a "low boy " and the other carrying 81mm mortar

ammunition. The truck with the mortars exploded

which forced the rear section of the convoy to come t o

a complete halt. The infantry from Company I hastil y

dismounted from their trucks to engage the enemy ,

only for many of the troops to trigger several "surpris e

firing devices" and mines skillfully hidden along bot h

sides of the road .

Lieutenant Colonel Cook recalled several years late r

that before the convoy had started out he and hi s

sergeant major had moved to an outpost on a hill top

just west of Route 9 . From there, he remained in radio

contact with both his command post and the convo y

and could observe the vehicles as they moved sout h

toward Ca Lu . When he saw the convoy stopped afte r

the initial burst of fire, he directed "the lead elemen t

to continue on to Ca Lu and return with reinforcements." He then joined the stalled troops. According

to Cook, from the site of the ambush, he "called and

directed artillery fire through his COC [Combat Operations Center} on enemy escape and reinforcing routes

both east and west of Route 9. "

In the meantime, Company L, 3d Battalion, 9t h

Marines boarded at Ca Lu the lead trucks to relieve th e

embattled column . At the ambush site, about 1215, a n

aerial observer using the call sign "American Beauty "

arrived overhead to assist in calling in supporting fires.

The leaden skies precluded the use of Marine fixed -

wing jets, but two helicopter gunships strafed th e

enemy firing positions. Marine artillery fired over 70 0

rounds including 54 155mm howitzer shells in support of the convoy after the initial contact. With the arrival of Company L and the continuing

artillery bombardment, the Marines disengaged unde r

occasional enemy sniper fire and completed the trip t o

Ca Lu, arriving there about 1510 . The convoy made

the return trip to the Rockpile area late that afternoon

without incident . The costs, however, had been high .

American dead and wounded totaled 19 killed and

over 70 wounded . Most of the casualties were sustained by Company I in the first moments of the

ambush. The Marines accounted for 10 enemy dead

and captured one prisoner. Marine intelligence officers

estimated that a North Vietnamese company participated in the attack.*

For a time after the ambush, the 3d Marines'

attention shifted once more to the north and east i n

that area between Camp Carroll and the Rockpil e

above Route 9 . Shortly after 0800 on the morning o f

16 January, a 3d Reconnaissance Battalion "Stingray "

team there found itself surrounded by about 40

North Vietnamese on high ground about 2,00 0

meters north of the Cam Lo River. According to th e

team, the enemy were obviously NVA regulars, wearing green utilities and helmets impressed with a yellow lightning bolt design, and armed with AK—4 7

rifles and two machine guns. The 3d Marines immediately sent a reaction platoon from Company H, 2 d

Battalion, 9th Marines to assist the encircled team .

Lifted into a helicopter landing zone about a 1,00 0

meters east of the reconnaissance team, the 2d Battalion reaction platoon came under machine gun fire .

The platoon returned the fire and called in air an d

artillery. After the artillery and air strike silenced th e

enemy guns, the infantry platoon joined up with th e

reconnaissance team . By this time, the North Vietnamese troops had disappeared, leaving six dead

behind. At 1340 that afternoon, Marine helicopters

*Colonel Robert C. Needham commented that this ambush wa s

very similar to one that 3/3 had run into in the same area in August and

September 1967 . Needham Comments. A survivor of the ambush wh o

visited Vietnam in 1994 wrote in a veteran 's newsletter that on the road

to Ca Lu he reached "the 13 January 1968 ambush site . . . . In my

mind's eye I could see the first cloud of black smoke {when} the ambus h

was sprung, and I smelled the odor of gunpowder in the air." Before

leaving, he and his companion planted some flowers in memory of th e

men killed there . Phil Quinones, "Vietnam—Tour '94'," Comwire, Vietnam, Oct 1994, v. 4, No . 1, pp . 3-4, Encl to Todd Comments .
56 THE DEFINING YEAR

extracted both groups of Marines to Camp Carroll .

The units sustained one Navy corpsman killed and

four Marines wounded . It was obvious that the

enemy was becoming much more aggressive all along

Route 9 and the DMZ in general.8 3

After a few brief quiet days, the DMZ war in the

western Kentucky sector also flared up. After leaving

Hill 28 and uncovering an enemy base area, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell 's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

took up its new positions at An Dinh between A— 3

and Con Thien to investigate recent probes at the latter base . The battalion immediately began patrolling

its area of operations. On the 17th, Bendell planned t o

send out a two-company patrol the next morning nea r

an abandoned hamlet just north of the trace about tw o

miles northeast of Con Thien . Company M was to b e

the blocking force while Company L was to be th e

sweeping force .84

The evening of the 17th, Captain John D . Carr, th e

Company L commander, held a meeting of his platoon

commanders. Second Lieutenant Kenneth L. Christy,

who headed the 3d Platoon, remembered that Car r

briefed them on the next day's planned patrol. According to Christy, he noticed that the route of advanc e

"took us through a bombed out ville that we al l

referred to as the `Meat Market'," because it was "Char -

lies' area—and almost everytime we went there eithe r

us or them, somebody got hammered." Christy's platoon had run a patrol in that area very recently, bu t

there had been "no sign of Charlie or Charlie decided

not to engage ." Captain Carr assigned the point position to his 1st Platoon . Lieutenant Christy argued ("to

the degree that a second lieutenant argues with a captain") that his platoon knew the area and should have

the point. Captain Carr, however, stated that the 3 d

Platoon needed a break and he wanted to give one o f

the other platoons the point experience .8 5

As planned, with the 1st Platoon on point, followed by the 2d Platoon with the command group ,

and the 3d Platoon bringing up the rear, Company L

departed the battalion lines at An Dien in pre-daw n

darkness. Suddenly the NVA about 0945 from wellcamouflaged bunkers and spider holes near the "Meat

Market" sprang their ambush on the Marine company. The 1st Platoon on the point engaged what it

thought was a NVA platoon only to find itself divided into separate groups, with the forward element cu t

off from the rest of the company. Captain Carr

brought up the 2d Platoon and his command grou p

and joined the rear element of the 1st Platoon, in a

large B—52 bomb crater.8 6

In the company rear, Lieutenant Christy recalled

that when the ambush occurred, "it sounded like a fe w

sporadic gun shots and then all hell broke loose ." The

men of his platoon hit the ground "facing outward a s

we usually did ." Christy took cover in a 105mm shell

crater with his platoon sergeant and radio man . At tha t

point, Captain Carr ordered the 3d Platoon commander to join him, about 180 meters to the platoon 's

front. Under heavy automatic fire, the 3d Platoo n

joined Carr in a series of rushes taking shelter in shel l

and bomb craters along the way. Miraculously, the pla -

toon had made the dash without sustaining any casualties. According to Christy, "we closed off the back -

side of what was the company perimeter. "87

As Company L more or less consolidated its position, the North Vietnamese continued to direct automatic weapons fire from all sides, mortars, and eve n

large caliber artillery upon the embattled Marines .

More urgently, the enemy was using the cutoff squad -

size remnant of the 1st Platoon, about 100 meters in

front of the rest of the company, as "bait" in a "NVA

killing zone ." Lieutenant Christy remembered Captain

Carr told him that there were "dead and wounded up

front and needed 3d Plat [platoon} to go up there an d

collect them up so we could get the wounded and dead

med-evaced and the hell out of the area ."88

By this time, the North Vietnamese fires had some -

what diminished . Captain Carr and a forward artillery

observer who was with the cutoff troops, Sergean t

Michael J. Madden, called in supporting U.S . artillery.

Sergeant Madden also made radio contact with an ai r

observer in a Huey who brought in helicopter gun -

ships to keep the enemy at bay. Under this protective

cover, Lieutenant Christy took one of his squads and

joined by Captain Carr reached the 1st Platoon group .

Christy then deployed his men and crawled forward to

another crater where Sergeant Madden, although

wounded, was still calling in artillery strikes. Ther e

were four other wounded men with Madden . Christy

remembered Captain Carr covering him with a shotgun while he went forward again to reach some Marine

bodies, including that of the 1st Platoon commander,

some 50 meters to the front . With the supporting

artillery fires, the 3d Platoon squad brought back th e

wounded and dead of the 1st Platoon . According to

Lieutenant Christy, he admonished some of his men fo r

being too gentle and that the bodies were not going t o

be hurt: "Lets get these people policed up and get ou t

of here before Charlie starts firing us up again."89

In the meanwhile, upon hearing of the Company L

predicament, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, the battal-
THE WAR IN THE EASTERN DMZ IN EARLY AND MID-JANUARY 5 7

ion commander, replaced Company M with anothe r

unit in the blocking position and then with a skeleton

command group accompanied Company M to relieve

Company L. After the linkup, the two companies overran at least three enemy mortar positions and severa l

machine guns and individual fighting holes. With

continuing helicopter gunship support and coverin g

artillery, Marine helicopters evacuated the most seriously wounded . The two companies then "crossed th e

trace in good order," late that afternoon carrying thei r

remaining casualties. In the action, the two companies

sustained casualties of 9 dead and 22 wounded including Captain Carr who was evacuated by helicopter.

According to the 9th Marines, the enemy sustained

over 100 casualties.90 *

By 20 January, a new phase of the war was abou t

to begin. Colonel Lo Prete and his 3d Marines staff

were about to close out the Lancaster operation an d

*For this action on the 18th, Captain John Carr, the Company L_

Commander, was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart; Captai n

Raymond W. Kalm, Jr., the Company M commander, received th e

Bronze Scar with V; Sergeant Michael J. Madden also received th e

Bronze Star with V; and one of the helicopter pilots received the Distinguished Flying Cross. On 25 March 1994 at Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina, Colonel Kenneth L. Christy, Jr., was awarded the Nav y

Cross for his heroism on 18 January 1968, more than 26 years afte r

the event. Sergeant Madden, who credited Christy for saving his life

and the others with him, had submitted an award recommendation .

Somehow the paperwork got lost and Madden in 1988 was surprise d

to learn that Christy had not received any medal for his actions tha t

day. Madden then launched a one-man successful campaign to rectify

the situation . The Navy Cross is second only to the Medal of Hono r

in awards for heroism in the Marine Corps . Bendell Comments; Co l

Kenneth L. Christy, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 8Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); Colonel Kenneth L . Christy, Jr., Biographica l

File, Reference Sec, MCHC .

take over the Osceola area in the Quang Tri secto r

from the 1st Marines. The 1st Marines in turn was t o

relieve the 4th Marines in the Camp Evans sector .

Colonel William Dick, the 4th Marines commander,

was then to assume control of the units in Lancaster.

For the most part, this phase of Operation Checkers

was a case of regimental musical chairs and had littl e

effect on the battalions in the various sectors. Both

the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and the two companie s

of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines were to remain i n

Lancaster, now called Operation Lancaster II .

According to the usual body-count measurement s

of the war, the 3d Marines in Operation Lancaster I

accounted for 46 enemy dead at a cost of 22 Marines

killed and 140 wounded . In comparison, during the

same period, the 9th Marines in Operation Kentucky sustained 90 dead and over 800 wounde d

while killing nearly 700 of the enemy. Still the indications were that the North Vietnamese were raisin g

the ante throughout the DMZ sector including Kh e

Sanh. Near the coast, on 20 January, enemy gunner s

fired at two Navy craft on the Cua Viet River forcing the Naval Support Activity, Cua Viet temporarily to close that important waterway, the main sup -

ply channel to the Marine base at Dong Ha . At the

same time, the 3d Marines observed that a larg e

enemy force, probably the 29th NVA Regiment had

moved into the area north of the Quang Tri River

and west of Ca Lu . Just as significant, another regiment had replaced the 90th NVA Regiment in the

Lancaster northern area of operations. The 90th NVA

had then shifted to the southwest and had possibl y

entered the "Scotland" or Khe Sanh area of operations. Perhaps the big enemy offensive in the nort h

was about to begin ."
CHAPTER 4

Khe Sanh: Building Up

The Battlefield—The Early Days—Protecting the Investment—The Isolation of Khe San h

The Decision to Hold—The Stage is Set—Sortie to Hill 881 North—The Enemy Plan Unfolds

The Battlefield

The village of Khe Sanh, composed of nine hamlets and also the capital of Huong Hoa District, onc e

sat astride National Route 9 in the extreme north -

western corner of South Vietnam . According to a

census, 10,195 civilians lived in the district, mostl y

clustered within four miles of the village .* Khe San h

controlled road movement from nearby Laos int o

northern Quang Tri Province and was the terminus

of a number of trail networks which crossed the

Laotian border further to the north and wound thei r

way through the valleys and along the rivers t o

intersect the highway in the vicinity of the village .

National Route 9 was actually little more than a

wide trail in places, yet it was a key feature of the

area because it provided a means of movement

between nearby Laos and the coastal region.

Between Khe Sanh and Dong Ha, Route 9 ran fo r

63 kilometers, crossing 36 crumbling old bridge s

along the way. Most of them, relics of the Frenc h

colonial era, could be bypassed and often were, due

to their deteriorated condition . ]

The terrain of the Huong Hoa District is characterized by steep, jungle-covered mountains separate d

by plunging valleys. Mountain peaks tower over th e

hamlets along Route 9, rising from 200 meters to

600 meters above the elevation of the highway .

Streams flow through many of the valleys, emptying

into one of two rivers. The Song Rao Quan drains th e

region to the north, flowing southeast to join other

rivers which continue to the sea. West of Khe Sanh ,

the Xe Pon, or Tchepone, flows east across the Laotian panhandle to a point 15 kilometers from the village, where it turns south forming a part of the international border between South Vietnam and Laos.

*Former Navy chaplain Ray W. Stubbe, a noted authority on Khe

Sanh and its environs, observed that this census did not include the

approximately 12,000 Montagnard tribesmen who lived in " some half

dozen villes" in the immediate Khe Sanh area. LCdr Ray W. Stubbe ,

ChC, USN, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 23Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Scubbe Comments .

There are two types of rain forest in the area . The

primary growth is found at higher elevations wher e

some trees reach 90 feet in height, forming a canopy

beneath which other trees, some up to 60 feet high ,

form a second canopy. The dense canopies reduce th e

light at ground level to the point that growth ther e

is limited to seedlings, flowers, and climbing plants .

Because of the sparse ground cover, the jungle ca n

be penetrated on foot with little difficulty. 2

The secondary rain forest is located at lower eleva -

tions where the ground has first been cleared, the n

later left for the jungle to reclaim . Here, the trees ar e

smaller, allowing more light to penetrate to ground

level. The resulting thick growth of bamboo, elephant grass, and climbing plants limits foot trave l

considerably. 3

The weather in the region varies through the course

of a year. It is warm in the summer, although coole r

than at the lower elevations near the coast, while i n

the winter, it is sometimes oppressively cold an d

damp. Annual rainfall exceeding 80 inches, much of i t

occurring during the winter monsoon, feeds the rai n

forests and contributes to the discomfort caused by th e

cold temperatures. A thick, milk-colored fog know n

in Indochina as crachin** occurs frequently in the win -

ter months, reducing visibility considerably.

During the war, a Montagnard tribe, the Bru, lived

near Khe Sanh, although the people in the villag e

**A weather condition which occurs in the highland regions o f

Southeast Asia for periods of three to five days at a time between October and April. It is described as: "A persistent low-level stratus phenomenon accompanied by prolonged precipitations which greatly affect s

military operations. Clouds are generally 3,000 to 5,000 feet thick wit h

ceiling under 1,000 feet and frequently below 500 feet . Visibility is . . .

generally below 2 miles and frequently below 1/2 mile ." Asst Chief o f

Staff, G–2, memo to Asst Chief of Staff, G–3, dtd 4Jul67, Subj : Planning Conference, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Ju167 . Colonel Frederic S .

Knight, who served as the 3d Marine Division G–2 or intelligence officer in 1968, noted that the word comes from the French verb, reacher,

which means to spit: " A friend said the true meaning of the word is best

described as 'that which blows back into your face when you spit into th e

wind . – Col Frederic S. Knight, Comments on draft chapter, dt d

10Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Knight Comments.

58
KHE SANH: BUILDING UP 5 9

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19018 6

A typical Bru village south of Khe Sanh has simple houses built on stilts to be above the ground an d

with grass roofs for protection from the elements. One of the aboriginal tribes who inhabited the Vietnamese highlands and whom the French called Montagnards, the Bru had been resettled largel y

along Route 9 near Khe Sanh by the South Vietnamese government.

itself were ethnic Vietnamese .* A simple honest people without even a written language, the Bru cared little for the authority of the national government or fo r

the political upheavals of the war, preferring to remai n

neutral, or at most, to sympathize half-heartedly wit h

whichever side controlled their village at any particular moment. While their original territory covere d

most of the district, as well as equally large areas i n

Laos and North Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government resettled most of the Bru of Huong Hoa District along Route 9 to prevent the enemy from recruiting among them .

In addition to the Bru and Vietnamese, a few French

coffee planters and American missionaries inhabite d

the area in the vicinity of Khe Sanh . Some of the Br u

were employed by the former and a few even received

a rudimentary education from the latter.

*The Montagnard (a French word meaning " mountaineer " ) tribe s

were not Vietnamese by descent or culture, but rather, an aboriginal

people who inhabited the highlands. Unworldly, poor, and apolitical ,

the Montagnards were often viewed by the Vietnamese as a lesser people and sometimes were treated with contempt . Colonel Knight wrote

that the Vietnamese name for the tribesmen was Moi which meant savage. He explained that the term Montagnard came into use "at the

insistence of Ngo Dinh Diem who deplored the common Vietnames e

usage . . . ." Knight Comments. Chaplain Stubbe noted the sharp contrast between the houses in Khe Sanh Village made of concrete an d

wood where the ethnic Vietnamese lived and the homes of the Bru

made of bamboo with grass roofs and on stilts in the surroundin g

" villes " . Stubbe Comments.

The Early Days

The history of Marines at Khe Sanh predates thei r

involvement in the Vietnam War by three decades.

Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, who served as

the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacifi c

during the war, remembered that while stationed i n

China in 1937, his battalion commander, Majo r

Howard N. Stent, visited the area to hunt tiger. Like

many visitors to Khe Sanh, Major Stent was impresse d

with its beauty, and returned to China with stories o f

the tall, green mountains, waterfalls, abundant game ,

and the peaceful Bru tribespeople . 4

In August 1962, MACV established a Specia l

Forces CIDG camp at an old abandoned French fort ,

about two kilometers east of the village of Khe Sanh

and just below Route 9, for border surveillance an d

anti-infiltration operations.** In November 1964, the

Special Forces team moved from the French fort to a

light-duty airstrip, built by French forces in 1949 on

the Xom Cham Plateau, above Route 9 and about two

kilometers north of their former base. This new site ,

which eventually became the Khe Sanh base, had sev -

* *CIDG is an acronym for Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Th e

CIDG consisted of local militia, armed, trained, advised, and, in fact ,

led by U.S . and South Vietnamese Special Forces personnel . Suc h

camps were scattered throughout the country. This French fort sit e

was later referred to by the American forces at Khe Sanh as the "ol d

French Fort . "
60 THE DEFINING YEA R

eral advantages. Militarily, it was on relatively level

ground and offered good fields of fire in all directions .

The terrain provided both good drainage and stabl e

soil, mostly consisting of "laterite clay or weathered

iron/aluminum rock." It also contained a "few basalt

outcroppings, at what was later called the `Rock Quarry. — At their new camp, the Special Forces and CID G

personnel built a number of bunkers which the

Marines later at Khe Sanh would refer to, erroneously ,

as "old French bunkers." 5

Earlier, in the spring of 1964, Major Alfred M .

Gray, later the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps ,

arrived in the Khe Sanh sector with a signal intelligence detachment and an infantry platoon and established a radio monitoring site atop Dong Voi Mep, bet -

ter known to the Marines as Tiger Tooth Mountain ,

north of the CIDG camp . The composite force, designated Marine Detachment, Advisory Team 1, was "th e

first actual Marine ground unit to conduct independent operations in the Republic of Vietnam ." After its

position had been compromised in July, the team redeployed to Da Nang 6*

In 1966, III MAF carried out two battalion-sized

operations near Khe Sanh to search for North Vietnamese units reported by Special Forces personnel .

The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines arrived in April and

established a camp around the airstrip from which t o

conduct Operation Virginia . After searching the

mountains around the CIDG camp for a week with -

out finding a trace of the enemy, the battalion

marched back to the coast along Route 9, becoming

the first "major force" to accomplish this feat in at

least eight years. ?

In late September 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Pete r

A. Wickwire's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines arrived at

Khe Sanh as part of Operation Prairie, beginning 2 2

months of continuous Marine presence in the area .

The monsoon was upon Khe Sanh by this time, an d

the Marines experienced temperatures as low as 4 0

degrees and winds which gusted to 45 knots . The bad

weather caused the airstrip to close frequently an d

when aircraft could not land at the combat base, som e

types of supplies reached dangerously low levels . Afte r

four months of vigorous patrolling, the Marines foun d

little in the way of enemy forces, claiming only 1 5

dead North Vietnamese . 8

*The Marines would later establish in lace 1966 a radio relay station on Hill 950, about 3,500 meters north of Khe Sanh and 9,000

meters southeast of Tiger Mountain . Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p . 128 . See also Stubbe Comments.

During Operation Prairie, the Special Forces personnel relocated their CIDG camp to the village o f

Lang Vei on Route 9 between Khe Sanh and the Laotian border. A detachment known as Forward Operating Base 3 (FOB—3),** first located in Khe Sanh village ,

moved to the old French fort, and then, in the latte r

part of 1967, deployed to newly built quarters adjoining the Khe Sanh combat base . A small MACV advisory team remained at the district headquarters in Kh e

Sanh village .9

In February 1967, III MAF had established Combined Action Platoon 0 to work with the Bru in th e

area . "CAP Oscar, " as it was called, was the only unit

in the Combined Action program to work with a

Montagnard tribe. The CAP headquarters was i n

Khe Sanh village from where they patrolled the surrounding Bru hamlets.1 0

By this time, February 1967, the 1st Battalion ,

3d Marines had departed for Okinawa, but Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines took the battalion's place to protect a detachment of Seabee s

from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1 0

which was assigned to extend and improve the

airstrip. The company patrolled the hills and valleys for any sign of Communist forces. Within a

month, increased contact led the 3d Marine Division to reinforce Khe Sanh with a second compan y

and in late March the Marines became engage d

with a powerful enemy force . The 3d Marine Division assigned control of the forces at Khe Sanh t o

the 3d Marines on 20 April 1967 . Within a matter of days, the Marines encountered strong Nort h

Vietnamese forces in fortified positions on the hill s

to the north of the Khe Sanh Combat Base ,

prompting the commanding officer of the 3d

Marines, Colonel John P. Lanigan, to deploy his 2 d

and 3d Battalions to the area . The ensuing battle s

to eject the North Vietnamese from the commanding terrain overlooking the combat base becam e

known as the "Hill Battles" and lasted until 1 1

May. In some of the most vicious fighting of th e

war, Marines wrested control of Hills 861, 88 1

North, and 881 South from the enemy.** *

The fighting in the First Battle of Khe Sanh was

savage and costly for both sides. Marine casualties

**FOB—3 was an element of the Studies and Observation Grou p

(SOG), which trained Nung, Muong, and Bru Montagnards for clan -

destine operations against Communist forces along infiltration routes .

***For detailed accounts of the Hill Battles, see Telfer, Rogers,

and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, Chapter 4 and Prados an d

Stubbe, Valley of Decision, pp . 83—105 .
KHE SANH : BUILDING UP 61

numbered 155 killed and 425 wounded, while th e

North Vietnamese left nearly 1,000 dead on the battlefield. When the battle ended, the Marines hel d

the hills which overlooked the combat base, thus

hampering Communist observation and fire on the

vital airstrip through which supplies and replacements flowed . "

Protecting the Investment

Immediately following the Hill Battles, III MA F

reduced the force at Khe Sanh to a single battalion . The

3d Marines departed the area, giving way to Lieutenant

Colonel Donald E. Newton's 1st Battalion, 26t h

Marines. Overall control of operations around Khe

Sanh passed to Colonel John J. Padley, commanding

officer of the 26th Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Newton's Marines maintaine d

company outposts on some of the commanding hill s

and conducted patrols in the surrounding jungle a s

part of Operation Crockett . As enemy contacts an d

sightings increased, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marine s

deployed to Khe Sanh, giving Colonel Padley th e

capability, if necessary, to meet another major Nort h

Vietnamese effort like that encountered during th e

Hill Battles .

Supplies reached the Marines at Khe Sanh either

by air or by vehicle convoys from the 3d Marin e

Division base at Dong Ha. The trip along Route 9

took the convoys through territory which was far

from secure, and they traveled well-armed and protected, usually accompanied by an infantry unit and

often by armored vehicles.

On 21 July, an infantry unit sweeping ahead o f

an 85-vehicle convoy trying to bring 175mm gun s

to reinforce the Marine base encountered stron g

enemy forces along the highway. While the Marine

infantry engaged the North Vietnamese, the convoy, which included besides the 175s, "truck s

loaded with ammunition and C—4 explosives, clay -

mores, mines, and other ordnance," returned t o

Camp Carroll. The ambush threat was too great t o

risk the guns . 12 *

While the Marines would continue some road convoys into Khe Sanh in the fall, it soon became clear tha t

*One authority on the battle for Khe Sanh, Chaplain Stubbe, commented that he was not sure why the guns were sent in the first place .

His supposition was that they would be used to support FOB—3 operations in Laos. He was certain, however, that the guns would hav e

made excellent targets for the North Vietnamese when they attacke d

the base . Stubbe Comments.

for all practical purposes Route 9 was closed .** Sinc e

the runway was closed for repairs to damage caused b y

the constant landing of heavily laden transport aircraft,

the Marines had to depend on helicopters and parachutes to maintain their logistic lifeline .

The Isolation of Khe Sanh

With their successful interdiction of Route 9 ,

the Communist forces isolated Khe Sanh from th e

rest of the ICTZ . Fortunately for the Marines, whil e

the weather remained clear, air resupply could pro -

vide for the needs of the combat base . With the

onset of the monsoon and the crachin, however, low

cloud ceilings and limited visibility would severel y

limit flights to Khe Sanh . III MAF was familiar

with this problem. As early as 1966, III MAF staff

members conducted a wargame of the defense of

Quang Tri Province in which they failed to defen d

Khe Sanh. During the exercise, when General

Westmoreland expressed his dismay at this decision,*** III MAF planners had responded that the y

considered Khe Sanh too difficult to support, citin g

the ease with which the enemy could cut Route 9

and the problems with air resupply during th e

monsoon . Now the game had become real . In July

1967, before the combination of enemy action and

monsoon rains ended the convoys, the logistician s

of the 3d Marine Division recommended planning

for the air delivery of supplies to the combat bas e

whenever the weather permitted . The airstrip

remained closed to all but light aircraft and helicopters throughout September while the Seabee s

peeled up the old steel matting, and laid a new subgrade of crushed rock .13*** *

* *Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J . McEwan, who in 1967 was the S—4

or logistics officer for the 26th Marines, remembered an occasion when th e

North Vietnamese blew a bridge over the Roa Quan River. He, with th e

regimental commander and engineer together with a rifle company, mad e

a reconnaissance on the practicality of repairing the span : " A search wa s

made for alternate crossing points to no avail . Major damage was done to

the bridge . There were strong indications of the enemy 's presence . It was

not the time to build a bridge over the Roa Quan River on Route 9 leading to Khe Sanh . " LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McEwan Comments .

***As former Washington Post reporter Peter Braestrup commented, "Westmoreland always wanted to hold Khe Sanh as a base for U .S

operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail . " Peter Braestrup, Comments on draft chapter, n .d . [Dec94Jan95) (Vietnam Comment File) .

*** *Lieutenant Colonel McEwan remembered that obtaining th e

crushed rock was not a simple matter. He recalled that it was not unti l

" a sergeant found a hill mass that had rock " which later naturall y

became known as the "Rock Quarry." McEwan Comments.
62 THE DEFINING YEA R

In October, the monsoon struck with a vengeance ,

pouring 30 inches of rain on ICTZ. Khe Sanh did not

escape the deluge . The hill positions were especiall y

hard hit. Unlike the Xom Cham plateau, the surrounding hills and mountains did not have soil suitable

for construction, and the rain pointed up this weakness. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colone l

James B . Wilkinson, described some of the damage :

. . .when the first torrential rains of the season hid [Hill]

861 the results were disastrous. The trenchline whic h

encircled the hill washed away completely on one side o f

the position and caved in on another side . Some bunker s

collapsed, while others were so weakened they had to b e

completely rebuilt . 14 *

The Marines kept busy repairing damage and

improving their positions. New bunkers on Hill 86 1

stood almost completely above ground, and the ne w

trenchline included a drainage system jury-rigge d

from discarded 55-gallon drums. Space on board

resupply helicopters was critical, and priority for construction materials went to the airfield project, leavin g

little or no room for imported fortification materials .

Logging details searched the nearby jungle for suitable

wood, but many trees were so filled with steel fragments from the earlier Hill Battles that the engineers'

chain saws could not cut them .1 5

October brought more than the monsoon . That

month, the North Vietnamese 325C Division, which

had taken part in the earlier "Hill Battles," appeare d

again in the enemy order of battle for Khe Sanh.1 6 On

31 October, Operation Ardmore ended with Operation

Scotland beginning the next day. Little more than a

renaming of the continuing mission of defending Khe

Sanh and using it as a base for offensive action against

Communist infiltration, Operation Scotland became

the responsibility of the 26th Marines.

November began clear and sunny at Khe Sanh, bu t

by the 10th, the crachin returned. Seabees continued

work on the airfield, improving it to the point that it

was suitable for use by medium-sized cargo aircraft ,

such as the Fairchild C—123 Provider, but more wor k

was necessary before it could safely handle the heavy

Lockheed C—130 Hercules aircraft.1 7

Anxious to find alternate methods to support th e

units on the hill outposts, should bad weather or

enemy fire prevent helicopter resupply, the 26t h

*Lieutenant Colonel Harper L . Bohr commenced that the rain i n

September resulted in "the collapse of some newly completed bunker s

resulting in the deaths of several Marines. " LtCol Harper L. Bohr, Jr. ,

Comments on draft chapter, dtd 2Nov1994 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Photo courtesy of Col Robert W. Lewis, USMC (Ret )

An aerial view of the Khe Sanh Combat Base facing north -

west (note north arrow at top ofphoto) was taken in November 1967 at 10,000 feet, with the airstrip seen in the center of the photo. By this time, medium-sized fixed-wing

transport aircraft could land on the airstrip, but the road

supply network had been cut.

Marines studied the route from the combat base to

Hill 881 South. Representatives from the 3d Motor

Transport Battalion, the 3d Antitank Battalion, and

the 3d Engineer Battalion examined the route and

determined that it would require extensive engineer

preparation before it could accommodate vehicl e

convoys. 1 8

The 3d Marine Division assigned the 26th Marine s

to prepare a contingency plan for the relief, if needed ,

of the Lang Vei Special Forces CIDG Camp . — The new

commanding officer of the 26th Marines, Colone l

David E. Lownds, ordered his 1st Battalion to find a n

overland route from the combat base to the CID G

* *There were actually two Lang Vei Special Forces Camps . The

first one had been overrun in May 1967 while the Marine comman d

was engaged in the Hill Fights. The American command decided c o

relocate the camp a few hundred meters to the southwest. Lieutenan t

General Louis Metzger, in 1967 a brigadier general and the 3d Marin e

Division assistant division commander, commented that "Westmoreland was specially interested in this camp . . . and had the Seabees completely rebuild that camp with heavy concrete bunkers . . . so strong .

. . [that it could withstand) a tank on top of it without crushing it in ."

The new camp was finished in the fall of 1967 . LtGen Louis Metzger,

Comments on draft, dtd 17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) . See also

Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, pp . 188-189 . Army Colonel

Bruce B . G. Clarke observed that the contingency plan also called fo r

the relief of the district advisors in Khe Sanh village . Col Bruce 13 . G.

Clarke, USA, Comments on draft chapter, n .d . (Apr95) (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Clarke Comments .
KHE SANH: BUILDING UP 63

Photo courtesy of Col Robert W. Lewis, USMC (Ret )

Aerial view of Hill 881 South in November 1967, reveals the strategic outpost northwest of Kh e

Sanh. The Khe Sanh base can be seen in the background.

camp which could be used by a company-sized relie f

force . Captain John W. Raymond led Company A int o

the jungle to find such a route, avoiding well-use d

trails to reduce the risk of ambush . The straight-line

distance was less than nine kilometers, but only afte r

19 hours of struggling through the treacherous terrain, did the Marines reach the CIDG camp, provin g

that it could be done, but demonstrating that it coul d

not be done quickly or easily. The 26th Marines

attempted no further efforts to locate cross-countr y

routes to Lang Vei .

On 9 November, III MAF moved to increase th e

intelligence collection capability at Khe Sanh by

deploying a detachment from the 1st Radio Battalion*

under now Lieutenant Colonel Gray to the comba t

base . The detachment moved to Hill 881 South and

*Radio battalions are Marine Corps electronic warfare units capable of conducting signal intelligence activities, mainly intercepts.

established an electronic listening post, much as Gray's

other unit had done four years earlier.' 9

The crachin so hampered air operations at Khe Sanh

during November that on the 18th, Lieutenan t

Colonel Wilkinson passed the word to his men to prepare for the possibility of reducing rations to two meals

per day.20 The same weather problems affected direc t

air support bombing missions. To improve the accuracy of bombing near Khe Sanh during periods of heavy

fog or low clouds, the Marines installed a radar reflector atop Hill 881 South which, in theory, would serve

as a navigation aid to attack aircraft supporting th e

combat base . The reflector did not work, however, as i t

was incompatible with the radar systems on board th e

Grumman A—6A Intruder attack aircraft which were

designed to carry out bombing missions in conditions

of restricted visibility.2 1

Enemy activity increased dramatically durin g

December. The 3d Marine Division's intelligence offi-
64 THE DEFINING YEA R

cers identified two North Vietnamese units between

Khe Sanh and Ca Lu : the 8th Battalion, 29th Regiment

and the 95C Regiment . Around the combat base ,

Marine patrols sighted new bunkers near Hill 88 1

North as well as North Vietnamese carrying supplies

and heavy weapons . Sniper fire increased around Hill

881 South and the enemy attempted probes against

Hills 861 and 950 . Intelligence sources reported tha t

both the 304th Division and the 325C Division of the

North Vietnamese Army were near Khe Sanh and

another enemy unit, the 320th Division, was east of the

combat base, near Camp Carroll and Cam Lo . Perhaps

the most revealing indicator of increased enemy activity was the rise in North Vietnamese truck traffic alon g

the nearby Ho Chi Minh Trail network from a monthly average of480 vehicles in the fall to more than 6,000

in December.2 2

With only one battalion at Khe Sanh to protect the

combat base and its vital airstrip, as well as the surrounding hills, the 26th Marines' defenses were

stretched thin . The III MAF staff, with many source s

of intelligence available, recognized the significance o f

the enemy buildup, prompting Lieutenant General

Cushman to call Major General Tompkins on 1 3

December to direct that another battalion be sent t o

Khe Sanh . Major General Tompkins, fearing that

northeastern Quang Tri was much more vulnerable,

argued the point and recorded later that he was "not at

all excited about the idea ."23 Nevertheless, within five

hours, Lieutenant Colonel Harry L . Alderman's 3d Battalion, 26th Marines touched down at Khe Sanh's

recently refurbished airstrip . *

The 3d Battalion conducted a four-day sweep of a

ridge line west of the combat base, then settled into new

positions. Companies I and K occupied Hills 881 South

and 861, respectively, and Company L joined the 1st

Battalion at the combat base proper as Colonel Lownd s

juggled the units among his defensive positions.

Taking advantage of his increased troop strength t o

conduct battalion-sized operations once again, Colone l

Lownds sent the 1st Battalion north of the combat bas e

to search the Rao Quan River Valley during the last

three days of December. As on the 3d Battalion's expedition the previous week, the 1st Battalion encoun -

*Colonel Frederic S. Knight of the 3d Marine Division G-2, or

intelligence staff, recalled that there was the need for a smaller scale

map of the Khe Sanh sector to show more detail, one on a scale of

1 :10,000, as opposed to the 1 :50,000 standard maps. There was none

available, but Knight finally found a Seabee, who "laboriously drew o n

what I would call butcher 's paper the tactical map displayed in Colone l

Lownds' bunker during the entire siege." Knight Comments.

tered only light contact, but found ominous signs o f

freshly built bunkers and small caches of supplies 24 **

The increased enemy activity noted during December continued. Early in the evening of 2 January, a listening post established by Company L, 3d Battalion ,

26th Marines near the west end of the airstrip reporte d

several persons 60 meters to their immediate front .

The company commander dispatched a squad to rein -

force the listening post. The Marines challenged th e

unidentified men but received no reply. At the

Marines' second attempt to challenge, the intruder s

opened fire on the listening post . Marines all along th e

nearby perimeter returned fire . The firing died down ,

which saw one Marine slightly wounded, and the

squad sent to reinforce the listening post searched th e

area to the immediate front, but found nothing in th e

dark. At first light, a patrol searched the area again an d

found five enemy dead . Using a scout dog, they followed the trail of a sixth man, believed wounded, but

did not find him .25

The 26th Marines' intelligence officer, Captai n

Harper L. Bohr, Jr., examined the bodies of the five

enemy and came to the conclusion that one of them

was Chinese, because the man "was just too big an d

too non-Vietnamese looking ." He sent photograph s

and a medical description to the 3d Marine Divisio n

in hopes of receiving confirmation of his supposition .

Captain Bohr determined that at least some of the

dead were officers, and a legend later grew that one o f

them was a regimental commander.26 *** At any rate ,

it appeared to the Marines that the enemy had indeed

been reconnoitering the perimeter, further fuelin g

speculation that a major North Vietnamese attack

was in the making .

Colonel Lownds continued to seek information con -

cerning the enemy. Infantry companies scoured th e

nearby jungle while small reconnaissance teams established observation posts on more remote hilltops an d

watched for signs of movement. The Marines continued to employ the latest technology to augment thei r

troop patrol effort, including sensors, signal intelli-

**Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Pipes, who as a captain commanded Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, commented that hi s

company was the anvil for this operation and that one of his platoon s

ambushed an enemy reconnaissance unit, killing two or three Nort h

Vietnamese soldiers. He remembered some maps and that the enem y

gear and weapons were helilifted our. LtCol Kenneth W. Pipes, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 10Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

***Captain Bohr later wrote that this claim could not be substantiated . See Maj Harper L. Bohr, Jr., Comments on " The Battle for Kh e

Sanh, " 18Dec68 (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File).
KHE SANH: BUILDING U P

gence, infrared aerial photo reconnaissance, and a relatively new device formally known as the XM—3 air -

borne personnel detector (APD), but popularly called

the "People Sniffer." The XM—3 was the size of a suit -

case, able to be mounted in a Huey helicopter, an d

designed to measure "ammonia emanations from th e

skin." While no one technique was sufficient in itself ,

in tandem, they provided the U.S . command sufficien t

evidence that the enemy was in the Khe Sanh sector i n

strength.27* For the Marines at Khe Sanh, increased

patrol contact indicated an enemy counter-reconnaissance screen in action .

6 5

The Decision to Hold

On 6 January, General' Westmoreland initiate d

Operation Niagara, a two-part plan to find enemy

units around Khe Sanh and to eliminate them wit h

superior firepower. The first part of the operation ,

Niagara I, called for intelligence officers to mount a

"comprehensive intelligence collection effort" t o

locate and identify enemy units. In Niagara II, aircraft, including Boeing B—52 Stratofortresses of the

4133d Bomb Wing in Guam and the 4258t h

Strategic Wing in Thailand, were to saturate targe t

areas with bombs. 28 Major General George Keegan,

Seventh Air Force G—2, moved quickly to establis h

an integrated intelligence collection and analysis

effort that would compile and record informatio n

from all sources . He went so far as to bring eigh t

French generals, some of whom were survivors of

Dien Bien Phu, to Vietnam as experts on Communist siege tactics.29 * *

In the U.S. capital, the Johnson administratio n

focused almost obsessively on the Khe Sanh situatio n

with the President himself poring over detailed map s

of the area. On 11 January, General Earle G. Wheeler,

*Chaplain Stubbe recalled that the "People Sniffers" were bringing

back hundreds of contacts. He remembered in the 26th Marines command post, "the map with the little red dots on the plastic overlay, an d

everyone wondering if this might not be an error—the detections of

the ammonia from the urine of packs of monkeys ." Stubbe als o

observed that the Marines also realized that radio pattern analysi s

could err when the NVA put out false transmitters, " broadcasting a s

though they were a Hq thus drawing airstrikes on a lone transmitte r

in the hills rather than a NVA Hq . . . ." Notwithstanding these flaws ,

Stubbe contended eventually "together and coordinated, the intelligence was of great significance." Stubbe Comments.

**Accomplished without the knowledge of the American Ambassador, this allegedly agitated the Director of the Joint U .S . Publi c

Affairs Office, Saigon . See W. Scott Thompson and Col Donald D.

Frizzell, USAF, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York : Crane, Russak,

and Co ., 1977), p . 183 .

Photo C8543—7 from LBJ Library Collectio n

The situation at Khe Sanh has intense high level interest as

President Lyndon B. Johnson, right, is seen here studying a

map of Khe Sanh with Presidential Assistant Walt W. Rostow, left, and CIA Director Richard Helms.

USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent General Westmoreland a message in which he noted that

there had been " discussion around town in very high

non-military quarters" concerning the enemy's intentions at Khe Sanh . He outlined the two divergent

views which were food for thought among the highl y

placed, but unnamed, individuals who were concerned

about the coming battle . One view held that Khe Sanh

must be defended because it afforded an opportunity t o

draw large enemy forces to battle, then to destroy them

with a combination of superior firepower and a counterthrust into Laos. The other view strongly counsele d

abandoning Khe Sanh because " the enemy [was) building toward a Dien Bien Phu."3 0

On a superficial level, the situation at Khe Sanh

began to have a certain resemblance to Dien Bien Phu ,

14 years earlier.*** Both were remote outposts organized

***In November 1953, the French occupied and fortified the village

of Dien Bien Phu in northwest Tonkin . The Viet Minh besieged the outpost, capturing it in May 1954 after a dramatic battle involving great los s

of life on both sides . The fall of Dien Bien Phu was the final straw whic h

broke the back of French colonialism in Indochina, leading to the 195 4

Geneva Accords and the partitioning of the Associated States of Frenc h

Indochina into autonomous countries. In both his comments and hi s

book, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, who was CGFMFPac i n

1968, took strong exception to the Dien Bien Phu analogy. He observed

that militarily the differences far outweighed the similarities . He emphasized the vast advantages in both fire and the overall tactical situation tha t

the Americans possessed at Khe Sanh over the French at Dien Bien Phu .

LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 310ct1994

and First to Fight, pp . 215-16 .
66 THE DEFINING YEA R

around small airstrips in the highlands. They were

each served by a single light-duty road which, in both

cases, was cut by the enemy, and were forced to rely

upon air delivered supplies. In early 1954 the crachi n

restricted flying at Dien Bien Phu as it did at Khe

Sanh in early 1968.

The Dien Bien Phu analogy mentioned in Genera l

Wheeler's message dated back to at least January 1967 ,

well before it was touted and dissected in Washington's

" very high non-military quarters. " Even before th e

First Battle of Khe Sanh, the 3d Marine Division staff

prepared an informal document entitled "Khe San h

Area Report. " The report analyzed the terrain and situation which the French had encountered at Dien Bie n

Phu, comparing them to the terrain and possibl e

enemy action at Khe Sanh .3 1

MACV also made its comparison between the tw o

events, but after the enemy buildup . General Westmoreland ordered his command historian, Colonel

Reamer W. Argo, Jr., USA, to prepare a study on th e

siege of Dien Bien Phu and other "classic sieges" t o

determine how Khe Sanh fit into the historical precedent. With his study not completed until early February, Colonel Argo presented to the MACV staff th e

rather bleak conclusion that Khe Sanh was following

"the pattern of previous sieges" in which the advantag e

lay with the besieging forces rather than the defense . In

his diary, Westmoreland characterized the entire presentation "fraught with gloom . "3 2

Despite the chilling effect of Colonel Argo's stud y

upon his staff, General Westmoreland was determine d

that Khe Sanh could be held because the Marines

there had advantages which the French had lacked at

Dien Bien Phu. First, they controlled the hills which

dominated Khe Sanh, whereas the French had left the

commanding heights around Dien Bien Phu to th e

enemy in the mistaken belief that artillery could not

possibly be moved onto them through the rugged ter -

rain. Further, the French were strangled by lack of sufficient air transport and delivery capability to mee t

resupply needs. At Khe Sanh, the airstrip could now

handle the large C—130 cargo aircraft and, even whe n

weather or enemy fire precluded landing, modern U .S .

air delivery methods could ensure that the base

remained supplied. Probably most significant,

though, was the advantage in firepower which th e

Marines enjoyed . The French had supported Dien

Bien Phu with a few World War II-era aircraft flyin g

from distant bases to reach the battlefield at extrem e

range, thereby reducing their payload and "loite r

time" over the target area . The Marines at Khe Sanh

could expect massive and overwhelming fire suppor t

from modern, high-performance jet attack aircraft an d

Boeing B—52 Stratofortresses with their precision ,

high-altitude, heavy bombardment capability . Marine

artillery units at the combat base and on the hill positions, as well as 175mm guns based at Camp Carroll ,

could provide continuous all weather firepower.3 3

All of the American commanders on the scene ha d

no doubt about their ability to hold the base . Lieutenant General Cushman, the III MAF commander,

spoke for all of his Marine commanders when he later

stated, "I had complete confidence in my Marines . Of

course they were outnumbered, but we had beautiful

U.S. Army artillerymen from the Third Section, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery Regimen t

at Camp Carroll are seen firing a 175mm gun in support of the Marines at Khe Sanh . The MI07

175mm gun fired a 147poundprojectile and had a maximum range of nearly 20 miles.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801357
KHE SANH: BUILDING UP 6 7

air and artillery support." He remarked that whil e

weather was a factor the forecasts were that the weather would improve rather than deteriorate . As he concluded, "I was concerned but not worried about th e

battle ." While General Westmoreland, the MACV

commander had less confidence in the defensive measures taken by the Marines at the base, he later wrote

that his decision to hold Khe Sanh, "was to my mind

militarily sound and strategically rewarding ."34

Even while General Westmoreland ticked off the

reasons why Khe Sanh could be defended, the bigge r

question was: why should it be defended? General

Westmoreland later wrote :

Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking

enemy infiltration from Laos along Route 9 ; a base fo r

SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstri p

for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Min h

Trail; a western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ ;

and an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to

cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail . 3 5

General Westmoreland's proposal for a ground

operation against the Ho Chi Minh Trail took the form

of a planned invasion of Laos, codenamed Operation E l

Paso. Although planning for the operation continued

through January, MACV did not intend to execute i t

until fall or winter, after the northeast monsoon ha d

passed. General Westmoreland said he wanted the plan

to be ready in time for the November 1968 presidential elections " so that we would have a military pla n

that could take advantage of a possible change i n

national policy" 36

In addition to these reasons for defending Khe Sanh ,

General Westmoreland pointed to tactical considerations, noting that "had we not taken a stand in tha t

remote area, our forces would have inevitably bee n

required to fight in the more populous coastal areas

where the application of firepower would have bee n

hampered in order to protect civilians ."3 7

Lieutenant General Cushman was "in complete

agreement" with the decision to hold Khe Sanh, pointing out that, although the combat base did not really

deter infiltration, it was "a complete block to invasio n

and motorized supply." He further felt that it was necessary to retain bases like Khe Sanh because the y

allowed him to conduct mobile operations in the

enemy's base areas at a time when III MAF did no t

have enough troops effectively to cover all of the territory near the DMZ .38

Even General Krulak, who in 1966 had opposed th e

idea of large unit operations near Khe Sanh, no w

agreed with General Westmoreland, saying that while

"to withdraw would save lives that would otherwise b e

lost. . . . nobody ever won anything by backing away"3 9

Although agreeing with the need to defend Khe San h

once engaged, Krulak continued to insist that th e

Marines never should have been there in the first place .

He quoted General Giap as wanting to stretch "the

Marines as taut as a bow string and draw them awa y

from the populated areas."40 While the North Vietnamese continued to place pressure on the Marines at

Khe Sanh, General Krulak doubted that General Gia p

would engage the Americans on their terms. For Krulak, "Khe Sanh was an unsound blow in the air."4 1

The intentions of the North Vietnamese at Kh e

Sanh still are a subject of debate . In contrast to General Krulak, Army Brigadier General Philip B . Davidson, the MACV intelligence officer or J-2, later argue d

that General Giap meant for "Khe Sanh to be Phase III ,

the culmination of the Great Offensive, Great Uprising." Davidson maintained that the North Vietnames e

planned to overwhelm the American base with two t o

four divisions and end "the war with a stunning military victory."4 2

In one of their recapitulations of the Khe Sanh

experience in 1969, the North Vietnamese appeare d

to agree in part with elements of General Krulak's

analysis of their designs and also those of Genera l

Davidson and General Westmoreland . The Nort h

Vietnamese authors stated that the mission of th e

overall general offensive including Khe Sanh "was to

draw the enemy out [into remote areas), pin hi m

down, and destroy much of his men and means of

conducting war." Specifically, the Khe Sanh-Route 9

campaign portion of the overall offensive had severa l

aims, including the destruction of " an important portion of the enemy's strength, primarily the American." The North Vietnamese wanted to draw the U .S.

forces "out Route 9, the further the better," and then

"tie them down." The campaign called for close coordination with other North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

commands throughout South Vietnam, especiall y

with Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue . According to the

North Vietnamese study, the destruction of "enemy

strength and coordination with other battlefield s

[military regions) are the most fundamental [and )

important." The plan directed that North Vietnamese commanders "focus mainly on striking th e

enemy outside his fortifications," but "to strike th e

enemy in his fortifications when necessary an d

assured of probable victory."In effect, the North Vietnamese would take Khe Sanh if they could, but ther e

were limits to the price they were willing to pay.
68 THE DEFINING YEA R

Their main objectives were to kill American troop s

and to isolate them in the remote mountain borde r

region of western Quang Tri Province . 4 3

The Stage is Set

On 10 January, Colonel Lownds closed a regimenta l

staff meeting with the warning that he expected an

enemy attack within 10 days4 4 The Marines continue d

the unending process of "digging in" with the objectiv e

of providing every fighting position and important facility with overhead protection . Over the next few days,

patrols continued to engage the enemy. Units reported

that enemy sappers had cut the perimeter wire in som e

places, but had carefully replaced it to hide the cuts.

Lieutenant General Cushman wired Major General

Tompkins on 13 January to expect an attack on Kh e

Sanh to begin on the 18th. To meet the threat, III MAF,

he said, would give Khe Sanh priority on B—52 sorties,

effective 16 January. Further, General Cushman requested that two U.S . Army brigades be placed on 24-hour

alert for redeployment to ICTZ 45 The same day Colone l

Lownds ordered that all personnel within the Khe San h

Combat Base, starting on 15 January, would wear helmets and flak jackets and carry weapons at all times.4 6

On the afternoon of 14 January, Second Lieutenan t

Randall D. Yeary led a reconnaissance patrol bac k

towards friendly lines on Hill 881 South after four day s

in the jungle . As the patrol moved down the south

slope of Hill 881 North, one kilometer from their destination, the North Vietnamese caught them in a n

ambush. In the opening shots of the fight, an RP G

round killed Lieutenant Yeary and Corporal Richard J .

Healy. The six remaining men in the patrol, heavil y

outgunned and all but two wounded, withdrew, leaving the bodies behind. Nearby, under heavy fire, helicopters extracted the survivors. A platoon from Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines searched the are a

later and recovered the bodies47

Far to the south, as part of Operation Checkers, the

2d Battalion, 5th Marines occupied new positions a t

Marines at Khe Sanh, wearing their flak jackets, fill sandbags to reinforce bunkers from incomin g

artillery rounds. The Marines later came under criticism that they left too many positions vulnerable to the enemy bombardment.

Photo from 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68
KHE SANH: BUILDING UP 6 9

Phu Bai, freeing the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines to

redeploy to Dong Ha . On 15 January, while the latter

battalion moved into its new quarters at Dong Ha,

Major General Tompkins became concerned about the

increase in enemy probes against Khe Sanh . Deciding

that Colonel Lownds "didn't have enough people," h e

sent a message to III MAF advising that he intended t o

reinforce Khe Sanh . General Cushman concurred an d

at 1730, the 3d Marine Division contacted the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines and notified the commandin g

officer, Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Heath, Jr., tha t

his destination was changed to Khe Sanh .48

At 0715 the following day, Heath's Marines bega n

flying into Khe Sanh on board fixed-wing transpor t

aircraft and for the first time since arriving in Vietnam ,

the 26th Marines was together as a regiment 49 Whil e

the rest of the battalion occupied an assembly area nea r

the western edge of the airstrip, Company F marched

three kilometers north to Hill 558. Overlooking the

Song Rao Quan at a point where its valley opens

toward the combat base, Hill 558 was a good positio n

from which to control movement along the river. Company F reported that the hill was clear of the enemy an d

on 17 January, the rest of the battalion moved forwar d

and established a three-infantry company strongpoint . While the 2d Battalion was redeploying, General

Cushman inspected the defenses of Khe Sanh . Following the visit, he told General Tompkins that he

thought the combat base needed a better patrolling

plan, more seismic intrusion detectors, and additional

work on the fortifications. Of particular concern to

General Cushman was the ammunition storage area

which, he advised General Tompkins, needed " tidying

up." A large quantity of the base's ammunition was

stored outside the revetments, making it vulnerable to

enemy fire . Within a week, this last warning would

appear a prophecy.50*

*Army Lieutenant General Philip B. Davidson, the former MACV

J–2, wrote that on 20 January 1968 he visited the Khe Sanh base wit h

his counterpart on the III MAF staff to calk with Colonel Lownds abou t

the enemy buildup . While there, he noted the " tents, fuel ammunitio n

dumps, and command post—all above ground and unprotected . . . .

In reporting his discussion and what he saw to General Westmoreland ,

the latter became agitated about the "description of the unprotected

installations at Khe Sanh and the general lack of preparation to with -

stand heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire . . . ." Davidso n

recalled that Westmoreland turned to his deputy, General Creighton W .

Abrams, and said, "'Abe, you 're going to have to go up there and take

over. – According to Davidson, this was the prelude to the establishment of MACV (Forward). See Chapter 6 for further discussion relative

to MACV (Forward). LtGen Philip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War, The

History : 1946–1975 (Novato, CA : Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 554–56 .

The Marines at Khe Sanh were well aware of thei r

vulnerabilities. What had been a one-battalion outpost

in early December had now expanded to three battalions. With Route 9 closed, U .S . aircraft could keep th e

Marines supplied with adequate ammunition and

rations, but could only bring in limited heavy equipment and fortification material. Lieutenant Colonel

Frederick J. McEwan, the 26th Marines S-4, years late r

remembered that the artillery battalion's bulldoze r

"was one of the most valuable and overcommitte d

heavy equipment items. " According to McEwan, "i t

dug gun emplacements, ammo revetments, othe r

berms, . . . tank hull defilade positions, and was used

extensively and dangerously maintaining the land sanitation fill."5 1

In an attempt to disperse the ammunition, Lieu -

tenant Colonel McEwan provided for three storage

areas. He placed the main ammunition dump on th e

east end of the combat base, just off the runway an d

dug in with revetments, but it was filled to capacity.

Another ammunition dump was located on the west -

ern end of the airstrip near the artillery battalion, and

a third closer to the central area of the combat base .

As an expedient for further dispersion, he force fed as

much ammunition as feasible to the combat units .

Still, as Captain William J. O'Connor, commander o f

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh ,

recalled that he personally was "very concerned . . .

that the ammo dump was located between my are a

and the air strip ." It was obvious to him that its location would place his battery and the air strip "in jeopardy" and the target of enemy guns. O'Connor insisted that his men dig spider holes outside the gu n

emplacements and that they wear their helmets and

flak jackets.5 2

On 18 January, the 26th Marines reported another

sudden heavy increase in enemy sightings and activity. That afternoon, a reconnaissance team made contact with the enemy on Hill 881 North, suffering tw o

casualties and immobilizing the team . The 3d Platoon

of Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, moved ou t

from a patrol base nearby and rescued the team with -

out incident. The reconnaissance Marines, however,

lost a radio and a manual encryption device** during

the firefight.

**Called a " shackle sheet" by the Marines, this was simply a smal l

printed page containing letters and numbers arranged in random fashion with a key used to arrange them in a rudimentary code . It was used

to encrypt certain information, such as friendly positions, for transmission over the radio.
70 THE DEFINING YEAR

Captain William H . Dabney's Company I received

orders to search for the missing radio and codes. At dawn

on 19 January, the 1st Platoon, commanded by Second

Lieutenant Harry F. Fromme, departed Hill 881 Sout h

for the scene of the ambush. At 1200, while moving

along a finger which led northeast up to the crest of Hill

881 North, the platoon engaged a North Vietnames e

unit in defensive bunkers . Fromme and the platoon had

patrolled the hill before and noticed that the trail ha d

been altered, which alerted them to possible danger .5 3

Lieutenant Fromme called for mortar fire and

artillery as he led his platoon through the thick vegetation, attempting to maneuver against the Nort h

Vietnamese. When three Marines fell with wounds,

Private First Class Leonard E . Newton stood erect i n

the high kunai grass and fired his M60 machine gu n

from the shoulder, providing covering fire for other s

who attempted to rescue them. Even after the wounded Marines were carried to safety, Newton continued t o

stand, engaging North Vietnamese positions until h e

was killed in action .54 *

Fromme's Marines broke contact and returned t o

Hill 881 South with total casualties of one killed and

three wounded . Eight North Vietnamese were confirmed dead. The platoon did not find the missing

radio nor the code sheet .5 5

Captain Dabney, having a premonition that "some -

thing was about to happen," requested and received

permission to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force to Hil l

881 North with his entire company on the next day.

Marine helicopters brought in two platoons and a command group from Company M, 3d Battalion, 26th

Marines to Hill 881 South to help man the perimete r

during Company I's absence .5 6

Elsewhere around Khe Sanh, sightings of the enem y

continued unabated . Reconnaissance patrols reported

groups of as many as 35 North Vietnamese at a tim e

and listening posts detected enemy troops moving near

Marine positions.57 It seemed that Captain Dabney's

guess was correct : "something was about to happen . "

Sortie to Hill 881 North

Company I departed at 0500, 20 January, moving

through dense fog into the valley which separated

*For his courageous act, Private First Class Newton received th e

Silver Star, posthumously. Lieutenant Fromme remembered that New -

ton, who was right next to him, was killed in the "first few minutes o f

the fire fight ." The platoon's radioman "tried repeatedly to pull hi m

down ." Harry F. Fromme, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 27Nov9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Fromme Comments.

Hill 881 South from its neighbor to the north . Dabney split his company into two columns which

moved along parallel fingers about 500 meters apart.

On the left, Lieutenant Fromme and his 1st Platoo n

led the way, followed by the company command

group and Second Lieutenant Michael H . Thomas'

2d Platoon . In the column on the right marched Second Lieutenant Thomas D. Brindley's 3d Platoon

and the six Marines remaining from Company B, 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion who had participated i n

the patrol of 18 January.5 8

At 0900, the fog lifted as the Marines crossed th e

narrow valley floor and began the climb up Hill 88 1

North. As during the first part of their journey, the two

columns traveled along parallel fingers . Near the crest,

four small hills formed a line perpendicular to Company I's advance .

Thirty minutes into Company I's ascent, the

enemy opened fire from positions on one of the smal l

hills, forcing the 3d Platoon to the ground . The other

column surged forward on the left in an attempt t o

flank the North Vietnamese, but was almost immediately stopped by heavy fire from another enemy

strongpoint which caused several casualties . The

company "dug in" and called for fire support . Enemy

gunners shot down a Sikorsky UH—34 Sea Horse

helicopter from Marine Aircraft Group 36 attempting to pick up Company I's wounded, but the crew

escaped injury59* *

As Marine artillery fire fell on the enemy, the 3 d

Platoon, joined by the reconnaissance team ,

advanced once again, assaulting and overrunnin g

the nearest NVA positions, then continued to th e

top of the hill. Lieutenant Brindley charged to th e

crest of Hill 881 North at the head of his platoon ,

only to fall to a sniper's bullet, mortally wounded .** *

With the 3d Platoon now atop the hill but low o n

ammunition, suffering numerous casualties, an d

under heavy machine gun fire, Dabney committe d

his reserve . The 1st Platoon held fast and supporte d

by fire, while the 2d Platoon and command grou p

**Lieutenant Fromme remembered that " one of the more daring

moments happened after the chopper was hit . It 'slid ' off the left sid e

of the finger and down some 50 meters to the draw below ." Fromme

stated that his platoon sergeant took one of his squads to rescue th e

crew of the helicopter : " For me, it was 30 minutes of nerves. Still,

directing suppressing fire on the hill Brindley 's then Thomas' platoon s

were trying to take . I wonder to this day why the NVA on our finge r

did not attack at this moment ." Fromme Comments.

***Lieutenant Brindley received the Navy Cross, posthumously,

for the action on Hill 881 North .
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ALLIED AND ENEMY UNITS

IN THE KHE SANH AREA

JANUARY 1968

1000 2000 3000 00O

Meters1 I I I

KHE SANH: BUILDING UP 71

withdrew to the south, crossed to the finger on the

right then turned north again to reinforce the beleaguered 3d Platoon. Captain Dabney remembered

that at one time he called in an air strike that

"dropped napalm 100 meters from 3d Platoon to

end a counterattack."so

When the 2d Platoon reached the crest, Lieutenant Thomas learned that some Marines from the

3d Platoon and the reconnaissance team were missing. Some had fallen, wounded, during the attack,

while others had pursued the fleeing enemy only to

be wounded and cut off from the company forward

of the hilltop position. Thomas immediately organized a rescue effort, recovering six of the injured

Marines under murderous enemy fire. Wounded

himself while carrying out the sixth man, Thomas

refused evacuation and returned to search for the last

two. Moving under fire to rescue the Marines, he

was killed in action.61*

During the battle, the commanding officer of the

3d Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Alderman, flew to Hill 881 South with his command

group to find the two platoons of Company M and

the other Marines left atop the hill pouring recoilless

rifle and mortar fire into the North Vietnamese on

Hill 881 North as Company I fought at close quarters. Alderman asked Lownds for reinforcements to

help clear enemy resistance from Hill 881 North and

consolidate the new position. Lownds denied the

request, ordering Company I to break contact immediately and return to Hill 881 South. His reasons

would become known soon enough.

Using air strikes and artillery to cover its withdrawal, Company I backed down the face of Hill 881

*Lieutenant Thomas received the Navy Cross, posthumously, for

the action on Hill 881 North.
72 THE DEFINING YEA R

North and returned to Hill 881 South at 1800 . The

company lost 7 killed and 35 wounded. While withdrawing, it estimated at least 100 dead North Vietnamese on the face of the hill .62 *

The Enemy Plan Unfolds

While Company I battled what appeared to be a

Communist battalion for Hill 881 North, a rathe r

bizarre and fortuitous event took place at the comba t

base : the disclosure of the enemy plan for the attack on

Khe Sanh . At 1400 on 20 January the 2d Platoon ,

Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines reported that

a North Vietnamese soldier was waving a white flag

near its position on the northeastern perimeter of th e

combat base . The company commander, Captain Kenneth W. Pipes, took a fire team approximately 50 0

meters outside the lines where the Communist soldie r

*Army Colonel Bruce B . G. Clarke commented that on the 20th

as well, the Army advisors at the district headquarters led a small forc e

and patrolled an area to the south of the Khe Shan base, but withdre w

to make way for a B—52 strike . Clarke Comments.

willingly surrendered . The battalion commander,

Lieutenant Colonel James B. Wilkinson, questioned

the prisoner immediately after his capture and wa s

"impressed by his eagerness to talk ." 6 3

The rallier,** as he turned out to be, was Lieutenan t

La Thanh Tonc, the commanding officer of the 14th

Antiaircraft Company, 95C Regiment, 325C Division . He

freely provided detailed information on the enemy's

dispositions and plan of attack for Khe Sanh, including the fact that the North Vietnamese would attack

Hill 861 that very night. Coming as it did on the

heels of Company I's encounter with the enemy o n

nearby Hill 881 North, the information was plausible .

Colonel Lownds dispatched an officer courier to 3 d

Marine Division headquarters with the information .

The combat base and the hill positions were as read y

as possible under the circumstances . There was nothing left to do but wait . 64

**The term "rallier" was applied to North Vietnamese or Vie t

Cong who availed themselves of the "Chieu Hoi " ( " Open Arms " ) pro -

gram to defect to the Government of South Vietnam .
CHAPTER 5

The 3d Division War in Southern Quang Tri an d

Northern Thua Thien, Operations Osceola and Neosho

Protecting the Quang Tri Base, Operation Osceola, 1—20 January 196 8

Operation Neosho and Operations in the CoBi-Thanh Tan, 1—20 January 1968—Operation Checker s

Protecting The Quang Tri Base,

Operation Osceola, 1—20 January 196 8

Faced with the buildup of the North Vietnames e

forces opposing them at the end of 1967, General

Tompkins and the 3d Marine Division staff prepare d

for the forward deployment of the remaining divisio n

units in Operation Checkers from Thua Thien

Province to Quang Tri, including the movement of

the division command post from Phu Bai to Dong

Ha. In turn, the 1st Marines in southern Quang Tri

was to take over the 4th Marines TAOR in Thu a

Thien and then eventually revert to the control of th e

1st Marine Division .

The 1st Marines had moved north from Da Nang i n

early October 1967 to reinforce the 3d Marine Division and conduct Operation Medina. Medina was a

multi-battalion operation designed to clear the Hai

Lang National Forest, located south and west of Quang

Tri City and containing the enemy Base Area 101 . Base

Area 101, in the far southwestern reaches of the forest ,

extended down to and beyond the Quang Tri and Thu a

Thien provincial border, and was home to the 5th and

9th NVA Regiments. After offering resistance in a fe w

heavy skirmishes during the first phase of the operation, enemy forces eluded the Marines for the rest of th e

operation.* In the nearly impenetrable jungle terrain ,

the 1st Marines uncovered some enemy base camps an d

storage areas but no sign of NVA or VC troops. After

confiscating more than four tons of enemy rice an d

miscellaneous weapons and ammunition, the Marine s

ended Operation Medina on 20 October and immediately began Osceola . '

In Osceola, the 1st Marines with two battalions, th e

2d Battalion, 4th Marines and 2d Battalion, 1s t

Marines, remained in the same objective area, but also

* Colonel Gordon D . Batcheller, who as a captain commanded Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, observed that in the initial contac t

in Medina, the enemy more than held its own : "They were fast and agil e

and we were slow and clumsy. Terrain, vegetation, insufficient helo sup -

port had something to do with it ." Col Gordon D. Batcheller, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 10Dec1994 (Vietnam Comment File) .

became responsible for the newly established Quan g

Tri base, near the city of Quang Tri . Out of North Vietnamese heavy artillery range, the Quang Tri bas e

served as a backup to the main logistic base at Don g

Ha and provided a new air facility for the Marine force s

in the north. On 25 October, the first KC—130 trans -

port aircraft landed at the Quang Tri Airfield . 2

In command of the 1st Marines since July 1967 ,

Colonel Herbert E. Ing, Jr., an experienced and deco -

rated combat officer, viewed his Osceola mission differently than that of Medina. At the beginning of

Osceola, American intelligence warned that the Nort h

Vietnamese were reorganizing for an offensive against

Quang Tri City. Colonel Ing believed, however, that

Operation Medina and ARVN supporting operation s

had thwarted any such plan. As a native Long Islande r

and former enlisted Marine who shrewdly selected hi s

options, he took practical steps to safeguard the Quan g

Tri base and to cut down on his own casualties . Concentrating on defending the airbase rather than fruitless searches for enemy units in the jungle, Ing initiated a pacification campaign and organized an innovativ e

anti-mine program. 3

During Osceola, the 1st Marines only once engage d

an enemy main force unit, the VC 808th Battalion, a t

the edge of the Hai Lang National Forest near th e

Giang River, about four to five miles south of th e

Quang Tri base . The 808th and the 416th VC Battalions apparently alternated moving into the Quang Tri

coastal region to disrupt the South Vietnamese government apparatus there . The VC employed at least thre e

hamlets in the central portion of the Osceola operatin g

area, Nhu Le, Nhan Bieu, and Thuong Phuoc, all on o r

near the Thach Han River, as way stations for thei r

units travelling to and from the base areas into the populated coastal plain . Colonel Ing considered that securing or at least neutralizing these hamlets was absolutely vital to the success of his mission .4

Sustaining most of his casualties from mines and

occasional sniper rounds, Colonel Ing, on 27 November 1967, established an infantry cordon around Nh u

73
74 THE DEFINING YEAR

Le and Thuong Phuoc . Believing Nhu Le as the focal

point of the VC mining effort, Ing decided to install a

permanent company patrol base in the hamlet, whic h

resulted in a dramatic drop in mining and enemy incidents. On 15 December, however, the VC, using Nhan

Bieu as a staging and harbor area, mortared the Quan g

Tri Airfield . The Marines then occupied that hamlet .5

Ing, earlier, had initiated Operation Minefind. In

the first phase, the 1st Marines commander assigned a

Marine infantry company, reinforced by several engineer mine detector teams, to a 1,000-meter area .

While the infantry provided security, the mine detector teams would sweep the sector. During the second

phase of Operation Minefind, Ing inaugurated an

incentive program that appealed both to the Marines

and the local civilian population . The regiment

rewarded any Marine that uncovered a mine with fou r

days rest and recreation (R&R) within country an d

placed no restrictions on the number of times that a

Marine could receive such a reward . Using a fullfledged advertising campaign, including aerial broadcasts, dropping and passing out leaflets, and passing

the word by mouth during Marine Med CAP (Medical

Civilian Assistance Program) visits to the local ham -

lets, the 1st Marines promised money payments for al l

turned-in explosive devices .

This program soon gained positive results . In

November, the 1st Marines reported that its "Min e

Awards" strategy brought in 251 pieces of ordnance as

compared to some 50 items before the regiment initiated the program. By the end of the year, Marines

found over 300 explosive devices themselves and loca l

civilians turned in another 370 . Yet, the 2d Battalion,

4th Marines soon discovered that at least in one ham -

let, Thon Nai Bieu (2), the local children "experienced

a prosperous business in exchanging grenades fo r

reward money." The youngsters obtained grenades and

other ammunition from the South Vietnamese Popular

Force (PF) troops in the village and then brought them

to the Marines and claimed their reward . Lieutenant

Colonel William Weise, the battalion commander,

quickly established liaison with the village chief and

the practice became less flagrant . 6

Despite the obvious potential for fraudulent claims,

the program still saved lives. During the Christmas

truce, for example, a nine-year-old boy approached th e

PFs in Thon Nai Bieu (2) where the 2d Battalion' s

Company G had set up defensive positions. Through

an interpreter, he told the company commander, First

Lieutenant Richard L. Harshman, that the VC had

planted boobytraps. The boy then led the Marines to

the site where the troops uncovered a Chinese grenad e

and two antitank mines. In this case, Lieutenan t

Colonel Weise gladly presented the boy with a cas h

"Christmas gift ." 7

With two battalions assigned to him for Osceola ,

Colonel Ing had divided the area of operations int o

northern and southern sectors, largely demarcated b y

the Thach Han River. The northern battalion provided

protection to the airfield while the southern battalio n

secured the avenues of approach . Ing used small reconnaissance teams to patrol the further reaches of the

Osceola area under the protective cover of the attache d

artillery from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines . Occasionally the southern battalion would make a sorti e

into Base Area 101 or into the Ba Long Valley, usuall y

with only limited success.

During late December and early January there wa s

a reshuffling of infantry battalions in the Osceola operating area. In the southern sector, Lieutenant Colone l

Marcus J. Gravel's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines shortl y

before Christmas reverted to its parent regiment's control after a few months' stint at Con Thien . It relieved

the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Evan L. Parker, Jr., which took over the

Con Thien outpost. Shortly before New Year's Day, th e

1st Battalion, 3d Marines, under Lieutenant Colone l

Richard W. Goodale, formerly the SLF (Special Landing Force) battalion Alpha of the Seventh Fleet, left th e

operational control of the 9th Marines and came unde r

the 1st Marines. At noon on 1 January, Lieutenant

Colonel Goodale assumed command of the Osceol a

northern sector and responsibility for the security o f

the Quang Tri Airfield from Lieutenant Colonel Weise .

Early on the morning of 2 January, the 2d Battalion ,

4th Marines transferred to the direct control of the 3 d

Marine Division in preparation for becoming the new

battalion landing team (BLT) of SLF Alpha.s

This succession of units caused a minor disruptio n

of operations, especially in the northern sector. Wit h

its pending departure, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marine s

evacuated Nhan Bieu on 30 December. On 5 January,

however, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines reestablished

a company-size patrol base near Nhan Bieu and the

neighboring hamlet of An Don . The Company A

commander, Captain David Hancock, formed a pro -

visional rifle company consisting of his 2d and 3 d

Platoons reinforced by a South Vietnamese Popular

Forces (PF) platoon from Mai Linh District . Hancock,

together with an improvised command group, the

battalion civil affairs officer, and an artillery forwar d

observer team, linked up with the PFs and two South
OPERATIONS OSCEOLA AND NEOSHO 7 5

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A80110 1

An aerial view in June 1968 shows a much more built-up Quang Tri base and airfield than tha t

seen in January during Operation Osceola. The Thach Han River can be seen in the background an d

Route 1 and a secondary road in the foreground.

Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Teams at the Quang

Tri bridge spanning the Thach Han River on Rout e

1 . By 1830, the combined force had established it s

base area and constructed its night defensive positions. The company was to conduct "extensive operations in this area to destroy guerrilla forces and the

local infrastructure ." 9

On this same date, the battalion's Company B ,

under Captain Thomas A . Scheib, in its sector about

2,000 meters to the west of Nhan Bieu, came under

heavy machine gun fire . The Marines returned th e

fire and killed at least one of the enemy. In the search

for the enemy weapon, the Americans found the VC

body, some miscellaneous clothing, and an AK—4 7

rifle. During the survey of the enemy effects, one

Marine tripped a wire and detonated an attached

block of TNT. The explosion resulted in one seriously wounded Marine, who was evacuated by helicopte r

to Quang Tri .l o

The continued occupation of Nhan Bieu and Nhu

Le appeared to stabilize the situation for Lieutenan t

Colonel Goodale in his base defense mission . Together with the South Vietnamese village chiefs and district officials, the Marines instituted an extensive civi l

affairs and psychological operations campaign, whic h

according to the 1st Marines, "showed every sign o f

being a success." l

Yet, areas of ambiguity continued to exist . On the

night of 10 January, Captain Hancock staked out tw o

ambushes near Nhan Bieu . About 2315, one of them

reported movement and requested illumination . The

Marines saw six shadowy figures enter a tree line .
76 THE DEFINING YEA R

About then, the other Marine outpost received incoming small arms fire and someone threw a grenade int o

their positions. The Marines responded with their ow n

salvo, including M—79 rounds. In the confusion and

darkness, the enemy broke contact and slipped away.

The next morning, the Nhan Bieu hamlet chief notified Captain Hancock that the VC had murdered a villager during the night. A subsequent investigation disclosed that the 60-year old man may have died as a

result of "friendly fire ." Many questions still remained :

What was he doing in the woods during the night an d

why did the village chief blame the killing on th e

enemy? There probably were no good answers.1 2

While maintaining a presence in the hamlets, Lieutenant Colonel Goodale attempted to keep the enemy

off balance with an occasional excursion into the

foothills and numerous river valleys in his western sector. In one typical such operation on 14 January,

Goodale launched a two-company "hammer and

anvil" assault against a suspected enemy main forc e

battalion in the area. At 0730, the battalion command

group together with Company D, "the anvil," occupied the hamlet of Ai Tu about 2,000 meters west of

the airfield. Company D then moved another 2,00 0

meters further west and settled into a blocking position in the high ground along a secondary road, Rout e

604, leading off Route 1, and south of the Vinh Phuo c

River. The "hammer" company, Company B, located

2,000 meters south, then advanced along a stream be d

to the north, hoping to smash any Viet Cong or NVA

against Company D .

Shortly after beginning its advance, Company B

encountered small arms fire, about 30 rounds, from its

front. The Marines responded with their M—16s an d

60mm mortars. After progressing another 2,00 0

meters without resistance, the company agai n

engaged the VC, in this instance calling upon artillery

support. At the same time, about 0900, the Viet Con g

hit a Company D position with about 20 rounds . Fifteen minutes later, members of a Marine Combine d

Action Platoon (CAP), attached to Company B for the

operation, saw seven North Vietnamese soldiers in th e

open, carrying weapons and packs, attempting t o

flank the advancing Marines. The CAP warned Company B and called artillery down upon the enem y

troops. Company B received some sniper fire from its

rear, but otherwise met no further opposition . By

noon, the two Marine companies had linked together.

The casualty scoreboard was about even : the Marine s

sustained one wounded man from Company B and

found no enemy bodies .13

The reconnaissance Marines attached to the 1s t

Marines and the southern battalion, Lieutenan t

Colonel Gravel's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, played

much the same "cat and mouse" game with the NVA

and VC, occasionally with more success . On 2 January,

Gravel conducted a two-company operation abou t

three to five miles southwest of Quang Tri City just

north of the Thach Han River. Acting on intelligence

that a NVA battalion commander, a Captain Min h

Chau of the 4th Quyet Tien Battalion, had established his

command post in Thuong Phuoc on the northern ban k

of the river, the Marine battalion secured the hamlet . A

search for the NVA command group proved fruitless ,

but the battalion, based on its intelligence information ,

uncovered an NVA "harbor" site in the hills abou t

three miles west of Thuong Phuoc . The site contained

a kitchen and a personnel bunker large enough to

accommodate nine persons. After destroying the

enemy site, the Marines returned to their base area .

During the operation, a Company C patrol near a ben d

in the river saw 13 enemy troops in green uniforms an d

took them under both rifle and artillery fire, killing at

least one . In his January report, the battalion intelligence officer noted that during the day the battalion

sighted some 57 enemy at ranges of 500 meters o r

more and brought them under artillery fire . The battalion claimed killing 10 of the enemy, although thes e

figures are not confirmed in the regimental account .' 4

Two days later, on 4 January, a reconnaissance tea m

from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion at 1415 engaged

about 12 NVA in about the same area where the 1st

Battalion, 3d Marines' operation on 14 January took

place . The team killed two of the enemy, recovered two

AK—47 rifles, a pistol, a pair of binoculars, a walle t

containing 5,500 piasters, and miscellaneous papers ,

rice, and clothing .1 5

On the 14th, another team from the 3d Force

Reconnaissance Company, perched on the high groun d

overlooking the Thach Han River, saw about 30 NVA

"with full equipment, helmets, and heavy packs" and

one .50-caliber machine gun moving south toward s

the river. The Marines called an airstrike on the enemy,

but were unable to observe the results. These NVA

may have been from the same North Vietnamese units

that were attempting to evade the two 1st Battalion ,

3d Marines companies to the north .1 6

Throughout the operation, Lieutenant Colone l

Gravel's 1st Battalion continued to see daily enemy

troop movement in small groups of two to eight in the

rolling hills south of its combat base at Lang Va, nort h

along the Thach Han River, and across the river in the
cuAvrn:Q' OPERATIONS OSCEOLA

NAPOLEON AND NEOSHO

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JANUARY 1968

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OPERATIONS OSCEOLA AND NEOSHO 77

1st Battalion, 3d Marines' sector. According to the battalion January report, the battalion Marines counted

166 enemy sightings, not including the 57 reported

during the two-company sortie across the Thach Han

on 2 January. Most of these sightings were at distances

of 500 meters or further. The Marines would either call

artillery or, if the enemy were within range, open up

with small arms. In either event, the Marines seldom

found out how effective their fire was upon the enemy.

They did know the NVA and VC kept coming.'7

The battalion's biggest catch occurred on 16 January. A patrol from Captain Gordon D. Batcheller's

Company A came across a wounded North Vietnamese

officer in the hills south of the village of Hai Phu. The

officer, First Lieutenant Nguyen Van Dinh, was the

assistant company commander of the 1st Company, K.8

(808th) Battalion. A South Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Team had shot Lieutenant Dinh during a reconnaissance he was making of the La Vang and Quang Tn

City vicinity. He apparently was trying to make his

way back to his base area when the Marines captured

him. According to a diary that the enemy lieutenant

carried on him, Dinh had participated in a December

attack on a Marine position just south of Hai Phu.18

Two days later, Captain Merrill J. Lindsay's Company C encountered a significant number of North Vietnamese, south of the Hai Le hamlets, a village complex

bordering the Tlìach Han. At 0945, two VC nearly

walked into a Marine position in the hills south of the

village. The Marines opened fire and killed both of

them and captured one carbine. Later that evening,

about 1730, another Marine patrol from Company C

encountered about 12 khaki-uniformed NVA just Outside Hai Le. In the exchange of fire, the Marines slew

another enemy soldier and recovered a submachine

gun. One hour later, in about the same area, the
78 THE DEFINING YEA R

Marines saw another 10 NVA in the open and too k

them under mortar, grenades, and small arms fire . The

result was another dead enemy. Company C apparently intercepted an enemy force either trying to enter Hai

Le or more likely, trying to reach the river for operations closer to Quang Tri City.1 9

Despite the sudden flurry of activity, Operation

Osceola for the 1st Marines was drawing to a close . The

operation officially terminated at midnight on the

20th.20 For the entire operation, the 1st Marines report -

ed killing 76 enemy troops, 21 of them during January, at a cost of 17 dead Marines and 199 wounded . In

addition, the Marines took prisoner one VC and thre e

NVA. From 1 to 20 January, the Marines sustaine d

casualties of 26 wounded and no dead as compared t o

7 dead and 70 wounded during December. The

December figures were somewhat skewed by the mortar attack on the airfield which accounted for 1 of the

dead and 40 of the wounded . Despite the relatively few

enemy dead, Colonel Ing considered the operation a

success. He pointed to his "Operation Minefind"

which accumulated 377 explosive devices uncovere d

by Marines and another 370 pieces of ordnanc e

brought in by civilians. Ing believed that this program

together with the occupation of key hamlets and constant patrolling rendered "a most effective enemy

weapon virtually ineffective and drastically reduced th e

number of Marine casualties incurred as a result o f

mines." Most significantly, with the one exception of

the mortar attack on the airfield, the 1st Marines protected the increasingly important Quang Tri base wit h

its growing logistic facilities from enemy attack.

Although enemy units in the Quang Tri sector were on

the move, they seemed deliberately to avoid Marin e

patrols and positions.2 1

Operation Neosho and Operations in the

CoBi-Thanh Tan, 1—20 January 1968

Further south, in the CoBi-Thanh Tan sector o f

northern Thua Thien Province, during January, the

remaining 3d Marine Division regiment, the 4th

Marines at Camp Evans, was winding up Operatio n

Neosho. Like Osceola and the DMZ codenamed operations, Neosho was a permanent area of operations

rather than a tactical campaign with short-term

objectives. Marine units had been operating in th e

CoBi-Thanh Tan since the spring of 1966 and the 4t h

Marines had established its command post at Camp

Evans in December of that year. In 1967, the regiment continued to run operations in the region,

changing the name designation from time to time fo r

the usual reporting and record-keeping purposes . On

1 November 1967, Operation Fremont became

Operation Neosho with the same units and in the

same area of operations. 22

The area of operations stretched from the My Chanh

River south to the river Bo, a distance of some 1 4

miles. From west to east, from the fringes of the enem y

Base Area 114 to Route 1, the sector consisted of 1 7

miles of jungled mountainous and hilly terrain . East o f

the Marine operating area lay the infamous "Street

Without Joy, " a coastal strip of interlocking hamlets

extending 20 miles north and south .* Since the days o f

the French War against the Viet Minh, the "Street" had

been a Communist bastion . The enemy had long used

the CoBi-Thanh Tan Valley, the opening of which was

located seven miles south of the Phong Dien distric t

capital, Phong Dien City, as the avenue of approach

from their mountain base area into the "Street With -

out Joy." From Camp Evans near Route 1, three mile s

south of Phong Dien, the 4th Marines could sortie int o

the valley to impede the movement of NVA and VC

regulars into the coastal lowlands. The regiment also

maintained manned outposts on two pieces of strategi c

ground. These were Hill 51, about 4,000 meters nort h

of the valley opening, and Hill 674, about 2,00 0

meters south of the valley. From Hill 674, which dominated the surrounding peaks, the Marines had established a radio relay station to ensure adequate voic e

communication within the operating area .

On 1 November 1967, at the start of Operatio n

Neosho, Colonel William L. Dick, the 4th Marines

commander, a veteran of four World War II campaign s

including Iwo Jima, had three infantry battalions an d

one artillery battery under his operational control . At

Camp Evans, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines provided

security for the regimental command post, the artiller y

battalion, the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, and sup -

porting forces. The two remaining infantry battalions ,

BLT 1/3, the SLF Alpha battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, were conducting a subsidiary operation to Neosho, Operation Granite, south of CoBi -

Thanh Tan, and west of Hill 674 .23

In Granite, the Marines encountered their stiffes t

opposition during Operation Neosho in 1967 . Wit h

its 1st Battalion under its command together with th e

*"The Street Without Joy " also refers to that portion of Route I.

from Quang Tri to Hue as well as the coastal strip . See Bernard 13 . Fall ,

Street Without Joy (Harrisburg, Pa .: Stackpole Company, 4th edition ,

1965), pp . 144-47 .
OPERATIONS OSCEOLA AND NEOSHO 7 9

Photo from 12th Mar ComdC, Jan69

An aerial view of Camp Evans (in and below the cross hairs) in the CoBi-Thanh Tan sector wa s

taken a year after Operation Neosho . Like the Quang Tri Base, Evans had expanded during the

period, but one can see Route 1 in the foreground and the main road network.

attached SLF battalion, the 4th Marines attempted t o

penetrate the NVA Base Area 114 . According to allie d

intelligence, the base area contained both the head -

quarters of the 6th NVA Regiment and the Tri Thien Hue

Front. Operating in the inhospitable approaches to th e

enemy base area from 25 October through 6 November 1967, the Marine units brushed up against tw o

battalions of the 6th NVA Regiment, the 800th and

802d. In scattered, but hard-fought skirmishes, th e

Marines took casualties of 25 killed and more than 80

wounded while accounting for approximately 20 NVA

dead and recovering 7 enemy weapons. According t o

the regimental report, "the enemy employed delayin g

tactics utilizing the terrain and vegetation to his

advantage ." Sergeant Ron Asher with Company C,

BLT 1/3 remembered that the "last few nights were

bad. Not only wet and leeches, but constant harassing

and probing at very close ranges. "2 4

After the closeout of Operation Granite, the 4t h

Marines had a reduced number of battalions availabl e

to it for Neosho. The SLF battalion deployed to

Quang Tri Province and transferred to the operational

control of the 9th Marines. After a three-company

sweep south of the Bo River back into the CoBi -

Thanh Tan, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and a command group of the 4th Marines conducted Operatio n

Cove from 18 through 21 November in the Phu Loc

sector south of Phu Bai. Upon its return from Phu Bai

to Camp Evans on 22 November, the 1st Battalion

immediately departed for Dong Ha where it also came

under the 9th Marines. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Camp Evans and

relieved the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines for the defense

of the base and manning the outposts on Hills 51 and

674. The 3d Battalion then in conjunction with the

ARVN returned to the CoBi-Thanh Tan where it con -

ducted small-unit patrols and company-size sweeps .

On 13 December, the battalion rejoined its paren t

regiment at Khe Sanh to counter the enemy buildu p

there . Neosho now consisted of the 4th Marines head -

quarters, detachments from the 3d Reconnaissanc e

Battalion, the artillery battalion, the 3d Battalion ,

12th Marines, and only one infantry battalion, the 1s t

Battalion, 9th Marines.25

Despite the relatively low casualty figures on bot h

sides recorded in Operation Neosho through the end of
80 THE DEFINING YEA R

December, both General Tompkins, the 3d Marin e

Division commander, and Colonel Dick remained concerned about enemy intentions in both the CoBiThanh Tan corridor and in the coastal region of northern Thua Thien Province, especially in the "Stree t

Without Joy" sector. The total of 24 enemy dead i n

Neosho at a cost of 4 Marines killed and 66 wounded

reflected neither the casualties in Operation Granit e

nor the SLF Bravo operation Badger Tooth . Badger

Tooth took place in the "Street" from 26—28 Decembe r

in and near the coastal hamlet of Thom Tham Khe just

north of the Quang Tri-Thua Thien border. In the

operation, the SLF battalion, BLT 3/1, suffered 48 dead

and 86 wounded while inflicting only 30 casualties on

the enemy.* To the southwest in Neosho, furthermore ,

Marine reconnaissance patrols continued to report the

heavy movement of enemy forces eastward through th e

CoBi-Thanh Tan. One battalion of the NVA 6th Regiment, the 802d Battalion, had supposedly departed the

valley for the Phu Loc District south of Phu Bai . The

other battalions of the regiment remained in the CoBi -

Thanh Tan either to screen the approaches to Base Area

114 or to move into the coastal lowlands when the

opportunity presented itself.2 6

At the end of December 1967, General Tompkins

provided General Cushman, the III MAF commander,

his thoughts about the situation in the CoBi-Thanh

Tan and the "Street Without Joy" sectors . He recommended that Cushman obtain the authorization for

another SLF operation in the Badger Tooth area t o

"upset long range plans of Tri Thien Hue forces in the

coastal area and along routes to their vital base are a

114." According to Tompkins' plan, the SLF battalio n

would land around 6 January 1968 in the former Badger Tooth amphibious operational area (AOA) and sta y

about five days there . The BLT then would come under

the operational control of the 3d Marine Division and

*Colonel John F. Mitchell, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at the time, remembered that hi s

Company A was supposed to link up with BLT 3/1 in Badger Tooth a t

a river crossing about 10 kilometers from the SLF landing site . Helicopters lifted the Marine company into its objective area, but the SL F

unit had to abort its part of the mission after the fire fight in Tho m

Tham Khe . With the permission of Colonel Dick, Mitchell took a reinforced platoon from his Company D and mounted tracked vehicles provided by an ARVN armored unit and "blitzed 9,000 meters into th e

sand dunes. " With this support, Company A was able to disengag e

from a VC force and return to Camp Evans . According to Mitchell ,

Colonel Dick called this operation "'Rommel 's War. – Col John F.

Mitchell, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Commen t

File). See also Col William L . Dick, Comments on draft chapter, dt d

1Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dick Comments.

4th Marines and move into the CoBi-Thanh Tan corridor. It would remain in the valley for another nine day s

to disrupt the continuing infiltration of the NVA regulars into the coastal lowlands. Tompkins mentioned

some 27 sightings in the past month of enemy troo p

movements in the CoBi-Thanh Tan, some consisting o f

forces as large as 150 to 450 men .2 7

Despite the obvious increase of enemy activity i n

the CoBi-Thanh Tan, neither III MAF nor the Seventh

Fleet had the capability of reinforcing the 4th Marine s

there at the beginning of the year. SLF Alpha was i n

the midst of an exchange of units while BLT 3/1, the

SLF Bravo battalion, had taken heavy casualties in the

Badger Tooth operation and needed time to recuperate . With the buildup of enemy forces along the DMZ an d

near Khe Sanh, General Cushman had few units t o

spare for operations in the CoBi-Thanh Tan .

At the beginning of 1968, Colonel Dick, the 4t h

Marines commander, had little choice but to continue

the same mode of operations in Neosho that he had

used since the departure of the 3d Battalion, 26t h

Marines to Khe Sanh . He later credited the 15th Interrogation and Translation Team (ITT), headed by Staff

Sergeant Dennis R. Johnson, which had a small facility at Camp Evans, for providing much needed intelligence through a network of village chiefs .28

The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John F. Mitchell, continued to man outposts on Hills 51 and 674, provid e

company-size reaction forces when needed, and con -

duct sweeps along Route 1 and "saturation patrollin g

and ambushing in known avenues of approach withi n

5,000 meters of the Camp Evans perimeter." Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell remembered that he receive d

"detailed briefings" from Colonel Dick and the 4t h

Marines staff on the situation and terrain . The battalion worked with the village chiefs to improve security in the sector. Mitchell assigned one of his companies to work directly with the local militia force, a

Regional Force company. The RFs would raid suspected VC hamlets, while the Marines made up th e

blocking force . While the technique often resulted i n

prisoners and captured documents, Mitchell late r

admitted that to be truly successful it require d

" longevity, stability, continuity, and prior training of

Marine personnel," conditions which "did not exist a t

this time of the war."29

The 4th Marines relied heavily on the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion detachments for the deeper insertions to monitor enemy movement, especially in the

CoBi-Thanh Tan corridor. Although the reconnais-
OPERATIONS OSCEOLA AND NEOSHO 8 1

sance Marines enjoyed some success in calling i n

artillery and air to disrupt the infiltration of the North

Vietnamese regulars, the enemy had begun to take

effective countermeasures. The worst incident occurre d

on 2 January 1968. That day about 0900, under cove r

of a slight drizzle and morning fog, a Marine helicopte r

inserted an eight-man patrol from Company A, 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion on a hill near the CoBi -

Thanh Tan ridgeline, about 8,000 meters southeast o f

Camp Evans. The hill offered in good weather an excel -

lent view of the valley and Route 554, which served the

NVA as a natural infiltration route into the coasta l

region. The specific missions of the patrol were t o

determine the nature of enemy activity in the area, cal l

in artillery and air on targets of opportunity, and, i f

possible, take a prisoner.3 °

The patrol maintained its outpost on an outcrop -

ping of the hill . In the belief that the two-feet-high elephant grass on the knoll concealed their presence, th e

Marines failed to lay out claymore mines, but did

deploy in a circular defensive perimeter. In an eighthour period, the Marines only saw enemy movemen t

on two occasions. In the first, about an hour after arriving at their outpost, they sighted one enemy soldier,

who filled his canteen at a nearby stream, and then continued on in a southwest direction . About five hours

later, five more North Vietnamese soldiers came int o

view along the same route as the first . Well-camouflaged with brush, the "enemy appeared to fall down

and disappear from view."3 1

For another two hours, the Marines observed no

enemy activity. As evening came on, about 1715, th e

patrol unexpectedly came under attack . Under cove r

of a grenade barrage and heavy machine gun fire ,

about 10 to 15 enemy soldiers rushed the Marine positions. Completely taken by surprise, the American s

responded with their own automatic weapons an d

grenades, "but initial casualties reduced effectiv e

return fire." Still, the Marines saw three enemy soldiers felled by their counterfire . The patrol called in a n

"on call" artillery mission, but was unable to determine its effectiveness.3 2

Of the eight men in the defensive perimeter on the

hill, only two survived. Marine Private First Class

James P Brown recalled that "things happened so

fast—the enemy was all around us." The other survivor, the patrol radioman, Marine Private First Class

James S. Underdue, remembered that he rolled over t o

attend to the wounds of a downed comrade when a bullet grazed his temple . His sudden movement probabl y

saved his life . At that point, the patrol leader, a corporal, yelled for the remaining men to get out the best

they could. As Underdue moved away, a grenade blas t

killed the corporal. Underdue and Brown both took

refuge in a bomb crater about 200 meters down the

hill. From the crater, they saw U.S . helicopters circlin g

overhead . According to Underdue, they tried to attrac t

the attention of the pilots by waving a green undershir t

but that action failed to do so: "One chopper landed

briefly and we thought they had spotted us. But they

took off again. I suppose the canopy was too thick . "

Shortly afterward a Marine air observer reported tha t

he saw the bodies of six Marines on the hill.3 3

After the departure of the helicopter, Underdue and

Brown took off in the direction of Camp Evans .

Although without a compass, the sound of American

artillery provided a bearing for the two Marines . The

artillery bombardment soon intensified and the two

men "burrowed a hole and settled down to wait . "

Brown recalled, "several times I thought I heard people approaching us but it was shrapnel whistlin g

through the undergrowth." They waited for th e

artillery to stop and then continued on . Private First

Class Underdue remembered, "the most we stoppe d

for was a minute to catch our breath . We had no water

and hadn't eaten in two days. " 34

The morning of the following day, 3 January, th e

two men crossed an open paddy and then saw what

they believed to be "a column of troops" on the crest o f

a nearby hill . The hill was actually Hill 51 manned b y

Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.

About the same time Underdue and Brown spotted the

Marines on the hill, a lookout from Company B on the

outpost sighted them and " reported two unidentified

personnel. " The company commander, Captain Rober t

T. Bruner, then sent out a patrol to determine if they

were VC or friendly. For a short period, the survivors

and the Marine patrol played a "cat and mouse game . "

Fording a small stream, Underdue and Brown suddenly came face-to-face with the point man of the Company B patrol . According to Brown, "for a moment it

looked as if he were going to open up on us. They

seemed just as nervous and scared as we were ." Within

40 minutes, the two reconnaissance Marines were bac k

at Camp Evans.3 5

At this point, Colonel Dick ordered Lieutenan t

Colonel Mitchell, the commanding officer of the 1s t

Battalion, 9th Marines, to recover the bodies and

equipment of the ill-fated reconnaissance patrol. In

turn, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell directed Captai n

Francis L. Shafer, Jr., the Company D commander,

maintaining a patrol base near Route 554, about 7,000
82 THE DEFINING YEA R

meters west of Hill 51, to carry out the mission . Reinforced by an engineer team and a forward air contro l

team, two Company D platoons on 4 January boarde d

Marine CH—46s to accomplish the grisly task . Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell himself boarded the comman d

helicopter, accompanied the mission, and picked th e

landing zone. While one platoon went into a landin g

zone near where the reconnaissance team was overrun ,

the other remained airborne ready to assist the secon d

platoon if necessary. The first platoon found all six bod -

ies and most of the equipment undisturbed by the

enemy. Two M—16s and two radios were missing.

Loading the dead men and their gear on the helicopters, the Company D Marines returned to thei r

patrol base while the CH—46s took the bodies an d

equipment back for identification and examination .36

While the Company D Marines encountered no

enemy troops, they found ample evidence that the

attack on the reconnaissance Marines was not a chanc e

encounter. From the fresh shell craters near the site, i t

was obvious the enemy had used mortars to support

the infantry. The failure of the reconnaissance Marine s

to move from their initial " insertion point" permitted

the enemy time "to adequately prepare for the

attack. " After interviewing the survivors, the Marine

debriefer concluded that the enemy force that so care -

fully planned the ambush was "the most highl y

trained unit yet encountered by Recon teams on th e

CoBi-Thanh Tan Ridge ." He believed that the effectiveness of previous Marine reconnaissance patrols i n

the sector and the calling in of artillery on enem y

units moving in the valley "prompted this enem y

counter-reconnaissance action ."3 7

Despite the disastrous results of the reconnaissanc e

patrol of 2 January, the 4th Marines continued to

monitor and inflict as much punishment as it coul d

upon the enemy units infiltrating into the coasta l

region. On 7 January, a Marine aerial observer directed fixed-wing and artillery strikes against enemy

bunkers and troops in the CoBi-Thanh Tan, abou t

2,000 meters southeast of Hill 51 resulting in a secondary explosion. The following day, Company A,

under the command of Captain Henry J . M. Radcliffe ,

thwarted an attempt of the Communists to interdic t

Route 1, about 5,000 meters east of Hill 51 . After

studying available intelligence and previous minin g

incidents with Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell and th e

battalion intelligence officer, Radcliffe had establishe d

a squad ambush in a known enemy infiltration rout e

into the Marine area of operations. Close to midnight,

the VC triggered the ambush . The Marines killed five

of the enemy, took two prisoners, and captured two

150-pound bombs that the VC were transporting fo r

use as "surprise explosive devices on Route 1 in th e

vicinity of Camp Evans ."38

For the next week and a half, the Marine operation s

in Neosho followed the same pattern . For example, on

15 January, an aerial observer controlled both airstrike s

and artillery in the eastern edge of the CoBi-Thanh Tan

on an enemy-held fortified hamlet on the west bank of

the Bo River. The bombardment resulted in two secondary explosions, the death of seven enemy troops, and

the destruction of five bunkers . Four days later, 19 Jan -

uary, about 4,000 meters south of Hill 51, a Compan y

C squad in an ambush site observed about 36 Nort h

Vietnamese moving along Route 554. The squad leader

reported the sighting to his company commander on

Hill 51, Captain John W. Craigle . Craigle dispatched

two more squads to intercept the NVA. An aerial.

observer in a fixed-wing spotter aircraft arrived overhead and called an artillery mission on the enemy. The

two Marine squads then "deployed on line" and "swep t

the area." After a brief firefight, the North Vietnamese

"broke contact and moved south into the mountains. "

The enemy left behind six bodies, one AK—47 and several documents. The documents confirmed the Communist supply routes in the CoBi-Thanh Tan . Finally,

on the following day, 20 January, Marines captured an

NVA sergeant and two VC officials, who "pinpointe d

Viet Cong and NVA supply routes, methods and time s

of resupply, enemy movement and other important tactical information of Viet Cong and NVA activity in the

CoBi-Thanh Tan Valley."3 9

The 4th Marines was about to close out Operatio n

Neosho. Through 20 January, the regiment accounted

for 53 enemy dead during the month at a cost of 4

Marines killed and 34 wounded . The total results for

Neosho, not including the figures for Operation s

Granite or Badger Tooth, were 77 enemy dead, 9 prisoners, and 10 captured weapons. Marines sustained a

total of 12 dead and 100 wounded. Although the 4th

Marines somewhat hampered the enemy infiltratio n

through the CoBi-Thanh Tan, the regiment was hardly in a position to prevent it.* According to Colone l

Dick, the regimental commander, "We were fightin g

on their [NVA} terms . . . , [and the) enemy was willing to pay the price . "4 0

*Colonel Dick several years later remembered that although he did

not know the specific numbers of enemy moving through the valley, the y

were very large . He wrote : " Groups of several hundred [NVA or VC] were

repeatedly sighted" by one regimental outpost alone . Dick Comments.
OPERATIONS OSCEOLA AND NEOSHO 8 3

Operation Checkers

By this time, Operation Checkers in the 3d Marine

Division was in full swing . On 15 January, Major General Tompkins turned over the responsibility of the

Phu Bai TAOR to the 1st Marine Division Task Force

X-Ray and moved his command post to Dong Ha . He

left behind at Phu Bai newly arrived Brigadier General Jacob E. Glick, the former commander of the 9th

Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) on Okinawa, wh o

had just replaced Brigadier General Lewis Metzger a s

the assistant division commander. At Phu Bai, Glic k

had command of the 3d Division rear headquarters and

support units, which he was to move to the Quang Tri

base at the beginning of February. With the implementation of Operation Checkers,

the Marine regiments in the division began playing a

version of musical chairs. The 4th Marines in Operation Neosho in Thua Thien Province was to take over

Operation Lancaster in the central DMZ sector from

the 3d Marines. In turn, the 3d Marines was to accep t

responsibility for the Osceola area. The 1st Marines was

then to move its command post to Camp Evans an d

undertake operations in the Neosho sector . 4 1

Since the beginning of the month, the three regiments had made preparations for the forthcoming

move . For example, on 6 January, the 1st Marines commander, Colonel Ing, issued his order relative to the

transplacement of tactical areas . From 6—20 January,

armed "rough rider" truck convoys ferried his headquarters staff sections and attached detachments from

the 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Engineer Battalion, the 1st

Shore Party Battalion, 1st Medical Battalion, the 1st

Motor Transport Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 11th

Marines the approximate 20 miles to Camp Evans.

Battery A and the Mortar Battery from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines also made the move. At 0940 on 20

January, the 1st Marines opened its new command post

and assumed operational control of the 1st Battalion,

9th Marines at Evans. At the same time, Colonel Ing

turned over to Colonel Joseph E. Lo Prete of the 3 d

Marines the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, which both remained in the Osceola area of operations. At Camp Carroll, Colonel Dick,

the 4th Marines commander, took control of the 2 d

and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines and began Operation

Lancaster 11 . 4 2 *

Events once more altered plans as MACV and III

MAF shifted units and rushed reinforcements to mee t

the perceived threat to Marine positions along the

DMZ and to Khe Sanh. The resulting reshuffling of

units would make the original Checkers plan almost

unrecognizable. In northern Thua Thien Province an d

southern Quang Tri Provinces, the Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division would establish a new area of operations

and in effect provide the filler between the 1st and 3d

Marine Divisions. In central and southern I Corps,

both the 1st Marine Division and the U .S . Army

Americal Division attempted to fill the gaps with

diminishing manpower resources.

* While the command chronologies of the 1st and 4th Marine s

denote that the 1st Marines assumed command of the Neosho secto r

on 20 January, both Colonels Dick and Mitchell remembered tha t

Colonel Dick was still at Camp Evans on 22 January when the 1s t

Battalion, 9th Marines deployed to Khe Sanh . 1st Mar ComdC,

Jan68 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68; Dick Comments; Mitchell Comments. See Chapters 6 and 14 relative to the deployment of the 1s t

Battalion, 9th Marines to Khe Sanh .
CHAPTER 6

Heavy Fighting and Redeployment :

The War in Central and Southern I Corps, January 1968

A Time of Transition—The Da Nang TAOR—Operation Auburn : Searching the Go Noi—A Busy

Night at Da Nang—Continuing Heavy Fighting and Increasing Uncertainty—Phu Loc Operation s

The Formation and Deployment of Task Force X-Ray—The Cavalry Arrives

The Changed Situation in the North

A Time of Transition

In January 1968, Army and Marine units in central

and southern I Corps under III MAF attempted to continue operations as best they could in their old sectors

while at the same time moving into new tactical area s

to counter enemy buildups. As the 3d Marine Division

planned to displace from Phu Bai to Dong Ha, the 1st

Marine Division began to implement its segment o f

Operation Checkers. One battalion of the 5th Marines

at Da Nang, the 1st Battalion, in December ha d

moved north from positions in the Dai Loc Corridor

south of Da Nang in Quang Nam Province to Phu Lo c

in Thua Thien Province . In the meantime, the 2 d

Korean Marine Brigade had started its displacement

from Cap Batangan in northern Quang Ngai Province,

17 miles south of Chu Lai, to positions north of Hoi An

in the Da Nang area of operations.

The U.S. Army's 23d Division, also known as the

Americal Division, had the responsibility for the

100-mile expanse of southern I Corps extending from

the Hoi An River in Quang Nam Province to th e

border with II Corps at Sa Huyen in Quang Ngai

Province . Formed in Vietnam at Chu Lai from the

U.S. Army's Task Force Oregon in September 1967 ,

the division held three primary operating areas : Duc

Pho in the south, Chu Lai in the center, and the Qu e

Son Valley in the north . Assuming the command of

the division in September, Major General Samuel B.

Koster, USA, maintained a rather informal comman d

relationship with General Cushman. Several years

later, Koster remembered that he would visit the III

MAF commander at Da Nang once a week "to tell

him what we were doing ." Although nominall y

under the operational control of the Marine command, the Army division commander stated, "I go t

the distinct feeling that [I was) to work my TAOR a s

I saw fit." General Cushman later asserted that h e

treated the Army division the same as he did Marine

units, but admitted that General Westmoreland

would not "let me move his Army divisions without

there being a plan that he'd okayed."" *

Command relations between the Korean Marin e

Brigade and the U.S. forces under General Cushman i n

I Corps were more complicated yet. Neither the III

MAF commander nor his division commanders ha d

operational control of the Koreans . The phrase "operational guidance" supposedly defined the relationship

between the Korean brigade and III MAF, but, according to Cushman, the term "meant absolutely nothing .

. . They [the Koreans) didn't do a thing unless they felt

like it." Major General Koster recalled that the Korea n

Brigade, while assigned to the Batangan Peninsula i n

the Americal Division area of operations, built large

"solid compounds," but "seldom launched `big operations. – When the Korean Marines began their deployment to Da Nang, Brigadier General Kim Yun Sang,

the Korean commander, agreed that the first battalio n

to arrive would receive "operational direction" from th e

U.S . 5th Marines until the rest of the brigade completed the move . Yet, Major General Donn J . Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commander, later

observed that he "had no command control" over th e

Koreans and was "not sure how much the MAF commander had ." According to Robertson, the Koreans

operated very cautiously and he suspected that they

were under orders through their own chain of command "to keep casualties down ."2

Although III MAF command arrangements with

the South Vietnamese in I Corps were also complex,

they were less awkward . As senior U.S. advisor in I

Corps, General Cushman had more influence wit h

General Lam, the South Vietnamese I Corps comman-

* General Earl E. Anderson, who was the III MAP Chief of Staff at

this time, emphasized that General Westmoreland, for example ,

"directed Cushman not to move the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division without his support . " Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft ,

dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

84
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 8 5

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37116 3

A Korean Marine lies in position with his M16 wit h

fixed bayonet at the ready during a combined operatio n

with U.S. forces. III MAF exercised an unsure command

relationship with the 2d Korean Marine Brigade, which

had moved up in January from the Chu Lai area to Ho i

An in the Da Nang sector.

der, than he had with the Koreans. Despite not having

operational control of South Vietnamese units, th e

Marines under the guise of coordination and cooperation since 1965 had devised several informal workin g

agreements with local units. As Cushman later

declared : "General Lam and I got along well both personally and socially . . . we went through some battles

together and that made for mutual respect ."3

In the extensive and heavily populated Da Nan g

area of operations, the III MAF elaborate civic action

and pacification campaign made for a very close relationship with the South Vietnamese units in the sector. The South Vietnamese Quang Da Special Zone

command shared the Da Nang TAOR with the 1s t

Marine Division. Colonel Nguyen Duy Hinh, the

Quang Da Special Zone commander, controlled both

the 51st ARVN Regiment and the 59th Regional

Force (RF) Battalion . While American advisors had

doubts about the commanding officer of the 59th R F

Battalion, they rated both Colonel Hinh and Colonel

Truong Tan Thuc, the commanding officer of th e

51st, very highly. U.S . Army Lieutenant Colonel W.

Ray Bradley, the senior advisor to the 51st, considere d

"Thuc as the most effective commander he had eve r

known." Bradley credited Thuc with "turning

around" the 51st and responsible for much of th e

progress in the South Vietnamese Revolutionar y

Development Program in the Da Nang area . According to Marine pacification standards, government

forces controlled only 40 out of 112 villages in th e

TAOR but over 61 percent of the population. 4

The Americal Division relations with the ARVN

2d Division in the southern two provinces of I Corps ,

Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, were more distant. As

Major General Koster, the Americal Division commander, noted, the 2d ARVN Division "seldo m

worked with us—occasionally they would be brough t

in as a blocking [force) ." Although General Cushman

observed that Colonel Nguyen Van Toan, the acting

division commander, was not as able a commander as

General Truong of the 1st Division, Toan "was adequate." The III MAF commander suggested that

Toan's talents were more political than military. 5

Perhaps the most unique connection between III

MAF and the South Vietnamese authorities was the

Combined Action Program (CAP) . The program consisted of the attachment of the equivalent of a Marin e

infantry squad and its corpsman to a South Vietnames e

Popular Forces platoon in a local hamlet or village . At

the end of 1967, III MAF had 27 officers, 1,079 enlisted Marines, and 94 Navy corpsmen assigned to these

units. They were organized into 3 Combined Action

groups, 14 companies, and 79 platoons. Except for six

in northern Quang Tri Province, the remaining 7 3

Combined Action platoons were located in the other

four provinces of I Corps. *

Since the summer of 1967, the Combined Actio n

Program came directly under III MAF rather than th e

individual divisions. As Director of the Combined

Action Program, Lieutenant Colonel Byron F. Brady

reported directly to Major General Raymond L. Murray, the Deputy Commander, III MAF. Brady coordinated and loosely controlled each of the three Combined Action groups. He made liaison with the

various Army, Korean, and Marine commanders fo r

"fire support, reaction forces, patrols, and ambushes . "

At the group and company level, the Combine d

Action Program largely consisted of administrativ e

and logistic support. The heart of the program, how -

ever, was the individual Combined Action platoon ,

usually headed by a U.S . Marine sergeant and a Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon commander. Nominally, the Marine sergeant was the advisor to the Vietnamese leader. In actuality, they often shared

command responsibility, depending upon the personal relationship between the two . Operationally, the

platoon came under the South Vietnamese distric t

chief, but relied heavily on the U .S . or allied infantry

battalion in its sector for fire support and reinforce -

*See Chapter 29 for a more detailed account of the Combined

Action Program .
86 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of Igor Bobrowsk y

Marines and South Vietnamese Regional Force troops of Combined Action Platoon D—1 patrol nea r

the hamlet of Thanh Quit south of Da Nang. These platoons were the cutting edge of the Combined

Action Program, which integrated a Marine squad with South Vietnamese militia (Popular o r

Regional Forces) in the surrounding villages and hamlets.

ment. In many respects, these semi-isolated CAP s

were the frontline of the Marine war in the village s

and hamlets, the target of nearly 40 percent of the

enemy attacks in I Corps in November and Decembe r

1967. They were among the first to indicate an enem y

buildup in the Da Nang and Phu Loc sectors. 6

By the end of 1967, the allies in I Corps had developed a rather sophisticated analysis apparatus for th e

collection and processing of local intelligence . The

core of this collection effort was the District Operations and Intelligence Center (DOIC) . Each center

consisted of representatives from the South Vietnamese district-level government structure includin g

the ARVN district S—2 officer, National Police, and

Revolutionary Development cadre . A U.S. MACV/III

MAF liaison team provided technical expertise . The

establishment of 14 such centers since August permitted the analysis and supposedly rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence to those South Vietnamese and allied civilian agencies and military unit s

and agencies able to take action . For example, in

November 1967, the Dien Ban center provided information to the National Police that led to the arrest of

64 members of the VC Hoi An infrastructure and the

capture of significant enemy planning documents. "

From various sources, III MAF received reports i n

December 1967 that the enemy was massing his force s

in I Corps. There was the buildup of enemy forces a t

Khe Sanh and the eastern DMZ. In the CoBi-Than h

Tan region the 4th Marines and South Vietnames e

sources reported the southeastward movement of elements of the 6th NVA Regiment and the appearance of a

new regiment, the 4th NVA, in the Phu Loc secto r

south of Phu Bai. Of even more concern to the 1st

Marine Division and the Americal Division was th e

forward deployment of the 2d NVA Division north into

*Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr., who commanded the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines at Da Nang in November 1967 ,

remembered that a sniper team attached to his Company A "killed a

VC courier and his armed escort at 700 meters ." According to van de n

Berg, the courier carried a large bag of documents "which included a

pay roster and many other documents. " Lieutenant Colonel van de n

Berg wrote that all of this was turned over to intelligence personne l

and may have been the source of information for the National Polic e

arrest of the 64 members of the VC Hoi An infrastructure . LtCol Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File).
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 8 7

both the Que Son Valley and the Da Nang TAOR .

Allied commanders also learned that the North Vietnamese established a new headquarters in the Quang

Da Special Zone in Quang Nam Province called Group

44 . Commanded by North Vietnamese Army Senior

Colonel Vo Thu, the former commander of the 3dNVA

Division, Group 44 located its headquarters in the

mountains of Dai Loc District, about 24 miles southwest of Da Nang. According to a captured enemy officer, the new command was a subordinate or forward

headquarters of Military Region 5 and now controlled

all independent enemy regiments, battalions, and separate units in the Quang Nam sector.8

Since September 1967, III MAF suspected that th e

enemy planned a large-scale offensive in the Da Nan g

area . At that time, according to U .S . intelligence officers, "a very reliable source" reported detailed enemy

plans for Quang Nam Province with "Da Nang as th e

ultimate object." The appearance of new units including the enemy 31st NVA Regiment in southwestern

Quang Nam and the establishment of Group 44 tended to corroborate the first report . In early December,

the allies uncovered further evidence that the 2d NVA

Division was about to escalate its operations in the Que

Son sector and reinforce the independent units an d

local forces in Quang Nam Province.'

On 5 December, helicopters and troops of the U .S.

3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division under the operational control of the Americal Division in Operation

Wheeler/Wallowa killed 17 North Vietnamese

troops in a skirmish on a ridgeline north of the tow n

of Que Son . In an examination of the enemy bodies ,

the Americans discovered four were dressed in American camouflaged fatigues while the remaining dead

wore North Vietnamese uniforms. Four of the Nort h

Vietnamese were officers, including the political officer of the 2d NVA Division. Among the various documents strewn about were several notebooks and various American maps. In a notebook marke d

"Absolutely Secret," American intelligence analyst s

found a plan for a division-size assault against American fire bases in the Que Son Valley, complete wit h

sketches of the targeted sites. The general attack

would involve all three regiments of the 2d NVA and

would be coordinated with smaller diversionar y

attacks against district capitals controlled by Group

44 . The diversions included a rocket bombardment of

the large Da Nang Airbase.lo

Lieutenant Colonel John F. J. Kelly, a member of

the III MAF staff, recalled that all of this intelligence

began to fit a pattern . According to Kelly, the

Photo courtesy of LtCol John F. J. Kelly, USMC (Ret )

LtCol John F. J. Kelly is pictured with a captured NVA

122mm rocket launcher which had a range of about 12,00 0

meters. According to LtCol Kelly, this was the first 122m m

launcher captured by Marine forces, a direct result of Operation Claxon in December 1967 to lure enemy units into a

premature attack on Da Nang.

Marine command had "very precise information of

his {the enemy) plans in the Da Nang TAOR" and

called several commanders' conferences to determin e

how best to deflect the Communist intents . According to the enemy documents recovered by the 1st

Cavalry Division brigade, the enemy was to begin

his offensive on 23 December. Lieutenant Colone l

Kelly later related that III MAF hoped to confound

the enemy by triggering his attack prematurely. In

an operation codenamed Claxon, the Marines set off

explosive charges throughout the Da Nang TAO R

that they wanted the VC forces to mistake for the

signal to start the offensive . The enemy refused t o

take the bait, however, and the 2d NVA Division, on

the 23d, also failed to attack the 3d Brigade's fir e

bases in the Wheeler/Wallowa sector. In the Que Son

Valley, American intelligence officers concluded that

the loss of the documents may have caused the NVA

to believe their plans were compromised and to postpone, if not cancel, the attacks against the Army's 3 d

Brigade . At Da Nang, however, III MAF still expected some sort of offensive against the populated centers in the TAOR.11 *

*Lieutenant Colonel Kelly observed that although the attac k

failed to materialize, some enemy rocket troops failed to get th e

word and "tried to rush forward to firing sites . . . ." They were

intercepted by Marines and " the first enemy 122mm launcher wa s

captured ." LtCol John F. J. Kelly, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File) .
AREA OF

0 5 10

KiIomet-rs I

.1,—'.. — uI

LEGEND

NSDC = NORTHERN SECTOR

DEFENSE COMMAND

SSDC = SOUTHERN SECTOR

DEFENSE COMMAND

ROK = REPUBLIC OF KOREA

FSB - FIRE SUPPORT BASE

LZ = LANDN ZONE

1ST MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS DA NANG

JANUARY 1968

t

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zr_I BALDY

THA •• BIN.

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88 THE DEFINING YEAR

The Da Nang TAOR

In January 1968 at Da Nang, the 1st Marine

Division commander, Major General Donn J.

Robertson, had only two of his three infantry regiments, the 5th and 7th Marines, under his operational control. A tall, courtly officer who had a varied Marine Corps career ranging from an infantry

battalion commander on Iwo Jima, where he earned

the Navy Cross, to Deputy for Fiscal Matters at

Marine Corps Headquarters, General Robertson took

over the division the previous June. Now, with the

pending additional responsibility for the Phu Bai

sector and the anticipated departure of the 5th

Marines from Da Nang to Phu Bai, Robertson

assumed an even more onerous burden. The previous

record of the Korean brigade provided little promise

that it would fill the holes in the Da Nang defenses

when the 5th Marines relocated to Phu Bai. Thus, at

Da Nang, the division entered the new year with an

expanding mission and diminishing forces with the

probability of encountering an even stronger

The Da Nang tactical area of responsibility

(TAOR) stretched from the Hai Van Pass in the

north to the Quang Nam-Quang Tin border to the

south. From east to west the TAOR extended from

the coast to the Annamite Mountain chain. Consisting of 1,048 square miles, the area contained a population of some 812,000 persons, not including the

city of Da Nang. Several large waterways, the Cau

Do, the Vinh Dien, the Yen, the Thu Bon, the Thanh

Quit, the Ky Lam, the Dien Ban among them, traversed the coastal plain south of Da Nang and spilled

into the South China Sea, often changing their name

along the way. With the resulting rich soil deposits,

the Da Nang region was one of the major rice producing areas in South Vietnam, second only to the

Mekong Delta.
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 8 9

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A8011.3 2

An aerial view of the Marble Mountain Air Facility and base on Tiensha Peninsula across the river

from the main airbase at Da Nang, which can be seen vaguely in the background to the right. Marble Mountain was home to the helicopters of Marine aircraft group based there.

In order to secure the approaches to the city an d

the nearby Da Nang Airbase, the 1st Marine Division had divided the sector into several defensive

zones and tactical areas of operation . The city

itself, the Da Nang Airbase, and the Marbl e

Mountain helicopter facility on the Tiensha Peninsula across the Han River from Da Nang and th e

main air base constituted the Da Nang Vital Area .

In the immediate area west of the city and the air -

base, the Marines had established two defensive

command sectors, the northern and southern .

Under the operational control of the 11th Marines,

the division artillery regiment, the Northern Sec -

tor Defense Command (NSDC), composed of

troops from various headquarters and suppor t

units, encompassed the division command post o n

Hill 327 (called Division Ridge), the norther n

artillery cantonment, and the Force Logistic Command on Red Beach . Bounded by the Cu De Rive r

on the north and the Southern Sector Defens e

Command (SSDC) on the south, a distance of some

10 kilometers, the northern sector command i n

cooperation with its tenant units manned the fixed

defenses and ran patrols in the surrounding pad -

dies, scrub brush, and low-lying hills to the west .

Similarly, the Southern Sector Defense Command ,

under the operational control of the 1st Tank Battalion, covered the southern and southwestern
90 THE DEFINING YEA R

approaches to the Da Nang Airbase and protecte d

the vital bridges across the Cau Do and Tuy Loa n

Rivers, south of the airbase . *

The two Marine infantry regiments, the 5th an d

7th Marines, and the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion were responsible for the protection of th e

regions south of the Cau Do and north of the Cu D e

Rivers. On the division left, or most eastern sector,

the amphibian tractor battalion patrolled the san d

flats along the coast south of the Marble Mountain

facility. South and west of the "amtrackers" an d

north of the Thanh Quit River, the 5th Marines

with two battalions, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, maintained it s

area of operations. With the north-south railroad

track serving as the boundary between the two regiments, the 7th Marines with all three of its battalions provided the shield in the western and north -

ern reaches of the division area of operations . The

2d Battalion, 5th Marines, under the direct contro l

of the division, operated in the An Hoa sector,

located in the southwest corner of the divisio n

TAOR south of the Thu Bon River. To the east o f

the 7th Marines and south of the 5th Marines, th e

Korean Marine Brigade began its deployment int o

the Dai Loc corridor between the Thanh Quit and

the Ky Lam.

With the introduction of enemy long-rang e

140mm and 122mm rockets in February and Jun e

respectively of the previous year against the Da

Nang base, the Marine division took several countermeasures. It established a rocket belt that extended 8,000 to 12,000 meters out from the Da Nang

Vital Area, the effective range of the enemy rockets . Within this circumference, the 11th Marines instituted a central control system which included th e

coverage by two artillery firing batteries of each part

of the Da Nang TAOR and the strategic placemen t

of artillery observation posts in the rocket belt . The

infantry intensified its patrols and allied aircraft

increased their observation flights into and over th e

approaches towards the most likely rocket-firin g

positions . At the same time, the Marines imposed

an 1800 to 0600 daily curfew on river and othe r

*Lieutenant Colonel Vincent J. Gentile, who commanded the 1st Tan k

Battalion at the time, recalled that most of his tank units were under the

operational control of various infantry units. As commander of the South -

ern Sector, he controlled " a group of support unit headquarters elements

south of Da Nang. " As he remembered, " my impression is that we had

more alerts than significant enemy activity in the SSDC. " LcCol Vincent J .

Gentile, Comments on draft, dtd 25Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

waterway traffic in the rocket belt area. Division

psychological operations teams, moreover, developed an extensive campaign among the local villagers including money awards for information o n

the enemy rockets.1 3 **

Despite all these efforts, the NVA rocket threa t

remained real . Unlike tube artillery, the rockets di d

not require a great deal of maintenance and the y

could be man-packed through the difficult terrain

of western Quang Nam . Rocket launchers were

considerably smaller than howitzers of a comparable caliber, and were thus much easier to concea l

from U.S. air observers or reconnaissance patrols.

Although mortars shared with rockets these trait s

of ease of maintenance, transportation, and concealment, the rockets had much greater range : the

122mm rocket could fire 12,000 meters, while th e

140mm variety had a range of 8,900 meters. The

120mm mortar, on the other hand, could fire onl y

5,700 meters. Well-trained crews could assemble ,

aim, and launch their rockets in less than 30 minutes . In one attack on the Da Nang airfield, six

enemy rocket teams fired 50 rounds within fiv e

minutes. With a few glaring exceptions, most of

the enemy rocket attacks resulted in relatively little damage and few casualties. As Major General

Raymond L. Murray, the deputy III MAF commander, observed, however, "it [the enemy rocket capability} was constantly on everyone 's mind . . . . "

With a relatively minor investment in men an d

* *Colonel John F. Barr, who served with the 11th Marines and th e

1st Field Artillery Group in 1967-68, observed that "rockets are stil l

the least expensive and most effective indirect fire weapon that a non -

industrial society can use ." He stated that co counter the threat, the 1st

Marine Division established "an ad hoc 'Rocket investigation Team,"'

to gather intelligence on enemy rocket tactics. This team consisted of

a representative of the G—2 or intelligence section, an artillery officer ,

a demolition man, a photographer, and a security team provided by the

1st Reconnaissance Battalion . At first light, after a rocket wa s

launched, the team would embark in a helicopter and would locate th e

firing site from the air using coordinates provided by the 11th

Marines. The team would then land and "explore the site in detail ." It

would blow any rockets left behind in place and take back any intelligence it was able to garner about rocker tactics and firing sites . By various countermeasures, the Marines reduced the amount of time that th e

enemy gunners had to mount their attack . Colonel Barr commented

that by late 1967, " every gun in the l lch Marine Regiment, when not

engaged in firing was pointed at a possible rocker firing site . . . . Th e

idea was to get as many rounds in the air as soon as possible in orde r

to disrupt rocket firing in progress." Using a combination of visua l

sightings and sound azimuths, the Marine gunners would try to identify " approximate site locations through map triangulation . " Col Joh n

F. Barr, Comments on draft, dtd 260ct94 (Vietnam Comment File).
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 91

equipment, the NVA could keep an entire Marine

division occupied.1 4 *

For the most part, the 1st Marine Division war i n

the Da Nang TAOR was a small-unit war. The nature

of the war and the terrain in the area were such that the

most effective form of military action was usually th e

small-unit patrol or ambush, carried out by a squad or

fire team. As a consequence, in 1967, more than 5 0

percent of division casualties resulted from enemy

mines and boobytraps, officially called surprise firing

devices (SFD). General Robertson, the division commander, called it a "vicious" type of combat whic h

inflicted the most cruel type of wounds, ranging from

blindness to multiple loss of limbs. The enemy exploited anything on hand to make these devices, from discarded ration cans to spent artillery shells, "any time

they could get powder, they used it ." Operating

against an unknown and often unseen enemy in an

unfamiliar environment among largely a hostile or at

best neutral rural populace, the Marines of the 1st

Division fought an unspectacular and difficult war. As

Lieutenant General Cushman, the III MAF commander, commented, the Marines at Da Nang "had a lot o f

slogging to do, a lot of patrolling to do . . . And their

casualties from mines were considerable as a result ."1 5

Through 1967, the enemy in the Da Nang area of

operations consisted for the most part of the VC infra -

structure and the local guerrillas in the surrounding

villages and hamlets. There was no clear distinction

between friend and foe . The innocent appearing farme r

in his field, or his wife or child for that matter, could

easily be a VC agent or even terrorist . According to

Marine estimates at the beginning of 1968, enemy

irregular or local force strength in the Da Nang area

was about 17,500, but only 4,000 of this number were

"full-time guerrillas." The remaining members of th e

irregular classification belonged to either Communis t

local "Self-Defense or Secret Self-Defense forces ." For

the Marine on patrol, however, it made little differenc e

if the enemy who shot or threw a grenade at him was a

full-time guerrilla or belonged to the local defens e

forces. Too often the results were the same .1 6

*Colonel William J. Davis, who commanded the 1st Battalion ,

7th Marines at this time, observed that the 122mm rocket was mos t

accurate when fired with a tripod and launcher, but that the VC ha d

fired both weapons without tripod or launcher by leaning them agains t

inclined dirt banks, facing the airbase, and then set off. Col W. J.

Davis, Tet Marine, An Autobiography (San Diego, CA, 1987), pp . 42—48 ,

End to Col William J . Davis, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Davis, Tet Marine .

Operation Auburn: Searching the Go Noi

The appearance of the North Vietnamese units

near Da Nang and the formation of Group 44 adde d

another dimension to the danger that the enemy

posed to the airbase and the city of Da Nang . Marine

intelligence suspected and later confirmed that the

North Vietnamese 31st Regiment, also known as the

Red River Regiment, with all three battalions, had

moved in December into the Dai Loc sector in th e

southwestern reaches of the Da Nang TAOR.

Although the 2d NVA Division with its three regiments continued to challenge the U .S . 1st Air Cavalry's 3d Brigade in the Que Son Valley, it had the

potential to move north through the Que Sons to

reinforce the enemy forces in the Da Nang area of

operations. The NVA 368B Artillery Regiment, consisting of four independent battalions and five independent companies, armed with the 122mm and

140mm rockets, presumably operating from secre t

bases in "Happy Valley," some 15 miles southwest of

Da Nang, in the far western confines of the divisio n

operating area, remained a constant irritant to the

Marine defenders. Even with the greater strength of

the Communist forces around Da Nang, General

Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commander, later

maintained: "Ours was a small war, and divisions

aren't small, even NVA divisions, but I never had th e

feeling that we were going to get pushed around o r

pushed out."17* *

At the same time, however, the VC local force battalions in the Da Nang area also became more active .

Two enemy local battalions, the V—25th and the

R-20th, had long operated in the Da Nang area . In

fact, the R—20 or Doc Lap Battalion, as early as September, 1965, launched one of the first enemy attacks

against a Marine battalion command post on Hill 2 2

near the Yen River. By December 1967, agent reports

located both battalions on the so-called Go Noi Island ,

about 25 kilometers south of the airbase near th e

demarcation between the Marine division and th e

Americal Division . According to Marine intelligenc e

officers, the enemy in the Da Nang sector during early

1968 would continue to harass the South Vietnamese

Revolutionary Development program in the Da Nan g

**Brigadier General Paul G . Graham, who was the 1st Marine Division operations officer or G—3 during this period, reiterated in his comments that the war around Da Nang " was strictly a guerrilla war" and

that enemy activity " was invariably hit and run tactics by small ambus h

or rocket firing units." BGen Paul G . Graham, Comments on draft, dtd

20Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Graham Comments.
92 THE DEFINING YEA R

sector, would conduct attacks by fire including rockets

at U.S. and South Vietnamese major installations, and

possibly would strike against isolated friendly forces

and installations.1 8

In order to preempt any such concentration of th e

enemy local and main force units, the 5th Marines at

the end of December initiated a spoiling action, code -

named Operation Auburn, on Go Noi Island . Located

10 kilometers inland from the South China Sea, th e

Go Noi is not a true island, but is simply an are a

bounded on all sides by rivers. Irregularly shaped by

the meandering of the Ky Lam, the Thu Bon, the Ba

Ren, the Dien Ban, and the Cau Lau rivers, the

"island" is 12 kilometers long and 4 kilometers wide

with generally flat terrain that gradually slopes

upward towards the western end . A few streams and

canals cut across the low-lying land and the remains of

the wrecked National Railroad tracks (known to the

Marines as the "B&O") bisected the island . A number

of small hamlets and villages dotted the area, mostl y

inhabited by women and children, the men having

gone to war, either for the government or for the Communists. Hedges and bamboo thickets literall y

formed walls around these rural communities . The

terrain between the hamlets varied, and include d

untended rice paddies overgrown with vegetation ,

open sandy areas, high elephant grass, and cemeteries

with tall grave mounds. Most of the hamlets contained "a network of drainage ditches" to carry off th e

surplus waters. These ditches, as one Marine battalion

commander observed, "provided superb, ready-mad e

fighting trenches," for any VC "fighting a maneuver

defense." With rules of engagement that limited the

use of supporting arms in populated areas, any Marine

penetration of the Go Noi "presented commanders

with extremely difficult decisions ."1 9

The preparations to move into the Go Noi bega n

on Christmas Day, 1967 . At that time, Colonel

Robert D. Bohn, the 5th Marines commander, issue d

his "Frag Order" detailing the participating units and

the concept of operations for Auburn . The Marine initial forces were to consist of four infantry companies,

two from the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, one from the

2d Battalion, 3d Marines, and one from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Another company from the 3d

Battalion was to be in reserve. Lieutenant Colone l

William K. Rockey, the commanding officer of the 3 d

Battalion, 5th Marines, would command the forces i n

the field and assume operational control of the othe r

infantry companies. The 11th Marines provided general artillery support with one battalion, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines in direct support . Marine helicopters from MAG—16 would bring the assault force s

into the landing zones and Marine helicopter gunships

and fixed-wing aircraft from both Da Nang and Chu

Lai would fly landing-zone-preparation and close air

support missions.20

Auburn was to be part of a larger operation involving both the ARVN Quang Da Special Zone command

and the Americal Division . The Marine units were to

establish blocking positions along the abandoned railroad track. After the Marines were in position, thre e

ARVN battalions starting from Route 1 would the n

attack from east to west along Route 537, pushing an y

enemy units into the Marines. Further south, the 1st

Air Cavalry's 3d Brigade in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa would position two companies from its 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry to close any avenue of escape in tha t

direction and also to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his forces in the Go Noi . Operation Auburn was

slated to begin at 0900 on 28 December when Marin e

helicopters were to bring Company E, 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines into Landing Zone Hawk, an abandone d

dried-up rice paddy, just east of the railroad and abou t

a 1,000 meters south of the Ky Lam River.2 1

After an hour landing zone preparation bombardment by both Marine air and artillery, at 0904, fou r

minutes later than the designated "L—Hour," the firs t

wave of MAG—16 helicopters dropped down into

Landing Zone Hawk . The troops of the lead assaul t

company, Company E, 3d Marines, commanded by

Australian Army Captain Ian J . Cahill, an eight-year

veteran and an exchange officer serving with th e

Marines, referred to themselves as the "Diggers" afte r

the popular nickname for Australian soldiers . Greeted

by desultory enemy rifle and automatic weapons fire ,

the "Diggers" of Company E quickly secured the landing zone but failed to silence the enemy snipers and

gunners. At 0940, the forward elements of the company attempted to advance toward its first objective, a

deserted hamlet in the Bao An Dong village complex ,

just to the southwest of LZ Hawk . Forced to pull bac k

in the face of heavy Communist small arms fire, Captain Cahill called for an airstrike . Following the strike ,

succeeding waves of Marine CH—46 Sea Knight helicopters brought in the remaining elements of Company E and Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, an d

Lieutenant Colonel Rockey's command group into th e

landing zone. According to Lieutenant Colonel Rockey, the enemy fire forced the Marines to move the land -

ing zone progressively westward, "with each helicopte r

wave landing a little farther west than the last wave."22
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 9 3

Abel Collection Photos

Marines from Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines take part in Operation Auburn in the Go No i

Island sector south of Da Nang. In the top photo, PFC Richard C. Spaniel, wearing "In God We

Trust" on his helmet, peers cautiously through thick brush for signs of enemy troops . Below, two other

Marines from Company I watch an airstrike on enemy positions to their front in the same operation .
94 THE DEFINING YEA R

With both Marine companies and the battalio n

command group in the landing zone by 1130, th e

Marines again tried to take their first two objectives .

Company I secured its objective, an abandone d

hamlet to the immediate front without encountering any serious resistance . In the second objective,

the same hamlet Cahill's Company E had tried to

take earlier, the Marine company was again in trouble . The seemingly innocent empty "ville" was in

actuality heavily fortified with interconnectin g

trenches and fighting holes that provided the Communists with fixed fields of fire. In a sudden

ambush, the enemy killed five Marines of Company

E and wounded another nine . As the "Diggers " literally dug in and fought for their lives, Lieutenan t

Colonel Rockey ordered Company I to move to the

flank of Company E . Taking advantage of the cove r

afforded by the tall elephant grass that had overgrown the uncultivated paddy field and five-foot -

high burial mounds,* other Communist troops prevented the Company I Marines from reaching the

embattled company.23

At this point, with both of his forward companie s

unable to maneuver, Lieutenant Colonel Rockey

asked for his reserve or "Bald Eagle" company, Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Concurrently, h e

again called for both artillery and fixed-wing support .

During the day, Marine fixed-wing and helicopte r

gunship aircraft flew close to 50 missions in support

of the Marine battalion. Many of the 11th Marine s

artillery rounds fell dangerously close to the Company E positions, with shell fragments wounding several Marines. According to the battalion commander,

"this was a calculated risk dictated by the situation . "

Lieutenant Colonel Rockey was more disturbed abou t

the numerous "check fires" placed on the artiller y

whenever an aircraft left the runway at Da Nang an d

maintained until the plane returned . He later wrote

in his after action report: "unnecessary check fire s

imposed on direct support artillery on D—Day wa s

and is a matter of great concern . Vitally required fire

*Lieutenant Colonel Gene W. Bowers, who at the time served as

the S—3 or operations officers of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines ,

remarked that these "graves were much bigger and higher than traditional Vietnamese graves, as they had to be built up to accommodat e

the very high water table ." He remembered that the enemy troops "had

dug into the graves, evicting the previous occupants, and converte d

them into mutually supporting bunkers which were seemingly impervious co horizontal small arms fire . " LtCol Gene W. Bowers, Comments on draft, dtd 30May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Bowers Comments.

support was needlessly withheld from the Battalio n

because of this imposition ."24

At 1530, CH—46s from HMM—265 brought i n

Company M into Landing Zone Hawk . As in the

arrival of the other two companies, enemy gunners

took the hovering aircraft and disembarking troop s

under fire . Company M Marine Private First Class

Jesse T. Lucero, on the lead helicopter, recalled tha t

as he jumped out an enemy sniper round struck hi s

helmet: "I got a little dizzy and sagged, but another Marine helped me up and I ran across the rice

paddy as fast as my feet could carry me ." The lead

elements then cleared a treeline and secured th e

landing zone . Together with the battalion command group, Company M moved forward to reliev e

Company E.25

In the hamlet, after the initial shock of combat ,

and with the support of air and artillery, the Marine s

of Company E held their own . Able to get in close r

and more accurately than both fixed-wing aircraft

and the artillery, UH—1E gunships from VMO—2

provided several strafing runs that prevented th e

enemy troops from overrunning the company's positions.** For example, one Huey aircraft spent five

hours in support of the Marine infantrymen . Its

machine gunner, Lance Corporal Stephen R . Parsons,

earned the nickname of "Sureshot . " Credited wit h

killing 15 enemy, Parsons later stated, "I knew I go t

at least seven." The aircraft itself sustained four hits

and Parsons was wounded in the face . An enemy .30-

caliber bullet had "entered his left cheek and exite d

at the roof of his mouth without breaking a tooth . "

About 1700, an air observer counted in front of th e

Company E positions 32 NVA dead, mostly clad "i n

green utilities."26

About an hour later, under covering fire fro m

the other two Marine companies, Company E

pulled back a few hundred meters to the position s

of Company M. Collocated with the battalion command group just forward of Landing Zone Hawk ,

both Companies E and M established their nigh t

defenses . Only about 200 meters separated the two

companies from Company I . Unable to reach its

dead, Company E in its withdrawal had left th e

bodies of nine Marines in the hamlet. All told, th e

**Lieutenant Colonel Bowers recalled after talking with Captai n

Cahill on the radio about the graveyard bunkers: "I instructed the gun -

ships to shoot their door-mounted machine guns straight down int o

the grave mounds to achieve penetration ." He credits this tactic wit h

reducing the effectiveness of the enemy fire. Bowers Comments.
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 9 5

3d Battalion sustained casualties of 19 dead and 2 5

wounded .2 7

Not sure about the size and composition of the

enemy forces, Colonel Bohn, the 5th Marines commander, that night secured permission to expand th e

operation . He obtained operational control from

General Robertson of a command group from the 2 d

Battalion, 5th Marines. Bohn ordered Lieutenant

Colonel Robert J. McNaughton, the battalion commander of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, to resume

command of his Companies E and G, which were

already in helicopter staging areas for Operatio n

Auburn, and reinforce the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine s

in LZ Hawk. At the same time, Bohn and a 5th

Marines command group would also move to LZ

Hawk to assume overall direction of the now two -

battalion Operation Auburn .28

Marine intelligence officers believed that a Nort h

Vietnamese Battalion had reinforced the local VC battalions in the Go Noi . A III MAF intelligence estimate showed the battalion, possibly the 190th NVA ,

also known as the 311th NVA or Quang Da Battalion,

had infiltrated into central I Corps from North Vietnam the previous April and was equipped with crewserved weapons.29

According to the Marine plan, the 2d Battalion ,

5th Marines with two of its companies was to lan d

in LZ Hawk on the morning of 29 December, followed by the 5th Marines command group . In the

meantime, the three companies already in Auburn

would secure Objective 1, the abandoned hamle t

that Company I had seized the previous day befor e

moving to assist Company E. After the 3d Battalion

had accomplished its mission and provided flan k

protection, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines woul d

attack towards the Bao An Dong hamlet wher e

Company E, 3d Marines had engaged the enemy o n

the first day.30

The operation on the 29th went much as planne d

with relatively light resistance from the enemy . The

3d Battalion, 5th Marines seized its objective withou t

opposition. After its arrival in Landing Zone Hawk,

shortly after 1000, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines

advanced with its Company E in the lead and Company G on the right flank and slightly in trace. An

enemy rear guard of about 20 men in well-camouflaged fighting holes fought the Marines at the edge

of the hamlet, but immediately disengaged 10 minutes later after Marine air and artillery pounded th e

enemy positions. In his account of Operation

Auburn, the 2d Battalion commander observed that

"realizing that fortified villages would be encountered, artillery and fixed wing air strikes were used t o

the maximum. Key to the success of the supporting

arms was the unit commanders' ability to move unde r

the outstanding coverage provided ."3 1

Shortly after noon, the two Marine companies

began their search of the hamlet. They detained two

suspicious Vietnamese clad in the usual black pajamas and recovered the bodies of the nine Marines

killed in the earlier fighting . About 1330, as the battalion command group approached, VC snipers once

more opened up on the American troops, woundin g

one Marine . The Marines returned the fire and

searched the suspected area, but the enemy had

departed. After another reconnaissance of the hamle t

with no further evidence of the enemy, the battalio n

returned to Landing Zone Hawk . The results of th e

day's action for the battalion were two VC suspects

and an estimated six enemy dead, at a cost of two

Marine wounded and evacuated .32 *

At this juncture, Colonel Bohn expected the operation to come to an end. The South Vietnamese had

encountered few enemy forces in their sector and wanted to release their units. General Robertson, the 1st

Marine Division commander, had already informed III

MAF and the 5th Marines commanders that he intended "to terminate" Auburn at noon on the 30th "barrin g

any unforseen developments." New information, however, caused Robertson to change his mind . About

1000 on the 30th, he radioed Colonel Bohn, "Operation Auburn will continue on reduced scale until further notice ." General Robertson declared that "intelligence indicates continuing enemy presence i n

northwest Auburn AO [area of operations]." The mes-

*Colonel Rockey, the 3d Battalion commander, recalled that he a

few days later received a message about an article in the Washingto n

Star newspaper on 31 December 1967 about the operation in the Go

Noi . The reporter described the desolation of the hamlets destroyed

by air and supporting arms. The article mentioned " little fires were

still burning" and Marines yelling at old women and children comin g

out of their shelters. It quoted one Marine saying "we should hav e

killed them all." The article does admit, however, that the Marine s

had " temporarily driven out the enemy including one Main Force V C

and one North Vietnamese battalion, but not certain what else the y

had accomplished . " According to Colonel Rockey, the message originated in Washington and that he had about 30 minutes to get an

answer back to headquarters about the accuracy of the article : "Min d

you, this was in the middle of the night, in the field, during actua l

action against the enemy. " Col William K . Rockey, Comments o n

draft, dtd 4Mar95 and attached msg, n .d ., reference to 31Dec67 ,

Washington Star . Lieutenant Colonel Bowers recalled that the search o f

the hamlet uncovered an underground storage area containing medical supplies, rifles, and rice. Bowers Comments.
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DECEMBER 1967-JANUARY 1968 "'

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HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 9 7

sage did not reveal whether the suspected enemy wa s

the 190th Battalion or another enemy force . Colonel

Bohn in his implementing order only stated "hig h

order intelligence indicates very important enemy uni t

between Liberty Bridge* and present Auburn AO."33

Despite the indication of new intelligence, th e

remainder of the operation was to be a fruitless search

for the phantom unit . On the 31st, both Lieutenant

Colonel McNaughton, the 2d Battalion commander,

and Colonel Bohn, the regimental commander,

returned to their respective command posts leavin g

Lieutenant Colonel Rockey, the 3d Battalion commander, solely responsible for the operation . Rockey

retained both the 2d Battalion's Company E and G ,

as well as Company E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines an d

Company M of his own battalion in the next phase o f

the operation. For the next four days, the four companies encountered only scattered sniper fire and

grenades as they extended the Auburn area of operations to the west. By 3 January 1968, the battalion

reached the hamlet of Phu Loc 6, about 7,500 meters

west of the "B&O," and just south of Liberty Bridge .

Companies E and G, 5th Marines reverted to 2d Battalion control and Company E, 3d Marines departe d

Auburn for its original area of operations . At 1725 on

that date, Lieutenant Colonel Rockey closed out th e

operation and his forward command group and Company M clambered on board trucks for the return tri p

to the battalion command post .3 4

For the entire operation, the two Marine battalions sustained casualties of 23 killed in action and

over 60 wounded and, according to Marine body

count, killed 37 of the enemy. With the exceptio n

of four of the Marines and five of the enemy, th e

deaths in Auburn occurred on the first day of th e

operation. The action on the 28th also accounte d

for nearly half of the Marine wounded. In the

remaining six days of the operation, enemy snipers ,

a casually thrown grenade, and the ever-presen t

"surprise firing device" were responsible for th e

remaining Marine casualties.3 5

Although Lieutenant Colonel Rockey's battalio n

in the extended phase of Operation Auburn met n o

significant enemy force, he observed "large enem y

forces could evade our search and destroy efforts,

concealed in the vast expanses of elephant grass in

some cases reaching 12 feet in height." Rockey

* The bridge across the Ky Lam River connecting the An Hoa combat base to the 7th Marines area of operations.

believed that given the abundant " luxuriant natural

cover and concealment" available to the enemy an d

the extensive area covered, the Marines required a

larger force to conduct the operation. No allied

order of battle in early 1968 showed the 190th NVA

Battalion in the Da Nang area of operations . Intelligence would indicate that the Group 44 headquarters later moved into Go Noi Island . This may hav e

been the basis for the information of the "very

important enemy unit" that caused the continuation

of the operation . In any event, the available evidence

pointed to elements of the V—25th and the R—20th

VC battalions being the only units engaged in

Auburn .** Colonel Bohn several years later complained about the nature of intelligence available t o

the Marines: "The major frustration was too muc h

general intelligence and no good tactical timely

intelligence . "3 6

A Busy Night at Da Nang

As Operation Auburn drew to a close, Group 44

prepared another surprise for the Marines at Da Nang .

On the night of 2—3 January 1968, in an obviousl y

coordinated series of ground and fire attacks, the V C

struck at 7th Marines positions north of the Thu Bon ,

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines command post at An

Hoa, and at Combined Action units and South Vietnamese District headquarters throughout the Da

Nang area of operations. The Communists capped off

their assaults with an early morning rocket barrage o f

the Da Nang airfield.

The enemy began the night's events about 220 0

with several sniping and harassing fire incidents on

Marine outposts throughout the Da Nang area of operations. About a half-hour later, some 15 Communis t

troops attacked the 7th Marines command post on Hill

55, the low-lying but dominant piece of terrain sout h

of Da Nang, with automatic weapons, rifle fire, an d

antitank rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). They

knocked out a security tower and wounded two

Marines. The defending troops responded with small

**Lieutenant Colonel Bowers believed, however, that the Marine s

engaged an NVA unit rather than the VC 1?—20 Battalion . He felt tha t

the tactics, uniforms, and "unusually fierce tenacity" were indicative o f

the NVA . According to Bowers, the designation was made the R—20 ,

" by default, simply because we couldn ' t prove that any other unit was

present ." Bowers Comments. An Army historian, George L . MacGarrigle, suggested that perhaps the 790th NVA Battalion "was the security force for Front 44 [Group 441 also known as Front 4 . " George L.

MacGarrigle, Historian, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment Files).
98 THE DEFINING YEA R

arms and 4 .2-inch and 81mm mortars. Under illumination provided by a C—117 flareship, a small Marine

reaction force tried to locate the attackers, but they had

made good their escape .3 7

After a brief uneventful interlude, about 6,00 0

meters to the northwest of Hill 55, Communist gunners at 0045 3 January mortared the Hieu Duc District headquarters and the U.S. advisory compound

located there . They then shelled the nearby 1st Battalion, 7th Marines command post on Hill 10 . A

Marine lookout in an observation tower spotted th e

mortar muzzle flashes and immediately radioed th e

coordinates to Battery G, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines ,

also on Hill 10 and collocated with the infantry battalion command post. Although about 40 enemy

rounds impacted near the Marine battery positions, al l

guns remained "up and firing." The Marine 105mm

howitzers responded with counter-mortar fires reinforced by 81mm mortars and 106mm recoilless rifles

and silenced the VC weapons.38

Fifteen minutes later, about 0100, U .S . advisors a t

the MACV compound at Hieu Duc reported tha t

about 20 sappers armed with grenades and satchel

charges had penetrated the perimeter. Lieutenant

Colonel William J. Davis, the 1st Battalion, 7t h

Marines commander whose area of operations included all of Hieu Duc District, remembered that the district's U .S . Army liaison officer radioed : "The VC are

throughout our position; request assistanc e

posthaste ."3 9 Davis ordered an infantry platoo n

accompanied by two supporting M48 tanks from th e

1st Tank Battalion to go to the assistance of the advisors at the district headquarters, about 500 meters

east of Hill 10 . The tanks had barely departed the hill

when an enemy rocket team, laying in ambush, fired

nine RPG rounds into the two vehicles. Although

still mobile and able to use their 90mm cannons an d

.50 caliber machine guns, both tanks sustained damage, one a jammed turret, and casualties. Four of the

eight Marine crewmen were wounded . Covered by

the infantry, the two vehicles pulled back to their former positions and another M48 lumbered forward . While also hit by an RPG round, the third tank followed by part of the Marine infantry platoon smashe d

through the enemy ambush site, killing one of th e

enemy gunners. The relief force reached the MAC V

compound at 0325 and the enemy, estimated at company size, began to disengage . After the breaking of

the "siege," the Americans discovered four enemy

dead on the defensive wire. There were no casualties

among the U.S . advisors. The part of the reaction

force that stayed behind in the ambush site was, how -

ever, not as fortunate . Enemy gunners mortared its

positions which resulted in seven Marines wounded

and one killed. Again counter-mortar fire quieted th e

enemy tubes 40

The Communists were up to more mischief. Turning their attention from Hieu Duc and the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in the next hour, they hit severa l

Combined Action platoon hamlets, the Dien Ba n

District headquarters, an outpost near the Ba Re n

River, and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines comman d

post at An Hoa. The enemy limited most of thes e

attacks to small-arms harassing fire and mortars . At

An Hoa, the enemy fired eight satchel charges from a

" tube-like device " near the airfield there . Two of th e

charges detonated in the air and the other six failed t o

explode . In somewhat of an understatement, the battalion commander observed in his monthly report ,

"Although ingenious, the crude mortars proved t o

have a high dud rate ." More serious was the VC

assault on the Combined Action Platoon S—1 locate d

in the coastal village of Phuoc Trach, east of Hoi An .

After first mortaring the platoon, an unknown number of enemy overran the compound . They destroyed

the communication and ammunition bunkers. By the

time a relief force consisting of three neighborin g

Popular Force platoons arrived on the scene after day -

break, the enemy had long gone. Casualties among

the Marine and PF troops in the hamlet were heavy.

All of the 14 Marines assigned to the Combine d

Action unit were either dead or wounded . The PFs

sustained 19 killed and 12 wounded . Communist

losses, if any, were unknown .4 1 4

The Communist raiders were not finished for th e

night. About 0400, a Marine sentry from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, manning a tower on Hill 10 ,

noticed large flashes about 3,000 meters to the east

near the Yen River and immediately sounded the rock -

et attack alarm. Within a 10-minute time span, nearl y

50 122mm enemy rockets impacted on the main airbase . Responding almost immediately to the attack, a

Marine M48 tank on Hill 43 in the Southern Defense

Sector took the suspected launching site under fire . An

Air Force Douglas AC—47 "Spooky" transport

equipped with 7.62mm miniguns and floodlight s

"also opened up immediately and hit area while enem y

*The record shows that four Marines were killed in the action a t

Phuoc Trach, five wounded, and five listed as missing . Although no t

specifically mentioned in the report, it is assumed that the five missing Marines were killed and their bodies later recovered .
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 9 9

Photo is courtesy of Col John F. Barr, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Donn J. Robertson, CG, 1st MarDiv, is escorte d

by LtCol John F. Barr, the operations officer of the 11th

Marines, the artillery regiment at Da Nang, as they visit

one of the firing sites uncovered by Marines the morning after

the rocket bombardment of the base. LtCol Barr is holding a

M1 Carbine, "a non-T/O weapon," " that he took as" "a n

added precaution . . . for a dawn landing at the site. "

was launching rockets." Marine 81mm mortars rein -

forced the M48's 90mm gun and 105mm howitzers

from the 11th Marines delivered 620 rounds withi n

two minutes on the enemy firing positions. Still the

enemy rockets destroyed three American aircraft, on e

Marine F—4B and two Air Force prop-driven planes,

and damaged 17 other aircraft . Due to cratering, th e

airbase had to close 3,000 feet of its east runway and

1,000 feet of the west runway until repairs could b e

made. Despite the barrage, casualties were low, onl y

four Air Force personnel sustained minor wounds.42

The next morning, a reaction force from Compan y

C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines uncovered about thre e

large firing sites and found a total of 21 unfired

122mm rockets and 1 140mm rocket . Near the western bank of the Yen, the Marines came across "fou r

enemy bodies clad in khaki and black uniforms . "

Marine intelligence officers later determined that the

enemy rocketeers fired their missiles from three distinct battery positions "and a total of 18 individual

rocket sites." It was obvious that the attack on the airbase was a major coordinated effort, probably carrie d

out by elements of the NVA 368B Artillery Regiment ,

possibly reinforced by a new enemy unit in the sector ,

the 1st Battalion, 68th Artillery Regiment. During the

night, in addition to the rocket attack, Group 44 units

had initiated some 25 actions by fire often followed b y

an infantry ground assault in seven of the nine districts

of Quang Nam Province 43

Continuing Heavy Fighting and

Increasing Uncertainty

Despite all of the ado in the Da Nang sector including the rocket attack on the airbase, the main enemy

thrust on the night of 2—3 January was further south i n

the Que Son Valley. Even with the compromise of hi s

plans in December, North Vietnamese Army Majo r

General Chu Huy Man, the commander of the enemy

Military Region 5 or B—1 Front, decided to proceed wit h

the offensive against the 1st Air Cavalry 3d Brigade fire

bases in the Wheeler/Wallowa operating area.* Ma n

apparently received "explicit instructions from Hanoi "

to send the entire 2d NVA Division against the U.S .

brigade's defenses in the Que Son sector. Having

deferred the onset of the campaign, the enemy apparently hoped that they had lulled the Americans into a

false sense of complacency. Furthermore, they obviously thought the Group 44 activity at Da Nang on the

night of 2—3 January would draw the American command's attention away from the Que Son Valley int o

the mistaken belief that the 2d NVA Division had

moved north and was about to attack the Marine base

at Da Nang. The North Vietnamese commanders

might have had another motivation, as well: "the helicopter killing zone in the valley's upper reaches was too

tempting to abandon ."44

Despite release to the news media by MACV abou t

the capture of the North Vietnamese document, General Koster, the Americal Division commander, wa s

not all that sure that the North Vietnamese had abandoned their original plan. With the NVA 2d Division

maintaining radio silence with the beginning of the

new year, Koster became even more suspicious about

the enemy's intentions. On 2 January, he ordere d

Colonel Hubert S. Campbell, the commanding office r

of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, who maintained his command post at Fire Base Ross near the

town of Que Son, to search a few of the enemy attac k

assembly areas depicted on the NVA map. 4 5

That afternoon, Company C, 2d Battalion, 12th

Cavalry encountered a large enemy force in a rice

paddy about 5,000 meters southwest of Fire Bas e

Ross . Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry reinforced Company C and 3d Brigade helicopter gunships provided air support for both companies. In the

ensuing four and a half-hour fire fight that lasted

*Army historian George L. MacGarrigle believed that by Te e

1968, Man most likely was a lieutenant general, but observed that " it's

difficult to determine what rank senior enemy generals held at an y

given time . " MacGarrigle Comments .
100 THE DEFINING YEA R

until near dark when the enemy withdrew, the Cavalry troopers sustained casualties of three dead and

five wounded and evacuated . They killed 39 North

Vietnamese with the armed helicopters accountin g

for most of the enemy losses. The American troops

also recovered several enemy weapons left behind b y

the retreating NVA and took two wounded prisoners. Under interrogation, the two captives related

that they had recently infiltrated into their new sec -

tor through the mountains to the northwest together with about 1,000 other North Vietnamese troops.

They stated that they had recently passed a rocke t

firing position with six 122mm rocket launchers an d

observed numerous antiaircraft emplacements . Upon

learning this intelligence, Colonel Campbell place d

his entire 3d Brigade on full alert. 4 6

In the early hours of 3 January, shortly after th e

initial assaults in the Da Nang area, the NVA 2d

Division struck, under the cover of darkness, four o f

the 3d Brigade's fire bases: Ross, Leslie, Colt, and

Baldy. At Baldy, located about 15,000 meters north -

east of Ross near Route 1, and Colt, about 10,000

meters east of Ross, the enemy limited himself t o

mortar attacks. The NVA division reserved its mai n

efforts for Ross and Leslie, throwing the 3d and 21st

Regiments against the two firebases. At Leslie, about

5,000 meters to the southwest of Ross, enemy

infantry followed closely upon the initial mortar and

rocket barrage . Although the North Vietnamese initially broke through the bunker line, the 1st Cavalry defenders threw back the enemy with heavy losses. At Ross, an even larger North Vietnamese forc e

used "human wave" tactics . The men of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, however, on Ross, were ready .

According to one account, Captain Charles A .

Krohn, the battalion intelligence officer, had mad e

an analysis of past NVA attacks and found a pattern .

The NVA depended on the preparatory mortars and

rockets to keep the defenders under cover with thei r

heads down while enemy sappers cut the wire an d

cleared away obstacles. Krohn suggested that the 2 d

Battalion troopers attempt during the shelling t o

keep their eyes on the perimeter irrespective of th e

shelling and continue firing . Even with the implementation of the intelligence officer's recommendations, the defense of Ross was a near thing . At one

point, 3d Brigade artillerymen on Ross lowered thei r

guns and fired canister rounds directly into th e

attackers . By 0530, the fighting at Ross was over an d

the NVA withdrew, defeated . At both perimeters,

the 1st Cavalry troopers counted a total of 331 NVA

dead at a cost of 18 Americans KIA, 137 evacuate d

and wounded, and 3 missing in action . 4 7

Further south, in the Que Son Valley, near Hie p

Duc, an undermanned 1st VC Regiment, the remaining infantry regiment of the 2d NVA Division, hit a

firebase of the Americal Division 's 196th Light

Infantry Brigade . Poorly coordinated with its forces

badly dispersed, the enemy attack soon faltered.

Colonel Louis Gelling, the 196th commander,

formed the brigade into two task forces and rapidl y

took the initiative. By 9 January, the 196th had

accounted for over 400 of the enemy.48

Although the 1st Cavalry troops on Leslie ha d

repulsed the ground assault on their positions, th e

North Vietnamese continued to maintain pressure

on the American fire base . NVA antiaircraft units

had occupied the high ground overlooking Lesli e

and their guns made any resupply of the base a n

extremely hazardous venture . Colonel Campbell, the

3d Brigade commander, later recalled that Lesli e

"was not resupplied for a period of about nine day s

because of the ring of 12.7mm's {enemy antiair

machine guns) around it ." During what amounted

to the siege of Fire Base Leslie, enemy gunners sho t

down 7 1st Air Cavalry helicopters and damaged 2 6

more seriously enough to put them temporarily ou t

of commission . 4 9

Despite the deteriorating weather which limited

both fixed-wing and helicopter support, the 196t h

and the 3d Brigade carried the fight to the enemy .

With preregistered points based on key terrain earmarked on the captured enemy map, Colonel Camp -

bell's artillery placed heavy fires on suspected enem y

positions. Preplanned B—52 strikes flying high

above the clouds also rained down a devastating

amount of explosives upon presumed NVA concentration areas. With this support, occasionally rein -

forced by Marine and Air Force tactical fixed-win g

aircraft and Army gunships when the weather permitted, the Army infantry attempted to outmaneuver and close with the enemy. Gelling's 196th

engaged in several night company-size fire fights ,

often in a driving rain storm. Both the 3d Brigad e

and the 196th took a heavy toll of the 2d NVA Division in the Que Son Valley. By the time the fighting

ended in mid January, the Army brigades had kille d

more than a 1,000 enemy at a cost of about 10 0

American lives . Although still remaining in th e

field, the 2d NVA suffered losses that impaired its

future effectiveness.50
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 101

Phu Loc Operations

While the Army units turned back the 2d NVA

Division offensive in the Que Son Valley, North Vietnamese units in Phu Loc District, north of Da Nang

and the Hai Van Pass, initiated a series of broad-based

assaults on allied units in that sector. Their special targets were the Marine Combined Action units, especially CAPs H (Hotel) 5, 6, and 7, protecting Route 1 ,

as it wended its way through the mountains between

Da Nang and Phu Loc District Town . The enemy obviously realized that cutting Route 1 here where it wa s

vulnerable reduced the capability of the allied forces t o

reinforce and resupply their forces to the north.*

To safeguard this important north-south lin k

between Da Nang and Marine forces in Thua Thie n

Province, III MAF had reinforced the 2d Battalion ,

26th Marines at Phu Bai with the 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines under the command of Lieutenant Colone l

Oliver W. van den Berg . On 26 December, while

remaining under the operational control of the 5t h

Marines at Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel van de n

Berg officially assumed from the 2d Battalion, 26t h

Marines at Phu Bai responsibility for the Phu Loc

TAOR extending from Hai Van Pass in the south t o

the Truoi River to the northwest . Route 1 bisected

the area of operations southeast to northwest. The terrain consisted of a narrow coastal lowland east of

Route 1, a high, jungled piedmont south and west o f

Route 1, and the Annamite Mountain Range to th e

west. Bach Ma Mountain rising above 1,400 meters

in height and located about 8,000 meters south o f

Phu Loc District Town dominated the western and

southern area of operations. A large inland bay, Dam

Cau Hai, rimmed the northern edge of the battalion's

sector. Most of the population was confined to a few

fishing villages along the coast and farming communities that lay on either side of Route 1 and in the

small river valleys in the district .

Lieutenant Colonel van den Berg established his

command post just south of the town of Phu Loc . Of

the battalion's four infantry companies, three deploye d

in or around the battalion assembly area. The fourth ,

*Colonel Robert J. Keller, who at the time commanded the 3 d

Combined Action Group which included the Phu Loc Combine d

Action units, observed that in late December 1967 and early Januar y

1968 : " In Phu Loc, the NVA was moving from the mountains to th e

coast and CAPs, stretched along Route # 1, providing nightly ambush -

es, represented obstacles that had to be dealt with . . . ." Col Robert J .

Keller, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Keller Comments.

Company D, established its base area about 15,00 0

meters to the east of the rest of the battalion and abou t

10,000 meters north of the Hai Van Pass. The 1st

Division attached two artillery batteries from the 11t h

Marines to Lieutenant Colonel van den Berg's command. Battery D, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines with its

105mm howitzers provided direct support for th e

infantry from positions within the 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines assembly area . A 155mm howitzer battery,

Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, split into two -

gun sections, one section at the battalion assembl y

area and the second with Company D, north of th e

Hai Van Pass. From both locations, the Marine

infantry battalion and its supporting artillery were in

position to cover the Combined Action platoons and

Route 1 in the sector.51 "

While the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines relocated

north of the Hai Van Pass, North Vietnamese units ha d

augmented the VC 804th and K. 4B Main Force Battalions and VC local force units that traditionally operated in the Phu Loc region. In early December, the

Marines received reports of a new 4th NVA Regiment.

On 13 December, a North Vietnamese soldier defecte d

to the South Vietnamese and gave his unit as the 1st

Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment, recently changed from

the 4th Battalion, 9th NVA Regiment . The "rallier" stated that his redesignated unit had arrived in the Ph u

Loc forward area near Bach Ma Mountain in lat e

November. This together with other prisoner reports o f

a 2d Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment in southern Thua

Thien Province confirmed the presence of the new

enemy regiment. Furthermore, other intelligence

sources identified a new VC Battalion, the 802d, located east of the recently arrived 4th NVA, along the Thua

Thien-Quang Nam Boundary.52

This relatively rapid buildup of enemy forces in the

Phu Loc sector obviously pointed to some enemy initiative in the very near future . A Combined Action

Marine, James Duguid, assigned to CAP Hotel 6 i n

the hamlet of Nuoc Ngot just off Route 1, and abou t

**Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr ., several years

later commented that the Combined Action platoons " were often

placed in untenable positions. " To provide a military presence and a

sense of security, the Combined Action units were usually in a villag e

perimeter and intermingled with the local population . Lieutenan t

Colonel van den Berg, Jr., observed that the options open to hi m

" seemed to be to let the Marine/CAPs be overrun or accept civilian

casualties. " He, nevertheless, employed "off-set registration techniques" that with a few or even one "firing adjustment, fire for effec t

missions could be called or directed" from his command post to support the Combined Action units . LtCol Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr. ,

Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment file) .
sna.Q4 —.

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102 THE DEFINING YEAR

6,000 meters east of the town of Phu Loc, recalled several years later that in November or December 1967

while on patrol he stumbled upon what was in effect "a

relief map made on the ground." The "map" consisted

of "rocks, sticks, and pieces of bamboo and leaves"

depicting the Marine base at Phu Bai, Route 1, and all

of the Combined Action platoons in "Hotel" Company. Duguid remembered that a rock denoted Phu Loc

headquarters and little sticks signified Marine and

South Vietnamese defensive bunkers. He passed this

information up the chain of command, but received no

reaction to the intelligence. Concurrently, however, the

defector from the 4th NVA Regiment provided supporting testimony about enemy intentions. He related that

the enemy Tri-Thien Military Region had ordered all

units under its command to carry out a major campaign before Tet: "The VC would attack like lightning

and occupy a few ARVN bases and [thenj will use the

(Tet) cease-fire period for resupply of food." III MAF

intelligence officers gave credence to such a stratagem

as in accordance with a North Vietnamese resolution to

sever Thua Thien and Quang Tn Provinces from South

Vietnam. The North Vietnamese rallier declared that

the first phase of the enemy campaign in the Phu Loc

area would include the destruction of bridges on Route

1 "to paralyze the supply route" followed by a "coordinated attack against the Phu Loc sub-sector using both

infantry and sapper units.""

By the beginning of the year, the enemy forces in

Phu Loc had opened their first phase of the offensive.

From 23 December through 6 January, enemy guerrillas and sappers launched a series of attacks against

allied convoys and bridges along Highway 1 from the

Hai Van Pass to the bridge over the Truoi River. For

example on 4 January near Company D positions,

Marine engineers discovered three destroyed culvert

bridges. Not satisfied with blowing the bridges, the

enemy sappers had "booby-trapped" the surrounding

* Colonel Robert J. Keller remembered that in late December

1967 or early January 1968 one of the Combined Action Platoons in

his sector, CAP Hotel 4, located just south of the Truoi River Bridge

'killed up to eleven NVA officers in an ambush in what appeared to be

a pre-troop movement scouting mission." Keller Comments.
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 10 3

area with grenades and cement-type mines . The engineers deactivated the "surprise firing devices" without

incurring any casualties . In a minesweep mission the

same morning on Route 1 further south, just above

the Hai Van Pass, the Marine engineers were less fortunate. A Marine truck detonated a 40-pound

cement-type mine which seriously wounded si x

Marines and badly damaged the vehicle. That night,

Marines of Company D received reports that a group

of 20 VC had the assignment to emplace mines nea r

their sector. A Marine patrol failed to uncover any

enemy, but an 81mm mortar fire mission resulted in a

secondary explosion.54

About 1030 the following morning, 5 January, near

the truck mining incident of the previous day, anothe r

engineer sweep team, with a squad from Company D

for security, triggered a VC ambush . An estimated 25 -

man enemy force attacked the Marines with grenade s

and automatic weapons. Two of the grenades landed in

the rear of a Marine truck . The driver accelerated bu t

enemy machine gun fire killed him and the truck ra n

off a steep incline . The remaining Marines regroupe d

and forced the enemy to break contact. The Company

D commander immediately sent two squads supporte d

by two Ontos to reinforce the sweep team. The following morning, on a bridge close to the ambush site, on e

of the Ontos struck a mine destroying the vehicle an d

killing the driver and wounding another Marine.

About 1300, 6 January, just west of the bridge, one o f

the Company D squads, searching for an enemy sniper,

came across what appeared to be another mine . As the

squad stopped in a small clearing to investigate the

object, two VC fired some 20 rifle rounds at the Americans, killing another Marine . The rest of the squad

maneuvered through some heavy vegetation to reac h

the enemy positions, but by that time the VC had disappeared. In the three incidents on 5—6 January, the

Marines sustained total casualties of 3 dead and 2 0

wounded, 17 seriously enough to be evacuated .5 5

To the west, near Phu Loc, the 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines conducted two company sweeps without incident, one by Company A to the south of the battalio n

assembly area, and the other by Company C to the

north and east of the assembly area . On the night of 6

January, however, a Company A listening post, about

5,000 meters south of Phu Loc, spotted about four VC

attempting to infiltrate the company's perimeter. The

Marines fired 60 rounds and the enemy troops fled .5 6

Through this period, the Combined Action platoons positioned along Route 1 sensed that the enemy

was preparing for a large push . Already, the VC had

initiated some 30 incidents, mostly minor contacts of

various sorts, in the local hamlets or along the highway.

As Thomas Krusewski, a former CAP Marine in Hote l

6, several years later observed, "[the] atmosphere

around you was tense . We began to have troop movement around [us)." The Combined Action Marines

noted motorcycle tracks in the woods which implie d

that the enemy was paying off the local hamlet chiefs

in return for the cooperation of the villagers. Krusewski remarked one "did not need to be a PhD to figure i t

[the situation] out ." The VC were about to attack ; the

only remaining questions were where and when .57

In the early morning hours of 7 January the Communist forces struck . They hit the Phu Loc Distric t

headquarters, the command post of the 1st Battalion,

5th Marines south of Phu Loc, the Company D bas e

position north of the Hai Van Pass, and three of the

Combined Action compounds between Phu Loc and

the Hai Van Pass. Although limiting their attacks o n

the Marine units to attacks by fire, the enemy penetrated the Phu Loc District headquarters and the nearby Hotel 5 Combined Action compound . The Communist troops overran the other two Combined Actio n

platoons, Hotel 6 and 7, located approximately 6 an d

14 kilometers respectively east of Phu Loc .5 8

At Hotel 6 in the hamlet of Ngoc Ngot during the

night of 6—7 January, Corporal Arliss Willhite remembered that the Marines and PFs had just returned from

a large sweep operation along Route 1 with CAP Hote l

7 . Following the suggestion of one of the Marine squa d

leaders, the CAP commander decided against putting

out the usual listening posts. The CAP Marines, however, posted a small security force including fou r

Marines at a nearby bridge on Route 1 . In the compound itself, another four Marines stood watch . At

about 0330 on 7 January, over 150 enemy troop s

dashed into the compound from two different directions, flinging satchel charges and grenades, and firing

automatic weapons . From his vantage point near the

bridge on Route 1 where he was in charge of the security group there, Lance Corporal Frank Lopez late r

described the attack : "All of a sudden hell broke loose ,

mortars are coming in and rockets and everything . "

The enemy assault force had placed blankets and mat s

over the concertina wire surrounding the compoun d

and "just hopped over with sappers and automatic

weapons." According to Lopez, "it looked like ants

coming over a hill or just coming through the wire

towards the compound, yelling, screaming, everyon e

was just yelling and getting hit ." By this time, Lopez

and his group were also under attack from about 40
104 THE DEFINING YEA R

VC and too busy defending themselves and the bridge

to observe the fight in Ngoc Ngot . 5 9

In the compound itself, pandemonium reigned .

Corporal Willhite recollected that the VC were in the

compound so fast some Marines and several of the PF s

panicked : "Some of them just went out and crawle d

under hootches and stuff, they forgot their rifles. "* On

the other hand, several Marines and a few of the Popular Force troops fought off the enemy as best the y

could. Willhite remembered that as he ran out of hi s

"hootch" with his rifle, enemy soldiers ignored him ,

concentrating instead upon the communication an d

ammunition bunkers. Reaching a site with a clear fiel d

of fire of the ammunition bunker, Willhite and a

mixed group of Marines and PFs attempted to stem the

tide. Both he and Krusewski credited one Popular

Force member, armed with a Browning automati c

rifle, for providing the necessary firepower to hold off

the enemy from reaching their positions. Within 25 to

30 minutes, nevertheless, the Communist attackers

had nearly destroyed the entire compound . Krusewski

later wondered "why they didn't kill everybody, I don' t

know, they just turned around and left when the sun

started coming up ." Equally puzzled, Willhite, nearl y

20 years later still spoke in disbelief, "It was like a miracle, sun came up, church bells rang . They just picked

up their stuff and walked away." 60

The detail led by Lance Corporal Lopez had withstood the enemy assault in their sector and the bridge

still stood. It was the only one of four bridges betwee n

Phu Loc and CAP Hotel 7 on Route 1 that remaine d

intact. Seeing the Communist troops withdrawing

from the compound, the four Marines returned t o

Ngoc Ngot and began to attend to the wounded and

bury the dead. 6 1

Of the more than 40 troops, both Marines and

South Vietnamese, in the Hotel 6 compound the

night before, only about seven escaped relatively

unscathed. The Marines sustained casualties of 5 dead

and 16 wounded, 12 of whom had to be evacuated .

Among the dead was the Navy corpsman . It woul d

not be until 0900 that a Marine platoon from Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines arrived and calle d

*In his comments, Willhite believed the reason that some of th e

Marines panicked was because the VC were into the compound s o

quickly. He recalled "hearing 'incoming!' then almost immediately

'They ' re in the compound . ' They were at the doors of our hootches . "

Willhite claimed the reason that he got out with his gear, "because I

always tied my backdoor shut with corn-wire at night to keep it fro m

being blown open by the wind . " Arliss Willhite, Comments on draft ,

dcd 28Sep94 (Vietnam Comment File).

in a helicopter to take out the most seriously wound -

ed. As Corporal Willhite later remarked, the CA P

Marines could not depend on supporting infantry and

artillery. When the enemy attacks, "they know al l

about your supporting units, and they tie them up . .

. they usually always get you . "G2

In this particular instance, the corporal wa s

absolutely correct . In the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s

command post, the battalion received a radio message

at 0335 about the attack on the Phu Loc District head -

quarters. At the same time the Combined Action

Group headquarters reported that it had lost radio

communication with CAPs Hotel 6 and 7 and that

Hotel 5 at Phu Loc was under attack . Less than five

minutes later, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines assembly

area south of Phu Loc came under an 82mm mortar

barrage and recoilless rifle fire . Among the wounded

was the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel va n

den Berg.** Major Harold J. McMullen, the battalion

executive officer, temporarily assumed command . 63

About an hour after the attack on the battalion

command post, Communist gunners also took th e

Company D base area under mortar and recoilless rifl e

fire . At 0530, the Company D commander sent a reaction force to Hotel 6 and 7, but enemy mortar rounds

forced the Marines to turn back . Waiting until daylight to avoid a possible enemy ambush, Majo r

McMullen sent a platoon-sized relief force from Company B to the assistance of the district headquarters an d

the CAP platoons. As the Company B platoon entere d

the Phu Loc District compound at 0700, they saw th e

VC attempting to disengage and took them under fire ,

killing seven of the enemy. At the headquarters, the

combined force of ARVN and U .S . advisors accounted

for about 50 of the enemy. An hour later the Marine

platoon reached Hotel 5 where the enemy had alread y

departed . The Marines there sustained casualties of on e

dead and five wounded . At about the same time, 0800,

another platoon from Company D arrived at Hotel 7

which had been overrun. The CAP Marines there suffered casualties of seven dead and four wounded. One

hour later the Company D platoon arrived at Hotel 6 .

All told on the morning of 7 January in the Phu Lo c

sector, the allies sustained casualties of 18 Marine s

killed and 84 wounded, 4 U .S . Army advisors wounded, and an unspecified number of South Vietnames e

regular troops and PFs killed and wounded, while

**Lieutenant Colonel van den Berg commented that "due to th e

lack of reaction time and space, I am not aware of any close defensiv e

fires called by/for any CAR" van den Berg Comments .
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 105

inflicting upon the enemy an estimated 80 dead . U.S .

and South Vietnamese intelligence officers later identified two enemy battalions as taking part in the coordinated attack, the NVA 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment,

probably attached to the new 4th NVA Regiment, and

the VC K4B Battalion .64

After the events of the 7th, the enemy units in the

Phu Loc area limited their efforts for the most part to

intermittent mortar and harassing attacks by fire on

both the Combined Action units and the 1st Battalion ,

5th Marines. The most serious incident occurred on 1 2

January when an enemy mortar attack on a 1st Battalion, 5th Marines defensive position south of Phu Loc

resulted in 6 Marines killed and 11 wounded . At the

same time, the NVA and VC units continued thei r

interdiction of Route 1 with minor ambushes of convoys and blowing up bridges and culverts. Between

7—15 January, the enemy had detonated 10 bridges ,

knocked out 4 culverts, and cut the highway in 3

places. Marine engineers and Navy Seabees repaired

most of the damage within three days. On the 15th ,

however, one bridge was still out, but "bypassable . "6 5

The Formation and Deployment of

Task Force X-Ray

By mid January, the 1st Marine Division ha d

established its Task Force X-Ray headquarters at

Phu Bai and the deployment of U .S . forces from

southern I Corps and Da Nang to the northern battlefield in Operation Checkers had begun in earnest .

Initially as part of the Operation Checkers planning

in November 1967, the III MAF staff considered

sending individual 1st Marine Division units nort h

and placing them under the operational control o f

the 3d Marine Division. At that point, Major General Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commander ,

recommended instead that the 1st Division merel y

extend its area of operations into Thua Thien . General Cushman concurred and on 4 December 196 7

General Robertson activated the Task Force X-Ray

planning staff, under his assistant division commander, Brigadier General Foster "Frosty" C . LaHue, to

carry out the new mission. 66

After a brief period of consultation between the 3d

Marine Division and the Task Force X-Ray staffs, on

18 December, General Robertson's headquarters

issued its operational order outlining the transfer of

responsibilities. The concept called for Task Force XRay to move its headquarters to Phu Bai and tak e

over the 3d Marine Division command post there .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A413469

BGen Foster C. LaHue, here in an official portrait, was th e

assistant division commander of the 1st Marine Division i n

January 1968 and also assumed the additional duty of

CG, TF X-Ray, in command of the 1st Marine Divisio n

forces at Phu Bai .

General LaHue would assume operational control o f

both the 1st and 5th Marines. The 1st Marines with

two battalions would deploy to Camp Evans while

the 5th Marines with three battalions would relocate

to the Phu Bai and Phu Loc sectors. Thus, the 1st

Marines would conduct operations in northern Thu a

Thien while the 5th Marines would bear the same

responsibility in the southern half of the province .67

This redeployment would be carried out in a serie s

of "incremental jumps." In an exchange of messages

and a conference at III MAF headquarters on 2 1

December, Task Force X-Ray and 1st and 3d Marin e

Division staff officers worked out a timetable and

agreement on the boundaries between the two divisions. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines in its move to

Phu Loc was the vanguard of Task Force X-Ray.6 8

On 11 January, the 1st Marine Division ordere d

the activation of Task Force X-Ray at Phu Bai . The

new command initially was to consist of the 5t h

Marines regimental headquarters and two of its
106 THE DEFINING YEAR

infantry battalions, the 1st and 2d. While the 1st

Battalion was to remain in the Phu Loc area, the 2 d

Battalion was to relieve the 2d Battalion, 26th

Marines at Phu Bai, which would then revert to the

operational control of the 3d Division. The Huong or

Perfume River was to be the demarcation line

between the 3d and 1st Marine Divisions . 69

Beginning on the 11th, helicopters, fixed-win g

transports, and Navy LCUs transported the Tas k

Force headquarters and the 5th Marines headquarters

elements from Da Nang to Phu Bai . Two days earlier, the advance echelon of the 5th Marines had arrive d

at the new base. From 13—15 January, Air Forc e

transports flew the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines directly from the small airfield at An Hoa south of Da

Nang to the Phu Bai airfield . At noon on 13 January,

Brigadier General LaHue announced from his new

command post at Phu Bai the activation of Task Forc e

X-Ray for operations.7 0

For the most part the shift of forces north ha d

gone without incident . Colonel Robert D. Bohn,

the 5th Marines commander, several years later

recalled that he had known about the proposed redeployment for over a month and had made preparations . Even before the transfer of his 1st Battalion t o

Phu Loc, he had visited the sector and talked t o

friends of his serving on the 3d Marine Division

staff at Phu Bai. Colonel Bohn mentioned that perhaps it may not have been proper for a regimenta l

commander to do this on his own, but on the othe r

hand, claimed "it was good . . . informal staff coordination." He recalled very few problems with th e

actual move .7 1

Still any such large transplacement of force s

results in some inconveniences and difficulties fo r

the troops involved. This was to prove no exception . One Marine staff sergeant assigned to the Task

Force X-Ray photo imagery section remembered

that after his arrival at Phu Bai there were "empt y

hootches" but no supplies and material. The members of the section had "to scrounge" plywood jus t

to make frames to hold their maps and photographs . On a more personal note, he observed

that he had not been paid since December and th e

headquarters had lost his pay and health records.

Although the 5th Marines had a mess hall, Colone l

Bohn recollected that the troops had no fresh foo d

and were eating C—Rations. He protested once he

learned that helicopters were being used to bring i n

china for the general's mess and the situation wa s

soon rectified : "It was an inevitable consequence of

displacing a hell of a lot more troops up north tha n

they had before. "72 °

Staff problems were almost inherent in the situation. As one staff officer later admitted that when th e

Task Force X-Ray staff arrived at Phu Bai they "didn't

know the magnitude" of the situation that they faced.

Although the staff was supposed to be a tactical rathe r

than an administrative headquarters, Colonel Boh n

observed that its officers were " so preoccupied with just

getting the logistics of being a headquarters that the y

had no time to really refine their combat operations

capability." The fact that the staff was temporary an d

task organized presented difficulties. As Lieutenan t

Colonel James C. Hecker, the G—1 officer responsibl e

for personnel affairs, noted, it "introduces into the sys -

tem austerity . . . austerity in staffing of the unit; the

management of the unit; and the economic employment of the material resources of the unit ." Colone l

Bohn remarked that the fact that the staff was temporary and thrown together was hardly conducive to

smooth operations.7 3

Still Task Force X-Ray was operational . On 12 January it issued its first operational order and laid out it s

concept of operations. The order itself differed littl e

from the original order published by the 1st Marine

Division in December. It detailed, however, the task

organization and units assigned . The 1st Marines was

slated to be attached with its 1st and 2d Battalions "o n

or about 24 January 1968 ." At the end of the month ,

the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was to join its parent

regiment at Phu Bai . In essence, Task Force X-Ray was

to be responsible eventually for all of Thua Thien

Province and General LaHue was to coordinate with

Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong of the 1s t

ARVN Division .74

In Thua Thien Province, Marine commanders

shared responsibility for operations with the 1s t

ARVN Division . U.S . advisors rated General Truong ,

the division commander and former commander of

the Vietnamese Airborne, as "top notch" and General

Cushman described Truong as the one Vietnames e

commander who "stood out" above the rest. Truong

maintained his division headquarters in Hue but kep t

only one of his infantry regiments, the 3d, in Thua

Thien Province. Lieutenant Colonel Phan Ba Hoa, th e

regimental commander, was also held in high esteem

* Brigadier General Paul G . Graham, who was 1st Marine Divisio n

G—3 or operations officer at the time, doubted the story about helicopters bringing in the china for the general 's mess: "I am certain I

would have heard about such an aberration ." Graham Comments.
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 107

by his American advisors who described him as a

"highly competent tactician and administrator." Hoa

positioned two of his battalions and a mobile task

group at PK 17, so named because it was located near

a road marker on Route 1, 17 kilometers north o f

Hue. He also retained one battalion and the division

headquarters near the city. In addition to these forces,

General Truong had under his control two airborne

battalions from the General Reserve, one at PK 17 an d

the other near Hue . The arrival of the General Reserve

battalions was part of a new impetus on the part of

General Westmoreland and the Vietnamese Join t

General Staff to reinforce the northern border areas

and provinces.75

The Cavalry Arrives

In Saigon at MACV headquarters, General Westmoreland had been concerned for some time abou t

the enemy intentions in the northern two provinces . While much of his attention remained riveted on

Khe Sanh, the MACV commander also worried

about the enemy buildup in the A Shau Valle y

about 30 miles southwest of Hue near the Laotia n

Border. Since the fall of the Special Forces camp

there in the spring of 1966, the North Vietnames e

had used the valley as one of their main base areas

and infiltration terminals into South Vietnam . During the summer of 1967, the 4th Marines in Operation Cumberland supported by engineers improve d

Highway 547 and established a firebase about 2 0

miles southwest of Hue. From there, U.S. Army

175mm guns fired into the valley. At the onset of

the fall-winter monsoon season in September, the

Marines abandoned the firebase because of th e

demands of the DMZ front on Marine manpower

and washed-out roads which seriously hampere d

resupply. Aerial photographic intelligence soo n

revealed that the North Vietnamese started their

own road project in the A Shau . Lieutenant General

Cushman jokingly recalled : "Lo and behold, they

[the NVA} started building their share of the rural

development here, and apparently, they're comin g

to meet the road we had built." The U .S . immediately started an air bombing interdiction campaig n

in the A Shau. Cushman remembered "some guy

came up with a chemical or something that was sup -

posed to turn dirt into mud . It actually worked to

some extent, we really plastered the A Shau Valle y

with that." According to the III MAF general, th e

bombing did slow up the NVA in the valley.7 6

About this time in early December, General West -

moreland decided to modify the plans for the Yor k

operations involving the 1st Air Cavalry Division. * While York I was to take place in February in th e

enemy's Do Xa base area in the I and II Corps Tactica l

Zone border region, MACV planned, as the weather

improved, to insert in April a joint task force of the 1st

Cavalry and III MAF units into the A Shau . On 16

December, Westmoreland visited General Cushman at

Da Nang to discuss accommodations for the 1st Cavalry if the Army division was to reinforce the Marines in

the next few months. According to the MACV commander, he believed the enemy would make his nex t

major effort in I Corps and that III MAF should accel -

erate its York logistic preparations to prepare for an

early deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division. He

directed Cushman to host a conference to include representatives from MACV, the Army division, and III

MAF to plan the necessary construction of helicopte r

and port facilities to be completed by mid January. At

the same time, Westmoreland met with Major General John J. Tolson, the 1st Air Cavalry Division commander, and alerted him about a possible early deployment to I Corps.7 7

While planning for the York I and II operations

continued into January, General Westmoreland an d

his staff began to place a higher priority on the reinforcement of northern I Corps. As reports indicate d

the buildup of forces at Khe Sanh and the DMZ, th e

MACV commander made his decision to send th e

1st Cavalry Division north of the Hai Van Pass . On

10 January, he canceled the York operation in the D o

Xa sector. Two days later he met with General Cush -

man at Da Nang to discuss the various contingency

plans. Westmoreland then ordered that the 1st Cavalry send two brigades north to Thua Thien

Province. These were the 1st Brigade from the 1s t

Cavalry and the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, temporarily attached to the 1st Cavalry Division. The Cavalry's 2d Brigade remained in II Corps

while the 3d Brigade stayed for the time being in th e

Wheeler/Wallowa area in the Que Sons. In fact, on

13 January, General Westmoreland told Cushma n

not "to direct movement" of the 3d Brigade t o

northern I Corps without his specific approval. Two

days later, he cabled Admiral Ulysses S . Grant Sharp,

CinCPac, and Army General Earle G . Wheeler, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that the 3d Brigade

would join the division at Phu Bai at a later date . On

*See Chapter 1 for discussion of the planning for the York operations.
'. __t GULF OF TONKIN

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••- -, •.' ,--•'• HUEj .•-.-

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RIVER BR

TFX-RAY

15 JANUARY 968

0 5 10

Kometer

108 THE DEFINING YEAR

17 January, the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division

began its deployment to Phu Bai.78

On that same date, General Westmoreland

explained to a gathering of his senior field commanders

the reasons for the reinforcement of III MAF north of

the Hai Van Pass. He believed that the NVA was about

to move against Khe Sanh and also against allied forces

in the coastal areas of southern Quang Tn and northern

Thua Thien Provinces from Base Area 101. As he had

earlier observed to Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler, 'the odds are 60—40 that the enemy will launch his

planned campaign prior to Tet." He told the assembled

officers that he realized the tenuous logistic situation,

but that the risk had to be accepted. He was especially

worried about the lack of a deep-water port and the

vulnerability of Route 1 between Da Nang and Hue.

He believed that it would take about another regiment

to secure the highway.79

General Westmoreland was also concerned about

command relations, especially in control of air.

MACV and III MAF staff officers had already started

to address this problem in the initial planning for

York II in the A Shau and for an air offensive in support of the Marine base at Khe Sanh, codenamed

Operation Niagara. The questions still remained

unresolved, however, with deep doctrinal differences

between the Marines of III MAF and Seventh Air

Force officers representing MACV. Although the

MACV air directive called for the Marine wing, operating under III MAF control, to support Marine units

and the Seventh Air Force to provide support for

Army units, Westmoreland was not sure that the system would work with the 1st Air Cavalry Division

deployed north of the Hai Van Pass.80

On 19 January, General Westmoreland visited

General Cushman and Major General Norman J.

Anderson, the commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing, at Da Nang. The MACV commander brought

up the issue of air support for the Cavalry Division in

its new area of operations. According to Westmore-
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 10 9

land, he told Cushman and Anderson that he believed

"we had to move toward a single managemen t

arrangement."* After a rather heated discussion, Westmoreland left the issue open, but told the Marin e

commanders that he expected them "to take care of

the 1st Cavalry Division." What he did not tell them

was that he had already sent a message to Admira l

Sharp recommending a change in air control procedures. In any event, at the meeting, the MACV commander directed General Cushman to detach the 1st

Cavalry's 3d Brigade from the Americal Division t o

rejoin its parent command .S 1

The 1st Air Cavalry Division quickly established an

area of operations in southern Quang Tri and norther n

Thua Thien Provinces. The division established its

command post on 20 January in a sector about five

kilometers north of Phu Bai, designated Landing Zone

El Paso, that included a Vietnamese civilian cemetery.

Major General Tolson, who had been on leave in the

United States at the time the order came to displace ,

arrived at El Paso the following day. With his 1st

Brigade battalions located both at El Paso and Landing

Zone Jane about 10 kilometers southwest of Quang Tri

City and other reinforcing units expected soon, he

immediately began to look for a new home for the division. As Tolson later stated, he needed "to get the division out of the graveyard ."8 2

Given his immediate mission to protect Quang Tri

City from the south and southwest and to be prepare d

to launch an attack into the enemy Base Areas 101

and 114, he took an exploratory reconnaissance fligh t

over his new area of operations. During this flight, on

22 January, he noticed the Marine base at Cam p

Evans and two possible landing sites just south of

Quang Tri City that he believed better suited for bas e

areas than the locations his units now occupied . Afte r

his return, he met with General Cushman at D a

Nang. He asked the III MAF commander for permission to take over Camp Evans from the Marines an d

also for the two sites in Quang Tri . Cushman grante d

him the request for Evans but told him that he woul d

have to coordinate with the 3d Marine Division fo r

the other two areas.83

On 22 January, the 1st Cavalry started its operation

Jeb Stuart in its new area of operations . Just south of

Landing Zone Jane, the 1st Brigade's Company C, 1s t

Battalion, 9th Infantry engaged a large enemy force . In

an obviously mismatched fire fight, the Cavalry troop -

* See Chapters 23 and 24 for the extended discussion of the Singl e

Manager issue .

ers, supported by their gunships, killed 52 of th e

North Vietnamese at a cost of one slightly wounde d

American soldier. Eventually the 1st Brigade moved

into the two new Quang Tri sites, redesignated Landing Zones Sharon and Betty, that General Tolson originally wanted . The 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne the n

assumed responsibility for Landing Zone Jane whil e

General Tolson established his headquarters at Camp

Evans together with the Cavalry's 3d Brigade . As one

Marine staff officer later remarked there was "a ful l

Army division operating where two reduced Marin e

regiments had been operating ."84

The Changed Situation in the North

The arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division altered the

Marine Checkers plan . This especially applied to the

1st Marines which just had moved from Quang Tri an d

relieved the 4th Marines at Camp Evans . The enemy

attack on Khe Sanh at the time had an equal impact o n

the plans. On 22 January, the 1st Marines received

orders to detach the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines whic h

was attached to the regiment for a helicopter lift to

Khe Sanh. This would leave Colonel Stanley S . Hughes, who relieved Colonel Herbert Ing two days earlie r

at Evans, with no infantry battalions for Operatio n

Neosho II in the Co Bi-Thanh Tan sector or for security of the base camp . With the concurrence of the Seventh Fleet and MACV, General Cushman inserted th e

SLF Alpha battalion, BLT 2/4, into Camp Evans .

Beginning on 22 January, the SLF helicopter squadro n

HMM—361 lifted three companies of BLT 2/4 from its

amphibious shipping offshore to Camp Evans an d

then, in turn, flew the companies of the 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines to Khe Sanh . At the same time, the

Marine helicopters flew 380 civilian refugees out of

Khe Sanh to Camp Evans . On the 23d, the 1st Marine s

in a "rough rider" convoy trucked the civilians to a

refugee relocation center in Cam Lo . By the afternoo n

of the 23d, the relief and transplacement of the 1st Battalion was complete . The 1st Marines assumed operational control of BLT 2/4 which assumed responsibility for Neosho II operations.85* *

It was obvious to all concerned that the Neosho

operation was to be of short duration . Although

Colonel Hughes on 23 January issued an operationa l

order for Neosho II, he soon received a message tha t

the 1st Cavalry was to assume responsibility fo r

**See Chapter 5 for description of Neosho I in Camp Evans an d

Co Bi-Thanh Tan area and Chapters 4 and 14 for Marine operation s

at Khe Sanh .
110 THE DEFINING YEA R

Camp Evans . Colonel Hughes was to close out Operation Neosho on the 24th, and begin redeploymen t

to Phu Bai. He was to assume operational control o f

his 1st and 2d Battalions and responsibility of the

Phu Bai Vital Area from the 5th Marines . BLT 2/4

would then reembark for another operation with the

3d Marine Division .8 6 *

On 25 January, the 1st Marines, which had

remained attached to the 3d Marine Division, reverted to its parent division and came under the control o f

Task Force X-Ray. The first elements of the 1st Air

Cavalry Division arrived at Camp Evans and formall y

took over the base two days later. From 25—28 January in a series of phased deployments, Colonel Hugh -

es moved his headquarters and the 2d Battalion, 1s t

Marines rear elements from Camp Evans to Phu Bai ,

as well as the artillery battalion, 1st Battalion, 11th

Marines. At 0830 on the 28th, Hughes opened his

new command post at the latter base . On 30 January,

the headquarters and Companies A and B of the 1s t

Battalion, 1st Marines began arriving at Phu Bai fro m

Quang Tri and returned to parent control . The 2d

Battalion, 1st Marines infantry companies were still a t

Con Thien but preparing also to move . Colonel Bohn ,

the 5th Marines commander, recalled that at this tim e

he visited Hughes and that the 1st Marines commander "was sitting in a hooch . . . [with) one bunk i n

there and one chair." Bohn asked "`Where the hell's

your CP?"' and Hughes replied "`This is it ." Colonel

Hughes stated that he did not yet have a specific mission and he had under him only "one battalion wit h

two companies."S7

In contrast, however, after the 5th Marines ha d

arrived at Phu Bai, the regiment had more tha n

enough to keep itself occupied . Since 15 January,

Colonel Bohn had responsibility for securing Highway 1 from the Hai Van Pass to Phu Bai . He was also

to provide reaction forces for all the Combined

Action platoons and for any key populated areas i n

the sector. For the most part, until the end of th e

month, the enemy confined his activity to attacks

and probes on Route 1 and Marine strongpoints i n

the Phu Loc sector.88

Through 29 January, Colonel Bohn kept his 1st

Battalion positioned at Phu Loc and made the 2d Bat-

*Colonel Bruce F. Meyers, who in 1968 commanded SLF Alpha

(TG 79 .4), commented that operational control of BLT 2/4 wa s

returned to him at noon on 26 January and that "we had all element s

of BLT 2/4 back aboard our shipping in five hours and fifteen minutes." Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dcd 20Feb95 (Vietnam

Comment File) .

talion responsible for the Phu Bai Vital Area. Originally, Bohn expected to use his 3d Battalion as hi s

maneuver battalion, but this changed with the arriva l

of the 1st Cavalry Division in northern I Corps . With

the Army taking over Camp Evans, however, and the

1st Marines moving from there to Phu Bai, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines remained in the Da Nang TAOR .

The regimental commander then decided to use the 2d

Battalion as a maneuver battalion when it was relieve d

at Phu Bai by the companies of the 1st Battalion, 1s t

Marines. On 29 January, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C .

Cheatham, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines commander ,

began the displacement of his battalion and two of his

companies into the Phu Loc sector.89

Thus, on the eve of Tet 1968, Task Force X-Ra y

consisted of two infantry regimental headquarters wit h

a total of three infantry battalions between them . Also

under Task Force X-Ray and providing artillery support was the 1st Field Artillery Group (1st FAG) consisting of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 11th Marines and

several separate batteries. Brigadier General LaHue ,

the task force commander, also shared the Phu Bai bas e

with rear echelons of the 1st Air Cavalry Division ,

Force Logistic Support Group Alpha, the rear headquarters and echelons of the 3d Marine Division, an d

the Seabees. As one of Lahu e 's staff officers, Lieutenan t

Colonel Arthur J. Poillon, observed, the arrival of th e

1st Air Cavalry Division had made the original Checkers plan "unrecognizable" and the Marines "found

themselves reacting to these Army movements . . . ."90

The establishment of the 1st Air Cavalry Division

area of operations between the 1st and 3d Marin e

Divisions also concerned General Westmoreland .

Already lacking confidence in Marine generalship, h e

decided to establish a new forward headquarters at

Phu Bai to control the war in the northern two

provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien . At first he

considered placing an Army Corps headquarters at

Phu Bai, but rejected this concept in the belief that it

would cause too much inter-Service dissension . On 26

January, he met with General Vien and Presiden t

Thieu about the establishment of both a Joint General Staff and MACV Forward headquarters at Phu Bai.

Army General Creighton W. Abrams, as Deputy

MACV, would represent Westmoreland while General Lam, the I Corps Commander, would be the personal representative of the Joint General Staff. At the

same time, he notified Admiral Sharp about his intentions and sent General Abrams to Phu Bai to discuss

the proposed new command arrangements with General Cushman, the III MAF commander.9"
HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT 11 1

Although both General Cushman at Da Nang and

General Krulak in Hawaii had their suspicions abou t

Westmoreland's motivations, they accepted th e

changes with good grace . The two Marine generals

acknowledged the validity of the MACV commander's desire to have his forward headquarters in place ,

under his deputy, in the northern sector, where, he

believed the decisive battle of the war was about to

begin. On the 27th, General Westmoreland ordere d

an advance echelon of the new headquarters unde r

Army Major General Willard Pearson to Phu Bai .

With the forward deployment of the 1st Air Cavalr y

Division, III MAF prepared to counter the expected

enemy offensive in the north .92 *

*The outbreak of the Tet offensive delayed the formal establishmen t

of the MACV Forward headquarters until 12 February. See Chapter 11
PART II

THE TET OFFENSIVE
CHAPTER 7

The Enemy Offensive in the DMZ

and Southern Quang Tri, 20 January—8 February

The Cua Viet is Threatened—Adjustment of Forces in Southern Quang Tri Province

Heavy Fighting Along the DMZ—A Lull in Leatherneck Square—The Cua Viet Continues to Heat U p

The Battle For Quang Tri City—Tet Aftermath Along the DM Z

The Cua Viet is Threatened

Beginning on 20 January, the North Vietnamese

intensified their efforts in the north from Khe Sanh t o

the Cua Viet. While most public and media attention

was focused upon the Khe Sanh base, the Marine

command could not ignore its northern logistical lifeline from the Cua Viet Port Facility to Dong Ha

along the Cua Viet River channel . From Dong Ha,

Route 9 connected the isolated Marine bases at Cam

Lo, Camp Carroll, the Rockpile, and Ca Lu . The continued presence of large North Vietnamese force s

along the eastern DMZ as well as the buildup o f

forces in the west around Khe Sanh limited the ability of the 3d Marine Division to concentrate its force s

in any one area. Even with the arrival of the additional Army forces in the north, the division was stil l

spread out from its Quang Tri base in the south, t o

Khe Sanh in the west, and to the Cua Viet in the east .

Almost simultaneously with attacks on Khe Sanh,

the North Vietnamese appeared to be making a determined attempt to halt the river traffic on the Cua Viet .

On 20 January, enemy gunners positioned on th e

northern bank of the river forced the temporary closing of the Cua Viet . Up to this point, Lieutenan t

Colonel Edward R. Toner's 1st Amphibian Tractor

Battalion with an infantry company, Company C, 1s t

Battalion, 3d Marines, attached to his command i n

Operation Napoleon, largely had responsibility for th e

security of the river. The battalion was becoming mor e

and more hard pressed to carry out this mission . '

Marine forklifts unload Navy landing craft at the Dong Ha ramp . With the Cua Viet too shallow for large-draft vessels,

the Navy used both LCMs (landing craft, mechanized) and LC Us (landing craft, utility) to ply the river between the Cua

Viet Facility and Dong Ha to bring in supplies to Marines in the DMZ sector.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19133 2

113
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THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 11 5

Only the previous morning, 19 January, a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,

patrolling the sand dunes along the coast north o f

the A–1 Strongpoint, and about 5,000 meters above

the Cua Viet, ran into a company from the enemy

K–400 Main Force Battalion . Corporal Ronald R.

Asher, the acting weapons platoon sergeant, remembered that he and two of his machine gun team s

accompanied the platoon . According to Asher, the

" lead squad walked into the NVA positions" an d

that "within seconds the sound of AK 's, M16s, . . .

and the unmistakable cough of one of my guns wa s

earth shattering ." For a few chaotic hours, the platoon took cover as best it could and attempted to

recover its casualties. Corporal Asher recalled tha t

he and another squad leader assumed control of th e

platoon as both the platoon leader and sergeant wer e

incapacitated . 2

By late afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Toner had

reinforced the platoon with the rest of Company C

supported by tanks and LVTs . Both sides used rifles,

automatic weapons, grenades, mortars, and artillery

fire in a hard-fought engagement that lasted much o f

the day. Enemy artillery from north of the Demilitarized Zone fired some 70 130mm rounds into th e

Marine positions . Still the enemy supporting arms

were no match for the firepower that the Americans

threw into the battle including air, naval gunfire ,

conventional artillery, and tank direct fire . By 1500,

both sides had disengaged . The Marines losses were 3

dead and 33 wounded, 31 of whom had to be evacuated. According to Marine accounts, they killed 23 o f

the enemy and recovered six weapons including tw o

light machine guns. 3

On the following day, the 20th, the enemy not

only fired at two Navy craft, but earlier that morning also engaged a South Vietnamese Navy Coasta l

Patrol Force junk on patrol in the Cua Viet. The 1st

Amphibian Tractor Battalion, conducting a twocompany operation nearby in conjunction with the

2d ARVN Regiment, ran up against an even

stronger enemy force, approximately a battalion i n

size, than it had the previous day. This time the battalion had established blocking positions just northwest of the hamlet of My Loc on the northern bank

of the Cua Viet. Starting as a small platoon action ,

the action soon evolved into a fullscale battle

employing all supporting arms. The enemy subjected the Marines to an artillery bombardment of about

50 130mm rounds that lasted for about a half hour

to cover its withdrawal that afternoon. According to

Marine officers, the North Vietnamese artillery used

forward observers to adjust its fire. Two of the LVTs

in the course of the battle sustained damage, one detonated an explosive device and the other was struck

by three rocket propelled grenades. The Marine tractor battalion in this fray suffered casualties of 13

dead and 48 wounded and reported a bodycount o f

20 dead North Vietnamese . In the same fighting, the

ARVN claimed to have killed an additional 20 an d

captured 2 prisoners. 4

The situation on the Cua Viet was becomin g

untenable . In the early morning hours of 21 Januar y

around 0200, a Company C, 1st Battalion, 3 d

Marines outpost spotted an enemy platoon attempting to dig in along the sand dunes very near the

scene of the fighting on the 19th . The Marine s

called in artillery throughout the night and at 093 0

Marine fixed-wing aircraft flew three attack sortie s

against the enemy troops. According to the Marin e

account, the enemy wore "green uniforms similar t o

those of previous contact . . . ." The NVA then withdrew to the north under Marine rifle fire an d

grenades, but left nine bodies behind . About an

hour later, a Navy landing craft (LCM) on the Cu a

Viet triggered another mine which exploded behind

it. The vessel remained afloat, but the explosion

knocked out both of its engines. Another LCM

which came out to tow the helpless craft back t o

port came under fire from the northern bank. After

all the LCMs had returned safely to the Cua Viet

Port Facility, the naval commander of the bas e

announced "All USN river traffic secured . " 5

While the river traffic once again resumed the following day, 22 January was almost a repeat of th e

21st. In the early morning hours of the 22d, an

American naval gun spotter assigned to the 2 d

ARVN Regiment A–1 outpost observed about 30 0

to 500 North Vietnamese troops through hi s

starlight scope moving south in the same general are a

where Company C had its previous clashes with th e

enemy. Pulling back a Company C ambush patrol ,

the American command threw in the entire spectru m

of supporting arms including 105mm howitzers, 8-

inch guns, Marine fixed-wing TPQ (radar-controlled )

aircraft strikes, and an AC–130 "Spooky" minigu n

strafing run . A later ARVN battle damage assessment

of the evidence, including blood stains, freshly dug

graves, abandoned web equipment and documents,

suggested that the enemy may have sustained as

many as 100 casualties. Further south, however, on

the Cua Viet the Navy reported another mining inci-
116 THE DEFINING YEA R

dent. This time, a Navy LCU struck two mines and

had to be towed back to port. Again the Cua Viet

Facility commander closed the river until the nex t

day when a Navy and Marine underwater demolitio n

team from Dong Ha would sweep the river. 6

This last was too much for General Cushman at III

MAE He radioed Major General Tompkins, the 3d

Marine Division commander, that the "interruptio n

to Cua Viet LOC {line of communications) unacceptable ." The III MAF commander observed that command detonated mines and ground fire against ship -

ping on the Cua Viet could only be undertaken fro m

the river banks. He ordered Tompkins to clear banks

"at once" and to coordinate his actions with the 1st

ARVN Division . Cushman advised the 3d Marin e

Division commander that he might want to use SLF

Bravo, specifically BLT 3/1, for this purpose in th e

sector for a few days. ?

The employment of BLT 3/1 in the coastal sector

of the DMZ was not a new idea. As early as 5 January 1968, General Cushman had notified the 3d

Division commander of an SLF operation to be calle d

Badger Catch/Saline to be carried out in the Cua Viet

area from 7 February through 22 February. Tompkins

was to insure coordination with the local ARVN

commander. On 15 January, Vice Admiral William F.

Bringle, the commander of the Seventh Fleet, issued

for planning purposes an initiating directive fo r

Operation Badger Catch. He mentioned only that th e

operation would take place in Quang Tri Provinc e

and at a date "to be determined dependent upon tactical situation ."8

Two days later, on 17 January, General Cushman

appeared to change the original mission for the SLF i n

northern Quang Tri . In a message to General Tompkins, Cushman suggested that the latter should carry

out coordinated preemptive attacks in conjunction

with the 1st ARVN Division in the general DMZ

area. He remarked that he intended "to assign elements of SLF Bravo . . . your opcon on request for

immediate employment in support of these operations." The closing of the Cua Viet, however, apparently caused the III MAF commander once more t o

change his mind. In a later message on 22 January,

Cushman told Tompkins to use the SLF in the Cua

Viet for a few days. Later that day, General Cushma n

informed General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, that BLT 3/1 would make an amphibious

landing in the Cua Viet sector on the 23d and assist i n

the clearing of the river. After the completion of tha t

mission, the battalion would then go to Camp Carroll

to take part in the planned preemptive offensive to

destroy enemy forces that posed a threat to the Camp

Carroll and Rockpile sites. 9

At a planning session at the 3d Marine Divisio n

headquarters on 23 January, SLF and division staff

officers first selected 0800 the next morning as th e

time for the landing . With the continued enem y

harassment of allied shipping in the Cua Viet channel ,

General Tompkins and the amphibious commander s

decided, however, to push forward H—hour to th e

early evening of the 23d . Around 1900, Lieutenan t

Colonel Max McQuown's BLT 3/1 started comin g

ashore and by 2130 McQuown had established hi s

command post temporarily at Blue Beach, on the

northern bank of the mouth of the Cua Viet.l 0

Operation Badger Catch was part of a concerte d

effort that General Tompkins had started at noon o n

the 23d to make the Cua Viet reasonably safe for

LCU and LCM traffic . At that time, he place d

armed guards on all boats, provided continuous

HU—1E gunship cover, and placed division "Sparrow Hawk" infantry squads on call for immediat e

insertion into the region. The mission of the BLT

was to eliminate all enemy forces in the immediat e

vicinity of the northern bank of the Cua Viet and t o

prevent any new North Vietnamese forces fro m

entering this area. Its area of operations extende d

some 3,000 to 4,000 meters above the Cua Viet and

about 5,000 to 7,000 meters inland . The 1st ARVN

Division was to clear the area south of the river and

provide blocking positions for McQuown's battalio n

to the west.' 1

The clearing of the Cua Viet proved to be a harder nut to crack than the planners at III MAF and th e

3d Marine Division first contemplated . As an indicator of what was to follow, on the morning of th e

24th, the North Vietnamese used a command deconated mine to sink a Navy LCM in the river channel . At that point, General Cushman asked th e

Navy Amphibious Ready Group commander for th e

SLF Bravo helicopter squadron, HMM—165, to lift

elements of BLT 3/1 to an island in the river channel that the North Vietnamese were using as a firing and command site to disrupt the boat traffic o n

the Cua Viet.* Although Badger Catch was to las t

*At this point, Operation Badger Catch was an SLF operation and

the SLF battalion and squadron still came under the Navy amphibiou s

ready group commander. Until the amphibious commander officiall y

gave up control of his forces ashore to III MAF or his representative, he

still nominally retained control of the SLF units .
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 11 7

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19027 7

Marines of BLT 3/1 of the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force (SLF) Bravo go into action in th e

Cua Viet sector after being brought ashore by helicopters of HMM—165, the SLF helicopte r

squadron . In the top photo, Marines move inland after arriving in the landing zone, while a Boeing Vertol CH—46 Sea Knight hovers overhead and prepares to return to the ships of the amphibiou s

ready group offshore. Below, Marines of the BLT in their new area of operations move through a

Vietnamese village with its thatched-roof huts.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190435
118 THE DEFINING YEA R

only a few days, BLT 3/1 would remain in the Cua

Viet sector with the same mission for over a month .

For Lieutenant Colonel McQuown and his battalio n

it was a time to vindicate themselves after thei r

somewhat uneven performance in their first SLF

operation, Badger Tooth, at the end of December.12 .

Adjustment of Forces in

Southern Quang Tri Province

Changes were occurring elsewhere in the 3d Marine

Division area of operations as well during this period .

As part of the Checkers plan to concentrate the 3 d

Marine Division in Quang Tri Province, Colone l

Joseph E. Lo Prete's 3d Marines took over the Operation Osceola sector centered around the relatively ne w

Quang Tri complex from the 1st Marines . The 1st

Marines moved to Camp Evans and the 4th Marine s

assumed responsibility for the Lancaster area at Cam p

Carroll. At 0930 on the morning of 20 January,

Colonel Lo Prete moved into his new command post a t

La Vang, about 4,000 meters below Quang Tri City

and south of the Thach Han River, and immediatel y

began Operation Osceola II with the same forces tha t

were in Osceola I. t 3

For all practical purposes, the mission and concept of operations for Osceola II were the same a s

those for Osceola I . The 3d Marines was to protec t

the Quang Tri base from enemy attack and to pre -

vent NVA units from Base Area 101 in the far reaches of the Hai Lang Forest Preserve from reaching the

coast. Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Goodale's 1st

Battalion, 3d Marines, located at Ai Tu, above th e

Thach Han and about 3,000 meters northwest o f

Quang Tri City, was responsible for the defense of th e

northern sector which included the airfield and th e

approaches to the base from the west. Collocated a t

La Vang with the 3d Marines was Lieutenant Colonel

Marcus J. Gravel's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Gravel's battalion covered the southern and southwester n

approaches into the Quang Tri coastal region . The

3d Battalion, 12th Marines, with two 105mm batteries, one at Ai Tu and the other at La Vang, and on e

provisional 155mm howitzer battery, also at L a

*Colonel Max McQuown wrote that in contrast to Operation Badger Tooth, Operation Badger Catch was the " proper, profitable use of a

potent fighting force. Initially, BLT 3/1 operated within an Amphibious Objective Area with all elements of the BLT ashore or on-call . "

Most importantly, he had " firm intelligence about the enemy in the

area. " Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Vang, provided the artillery support. Company C, 3d

Tank Battalion, and an Army "Duster " battery, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery, equipped wit h

M42s armed with twin 40mm antiaircraft guns were

also at La Vang under the operational control of th e

3d Marines and ready to assist the infantry. Elements

of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion screened the

approaches to the west . 1 4

With only two battalions available to him, L o

Prete barely had sufficient forces to protect the

immediate Quang Tri base area let alone carry ou t

mobile operations in the extensive southwestern area

of operations toward Base Area 101 . Although the

1st ARVN Regiment maintained forces to the eas t

and north of the Marine regiment, the North Vietnamese had already infiltrated at least two battalion s

of the 812th NVA Regiment into the coastal region

east of Route 1 and Quang Tri City . The NVA Quyet

Thaig Artillery Regiment equipped with 82mm mortars and rockets was deployed to the southwest and

west of the Marines. To the west, Marine reconnaissance "Stingray" patrols made continual sightings o f

small groups of enemy soldiers moving eastward

towards the coast.1 5

For the most part, the enemy largely bypassed th e

Marine positions and confined his attacks on the

Marine base areas and the Quang Tri airfield t o

harassing sniper fire, occasional mortar shelling, and

rocket bombardment. On two occasions, 24 and 3 1

January, enemy 122mm rockets and 60mm and

82mm mortar rounds hit the Quang Tri airfield bu t

caused relatively little damage . Through January, the

Marines sustained casualties of 2 dead and 32 wounded and killed 8 of the enemy and took 1 prisoner.

They also recovered six weapons.1 6

With the North Vietnamese attacks on Khe San h

and the Cua Viet, both Generals Westmoreland an d

Cushman recognized the need for additional forces i n

Quang Tri Province . Westmoreland's decision to

reinforce Marine forces in the north with the 1st Ai r

Cavalry Division provided General Cushman, the II I

MAF commander, with additional options .** On 22

January, after a conference with both General Westmoreland, and the MACV deputy commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, Cushman outlined his

plans for the Army division . He planned to assign

Major General John J. Tolson, the 1st Cavalry Commander, an extensive area of operations that would

* *See Chapter 6 for further discussion about the deployment of th e

1st Air Cavalry Division to I Corps .
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 11 9

include the enemy Base Area 114 in northern Thua

Thien Province, and Base Area 101 in southern

Quang Tri Province. The division command post

with one brigade would be located at the forme r

Marine base at Camp Evans . This brigade would be

responsible for operations to clear out Base Area 114 . While part of the same operation, Operation Jeb

Stuart under the command of General Tolson, th e

second brigade upon its arrival would deploy t o

Quang Tri . It would relieve the 3d Marines of its

responsibility south of the Thach Han and take over

the La Vang base area .1 7

On 22 January, the 1st Air Cavalry's 1st Brigade ,

under the command of Army Colonel Donald V.

Rattan, deployed from Landing Zone El Paso nea r

Phu Bai and established a new fire base at Landing

Zone Jane, about 10,000 meters south of Quang Tr i

City. Three days later, the 1st Brigade, four battalions strong, moved from Jane to Landing Zon e

Betty, just below the 3d Marines headquarters . One

Marine, Corporal William Ehrhart, with the 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines, recalled the day the Cavalr y

arrived:

One morning, army helicopters, mostly Hueys, . . .

just kept coming and coming and coming, dropping

down and disgorging soldiers like insects depositin g

eggs, then flying off to be replaced by still more helicopters. All day long they came . I had never seen s o

many helicopters before. I had never even imagined that

so many helicopters existed . 1 8

With the arrival of the Army brigade, Operatio n

Osceola II became a one-infantry battalion operatio n

under the 3d Marines and responsible only for th e

protection of the Quang Tri airfield and its immediate environs. Colonel Lo Prete moved his command post from La Vang to Ai Tu west of the airfield. On 27 January, Lieutenant Colonel Gravel's

1st Battalion, 1st Marines reverted to the control of

its parent regiment and joined the 1st Marines at

Phu Bai.19

Heavy Fighting Along the DM Z

There had also been a readjustment of forces in the

central DMZ front . On 20 January, the 4th Marines,

under Colonel William L. Dick, had taken over the

Lancaster area of operations from the 3d Marines .

Outside of a slight change of name, Lancaster II

retained the same forces and mission as the old operation. Colonel Dick and his staff moved into the 3 d

Marines' old command post at Camp Carroll an d

assumed operational control of the two battalions

already in Lancaster, the 2d and the 3d, of the 9t h

Marines.* Artillery batteries under the operational

control of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines directl y

supported the infantry base areas in Lancaster : Camp

Carroll, Thon Son Lam or Rockpile area, and Ca Lu .

Like Colonel Lo Prete before him, Colonel Dick' s

main task was to keep Route 9 open in an area characterized by rolling hills, an occasional ravine, overgrown brush, streams, and dry streambeds . Still

Route 9 was the main land logistic lifeline for the

Marine outposts in the DMZ sector.2 0

With the move of the 4th Marines to Camp Carroll,

the regiment's "tempo of action picked up immediately." Upon the first night of the arrival of the regimental headquarters and staff, North Vietnamese gunners

fired some 30 140mm rockets into Camp Carroll rein -

forced by 15 rounds of 85mm artillery fire . Although

causing relatively little damage, these turned out to b e

the first shots in a determined attempt by the North

Vietnamese to isolate Camp Carroll and cut Route 9 .2 1

Four days later, 24 January 1968, elements of the

320th NVA Division, an elite unit and veteran of the

1954 Dien Bien Phu campaign and newly arrived i n

the DMZ sector, initiated the enemy campaign in

earnest with an ambush of a Marine "Rough Rider "

convoy. The convoy was on a routine artillery resupply

mission from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll . It consiste d

of three trucks and a jeep armed with quad .50-calibe r

machine guns. Around 1330 that afternoon, when th e

trucks were about to turn into the Camp Carroll acces s

road, about 3,000 meters above the Marine base, the

North Vietnamese sprang their ambush .2 2

The enemy soldiers opened up with small arms ,

mortars, machine guns, and recoilless rifles, immediately immobilizing all four vehicles. Using their

weapons, including the quad .50, to defend themselves, and taking what cover they could, the Marines

with the convoy called for assistance . The 4th Marines

sent a reaction force from Camp Carroll, consisting of a

platoon from Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines ;

two tanks, one a flame tank, from Company B, 3 d

Tank Battalion ; and two Army M42 Dusters from Battery C, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery. The North Vietnamese, however, were waiting for the reaction column. An enemy gunner fired on the lead tank,

stopping it with a recoilless rifle round and killing th e

*Actually it was a battalion and a half, as the 2d Battalion, 9t h

Marines only had two companies in Lancaster. The other two companies were under the command of the battalion executive officer in th e

neighboring 9th Marines Kentucky area of operations. See Chapter 3 .
120 THE DEFINING YEA R

reaction force commander, Captain Daniel W. Kent,

who was also the tank company commander. Again th e

Marines fought back and called for support . When two

UH—1E gunships appeared overhead, about 1830, th e

North Vietnamese troops broke contact and disappeared. A second relief column of two more dusters and

two trucks armed with quad .50s arrived from Dong

Ha and assisted with the evacuation of the dead an d

wounded. The Marines suffered casualties of 8 men

dead and 44 wounded . They killed about three of the

enemy. Not only did the vehicles of the original convo y

require extensive repairs, but two of the dusters and the

one tank hit by the RPG round also sustained damage .

General Tompkins, the 3d Marine Division commander, could not tolerate this situation . It appeared

that the North Vietnamese at will could cut Route 9

and thus, in effect, deny access to Camp Carroll and th e

other Marine bases in Operation Lancaster. Upon learning about the ambush, he transferred Lieutenant

Colonel Lee R. Bendell's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

from the Kentucky area of operations to the Lancaste r

one and returned the battalion to its parent regimental

control. The battalion was to clear the ambush site an d

then sweep Route 9.23

On the afternoon of 24 January, Marine helicopters

brought Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, the battalio n

commander, a skeleton battalion command group, an d

Company M to Camp Carroll . At 1900, Bendell an d

his small headquarters group accompanied Company

M under Captain Raymond W. Kalm to the ambus h

site to assist in the evacuation of casualties . Upon learning that the second relief force had already brought i n

the wounded and some of the bodies, the Marine company established night positions on a ridgeline, abou t

1500 meters south of and overlooking Route 9 and als o

screening " the NVA from Camp Carroll . "2 4 The next

morning the company would begin its reconnaissance

of the battalion's planned objective area.2 5

At 0630, on the 25th, the company departed its

nighttime positions. Lieutenant Colonel Bendell advise d

Captain Kalm to occupy a small hill just north of Route

9, about 2,000 meters south of the Cam Lo River. Afte r

sending his 3d Platoon under Second Lieutenant John S .

Leffen, to occupy the strategic height, the Marine captain led the rest of the company to the ambush site

of the previous day, about 1,000 meters to the west . *

*Major John S. Leffen, then the platoon commander, remembere d

some of the events somewhat differently . He recalled moving to the hil l

north of Route 9 the previous evening . Maj John S. Leffen, Jr ., Comments

on draft, n .d. (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Leffen Comments .

The company recovered four of the Marine dead fro m

the earlier action and then began a sweep from west to

east on Route 9 . About 0915, the lead platoon had no

sooner passed by the damaged vehicles still strew n

along the side of the road when it came under automatic weapons fire .** With the assistance of Leffen 's

platoon left on the hill, the company obtained fire

superiority. Lance Corporal Jack L. Patton, a machine

gunner with the 3d Platoon, sighted the enemy gun .

Patton later laconically stated, "my gun returned fire

and we killed the enemy." In that action, the Marines

sustained casualties of two dead and two wounded an d

killed three of the enemy. They also recovered the

NVA light machine gun .2 6 ***

Company M then established a defensive perimeter on the hill and waited for the rest of the battalion to join it. By mid-afternoon, both Companies I

and L as well as the rest of the battalion command

group had arrived. Although not suffering any more

killed, the battalion sustained 17 more wounde d

from random mortar fire from nearby enemy gunners. That night the battalion "established a three -

company, tied-in perimeter" across both sides o f

Route 9. 27

At about 0230 on 26 January, Colonel Dick, th e

4th Marines commander, radioed Lieutenan t

Colonel Bendell that he had received intelligence of

large North Vietnamese forces operating just nort h

of the Cam Lo River. The regimental commande r

wanted the 3d Battalion to secure Route 9 from th e

Khe Gia Bridge, about 5,000 meters west of th e

battalion's present position, east to Cam Lo, a distance of about 9,000 meters. Two companies were to

deploy north of the river, while the remaining company cleared the road . Lieutenant Colonel Bendell

suggested instead that " the mission of securing the

road was best performed along the road and south o f

the Cam Lo River." The regiment, however, insiste d

that the battalion carry out the mission as originally ordered.2 8

Lieutenant Colonel Bendell then prepared his

plans and started to carry out his new orders . Companies I and L were to cross the Cam Lo and operat e

**Colonel Bendell recalled that "one Marine managed to start the

abandoned tank and pulled all the convoy vehicles back toward Cam

Lo ." Col Lee R . Bendell, Comments on draft, n .d . (Nov94) (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Bendell Comments .

** *Major Leffen, the 3d Platoon commander, recalled that th e

captured enemy weapon was a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rathe r

than a light machine gun . Leffen Comments.
1 IlL !NEM\ ( )lFLNSI\F 1\ IHE I)MZ AND ()ti11ER\ Q1 IA\( IR] 121

CLEARING OF ROUTE 9

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122 THE DEFINING YEA R

on the northern banks of the river while Company M

secured Route 9, south of the river. The enemy, how -

ever, forced the Marines to change the original concept of the mission . At 0845 on the morning of the

26th, a Company M patrol discovered that the

enemy had blown a bridge on Route 9 over a smal l

streambed, just below the hill, now dubbed "Mike's

Hill" after Company M, where the company had

established its night defensive position. The patrol

reported that the road was "impassable without

engineer improvement." Just as Company I was

about to cross the river, the regimental commande r

changed his order about operating on both banks o f

the Cam Lo.* Colonel Dick directed the battalion t o

"continue to secure Route 9, to deny enemy access t o

bridges and culverts, and to patrol and ambush 37 5

meters north and south of Route 9, occupying th e

high ground on either side of the route as necessary. "

In effect, the battalion was to secure that portion o f

Route 9 that extended from the opening to Camp

Carroll eastward to the destroyed bridge .2 9

During the rest of the morning and afternoon o f

the 26th, the three companies patrolled the approximately 2,000 meters of Route 9, encountering littl e

resistance except for the occasional sniper and morta r

bombardment. Throughout the day, however, the

battalion recovered enemy equipment, includin g

pieces of clothing and web gear, ammunition ,

grenades, and even antipersonnel mines and spotte d

small groups of enemy soldiers. By nightfall, concerned about the perimeter of the previous night o n

relatively low terrain, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel l

ordered the battalion to form three separate company defensive perimeters "on favorable high ground

on both sides of Route 9, including Company M on

Mike's Hill."30

After returning to its hill for the night, Company

M also established several small ambush sites . The 3d

Platoon commander, Second Lieutenant John S . Leffen, sent out an ambush squad and established a fire

team listening post at the bottom of the hill . According to Leffen, both the squad and fire team as the y

arrived at their designated positions reported ther e

were North Vietnamese soldiers all around them .

Lieutenant Leffen pulled back the listening post, bu t

*Colonel William L. Dick explained in his comments that onc e

the bridge was blown, " a change in plans was obviously required "

and required a "rapid reevaluation ." Col William L . Dick, Comments on draft, dtd lDec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Dick Comments.

left the ambush squad where it was because of its

"tactical importance . "3 1

During the night of 26—27 January, North Vietnamese soldiers attempted to infiltrate the Marin e

positions through a streambed to the west of Mike 's

Hill and gullies and other streambeds to the nort h

and east .** On Mike's Hill, Lieutenant Leffe n

remembered that about 0500 on the morning of th e

27th, "we heard what sounded like `wall to wall '

NVA all around our positions. " He remarked on th e

poor noise discipline of the enemy troops. Although

the Marines could not hear the sound of the movements of the NVA soldiers, "What gave them away

was their constant talking ." A Marine mortarman ,

Frank Craven,*** with Company M several year s

later recalled, "They were at the bottom of the hil l

and we were at the middle of the hill . . . They didn't know it and we didn't know it until . . . we

butted heads." According to Craven, "we hear d

some noise and then it was automatic machine gu n

fire from then on . It was terrible ."3 2

The fight for Mike's Hill would last through the

entire afternoon and spread to Route 9 and involve al l

three companies of the 3d Battalion. On the hill,

itself, the battle turned into a wild melee . Clambering up three slopes of the hill, the North Vietnames e

employed mortars, rocket propelled grenades, an d

automatic weapons to cover their advance . The

Marines responded in kind . Lieutenant Leffen

remembered "when we ran out of bullets we threw

grenades and misdelivered .50 cal rounds in a variable

and alternating fashion to keep the NVA honest unti l

the helos could bring us more ammunition ."33 From

an enlisted man's perspective, Frank Craven recalle d

that it was "every man for himself. You still work as

a team somewhat . . . but as far as a coordinated formal thing, all that gets wiped away. The thicker the

battle the more informal and it was very thick . "

Craven particularly remembered one machine gunne r

at the top of the hill that kept the enemy back : "He

just kept that area sprayed ." 34

From a nearby hill to the east of Company M,

Company L fired 60mm mortars and rifle round s

into an exposed enemy flank. Lieutenant Colonel

Bendell, from his temporary command post o n

**Colonel Bendell commented that the enemy had moved into

attack positions under cover of darkness and that "it appeared thei r

principle attack was along the road where the battalion perimeter had

been located the night earlier." Bendell Comments.

*** Frank Craven lacer legally changed his name to Abdullah Hassan .
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 12 3

Top photo is from the John S . Leffen Collection and the bottom is courtesy of Col Lee R. Bendell, USMC (Ret)

The fight for Mike's Hill, named after Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, would be the pivotal battle in the openin g

up of Route 9 to Camp Carroll in January 1968 . In the top photo, the smoke from a Boeing B—52 Arclight strike on North

Vietnamese positions can be seen from a Company M position on Mike's Hill. Each of the B—52 Stratofortresses could hold 2 7

tons of ordnance. Below, Mike's Hill after the battle has much of its foliage destroyed. Route 9 can be seen in the foregroun d

and the Cam Lo River in the background .
124 THE DEFINING YEAR

Mike's Hill, then ordered Captain John L.

McLaughlin, the Company L commander, t o

maneuver his company down to Route 9 and reliev e

a Company M squad surrounded by North Vietnamese troops at an ambush site near the destroyed

bridge . By noon, after overcoming determined

pockets of enemy resistance with the assistance o f

81mm mortars and coordinated small arms fire from

a Company M squad on Mike's Hill, Company L

reached the bridge and relieved the embattled

Marines there. In the process, the company took

some casualties, but killed 23 of the enemy and captured 3 prisoners. With the arrival of Company L at the bridge an d

Mike's Hill now secure, the battalion commander

directed Captain John L . Prichard, the Company I

commander, to advance eastward along Route 9

from his positions toward Company L, a distance o f

some 1,000 meters . Because of the nature of the terrain in the sector, open ground interspersed wit h

hedgerows and heavy brush, Bendell called artiller y

fire upon enemy firing positions north of the Cam

Lo River to cover Company I's open left flank . *

About 200 meters west of the bridge, a well-camouflaged and dug-in NVA company using

streambeds and dense vegetation as cover stoppe d

Company I . Failing to overcome the enemy resistance with repeated frontal assaults, Captai n

Prichard asked for reinforcements . He ordered up

his reserve platoon from his old position and Lieu -

tenant Colonel Bendell directed Company L to sen d

one platoon to Prichard. By 1400, with the suppor t

of Huey gunships, the two companies had linked up

and began the mop up . For the most part, the battle for Mike's Hill was over.35

About that time, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel l

received a radio message from Colonel Dick that

Major General Tompkins, the 3d Division commander, wanted the battalion to return to Camp Carroll .

Concerned that the NVA were still in force north of

the river, Bendell failed to see the tactical advantage o f

"re-seizing terrain fought for earlier" and recommended the battalion stay and mop up the area .36 After first

ruling against Bendell, Colonel Dick and Genera l

Tompkins decided to permit the battalion to continue

*Colonel Bendell recalled that he directed his operations office r

and his artillery liaison officer "to 'seal off the battle area by artiller y

fires all along the Cam Lo River at the suspected crossing points. This

apparently prevented reinforcements and even made retreat hazardous

for chose south of the river." Bendell Comments.

with the road-securing mission for another day.** By

1700 on the 27th, "vehicles were able to move with -

out harassment along Route 9 from both directions to

the destroyed bridge . . . ."37

After evacuating the casualties, which included th e

Company I commander, Captain Prichard, who late r

died of his wounds, Lieutenant Colonel Bendel l

formed his battalion into two companies. He placed

Company I under the operational control of Compan y

M and attached one of Company M's platoons to Company L. According to the battalion commander,

instead of having "three short-strength companies," he

now had two "full-strength" ones. During the day, the

battalion had killed more than 130 of the enemy, captured 6 prisoners, and recovered 3 57mm recoilless

rifles, 2 60mm mortars, 35 AK-47s, and extensiv e

ammunition and equipment. The 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines, however, had paid a heavy price : 21 men

dead and 62 men wounded .38

On the 28th, the now two ad hoc companies continued their patrolling of Route 9 with relatively little

incident. About 1430, a Company L patrol happened

upon a tunnel. Its entrance was three feet in diamete r

and it extended about eight feet underground . Five

other tunnels, running east to west, intersected wit h

the first one . In these tunnels were several North Viet -

namese bodies, some lying on makeshift litters . The

Marines buried the bodies and destroyed the tunnels.** *

After completing this grisly task, the battalion

received orders once more to return to Camp Carroll .

Marine helicopters flew Company L to Camp Carroll,

while the revamped Company M returned to the bas e

on foot. Once the Marines were a safe distance away,

Air Force B—52s in an Arclight mission carpet bombe d

suspected enemy avenues of retreat and firing position s

north of the Cam Lo River.39****

**Colonel Dick later wrote, "it was manifest that the battalio n

couldn't remain in the area indefinitely and there was no available uni t

for relief. In any event the position would have to be uncovered . . . .

when the CG stated his wish for 3/4 to withdraw I certainly wasn' t

going to 'rule' against him but did demur to the extent that Lee (Ben -

dell) was on the ground and in a better position to make a reasonabl e

estimate of the situation, and could be brought in the following day.

Which is what happened . " Dick Comments.

*** These bodies were included in the figures of North Vietnames e

dead listed above for the action of 27 January.

****Major Leffen remembered that an aerial observer "spoke

directly to me indicating we were 'in a lot of trouble .' He . . . could see

a column of 3's headed south toward our position as far as he could see .

We were then told to be five clicks south of the hill by 1700 ." He wrote

that the B—52s struck exactly at that time and "we could see pieces o f

the enemy in the trees following the arclighc . " Leffen Comments
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 12 5

Both photos are courtesy of Col Lee R. Bendell, USMC (Rec)

At top a well-camouflaged NVA foxhole was used during the fighting for Route 9 . These fighting

positions were often interconnected by a complex tunnel network. Below, the first Marine convoy

arrives at Camp Carroll after the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines reopened Route 9 .
126 THE DEFINING YEA R

The following day, 29 January, the battalion reinforced by tanks and Company H, 2d Battalion, 9t h

Marines returned to the destroyed bridge on Route 9 .

The mission was to provide security for an enginee r

unit building a bypass for the bridge and to open the

road for vehicular traffic . Company L this time occupied Mike's Hill, while Company M and the tank s

patrolled Route 9 west to the Khe Gia Bridge . Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines remained with th e

engineers at the downed span . For the most part, the

road-clearing mission was uneventful . Enemy gunners

once mortared Mike's Hill which resulted in tw o

wounded Marines from Company L . On the road

patrol, a nervous Marine mistakenly shot and wounded a second Marine, whom the first thought to be a n

enemy soldier. The infantry-tank patrol also cam e

across 30 enemy bodies and several weapons just nort h

of Route 9 . At the damaged bridge site, Company H

took two wounded North Vietnamese soldiers prisoners. At 1530 that afternoon, the engineers completed

the work on the bypass and "a huge Dong Ha convoy

began moving through the bridge point, enroute to

Camp Carroll." Route 9 was once more open . With the completion of opening Route 9, the 3 d

Battalion, 4th Marines returned to Camp Carroll, bu t

remained under the operational control of the 4th

Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Bendell sent a personal

message to the officers and men of his command ,

thanking them for their efforts: "You may all take pride

in a good job, well done ." The following day, the battalion received a message from General Westmoreland ,

the MACV commander, complimenting "the officers

and men of 3/4 for the aggressive attack against the

enemy's 64th Regiment . . . This action undoubtedly

pre-empted enemy attack against Camp Carroll ."4 0

Despite the hard-won accomplishment of reopening Route 9, the identification of the 64th NVA Regiment had ominous undertones for the Marine command. Intelligence officers were now sure that a ne w

enemy division, the 320th NVA, had replaced the

324B NVA Division in the western Demilitarized

Zone. The new division consisted of the 48th and 56th

NVA Regiments in addition to the 64th.* All the prison-

*There is a minor question whether the 64th NVA was involved in th e

fighting for Route 9 from 24–29 January. According to the 3d Marine Division 's after-action report for Lancaster II, dated over a year after the action ,

the 64th was in reserve, while the other two regiments attacked Route 9 . It

claims that prisoners captured in the action "substantiated this intelligence ." Yet, all the contemporary documents refer only to the 64th identified in this fighting . If the 64th was in reserve, it appears contradictory that

the prisoners captured by the Marines would be from that regiment .

ers captured by the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines wer e

from the 64th, and most were recent draftees. This new

enemy regiment had crossed the Ben Hai about 1 0

days previously, apparently with the mission of cuttin g

Route 9 and isolating Camp Carroll and the other bases

in the Lancaster area. There was no doubt that there

would be another attempt? '

A Lull in Leatherneck Squar e

For Colonel Richard B . Smith's 9th Marines in

Leatherneck Square, things had been relatively quiet .

Because of the uncertainties of enemy intentions in th e

DMZ, on 20 January, General Westmoreland had

agreed to a III MAF request to suspend work on th e

barrier until the situation clarified. The 9th Marine s

continued to be responsible for the defense of the A—3

and A—4 (Con Thien) Strongpoints just below th e

cleared trace, and their supporting combat bases. On

the 21st, enemy gunners fired upon the 3d Battalion ,

4th Marines, then still under the 9th Marines in positions about six kilometers northeast of Con Thien ,

with about 300 rounds of mixed caliber artillery and

mortar rounds. The battalion sustained 10 casualties,

all wounded . Until the end of the month, there were

several small actions, but no major attempt of th e

North Vietnamese units to penetrate in strength the

Marine defenses.4 2

For the most part, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines a t

Con Thien bore the brunt of whatever enemy activity

there was, largely continuing mortar and artillery

bombardment. Having already lost one commander to

enemy mortars, the 2d Battalion earlier had hopes that

in Operation Checkers, it would leave Con Thien an d

rejoin its parent regiment, the 1st Marines. Major General Tompkins, the 3d Marine Division commander,

however, told General Cushman that "with present

enemy threat . . . the relief of 2/1 at Con Thien is postponed until after Tet . "43

The small hill, only 160 meters high, but less tha n

two miles south of the Demilitarized Zone, remaine d

a key terrain feature for the Marines and a favorite tar -

get for North Vietnamese gunners and small infantry

probes . Shortly after noon on 22 January, the enem y

bombarded the Marine strongpoint with 100 round s

of 82mm mortar, followed by 130 rounds of 152m m

shells from guns within North Vietnam . The battalion sustained 2 men killed and 16 wounded. One-half

hour later, about 1,000 meters north of the base, Companies F and G encountered a North Vietnames e

infantry company. The enemy unit withdrew under
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 12 7

cover of 60mm mortar fire . In the firelight, th e

Marines sustained casualties of two men dead and

eight wounded and killed three of the NVA. The following night the enemy hit the Marine base again ,

but with much less force . At 2300, 40 82mm and 2 0

60mm mortar rounds together with 10 rounds o f

152mm artillery shells landed within the Con Thien

perimeter. This time the Marines sustained si x

wounded but no dead.44

On 29 January, the battalion demonstrated the

value of maintaining the Con Thien outpost despit e

the continuing harassment . About 0125, a Marine forward observer there looking through his starlight scop e

discovered a North Vietnamese convoy moving on a

secondary road, about a 1,000 meters in the DMZ

north of the Ben Hai River, and called in air and

artillery missions. The observer then saw the enemy a t

a site, just below the Ben Hai, launch four to five SAMs

(surface-to-air missiles) at the American aircraft . He

then ran a radar-controlled (TPQ) mission on the SA M

site. After the firing and bombing missions, the

Marine outpost reported a "total of nine secondar y

explosions including a huge fireball, and one secondar y

fire for area of convoy and suspected SAM sites . "4 5

While the enemy activity in the Kentucky area o f

operations remained relatively low, General Tompkin s

did not want to deplete his defenses in the sector. The

division and 9th Marines continued to receive reports

of enemy movement around Marine positions in the

operation. News about the arrival of the 320th NVA

Division on the DMZ reinforced the unease that th e

Marine commanders had about the overall situation o n

the northern front.46

The transfer of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines to th e

Lancaster area of operations and the unexpected assignment of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines to Khe Sanh

forced General Tompkins again to look to the Special

Landing Force, this time SLF Alpha with BLT 2/4, for

reinforcement. Earlier, on 22 January, BLT 2/4, under

the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Weise ,

had relieved the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at Camp

Evans and had come under the operational control o f

the 1st Marines . With the takeover of Evans by the 1st

Cavalry Division and the movement of the 1st Marine s

to Phu Bai, the BLT was once again free.* With the

concurrence of the Seventh Fleet, Generals Cushman

and Tompkins agreed to assign Weise's BLT the area o f

operations northeast of Con Thien, just vacated by th e

3d Battalion, 4th Marines.47

*See Chapter six for operations in Thua Thien Province.

On 26 January, BLT 2/4 reembarked from Cam p

Evans to SLF Alpha amphibious shipping and the following day, in Operation Fortress Attack, deployed to

the Kentucky area of operations . Shortly after 0900 on

the 27th, the SLF helicopter squadron, HMM–361 ,

landed the first wave of the battalion in a landing zone

near the combat operating base, C–2, on Route 561 .

By 1900, the entire BLT was ashore and the 9th

Marines assumed operational control of the battalion

from the Navy. According to plan, most of the supporting elements of the BLT including the Ontos an d

the amtrac platoons were detached and placed under

other division commands. The following day the battalion moved from the C–2 base to its assigned ne w

area of operations near Con Thien 4 8

On 31 January, General Tompkins would shift

forces once more . He divided the 2d Battalion, 4t h

Marines into two command groups, each with tw o

companies. The 3d Division commander sent Command Group A with Companies F and G attached t o

Camp Carroll and placed it under the operational

control of the 4th Marines. Command Group B ,

under Lieutenant Colonel Weise's executive officer,

remained with the 9th Marines in the Kentucky area

of operations. As Tompkins explained to Genera l

Cushman, he believed that the "enemy will aim a

major effort to overrun Camp Carroll, Thon Son La m

[the Rockpile area], and Ca Lu ." According to the 3d

Division commander, the "320th Division is

admirably positioned" for such an attack which

"offers enemy greatest return [and) more profitabl e

for him than similar major effort against hardened

positions " of the barrier strongpoints in the Kentucky

area of operations. General Cushman agreed '1 9

The Cua Viet Continues to Heat Up

To the east of the Kentucky area of operations, th e

North Vietnamese continued their effort to close th e

Cua Viet River channel . Following the sinking of th e

LCM on 24 January by a command detonated mine ,

the next morning NVA gunners struck again . From

positions in the hamlet of My Loc on the northern bank

of the river they fired rifle propelled grenades and

recoilless rifles at a Navy convoy of two LCMs and a

LCU (landing craft, utility). Both the two LCMs took

hits and returned to the Cua Viet Port Facility. The

LCU continued on to Dong Ha . The action resulted in

five Americans wounded, four Navy crewmen and a

Marine from Company K, BLT 3/1 . In their return fire

at the enemy positions, the Navy gun crews inadver-
128 THE DEFINING YEA R

tently struck Company K trying to clear the northern

bank in Operation Badger Catch .5 0

Since coming ashore on the evening of 23 January,

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown 's BLT 3/1 began its

mission of attempting to clear the hamlets north of the

river. The terrain in the Badger Catch area of operations consisted largely of sand dunes and sandy barre n

soil extending some 5,000 meters inland to a tributary

of the Ben Hai River. This stream, unnamed on th e

maps but called Jones Creek by the Marines, ran south

from the DMZ into the Cua Viet. Bordering bot h

Jones Creek and especially the Cua Viet were extensiv e

paddy areas that supported rice farming . The rice

growers lived in hamlets on the banks of the Cua Vie t

or the adjacent area just above it. Because of the war,

many of these hamlets were now abandoned and others

were used as refugee centers.

According to agent reports, the enemy force in th e

Cua Viet sector numbered about 1,200 men, consisting of three North Vietnamese companies and three

Viet Cong companies, two main force and one loca l

force . On the 24th, the BLT had secured its first objective, a refugee resettlement village on the river about a

1,000 meters east of My Loc without incident . It als o

had searched two hamlets to the north, Ha Loc and Ha

Loi, again without meeting any resistance. In a separate

operation on an island in the river, Company L had little success in locating any of the enemy forces tha t

might have been responsible for the sinking of th e

LCM that day. 5

On the 25th, the battalion encountered much

stiffer resistance . Even the previous day, it had come

under small arms and mortar fire from My Loc, one o f

the battalion's prime objectives . At dawn, and without preparatory fires, Captain John E . Regal, the

Company K commander, ordered his company into

an attack on the hamlet along a narrow front . He

deployed one platoon to the right to form blocking

positions north of the city. While attempting to

maneuver around the hamlet, the blocking platoo n

came under heavy machine gun and small arms fire . With this platoon caught in a deadly cross fire fro m

the hamlet, Regal sent in reinforcements including

tanks attached to him for the operation . Even with

the tanks in support, Company K had difficulty i n

pulling out its casualties from the initial action . The

tanks exchanged fire with enemy antitank gunner s

armed with RPGs. Although the tanks sustained five

hits, all escaped relatively unscathed . It was about

this time, the enemy gunners in My Loc opened up

on the Navy convoy. About 1000, the company had

succeeded in bringing out its dead and wounded, si x

killed and nine wounded .52

By this time, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown and

Captain Regal had learned from nearby ARVN unit s

that a NVA battalion was in My Loc . They decided to

pull Company K back and bring in air strikes an d

supporting arms. From 1030 to 1430, Marine, Air

Force, and Navy jets flew four close air support missions against My Loc . Then under covering artillery

fire, about 1500, Company K once more moved upon

the hamlet, this time meeting almost no resistance

except a few occasional sniper rounds. In My Loc, the

company recovered an RPG—7 rocket launcher and

the bodies of 20 North Vietnamese soldiers . The

Marines also captured one prisoner. Later that

evening, the company came under artillery fire from

firing positions north of the DMZ, but sustained n o

casualties. Lieutenant Colonel McQuown selected M y

Loc for his command post and also for the battalion's

main combat base because of the hamlet 's "strategic

location relative to river traffic ." 5 3

For the time being, the Marine occupation of My

Loc appeared to confound the enemy gunners . For th e

next few days, the enemy was unable to interfere wit h

the American shipping on the Cua Viet. General

Tompkins and the commander of the Cua Viet Nava l

Support Activity also implemented increased securit y

arrangements that may also have contributed to th e

safe passage of the Navy craft . The Naval Support

Activity provided Navy crews with PRC—25 radios

that permitted them to communicate with Marine ai r

observers flying overhead and with helicopter gun -

ships. Moreover, the two commanders agreed upon

check points along the river where boats could "report

their location in relation to any enemy activity ." This

permitted the 3d Marine Division "to react to any con -

tact with artillery, naval gunfire, air, when available ,

and ground forces in the form of USMC and/or ARV N

Sparrow Hawk reaction forces." Finally, the two commanders concurred upon the assignment of two Navy

patrol boats on the river carrying armed Marines, tw o

National policemen, and an interpreter to stop an d

search "indigenous water craft." 54

Despite the limited reprieve for the Cua Viet shipping, the enemy still posed a real threat to the 3 d

Marine Division river lifeline . The fighting for My Loc

revealed that the NVA 803d Regiment, part of the 324B

Division, had shifted from positions in the Kentuck y

and Lancaster operational areas to the northern coastal

plain east of Route 1 . Skirting the 2d ARVN Regiment's positions at the A—1 Strongpoint and the C—1
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 129

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Top, a Marine from Company K, BLT 3/1 carrying a M79 grenade launcher runs gingerly throug h

an NVA-held hamlet during Operation Badger Catch. During the same operation, below, a 60m m

mortar team from the BLT casually prepares to fire its weapon in support of the infantry.
130 THE DEFINING YEA R

Combat Base, at least one battalion of the regimen t

had infiltrated between the C-4 Combat Base manned

by Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and the Cua

Viet River. With the obvious mission to interrupt the

flow of supplies along the river to Dong Ha, the 3d

Battalion, 803d Regiment occupied those hamlets

fronting on the river and a few just above . "

For the most part, the enemy troops built rather

formidable fortifications in these hamlets. As in My

Loc, their first line of defense was on the edge of th e

hamlet or village . They constructed these defenses i n

depth with bunkers, fighting holes, interconnecting

tunnels, and trench lines often extending into the center of the hamlet. The North Vietnamese soldiers usually converted the villagers' "family type bomb shelters" into fortified bunkers for their own use . From the

nature of the defenses and the skill with which they

used them as reflected in My Loc, the enemy intended to hold their positions unless forced out by overwhelming strength .5 6

For BLT 3/1 the taking of My Loc was only th e

beginning of the attempt to clear the enemy out of the

Cua Viet sector. Several small hamlets, while not on the

river, but just above it, provided cover for the units of

the 803d. On the following day, 26 January, anothe r

company of Lieutenant Colonel McQuown's command, Company I, encountered much the same, if no t

even more tenacious resistance, in the hamlet of La m

Xuan as Company K in My Loc .

On the morning of the 26th, while Company K

continued to secure My Loc, Captain Lawrence R.

Moran's Company I covered the northern flank. Afte r

a few enemy probes and calling an air strike on La m

Xuan, about 1500 meters to' the northwest, Moran's

company, that afternoon, advanced upon the latte r

hamlet. Attacking from east to west, Company I a t

first met hardly any opposition . The enemy troops

allowed the Marines to move into the first tree lin e

of the hamlet before opening up . Firing from wellconcealed positions, especially scrub brush immediately to the rear of the Marines, the enemy, accordin g

to the battalion's report, "inflicted moderate casual -

ties and . . . [caused} the attack to bog down ." 5 7

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown immediately sent i n

his attached tanks and an attached Ontos platoon t o

assist the beleaguered company. Even with the tanks

and the Ontos, the latter equipped with 106mm

recoilless rifles, Moran had difficulty in disengaging .

Under covering artillery fire, smoke shells, and close ai r

strikes, it took the Marine company more than five

hours to extract all of its casualties from Lam Xuan .

With night coming on, Lieutenant Colonel McQuow n

decided to pull back Company I and concentrate the

rest of his forces rather than continue the attack. In this

first fight for Lam Xuan, Company I suffered 8 dead

and 41 wounded . The Marines claimed to have killed

17 of the enemy and taken 2 prisoners.

The first phase of Operation Badger Catch was over.

At 1400 on the 27th, the amphibious ready group

commander relinquished command of the forces ashor e

to the 3d Marine Division . In turn, General Tompkins

gave operational control of BLT 3/1 to Lieutenan t

Colonel Toner, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalio n

commander and senior to Lieutenant Colonel

McQuown. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalio n

remained responsible for Operation Napoleon and th e

BLT operation became Operation Saline . For Lieutenant Colonel McQuown, outside of new reportin g

procedures, his task remained the same .5 8

On the 27th, the battalion consolidated its position s

before continuing with the attack. Lieutenant Colonel

Toner provided the battalion with five more tanks, th e

ones detached from the SLF Alpha battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Weise's BLT 2/4 . At 1955 that evening ,

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown informed the amtrac

battalion commander that he planned to attack La m

Xuan the following morning .

During the night and early morning hours of 28

January, two Marine fixed-wing aircraft carried out

radar-controlled bombstrikes on Lam Xuan . This was

followed shortly after 0800 by naval gunfire mission s

by Navy ships in the South China Sea . Then, supported by two tank platoons and the Ontos platoon, Captain Edward S. Hempel's Company L took its turn

against the Lam Xuan defenses . Despite the display o f

U.S . supporting arms, the North Vietnamese unit in

Lam Xuan remained undaunted and relatively

unscathed . It had constructed its bunkers and trench -

lines with overhead covers which were, as Lieutenan t

Colonel McQuown observed, "only subject to damag e

from direct hits."59

As the tanks moved up into the attack positions,

enemy mines disabled three of them . Another fell int o

a deep bomb crater full of water and became submerged. Still with the direct fire support of the tanks

and the recoilless rifle fire of the Ontos, Company L ,

attacking from east to west, made slow but deliberat e

progress. As the enemy resistance stiffened, Captai n

Hempel pulled his men back about noon, so that

Marine supporting arms could work over the area onc e

more . Lieutenant Colonel McQuown then reinforced

Company L with Captain Regal's Company K . The
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 13 1

two Marine companies advanced on line . Company M

also established a platoon blocking position north o f

Lam Xuan. At dusk, under cover of North Vietnamese

guns from north of the DMZ, the NVA troops tried t o

withdraw. With a flare plane overhead, the Marine s

continued to press the attack against the enemy. Most

of the NVA in the hamlet, nevertheless, managed to

make good their retreat, leaving a rear guard to hold off

the Marines. About 2100, Companies K and L consolidated their positions in Lam Xuan . The following

morning the Marines continued with their moppin g

up. At 1445 the afternoon of the 29th, the two companies reported that Lam Xuan was "completel y

secured." The Marines, however, once more paid a price

in casualties: 8 dead and 41 wounded . They had killed

69 of the enemy and captured 2 prisoners . 60

The war still continued to have its surreal qualities . While the fighting expanded all along the DMZ, the

allies still prepared for the usual annual Tet truce .

According to MACV directives, the truce period was

supposed to extend for 36 hours beginning at 1800 on

29 January. In the DMZ sector, BLT 3/1's fight for

Lam Xuan made the implementation of the truce very

unlikely. Major General Tompkins recalled that 3 0

minutes before the prospective cease-fire he received a

telephone call from General Cushman, "that exempted the 3d MarDiv . . . from any such foolishness. It was

to be `business as usual' for northern I Corps ." An

entry in the BLT 3/1 journal read, "29{January} 1800H— Received information that the `Tet ceasefire' will not go into effect." Captain Regal, whose

company still remained in Lam Xuan, remembered

that he took no chances, cease-fire or no cease-fire. At

1800, his company remained on alert and a few minutes later "we again received the inevitable 40 round s

of incoming ." Five minutes after the bombardment

the message arrived "to disregard all previous traffi c

regarding the `cease-fire ;' it would not apply to the

northern provinces." 6 1

On the day of Tet, 31 January 1968, while Company K remained in Lam Xuan, BLT 3/1 was once mor e

engaged in a struggle for another of the hamlets on the

northern bank of the Cua Viet, Mai Xa Thi . Strategically located where Jones Creek emptied into the Cu a

Viet, the hamlet spread over both banks of the smalle r

waterway. This time, Captain Raymond A . Thomas'

Company M spearheaded the assault against the hamlet. Under cover of darkness, Thomas' company move d

out of My Loc into attack positions just southwest of

Mai Xa Thi. To the north, Captain Regal sent one of

his platoons from Lam Xuan towards Mai Xa Thi,

about 2,000 meters to the south . The plan was for the

Company K platoon to make a diversionary attack by

fire, while Company M made the main assault from th e

opposite direction.62

The Marines achieved surprise and the plan seeme d

to be working. About 0700, the Company K platoo n

opened fire from its positions north of the hamlet .

About 15 minutes later, under cover of supporting

artillery and morning fog, Company M moved

through a tree line, into an old graveyard, and the n

across a rice paddy into the hamlet . The North Vietnamese soon recovered from their initial shock and

fought back with RPGs, .50-caliber machine guns,

and mortars from covered positions within Mai X a

Thi . The enemy even employed artillery in the Demilitarized Zone against the Marines in the hamlet . With

his right platoon heavily engaged, Captain Thomas

attempted to call in a close air strike, but the fog ha d

not lifted and the sky remained overcast . 6 3

At this point, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown

decided to reinforce Thomas . He sent Company I up

the Cua Viet in LVTs to take over Thomas' left flank .

At the same time, a platoon of LVTH—6s, amphibia n

tractors equipped with 105mm howitzers, arrived to

provide direct artillery support . Even with the reinforcements, the Marines only made slight progress as

the enemy continued to resist . From positions across

Jones Creek, enemy gunners fired rocket-propelle d

grenades into the Marine flank . Marine artillery fir e

soon subdued the North Vietnamese gunners, but th e

Marine advance remained stalled . While Company I

took over his left flank, Captain Thomas and th e

remaining three platoons had joined the right flank

platoon . Frustrated in their attempts to force the

enemy out of their well dug-in positions, the Marines

needed assistance . About 1500, the two Marine companies received word to pull back as the reduced

cloud cover now permitted an air strike . The bombing missions proved somewhat of a disappointmen t

because "of haze and many duds. "64

About 1600, Companies I and M returned to the

attack. Lieutenant Colonel McQuown now sent i n

Company L to follow in trace the first two companies . While still resisting, the enemy began to giv e

way. At 1900, the three companies reported tha t

they were making better progress. A flare plane

arrived overhead and the Marines continued t o

press forward under illumination . By 2130, the

Marines had secured about 80 percent of the ham -

let and radioed back that "sniper fire continues, but

organized resistance has ceased ." The following day,
132 THE DEFINING YEA R

The top photo is from the Abel Collection ; bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190420 .

Marines of BLT 3/1 also sustained casualties during the fighting . At top, four Marines from Company K carry one of their wounded comrades to relative safety . Below, Navy Corpsman HM3

Edward F. Darewski, also with Company K, provides a wounded Marine an intravenous solution .
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 13 3

Photo is from the Abel Collection

A BLT 3/1 platoon leader directs his men to attack enemy

positions during Operation Badger Catch, as the enemy

offered heavy resistance to Marine efforts to clear the hamlets

near the Cua Viet.

the three companies occupied all of the hamlet . In

the fighting, the BLT sustained 12 dead and 4 6

wounded. They killed 44 of the enemy and captured 2 North Vietnamese soldiers. 65

From prisoner interrogation, the battalion later

learned that Mai Xa Thi had been the command post

of the 3d Battalion, 803d NVA Regiment . As Lieutenant Colonel McQuown observed, that despite al l

of the sophisticated intelligence sources, "BLT 3/ 1

was not able to ascertain when the enemy occupied a

given area ." He therefore worked on the assumptio n

that "all areas that could be occupied by the enemy "

were defended by the enemy. According to

McQuown, "This practice consumed time an d

resources but prevented the kind of surprise encounters which had been costly on previous operations ." 6 6

Thus for the Marines along the DMZ front, Te t

had little meaning . It was the same dogged fighting

that they had encountered for the last two to thre e

weeks. There was no truce, but also there was no sudden thrust through the DMZ or attack on Khe Sanh

that the allies half-expected . The only significant

new enemy initiatives in this period were the

attempts to cut Route 9 and more importantly, th e

Cua Viet supply line .

The Battle For Quang Tri City

While along the DMZ, 31 January was jus t

another day in the war, the same was not true fo r

the allied forces near Quang Tri City. In the early

morning hours of 31 January, all of the militar y

installations near the city came under either enem y

rocket and mortar attack, or both . This included

the 3d Marines base area in Operation Osceola II at

Ai Tu, the 1st Air Cavalry's 1st Brigade's LZ Betty,

and the 1st ARVN Regiment command post nea r

La Vang east of Route 1 . Simultaneously with the

bombardment of the military base areas, the 812th

NVA Regiment launched a ground attack against

Quang Tri City.

The 1st ARVN Regiment, not noted for its

aggressiveness, withstood the shock of the North

Vietnamese assault against the city. U.S . military

advisors considered the 1st the weakest of the three

regiments of the 1st ARVN Division . Only a few

months previous, a 3d Marine Division message

contained the observation that while Lieutenan t

Colonel Nguyen Huu Hanh, the commanding officer of the regiment, had a "mediocre reputation," h e

was "not incompetent." The advisors blamed th e

"present passive" role of the regiment in support of

the "Revolutionary Development" program of tending "to adversely effect regiment and Hanh ." 67

It was, nevertheless, because of its participation i n

Revolutionary Development, that the 1st ARVN was

in position to counter the thrust of the North Vietnamese attack. Two of the battalions, the 2d and 3d,

were conducting security missions relatively close to

Quang Tri City and could be called back into the cit y

at very short notice . Hanh had stationed his 1st Battalion, together with the regimental armored personnel carrier (APC) squadron, at a military installatio n

in the western suburbs of Quang Tri. Just to the

northeast of the city, in the Catholic hamlet of Tri

Buu, Hanh placed the 9th Airborne Battalion that

had been sent north from Saigon and put under hi s

operational control . In the city itself, Regional Forc e

troops and combat police supplemented the regular

forces. Because of these dispositions, the 1st ARVN

Regiment could readily concentrate its forces an d

those of the local militia.68

The South Vietnamese had some inkling that th e

city was in some danger. Given the unsettled situation in the north, on 28 January, General Lam, the I

Corps commander, flew to Quang Tri City and consulted with Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Am, the
134 THE DEFINING YEA R

Quang Tri Province Chief and former commander o f

the 1st ARVN Regiment. They decided to place the

city "in a state of emergency " and also imposed martial law. Am also provided weapons to various cadre

and government civil servants. At the same time,

elements of the 812th NVA Regiment, which had formerly been operating in the DMZ sector, infiltrate d

into the hamlets and countryside surroundin g

Quang Tri City. According to a South Vietnamese

account, the arrival of the enemy troops sent "thou -

sands of local people panicking toward the city." By

now the entire city was alert . 69

The enemy failed to carry out his plan . Sappers

were supposed to infiltrate into the heart of the cit y

on the night of 30—31 January and create a diversion. Once the sappers struck, the 812th was to

launch its attack under cover of a mortar and rocke t

barrage. The plan went awry for the North Vietnamese, however, almost from the beginning . A platoon from the 10th Sapper Battalion reached its

objectives around 0200 on the 31st, but soon found

itself isolated and easily rounded up by local police

and militia . The 812th with five battalions under its

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Top, after heavy fighting in the Cua Viet area, Marines from BLT 3/1 examine an enemy fightin g

hole with one Marine actually in the enemy position . Below, Marines from the BLT interrogate a

frightened NVA prisoner captured in the fighting
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THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 135

control was more than two hours late in getting

started. Rain-swollen streams and the unfamiliarity

of the North Vietnamese with the terrain accounted

in part for the delay.°

Unexpected resistance by the South Vietnamese

forces also played a role. At Tn Buu, for example, the

814th VC Main Force Battalion, attached to the 812th

1\TVA Regiment, encountered the 9th Airborne Battalion. Apparently the VC tried to take the South Vietnamese troops off guard by donning ARVN paratroop

uniforms. The ruse failed when one of the 9th Airborne sentries observed that the "impostors had worn

rubber sandals rather then the genuine jungle boots."

Despite the uncovering of the Vier Cong, the 9th Airborne at Tn Buu was heavily outnumbered and had

little choice but to fall back into Quang Tn City. By

daybreak, the 812th had penetrated the city at several

points, but the South Vietnamese had repulsed an

attack on the Quang Tn Citadel and the jail. The issue

was still in doubt at noon.

At about this time, the civilian director of the

CORDs organization in Quang Tn Province, Robert

Brewer, and the senior U.S. Army advisor to the 1st

ARVN visited Colonel Donald V. Rattan, the 1st

Brigade commander, in his command post at LZ

Betty. They told Rattan that the situation inside the

city "was still highly tenuous." Brewer believed that

at least an enemy battalion was in the city and that

the ARVN "were badly in need of assistance." The

North Vietnamese appeared to be reinforcing from

the east "and had established fire support positions

on [thej eastern and southern fringes of the city."

Colonel Rattan agreed to provide a relief force from

his commarld.71

Given the disposition of U.S. and South Vietnamese

forces in the sector Rattan had the only forces available

that could reinforce Quang Tn City. West of the city at

the Quang Tn Airfield at Ai Tu, Colonel Lo Prete's 3d

Marines in Operation Osceola II consisted of only one

infantry battalion, some artillery, and a makeshift
136 THE DEFINING YEA R

infantry company composed of rear elements of the 3 d

Marine Division headquarters and support troops .* Of

these forces, Lo Prete kept two companies of his

infantry battalion deployed to the west, out to mortar

and sniper range, to screen the vital area . Two companies remained in reserve and the 500-man ad hoc company guarded the perimeter. Lo Prete had no men to

spare for the defense of Quang Tri City which was a n

ARVN responsibility.72**

Rattan also could only send a limited force to relieve

the ARVN in Quang Tri City. Like the 3d Marines,

Colonel Rattan had no responsibility for the defense o f

the city. Looking to the eventual relief of Khe Sanh an d

to cleaning out the enemy Base Area 101, three of the

four battalions attached to the 1st Brigade were oriented to the west and southwest of LZ Betty. With the 1st

Battalion of the 8th Cavalry providing the only security for the Cavalry fire bases in the northern reaches o f

Base Area 101 and the 1st Battalion, 502d Airborne

Infantry committed to base security at LZ Betty, Rat -

tan had only two battalions, the 1st of the 12th and 1s t

of the 5th, "free to maneuver against the attacking

enemy" in Quang Tri City.7 3

After consulting with Brewer and his Army adviso r

colleague and determining the most likely enemy infiltration and support positions, Colonel Rattan selecte d

his landing assault areas. He wanted to destroy th e

enemy supporting mortar and rocket positions an d

then block the North Vietnamese from either reinforcing or withdrawing their infantry units in the city. At

1345, the brigade commander ordered the air assault s

" as soon as possible with priority on lift assigned" t o

the 1st of the 12th. The 1st of the 5th would follow. At

the same time, he alerted the 1st Squadron of the 9th

Cavalry to fly "armed reconnaissance missions at tree

top level" using both gunships and H–13 Aerial Rocket Artillery helicopters. 74

Within two hours, by 1555, the 1st Cavalry helicopters had landed five companies, three from the 1s t

"Lieutenant Colonel Karl J. Fontenot, the commanding officer of

the 3d Tank Battalion, remembered that we organized a provisiona l

rifle company from the tank battalion, H & S Company, supplemented by about 70 men by other division elements and this went to Quan g

Tri ." LtCol Karl J. Fontenot, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec 94] (Vietnam Comment File) .

**Colonel Vaughn R . Stuart, who was executive officer of the 3 d

Marines in 1968, recalled that the Marine battalion at the Quang Tr i

Air Field "functioned closely with the First Brigade of the 1st Air Ca v

after it displaced to the outskirts of Quang Tri City ." As he remembered, the Marine battalion was under the "op con" of the 1st Brigad e

for the short period the Brigade was there. Col Vaughn R. Stuart ,

Comments on draft, dtd 20Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

of the 5th and two from the 1st of the 12th, into landing zones east of Quang Tri . In the two central landing

zones, straddling the rear support positions of th e

enemy K–4 Battalion, 812th Regiment, Companies B

and C of the 1st of the 12th encountered resistanc e

from the very beginning . In fighting that lasted unti l

2000 that night, the "surprised and confused enemy "

employed machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifle s

against the American soldiers. Between them, the two

Air Cavalry companies accounted for over 60 of th e

enemy left on the battlefield . Already heavily engaged

inside the city with the ARVN troops and now in it s

rear by the two companies of the 1st of the 12th, th e

K–4 Battalion for all practical purposes was "rendered

ineffective ." 7 5

To the north, Company B, 1st of the 5th, attache d

to the 1st of the 12th for this operation, arrived in a

relatively calm landing zone northeast of Tri Buu .

Army Captain Michael Nawrosky, the Company B

commander, remembered that the "little people [the

ARVN} were in pretty good contact that night . "

Although the Company B position remained quie t

for the most part, on two occasions enemy soldiers

retreating from Quang Tri and Tri Buu skirted th e

company's perimeter. In both cases, according to

Nawrosky, "we engaged with mortar, 79s, and

machine guns, but had negative assessment tha t

night." When the company searched the area the following morning, Nawrosky related, " there were no

dead; this is VC and NVA tactics in moving the m

out. " Later that day, Company B joined the other tw o

companies of the 1st of the 5th Cavalry in their landing zones southeast of Quang Tri City between th e

railroad and Route 1 .7 6

Like the two companies of the 1st of the 12th ,

Companies A and C of the 1st of the 5th on the afternoon of the 31st met relatively large enemy force s

near the village of Thong Thuong Xa just south of

Route 1 . They established blocking positions behin d

the K–6 Battalion, 812th Regiment which had attacked

Quang Tri from the southeast. Similar to their sister

battalion, the K-4, the K–6 found itself "wedged

between the ARVN forces and the cavalrymen ." The

1st Brigade's scout gunships and aerial rocke t

artillery (ARA) helicopters "created pandemonium i n

the K–6 Battalion rear." According to the brigade's

account, the NVA soldiers "were obviously completely unfamiliar with Air Cavalry techniques of warfare . "

The ARA helicopters and gunships "experience d

unusual success against the enemy troops ." Rather

than firing at the approaching helicopters, the NVA
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 13 7

"would attempt to play 'dead . – The brigade only lost

three aircraft to enemy gunfire .7 7

By the morning of 1 February, it was obvious that

the North Vietnamese had given up on the attempt

to take Quang Tri City. In the city itself, ARVN and

local South Vietnamese militia and police mopped

up. Outside the city, the Communists initiated a halfhearted anti-government march against Quang Tri by

the residents of Tri Buu. The South Vietnamese

police quickly dispersed the demonstration and b y

that evening, with support of U.S . fixed-wing air

support, ARVN forces retook Tri Buu . For the most

part, the North Vietnamese were now only intereste d

in getting out the best they could . During the night,

many of the NVA units broke down into small

groups to make good their retreat . Some North Vietnamese soldiers tried to escape by mingling among

the thousands of refugees now leaving the city . Captain Nawrosky told of his company finding at least

two North Vietnamese soldiers who "had donned

civilian clothing over their own uniforms . . . they'd

thrown their weapons away and they tried to get ou t

wearing civilian clothes." 78

While the mopping up or pursuit phase continued for several more days, most of the major contact s

were over by 1 February. In the most significan t

action of the day, Company A, 1st Battalion, 502d

Airborne Regiment, newly inserted into the operation and supported by ARA and gunship helicopters,

killed over 75 of the enemy near a large cathedra l

about 5,000 meters south of Quang Tri City.

According to American records, the North Vietnamese lost over 900 men killed, 553 by the ARVN ,

and 86 captured, as well as substantial weapons an d

equipment, in their aborted attempt to take Quan g

Tri City. The allies took substantial casualties as well ,

but much less in comparison to the North Vietnamese .* The outcome may very well have been different and caused even more complications for II I

MAF if the Cavalry's 1st Brigade had not been i n

position to have come to the assistance of the Sout h

Vietnamese. Still the unexpected tenacious resistanc e

by the poorly regarded and outnumbered 1st ARVN

Regiment and the local militia provided the opportunity for the Cavalry to come to the rescue .7 9

*The after-action reports and the Vietnamese accounts do not provid e

specific American and allied casualties . Department of the Army records

show, however, that for all of Operation Jeb Stuart, not just for the battl e

of Quang Tri City, through 10 February, U .S. casualties were 58 KIA an d

303 wounded as opposed to 855 enemy dead . Dept of the Army, Operational Summary/Brief, dtd 11Feb68 (CMH Working Papers).

Tet Aftermath Along the DMZ

On the DMZ front, the North Vietnamese continued to place pressure on the Marine units, but to a

somewhat lesser extent than before Tet . Along the

coast, above the Cua Viet, the 803d continued its

efforts to cut that vital waterway. BLT 3/1 in Operation

Saline remained the frontline battalion . Of all the battalion's units, Captain John Regal's Company K in the

hamlet of Lam Xuan was the most vulnerable and

exposed to an enemy attack . Having stayed in Lam

Xuan since finally securing the hamlet on 29 January

and having observed increased enemy activity, Regal

believed "that something was up ." On the afternoon of

1 February, he requested and received permission fro m

his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel

McQuown, to move to new night positions, about 30 0

meters east of Lam Xuan .80

Waiting until darkness so that it could not be easily detected, the company shifted to new fighting positions. Later that night, Regal received intelligence tha t

added weight to his opinion that his company had

been targeted by the enemy. An enemy officer captured

in the fighting for Mai Xa Thi on the 31st told his cap -

tors that the 803d planned a battalion-size attack

against one of the Marine companies. Regal had n o

doubts that the company was his.

Company K had only a short wait until the fireworks began. At about 0245 on 2 February, about 10 0

82mm mortar rounds followed by a similar number o f

130mm artillery rounds fell into the company's forme r

positions in Lam Xuan. According to Regal, "Lam

Xuan was sparkling like a Christmas tree . . . Fortunately for us we weren't there ." With additional ligh t

provided by a flare ship over Gio Linh that lit up the

entire Cua Viet area, the Marines then spotted the

enemy infantry. Captain Regal later wrote : "There they

were ; from my position, I could see the enemy walkin g

from right to left in single file . They were just outside

a hedgerow, east of the hamlet, no more than 100

meters from our line ." As the forward elements of the

North Vietnamese unit approached the Marine positions, they appeared confused as officers tried t o

regroup their men. Regal believed that the enemy

"must have been going to sweep through the area into

which we had moved after they found we had abandoned the village and just stumbled into our lines. "

Regal called for an illumination round which completely exposed the enemy troops in front of the Marin e

lines. He then gave the signal to fire . For the next few

hours until sunrise, the outnumbered Marines of Corn-
138 THE DEFINING YEA R

pany K supported by Navy gunfire, mortars, and

artillery repulsed repeated assaults by the NVA battalion. These attacks, however, lacked coordination an d

consisted for the most part, as described by Captai n

Regal, of sporadic rushes by small groups of NVA "in a

fanatic attempt to penetrate our lines ." They all failed .S 1

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown sent forward some

LVTs with additional ammunition for the company,

but North Vietnamese artillery forced the amtracs t o

hold up. The battalion commander then ordered Company M with two tanks to reinforce the embattle d

Marines of Company K whose ammunition was now

running low. Arriving at daybreak and with the tw o

tanks as a spearhead, Company M, supported by Company K, launched the counterattack against the NVA .

Like the previous actions in Lam Xuan, the fightin g

"was from hedgerow to hedgerow driving the remainder of the NVA to the northwest through the area covered by NGF [naval gunfire] ." With supporting fires

from three artillery batteries, the tanks, and a destroyer offshore, the battalion reported at 1445 that afternoon while continuing to meet resistance, "most of

hamlet area has been secured . Large numbers of NVA

bodies and amounts of equipment are being found

throughout the area ." The two companies continued

their search and collected the enemy weapons and

equipment found upon the battlefield . At nightfall ,

the Marines then pulled out of the hamlet once more ,

establishing their night positions in Mai Xa Thi to th e

south. They left behind them, however, the Nort h

Vietnamese dead and Lieutenant Colonel McQuown

called in "interdicting artillery and fire " on the known

trail from the north leading to Lam Xuan . As the battalion commander later explained, he anticipated that

the NVA "would attempt to recover the bodies." The

American supporting fires "continued through the

night until dawn . . . ."82

In the third battle for Lam Xuan, the Marines killed

141 of the enemy and captured 7 prisoners at a cost o f

8 Marines dead and 37 wounded . The morning of 4

February, Companies I and K returned to Lam Xuan

but the NVA had departed . Of the enemy dead, the

Marines found only nine bodies in the hamlet whic h

the NVA had not dragged away. Lieutenant Colonel

McQuown recalled that those corpses "left behind wer e

still in the makeshift litters that were being used to

carry them off." As Captain Regal later observed, "We

had not seen the last of the 803d. "83

Further to the west in Operation Kentucky, Tet fo r

the 9th Marines was quieter than usual . Even so, on 31

January, Combined Action Marines assigned to hamlets

in the Cam Lo sector reported large concentrations of

enemy troops in their vicinity. Receiving further intelligence that the enemy might attack the Cam Lo District headquarters, south of the Cam Lo River, Colone l

Smith, the 9th Marines commander, ordered Lieutenan t

Colonel William M. Cryan, the 2d Battalion, 9th

Marines commander, to reinforce the Combined Action

Company P (Papa) headquarters located there and on e

of the Combined Action platoons, "Papa" 1, in one o f

the nearby hamlets on Route 9 . Cryan sent an infantry

platoon with a detachment of Army M42 Dusters t o

the Cam Lo District headquarters compound and dispatched an infantry squad to CAP Papa 1 . 84

The Communist forces struck at 0215 the morning

of 2 February with mortar and recoilless rifle bombardment of both the district headquarters and CA P

Papa 1 compounds. At the district headquarters, th e

enemy also launched a three-sided ground assault . In

the first fusillade, a recoilless round killed the senio r

U.S . advisor, Army Major James C. Payne . Army Captain Raymond E. McMacken, his deputy, the n

assumed command of the headquarters compound .

McMacken called in artillery " to box the headquarters

in." According to the Army captain, the Marine

defenders "just stacked them up on the wire ."' He

recalled that "five Marines rushed across the compound

and took over a machine gun bunker. They got a .3 0

[caliber} machine gun into action to kill 15 NVA on

the wires in front of them." An enemy RPG gunner,

however, took out the machine gun bunker, woundin g

all five of the Marines inside. One of the Combined

Action Marines, Lance Corporal Lawrence M . Eades,

the company clerk of CACO Papa, suddenly foun d

himself a machine gunner. According to Eades, "When

we were hit, I grabbed my M16 and a M60 machine

gun and ran to my position on the northwest side o f

the perimeter. " McMacken credited Eades with killin g

over 20 of the enemy.8 5

With the supporting arms including the dua l

40mm antiaircraft guns mounted on the Army M42

Dusters, the Cam Lo compound successfully held ou t

against the attackers. In fact, the enemy troops only

succeeded in getting through the first of the three

belts of wire around the headquarters compound . By

*Colonel Richard B. Smith recalled that before he took over th e

9th Marines he was the division inspector. He stated that he was " a

great believer in wire . . . . Much of my effort was to get the CAP's

wired in and I mean heavily wired . The enemy didn't expect this and

attackers would get hung up before realizing what was there . " Co l

Richard B. Smith, Comments on draft, dtd 19Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Smith Comments .
THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI 13 9

0615, a reaction force from the 2d Battalion, 9t h

Marines, including a reinforced Marine platoon and

another detachment of Army Dusters, arrived on the

scene . Later they were joined by another reaction forc e

from Dong Ha. The Marine infantry intercepted the

enemy attacking force attempting to recross the Ca m

Lo River north of the compound. According to the 9th

Marines, the Americans killed 111 of the Communis t

troops, probably from the 27th Independent Battalio n

and the VC Cam Lo Local Force Company, and rounded

up 23 prisoners.* The U.S . forces sustained casualtie s

of 3 dead, two Marines and the U.S. Army senior advisor, and 18 Marines wounded.

From a III MAF perspective, Colonel Franklin L .

Smith described the defense of the Cam Lo Distric t

headquarters as a "hot little action," but successful ,

"largely through the determination of the CAP

unit." Colonel Richard B. Smith, the 9th Marines

commander, had a dissenting view. He believed tha t

the establishment of the Combined Action units in

the DMZ, where the people were relatively unsympathetic to the government, "a waste of time. "

According to the 9th Marines commander, he continually had to divert line infantry units from thei r

main mission of defending the strongpoints against

the NVA to come to the rescue of the CAPs. He saw

the Cam Lo action in that context .86 * *

For the most part, for the next few days, the 9th

Marines units except for the occasional bombardmen t

of Con Thien had a sort of reprieve along the barrier.

This ended on 7 February with an enemy ambush of

Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Shortly after

1230, Company K's 3d Platoon, patrolling below th e

main supply route between A—3 and A—2 just west o f

Route 1, triggered the trap . Using small arms,

*Although the 9th Marines took several prisoners, the regiment 's

situation and intelligence reports did not cite the specific units that

carried out the attack on Cam Lo. On the other hand, the intelligence

section of the regimental command chronology shows only the above

two units operating in the Cam Lo sector. An article in the III MAF

newspaper claims three North Vietnamese battalions participated i n

the attack . 9th Mar ComdC, Feb68 ; Clipping "Cam Lo—Hub of the

DMZ, " Sea Tiger, n .d . [Feb68J, Encl, Bendell Comments. Colonel

Smith recalled that the 9th Marines claimed 130 enemy and 40 prisoners but would not dispute the figures in the text : " I have never see n

a body count report that I agreed with . " Smith Comments.

**In his comments, Colonel Smith further stated that outside of

the Marines assigned to the CAP, the defenders " could not find an y

CAP people to man their guns . The position was saved by the Marine s

inside ." He recalled that the senior "Army advisor . . . had called on m e

the day before for this support . He knew from his intelligence source s

that he was going to be hit . " Smith Comments.

machine guns, and grenades in a sudden outburst o f

fire, the North Vietnamese killed nine Marines including the platoon commander and wounded anothe r

seven . With the death of the Marine officer, "confusio n

set in." Captain Donald R. Frank, the Company K

commander, with his 1st and 2d Platoons, about 50 0

meters to the north, moved to reinforce the 3d .87

The NVA had expected the Marines to do just tha t

and had set up another ambush slightly to the north o f

the first. As the 2d Platoon tried to maneuver, a hidden

machine gun opened up, followed by small arms fire

and then grenades. The platoon suffered 18 dead and 10

wounded in the first five minutes of the action including the platoon commander and two radio operators . In

the meantime, the 1st Platoon attempted to relieve th e

3d Platoon and succeeded in bringing out some of th e

wounded and the able bodied . After the helicopter evac -

uation of the most serious casualties, the 1st and 3 d

joined the 2d Platoon in its shrinking perimeter.

At the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines combat operations

center at A—3, Lieutenant Colonel James W. Marsh,

the battalion commander, and Major Raymond F .

Findlay, Jr., the battalion operations officer, monitore d

the radio. Upon being briefed on the situation by Captain Frank, Major Findlay replied "Okay, hang on . We're on our way." He sent Company L to set up

blocking positions and alerted Company M . The battalion then called for an air observer to assist in bringing in supporting arms. Flying over the ambush site ,

the observer, using the codename "Southern Comfort, "

reported: "I've never seen such a concentration o f

NVA." Remarking on an extensive NVA bunker system and interconnected trenches, Southern Comfort

estimated the size of the enemy force to be betwee n

200 to 400 men. According to Jeff "TJ" Kelly,*** then

a corporal, who was handling the communication s

with Southern Comfort, the "AO was running gun -

ships on the NVA, but it was in the center of th e

bunker complex, not close to Kilo [Company K}

where it was most needed. he could not get it close r

because Kilo and the NVA were mixed together ."8 8

By late afternoon, Company L had establishe d

blocking positions to the southwest and engaged a

number of enemy trying to reach the hamlet of Ph u

Tho, about 2,000 meters below A—3 . Company M ,

accompanied by Major Findlay, had reached Company

***According to the unofficial historian of the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines, Kelly 's full name was Thomas Jeffrey Kelly and in Vietnam

went by the nickname TJ. He now prefers to be called Jeff. LtCol Ott o

Lehrack, Comments on draft, dtd 29Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
140 THE DEFINING YEAR

K, dug in about 150 meters southwest of the original

contact. Corporal Kelly, who had become th e

radioman for Company M, remembered that "Kilo 's

platoons: first, second, weapons and what was left of

third were strung out in a tactical withdrawal ." Major

Findlay consulted with Captain Frank . According to

Corporal Kelly, the Company K commande r

"want[ed} to go back in . . . we have people in there . "

With heavy rain and low cloud ceiling precluding an y

more air support and well-entrenched enemy, Findlay

decided against an immediate assault : "We're going to

pull back . . . . Come first light we're going to ge t

some more firepower in here and go after them . "

During the night, Company L returned to A—3

while Companies K and M established a two-compan y

defensive perimeter west of Route 1 near Gio Linh .

The 12th Marines provided heavy supporting fire s

around the two exposed companies. Corporal Kelly

remembered that it was a wet "miserable night . . .

{and} rain swirled into the hole chilling us . . ." At the

end of the long and comparatively uneventful night ,

the Marines prepared to renew the attack . A detachment of tanks from Gio Linh joined the two companies

and the Marine artillery opened up with their preparatory fires upon the enemy entrenchments .

Under cover of the Marine artillery bombardment

followed by Huey gunship strafing runs, on the morning of 8 February, the two Marine companies crosse d

Route 1 into a small woods that contained the NVA

entrenchments. As Kelly observed: "It was all grunts

now." The NVA suddenly began to panic and bolt.

Corporal Kelly later described the Marine attack :

Now Kilo was the grim reaper, killing anything tha t

moved as they assaulted through the North Vietnames e

trenches and bunkers in a tactic so simple and direct I

was amazed by its effectiveness. Their firepower was a

wave of destruction surging before them, overwhelmin g

the enemy. It was over quickly. 89

Other members of the battalion remembered th e

events of that morning less melodramatically. Captai n

Otto J. Lehrack, the commanding officer of Company

I, later wrote that his recollection was that Company

K "did launch an assault, supported by tanks from Gi o

Linh, but by that time there wasn't much of an enemy

force left and it was pretty much of a walk ." According to Lehrack, the company sergeant of Company K ,

Gunnery Sergeant Jimmie C. Clark, later told him:

"What NVA was left in the holes were chained t o

their guns . . . so they couldn't get up and run ." Clark

went on to state : "We went in and retrieved our ow n

and brought our own people out . . . . We were pretty

beat and torn up, but we had to do it . "90

During the two-day fight, casualties were heavy fo r

both sides. The Marines claimed to have killed 139 of th e

enemy, but sustained a total of 30 Marine dead and 3 5

wounded. Some of the wounded were from the previou s

two ambushes and perilously survived the night amon g

the North Vietnamese . One American survivor related

that an English-speaking North Vietnamese soldie r

called out "Corpsman, I'm hit," and then shot the Nav y

medic when he came to assist . Another Navy corpsman ,

Hospital Corpsman 3d Class, Alan B. Simms, who

remained unscathed, hid and tended four wounded

Marines, saving their lives. At least four of the North

Vietnamese soldiers blew themselves up with grenade s

rather than surrender. After helicopters evacuated the

American wounded from an improvised landing zone,

the Marine infantry loaded the American dead and Nort h

Vietnamese gear upon the tanks. According to Kelly :

It was absolutely quiet except for the groans of th e

loaders and the sounds made by the bodies of the dead

being dragged to the tanks. They were stacked four

high—one on his back, the next on his stomach—th e

heads and arms placed between the legs of the bod y

underneath to lock in the stack and prevent it from toppling. . . . The tank crews watched in horror.

The tanks returned the bodies to Gio Linh and th e

infantry returned to A-3 .9 1

Once more, the war along the DMZ for another

brief period went into one of its customary lulls. Contrary to General Tompkin's expectations that the

North Vietnamese would make their major effort i n

the Camp Carroll/Rockpile/Ca Lu sector, the 4t h

Marines in Lancaster had few flareups of any significant

action. The enemy made no significant attempt to cu t

Route 9 after the fighting for "Mike's Hill ." Outside of

an artillery bombardment on Camp Carroll on 2 February, and an attack on a truck convoy a week later, th e

Lancaster sector remained quiet during the first two

weeks of February. While maintaining pressure al l

along the DMZ front, the NVA largely limited thei r

Tet offensive in the north to the disruption of the Cu a

Viet supply line, which apparently was intertwined

with the attack on Quang Tri City. As captured enemy

documents later indicated, North Vietnamese commanders attributed their failure to take Quang Tri Cit y

to their inexperience with the coordination of large

forces that involved two major commands : The DMZ

Front and the Tri Thien Hue Front.92 This failure of coordination characterized the entire enemy Tet offensiv e

and was especially true of the enemy attacks in the Da

Nang area further south .
CHAPTER 8

The Tet Offensive at Da Nang

Allied Dispositions—The Enemy Plans His Offensive—The Attack—The Fighting Continue s

A Brief Lull and Renewed Fighting

Allied Disposition s

By the time of Tet, Operation Checkers had ende d

and at Da Nang the situation was precarious. With the

departure of the 5th Marines, there was only one

Marine infantry regimental headquarters in the extensive Da Nang tactical area of operations. Colonel Ross

R. Miner's 7th Marines with all three of its battalion s

had the responsibility for the northern, western, an d

southwestern sectors. The 2d Battalion was in the

north, the 1st Battalion was in the center, and the 3 d

Battalion was in the south . With the departure of the

2d Battalion, 5th Marines in mid January for Phu Bai ,

the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines extended its area of operations to include An Hoa to the south . Colonel Miner

attached two additional companies to the 3d Battalion—Company L, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and

Company H, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines—to cover it s

extended area. l

A conglomeration of Marine support units, ARVN,

Korean Marines, and two Marine infantry battalions

attempted to secure the remaining area . In the Da

Nang Vital Area, the artillery regiment, the 11th

Marines, continued to oversee the Northern Sector

Defense Command and the 1st Tank Battalion, th e

Southern Sector Defense Command . In both these sec -

tors support troops doubled as infantry, manning fixe d

defensive positions and conducting patrols . Major

General Donn J. Robertson, the 1st Marine Division

commanding general, kept under his direct control the

3d Battalion, 5th Marines and the 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines. Located between the Cau Do and Thanh Qui t

A U.S. Marine amphibian tractor from the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion transports Korea n

Marines during a sweep operation near Hoi An . The tractor is armed with a 106mm recoilless rifle .

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

141
142 THE DEFINING YEA R

Rivers and on either side of Route 1, the two battalion s

provided the last line of defense before the so-called

"Vital Area. " The most eastern of the battalions, the

2d, shared its area with the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which was responsible for the coastal sand flat s

south of Marble Mountain . Below the Marine battalions, the Korean Marine Brigade secured the Hoi A n

sector and the southeastern approaches above the K y

Lam River to the Da Nang base . Behind the Marine

and Korean lines, the 51st ARVN Regiment deploye d

in support of the South Vietnamese Revolutionary

Development program. With both fixed-wing and

helicopter gunships and more than 120 artillery piece s

ranging from 4.2-inch mortars to 175mm guns, General Robertson was confident that he could counter an y

threat that the enemy posed to Da Nang despite the

thinness of his manned defenses. 2

In the Da Nang sector, the tempo of operations had

picked up during the last weeks of January. The Korean Marines, while not finding any sizeable forces, con -

tinued to encounter small enemy units and boobytraps

which took their toll. In the 7th Marines sector, th e

Marines described the same type of activity as well as

increased enemy infiltration . The 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines reported "a definite increase of enemy harassment" and the movement of sizeable enemy units int o

the Go Noi Island area . Lieutenant Colonel William K .

Rockey, the 3d Battalion commander, commented o n

the "increasing frequency and ferocity" of enemy contacts. He remembered that because of the number o f

casualties his battalion sustained, "it was necessary t o

employ administrative personnel on patrols" wit h

"clerks, cooks, and drivers" on line . In one operatio n

near Dien Ban, the 51st ARVN Regiment sustained

losses of 40 men killed, 6 missing, and 140 wounde d

while accounting for about 80 enemy dead and 13 prisoners. As Igor Bobrowsky, a former Combined Actio n

member of Delta 2 near the village of Thanh Quit ,

recalled this period : "It wasn't that something happened . . . It was just that the intensity of what was

going on kept on increasing, increasing, increasing."3

While activity in the Army's Americal Division

areas of operations in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin was

somewhat diminished, there was enough enemy i n

northern and central I Corps to cause concern for both

the American and South Vietnamese commands . On

27 January, General Westmoreland announced a ceasefire to be observed by allied forces for 36 hours beginning at 1800 on 29 January in honor of the Tet holidays. Although authorizing the cease-fire, he warne d

all American commanders to be unusually alert

because of "enemy increased capabilities." At 1700 o n

29 January, Westmoreland canceled the truce in the

DMZ and the entire I Corps sector. 4

Major General Robertson remembered that "the

Cease-fire was to be in effect . . . and the regimenta l

commanders reported intense fire from the enemy and

requested authority to continue artillery fire, if necessary . . . ." Robertson granted the request and the n

"about 1840 we got the word from III MAF that the

cease-fire had been called off " 5

The Enemy Plans His Offensive

For some time, the American forces had been awar e

that the enemy was about to launch some type of majo r

offensive . General Westmoreland was convinced that

this big push would come either just before or righ t

after Tet—but not during the holidays and probably a t

Khe Sanh and in the DMZ sector. At Da Nang, III

MAF knew that the Communists were on the move .

Marine and Army reconnaissance flights using infrare d

technology and XM—3 "People Sniffer" airborne personnel detectors (APD) mounted on Huey helicopters

indicated strong enemy concentrations in the hills near

Hieu Duc west of the 7th Marines . Lieutenant Colonel

William J . Davis, the commanding officer of the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, recalled that his unit began t o

take fewer casualties from surprise firing devices or

boobytraps and began to suspect that enemy troop s

unfamiliar with the terrain might be attempting t o

move into his sector. Davis notified the division head -

quarters of his findings. According to Davis, a few

hours later, General Robertson called a division briefing for all battalion commanders . At the briefing, the

division G—2 or intelligence officer, told the assembled

officers that "they are finally going to come out an d

fight. We don't know why, but we know they are! " He

later confided to Davis, "Bill, your phone call was righ t

on the money! I called all the regiments and battalions

and the same was happening to them ."6

On the evening of 28 January, just west of Hie u

Duc, a Marine squad from Company C, 1st Battalion ,

7th Marines ambushed a three-man Viet Cong reconnaissance patrol. The Marines killed two of the enemy

and wounded the third . The Marines evacuated th e

*Lieutenant Colonel John F. J. Kelly, who was an intelligence officer on the III MAF staff, commented that General Westmoreland canceled the truce at "the request of LtGen Cushman, who also requeste d

that the announcement be held until six hours before the scheduled

beginning of the truce so as not to tip III MAF 's hand . " LtCol John F.

J. Kelly, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 14 3

survivor to the Naval Support Activity hospita l

where he died of his wounds . Before his death, however, the Vietnamese identified himself as Major

Nguyen Van Lam, the commanding officer of the

R—20 Doc Lap Battalion . From the recovery of Lam's

notebook and a detailed sketch map of Hill 10, the

location of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines' command

post, the R—20 commander was obviously on a exploration mission to discover any vulnerability in the

Marine battalion's defenses.7*

From other sources, the Marine command learne d

of other ominous measures taken by the Communist

forces in the Da Nang sector. According to intelligence reports, on 15 January, Group 44, the forward

headquarters of Communist Military Region 5,

moved from the hills in western Quang Nam, to an

advance position on Go Noi Island . On 29 January,

Marine intelligence officers received a reliable report

that the 2d NVA Division also had established its

command post in western Go Noi . According to

Marine Chief Warrant Officer Stuart N . Duncan,

assigned to the 5th Counterintelligence Team, a

Combined Action unit in the northern Da Nang

area, a few days before Tet, killed a VC who tried t o

hide in a tunnel. The CAPs found several documents

on the body and in the tunnel which the man obviously had used as his base of operations. In his last

report, the Communist agent wrote, "I have been

discovered and mission not yet completed ." From

the details of the other recovered documents, the V C

obviously were making an extensive reconnaissanc e

of the Da Nang area . His notes contained descriptions of military structures, distances, weapons, an d

other information that would be of value to an

attacking force . 8

Additional intelligence tended to confirm th e

enemy was about to initiate something big . The

ARVN 51st Regiment operating in the southern

sector of the Da Nang area of operations came across

evidence including documents pointing to a

buildup of Communist strength together wit h

probes of allied defenses. On 29 January, a local vil -

*Colonel Davis, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commander, wrot e

that, according to the interrogation of another prisoner, Major Lam, i f

he had not been killed would have become an advisor to the 31st NVA

Regiment, also known as the 3d NVA Regiment, for terrain and operations. Another prisoner claimed that Lam was the chief of staff for th e

NVA regiment. Col W. J. Davis, Tet Marine, An Autobiography (Sa n

Diego, CA, 1987), pp . 117-18, Encl to Col William J . Davis, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Davis ,

Tet Marine.

lage chief told the security officer of the Naval Support Activity at Camp Tiensha that about 300 VC

would attack the Marble Mountain transmitter tha t

night. That same day, the 1st Marine Division notified III MAF that "usually reliable sources" told o f

staging areas south of Da Nang for an impending

attack. Finally, according to Marine intelligence

officers, another "very reliable source" flatly stated

"that the time of attack throughout MR (Military

Region) 5 would be" at 0130 and no later than 020 0

on 30 January. 9

The Communist forces throughout South Vietnam

were about to strike . In I Corps, the allies learne d

from a defector that the enemy planned an attac k

against Quang Ngai City. According to this former

member of the VC 401st Regimental Security Guard ,

local Communist cadre stated that "the war had lasted too long and the Front had to seek a good opportunity to stage a great offensive that would bring th e

war to an early end ." Further, the South Vietnamese

National Police reported that Viet Cong local leader s

from Quang Tin, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai

Provinces met in a base area in the hills of northern

Quang Ngai to plan attacks on Chu Lai and o n

Quang Ngai City. l o

While the Communists concentrated their forces

for the large offensive, many of these units suffere d

from too many rapid replacements and in some case s

from poor morale. As the defector from the 401st

later revealed, his unit lacked "weapons, experienced

soldiers, and transportation manpower." He personally believed the plans were impractical and deserted at

the first chance he had . Another Communist soldier,

who infiltrated from North Vietnam after receiving a

year's training as a radioman in Hanoi, was thrust

into one of the attacking battalions south of Da Nan g

so hastily that he never learned the name of his uni t

let alone those of his officers. Two members of a VC

engineering company, also in the Da Nang area, late r

recounted that nearly 80 percent of their unit was

from North Vietnam . The Communists obviously

were bringing the local VC main force units up t o

strength, even if to do so they had to bring i n

replacements from the north . For example, while the

enemy R—20th attempted to maintain a full complement of 400 men through the recruitment o r

impressment of local villagers and infiltration o f

North Vietnamese "volunteers," intelligence sources

rated the unit only "marginally effective ."1 1

Throughout the Da Nang area of operations, th e

enemy began to move into attack positions. In addition
144 THE DEFINING YEAR

to the R—20 VC Battalion, south of Da Nang, the 1st

VC and 3d NVA Regiments* both part of the 2d NVA

Division started to deploy toward Go Noi Island. Elements of the 368B NVA Rocket Artillery Regiment wer e

in firing positions to the west and northwest of the 7t h

Marines. Other units included the 402d Sapper Battalion, the V—25th VC Battalion, and other VC local forces .

A warning order and plan prepared by the Communis t

Da Nang City Committee called for a preliminary

attack on the city by sappers and VC troops. The attack

force would consist of two groups, one to move by land

and the other by water to knock out the bridge separating the city from Tiensha Peninsula and to captur e

the I Corps headquarters. This would be followed by a

rocket barrage and an assault by the main force units

on allied military units and installations. Within the

city itself, VC cadre were to force the "inhabitants into

the street for demonstrations . . . and prepare the people for continuing political struggle against the government as well as kill GVN and ARVN cadre . "1 2

Before the Communist forces launched their attack ,

the commanders prepared to read to their troops a

directive supposedly prepared two weeks earlier by th e

Presidium of the Central Committee of the National

Liberation Front. The Front announced that the 196 8

Tet greeting of "Chairman Ho [Chi Minh] is actually a

combat order for our entire Army and population . "

The soldiers and cadre of the "South Vietnam Liberation Army" were to move forward in the attack:

The call for assault to achieve independence and liberty has sounded ;

The Truong Son and the Mekong River are moving .

You comrades should act as heroes of Vietnam an d

with the spirit and pride of combatants of the Liberation Army.

The Victory will be with us. 1 3

The Attack

By evening on the 29th, the 1st Marine Division at

Da Nang was on a 100-percent alert . During the day,

the division had positioned 11 reconnaissanc e

"Stingray" patrols along likely enemy avenues o f

*There is some confusion, probably deliberate on the part of the

North Vietnamese, on the designation of the regiments, especially the

3d of the 2d NVA Division . According to Marine records the 3d NVA

was also known as the 31st NVA Regiment . There was also an independent 31st NVA Regiment that also infiltrated into the western Da Nan g

TAOR. Although an attempt has been made to use 3d NVA whe n

referring to the regiment that was parr of the 2d NVA Division, the

records do not always differentiate between the two . FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Feb-May68 .

approach . At 1600, one of the Stingray units, using th e

codename "Saddle Bag, " situated in the mountains just

south of a bend in the Thu Bon River below An Hoa ,

about 20 miles southwest of the Da Nang base, reported observing about 75 enemy soldiers wearing helmet s

and some carrying mortars. The 11th Marines fired an

artillery mission with unknown results . About 50

minutes later, another recon team, "Air Hose, " about

2,000 meters to the northeast of "Saddle Bag," sa w

more than 50 enemy troops moving eastward . The

artillery fired another salvo, which caused a large secondary explosion. At 1920, in the same general area ,

still another Stingray patrol, "Sailfish," radioed that

about 200 Communist troops, some carrying 40m m

rocket launchers, passed its positions. Again the

artillery responded with "excellent effect on target . "

Because of an air observer on station, the Marine gunners checked their fire . At that point, three fixed-win g

aircraft and four helicopter gunships then bombed an d

strafed the enemy column . Darkness prevented "Sailfish" from observing the number of casualties that th e

artillery and air inflicted upon the enemy .l a **

At Da Nang, the Marines remained tense . One

experienced Marine noncommissioned officer, servin g

in his third war, First Sergeant Jack W. Jaunal of the

Headquarters and Service (nicknamed "Heat an d

Steam") Company, 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion ,

located below Marble Mountain, recorded his impressions. He remembered that before midnight "the alert

sounded, and it was all hands to the wire [manning

defensive positions]." Although Jaunal's sector

remained relatively quiet, he recalled that "we could

see flashes of other areas being hit" and heard mortars

and rockets: "The Marine helicopter strip [Marble

Mountain] two miles to our north got hit . . . Also Da

Nang Airfield got it."1 5

Major General Raymond L. Murray, the III MAF

deputy commander, remembered that he heard a "hel l

of a lot of racket" and "woke up . . . [to] the airfield at

Da Nang . . . being rocketed." At first, the general and

** Colonel Broman C . Stinemetz, who as a lieutenant colonel, commanded the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, related that " in preparatio n

for the Tet stand-down the 1st Recon Battalion deployed the larges t

number patrols ever at one time . These covered the mountainou s

remote zone west of the Americal Division extending along a line

northward up to and including that high ground west ofTask Force XRay. The collective impact of these patrols, operating in either th e

Sting Ray—or intelligence gathering—mode, significantly lessene d

the enemy effectiveness in the 1st Marine Division TAOR during th e

Tet offensive ." Col Broman C. Stinemetz, Comments on draft, dr d

2Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 14 5

his steward confused the rockets with the traditional

fireworks shot off in honor of Tet . Soon reports came i n

that the base was under attack and a Marine helicopte r

flew the general from his quarters to III MAF headquarters.* According to Murray, " . . . from then on

until Tet was over, there were just constant attacks. " 1 6

The 1st Marine Division commander, Major General Robertson later compared the enemy activity that

night to a "10-ring circus. " In the Da Nang sector, during the early morning hours of 30 January, Communis t

gunners took under mortar and rocket fire 15 differen t

allied units and installations. On the ground, several

enemy infantry and sapper units of varying size probe d

and attacked various Marine and allied defenses

throughout the TAOR. Shortly after midnight, Marin e

sentries from the 1st MP Battalion, posted near the

main I Corps Bridge connecting Da Nang to the Tiensha Peninsula, spotted two swimmers near the span .

They fired, killing one of the enemy underwater demolition team, while the other member surrendered to the

Marines. About 0100, a Marine platoon from Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, positioned near the

Route 1 Bridge crossing the Cu De River north of Da

Nang, saw another two enemy on a raft with a wood -

en box. Again, the Marines killed the VC and once

more foiled an apparent enemy demolition effort. Two

and a half hours later, on the other side of the main D a

Nang Bridge, Armed Forces police noticed two VC i n

the water and several sampans approaching . The MPs

shot one of the swimmers, took the other man prisoner, and drove off the boats with a fusillade of bullets .

Once more the enemy failed to cut the main lines of

communication into Da Nang .1 7

About 0230, the enemy struck the perimeters of

the Da Nang base itself. In the Southern Sector

Defense Command, just north of the Cau Do Rive r

and west of Route 1, an enemy 12- or 15-man sapper

squad blew a hole in the defensive wire of the join t

perimeter of the 7th Engineer and 7th Communications Battalion. The enemy troops attacked a Marin e

bunker and ran through the Communications Support

Company area throwing grenades and satchel charge s

in the living quarters. The only Marine casualties were

two men who failed to vacate their "hootches" in time .

*General Earl E. Anderson, who as a brigadier general was the II I

MAF Chief of Staff, recalled that General Murray at this time was living at the beach house . Because of security concerns after the Te t

attack, General Murray moved into the bachelor officer quarters with

him. They each had a bedroom and bath and shared a sitting room .

Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam

Comment File).

Abel Collectio n

The Da Nang Airbase comes under VCINVA rocket attac k

on the night of 29—30 January 1968. Flares light up the

sky, top, as raging fires caused by the rockets burn out of

control on the ground, illuminating parked aircraft on the

airfield, bottom.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190366
146 THE DEFINING YEAR

Manning defensive positions, the Marine communicators and engineers repelled the attacking force, killing

four of the VC. Enemy gunners then replied with a

mortar barrage, which resulted in two Marine dea d

and two wounded.1 8

A half-hour after the assault on the 7th Communication Battalion, the enemy hit even closer to the

Marine command nerve center at Da Nang . Another

enemy sapper squad, about the same size as the one

that carried out the earlier attack, penetrated the 1st

Marine Division Subsector Bravo combat operations

center and communications facility on Hill 200, less

than 1,000 meters from the main command post o n

"Division Ridge" (Hill 327). Employing small arms

fire, satchel charges, rocket propelled grenades, and

bangalore torpedoes, the enemy troops thrust through

blown gaps in the Marine wire . The communications

bunker bore the brunt of the enemy attack where th e

sappers destroyed both the bunker and the equipmen t

inside and " put the division tactical net off the air until

0400. " Headquarters Marines quickly manned thei r

defenses and called in artillery illumination and a fir e

mission. The Northern Sector Defense Command

rapidly assembled its reaction company and deployed

one platoon to the division command post. Two other

platoons took up positions around nearby hills 244 an d

200. In the assault, the Communists killed four

Marines and wounded another seven before withdrawing. At first light, a Marine reaction force found enem y

blood trails. Major General Robertson later praised the

Security and Communications platoons of the 1s t

Marine Division Headquarters Battalion for thei r

efforts in the defense . He pointed to the rapid reactio n

of the Security Platoon in reinforcing the perimete r

and providing a mobile reserve and " the off-duty personnel from the bunker and staff sections for their provision of security of the immediate bunker area ."1 9

At 0330, about one hour after the sapper attack on

the Marine command post, enemy forces launched a n

assault against General Lam's I Corps headquarters .

Under cover of darkness, elements of the VC R—20th

and V—25th Battalions had crossed the Cau Do Rive r

and penetrated the Hoa Vang village complex. With

covering fire provided by 81mm and 82mm mortars,

about a reinforced company reached the I Corps head -

quarters compound actually located within the city o f

Da Nang just outside the northern perimeter of th e

main airbase. The enemy attacked the compound from

two directions, from the south and the east. From the

south, about a dozen of the enemy used boards to cros s

the outer wire and ladders and boards to clamber over

the compound wall into the courtyard below . An alert

ARVN sentry took the VC under fire near the flagpole .

Four ARVN armored personnel carriers reinforced by a

reconnaissance squad maneuvered to contain th e

attackers. A conglomeration of internal security forces

threw back the enemy force from the east that tried t o

use similar tactics to get inside the compound from

that direction. 20

Colonel Nguyen Duy Hinh, who was acting Chie f

of Staff, I Corps, at the time, remembered that he ha d

earlier that night received a call from the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff alerting the command t o

expect "an increased surge of activities" by enemy

forces. After informing General Lam and issuing

instructions to subordinate units to be on special alert ,

Colonel Hinh returned to his quarters about 50 0

meters from the main headquarters building . About

0330, the colonel woke up to the sound of battle . From

his bedroom window, he could see tracers lighting up

the nighttime sky. He quickly picked up the phone

and called General Lam and told him that the head -

quarters was under enemy attack . An incredulous I

Corps commander gave the equivalent reply in Vietnamese to "baloney! baloney!," but, nevertheless, hurriedly dressed and prepared to depart for his headquarters, which was some distance from his house . 2 1

The fighting within the compound continued until

daylight. After their breaching of the outer defenses,

the enemy squad fired B-40 rockets at the headquarters

building, but then fought a delaying action, waiting

for reinforcements. These reinforcements never came .

The bulk of the enemy attack force remained in Ho a

Vang Village bogged down in a firefight with local PF

and Regional Force troops reinforced by a Combined

Action platoon, E—3 . Viet Cong gunners from Hoa

Vang, nevertheless, maintained an intermittent mortar

bombardment upon the I Corps tactical operation s

center. Shortly after 0445, General Lam ordered the

4th ARVN Cavalry Regiment, a Ranger battalion, an d

a detachment of National Police to augment the Sout h

Vietnamese militia units in Hoa Vang and the headquarters personnel forces in the compound .2 2

III MAF also sent reinforcements. Lieutenant

Colonel Twyman R . Hill's 1st MP Battalion operated

directly under III MAF and was responsible for the

"close-in defense" of the Da Nang Airbase, the two

bridges between Tiensha Peninsula and the main airbase, and the Naval Hospital on the Tiensha Peninsula . The MP commander remembered that he receive d

a telephone call at 0345 on the 30th from Colonel

Thomas L. Randall, the III MAF G-3, who asked him
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 14 7

"to send three platoons to blocking positions south of I

Corps headquarters." With one of his companies on th e

Tiensha Peninsula and the other three protecting the

main airbase perimeter, Hill argued that he could no t

spare three platoons. He and Randall agreed that they

would deploy one of the battalion's two reserve provisional Quick Reaction platoons composed of headquarters personnel. This platoon under First Lieutenant

John E . Manning departed the airbase about 0415 an d

arrived in the blocking positions about 0515.23 *

About a half-hour later, the 1st Division learned

that the enemy squad in the headquarters compoun d

had disengaged and took its casualties with it . In this

fighting, which had lasted about three hours, the Sout h

Vietnamese defenders sustained casualties of thre e

dead, seven wounded, and two damaged armored vehicles. The skirmishing south of the headquarters near

Hoa Vang, however, continued. Mortars and recoilless

rifle rounds continued to land inside the headquarter s

compound from enemy firing positions in Hoa Vang .

General Lam arrived at the headquarters compound

shortly after dawn . After a quick appraisal of the situation, the I Corps commander turned to the senior U .S .

advisor at the I Corps Tactical Operations Center,

Army Major P. S. Milantoni . According to Washington

Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer, Lam pointed with

his swagger stick to the enemy 's firing positions on the

large map in the room and said : "Milantoni, bomb

here . Use big bombs. " The U.S . major remonstrated

that the site was relatively close to the compound, bu t

Lam insisted that the air strikes be flown . Milanton i

relayed the request to the air support center. The Air

Force watch officer on duty protested, "that's too close ,

you'll never get a clearance for it. " Major Milantoni

replied, "General Lam just gave it ."24

Shortly afterwards, Marine fixed-wing aircraft and

helicopter gunships blasted the enemy in Hoa Vang .

This apparently broke the back of the VC resistance .

Under pressure from the Vietnamese relief forces and

the Marine MP platoon, the enemy retreated with th e

allies in full chase . In the initial fighting for Hoa Vang ,

the South Vietnamese and Americans accounted for 2 5

enemy dead. In the pursuit, which amounted to a rout ,

the VC lost nearly 100 dead . In the attack on the I

Corps headquarters and in the defense of Hoa Vang vil -

*In his comments, Colonel Hill stated that he deployed only on e

of his reserve platoons. The battalion's monthly report, however, indicates that both platoons may have eventually moved into the blockin g

positions south of the I Corps headquarters . Col Twyman R . Hill,

Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) and 1s t

MP ComdC, Jan68 .

lage the allies sustained losses of nine dead and severa l

wounded. Among the casualties were two Marine s

killed, including Lieutenant Manning, and six wounded from the 1st MP Battalion .2 5

The rockets and mortar bombardment of Da Nang

also took a toll of Marine lives and inflicted greate r

material damage upon the Da Nang base and especially upon the airfield and aircraft. In scattered and intermittent attacks beginning before 0200 and lastin g

about one-half hour, enemy gunners fired both mortars

and rockets that landed near positions of Marine

artillery, antiair missiles, and the Force Logistic Command. Battery A, 1st Light Antiaircraft (LAAM) Missile Battalion armed with HAWK (Homing All the

Way Killer) surface-to-air missiles, in the mountainou s

Hai Van Pass sector north of Da Nang, reported abou t

0140 coming under 82mm mortar fire . About 20 minutes later the missile battery sighted enemy rocket firing sites and two minutes later radioed that 12 rocket s

of undetermined size landed in and around its area .

One of the rockets damaged one of the missile launchers and wounded three of the Marines. At about the

same time, approximately 15 enemy 122mm rockets

struck an artillery complex in the 11th Marines Northern Sector Defense Command which included a

detachment from the 1st Armored Amphibian Company, the 155mm Gun and 8-inch Gun Batteries, as

well as Batteries H, 3d Battalion and M, 4th Battalion ,

11th Marines. The artillerymen sustained two wounded and some equipment damage, but escaped relatively unscathed. Other enemy rocketeers took the Marine

Force Logistic Command compound near Red Beac h

under fire . Approximately at 0200, about four of the

122mm rockets fell in or near the compound, one land -

ing near the 1st Air Cavalry air pad temporarily located there, damaging four of the helicopters, but resulting in no Marine or Army casualties .26

After a lull of about an hour to an hour and a half,

the enemy gunners renewed their assault on the airbase

and also included the helicopter air facility at Marble

Mountain. About 0330, perhaps to divert Marine

attention from the ground assault on I Corps head -

quarters and the city of Da Nang, enemy mortars

opened up on Marble Mountain . Approximately 1 6

rounds impacted in the MAG—16 sector and anothe r

four in the Army aviation company area . About the

same time, from their firing positions on the wester n

fringes of the Da Nang TAOR, NVA rocketeers let g o

with a fusillade of 122mm rockets aimed at the mai n

airbase . Some 36 of the large missiles landed on th e

main base, including the airfield . Fifteen minutes later,
148 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from Abel Collection

Firefighters from Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 11 battle flames engulfing two Grumman A— 6

Intruder aircraft from Marine all-weather attack squadron VMA—242(AW) .

the enemy gunners followed with another 29 rockets ,

mostly aimed at the southern end of the airbase . Considering the amount of ordnance that the enem y

expended, casualties were relatively small . The rocket

attacks resulted in the deaths of 3 Marines and the

wounding of another 11 . Material and equipment losses, however, were much more extensive. The rockets

destroyed five aircraft, nine items of ground equipment, two vehicles, and one warehouse outright . Fourteen aircraft, six pieces of ground support equipment ,

five buildings, and another two vehicles sustained

damage of one sort or another.* Lieutenant Colonel

William K. Rockey, the commander of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, later wrote : "The rocket trails of

approximately 10 to 20 missiles as they rose into th e

*Colonel Robert W. Lewis, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded VMCJ-1 at Da Nang at the time, remembered that the "rocke t

damage at Da Nang consisted almost entirely of aircraft damage . The

rockets were accurate and landed on the MAG-11 flight line ." Co l

Robert W. Lewis, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Lewis Comments.

air to arc over our positions to strike the Da Nang Airbase was vividly clear to all ." He observed that the

"rocket launching position was located directly south "

of his command group, "an estimated distance of more

than 3,000 meters."27

The Marine response to the bombardments wa s

rapid. Immediately the 11th Marines artillery units

"initiated counter-rocket fires" at suspected avenues o f

approach . As various outposts reported their sighting s

to the Division FSCC, the artillerymen then shifte d

these fires to actual sites. On the ground, at least on e

Marine unit prevented a rocket attack . A patrol from

Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, operatin g

below the battalion's command post on Hill 10, sa w

about 10 North Vietnamese soldiers just south of th e

Tuy Loan River preparing positions. The Marines

called in artillery and mortar missions . Although the

enemy troops fled, the Marines found five unexpende d

122mm rockets on the site . Later that night, the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines reported 15 secondary explosions from Marine counter-mortar artillery fire . In the
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 149

morning, the infantrymen discovered blood trails and

three NVA bodies in the vicinity of the explosions. *

Colonel Franklin L. Smith, of the III MAF operations staff, remembered that information about th e

attacks that night came into the headquarters "i n

dribs and driblets. " As he later explained, however, i t

soon became apparent "that a general offensive was

underway." In the Da Nang area of operations, outsid e

of attacks by fire on the Marine base and outlying

positions, and the two ground assaults on Marin e

command and communications positions, the Communist infantry units largely concentrated on the

South Vietnamese units. In the Hai Van Pass area i n

the north, North Vietnamese regulars attempted to

cut Route 1 . To the south of the airbase, other enemy

main force units attacked the District Town of Dien

Ban and the provincial capital of Quang Nam, Hoi

An, on Route 4. At 0230 on the 30th at Dien Ban ,

elements of the R—20th and V—25th struck the subsector headquarters defended by the 15th Popula r

Forces Platoon and the 708 Regional Forces Company. Entering the town from the southwest, the VC

fired about 70 rocket propelled grenades at the local

forces, but never penetrated the defender's perimeter.

About two-and-a-half hours later, the enemy units

"ceased fire and withdrew." The Vietnamese militia

suffered 1 PF killed and 10 wounded. According t o

the U.S . Advisory Group at Da Nang, the PFs and

RFs accounted for eight dead VC and captured one

wounded enemy soldier. In the town itself, 10 innocent people, caught in the crossfire, sustained wounds ,

but no civilians died as a result of the battle .2 8

About 5,000 meters to the east, in Hoi An, how -

ever, Communist forces gained somewhat the uppe r

hand. Beginning their attack about 0300, about one -

half hour after Dien Ban had been hit, two companie s

of the V—25th Battalion used the noise of firecracker s

set off and general firing by Tet celebrants to cove r

their approach. One of the companies captured a German missionary hospital in the city and the other hi t

*Igor Bobrowsky, a former Combined Action Marine in CAP

Delta 2, located near the Thanh Quit River bridge on Route 1 sout h

of Da Nang, remembered that an enemy team fired from a "spot probably within a click of our positions . . . . We took them under fire . . .

and cheered when one time, after just getting off/possibly two rockers,

they were lit up by a chopper that had apparently been hovering in th e

dark waiting for them. A number of other choppers/airplanes/ the n

immediately blasted and raked over the whole area . We added as muc h

machine gun and automatic fire into the mix as we could pump out . "

Igor Bobrowsky, Comments on draft, dtd 26Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bobrowsky Comments .

the rear base of the 51st ARVN Regiment, the Chi

Long Camp, garrisoned by the ARVN 102d Enginee r

Battalion. Surprised by the initial assault, the engineers fell back, giving up half the camp to the Communist attackers. Bringing up two artillery platoons,

the South Vietnamese gunners lowered their pieces

and fired pointblank at the VC. By daybreak, the

engineers held their own and the situation in Hoi A n

was at a stalemate .2 9

The Korean Marine Brigade deployed six companies around the city and the South Vietnamese 51st

Regiment prepared a reaction force . In addition, the

1st Marine Division alerted one company to participate

in the relief of Hoi An, if needed . According to Communist documents, captured later, the two VC assaul t

companies were to pull out at first light, but becam e

bogged down in the city. The struggle for Hoi An

would continue into the following day.

Still by daybreak on 30 January, the intentions o f

the Communists were not entirely clear. While the

enemy attacks were widespread in the Da Nang are a

of operations, the intensity of enemy operations i n

other areas of Vietnam varied . For the most part, the

Communist offensive appeared to be limited to its

Military Region 5 . Even here, the assaults were largel y

confined to the Da Nang area in I Corps and to five

provincial capitals in II Corps. In II Corps, the enemy

struck the cities of Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Ban Me

Thuot, Kontum, and Pleiku. According to some

sources, the Communist high command had scheduled a full nation-wide assault on the night of 29—3 0

January, but postponed it for one day. Whether Military Region 5 never received the word, or failed to noti -

fy some of its subordinate units is still open to conjecture. Indeed, the Communist leaders may even have

had other ulterior motives. At MACV headquarters, a t

0700 on 30 January, Brigadier General Philip B .

Davidson, the J—2 or MACV intelligence officer ,

briefed General Westmoreland and predicted "this is

going to happen in the rest of the country tonight o r

tomorrow morning ." He was right .3 0

The Fighting Continues

Outside of the Da Nang and Hoi An sectors, most

of I Corps remained relatively quiet during the nigh t

and early morning hours of 29—30 January. At 0600,

however, about nine kilometers north of Tam Ky i n

Quang Tin Province, about 100 people gathered for a n

antiwar demonstration. A Popular Forces platoon

attempted to disperse the crowd . According to an ini-
lET OFFENSIVE AT

DA NANG

30 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1968

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150 THE DEFINING YEAR

tial advisory report, "an unknown number of grenades

were thrown by unidentified persons, killing 20

demonstrators." The report failed to state whether the

unidentified grenade throwers were PF troops or members of the crowd. The South Vietnamese militia

detained 30 people from the group, 15 men and 15

women, all of whom under interrogation admitted to

being Viet Cong cadre. About three and a half hours

later in the same vicinity, about 200—300 VC Main

Force troops attacked a village in the sector. Elements

from the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry then engaged the

enemy force which broke and fled. Joined by Compafly C, 7th Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment from the

Americal Division, the U.S. Army troops eventually

killed 36 of the enemy, detained another 18, and recovered 11 weapons.31

At Da Nang, on the 30th, the fighting did not subside with the coming of daylight. Elements of the VC

R—2Oth and local force units which participated in the

attack on Hoa yang and I Corps headquarters attempted to escape the dragnet of Marine and ARYN forces.

While the 1st MP Battalion supported by the 1st Tank

Battalion established blocking positions north of the

Cau Do River, the ARVN 3d Battalion, 51st Regiment swept the sector south of the river. Caught east of

the Cam La Bridge and Route 1, on a small island

formed by the convergence of the Cau Do, a small tributary of the river, and the Vien Dien River, the VC

turned to fight. A Combined Action platoon at 0830

saw a number of VC attempting to swim across the

Cau Do to the island.32

By this time, General Robertson, the 1st Marine

Division commander, had taken measures to bolster

the ARVN south of the Cau Dau. He ordered the 3d

Amphibian Tractor Battalion to form a blocking

position on the southeastern bank of the Vien Dien

River. First Sergeant Jaunal of the tractor battalion's

H&S Company remembered that he received a telephone call that morning "that a few miles from our

area the infantry had some VC or NVA trapped on an

island and our Amtracs and Marines were to act as a

blocking force."33

Simultaneously, the division ordered the helilift of a

company from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines to reinforce the ARVN and the Combined Action Marines.

By 0925 Lieutenant Colonel Rockey, the battalion

commander, had formed a "jump battalion command

group" and had his Company I, under Captain Henry

Kolakowski, Jr., reinforced by mortars, at the battalion

landing zone where four Marine CH—46 Sea Knight

helicopters awaited them. Within a few minutes the

helicopters were airborne and then landed in a flat

paddy just south of the island and near the Combined

Action unit which had taken three casualties. Marine
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 15 1

rifleman John L. Gundersen in the 1st Platoon of Company I remembered that as soon as he and his squad

alighted they came under heavy automatic and smal l

arms fire from the island .* The Marines took what

cover they could behind a dirt berm and returned th e

fire . Within a few minutes the enemy weapons were

silent. The company then searched the immediate area

at first without encountering any resistance, sweepin g

first to the west and then retracing their route . As they

once more entered the paddy where they started, the

Marines again came under heavy fire, including mortars, from the enemy-held island .3 4

With the increasing intensity of fire from the island

and reports that South Vietnamese forces had observe d

some 250 people dressed in black pajamas movin g

toward the west, the Marine command decided upon a

combined operation with the ARVN to mount a n

assault on the enemy forces there .** Company I was to

cross over the tributary to the island using a nearby

footbridge while the ARVN assaulted from the west

and protected the Marine left flank . Marine air an d

supporting arms were to soften up the enemy position s

before the attack. As the infantry waited and th e

artillery fires lifted, the first Marine McDonnell Douglas F4B Phantoms came in and made "a spotting

run," then strafed the enemy positions, and dropped

high explosives and napalm. Marine John Gundersen

recalled that the

. . . concussion from each bomb shaking my face an d

eyeballs. The explosions blurred my vision momentarily. Small pieces of shrapnel were falling on us with some

larger pieces buzzing over our head . . . . I couldn't imagine anyone escaping such a pounding . 3 5

After the air bombardment, sometime betwee n

noon and 1300, Company I rushed over the foot -

bridge, some 50 meters away. Captain Kolakowski

dropped off his 3d Platoon to guard the norther n

entrance of the bridge while the other two platoon s

continued the attack on the objective, the hamlet o f

Lo Giang 2 on the island . The Marine assault on the

*Lieutenant Colonel Gene W. Bowers, the battalion operation s

officer, recalled the situation somewhat less dramatically, writing tha t

the landing was uneventful except for some long range sniping fro m

the island ." LtCol Gene W. Bowers, Comments on draft, dtd 30May9 5

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bowers Comments.

**Lieutenant Colonel Bowers commented that the 250 people i n

black pajamas were " identified by close passes by UH-1E gunships t o

be villagers, mostly women and children, who were fleeing the fighting

in their village . They collected in a huddled group on the northern -

most peninsula of the island at the rivers ' convergence . They remained

there unmolested throughout the action . " Bowers Comments.

hamlet soon bogged down as the troops followed a

path that led to the village gate . An enemy sniper

killed the point man on the lead platoon and then th e

Marines came under heavy fire . According to Joh n

Gundersen, his squad then took the point and wen t

through the gate . They had orders to turn west unti l

they reached a tree line and then hold fast . Gundersen remembered as they ran " seeing numerous on e

and two-man fighting holes on the edge of the tree -

line ." When they reached the tree line, only his

fireteam was there : "We did a quick ammo check discovering we were very low on rounds having only tw o

grenades and two magazines of ammo between us.

Luckily, we met no resistance before being ordere d

back to the rest of the platoon to dig in ."36

By this time it was late afternoon and daylight had

begun to fade . The first two platoons of Company I had

established a perimeter in the southeast sector of the

hamlet while the 3d Platoon remained at the northern

end of the footbridge. Gundersen recalled that they

had been resupplied and that they had dug their defensive holes along a small path that curved around an d

led to the river. The Marine rifleman wondered wh y

they established their position there on the low groun d

and isolated from the rest of the hamlet. At dusk, however, Captain Kolakowski ordered them to leave thei r

vulnerable defenses and silently move up to the top of

the slope and again dig in.37

Under cover of darkness the enemy struck. The

Marines had called for C—130 "Spooky" flareships to

light up the area, but one of the lumbering aircraf t

had run out of flares and departed before its relie f

appeared overhead . The enemy took advantage o f

this approximately 30-minute period of pitch blackness to mass a force before the 3d Platoon guarding

the bridge escape route . About the same time, the

enemy infiltrated into the lines of the other two platoons in the hamlet . Marine John Gundersen recalled

hearing someone inside the perimeter whistling . He

was about to tell them to be quiet "when a wall o f

tracers ripped through my position from the north . "

This continued for a few minutes when he heard

another set of whistles very much resembling "various bird calls." This time enemy fire came from th e

west and then from another direction with still

another whistle. By this time, the relief flareship wa s

overhead and dropped illumination canisters . In the

eerie light given off by the flares, the Marines "coul d

see the enemy massing in front of us" and called in

artillery and mortar support . Gundersen later wrote :

"To escape the artillery which was right on target,
152 THE DEFINING YEA R

they rushed towards us." He recalled that some

broke through, but "became trapped between us an d

the 2d Platoon. "38

In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Rockey and

his small command group had established the battalion command post just below the island on the southern bank of the tributary to coordinate the operatio n

and its supporting fires. Initially the command group

consisted of the battalion commander; his operations

officer, Captain Gene W. Bowers; the assistant operations officer, Captain Lee C. Gound; and "artillery and

mortar F.O.'s, helicopter support team, radio operators,

and a few strap hangers who came along for the ride . "

The first disappointment was the failure of the ARVN

forces to support the Marine attack. Although, as Captain Bowers recalled, he heard some outgoing firing

from our left flank, but "never saw any ARVNs move

forward in the paddy." Bowers sent a senior liaison staff

NCO " to find their headquarters to make contact . . .

but he came back, saying the ARVNs were in the

defensive mode, no one spoke English, and the y

ignored him." Lieutenant Colonel Rockey during the

interim ordered a section of 106mm Recoilless Rifles,

mounted on small flatbed four-wheeled drive vehicles,

called Mechanical Mules, to reinforce the temporar y

command group from the 3d Battalion's combat base ,

some 9,000 meters to the south . The Mule-mounted

106s, however, did not arrive until after dark.3 9

For the command group, the first crisis occurred

when the enemy struck the 3d Platoon at the footbridge, causing several casualties. Among the dead

was the platoon leader. Captain Bowers remembered

talking to a wounded lance corporal who called the

situation desperate and "pled for immediate reinforcements . . . ." With the permission of Lieutenant

Colonel Rockey, Bowers hastily formed a provisiona l

platoon of about 30 men and placed it under the command of his assistant, Captain Gound . According to

Bowers, he pressed all the available men in the CP into

the platoon including mortarmen, radiomen, recoil -

less rifle men, and even a chaplain's assistant . He told

Gound to take his makeshift force and attack across

the bridge and relieve the embattled 3d Platoon.40

According to Bowers, when Gound's troops departed, the only people left in the CP were Lieutenan t

Colonel Rockey and himself. The battalion commander "carried the Division Tactical net radio and monitored the artillery nets." Bowers carried the battalion

tactical net radio, monitoring the forward air controlle r

net as well as the company's tactical net. When the

provisional platoon arrived at the 3d Platoon's position,

Captain Gound radioed Bowers and asked for 81m m

support against enemy troops he could see to his front .

Bowers ran to where the mortars were guarded by on e

mortarman who told the Marine captain that "he wa s

a new replacement ammo humper, who had no idea

how to aim and fire the mortar." Captain Bowers told

the man to help him break out the ammunition and

then for about half an hour, the two "provided overhead free gun, dead reckoning, zero charge fire support

to Captain Gound 's platoon, " while the latter "adjusted the fire by saying . . . 'a little right,' a little closer, '

and so forth ." This broke the enemy attempt to overrun the Marines at the bridge 4 1

With the support of artillery, air, and mortars,

together with their individual weapons and claymor e

mines, the Marines of Company I broke the back o f

the enemy attack . According to Gundersen with th e

1st Platoon, "the sounds of the arty, the rockets, th e

mortars, the grenades combined with the eerie swaying of the illumination on their parachutes created a

hellish vision . Never before, or since have I been i n

such an acute state of fear." The fight, however, had

gone out of the VC who began to disperse into smal l

groups and tried to make their escape off the island .

Captain Bowers recalled that under the light of the

flares, the Marines reported "what they described a s

`hundreds' . . . of heads of swimmers attempting t o

escape across the river to the east ." On the other bank

of the river, however, the small task force from the 3 d

Amphibian Tractor Battalion blocked their way. The

amtrac troops rounded up in the water about 10 5

detainees fleeing the island .42

On the morning of the 31st, the Marines of Company I, now reinforced by the ARVN and the AmTrac

Marines, surveyed the results of the fighting and continued to mop up the remnants of the enemy force . At

dawn, near the positions of the 1st Platoon, John Gundersen remembered "bodies of the enemy soldiers wer e

strewn about not more than 15 meters in front of ou r

perimeter, swelling indepth in front of the machin e

gun to as much as six deep . I was awed by the sight of

all those bodies." He observed that the VC never realized that the Marines had moved from the fightin g

holes in the lower path and they "spent the whole

night and their lives attacking those holes ." Captai n

Bowers related that another "60 or so dead enemy wer e

counted in front of Gound's position." Company I and

the small command group remained in the sector unti l

about 1500 on the 31st and then returned to thei r

original combat camp to the south . According to

Marine sources, the heavy action on this small island
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 15 3

resulted in 102 VC killed, 88 prisoners of war, 13 VC

suspects, and 70 laborers. Apparently the enemy forces

were a mixed group from several different units interspersed together. Allied intelligence officers identifie d

members from the V-25th, R-20th, C—130th Battalions, and the Q—15th and Q—16th Local Force Companies.

The Marines failed to determine whether this mixe d

force had a specific mission or consisted of remnant s

from units that had participated in the earlier attack on

the I Corps headquarters. 4 3

The rest of the enemy efforts in the Da Nang area

and TAOR were about as haphazard and relatively

ineffective as the fight on the unnamed island . In the

northeast, near the Force Logistic Command sector, villagers from Nam 0 just south of the strategic Nam 0

Bridge, told Popular Force troops, members of the

Q—4 Combined Action platoon, that the VC planned

to attack the CAP compound. At 0735, enemy gunners fired two rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the

compound tower and a VC infantry platoon opened up

upon the Combined Action unit. The RPGs misse d

the apertures in the tower and fell to the ground . Afte r

a brief firefight, the VC troops withdrew taking any

casualties with them. In a sweep of the area, the

defenders found ammunition clips and bloodstains .

Local villagers told the Marines that at least one VC

had been killed in the brief skirmish . Two Marines sustained wounds.4 4

The most serious ground attack against a Marin e

unit occurred in the western portion of the Da Nan g

TAOR just below the Tuy Loan and Cau Do Rivers

near the eastern bank of the Yen River. About 0745 ,

approximately two companies or a reinforced company from the 31st 1VVA Regiment ambushed a Marine

platoon from Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines .

At this point, Company G was under the operational

control of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which ha d

the responsibility of protecting the western

approaches to the Marine base . As the Marine platoon patrolled along the banks of the Yen, a heavy

machine gun suddenly opened up . Firing from wellconcealed and dug-in firing positions, the enemy

machine gunners and infantry took a heavy toll of

the Marines. With the enemy too close to call in

artillery or fixed-wing air, the Marines radioed fo r

reinforcements. A second platoon from Company G

arrived at the site and attempted to maneuver to th e

NVA flank. The enemy then attacked forcing th e

Marine platoons to fall back to more defensive positions. By 1100, Marine helicopters evacuated th e

most seriously wounded and brought in the rest of

Company G into blocking positions on the wester n

bank of the Yen ." 5

The Marines now counterattacked supported b y

artillery and Marine gunships and fixed-wing air . The

North Vietnamese fought a delaying action as the y

began to withdraw. Later that afternoon, the 1st Marine

Division helilifted a "Bald Eagle" reaction force from

Company E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines east of the rive r

in an attempt to close the circle around the NVA . Linking up, under artillery and air cover, the two Marin e

companies continued their advance until forced to hal t

because of darkness and then took up night defensive

positions. Shortly after 1800, an air observer reported

seeing 25—30 enemy troops in trenchlines, bunkers, and

fighting holes. In the morning when searching the battle area, the Marines would find "ample evidence o f

enemy casualties, but only two enemy bodies . . . . "

Total Marine casualties of this incident on the 30th wer e

10 Marines killed and 15 wounded . Most of the dead

and wounded were from the platoon of Company G

that fell victim to the enemy ambush .

The attack on the western perimeter was probably

the most serious thrust against Marine positions on th e

day and evening of 30 January. Throughout the day,

however, Marine units throughout the TAOR reported

incidents. A Company E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marine s

squad patrol in its regular area of operations just east of

the confluence of the Thanh Quit and Vinh Dien Rive r

came under attack from an estimated squad of enemy.

A detachment of four LVTs from the 3d AmTrac Battalion quickly arrived, but the enemy had alread y

departed. The Marine squad sustained casualties of on e

man killed and one nonbattle casualty. Apparently one

Marine at the death of his comrade became so distraught that he was unable to function " 6

In Da Nang City itself, about 1050 in the morning ,

approximately 500 people gathered at a Buddhist

pagoda and attempted to hold a march . The National

Police arrested 25 of the crowd and quickly disperse d

the would-be demonstrators. This demonstration may

have been planned to coincide with an attack on th e

city which never developed 47

South of the Hai Van Pass, in the northern portio n

of the Da Nang TAOR, in the 2d Battalion, 7t h

Marines sector, the North Vietnamese were able to

close Route 1 temporarily, but failed to penetrat e

allied defenses. At 0915, a squad from Company G,

2d Battalion, 7th Marines providing road security fo r

a Marine engineer mine-sweeping team on Route 1

just below the pass, encountered a small enemy sapper detachment. Reinforced by another squad, the
154 THE DEFINING YEA R

Company G Marines killed three of the enemy troop s

and captured two . The two North Vietnamese prisoners identified themselves as members of the H–2

Engineering Company, part of the 2d Sapper Battalion .

According to the enemy soldiers, their mission was t o

mine and interdict allied traffic in the Hai Van Pass

area . Their weapons included AK–47s and B–4 0

Rockets. Despite the Marine patrolling, NVA sappers, probably from the 2d Sapper Battalion, blew

three bridges and one culvert over Route 1 in the pass

area . An entry in the 1st Marine Division Journal for

30 January read "Rt # 1 from Hai Van Pass to Ph u

Loc closed as a result of enemy action . "48

On the night of the 30th, elements of a battalion o f

the NVA 4th Regiment attacked an ARVN outpost at

the foot of the Hai Van Pass. The South Vietnames e

quickly rushed the newly arrived 5th ARVN Ranger

Battalion into the area north of Da Nang City. Supported by U.S . artillery and air, the South Vietnames e

successfully contained the Communist units in the

Nam 0 and Lien Chien regions. This fighting would

continue in a desultory fashion throughout the night 49

South of Da Nang, in Hoi An, on the 30th, the

South Koreans, reinforced by elements of the ARV N

51st Regiment, tried to tighten the loop and began

preparations to retake the city. At 0730, the Sout h

Koreans reported about 200 to 300 enemy troops stil l

in Hoi An. An American advisor within the MACV

compound reported at 1145 that the VC were diggin g

in the engineer compound and that "numerous boats

in river loaded with Charlie ." After calling in helicopter gunships, the Korean Marines, at 1320, reached

the old MACV compound and linked up with U .S .

advisors there. The VC continued to hold the hospital ,

however, and part of the engineer compound .

Although the Koreans and the ARVN surrounde d

most of the city, the Communist troops still were able

to keep their southern flank open .5 0

The Korean Marines sent three companies to close

the southern link and then moved forward into the

attack. By dark the Koreans had captured the hospital

and were in position to relieve the engineer compound .

The Koreans kept one company at the MACV compound for security and prepared for a sweep to clear ou t

the city in the morning . During the night, enemy

resistance dwindled to sniper fire on the Marine positions. Colonel Franklin Smith, from the III MAF perspective, suggested later that a reluctance upon the

part of the South Korean Marine Brigade commande r

to cause undue damage and to avoid civilian casualtie s

lay behind the slowness and deliberateness of the Kore -

an advance. According to U .S . advisors and to Sout h

Vietnamese sources, the fight for Hoi An resulted i n

allied casualties of 58 killed, 103 wounded in action ,

21 missing in action, and 14 weapons lost. The allies

claimed they killed 343 of the enemy and detained 19 5

prisoners. Of the prisoners, the South Vietnamese iden -

tified 6 as military, 109 as workers, and the remainin g

80 as VC cadre .

Throughout the Da Nang TAOR, the intensity of

activity increased during the night . From 1800 t o

2400 on the 30th, the 1st Marine Division reported t o

III MAF over 30 incidents ranging from sightings o f

large enemy forces, to mortar attacks, and a few

infantry assaults. At the same time, the 1st Division

had sent out several reconnaissance elements whic h

began to pay dividends. At 1835, Recon team "Ic e

Bound," positioned in the mountains about eight

miles northwest of Da Nang observed an enemy rock -

et unit prepare a firing position for their missiles .

After calling in artillery which resulted in three secondary explosions, the reconnaissance Marines reported seven enemy killed . The enemy launched no rockets from this site .5 1

Another reconnaissance patrol, Recon Team "Rummage," about 30 kilometers south of Da Nang in the

Que Son Mountains below An Hoa, had even more

spectacular results. About 1900, it spotted a column o f

about 40 NVA at the head of even a larger colum n

moving east along a trail . The North Vietnamese soldiers wore flak jackets and helmets and carried a

machine gun, and a small rocket detachment with si x

122mm rockets. "Rummage" soon determined that

the total number of North Vietnamese troops approximated 500 or more men, moving in two columns . The

lead column consisted of about 100 to 150 men, followed by the main body. The main body advanced i n

column maintaining about three to four feet spac e

between each man. Instead of calling artillery fir e

immediately, the reconnaissance Marines arranged

with Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines and a

detachment of the 3d 155mm Gun Battery at An Ho a

for an "artillery ambush ."5 2

After counting 500 men pass their position, Rummage sprung the trap. Landing in large bursts, about

50 to 75 artillery rounds fell on the lead column .

Rummage reported about 50 NVA dead with another 100 "probable ." Immediately after the artillery

shelling, a C–47 Spooky arrived on station and

worked over the same area with its Gatling guns .

Rummage radioed back that Spooky caught about 5 0

NVA crossing a stream and the recon Marines could
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 15 5

observe "rounds hitting all around them [the NVA} . "

Spooky then called in Marine fixed-wing attack air -

craft which dropped napalm with "outstanding coverage of target." Darkness prevented any accurate bomb

assessment, but the "Rummage" Marines could

observe enemy movement when illumination was

available . According to the team leader, "We never

saw the end of the main body . . . [but] when we

stopped the count, there were NVA still in column o f

4 's as far as we could see with our M49 [rifle spotting

scope} . "

Later intelligence and interrogation reports of prisoners of war would indicate that the unit that "Rummage " had intercepted was probably a battalion of th e

2d NVA Division. Apparently the division was slow in

moving into the Da Nang area and was not in position to support the local forces in the earlier phase o f

the enemy offensive . According to Marine intelligence sources, Rummage may well "have rendered a

reinforced battalion combat ineffective, forcing th e

enemy to modify his plans at a critical time." In a

message to III MAF, General Robertson observed :

"Never have so few done so much to so many. "

By this time, the Communist Tet offensive was in

full bloom, not only at Da Nang, but throughout

Vietnam. In the early morning hours of 31 January,

Communist forces assaulted provincial and distric t

capitals extending from the Mekong Delta in th e

south to Quang Tri City in the north . In Thua Thien

Province in I Corps, two North Vietnamese regiments held most of Hue City and the Marine base at

Phu Bai came under mortar and rocket barrages.

Along Route 1 between Phu Bai and Da Nang, VC

and NVA main force units on the 31st made some 1 8

attacks on bridges, Marine company positions in th e

Phu Loc area, and several of the Combined Actio n

platoons . Elsewhere in I Corps, below Da Nang ,

around 0400 on 31 January, elements of the 70th VC

Battalion and the 21st NVA Regiment struck Tam Ky,

defended by the ARVN 6th Regiment and an

artillery battalion . At daybreak, the South Vietnamese troops counterattacked. According to the

South Vietnamese official history, the enemy retreated in disorder leaving on the battlefield, "hundreds of

bodies and 31 wounded who were captured ." Another 38 of the enemy surrendered .5 3

Much the same occurred at Quang Ngai City i n

the most southern of the I Corps provinces . At 0400

on the 31st, supported by local guerrilla forces, the

VC 401st Main Force Regiment struck the city and airfield and initially achieved surprise, but failed to

exploit its advantage. By that night, with the enem y

command and control structure shattered, the fight

was over.* The VC lost about 500 killed and som e

300 weapons. For its part, the 2d ARVN Division

sustained casualties of 56 killed, 138 wounded, an d

one man missing . The ARVN also lost 43 weapons .54

At the American base at Chu Lai, the Communists

limited their attacks to mortar and rockets although

rumors circulated that the NVA were about to launch

a ground assault on the base . While the America l

Division maintained a 100 percent alert, enemy gunners, nevertheless, in the early morning hours successfully launched their rockets and mortars. One 122mm

rocket exploded a bomb dump and caused extensive

damage . Colonel Dean Wilker, the MAG—12 commander, later recalled that the resulting blast of th e

bomb dump "caved in one of my hangars and dam -

aged the others."55 The two Marine aircraft groups at

Chu Lai, MAG—12 and MAG—13, sustained 3 fixed -

wing aircraft destroyed and 23 damaged, 4 of them

substantially. There was no further ground assault .5 6

In the extensive Da Nang TAOR, the early morning hours of 31 January were almost a repeat of the

events of the 30th. Enemy gunners fired rockets at

both the Da Nang Airbase and this time also included the Marble Mountain helicopter facility on Tiensha

Peninsula. No rockets fell on the main airbase but

Marble Mountain sustained some damage. The enemy

rocket troops fired in two bursts, one at 0342, followed by a second barrage three hours later. About the

same time as the rocket attacks on the Da Nang base

and Marble Mountain, enemy mortars bombarded th e

command post of the 7th Marines on Hill 55 south o f

Da Nang and forward infantry positions. These

included Hills 65 and 52 manned by companies of the

3d Battalion, 7th Marines in the southwestern part o f

the TAOR and Hill 41 defended by Company D, 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines in the central western sector.

The mortar attacks resulted in only five wounded and

none killed among the Marine defenders. Countermortar fire quickly silenced the enemy tubes . The

Marine staff speculated that the enemy launched th e

mortar attacks largely as a cover for the rocket attacks

against Marble Mountain . Even at Marble Mountai n

the damage was relatively contained . The Marines lost

1 helicopter and sustained damage to 29 others . Two

*A U.S . Army historian, George L . MacGarrigle, observed that th e

attack on Quang Ngai City failed because the commander of the 401st

" was unable to coordinate the action . " George L. MacGarrigle, Historian, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
156 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of Col Robert W. Lewis, USMC (Ret)

Chu Lai airfield is seen in an aerial view after the rocket attack . Note arrows pointing out damage

to aircraft hangars at the base.

attached U.S . Army personnel were wounded .57

During the day and evening of the 31st, the VC

and NVA infantry units pressed the offensive on th e

ground. In the northern sector of Da Nang, NVA or

VC main force troops entered Nam 0 once again and

killed the hamlet chief.* Combined Action platoo n

*Mike McDonell, who was the Northern Sector Defense Command " watch officer " , recalled that he tried to warn the " CAPs . . .

that there was a battalion of NVA in their ville ; we could not raise

them, the NVA went into assault and we had to call artillery on their

position . . . ." He remembered that time as "when the world turne d

upside down ." Mike McDonell, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File) .

Q—4 there continued to hold out. At about 0740, a

crowd of 400 Vietnamese civilians made up mostl y

of women and children and carrying NVA and V C

flags approached the Combined Action compound .

The Marines and Popular Force troops fired at arme d

members of the crowd who appeared to be directing

the march . The crowd scattered only to gather on th e

fringes of the Da Nang base near the Force Logisti c

Compound near Red Beach . Again the crowd dispersed and this time did not recongregate . In the

meantime, the VC harassed with sniper fire both

CAP Q—4 and the nearby Nam 0 bridge securit y

detachment from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. 5 8
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 15 7

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19039 0

A bandaged VC, wounded in the fighting for Nam 0, waits

for evacuation. The prisoner talked freely to his captors while

he received medical attention.

The Da Nang Northern Sector Defense Command

dispatched a provisional company to assist the Combined Action Marines as well as the security detachment. The provisional company linked up with tw o

South Vietnamese Ranger companies that were operating in the area to contain the battalion from the 4th

NVA Regiment which had slipped through the Hai Va n

Pass the night before . With part of the force establishing blocking positions north of the hamlet, the rest o f

the provisional company and South Vietnamese

Rangers moved through Nam O. By the afternoon of

the 31st, the Marines and Rangers had completed their

sweep. They collected some 200 people that they

detained for further questioning . Some of the VC in

the hamlet fled south, but encountered a platoon fro m

Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines coming up to

reinforce the allied forces in the Nam 0 region . In the

resulting engagement, the Marines of Company E

killed about 13 VC. The enemy unit was from th e

Q—55th Local Force Company, which normally operated

in the area . A prisoner captured in Nam 0 identified a

North Vietnamese battalion, probably from the 4th

NVA Regiment, operating below the Hai Van Pass wit h

the "mission to form civilians for demonstrations ."5 9

According to a South Vietnamese account, th e

ARVN Rangers killed 150 of the enemy and captured

another 18 in the battle for Nam 0 and in other fighting below the pass through 31 January. ARVN intelligence officers speculated that the battalion from th e

4th NVA Regiment was supposed to have spearheaded

the attack on the city of Da Nang the previous day, but

arrived too late to influence the battle . 6 6

In other sectors of the Da Nang TAOR, the Communists also maintained the pressure on the allied

forces. For the most part, the VC and NVA limited

their attacks on the Marines to mortar bombardments

and harassing small arms fire . Although agent reports

and other intelligence indicated continued enem y

assaults north of the Cau Do River against Hoa Van g

and Da Nang City, most of these came to naught . The

1st MP Battalion completed three sweeps of the airbas e

perimeter and the areas just southeast, southwest, an d

just north of the airbase without incident . The battalion's Company B, however, in an operation with a

Combined Action platoon in two hamlets on the Tiensha Peninsula or Da Nang East, surprised a VC force i n

two hamlets north of Marble Mountain . The Marines

and Popular Force troops killed 22 of the enemy and

took another 23 prisoner. 6 1

There were two serious incidents in the 7th Marine s

sector. In the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines area of operations, about 2,000 meters west of Hill 55 on the other

side of a bend in the Yen River, a squad from Company L at 1145 ran into what eventually turned out to b e

a fairly large-sized enemy unit . Reinforced by the

remainder of Company L and two platoons from Company M together with two tanks and a LVT, the

Marines engaged the NVA. Company L, 3d Battalion,

5th Marines set up blocking positions on the east ban k

of the Yen . Able to establish clear fields of fire in the

rice paddy where the heaviest firefight occurred, the

enemy prevented the 7th Marines elements from closing with them. After dark, both sides withdrew, the

Marines to night defensive positions and the NVA t o

the west. In the engagement, the Marines lost 5 killed

and 12 wounded. They counted 34 enemy dead . Noting the new web gear and weapons with the Nort h

Vietnamese bodies left on the battlefield, Marine intelligence officers believed the North Vietnamese unit t o

be from the 31st NVA Regiment.6 2

About 5,000 meters to the northwest, later tha t

night, a squad from Company C, 1st Battalion, 7t h

Marines encountered an enemy force possibly from the
158 THE DEFINING YEA R

same NVA regiment. The Marine squad was about to

establish a night ambush site when an enemy force o f

about 100 fired upon them. Two other squad patrols

from Company C in the vicinity quickly joined th e

first squad . Another platoon from the Marine company also reinforced the engaged troops about an hou r

later. Finally the enemy broke contact at 2000 and disappeared. The Marines took the worst in this uneven

battle . Initially surprised, the first squad sustained

heavy casualties. All told, the Marines lost 12 kille d

and 6 wounded . They later found three enemy bodie s

at the site . The dead enemy troops were wearing blac k

pajamas under their green utilities. According to a

Marine report, "it was evident that the enemy was pre -

pared to masquerade as Vietnamese civilians in th e

process of infiltrating the TAOR and that he wa s

attempting to infiltrate his forces in small units ." 6 3

The greatest danger to the TAOR at this juncture, however, was from the south in that area

defended by the Korean Marine Brigade and the 51st

ARVN Regiment. Although the Koreans and

ARVN in a combined operation finally cleared Ho i

An, enemy units to the west, south, and north of that

city continued to press the attack . At 0920, enemy

forces attacked the district towns of Dien Ban, just

above the Ky Lam River, and Duy Xuyen below th e

river. At Dien Bien, the 51st ARVN reinforced by

Korean Marines contained the attack . At Duy

Xuyen, however, the Communist troops overran th e

town, forcing the district chief to flee and take refug e

with the Koreans. Americal Division artillery operating in the Que Son sector took the Communist

forces under fire, but did not shell Duy Xuyen tow n

because of the civilian population there . The III

MAF Command Center later that evening radioed

MACV in Saigon : "Although the enemy has suffered

heavy losses within his local and main force VC units

during the past two days, he still possesses a formidable threat utilizing NVA troops poised on the

periphery of the Da Nang TAOR."m

While the Communist forces continued to harass

allied positions on the night of 31 January—1 February 1968, the intensity of combat did not match tha t

of the previous two nights. Still enemy gunners just

before 0100 launched 12 122mm rockets aimed a t

the Da Nang base and blew up two ammunitio n

dumps, one for napalm and the other for flares. While making for a loud and colorful pyrotechnical

display, the explosions caused no casualties and n o

damage to any of the aircraft . There were no other

rocket attacks that night . G 5

Again during the day of 1 February, the number o f

incidents between allied and Communist forces fell

from those of the two previous days. Enemy gunners,

however, continued to be active and shot down a

Marine CH—46 attempting to insert a reconnaissance

team into a landing zone in the hill mass in the west -

ern sector of Da Nang below the Tuy Loan River . The

helicopter burned upon crashing, but the crew an d

most of the patrol were able to get out . While Marine

fixed-wing aircraft flew strike missions against the

enemy gun emplacements, another helicopter evacuated the survivors. Of the 13-man Recon team, dubbe d

"Dublin City," one was dead, nine were injured, an d

three escaped unscathed . According to Marine pilo t

reports, the enemy had approximately 250 men in th e

area equipped with automatic weapons, including a t

least one .50-caliber-type machine gun . After the

fixed-wing aircraft and evacuation helicopter cleare d

the area, the 11th Marines saturated the area wit h

artillery flre . G6

A Brief Lull and Renewed Fighting

On 1 February, General Robertson began to refin e

his defensive dispositions at Da Nang so as to counte r

any further incursions on the part of the NVA regulars

and the VC main force units pressing on the Marin e

TAOR. Robertson wanted to "canalize enemy movements in order to develop lucrative targets which coul d

be exploited." Given also the enemy rocket threat, h e

still needed to maintain extensive patrols in the socalled Rocket Belt . The 1st Marine Division commander decided then to move Company M, 3d Battalion ,

7th Marines from its fairly remote position on Hill 5 2

in the far western reaches of the Vu Gia River Valley

above the An Hoa Basin to the more centrally locate d

Hill 65. Because of the location of Hill 65, just above

Route 4 about 4,000 meters west of the district tow n

of Dai Loc, and below Charlie Ridge, where the VC

had heavy machine gun emplacements which precluded any helicopter lift, the Marine company had t o

make the move on foot. The company arrived at its dispositions at 0100 the following morning . A contingent of South Vietnamese Nung mercenaries from the

Special Forces CIDG Camp at Thuong Duc took ove r

the defense of Hill 52 from Company M .67

Still the Marine command believed the new positions of Company M not only covered the approaches

to Dai Loc, but provided the division with anothe r

reserve force . Further to the east Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, at the battalion's command post
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 15 9

about 500 meters north of Dien Ban town, remained a s

the division mobile reserve mounted in LVTs and sup -

ported by tanks. It also served to block one of the

principal avenues of approach to Da Nang from the

south." The only other Marine reserves available to the

division were the provisional companies of the North -

ern and Southern Defense Commands.

For the next few days, there was a relative lull in th e

Da Nang sector, at least as compared to the last two

days of January. There were still ominous signs an d

actions that the enemy push on Da Nang was not over.

Although most of the enemy activity was restricted to

small-unit contacts, on the night of 2—3 February,

enemy gunners again rocketed the Da Nang base .

From firing positions southwest of the base, 2 8

122mm missiles fell on the airfield, destroying one air -

craft and damaging six others. Marine counter-rocke t

fire from the 11th Marines and 1st Tank Battalion

resulted in five secondary explosions . 68

While from 1—5 February, the enemy groun d

assaults on Marine positions appeared to diminish ,

Marine spotters in the tower on Hill 55 reported th e

constant movement of small groups of enemy troop s

in the western portion of the Korean Marine area o f

operations. Marine commanders and staff officers

could only speculate that the enemy was probabl y

infiltrating north in small groups to "predetermine d

rallying points " for a further assault either on the cit y

or on the base. Other disturbing intelligence tende d

to confirm this analysis. On 2 February, the Marines

received a report that the 2d NVA Division had moved

its headquarters four miles north, to a position above

Route 4, from its previous location on Go Noi Island .

Two days later, Marine intelligence officers learned

that the 21st NVA Regiment was in the Go Noi area.

Finally there were rumors that the other two regiments of the 2d Division, the 1st VC and the 3d NVA,

had infiltrated even further north . In fact, elements of

both regiments had reached jump-off points jus t

south of the Cau Do River. As Lieutenant Colonel

John F. J. Kelly, an intelligence officer on the III MA F

staff, remembered, III MAF had expected the 2d NVA

Division to have participated in the attack on the 30t h

and 31st, "and it was waited on with bated breath, w e

knew that it was coming ."69

The Marines did not have a long wait . On the

night of 5—6 February, the Communist forces bega n

the second phase of its Da Nang offensive . At 2000 o n

the night of the 5th, a Marine platoon ambush from

Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines intercepted

about 60 North Vietnamese troops about 4,000

meters south of the Tuy Loan River in the western sec -

tor of the area of operations moving northeast towar d

the river and the base with mortars and automati c

weapons. Calling artillery upon the enemy troops, the

Marines then swept through the area and recovered

about 17 60mm mortar rounds. They later found fou r

enemy dead. While the Marines successfully thwarted

this attempt, between 0100 and 0500 on the morning

of the 6th, enemy gunners mortared or rocketed all of

the command posts, fire bases, and company comba t

bases in the 7th Marines sector. In the attack, the

enemy gunners fired 122mm rockets at Marine

artillery positions at An Hoa, Hill 55, and Hill 10.

Twenty rockets fell on Hill 10, manned by Battery G ,

3d Battalion, 11th Marines which resulted in 23 casualties, including two dead . The remaining rocke t

attacks were ineffective. Two of the mortar attacks hi t

the 1st Air Cavalry Division helipad near the Forc e

Logistic Command area in the Red Beach sector.

These destroyed two of the Army helicopters and

damaged eight others. The mortar rounds killed on e

U.S. soldier and wounded two .7 °

On the ground in the 7th Marines sector, Nort h

Vietnamese units hit several of the Combined Actio n

platoons, especially in the 3d and 1st Battalion areas .

One of the major attacks was against CAP B—3 in th e

hamlet of Duong Lam (1) just below the Tuy Loa n

River. Shortly after 0100 on the 6th, enemy gunners

opened up on the hamlet with intermittent mortar

rounds and small-arms fire . About an hour later,

North Vietnamese troops who had infiltrated Duong

Lam rushed the CAP compound . While successfull y

beating back the enemy onslaught, the Combined

Action leader called for help . At 0240, a squad from

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, supported by tw o

tanks from the 1st Tank Battalion, moved to assist th e

embattled CAP unit . The reaction force itself came

under automatic weapons fire and enemy rocket- propelled grenades disabled the two tanks. About 0330 ,

two more Marine tanks from the district town of Hie u

Duc arrived at the northern fringes of the hamlet . The

armored force pushed through the hamlet an d

encountered only occasional small-arms fire . Joining

up with the squad from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine s

and some newly arrived ARVN troops, the tanks the n

relieved the Combined Action garrison . The combined force then swept the general area where they

found two enemy bodies and took three prisoners .

According to the prisoner accounts, they were from

the 3d Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment and confirmed

that " . . . Da Nang itself was the ultimate objective ." 7'
160 THE DEFINING YEAR

The heaviest action occurred in the 3d Battalion ,

5th Marines and 4th Battalion, 51st ARVN sectors

along Route 1 . Corporal Igor Bobrowsky with CA P

D—2 located near the Thanh Quit Bridge along Rout e

1 remembered being besieged in his compound b y

North Vietnamese regulars. As he recalled suddenly

the enemy was there and forced his Marines and PF s

to take refuge in the compound together with man y

local villagers: "We were running out of ammunitio n

and everything else, so that was a big fear ." According

to Bobrowsky, the NVA suddenly disappeared as

quickly as they had appeared . He later conjecture d

that "what saved us from being . . . taken out totally

was the fact that they had bigger fish to fry, they wer e

headed to Da Nang."72 *

The bigger fish was the 4th Battalion, 51st ARV N

Battalion base camp about 5,000 meters north o n

Route 1 above the Thanh Quit River. At about 0300 ,

two North Vietnamese battalions struck the ARVN

compound . Two LVTH—6s from the Marine 1st

Armored Amphibian Company attached to the 11th

Marines responded to a call from the U .S. Army advisor attached to the ARVN unit. Firing 290 105mm

shells, the tractor artillery reportedly killed about 80 o f

the enemy attackers caught in the open .7 3

About 0900, Lieutenant Colonel William K. Rockey, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines commander, ordered

a small command group and two companies, Company M of his battalion and Company F, 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines attached to his command, to the relief of th e

ARVN camp. Accompanied by tanks and LVTs, Company F maneuvered to the north of the ARVN base .

Company M advanced toward a hamlet to the south of

the ARVN. Both Marine companies encountered

heavy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades as

they approached their objectives. The Marine companies then pulled back and called in artillery and air.

Lieutenant Colonel Rockey then directed Company G

of the 3d Marines, also attached to him, to move up

along the banks of the Bau Xau River toward a blocking position southwest of the ARVN base "to seal up "

any escape route in that direction . As Company G

*Igor Bobrowsky commented on the "audacity (stupidity) of the

NVA at the start of their push, when—as in our area, they moved i n

such numbers, openly and in the broad daylight that until they bega n

to fire on us our only thought was that they must be an allied unit tha t

strayed into our area. " He added that although the NVA main grou p

moved out they left "a blocking force behind to keep the CAP unde r

fire . . . ." He believed these troops " were deliberately left in place t o

serve as stepping stones along the line of retreat—in the event of a

withdrawal . " Bobrowsky Comments .

began its redeployment along the river route it ran int o

enemy forces attempting to retreat in that direction .

Rockey then ordered a platoon from his Company K to

reinforce Company G. By the end of the day, the elements of the four Marine companies had established

their night positions. During the day's fighting, Rockey's battalion killed 107 of the enemy and took tw o

prisoners. His Marines sustained casualties of 11 kille d

and 53 wounded .74 * *

The fighting continued during the night and int o

the next day. From their night positions, Company G

observers saw large numbers of North Vietnamese

approaching them from the north . The Marine company called in mortar and artillery fire . Battery F, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines alone shot off some 1,200 rounds.

Even in the face of the artillery, the North Vietnames e

continued their advance upon the Marine positions .

Company G repulsed a number of probes throughou t

the night until the enemy broke contact at dawn . The

3d Battalion, 5th Marines together with Companies F

and G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines then began methodically to eliminate pockets of enemy resistance in th e

general area . In one contact about 1645, Company M,

3d Battalion, 5th Marines met a force of 100 enem y

troops. The Marines and VC in the ensuing fireligh t

fought at a range as close as five meters from one another with the Marines achieving the upper hand . According to the Marine after-action report, Lieutenan t

Colonel Rockey's battalion and the attached two companies from the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines accounted fo r

more than 320 enemy dead in less than 36 hours .

By this time, Major General Robertson, the 1st

Marine Division commander, was worried about th e

ability to contain the enemy offensive south of Da

Nang. The VC R—20 and V—25th Battalions had

struck again at Hoi An, engaging both the Korea n

Marine Brigade and the 1st and 2d Battalions of th e

ARVN 51st Regiment. North Vietnamese battalion s

from the 2d NVA Division had eluded the Korea n

and ARVN defenses in the southern sector and ha d

penetrated the defensive perimeter of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines just

below the main base . While the Marine battalion s

successfully kept these initial assaults on the night of

5—6 February in check, General Robertson was not

** Igor Bobrowsky with CAP D-2 remembered that Company M

was " ambushed in the streets near the north end of Thanh Quit . . .

. A good number of M Company that survived the ambush got dow n

to us, along with some of their dead and a lot of wounded . "

Bobrowsky Comments.
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 16 1

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

Marines from Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines move through tall grass in a hamlet on their

way to relieve an embattled ARVN base camp near the Thanh Quit River.

sure how much longer they could . The fighting during the preceding week had drawn down th e

strength of the ARVN and the two Marine battalion s

and the enemy division still had uncommitted units

that it could throw into the fray. General Robertso n

shared these concerns with General Cushman, the III

MAF commander.7 5

On 7 February, this request led to a strange confrontation, if there was a confrontation, between General Westmoreland and General Cushman . On the

previous night as well as attacking at Da Nang,

North Vietnamese troops overran the Special Forces

Camp at Lang Vei, south of Khe Sanh .* Believing that

III MAF should have relieved the camp and fearing

that the enemy was about to launch the much-heralded attack on Khe Sanh itself, the MACV commander called for a special meeting on the mornin g

of 7 February of the senior U.S. commanders in I

Corps. At the meeting itself, he became even mor e

upset as he learned about the situation at Da Nang .

As he later confided, "the VC were getting closer an d

closer to Da Nang Airbase . There was an absence of

initiative by the CG III MAF, in dealing forcefull y

with the situation ."7 6

*For the overrunning of Lang Vei see chapter 14 .

According to General Westmoreland's account, h e

acted rather abruptly and made his displeasure known .

Shocked at what he considered things left undone, h e

ordered "in exasperation" Major General Robertson of

the 1st Marine Division and Major General Samuel

Koster of the Americal Division from the room . The

MACV commander told the two generals " to return

only when they had worked out a viable plan for close -

ly coordinated offensive action against the enemy

threatening the airfield."7 7

Apparently, however, although conscious of Westmoreland's sense of urgency about the tactical situatio n

at Da Nang, the Marine commanders were unaware o f

Westmoreland's unhappiness about the arrangements .

According to both Generals Cushman and Robertson

the meeting was not acrimonious . General Robertson

remembered that he briefed the MACV commander

on the enemy and stated that he needed more troops . Westmoreland then turned to Major General Koste r

and merely said : "`Sam, you let Robby have two, three ,

or even four battalions if he needs them . — The MACV

commander then dismissed Koster and Robertso n

from the meeting "to go out and work out the details . "

General Cushman later commented that he did no t

normally order the movement of Army units until h e

and General Westmoreland "got together and agreed
162 THE DEFINING YEA R

upon a plan . " His view was that the purpose of th e

meeting was to obtain Westmoreland's approval for the

reinforcement of Da Nang by the Americal Division 78 *

Despite the mixed perceptions about the meeting ,

the various parties quickly worked out a plan of action .

Colonel Smith of the III MAF staff, who sat in on th e

conference between Generals Koster and Robertson,

remembered that after studying the situation map, th e

conferees "came to the conclusion that the best way o f

stopping this attack was to interpose an equally strong

force between the 2d NVA Division and the Da Nan g

Vital Area . " The idea was to stop the enemy division

from entering the Vital Area rather "than pushing him

from the south and in effect pushing him" into the sec -

tor. The planners decided to send a two-battalio n

Army task force from the Americal Division into the

northern sector of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines nea r

Route 1 south of the Cau Do.7 9

The afternoon of 7 February, General Cushma n

issued the orders for the movement of the Arm y

units to Da Nang . Major General Koster was to

deploy one battalion immediately and to send the

task force command group and remaining battalio n

the following day. Upon arrival at Da Nang, the

Army units were to be under the operational contro l

of the 1st Marine Division. The mission of the

Americal task force was to "block enemy movemen t

to the north, deny enemy access to the Da Nang

Vital Area, and destroy enemy forces."80

According to plan, late in the afternoon of 7 February, Marine helicopters brought the lead Army battalion, the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 196th Ligh t

Infantry Brigade, commanded by Army Lieutenan t

Colonel William J. Baxley, into a landing zone near

the hamlet of Duong Son (1) just off the old railroa d

*General Westmoreland commented that he was "critical of Cush -

man 's lack of initiative in responding to an immediate tactical situation," not of the command arrangements . He assumed that Cushma n

" appreciated that the Americal Division was under his tactical command ." Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, Comments on draft, dtd

180ct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

Marine Brigadier General John R. Chaisson, the head of the

MACV Combat Operations Center, who also attended the meeting ,

wrote to his wife about "recriminations" at the meeting, but these

related to the Lang Vei situation . BGen John R. Chaisson, ltr to wife ,

dtd 8Feb68 (Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute) . Cushman related tha t

he was "criticized because I didn't send the whole outfit from Khe Sanh

down there (Lang Vei), but I decided . . . that it wasn 't the thing t o

do . " Cushman Intvw, Nov82, p . 31 . General Earl E . Anderson, the III

MAF Chief of Staff, also attended the meeting and agreed "that it wa s

not acrimonious." Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd

18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). See also Chapter 14 .

tracks, about 2,000 meters south of the Cau Do . The

Army troops quickly moved into night positions an d

encountered only harassing sniper fire or an occasional mortar round .8 1

The night of 7—8 was relatively uneventfu l

throughout the Da Nang TAOR until about 0345 . At

that time, enemy mortar rounds fell into the CAP E— 4

compound in Lo Giang (1) hamlet, about 2,000

meters northeast of Duong Son (1) . While beginning

with the mortar bombardment, the enemy soon escalated the fighting. By daylight, enemy ground force s

surrounded the CAP hamlet .

At that point, to ease the pressure on the CAPs,

General Robertson about 0700 deployed the Army

battalion to Lo Giang (5), about 1,000 meters north o f

Lo Giang (1), just below the Cau Do . The Army troops

soon found themselves engaged with another enem y

battalion. The 1st Marine Division commander then

reinforced the Army unit with two Marine companies ,

Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and Company

I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. This fighting continued

to rage until late afternoon.

In the meantime, CAP E—4 continued to hold ou t

against overwhelming odds. A small Combined Action

headquarters detachment of 15 men from Hoa Van g

also attempted to reinforce the embattled CAP, bu t

never reached Lo Giang (1). Only 1 of the original 1 5

men survived . By mid-afternoon CAP E—4 was nearl y

out of ammunition . At 1550, under cover of helicopter

gunships and fixed-wing aircraft, Marine helicopters

successfully evacuated the Combined Action platoo n

out of Lo Giang (1) . In Lo Giang (5), the action lasted

for another hour and a half, when the NVA/VC force s

tried to break contact. In that fighting, the soldiers and

Marines killed over 150 of the enemy.

By that evening, Army Task Force Miracle, unde r

Army Colonel Louis Gelling, the commander of the

196th Light Infantry Brigade, had been established i n

the Da Nang area of operations. Gelling, the task force

headquarters, and the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, unde r

the command of U.S . Army Lieutenant Colonel Lyma n

H. Hammond, Jr., had arrived from Chu Lai that afternoon . Establishing his command post near Duong Son ,

Colonel Gelling assumed operational control of the 1s t

of the 6th near Lo Giang (5) and placed the 2d of the

1st in blocking positions below Lo Giang (1) . During

the following day, while the 1st of the 6th mopped up

in its area, the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry attacked north .

The latter battalion ran into a North Vietnamese battalion and engaged it in a nine-hour battle . Pulling

back its assault elements, the Army unit saturated the
THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG 16 3

area with artillery. They later found 46 enemy bodies

and took a wounded man prisoner. Intelligence indicated that the enemy unit in the southern hamlet was from

the 3d Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment, and the units in Lo

Giang (5) were from the 1st VC Regiment. In the meantime, that day, on the eastern flank of the Army units ,

on the east bank of the Vinh Dinh River, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines encountered two companies from th e

1st VC Regiment and killed about 90 of the enemy.

The enemy offensive in the Da Nang sector ha d

spent itself. During the next few days, Task Force Miracle conducted sweeps in its sector and encountere d

relatively little resistance . Both the 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines to the east of the Army task force, and the 3 d

Battalion, 5th Marines to the south, also reported relatively little enemy activity in their sectors. Only the

7th Marines to the west experienced an increase in incidents as North Vietnamese regulars and the VC mai n

force troops moved through the western TAOR t o

return to their mountain strongholds in Base Area 11 4

and through Charlie Ridge into "Happy Valley ."82 *

To the south, in the Korean sector, the ROK Marine s

with the assistance of the ARVN again drove Communist forces out of the Hoi An environs . According to an

enemy NCO from the 31st NVA Regiment captured in

the fighting, the mission of his unit was to "attack Ho i

An, five times if necessary, and set up a liberation gov -

ernment." Hoi An still remained in friendly hands . In

the Que Son Valley on 9 February, the Americal Division engaged elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, the

only regiment of the 2dNVA Division that had not been

in the Da Nang sector. The 21st was also in retreat .83

According to Marine intelligence reports, on 9 February, the 2d NVA Division moved its headquarters

back to the Go Noi from its more forward positions .

The following day, the same sources indicated that

both the 1st VC and the 3d NVA Regiments had also

withdrawn to the Go Noi . On 11 February, General

Cushman observed the 2d NVA Division "appeared to

be withdrawing from contact southward" and ordere d

his subordinate commanders to continue to press the

attack. He, nevertheless, released TF Miracle from the

operational control of the 1st Marine Division an d

returned it to its parent command . The task force

headquarters and its two battalions returned to Chu La i

*Igor Bobrowsky with CAP D-2 remembered the "retreatin g

NVA/VC were certainly more pathetic on the way back out to thei r

lairs than they were coming in on us . At the same time though, they

were . . . somehow scarier—because they were so clearly desperate i n

trying to get away, like small packs of cornered rats looking for holes

to scurry through in a burning building. " Bobrowsky Comments .

the following day. The battle for Da Nang was largel y

over. Despite limited attacks later in the month, these

were largely, as a report stated, "an attempt to maintai n

the facade of an offensive ."8 4

During the Da Nang Tet offensive, both sides experienced heavy casualties, but the Communist force s

proved to be no match for the allied forces. According

to III MAF figures, from 29 January through 14 February at Da Nang, Marines sustained 124 killed an d

more than 480 wounded . Army forces in the Da Nang

area including the troops from Task Force Miracle suffered 18 dead and 59 wounded . South Vietnamese and

Korean casualties probably equalled or slightly exceeded the American. U.S . estimates of enemy casualties

ranged between 1,200 and 1,400 dead . Colonel Smith

believed that the 1st VC Regiment alone lost about 600

men. The 2d NVA Division still remained intact, but

obviously was not about to renew the offensive S 5

From almost every account, the Communist attack

in the Da Nang TAOR was very inept . Despite the

thinness of the Marine lines and the ability of both the

NVA and VC to infiltrate, the enemy never capitalized

on these advantages. According to a VC after-action

report early in the offensive, the writer complained

that the "commander did not know . . . [the) situatio n

accurately . . . and that orders were not strictly

obeyed." In a 1st Marine Division analyses, the author

commented that the 2d NVA Division's approach was

"along a single axis of advance so that his eventual target was easily identifiable ." Moreover, once the NVA

units arrived south of Da Nang they "made no furthe r

attempts at maneuver even while being hunted b y

Marine and Army units, and when engaged, seldom

maneuvered, except to withdraw." General Robertson ,

the 1st Division commander, observed that the dela y

of the 2dNVA Division into the picture may have bee n

because the Communist forces "got their signals

mixed . . . ." The VC were supposed to be inside "whe n

the NVA division came marching down main street .

You get your timing off and you've got problems . "

Another possible explanation was that the Da Nang

attack may have been a secondary assault—to cause as

much damage as possible and divert allied forces from

the almost successful effort of the Communist forces to

capture the city of Hue .8 6 **

**Brigadier General Paul G. Graham who was the 1st Marin e

Division Operations Officer (G-3) at the time disagreed with the last

statement, writing "Hue had no military value to the NVA/VC . Da

Nang was the prize—for success in that endeavor could have had a serious effect on the Allied efforts in the III MAF area . " BGen Paul G.

Graham, Comments on draft, dtd 20Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
CHAPTER 9

The Struggle for Hue—The Battle Begins

The Two Faces of Hue—The NVA Attack—Redeployment at Phu Bai and Marines Go to Hue

The Two Faces of Hue

As the former imperial capital, Hue was for most

Vietnamese the cultural center of the country. With a n

equal disdain for both northerners and southerners, th e

religious and intellectual elite of the city held themselves aloof from active participation in the war. Instead

they advocated local autonomy and traditional Vietnamese social values that led to a distrust of the central

Saigon government and its American allies as well a s

Communism. In both the 1963 Buddhist uprising an d

the 1966 "Struggle Movement," the monks from th e

Hue pagodas and students and professors at Hue University provided the informal leadership against th e

successive Saigon regimes.

Despite the city's reputation for dissidence, th e

Communists failed to take advantage of the Hu e

protest movements. Both the South Vietnamese Arm y

and Viet Cong troops for the most part refrained from

any show of force in the immediate vicinity or in the

city itself. With a sort of unspoken truce in effect, Hue

afforded both sides a certain respite from the war. * With a wartime population of about 140,000 persons ,

Hue retained much of its prewar ambience . Divided

by the Huong or Perfume River, the city emitted a

sense of both its colonial and imperial pasts . It was, in

effect, two cities.

North of the river, the three-square-mile Citade l

with its ramparts and high towers gave the appearance

of a medieval walled town . Built by the Emperor Gia

Linh in the early nineteenth century, it contained th e

former imperial palace with its large gilt and dragondecorated throne room . Within the Citadel walls la y

formal gardens and parks, private residences, marke t

places, pagodas, and moats filled with lotus flowers .

Buddhist bells and gongs as well as the chant of prayers

resounded through its streets.

South of the river lay the modern city. Delineated by

the Perfume River and the Phu Cam Canal into a rough

triangle, southern Hue was about half the size of the

*Peter Braestrup, then the Saigon Bureau Chief for the Washington

Post, observed that this informal truce only applied to Hue . Pete r

Braestrup, Comments on draft, n .d . (Jan95) (Vietnam Comment File).

Citadel. The university, the stadium, governmen t

administrative buildings, the hospital, the provincial

prison, and various radio stations were all in the new city.

Attractive Vietnamese schoolgirls dressed in the traditional Ao Dai bicycled or walked along stately Le Lo i

Boulevard, paralleling the riverfront. The Cercle-Sportif

with its veranda overlooking the Perfume River evoked

memories of the former French colonial administration .

In January 1968 as the Tet season approached, how -

ever, a certain uneasiness lay over the city. The cancellation of the Tet truce and the enemy attacks on D a

Nang and elsewhere in southern I Corps dampened th e

usual festive mood of the holiday season . On 30 January, Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, the commanding general of the 1st ARVN Division, canceled

all leaves and ordered his units on full alert. Most of the

troops, however, already on leave, were unable to rejoi n

their units. Moreover, the only South Vietnamese force s

in the city itself were the division staff, the divisio n

Headquarters Company, the Reconnaissance Company,

a few support units, and Truong's personal guard, th e

elite "Black Panther" Company. The division headquarters was in the walled Mang Ca military compound, self-contained in the northeast corner of th e

Citadel. General Truong positioned the Black Panthers

on the Tay Loc airfield in the Citadel, about a mil e

southwest of the division compound. In the souther n

city, the U.S. maintained a MACV compound in a former hotel which served as a billet and headquarters fo r

the U.S . advisory staff to the 1st ARVN Division)

The NVA Attack

Although allied intelligence reported elements o f

two NVA regiments, the 4th and the 6th, in Thua

Thien Province, there was little evidence of enem y

activity in the Hue sector. Indeed, the 1st ARVN Division dismissed any conjecture that the enemy had

either "the intent" or "capability" to launch a division -

size attack against the city. U.S . order of battle records

listed the 6th NVA headquarters with its 804th Battalion in the jungle-canopied Base Area 114, about 20 t o

25 kilometers west of Hue . One battalion, the 806th,

was supposed to be in the "Street Without Joy" area i n

164
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Phong Dien District, 35 kilometers northeast of Hue ,

successfully evading ARVN forces in the sector. American intelligence officers believed the remaining battal -

ion, the 802d, to be about 20 kilometers south of th e

city or with the regimental headquarters in Base Area

114. According to the best allied information, the 4th

NVA Regiment was in the Phu Loc area near Route 1

between Phu Bai and Da Nang. 2

Unknown to the allies, both enemy regiments wer e

on the move towards Hue . The 6th NVA had as its

three primary objectives the Mang Ca headquarters

compound, the Tay Loc airfield, and the imperia l

palace, all in the Citadel . South of the Perfume River,

the 4th NVA was to attack the modern city. Among its

objective areas were the provincial capital building, th e

prison, and the MACV advisors compound. The two

regiments had nearly 200 specific targets in addition t o

the primary sites, including the radio station, polic e

stations, houses of government officials, the recruitin g

office, and even the national Imperial Museum. The

target list contained detailed intelligence to the extent

of naming suspected government sympathizers and

their usual meeting places. 3

On 30 January, some of the enemy shock troops an d

sappers entered the city disguised as simple peasants .

With their uniforms and weapons hidden in baggage ,

boxes, and under their street clothes, the Viet Con g

and NVA mingled with the Tet holiday crowds.* Many

donned ARVN uniforms and then took up predesignated positions that night to await the attack signal .4

By this time the 6th NVA Regiment was only a few

kilometers from the western edge of the city . About

1900, the regiment had assembled on a slope designated "Hill 138" for its evening meal . According to a

North Vietnamese Army account, the troops ate a meal

of "dumplings, Tet cakes, dried meat, and glutinous

rice mixed with sugar." The commander and his officers inspected the men's gear and many of the soldiers

*Colonel John F. Barr, who as a lieutenant colonel, commanded th e

1st Field Artillery Group, had recently arrived at Phu Bai as part of Operation Checkers. (See Chapter 6) Barr remembered that on the morning o f

the 30th, he visited Hue "to effect command coordination between the

1st Field Artillery Group and the ARVN artillery commander in the

Citadel . While into and through the city, I noted the unusual number of

young men in civilian clothes; unusual in that most Vietnamese youth s

were either drafted by the ARVN or off in the hills with the Viet Cong .

I mentioned this upon arrival at the ARVN artillery headquarters . I was

assured by the artillery commander that it was customary for local farmers to come into Hue to celebrate the Tet holiday . Since he was a thoroughly professional soldier with eight years combat experience in th e

province, I accepted his explanation—to my subsequent regret . " Col John

F. Barr, Comments on draft, dtd 24Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A18825 1

Top, picture taken in February 1967, long before the battle ,

shows the elaborate entrance and part of the surrounding wal l

to the Imperial Palace grounds in the Citadel . This wall is

separate from the walls of the Citadel itself Bottom, the

Golden Throne of the former Vietnamese Emperors is at the

heart of the palace, which the North Vietnamese used as a

headquarters during the fighting for the city.

Photo courtesy of Alex Wells, Jr .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE BATTLE BEGINS 16 7

" changed into new khakis." At 2000, the regiment

" resumed its march."5

At this point the 6th NVA divided into three

columns, each with its particular objective in the

Citadel. At 2200, about four kilometers southwest of

Hue, the commander of the 1st ARVN Division

Reconnaissance Company, First Lieutenant Nguyen

Thi Tan, was on a river surveillance mission with

about 30 men, when a Regional Force company t o

his east reported that it was under attack . Remaining

under cover, Lieutenant Tan and his men observed

the equivalent of two enemy battalions filter past

their positions, headed toward Hue . Tan radioed this

information back to the 1st Division . The two battalions were probably the 800th and 802d Battalions

of the 6th NVA . 6

Despite Tan's warning, the enemy troops continue d

toward Hue unmolested . In the enemy command post

to the west of the city, the NVA commander waited

for word that the attack had begun . At approximatel y

0230 31 January, a forward observer reported, "I am

awake, I am looking down at Hue . . . the lights of the

city are still on, the sky is quiet, and nothing is happening." Anxiously, the NVA officers looked at one

another, but no one voiced their doubts. A few minutes later, the observer came back upon the radio an d

announced that the assault was under way. 7

At 0233, a signal flare lit up the night sky above

Hue. At the Western Gate of the Citadel, a four-ma n

North Vietnamese sapper team, dressed in South Vietnamese Army uniforms, killed the guards and opened

the gate . Upon their flashlight signals, lead elements o f

the 6th NVA entered the old city. In similar scenes

throughout the Citadel, the North Vietnamese regulars poured into the old imperial capital .8

The 800th and 802d Battalions pushed through the

Western Gate and then drove north . On the Tay Loc

airfield, the "Black Panther" Company, reinforced b y

the division's 1st Ordnance Company, stopped th e

800th Battalion. Although the enemy battle account

stated that the South Vietnamese "offered no stron g

resistance," the NVA report acknowledged "the heav y

enemy [ARVN} fire enveloped the entire airfield . By

dawn, our troops were still unable to advance ."9

While the fighting for the airfield continued to see -

saw with first the ARVN having the upper hand and

then the Communists, the 802d Battalion struck the

1st Division headquarters at Mang Ca . Although the

enemy battalion penetrated the division compound ,

an ad hoc 200-man defensive force consisting of staff

officers, clerks, and other headquarters personnel man -

aged to stave off the enemy assaults . General Truong

called back most of his Black Panther Company from

the airfield to bolster the headquarters defenses. With

the reinforcements, the division headquarters

remained secure . Nevertheless, by daylight, more than

The southern gate to the Citadel, with its flagpole, is where the North Vietnamese raised the Vie t

Cong banner.

Photo courtesy of Col Talman C. Budd II, USMC (Ret)
168 THE DEFINING YEAR

60 percent of the Citadel, including the imperia l

palace, was in the hands of the NVA. At 0800, North

Vietnamese troops raised the red and blue Viet Con g

banner with its gold star over the Citadel flag tower.' °

Across the river in southern Hue, much the same

situation existed. U.S . advisors to the 1st ARVN Division in the MACV compound, a complex of severa l

two- to three-story buildings, including a former hotel ,

awoke in the early morning hours to the sound o f

bursting mortar and rocket rounds. The Americans

grabbed any weapons that were at hand and manne d

their defenses. Like the 1st Division staff, the advisors

successfully repulsed the initial enemy ground attack.

While not mounting any further ground assaults, the

NVA maintained a virtual siege of the compound wit h

mortars, rockets, and automatic weapons fire . "

The 4th NVA Regiment with the 804th NVA Battalion, supported by local force companies and elements of the Hue City Sapper Battalion, had launched

its offensive against the modern city . Divided into several attack groups, the enemy sought out key civil and

military facilities. Even according to the North Vietnamese official account, the enemy actions and preparations in the new city lacked the cohesion and timing

of those in the Citadel. The North Vietnamese author

wrote : "The attacks on southern Hue were carried ou t

by many forces which employed many very differen t

forms of tactics. " One unit lost its way in the darkness

and did not arrive in the city until 0600 . Despite confusion and some reverses, that morning, the NVA had

control of most of southern Hue except for the prison ,

the MACV compound, and the Hue LCU (landin g

craft, utility) ramp on the waterfront to the northeas t

of the compound .1 2

In the Citadel, on 1 February, the embattled General Truong called in reinforcements. He ordered his 3 d

Regiment; the 3d Troop, 7th ARVN Cavalry ; and the

1st ARVN Airborne Task Force to relieve the pressure

on his Mang Ca headquarters. Responding to the call

at PK 17, the ARVN base located near a road marke r

on Route 1, 17 kilometers north of Hue, the 3d Troo p

and the 7th Battalion of the Airborne task force rolle d

out of their base area in an armored convoy onto Rout e

1 . A North Vietnamese blocking force stopped th e

ARVN relief force about 400 meters short of the

Citadel wall. Unable to force their way through the

enemy positions, the South Vietnamese paratroopers

asked for assistance . The 2d ARVN Airborne Battalio n

reinforced the convoy and the South Vietnamese finally penetrated the lines and entered the Citadel in the

early morning hours of the next day . The cost had been

heavy : the ARVN suffered 131 casualties including 4 0

dead, and lost 4 of the 12 armored personnel carriers i n

the convoy. According to the South Vietnamese, th e

enemy also paid a steep price in men and equipment .

The ARVN claimed to have killed 250 of the NVA ,

captured 5 prisoners, and recovered 71 individual and

25 crew-served weapons.1 3

The 3d ARVN Regiment had an even more difficult time . On the 31st, two of its battalions, the 2d and

3d, advanced east from encampments southwest of th e

city along the northern bank of the Perfume River, but

North Vietnamese defensive fires forced them to fal l

back. Unable to enter the Citadel, the two battalion s

established their night positions outside the southeast

wall of the old City. Enemy forces surrounded the 1st

and 4th Battalions of the regiment, operating to the

southeast, as they attempted to reinforce the units i n

Hue. Captain Phan Ngoc Luong, the commander of

the 1st Battalion, retreated with his unit to the coastal

Ba Long outpost, arriving there with only three clips

per man for their World War II vintage Ml rifles .* At

Ba Long, the battalion then embarked upon motorize d

junks and reached the Citadel the following day . The

4th Battalion, however, remained unable to break its

encirclement for several days.

South of the city, on 31 January, Lieutenant Colonel

Phan Huu Chi, the commander of the ARVN 7t h

Armored Cavalry Squadron attempted to break th e

enemy stranglehold . He led an armored column toward

Hue, but like the other South Vietnamese units, foun d

it impossible to break through . With the promise o f

U.S . Marine reinforcements, Chi's column, with thre e

tanks in the lead, tried once more . This time they

crossed the An Cuu Bridge into the new city. Coming

upon the central police headquarters in southern Hue ,

the tanks attempted to relieve the police defenders. When an enemy B—40 rocket made a direct hit upon

Lieutenant Colonel Chi's tank, killing him instantly,

the South Vietnamese armor then pulled back .' 4

Redeployment at Phu Bai and Marines Go to Hue

The first U.S . Marines to bolster the South Vietnamese in the city were on their way. They were from

the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, part of Task Force X -

*Although the U.S . was reequipping the South Vietnamese Arm y

units with the magazine-fed automatic 5 .56mm M16, most South

Vietnamese Army units in February 1968 were equipped with the

semi-automatic, 8-shot, .30-caliber clip-fed M1 . See Jeffrey J . Clarke ,

Advice and Support : The Final Years, 1965-1973, United States Army i n

Vietnam (Washington : CMH, 1988), p. 284 .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE BATTLE BEGINS 16 9

Ray, the new command just established at the Marin e

base at Phu Bai, about eight miles south of Hue .15 As

part of Operation Checkers, the Task Force X-Ra y

commander, Brigadier General Foster "Frosty" C.

LaHue had opened his command post on 13 January . *

Two days later, as planned, he took over responsibility for the Phu Bai base from the 3d Marine Division.

LaHue, who had been at Da Nang until that time ,

serving as the 1st Marine Division assistant divisio n

commander, had barely enough time to becom e

acquainted with his new TAOR, let alone the fast -

developing Hue situation. This was true as well fo r

most of his commanders and units at Phu Bai .' 6

With several changes making the original Checkers

plan unrecognizable by the eve of Tet, LaHue had unde r

him two regimental headquarters and three battalions.

These were the 5th Marines, under Colonel Robert D .

Bohn, with its 1st and 2d Battalions, and the 1st

Marines, under Colonel Stanley S . Hughes, with its 1st

Battalion in the Phu Bai sector. While Colonel Boh n

had arrived with Task Force X-Ray on the 13th, Colonel

Hughes did not reach Phu Bai until 28 January. The 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Marcus J. Gravel, began making its move from Quang Tri

about the same time . His companies C and D had

reached Phu Bai on the 26th while his Company B, an d

Headquarters Company came three days later. The battalion's remaining company, Company A, deployed o n

the 30th . Captain Gordon D. Batcheller, the Compan y

A commander, remembered that while most of his

troops were at Phu Bai on that date, two of his platoo n

commanders "had mistakenly stayed at Quang Tri" and

the third was at a "Division Leadership School . . . ." I7* *

On 30 January, the 1st Marines assumed from th e

5th Marines responsibility for the Phu Bai area of operations as far south as the Truoi River. At the same time,

Colonel Hughes took formal operational control of hi s

1st Battalion . Companies B, C, and D of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines had already relieved the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines at various bridges along Route 1 an d

other key positions in this northern sector. When

Company A arrived on the 30th, it became the Phu Ba i

reserve or "Bald Eagle Reaction Force ." Captain

Batcheller years later recalled that the company actually was to "stand down" until 1 February when it was to

*See Chapter 6 for the establishment of Task Force X-Ray at Phu Bai .

**Batcheller related that the platoon leader at the division leader -

ship school was there "as a student, although already nominated for a

Silver Star! . . . Battalion could not refuse to fill a Division quota. " Co l

Gordon D. Batcheller, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Batcheller Comments .

assume security of the LCU Ramp in Hue itself, jus t

north of the MACV compound .l s* *

In the meantime, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ha d

moved into the Phu Loc sector and took over that are a

south of the Truoi River and as far east as the Cao Dai

Peninsula. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines remaine d

responsible for the rest of the Phu Loc region, extending to the Hai Van Pass.l 9

In the Phu Loc area on 30 January, about 1730, a

Marine reconnaissance patrol, codenamed "Pearl

Chest," inserted about 3000 meters south of the tow n

of Phu Loc, observed a North Vietnamese company

moving north armed with three .50-caliber machine

guns, AK-47s, and two 122mm rockets. "Pearl Chest"

set up an ambush, killing 15 of the enemy troops. The

North Vietnamese fell back and surrounded the Reco n

Marines, who called for assistance . Both air and the

artillery battery attached to the 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines at Phu Loc responded to the request. The

fixed-wing aircraft, however, could not "get a fix" o n

the enemy troops and were unable to assist . 25

At that point, about 1930, Lieutenant Colonel

Robert P. Whalen, the 1st Battalion commander, sen t

his Company B to relieve the Recon team . As the

relieving company approached the ambush site, the y

heard Vietnamese voices, movement, and someon e

threw a grenade at them. In return, the Marines hurled

grenades of their own and then moved in where the y

had heard the commotion . The enemy was no longer

there, and the Marine company advanced cautiously.

Lieutenant Colonel Whalen asked Colonel Bohn, th e

5th Marines commander, for reinforcements so as not

to uncover his defenses at Phu Loc itself.2 1

At the direction of Colonel Bohn, Lieutenant

Colonel Ernest C . Cheatham, Jr., the 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines commander, who had just established hi s

command post on the Cao Dai Peninsula, sent his

Company F to reinforce the 1st Battalion. Captain

Michael P. Downs, the Company F commander, late r

recalled that the North Vietnamese ambushed hi s

company as it moved into the 1st Battalion sector.

Approximately around 2300, on the 30th, about

1,000 meters southeast of the Cao Dai Peninsula alon g

Route 1, enemy troops opened up on the Marine com -

***It is not clear that the 1st Marines planned to assign a company permanently to the LCU Ramp . According to the Task Force X-Ra y

operating orders, the 1st Marines had the responsibility to ensure th e

security for road convoys enroute from Phu Bai to the LCU Ramp . It

is probable that Company A was to be assigned to road convoy security to the LCU Ramp . See TF X-Ray OpO, dtd 26Jan68, Encl, 1st Mar

ComdC, Jan68.
•. - tJLF OF TONKIN TF X-RAY

31 JANUARY 1968

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170 THE DEFINING YEAR

pany from the railroad tracks which paralleled the

road with both automatic and semi-automatic

weapons, killing one Marine and wounding three.

After the initial burst, the NVA broke contact and the

Marine company secured a landing zone to evacuate

the wounded. Company F then returned to the 2d

Battalion perimeter.22

By 2400 on the 30th, the engagement south of

Phu Loc was about over. The Marine command did

not want to commit any more troops and ordered

the Recon Team "to break out and move to the

north." Lieutenant Colonel Whalen then directed

his Company B to return to Phu Loc, which it did

without incident. The results of this activity

including that of Company F were 1 Marine dead

and 5 wounded and 16 enemy dead, 15 killed initially by the Recon Team, and another by Company B. Colonel Bohn, the 5th Marines commander,

believed that this action prevented a full fledged

attack upon Phu Loc itself.23

On the night of 30—31 January, the same time the

North Vietnamese struck Hue, the Marines had their

hands full throughout the Phu Bai area of operations.

Enemy rockets and mortars struck the Phu Bai

airstrip and Communist infantry units hit Marine

Combined Action and local PF and RF units in the

region including the Truoi River and Phu Loc sectors. At the key Truoi River Bridge, about 0400 a

North Vietnamese company attacked the South Vietnamese bridge security detachment and the nearby

Combined Action Platoon H—8. Lieutenant Colonel

Cheatham ordered Captain G. Ronald Christmas,

the Company H commander to relieve the embattled

CAP unit. The Marines caught the enemy force

beginning to withdraw from the CAP enclave and

took it under fire. Seeing an opportunity to trap the

North Vietnamese, Cheatham reinforced Company

H with his Command Group and Company F, which

by this time had returned from its abortive venture

to Phu Loc.24
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE BATTLE BEGINS 17 1

With his other companies in blocking positions ,

Cheatham hoped to catch the enemy against the Truoi

River. While inflicting casualties, the events in Hue wer e

to interfere with his plans. At 1030, 31 January, Company G departed for Phu Bai as the Task Force reserve .

Later that afternoon, the battalion lost operational control of Company F. Captain Downs years later remembered the company "disengaged . . . where we had them

[the NVA} pinned up against a river, moved to the rive r

and trucked into Phu Bai." With the departure of Company F about 1630, the NVA successfully disengage d

and Companies H and E took up night defensive positions. According to the casualty box score, the Marine s

of Second Batalion 5th Marines in this engagemen t

killed 18 enemy troops, took 1 prisoner, and recovered

sundry equipment and weapons including 6 AK-47s, a t

a cost of 3 Marines killed and 13 wounded .2 5

While the fighting continued in the Truoi River

and the Phu Loc sectors, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine s

had begun to move into Hue city. In the early morning hours of 31 January after the rocket bombardmen t

of the airfield and the initial attack on the Truoi Rive r

Bridge, Task Force X-Ray received reports of enem y

strikes all along Route 1 between the Hai Van Pas s

and Hue . All told, the enemy hit some 18 targets fro m

bridges, Combined Action units, and company defensive positions. With Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines as the Phu Bai reserve, Colonel Hughe s

directed Lieutenant Colonel Gravel to stage the company for any contingency. At 0630, Colonel Hughes

ordered the company to reinforce the Truoi Rive r

Bridge . All Captain Batcheller recalled several years

later was that "we were rousted up about 0400 on th e

31st and launched south on trucks to rendezvous wit h

and reinforce . . . [ARVN} forces about a map sheet

and a half south of Phu Bai ."2 6

According to Captain Batcheller, the truck convoy carrying his company was escorted by two Army

"Dusters," trucks armed with four .50-caliber

machine guns, one at the head and the other at th e

rear of the column. When the convoy reached its

destination, there were no ARVN troops to mee t

them.* On their way south on Route 1, the compa-

*These trucks were not actually " Dusters, " which refers to th e

Army M42 tracked vehicle mounting 40mm antiaircraft guns . Battery

D, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery, U .S . Army at Phu Bai was equipped

with both the trucks equipped with the quad .50-caliber machine gun s

(M55) and the M42s. The Marines referred to both vehicles a s

" Dusters. " See 1st Mar AAR, Opn Hue City, p. 12 and Shelby L . Stan -

ton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, D.C. : U.S . News Books,

1981), pp . 104, 278, and 355 .

ny had passed several Combined Action units ,

whose troops told them "` boo-coo' VC movin g

towards Hue, but none had been hit, and all bridge s

were up." Batcheller then received orders from Lieu -

tenant Colonel Gravel to reverse his direction, either

to reinforce an Army unit north of Hue or, on th e

other hand, to go to the assistance of a Combine d

Action unit just south of Phu Bai .** In any event,

whatever the case, this new mission was short-lived .

About one-half hour later, about 0830, the company again received another set of orders, presumably

from Task Force X-Ray, "to proceed to the Hue

Ramp area . . . to investigate reports that Hue City

was under attack."27***

Up to this point the fighting for Hue had bee n

entirely a South Vietnamese affair. General LaHue, the

Task Force X-Ray commander, actually had very littl e

reliable intelligence on the situation. All he knew was

that Truong's headquarters had been under attack, as

was the MACV compound . Because of enemy mortaring of the LCU ramp in southern Hue, the allies had

stopped all river traffic to the city. As LaHue later

wrote : "Initial deployment of forces was made wit h

limited information. "28

With this "limited information," Company A continued north towards Hue . As the convoy proceeded

along Route 1, it met up with four tanks from the 3d

Tank Battalion. The tanks had been on their way

from Phu Bai to the LCU ramp at Hue for embarkation and transfer north to the 3d Marine Division at

Dong Ha . These tanks had happened upon some o f

the burnt-out hulks of the 7th ARVN Armored Cavalry Squadron and had decided to return to Phu Bai

when Company A "came up behind them. "

Batcheller remembered that he talked over the situation with the major in charge "and he agreed to joi n

us as we moved towards the MACV compound . "

According to the Company A commander, a short

time later, Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. LaMontagne, the 3d Marine Division embarkation officer,

**Batcheller remembered that Gravel told him to reinforce th e

Army division, which would have had to have been the 1st Air Cavalry Division located at Camp Evans, 12 miles north of Hue . On th e

other hand, the 1st Marines Command Chronology states that at 080 5

"Bald Eagle (A/1/] .) [was] diverted from Truoi Bridge to the locatio n

of CAP A—3 . . . to investigate reports of NVA activity. " Batcheller

Comments and 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . 111-A-4 .

***Batcheller lacer wrote that he had " never heard of Task Force

X-Ray, or General LaHue . " As far as he knew, he " was working for

Mark Gravel and Major [Walter D .] Murphy, " the battalion operation s

officer. Batcheller Comments.
172 THE DEFINING YEAR

accompanied by a Navy chief petty officer, sough t

him out and "made the valid observation that w e

were moving too slow ." Batcheller stated that he was

"never clear" about the status of LaMontagne, "who

never tried to assume command," but offered excellent advice . Actually LaMontagne was on the way to

the LCU Ramp to supervise the loading of 3d Marin e

Division (Rear) equipment and personnel who wer e

still redeploying from Phu Bai to Dong Ha.29 °

As the Marine company approached the souther n

suburbs of the city, they began to come under

increased sniper fire . In one village, the troops dismounted and cleared the houses on either side of th e

main street before proceeding. The convoy then

crossed the An Cuu Bridge, which spanned the Ph u

Cam canal, into the city. Caught in a murderous

crossfire from enemy automatic weapons and B—4 0

rockets, the Marines once more clambered off the

trucks and tanks. Sergeant Alfredo Gonzalez, a 21 -

year old Texan and acting 3d Platoon commander,

took cover with his troops in a nearby building . When enemy machine gun fire wounded one Marine

in the legs, Gonzalez ran into the open road, slun g

the injured man over his shoulder, and despite bein g

hit himself by fragments of a B—40 rocket, returne d

to the relative safety of the building . Responding t o

orders from Captain Batcheller, Gonzalez rallied hi s

men, who were on the point, and the column was

again on the move .30

This time the Marine convoy only advanced abou t

200 meters before Communist snipers again forced

them to stop . The enemy was on both sides of the road

with a machine gun bunker on the west side of the

road. A B—40 rocket killed the tank commander in the

lead tank. At that point, Sergeant Gonzales, on the eas t

side of the road with some men of his platoon, crawle d

to a dike directly across from the machine gun bunker. With his Marines laying down a base of fire, Gonzales

jumped up and threw four grenades into the bunker ,

killing all the occupants.

*Lieutenant Colonel Karl J . Fontenot, who at the time commanded the 3d Tank Battalion, remembered that the 3d Battalion was in th e

midst of displacing from Phu Bai to Quang Tri and that the last fou r

tanks, two gun and two flame tanks, in the battalion were slated to g o

by LCU from Hue to Dong Ha . According to Fontenot, LaMoncagne

was to supervise the loading of these tanks at the LCU . Fonteno t

recalled that he happened by chance to be at Phu Bai on the 31st, an d

was informed that the MACV compound was under attack and that th e

1st Battalion, 1st Marines was going to Hue. He claimed that h e

radioed these tanks and "briefed them on the enemy threat and advised

them to load and prepare to fight. " LtCol Karl J. Fontenot, Comments

on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File) .

As the Marine company cautiously made its wa y

northward in the built-up area, Captain Batchelle r

maintained "sporadic radio contact " with Lieutenant

Colonel Gravel at Phu Bai . For the most part, how -

ever, he heard on his artillery and air radio nets nothing but Vietnamese . The convoy reached a "causewa y

or elevated highway in the middle of a large cultivated area," and once again came under enemy snipe r

fire . Batcheller went to the assistance of a fallen ma n

and was himself wounded seriously in both legs.

Gunnery Sergeant J . L. Canley, a giant of a man, six

feet, four inches tall and weighing more than 24 0

pounds, then took command of the company .

As Company A engaged the enemy on the outskirts

of Hue, Colonel Hughes, the 1st Marines commander,

requested permission from General LaHue to reinforc e

the embattled company. The only available reinforcements were the command group of the 1st Battalion ,

1st Marines and Company G, 2d Battalion, 5t h

Marines, which earlier that morning had become th e

Phu Bai reaction force in place of Company A . Lieutenant Colonel Gravel, the 1st Battalion commander,

remembered that there was no intelligence on the situation in Hue and that his own battalion was "strun g

out" in the Phu Bai sector with elements still at Quang

Tri . He had never met Captain Charles L. Meadows,

the Company G commander, until "that first day. "

Gravel said the only planning he was able to accomplish was to give the order : "Get on the trucks, men. "

For his part, Captain Meadows recalled that his tas k

was to "get into the trucks with . . . [his] company, go

up to the 1st ARVN Division headquarters and escort

the CG [commanding general] back down to Ph u

Bai." The mission should "take no longer than two t o

three hours. "31 * *

Crossing the An Cuu Bridge, Lieutenant Colonel

Gravel's relief column reached Company A in the earl y

afternoon . With the linking up of the two forces,

Gravel kept the tanks with him, but sent the trucks

and the wounded, including Captain Batcheller, bac k

to Phu Bai. The vehicles returned without escort, jus t

"truck drivers and the wounded . Some of the wounded could fire weapons." Lieutenant Colonel Grave l

determined that this was the only feasible way to evacuate the wounded because "we weren't going to ge t

**According to the 1st Marines account, Colonel Hughes directe d

Gravel to reinforce Company A at 1030 . The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

Journal shows that the command group departed Phu Bai at 1243 that

afternoon . 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . III—A—4 ; 1/1 Jnl, 31Jan68, Encl ,

1/1 ComdC, Jan68 .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE BATTLE BEGINS 173

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37133 6

A Marine M48 tank moves in one direction on one of the broad streets of modern Hue, while a grou p

of South Vietnamese citizens flee the fighting in the other direction . Marine tanks from the 3d Tank

Battalion supported the first Marine units to enter the city

any helicopters in there . . . ." According to Gravel ,

this "was a terrible longshot . . but it worked . . . ."3 2

With the tanks in the lead, then Company A, the

battalion headquarters group, and Company G following in trace, Gravel's makeshift command made its way

toward the MACV compound, arriving there about

1515 . By this time, the enemy attackers had pulled

back their forces from the immediate vicinity of th e

compound. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel met with Army

Colonel George O . Adkisson, the U .S . senior advisor to

the 1st ARVN Division . According to Marine accounts,

Adkisson told the Marine battalion commander tha t

the "Citadel was in fine shape," but that they needed

assistance in evacuating American nationals .33

This contradicted an earlier telephone conversation between the South Vietnamese I Corps and th e

III MAF command centers, both located at Da Nang .

General Lam, the I Corps commander, had heard that

the ARVN troops in Hue were surrounded and out o f

ammunition. The Task Force X-Ray commanding

general, Brigadier General LaHue, remembered that

reports came in that the 1st ARVN Division was "i n

trouble" and "we were ordered to go across the rive r

to relieve some of the pressure." He relayed these

orders to Lieutenant Colonel Gravel.34 *

Leaving Company A behind to secure the MAC V

compound, the Marine battalion commander too k

Company G, reinforced by the three tanks from the 3 d

Tank Battalion and a few South Vietnamese tanks

from the ARVN 7th Armored Squadron, an d

attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfum e

River. Gravel left the armor behind on the southern

bank to provide direct fire support . As he remembered, the American M48s were too heavy for th e

*In a personal letter to Captain Batcheller, Lieutenant Colonel

Gravel expressed his anger about the order: "We proceeded to th e

MACV compound then were gifted with the most stupid idiotic mission to cross the Perfume River Bridge and go to the aid of the CG 1s t

ARVN Division ." He stated that he told "Task Force X-Ray" about his

concerns, but was ordered to "go anyway." LtCol Mark Gravel ltr t o

Capt Gordon D. Batcheller, dtd 24Feb68, Encl to Batcheller Comments, hereafter Gravel Itr, Feb68 .
174 THE DEFINING YEA R

bridge and the South Vietnamese tankers in ligh t

M24 tanks "refused to go ."3 5

As the Marine infantry started across, an enemy

machine gun on the other end of the bridge opened up ,

killing and wounding several Marines. One Marine ,

Lance Corporal Lester A . Tully, later awarded the Silve r

Star for his action, ran forward, threw a grenade, an d

silenced the gun . Two platoons successfully made thei r

way to the other side . They turned left and immediately came under automatic weapons and recoilless rifle

fire from the Citadel wall . Lieutenant Colonel Gravel

recollected that it was late in the afternoon and the sun

was in their eyes: "We were no match for what was

going on . . . I decided to withdraw."3 6

This was easier said then done . The enemy was well

dug-in and "firing from virtually every building i n

Hue city" north of the river. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel radioed back to Colonel Adkisson "for some vehicl e

support . . . to come and help us recover our wounded . "

According to Gravel, "the trucks didn't come and the y

didn't come . . . ." Becoming more and more agitated,

the battalion commander took his radio man and a n

interpreter "to find out where in the hell the vehicles

were ." They came upon some U .S . naval personnel and

a few of the American advisors in two Navy trucks and

brought them back to the bridge . In the meantime, the

Marines commandeered some abandoned Vietnamese

civilian vehicles and used them as makeshift ambulances to carry out the wounded . Among the casualties

on the bridge was Major Walter D . Murphy, the 1st

Battalion S—3 or operations officer, who later died of hi s

wounds. Captain Meadows remembered that he los t

nearly a third of his company, either wounded or killed ,

"going across that one bridge and then getting bac k

across that bridge . "37 *

*Lieutenant Colonel Gravel in his letter to Batcheller gave th e

number of Marines from Company G that were wounded as 44 . Eri c

Hammel in his account gives the casualties for Company G as 5 dea d

and 44 wounded, which probably does not include Major Murphy.

Colonel Meadows, years later, commented that " to my recollectio n

LtCol Gravel did not join us on the other side of the bridge . I remember calling him on the radio and giving him my sicreps and eventually the urgent need for vehicles." Gravel Itr, Feb68 ; Eric Hammel, Fire

in the Streets, The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968 (Chicago, Ill : Contemporary

Books, 1991), p. 90 ; Col Charles L. Meadows, Comments on draft, dtd

13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

By 2000, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines ha d

established defensive positions near the MAC V

compound and a helicopter landing zone in a fiel d

just west of the Navy LCU Ramp in southern Hue .

On that first day, the two Marine companies in Hue

had sustained casualties of 10 Marines killed and 5 6

wounded . During the night, the battalion called i n

a helicopter into the landing zone to take out th e

worst of the wounded. According to Lieutenan t

Colonel Gravel, "it was darker than hell and foggy, "

and the pilot radioed "`Where are you? I can't see . —

The sergeant on the ground, talking the aircraft

down, knocked on the nose of the CH-446, and

replied, "'Right out here, sir. — Gravel marvelled

that the sergeant "had a knack about working wit h

helicopter pilots . . . He brought it [the helicopter)

right on top of us. "38* *

The American command still had little realization of the situation in Hue . Brigadier Genera l

LaHue later commented: "Early intelligence did

not reveal the quantity of enemy involved that we

subsequently found were committed to Hue ."°* °

General Westmoreland's headquarters had, if possible, even less appreciation of the magnitude of th e

NVA attack on the city. Westmoreland cabled General Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the U .S .

Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the "enemy has approximately three companies in the Hue Citadel an d

Marines have sent a battalion into the area to clea r

them out. " 3 9

**One of the co-authors expressed doubts about the accuracy o f

the above account: "Not very long ago, 1 stood on an LZ trying to

communicate with a CH–46 pilot through the helicopter's own I C

[internal communication] system . Impossible, and this helicopter was

on the ground, at low power . A hovering helicopter is louder by a t

least a magnitude. I have been under them . . . when they are less tha n

10 feet off the deck and I can tell you that I don't believe this story

for a minute . Having said all this, I still feel it 's too good to pass up . "

Maj Leonard A . Blasiol, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 30Jun8 8

(Vietnam Comment File) .

***General Earl E. Anderson, then the Ill MAF Chief of Staff a t

Da Nang as a brigadier general, recalled that he was in "constant con -

tact by phone . . . [with] Frosty LaHue . . ., neither of us sleeping

more than an hour or two a night ." Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments

on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
CHAPTER 1 0

The Struggle for Hue—The Second Phas e

More Reinforcements—The Beginning of the Advance 3—4 February—Block by Block 5—8 Februar y

More Reinforcements

By the morning of 1 February, the actual situation was becoming only too apparent to both th e

South Vietnamese and American troops in Hue . In

Da Nang, General Lam, the I Corps Commander ,

and General Cushman, CG III MAF, agreed that th e

1st ARVN Division would assume responsibility fo r

the Citadel while Task Force X-Ray would clear that

part of the city south of the Perfume River. General

LaHue, the TF X-Ray commander, ordered Lieu -

tenant Colonel Gravel's "bobtailed" 1st Battalion ,

1st Marines in southern Hue to advance to the Thu a

Thien provincial headquarters building and prison ,

a distance of six blocks west of the MACV compound. Still unaware of the extent of the enemy

forces in both the old and new cities, LaHue told a

group of American reporters at Phu Bai : "Very definitely, we control the south side of the city . . . I

don't think they [the Communist forces] have an y

resupply capability, and once they use up what they

brought in, they're finished." "

Marine infantry advance cautiously under support of the 90mm gun of a M48 tank in street fighting in Hue. Even with the tank support, the Marines found the enemy resistance difficult to overcom e

in the first days of the operation.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19040 0

175
176 THE DEFINING YEAR

At 0700, Gravel launched a two-company assaul t

supported by tanks towards the jail and provincia l

building. As a M79 grenadier from Company G, 5t h

Marines recalled : "We didn't get a block away [fro m

the MACV compound} before we started gettin g

sniper fire . W e got a tank . . . got a block, turned righ t

and received 57mm recoilless which put out our tank . "

The attack was "stopped cold" and the battalio n

returned to the MACV compound . 2

By this time, General LaHue realized the enemy

strength in Hue was much greater than he had originally estimated . Shortly after noon, he called in Colonel

Stanley S. Hughes of the 1st Marines and gave him tac -

tical control of the forces in the southern city. In turn,

Hughes promised Gravel reinforcements and provide d

him with the general mission to conduct "sweep and

clear operations in assigned area of operation . . . to

destroy enemy forces, protect U .S . Nationals an d

restore that portion of the city to U .S . control." 3

North of the Perfume River, on the 1st, the 1s t

ARVN Division enjoyed some limited success .

Although the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 3d ARVN

Regiment remained outside of the Citadel walls

unable to penetrate the NVA defenses, the 2d and 7t h

Airborne Battalions, supported by armored personne l

carriers and the Black Panther Company, recapture d

the Tay Loc airfield . About 1500, the 1st Battalion, 3 d

ARVN reached the 1st ARVN command post at the

Mang Ca compound . Later that day, U .S . Marine helicopters from HMM—165 brought part of the 4th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment from Dong Ha into the

Citadel. One of the pilots, Captain Denis M . Dunagan, remembered that the call for an emergenc y

trooplift came in about 1400. Eight CH—46 "Sea

Knights" made the flight in marginal weather with a

200—500 foot ceiling and one mile visibility, arrivin g

in an improvised landing zone under enemy morta r

fire . The deteriorating weather forced the squadron to

cancel the remaining lifts with about one-half of th e

battalion in the Citadel. 4

In the meantime, Marine helicopters had completed a lift of Captain Michael P. Downs' Company F, 2d

Battalion, 5th Marines into southern Hue . Captain

Downs, whose company had relieved Company G as

the Task Force X-Ray reserve the previous day, remembered that on the 1st he reported to Major Ernest T

Cook, the 1st Marines operations officer, who told him

he was going into the city and be under the operational

control of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Although

coming under machine gun fire from the Citadel walls

across the river shortly after 1500, the Marine CH—46s

carrying the company landed south of the LCU Ramp

"with minimum difficulty." Upon arrival, Lieutenan t

Colonel Gravel told Downs to relieve a MACV communications facility surrounded by a VC force . Downs

remembered that nothing he had been told back i n

Phu Bai prepared him for the situation he encountered .

The company " spent the better part of the afternoon "

trying to reach the isolated U.S . Army signal troops

and "never made it. " According to personal record s

that he kept, Captain Downs stated his company sustained casualties of 3 dead and 13 wounded .5

Company F then returned to the 1st Battalion, 1s t

Marines command post at the MACV compound .

Lieutenant Colonel Gravel prepared to renew hi s

effort to reach the jail and provincial headquarters . At

2300, Lieutenant Colonel Gravel requested air support "to suppress heavy resistance . . . ." The tactica l

air observer reported that the low ceiling precluded

any aviation support . Gravel received orders to

remain in his night positions .6*

At Da Nang, General Cushman continued to discuss the situation with General Lam . The two commanders decided against the employment of fixed -

wing aircraft or artillery in Hue. As Cushman late r

related, "I wasn't about to open up on the old palace

and all the historical buildings in there . I told Lam h e

was going to have to do it. " While the South Vietnamese would remain responsible for the Citadel and

the Marines for the southern city, Cushman made plan s

to cut the enemy lines of communication to the west ?

With the concurrence of General Westmoreland ,

the III MAF commander made arrangements for

*Former captain and now retired Brigadier General Downs remembered that he received orders after returning to the MACV compoun d

to take his company and a couple of tanks to the jail . He stated that he

"found the order no more reflective ofwhat the situation was in the cit y

at the time and questioned the sensibility of it." Lieutenant Colonel

Gravel agreed with him and sent a message drafted by Downs to Task

Force X-Ray suggesting that the order be rescinded . The order was

rescinded . As far as the air support, General Downs probably correctl y

observed that the rules of engagement at the time probably would have

prevented any use of air support in the city. BGen Michael P. Downs,

Taped Comments on draft, dtd 11Dec92 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Downs Taped Comments, Dec92 and BGen Michael P.

Downs, Comments on draft, dtd 19Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Downs Comments, Dec94 . Lieutenant Colonel Grave l

described the order co go take the provincial jail slightly differently . He

stated that when Company F arrived he was given " another stupid mission . Go down and secure the Provincial prison . Well 1 didn 't go, I

finally convinced them that we didn't have the power and that the prisoners had been released on 30 January. " LtCol Gravel ltr to Capt Gordon D. Batcheller, dtd 24Feb68, Encl to Col Gordon D . Batcheller,

Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 17 7

bringing the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Divisio n

(Airmobile) into the Hue battle . In late January, the

1st Air Cavalry with two of its brigades had relieved

the 1st Marines at Camp Evans, about 12 mile s

north of Hue. Since 31 January, the division's 1st

Brigade, reinforcing the 1st ARVN Regiment, wa s

committed to the fight for Quang Tri City. On 1

February, General Cushman then alerted the 1st Ai r

Cavalry commander, Major General John J . Tolson ,

to be ready to deploy his 3d Brigade from Evans int o

a sector west of Hue . By 2215 that night, Tolson's

command had asked III MAF to coordinate with I

Corps and Task Force X-Ray its designated area o f

operations in the Hue sector. 8

Tolson 's plan called for the insertion of two battalions of the 3d Brigade northwest of Hue . The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was to arrive in the landing zon e

first, followed by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry and th e

3d Brigade headquarters. Attacking in a southeasterl y

direction, the two battalions would then attempt t o

close the enemy supply line into Hue . An attached battalion from the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) ,

the 2d Battalion, 501st Airborne, would cover the

Camp Evans base area. The 1st Brigade would continue to operate in the Quang Tri sector. 9

Under difficult circumstances, the "First Team"

began its movement into the Hue area. Peter Braestrup

of the Washington Post remembered that he dined wit h

General Tolson a week later and that he "heard and sa w

how the bad weather was hampering . . . [the] newly

moved division's logistics buildup and its efforts to

move down on Hue ."I n In mid-afternoon on the 2d, the

2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry arrived in a landing zon e

about 10 miles northwest of Hue and then pushed

towards the city. H

In southern Hue, on 2 February, the Marines mad e

some minor headway and brought in further reinforcements . The 1st Battalion finally relieved th e

MACV radio facility that morning and later, after a

three-hour fire fight, reached the Hue University

campus.* Although the NVA, during the night, had

dropped the railroad bridge across the Perfume Rive r

west of the city, they left untouched the bridge across

the Phu Cam Canal . About 1100, Company H, 2 d

Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Captain G .

*Although the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Journal makes referenc e

to securing the University at 1630 on 2 February, Brigadier Genera l

Downs recalled that the battalion did not secure the University tha t

day: " We got to Hue University. Had a tank hit and didn 't get any further. We were then ordered back to our MACV positions ." 1/1 Jnl File ,

dtd 2Feb68, End 1/1 ComdC, Feb68 ; Downs Comments, Dec94 .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A371.12 6

Marines of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines lower

a wounded comrade from the rooftop of one of the buildings

of the Hue University campus.

Ronald Christmas, crossed the An Cuu Bridge ove r

the canal in a "Rough Rider" armed convoy1 2

As the convoy, accompanied by Army trucks

equipped with quad .50-caliber machine guns and two

Ontos, entered the city, enemy snipers opened up o n

the Marine reinforcements. Near the MACV compound, the Marines came under heavy enemy machin e

gun and rocket fire. The Army gunners with their

"quad .50s" and the Marine Ontos, each with si x

106mm recoilless rifles, quickly responded. In the

resulting confusion, the convoy exchanged fire with a

Marine unit already in the city. As one Marine in th e

convoy remembered, "our guys happened to be out o n

the right side of the road and of course nobody knew

that. First thing you know everybody began shooting

at our own men . . . out of pure fright and frenzy"13* *

**General Downs recalled that his company was shot at by one o f

the Marine convoys that entered Hue . He believed, however, this

occurred on 3 February rather than 2 February. Downs Comments,

Dec94 .
178 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19081 6

One of the collapsed bridges across the Perfume River connecting the new city with the Citadel . The

NVA destroyed the Perfume River bridges, but left standing for a time the bridge over the Phu Ca m

Canal leading into the new city from Phu Bai along Route 1 .

Within a few minutes, the guns were silent . Neither of the Marine units took any serious casualties an d

the Marine fire had suppressed the enemy weapons.

One rocket, however, disabled a truck and the Marine s

successfully towed the vehicle to safety. Two journalists, Cathy Leroy and Francois Mazure, both French citizens, took asylum with the convoy after their releas e

by North Vietnamese soldiers.1 4

About mid-day, Company H joined Lieutenan t

Colonel Gravel where the 1st Battalion had established

its toehold near the MACV compound . The NVA,

however, continued to block any advance to the south.

An enemy 75mm recoilless rifle knocked out one of th e

supporting tanks. By the end of the day, the Marines

had sustained 2 dead and 34 wounded and claimed t o

have killed nearly 140 of the enemy. As one Compan y

G Marine remarked, the unit spent the day "hittin g

and seeing what was there." The battalion consolidated its night defensive positions and waited to renew it s

attack on the following day.15
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 17 9

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37133 5

Machine gunner PFC Dominick J. Carango, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, provide s

covering fire for advancing troops of his company with his M60 machine gun in the Hue stree t

fighting. His assistant, with bandoliers of 7.62mm ammunition rounds wrapped around him ,

crouches beside him

At Phu Bai, during the meantime, Colonel Hughe s

prepared to bring his headquarters group into Hue . On

the afternoon of the 2d, Colonel Robert D . Bohn, the

5th Marines commander, called in his 2d Battalio n

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C . Cheatham,

three of whose companies were already in Hue .

According to Cheatham, a big man who had playe d

professional football, Bohn told him, "saddle up wha t

you need . . . [the 1st Marines] headquarters is going to

Hue tomorrow. There's problems up there . . . We're

going to put you in . . . ." The battalion commande r

remembered, "and so the next morning we went . We

went blind. And that was it." 1 6

On the 3d, both the command groups of the 1s t

Marines and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines arrived i n

Hue in another "Rough Rider" armed convoy. The

weather had taken another turn for the worse : a cold 5 0

degrees with constant precipitation in the form of fog ,

a fine mist, or rain. Although the Marine trucks came

under enemy sniper and mortar fire, they safely reached

the MACV Compound in the city. Colonel Hughes

established his new command post there and held a

hurried conference about 1330 with his two battalio n

commanders. While Lieutenant Colonel Cheatha m

then took control of his three companies already in th e

city, Gravel retained command of his Company A . The

regimental commander gave the latter the task to keep

open the main supply route while Cheatham was to

continue the attack south from the University towards

the provincial headquarters.' ?

At this point, Hughes, a pre-World War II enliste d

Marine, who had been awarded the Navy Cross fo r

action on Cape Gloucester in the Pacific campaign ,

turned to Cheatham. According to the 2d Battalio n

commander, Hughes told him : "I want you to move up

to the Hue University building, and your right flank i s

the Perfume River and you're going to have an expose d

left flank . . . . attack through the city and clean the

NVA out." Cheatham expectantly waited for furthe r

clarification of his orders, but the regimental comman-
180 THE DEFINING YEA R

der gruffly stated, " if you're looking for any more, yo u

aren't going to get it. Move out! " He then softly added:

"You do it any way you want to and you get any heat

from above, I'll take care of that ."1 8

The Beginning of the Advance 3—4 February

Establishing his command post at the University ,

Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham ordered a two-company, tank-supported attack against a complex of buildings—the public health, the provincial treasury, and

the post office—just across the street from his positions. While Company G remained in reserve, Company H was to capture the public health building an d

Company F, the post office and treasury facilities. Like

Lieutenant Colonel Gravel before him, Cheatham discovered there was no quick solution . The thick walls

of the treasury and postal buildings appeared to b e

impervious to the Marine bullets and LAAWs (Ligh t

antiarmor weapons).* According to Lieutenan t

Colonel Cheatham, the battalion tried to take the pos t

office and treasury buildings about five or six differen t

times: "That means mustering everybody's courag e

and energy up . . . . You'd assault and back you'd come ,

drag your wounded and then muster it up again and

try it again."1 9

Although Company H reached the public healt h

building by evening, it had to fall back to the University. As Captain Christmas later explained, the Marine s

just did not have enough men . The frontage for a company was about one block, and with two companie s

forward "that left an exposed left flank" subject to

enemy automatic weapons fire . The battalion stayed in

its night defensive positions and waited for daylight .20

In the meantime, Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines maneuvered to the southeast of the MACV

Compound and captured an abandoned South Vietnamese police station against nominal resistance . The

Marines found 30 carbines, 2 Browning automati c

rifles, 10 Ml rifles, 20 60mm mortar rounds, and 40

cases of small arms ammunition . At 1900, the battalion reported that the nearby International Contro l

Commission (ICC) team was safe and that "no USMC

personnel entered ICC building," thus not providing

*The M72 LAAW was a 66mm single-shot rocket-propelled anti -

tank weapon with an effective range of 325 meters . The launcher tube

was discarded after firing . It can penetrate 36 inches of concrete.

Brigadier General Downs, who commanded Company F, 2d Battalion ,

5th Marines in Hue, commented that despite what the manuals say ,

there was " no way " the LAAW could penetrate 36 inches of concrete .

Downs Comments.

any grounds that U .S . troops violated the terms of the

1954 Geneva accords. 21 **

The following morning, 4 February, Colonel Hugh -

es discussed the situation with his two battalion commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel was not surprise d

to learn that the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was " exactly where we 'd left them" the day before . Believin g

"that there perhaps was some second-guessing down at

headquarters on the inability of 1/1 to attack, " Grave l

now felt somewhat vindicated. In any event, Colone l

Hughes decided to place the 1st Battalion on Lieu -

tenant Colonel Cheatham's exposed flank and continu e

the push against the enemy defensive positions .22

As the 1st Battalion began to clear its objective

area, Lieutenant Colonel Gravel had only one infantry

company, Company A, now under First Lieutenan t

Ray L. Smith, who had relieved the wounded Captai n

Batcheller. Lieutenant Smith recalled that from th e

2d, when he arrived in Hue,*** until then, the battalion had basically held its own near the MACV Compound. Now on the morning of the 4th its first objective was the Joan of Arc School and Church, onl y

about 100 yards away. According to Smith, the building "was square with an open compound in the middle and we found by about 0700 that it was heavil y

occupied." Smith's Marines found themselves

engaged in not only building-to-building, but roomto-room combat against a determined enemy . Lieutenant Colonel Gravel remembered that in the con -

vent building "in these little cloisters that the ladie s

live in . . . we went wall-to-wall . . . ." One Marine

would place a plastic C-.4 charge against the wall,

stand back, and then a fire team would rush throug h

the resulting gaping hole .23

In the school building, Sergeant Alfredo Gonzalez '

3d Platoon secured one wing, but came under enem y

rocket fire from across the courtyard . The Marine

sergeant dashed to the window and fired about 1 0

LAAWs to silence the enemy. A B—40 rocket shattered the grilled pane and struck Gonzalez in the

stomach, killing him instantly. Lieutenant Smith

credited Gonzalez for taking out two enemy rocket

positions before he was killed . Sergeant Gonzalez was

**The International Control Commission was created by th e

Geneva Agreement of 1954 to ensure the provisions of that treaty . It

consisted of Polish, Indian, and Canadian members. Although by thi s

time, the Commission was unable to enforce anything, it still retaine d

facilities and personnel in both North and South Vietnam.

*** Lieutenant Smith had arrived in Hue in the convoy with Company H on 2 February.
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 181

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A374463 and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37143 6

Top, a Marine from the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines from a classroom at flue University returns fir e

with his M16 at a NVA sniper in a building across the street . The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines made

its command post in the University. Below, Marine Sgt Reginald Hiscks, Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, wearing an unauthorized beret, fires his M3A1 submachine gun . Strapped to his

back are four extra clips of .45-caliber ammunition.
182 THE DEFINING YEA R

later awarded the Medal of Honor for both his action s

here and on 31 January2 4

After securing the school, Smith's Company A

maneuvered to the sanctuary which lay among a grov e

of trees and houses. Gravel wistfully recalled that it

was "a beautiful, beautiful, church ." As the troops

advanced upon the building, the NVA threw down

grenades, killing or wounding several Marines.

According to the battalion commander, "They [th e

enemy soldiers) were up in the eaves, the wooden

overhead; and they were in there and we couldn't get

them out." Reluctantly, Gravel gave the order to fire

upon the church . Marine mortars and 106mm recoil -

less rifles pounded the building . In the ruins, the battalion found two European priests, one Belgian and

one French, both unhurt, but according to Gravel ,

"absolutely livid, " that the Marines had bombarded

the building . Believing he had little choice in his decision, Gravel thought the clerics in their dark clothing

were fortunate to escape with their lives as the troops

were "braced" to shoot at anyone in a black uniform .2 5

At 0700 on 4 February, Lieutenant Colone l

Cheatham's companies renewed the attempt to take the

public buildings across from the University. Captain

Christmas' Company H blasted its way through walls

and courtyards with 3 .5-inch rockets, employing squad

and fire team rushes, and captured the public health

building. From there, the company was in position to

support Company F's assault upon the treasury building .

Captain Christmas recounted that his compan y

employed the 106mm recoilless rifles to cover its

movements. At first, the Marines attempted to use

smoke grenades, but the NVA clearly saw through this

tactic . As if on signal, "everything that was on our

flank just opened up on that street." To counter the

enemy ploy, the Marines would "pop smoke" to ascertain the enemy machine gun position or positions an d

then "here would come a mule-mounted * 106 and

those Marines would wheel that thing out . Go throug h

the full drill . . . crank off" a .50-caliber spotting roun d

and then the 106mm round . The backblast of the 10 6

raised a cloud of dirt and the recoilless rifle shell force d

the enemy troops to keep their heads down. Taking

advantage of the opportunity and the dust cover, the

Marine infantry dashed across the street . Christmas

then explained, "once we got across that street . . . tha t

first lead element could direct its fire back toward tha t

automatic weapon [or weapons) . "26

*The mechanical mule was a small flatbed four-wheeled drive

vehicle which often was used to carry a 106mm recoilless rifle.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A1.90301.

Top, A Marine from Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines, armed with a M16 and with two LAAWs (light

antiarmor weapons) strapped to his back, runs for cover. A

Marine 106mm recoilless rifle on a trident can be seen in th e

gateway to the house in the background . Below, the ruined

interior of the St. Joan of Arc Church appears after its capture by the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. LtCol Marcus J.

Gravel, the battalion commander, reluctantly gave the order

to fire upon the sanctuary, remarking that it was a "beautiful, beautiful church. "

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190474
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 183

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37121 6

A Marine 106mm recoilless rifle team set the weapon on its tripod in one of the Hue University classrooms, to take out an enemy machine gun . According to one of the gunners, "we fired it with a lanyard where we knocked out our objective we kind of knocked out the building that the 106 was i n

too, but it didn't hurt the gun, once we dug it out. "

According to one of the NCOs, the recoilless rifles

teamed up with both the 81mm mortar crews and th e

infantry. The 106s would blast "holes into the back o f

buildings so that units could get in without using the

normal exit." Marine recoilless rifle gunners flushed

out the NVA and then forward observers for the 81 s

called in the mortars: "Blowing the buildings open s o

that the infantry could get through ." Sergeant Terry

Cochrane, the platoon sergeant of the 2d Battalion's

106mm platoon, remembered that the gunners even

fired one recoilless rifle from inside one of the University buildings. Unable to position their weapon t o

knock out a machine gun that blocked the battalion's

advance, Cochrane and his gunners took their 460-

pound recoilless rifle "inside . . . and we fired it with a

lanyard where we knocked out our objective—we kin d

of knocked out the building that the 106 was in too ,

but it didn't hurt the gun, once we dug it out ."2 7

The North Vietnamese, nevertheless, were still i n

force inside the treasury building . With its thick walls

and large steel door, the structure remained imperviou s

to Company F's repeated efforts to force its way into the

building, despite the use of recoilless rifles and tanks .

The NVA covered with fire all avenues of approach . At

this point, according to one account, Major Ralph J .

Salvati, the 2d Battalion's executive officer, suggested

employing CS (a variant of tear gas) against the enemy.

Salvati told Cheatham that he had seen a stack of E—8

CS launchers in the MACV compound and proposed

that he go and obtain them. Lightweight and compact ,

one launcher could fire 64 CS canisters in four volleys

of 16 each. After a jeep trip in which he acquired the

launchers, Salvati joined Captain Downs in an abandoned school near the treasury.28 *

Putting on their gas masks, Salvati and two

enlisted Marines ran into an adjoining courtyard an d

set up the launcher. After a misfire, the Marine majo r

hooked up a battery to the trigger mechanism . This

time the E—8 launcher hurled the gas canisters int o

*According to a member of the 1st Marines staff, Colonel Hughe s

" stressed the use of the E—8 CS dispenser until no more were available . "

Maj Ernest Cook, Comments on draft ms, dtd 20Oct69, Donnelly an d

Shore, " Ho Chi Minh 's Gamble " (Vietnam Comment Files) .
184 THE DEFINING YEA R

Top picture is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A371122 and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37295 0

Top, Marines from the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines wearing gas masks are about to flush out enemy

soldiers holding out in a stronghold. The Marines used CS (a variant of tear gas) to disable th e

enemy and curtail casualties. Bottom, a Marine M48 tank is stationed next to the blown An Cu u

bridge. With the bridge down, the main land resupply route into the city from Phu Bai was closed .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 18 5

the treasury compound and within minutes produced a huge chemical haze . With the gas permeating the building and under the protective fire of

81mm mortars and 3 .5-inch rockets, goggle-eyed

Marines of Company F pushed forward in their ga s

masks. According to Captain Downs, once th e

Marines got inside the building, "the NVA wante d

no part of us and they exited the building as quickly as they could ."2 9

Until 4 February, the An Cuu Route 1 bridge ove r

the Phu Cam Canal still stood and permitted th e

Marines to reinforce the troops in Hue . On the

morning of the 4th, Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines arrived in a "Rough Rider" armed convoy

and joined Lieutenant Colonel Gravel's command .

That night, however, North Vietnamese sappers

blew the bridge, effectively closing the land rout e

into the city. This left the Marine command only two

alternatives to resupply the Hue forces—river traffi c

and helicopters. With the continuing mist and overcast, every helicopter mission was a hit-and-miss

venture. More than once, heavy enemy 12 .7mm

antiaircraft fire forced Marine pilots to jettison thei r

loads of ammunition slung underneath their low-flying helicopters. The river route also presented problems. Taking advantage of the narrow ship channe l

up the Perfume River from the sea, the enemy subjected allied craft to both mortar bombardment an d

automatic weapons fire .3 0

In the interval, nevertheless, Task Force X-Ra y

had taken advantage of the reprieve to build up the

combat stocks of the 1st Marines in Hue . On the 4th ,

Marine trucks from Company B, 1st Motor Transport

Battalion brought in enough rations to sustain both

infantry battalions in Hue for two days . The following day, a Navy LCU from Da Nang braved the NVA

crossfire from both banks of the Perfume River an d

docked at the LCU ramp in the city. In Hue, the 1st

Marines now had enough rations to last through 1 6

February. With the arrival of a second LCU on the

5th, and another landing craft three days later, the

regiment experienced no shortage of ammunitio n

despite its expenditure at 10 times the normal combat rate in Vietnam.3 '

Block by Block 5—8 February

The Marines in Hue began to adapt to the stree t

fighting, so different from the paddies and jungle of

the Vietnamese countryside in their previous sectors .

As Captain Christmas of the 2d Battalion later

observed, " street fighting is the dirtiest type of fighting I know." Although one Marine fire team leade r

agreed with Christmas that " it's tougher in the

streets," he also remarked, " it beats fighting in the

mud . . . . You don't get tired as quickly when yo u

are running and you can see more of the damag e

you're doing to the enemy because they don 't drag

off their dead. "32

One of the immediate problems caused by the

change of locale from the countryside to the urba n

was in orientation . Both Lieutenant Colonels Gravel and Cheatham complained about the inadequacy

of their maps. Originally their only references were

the standard 1 :50,000-scale tactical maps whic h

showed little of the city detail . As Captain Meadows, commander of Company G, observed, "you

have to raid the local Texaco station to get your

street map. That's really what you need ." Both battalions eventually obtained sufficient maps, whic h

numbered the government and municipal buildings

and prominent features of the city. Cheatham and

Gravel and their commanders used the numbers to

coordinate their activity.33 *

Prior to that time, Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham

and his commanders used colors to designate their

positions. Captain Christmas later related some of

the resulting confusion . He would radio Captai n

Downs and yell, "Hey, I'm in a pink building . "

Downs would reply, "Hey, that's fine . I'm over her e

in a green building." Then Captain Meadows would

chime in with "Good! I'm in a brown building ." At

this point, Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham woul d

come up on the network and ask, "Where the hell are

the green, brown, and pink buildings? " 34

By this time, Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham had a

firm idea about the extent of the task that his battalio n

faced . The 2d Battalion had an area of operations about

11 blocks wide and 8 to 9 blocks deep . As the battalion commander later declared : "It wasn't that big [but)

it looked plenty big at the time ." He recalled that he

"attempted to . . . attack with two companies up and

keep that third company of mine back, protecting our

left flank." Cheatham admitted that usually he had t o

commit his reserve : "The area was just too large for on e

infantry battalion, minus a company, to attack ."3 5

*General Downs commented on the map situation as follows :

"Chuck Meadows may well have taken a map off the gas station wal l

but the ones we used were 1 :12,500 AMS [Army Map Service) maps .

They were most valuable . Initially, I think there were only three i n

the battalion with only the company commanders having one . "

Downs Comments.
186 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37122 0

A Marine from Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,

holding a M60 machine gun inside the bathroom of a private household, looks out the window for enemy forces in

house-to-house fighting in Hue . Strapped to his back is an

apparent ammunition box.

With little room to outflank the enemy, the battalion had to take each building and each block "one at a

time." According to Cheatham, "we had to pick a

point and attempt to break that one strong point . . .

and then we'd work from there ." After a time ,

Cheatham and his officers noted that the enemy

"defended on every other street. . . . When we woul d

take him off one street, we would usually push

through the next row of houses fairly quickly and the n

hit another defensive position ."36

The close-quarter combat and the low-lying clou d

cover prevented both Marine infantry battalions fro m

depending upon air and artillery. Fixed-wing close air

support was out of the question. Both units used

artillery only occasionally and then usually later i n

the operation and for interdiction missions on suspected enemy approach and escape routes. As Lieutenant Colonel Gravel explained, "artillery in an are a

like that is not terribly effective because you can' t

observe it well enough . You lose the rounds in the

buildings, in the streets . . . and you have a difficult

time with perspective . "3 7 *

Supported by the four tanks from the provisional

platoon of the 3d Tank Battalion which arrived wit h

the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on the 31st and a platoon of Ontos from the Anti-Tank Company, 1st Tank

Battalion, the Marine infantry advanced methodicall y

against stubborn enemy resistance . Lieutenant Colonel

Cheatham had reservations about the employment of

the tanks in his sector. He later commented, "yo u

couldn't put a section of tanks down one of thos e

streets. The moment a tank stuck its nose around th e

corner of a building, it looked like the Fourth of July . "

The enemy opened up with all the weapons in its arsenal from B—40 anti-tank rockets to machine guns.

According to Cheatham, one tank sustained over 12 0

hits and another went through five or six crews. The

battalion commander observed that when the "tankers

came out of those tanks . . . they looked like they were

punch drunk."38

The Marine infantry commanders were muc h

more enthusiastic about the Ontos with its si x

106mm recoilless rifles. Despite its "thin skin," Lieu -

tenant Colonel Cheatham described the vehicle "as

big a help as any item of gear that we had that was

not organic to the battalion . . . ." An even stronge r

backer of the Ontos, Colonel Hughes, the 1st Marine s

commander, later commented "If any single supporting arm is to be considered more effective than al l

others, it must be the 106mm recoilless rifle, especially the M50 Ontos . . . ." Hughes believed that th e

mobility of the Ontos made up for the lack of heavy

armor protection and that its plating provided th e

crew with sufficient protection against enemy smal l

arms fire and grenades. From ranges of 300 to 50 0

meters, the 106mm recoilless rifles rounds routinel y

opened "4 square meter holes or completely

knock[ed} out an exterior wall ." Even at distances o f

1,000 meters, the recoilless rifles proved effective .

Because of the Ontos' vulnerability to enemy RPGs

and B—40 rounds, Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham

*Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines in artillery support of TF X -

Ray, commented that while use of artillery was limited, especially th e

105mm howitzers, " the heavier more accurate, 155mm and 8-inc h

were utilized more effectively." He declared that his battalion's fire

support coordinator with the 1st Marines " from an OP [outpost] on th e

roof of the MACV Headquarters building, called and adjusted fire missions. He was able to accurately 'walk' rounds along streets disruptin g

enemy troop buildup and sniper emplacements. " Col Robert C. V.

Hughes, Comments on draft, n .d . [1995] (Vietnam Comment File).
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 187

The top picture is courtesy of LtCol Ralph J . Salvati, USMC (Ret) and the bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37112 5

Top, LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, in forefront of the picture, directs a target for a Marine Onto s

equipped with six 106mm recoilless rifles, along Le Loi Street . The Perfume River can be seen in the

background as well as the Citadel across the river. Bottom, Marines from Company H, 2d Battalion,

5th Marines take cover behind a partially destroyed brick wall in heavy street fighting in Hue City.
188 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37112 4

A Marine from Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines carries an elderly woman patient out of

the hospital complex to relative safety. During the heavy fighting, the Marines evacuated the patient s

from the hospital as best they could.

employed the vehicle in hull defilade, "even if the

defilade was only behind a brick wall . . . ."3 9

Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham reserved his greates t

praise for his own battalion's organic supportin g

weapons, including 106mm recoilless rifles, the 3 .5 -

inch rockets, and mortars. He especially liked the 3 .5 -

inch rockets that could penetrate 11 inches of steel

and "that thing would pop these walls." He specifically remembered one firefight that lasted for nearly tw o

hours between Marine and enemy gunners shootin g

3 .5-inch and B—40 rockets at one another at a range o f

50 meters. Cheatham recalled "hundreds and hundreds of rockets going out . . . And the same thing is

coming back at us. But we had more ammunitio n

than they did . "40 *

Company F's commander, Captain Downs, recollected the similar use of 81mm mortars at extremely

* Brigadier General Downs, who commanded Company F in Hu e

City, wrote in 1994 that Cheatham should receive credit for bringin g

the 3 .5 rocket launchers and ammunition into the city with him : "He

collected them from the 2/5 company supplies at Phu Bai . We had no t

been carrying any with us . " Downs recalled that the manuals stated

that the 3 .5s and the LAAWs were similar, but " in fact the 3 .5 's were

far more effective ." Downs Comments, Dec94 .

close quarters. He regularly brought his own mortar

fire within 35 meters of his men : "We were on one side

of the street and the 81s were fired on the other side o f

the street." Cheatham compared his battalion's application of 81mm mortars to a sledge hammer : "If you

put enough 81 rounds on top of a building, pretty soon

the roof falls in ." Captain Downs remembered that his

orders from Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham were that "i f

we even suspected that the enemy were in a building

to blow it down . " In Down 's opinion, this was whe n

"we really became serious about retaking the city ." 4 1

On the morning of 5 February, both Marine battalions resumed the attack in a southwesterly directio n

toward the city hospital and provincial headquarters .

On the right flank, Captain Christmas' Company H

advanced along Le Loi street, paralleling the river -

front. The two companies of the 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines secured the left flank . Lieutenant Colonel

Gravel tried to keep a two-block front, which he late r

explained, "is simple enough . But when you realiz e

that there's no one on your left . . . you've got to

expand this out . . . ." This took troops, "resources tha t

we were very, very short of." Lieutenant Smith late r

wrote that 5 February was "an extremely rough day"
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 18 9

with the battalion sustaining 19 casualties an d

advancing "only 75 yards." Gravel remembered, "Th e

going was slow. We would go, maybe a block. We

fought for two days over one building . "4 2

Although both battalions encountered "moderate to

heavy" enemy resistance on the 5th, Lieutenant

Colonel Cheatham's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines mad e

somewhat faster progress. About 1630, Captain Meadow's Company G secured the main hospital buildin g

after a 90-minute firelight supported by a M48 tank ,

106mm recoilless rifles, and 3 .5-inch rockets. The

Marines removed the civilian patients as best they

could from the line of fire, killed 4 NVA soldiers, and

took 30 wounded prisoners. For the day, the three companies of the battalion accounted for over 70 Nort h

Vietnamese dead and 40 captured enemy weapons 43

The following morning, Cheatham's battalion continued clearing the hospital complex with all three

companies on line . Two of the companies, H on the

right and G in the center, met with relatively mino r

resistance, and quickly consolidated their positions.

Company F on the battalion's left flank, however, too k

heavy fire from its front and pulled back to call in both

81mm mortars and for one of the few times, even

105mm howitzer support from Marine artillery for -

ward gun sites. About 40 high explosive 105mm shells

fell upon the enemy. By late afternoon, the NVA broke

contact under fire and the Marine company secured th e

last of the hospital buildings. Down's company sustained 4 dead and 11 wounded, but killed over 20 o f

the enemy. 44 *

In the interim, Captain Meadow's Company G ,

from the hospital complex, launched its attack against

the provincial prison, just to the southwest . While the

1st Platoon provided protective fire from the second

story of the main hospital building, Marine mortarmen

and 106mm recoilless rifle gunners blasted a hole i n

the prison walls. One Marine corporal remembered

that the Marines fired CS canisters into the gapin g

hole, hoping to force the enemy troops out, but "the y

threw it [the CS} back against us." 4 5

*Then captain, now Brigadier General Downs, recalled years later ,

that after securing the hospital complex, his company entered a nearby building by the Perfume River. As Downs joined his men, one of

his platoon sergeants " had two Vietnamese spread eagled up agains t

the wall ." When the company commander asked who they were, the

sergeant answered that one of them was " trying to tell me that he is the

mayor of Hue . " One of the Vietnamese turned out to be Lieutenan t

Colonel Pham Van Khoa, the South Vietnamese Thua Thien Province

Chief who had been hiding until then in an attic cubby hole with hi s

body guard . Downs Taped Comments, Dec92 . See also Chapter 12 .

Believing the NVA were also equipped with ga s

masks, the Marine infantry, wearing their masks, cautiously searched the rooms and cells of the priso n

beginning with the top floor. As a Marine squad leader,

Sergeant G . B . Zachary, related : "Clear the top deck

and work your way down ." Second Lieutenant Michae l

A. McNiel, Company G 's 1st Platoon commander,

described the taking of his unit's first prisoner, an NVA

sniper, equipped with both a SKS and a Ml rifle and

eight grenades. Although McNiel had a Thompso n

submachine gun in the man's face, the prisoner tried t o

jump Sergeant Zachary and take one of the latter's

grenades. The Marine lieutenant wrestled the NVA

soldier down to the floor with a "half nelson" and then

bound his hands behind his back. Yet, the Marines

"had to carry him down, with him fighting all th e

way." According to McNiel's account, his platoon took

eight more prisoners, who threw "down their weapons,

raised their hands and came walking out."** In the capture of the prison, Company G killed 36 NVA at a cos t

of only 1 Marine wounded . 4 6

On the 2d Battalion's right flank, Captain Christmas' Company H encountered tough going after it left

the hospital and pushed forward toward the nearb y

provincial headquarters. Like its sister companies,

Company H employed mortars, gas, and 106mm

recoilless rifles to soften up the objective . A Marine driver of one of the flatbed mules mounting a 106m m

recoilless rifle later stated :

[The) NVA threw everything they had at us . We

took incoming mortars and rockets and automatic fire .

We had to push the mule out, fire, and pull it back i n

under heavy sniper fire while we were firing . We opene d

up the way for the `grunts' [the infantry) to take the

building .

Two Marine tanks came up to support the attack .

One of the tanks took two direct hits from B–40 rockets but continued to fire . In addition, the Marine s

expended over 100 81mm mortar shells, 60 recoilless

rifle rounds, and 4 E8 CS launchers in support of the

assault on the headquarters. Wearing their gas masks ,

the tired Marines of Company H, in midafternoon ,

finally overwhelmed the NVA defenders in the provincial headquarters. They killed 27 enemy soldiers, too k

**Lieutenant McNiel 's version is somewhat at odds with the official after-action report . The report shows only two prisoners captured i n

the fight for the prison . If the report is accurate, McNiel may have con -

fused the five ARVN soldiers and two South Vietnamese prison official s

who were liberated in the battle with North Vietnamese soldiers . 2dLt

Michael A . McNiel in LCpI Charles D . Bedford et al ., intvw, 10 Ma y

68, Tape 2673 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; 2/5 AAR Hue City.
190 THE DEFINING YEA R

3 prisoners, and captured an assortment of enemy smal l

arms and ammunition . The company sustained 1 dead

and 14 wounded in the fight .4 7

The province headquarters had served as a symbol

for both the NVA and the Marines in the modern city.

A now-frayed flag of the Viet Cong National Liberation Front had flown from the flagpole in the courtyar d

of the provincial building since the NVA initia l

takeover of the city. Immediately after the capture of

the headquarters, two Marines rushed into the court -

yard and hauled down the enemy ensign. Gunnery

Sergeant Frank A. Thomas "vaulted through a hole i n

the wall" and ran to the flagpole clutching an American flag. As a CBS television crew filmed the event ,

Thomas raised the Stars and Stripes on the pole. *

According to Thomas, "We never knew exactly wher e

the flag came from, but when we said we wanted a n

American flag to raise, one of our Marines produce d

one a very few minutes later." For this one time, the

Marines ignored the MACV directive that forbade the

display of the U.S . flag without the South Vietnamese

national banner beside it 48* *

The capture of the provincial headquarters was

more than symbolic . The building apparently had

served as the command post for the 4th NVA Regiment.

Once the headquarters fell to the Marines much of the

enemy organized resistance in southern Hue collapsed .

Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham remarked on the

enemy's lack of maneuverability . Once the Marine s

overcame a NVA strongpoint, although a gap migh t

exist between the Marine companies, the enemy troop s

"never enveloped, they never came back around behin d

us or anything ." As Lieutenant Smith from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines wrote, from 6 February forward

" [Company} A began to roll and although we too k

more casualties, we never had a day to match" the earlier fighting . Lieutenant Colonel Gravel was even mor e

emphatic :

He [the NVA] seemed to lose his stomach for the

fight. . . . once we started rolling . . . the main force sort

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

Happy Marines from Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines display the Viet Cong banner that flew from a

flagpole in the courtyard of the Provincial Building. The

Marines raised the American flag in its stead, ignoring fo r

a time a MACV directive that forbade the display of th e

U.S. flag without the South Vietnamese flag beside it.

* Former Washington Post Correspondent Peter Braestrup commented that as the flag was raised, " NVA soldiers in covered foxholes were

discovered at the same time—and shown on CBS film ." Pete r

Braestrup, Comments on draft, nod . [Dec94—Jan95) (Vietnam comment File).

**Brigadier General Downs, who commanded Company F i n

1968, related that in September 1991 when the Aegis Cruiser CG 66

Hue City was officially commissioned, "The first flag raised on that shi p

was the same flag that was raised in front of the Provincial Headquarters Building on 6Feb68 and the flag was raised by Gunny Thomas an d

the two Marines who assisted him . " Downs Taped Comments, Dec92 .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE SECOND PHASE 19 1

of evaporated . . . and left some local force—rinky dink s

. . . when his defense crumbled, it crumbled .49

On the morning of 7 February, both Marine battalions renewed their offensive. On the right flank,

Cheatham's battalion with two companies on line and

one in reserve made rapid progress. According to th e

battalion's entry for the day in its after-action report, "i t

became quite obvious the enemy had retreated leaving

bodies and weapons behind . " On the left flank, the 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines also moved forward, but at a

slower pace, and met pockets of heavy resistance. The

NVA knocked out an Ontos supporting the battalion

with a B—40 rocket, killing the driver and woundin g

the vehicle's commander. After a firefight, a platoon

from Company B retrieved the damaged vehicle, evacuated the wounded Marine, and recovered the body o f

the dead man .5 0

By 10 February, despite some desperate efforts by

isolated groups of NVA and the occasional sniper, th e

two Marine battalions had reached their objectives.

With the Marines in control south of the Perfum e

River and the NVA still holding fast in the Citadel

north of the river, Hue was now indeed two cities .

Three days earlier, North Vietnamese sappers ha d

blown the main bridge across the Perfume, literally

dividing the city in two . Marine engineers destroye d

the Le Loi Bridge at the end of Le Loi Street to preven t

the enemy from bringing reinforcements into southern

Hue from the west . At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, reinforced by Company G, ha d

secured the northern end of the wrecked An Cu u

Bridge over the Phu Cam Canal . Lieutenant Colonel

Cheatham and the remaining companies of the 2d Battalion prepared to cross the Phu Cam and enter a ne w

area of operations south of the city.5 1

In clearing the modern city, the Marines took a

heavy toll of the enemy, but at a high cost to themselves . The Americans had accounted for over 1,000

enemy dead, took 6 prisoners, and detained 89 suspects. Marine casualties included 38 dead and abou t

320 wounded . Company H had been particularly hard

hit. Every officer, including Captain Christmas, and

most of the staff NCOs had sustained wounds . Corporals were now squad leaders . One Marine from Company G observed, "we would start getting new guy s

and it just seemed that every time we got new guys we

would lose them just as fast as we got them ." Anothe r

Marine from the same unit remarked, "the stink—you

had to load up so many wounded, the blood would dr y

on your hands. In two or three days you would smell

like death itself "52

With the Marine lines secure, the South Vietnames e

authorities assisted by U .S . military and civilian advisors began to bring some semblance of order int o

southern Hue. They established a refugee center at the

University for the hapless civilians unexpectedl y

caught in the middle of a war. The National Polic e

began to take harsh measures against both civilians an d

ARVN troops participating in the wholesale looting

that occurred behind the Marine advance . By 13 February, Marine engineers had built a pontoon bridg e

alongside the destroyed An Cuu span and Marine truc k

convoys brought in much-needed supplies and food fo r

both the troops and the civilian population. Although

the battle for southern Hue was largely over, the fight

for the Citadel had just begun .53
CHAPTER 1 1

The Struggle for Hue—Stalemate in the Old Cit y

A Faltering Campaign—Going into the Walled City—The Fight for the Tower—Continuing the Advanc e

A Faltering Campaig n

While the Marines cleared the new city, the Sout h

Vietnamese offensive in the Citadel had faltered . In the

first days of the campaign, the 1st Battalion, 3d ARV N

Regiment had cleaned out much of the northwest corner of the old city while the 1st ARVN Airborne Tas k

Force, just south of the 1st Battalion, attacked from th e

Tay Loc airfield towards the western wall . To the east,

the 4th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment advance d

south from the Mang Ca compound toward the former

imperial palace grounds, enclosed within its own walls

and moats.* The battalion made excellent progress

until enemy resistance stiffened about half-way towar d

the objective . By 4 February, the 1st ARVN Divisio n

reported that it had killed nearly 700 NVA troops in

the Citadel . '

At this point, General Truong, the 1st ARVN Division commander, decided to make some readjustmen t

in his lines. On the 5th, he moved the airborne tas k

force's three battalions into the northeast sector, relieving the 4th Battalion, 2d ARVN. Assuming responsibility for the airfield, the 4th battalion, on the following day, pushed forward all the way to the southwest

wall . At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 3d ARV N

Regiment recaptured the An Hoa gate in the north -

western corner of the Citadel . South of the Citadel, just

north of the Perfume River, the remaining three battalions of the 3d ARVN Regiment, futilely butte d

against the southeastern wall of the old city in an effort

to roll up the enemy defenses from that direction . 2

On the night of 6—7 February, the NVA counterattacked . Using grappling hooks, fresh North Vietnamese troops scaled the southwestern wall and force d

the 2d Battalion, 4th ARVN to fall back with heavy

losses to the Tay Loc airfield. That afternoon, the cloud

*Col Arthur J. Poillon, the operations officer of Task Force X-Ray,

recalled that the term Citadel caused some initial confusion as it was

"sometimes used to identify the old walled city and sometimes to identify the palace grounds ." Col A. J. Poillon, Comments on draft ms ,

30Oct69, Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble" (Vietna m

Comment Files). In the present text, Citadel is used to refer to th e

entire old walled city.

cover lifted enough for South Vietnamese Air Forc e

fixed-wing aircraft to drop 25 500-pound bombs o n

the now NVA-occupied southwest wall of the Citadel . 3

With the NVA pouring reinforcements into the ol d

city, General Truong once more redeployed his own

forces. He ordered the three battalions of the 3d ARVN

Regiment south of the Citadel to give up the apparen t

hopeless effort to force the southeastern walls and move

into the city. On the afternoon of the 7th, the 3d

ARVN Regimental headquarters and the three battalions embarked on South Vietnamese motorized junk s

which landed the troops at a wharf north of Hue . The

3d ARVN units then entered the Citadel through the

northern gate and took up new positions at the 1s t

Division Mang Ca compound. By that evening, General Truong had inside the Citadel four airborne battalions, the Black Panther Company, two armored cavalry squadrons, the 3d ARVN Regiment with all four

battalions, the 4th Battalion from the 2d ARVN Regiment, and a company from the 1st ARVN Regiment . 4

Despite the ARVN troop buildup in the old city,

General Truong's forces made almost no further head -

way against the enemy. For the next few days, th e

ARVN ran up against dug-in NVA who refused to b e

budged. The North Vietnamese still controlled about

60 percent of the Citadel . Infiltrating well-fed and

well-equipped replacements each night into the ol d

city, the North Vietnamese continued to hold thei r

own against the ARVN. 5

To the west, the U .S. Army's 1st Cavalry Divisio n

(Airmobile) was having about as little luck as the

ARVN forces in the Citadel against the North Vietnamese . Major General John J. Tolson, the division

commander, recalled, "I was to seal off the city from th e

west and north with my right flank on the Perfum e

River." Tolson observed, however, that the weather and

low-ceiling of 150—200 feet combined with the enem y

antiaircraft weapons "made it impractical and illogica l

to contemplate an air assault by any unit of the Division, in the close proximity of Hue ." 6

As the vanguard of Colonel Hubert S . Campbell's

3d Brigade, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry started ou t

on foot the early morning of 3 February in a cold driz -

192
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY 193

zle from its landing zone, some 10 miles northwest o f

Hue. With the mission "to move towards Hue, make

contact with the enemy, fix his location, and destro y

him," the battalion advanced southeastward along a

route paralleling Route 1 . About 1000, the American

troops saw a North Vietnamese battalion setting u p

defenses in Que Chu, about 500 meters to their front .

A tree-lined and thickly vegetated hamlet in a model

Revolutionary Development village called La Chu b y

the South Vietnamese and the La Chu Woods by th e

Communists, Que Chu extended 200 meters nort h

and south and was about 75 meters wide . Armed wit h

machine guns, AK-47s, and recoilless rifles, and sup -

ported by mortars, the North Vietnamese occupie d

positions originally prepared by ARVN troops . Under

cover of rocket fire from especially equipped helicopte r

gunships of the division's Aerial Rocket Artiller y

(ARA) Squadron, the American infantry attacked .

Finally after several hours, the 2d Battalion cracked th e

enemy defenses and established a night perimeter i n

northern Que Chu. 7

After a relatively uneventful night disturbed by a n

occasional enemy mortar round, the 1st Cavalry uni t

faced a fire storm early the following morning . Under

cover of darkness the enemy had moved up reinforcements in regimental strength and, after a heavy mortar

barrage at daybreak, launched a counterattack . Surrounded and outnumbered, but supported by artillery

and the ARA helicopters, the 2d Battalion repulse d

several of the enemy efforts. Forced into a shrinking

perimeter, the 2d Battalion had sustained casualties of

11 dead and 51 wounded in the two days fighting fo r

Que Chu. The battalion had accounted for eight

known enemy dead and captured one prisoner. In

assessing the situation that night, General Cushman's

III MAF headquarters informed MACV, "it is believed

that the 2/12 Cav is blocking a possible exfiltratio n

route for the [NVA} forces involved in the battle o f

Hue City." 8

At this time, Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Sweet,

the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, more concerned about the enemy overrunning his positions

rather than blocking any exfiltration route from Hue,

held a hasty conference with his staff and company

commanders. Although the 3d Brigade headquarters

and Lieutenant Colonel James B . Vaught's 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry had arrived in the landing zone to th e

north, the 2d Battalion could not expect any reinforcements until the next day. Sweet and his officers decided upon a night march to elude the enemy and set up

their defenses in a more favorable terrain. Believing the

North Vietnamese would expect a breakout toward th e

north, Sweet decided to move to the high ground ,

4,000 meters to the southwest, overlooking a secondary road and the Song Sao, one of the tributaries o f

the Perfume River. Under the cover of darkness, the

battalion slipped out of Que Chu at 2200 unnoticed by

the North Vietnamese. Slogging its way through th e

wet paddylands, the battalion arrived at the hill mass,

Nha Nhan, by 0700 the next morning . Dominating

the approaches to Hue six kilometers to the east, th e

exhausted men of the 2d Battalion established their

new perimeter. As one of the troopers later related :

"We had gotten less than six hours sleep in the past 4 8

hours. We didn't have any water and the river wate r

was too muddy to drink."9

While the 2d Battalion remained on Nha Nhan ,

the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry advanced into the Qu e

Chu sector on the afternoon of the 5th . Patrolling th e

area west of the hamlet, Lieutenant Colonel Vaught's

men encountered only token resistance . In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Sweet's 2d Battalion believed

it stopped all enemy daylight movement "by calling

down artillery on the plains before them." Major General Tolson even gave thought to move the 2d Battalion back to Camp Evans. Tolson later stated : "At this

point, . . . I was faced with a couple of situations that

strained my resources. . . . when Hue was occupied, my

main land supply line was out." Concerned about protecting Camp Evans and his helicopters and supporting his 1st Brigade at Quang Tri City, Tolson believe d

it "obvious at the time I was told to attack towards

Hue that I already had at least three missions that I felt

had to be carried out."l o

For the time being, General Tolson dismissed any

idea about bringing the 2d Battalion out of the fight

for Hue . On 7 February, just northwest of Que Chu,

Lieutenant Colonel Vaught's 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry encountered a strong NVA force that had reoccupie d

Que Chu. Unable to push the NVA out, Vaught calle d

in ARA helicopters and artillery. The next morning,

the Army troopers renewed the attack, but were forced

back in the face of NVA automatic weapons fire ,

RPGs, and mortars. In frustration, the American battalion dug in for the night. "

At this point, the 3d Brigade commander ordered

Sweet's 2d Battalion to deploy off its hill and come in

behind the enemy, squeezing the NVA between the

two American units. On the morning of 9 February,

the 2d Battalion troops departed their positions only t o

bump into a North Vietnamese battalion in the hamlet of Bon Tri, about 3,000 meters south of Que Chu .
194 THE DEFINING YEA R

Like Vaugh t's unit, Swee t's battalion had little success

against the strong enemy defenses. 1 2

For the next few days, the 1st Cavalry units west o f

Hue, like the ARVN in the Citadel, faced stalemate .

They were able to hold their own, but did not have th e

wherewithal to push the NVA out .* During this period, the North Vietnamese command maintained its

" own support area outside the western wall [of th e

Citadel) . . . capitalizing on the failure of friendly forces

to isolate the Hue battlefield ." As Peter Braestrup, th e

Washington Post correspondent, later wrote, "sealing off

an eight-mile perimeter [west of Hue) would hav e

demanded far more troops . . . than were available . " 1 3

With the clearing of southern Hue by the 1s t

Marines, General Cushman prepared to bring mor e

forces into the fight for the entire city. After the

arrival of General Abrams and the formal establishment of the MACV Forward headquarters at Phu Bai

on 12 February, Cushman met with the Army general the following day. They both agreed that the

"successful conclusion to Operation Hue City wa s

the number one priority in ICTZ." The III MAF

commander relayed this concern to General Tolson ,

who still wanted to return the 2d Battalion, 12t h

Cavalry to Camp Evans. Cushman admonished th e

1st Cavalry commander to give up any notion o f

withdrawing the 2d Battalion from the fight . The

Marine general stated that the battle was about to

reach a climax and ordered Tolson to keep his force s

in position to prevent the enemy from escaping to

the southwest.14

In the interim, General Westmoreland and th e

South Vietnamese Joint General Staff had sent reinforcements to I Corps . The 1st Battalion, 327th Airborne Regiment from the 101st Airborne Divisio n

had arrived at Phu Bai and came under the operational control of Marine Task Force X-Ray. Another

battalion from the division was on its way by sea .

The South Vietnamese flew the first elements of the

Vietnamese Marine Task Force A to Phu Bai from

Saigon to relieve the battered Airborne Task Force i n

the Citadel. At Phu Bai, on 9 February, Brigadie r

General Foster C. LaHue, the Task Force X-Ray

commander, had ordered his 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines to prepare to move into Hue .1 5

*As U.S. Army historian George L . MacGarrigle observed, th e

enemy probably was content to contain him [the Army forces west o f

Hue], rather than risk a major fight should the weather clear, giving th e

1st Cavalry an opportunity to 'pile-on .'" George L . MacGarrigle, Historian, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Going Into the Walled City

At 0700, 10 February, Company A, 1st Battalion ,

5th Marines departed the battalion's Phu Loc operatin g

area south of Phu Bai for the latter base . Reaching Phu

Bai about 1100, the company came under the direc t

operational control of the 5th Marines regimental

headquarters. Colonel Robert D. Bohn, the 5th

Marines commander, ordered the company into Hu e

city to reinforce the 1st Marines. Approaching the A n

Cuu Bridge that afternoon in a "Rough Rider" convoy,

the Marine infantrymen dismounted from their trucks ,

crossed the broken span, and entered southern Hue o n

foot. At the same time, the 1st Battalion's Company B

arrived at Phu Bai as did the lead elements of th e

Army's 1st of the 327th Airborne . The Army battalio n

made ready to relieve the remaining companies of th e

Marine battalion in the Phu Loc sector. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in turn, was about to expand th e

Marine Operation Hue City into the old Citadel t o

reinforce the ARVN.1 6

Simultaneously, the Marine command attempted t o

improve the coordination for artillery, naval gunfire ,

and other supporting arms for the Citadel fighting.

Earlier on 8 February, the 1st Field Artillery Group

(FAG) at Phu Bai, the artillery command for Tas k

Force X-Ray, deployed four 155mm howitzers of Battery "W", 1st Battalion, 11th Marines to firing positions at Gia Le, about 3,000 meters west of Phu Bai, t o

improve supporting fires for the forces in Hue . Two

days later, the 1st FAG sent two 4 .2-inch mortars from

the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines to the stadium i n

southeast Hue to provide CS (teargas) and heavy mortar support for the forces in the Citadel . About th e

same time, a 105mm howitzer battery from the 1st

Battalion, 11th Marines entered the city across the

newly established pontoon bridge over the Phu Cam

Canal . From its positions in southern Hue, the battery

was in position to support the Marines to the north an d

to the west.' ?

On 10 February, the 1st FAG commander, Lieu -

tenant Colonel John F. Barr ordered two officers on his

staff to the Citadel area as forward observers . One of the

officers, First Lieutenant Alexander W. Wells, Jr., the

S—2 [intelligence officer) on the FAG staff, remembered that he received word that morning that th e

"colonel" wanted to talk to him. Barr informed Wells

that he had volunteered the young lieutenant 'for a 24-

hour mopping-up mission [emphasis in the original)" t o

General Truong in the Citadel to coordinate supporting fires. Wells, whose tour in Vietnam was about over,
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY 19 5

indicated he would rather stay where he was, but Lieutenant Colonel Barr gave him little choice .1 8

Shortly after 1630 on the 10th, Wells and his

radio operator flew by helicopter to the Tay Loc air -

field in the Citadel where the Marine lieutenant wa s

to provide support to the 2d Battalion, 4th ARVN

and the Black Panther Company, which had just

retaken the field . As the aircraft approached Tay Loc ,

the enemy took it under sniper fire . The two Marines

leaped out of the hovering craft and ran into a Quonset hut, near the airfield tower, and "full of Australians [advisors to the Vietnamese units there] playing cards and drinking scotch." At that point, Wells

recalled he was told that General Truong wanted to

see him at the Mang Ca division headquarters compound, about a mile to the east.1 9

Upon Wells reaching the division headquarters,

General Truong briefed him upon his new assignmen t

as a forward observer with the "supporting remnants

of an ARVN Airborne battalion pinned down in a

forward area." Wells remembered that he "was

shocked to learn that the [1st Battalion,} 5th Marine s

had not arrived yet and that he and his radioma n

would be the only Americans in actual combat wit h

the ARVN." The Vietnamese general pointed out to

Wells, on a large wall map, the location of his designated outpost, surrounded by enemy troops . Truong

explained the Vietnamese' unit required "his `big guns'

immediately to break the siege ." According to Wells ,

"Truong emphasized . . . that the Emperor's Palace of

Perfect Peace and the Royal City itself were in a stric t

no-fire zone, but H&I [harassing and interdiction ]

fires could be designated on the outer wall surrounding the Palace grounds."20

After the briefing, two ARVN soldiers, whom

Wells remembered as rangers, escorted the Marine

lieutenant and his radioman through the dark streets

and alleyways to the ruins of a Buddhist pagoda ,

about 500 meters west of the Dong Ba tower. Wells

recalled it took him about three hours to negotiate

the half-mile distance from the Mang Ca compound

to the pagoda . Inside and around the courtyard of the

temple only a short distance from the Imperial Palac e

were about 100 Vietnamese troops. According to

Wells, they were surrounded by North Vietnames e

forces. Given his ominous circumstances, Lieutenan t

Wells nicknamed his refuge the "Alamo. " For the

next two weeks, Wells called in Marine supporting

artillery and naval gunfire from ships off the coast ,

adjusting his target selection by reference to his map

and to sound.2 1

In the meantime, General Truong revised his plan s

for the battle of the Citadel . With the arrival of th e

South Vietnamese Marine Task Force A at Phu Bai, he

proposed to have them replace the battered Vietnamese

airborne battalions in the eastern sector. The airborne

units would then return to Phu Bai and be flown back

to Saigon. Through the chain of command, he asked

for Task Force X-Ray to provide him with a U .S .

Marine battalion. The U.S. Marine battalion would

then relieve the Vietnamese Marines and attack to the

south. After the arrival of the American Marines, the

Vietnamese Marines would push to the west and the n

turn south, advancing along the western wall . In the

meantime, the four 3d ARVN Regiment battalions

would continue to clear the northwest sector . Eventually the allied forces would surround and isolate the

NVA forces, holed up in the former imperial palace

Vietnamese Marines deploy after U.S . Marine helicopters, in the background, have brought them into a landing zone nea r

Hue . While not depicted in this photo, on 11 February, Marine helicopters had brought one company and the Task Forc e

Headquarters directly into the Citadel.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A422067
il—IL DEFININ( YEAR

LANDING FOR

MOVEMENT TO

CITADEL

ENTRY TO 1ST RVN

DIVISION COMPOUND

'Jr NOT TRUE I NO ARVN UNITS

HERE WHEN WE kRF1IVED.

MACV PROPAGANDA

ARVN

ARINES

THE ARVN

MARINE UNITS

DID NOT MOVE

ROM THIS POSITION

NTIL OUR ZONE HAD

BEEN SECURED

MO/EMENT

Us

BRIEFING MAP AND COMMENTARY

PROVIDED BY COL ROBERT H. THOMPSON,

USMC (RET.), TO KEITH B. NOLAN

COPY

0

I-

- fly
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY 19 7

grounds, which separated the Vietnamese and American Marine sectors. 2 2

As was often the case, events overtook the plans .

Although the Vietnamese Marine Task Force A and its

1st Battalion arrived at Phu Bai from Saigon on 9 February and came under the operational control of th e

1st ARVN Division, the Vietnamese Marines

remained at Phu Bai . In a meeting with the Vietnamese Marine commander, Major Hoang Thong, at

Task Force X-Ray headquarters, Brigadier Genera l

LaHue suggested that Thong deploy immediately t o

the Citadel . Major Thong, however, declined until the

rest of his command joined him . The Vietnamese

commander explained that he "was acting under written instructions promulgated by the Vietnamese Join t

General Staff which prohibited piecemeal [commitment) . . . of his force ."23 *

The support elements of the Vietnamese Marine

Task Force reached Phu Bai on the night of 10 February from Saigon and Major Thong began his preparations to move the 1st Battalion into the Citadel. On

the morning of 11 February, U .S . helicopters started

the helilift of the Vietnamese Task Force headquarters

and 1st Battalion into the Citadel . Low ceiling and

drizzle forced a halt in the air movement of the Vietnamese Marines with only the task force headquarter s

and one company of the 1st Battalion in the old city .

General LaHue proposed to Major Thong that h e

order the remainder of the battalion be trucked t o

southern Hue and then board LCM (landing craft

mechanized) for the trip downriver to a landing site

north of the Citadel. The Marines would then move on

foot into the city. Again Major Thong refused "as he

did not feel that either route was sufficiently secured. "

It would be two days before additional units of th e

Vietnamese Marine task force joined the one compan y

in the Citadel.24

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines

began to go into the old city. Shortly after 1045 on 1 1

February, Marine CH–46 "Sea Knight" helicopters lifted three platoons of Company B from the Phu Bai airfield to the Mang Ca compound in the Citadel. Enemy

gunfire wounded the pilot of the helicopter carrying

the 3d Platoon, forcing him to abort the mission an d

return to Phu Bai with the troops still on board. Late r

*Colonel Talman C . Budd II, who as a major served as an adviso r

to the Vietnamese Marine Task Force at Hue, commented that Majo r

Thong was correct in that Vietnamese Armed Forces " policy precluded the piecemeal commitment of an operational unit so waiting unti l

the other battalion (the 5th) arrived was appropriate . " Col Talman C.

Budd II, Comments on draft, dtd 30Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

that day, Company A with five tanks attached from the

1st Tank Battalion embarked in a Navy LCU at th e

ramp in southern Hue. After their relatively uneventful cross-river passage, the Marine company and tank s

joined the two platoons of Company B at the 1st

ARVN Division headquarters.25

On 11 February as well, Major Robert H . Thompson, the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines, and his command group accompanied his

remaining companies from the Phu Loc sector to Ph u

Bai. Only 10 days before, Colonel Bohn, the regimental commander, had chosen Thompson, who had

served with him before as a battalion operations officer,

to take over the battalion after the wounding of its previous commanding officer. Before assuming command

of the battalion, Thompson, a lieutenant colone l

selectee, had been the III MAF Embarkation officer.* *

The NVA had prepared a rather undignified assumption of command ceremony for the new battalion commander. Thompson recalled :

The moment I stepped off the helicopter [at Ph u

Loc) we received mortar incoming . My first 15 minute s

with 1/5 was spent at the bottom of a muddy fightin g

hole with my baggage and several Marines piled on to p

of me . 26

When Major Thompson arrived at Phu Bai, he

reported to General LaHue . The Task Force X-Ray

commander told him that the 1st Marines had largel y

cleared southern Hue, "but that the 1st ARVN Division was having a very difficult time in the Citadel . "

General LaHue stated that Major Thompson's battalion would be given a zone of action in the Citadel t o

assist the ARVN in cleaning out the remaining NVA

forces from the city. LaHue expressed some concern

about Thompson's rank or rather lack of it . According

to the battalion commander, LaHue feared that "since

I was only a major, I might be dominated or overl y

influenced by General Truong ." General LaHue even

suggested "making me a brevet colonel ." Major

Thompson replied that he did not believe that unusual action would be necessary, since he did not usuall y

wear rank insignia in combat . The battalion commander had the impression that "no one seemed to kno w

**Colonel Rex C . Dillow, who served as the III MAF G—4 or logistic officer, recalled that Major Thompson had headed the III MA F

embarkation transportation section and had the responsibility for ship -

ping of resupply to Marine units. According to Dillow, Thompson had

always wanted an infantry assignment, but still had done an "outstanding job" for him. Dillow stated that he, therefore, "offered no objectio n

when Colonel Bohn wanted him for the 5th Marines. " Col Rex C. Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
198 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19456 5

A Marine M48 tank in support of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines enters the Citadel . On the

front turret is an ironic commentary on the war and the anti-war movement reading, "The Original Flower Children . "

what the actual situation was in the Citadel. I can

remember General LaHue commenting that i t

shouldn't take more than a few days to clean up th e

Citadel affair."2 7

After concluding his conversation with Genera l

LaHue, Major Thompson and his command group ,

together with the 3d Platoon of Company B, departed Phu Bai by "Rough Rider" convoy to Hue . Like

the other 5th Marines battalions, the 1st Battalio n

came under the operational control of the 1st

Marines. Upon his arrival at the 1st Marines command post in the former MACV compound in the

new city, the battalion commander immediately discussed the situation with Colonel Stanley S. Hughes,

the 1st Marines commander. According to Thompson, Hughes ordered him to "move up the Perfume

River in LCUs, land and enter the Citadel from the

north." He then was "to seek out General Truon g

and advise him of my intentions." Thompson

recalled that he was to launch a three-company

attack southward "within a zone of action tha t

extended from the inner palace wall on the west to

the Citadel Wall on the east."28

Major Thompson and his advance group spent the

night of 11—12 February in some damaged Hue University buildings. Just before he retired for the night,

the battalion commander remembered that "an Army

major appeared before me in full battle dress, including a .45-caliber pistol ." The man identified himself as

Father Aloysius S . McGonigal, a Catholic chaplai n

assigned to the MACV advisory group . He understood

that "my chaplain had not accompanied us and asked

that he be allowed to accompany us to the Citadel . "

According to Thompson, he gladly accepted the offer.29

The following afternoon Companies C and D from

Phu Bai joined Thompson and his small advance part y

at the LCU ramp in the new city. He transferred Company D to the operational control of the 2d Battalion,

5th Marines. Thompson then completed his preparations for the crossing of the river to the Citadel side .

After some delays because of enemy mortar and snipe r

fire on river traffic, Major Thompson's headquarter s

group, the Company B 3d Platoon, and Company C

embarked on board a Navy LCU for the river passage .

Although encountering an occasional RPG round or

enemy sniper fire from both banks of the Perfume
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY 199

River while on board the Navy craft, the Marines landed at the ferry landing north of the city without incident. As the troops were about to start their march t o

the Citadel, Major Thompson later related that "villagers warned me that the NVA had set up an ambus h

along the route I had chosen ." The Vietnamese civilians guided the Marines along another road . Upon

entering the northern gate into the Citadel, the battalion was met by Captain Fernandez Jennings, Jr., the

Company B commanding officer, who had arrived th e

previous day, and some ARVN officers. After some

misunderstanding, the battalion commander convinced the South Vietnamese to permit the Marine battalion to come into the 1st Division compound .3 5

After his arrival at the Mang Ca compound, Major

Thompson met with General Truong and the staff o f

the 1st ARVN Division . According to Major Thompson, General Truong "was very eager to accommodat e

our plan of attack or anything we wanted to do, for that

matter." The staff briefed Thompson on the situation,

advising him that "an ARVN Airborne battalion wa s

holding a position in the vicinity of where we wanted

to launch our attack from and that they would hold

that position until we passed through that morning ."*

Thompson then prepared his plan . He remembere d

several years later that he proposed "to move from our

assembly area [in the division compound] at first ligh t

the next morning in a column of companies to make

contact with the Airborne battalion which was to serv e

as our line of departure [LOD] ." The battalion woul d

then advance "with two companies abreast" and on e

company in reserve .

Again the actual situation differed from what wa s

supposed to be . Apparently when the one Vietnamese

Marine company came into the Citadel the previous

day, the Vietnamese airborne units departed for Phu

Bai and Saigon . Unaware of the interruption in the airlift of the Vietnamese Marines, Major Thompso n

radioed Colonel Hughes late on the night of 12 February that he had no information on the whereabouts o f

*In a copy of a map that Colonel Thompson received in his briefing and which he in turn provided Keith Nolan, three ARVN airborne

battalions are shown attacking south in the eastern sector of the

Citadel. The four battalions of the 3d ARVN Regiment supported b y

an armored cavalry company are attacking towards the western wall .

Another armored cavalry company, the division headquarters, th e

Black Panther Company, and the division reconnaissance company ar e

in the Mang Ca Compound . The 2d Battalion, 4th ARVN Regimen t

is outside the Citadel protecting the northern approaches . Map

attached to Col Robert H . Thompson ltr to Keith W. Nolan, dtd

16Sep80 (Nolan Papers, MCHC) .

the two Vietnamese Marine battalions but, "unless

directed otherwise, intend to commence attack at 1 3

[February] 0800 . . . ." Thompson also did not know

that the Vietnamese airborne had departed the Citadel .

The Fight for the Tower

As planned, on the morning of 13 February, the 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines moved out of the Mang Ca

compound with two companies abreast—Company A

on the left and Company C on the right . Company B

would remain in reserve . From the outset, the Marines

encountered "enemy elements of squad and platoo n

[size] in well prepared positions and bunkers dug in

built up areas and along the Citadel walls. " In Major

Thompson's words, "[within] fifteen minutes . . ., all

Hell broke loose. There was no Airborne unit in the

area and Company A was up to their armpits in NVA. "

Under fire from automatic weapons, fragmentation

grenades, B—40 rockets, mortars, and AK-47s, Company A, within minutes, sustained 35 casualties.

Among the wounded was Captain John J . Bowe, Jr. ,

the company commander.

At that point, Major Thompson ordered his reserve ,

Captain Jennings' Company B, to relieve Company A .

First Lieutenant Scott A. Nelson's Company C

resumed the attack with Company B on its left flank .

With two tanks in the lead, Company C advance d

about 300 meters before heavy enemy fire from a n

archway tower along the Citadel's eastern wall leading

to the Dong Ba Bridge, once more stopped th e

Marines. The NVA had dug in at the base of the wall

there and "tunneled back underneath this structure . "

While protected by the thick masonry from allied supporting fires, the enemy could use the archway to bring

further reinforcements into the Citadel . With the

Marine battalion about 75 meters short of its origina l

proposed line of departure, Colonel Hughes radioe d

Major Thompson to hold his positions, "reorganize and

prepare plans for continuing attack indicating type fir e

support deemed necessary and desirable ."32

Unable to budge the enemy with his present

resources, Major Thompson replied that he required

the entire arsenal of allied power to support his attac k

the next morning. Thompson wanted "to walk the

artillery in front" of his advancing troops and close ai r

support missions to soften the enemy defenses. He als o

asked that his Company D, still in the southern city, b e

returned to his operational control in the Citadel .33

On the morning of the 14th, the battalion resume d

the attack. Offshore, Navy cruisers and destroyers
200 THE DEFINING YEA R

opened up with their 5-inch and 8-inch guns. Marine

8-inch and 155mm howitzers from firing positions a t

Phu Bai and Gia Le added to the bombardment. For

the first time in several days, the cloud cover lifted fo r

a brief period and Marine F—4B Phantoms and F—8

Crusader jets flew support missions. First Lieutenant

Andrew C. Delaurier, a Crusader pilot from

VMF—235, observed that as his two-plane flight

arrived over Hue City there was "extremely heavy air

activity everywhere ." They had to make two runs to

acquire the target, the Dong Ba tower. Once they had

it, his wingman "proceeded with one run with zunis

and snakes and I followed up with the napalm." *

Although enemy antiaircraft fire hit Delaurier's aircraft

causing him to leak fuel, he made his way safely bac k

to Da Nang.3 4

Despite the heavy bombardment, the tower still

stood . As Major Thompson later explained, the naval

guns "were accurate, but of little value because their

flat trajectory either hit the outside of the Citadel wall

or passed over the wall and any targets that we migh t

have had inside the wall." Thompson also praised th e

accuracy of the Marine artillery, but with the battalio n

on the " gun target line** . . . it [was) virtually impossible for us to lean into our fires." In other words, with

the Marine artillery firing at extreme range and parallel to the direction of attack, the shell dispersion coul d

cause friendly casualties. According to Thompson, the

NVA also moved forward when the Marines fell bac k

to use their supporting arms, "so when the fires were

lifted we had to fight to retake more ground ."35

The Marine attack soon stalled . On the right, Company C advanced about 100 yards, destroyed an NVA

rocket position, and captured an enemy soldier who

walked into the company lines. But on the left flank,

Company B made no progress against the enemy-occupied tower. After several futile attempts to take the

tower, Major Thompson ordered both companies bac k

into night defensive positions .

Earlier that day, Captain Myron "Mike" C. Harrington's Company D had reverted to Thompson's

command . Harrington brought two of his three platoons to the LCU ramp in southern Hue for transportation down river to the Citadel . At the ramp, there

were two LCUs, but fully loaded with supplies for th e

*"Zunis" refer to 5-inch Zuni rockets, an air-to-surface unguide d

rocket with solid propellant while "Snakes" pertain to 250- and 500-

pound bombs configured with a special tail called "snake eyes . "

**The gun target line was an imaginary straight line from th e

guns to the target .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37366 8

In the fighting in the Citadel, a Marine grenadier fires his

M79 grenade launcher. Apparently he has modified his

jacket to include a belt pouch for grenades. He also has one

grenade stuck in his helmet strap.

1st Battalion . Harrington squeezed on board one of the

craft with his headquarters group and one infantry

squad. Although taking fire from NVA gunners on th e

Citadel wall, the Navy craft safely made the trip across

the river. Harrington and his small force jumped off

and waited for the LCUs to make a return trip with the

rest of the company.3 6

At the LCU ramp, the remaining two platoon s

boarded the Navy craft to join their company commander and his small detachment . Again as the LCU s

made their way across the Perfume, NVA gunner s

took them under fire. On the opposite shore, two

Marine 4.2-inch mortars responded with both high

explosive and CS shells. A sudden shift of wind

brought the gas fumes back on the Navy boats, blinding and choking both the sailors and Marines. The

two LCUs returned to the southern ramp . The ship

commanders decided against another attempt to cros s

the river. Fortunately after several hours, a Navy Swift

boat arrived with three Vietnamese junks in tow.

Armed with a mounted .50-caliber machine gun, the

Swift boat commander agreed to take the Marines o n

board the junks and tow the small convoy to the other
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY 20 1

side . After the Swift boat left the junks at a point off

shore, the Marines rowed them to the northern landing site where an impatient Captain Harrington wa s

waiting for them.

Arriving in the Citadel while it was still light ,

about 1800—1900 on the 14th, Harrington and his

command joined the remainder of the battalion . That

night, Major Thompson briefed Harrington on the situation and told him that it would be Company D's

turn to go against the tower the next morning . Harrington returned to his company and prepared them

for the coming attack.37

On the 15th, Marine artillery and naval gunfire

once more hit the enemy positions. Under the

pounding this time, part of the tower gave way.

With another break in the cloud cover, two Marin e

A—4 jets darted in under the gray skies and dropped

250- and 500-pound bombs on the target .* Backe d

both by tanks and Ontos, the Company D Marine s

pressed forward with Company C protecting it s

right flank. The North Vietnamese, nevertheless ,

defended their positions tenaciously and Majo r

Thompson ordered Company B, which had been i n

reserve, again into the attack . After six hours of hard

fighting, including hand-to-hand combat, Harrington's 1st Platoon established a foothold at the bas e

of the tower. According to one account, Marine Private First Class John E. Holiday made a "one-man

charge" against an enemy machine gun bunker on

the wall, firing his "machine gun from the hip ,

'John Wayne' style ." The rest of the company followed him and captured the tower.38* *

The capture of the tower came at no small cost .

Thompson's battalion lost 6 men killed and sustained

more than 50 wounded, while claiming 20 enem y

dead. That night, Captain Harrington left one squad i n

the tower and established his CP in a damaged hous e

below the wall . In a surprise night attack, the NVA

retook the tower for a brief period . According to Harrington, the Marine squad fell back without orders an d

the company commander at the base of the tower suddenly saw North Vietnamese soldiers crawling over th e

rubble of the tower. Laying down a base of fire from his

*In 1980, Colonel Harrington in his comments to Keith Nola n

recalled only one air strike while he was in Hue and that was while he

was attached to the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines . Harrington Comments

on Nolan ms, dtd 24May83 (Harrington Folder, Nolan Papers) . The

battalion report, however, mentions that the battalion controlled a

flight of A4s against the Citadel wall . 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.

**A search of award recommendations failed to locate any pre -

pared for Private First Class Holiday for this action .

defensive positions, Captain Harrington led another

squad in a counterattack . The tower finally remained

in Marine hands.39

Continuing the Advance

On the morning of the 16th, the battalion continue d

to push southeast along the Citadel Wall . Major

Thompson's Marines immediately made contact ,

" engaging the enemy at extremely close range . " Despite

heavy enemy resistance, the 1st Battalion advanced

about 150 yards. At that point, Major Thompson called

a halt to allow fresh supplies reach the battalion . In the

days' fighting, the Marines accounted for another 63

North Vietnamese dead while sustaining casualties of 7

killed and 47 wounded .40

For the next few days the 1st Battalion met th e

same close-quarter resistance from the enemy . In contrast to the enemy in southern Hue, the battalion discovered that the NVA units in the Citadel employed

"better city-fighting tactics, improved the already formidable defenses, dug trenches, built roadblocks an d

conducted counterattacks to regain redoubts which

were important to . . . [their) defensive scheme ." Majo r

Thompson later observed that the older city consiste d

of "row after row of single-story, thick-walled masonry

houses jammed close together and occasionally separat -

ed by alleyways or narrow streets. " The Marines

encountered "hundreds of naturally camouflaged,

mutually supporting, fortified positions. " Moreover,

according to the battalion commander, "both of our

flanks were exposed to enemy." To the east, or left

flank, four- or five-story houses stood outside the moa t

from which the "NVA were able to dominate the to p

of the Citadel wall with observation and fire ." To the

west, or right flank, the "imperial palace provided the

enemy a haven from which he could deliver small arms,

rocket and mortar fire ." Eventually Thompson received

permission to fire mortars and on a "few occasions to

have the ARVN fire artillery for us inside . . . the palace

walls." As Major Thompson wrote in 1980, the enemy

"had everything going for him."4 1

Thompson countered the enemy fixed defenses with

heavy artillery, naval gunfire, liberal use of riot contro l

agents, and when the weather permitted, fixed-wing

support. Major Thompson observed, however, "ther e

was slow, misty cold rain falling constantly. I don't

recall seeing the sun during that period and the cloud

cover broke enough to allow close air support on abou t

three brief occasions." The Marine battalion commander depended largely on his unit's own firepower, espe-
202 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19058 8

During a lull in the fighting in the Citadel, a Marine takes time out to clean his M16 rifle .

Marines had discovered through bitter experience that the M16, if not cleaned regularly, was pron e

to jamming.

cially his mortars and automatic weapons, and th e

tanks and Ontos that reinforced his battalion . He

placed both the tanks and Ontos under the control o f

the attached tank platoon commander. The infantry

provided a screen while the mobile Ontos or tanks furnished direct fire support. In order to enhance observation, the tank or Ontos commander together with th e

infantry commander would reconnoiter the target area ,

generally a building blocking the Marine advance . The

tank or Ontos commander then returned to his vehicle ,

prepared to move forward at full speed as the infantry

Marines laid down a heavy volume of fire: "Upon

reaching a position where fire could be placed on th e

target, the vehicle commander halted his vehicle and

fired two or three rounds into the target then reversin g

his direction, returned quickly within the friendl y

front lines. "

At first, the M48 tank's 90mm guns were relatively ineffective against the concrete and stone houses;

shells occasionally even ricocheted back upon th e

Marines. The tank crews then began to use concrete -

piercing fused shells which "resulted in excellent penetration and walls were breached with two to fou r

rounds." Although casualties among the Ontos and

tank crews were high, the tanks themselves withstood

with relatively little damage direct hits by the enemy

RPG rounds. Major Thompson compared the tankers

to the "knights of old sallying forth daily from thei r

castles to do battle with the forces of evil . . . ." One

Marine rifleman stated : "If it had not been for th e

tanks, we could not have pushed through that sectio n

of the city. They [the NVA) seemed to have bunkers

everywhere . "42

From its firing positions in southern Hue, the two -

tube 4.2-inch mortar detachment from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines supported the battalion's advanc e

with both high explosive and CS rounds. One of the

Marine gunners, Private First Class Edward M . Landry,

remembered several years later, "I did my job . . . on

the mortar, followed orders, was scared . . . the whole

time, and took care of my buddies ." Landry recalled ,

"we had one sergeant in charge . . . and no officer. Which we didn't need anyway as we knew our job . "

On 18 February, he noted in his diary : "Firing a CS
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY 203

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37137 7

In heavy house-to-house fighting in the Citadel, a Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines machin e

gunner, with his assistant close by, fires his M60 machine gun on its tripod at an enemy position .

Both Marines are laden with bandoliers of ammunition for their weapon .

mission across the river again today. The air is full of An exhausted Marine crew member lies on top of his Onto s

gas. . . . We are almost used to it unless it is very heavy . tracked vehicle among its six 106mm recoilless rifles.

We then use our masks." In the Citadel, the 4 .2-inch Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19076 7

CS shells proved more effective than the E—8 dispensers. The rounds penetrated the tile roofs of the

buildings and "concentrated the full power of the

round in the building rather than relying on the infiltration of the CS gas from outside . " Enemy prisoners

testified to the demoralizing effect of the gas on their

units, although some NVA officers and senior NCOs

carried gas masks with them into battle 4 3

After heavy fighting on 17 February, Majo r

Thompson called another temporary halt to the

advance . NVA mortars sank an LCU attempting t o

resupply the battalion in the Citadel . Facing shortage s

in food and ammunition, especially in 106mm rounds

for the Ontos and 90mm rounds for the tanks, Thompson rested his exhausted men until the supplies reache d

his battalion. The attack was at a standstill4 4
CHAPTER 1 2

The Struggle for Hue—

The Taking of the Citadel and Aftermath

The Struggle in the Western Citadel—An Estimate of the Situation and Mounting the Offensive—

Closing Out Operation Hue City—A Summing Up

The Struggle in the Western Citadel

While the American Marine battalion fought for

the Dong Ba tower and painfully inched its way for -

ward, the Vietnamese Marine task force also entered

the battle . After several delays, on 13 February, U.S .

Navy landing craft ferried the command group an d

the remaining companies of the 1st VNMC Battalio n

and the entire 5th VNMC Battalion from the LCU

ramp across the Perfume River to the northern landing site . At his Mang Ca headquarters, the 1st ARVN

Division commander, General Truong assigned th e

southwest sector of the Citadel, west of the Imperial

Palace, to the Vietnamese Marine Task Force ." According to Truong's concept of operations, the following

morning, the task force would pass through friendl y

forces south of the headquarters and then attack firs t

to the west and then make a left turning movemen t

with the 1st Battalion on the eastern flank and the 5t h

Battalion on the western . '

As planned, at 0900 on the 14th, the Vietnames e

Marines left their line of departure, but both battalions immediately ran into strong enemy forces. From

0930–1200, the 5th Battalion engaged in heavy

house-to-house fighting until it reached its firs t

objective . In its sector, the 1st Battalion failed in it s

mission to secure a small school, stubbornly defende d

by the NVA. 2

According to a South Vietnamese reporter who

accompanied the 1st Battalion's 4th Company, a Vietnamese Marine platoon leader, Third Lieutenant Nhut ,

led his men supported by a tank into a pagoda from

which to launch the assault on the school . After a sup-

*For purposes of control, Truong had divided the Citadel into si x

zones or areas of operations: Zone A was the Mang Ca compound ; Zone

B was the area immediately south of the headquarters and unde r

friendly control; Zone C was in the northwest sector and given to th e

3d ARVN Regiment ; Zone D was the sector of the U .S. 1st Battalion ,

5th Marines; Zone E was the Imperial Palace and grounds still occupied by enemy forces; and the Vietnamese Marine sector was to b e

Zone F. Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 257-58.

porting air strike on the enemy positions, Lieutenan t

Nhut suddenly dashed forward toward an abandoned

house, halfway between the school and the pagoda .

Enemy automatic fire cut the lieutenant down . The

company commander shouted over the radio : "I never

told anyone to charge ahead yet . I told everyone to wai t

. . . ." He then reported to the battalion commande r

"the loss of a `big child – [referring to a "comrade i n

arms"). During a lull in the fighting, a small group o f

Marines recovered Nhut's body and equipment. On

the helmet was the inscription "Live beside you, darling, die beside buddies." The reporter later learne d

that this was the slogan of the 4th Company. During

the 14th, the 1st Battalion took casualties of 9 dea d

and 24 wounded . Repulsing early morning probes o n

its positions on the 15th, the 1st Battalion counterattacked and finally captured the schoolhouse that afternoon . In two days of heavy fighting, the two Marin e

battalions had advanced less than 400 meters . 3

To the north of the Vietnamese Marines, the 3 d

ARVN Infantry Regiment in the northwest sector o f

the Citadel also met with setbacks . On 14 February,

the enemy forces broke out of their salient west of the

Tay Loc airfield and cut off the 1st Battalion of the 3d

Regiment in the western corner of the Citadel. It took

two days for the ARVN to break the encirclement .4

By this time, the enemy also had its problems. On

the night of 16 February, the ARVN troops at th e

"Alamo" with Lieutenant Wells, monitoring enemy

radio frequencies, intercepted a transmission orderin g

"an attack of battalion-size reinforcements into th e

Citadel through the `west gate' and over the moa t

bridge ." Wells immediately called upon the Marin e

155mm howitzers at Gia Le and all available Nav y

gunships on station to "`fire for effect' at the on-call targets around the gate and bridge ." According to the

Marine lieutenant, the howitzers "and a 5-inch mount

from one of the destroyers responded simultaneousl y

within three minutes and continued firing for approximately 10 minutes." Lieutenant Wells remembered

that after approximately 100 rounds, "there wa s

204
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 205

screaming on the radio. " The enemy had received a

direct hit on the moat bridge, killing a high-rankin g

(possibly a general) North Vietnamese officer and

blowing several enemy troops into the water.5 *

About midnight, the ARVN intercepted anothe r

enemy message from the commander of enemy force s

inside Hue to his immediate superior. The NVA commander in Hue announced that his predecessor had

been killed, that he had assumed command, and tha t

"many other men had either been killed or wounded . "

He recommended that his troops be permitted to

withdraw from the city. The senior officer denied th e

request and "ordered the new cmdr [commander] to

remain in position and fight ."6 **

An Estimate of the Situation and

Mounting the Offensive

At the same time, the U.S . command feared a

buildup of NVA forces in the Hue sector. Earlier on th e

16th, General Abrams, the MACV (Forward) commander, had talked to Major General Tolson, of the 1s t

Cavalry Division, and then flew over the Army division's objective area west of the city. According to his

observations and information, the NVA had at least

three battalions still in the city: "They are resupplie d

nightly from a base camp 18 kilometers west of the

city, generally through the west gate . They have plenty of 60mm mortar and B–40 rocket ammo ." More -

over, allied intelligence now identified a new enemy

battalion west of the city and a new regimental head -

*Wells was convinced that the 155mm howitzers hit the bridg e

since the enemy message about the attack " came just after I heard

arty rounds coming in ." Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report. "

**According to a recent Vietnamese history, the Communis t

Central Party Military Affairs Committee issued instructions that the

Citadel must be held until 18 February . On the 20th, the local Tri

Thien Region Party Committee suggested to the Central Party committee that it permit the withdrawal from Hue . The Central Party the n

instructed the Communist military region headquarters to : "Strive to

hold, you will be supplied, including by air." The Vietnames e

account then goes on to state " From the night of the 20th throug h

the 23d of February IL—14 aircraft of our Air Force flew parachut e

resupply to our forces in Hue . Although the effectiveness was low,

the resupply by our air force stimulated the fighting morale of ou r

troops and people on the battlefield ." Than Khu No. 4 (Military

Region 41, Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc (1954-1975 )

(History of the War of National Salvation Against America (1954-1975))

(Peoples Army of Vietnam Publishing House : Hanoi, 1994), pp .

236—38 . The authors are indebted to Mr . Robert J . Destatte of th e

Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office, U .S . Department of Defense, for the above translation . The authors know of n o

source that confirms or mentions the Vietnamese claim of an airlift

to the NVA forces in the Citadel .

quarters two kilometers north of the city with at least

one battalion . Abrams radioed General Cushman to

expect "a renewed attack in the Hue area at any time "

and that "we must seek every means to reinforce the 3 d

Bde [Brigade) of the 1st Air Cav [Air Cavalry) Div to

bring additional forces to bear north and west of Hue . "

According to the MACV (Forward) commander, "w e

should make every effort to move against the enemy,

now, straining our logistic base to the maximum to

include air supply if required ."7

Later on the same afternoon at Phu Bai, General

Abrams hosted a meeting with Vice President Nguye n

Cao Ky and Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, th e

I Corps Commander. Lieutenant General Cushman, th e

III MAF commander, and Brigadier General LaHue ,

the Task Force X-Ray commander, also attended th e

conference . The MACV Forward staff and General

LaHue briefed the Vietnamese dignitaries on the Hu e

situation. According to Abrams, Vice President Ky

stated that his intelligence sources concurred with th e

American assessment of an enemy buildup west of th e

city. Ky voiced the opinion that the North Vietnames e

were willing to sacrifice "thousands of men to win a

slight political gain." The South Vietnamese Vice President declared that the U.S . forces should not allow the

enemy use of pagodas, churches, and other religious

symbolic buildings to deter their advance and that h e

would "accept responsibility " for any destruction . 8

The following day, General Westmoreland, th e

MACV commander, met with both Generals Abram s

and Cushman . Westmoreland concurred with thei r

belief that the enemy was about to launch a majo r

operation with Hue as its target. He also accepted th e

judgment of both of his field commanders in I Corp s

upon the need for further reinforcements. The American commanders decided to place under Task Force XRay the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Divisio n

with two battalions. They also agreed to reinforce the

3d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division with tw o

more battalions . According to the allied plans, the 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines and the 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines would continue mopping up in the moder n

city and expand operations to the east and south o f

Hue. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne would bloc k

avenues of retreat to the south and southwest, while the

3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division pressed the NVA

from the northwest. '

In the Citadel, itself, General Truong, the ARV N

1st Division commander, prepared for the final thrust

against the entrenched and determined enemy forces.

He assigned the Vietnamese Marine Task Force, now
206 THE DEFINING YEA R

reinforced by a third battalion from Saigon, to clear th e

southwestern wall .* With the Vietnamese Marines o n

the western flank, he placed the 3d ARVN Regiment

in the center with orders to attack south towards th e

Imperial Palace . The Vietnamese general placed his

Reconnaissance Company on the right flank of Major

Thompson's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which

renewed its assault in the southeastern sector.1 0

From the 18th through the 20th, the America n

Marine battalion and South Vietnamese units in th e

Citadel continued to meet dogged resistance from th e

enemy. If the NVA in the Citadel were now fighting a

rear guard action, they contested nearly every piece of

ground. Even with mounting casualties, the North

Vietnamese continued to throw replacements into the

fight and their supply lines remained open . During the

early morning hours of 19 February, two enemy battalions attacked the South Vietnamese Marines in the

southwestern sector of the Citadel . Although the

Marines, supported by artillery, beat back the enemy

assault, several high-ranking NVA officers and political leaders used the "diversion" to make good thei r

escape from the city. "

In the southeastern sector, on 19 February, after

regrouping, the American Marine battalion resumed

the offensive . With Companies B, C, and D in the van -

guard, and Company A still in reserve, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines only made nominal advances against

its stubborn foe, holed up in the rubble, structures, and

walls of the Citadel . Major Thompson, the battalion

commander, later remembered that one particula r

building, "a large, two-storied administrative buildin g

(the largest in the Citadel)" was of particular concern t o

him. From it, the enemy had excellent observation an d

fields of fire . According to Thompson, he "felt that if

we could take this position, the rest would be easy." By

the 20th, however, Thompson believed that most of

the companies had run out of steam and that some new

approach was needed .1 2

*Colonel Talman C . Budd II, then Major Budd and advisor to the

Vietnamese Marine Task Force, remarked that Major Thong, the Vietnamese Marine Task Force commander, maintained his command pos t

with his 1st Battalion commander, since they were close friends.

According to Budd, he did so because Colonel Yew, "the ceremonia l

Asst . Commandant, was sent up to Hue to oversee the TF ' A' operations." The Task Force Commander "resented that Col Yew had bee n

sent up to Hue so rather than locating the TF CP [Command Post) i n

the vicinity of the 1st ARVN Division where Colonel Yew was . . . {he]

chose to move his CP forward with his old friend the 1st Battalio n

commander to keep Colonel Yew out of his hair ." Col Tatman C. Bud d

II, Comments on draft, dtd 30Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Budd Comments.

Photo is from the Abel Collection

Walter Cronkite, the CBS Evening News anchorman, is

filmed covering Marine operations in Hue . The battle for

Hue provided dramatic footage for the TV cameras which

Americans at home could view almost the next day .

At Phu Bai and Da Nang, both Generals Abram s

and Cushman shared Major Thompson's concer n

about progress in the Citadel and American casualties. News correspondents with the Marines in the

old city filed dispatches and film about the intensit y

of the fighting in the old city that American audiences viewed and read almost the next day .** One

dramatic picture showed a Marine tank with a

makeshift litter on its rear, carrying wounded from

the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines back to the battalio n

aid station. Reporter Lee Lescaze wrote an articl e

entitled "Shortage of Men, Air Support Slows Marin e

Drive in Hue" that, on 19 February 1968, appeare d

on page 1 of the Washington Post. According to

Lescaze's account, the battalion had only advanced

four blocks and still were two blocks from the south -

ern wall of the Citadel. He quoted Marine compan y

officers asking "when are they going to get help . "

Lescaze described the lead companies "trying to kee p

on line as they maneuver through buildings and rubble of Hue ." In some instances, corporals were actin g

**Two of the news correspondents, Alvin B. Webb, Jr., of th e

United Press and H . D . S . Greenway of Time Magazine, were wounded

when they and Charles Mohr of the New York Times pulled a wounded

Marine to safety in the Citadel . Braestrup, Big Story, I, p . 238 .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 207

platoon leaders taking the place of wounded or dead

company officers. One officer remarked, "We don't

have enough men, enough air support, or enoug h

artillery to do this thing quickly . . . . "13*

On 20 February, General Abrams radioed Genera l

Cushman that he recognized the efforts of everyone "t o

reduce the siege of Hue and that the weather has had

considerable impact ." Abrams, nevertheless, considered " the measures so far taken to be inadequate an d

not in consonance with the urgency of the problem o r

the resources you command ." The Army general considered it "essential' that we bring to bear every avail -

able means at our disposal in firepower and support t o

eliminate the enemy forces in Hue." He directed

Cushman to give priority on artillery fires to both th e

ARVN and Marine units in the city. Abrams declared

that General Truong should coordinate "all outsid e

support rendered and we should be responsive to his

requests." He told Cushman : "In accomplishing all

the above, I direct that the resources owned by the

U.S . be unstintingly committed to the support of the

Vietnamese forces of all types cutting out all the red

tape and administrative procedures that in any way

hinder the conduct of the battle." According t o

Abrams, "this is one battle and anything anyone ha s

that is useful should be committed to its early an d

final conclusion ." 14* *

At the same time he radioed Cushman, General

Abrams also sent a message to General Tolson of th e

1st Air Cavalry Division. He told Tolson : "You have a

priority task to clear the northwest, west and southern

approaches, to Hue within the next 48 hours, using al l

resources at your disposal . . . ." Abrams then ordered

General Tolson to "make personal contact with B G

* *The 1st Marine Division responded to obvious concern by higher headquarters. Although not disputing the accuracy of Lescaze's article, a division message stated that of the 10 platoons of the battalio n

in the Citadel, three were commanded by lieutenants, one by a gunnery sergeant, two by staff sergeants, two by sergeants, and two by corporals. In its message, the division observed that weather permitte d

fixed-wing support only on three days, 14—16 February 1968 . Becaus e

of the need for accuracy, the division stated it used only 8-inch howitzer and naval gunfire in support of the battalion . It admitted tha t

"1/5 casualties have been high . During past week, priority of personnel replacement has been given to the 5th Marines . " 1st MarDiv ms g

to CGFMFPac, dtd 21Feb68, Encl 14, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 .

**Brigadier General Paul G. Graham, who as a colonel served as

the G—3 or operations officer of the 1st Marine Division, believed tha t

this message, " was simply a case of a frustrated Abrams trying to direct

one of his subordinate commanders to hurry the Hue campaign whic h

would relieve him of some political stress caused by the Hue attack . "

BGen Paul G. Graham, Comments on draft, dtd 20Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Graham Comments.

Truong . . ., assess the situation within the city . . . and

report personally to this headquarters with your pro -

posed plan of action ." The MACV (Forward) commander then promised Tolson that he would issue the "necessary orders" to General Cushman "to insure that al l

available resources are placed at your disposal to accom -

plish this mission. "1 5

Despite the note of anxiety in Abrams' messages, th e

battle for Hue was in its last stages . On 20 February,

reenforced by the 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry and th e

1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, the 1st Cavalry's 3d Brigade ,

now four battalions strong, prepared to clear the Que

Chu area . With clearing weather and both air an d

artillery support, the 3d Brigade advanced against stubborn enemy forces, who fell back towards Hue . By the

end of 22 February, the Brigade was within 2,50 0

meters of the city walls. In the two days of the attack ,

the U.S . troops had killed more than 120 of the enemy.

The brigade was about to close the western approaches

to Hue, cutting the enemy supply route into the city.

On the previous day, U.S . Army Brigadier General

Oscar E. Davis, the assistant division commander of the

1st Cavalry, had become the coordinator of supportin g

arms fire in the Citadel with his headquarters collocated with General Truong at the Mang Ca compound. t 6

In the Citadel, Major Thompson had decided on

another tack to get his battalion moving again. On the

afternoon of the 20th, he held a conference with hi s

company commanders. Thompson stated that "to continue the attack as before would be sheer folly" an d

suggested the possibility of a night attack . According

to Thompson, most of the company commanders

"were not very enthusiastic . . . they were willing to try,

but I could see that their hearts were not in it. " He

understood their reluctance, "they had endured a grea t

deal during the past two weeks ." On the other hand, a

few days earlier, he had given his reserve company,

Company A, to First Lieutenant Patrick D . Polk. In a

brief period, Polk had revived the morale of the company, which had taken horrendous casualties on th e

first day of action in the Citadel . Thompson believe d

that "Pat Polk and Company A were ready to go . "

According to the plan, a platoon from Company A was

to seize three key facilities, including the two-story

administrative building, flanking the North Vietnamese positions during the night . At first light, the

rest of the battalion was to launch the general attack .1 7

As planned, the 2d Platoon, Company A, led by

Staff Sergeant James Munroe, moved out at 0300 o n

the 21st from the company perimeter. Divided into

three approximately 10-man teams, the Marines cap-
208 THE DEFINING YEAR

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37141 6

Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines use walls and the sides of houses to cover thei r

advance on a key North Vietnamese position in bitter street fighting in the Citadel. On 21 February,

the company reinforced the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, relieving the 1st Battalion's Company B.

tured all three buildings with only minimum resistance by the enemy. Major Thompson later speculate d

that the North Vietnamese withdrew from the buildings during the night to sleep elsewhere . In the morning about daybreak, the enemy troops started to move

back, providing "a turkey shoot" for the Marines of

Company A. According to one of the Marine enliste d

men, "Hell, the first thing in the morning we saw six

NVA . . . just standing on the wall . We dusted them

all off" According to Major Thompson, "this thre w

the NVA into utter confusion and . . . gave our othe r

companies the spirit they needed to continue the attac k

with zest." Despite the initial success, the North Vietnamese "defended the ground within the zone of actio n

with tenacity." By the end of the day, the battalion ha d

killed about 16 North Vietnamese, taken 1 prisoner,

and captured 5 individual weapons at a cost of 3 dea d

and 14 wounded Marines. The battalion was still abou t

100 yards short of the southeastern wall .1 8

The end, however, was in sight . On the 21st, Company L, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines had relieved Company B, which received a well-earned rest . The following

morning, the 1st Battalion prepared for the final assaul t

on the southern wall . Lieutenant Polk carefully briefed

Company A, which this time was to be in the vanguard

of the attack. At 0930, the Marines once more pushed

forward. Except for some scattered snipers and an occa -

sional mortar round, the enemy seemingly had melted

away. Upon reaching the southeastern wall of th e

Citadel, Lance Corporal James Avella took out a small

American flag from his pack and fastened it to "a sagging telegraph pole." The battalion's after-action report

documented this event with the phrase, an "element" o f

Company A "hoisted our National Ensign . "

Upon the securing of the wall, Major Thompso n

ordered the new company under his command,

Company L, to capture the southern gate and th e

immediate area outside the Citadel leading to the

bridge across the river. The company commander,

Captain John D. Niotis, made his preparations for

the assault . Major Thompson set up his temporar y

command post in a building about 300 meters from

the objective so that he could witness the attack .

Thompson recalled it was "a classic combined arms

effort that could not have been executed better on a

blackboard ." The sun was out for the first time in

two weeks and Marine fixed-wing aircraft droppe d

napalm within 800 meters of the advancing troops.

A M48 tank provided suppressive fire to the company's rear at enemy positions on the palace wall . At
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 209

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801236 and bottom photo is courtesy of Col Talman C . Budd II, USMC (Ret)

Top, on 24 February, South Vietnamese soldiers from the 212th Company, 3d ARVN Regiment rais e

the South Vietnamese flag over the Citadel. Below, Major William P. Eshelman, the senior adviso r

to the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, is seen at the CP of the 4th Battalion along the West Wal l

with Vietnamese Marines.
210 THE DEFINING YEA R

one time, the tank turned around and trained it s

90mm main gun directly at the building occupie d

by Thompson and his command group . The tank

fired but according to the battalion commander "the

round hit a stone archway between us and exploded . "

Again, the tank opened fire, raking the building

with its .50-caliber machine gun, but Thompson's

operations officer "had the presence of mind to ge t

on the radio and get the tank from firing at us. "

Major Thompson later related that the tank commander, the tank platoon sergeant, "was very embarrassed about taking his battalion commander unde r

fire ." Without any other major incidents but sustaining casualties of 3 dead and 30 wounded during

the day, by 1800, the Marine battalion succeeded i n

attaining all of its objectives. According to the battalion's report, "enemy contact . . . was lighter than

any previous offensive day." One Marine observed,

"Hey it's Washington's birthday."" 9

To the west of the American Marines, however, th e

North Vietnamese continued to fight for nearly every

inch of the old city still in their hands . In the Vietnamese Marine sector on the 22d, the enemy fired

122mm rockets followed by ground attacks on the

Marine positions. Although forced back, the North

Vietnamese maintained the pressure on the Marine

task force. On the 23d, the Vietnamese Marines "were

in moderate to heavy contact" throughout the day and

"no advances were made . . . ." Venting his anger at

what he considered the slow progress of the Vietnamese Marines in a message to General Westmoreland, General Abrams threatened to recommend t o

the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff the dissolution of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. He complained

to Westmoreland that the Vietnamese Marines in the

last three days "have moved forward less than half a

city block, " although being the " strongest force in the

Citadel either Vietnamese, U.S ., or enemy. "2 0

*Colonel Talman C . Budd II, a former advisor to the Vietnamese

Marine Corps, commented that the criticism of the Vietnamese Marine s

was unjust. He claimed that U.S . commanders were critical withou t

understanding the Vietnamese limitations . He remarked that the Vietnamese Marines were basically light infantry with their battalions numbering about 400 to 600 men and " were standing toe to toe with the

same NVA with far less resources than the Marine units had . The VNMC

had a battery of 105mm howitzers ; no tanks, Ontos, or other supporting

arms. " According to Budd, " the battle in the western sector of operation s

was in many respects more difficult and ferocious because the enemy ha d

the unrestrained ability to replenish his forces and supplies with impunity through the west wall ." Budd admitted, "the Vietnamese could have

been more aggressive under some circumstances but I 'm still not sure

that Hue City was one of those cases. " Budd Comments.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A80045 0

A Marine sergeant from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines sits

with his weapon on the throne inside the Imperial Palace .

The palace was recaptured from the North Vietnamese b y

South Vietnamese forces, not by the U.S. Marine battalion.

Notwithstanding Abrams' frustrations, both the 3 d

ARVN and the Vietnamese Marines were about t o

close out the chapter on the battle for the Citadel . On

the 22d, the 3d ARVN Regiment had assisted th e

Vietnamese Marines in quashing the enemy attack an d

mounted a counterattack spearheaded by the 1st Division's Black Panther Company. ARVN and America n

artillery, on the night of the 23d, spoiled another NVA

attempt to break through South Vietnamese defense s

in the western sector of the Citadel . The 2d Battalion ,

3d ARVN then launched its own surprise attack alon g

the southern wall. At 0500 on the 24th, soldiers of th e

ARVN battalion pulled down the Viet Cong banner

and raised the Republic of Vietnam standard in its

place on the Citadel flag tower. By 1025 on the 24th ,

the 3d ARVN Regiment had reached the souther n

wall and secured it. General Truong then ordered the

Black Panther Company and the 2d Battalion, 3 d

ARVN to assault the Imperial Palace . Meeting little

resistance, the ARVN troops, by late afternoon, recaptured the palace with its surrounding grounds an d

walls by late afternoon . In the meantime, the Vietnamese Marines took the western wall . By nightfall,

only the southwest corner of the Citadel remained

under enemy control . Under cover of darkness at 0300

on the 25th, the 4th Vietnamese Marine battalion

launched a surprise attack and eliminated this last

pocket of North Vietnamese organized resistance in the
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 21 1

Citadel . Outside of the eastern walls of the Citadel, a

two-battalion ARVN Ranger task force cleared the Gia

Hoi sector, a small enclave located between the Citadel

and the Perfume River that had been under NVA control since 31 January. Save for mopping-up operations,

the fight for the Citadel was over.2 1

For the U.S . 1st Battalion, 5th Marines in the

Citadel, except for isolated skirmishes, its last significant action occurred on the 22d with the seizure of the

southeast wall and its approaches. Major Thompson

had hoped to participate in the taking of the Imperia l

Palace, but as he later ruefully observed : "For politica l

reasons, I was not allowed to do it . To save face, the

Vietnamese were to retake the `Forbidden City' . . . .

Marine tanks, Ontos, and recoilless rifles, however, provided direct support for the assault on the palace . On

26 February, ARVN forces relieved the Marine battalion, which departed the Citadel to join the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines in a two-battalion sweep east and

north of the city.2 2

Closing Out Operation Hue City

For the Marines, the operation, now officially called

Hue City, lasted about another week . While the 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines essentially mopped up in southern Hue,* the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, since 12 February, had conducted numerous company and platoonsize combat patrols south of the Phu Cam Canal . The

battalion relieved the 101st ARVN Engineering Company that had been surrounded by NVA just southwest

of the new city. On 24 February, the battalion began a

*First Lieutenant Ray L . Smith, the acting Company A commander, recalled that his company on 10 February together "with a militia

of cooks etc ., that they called 'B' Company, " returned to the MACV

compound and " began pushing east." At first, the battalion encountered little resistance as it covered two blocks and reached the socce r

stadium . Smith remembered that they had a road to cross east of th e

stadium and " we bumped hard again . " According to Smith, an ARVN

major, who had been on leave and hiding from the NVA, joined the m

and informed the Marines that a North Vietnamese battalion head -

quarters was next door to his house . With clearances obtained from the

Vietnamese authorities for "unobserved fire . . . for the first time," the

Marine battalion called in supporting artillery and mortar missions .

The following morning, the Marine infantry "went in" under a CS ga s

cover: "We had some fairly heavy resistance, but we cleared it out easily . . . ." Smith remembered, " we found where they had their battalion headquarters, " but the enemy bodies had been cleared out . Afte r

the taking of the headquarters, Smith wrote that Company A got some

rest " and were used mostly for security until we left." 1stLt Ray Smit h

to Capt Gordon D. Batcheller, dtd 25Mar68, Encl co Col Gordon D .

Batcheller, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Commen t

File). Unfortunately, the 1/1 Command Chronology and journal file i s

silent on this incident. 1/1 ComdC, Feb68 .

three-company sweep south of the city in conjunction

with the two battalions of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division . Under cover of darkness at 0300, the

battalion advanced south of the Phu Cam Canal alon g

Route 1 and then swung west and easily took its first

objective around 0500, a piece of high ground 1,00 0

meters south of the canal and west of the highway.

About an hour later, Company F secured its secon d

objective, Hill 103, another 1,000 meters south, agai n

without meeting any resistance .** On Hill 103, Lieu -

tenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham, the battalion commander, established an outpost manned by an artiller y

forward observer team, a forward air controller, and an

infantry squad from Company F for security . He the n

prepared to advance through a Vietnamese cemetery

upon his main objective, an ARVN engineer battalio n

compound, about 1,500 meters to the west. The engineers had held out against repeated VC and NVA

assaults since the beginning of the month .2 i

Close to 0700, with Company G on the right, Company H on the left, and Company F following in trace ,

the battalion began its attack to secure the ARVN

compound . Enemy mortars and automatic weapon s

fire forced the Marines to take cover among the tombs .

After the battalion called in artillery and mortars on

the suspected enemy positions, Company G, abou t

0830, reached the perimeter of the base and tied i n

with the ARVN engineers there . After discussing

defensive arrangements with the ARVN base commander, the Company G commander, Captain Charle s

L. Meadows, reported back to Lieutenant Colone l

Cheatham about the situation . The company commander warned Cheatham that the ARVN engineers ha d

extensively mined the approaches to their compoun d

and that a guide was required to pass through safely.

**Brigadier General Michael P. Downs, who as a captain commanded Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, recalled that on th e

24th, his company passed the remains of a Marine convoy that ha d

been ambushed earlier in the month in an attempt to bring supplies t o

an isolated Marine artillery battery located at the Rock Quarry acros s

the Perfume River from Phu Bai . Two men from his company who had

been wounded and trying to rejoin the company were among the casualties: "It was a demoralizing site . " BGen Michael P. Downs, Comments on draft, dtd 19Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Downs Comments. Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, who had commanded the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, recalled the same convoys. He

wrote : " All the vehicles were disabled and remained at the ambush sit e

until control was reestablished later in the month ." According to

Hughes, the Marine artillery battery was not attacked during th e

entire period and occasionally initiated counter battery fire on enemy

rocket launching sites in the Phu Bai sector. Col Robert C . V. Hugh -

es, Comments on draft, n .d . [1995) (Vietnam Comment File) .
AREA OF OPERATIONS

24-27-FEBRUARY 1968

. 21

.-,,, J-— /

I

-

r -, 17

-r---

:—.

- '.-

IL

212 THE DEFINING YEAR

Despite all precautions, the Navy corpsman with

Cheatham's command group triggered a mine and was

seriously wounded.24

Throughout the remainder of the day, the Marine

companies in their defensive positions in the compound and around the perimeter came under mortar

and automatic fire from a VC-held Buddhist temple to

the immediate south and a ridgeline to the west, overlooking the ARVN base. Cheatham observed that the

Communist gunners had preregistered their mortars

and automatic weapons fire on the key Marine defensive positions and terrain objectives. Deciding upon

much the same tactics as he had already employed, the

battalion commander planned upon enveloping the

enemy's positions under cover of darkness and coming

upon him in the morning.25

The enemy, however, was not taken in by the

Marine stratagem. Companies F and G moved out of

the perimeter as planned and then waited for artillery

and airstrikes to soften the enemy defenses. At 0700 on

the 25th, the two companies launched their attacks to

take the ridgeline and were met by mortar salvos and

continuous and accurate automatic weapons fire. As

one Marine infantryman with Company G observed,

"everyplace we'd go they would mortar us." With supporting artillery fires, naval gunfire, and close air support, the Marine infantry finally reached the crest of the

eastern portion of the ridgeline. In their efforts during

the day, the two companies sustained casualties of 1

Marine killed and 11 wounded. The Marines, in turn,

killed three of the enemy and took one prisoner. In the

meantime, Company H, which had cleared out a hamlet in support of the Army airborne brigade operating

to the south of the Marines, joined the other companies

on the eastern ridgeline.26

On the morning of the 26th, the Marine battalion

continued the attack to clear the ridgeline. In scattered skirmishes, Companies F and G on the ridgeline

killed about 20 NVA and took casualties of 2 Marine

dead and 13 wounded. About 500 meters to the

north, Company H, supported by air and artillery,

maneuvered to take the last hill on the ridgeline,

where the enemy remained entrenched in fixed positions. About 1330, enemy defenders, using mortars,

machine guns, and 57mm recoilless rifles, forced

Company H to pull back and call for an air strike. In

the fighting, the Marines sustained casualties of one

dead and five wounded and later counted six North

Vietnamese bodies 27

Resuming the attack after the air strike, Company H once more pushed forward. Again, the Communist troops doggedly resisted the Marine advance.

About 1620, once more unable to make any further

headway, the Marine company called upon air to take

out the enemy defenses. Two flights of A—4 Skyhawks came in low and dropped their ordnance.

Although the bombs knocked out two enemy mortars and two machine guns, killing about 20 North
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 21 3

Vietnamese troops, one fell short and burst near th e

Marines, killing four and wounding two . With darkness coming on, Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham

recalled the company and waited for the next morning to renew the assault.

On the morning of the 27th, Marine air an d

artillery bombarded the enemy defenses. After the last

fires had lifted, all three companies of the 2d Battalion

rushed forward . Reaching the crest of the hill withou t

encountering opposition, the Marines discovered tha t

the enemy had departed during the night . Strewn

around the hillscape were 14 enemy bodies. The

Marine battalion then completed its sweep south of the

new city the next day and prepared for a joint operatio n

with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to the east an d

north of Hue .

Leaving the southern sector to the 1st Brigade ,

101st Airborne on the 29th, the two Marine battalions entered their new area of operations to cut off any

NVA forces trying to make their way from Hue to th e

coast. Although encountering few enemy forces, th e

two battalions uncovered "fresh trench work along th e

route of advance, 3,000 meters long with 600 fighting holes . " Captain Michael P. Downs, the Company

F commander, remembered a trench complex that

"traveled in excess of five miles" with overhead cove r

every 15 meters. As Downs remarked, "that had to b e

a way to get significant reinforcements into the city. "

The search for significant North Vietnamese force s

proved fruitless. Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham

observed, "we couldn't close it [the loop around th e

enemy]. To be honest, we didn't have enough peopl e

to close it." On 2 March 1968, the Marines closed ou t

Operation Hue City.2 8

A Summing Up

The battle cost all sides dearly. Marine units of Tas k

Force X-Ray sustained casualties of 142 dead and clos e

to 1,100 wounded.* U.S. advisors with the 1st ARVN

Division in Hue reported 333 South Vietnamese Army

*The breakdown of casualties among the Marine infantry battalions are as follows : The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines sustained 67 dea d

and 403 wounded . The incomplete 2d Battalion, 5th Marines afteraction report does not show total Marine casualties, but the battalion 's

command chronology for February shows 65 Marines killed and 42 1

wounded . It can be assumed that over 90 percent of these casualtie s

occurred during the Hue City fighting . The 1st Battalion, 1st Marine s

did not submit an after-action report for Hue, but its comman d

chronology for February reflects 17 dead and 154 wounded . Again it

can be assumed that the bulk of the casualties occurred in the Hue City

fighting. 1/5 AAR Hue City ; 2/5 ComdC, Feb68 ; 1/1 ComdC, Feb68 .

troops killed, 1,773 wounded, and 30 missing i n

action. According to the U .S . Marine advisors with the

Vietnamese Marine task force in Hue, the Vietnamese

Marines suffered 88 killed, 350 wounded, and 1 missing in action . The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

listed casualties of 68 killed and 453 wounded for thei r

part in the battle while the 1st Brigade, 101st Air -

borne showed 6 dead and 56 wounded in its battl e

account. Thus, all told, allied unit casualties totale d

more than 600 dead and nearly 3,800 wounded and

missing. Obviously the enemy did not escape

unscathed . Allied estimates of NVA and VC dead

ranged from 2,500 to 5,000 troops. According to the

South Vietnamese, captured Communist document s

admitted to 1,042 killed and an undisclosed number o f

wounded.2 9

Just as speculative were the size and number o f

units that the allies engaged in the one month battle .

The allied command, however, knew that the enem y

was in Hue in force . South Vietnamese and U.S . intelligence officers initially identified at least three Nort h

Vietnamese regimental headquarters controlling subordinate units during the early fighting . These were

the 4th, 5th, and 6th NVA Regiments. Later, American

and South Vietnamese units confirmed battalions fro m

at least three more NVA regiments—the 29th from the

325C NVA Division and the 90th and 803d from the

324B Division. The 1st Air Cavalry Division reporte d

prisoners from yet another regiment, the 24th Regiment ,

304th NVA Division. Allied intelligence estimated tha t

from 16 to 18 enemy battalions took part in the battle

for Hue in one form or another, not including VC loca l

force units. It would be a safe bet that from 8,000 t o

11,000 enemy troops participated in the fighting for

Hue in the city itself or the approaches to the forme r

imperial capital .3 °

Until the battle for Hue, the allied order of battl e

estimates carried the battalions from the 29th and the

90th NVA as part of the besieging force at Khe Sanh ,

approximately 45 miles to the northwest. The 803d

Regiment was supposed to be in the eastern DMZ,

another 45 miles to the north . One prisoner from the

803d, captured on 23 February by Vietnames e

Marines, told his captors that his unit on the night o f

21—22 February made a forced march from Gio Linh

District to the Citadel . Although wounded himself, he

spoke of the high morale and fairly low casualties in his

unit. On the 23d, he stated that his unit receive d

orders to withdraw, but did not know why. In the hasty

departure, he lost his way and ran into the South Vietnamese troops. 3 1
214 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of Col Talman C. Budd II, USMC (Ret )

The South Vietnamese Marine Task Force Alpha commander, the officer on the right holding a map ,

confers with officers of the 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion west of the city, after leaving Hue .

The allies remained unsure about the North Vietnamese command and control for the battle of Hue .

U.S . after action reports referred to a division-siz e

force, but never identified any particular enemy division headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van

Khoa, the South Vietnamese Thua Thien Provinc e

chief, who remained in hiding until rescued by American Marines,* accidentally overheard a conversatio n

among some enemy officers. According to Khoa, th e

North Vietnamese mentioned a division taking part i n

the battle and the division headquarters was "in a n

unknown location south of the city of Hue inside a

pagoda ." Khoa could not remember the number of th e

division, but recalled that it ended with a 4 . In all

probability, however, Khoa confused the divisio n

headquarters with the 4th NVA Regiment. Given the

disparity of so many regiments from so many different

divisions, allied intelligence officers believed that a

forward headquarters of the Tri-Thien-Hue Front under

a North Vietnamese general officer directed the NVA

Hue offensive .j'

Given both the resources that the North Vietnamese put into the battle and the tenacity with which

they fought, it was obvious that the Hue campaign wa s

*See Chapter 10 .

a major component of the entire Tet offensive . According to an enemy account, the North Vietnamese military command in planning the offensive took into consideration that the U .S . and South Vietnamese had

concentrated their forces in the north, expecting a n

attack along Route 9. It viewed Hue a weak link in th e

allied defenses in the northern two provinces. As the

North Vietnamese author wrote : "The enemy knew

nothing of our strategy; by the time our forces

approached the city of Hue, the enemy still had no t

taken any specific defensive measures .";>

Once in Hue, the North Vietnamese were there to

stay. The Communists established their own civil government and their cadres rounded up known government officials, sympathizers, and foreigners includin g

American civilians and military personnel in the part s

of the city they controlled. After the recapture of Hue ,

South Vietnamese authorities exhumed some 3,00 0

bodies thrown into hastily dug graves . In all probability, these were the victims of the Communist

roundups. Although the North Vietnamese admitted

the tracking clown and punishing of "hoodlum ringleaders," they claimed most of the reported civilia n

deaths were the result of happenstance, exaggeration s

by the South Vietnamese, or caused by the allies. The

true sufferers in the battle were the people of Hue .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 21 5

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190581 and bottom photo is courtesy of Col Talman C . Budd II, USMC (Bet )

At top, a bound North Vietnamese prisoners captured in the fighting for Hue are waiting to board the

Army "Huey" helicopter in the background for evacuation and later interrogation. In bottom photo . a

South Vietnamese Marine colonel, the Assistant Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, briefs

the press on the battle for Hue and prisoners captured by the South Vietnamese Marines.
216 THE DEFINING YEA R

Some estimates held that over 80 percent of the structures in the city sustained damage or were destroyed.

Out of a population of about 140,000, more than

116,000 people were homeless and 5,800 were either

dead or missing. According to most reports, Hue wa s

a devastated city.i4 *

From the allied perspective, the struggle for Hue

was a near thing, especially in the first few days. Only

the failure of the North Vietnamese to overrun th e

Mang Ca and MACV compounds permitted the allies

to retain a toehold in both the Citadel and the new city . With the holding of these two positions, the Americans and South Vietnamese were able to bring in reinforcements to mount a counteroffensive . The battalion

commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, Lieu -

tenant Colonel Marcus J. Gravel, observed that the

enemy had oriented his defenses to fend off forces com -

ing into the city: "When we got in and were able to

stay in there in strength . . . we fought him from the

inside out." Even then, if the enemy had blown the A n

Cuu Bridge across Route 1 on the first day, the Marine s

would not have been able to bring in their initial battalions and supplies into the city 3 i

Fortuitously for both the Americans and the Sout h

Vietnamese, the 1st Air Cavalry Division had arrive d

in northern I Corps before Tet and was in position to

commit eventually a four-battalion brigade to the battle . Overcoming strong enemy opposition, includin g

elements of three separate regiments, on 25 February,

the 3d Brigade reached the walls of the Citadel, closin g

out the enemy avenues of approach to the city from the

west. By this time, the American and South Vietnamese forces had overwhelming superiority and th e

North Vietnamese units, fighting a rear guard action ,

* Former Washington Post reporter Peter Braestrup, an eyewitness t o

the battle, cautioned in his book against overdramatic comparisons tha t

appeared in the media of the Hue battle with World War II battles.

According to Braestrup, " to the uninitiated or imaginative observer on

the ground, it [Hue] suggested Seoul or Stalingrad . . . . Actually Hu e

got off fairly lightly by World War II or Korean War standards fo r

three-week urban battles." Braestrup, Big Story, vol . 1, p. 202 . For contrasting views of the Hue " massacres, " see Douglas Pike, " Viet Cong

Strategy, New Face of Terror, " and D . Gareth Porter, " The 1968 Hue

Massacre " in Hue Tet Folder, A&S Files, Indochina Archives . William

D . Ehrhart a former Marine who served with the 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines in Hue and has written extensively on the Vietnam experience,

commented that he personally saw a lot of dead civilians, killed not b y

intent, "but only because they were in the midst of some of the fierces t

fighting of the war." While admitting he did not know "what actuall y

happened," Ehrhart believes "there is more room for doubt than you r

account (and most others suggest) ." William D. Ehrhart, Comments on

draft, dtd 23Nov91 (Vietnam Comment File) . The authors of this work

feel no need to change the description in the text .

abandoned the struggle to hold on to the city. Major

General Tolson, the 1st Cavalry commander, remembered that General Truong told him that if "I coul d

ever get the Cav to the walls of Hue, the enemy would

'bug out. – The problem was that it took 22 days for

the 3d Brigade to fight its way there . Major Talman C .

Budd II, the U.S . Marine advisor to the Vietnamese

Marine Task Force, later wrote that if the 1st Cavalr y

had been reinforced or replaced "to enable sealing off

the west wall sooner, . . .{it} would have shortened th e

struggle to reach the south wall . " 3C'

Although the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese harassed ship traffic in the Perfume Rive r

and the other water routes into the city, they mad e

no serious attempt to close the waterways . Even with

the An Cuu Bridge closed for over a week, the

Marines had stockpiled and brought in enough sup -

plies by LCU to support operations in both th e

Citadel and southern Hue . By 14 February, with a

pontoon bridge in place over the canal, the road network into the new city, at least, was once more open .

On two occasions, nevertheless, because the NV A

sank one LCU and temporarily shut down the boa t

traffic on the Perfume River, Major Thompson in th e

Citadel stopped his battalion's advance because of a

shortage of 106mm and 90mm rounds for his recoilless rifles and tanks.37 If the enemy had made a

stronger effort to cut both the water and land lines of

communications, the outcome of the struggle fo r

Hue would have been less predictable .

Despite marginal flying conditions that curtailed

resupply missions and the haphazard attempts of the

enemy to cut the lines of communications, th e

Marines eventually built up their logistic facilities i n

Hue. Marine helicopters eventually lifted more tha n

500 tons of all types of supplies into Hue while five

Navy LCUs brought in another 400 tons . After the

opening of Route 1 on 12 February, Marine truck s

from Company B, 7th Motor Transportation Battalion

carried the bulk of the resupplies into the city. More

than 100 truck convoys made the round trip from Ph u

Bai to Hue . 3 8

The 1st Marines first established its logistic support

area (LSA) in the city next to the LCU ramp . Because

of the LSA's exposure to enemy mortar fire and snipers,

the Marines moved it to a South Vietnamese government complex next to the MACV compound . With

the stockpiling of supplies resulting in a premium fo r

space, the 1st Marines then relocated the LSA to the Tu

Do Soccer Stadium several blocks to the east of th e

MACV buildings. On 22 February, Force Logistic Sup-
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 21 7

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190503 and bottom photo is courtesy of Col Talman C . Budd II, USMC (Ret)

The fighting for Hue caused extensive damage in the city. Top, the ruins of the Hue market place can

be seen, while below is a view of the south wall of the Citadel taken from the west wall. The devastation upon the homes and buildings in between the two walls is obvious.
218 THE DEFINING YEA R

Top photo is courtesy of Col Talman C . Budd II, USMC (Ret) and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19049 2

After the destruction of the bridges Marines depended upon river traffic for resupply. At top is an

aerial view of the river after the battle with several damaged river craft. The picture was taken from

a helicopter whose machine gun can be seen in the forefront . Below, Marine infantry have M16 rifle s

and M60 machine guns at the ready to return enemy sniper or harassing fires from on hoard a LC M

(landing craft, mechanized) carrying 105mm ammunition.
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 21 9

port Group (FLSG) Alpha took over from the 1st

Marines the running of the LSA .

In his after-action report, General LaHue, the Task

Force X-Ray commander, observed that his comman d

made few if any logistic innovations, but implemente d

some procedures "which were necessary and effective . "

According to LaHue, these usually "involved forc e

feeding and preplanning . " Because of the nature of th e

fighting, the 1st Marines and the committed battalion s

found it almost impossible to anticipate their needs i n

advance . The result was that their "requests escalate d

quickly from routine, to priority, to emergency ." Based

on the experience of the first four days of combat, Task

Force X-Ray then prestaged a "balanced package of

usually needed supplies. As soon as higher priority

cargo was delivered, these would then be delivere d

without a request." The Task Force commander credited the logistic support with enabling the infantry battalions to clear the cityj9

With the low ceilings limiting the number of helicopter flights, medical support and evacuation als o

operated under different and more difficult circumstances . It soon became apparent to the 1st Marines fo r

the need of forward medical facilities . Colonel Hughe s

established the regimental aid station at the MAC V

compound with eight doctors. The regimental facility

provided "definitive" emergency care and control and

coordination of all medical evacuation . It also served as

a battalion aid station for the 1st Battalion, 1s t

Marines. The other two battalions, the 1st Battalio n

and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, each had its own aid

station . Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham, the 2d Battalion commander, declared that medical evacuation was

"a throwback to World War II . {I] Had my doctor . . .

one block behind the frontline treating the peopl e

right there ." 10

The Marines used trucks, mechanical mules, and

any available transportation to carry the wounded bac k

to the treatment facilities. According to the 1st

Marines account, it averaged about two to three minutes to bring a wounded man from the battle site to a n

aid station . It took another two to three minutes from

the aid station to the helicopter landing zone for further evacuation if required . Eventually, the regimental

surgeon established two categories of wounded to b e

evacuated by helicopter—Class I, emergency medevac,

weather permitting; and Class II, immediate evacuation. Army helicopters assisted in Class I while Marin e

helicopters had sole responsibility for the emergenc y

Class II, "which they accomplished under severe

weather conditions, and with great risk to the helicopter crews, often times flying with a 100-foot ceiling

and 0 visibility." 1 1

On the south side of the Perfume River, only two

casualties who arrived alive at the forward aid station s

died. These were two men from the 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines who died minutes after their arrival, one of

gunshot wounds (GSW)to the head and the other of a

wound to the neck with "severance of both carotid

arteries." Across the river, where the 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines was dependant upon air or water evacuation ,

six men died "after emergency care while awaiting

helicopter evacuation during severely inclemen t

weather." The battalion surgeon declared, however,

that four "would have died regardless of evacuatio n

because of the nature of their wounds, and of the

remaining two it is equivocal whether they could hav e

been saved if evacuated quickly." In the Hue City battle, like all operations in Vietnam, despite the problems with helicopter evacuation, if a Marine reache d

an aid station alive, his chances of survival were close

to 99 percent.''-*

One other problem that the allies faced was population control. With the widespread destruction in the

city, the estimated 116,000 homeless had to be fed

and temporarily housed. Much of the population just

fled the city and took refuge with relatives and friend s

in the surrounding villages. After the initial confusion, both U.S. and South Vietnamese agencies began

to set up refugee centers. U .S . Army Major Jack E. Walker, a subsector advisor, recalled that his superio r

about a week after the NVA struck told him that h e

was now the "CORDS `refugee man. — According to

Walker, he surveyed the situation and discovered that

he had 5,000 refugees in a Catholic church and another 17,000 at Hue University. Another 40,000 displaced people were in the Citadel sector . Walker initially concerned himself with three tasks : restoring

city services including water and power ; eliminating

health hazards including burying the dead; and securing food . With the assistance of the local Catholi c

hierarchy and American resources and personnel , Walker and his people began attacking all of thes e

problems. By the end of February, a full-time refuge e

administrator was in place and local government slowly began to function once more .,

* Brigadier General Michael P. Downs observed that the 99 percen t

chance of survival after reaching a battalion aid station was probabl y

true after 4 February. He stated he had at least two Marines of his company before that date die of wounds after being evacuated to an aid station . Downs Comments. Those two Marines, however, may have been

the two who died referred to in the text .
220 THE DEFINING YEA R

Top photo is courtesy of Col Talman C . Budd II, USMC (Ret) and the bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37293 0

The civilian population of Hue was caught in the middle of the battle . Top, survivors from the houseto-house fighting in the Citadel attempt to make themselves as comfortable as possible on a dir t

embankment, apparently in one of the parks of the old city . Below, Marines lead and assist Sout h

Vietnamese refugees carrying what belongings they can away from the combat area .
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 22 1

In the first two weeks there was hardly any semblance of public order. The authors of the South Vietnamese official history of Tet wrote : "Thievery and

looting were widespread . War victims stole from thei r

fellow sufferers. All deserted houses were emptied of

valuables . Robbed victims sought to steal from others . "

At least one Marine battalion commander, Lieutenan t

Colonel Gravel, complained about the "ARVN looting

behind us."4 1

More serious, from an American perspective, were

reports that U.S . Marines were also involved in th e

looting. The Associated Press was supposed to have a

photograph of an American soldier or Marine carryin g

a large painting under his arm. A Swiss newspaperman

reported to MACV that he saw "numerous breaches o f

discipline which would not be tolerated in the Swiss

Army." He claimed that a Marine tried to sell him a

Longines watch and that he saw other Marines hel p

themselves to photographic equipment from a partially destroyed store . The newspaper man came across

another group of Marines near the Royal Palace manning a strongpoint, and "drinking whiskey, cognac,

and beer, and cooking chickens." Moreover, he

observed several Marines "amusing themselves by

shooting at dogs, cats and chickens." A CORDS official told Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker that Marines

vandalized the offices of the manager and deputy manager of the Hue power plant, alleging they took as well

"whiskey, piasters, and dollars." 4 5

On 26 February, General Westmoreland ordere d

both Generals Abrams and Cushman to give their

"personal attention" to this potentially explosive issue .

In turn, General Cushman asked both the commanding generals of Task Force X-Ray, Brigadier Genera l

LaHue, and the 1st Marine Division, Major Genera l

Donn J . Robertson, to inform him of all measures

taken by members of their commands to avoid suc h

incidents: "Looting obviously cannot be tolerated, and

we must insure that every step is taken to prevent it .

Officers and NCOs must be held responsible for looting by their subordinates." For his part, General

Abrams assigned the MACV (Forward) staff judg e

advocate to begin a formal investigation . At the same

time, General Robertson sent an attorney from the 1s t

Division legal office, Captain Bernard A. Allen, to Hue

to assist in the probe .4 6

On 2 March 1968, General Abrams reported t o

Westmoreland the results of the investigation . He first

disposed of the question of the Associated Press photograph. According to the AP Bureau heads in Vietnam ,

they knew of no such picture . They did remember a

photograph taken before Tet of a 1st Cavalry soldie r

carrying a religious painting of the Virgin Mary in a

sector south of Da Nang . After interviewing all commanders, newsmen, and CORDS personnel, the investigators concluded that "probably some small article s

were looted by the Marines . . . however, these reported incidents were in extreme contrast to extensive an d

systematic looting by ARVN troops and civilians . "

Captain Allen learned that ARVN troops employed

trucks to carry away their booty. Colonel Khoa, the

Thua Thien Province Chief, had received no formal

complaints from South Vietnamese citizens against th e

Marines. General Abrams observed : "At this time,

investigation has failed to produce sufficient evidenc e

upon which to base prosecution for any instance o f

looting by U .S . personnel ." ''

Abrams generally commended the Marine commanders . He observed that Colonel Hughes of the 1s t

Marines very early took "positive measures to dete r

looting." On 4 February, Hughes told all officers and

NCOs that "looting and pillage would not be tolerated." He directed that battalion and company commanders carry out periodic "shakedowns" of personnel . Many valuables were turned into the regimenta l

CP and returned to the rightful owner. Hughes did

authorize the commandeering and "cannibalization of

vehicles as it became necessary to transport casual -

ties."** He also ordered the shooting of dogs, cats, an d

pigs because the animals were "eating bodies, both o f

U.S . and [Vietnamese} . . . which could not be immediately retrieved because of the tactical situation . "

Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham stated that in the University his men used blankets and broke windows "t o

avoid fragmentation from incoming rounds ." General

Abrams concluded "Marine commanders appear to

have taken reasonable measures to prevent looting an d

needless destruction ." I 8

Obviously in a fluid situation and close-quarte r

street fighting such as Hue, commanders did not hav e

absolute control or know all of the activities of thei r

men. One Marine lance corporal reported, "anythin g

that was of any value we took . . . to keep for souvenir s

and stuff." He mentioned random destruction cause d

by Marines in the University of microscopes and othe r

* Brigadier General Paul G . Graham, the former 1st Marine Divisions Operations Officer or G—3, commented that looting was not a

problem as far as the Division was concerned . . . ." Graham Comments

**Peter Braestrup, the former AFkshsngton Post reporter commented that he remembered reading a sign "'Hotel Company Kicks Ass ' . .

. on a seized van, used to haul supplies. " Peter Braestrup, Comments

on draft, n .d . [Dec94—Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File) .
222 THE DEFINING YEA R

laboratory equipment . The lance corporal was particularly amused by the troops seizing stray vehicles such

as motor scooters, trucks, and even jeeps : "A grunt . . .

would just jump on it and start riding it around th e

streets . . . that was pretty funny—right in the middl e

of this war riding up and down the streets in moto r

scooters and even a 1964 black Mercedes goes flyin g

down the street filled up with a bunch of Marines i n

it." A Navy corpsman with the Marines recorded in hi s

diary: "Looting is widespread . The ARVN's wait until

the Marines secure an area and then move in to loot .

The Marines do well for themselves also." 49

Although admitting to the validity of some of thes e

accounts, Marine commanders in Hue believed that

their men acted with general restraint considering al l

the temptations confronting them. Five years later,

Lieutenant Colonel Gravel recalled, "we took things to

our use ; I wouldn't kid you about that . I saw some

things and I saw that they were returned ." He remembered : "We used bedding, we used food, we used alco -

hol that was there ; but there was no looting to one's

own advantage . There were a couple of attempts at it,

but word got around and I daresay there was damne d

little, if any." In a similar vein, Lieutenant Colone l

Cheatham and his company commanders made much

the same case . At the Marine Corps Schools, in Jul y

1973, Captain Meadows, the Company G commander,

related : "We did take things for our use . . . blankets,

food, water. We must have taken every candle in that

side of the city for illumination for our own use at

night. These things—you want to call it looting?

O.K., we looted." Despite some admitted pilfering o f

small items such as watches and money, all of the company commanders denied there was any real problem.

As Captain Meadows concluded : "Your troops don' t

have time to pick up big things to carry them around .

They have other, more pressing things [to do} ."5 °

Some independent accounts supported the contention of the Marine commanders that their troops

acted with reasonable forbearance in the city. The

Marine PFC James M. Jones from Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines assists a Vietnamese child to climb out of a window of her house to escape the house-to-house fighting in the new city . Marines did what they could for the hapless civilia n

population caught up in the fighting.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A371127
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH 22 3

Washington Post carried one story describing Marines

holed up in a residence that obviously belonged to a

wealthy man . The house contained a fully stocked

liquor cabinet, furniture, television set, and various

other furnishings. About 0700, as the Marines sat

around eating their breakfast of cold C—Rations, the

owner's servants arrived with a note asking permissio n

to remove the household goods. It took four servants

three round trips to carry out the items . The onl y

things that were missing were the beer that the

Marines had drunk and one broken bottle of Johnn y

Walker whisky. In another report, an American volunteer worker, who had been visiting Vietnamese friend s

in Hue when the offensive erupted, described his rescue by Marines from Company B, 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines. His friends provided him with sanctuary i n

their house while the North Vietnamese held the city .

As the fighting intensified, the "family heard soldiers

firing nearby" and hid the American under one of the

beds. According to the newspaper account, one Marin e

reached the side of the house and shouted : "Are there

any VC in there?" The volunteer scrambled outside

and identified himself. An unbelieving Captain Fernandez Jennings, Jr., the company commander, wondered aloud about the Marine asking if there were V C

inside. When assured that was the case, Jennings muttered to himself, "It's a great war ." s '

The suddenness and the extent of the enemy offensive in Hue caught both the South Vietnamese and

American commands offstride . At first underestimating the strength of the enemy in Hue, the allies sen t

too few troops to drive the attackers out . Although

the South Vietnamese and U.S . commands in I Corps

eventually deployed additional units piecemeal into

the Citadel and the southern city and inserted the 3 d

Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division to the west, comman d

and control and coordination remained a proble m

until the last weeks of the operation . In a sense, Task

Force X-Ray, the 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d

Brigade all fought their own battles in isolation fro m

one another. Outside of General Cushman of III MA F

and General Abrams, MACV (Forward), there wa s

not even an overall American, let alone single commander of the Hue campaign. Both Cushman and

Abrams were at too high a level and distracted b y

Khe Sanh to focus much of their attention, excep t

periodically, to the Hue situation . From his headquarters at the Mang Ca compound, General Truong ,

the 1st ARVN Division commander, did control th e

South Vietnamese effort in the Citadel . Major Talma n

C. Budd II, the U.S . Marine advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Task Force A, observed, however, that

the lack of an overall commander resulted in no general battle plan and competition for supporting fires,

air, and logistic support . A Task Force X-Ray staff

officer sardonically remarked that by the time Arm y

Brigadier General Davis of the 1st Cavalry Division

became the Hue coordinator, "he didn't have any -

thing to coordinate, but he had the name ." The command relationships in northern I Corps under MAC V

(Forward) were tenuous at bests ''- * With the date approaching for the end of his stay

at Phu Bai in early March, General Abrams provided

General Westmoreland his assessment of the enemy

situation in the north . Abrams was less concerned

about Khe Sanh, but worried about the NVA using

the A Shau Valley and Route 547 leading from th e

valley to "turn our flank ." He also expressed some

anxiety about the recent move of the 803d NVA Regiment into the Hue vicinity. Abrams stated that and

the "continuing movement of [NVA} replacements t o

coastal plains supports my belief that Hue is th e

objective he [the enemy] would most like to have . "

The MACV [Forward] commander acknowledged ,

however, that the NVA might "settle for an objectiv e

of less importance should the opportunity presen t

itself." He believed both sides were fighting for time

and that "both sides require time to overcome manpower and logistical deficiencies ." In the long run ,

however, he believed that time was on the allied side .

General Cushman and General Westmoreland concurred in Abrams assessment. All three American

commanders believed that the recapture of Hue was

only a lull before the North Vietnamese launche d

another wave of attacks.5 3

*See Chapter 13 for further discussion of command relations i n

northern 1 Corps.
PART III

AFTER TET,

KHE SANH ,

AND MINI-TET
CHAPTER 1 3

Post-Tet in I Corp s

The Immediate Ramifications of the Tet Offensive—Readjustment in I Corp s

Readjustments in the U.S. I Corps Command Structure—Planning for the Futur e

March Operations in the DMZ Sector—March Operations in the Rest of I Corps—Regaining the Initiativ e

The Immediate Ramifications of the Tet Offensive

By the end of February and the beginning of March

with the securing of the city of Hue, the enemy's countrywide Tet offensive had about shot its initial bolt .

According to American estimates, the Communists

lost about half of their attacking force, more than

40,000 from an estimated 84,000 men . In I Corps

alone, from January through March 1968, Lieutenan t

General Robert Cushman, the III MAF Commander,

later calculated that allied forces killed over 30,000 of

the enemy, the equivalent of 74 infantry battalions.1 *

The Communist command, itself, admitted to several shortcomings. As early as 1 February 1968, th e

Central Office of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong governing body, issued a circular to its subordinate commands. According to the Communist leadership, "w e

failed to seize a number of primary objectives and to

completely destroy mobile and defensive units of th e

enemy." The memorandum blamed the Viet Cong military forces for failure "to hold the occupied areas," and ,

moveover, held the political cadre accountable for no t

motivating the " people to stage uprisings and break

the enemy oppressive control . " In Military Region 5,

which included both Quang Ngai City and Da Nang ,

the Communist headquarters conceded that its troops

and cadre within the cities were not strong enough t o

assist the main force units outside of the cities . In an

official history, the Communist author acknowledge d

that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attackin g

units "did not meet the basic requirements that had

been set forth." Contrary to the enemy expectations,

the South Vietnamese Army had not disintegrated an d

in many sectors acquitted itself reasonably well, especially on the defensive .'-

Still the tenor of the Communist communiques wa s

one of defiance . They all claimed the achievement of

*Cushman's statistics include figures before and after Tet and ,

therefore, give a somewhat distorted picture of the enemy 's Tet casual -

ties. It, nevertheless, is indicative of the intensity of the fighting in the

I Corps sector during the Tet period and of the enemy's losses.

great victories and made references to final victory fo r

their cause. At the same time, however, the enemy

leadership warned their supporters: "Our people's

struggle has stepped into an extremely tense and fierc e

phase and is developing very rapidly" They no longe r

spoke of a short-term campaign, but that "the General

Offensive and General Uprising will not last for only a

few days, but that it is a phase of a general attac k

against the enemy." One phase was over and another

was to begin . 3

The American military was also examining th e

consequences of the enemy's offensive . While confident that Tet was a major military defeat for the Communists, U.S . commanders were well aware of the cos t

to their side. Allied casualties during the fightin g

totaled in excess of 12,000, with about two-thirds suffered by the ARVN. The battle of Hue was a nea r

thing, especially in the first few days . While expecting an attack, especially in the north around Khe San h

or possibly the DMZ, General Westmoreland and th e

MACV staff had underestimated the breadth an d

extent of the enemy general offensive . Some 600,000

civilians were now refugees, about 100,000 in I Corps

alone . The pacification effort had sustained a majo r

setback . In mid-February, Marine Brigadier General

John R. Chaisson, the director of the MACV Comba t

Operations Center, observed in a letter home, "the

damage in the cities and to the economy is staggering .

ARVN will be somewhat less than effective for

weeks." He then wrote, however, " . . . there is a general tightening up of everything, and if the guys o n

top don't panic this could be the turning point of the

war-even though he {the enemy} initiated it for us . "

Chaisson expressed the sentiments of many of th e

MACV commanders including both Generals Westmoreland and Cushman .-

;

In Washington, the Johnson administration als o

began its reevaluation of the Vietnam War in light o f

the enemy offensive . Other factors also clouded the situation. On 23 January, North Korean gunboats captured the U.S . intelligence ship, USS Pueblo (AGER-2),

225
— ,— -

C

04 •

,-:.---°•-

POST TET

IN I CORPS

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Kilometers

•—' _o

226 THE DEFINING YEAR

off the Korean coast and took the officers and crew priscier. In response, the administration called up 14,000

°The North Koreans claimed territorial waters off their coast up to

20 miles, while the U.S. only recognized Korean territorial waters of 3

miles. According to the official incuiry the Pueblo was boarded approximately 15 miles off the Korean toast. CinCPacFlt, Findings of Fact,

Opinion, etc. of Court of Inquiry, Case of Pueblo (AGER—2), nd.,

Pueblo File, Post 1Jan46 Comd File (OAB, NHD). See also Center of

Naval History, Comments on draft, dtd Dec94 (Vietnam Comment

File) and VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance, A Story

Navy and Air Force Reserves, so as not to divert any

active forces from the Southeast Asia battlefield. Continued domestic opposition to the war, often led by influential members of his own party; also served to distract the

President's attention. Although forewarned about a possible enemy offensive, "it was more massive," than President Johnson, like Westmoreland, "had anticipated."

of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965—1968 (Washington: Naval Historical Division, 1972), p. 219.
POST-TET IN I CORPS 22 7

If possible, the mood in Washington was grimmer than that in Saigon . While the President rejected proposals by the Joint Chiefs to intensify the air

war over Haiphong and Hanoi, he was willing to

rush ground reinforcements, if necessary, to prevent

the fall of the Marine base at Khe Sanh . On 3 February, at the behest of the President, the Chairman o f

the Joint Chiefs, General Earle G . Wheeler, asked

Westmoreland, "if there is any reinforcement or help

that we can give you." In reply, Westmoreland onl y

requested another squadron of C—130 cargo aircraft

and air-drop equipment. At the same time, Westmoreland asked his staff to make a study of the long -

range requirements. At this point, Wheeler rathe r

tartly observed that the long-range could wait, "we

can handle only one major problem at a time ." The

Chairman emphasized that the Joint Chiefs and the

President were concerned about Westmoreland's

" immediate requirements stemming from the present situation in Vietnam ." In another cable, Wheeler warned the MACV commander: "The United

States Government is not prepared to accept a defea t

in South Vietnam. In summary, if you need more

troops, ask for them." 6

These exchange of messages between Westmoreland and Wheeler developed into a strange colloquy i n

which the Chairman eventually maneuvered Westmoreland into requesting significant additional force s

which would require a callup of the Reserves. On 1 2

February, at a meeting at the White House, however,

President Johnson delayed his final decision, bu t

approved the immediate deployment of a brigade o f

the U.S. Army 82d Airborne Division and the 27th

Marines to Vietnam . Both the Army Brigade and the

Marine regiment were to reinforce General Cushman's

forces in I Corps.7 *

Readjustment in I Corps

By the end of February, the reinforcements for I

Corps were in place or on their way. On 10 and 1 2

February, the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E . Greenwood, at

Hawaii embarked on board three Navy ships, the US S

Vancouver (LPD 2), the USS Bexar (APA 237), and the

Washburn (AKA 108). Originally scheduled to participate in two landing exercises on Okinawa, the newly

formed BLT received a change of orders while at sea o n

13 February, as a result of the President's decision, t o

*Chapter 27 will go into further detail on the manpower decision s

of February 1968 and the question about the activation of the Reserves .

proceed to Da Nang. Between 14 and 21 February, th e

rest of RLT (Regimental Landing Team) 27 deploye d

by sea and air from Camp 'Pendleton, California to D a

Nang. U.S . Air Force Military Airlift Comman d

planes flew more than 3,300 men of the regiment

together with 1,196 short tons of their equipment

from California to Vietnam . By 17 February, the 27t h

Marines headquarters, under Colonel Adolph G .

Schwenk, Jr., together with those of BLTs 2/27, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Bacher, and

3/27, under Lieutenant Colonel Tullis J . Woodham,

Jr., opened their command posts at the Da Nang base .

The forces arriving as part of RLT 27 also included

personnel from the artillery battalion, 2d Battalion ,

13th Marines, under the command of Lieutenant

Colonel Rhys J. Phillips, Jr. On 21 February, the US S

Thomaston (LSD 28) departed San Diego with the surface elements of the RLT, some 200 personnel and ove r

5,000 tons of equipment for Vietnam . By the end of

the month, the 1st Battalion had joined the other two

battalions of the regiment at Da Nang. General Cush -

man later declared that he had not known the 27t h

Marines was available and that he had not requeste d

them, but that they arrived in " response to overall

requirements set by Westmoreland." As the 1st

Marine Division assistant division commander and

Task Force X-Ray commander, Brigadier General Foster C . LaHue, remembered, however, III MAF was

"happy to get them [RLT 27] . " 8

Throughout this period, General Westmoreland

continued to deploy U.S . Army units north . From

mid January through the end of February, MACV

reinforced III MAF with over 20,000 Army troops in I

Corps, including support units. The combat forces

included the 1st Air Cavalry Division headquarters and

two brigades, two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division, and the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division ,

which, like the 27th Marines, had just arrived in Vietnam from the United States. First located at Chu Lai i n

Quang Tin Province under the Americal Division, elements of the 82d Airborne brigade then joined the 1st

Marine Division Task Force X-Ray in the Phu Ba i

Vital Area in Thua Thien Province .,

By, the end of February, III MAF numbered nearl y

129,000 officers and men, an increase of nearly 12,00 0

over the previous month. These figures included over

82,000 Marines and nearly 45,000 U .S . Army personnel. In Quang Tri Province, encompassing U .S . units at

Khe Sanh, the DMZ sector, and south of Quang Tri

City, there were 16 maneuver battalions (infantry,

amphibian tractor, and tank), 13 Marine and 3 Army .
228 THE DEFINING YEA R

Sixteen battalions, 12 Army and 4 Marine, operated i n

Thua Thien Province. Seven Marine battalions, including the 3d Amphibian Tractor battalion, stayed in the

Da Nang area of operations while five Army battalion s

from the U.S . Army Americal Division continued

Operation Wheeler/Wallowa in the Nui Loc Son sec -

tor. Of the remaining eight battalions of the Americal ,

four were at Chu Lai and the rest split between Quan g

Ngai and Duc Pho.l o

With the possible exception of the Khe Sanh sector

and continuing harassment of Marine positions along

the eastern DMZ, by the end of the month, the enemy

tempo of operations throughout I Corps had diminished. Even along the DMZ, the intensity of the NVA

attacks no longer matched those at the beginning o f

February. In fact, the number of ground assaults i n

February actually declined while the NVA confine d

most of its activity to artillery, rocket, and mortar bombardment. Taking advantage of the apparent lull in th e

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Tet offensive, the

American commanders continued to make adjustments and to take the fight to the enemy throughou t

the I Corps sector. "

In southern I Corps, the Americal Division continued with Operation Muscatine in Quang Ngai

Province. For the most part, the Army units experienced relatively light contact except for two significant

clashes with a VC battalion . In the first, on 12 February, Americal Task Force Barker conducted a combine d

operation with the 2d ARVN Division and engaged i n

a five-hour firefight . The Americal task force reported

killing 78 of the enemy with the loss of 1 U .S . soldier.

Eleven days later, on the 23d, Company A, 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry apparently encountered the same

enemy unit with almost the same results. The Americans claimed to have killed 68 of the enemy at a cost o f

the lives of 2 U.S . soldiers. For the entire month, the

Americal Division in the operation killed over 270 o f

the enemy and sustained casualties of 13 killed and

124 wounded. The division also reported recovering

35 individual enemy weapons and accidentally killin g

8 innocent civilians caught in the crossfire betwee n

American and VC units.12

Further north, in the Wheeler/Wallowa area of

operations, the Americal Division also accounted for a

significant number of enemy casualties . On 9 February,

in the Que Son Valley, elements of the divisio n

engaged a battalion of the 29th NVA Regiment. In littl e

over seven hours, the American soldiers killed more

than 200 of the enemy and recovered 53 individual an d

13 crew-served weapons. Near the end of the month,

1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry and a troop of the 7t h

Squadron, 17th Cavalry ran into another fairly large

Communist unit and accounted for 148 enemy dead

and recovered 32 individual and 9 crew-serve d

weapons. For the month, the Army units in the operation sustained casualties of 98 dead and 455 wounde d

while in turn killing nearly 1,200 of the enemy, takin g

24 prisoners, and recovering 274 individual and 3 7

crew-served weapons. The division acknowledged tha t

92 "innocent civilians" also inadvertently met thei r

death as a result of the operation . Despite the two battalion-sized actions, Operation Wheeler/Wallowa

mostly involved numerous contacts between America n

and NVA/VC small-unit patrols .1 3

The war in the 1st Marine Division Da Nang area

of operations, especially after the repulse of the 2d

NVA Division's offensive in the second week of February, also reverted to a small-unit war. For the Marine

units in the TAOR it was a period of retrenchmen t

and readjustment. By the end of the month, the newl y

arrived 27th Marines took over the sectors formerl y

held by the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Bacher, the

commander of the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines ,

remembered that when he arrived he was met by a

A Marine combat engineer carefully disarms a boobytrapped 105mm artillery round south of Da Nang.

Abel Collection
POST-TET IN I CORPS 22 9

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A70808 1

Mines and explosive devices were among the greatest dangers to Marines at Da Nang . Two members

of Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines administer to a fallen comrade who had just tripped a

"surprise explosive device. "

lieutenant colonel from III MAF who took him to

headquarters, "where I was given orders to report t o

the 1st Marine Division." At the same time, "troops

and equipment of 2/27 were being trucked southwest

of Da Nang to the CP [command post} of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines." After about three or four days,

the 3d Battalion departed for Phu Bai and "2/2 7

assumed the mission and TAOR" of the latter battalion. The 3d Battalion, 27th Marines relieved the 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines which also left for Phu Bai.

Lieutenant Colonel Woodham, the 3d Battalion commander, recalled that his unit's main responsibility

was the patrolling of the Rocket Belt .1 4

The 7th Marines and the Korean Marine Brigad e

remained responsible for the southern and western are a

of operations, including An Hoa . At An Hoa, Colonel

Ross R. Miner, the 7th Marines commander, late r

remarked that his 3d Battalion there was "barely keeping its head above water." The enemy had closed the

land lines of communication and resupply could be

carried out only by air.i 5

Indicative of the demoralizing characteristic of the

1st Division war in the Da Nang TAOR, nearly 54

percent of all division casualties in February were as a

result of mines and explosive devices . Lieutenan t

Colonel Woodham later observed his area of operation s

contained "the highest saturation of mines and boob y

traps in the history of land warfare ."1 6 *

*It must be remembered that the percentage figure above relate s

to all 1st Marine Division casualties, not only those at Da Nang . Fo r

February 1968, the 1st Marine Division suffered a total of 369 KI A

and 2,400 wounded . Of that total, 142 of the dead and 1,100 of th e

wounded were sustained by TF X-Ray in the battle for Hue City . Min e

warfare and explosive devices played only a small role in that battle . It

would be safe to assume then that the percentage of 1st Marine Division casualties at Da Nang as a result of enemy mines would be eve n

higher than the 54 percent quoted above . 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 ,

p. 7 . See also Chapter 12 .
230 THE DEFINING YEA R

With the securing of Hue in late February, Tas k

Force X-Ray at Phu Bai prepared to take the offensiv e

to open Route 1 between Da Nang and Phu Bai, whic h

had been closed since Tet . On 26 February, Colone l

Robert D. Bohn's 5th Marines began Operation Houston in the Phu Loc and Hai Van Pass sectors . To carry

out the operation, Bohn received the two battalions

from Da Nang relieved by the 27th Marines, his 3d

Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines.* In addition, Brigadier General LaHue, the Task Force X-Ra y

commander, provided the 5th Marines with operational control over three U .S . Army battalions, the 1st

and 3d Battalions, 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry1 7

While the infantry provided security in Operatio n

Houston, Seabees, Marine engineers, and the U .S .

Army 35th Engineer Battalion worked on the repairs

of Route 1 and its bridges and culverts. According to

Marine reports, the VC and NVA during the Tet offensive had damaged or destroyed 20 bridges and 26 culverts along Route 1, largely between Hai Van Pass an d

Phu Bai. Oddly enough, the enemy pioneers and

demolition teams caused relatively little damage in th e

Hai Van Pass itself, where Route 1 was most vulnerable . On 29 February, the engineers completed the

repair work on the final section of Route 1 between

Hai Van Pass and Phu Loc . Technically Route 1 was

now open throughout the entire length of I Corps . III

MAF, nevertheless, postponed the first road convoy

from Da Nang to Phu Bai until March .1 8

With the end of Operation Hue City in sight, General LaHue planned to use the 1st Marines to operat e

along the area northeast of Phu Bai in order to secure

the water route of communication from the mouth of

the Perfume River to Hue City. Although the NVA

and Viet Cong during the battle for the city, occasion -

ally harassed river traffic along the Perfume River ,

they never succeeded in cutting this vital logistic life -

line for the allied forces in the city and at Phu Bai . On

12 February, Task Force X-Ray had taken over fro m

the 3d Marine Division the responsibility for the protection of the Naval Support Activity at the Col

Co/Tan My LST ramp at the mouth of the Perfume

River. From the LST ramp, supplies were either transhipped by truck to Phu Bai or loaded on board LCU s

and smaller river craft for delivery at the LCU Ramp

in Hue City. During the month of February, enemy

*The other two battalions of the 5th Marines, the 1st and 2d Battalions, were attached to the 1st Marines in Operation Hue City. See

Chapter 12 .

gunners struck 44 of the smaller naval craft an d

destroyed two LCUs.I 9

With the closing of Route 1 during much of February and the continuing arrival of Army units i n

Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces, resupply b y

sea became even more critical . One Marine staff officer later remembered that when the 1st Air Cavalry

and the 101st Airborne units first deployed north,

"it was touch and go . " Fortunately, the Army's 1st

Logistical Command together with III MAF and a

Navy pontoon causeway unit had already made

preparations for the development of a logistic overthe-shore facility along the coast running parallel to

Hai Lang in southern Quang Tri Province . Army

logistic planners estimated that the Army force s

would require, " 3,600 tons of supplies daily in an

area where existing supply lines were just barely

able to keep up with requirements." While work

began in February, the new logistical facility, calle d

Wunder Beach, did not become fully operationa l

until mid-March.2 0

During February, the 1st Air Cavalry Division continued Operation Jeb Stuart in northern Thua Thien

and southern Quang Tri Provinces. While operating to

some extent in enemy Base Areas 114 and 101, the

division confined most of its activity to the battle fo r

Hue City, the establishment of Camp Evans, and the

buildup of its forces near Quang Tri City at Hai Lang .` *

Indicative of the growing influence of the Army in this

sector, the 1st Air Cavalry took over more of the 3 d

Marine Division area of operations. On 16 February,

the Cavalry's 1st Brigade assumed operational control

of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and responsibility fo r

the 3d Marines' former Osceola II tactical area nea r

Quang Tri. While the 3d Marines, with only rear echelon troops attached to it, still remained accountabl e

for the interior defense of the new Quang Tri base and

airfield, the Army's 1st Brigade now provided the protection to the approaches for both the Marine base an d

the new Army bases at Hai Lang and Wunder Beach .2 1

**During the month, the 1st Air Cavalry consisted of its 1st

Brigade at Hai Lang ; the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division at Camp

Evans; and ics 3d Brigade taking part in the battle for Hue, althoug h

still nominally part of Operation Jeb Stuart . The division's participation in the battle for Hue, which was included in its overall statistic s

for Jeb Stuart, accounted for nearly half of the 1st Cavalry 's 1,167 casualties for the month as well the reportedly 2,000 losses it inflicted o n

the enemy for the month . The 1st Air Cavalry's 2d Brigade was slated

to relieve the 101st Airborne 's 2d Brigade at Camp Evans in March . III

MAF ComdC, Feb68 ; Waldron and Beavers, " The Critical Year, 1968,"

pp . 19-20 . See also Chapter. 12 .
POST-TET IN I CORPS 23 1

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

A Navy LC U (landing craft, utility) arrives at the Dong Ha LCU ramp laden with drums of

asphalt. Although the NVA made some attempts to close the Cua Viet, the Navy had establishe d

Task Force Clearwater to convoy river traffic from the coast to Dong Ha .

Another reason for the relief of the 3d Marines a t

Quang Tri was to free the regiment to assume contro l

over the ground operations to safeguard the vital Cua

Viet water passageway to Dong Ha . With the interdiction of much of Route 1 during and after Tet, the lifeline of the Marine forces in the north depended mor e

and more upon the sea and to a somewhat lesser extent

upon air resupply. During February, III MAF sent by

ship from Da Nang to Dong Ha over 45,700 short ton s

of material as compared to 342 tons arriving at Don g

Ha by air. With the disruption of the land lines of communication and the occasional enemy interdiction o f

the Cua Viet, the 3d Marine Division reported that the

"division's [supply] requirement fell short ." The division especially lacked communications equipment an d

repair parts. In order to meet the division's needs, III

MAF limited shipment to those supplies considered

"combat essential ."* With the approval of MACV, General Cushman also curtailed the shipment of "Dyemarker" material and halted all construction work o n

the barrier. Still Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, the 3d Marine Division commander, recalled that

in mid-February at a very critical juncture, the divisio n

received for three days large "shipments of cement and

culverts from Da Nang ." According to Tompkins, he

sent an angry message to III MAF to "delay the culverts

and cement in favor of food and ammunition ."22

*Lieutenant Colonel Otto Lehrack, who as a captain commande d

Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, commented that during thi s

period resupply was difficult for the Marines of his battalion : "We too k

helmets, flak jackets and boots off our dead . I knew a Marine in Graves

Registration who was my only reliable source for compasses ." LtCo l

Otto Lehrack, Comments on draft, dtd 19Nov94 (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Lehrack Comments.
232 THE DEFINING YEA R

Despite certain " snafus " such as the unwanted

cement, the American command quickly took step s

to ensure the logistic support to its forces in th e

north. In the Cua Viet sector, on 24 February, th e

Navy established Task Force Clearwater under III

MAF to coordinate river traffic and convoys of Navy

craft from the Cua Viet facility to Dong Ha .* During the month, enemy gunners killed 7 sailors,

wounded 47 more, and damaged 27 Navy vessels.

On 27 February, for example, an enemy B—40 rocket-propelled grenade struck an LCU on the Cua Vie t

laden with explosives resulting in the disabling of

both the LCU and an escort patrol boat. Most of the

convoyed vessels, however, completed the trip with -

out incident.2 3

The 3d Marine Division also took measures to safe -

guard the Cua Viet and attempt to keep North Vietnamese regulars and VC main force units out of the

northeastern quadrant of Quang Tri Province above

the Cua Viet. On 29 February, Major General Tompkins combined the two operations in the sector, Oper -

ation Napoleon and Operation Saline into one operation, Operation Napoleon/Saline under the control o f

the 3d Marines. Colonel Milton A. Hull, who had

assumed command of the 3d Marines on 18 Februar y

from Colonel Joseph E . Lo Prete, moved his command

post on the 29th, from the Quang Tri airfield to th e

Cua Viet facility and collocated it with the 1st

Amphibian Tractor Battalion .24

While Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Toner, th e

commander of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion ,

during February nominally had operational contro l

of both Operations Napoleon and Saline, his concerns were mainly with the activities of his own battalion. In February, during Operation Napoleon, th e

amphibian tractor battalion, with one attached rifl e

company, limited itself to patrols generally aroun d

the Cua Viet Naval Facility at the mouth of th e

river. While ground contact remained light, th e

enemy subjected the base to heavy incoming rocke t

and artillery fire and continued efforts to interdict

*Task Force Clearwater consisted of 20 river patrol boats (PBRs) ,

reinforced with monitors, armored river craft, PACVs (Patrol Ai r

Cushioned Vehicles), landing craft, and minesweepers . The Task Force

was responsible not only for the Cua Viet, but also the Perfume Rive r

further south which provided access co the sea for the city of Hue . It

maintained its headquarters at Mobile Base II, a floating barge complex, located first at Tan My and then moved north to the Cua Viet .

Edward J. Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, An Illustrated History of th e

U .S. Navy and the %Vsr in Southeast Asia (Washington : Naval Historical

Center, 1994), p . 188. See also Chapter 28 .

the river with uneven results . For the month i n

Operation Napoleon, the Marines sustained casual -

ties of 4 dead and 30 wounded while accounting for

79 of the enemy.2 5

The SLF Bravo battalion, BLT 3/1, under Lieu -

tenant Colonel Max McQuown, in Operation

Saline, operating for the most part above, but occasionally below, the Cua Viet, on the other hand ,

continued to encounter elements of the 803d NVA

Regiment.** In February, the battalion killed over

270 of the enemy, took 18 prisoners, and recovere d

72 individual and 35 crew-served enemy weapons.

According to both Marine and ARVN sources,

since 29 January, the allies had killed 1,000 enemy

troops in the Cua Viet region and had prevented a n

attack on Dong Ha.26

While the watch on the Cua Viet remained some -

what tenuous, the enemy forces continued to mount

pressure on Khe Sanh and still posed a threat to th e

Marine positions south of the DMZ in Operations

Kentucky and Lancaster II .*** As one 3d Marine Divi -

sion staff officer remarked, the NVA in the borde r

region, "always had someone pressing us somewhere . "

In the 4th Marines Operation Lancaster II, after a n

ambush of a convoy near Camp Carroll on Route 9 i n

early February and a company engagement near Ca

Lu, the North Vietnamese forces largely limite d

themselves to artillery and mortar bombardments o f

Marine positions. On 28 February, a NVA antiaircraft

gun shot down a Marine CH—46 not far from Ca Lu

resulting in the death of 22 Marines . For the month

**See Chapter 7 for description of the BLT's activities during lac e

January and early February in Operation Badger Catch/Saline . In th e

final stages of the battle of Hue, the South Vietnamese Marines captured North Vietnamese troops from the 803d NVA Regiment . See

Chapter 12 . Colonel Max McQuown, the then BLT commander, late r

recalled two significant operations south of the Cua Viet . In the first

case, the BLT attached reconnaissance platoon, operating south of th e

river, sighted NVA formations . Employing LVTs and LCUs to cross th e

river, the rest of the battalion supported by tanks surrounded the NVA

in a village . With the tanks lighting up the area with their Xenon

lights and after an artillery and mortar bombardment, McQuown

launched a night attack and secured the hamlet . While the battalio n

remained south of the river, the reconnaissance platoon spotted another group of NVA in a neighboring village and the battalion secure d

this hamlet as well . Before the BLT returned to its base area north o f

the river, the Marines searched another village and collected a larg e

number of young males in civilian cloches. Suspecting they were Nort h

Vietnamese, the Marines turned them over to the South Vietnamese .

Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dcd 22Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter McQuown Comments .

***See Chapter 14 for description of operations at Khe Sanh an d

Chapter 7 for Operations Kentucky and Lancaster 11 in early February .
POST-TET IN I CORPS 233

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801311 and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A650034

Top, Marines from BLT 2/4 taking part in Operation Lancaster II exchange fire under smoke cove r

across an open field with North Vietnamese troops about 2,000 meters north of Camp Carroll. Below,

Marines from the same battalion and operation rush across open ground with two of the troops carrying 3 .5-inch rockets.
234 THE DEFINING YEAR

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

A Marine M48 tank from the 3d Tank Battalion rumbles past a battle-damaged church just eas t

of Con Thien. Marines from Con Thien outpost had spotted three North Vietnamese tanks north of

their position in North Vietnam.

in Operation Lancaster II, the Marines reporte d

killing 85 of the enemy and sustained casualties of 5 8

dead and 321 wounded .27

In the 9th Marines sector in the Kentucky area of

operations, the Marines confirmed the presence of

the 320th NVA Division which had replaced th e

324B Division in the DMZ war. The North Vietnamese maintained a screening force south of th e

DMZ and the Marine outpost at Con Thien, on 1 6

February, observed three North Vietnamese tanks

north of their position and called in air. According t o

Marine reports, the North Vietnamese had tw o

armored regiments, the 202d and 203d NVA, each

with 80 tanks (40 T—34s and 40 PT76s). Although

not knowing the location of the two armored regiments, American intelligence acknowledged th e

capability of the enemy to use tanks in areas wher e

he could secretly mass his forces "and overrun friendly outposts with little opposition." The Marines prepared anti-mechanized plans.28

For the most part, the ground action in Kentucky

slackened after the first two weeks of February. In one

of the sharpest encounters, however, on 16 February, a

3d Battalion, 3d Marines two-company sweep of the

southern DMZ encountered NVA infantrymen i n

bunkers, but no tanks. With the assistance of air, the

Marines killed approximately 20 of the enemy at the

cost of 4 Marine dead and 6 wounded.* While th e

enemy mounted no major offensive against Marin e

positions in Kentucky during the latter part of the

month, the NVA continued to deploy forces in an d

through the DMZ.29

As in the Lancaster area of operations, the enem y

intensified his artillery, rocket, and mortar shellin g

of Marine positions and base areas in the Kentucky

area . In one of the more spectacular instances, on 2 6

February, the North Vietnamese gunners fired some

400 artillery and mortar rounds and scored direc t

hits on the Dong Ha airfield and the Force Logistic

Support Group Bravo complex located there . While

casualties were relatively low, one dead and severa l

wounded, material damage was heavy. The shellin g

destroyed two light Army observation aircraft, an

* Lieutenant Colonel Otto Lehrack observed that his Company I wa s

the only one of the two companies involved that had contact in this particular action . He remembered that the contact took place in the north -

ern sector of a prime enemy infiltration route . Lehrack Comments.
POST-TET IN I CORPS 23 5

Photo is from the 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb6 8

An officers' quarters in the 3d Marine Division command post sector at Dong Ha has been completel y

demolished by a direct hit from a North Vietnamese 122mm rocket .

ammunition storage dump, and 20,000 gallons of

diesel fuel. In Kentucky during the month, th e

Marines sustained casualties of 89 dead and 26 7

wounded. During the same period, they reported

killing nearly 400 of the enemy and capturing 3 9

prisoners. While the bombardment of the Dong Ha bas e

exposed its vulnerability to enemy weaponry, som e

relief of the logistic situation for the allied forces i n

the north was in sight. The new Quang Tri base ,

which was for the most part out of enemy artillery

range except for mortars and the occasional rocket,

was about half completed and could begin to share

part of the logistic burden . By the end of the month ,

the remaining 3d Marine Division rear echelon force s

still at Phu Bai prepared to shift their operations t o

Quang Tri. At the same time, FLSG Bravo at Dong

Ha moved some of its equipment and ammunitio n

still in exposed storage sites to the Quang Tri base .

The new Wunder Beach facility also was nearing

completion . While the North Vietnamese forced th e

allies to convoy naval craft along both the Cua Viet

and Perfume Rivers, the supplies were getting

through. As the III MAF commander, Lieutenant

General Cushman, five months later explained, "wit h

the increased forces in Northern I Corps and logisti c

support problems . . ., we had to move cautiously

until our logistics pipeline was capable of supportin g

a bold and aggressive campaign throughout ICTZ. " 3 0

Readjustments in the U.S. I Corps

Command Structure

With the arrival of Army forces in northern I

Corps, MACV and III MAF continued to readjust the

command structure in the north. From the beginning

of the year, General Westmoreland had his doubts

about the capability of the III MAF and Marine division staffs to control the expanding war in the north . *

In early January, he convinced the new Marine Corp s

Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, who was

on a visit to Vietnam, that both the 1st and 3d Marine

*See chapter 1 for the discussion of Westmoreland's doubts about

the Marine Corps command structure .
236 THE DEFINING YEA R

Divisions required an additional brigadier general

assistant division commander. According to the

MACV commander, the "wide dispersion" of divisio n

units dictated that the Marine Corps adopt the Arm y

practice of two assistant division commanders " for

most effective command and control ." General Chap -

man concurred as did Admiral Sharp, the Pacific theater commander. By mid-January, the Defens e

Department authorized each of the Marine division s

two assistant division commanders .3 1

With the new authorization, General Chapman

immediately set out to fill the new billets. On 19 January, he informed both MACV and Lieutenant General Krulak, the FMFPac commander, that he had

ordered Brigadier General Jacob Glick, the forme r

commander of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade

Right, BGen Jacob E. Glick, here in an official portrait,

relieved BGen Louis Metzger, who was about to be promoted

to major general, as Assistant Division Commander of the 3 d

Marine Division . Below, from left, MajGen Rathvon McC.

Tompkins, the 3d Division commander; Gen Leonard F.

Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps; MajGe n

Metzger; and LtGen Robert E. Cushman, CG, III MAF,

hold the two-star flag of newly promoted MajGen Metzger. Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A41934 0

3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68
POST-TET IN I CORPS 237

on Okinawa, to Vietnam as the second assistant division commander (ADC) for the 3d Marine Division .

Chapman was " searching for another brig gen for 1st

MarDiv and will send him earliest."3 2

Actually Brigadier General Glick relieve d

Brigadier General Louis Metzger, whose tour of duty

was about to end . Metzger had controlled the 3d

Marine Division (Fwd) headquarters at Dong H a

until Major General Tompkins had moved his command post there from Phu Bai.* Tompkins wanted

Glick back at the division rear at Phu Bai to supervis e

the transfer from Phu Bai to the new 3d Division rea r

base at Quang Tri . The enemy's Tet offensive, however, delayed the move and through February Genera l

Glick shared space with Brigadier General Foster C .

LaHue's 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray headquarters at Phu Bai . According to Glick, he looked

after the logistic support forces there while LaHu e

controlled operations.3 3

Brigadier General Carl W. Hoffman, who arrived

in Vietnam a few days after Glick, in fact, became th e

second assistant division commander of the 3 d

Marine Division. With the greater emphasis upon th e

3d Division area of operations which included th e

DMZ and Khe Sanh, General Cushman delayed unti l

February appointing a second assistant division commander to the 1st Marine Division . Indeed, whe n

General Hoffman, who had just served as Military

Secretary to the Marine Corps Commandant, landed

at the Da Nang Air Base, Cushman first thought to

place him temporarily in a special III MAF billet .

According to the III MAF commander, he considered

establishing a "III MAF War Room (Fwd) at Dong

Ha" and making Hoffman his personal representativ e

to the 3d Marine Division. General Westmoreland's

decision to create the new MACV (Forward) headquarters** at Phu Bai under his deputy, Genera l

Abrams, made the idea of a forward III MAF headquarters superfluous. Brigadier General Hoffman

joined General Tompkins at Dong Ha as the 3 d

Marine Division ADC for operations .34

By this time, it was clear that III MAF was to

become truly a joint command rather than basicall y

a Marine Corps headquarters . As General Hoffma n

several years later remembered, "at that time we realized that the United States Army was moving to th e

north in earnest." In mid-January, General West -

*See Chapter 3 for the move of the 3d Marine Division headquarters north to Dong Ha in January.

**See Chapter 11 for the establishment of MACV (Fwd) at Phu Bai .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A41484 6

BGen Carl W. Hoffman became the Assistant Division

Commander (ADC) of the 3d Marine Division for operations. The 3d Marine Division now had two ADCs.

moreland assigned Army Brigadier General Salve H .

Matheson, the former commander of the 1st Brigade,

101st Airborne Division, to Lieutenant General

Cushman's staff as Deputy Commander, Army. In a

reclama, the III MAF commander asked Westmoreland for permission to change Matheson's designation to "Deputy for Army Matters." As General

Cushman explained, Marine Major General Raymond L. Murray was already Deputy Commander for

all U.S . forces in III MAF. Cushman wanted to us e

Matheson as a "point of contact for major Army com -

manders" and as an advisor to the III MAF command

as to "Army capabilities in both the operational and

logistical fields." Westmoreland agreed to th e

change, but stated that in the meantime that Matheson would temporarily be made the J—3 or operations officer for the new MACV (Forward) headquarters at Phu Bai .3 5

From the Marine perspective, the activation of th e

MACV (Forward) headquarters at Phu Bai did nothing to ease the command relationships in the north . If

anything, it added to the problem by laying an inter-
238 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of U .S . Army Center of Military History

In February 1968, MACV established a forward head -

quarters at Phu Bai under U.S . Army Gen Creighton W.

Abrams, Deputy ComUSMACV, which caused some resentment among Marine officers.

posing headquarters between III MAF and MAC V

and providing an additional layer of command fro m

above . According to General Cushman, "whe n

Abrams came north, oh Christ, we got messages all

night long, in the middle of the Goddamned night

and everything else.' Colonel Franklin L. Smith, a

member of the III MAF G—3 staff, recalled : "They

[the MACV (Forward) Headquarters staff] were located up there and forgot that they were a senior head -

quarters to III MAF on one hand [by not keeping III

MAF informed on its actions) and remembered very

well on every other hand because they began to inter-

*General Earl E. Anderson, who served as the III MAF Chief of

Staff, remembered : " More than once I had to go to General Cushman 's

quarters to awaken (not an easy task as he was a very sound sleeper and

had a hearing loss suffered at Pearl Harbor when he was aboard the

Pennsylvania) and ask him to come to the command center to take a call

from Abrams on the scrambler phone, which he hated co use. While

General Cushman respected Abrams as a combat officer, Abrams wa s

very opinionated and often abrasive ." Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

pose themselves between III MAF" and subordinate

units. Cushman concluded, "as would be expected,

having the senior commander's agent in the battle area

resulted in his exercise of more command influenc e

and direction of III MAF Forces . . . than is customarily exercised by the senior command." 3 6

The creation of the MACV (Forward) headquarter s

also caused resentment among Cushman's subordinat e

Marine commanders, if not Cushman himself. Major

General Murray, the III MAF Deputy Commander,

later stated that he assumed that MACV established

the forward headquarters because it did not trust III

MAF to control the situation . The 3d Marine Division

commander General Tompkins was even more blunt :

"I thought it was the most unpardonable thing tha t

Saigon did." Despite the disclaimers on the part of

MACV that it had still utmost trust and confidence i n

Cushman, Tompkins declared, "you don't move a

MACV (Forward) up in a combat area unless you'r e

very, very, very worried about the local commander,

afraid he can't hack it. . . . it's tantamount to . . . a relief

of a commander." 37

On 14—15 February, the sudden relief of Majo r

General Murray because of illness by Marine Major

General William J. Van Ryzin, who arrived from

Washington, only compounded the confusion .

Rumors circulated in Saigon about a shakeup in the

Marine command, which was not the case . On the

14th, Murray informed General Cushman of his

incapacity and turned himself into the hospital . Van

Ryzin received the news on the morning of the 14t h

and was on an aircraft for Vietnam by 0600 the following day.3 8

By mid-February there was an obvious need to

clarify the command relations in northern I Corps .

On 17 February, at a meeting at Phu Bai with Generals Abrams and Cushman, Westmorelan d

announced that he planned to form a provisional

corps (which would formally be called Provisional

Corps) in northern I Corps sometime in early March

that would consist of the 1st Air Cavalry Division ,

the 101st Airborne Division, and the 3d Marin e

Division . The MACV (Forward) headquarters woul d

then be deactivated and the new Provisional Corp s

would be subordinate to III MAF. General Westmoreland stated that he hoped to appoint U .S. Army

Lieutenant General William B. Rosson to head th e

new command . Rosson, the previous spring, had

commanded the U.S . Army's Task Force Oregon

which later became the Americal Division at Chu Lai .

Having enjoyed excellent personal relations with III
POST-TET IN I CORPS 23 9

MAF, Rosson was an ideal selection.* To further allay

Marine suspicions about the proposed command relations, the MACV commander told Cushman that he

might ask the Marine Corps to provide a major general as deputy commander for the new Provisional

Corps (Prov Corps). While the 3d Marine Division

would still receive close air support from the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing, the whole question about air

control still remained unresolved .39

For the time being, however, III MAF and MACV

concentrated on working out the wrinkles for the

establishment of the Provisional Corps . On 20 February, General Abrams sent out to the various interested parties a proposed letter of instruction (LOI) for

the new command . According to Abrams' proposal ,

the commander of the new corps would have operational control of all units in the northern two

provinces of I Corps with the exception of the Hai

Van Pass area of Thua Thien Province . The corps

would be similar in organization to the U.S . Field

Forces I and II, with the exception that it would operate under the Commanding General, III MAF, General Cushman. Cushman would still remain the

Senior Advisor in I Corps and maintain his relationship with the CORDS organization . III MAF would

not have operational control of Seventh Air Forc e

units in I Corps. The U.S. Army, Vietnam would pro -

vide a headquarters to coordinate logistic support i n

the two northern provinces. Furthermore, the Prov

Corps commander would have the authority to have

direct liaison with General Lam, the I Corps commander and with the ARVN forces in his sector .40

In their comments on the proposed directive, General Cushman and Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth,

Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam took exception t o

or wanted further elaboration on some of the provisions. Admiral Veth desired assurances that he remai n

in the operational chain of command over the nava l

forces in I Corps including the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang and the Seabees . He also assumed that the

Navy would retain the responsibility for common

items of supply for all U .S . forces in I Corps. Genera l

Cushman suggested that the tactical situation determine the boundary between the 1st Marine Division

*At the time, Lieutenant General Rosson was then Commandin g

General I Field Force Vietnam. According to General Westmoreland ,

Rosson would retain his position as commander of the I Field Force, so

as to retain his third scar while serving in a subordinate position . His

deputy would become acting commander of the I Field Force command . Westmoreland msg to Abrams, dtd 26Feb68 (EO Files, Abrams

Papers, CMH .)

U.S . Army Center of Military History,

Top, U.S. Army LtGen William B. Rosson, Provisiona l

(Prov) Corps Commander, is seen with South Vietnames e

Col Quang Toan, the commander of the 2d ARVN Division . Below, Marine MajGen Raymond G. Davis, a holder of the Medal of Honor, was made Deputy Commander ,

Prov Corps. The new command replaced MACV (Fwd )

and was a subordinate command of III MAF, which helped

to smooth relations between the Marines and MACV.

U.S . Marine Corps
240 THE DEFINING YEA R

and Provisional Corps. He also opposed any proposal to

place Task Force X-Ray under Prov Corps or any

change in operational control or coordination in relation to other U.S . or South Vietnamese forces in I

Corps. The III MAF commander also asked that there

be no diminishment in his authority over the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing to support both the 1st and 3 d

Marine Divisions. Relative to the logistic setup, Cushman recommended that the III MAF FLC and the

Army Logistic Command at Qui Nhon support thei r

respective Services and that they work out an agreement on mutual support 41

The proposed letter of instruction for Provisiona l

Corps continued to be refined . On 27 February, General Abrams sent a revised draft to General Westmoreland that incorporated some of the wishes of the

Marines. The new draft still called for the establishment of an Army logistic headquarters in I Corps an d

left unresolved the boundary between the 1st Marine

Division and Provisional Corps. It also failed to mention the command relationship between Task Force X -

Ray and Provisional Corps. In a message to Genera l

Westmoreland, General Cushman asked for a cleare r

demarcation of his authority. He wanted the letter of

instruction to state specifically that Prov Corps woul d

exercise operational control "of only ground tactica l

units" and that III MAF would retain control of al l

wing assets in I Corps. Again Cushman argued strongly that the 1st Division retain operational control o f

Task Force X-Ray and that its area of operation s

include the Phu Loc District as well as the Hai Van

Pass sector of Thua Thien Province. 42

On 3 March 1968, General Westmoreland finally

issued the letter of instruction for Provisional (Prov )

Corps. The final approved version designated Lieu -

tenant General Rosson as the commanding general an d

10 March as the effective date for the formal establishment of the new command . Marine Major General

Raymond G. Davis became the deputy commande r

under General Rosson. General Westmoreland also

incorporated into the directive most of the changes recommended by General Cushman . Still, Westmoreland's final directive clearly indicated that there was a

special relationship between Prov Corps and MACV .

Although General Cushman was to be his immediat e

superior, General Rosson was to submit reports "simultaneously" to MACV and III MAF "to insure timel y

reporting." On the cover sheet of the III MAF copy o f

the LOI, a III MAF staff officer wrote, "I wonder wh y

they don't want 1st Div and Americal Division reports

direct?" General Cushman initialed the routing slip

without comment . He had already lost one major battle . On 7 March, General Westmoreland ordered, "al l

Marine fixed-wing strike and reconnaissance aircraft,

and their associated Marine air control assets, b e

assigned effective 10 March 1968, to the mission direction of Deputy for Air Operations, the Commanding

General, Seventh Air Force ." 43 *

While assured, at least temporarily, of the primacy

of his authority in northern I Corps, at least over al l

ground forces, and despite denials to the contrary, General Cushman and his staff still harbored suspicion s

about the Army's, if not Westmoreland's, motivations.** As Brigadier General Hoffman later declared ,

"it became necessary, or it became desirable, from our

viewpoint to be sure that the Army didn't take over

everything that we'd built up in that particular area . "

Colonel Franklin Smith of the III MAF staff remembered that the transition of MACV (Forward) into Provisional Corps was rather painful . The PCV staff was

largely composed of the same personnel that made up

the forward headquarters and " they tended to carry

over the authority they had as MACV Forward people ." According to Smith, "we would have from time

to time to pick up the phone and say you can't do this. "

Aware that the PCV G—3 was to be a brigadier general, Cushman assigned Brigadier General Hoffma n

temporarily to be the III MAF G—3 .*** As Genera l

Cushman concluded, III MAF was a Marine command

only in relation to Marine peculiar things, "but for tactical operations it's a joint command ." 44

* See Chapters 23 and 24 for discussion of the Single Manager issue

relative to Marine aviation .

**In his interviews, Cushman supported both the creation o f

MACV (Fwd) headquarters and the establishment of Provisional Corps .

At the same time, however, his remarks indicated a suspicion that the

Army was attempting to move into northern I Corps and that he too k

measures to guard against this. See Cushman Mar69 incvw, pp .

459—60 and 465—66 and Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp . 18—9.

Army historian Graham A. Cosmas observed : "It seems clear tha t

Westmoreland expected a much bigger Communist offensive in th e

north than actually developed . He did not trust 11I MAP to handle i t

and wanted Abrams on the scene with a headquarters to control th e

battle if necessary. Westmoreland authorized Abrams at MACV Fwd t o

give tactical direction to III MAF's subordinate units if the situatio n

required . ProvCorps did ease III MAF's span of control problems, bu t

its presence raised Marine suspicions, although Rosson evidently did a

good job of smoothing out relations with III MAF." Dr. Graham A .

Cosmas, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 23Nov94 (Vietnam Comment

File).

***Hoffman nominally continued to be 3d Marine Division assistant division commander, but was carried on the 3d Marine Divisio n

rolls as TAD (temporary additional duty) at III MAF . 3d MarDiv an d

III MAF ComdCs, Feb—Apr68 .
POST-TET IN I CORPS 24 1

Planning for the Future

With the new command structure in I Corps largely in place at the beginning of March, the allies bega n

to plan the counteroffensive . As General Cushman later

explained, the idea was to go "after the enemy first i n

the coastal areas in a series of short duration operations ,

using the mobility of our forces to fix and destroy

enemy forces which had escaped from the major Te t

battle areas. " On 2 March, at a meeting at III MAF

headquarters in Da Nang, Generals Cushman and

Abrams approved the planning concept for the fina l

phase of the offensive, Operation Pegasus, the relief an d

breakout from Khe Sanh45

On 10 March, with the formal establishment o f

Prov Corps, Lieutenant General Rosson* at his head -

quarters in Phu Bai outlined for both Generals Westmoreland and Cushman his full plans for the counteroffensive in the north . The first effort would be the

continuing operations against enemy forces in the Con

Thien-Gio Linh forces north of Dong Ha . At the end

of March and the beginning of April, the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 3d Marine Division would give

priority to the opening of Route 9 and beginnin g

Operation Pegasus for the relief of Khe Sanh .** Follow -

ing the relief of Khe Sanh, Prov Corps would the n

undertake a reconnaissance-in-force into the A Shau

Valley southwest of Hue 46

At the 10 March meeting, General Westmoreland

approved Rosson's concept and also directed General

Cushman to undertake a broad-based study to estimat e

the future requirements for the defense of northern I

Corps. General Cushman turned the task over to hi s

acting G-3, Brigadier General Hoffman with a due

date of 1 April. For planning purposes, Hoffman's

study group was to assume that the political aspects of

the war would not change and that there would be n o

further refinement of the rules of engagement . The

planners were to assume that by 1 September Khe San h

was no longer in danger and that Route 9 would be

open from Khe Sanh to Dong Ha . By that date, one of

*Although General Rosson did not assume command of Prov Corps

until 10 March, since 1 March he had been the Deputy Commander ,

MACV (Forward). Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968," p. 19 .

**According to General Rosson, he first wanted to mount a majo r

offensive in the center and eastern portion of the 3d Marine Division

and then sometime later follow with the Pegasus operation . He wrote

that both Generals Cushman and Westmoreland overruled him "i n

turn based on what I was told was President Johnson's insistence tha t

Khe Sanh be relieved soonest . " Gen William B. Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File) . See also Chap -

ter 14 for the Pegasus planning .

the Army divisions, either the 1st Air Cavalry or th e

101st Airborne, would have been detached from I

Corps. Also included in the scenario for the study wer e

the assumptions that the enemy would not have mad e

any major reinforcement of his forces in the north and

that the situation elsewhere in I Corps would not hav e

required any depletion of the remaining units in the

northern two provinces. According to MACV's guidelines, Hoffman's group was to look especially at "the

pertinent aspects of the dyemarker system" relative t o

Khe Sanh and the DMZ strongpoints . Westmoreland

directed that the analysis be "`wide open ' and not constrained by past policies or precedents. "4 7

Hoffman's group completed its study within the

designated time and made several proposals relative t o

the war in the north . Given their guidelines, the III

MAF planners concentrated on the future of the barrier, the strongpoints and allied forces along the DMZ,

and the base at Khe Sanh . As far as the A Shau Valley,

the group recommended only the establishing of a fir e

base in the approaches to the valley, and limiting operations to artillery and infantry raids . In probably one of

its more controversial conclusions, the panel suggeste d

the abandonment of Khe Sanh in favor of a much

smaller base at Ca Lu . The group argued that the

defense of Khe Sanh would require a force of at least 1 0

battalions. Relative to the barrier, the Hoffman pane l

observed that the enemy threat in the DMZ sector was

"invasion, as opposed to infiltration ." The study group

contended that the barrier strongpoints actually assisted the enemy by placing Marine and allied forces i n

fixed and static positions within NVA artillery range .

Still the III MAF study advised against cancellation of

Dyemarker because a "major conceptual change at this

time might not be politically or psychologically

acceptable." Instead, the III MAF panel suggested an

"indefinite deferral of further Dyemarker SPOS [strong

point obstacle system} while maintaining current positions with a reduced number of forces ." While most of

its recommendations were not immediately implemented, the III MAF study clearly outlined the future

prospects facing the allied forces in the northern war.

March Operations in the DMZ Sector

While the American command planned to take th e

initiative from the enemy, the North Vietnamese still

maintained formidable forces in the field, especially i n

the eastern DMZ sector in Operations Kentucky and

Napoleon/Saline . In the Cua Viet region, in early

March, this became increasingly evident . In Operation
242 THE DEFINING YEA R

Napoleon/Saline, on 1 March, Company M, BLT 3/1 ,

supported by two engineer LVTE—ls and two howitze r

LVTH—6s from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion ,

crossed Jones Creek just above where it emptied int o

the Cua Viet for a sweep into the hamlet of Mai Xa Th i

(West) 48*

Earlier, the LVTEs and LVTHs "swam down the

Cua Viet to a position a few meters south of the villag e

and west of Jones Creek. From there, the LVTEs shot

line charges over the houses fronting the river, levellin g

the structures and "clearing the way for the follow on

Marines." The LVTHs fired canister rounds into the

village and then moved to new positions off shore t o

support the infantry. While still on the LVTs carrying

them across the river, the Marine company came unde r

accurate fire from the western bank of Jones Creek .**

Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown, the BLT commander, immediately ordered his Company I to secur e

the left flank of Company M and the southern portion

of Mai Xa Thi. In heavy fighting that lasted until

nightfall, the two companies killed 36 of the enemy

and took 3 prisoners. During the next two days, BLT

3/1 operated in the village and secured a small island,

just below Mai Xa Thi, in the Cua Viet River . The battalion uncovered 83 more bodies and captured anothe r

prisoner. Marine casualties were also heavy—27 killed

and 81 wounded.

In this renewed fighting for Mai Xa Thi, th e

Marines learned that elements of the 320th NVA Division were coming into the Cua Viet sector to replace th e

803d NVA Regiment which had the previous month

moved south into Thua Thien Province . While most of

the enemy dead were from the 270th Main Force Regiment, which had long operated in the region, two of th e

prisoners, a lieutenant and a private, were from the 52d

NVA Regiment, 320th NVA Division. Up to this time,

the 52d had been in reserve above the DMZ in North

Vietnam, while the other two regiments of the division, the 48th and 64th had moved into the Kentucky

and Lancaster areas.49***

*This was to differentiate it from that portion of the village of Mai

Xa Thi on the eastern bank of Jones Creek.

**Colonel McQuown noted as a safety precaution " against mines

and RPG rounds," the Marine infantry rode on top of LVTs rather tha n

inside when they were used as troop carriers . McQuown Comments.

***Colonel McQuown related that he turned over his prisoners

together with weapons and documents to the 3d Marine Division :

"These NVA troops were fresh, mostly young males, and carried bran d

new weapons . . ." including a flame thrower and a " fragmentatio n

grenade launcher 'far superior to its U.S . counterpart' . " Relative to the

flame thrower, McQuown observed, "this was the first and only tim e

we had seen one in the hands of the NVA ." McQuown Comments.

Under questioning, the two prisoners declared they

were part of a small detachment from a heavy weapons

company and an advance party of their regiment. Their

mission had been to provide RPG (rocket-propelle d

grenade) support for the 270th unit in Mai Xa Th i

against Marine amphibian tractors and tanks in the

Cua Viet sector. Both prisoners claimed that the bulk

of their regiment was to infiltrate south on the night o f

1—2 March, but gave conflicting accounts. According

to the lieutenant, the rest of the regiment was to cros s

the Ben Hai River, just west of the so-called "Freedom

Bridge" into South Vietnam and that the final destination of the regiment was Quang Tri City. The private,

on the other hand, related that the regiment would

cross the Ben Hai by boat near the ocean and then infiltrate into the Cua Viet sector. Although cooperative,

the 18-year-old enlisted man had little other information except that " they had orders to remain close to th e

Cua Viet." While the lieutenant may have known

more of the big picture, his Marine interrogators wer e

suspicious of his testimony. They reported that "the

captive continually tried to lie throughout the interrogation" and that "his reliability could not be determined . "

5

0

While the intelligence of a new North Vietnames e

unit in the Cua Viet pointed to the continued presence

of enemy units in this vital area, the Marines ha d

already started their own buildup in the sector. Wit h

his new command post at the Cua Viet base, Colonel

Hull, the 3d Marines commander, had just taken control of the operation . The forces in Napoleon/Salin e

included both BLT 3/1 and the 1st Amphibian Tracto r

Battalion. On 4 March, Hull's 1st Battalion, 3 d

Marines joined the operation, moving up from th e

Quang Tri base to the Cua Viet sector. The following

day, there was another adjustment of forces, but this

was an exchange of missions rather than a reinforcement. BLT 2/4 under Lieutenant Colonel William

Weise redeployed from the Lancaster II area of operations to the Napoleon/Saline operation, replacing BLT

3/1 . The latter battalion then took the place of the former in the Lancaster area of operations .51*** *

****Colonel Bruce F. Meyers, who at the time commanded SLF

Alpha, observed that BLT 2/4 remained under the administrativ e

control of the SLF commander for medical evacuation of casualties

and "a significant portion of logistic support, " even while under th e

operational control of various regimental commanders . He recalle d

that the embarked SLF helicopter squadron, HMM-363, helilifte d

BLT 3/1 to Camp Carroll and in exchange brought BLT 2/4 to th e

Cua Vier sector. Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dt d

20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File).
POST-TET IN I CORPS 243

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A194604

Marines of BLT 2/4 ride amphibian tractors (LVTs) in the Cua Viet during Operation

Napoleon/Saline. Note the sandbags on the tractors to protect the Marines from explosive rounds. The

BLT redeployed from the Lancaster area to the coastal Napoleon sector in early March .

Even with the enemy reinforcement in his sector,

the addition of another battalion to his forces permitted Colonel Hull to undertake expanded operations o n

both sides of the Cua Viet. While at the beginning o f

the month, the North Vietnamese continued their

attempts to interdict the river, they eventually limited

these efforts to attacks by fire. On 8 March, the Navy

announced that the Cua Viet was open and that allied

shipping no longer required convoys.5 2

Still the enemy was far from quiescent. On 10

March, enemy artillery hit the Cua Viet base, ignitin g

150 short tons of ammunition . The resulting explosion

and fire caused the death of one American servicema n

and injuries to several others. It also destroyed a mess

hall, a communications van, and 47 out of the 64 site s

holding 10,000-gallon POL bladders. By the end of

the month, the base had only repaired or replenished

60 percent of the sites, equipment, and supplies

destroyed in the attack.5 3

In several sharp encounters north of the Cua Viet

during the month, Marine infantry sweeps also me t

with stiff resistance . Lieutenant Colonel Weise's BLT

2/4, just arrived in the sector, bore the brunt of thi s

fighting . On 18 March, one of the bloodiest action s

occurred in an abandoned hamlet about 1,000 meters

southwest of Mai Xa Thi (West). Supported by

artillery north of the DMZ and with well-designed

fields of fire for their small arms and machine guns, the

entrenched enemy held off three companies of BLT 2/4

throughout the day. With the assistance of their own

artillery and close air strikes, the Marines finally force d

the enemy to withdraw. After entering the hamlet the

next day, the Marines found 72 bodies and captured 4

prisoners. Other sources estimated that the enemy

death toll may have been as high as 130 as a result o f

the airstrikes on the retreating forces. The cost had

been high to the Marines as well . BLT 2/4 suffered

casualties of 13 dead and 110 wounded . For the entire

month in Operation Napoleon/Saline, the 3d Marin e

Division reported to have killed more than 440 of th e

enemy while sustaining in turn 65 fatalities and ove r

450 wounded . According to Lieutenant Colone l

Weise, the Marines were doing the best they could i n

a "very active area ." Weise praised Colonel Hull, the 3d
244 THE DEFINING YEAR

Marines commander and in charge of the operation,

calling him, "an extremely competent Marine, a goo d

leader," but "frustrated as we all were without adequat e

resources to do the job . . . ."5 4

During the month, there were also continued clashes to the west of Napoleon/Saline in the 2d ARVN Regiment sector and in the 9th Marines' Kentucky area o f

operations. Located between Napoleon/Saline and Kentucky, the 2d ARVN operated largely east of Route 1

and west of Jones Creek. For the most part, the ARVN

regiment gave a good account of itself. In their most

significant engagement, on 12 March just east of Route

1 and about 2,000 meters below Gio Linh, the South

Vietnamese unit claimed to have killed over 200 of the

enemy at a cost of 4 ARVN killed and 15 wounded .5 5

Further to the west along the DMZ front, the North

Vietnamese remained active in the 9th Marines' Kentucky sector. Most of the action centered in the area

between Gio Linh and Con Thien . On 3 March, in one

of the more significant of the encounters, Company L,

3d Battalion, 3d Marines intercepted an NVA battalion attempting to infiltrate the Marine positions . The

battalion maintained a two-company outpost on Hil l

28 just north of the A—3 Strong Point, manned by

Companies I and L. On the morning of the 3d, Captai n

Roger Zensen, the Company L commander, accompanied his 2d Platoon on a reconnaissance patrol to the

northwest. Just before noon, at one of the patrol checkpoints, the Marines " spotted an NVA soldier about

800—1,000 meters to the north . He appeared to be an

officer with binoculars scanning the terrain to th e

south in our direction." Zensen recalled that the platoon sergeant asked him for permission to shoot at the

man with a M16, but the company commander denied

the request so as not to give away their position. Captain Zensen later wrote, "Oh if we only had our snipers ,

it would have been a sure kill." Instead he had his

enlisted artillery forward observer call in a fire mission .

The Marine platoon then checked out the area "righ t

along the southern edge of the DMZ." While finding

no enemy casualties, there was "obvious evidence of

recent activity. "56

At that point, the Marine platoon came under rifl e

and grenade fire . The Marines returned fire but the

enemy troops continued to close and Captain Zense n

requested reinforcements. The only available force s

were two platoons of his own company on Hill 28 ,

600—800 meters to the southeast. At the same time, an

air observer called in fixed-wing airstrikes and helped t o

coordinate artillery missions. Zensen remembered tha t

the enemy "moved in close to avoid the air strikes" and

also "circled our right flank . " Another 20 or so enem y

troops took up position to the Marine rear, taking cove r

in a bomb shelter. With the assistance of machine gu n

fire, the platoon prevented the NVA from advancing

any further until the "AO was able to direct the fire of

Huey gunships at the enemy and silence" one of th e

positions. By this time, the two other platoons arrived

and reinforced both flanks. As the company disengaged,

enemy artillery fired upon them, but "fortunately was

not on target ." In the skirmish, the Marine reports

showed over 100 of the enemy killed at a cost of on e

Marine dead and 13 wounded.° Zensen called it "a hel l

of a fight and a scary afternoon ." He observed that lucky

for the Marines the enemy force "was apparently on the

move and had not fortified their positions . "

A few days later, on 16 March, again near the A—3

Strong Point, Companies M, 3d Battalion, 3d Marine s

and C, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines clashed with another battalion-sized enemy force . The two Marine companies called in artillery and air upon the North Vietnamese troops. Under the supporting arms

bombardment, the bulk of the enemy battalion disengaged, but left a company behind to fight a rear guard

action. North Vietnamese artillery from north of th e

DMZ answered the American supporting arms with a

400-round barrage of its own on the Marines . According to one Marine report, because of the " inaccuracy of

the hastily delivered enemy artillery," the two Marin e

companies " assaulted into the enemy trenches, killin g

83 NVA before contact was broken at 1530 . " Marine

casualties were two killed and nine wounded . For th e

entire month in Operation Kentucky, the 9th Marines

reported over 400 enemy dead while Marine casualtie s

were 37 killed and more than 200 wounded .57°°

*Lieutenant Colonel Zensen commenced that he believed that the

official listing of enemy casualties was exaggerated, but stated that "i t

is hard to know just how many enemy soldiers were killed ." Th e

reports also indicate that Marine snipers killed the enemy officer wit h

binoculars, which was not the case . LtCol Roger Zensen, Comments o n

draft, dtd 4Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

**Lieutenant Colonel Otto Lehrack, who commanded Company I,

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, observed that Company M, earlier on 6

March, in the same area as Company L on 3 March, encountered a sizeable enemy force with the Marines sustaining casualties of 15 dead an d

a number of wounded. [For a detailed account of that action, see LtCo l

Otto J. Lehrack, No Shining Armor, The Marines at War in Vietnam, A n

Oral History (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press ofKansas, 1992), pp .

243-52 .J Lehrack then observed that all of these actions including the

one of 16 February took place along a major infiltration route whic h

included Route 561 and an area that the Marines called the "Market -

place ." He believed that the battalion " forays into this area presented

the NVA with little choice but to fight . " LtCol Otto Lehrack, Comments on draft, dtd 19Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
POST-TET IN I CORPS 245

Further to the west, in the 4th Marines' Lancaster II

operation, the tempo of enemy activity remained relatively low. For the month of March, the regiment

reported killing nearly 60 enemy dead and capturing 2

prisoners while sustaining 13 killed and over 140

wounded . An enemy ambush of Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines in the hills 3,000 meters west of Ca

Lu caused most of the Marine casualties for the month,

accounting for all of the dead and nearly half of th e

wounded . After completing an unsuccessful search for

suspected enemy mortars on the high ground, th e

Marine company had started down towards Route 9 .

Enemy 60mm mortars caught the company in th e

open resulting in 13 killed, and over 40 wounded .

Among the more seriously wounded was the compan y

commander, Captain Alexander K . Ward. While evacuating all of the wounded, the Marines had to leav e

behind eight of the dead . A reconnaissance team finally retrieved the bodies four days later.58

In northern I Corps, nevertheless, by the end of th e

month, especially along the DMZ front, the situation

for the allies had improved dramatically. For the most

part, with the notable exception of that portion o f

Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh, the supply lines were

now open. With the opening of Route 1, Brigadier

General Glick moved the rest of the 3d Marine Division (Rear) from Phu Bai to the Quang Tri base . During the month, Marine and allied trucks made ove r

2,000 resupply runs between Phu Bai and Quang Tri.

In the last week of the month, III MAF moved ove r

3,866 short tons of supply from Dong Ha to Ca Lu . All

told for March, 162 American truck convoys carrie d

over 12,690 short tons of cargo in northern I Corps .

The sea lanes and river routes also remained active .

With the opening of Wunder Beach and the installation of the pontoon causeway there on 17 March, the

allies landed more than 10,000 short tons . All of the

ports in the north during the month registered recor d

tonnage unloaded . The logistic situation had improved

to the extent that III MAF lifted the limitation on

equipment and material beyond just the combat essential. In fact, while not bringing in additional construcA Marine Sikorsky UH—34D Sea Horse helicopter is about to land with supplies as U.S. Army troopers from the 5th Armored Cavalry Regiment watch from their armored personnel carrier. The Army unit

was under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division for a joint operation with BLT 2/4 .

Photo is from the Abel Collection
246 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37141 4

A Marine M67A2 flametank in a blocking position and in support of Company I, 3d Battalion,

27th Marines aims a streak offire at suspected enemy positions in the Da Nang area of operations .

The 27th Marines, newly arrived in February, began conducting small unit operations in late February and early March.

tion materials for the barrier strongpoint system ,

Marine engineers completed the strongpoint bunkers

on Con Thien, made some minor repairs of bunker s

damaged by artillery, and installed an additional minefield for the strongpoint at Gio Linh . At Ca Lu, Marine

and Army engineers and Navy Seabees had started th e

building of a major base to include an airfield, ammunition storage facilities, bunkers and helicopter revetments, and a supporting road network .59

By the end of the month, the allies in the north wer e

about prepared to launch their counteroffensive for the

relief of Khe Sanh and to alleviate the pressure on the

DMZ front. On 28 March, the 1st Air Cavalry Division took over from the 3d Marine Division and th e

4th Marines in Lancaster II the responsibility for th e

combat base at Ca Lu . While the 3d Marine Divisio n

complained that the construction of the facilities at Ca

Lu and the effort to keep Route 9 open from Dong H a

to the base restricted its mobility to a certain extent ,

the division still prepared to carry out its own limited

offensive . As a counter to any enemy tank threat in the

north and to provide the Marines on the DMZ a more

potent armored punch, in March, MACV had attache d

to the 3d Marine Division the U .S . Army 3d Squadron ,

5th Armored Cavalry Regiment reinforced by a company from the 2d Battalion, 34th Armored Regiment .

On 29 March, General Tompkins formed, under the

command of Colonel Hull, the 3d Marines' commander, Task Force Kilo, which consisted of the Army

armored cavalry squadron and BLT 2/4 . The following

day, in coordination with the 2d ARVN Regiment ,

Task Force Kilo mounted an attack in the Gio Lin h

sector as a cover for the Pegasus operation . The allied

counteroffensive in the north was underway . 6 0°

March Operations in the Rest of I Corps

By the beginning of March, the enemy main force

units, outside of Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces,

pretty much lay low. In the Americal Division operation Wheeler-Wallowa in the Que Son Valley, the

196th Light Infantry Brigade accounted for about the

same number of enemy dead as the previous month ,

while sustaining about a quarter less casualties . As far

as the Americal Division's Operation Muscatine sout h

of Chu Lai was concerned, III MAF listed it among several operations that "did not have any significant combat." Still, as General Cushman observed, the Communist forces in I Corps had largely won th e

countryside "by default" as the ARVN, South Vietnamese militia forces, and Revolutionary Developmen t

teams during Tet fell back to defend the cities an d

*See Chapter 14 for further discussion of Task Force Kilo and it s

relationship to Operation Pegasus .
POST-TET IN I CORPS 247

Top photo is from Abel Collection while the bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A372933 .

Top, Marines from a 60mm mortar section of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines run from a landing zone

in the "Arizona Territory" southwest of Da Nang . The last man has the mortar base strapped acros s

his shoulders while the mortar tube can be seen carried by the Marine in front of him . Below, Marines

during Operation Worth form a chain to move supplies out of a landing zone in "Happy Valley ."
248 THE DEFINING YEA R

towns. According to U .S . measurements, GVN contro l

in the countryside reached its lowest point in March6 1

In much of southern I Corps, however, the American and South Vietnamese forces in March began to

reenter the hamlets abandoned to the Viet Cong. Lost

in the reporting of these numerous engagements was a

16 March 1968 United Press dispatch describing a n

operation by Task Force Barker of the Americal Division's 11th Light Infantry Brigade in the hamlet of M y

Lai, called "Pink Village" by the American troops.

According to the news report, "'Pink Village' ha d

become `Red, White, and Blue' Village ." A U.S .

spokesman reported that the American troops had

killed "128 Communists." The 128 "Communists,"

however, turned out to be all villagers, mostly women ,

children, and old men . It would be nearly a year late r

when the details about the My Lai massacre surfaced 62•

In the large Da Nang area of operations, the 1st

Marine Division faced many of the same circumstance s

that the Americal Division did—a low-level wa r

fought in the surrounding hamlets and villages . In regimental reserve, the newly arrived 1st Battalion, 27th

Marines spent much of March getting acclimated an d

adjusted to its new mission . Second Lieutenant

William R. Black, Jr., a platoon commander with

Company A, remembered that his company conducte d

a lot of patrols to keep "on our toes tactically while getting our act together." Lieutenant Black admitted that

the battalion was still not too effective as the troops

were still unfamiliar with their sector and not yet battle-hardened. While the other two battalions of the

27th Marines were more active, their great concern

remained surprise firing devices . Overall, the regiment

undertook over 2,900 small unit patrols throughout it s

TAOR resulting in about 310 contacts, 182 initiate d

by the Marines and the remainder by the VC 63

The Communist forces made only one serious attack

on the Da Nang base in March and that was limited to a

series of rocket bombardments. On 4 March, beginning

at 0100 and lasting until 0255, enemy gunners fire d

some 50 122mm missiles onto the base . Nine landed

near the 7th Communication Battalion, six on the FLC

compound near Red Beach, and the remainder at th e

Marble Mountain Facility. The rocket attacks resulted i n

6 deaths and nearly 30 wounded . They also destroyed 1

CH–53 and damaged 37 other helicopters and observation aircraft . Lieutenant Colonel William S. Fagan, commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines at the time ,

remembered "our primary and overriding mission . . .

*See Chapter 29 for further discussion of My Lai .

was to prevent the enemy from firing his 122mm rockets toward the Da Nang vital area." His battalion sent out

squad-sized patrols and ambushes " every day and night

with emphasis on night ." He estimated that "virtuall y

half of our infantry squads, with normal attachments,

were on ambush every night ." According to Fagan, the

enemy was able to fire only a few rockets successfull y

from his sector, but there "was fairly continuous enem y

contact with casualties on both sides."61

Based on intelligence that the Communist force s

continued to work on upgrading their road networ k

from Base Area 607 northwest of Da Nang and possibly

infiltrating units south into "Happy Valley" and th e

"Arizona Territory" (named after the U .S . western bad -

lands), the usual approaches to the base from the mountains to the west, the 7th Marines launched two spoiling attacks. In the first, Operation Rock, the 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines conducted a one-battalion sweep

on the peninsula formed by the Vu Gia and Thu Bo n

Rivers, the so-called "Arizona Territory," about 6,00 0

meters northwest of the battalion's base area at An Hoa .

During the four days of the operation, from 6–1 0

March, the Marines encountered only small units, sustaining casualties of 3 dead and 24 wounded whil e

killing about 35 of the enemy. On 13 March, in the second operation, Operation Worth, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Marines supported by tanks of the U .S . Army's

3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry, entered into the

anything but "Happy Valley." In the nearly two-wee k

operation, which ended on 26 March, the Marines an d

Army tankers only met scattered resistance . Still the

Marines took casualties of 27 dead and 89 wounded an d

killed an estimated 160 of the enemy. 65

In March, while the Marine units at Da Nang

continued to hold their own, to the north, Task Forc e

X-Ray consolidated its area of operations and mad e

the necessary adjustments with the Provisional

Corps. With the formal end of Operation Hue City

on 2 March, General LaHue, the Task Force X-Ra y

commander, started to bring the respective battalions under the 1st Marines back to their own sectors.

The two 5th Marines battalions that participated i n

Hue City, the 1st and 2d Battalions, rejoined thei r

parent regiment in the 5th Marines' Operatio n

Houston in the Phu Loc District. LaHue assigned

the 1st Marines the defense of the Phu Bai vital are a

and Col Co/Tan My naval support activity with two

battalions, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines which moved up from Operation Houston . At the same time, the two Army battalions in Operation Houston, the 2d Battalion,
POST-TET IN I CORPS 249

502d Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 327th Regiment reverted to Army control . 6 6

While trying to build up the defenses of Phu Ba i

and protect Route 1 and the vital water routes, General LaHue also wanted to expand operations into th e

approaches towards both the base and the city of Hue .

On 3 March, giving the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborn e

Division, two battalions—the 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines and the 2d Battalion, 327th Airborne Regiment—LaHue ordered the Army brigade, still unde r

his operational control, to conduct an operation in the

old Cumberland area, along Route 547, the gateway to

the A Shau Valley. Lasting only four days, from 3

March until 7 March, the two-battalion operation ,

code-named Mingo, had little to show for the effor t

except for five dead VC and two captured rifles . Faced

with the changing command relations with the establishment of Provisional Corps, General LaHue cut

short the operation . 6 7

On 8 March, two days before the activation of Prov

Corps, III MAF implemented the agreed-upon chang e

of boundaries between Task Force X-Ray and the new

command. Task Force X-Ray retained responsibility

for the Phu Bai vital area and Phu Loc District with th e

1st Marines in the former and the 5th Marines in th e

latter. General LaHue returned the two U.S. Army

brigades under his operational control, the 1st Brigade,

101st Airborne Division and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to Army Major General Olinto M .

Barsanti, the commander of the 101st, who had just

established his command post to the west of Phu Bai.

The 101st was to take over the expanse between the 1s t

Air Cavalry at Camp Evans and Task Force X-Ray a t

Phu Bai. This included the area around Hue, Route 1

north of Phu Bai, the Col Co/Tan My area, and Route

547 towards the A Shau Valley. 68

With a smaller area of operations and with fiv e

infantry battalions under his operational control ,

General LaHue decided upon a three-phased operation to the east of Phu Bai. The first phase, Operation Ford, was to be a two-battalion sweep of the Ph u

Thu Peninsula which had long been a staging area

for the 804th Main Force Battalion . He gave the mission to Colonel Stanley S. Hughes, the 1st Marine s

commander, and coordinated the operation with th e

1st ARVN Division Lam Son 194 to the north of the

Marines. On 14 March, Marine helicopters deposited in landing zones, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines on

the northern, and the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines o n

the southern part of the peninsula. The two battalions than began to advance towards one another. In

several sharp clashes, the two Marine battalion s

killed 145 of the enemy and captured 5 prisoners.

The Marines lost 14 men dead, including a Nav y

corpsman, and sustained 113 wounded . On 20

March, Task Force X-Ray closed out the operation .

General LaHue canceled the planned second and

third phases of Operation Ford . 69

By this time, the planning for Pegasus, the relie f

operation for Khe Sanh, was in full swing . The 1st Air

Cavalry Division prepared to close out its Operatio n

Jeb Stuart and move to its new staging area at Ca Lu .

With the westward deployment of the 1st Cavalry

Division, the 101st Airborne Division was to move t o

a new operating area some 18 miles northwest of Hue .

At the same time, the 1st Marines with its 1st and 2 d

Battalions, reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines ,

was to join the 1st Air Cavalry in Operation Pegasus.

Task Force X-Ray was to take over then the area vacated by the 101st Airborne Division.7 °

Brigadier General LaHue, thus once more, wa s

to expand his area of operations, while at the same

time having fewer troops to do so. At the end of the

month, Major General Donn J. Robertson, the 1st

Marine Division commander, provided some relie f

by transferring one of the 27th Marines' battalions ,

the 1st Battalion, from Da Nang to assume the

security of Route 1 between Hue and Phu Bai an d

the protection of the ColCo/Tan My base . The battalion relieved the remaining Army units still there

and operated almost to the suburbs of Hue . At the

same time, General LaHue expanded the 5th

Marines' Houston area to include the remaining

portion of the X-Ray TAOR, excluding the are a

occupied by the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines an d

the Phu Bai Vital Area. At the same time, the task

force commander ordered the 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines with two companies to take over from th e

1st Marines the protection of key outposts an d

bridges, especially the Truoi River Bridge on Rout e

1 southeast of Phu Bai.7 '

While Task Force X-Ray made these variou s

adjustments, the Communists were not slow to take

advantage of what they perceived as possible chink s

in the American defenses. On 21 March, in a relatively minor attack, enemy gunners fired some 2 0

mortar and rocket rounds on the Phu Bai Base ,

which resulted in two Marines wounded and some

structural damage to a building . Five days later,

between 0300 and 0330 on the morning of the 26th ,

however, 108 122mm rockets and nearly 80 82mm

mortar rounds fell upon both the airfield and the
250 THE DEFINING YEAR

Phu Bai compound. This barrage resulted in 4 dead,

2 Marine and 2 ARVN, and 46 wounded, most o f

whom were Marines. Despite hitting the airfield, the

Force Logistic Support Group sector, and an ARV N

training area, the rockets and mortars caused onl y

relatively light damage to three aircraft, two helicopters and a C—117D transport, and destroyed two

10,000-gallon fuel bladders.72

Instead of further bombardments on the Phu Bai

base, on 31 March 1968, under cover of a morta r

and ground attack, enemy sappers successfull y

placed demolitions on the Truoi River Bridge and a

smaller bridge, designated Bridge No. 4. The K—2

VC Battalion with three companies reinforced by

three sapper platoons had simultaneously attacke d

the two bridge outposts and a nearby Combined

Action Platoon, CAP H—3. Alerted by one of thei r

ambushes, the Combined Action Marines repulse d

the enemy attack after it reached the outer wire .

The bridge outposts were not so lucky . Both the

Truoi Bridge and Bridge No. 4 sustained substantive damage with both bridges impassable for

motor traffic and Bridge No . 4 to foot traffic a s

well. Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had

placed two squads on the smaller bridge supporte d

by a machine gun and a recoilless rifle and a platoo n

supported by two machine guns and two mortar s

on the Truoi River Bridge . The attacking force o n

Bridge No. 4 killed eight Marines and wounded

seven more . On the Truoi River Bridge, the Marin e

platoon sustained casualties of 6 dead and 2 3

wounded . The Communists lost a total of 12 men

in the attacks. In an investigation of the attack ,

Colonel Bohn, the 5th Marines commander, reported "the strength of the security forces was adequate." He blamed the success of the enemy attack

partially on the fact that the company was new to

the sector and had only occupied these positions th e

day before .7 3

Although the Marines improved their defensive

dispositions and coordination of supporting arm s

and placement of reaction forces, Task Force X-Ray

at the end of the month was hard pressed to maintain any initiative . Originally Task Force X-Ray had

planned to expand operations in April, but Genera l

LaHue admitted that he had postponed the detaile d

planning for these undertakings. Any new offensive

actions "were contingent upon the developing situation and what economies of forces can be instituted . . . ." Still if the war had reached a stalemate i n

the Task Force X-Ray area of operations, the allies

were ready to launch their major counteroffensive i n

the north.74

Regaining the Initiative

While the much-heralded relief of Khe Sanh ,

Operation Pegasus, grabbed most of the attention ,

the allies in April appeared to have regained the initiative in most of I Corps. According to U .S . pacification statistics, 7,000 more civilians in I Corps wer e

living in secure areas than the previous month ,

marking the first increase since the enemy Tet offen -

sive . In what amounted to a corps-wide offensive, II I

MAF conducted 17 major operations of battalion -

size or larger, resulting in over 3,500 enemy casual -

ties. The South Vietnamese were also active . In

Quang Tin Province, for example, the 2d Battalion,

6th ARVN Regiment opened up 15 miles of roa d

between the district town of Tien Phouc and th e

province capital of Tam Ky . For the most part, how -

ever, in the three southern provinces of I Corps, th e

Communist forces avoided battle and limited most

of their activity to scattered guerrilla attacks and

mines and boobytraps.75

At Da Nang, as in the rest of southern I Corps ,

the 1st Marine Division reported that " irregular

activity . . . continues to inflict more casualties tha n

actual contact with the enemy." At the same time ,

however, the division for the first time since Te t

began offensive operations about 12 miles south o f

the airbase in the Go Noi Island, formed by th e

channels of the Thu Bon, Ky Lam, and Ba Re n

Rivers. From 10—14 April, the 3d Battalion, 7t h

Marines conducted Operation Jasper Square in th e

western Go Noi. In the four days of the operation ,

the battalion killed 54 of the enemy at the price of

6 Marine dead and 30 wounded . While the operation ended on the 14th, the 3d Battalion remaine d

in the Go Noi "with all units becoming part of the

Da Nang TAOR."7 6

In the interlude, Marine and Army radar imager y

aircraft and "Stingray" reconnaissance patrols

reported continued enemy improvement of the

enemy road network leading through Charlie Ridge

into Happy Valley and also into the Arizona Territory and Go Noi Island sectors. The Marine reconnaissance teams not only observed enemy troo p

movement, but also directed artillery and air ont o

the enemy forces. For example, on the morning of 7

April, one Stingray patrol with the radio call sign

"May Fly" from its perch on a ridgeline looking into
POST-TET IN I CORPS 25 1

Photo courtesy of LtCol Charles E . Mueller, (USMC) Ret

Prior to Operation Allen Brook, MajGen Donn J. Robertson briefs syndicated columnist Joseph

Alsop on the situation at Da Nang. Trudging up the hill to view the terrain are LtCol Charles E.

Mueller, the commander of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in the lead, followed by Gen Robertson ,

then Mr. Alsop. Two of the Marines are carrying what appears to be a briefing map.

the Arizona spotted some 200 main force troop s

wearing green utilities, helmets, and flak jackets.

The Marines called in helicopter gunships and an

artillery fire mission . "May Fly" reported 51 of the

enemy killed. During the rest of the day an d

through the night of 8 April, the reconnaissance

team counted nearly 170 more enemy troops in nine

sightings which resulted in an estimated 70 enemy

dead. Later in the month, from 23 April through

the 30th, two other Marine Stingray teams, one

overlooking the Arizona and the other the Go Noi ,

in 17 sightings, reported nearly 370 enemy troops

moving through the Thu Bon and Vu Gia Rive r

Valleys and claimed 191 of the enemy killed b y

Marine supporting arms.7 7

On 27 April, III MAF organized Operation

Quick Track, under Lieutenant Colonel John F. T.

Kelly, of the III MAF G—2 staff, to track the 2d

NVA Division. According to Marine intelligence,

the enemy division had retreated southwest to th e

Laotian border after the failure of its Tet campaign,

but was planning now to mount a new offensive in

the Da Nang area of operations. With his comman d

post on Hill 55 south of Da Nang, Lieutenan t

Colonel Kelly's task force consisted of a small head -

quarters, the provisional company of the 1st Reconnaissance Company, a detachment of Sub-Unit 1 ,

1st Radio Battalion with signal intelligence capability, and the U.S. Army Special Forces 14th Company, Mobile Strike Force and the 245th Surveil -

lance Airplane Company, 16th Aviation Group . The

1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Win g

would provide support when necessary . Task Force

Kelly, named after its commander, began its first

inserts on 30 April and continued the operation int o

May. According to Kelly, Operation Quick Trac k

reflected Lieutenant General Cushma n's "innovative

use of intelligence to track ahead of the enem y

rather than report history. " 7 8

With the obvious movement of enemy regulars

into the western and southern avenues of approach to

the Da Nang base, General Robertson decided upo n

a series of preemptive operations . In the first, Operation Ballard, on 29 April, the 7th Marines sent one
252 THE DEFINING YEA R

battalion into the Charlie Ridge area . At the same

time, both the 7th and 27th Marines prepared to con -

duct a two-regiment operation, Operation Allan

Brook in the Go Noi . This would then be followed b y

another 7th Marines operation, later called

Mameluke Thrust, into both the Arizona and Happy

Valley regions. As one regimental commande r

observed, these operations reflected a III MA F

"change of emphasis . . . to go after the enemy in hi s

base camps, rather than attempt to interdict him b y

patrols close into the vital area ."29 *

In April, however, the capability of the 1st

Marine Division to conduct these expanded operations was fairly limited, especially in the Task Forc e

X-Ray sectors at Phu Bai and in Phu Loc . As

Brigadier General LaHue, the Task Force X-Ra y

commander admitted, whenever the divisio n

mounted such an operation it was taking a chance

of reducing the density of operations. With four of

the nine infantry battalions of the 1st Divisio n

assigned to X-Ray, LaHue stated that he had adequate forces to "do assigned operations . . . [but)

not adequate . . . to go after the enemy

According to LaHue, he could "keep Highway 1

open, aggressively patrol, and keep after the enemy

in some strength ." His tenure at Phu Bai, however,

was about over. On 7 April, Brigadier General John

N. McLaughlin relieved LaHue as the commander

of Task Force X-Ray. The latter returned to D a

Nang where a week later, Brigadier General Georg e

D. Webster replaced him there as the assistant division commander.S O

The Phu Bai forces under McLaughlin operated

much the same as they did under LaHue . The 5th

Marines continued its expanded Houston operation. On 13 April, in a no-name operation, literally called No Name No . 2, the 1st Battalion, 27th

Marines ran into two North Vietnamese companies, probably from the 804th Main Force Battalion, in a fortified hamlet along a small canal nort h

of Route 1 and a few miles east of Hue . According

to Second Lieutenant William R . Black, Jr., of

Company A, "the enemy [was) in [a) great situation to fight us off . . . ." When Black's 2d Platoon

reached the hamlet, the company's 3d Platoon ,

under Second Lieutenant Roger Charles ha d

already been hit hard and trying to withdraw .

Black later wrote his family :

*See Chapter 17 for coverage of Operations Allan Brook an d

Mameluke Thrust.

In retrospect, I now know I should have written u p

Lieutenant Charles for a decoration . He had advanced as

close to the enemy as he could get. He had lost his radi o

to enemy fire . He was taking care of the wounded ma n

near him. He guided the rest of us as we arrived at this

position to help, & he continued to fight the enemy . At

the time, I was naive enough to think that this was expected of us, as routine combat performance by a good Marine .

The Marine battalion lost 24 dead and 3 7

wounded while accounting for an estimated 60 of

the enemy. On the following day, Easter Sunday,

the Marines picked up the dead. Lieutenant Black

several years later remembered the scene as a

macabre "Easter Procession—pulling dead bodie s

back in ponchos . "8 1* *

From 19—26 April, in a rice-denial operation, the

2d Battalion, 5th Marines supported by two ARV N

battalions conducted Operation Baxter Garden on th e

Phu Thu Peninsula. During the seven-day operation ,

the Marines engaged enemy platoon-sized forces, bu t

for the most part met up with scattered enemy groups.

Most of the Marine casualties were the result of triggering enemy land mines. The Marines sustained 1 3

dead and 125 wounded while killing 55 of the enemy.

At the end of the month, Task Force X-Ray continued

to be responsible for an expanding area of operations

with limited forces 8 2

While the 1st Air Cavalry Division ended its participation in Operation Pegasus on 15 April, the airmobile division and the 101st Airborne Division

undertook the long-postponed offensive in the A

Shau Valley .*** For some time, American commanders

had viewed with concern the activity of the enemy t o

improve his lines of communication leading from th e

A Shau into Quang Nam Province and also toward s

**William Black commented that "in the Episcopal Church, where

I grew up, the Easter 'procession' is a glorious parade by the choir,

acolytes, priest, and children into the church at the beginning of th e

Easter worship service . It is a vivid and joyful celebration of Christ's triumph over death . Hence the irony that hit me that Easter morning . . .

." In his letter to his parents, he remarked upon battlefield discipline o f

the enemy : "He not only took with him his own wounded (& did something with his dead if he did not take them too); he even gathered up hi s

spent cartridges and took them . In the very trench that he had fough t

us for five hrs, we could hardly find a spent cartridge! The enemy know s

how to discourage us. We found bits of meat in trenches where direc t

arty hits had destroyed the enemy, but we only found two enemy bodies." William R. Black, Comments on draft, dtd 4Jan95 and attached

Itr to parents, dtd 20—21Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File) .

***The 2d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, however,

remained at Khe Sanh under the operational control of the 3d Marin e

Division . See Chapter 14 . For the earlier planning for A Shau operations, see the discussion of the proposed York operations in Chapter 1 .
POST-TET IN I CORPS 25 3

the approaches to Hue . For example, on 28 March, an

aerial photo reconnaissance mission over the valle y

revealed the existence of what Marine intelligenc e

officers dubbed the "Yellow Brick Road, " a newl y

constructed corduroy road extending from the A Shau

through Laos and Base Area 607 into Quang Nam

Province . Beginning on 19 April, after two days o f

B—52 preparatory strikes in the valley, the 3d Brigad e

of the 1st Air Cavalry and the 1st Brigade of th e

101st reinforced by an ARVN airborne task forc e

began Operation Delaware in the A Shau.83

For about a month, units of the two Army divisions conducted a series of " leap-frog" helicopte r

assault operations throughout the length an d

breadth of the A Shau. While initially encountering

heavy antiaircraft fire, U.S . supporting air and

artillery eventually silenced the enemy guns.* The

Army troops met mostly local enemy rear echelo n

troops and engineers, but occasionally fought

engagements with regular infantry. At the end of the

operation, the Americans reported killing 735 of the

Communist soldiers, while suffering 142 dead an d

731 wounded. The ARVN task force lost 26 kille d

and 132 wounded . As General Cushman observed ,

the A Shau was "not a . . . a fortress of combat troops

. . ., but . . . a highway, you might say, for logistic s

supply and for the movement of reinforcements an d

replacements." The allies captured huge caches of

enemy weapons, equipment, ammunition, foodstuffs

and other military supplies including more than 70

trucks, two bulldozers, and a destroyed PT—76 tank

from the 3d Battalion, 203d Tank Regiment before the

operation concluded . 84

To fill in the gap in the forces in the north during

the Delaware A Shau operation, General Cushman ,

with the concurrence of MACV, transferred th e

Americal Division's 196th Light Infantry Brigade t o

the operational control of General Rosson in Prov

Corps. In turn, the Prov Corps commander assigne d

the new brigade to Camp Evans as the corps reserv e

under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry

Division . About the same time, on 18 April, after the

close of Operation Pegasus, the 26th Marines move d

*Lieutenant General Richard E . Carey, who served in Vietnam i n

1968 as a lieutenant colonel and as a squadron leader, observed tha t

during Delaware, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing "provided massiv e

fixed wing and helo support for an entire day. " He recalled that th e

Army lost several helicopters in several minutes and required th e

Marine air since the Army units were out of range of Army heav y

artillery. LtGen Richard E . Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File).

from Khe Sanh to the Quang Tri base and took ove r

the area of operations there . Further north at Dong

Ha, the 3d Marine Division had established a small

division reserve built around an armored task force ,

called Task Force Robbie, after the nickname of its

commander, Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, the former division inspector. 8 5* *

For the larger part of April, the three 3d Marin e

Division operations along the DMZ, Lancaster II ,

Kentucky, and Napoleon/Saline, continued with

most of the same forces as they had the previous

month. As a sub-operation of Lancaster II, from

12—16 April, BLT 3/1 carried out Operation Charlton in the Ba Long Valley. The battalion captured

one crew-served weapon and held 56 detainees, but

sustained 11 wounded. While in April, the 3 d

Marine Division reported higher enemy activity i n

the form of artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks on

Marine positions on the DMZ front, the number o f

American and Communist casualties in Operatio n

Kentucky were actually lower than the previou s

month. In Operation Lancaster II, however, at the

end of April, the North Vietnamese increased thei r

artillery bombardment of Camp Carroll to about

40—50 rounds a day.8 6

In the Cua Viet sector at the end of the month, th e

enemy posed the greatest threat. On 27 April, the

Navy's Task Force Clearwater warned III MAF tha t

the enemy was apparently preparing to interdict th e

waterway. North Vietnamese artillery and rocket

attacks on the port facilities at the mouth of the Cu a

Viet and the offloading ramps at Dong Ha als o

increased . On 29 April, the ARVN 2d Regiment

engaged an NVA unit from the 320th NVA Division .

During the night of 29—30 April, enemy machin e

gunners opened up on Navy patrol craft in the Cua

**According to Lieutenant Colonel Karl J. Fontenot, Major General Tompkins established Task Force Robbie in mid-February .

Fontenot while still commanding the 3d Tank Battalion also served as

the executive officer of the task force . He recalled that General Tompkins " briefed us personally on his expectations which essentially was t o

form a very flexible organization ready for employment in any direction at any time ." The task force made its headquarters at Cam Lo sinc e

it was a centralized position . While the task force organization was

flexible, it usually consisted of a tank company ; two Army M4 2

tracked vehicles mounting twin 40mm antiaircraft guns ; two Army

truck companies with trucks equipped with quad .50-caliber machin e

guns (M55); other assorted motor transport ; an engineer detachment;

and usually one rifle company. Fontenot wrote " TF Robbie made itself

pretty visible in the division area with rapid moves over the roads to

Camp Carroll, Dong Ha, etc . " LcCol Karl J. Fontenot, Comments on

draft, n.d. (Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File) .
254 THE DEFINING YEA R

Viet from the Dai Do village complex about 1,00 0

meters north of Dong Ha . Colonel Hull sent BLT 2/ 4

to clear out the enemy. In fighting that would last

nearly a month, the battle for Dong Ha with the NVA

320th Division was joined and the enemy had begun a

new offensive on the eastern DMZ to counter the

allied thrusts to the west. 87 *

From late February through the end of April, th e

allied forces in I Corps had regained the initiative .

From Quang Ngai in the south to Quang Tri Provinc e

in the north, allied troops had taken a large toll o f

both enemy main force and guerrilla units . Still the

cost had been high, and the enemy was far from

defeated. Outside of the battlefront, events in Washington and Hanoi were also to influence the course o f

the war. On 31 March, in a televised speech to the

nation, after a relatively poor showing earlier in th e

month in the New Hampshire primaries, Presiden t

Johnson in a surprise statement announced his decision not to stand for reelection, to restrict the bomb -

*For the fighting at Dai Do and its aftermath see Chapter 15 .

ing campaign over North Vietnam,** and to authorize

only a limited reinforcement of American troops i n

Vietnam. On 5 April, unexpectedly, the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh declare d

that his government was willing to negotiate with th e

Americans. The following month a North Vietnames e

and American delegation met in Paris. In the mean -

time, with the arrival of the two Army divisions, th e

101st and the 1st Air Cavalry, III MAF and Provisional Corps had entered the foreboding A Shau fo r

the first time since 1966 and most importantly earlier had broken the siege of Khe Sanh .8 8

**U.S . Army Colonel Bruce B . G. Clarke wrote that according to

Army sources, at the time of the President's speech the 1st Air Cavalry Division was preparing plans for its next mission, Operation

Delaware, after Operation Pegasus. According to Clarke, the planners

developed a concept "to press west into Laos and then turn south alon g

the Ho Chi Minh Trail into Laos to enter the A Shau Valley from th e

northwest rather than the east ." Apparently "General Tolson shut off

this planning by noting that the planners obviously hadn't heard th e

President's speech and what they were proposing was politically

impossible." Col Bruce B . G. Clarke, USA, Comments on draft, n .d .

[Apr95] (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 14

The Siege of Khe Sanh

Digging In—Opening Moves—"Incoming!"—The Fall of Khe Sanh Village

Reinforcement and Fighting Back—Round Two—The Fall of Lang Vei—The Intensifying Battl e

Settling the Score—Operation Pegasus

Digging I n

By late January, U .S. planners at every level wer e

determined to defend Khe Sanh, despite the suggested possibility of "another Dien Bien Phu ."* General

Westmoreland voiced numerous reasons for defending the remote outpost . It was a valuable base for

monitoring North Vietnamese infiltration throug h

Laos along the "Ho Chi Minh" and "Santa Fe "

Trails.** It was also important to Westmoreland's

planned invasion of Laos by which he intended physically to cut the trails. Moreover, Khe Sanh served as

left flank security for the Strong Point Obstacle System, also known as the Dyemarker Project . Finally,

and vitally significant when considering the unpopularity of the war to many Americans by 1968, was th e

psychological significance of Khe Sanh . While it had

no intrinsic political importance, being neither a cultural nor economic center, to relinquish it in the fac e

of North Vietnamese pressure would result in a majo r

enemy propaganda victory.*** Admiral Ulysses S .

Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, an d

Westmoreland's immediate superior, concurred i n

this analysis, saying "withdrawal from any portion o f

Vietnam would make immediate and sensationa l

news, not only through the Western news media, but

also through the Communist capitals as a major propaganda item." '

At Khe Sanh, the 26th Marines had the responsibility to prevent the base from falling to the sur-

*See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the events preceding the

Battle for Khe Sanh .

**The "Santa Fe" Trail was actually part of the Ho Chi Minh Trai l

network, entering South Vietnam from Laos northwest of Khe Sanh .

See Chapter 3 .

***In his comments, General Westmoreland wrote that "the abandonment of that central terrain feature (Khe Sanh) would have mad e

available to the enemy a route to the populated area near the coast . Our

control of Khe Sanh forced the enemy to change his battle plans and t o

reduce the threat to the coastal areas and its population . " Gen William

C . Westmoreland, USA), Comments on draft, dtd 18Oct94 (Vietna m

Comment File) .

Unnumbered Department of Defense (USMC) Phot o

An aerial view of the Khe Sanh Combat Base looking wes t

was taken during the siege. The runway of the airstrip ca n

be seen below and in the top right of the picture is wha t

appears to be a rocket pod hanging below the aircraft taking

the picture.

rounding Communist forces. With three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a full range of supporting units, including tank and antitank detachments, antiaircraft weapons, engineers, shore party, air

control, communications, and a host of others, Colone l

David E . Lownds, the 26th Marines commander, continued improving his defenses.

The Marine positions arced around the comba t

base from the westnorthwest to the north, forming a

line of heavily fortified, mutually supporting strong -

points. Seven kilometers northwest of the comba t

base, Company I and Company M occupied Hill 881

South, from which Company I sortied on 20 Januar y

255
256 THE DEFINING YEA R

meeting heavy Communist resistance .* Three kilometers to the east of Hill 881 South, Company K sat

atop Hill 861 . The 2d Battalion's main position wa s

on Hill 558, just over a kilometer east of Company K,

overlooking the Song Rao Quan valley. Further still

to the east, and almost four kilometers north of the

combat base, the 2d Platoon of Company A sat high

atop the dominant precipice known as Hill 950 t o

guard the radio relay site there . At the combat base

proper, the 1st Battalion and Company L, 3d Battalion defended the airstrip with the headquarters elements, and the firing batteries of the 1st Battalion ,

13th Marines.

Adjacent to the combat base and just north of

Route 9 was the massive bunker complex of the secretive SOG Forward Operating Base 3 (FOB—3) whose

members conducted clandestine anti-infiltration

operations in Laos and along the border. Outlying

defensive positions further south included those of

Combined Action Platoons Oscar and the 915t h

Regional Force Company protecting the hamlets of

Khe Sanh Village as well as the small MACV advisory team at the district headquarters located there .

Further to the southwest was the Lang Vei Special

Forces CIDG Camp located on Route 9, nine kilometers from the combat base and only two kilometers

from the border with Laos .**

In every position, the defenders continuousl y

worked to prepare for the coming battle . Following a

visit to Khe Sanh, General Cushman directed that all

fighting holes have overhead cover capable of withstanding direct hits from 82mm mortars and that th e

ammunition supply point be reorganized to provide

better protection for the ammunition stocks, much o f

which were outside the revetments .2 Fortification

material was in short supply, but the Marines used

many field expedients, including damaged portions o f

the airstrip's steel matting and metal pallets used for air

delivery of supplies. Rolls of "German tape," with its

razor-like edges, were added to the multiple layers of

protective barbed wire ringing the combat base an d

*A detachment of three 105mm howitzers from Battery C, 1st

Battalion, 13th Marines was attached to Company Ion Hill 881 Sout h

to provide additional fire support for the base . Colonel Kent O. W.

Steen, who served with the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines as a young officer in 1968, wrote : "There were times when these three artillery pieces

were all that could be brought to bear on attacks on the . . . main base . "

Col Kent O. W. Steen, Comments on draft, dtd 1Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Steen Comments; 1/13 ComdC, Feb68 .

**See Chapter 4 relative to the activities and establishment o f

these organizations in the Khe Sanh sector.

the hill outposts in a band 25 meters wide in many

places. Marines placed explosives inside rolls of barbe d

wire to produce boobytraps which, when activated by

a tripwire or detonated on command, would send sharp

shards of twisted metal flying in every direction . In

some places, the defenders emplaced drums offougasse,

a mixture of gasoline and diesel fuel detonated by plastic explosive which produced a wall of flame certain to

discourage even the most determined attacker. Still

there were shortcomings in the Marine defenses . Former Washington Post correspondent Peter Braestrup ,

who served as a Marine officer during the Korean War,

remembered that after he visited Khe Sanh at the end

of January, 1968, "I saw on main base [that) man y

perimeter trenches were waist high, no more . Marines

don't like to dig ."3** *

In addition to the physical preparation of the

ground at Khe Sanh, higher headquarters entered th e

picture to assist in the defense of the combat base and

its outlying positions. General Westmoreland ordered

that Khe Sanh receive maximum support from Boein g

B—52 Stratofortress heavy bombers and ordered the 1st

Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to prepare to deploy

to I Corps Tactical Zone on 24-hour notice . Genera l

Cushman directed the 3d Marine Division to shift

heavy artillery units for better support of Khe Sanh and

requested that the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division be alerted for deployment to the Hue-Phu Bai are a

on 24-hour notice . 4

Logistical preparations went forward at the sam e

time . By the third week in January, Khe Sanh had at

least a 30-day supply of ammunition for all of its

***For discussion of Marine vulnerabilities at Khe Sanh se e

Chapter 4 . See also LtGen Philip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War, The

History : 1946—1975 (Novato, CA : Presidio Press, 1988), pp .

554—56 ; LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, Comments on draft, dt d

7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); and William J . O'Connor, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

O'Connor Comments. See also the references to Marine shortcomings in building fortifications and bunkers in Chapter 1, especiall y

with reference to comments by Major Gary E. Todd who served o n

the 3d Marine Division intelligence staff in 1968 and Colonel Joh n

C. Studt. Colonel Studt, who as a lieutenant colonel took over the

3d Battalion, 26th Marines at Khe Sanh in March 1968, observed

that "the first thing I undertook was a total reconstruction of ou r

defensive positions starting with the company commanders buildin g

a proper bunker with me ." Col John C. Studs, Comments on draft ,

dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File). From another perspective ,

Colonel Kent O. W. Steen, an artillery officer at Khe Sanh, commented, "we did homemade bunkers not because we wanted to o r

didn't know better, but that there weren't enough airlift and construction resources in Vietnam to provide the materials we nee d

once the threat was understood ." Steen Comments.
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 25 7

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190273 while the bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190685 .

Top, a Marine infantryman takes a brief nap in his covered overhead bunker, protecting him fro m

incoming artillery and mortar rounds. Below, the photograph is an overview of the 1st Battalion,

26th Marines bunker defenses along the western perimeter of the base . The Marines had come unde r

criticism for not "digging in . ,,
258 THE DEFINING YEA R

howitzers, mortars, and small arms. Even so, Cushman declared that when aircraft became available, h e

intended to increase those stocks by another five

days' supply. 5

The rallier who surrendered to Captain Kenneth

W. Pipes' Company B Marines on 20 Januar y

proved to be a gold mine of information .* Lieutenant La Thanh Tonc answered questions freely,

providing intelligence officers detailed information

concerning the North Vietnamese plan for th e

attack and reduction of the Khe Sanh Combat Base .

Tonc claimed that the Khe Sanh campaign was the

most important effort undertaken by the North

Vietnamese since the U.S. became involved in the

war. Their objective was to seize Quang Tri Province

and force the U.S. out of South Vietnam by capturing every U.S. base between the Laotian border and

Con Thien. According to La Thanh Tonc, the effort

was so important that the North Vietnames e

Defense Ministry controlled it directly.

The enemy plan called for a major offensive effort

by the North Vietnamese 325C Division . The 5th

Battalion of the division's 95C Regiment was to capture Hill 1015, the highest peak of Dong Tri Mountain, which would neutralize the Marine-manned

nearby Hill 950. From this high ground overlooking the airfield and its approaches, Communist gunners could interdict aerial supplies and reinforcements. The 6th Battalion, 95C Regiment was to seiz e

Hill 861. The 4th Battalion, 95C Regiment had

orders to attack the western end of the airstrip, near

where, on 2 January, the Marines had killed th e

North Vietnamese reconnaissance party. The 101 D

Regiment was to attack the east end of the airstrip i n

coordination with the effort by the 4th Battalion ,

95C Regiment at the other side of the combat base .

Lieutenant La Thanh Tonc told the interrogators

that the North Vietnamese 29th Regiment was in

division reserve, its location unknown to him (i t

was, in fact, headed for Hue City and the savage battles of the Tet Offensive) . The cooperative lieutenant

was unable to provide specific information concerning the size, designation, location, or equipment o f

any NVA artillery units, but he was certain that

heavy artillery and rockets would support th e

attacks . The offensive, he claimed would begin

before Tet—only 10 days away. ?

*The details concerning the actual capture of Lieutenant La Than h

Tonc are contained in Chapter 4 .

Opening Moves

Just after 2000 on 20 January, an eight-man Marin e

reconnaissance team, four kilometers west of Khe San h

on Hill 689, reported that it was surrounded, unde r

attack, and required artillery support. Lieutenant

Colonel John A. Hennelly's 1st Battalion, 13t h

Marines responded . Through the night, Hennelly's

gunners enclosed the reconnaissance team in a protec -

tive box of artillery fire, preventing the North Vietnamese from overrunning its position. In all, ove r

2,200 rounds of friendly artillery fire fell around th e

trapped Marines, sometimes within 20 meters of them .

The technique was effective. Marines reported 25

North Vietnamese casualties, while the patrol sustained only two wounded 8**

Within a few hours, however, the fight on Hill

689 would become a sideshow. Shortly after midnight, two red star cluster signalling flares soared

into the darkness above Hill 861, and immediatel y

300 North Vietnamese fell upon Company K's line s

from the northwest . Striking from attack position s

within 100 meters of the crest, the enemy blasted

holes in the protective wire with bangalore torpedoe s

and quickly advanced, supported by mortars targeting Company K's bunkers and trenches . The NVA

moved up the northwest slope, keeping the crest o f

the hill between the combat base and their attackin g

units, thus curtailing the Marines' use of artillery fir e

in the defense. 9

Company K, commanded by Captain Norman J .

Jasper, Jr., fought back hard as enemy rifle, machine

gun, and mortar fire poured into Hill 861, but the

North Vietnamese penetrated the 1st Platoo n 's defenses and overran the company's landing zone . Moving

through his company area, directing the defense of the

hill, Captain Jasper was wounded three times an d

unable to carry on. His executive officer, First Lieu -

tenant Jerry N . Saulsbury, took command of Company

K in the middle of the fight.

**Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly remembered that his artillery use d

eight 105mm howitzers to keep literally a wall of fire" between th e

Marine patrol and the enemy. The plan had been to extract the men by

helicopter, but this proved infeasible because in order to do so th e

artillery had to stop firing and the North Vietnamese . . . [would have)

moved back in . By this time, the entire base was under attack and h e

recalled that he had the three howitzers firing the east end of the box

cease fire and passed the word to the reconnaissance ream to move eas t

to the base . Hennelly stated the team arrived safely back about dawn ,

which he believed was a miracle . LtCol John A. Hennelly, Comments

on draft, dtd 30Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hennell y

Comments.
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 259

Photo is from the Ted Vdorick Collection

A photo of Hill 869 was taken from the trenchline of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at the Rock Quarry.

The 3d Battalion command group was still on Hil l

881 South, where it had gone earlier in the day to monitor Company I's battle on Hill 881 North.* The

weather had closed in during the afternoon, grounding

helicopters and effectively trapping Lieutenant Colone l

Harry L. Alderman and key members of the battalion

staff atop Hill 881 South .

Alderman's operations officer, Major Matthew P.

Caulfield, contacted Hill 861 by radio during the figh t

and learned that Lieutenant Saulsbury had assumed

command. Caulfield knew that Saulsbury had recentl y

been dropped from flight training and had no infantry

experience . Concerned, Major Caulfield told Saulsbury

to rely on the company gunnery sergeant, who was wel l

known in the battalion as an effective and experienced

combat leader. "The Gunny is dead," Saulsbury

replied. When Caulfield next told Saulsbury to ge t

advice from the company first sergeant, Saulsbur y

informed him that the first sergeant was in the wreck

of the company command post, dying .l o

Lieutenant Saulsbury turned to the task at hand ,

fighting Company K like a veteran combat commander. The action was close and fierce, with North Vietnamese moving through parts of the position, heavin g

satchel charges into bunkers. The enemy next pene-

*See Chapter 4 .

trated the southwest side of 861's perimeter, forcing

the 3d Platoon from its positions and occupying th e

Marines' bunkers. Sergeant Mykle E. Stahl singlehandedly counterattacked, distracting the enemy troops

while other Marines recovered casualties . As he

advanced up the trenchline, three North Vietnames e

attempted to capture him and Stahl suffered a bayone t

wound before killing two of them. When his rifle malfunctioned, another Marine killed the third man . Stah l

then picked up an enemy AK–47 assault rifle and

attacked a third bunker, killing three of the enemy an d

capturing three others. When the 3d Platoon reoccupied its positions, Stahl, although wounded thre e

times, manned a .50-caliber machine gun and continued to fight.1l**

Major Caulfield ordered some of the battalion's

81mm mortars on Hill 881 South to fire in support o f

Hill 861, ever mindful that the NVA might also attack

Hill 881 South at any time . The mortars fired 68 0

rounds that night, causing the tubes to become so hot

that the Marines cooled them first with water, the n

fruit juice, and finally, by urinating on them .1 2

By 0530, the enemy onslaught had spent itself

against the determined defense of Hill 861 . Marine

signal intelligence personnel reported hearing th e

**For his actions, Sergeant (later Captain) Stahl received th e

Navy Cross.
260 THE DEFINING YEAR

commander of the attacking NVA unit ask for reinforcements. But it was too late for that. Company K hi t

the enemy with a final blast of fire, driving them off

the hill.1 3

The battle for Hill 861 left 4 Company K Marines

dead and 11 wounded . At daybreak, elements of the

company swept the area outside their wire, finding 4 7

dead North Vietnamese and capturing 3 wounded .

One of the prisoners claimed to belong to the 4th Battalion, 95C Regiment, a slight conflict with Lieutenant

La Thanh Tonc's revelation of the previous afternoon ,

but, nonetheless, close enough to lend further credibility to his information.

"Incoming! "

No sooner had the North Vietnamese abandoned

their attempt to take Hill 861 than they struck the

Khe Sanh combat base itself. At 0530, enemy artillery,

mortar, and rocket fire smothered the airstrip and its

surrounding bunkers and trenches. The first round

landed in the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines area, scoring

a direct hit on the generator which powered its digita l

fire control computer, but the battalion continued t o

fight back with the fire direction center computing firing data manually.14

Within minutes of the opening salvo, enemy shell s

hit the base's ammunition supply point known a s

"ASP Number 1" . More than 1,500 tons of ammunition began exploding, throwing fragments and unexploded rounds, some of them on fire, through the air to

land in and around the Marines' fighting positions.

Captain Pipes, the commanding officer of Company B ,

1st Battalion, 26th Marines, moved his command pos t

three times because the explosions continued showering his position with smoldering mortar and artillery

projectiles which threatened to detonate at an y

moment. 15*

Incoming rounds smashed into the airstrip, ripping

apart the steel plates and damaging helicopters. A

direct hit destroyed the 1st Battalion, 26th Marine s

mess hall and another struck the tiny post exchange .

Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines lost all of its

personnel records to enemy shell fire . Riot control

grenades burned in the inferno at ASP Number 1 ,

* Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Pipes, the commander of Company B in 1968, remembered that one of the first Marines killed wa s

his radio operator: "I found him slumped over the entrance to ou r

bunker, as I exited to search for him ." LtCol Kenneth W. Pipes, Comments on draft, dcd 10Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Pipe s

Comments, 1995 .

sending choking clouds of "CS" gas rolling throug h

the trenches and bunkers to add to the Marines ' misery. Some did not have gas masks and could only cove r

their faces with wet towels. 1 6

Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's artilleryme n

remained at their howitzers, providing counterbattery

fire . In Battery C's position, near the ASP, scores of hot ,

smoking shells thrown skyward by explosions, fell onc e

more to earth . Captain William J. O'Connor, First Lieutenant William L. Eberhardtt, and Sergeant Ronnie D .

Whiteknight, all of Battery C, picked up between 7 5

and 100 of these dangerously hot projectiles and move d

them away from the gun pits. Captain O'Connor

recalled that one Marine driver abandoned his truc k

loaded with ammunition "sitting in the middle of m y

Battery area ." At that point, Sergeant Whiteknigh t

"rushed out of a bunker and drove the truck away fro m

the guns and into a less dangerous area." When CS ga s

rolled over the gun line, Lieutenant Eberhardtt and

Sergeant Whiteknight brought gas masks to the cannoneers so that Battery C might continue its duel with

the North Vietnamese gunners .'?* *

At 1000, a large quantity of C—4*** and other explo -

sives went up with a tremendous blast, rocking the

entire combat base. A shock wave rolled through Khe

Sanh, cracking the timbers holding up the roof of the

1st Battalion, 26th Marines command post . The battalion staff fell to the ground but the roof, after settlin g

about one foot, held fast .1 8

As the enemy shells continued to fall and ASP

Number 1 continued to burn, each new explosion took

its toll on the Marines' ammunition supply." Ammunition technicians from Force Logistic Suppor t

Group—B fought the flames with fire extinguishers an d

shovels, but by afternoon the garrison was dangerously

low on many types of ammunition. General Cushma n 's

warning of the previous week to "tidy up" ASP Number 1 was driven home . Worse, the logistical air effort

to build up ammunition stocks would have to begi n

again, meaning that other types of supplies would wai t

even longer for delivery while the priority for space on

board planes continued to go to ammunition .

**William O'Connor, the Battery C commander, recalled tha t

when he took over the battery, the troops had a dog mascot with th e

mange . O'Connor related, "despite my orders the dog was no t

destroyed but was cleaned up. He was smart enough to hide from me ,

but when we got hit . . . [on 21 January] CS rolled into the area fro m

the exploding dump and I found myself sharing my gas mask with th e

dog . That dog later left for the States with one of our rotating troops

and did make it back safe and sound ." O'Connor Comments.

***A plastic explosive .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 26 1

Photo from the David Douglas Duncan Collection, MCHC

A lone combat boot and helmet are seen among the debris where a Marine's "hootch" stood before i t

was destroyed when a 122mm rocket hit the nearby ammunition dump .

Nightfall brought no respite for the defenders of

Khe Sanh. At 1950, the 2d Platoon, Company L, 3 d

Battalion reported about 35 North Vietnamese crawling toward its wire near the western end of the airstrip .

The Marines opened fire with grenade launchers and

light antiarmor weapons (LAAW5).* When the action

ended an hour later the North Vietnamese were see n

dragging away casualties and 14 enemy dead remaine d

in the wire.2 0

The fighting and shelling of 21 January resulted i n

14 Marines dead and 43 wounded. Combined with th e

ammunition dump explosions, the shelling destroyed a

Bell UH—1 Iroquois helicopter, all of the weather mon -

itoring equipment, most of the airstrip's night lighting

system, many field telephone lines, bunkers, enginee r

equipment, generators, the post exchange, a mess hall,

and other facilities.21* *

*The M72 Light Antiarmor Weapon (LAAW) is a 66mm antitank rocket system in which a projectile is prepackaged in a disposabl e

launcher. In Vietnam, the Marines used these weapons against enemy

bunkers and as on this occasion even against infantry.

**Colonel William H . Dabney, who as a captain commanded

Company I on Hill 881S, recalled that as well as the main base bein g

bombarded, "several rounds of 120mm mortars struck" Hill 881S ,

wounding several Marines, and that "as they were being evacuated ,

several more rounds struck the helicopter zone, killing the compan y

corpsman and two other Marines and destroying a CH—34 helicopte r

and wounding its crew." Col William H . Dabney, Comments on draft ,

n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dabney Comments .

III MAF immediately moved to replenish th e

ammunition lost in ASP Number 1, but the task wa s

complicated by damage to the airstrip. With only

1,800 feet of the 3,900-foot runway open, large-capacity cargo aircraft could not land . Further, the damage

to the night lighting system and poor weather added

to the problem. Nonetheless, six Fairchild C—12 3

Provider light cargo aircraft of the 315th Air Commando Wing landed at Khe Sanh after dark on 21 January under artillery illumination, bringing in 26 tons

of much needed ammunition . After midnight, a 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing Sikorsky CH—53 Sea Stallio n

helicopter delivered whole blood after an extremely

dangerous landing on the "socked-in" airstrip.22

The Fall of Khe Sanh Village

Almost simultaneously with the attack on the mai n

base, the North Vietnamese launched an assault agains t

the Regional Force troops and Combined Action Osca r

units in Khe Sanh Village about 3,000 meters to th e

south.*** Early on the morning of the 21st, under cove r

***Marine records state that the attack on Khe Sanh Villag e

occurred at 0630 on the morning of the 21st while Colonel Bruce B .

G. Clarke, USA, who was the senior U .S . Army advisor for Huong Ho a

District, in an account he wrote in April 1968, states that the NV A

attack began at 0500. See 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, and Copt Bruc e

Clarke, untitled account, dtd Apr68, attached to Col Bruce B . G.

Clarke, Comments on draft, n .d . [Apr95) (Vietnam Comment File).

THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 263

of fog, elements of the 66th Regiment, 304th North Vietnamese Division struck the Huong Hoa District headquarters in the village complex. The mixed group of

defenders included two platoons of the 915th Regional Force Company, the small four-man U.S . Army advisory group headed by Army Captain Bruce B . G.

Clarke, and two Combined Action Platoons of Combined Action Company "Oscar," commanded b y

Marine First Lieutenant Thomas B . Stamper. The tota l

strength of the allied force consisted of approximatel y

175 soldiers and Marines. Combined Action Platoon

Oscar–1 (CAP 0–1) consisting of 10 Marines and 1

Navy corpsman, headed by Sergeant John J. Balanco ,

and about an equal number of Bru tribesmen, was in

the headquarters hamlet. The second Combined

Action Platoon, Oscar–2 (CAP 0-2), led by Sergean t

Roy Harper, at about the same strength, was in a nearby hamlet about 200 yards to the west .

With Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Stamper coordinating artillery and air support from the headquarters command bunker, CAP 0–1 and the RF troop s

stood off the initial attacks in fierce fighting .* Whil e

eventually forced to give up most of the hamlet, th e

two units established a final defensive perimeter in th e

headquarters compound . CAP 0–2 also managed for

that first day to stave off the NVA in their sector.

As the fog lifted about midday on the 21st, the

intensity of the combat slackened somewhat . While

the North Vietnamese continued to place pressure

upon the defenders with mortar and RPG bombardments, they limited their infantry action to small

arms fire and probes. Helicopters attempted to

resupply the embattled headquarters compound, bu t

could not land . According to Corporal Balanco, th e

crews managed, however, to kick out some muc h

needed ammunition .

*Captain Clarke was on a separate advisory radio net from Lieu -

tenant Stamper. Clarke managed to keep in radio contact with Robert

Brewer, the Senior Quang Tri Province Advisor in Quang Tri City, and

more importantly established radio contact with an Air Force forwar d

air controller who called in repeated air strikes against the North Vietnamese . Lieutenant Stamper had direct radio contact with the 26t h

Marines and was able to call in artillery support and Marine ai r

through the Marine radio net . Col Bruce B. G. Clarke, USA, Comments on draft, n .d . [Apr95) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Clarke Comments; Capt Bruce Clarke, untitled account, dtd Apr68 ,

attached to Clarke Comments. According to Prados and Stubbe, Captain Clarke was out on an early morning patrol just before the enem y

onslaught on the 21st, but "miraculously got back to the perimete r

and under cover" to help coordinate the defense . John Prados and Ra y

W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision, The Siege of Khe Sanh (Boston : Houghton

Mifflin Co, 1991), p . 258 .

Two relief expeditions also failed in their attempts .

In the first, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines from the

Khe Sanh base sent out a platoon from Company D t o

the village. The platoon reached Hill 476 overlooking

Khe Sanh Village and could see North Vietnamese

troops deploying. Receiving new orders that the relie f

mission was too dangerous, the platoon returned t o

base . The second expedition was a disaster. The U.S .

Army 282d Assault Helicopter Company attempte d

to bring in that evening the South Vietnamese 256t h

Regional Force Company from Quang Tri City.

Unfortunately, in a series of mishaps and misunderstandings, the aircraft came down in a landing zon e

near the abandoned French Fort, 2,000 meters east of

Khe Sanh, the former home of FOB–3, and now a

North Vietnamese stronghold. It was a near slaughter:

the North Vietnamese killed over 25 of the America n

pilots and crew and 70 or more of the RF troops .

Among the dead was the expedition leader, U .S . Army

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Seymoe, the deputy adviso r

for Quang Tri Province . According to authors Joh n

Prados and Ray Stubbe, this failed expedition "i n

terms of proportionate casualties and equipment losses . . . would be the worst military debacle of the entire

campaign at Khe Sanh ."23

During the night of 21–22 January in Khe Sanh

village, the situation remained tense but relativel y

quiet, except for some enemy sniper fire. During this

time, the Marines and surviving Bru of CAP 0–2 t o

the west, fought their way to the headquarters compound .** The Marines sustained several wounded but

no dead. On the morning of the 22d, Sergeant Balanco, who was later awarded the Silver Star for his part

in the fight, led a patrol towards the Old French Fort,

hoping to find survivors of the aborted relief mission .

At the bottom of the hill upon which the fort was situated, Balanco turned back, fearing he was being se t

up for an ambush after seeing some Vietnamese in

strange uniforms. Upon approaching the western sec -

tor of the headquarters compound, Balanco and hi s

men recovered what he claimed to be 150 weapons ,

including RPGs and assault rifles, many of them

**Former Navy Corpsman John R . Roberts, who served with CA P

0—2, recalled that Sergeant Harper, although badly wounded, continued to coordinate the defense . Roberts wrote that most of the othe r

Marines in the CAP were also wounded . Despite their wounds, the

CAP—2 Marines decided that the only choice they had was to break ou t

and attempt to reach CAP—1 in the headquarters compound, whic h

they successfully did . John R. Roberts, "The Bastard Sons of Khe Sanh ,

the Marines of CAP, Oscar II," ms, attached to John J. Balanco, Comments on draft, dcd 15Nov94 and 5Apr95 (Vietnam Comment File).
264 THE DEFINING YEA R

brand new, from the bodies of the "hundreds of mutilated and mangled NVA" there .24

During the late morning of 22 January, a Marine

helicopter took Lieutenant Stampler back to the Kh e

Sanh base to consult with Colonel Lownds about the

feasibility of continuing the defense in the village .

According to Lownds, upon Stampler's recommendation and after "long consideration and proper evaluation of the facts," he decided to evacuate the units 2 5

The resulting evacuation took place under chaoti c

conditions including North Vietnamese shelling .

Sergeant Balanco remembered, "We received an agonizing radio message . . . from an emphatic and concerned Lt. Stampler telling us to pack up ." According

to Balanco, "no R.F.'s or Bru with their 'weapons'

would be allowed on the helicopters to return to the

combat base ." He recalled that six helicopter evacuation missions flew out of the village that day . As the

first helicopters took off, a group of frightened Vietnamese civilians rushed to board the aircraft . Balanco

fired "a few M—70 rounds " in the opposite direction ,

causing them to hold back so that the wounded coul d

be taken out first. 2 6

The helicopters took out all of the America n

wounded including two U .S . Army sergeants from th e

Advisory Group . Captain Clarke also had received

orders from Robert Brewer, the Senior Quang Tri

Province Advisor, to evacuate the headquarters.

According to Clarke, Brewer had not wanted to abandon Khe Sanh Village, but in that Colonel Lownds

could not provide any further artillery support, there

was no longer any choice. Clarke and one of his advisory sergeants declined to board the helicopters. They

led the remnants of the 195th RF Company and several of the Bru safely to the FOB—3 compound along

a secret trail.27 *

*There seems to be some doubt whether Colonel Lownds ordere d

that the RFs and the Brus not be evacuated by helicopter. Accordin g

to Lownds' interview, he ordered the evacuation of the Bru CAPS an d

RFs, but they and Captain Clarke elected to walk out rather than boar d

the helicopters. Col David E . Lownds inrvw, 13Mar68, pp . 22—23, i n

Khe Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC . Given the accounts

on the ground by both Clarke and Sergeant Balanco, it is obvious tha t

the RFs and the Bru would have boarded the helicopters if they had th e

choice . It may very well have been that Colonel Lownds' orders ma y

have been misunderstood or that the situation on the ground may hav e

determined the decision not to evacuate them . In any event the relations between the Army advisors and the Marine command with th e

exception of the CAP Oscar Marines was not very good . Colonel Clark e

later wrote : "It was so bad that the Marines were eavesdropping on ou r

radio nets . . . In this regard, I had coordinated to have my own alternate communications back to Quang Tri ." Clarke Comments.

Photo courtesy of John J. Balanco

Cpl Bruce Brown, LCpI Frank Batchman, and Sgt JohnJ.

Balanco, members of Combined Action Company Oscar wh o

served with the Bru Montagnards in the Khe Sanh villag e

complex, are seen at the secretive Forward Operating Base

(FOB) 3, next to the Khe Sanh base, where they set up new

positions with their Bru Popular Force troops.

Sergeant Balanco departed on the last helicopter to

leave the headquarters compound . Just before he

boarded the aircraft, two civilian Bru approached hi m

carrying a badly burned man and asked the Marine to

take him on board . At the same time, the pilot was

shouting: "No one except Americans could go on th e

LAST CHOPPER OUT and he was departin g

RIGHT NOW! " Taking out his pistol and thinking to

put the wounded man out of his misery, Balanco suddenly changed his mind . He returned the pistol to hi s

holster and "screamed for everyone to move back and

got him on that last chopper out ." After arriving at th e

Khe Sanh base, the Marines of Combined Action Com -

pany Oscar, including CAP—3 which also evacuated its

hamlet located north of the headquarters, joined th e

RF troops and the Popular Force Bru at the southern

edge of the FOB—3 compound .28"

Reinforcement and Fighting Back

On 22 January, Khe Sanh Combat Base was th e

scene of frenetic activity. The resupply effort continued as 20 Air Force C—123 sorties delivered anothe r

**Captain Clarke later that afternoon led a Special Forces Strik e

Force from FOB—3 which destroyed everything of value in the Kh e

Sanh Village headquarters. Clarke Comments and Balanco, " Abandoned," p . 186 .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 265

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

An Air Force C—123 Provider transport is about to land just beyond the leveled ammunition dump

at Khe Sanh, bringing in much-needed supplies .

130 tons of ammunition . After unloading, the

empty aircraft joined the helicopters of Marin e

Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 in evacuating

wounded Marines and civilian refugees. Attack aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, as well a s

Navy and Air Force planes, struck known and suspected Communist positions in the surrounding

area . The North Vietnamese did not remain silent.

Artillery, rockets, mortar, and small arms fire pounded the base and hill positions at intervals throughout

the day, playing havoc with efforts to repair damage .

Enemy fire hit one CH—46 helicopter as it was lifting off from the airstrip, causing it to crash withi n

the perimeter.2 9

At 1200 on the 22d, the 3d Marine Divisio n

ordered Lieutenant Colonel John F. Mitchell's 1st

Battalion, 9th Marines to deploy to Khe Sanh . *

Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell recalled that his battalion command group and two rifle companies arrive d

by helicopter that day. Mitchell remembered that a s

the helicopters landed the battalion was greeted b y

*See Chapter six for the redeployment of the 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines from Camp Evans.

"a hail of automatic weapons fire followed by mortar fire" and the unit sustained its first casualties at

Khe Sanh . According to the battalion commander,

there were no guides and he directed his compan y

commanders "to disperse their companies as best

they could, seek protective cover or trenches, and

await further orders. " Then Mitchell sought out

Colonel Lownds in the 26th Marines command

post. The 26th Marines commander told Lieutenant

Colonel Mitchell to assemble his troops and "be prepared for immediate deployment due west" of th e

Khe Sanh base . At Mitchell's request, given the lateness of the hour, Colonel Lownds agreed that

Mitchell could wait until the following day to

deploy to his new sector.30

The next morning, the battalion moved out from

the combat base and spent much of the time in "clearing/reconnoitering the area west/southwest" of the

combat base . Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell selected a

small hill that fronted a rock quarry approximatel y

1,500 meters to the west southwest of the main base

for his command post and main defensive area .

Mitchell then sent the 1st Platoon of Company A

about 500 meters outside the battalion perimeter on an
266 THE DEFINING YEA R

even smaller hill to set up an outpost on a knoll west of

the quarry, which he designated Alpha 1 .* His priority

at both sites was the building of his defensive position s

starting "from scratch . " While "building materials,

wire, and mines " arrived from the main base as they

"became available," the battalion first depended upon

its own "ingenuity and hard work—diggingscrounging, . . . to survive the incoming . "

Over the next several days, Khe Sanh maintained a

high level of activity, as helicopters and cargo aircraft

flew in and out as often as the weather permitted, an d

Marines worked to improve their defensive positions .

On 23 January, enemy antiaircraft fire became a significant threat, with NVA gunners downing a helicopte r

and a jet attack aircraft in a 20-minute period3 '

Communist shelling continued, completely destroying the base post office and further damaging bunkers,

trenches, and the airstrip.32 The Marines fought back ,

expending massive quantities of artillery and morta r

ammunition in attempts to silence the enemy guns.

This, however, proved to be a difficult task . The enemy

gun positions were well-concealed in dense jungle, visible only when actually firing. Because these positions

were usually located on the reverse slopes of hills, the y

were often not even visible from Marine positions. Air

observers of the 3d Marine Division maintained constant patrol over the area during daylight hours, providing some of the information the Marines needed t o

return fire effectively.33* *

*Bert Mullins who served as a radioman to Lieutenant Colonel

Mitchell recalled that after leaving the main base that they actuall y

reached first the small hill which later became A—1 . He remembered

Mitchell "remarking that we must be on the wrong hill because it was

much too small ." Bert Mullins, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Mullins Comments . Lieutenant Colonel

Mitchell stated that he ordered the establishment of the A—1 outpos t

because he believed that the NVA would need more than one avenu e

of approach to make an all-out assault on the main base and that A— 1

lay "astride the west to east axis" to Khe Sanh . Moreover, he needed "as

much warning as possible before the enemy would reach 1/9's MLR

[main line of resistance) ." Col John F. Mitchell, Comments on draft ,

drd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Mitchell Comments .

**Navy Captain Bernard D . Cole, who as a lieutenant junior

grade and naval gunfire officer assigned to the 26th Marines, served a s

an assistant target intelligence officer in the 26th Marines Fire Sup -

port Coordinating Center. He recalled that "air dropped sensors were

a primary source of targeting data for us . " These sensors " were still

classified . . . and we were not supposed to refer to them as a n

info[rmation] source . . . ." Cole remembered that "we received a for -

matted readout from the sensors . . . [which] would indicate the sensor location and type, and the type of target (troops or vehicles) and

the approximate number . . . ." Capt Bernard D . Cole, USN, Comments on draft, dtd 27Oct94 and 23Jun96 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Cole Comments.

Enemy long-range artillery presented an eve n

more difficult problem . The accepted view was that

the artillerymen fired their large guns from position s

on Co Roc Mountain, a precipitous cliff southwest o f

the combat base, across the Laotian border and outside the maximum range of the artillery pieces of the

1st Battalion, 13th Marines. One 3d Marine Division

intelligence officer, Major Gary E . Todd, wrote that

the reports he read stated that "NVA artillery was

dug into the eastern face of Co Roc so as to be almos t

impossible to hit with counter-battery fire, even if we

had the artillery with range. " These same source s

reported that the NVA gun emplacements were in

"man-made caves, completely camouflaged, and fitted out with rails similar to railroad tracks . " The

North Vietnamese gunners "would roll their guns to

the mouth of the cave and, with barrel protruding,

fire, then roll back smoothly into the cave and restore

the camouflage." Navy Lieutenant Junior Grad e

Bernard D. Cole, attached to the 26th Marines as th e

assistant target intelligence officer, remembered tha t

he "personally targeted Arc Light strikes (which cam e

in flights of three B—52s) on Co Roc . " According to

Cole, "The strikes would quiet down the NVA gunners for a couple of hours—from the shock . . ., but

then they would resume firing ."34

Captain William H. Dabney, who commanded Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines on Hill 881 Sout h

had a different perspective. According to Dabney, "Co

Roc was a myth, perhaps because of the imposing loo k

of the mountain and the romantic sounding name. "

While granting that some rounds were fired from

artillery at Co Roc, he argued that the more destructive

NVA firing positions were located to the west of Hil l

881 South . Dabney contended that being seven kilome -

ters west of Khe Sanh and 1,500 feet higher than the

Marines on the base, his company was in a better posi -

tion to locate the enemy artillery positions . While not

always hearing the guns being fired, he declared, "we

could usually hear the rounds going over."3 5

He described how one of his artillery spotters, Corporal Molimao Nivatoa, a native Samoan and blessed

with unusually good eyesight, using powerful ships '

binoculars, found several of these enemy guns to th e

west. Because of the location of Hill 881 and its height ,

the Khe Sanh DASC often passed off aircraft wit h

unexpended munitions to Company I . As Dabney

explained, the Khe Sanh DASC "rarely could see targets of opportunity" and "we, conversely, always

[emphasis in the original) had targets ." On one suc h

occasion, according to the Marine captain, he just had
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 267

Photo is from the Ted Vdorick Collectio n

A lone Marine can be seen standing up along the trenchline of Company D, 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines, located in the Rock Quarry about 1,500 meters west of the main base. Note the sandbags

along the trenchline .

The American flag flies over the command bunker of Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines on Hill 88 1

South, one of the main hill outposts. Captain William H. Dabney, the Company I commander, who had th e

colors raised every morning, argued that his company was in one of the best positions to locate the enemy guns.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A191078
268 THE DEFINING YEAR

several flights of "Navy and Air Force birds handed off'

to him when Corporal Nivatoa suddenly " spotted a

flash and then several others." A few seconds later, the

Marines on the hill heard the rounds going overhea d

and then saw them impacting on the main base . This

time, Dabney contacted a Marine airborne forward air

controller codenamed Southern Oscar flying a Cessn a

light single-engine fixed-wing 0—1E. Turning over

control of the aircraft given to him to Southern Oscar,

Captain Dabney described to the airborne controlle r

the nature of the target and relayed to him Corpora l

Nivatoa's directions. When Southern Oscar had one o f

the aircraft drop his bombs on a ridgeline and ask for

an adjustment, Dabney recalled the corporal's response :

"Left a click, add two ridge lines." Given these new

bearings, the air controller spotted first one gun an d

then several others. While not sure because of enemy

antiaircraft fire, Southern Oscar believed that th e

resulting airstrikes took out four of the guns. Dabney

wanted to call in B—52 strikes on these positions, but

declared that one of his everlasting frustrations wa s

that nothing ever came of his recommendations .36 *

*In his comments, Colonel Dabney wrote : For what it's worth, th e

folks in the Khe Sanh COC [Combat Operations Center] never realized

how the NVA artillery was emplaced and employed, but then, they never

came up co [Hill) 881S and looked ." He believed that they were unnecessarily fixated upon Co Roc . Although respecting the abilities and brillianc e

of Captain Mirza M. Baig, the 26th Marines Target Intelligence Officer,

Dabney believed the latter too engrossed in his " technological acquisitio n

goodies" and "forgot he had . . . eyeballs working for him ." In supporting

his viewpoint, Colonel Dabney asked why would the North Vietnamese

employ their Russian-made 130mm guns with a 27,000 meter range fro m

Co Roc which was only 12,000 meters from Khe Sanh and risk losin g

them. He observed that Hill 881 South was three to four miles off the gu n

target line from Co Roc, and "if we could hear [emphasis in the original )

the rounds whistling over, they couldn't be coming from Co Roc!" Instead ,

he believed the main enemy guns were located about five kilometers nort h

of Co Roc and about 15,000 meters west of Hill 881 South . Instead of

emplacing them in battery positions, they placed individual guns " along

the gun-target line, about 500 meters apart, since the target (Khe Sanh)

was fixed, they had only to adjust each gun for range based on its location .

Deflection was a constant ." He concluded: "It made sense, really, to pu t

their artillery, guns firing at extreme range . . . to the west, where they

could fire down the long axis of the target . That way, 'over and shorts'stil l

had effect on target . " Dabney Comments. Captain Bernard D . Cole, USN,

after reading Colonel Dabney 's comments, wrote: " I do not dispute tha t

Col Dabney was able to spot arty firing at Khe Sanh from positions other

than Co Roc, but I certainly disagree that 'Co Roc was a myth . ' We obviously knew about and targeted non-Co Roc arty, which we located throug h

'all source' intelligence—although Harry Baig regularly went out to th e

perimeter (without helmet or flak jacket!), our job in the FSCC was o f

course not observation but fire support coordination . I simply think that

Col Dabney is basing his conclusion on inadequate information ." Captai n

Cole also insisted that "If anyone called in a viable Arclighc target, we

would hit it . . . ." Cole Comments, dtd 23Jun96 .

While there may have been some question abou t

the location of the enemy guns, there was little dispute that enemy rockets, especially the 122mm Soviet type, posed possibly an even greater threat to the

Khe Sanh base. Used in great volume and difficult to

suppress, the enemy gunners fired them from west o f

the base which offered "the long axis of the base" as a

target. Given the limited range of the missiles, Hil l

881 South was in a strategic position . From the hill,

the Marines of Company I could observe the NVA

.gunners shoot off their rockets, usually in sheaves of

50 rockets firing simultaneously towards Khe Sanh.

This permitted Dabney to give the main base about a

10-second warning to sound the alarm and for th e

Marines there to take cover. While unable to suppress

the rockets when they fired because of their sheer volume, Dabney's Marines were able to take countermeasures. According to the Company I commander,

the North Vietnamese regularly used the same site s

over and over so he employed his mortars and

106mm Recoilless Rifles against them "at nigh t

while they were setting up sometimes producing secondary explosions." The Marines also called in ai r

strikes against the sites, but with mixed results

because of the weather.3 7

An ominous indication of an even more extensiv e

North Vietnamese campaign against the Marine bas e

occurred in mid January. On the morning of the

24th, Communist tanks overran the BV—33 Battalion, Royal Lao Army, at Ban Houaysan, an abandoned

airfield on Route 9, just across the border in Laos . The

appearance of NVA tanks outside North Vietnam wa s

extremely unusual. Later the same day, an air observer reported sighting a MiG aircraft 10 to 15 miles

west of Khe Sanh .

Closer to home, the 3d Platoon, Company F,

26th Marines engaged an NVA company only on e

kilometer north of the battalion's position on Hil l

558. The Communist troops were equipped wit h

helmets and flak jackets and used whistle signals .

They were not afraid to leave their positions t o

maneuver, at one point sending 50 men against th e

Marines' flank . The Marines reported that th e

enemy fought tenaciously, refusing to withdraw

even after "four hours of pounding" by artillery an d

aircraft. One North Vietnamese machine gunne r

remained at his post until killed by rifle fire at a

range of only five meters .38

In light of the major battle anticipated at Kh e

Sanh, General Westmoreland requested that Lieu -

tenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, the I Corps corn-
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 269

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A80111 4

ARVN Rangers occupy a defensive trench east of the runway

and actually just outside the main base. The American command wanted a Vietnamese unit to participate in Khe San h

for "psychological" reasons as well as military.

mander, provide South Vietnamese units to participate in the defense of the combat base, citing "psychological reasons as well as military ." Lam agreed ,

and on 27 January, Captain Hoang Pho and hi s

ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion arrived at the comba t

base and took their place at the east end of the runway just forward of Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th

Marines, actually outside of the base defensiv e

perimeter. According to one source, Colonel Lownds

wanted "to gain more elbow room . . . to push out th e

perimeter" since he had received implied criticism

from his superiors about the limited extent of his

defenses in this sector.39 Although their unit, 31 8

men strong, was about 100 short of its authorization ,

these tough, disciplined soldiers would prove themselves time and again during the battle, earning th e

respect of the Marines .40

Enemy sappers were at work, apparently preparing the way for planned ground attacks. Marines on

the perimeter found barbed wire cut, but replaced to

look as if it were whole, and Claymore mines* turned

around to face Marine trenches . 4 1 Intelligence reports

from higher headquarters warned Colonel Lownds t o

be watchful for signs of NVA tunneling . The

Marines monitored seismic intrusion detectors,

drove metal engineer stakes into the ground and listened to them with stethoscopes borrowed from the

medical unit, and even employed divining rods.

They dug a number of "countermines " in response t o

possible indications of tunneling, but found n o

enemy tunnels . 4 2

Beyond Marine positions, American aircraft

opened a new era in warfare, planting unattende d

ground sensors near likely enemy avenues of

approach and assembly areas.** These devices were

extremely sensitive and could monitor sound o r

vibrations, transmitting their information by radi o

to intelligence personnel. The position of each sensor was carefully recorded, permitting the Marine s

to quantify unusual enemy activity. By noting the

activation of a number of different sensors, intelligence personnel could estimate the size and composition of an enemy unit, as well as its direction of

march and speed . The devices would play a key rol e

in the battle. 4 3***

Round Two

By the end of January, intelligence officers painte d

a frightening picture of the magnitude of the Nort h

Vietnamese effort around Khe Sanh . Reacting to

developments, Major General Rathvon McC . Tompkins, the commanding general of the 3d Marine Division, ordered Lownds to limit patrolling to withi n

500 meters of friendly lines. Tompkins feared that the

North Vietnamese wanted to draw the Marines ou t

into the open, away from the protection of their

bunkers, trenches, mines, and barbed wire . Patrolling ,

he reasoned, was unnecessary because intelligence wa s

*A directional anti-personnel mine emplaced above ground facing

the enemy.

**According to Colonel Dabney, he observed that these sensors

were planted "by black, unmarked, 'Air America' [a CIA sponsored

aviation company) birds which looked to me to be B—26s ." Dabney

Comments.

***Colonel John F. Mitchell, who in 1968 commanded the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at Khe Sanh, commented that the 26th Marines provided him in early February with a "black box" that monitored sensors

along Route 9 . He observed that " it was very productive . " His battalio n

S—2 or intelligence officer listened in on the NVA radio nets in conjunction with the sensor monitoring and " the raw intelligence gleamed . . .

was put to good use throughout the siege . " Mitchell Comments.
270 THE DEFINING YEA R

providing accurate information on enemy unit locations and activities 44 *

Tet Mau Chanh, by far the most significant and

celebrated holiday season in Vietnamese culture ,

approached. During some previous holiday periods,

both sides had agreed to temporary cease-fires whic h

were observed more often in the breach . In 1968, th e

Tet cease-fire was scheduled for the period from 1800 ,

29 January until 0600, 31 January . At 1100, 29 January the command post of the 37th ARVN Ranger

Battalion received a radio message in a "norther n

accent" stating that the NVA had an ARVN Ranger

patrol in sight, but would not fire because of Tet . The

voice advised the Rangers to recall their patrols unti l

after the holidays. The ARVN unit changed radio frequencies .4 5 Later that day, the 3d Marine Division

notified Khe Sanh that the Tet truce was canceled .

One unit history recorded that "as if to signal tha t

they also heard the news the NVA dropped six 60m m

mortar rounds into the Combat Base at precisel y

311800 January."46* *

With the truce cancellation, the massive air campaign under Operation Niagara continued unabated .

On 30 January, B—52s carried out the biggest strike

of the war to that date against targets in the Khe San h

area, dropping 1,125 tons of bombs. 4 7** *

* This limitation on patrolling did not apply to all of the forces at Kh e

Sanh . The members of FOB—3, the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) ,

with their attached Montagnards continued to run their clandestine operations. Navy Captain Bernard D. Cole, who served in the 26th Marines

FSCC, recalled that Colonel Lownds "had a small map room separate fro m

the main FSCC Hq. When he took proposed B—52 strikes for approval, a

Special Forces captain there plotted the progress of long-range patrols into

Laos. " Cole Comments. Former Marine Sergeant John A. Balanco who

served with CAP 0—2 at FOB—3 recalled : "Black helicopters would lan d

with no markings on them and cake men dressed in civilian clothes away. "

He mentioned that Captain Clarke and the mixed group with him als o

patrolled and the CAP Oscar Marines occasionally joined them . Balanco ,

"Abandoned," pp. 185—91 . Colonel Mitchell stated that he did not adhere

to the 500-meter limit either and that " 1/9 patrolled every day of the week "

north, south, and west of his positions, " up to 1,200 meters or more ." He

mentioned that he and FOB—3 were the only commands that patrolled

daily and that he and the FOB—3 commander "devised a coordinated pla n

for patrolling and intelligence gathering. " It was his opinion "that you must

have maneuverability to complement fire power and to keep your enem y

having doubts about your intentions. " Mitchell Comments.

**Both the North Vietnamese and the allied forces at Khe San h

routinely monitored each others' radio nets. Colonel Mitchell with th e

1st Battalion, 9th Marines commented that by monitoring the enem y

nets, it was apparent that the North Vietnamese had "complete knowledge of the . . . T/O and T/E of the Marine units at Khe Sanh, " including the " names of key commanders. " Mitchell Comments .

***For further discussion of Operation Niagara see Chapter 23 .

The troop and logistics buildup at Khe Sanh, as

well as the massive air support effort, indicated the

resolve of U .S . forces to defend the base . Commanders

and officials at every level, including the President ,

expressed concern for the situation in northwest Quan g

Tri Province. President Johnson, in particular, was

sometimes depicted as having had a fixation with Kh e

Sanh . Indeed, an enduring legend of the campaign concerns an incident in which the President supposedly

asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to sign a letter to th e

effect that they believed Khe Sanh could be defended .

In truth, President Johnson asked for General Westmoreland's personal assessment of the situation, whic h

was then circulated among the Service chiefs for comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously endorse d

Westmoreland's conclusion that Khe Sanh could an d

should be held .4 8

Perhaps the most dramatic indication of the President's concern was his question to the Chairman of th e

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, about

the feasibility of using tactical nuclear weapons t o

resolve the battle on favorable terms. Westmoreland

established a "small secret study group" to examine

the consequences of what was nicknamed Operatio n

"Fracture Jaw." The group reported that "because the

region around Khe Sanh was virtually uninhabited ,

civilian casualties would be minimal." Although planning never proceeded beyond this stage, the President's interest in the possibility of such a drastic ste p

underscored his perception of the seriousness of th e

situation at Khe Sanh . 4 9

Bru refugees streamed into Khe Sanh seeking evacuation from the war-ravaged area . They told the

Marines that the North Vietnamese claimed they

would "liberate the Khe Sanh airstrip" by 5 February.

Indeed, on the night of 3—4 February, sensors northwest of Hill 881 South detected the movement of

1,500 to 2,000 people . Captain Mirza "Harry" M.

Baig, Colonel Lownds' Target Intelligence Officer, initially believed the movement to be a North Vietnamese resupply effort and passed the information t o

fire support units for their attack . On the following

night, however, the massed movement continued and

further study caused Baig to change his opinion . He

now thought the sensors had detected a North Vietnamese regiment in attack formation .50

The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, joined by four

batteries of Army 175mm guns to the east, pounded the area indicated by Baig with volley after volley of artillery fire . The dreadful hammering had a

telling effect. The sensors transmitted the rumble
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 27 1

Photo from the David Douglas Duncan Collection, MCH C

MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, the CG, 3d MarDiv, is seen as a passenger with an unidentified crew member in a Marine helicopter on one of his frequent visits to the Khe Sanh base .

of impacting shells, as well as the voices of hundreds of panic-stricken men running to escape th e

deadly barrage .

Just to the east of the target area, the men of Captain Earle G. Breeding's Company E, 2d Battalion ,

26th Marines watched the scene from a hilltop position just 500 meters northeast of Company K's

strongpoint on Hill 861 . Company E had occupied

the hill (dubbed "861A") that morning, 5 February,

because it blocked direct observation between Hil l

861 and the 2d Battalion strongpoint on Hill 558 .

There were no sensors near Hill 861 or 861A .5 1

At 0300, about two hours after the Marine an d

Army artillerymen shelled the suspected North Vietnamese regiment, the combat base came under Communist rocket, artillery, and mortar fire . Five minutes later, Captain Breeding reported that 200 Nort h

Vietnamese were breaching the wire atop Hill 861 A

and Colonel Lownds immediately set a "Red Alert "

for the 26th Marines.52

Smoke from a B—52 massive Arclight airstrike rises in th e

background as photographed from FOB—3 . During Operation Niagara, the Boeing Stratofortress long-range bomber s

based at Guam and Thailand conducted hundreds of thes e

strikes in support of the Marines at Khe Sanh .

Photo courtesy of John J. Balanco
272 THE DEFINING YEA R

Intense mortar and small arms fire rained down on

Company E from the attacking NVA even as the 1s t

Battalion, 13th Marines poured on a heavy answering

barrage . Communist sappers blasted holes in the protective barbed wire through which following infantr y

advanced, shooting as they came . Company E, having

occupied the hill only a few hours before, was not wellentrenched. Still, the Marines used every weapon the y

could bring to bear, including CS gas grenades, against

the oncoming North Vietnamese .5 3

The enemy troops pressed their attack vigorously ,

reaching and penetrating the 1st Platoon 's perimeter.

First Lieutenant Donald E. R. Shanley and his platoo n

withdrew in good order to alternate positions from

which they continued the fight. Meanwhile, friendl y

artillery rolled back and forth over the slope upon

which the North Vietnamese were attacking, seekin g

to cut off any following reinforcements . Aircraft joined

in, dropping their loads under radar control accomplished by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's Air Suppor t

Radar Team (ASRT) B of Marine Air Support

Squadron (MASS) 3 at the combat base .

Shortly after the North Vietnamese penetration, a t

0500, Lieutenant Shanley led his men from their fighting holes in a bold counterattack . The 1st Platoon fel l

upon the enemy with knives, bayonets, rifle butts, and

fists. Captain Breeding later described the scene as

" just like a World War II movie . . . Charlie didn 't

know how to cope with it . . . we just walked all over

him."5 4 The North Vietnamese who survived the counterattack fled the hilltop, then regrouped and attacked

again, halfheartedly. The Marines quickly repulsed th e

discouraged enemy. While the fight for Hill 861A cost Company E, 7

dead and 24 wounded, a company sweep at daw n

revealed over a 100 enemy dead on the slope of the hill

President Lyndon B. Johnson confers with U.S. Army Gen Earle G . Wheeler, Chairman of the Join t

Chiefs ofStaff. The Joint Chiefs concurred with Gen Westmoreland's assessment that Khe Sanh coul d

be successfully defended

Photo Courtesy of Center of Military History
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 27 3

Photo from the David Douglas Duncan Collection, MCH C

A Marine sniper team on Hill 861A from Company E, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines goes int o

action . On the left is LCpl Albert Miranda with his Remington 700 sniper rifle, taking aim at a

distant target, while his partner, in the center, LCpl David Burdwell, points out the enemy soldie r

to his platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Alec J. Bodenweiser, with the binoculars.

and within the perimeter. Captain Baig later speculated that the heavy and accurate artillery fire (almost

2,000 rounds from the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

alone) on and behind the assaulting Communists had

prevented their reserves from joining the attack . %

The Fall of Lang Vei

Having failed to capture first Hill 861, then its

neighbor 861A, the North Vietnamese turned their

attention elsewhere . Their next target was the new

Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, defended by Detachment A—101, Company C, 5th Special Forces Grou p

and four CIDG companies of Bru Montagnards .

Lang Vei was a heavily fortified position on Route 9

about two kilometers from the Laotian border from

which Detachment A—101 ran patrols to monito r

North Vietnamese infiltration into Quang Tri

Province. About a kilometer closer to Khe Sanh wa s

the village of Lang Vei, site of the old Special Forces

camp. Here, the survivors of the Royal Lao BV—33

Battalion, overrun by North Vietnamese tanks at Ban

Houaysan a few days before, rested with thousands of

civilian refugees, including their own families .5 6

The many missions assigned to the 26th Marines for

the Khe Sanh battle included responsibility for providing fire support for Lang Vei and for reinforcing the

camp should the enemy attack it. Lieutenant Colonel

Hennelly sent a 1st Battalion, 13th Marines forward

observer to the camp on 6 January to register defensiv e

fires. A month earlier, Colonel Lownds sent a compan y

from Khe Sanh to Lang Vei to rehearse the reinforcement plan . It stayed off the road under the assumption

that the enemy would set ambushes along Route 9 as

part of an attack on Lang Vei . Because of the heavy jun -

gle, the company took 19 hours to cover the nine-kilometer distance.5 7

At 0030, 7 February, the North Vietnamese struc k

the Lang Vei camp. In the first engagement between
274 THE DEFINING YEAR

Both photos are from the David Douglas Duncan Collectio n

Top, Capt Earle G . Breeding, Commander of Company E, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, with cigar

in his right hand and radio in his left, reports the successful counterattack of his company against

the enemy on Hill 861A. Below, two Marines of Company E repair the unit's barbed wire after its

successful defense of Hill 861A . The body of one of the attackers is in the foreground .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 27 5

American troops and enemy tanks since the Korea n

War, 12 Soviet-built PT—76 light amphibious tanks of

the 202d Armor Regiment, followed closely by infantry

from the 304th Division, crashed through the chai n

link fence surrounding the compound and rolled

through the camp shooting . The defenders destroyed a

number of the tanks with 106mm recoilless rifle fire,

but to no avail. In a desperate and hard-fought action ,

the enemy overwhelmed Detachment A—101 and the

Bru CIDG companies. Survivors remained in bunkers,

among them the detachment commander, Army Captain Frank Willoughby, a former Marine noncommissioned officer.5 8

From his underground combat operations center

(COC), Willoughby called for air and artillery support. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines responded t o

Willoughby's request with repeated missions, firing

the brand-new, top-secret controlled fragmentation

munitions (COFRAM), colloquially known as "Firecracker, " for the first time in combat .* Overhead ,

Marine and Air Force attack aircraft tried to follo w

Willoughby's directions in the darkness to dro p

their bombs on enemy concentrations in and aroun d

the camp .5 9

For most of the night, Willoughby and a few other

survivors remained in the COC bunker with a n

enemy tank on top of them, firing, while the Nort h

Vietnamese rolled countless fragmentation and gas

grenades into the bunker and called to the soldiers in

English to surrender. Willoughby remained in radio

contact with the 5th Special Forces Group in Da

Nang which requested that the 26th Marines execut e

*A projectile containing a number of "submunitions" or bomblets,

which are ejected from the shell and spread over a wide area, each

bomblet exploding like a small grenade . It is considerably more lethal

than the standard high explosive projectile . This ammunition is still i n

use today under the name Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) .

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hennelly who commanded the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines recalled that sometime earlier an Army brigadie r

general and warrant officer "flew into Khe Sanh with some 105m m

cofram and a hand-written set of firing tables for the new ammo . "

From his understanding, "it sounded like COFRAM would be goo d

against troops in the open on terrain without much vegetation . " Hennelly stated that when " things hit the fan" and the Special Forces

required artillery support, he would have preferred " HE thigh explosive) rounds " with variable or time fuzes . He, however, received orders

to use the COFRAM, " The orders were coming from Washington ,

D .C. (honest to Pete) . " Hennelly stated that " we fired a mission or two

with Cofram but it was not the time or situation to be messing aroun d

with a new ammo . It was slowing the fire missions down . " He directed that they switch back to conventional ammunition and " that 's primarily what we fired although I was telling folks up-the-line we wer e

using cofram ." Hennelly Comments.

the previously arranged contingency plan for the reinforcement of Lang Vei . Colonel Lownds refused,

reporting that the combat base itself was even then

being heavily shelled and that he expected an enemy

assault against the airstrip at any time . Further, the

difficulty of moving through the difficult terrain to

Lang Vei at night with enemy tanks on Route 9 mad e

reinforcement, in the words of one Marine staff officer, " suicidal."60

Generals Westmoreland, Cushman, and Tompkins

accepted Lownds' decision . Westmoreland later wrote,

"honoring the prerogative of the field commander o n

the scene, I declined to intervene until I could ascertai n

more on the situation." During the late morning of 7

February at Da Nang, General Westmoreland me t

with General Cushman and other senior commanders

in I Corps. While the conference dealt with the situation throughout I Corps, General Westmorelan d

expressed his concern about the Lang Vei situation .

Among the participants at the meeting were Arm y

Colonel Jonathan E Ladd, the commander of the 5th

Special Forces Group, who had just flown from Khe

Sanh to Da Nang, and Army Lieutenant Colone l

Bru civilian refugees, including many children, wal k

toward Ca Lu along Route 9 after the fall of Lang Vei. Not

having the resources to care for them and fearing the possibility of enemy infiltrators, the Marines decided against

allowing the refugees into the Khe Sanh base.

Photo from the 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68
276 THE DEFINING YEAR

Daniel L. Baldwin, III, the northern SOG commander.

Ladd strongly advocated that a relief force be sen t

immediately to relieve or evacuate the survivors. Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin recommended that the Specia l

Forces troops at FOB—3 conduct a helicopter-supported evacuation of the camp . After much discussion and

some recrimination, General Westmoreland ordere d

General Cushman to provide helicopter and fixedwing support to Baldwin . 6 1 *

By this time, however, the defenders were largel y

dependent upon their own efforts. Individually and

sometimes in groups, the Special Forces and Bru

CIDG troops broke out of the camp and most made

their way to Lang Vei Village where the Royal Laotian

BV—33 Battalion still remained. Special Forces personnel with the battalion in the old camp there

attempted to encourage and plead with the Laotians to

assist their comrades in the new camp, but the result s

were only a few feeble and begrudging counterattacks .

*Colonel Ladd, the 5th Special Forces Commander, in an oral history several years later described his activities and participation in th e

7 February meeting . He declared that he had been at Lang Vei up t o

the night before the camp had been hit, and that the Special Forces

there "could hear the tanks moving around ." Ladd departed by helicopter to obtain anti-tank mines and assistance . According to Ladd, h e

talked to General Cushman at Da Nang who wanted to help him, bu t

the people in Saigon did not believe that there were tanks there and

that the Special Forces "didn't need" the mines. He then flew back ove r

Lang Vei the following morning and saw tanks sitting on top of th e

base . According to his account, he then went to Khe Sanh and aske d

Colonel Lownds to mount a relief expedition which Lownds refused t o

do . Ladd then flew back to Da Nang and found General Westmorelan d

there . According to the Special Forces colonel, he then told Westmoreland there were three choices : "Stay there and hold ; abandon th e

place ; or the Marines reinforce." Frustrated at the meeting, Lad d

declared he then called General Abrams, stating : "I just can't get Westmoreland's attention long enough to do anything . He is just putting it

off." Ladd claimed that it was General Abrams who called Genera l

Norman Anderson, the Marine 1st MAW commander and ordered hi m

to provide aircraft support for an evacuation . Col Jonathan F. Ladd ,

USA (ret) intvw, n .d . [1977?) (U .S . Army, Military History Institute,

Carlisle Barracks, Pa), pp. 22-30, attached to Clarke Comments, here -

after Ladd Intvw. The discussions at the meeting of 7 February were

wide ranging and involved the situation at Da Nang as well as at Lan g

Vei (See Chapter Eight). Many of the participants at the meeting had

very different perceptions of what occurred . General Westmorelan d

later wrote that he was "shocked at things that virtually begged to b e

done . . . ." Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 342. On the other hand ,

both General Cushman and General Earl E . Anderson, Cushman 's chie f

of staff, remembered no acrimony at the meeting . Cushman Intvw,

Nov82, p. 29 and Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dt d

18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Marine Brigadier General John R .

Chaisson, however, who headed the MACV Combat Operations Center, in a letter soon after the meeting, wrote about "recrimination s

between the Green Berets and the Marines ." BGen John R. Chaisso n

la. to his wife, dtd 8Feb68 (Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute).

Shortly after 1700, under strong air cover from fixed -

wing aircraft and helicopter gunships, Marin e

CH—46s helilifted the relief force from FOB—3 int o

old Lang Vei. Despite some mobbing by Laotian an d

some of the Vietnamese troops, the helicopters

brought out most of the Americans and the most seriously wounded of the Laotians and Vietnamese troops.

The rest made their way to Khe Sanh on foot. The loss

of life was heavy for the Special Forces and CID G

troops at "new" Lang Vei . Almost 300 of the camp's

487 defenders were killed, wounded, or missing,

including 10 Americans killed and missing, and

another 13 wounded from a total of 24 .62

Of the debacle and its aftermath, General Cushman

later said:

The base was overrun in the middle of the night, i n

a matter of a couple of hours. . . . The garrison ha d

already been defeated . There was nothing one could do

really, to salvage the situation . . . . it would have been a

grave risk to send Marines from Khe Sanh to Lang Ve i

in the hours of darkness. G3* *

The destruction of Lang Vei created a secondar y

problem for Colonel Lownds. More than 6,000

refugees, many of them Laotians of the BV—33 Battalion and their families, as well as a number of Vietnamese Special Forces and Bru CIDG personnel wh o

had escaped Lang Vei alive, crowded outside the gate s

of the combat base . Lownds refused to admit them

**Most Marines agreed with General Cushman and would accep t

the statement of Navy Chaplain Ray W. Stubbe, who has written an d

researched extensively on the subject of Khe Sanh, that an entire NVA

regiment "waited to ambush any rescue force ." LCdr Ray W. Stubbe ,

USN, Comments on draft, dtd 23Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Major Gary E. Todd, who served as an intelligence officer on the 3 d

Marine Division staff during this period, supported this view in his

comments that Bru refugees "had seen what amounted to an NVA

regiment lying in ambush between KSCB [Khe Sanh Combat Base )

and Lang Vei that night during the attack . " Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 28Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) . One Marin e

exception to the contention that a relief expedition was infeasible tha t

night was Colonel John F. Mitchell, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, at the time, the unit slated to carry out the Marin e

contingency plan for the relief of Lang Vei . Colonel Mitchell commented that at the end of January Colonel Lownds assigned him th e

Lang Vei relief mission . According to Mitchell, the plan at that tim e

called for the battalion to make the relief overland . The battalion

commander suggested to Colonel Lownds that " the only successfu l

way to accomplish this mission, would be by Helo Assault ." At tha t

point, Lownds answered, "Hell you would lose one-half your force an d

helicopters during the landing . " While not taking exception to

Colonel Lownds projection, Mitchell replied, "Yes, but I would b e

there . " Colonel Mitchell still contends: " In my opinion the Marines

should have done the 'right thing' by sending a relief unit ." Mitchell

Comments, dtd 9Feb96 .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 27 7

because he did not have the resources to care for the m

and because he feared that the crowd might conceal

enemy infiltrators. But neither could he allow them to

remain outside the wire for fear that the enemy might

use them to shield an attack on the perimeter.

On the afternoon of 7 February, General Tompkin s

issued guidance for dealing with the refugees in th e

event the NVA attempted to use them to screen an

attack. First, the Marines were to use CS gas in an

attempt to disperse the crowd . If that failed, they

would fire over their heads. If the North Vietnamese

continued to push the refugees in front of an attack ,

Tompkins authorized the garrison to shoot into the

crowd. 64 To preclude such a disastrous occurrence ,

Lownds arranged to move the refugees about two kilo -

meters from the perimeter for the night . Some were

eventually processed and flown out, but most simply

walked away, down Route 9 to the east. *

The Intensifying Battle

Fresh from their first major success of the Khe Sanh

campaign, the Communist forces moved quickly

against their next objective . During the night follow-

*The situation with the refugees especially with the Bru exacerbated the already strained relationships between the Army Specia l

Force troops and the Marine command at Khe Sanh . The Special Forc e

units believed that the Bru who had served with them faithfully an d

well were being misused . Colonel Ladd stated in an interview severa l

years later that when the Bru arrived at the Khe Sanh base they wer e

stripped of their weapons and turned back . According to Ladd, th e

Marines at the base said, " they couldn 't trust any gooks in their dam n

camp ." Ladd Intvw. Both Army Colonel Bruce B. G. Clarke, who ha d

been at Khe Sanh Village and later brought his forces to FOB—3 an d

former Marine Sergeant John J . Balanco CAP 0—2 also at FOB— 3

wrote of the suspicion that they received . As a CAP Marine, Balanco

identified very closely with the Bru with whom he served and stated

that he felt very isolated after the CAPs were " not allowed on the bas e

with our fighting Bru! " While at FOB—3, he noticed that the Marin e

tanks at Khe Sanh had their guns trained on FOB-3 . Balanco, "Abandoned," pp . 185-91 . Colonel Clarke noted that at FOB-3, "We ofte n

took more fire from behind than from the NVA to our front." Clarke

observed that the basic difficulty at Khe Sanh was " that there was n o

unity of command in the AO [Area of Operations], a lack of communication and coordination and misunderstanding of the interrelate d

destiny that would be ours." Clarke Comments. In relationship to

unity of command, Colonel Lownds was in a difficult situation . As one

Marine officer, Colonel William H . Dabney, who at the time commanded Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines on Hill 8815 ,

observed the Special Forces had their own command channels separate

from the Marines and were not under Colonel Lownds ' operational control . From the Marine perspective, the Special Forces including th e

FOB—3 troops, " were so secretive and so independent that they wer e

impossible to coordinate as part of a larger battle . . . . Special units d o

not belong near a pitched battle . They only inhibit fire support and get

in the way. " Dabney Comments.

ing the Lang Vei battle, three companies of the 101D

Regiment moved into attack positions near the 1st Bat -

talion, 9th Marines.

About 500 meters west of the battalion 's perimeter,

Second Lieutenant Terence R. Roach, Jr., and Company A's 1st Platoon, occupied "Alpha 1," named after

the platoon's designation . With added machine gun

teams, forward observers, and corpsmen, Lieutenant

Roach's reinforced platoon numbered 66 men . The

outpost provided an extra measure of security for the

battalion through its ability to detect and report

enemy activity well forward of the lines.

The Alpha 1 outpost was a well-prepared defensive

position. The hill itself was quite steep on all but the

northwest slope . It was ringed by multiple layers of

barbed wire on the slopes and, at the crest, a trench network which included a number of sandbagge d

bunkers.65

At 0415 8 February, in heavy fog and near-total

darkness, the North Vietnamese struck the outpost ,

laying down a heavy and accurate mortar barrage tha t

covered the hilltop for three to four minutes. Enemy

infantry followed close on the heels of the mortar fire ,

attacking from the northwest .

The North Vietnamese assault troops threw canvas

over the outpost's protective barbed wire and rolle d

over it. Almost immediately, enemy soldiers swarmed

into the inner perimeter. Lieutenant Roach tried t o

stem the breakthrough almost singlehandedly, killing

several of the enemy with his rifle and attempting t o

rally the troops on the perimeter. While able to pull

one of the badly wounded Marines to relative safety, h e

died in a hail of automatic weapons fire . The enemy

had successfully captured half of the hilltop, while the

remnants of the platoon attempted to regroup, especially in the southeastern portion of the outpost 6 6

While the defenders of the Alpha 1 outpost fough t

desperate hand-to-hand encounters in the trenchlines ,

sometimes swinging entrenching tools or five-gallon

water cans, the rest of the battalion endured persistent

and heavy shelling, apparently intended by the NVA

to prevent the dispatch of reinforcements. Nonetheless,

the battalion's mortar crews braved the incoming

rounds to fire in support of Alpha 1 .

On the hill, about 30 Marine survivors gathered in

the southern portion of the trench network and used

sandbags to wall off their part of the trench from th e

enemy. Some of their weapons were damaged or

destroyed, ammunition was scarce, and many of th e

men were wounded . The North Vietnamese did not

rush them, but instead contented themselves with
278 THE DEFINING YEA R

showering great numbers of grenades on the Marines .

One survivor later recounted, " . . .they continued

throwing 25 or 30 grenades every 4 or 5 minutes . It

was unbelievable how many . . . grenades they had

actually transported into battle . "67

At 0740, the commanding officer of Company A ,

Captain Henry J. M. Radcliffe, gathered up his 2d Platoon and went to the rescue of the outpost. The relief

force fought its way to the base of the hill in 25 minutes. There, Radcliffe directed an air strike on the

North Vietnamese, then led his Marines in a frontal

assault which forced the enemy off the hill and directly into the fire of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. Companies B and D joined the 106mm recoilless rifles and

a tank in cutting down the retreating enemy troops . By

1100, the battle was over and the charred and blaste d

remains of the outpost were again in Marine hands 68 *

Alpha 1 Marines had paid a high price . Worse than

the utter destruction of their position, casualties numbered 24 dead and 27 wounded. Over 150 North Vietnamese bodies littered the hill and many more ma y

have died. Additionally, the Marines captured muc h

enemy equipment, including 13 machine guns, an

indication that the North Vietnamese fled the battle -

field in disorder. 69

Although the hill was once more under friendly

control and evidence suggested that the Communis t

forces had suffered a defeat, Colonel Lownds ordere d

the outpost abandoned . Captain Radcliffe and his men

withdrew to the battalion perimeter.

In the four days from 5 February through 8 February, the North Vietnamese launched three major

assaults on positions in the Khe Sanh complex, succeeding only at Lang Vei . The battles for Hill 861 A

and the Alpha 1 outpost, though desperate and blood y

for the Marines, had ended as stinging defeats for the

Communist forces. The second round was over.

Apparently still smarting from heavy casualties suffered in their assaults on the outlying positions, th e

Communist forces tried a new approach . They stopped

attempting to seize the outposts and increased their

attentions to the combat base itself.

North Vietnamese trenches reached toward the eastern end of the airstrip, growing at the astonishing

speed of several hundred meters in a single night .70

*Colonel Mitchell, the battalion commander, stated that he had

wanted to launch the relief mission earlier, but did not receive permission until 0730 . Mitchell also explained that he had one tank attached

to his battalion, but would move the tank every night . This way the

enemy would know "1/9 had a tank capability, but he wouldn't kno w

how many ." Mitchell Comments.

One Marine recorded that, "we watched with some fascination and no small apprehension, day by day, as the

trenches crept closer and closer to our perimeter. "7 1

Some of the enemy trenchlines stretched 2,000 meters

from assembly areas to within 35 meters of the

Marines' perimeter.7 2

The Marines tried a number of tactics to discourag e

the enemy's digging . Aircraft attacked the trenches

with rockets, 2,000-pound bombs, and "napal m

baths," a scheme in which they dropped a number of

unfused napalm tanks on the target which were the n

ignited by rocket or cannon fire from following planes .

Despite the Marines' best efforts, however, the digging

continued apace .73** At the same time, North Vietnamese gunners kept up their program of daily firin g

on the base, especially during periods when fog o r

clouds reduced visibility and hampered U .S . air operations, thereby helping to conceal the enemy guns 74

Throughout the siege, the base remained totall y

dependent upon air-delivered supplies, which fact the

North Vietnamese were obviously aware . Enemy antiaircraft guns appeared in the hills surrounding th e

airstrip, forcing cargo aircraft to run a gauntlet of fire

both on their approach to and their retirement fro m

Khe Sanh. Aircraft attempting to land prompted a n

avalanche of incoming fire seemingly from every

weapon, of every caliber, which the North Vietnamese

could bring to bear on the airstrip . The destruction on

10 February of a Marine KC—130 dramatized on television the vulnerability of the air link to Khe Sanh .** *

The incredible firepower the Marines marshalled to

defend Khe Sanh scarred the countryside so that i t

looked, in General Tompkins words, "like pictures o f

the surface of the moon, in that it was cratered and

pocked and blasted ."75 Aircraft and howitzers pounde d

the surrounding countryside with unrelenting ferocity,

treating the NVA to a steady diet of attacks . A divers e

and highly developed targeting system supported this

process, using input from air observers, sensors, signal

intelligence, agents, prisoners, ralliers, refugees, and

**Colonel Mitchell, nevertheless, claimed that his 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines attained some success against the enemy's digging efforts .

He stated that he ordered his Company D commander to send ou t

units from fire team to platoon, before the fog lifted, to destroy or collapse the enemy tunnels . He also stepped up patrols to 400 meters " to

ensure the beginning of tunnel activity. " According to Mitchell, his

intelligence officer who monitored the NVA radio nets, heard "discontinue tunneling activities in the 1/9 sector as it is non-productive . "

Mitchell Comments.

***See Chapter 23 for the detailed account relative to the air sup -

ply of the Marine base .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 279

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19085 2

Two Marine forward observers lying on top of a bunker train high-powered binoculars on enemy

trenchlines in an attempt to locate NVA mortars. Another Marine can be seen resting inside the bunker.

special operations units, as well as information provided by the Marines manning the defenses of Khe Sanh.

In one instance, the 26th Marines scheduled a special air

and artillery strike in reaction to a report concerning a

"force-wide meeting" of enemy commanders and thei r

staffs in a schoolhouse on the Laotian border. Twenty

minutes after the scheduled start time of the meeting, 2

Grumman A—6 Intruders and 4 McDonnell-Dougla s

F—4 Phantoms dropped 152 500-pound bombs followed by 8 artillery batteries firing 350 rounds into a n

area large enough "to take in the hangers-on and othe r

idlers who usually congregate around large staffs . "76

Near the end of February, the intensity of enemy

shelling increased even further, reaching a crescendo o n

the 23d, when according to an official count, 1,30 7

rounds of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire slamme d

into the base, killing 12 and wounding 51 .* A chanc e

hit on Ammunition Supply Point Number 3 caused

secondary explosions which consumed over 1,60 0

rounds of 90mm and 106mm ammunition .7 7

*Colonel Dabney doubted the accuracy of this official count ,

making the point that " when you are getting that many rounds,

nobody is fool enough to sit around and count them ." Dabney Comments. On the other hand, Captain Cole related that "the FSCC made

a serious attempt to count incoming rounds—and . . . . Jack Hennelly (Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hennelly, commander of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines] was very conservative about this, so if 1,307 was

too exact, it probably was not too far off the mark ." Cole Comments,

dtd 23Jun96.

On 25 February, Second Lieutenant Donal d

Jacques led the 3d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines through the perimeter wire of

the combat base and headed south on a short-rang e

patrol as part of the regiment's effort to gathe r

information on enemy activity close to the base .

About a kilometer south of the base, the patrol

spotted three North Vietnamese near the road leading to Khe Sanh Village and gave chase . Just south

of the road, the Marines ran into an ambush . A

company-sized enemy unit occupying a bunke r

complex allowed the platoon to advance to withi n

point-blank range before opening fire and driving

the Marines to cover.78

The platoon attempted to maneuver, but under th e

intense enemy fire, casualties mounted rapidly .

Jacques ordered a withdrawal while the company

commander, Captain Pipes, sent another platoon to

assist. Second Lieutenant Peter W. Weiss led the 1st

Platoon through the gaps in the perimeter wire and

headed for the scene of the ambush . About 300 meters

from the beleaguered 3d Platoon, Weiss and his me n

received enemy machine gun fire from 20 meters t o

their front, forcing them to the ground .79*

**According to George W. Jayne, who was a fireteam leader wit h

the 1st Platoon, his squad received the bulk of the enemy's first burs t

of fire, killing both the squad leader and Navy corpsman . George W.

Jayne, Comments on draft, dtd 1Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
280 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19059 4

Large clouds of dust and smoke obscure part of the Khe Sanh combat base after an enemy rocket an d

artillery bombardment. On 23 February another Marine ammunition supply point took a direct hit ,

which resulted in several secondary explosions

With both platoons still under extremely heavy

close-range fire, the Marines at the combat base

attempted to provide supporting fire from tanks,

heavy machine guns, and 106mm recoilless rifles, bu t

fog and the proximity of friendly and enemy force s

hampered their efforts. To add to the confusion, the

North Vietnamese entered Company B's radio net ,

possibly using a radio captured from one of the 3 d

Platoon's destroyed squads, compounding communication problems in the critical situation.80

Several survivors from the 3d Platoon filtere d

back to the 1st Platoon. Lieutenant Weiss ordere d

his men to gather the wounded and withdraw. The

3d Platoon was a shambles. Lieutenant Jacques wa s

severely wounded, and most of his men were eithe r

wounded, dead, or missing . The 81mm mortar forward observer, a Blackfoot Indian corporal name d

Gilbert Wall, threw Lieutenant Jacques over hi s

shoulder and carried him, with his radio, back to th e

perimeter, adjusting mortar fire missions all the way

back. The lieutenant, however, was hit in bot h

femoral arteries and bled to death even as Wall carried him. et *

For what had started out as a platoon patrol, th e

casualties were staggering: 6 killed in action, 1 7

wounded, and 25 missing .82** No enemy casualtie s

could be confirmed. On 27 February, Colonel

Lownds issued further restrictions on patrolling ,

*Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Pipes, who commanded Company B at Khe Sanh, observed that Lieutenant Jacques was one of his

strongest platoon leaders. His platoon had occupied one of the ke y

defensive positions at the base and Jacques' men had ambushed an

NVA reconnaissance unit in late December 1967 . Pipes remarked tha t

all the leaders of this platoon including the squad leaders were killed

in this action—in front and leading their men . According to Pipes,

the extent of the NVA entrenchments and fortifications were not a s

evident until the tragic action . . . ." Pipes Comments, 1995 .

**One of the Marines listed as killed in action was Sergean t

Ronald L. Ridgway, who turned out to have been captured by th e

North Vietnamese and released in March 1973 after the Paris Agreement of January 1973 .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 281

limiting it to that which was "necessary to insur e

the security of . . . defensive obstacles and local

security elements ."8 3

Apparently buoyed by their success against the ill -

fated Marine patrol, the North Vietnamese once mor e

tried their hands at penetrating the combat bas e

perimeter. During the night of 28—29 February, sappers prepared the ground to the front of the ARVN

37th Ranger Battalion, cutting holes in the wire, an d

removing mines and trip flares. Their activity went

undetected until the next morning.84

The following night at 2130, in heavy fog, a battalion of the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment,

304th Division struck the ARVN positions.

Unknown to the enemy, electronic sensors ha d

silently heralded their impending attack and by th e

time the first waves of assault troops rushed th e

wire, two B—52 strikes, diverted from other targets ,

were on the way. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines,

accompanied by the Army's 175mm guns and

radar-directed attack aircraft, pounded the Nort h

Vietnamese infantry with telling effect . The B—52 s

saturated the area to the rear of the assault waves

with tons of high explosive bombs, devastating

what the sensors indicated was a second enemy battalion moving forward to attack.8 5

Once again, the weight of U.S. fire support

wrecked the enemy's efforts. The Rangers reporte d

that the North Vietnamese left 7 dead in th e

perimeter wire, but a search the following morning revealed 71 more with many bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges. Of the carnage, one

account read,

. . . the dead were still huddled in trenches, many in th e

kneeling position, in three successive platoon lines, as if

they had been caught in the assault position . The devastating effect of the firecracker round was apparent . 86

The only friendly casualty was a single wounde d

Ranger.

For the remainder of the Khe Sanh battle, th e

enemy concentrated most of his efforts against th e

ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion, attacking its position seven times during March, including another

battalion-sized assault on the 18th . Although

North Vietnamese sappers breached the wire during one of these attacks, the Rangers repulsed ever y

attempt, with the assistance of supporting fire s

from the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and attac k

aircraft.87 In addition to these assaults, the North

Vietnamese employed psychological warfare against

the ARVN, using loudspeaker broadcasts enticin g

them to defect.88 *

At the beginning of March, III MAF began planning Operation Pegasus, a major effort to reopen Route

9 from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh . In the meantime, air

delivered supplies remained the order of the day.** Th e

monsoon ended in March, greatly easing the weathe r

problems which had earlier plagued air operations i n

the area .89 Antiaircraft fire and incoming rounds on th e

airstrip, however, remained a problem . The first day of

the month, mortar fire struck a C—123 as it landed ,

destroying the aircraft .90 On 6 March, enemy gunners

downed another C—123 about five miles east of Khe

Sanh, killing 43 Marines, a sailor, and the crew of 4.***

Only one and a half hours later, incoming fire damaged

and grounded another C—123 attempting to take off.

This aircraft remained at Khe Sanh awaiting repairs ,

where it was hit once more on the 17th and

destroyed.91 Helicopters suffered as well, with two Boeing CH—46 Sea Knights and a Bell UH—1 Iroquois

falling to enemy gunners during the month .92

In early March, North Vietnamese propaganda

teams entered Montagnard villages, announcing

that the final, major attack on Khe Sanh Combat

Base would soon begin. But, by the middle of the

month, the theme had changed to "Ho Chi Minh

would be unhappy if they [the NVA} wasted thei r

time on only 6,000 Marines at Khe Sanh!"93 At th e

same time, U.S . intelligence sources reported that

the North Vietnamese 325C Division was relocating

to Laos and the 304th Division was withdrawing to

the southwest.94

*Former Marine Bert Mullins, who served with the 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines at Khe Sanh, observed that the NVA also employed psychological war techniques against the Americans as well . He recalled

leaflets fired by North Vietnamese artillery that urged American troops

to surrender. Mullins Comments.

**While supplies were adequate for very basic needs and no on e

starved, Navy Captain Bernard D. Cole recalled that food was in " relatively short supply during the 'siege .'" He remembered that h e

received just two C—ration meals per day . . . ." Cole stated that thi s

was an "observation, not a complaint : obviously, the troops in the

trenches had higher priority than chose of us sitting on our butts in th e

relative safety of the FSCC!" Cole Comments. Colonel Kent O . W.

Steen, a former artillery officer at Khe Sanh, wrote that the priority fo r

resupply was upon ammunition and " at times, we were down to one

C—Ration per day . . . ." He observed that the " uncomfortable-tireddirty-stressed souls at Khe Sanh were quite hungry for the most part . "

Steen comments.

***This aircraft is variously reported as either a C—123 or a

C—130 . Air Force records indicate the former. Nalty, Air Power, p . 46 ;

3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 7Mar68, in III MAF Kh e

Sanh Ops File .
282 THE DEFINING YEA R

Despite these indications that the battle was drawing to a close, the North Vietnamese continued pounding the Marines with artillery fire . On 22 March, ove r

1,000 rounds fell on the combat base and hill positions. Once again, a hit on ASP Number 1 resulted i n

several hours of secondary explosions and a fire whic h

destroyed more than 900 rounds of artillery ammunition, almost 3,000 rounds of antitank ammunition,

and lesser quantities of fuzes, demolition kits, and

other assorted items. The enemy bombardment continued the following day with even more shells striking the Marine base 9 5

The enemy had far from given up the fight. On 24

March, Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine s

engaged two North Vietnamese platoons for over four

hours. The contact resulted in 5 Marines killed and 6

wounded, a UH—1 helicopter gunship downed, and

31 dead North Vietnamese .9% Two days later, a smallunit patrol* from Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines encountered a North Vietnamese compan y

entrenched on a small hill that the battalion used as a

daylight observation post, about 200 meters west o f

its perimeter. According to the Marine forward

observer with the patrol, Larry J. Seavy-Cioffi, the y

walked into "a well-entrenched NVA company, 1 5

feet from the top Seavy-Cioffi recalled that the

patrol point man spotted an enemy soldier "adjustin g

his helmet otherwise we would have been walkin g

dead right into their laps. " The patrol withdrew under

heavy fire and called for fire support. Company B reinforced the patrol and the Marines finally retook the

hill. According to Marine documents, the North Vietnamese lost 26 men and Company B suffered 3 dead

and 15 wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell later

wrote: "This was the closest penetration by a company size NVA to 1/9's defensive perimeter, and neve r

happened again during the siege ."97

Settling the Score

Since the fateful patrol of 25 February, the men of

Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines had a score to

settle with the North Vietnamese . On 30 March, the y

got their chance in what one report termed "the first

*There is some question about the size of this patrol . The official

reports indicate a platoon, while both Colonel Mitchell and hi s

radioman, Bert Mullins, state that it was a reinforced squad . Larry J.

Seavy-Cioffi, who was an artillery forward observer with Company B ,

stated that he was on that patrol and it consisted of no more than si x

men, including himself. See Mitchell Comments, Mullins Comments ,

and Larry J. Seavy-Cioffi, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 an d

29Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).

planned . . . attack of a known enemy position in the

battle for Khe Sanh Combat Base. " Lieutenant Colone l

Frederick J. McEwan, who relieved Lieutenant Colone l

James B. Wilkinson as the battalion commander on 1 5

March, recalled that he and his operations officer,

Major Charles E. Davis III, planned the attack "with

careful attention to every detail. " With the assistance o f

the battalion artillery officer and air officer, they especially laid out the projected fire support to box th e

enemy troops in and to prevent the NVA from rein -

forcing. Morning fog and low air cover, however, fore -

stalled the effective use of air and made the attack eve n

more dependent upon its artillery arm98

In the early morning hours, under cover of fog an d

darkness, Captain Kenneth W. Pipes led Company B

through the perimeter wire and into attack positions

300 meters south of the combat base . As the company

deployed for the attack in a line along the enemy 's left

flank, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines began preparation fires to soften the enemy positions . By noon, th e

cannoneers would fire over 2,600 rounds in support of

Company B .99

At 0755, the company launched its assault behin d

a rolling barrage fired by nine batteries of artillery ,

including heavy artillery firing from near the Rockpile .

The 2d Platoon under First Lieutenant John W. Dillon

seized the first objective, an NVA trenchline, near th e

lower slopes of Hill 471 . From there, the platoon laid

down a base of fire while the Company B comman d

group and the other two platoons passed through and

attacked toward the second objective, an NVA bunker

complex near where the earlier patrol had bee n

ambushed .'°°

The Marines advanced through the bunker complex

with fixed bayonets, grenades, flamethrowers, and anti -

tank rockets, and in the words of one account, "killing

all NVA in sight." lol Engineers followed the infantry,

setting demolition charges to destroy the larger

bunkers. According to Major Davis, "the only serious

glitch occurred when the NVA came up on the conduc t

of fire net and called for a cease-fire ." Davis declared that

before the battalion was able to get "the fire turned back

on," enemy mortars opened up on the attacking

Marines and "inflicted most of the casualties." Among

the wounded was Captain Pipes, who still retaine d

command . One Marine in the 3d Platoon, Wayne Morrison, who later was awarded the Silver Star, as was the

captain, remembered that Pipes, carrying two radios

with his right arm and with a wound in his left shoulder, came up behind him and said "we were going t o

have to attack because we were pinned down."102
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 283

The initial Marine attack, nevertheless had stalled .

Captain Pipes recalled that his command group had

been "decimated." Among the dead was his artillery

forward observer First Lieutenant Marion H . "Hank"

Norman, who died in his arms and assisted in th e

preparation of the firing plans. Lieutenant Dillon

brought up the 2d Platoon and "covered the ordered

withdrawal back to the base."103

The North Vietnamese bunker complex was a flaming ruin, but the Marines had failed to locate the

remains of the men killed in the February ambush . *

Casualties on both sides had been heavy. The Marines

claimed to have killed 115 of the enemy and intercepted enemy messages indicating that the NVA unit ,

later identified as the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment,

304th Division, sustained grievous losses. Company B,

however, had not gone unscathed: it suffered 10 dead,

100 wounded and 2 missing . One Marine artillery officer later wondered if the raid to try to bring back th e

bodies had been worth the additional bloodshed : "No

matter whether you get the bodies back at that poin t

or not, you still [had) left your bodies out there ." He

argued at that point "getting the bodies simply wasn't

that important." Nevertheless, as Lieutenant Genera l

Victor H. Krulak, the FMFPac commander who happened to have witnessed the Company B attack, late r

wrote, the attack served to signal "that the siege was

ended ." It may not have been over as yet, but it wa s

indicative that the Marines on the ground had started

to bring the fight to the NVA and a new phase was

about to begin .104

On the day following Company B's raid, Operatio n

Scotland ended, giving way to Operation Pegasus. Elements of the 101D Regiment still remained in the area,

possibly to cover the withdrawal of their comrades.

Although the official enemy casualty count for Operation Scotland totalled 1,602 dead, 7 prisoners, and 2

ralliers, intelligence estimates placed the death toll in

the neighborhood of 10,000 to 15,000 .105

The allies had applied an incredible amount of fire -

power upon the North Vietnamese . Tactical aircraft

and B–52s flew 24,449 sorties in support of Khe Sanh ,

dropping 103,500 tons of ordnance . The artilleryme n

of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and the 2d Battalion, 94th Field Artillery fired 102,660 rounds of various calibers at enemy positions.l o6

The North Vietnamese, in turn, fired 10,90 8

rounds of artillery, mortars, and rockets into U .S .

positions in and around Khe Sanh . This fire, com-

*The remains were recovered a few days later.

bined with small-unit action from Operation Scotland, beginning on 1 November 1967, caused th e

deaths of 205 defenders of Khe Sanh . Another 1,66 8

fell wounded, about half of them serious enough to

require evacuation.107 *

Operation Pegasus

While in March the garrison of the Khe Sanh Combat Base remained in the grip of strong North Vietnamese forces, the allies had already taken initial steps

to lift the siege . During Operation Scotland, the

defenders had endured daily pounding by enem y

artillery, mortar, and rocket fire, as well as frequen t

probes which kept alive the threat of a massive ground

assault. Route 9, the only practical overland route to

Khe Sanh from the east, was impassable due to its

poor state of repair and the presence of enemy units .

Supplies continued to reach the combat base by air ,

but the massive logistical effort strained the already

thinly stretched supply of transport aircraft availabl e

in Vietnam. Intelligence officers at General Tompkins'

3d Marine Division headquarters noted reports from

prisoners, ralliers, and agents that the North Vietnamese were moving missiles into the DMZ an d

northern Quang Tri Province for use against Con

Thien and Khe Sanh. It was obvious the American

command could not permit this situation to continu e

for much longer.108* *

On 2 March, General Cushman met in Da Nang

with his subordinate commanders and, with Genera l

Abrams present, approved the initial concept to open

Route 9 and relieve Khe Sanh. The following week, in

a meeting on 10 March, also at Da Nang, Genera l

Westmoreland, in turn, agreed to the concept of operations for the relief of Khe Sanh, now codenamed

Operation Pegasus. Among the members of this conference was Army Lieutenant General William B .

Rosson, the commander of the newly created Provi-

* U .S . casualty figures for Operation Scotland are sometimes questioned as being too low. The casualty reporting system listed only thos e

casualties suffered by the unit (and its attachments) responsible for a

given operation . Other casualties incurred in an operational area, by air

crews flying in support, for instance, were usually reported by the parent unit. For example, some of the 43 men killed in the C—123 cras h

of 6 March are not included in Operation Scotland figures because the y

were members of the aircrew and others were Marines who had not ye t

reported to the 26th Marines.

** Prados and Stubbe quote Captain Dabney about the possible firing of a Soviet FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) missile, but found no

other evidence of the NVA employing ground to ground missiles durin g

the Khe Sanh campaign . Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p . 392 .
284 THE DEFINING YEA R

sional Corps or Prov Corps.* While a subordinate com -

mand of III MAF, Prov Corps included the 1st Air Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division, and 3d Marine

Division and was responsible for all operations i n

northern I Corps. General Rosson assigned to Majo r

General John J. Tolson, the commander of the 1st Ai r

Cavalry Division, the responsibility for the detaile d

planning of the operation in coordination with the 3 d

Marine Division. Rosson also placed under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division the 1st

Marines, the 11th Engineers, and a Seabee battalion .109

According to the concept of operations for Pegasus,

the 1st Air Cavalry Division together with the 1st

Marines would deploy from positions near Hue to a

new base to be specially constructed at Ca Lu, 16 kilometers east of Khe Sanh. Capitalizing on its air mobility, the Army division would advance along the axis of

Route 9. Engineers would follow, repairing culverts

and bridges to make the road passable to vehicles. The

South Vietnamese promised an ARVN airborne tas k

force of three battalions to participate in the operation .

D–day was set for 1 April 1968 .

Preparations began immediately. The 11th Engineer Battalion and Naval Mobile Construction (Seabee )

Battalion 5 joined the 1st Air Cavalry Division engineers in building the base at Ca Lu, to be called "Landing Zone Stud ." The project included bunkers, suppl y

storage facilities, and an airstrip capable of handling

Fairchild C–123 Provider cargo aircraft . At the same

time, the 1st Air Cavalry Division completed th e

detailed plans for the attack westward and the 3d

Marine Division scheduled a deception operation

designed to divert the enemy's attention from Kh e

Sanh to Dong Ha . The 1st Marines at Phu Bai began

"extensive retraining and rehabilitation" as a recuperative measure following its participation in the battle

for Hue City.11 o

* *

The 1st Air Cavalry Division began preparing th e

battlefield on 26 March when Lieutenant Colone l

Richard W. Diller's 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry bega n

helicopterborne reconnaissance patrols in everwidening arcs from LZ Stud. Diller's squadron located and targeted NVA positions, and prepared landing zones by directing air strikes using delay-fuzed

or "daisy cutter" bombs to blast gaping holes in the

dense vegetation . "

*See Chapter 13 for the establishment of Prov Corps .

**Actually outside of the 1st Marines regimental headquarters ,

only the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines had participated in the battle for

Hue. See Chapters 9-12 .

At 0600, 30 March, the 3d Marine Division

launched the diversionary operation northeast of Don g

Ha. Task Force Kilo, composed of the 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines; the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry ; and two

ARVN infantry battalions, attacked north toward th e

DMZ along the coastal plains near Gio Linh . Encountering light resistance, the task force reached its objectives the first day, but continued the operation throug h

1 April to mask the preparations for Pegasus.11 2

As a final step for the coming offensive, Operatio n

Scotland at Khe Sanh came to a close on 31 March, an d

General Rosson at that time placed the 26th Marine s

under the 1st Air Cavalry for Operation Pegasus .** *

Intelligence reports from Khe Sanh indicated that th e

North Vietnamese were abandoning their position s

around the combat base and retiring to Laos, leaving a

few units in place to cover the withdrawal . Prisoners

reported that NVA units suffered from low morale as a

result of heavy casualties and severe supply problems .11 3

The enemy, reportedly, was having "difficulty coordinating anything larger than a company operation ."I1 4

The allied forces poised to attack these battered Nort h

Vietnamese units numbered over 30,000 troops organized into 19 infantry battalions with a host of sup -

porting artillery, engineer, and aviation units, makin g

Operation Pegasus " the largest III MAF offensive of

the war," up to that time . 11 5

Despite the extensive preparations and high expectations, Operation Pegasus started not with a bold an d

powerful thrust, but with a decidedly more ponderous

motion. At H–hour–0700, 1 April—foul weather

grounded the helicopters of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, but the men of the 1st Marines, on foot, crossed

the line of departure on time, initiating the offensive .

The regiment attacked along Route 9 with the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines north of the road and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines south of it. As the infantry moved

forward, the 11th Engineer Battalion opened Route 9 ,

removing mines and obstacles from the road and

repairing bridges, culverts, and bypasses . The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines remained at Ca Lu, providing security for the recently completed LZ Stud .11 6

By 1300, the weather cleared, allowing Tolson's 3 d

Brigade to conduct the planned air assaults into landing zones along Route 9 west of the 1st Marines .

***General Rosson remembered that Major General Tompkin s

" suggested to me that the 26th Marines be placed under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division to facilitate coordination a s

the relieving forces approached the combat base . " Gen William B .

Rosson, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File) .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 285

Despite the delay, the brigade secured its landing zone s

and flew in its artillery before nightfall . Throughout

the area of operations, allied forces made only light

contact with the North Vietnamese . In the following

days, the operation continued in the pattern set on

D—day, including the seemingly obligatory bad weather in the mornings, which forced delays in airmobile

operations. The North Vietnamese remained elusive .) 7

The garrison at Khe Sanh joined the offensive on 4

April from the combat base when the 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines sortied against Hill 471 . With Company B protecting the perimeter at the rock quarry wes t

of the combat base, the battalion moved to the line o f

departure at 0230, finally leaving the positions it had

defended for 73 days. At 0600, the Marines attacked

along the fog-shrouded Che Rien Ridge toward Hil l

471, which lay two kilometers to the southeast . Following a lengthy artillery and air preparation, Company A assaulted the hill at 1500 . The defenders, a

reinforced platoon of the 8th Battalion, 66th NVA

Regiment, put up a spirited fight, but Company A

soon overwhelmed them, securing the hill at 1600 .

The attack cost the battalion 10 dead and 56 wounded. The enemy left 16 dead on the objective .11 8

The North Vietnamese were not content to give u p

Hill 471 that easily. Shortly after the Marines overran

the hill, enemy rocket fire began and by midnight, 19 2

rounds had fallen. At 0430, two companies of the 66th

NVA Regiment assaulted Captain Ralph H . Flagler's

Company C on the eastern half of the hill . Company A ,

located on the western side, was masked by the crest o f

the hill and could not fire in support . North Vietnamese infantry swarmed up the slope firing rifles ,

sub-machine guns, and RPGs, while heavy machine

guns pounded Company C's positions. The enemy

advanced to within 20 meters of the Marine fighting

holes, but Flagler's men stood fast, with the help of

almost 1,000 rounds of artillery fire from the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. By 0630, the enemy attack was

spent and the North Vietnamese withdrew. At a cost of

1 Marine dead and 28 wounded, the 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines killed over 140 North Vietnamese and captured 5 prisoners.11 9

Other units of the Khe Sanh garrison went on the

offensive as well . On 6 April, Captain Lee R . Overstreet's Company G, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines left

Hill 558 in the early morning on the battalion's first

long distance patrol of the Khe Sanh battle . Its mission

was to determine if the enemy occupied the ridg e

which extended southeast from Hill 861 like a huge ,

stubby finger pointed at the combat base . 125

Just before noon, as the company reached the crest

of the ridge, North Vietnamese concealed in camouflaged, mutually supporting bunkers opened fire, cutting down several Marines at point-blank range .

Unable to advance into the heavy and accurate enemy

fire, Company G suffered additional casualties a s

Marines tried to recover the fallen men nearest the

enemy positions. Captain Overstreet called for artiller y

and air support, but the number of aircraft availabl e

was limited and the artillery frequently entered a

"check fire" status to allow for the safe passage of plane s

supporting other units . Because of these fire support

coordination problems, the Marines could not overcome the stiff enemy resistance atop the ridge . With

six Marines missing in action, but presumed to be dead

within the enemy perimeter, Captain Overstree t

ordered Company G to withdraw to Hill 558 at nightfall "as a result of regimental policy to recall units t o

the defensive positions for the night. " In addition to

the 6 MIAs, Company G lost 4 killed and 47 wounded and claimed 48 NVA died in the fight.121 *

Elsewhere in the area, many major events took plac e

on 6 April, giving Operation Pegasus the appearance o f

a three-ring circus . The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines

attacked out of the combat base to the south, sendin g

Company D against the NVA bunker complex where

25 missing members of Company B had last been seen

during operations on 25 February and 30 March .

Company D recovered the remains of 21 Americans.1 2 2

The 1st Air Cavalry Division's 3d Brigade, clearing

Route 9 in the area west of the 1st Marines, encountered a strong NVA blocking position and fought a

day-long battle which ended when the enemy fled ,

leaving 83 dead .123 At noon, the men of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines became the first defenders of Kh e

Sanh relieved in Operation Pegasus when the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry landed at Hill 471 and assumed

responsibility for its defense .124 The 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines immediately attacked westward toward Hil l

689. As a climax to the many events of the day, the

ARVN 84th Company, 8th Airborne Battalion landed

by helicopter at the Khe Sanh Combat Base and linke d

up with the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion . This

marked the first entry of an organized ground comba t

unit into the base since the Rangers themselves had

arrived on 27 January.125

The momentum of the offensive continued

unabated on 7 April . The 2d Battalion, 26th Marine s

returned to the scene of the previous day's ambush ,

*The six missing Marines were later found dead on the ridge .
286 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19122 0

Top, PFC Murray C. Henderson of Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines cools himself off using his helmet as a

bucket on the way from Ca Lu to relieve Khe Sanh during

Operation Pegasus. Below, a Marine convoy moves alon g

Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh . This road had been

closed since the previous summer.

this time with two companies, and cleared the ridg e

of enemy, killing over 30. The 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines continued the westward advance it had

begun the previous afternoon, capturing Hill 55 2

with no enemy resistance . Near Khe Sanh Village, the

2d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division captured

the old French fort after a three-day battle against a n

NVA battalion . Along Route 9, the 1st Marines con -

ducted a few airmobile operations of its own, as th e

2d Battalion, 1st Marines and the 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines searched the vicinity of the highway for sign s

of enemy activity which might threaten the 11th

Engineer Battalion's road repair project. The 3d

Brigade of General Tolson 's division pressed on alon g

Route 9, still west of the 1st Marines.12 6

Enemy resistance began crumbling even further as

the allied force maintained pressure. Units reported

finding many abandoned weapons and large number s

of North Vietnamese bodies and mass graves as enemy

units withdrew toward Laos . Some organized resistance

remained, however, as the Communist forces continued to conduct limited objective ground attacks and

probes in some areas.12 7

The much awaited linkup of U.S . forces at the Kh e

Sanh Combat Base proper occurred at 0800 on 8

April, when the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry entered th e

base along the coffee plantation road .128 As the 3d

Brigade began moving in, the 26th Marines prepare d

to depart the base it had defended amid so muc h

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A191584
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 28 7

adversity and for so long. But the offensive did no t

slow down, even for this event . West of the base, th e

1st Battalion, 9th Marines advanced onto Hill 68 9

which had, for 11 weeks, dominated its position at th e

quarry. The enemy, although unseen, made their presence felt through steady and accurate mortar fir e

which killed 9 Marines and wounded 27 during th e

battalion's advance.12 9

No enemy artillery fire fell on the combat base o n

9 April, and General Rosson, commander of the

recently formed Provisional Corps, Vietnam, reported to General Cushman that airdrops of supplies

were no longer necessary because the airstrip wa s

open to all types of aircraft up to and including

C-130s.* In keeping with a plan to begin supplying

all units in northwestern Quang Tri from LZ Stud ,

Operation Pegasus forces began using the ammunition at Khe Sanh in an attempt to draw down the

huge stockpiles to a manageable level which III

MAF could later evacuate .13 0

The engineers declared Route 9 open to vehicular

traffic on 11 April, ending a project involving the

replacement of 9 bridges, the construction of 1 7

bypasses, and the repair of 14 kilometers of road . It

was the first time the road was passable from Ca Lu t o

Khe Sanh since September 1967 .131 The same day,

General Rosson ordered the 1st Air Cavalry Divisio n

to make ready immediately for offensive operations in

the A Shau Valley. Hours later, the division's 1st

Brigade left the Khe Sanh area and the ARVN 37th

Ranger Battalion followed shortly afterward .132

As Army units prepared to move south, the 1st

and the 26th Marines continued offensive operations

around Khe Sanh. With patrols reporting enem y

units remaining on Hill 881 North, Colonel Bruce E.

Meyers, the new commanding officer of the 26t h

Marines, ordered the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines to

clear the hill, scene of the bitter fighting which ha d

marked the beginning of the siege almost thre e

*Colonel Bruce F. Meyers, who relieved Colonel Lownds shortl y

after this order, remembered that on 13 April 1968, an Air Forc e

C—130 was hit by "rocket shrapnel" as it came in for a landing, shred -

ding its tires, lunging partially off the runway, hitting some equipment, and bursting into flames. Ground rescue crews saved the live s

of the crews and most of the passengers . The only person who died i n

the crash was Felix Poilane, the French planter, who was returning t o

his plantation located near the fire base . According to Meyers, " while

the C—130 was burning on the runway, it shut down the bulk of ou r

airfield activity until it burned down and was finally put out wit h

foam and bulldozed off the runway ." Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments

on draft, dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyer s

Comments, Feb95 .

months before and "the last enemy position posing a

threat to Khe Sanh."133* *

Unlike Company I's reconnaissance in force of 2 0

January which was the last time U .S . forces had been

near Hill 881 North,*** the attack planned for Easte r

Sunday, 14 April, called for the entire 3d Battalion to

take part. With the relief of the main base by the

Army, Lieutenant Colonel John C . Studt, who had

assumed command of the 3d Battalion the previou s

month, had consolidated his companies on Hill 88 1

South. Studt had expanded the area of operations t o

include "Pork Chop Hill," the high ground immediately to the north, which the North Vietnamese had

vacated. With the order to take 881 North, the battalion commander laid on a full menu of fire support ,

even lining up all eight of the battalion's 106mm

recoilless rifles to support the assault. In addition to th e

howitzers and guns emplaced at the main base and C a

Lu, the battalion also had the support of the thre e

105mm howitzers on Hill 881S.134

After nightfall on the 13th, the battalion prepared to

mount the attack . Shortly after midnight, under the

cover of darkness, all four companies accompanied b y

two scout dog teams moved along routes previousl y

secured by patrols into assault positions in the "saddle "

located between Hills 881 South and North . Lieutenant

Colonel Studt left one platoon of Company I togethe r

with his H&S Company on Hill 881 South. He had

relieved Captain William Dabney, who had been selected for promotion to major, and placed him in comman d

of a battalion Provisional Weapons Company and rear

security on Hill 881 South.  Throughout the night

Marine artillery and mortar shells crashed into Hill 88 1

North, destroying the enemy's bunkers and trenches, a s

Lieutenant Colonel Studt's Marines waited for daybrea k

and the order to mount the final attack .135

** Colonel Meyers, who commanded Special Landing Force Alph a

prior to his assignment to the 26th Marines, assumed command of the

26th Marines on 12 April . He remembered that on 10 April he departed the LPH Iwo Jima and flew to the 3d Marine Division CP at Don g

Ha where he received a briefing and his orders : "Move out in the attac k

and retake the hills around Khe Sanh . . . ." He then traveled by helicopter to LZ Stud where Major General Tolson and his staff briefe d

him further. After the briefing, he flew to Khe Sanh and " began walking the perimeter " with Colonel Lownds. The turnover continued during the next day and finally on the 12th, "we had a very brief chang e

of command ceremony." Meyers Comments, Feb95 .

***See Chapter 4 .

****Studt not only wanted to use Dabney 's experience, but also to

keep him relatively safe after being in such an exposed and isolate d

position for so long . See LtCol John C. Studt, "Battalion in th e

Attack, " Marine Corps Gazette, July 1970, pp . 39-14 .
288 THE DEFINING YEA R

Top Photo is courtesy of Col Bruce F. Meyers (Ret) and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A41648 2

Top, at a change of command ceremony of the 26th Marines, Col David E . Lownds, left front, is abou t

to turn over command of the regiment to Col Bruce E Meyers, standing next to him. Col Lownds still

has the distinctive moustache that he wore during the entire siege . Below, President Lyndon B. John -

son presents the Presidential Unit Citation Streamer to SgtMaj Agrippa W. Smith, who is holding

the colors of the 26th Marines, as Col Lownds, right, who has shaven off his moustache, watches .
THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 289

Finally, shortly after dawn about 0530, followin g

closely its artillery final preparation fires, the battalio n

attacked with three companies abreast and the command group and one company in reserve close behind .

Surging forward through an eerie and barren landscap e

of charred limbless trees and huge bomb craters, th e

Marine battalion rolled up the enemy's defenses on the

southern slope of the hill. Colonel Meyers, who watched

the attack with Captain Dabney from 881 South,

remarked on the effective use of the supporting 106m m

recoilless rifle fire . As the Marine lead elements

approached a tree line in their "uphill assault . . . the

106's [on Hill 881 South} literally blew the tree line

away." t 3 6 Finally, with the crest of Hill 881 North

before it, the battalion called for a massive artillery firing mission. When over 2,000 rounds of artillery fir e

had fallen on the objective, Company K attacked

along the right flank. Captain Paul L. Snead's me n

rushed through the smoking debris of the NVA

defenses, rooting out the defenders from the ruins of

bunkers and trenches. At 1428, Company K marked

Hill 881 North as friendly territory by raising a U.S .

flag which a squad leader had brought along . The 3d

Battalion lost 6 dead and 21 wounded . The Marines

took two prisoners from the 8th Battalion, 29th Regiment, 325th NVA Division and killed over 100 of the

North Vietnamese troops. With the enemy driven

from the hill, at least for the time being, the Marine s

began withdrawing to Hill 881 South, their mission

accomplished . According to Colonel Meyers, the

Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia, later use d

the assault on Hill 881 North "as a classic example of

a Marine battalion in the attack. "137

The attack on Hill 881 North was the last battle o f

Operation Pegasus. At 0800, 15 April, the 3d Marine

Division once again assumed responsibility for the

Khe Sanh Combat Base and Operation Pegasus gav e

way to Operation Scotland II. The 1st Air Cavalry

Division transferred its command post to Camp

Evans, but left its 2d Brigade under the control of the

3d Marine Division . The 1st Marines, to this point

still operating along Route 9 just west of Ca Lu ,

moved to Khe Sanh to assume responsibility for

defense of the combat base from the 26th Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Studt recalled that his 3d Battalion, on 15 April, "was shuttled out of the 881 area b y

choppers . . . first to Khe Sanh than to Quang Tri [Airfield)." Even as the Marines boarded their helicopters

out of the Khe Sanh sector, Company K came under

enemy mortar fire. As the helicopters landed at the

Quang Tri Airstrip, the 3d Marine Division band,

playing the Marine Corps Hymn, was there to gree t

the troops . According to the band master ,

. . . it was the most inspiring performance of his career:

chopper after chopper disgorging filth covered Marine s

in tattered and torn utilities, some with bandages, man y

carrying NVA souvenirs, but the expressions on thei r

faces as soon as they perceived the strains of the Hym n

was what moved him .

With a sense of irony, Captain Dabney many years later

observed that the attacks on Hill 881 North marke d

the beginning and the end to the siege .13 8

In Operation Pegasus, allied forces accomplished

their mission of reopening Route 9 between Ca Lu an d

Khe Sanh at a cost of 92 Americans dead and 667

wounded, and 51 ARVN killed . The North Vietnamese

lost over 1,100 killed and 13 captured. III MAF units

found supply caches estimated as "exceeding the basi c

load for an NVA division," including 3,000 tons of rice ,

over 200 crew-served weapons, 12,000 rounds of large

caliber ammunition, 5 wheeled vehicles, and a tank.

A cloud of controversy has surrounded the story of

Khe Sanh in the years since the battle . Some of th e

unsettled issues remain : 1 . the reasons for defending

the base in the first place ; 2. the importance of the roles

played by the various supporting arms (particularl y

B-52s, as opposed to tactical aircraft and artillery) ; 3 .

the failure of the 26th Marines to reinforce Lang Vei ; 4.

speculation why the North Vietnamese made n o

attempt to cut the source of the water supply for the

base, pumped from a stream north of the Khe Sanh

perimeter and in the area controlled by NVA troops; 5.

and finally whether Khe Sanh was an attempted replay

of Dien Bien Phu or a diversion for Tet . *

*Both Lieutenant General Krulak, the former CGFMFPac, an d

Colonel Frederic S. Knight, the 3d Marine Division G—2 or staff intelligence officer, remarked on the failure of the North Vietnamese to cu t

the water supply. In his book, General Krulak argued that the fact tha t

the North Vietnamese did not do so is an indication that the enemy ma y

have "had no intention of undertaking an all-our assault on the base. "

LtGen Victor H . Krulak, First to Fight, An Inside View of the U .S. Marin e

Corps (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Md ., 1984), p . 218 . Colone l

Knight called this failure the most "puzzling aspect of the siege. . . .

They literally could have cut off our water. " He observed that the airlifting of the water would have "added an enormous logistical burden . "

Col Frederic S. Knight, Comments on draft, dtd 10Feb95 (Vietna m

Comment File) . In his comments, Colonel Steen observed that "whe n

the hose was cut by artillery fragments or the pump was down, we wer e

out of water and on our knees ." He observed that as it was the Marines

rationed their water until they left in April and "personal sanitation wa s

at a minimum. " Steen Comments. Navy Captain Bernard D. Cole also

commented on the failure of the NVA to interrupt the water and as wel l

remarked that they made no attempt to cut the land line telephone connection from Khe Sanh to MACV. Cole Comments.
290 THE DEFINING YEAR

Controversy aside, there is little question that th e

North Vietnamese committed considerabl e

resources to the battle and that their units fough t

hard in what appeared to have been a major effort .

The U.S. and South Vietnamese defenders of th e

Khe Sanh Combat Base surrounded and outnum -

bered, nevertheless, with the use of extensive sup -

porting arms skillfully fought a difficult battl e

against a resolute enemy until the siege was lifted i n

Operation Pegasus. By any accounting, Pegasus

regained the initiative for III MAF forces in north -

western Quang Tri Province.
CHAPTER 1 5

The Battle for Dong Ha

Why Dong Ha?—The Fight for Dai Do, The First Day—The Continuing Fight for Dai Do

The End of the First Offensive—The Second Offensive

Why Dong Ha ?

With the commitment of large U .S. forces to the

far western reaches of I Corps in Operations Scotland

II around Khe Sanh and Delaware in the A Shau Val -

ley, the North Vietnamese decided to mount a ne w

offensive in the eastern DMZ . Perhaps hoping that

the American command with its attention riveted t o

the west would be caught off guard, the 320th NVA

Division at the end of April and early May struck in

the sector just above Dong Ha . Dong Ha served not

only as the command post for both the 3d Marin e

Division and the 9th Marines, but also remained the

main logistic base for the north. It lay at the junction

of Routes 1 and 9 and was the terminus of the Cua

Viet River route. During the month of April, whil e

the new Quang Tri base and Wunder Beach further

south in Quang Tri Province alleviated some of th e

logistic pressure on Dong Ha, nearly 63,000 tons o f

supplies came in by sea at the Cua Viet port facilit y

for the 3d Marine Division and then were shipped u p

the Cua Viet River to Dong Ha . l

Despite its obvious importance, Dong Ha was vulnerable to a determined enemy attack. The most

immediate available troops were from the nearby 2 d

ARVN Regiment which had its command post in the

town of Dong Ha . Marine support units rather than

line infantry were at the Dong Ha base itself. Major

General Rathvon McC. Tompkins' only reserve was

Task Force Robbie, under Colonel Clifford J.

Robichaud, consisting of a rifle company, Company D,

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and an armored company,-

Company A, 3d Tank Battalion, reinforced by four

Army vehicles including two M42 "Dusters," a piaAn aerial photo shows the sprawling Dong Ha base and surrounding terrain. Dong Ha was the headquarters and forward base of the 3d Marine Division. The airstrip can be seen in the center of the picture.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A80112 2

291
292 THE DEFINING YEAR

toon of Ontos, and a platoon of engineers. For the most

part, even this modest force was committed elsewhere . 2

Furthermore, Dong Ha lay just below where thre e

ongoing operations converged . To the west of Rout e

1, the 9th Marines conducted Operation Kentucky

with three battalions, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines ;

1st Battalion, 4th Marines; and the 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines. The 3d Marines, to the east of Route 1, wa s

responsible for the Napoleon/Saline sector, also wit h

three battalions under its operational control, the 1s t

Battalion, 3d Marines; the 1st Amphibian Tracto r

Battalion; and BLT 2/4. Between the two Marine regiments, the 2d ARVN Regiment with four battalions* held the area of operations along both sides of

Route 1, north of the Bo Dieu River** and Dong Ha ,

to the Demilitarized Zone . This sector included bot h

the A—1 and A—2 (Gio Linh) and the C—1 and C—2

Dyemarker positions, and much of the Leathernec k

Square sector east of Route 1 to Jones Creek, the tributary of the Ben Hai that ran north and south, an d

emptied into the Cua Viet . The North Vietnames e

were well aware of the unit boundaries, which onl y

changed occasionally after some negotiations, an d

were not slow to make use of the allied dispositions

for their own advantage .

During most of April, in both the Kentucky and

Napoleon/Saline areas, the tempo of operations had

slowed from the previous month . This was especially

true of the Napoleon/Saline coastal sector after the Task

Force Kilo offensive at the beginning of April . With

only scattered actions during the rest of the month, th e

3d Marines had turned much of its attention to civi c

action and refugee resettlement. After the initial clearing offensive north of the Cua Viet, many of the Sout h

Vietnamese farmers and fishermen attempted to retur n

to their abandoned villages north of the waterway. As

Lieutenant Colonel William Weise, the BLT 2/4 commander, remembered, "things had calmed down" bu t

he suspected "that the enemy had shifted his major

efforts westward into the ARVN area ." 3

For some time, through prisoner interrogations and

captured enemy documents, the 3d Marine Divisio n

*An ARVN battalion numbered between 200 and 400 men, less

than half of the 900-man Marine battalion .

**The Cua Viet just above Dong Ha becomes the Bo Dieu . On

some maps it is also shown as the Mieu Giang. Brigadier General

William Weise observed that the "Bo Dieu River (a continuation of th e

Cam Lo and . . . Mieu Gang) flows east from Dong Ha and empties into

the Cua Viet . . . (about 3 km northeast of Dong Ha) which in tur n

flows into the . . . Gulf of Tonkin . . . ." BGen William Weise, Comments on draft, dtd 29Oct92 (Vietnam Comment File) .

staff knew that elements of the 320th NUA Division

had infiltrated into the eastern DMZ sector. During

the last week of April, Navy Task Force Clearwater,

which was responsible for convoying and protectin g

the shipping on the Cua Viet, received reports of

enemy intentions to interdict the waterway. Also during this period, the North Vietnamese guns north of

the Demilitarized Zone increased their bombardmen t

of allied positions and especially of the port facilitie s

both at Dong Ha and at the mouth of the Cua Viet. 4

On the afternoon of the 29th, the 320th initiated

attacks against the ARVN 2d Regiment and agains t

the Marines in the Kentucky area of operations. On 29

April, enemy sappers blew a culvert on Route 1 nea r

the hamlet of An Binh, about four miles north of

Dong Ha. Acting upon intelligence that North Vietnamese regulars had entered An Binh, the ARVN 2d

Regiment sent in its 1st and 4th Battalions nort h

from Dong Ha and south from C—1 to investigate th e

incident and trap any enemy forces between them .

The ARVN units themselves, however, encountered

heavy resistance "which they could not handle" and

called for assistance . According to a newspaper

account, Lieutenant Colonel Vu Van Giai, the 2 d

ARVN commander, told Major General Tompkins

that "he was holding on the road but that he was worried about some new pressure that was starting t o

build up on his left flank." At that point, about 1415 , Major General Tompkins ordered Task Force Robbi e

to move from C—3 with Company D, 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines, reinforced by Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, to assist the ARVN . 5

At Cam Vu on Route 88, a secondary route runnin g

parallel and 3,000 meters north of Route 9, abou t

5,000 meters west of An Binh, the Marine task forc e

ran into a North Vietnamese blocking force waiting fo r

them. In a seven-hour "sharp engagement, " lasting

from 1600 till nearly midnight, Task Force Robbie

suffered casualties of 11 dead and 22 wounded an d

reported killing 26 of the enemy. Four of the tanks

with the task force also sustained damage . Task Force

Robbie returned to its original positions at C—3 . In the

meantime, the two South Vietnamese battalions ha d

disengaged and retreated to C—1 . The ARVN reported

killing 130 of the enemy while taking casualties of 1 7

dead and 47 wounded .

On the evening of 29 April, concerned about th e

obvious presence of North Vietnamese units on Route

1, General Tompkins alerted additional forces. He

directed Colonel Milton A. Hull, the 3d Marines commander, to be prepared to send a company from the
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 293

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A191498

A Marine M48 tank and two Marines, part of Task Force Robbie, engage an enemy force near Don g

Ha. Task Force Robbie was the 3d Division's small armored reserve force, called after the nicknam e

of its commander, Col CliffordJ. Robichaud.

Napoleon/Saline sector to a new defensive position near

Route 1 . At 1715, Marine helicopters lifted Company

E, BLT 2/4 from near the hamlet of Nhi Ha in the

Napoleon northwestern sector to just north of the

Dong Ha bridge.* Later that night, Tompkins ordere d

the helicopter lift of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

from the 4th Marines Operation Lancaster II sector to

C—3 to reinforce Task Force Robbie . 6 * *

On the afternoon of the 30th, the 3d Battalion, 9t h

Marines arrived at C—3 . Reinforced by four tanks from

Task Force Robbie, the battalion then pushed forward

towards Cam Vu. Just north of Cam Vu, about 1610 ,

Company I of the 3d Battalion, like Task Force Robbie

the previous day, came up against North Vietnamese ,

probably in company strength, in an L-shape d

ambush. As Company I attempted to establish a defensive perimeter, the other companies of the battalion

and the tanks pushed forward to assist the expose d

company. With the coming of the reinforcements, th e

Vietnamese disengaged under cover of artillery north of

*There is some question whether Company E actually deployed

near the Dong Ha Bridge or to another smaller bridge spanning Rout e

1 another 5,000 meters north of the Dong Ha Bridge. Brigadier General William Weise insists that it is the latter bridge and the BLT 2/ 4

CAAR is in error on this matter. BGen William Weise intvw, 21Feb8 3

(Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

**Major Gary E . Todd, who at the time had just joined the battalion as the acting operations officer alpha, remembered that only

three of the companies and the battalion command group were committed to the operation . The remaining company stayed at the Rockpile under the executive officer . Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft ,

dtd 280ct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Todd Comments.

the DMZ and their own mortars.*** The Marine report s

showed 41 enemy killed at a cost of 20 Marines dea d

and 72 wounded. Despite the severity of the clash a t

Cam Vu the fiercest fighting of the day occurred abou t

10,000 meters to the northeast, involving BLT 2/4 and

units of the 320th NVA Division in the village of Dai

Do, about 2,500 meters north of Dong Ha . The battl e

for Dong Ha had begun . ?

The Fight for Dai Do, The First Day

Dai Do was actually a cluster of five hamlets, onl y

one of which was actually named Dai Do, on a smal l

peninsula carved out by the Cua Viet where it runs int o

the Bo Dieu. The Cua Viet rims the eastern edge while

the Bo Dieu forms the southern boundary. Two

unnamed small tributary streams of the larger rivers

outline the northern and western reaches of the peninsula. The northernmost stream which flowed into th e

Cua Viet marked the boundary between the 2d ARVN

Regiment and the 3d Marines. This stream separated

the hamlet of Bac Vong in the Napoleon/Saline area of

operations from the hamlet of Dong Huan on th e

northeastern lip of the peninsula . About 500 meters

south of Dong Huan was the hamlet of An Loc whic h

overlooked the Bo Dieu. Dai Do was another 50 0

***Major Todd recalled that the intermingling of forces limite d

the use of air support . He observed that the North Vietnamese professionally adjusted their artillery fire and that the Marines faced a n

" army that was as well equipped as their government and its supporters could afford ." Todd Comments.
294 THE DEFINING YEAR

meters to the northwest abutting the western stream ,

as were the two remaining adjacent hamlets Dinh To

and Thuong Do to the north. Rice paddies and two

cemeteries lay interspersed among the five hamlets .

Sometime during the previous days, at least four

North Vietnamese battalions, two of them for certain

from the 48th and 52d NVA Regiments of the 320th

NVA Division, had made their way without bein g

noticed in relatively flat and open terrain, south fro m

the DMZ through the 2d ARVN Regiment into the

Dai Do peninsula complex . In a relatively short time ,

the enemy troops were in formidable defenses . These

included a series of fortified A—frame bunkers "covered

with several feet of earth, reinforced by bamboo legs,

and well-camouflaged" and supplemented by trenches ,

and fighting holes. Lieutenant Colonel Weise recalled

that the bunkers "could support the weight of an M4 8

tank without collapsing ." 8

All of the North Vietnamese defenses were wel l

designed, protected by barbed wire, mutually supporting, with clear lines of fire, and took advantage of th e

terrain, especially the hedgerows on the perimeter o f

each of the hamlets. Lieutenant Colonel Weise later

stated that over time, small North Vietnamese units

had come into the area and used the local populace to

do "most of the work with a few of their officers in ther e

to direct the placements of the various positions ." This

was all done according to a very careful plan so that al l

the regulars had to do when they arrived on the scene

were to man the positions. Weise personally believed

that the only way the enemy accomplished this task wa s

because the 2d ARVN Regiment which was responsible for the sector "was asleep at the switch ." 9*

*Colonel Max McQuown, whose BLT 3/1 had been relieved b y

Weise's BLT 2/4 in the Cua Viet, observed that a Vietnamese village or

hamlet, " viewed from the air . . . looks like a group of small squares delineated by dense bamboo hedgerows . . . Bamboo will bend with the win d

but will not break. The roots are as strong as iron . The NVA converted

these natural barriers into formidable defensive positions. They built

interconnecting tunnels under each hedgerow, reinforced the tough overhead root system and cut and camouflaged ground level firing aperture s

for rifles, machine guns, and RPG's. Mortar positions were located i n

houses, out buildings, pig sties, or haystacks. The beauty of this defens e

was the NVA remained in a concealed protected position and, using th e

connecting tunnels, they could move to any side of a village that wa s

being threatened and engage the enemy without exposing themselves . "

McQuown agreed in his comments with Weise that " villagers participated in the construction of these bastions," probably having little choice,

but that he believed "some of the ARVN had to know what was goin g

on ." He declared that the lesson that his BLT learned "was to assume al l

villages had similar defenses" and to attack with sufficient troops "to ge t

the job done quickly." Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dt d

26Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McQuown Comments .

While the 3d Marine Division had intelligence of

the 320th moving into the eastern sectors with a vague

mission of interdicting the Cua Vet, the allies had

almost no inkling of the buildup in the Dai Do area .

Up to this time, the 3d Marines and 2d ARVN Regiment had encountered mostly small groups in squad o r

platoon formations, and occasionally a company-siz e

unit to the north, east, and west of Dai Do . The most

recent actions provided some evidence that the enem y

was perhaps making his main effort to the northwest.l o

In the early morning of the 30th, the North Vietnamese revealed their presence in the Dai Do sector.

About 0330 enemy soldiers from positions in the ham -

let of An Loc on the northern bank of the Bo Dieu fire d

upon a Navy Task Force Clearwater river patrol boat

with small arms and machine guns. The Navy craft

returned the fire and turned back for the Dong Ha

ramp area . Approximately a half-hour later, the NVA

from the same position opened up upon a Navy LCU ,

this time with rocket-propelled grenades as well as rifl e

and machine gun fire . The Navy ship sustained several hits and casualties, one sailor dead and six wounded .

This ship too returned to the Dong Ha ramp .)

Lieutenant Colonel Weise remembered that he routinely monitored the Task Force Clearwater radio ne t

and overheard the report relative to the last incident ,

the attack on the LCU . Shortly afterwards, Captai n

James L. Williams, the commander of Company H ,

radioed that one of his patrols not too far from th e

hamlet of Bac Vong had also seen the incident. Weis e

relayed the information to Colonel Hull, the 3 d

Marines commander. About two hours later, at day -

break, about 0600, Hull ordered Weise to investigat e

the incident. Since An Loc was in the 2d ARVN regimental sector, Lieutenant Colonel Weise requeste d

Colonel Hull for a shift of boundaries, which had to b e

authorized by the 3d Marine Division . While waitin g

for the permission, Weise then alerted Captai n

Williams about the situation. About 0700, with the

boundary shift approved, the battalion commande r

ordered Williams to send the platoon near Bac Von g

across the adjacent stream and to "reconnoiter area

from which attack occurred ." At the same time, he

directed Williams to "assemble remainder of Hote l

[Company H} which was widely dispersed on patrol . "1 2

For that matter, at this point of time, Lieutenan t

Colonel Weise's entire command was widely dispersed. Weise maintained his command post at Ma i

Xa Chanh at the southern terminus of Jones Creek ,

about 5,000 meters northeast of Bac Vong, collocated with his Company F. One platoon of Company F
ALLIED AND ENEMY POSITIONS

IN AND AROUND DAI DO

30 APRIL 1968

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--- HTHE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 295

was at My Loc on the Cua Viet, about 3,000 meters

east of the company and battalion command posts.

Company G was positioned another 3,000 meters to

the north of the battalion command post near the

hamlets of Lam Xuan and Nhi Ha on both sides of

Jones Creek. The previous day, Weise had lost operational control of his Company E, now positioned on

Route 1, about 5,000 meters to the west of the

Napoleon sector, to the 3d Marine Division. Moreover, according to the battalion commander, he could

not move Company G and the Company F platoon at

My Loc from their positions without first obtaining

the approval of the 3d Marine Division. This, in

effect, only left him two maneuverable infantry units

to carry out the mission, Company H and the two

platoons of Company F with him at Mai Xa Chanh.

At the time he ordered Captain Williams to assemble

his company, Lieutenant Colonel Weise also told Captain James H. Butler, the Company F commander, to

mount his two platoons on amphibian tractors and to

deploy from Mai Xa Chanh to Bac Vong.'3

About 0830, as the initial platoon of Company H

advanced through Bac Vong and approached the

stream which had been the original boundary with the

2d ARYN Regiment, the platoon came under heavy

rifle and machine gun fire as well as mortar and rocket

bombardment. The enemy was well entrenched in the

hamlet of Dong Huan just across the stream from Bac
296 THE DEFINING YEA R

Vong . It was obvious to both Captain Williams and

Lieutenant Colonel Weise that it would take more tha n

a platoon to get the North Vietnamese out of the objective area . The battalion commander directed William s

to pull his platoon back and wait for the rest of his

company and the two platoons from Company F to

arrive . He also reinforced Williams with the reconnaissance platoon attached to his BLT and two M48 tanks .

Before the Marines could reach An Loc, they had t o

eliminate the NVA from Dong Huan .14

Expecting resistance from the enemy, Weise asked

for permission to move Company G from Nhi Ha an d

the Company F platoon from My Loc to Bac Vong t o

support the attack . At this time, about 0900, Lieu -

tenant Colonel Weise and a small operational group ,

consisting of his sergeant major, air liaison officer, an d

three radio operators, boarded a Navy monitor (an

armored LCM 6) so that he could see and possibl y

control the course of events. According to Weise, th e

"monitor proved to be an ideal command post wit h

good communications and significant fire power—a

breech-loaded 81mm mortar, two 20mm cannons ,

plus .50- and .30-caliber machine guns." The Nav y

ship sailed up the Cua Viet from Mai Xa Chanh to a

point on the river opposite Dong Huan .1 5

Weise's plan for the attack was to have artillery and

air to prepare the objective area and then for William' s

Company H to cross the stream. The two M48 tanks,

the reconnaissance platoon, and Company F and the

amphibian tractors reinforced with two 106mm

recoilless rifles were to lay down a heavy base of fire t o

cover the Company H attack . Once Company H was

well established on the other side of the stream, Company F with the two 106s and the amphibian tractors

would cross. Company F was to create a diversionary

effort to draw the enemy's attention from Compan y

H, which would then attack Dong Huan. With the

securing of Dong Huan, Company F would then tak e

Dai Do. If the situation became tenuous, Lieutenan t

Colonel Weise, who had received back operationa l

control of his Company G at Nhi Ha, hoped to helilift

the latter company back to the former battalion CP at

Mai Xa Chanh. From there, the company with th e

BLT's two tanks would board an LCM—8 to reinforc e

the two other companies in the Dai Do sector.1 6

At first, the plan appeared to be working . With

radio links to an aerial observer, the battalion directed helicopter gunship and fixed-wing airstrikes a s

well as artillery on suspected enemy positions

throughout the entire five-hamlet village complex .

According to the aerial observer, the airstrikes

knocked out at least three of the North Vietnamese

.50-caliber machine gun positions . With the lifting

of the air bombardment, Company H crossed th e

stream about 400 meters northwest of Bac Vong .

According to Lieutenant Colonel Weise, "Captai n

Williams did a masterful job of moving his company . . . across open rice paddies under enemy fire, "

ford the stream, and then move south, literally

crawling the last 1,500 meters, again in the open, t o

reach the assault position with relatively light casualties. As planned, the tanks, the amphibian tractors ,

the reconnaissance Marines, and the Marines of

Company F provided covering fire for the assaul t

company. The artillery batteries of the 12th Marine s

used white phosphorous and smoke shells to cloak

the movement of Company H .1 7

With Company H in the assault positions, th e

two platoons of Company F on top* of the amphibian tractors crossed the stream and took positions o n

the right flank of Company H . While Company H

was to attack Dong Huan, Captain Butler was to

secure Dai Do, about 700 meters to the west of Don g

Huan. About 1400, both companies launched thei r

assaults. In a relatively short, but fierce struggle ,

Company H successfully fought its way into Dong

Huan, but at some cost . Among the casualties was

Captain Williams, wounded by a grenade about halfway through the hamlet . Williams killed his

assailant with a well-placed shot from his .45-caliber

service pistol. With the company commander down ,

First Lieutenant Alexander F. Prescott assumed command, rallied the troops, and continued the attack .

By 1500, the Marines controlled Dong Huan . Company H had consolidated its positions and bega n

evacuating its casualties.18

Captain Butler's Company F with the amphibia n

tractors had not fared as well . Sporadic enemy artillery

from the north and enemy mortars, recoilless rifles ,

and machine guns from positions in Dai Do prevented the company from reaching its objective . The

enemy recoilless rifles took out two of the tractors. As

a field expedient, the Marines had mounted their two

106mm recoilless rifles on top of two of the tractors ,

"secured by sandbags." Despite the added fire power,

the 106s failed to silence the enemy weapons in Da i

* Brigadier General Weise later explained that "we usually avoide d

riding inside the LVTP—5 Amphibian Tractor . . . because its highl y

volatile gasoline fuel tanks were located beneath the troop compartment . It was feared that there would be little chance of escape if the

amtrac struck a land mine. Land mines were plentiful in our area. "

Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " Footnote 4, Footnotes, p . 3 .
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 297

Do. Although one of the platoons reached the easter n

edge of the hamlet, the other remained in the open i n

a cemetery about 300 meters to the east. At one point

in the course of the afternoon, Captain Butler radioed

that he only had "26 effective Marines . "1 9

Lieutenant Colonel Weise had wanted to reinforce

Company F with Company G, but these hopes wer e

soon dashed. The company had prepared for the helilift

from Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan back to the battalion CP.

After the first wave of helicopters had taken out th e

81mm mortar section and some of the supplies, enem y

artillery and mortars bombarded the landing zone followed by a ground assault against the company positions. Left with little choice, Captain Manuel S. Vargas,* the company commander, canceled the rest of th e

helilift. The company beat back the enemy attack and

then Vargas ordered the company to make a nigh t

march back to Mai Xa Chanh.20

Earlier in the afternoon, Colonel Hull had boarded

one of the Navy patrol boats, a lightly armed, 14-foot,

fiberglass boat with a 35-horsepower outboard moto r

that the Marines called " skimmers," to have a look at

the situation for himself. He first stopped at Dong

Huan and discussed the fighting and evacuation of th e

casualties with Lieutenant Prescott and then joined

Lieutenant Colonel Weise on board the "monitor. "

According to Weise, Hull told him that now that the

"battle was joined we had to maintain pressure on the

enemy to keep him off balance ." Hull promised the

battalion commander operational control of Company

B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, which had a platoon of

LVTPs attached to it south of the Bo Dieu.2 1

First Lieutenant George C . Norris, the Company B

commander, radioed Lieutenant Colonel Weise to

report his availability. Weise briefed Norris on the situation and then ordered "his company to mount th e

amtracs, cross the river, attack and seize An Loc, th e

hamlet from which the enemy had earlier attacked th e

Navy Utility Boat." At 1625, the first of two waves of

Company B landed on the northern shore of the Bo

Dieu River just south of An Loc under covering fire

from the weapons of Task Force Clearwater's River

Assault Group boats. By 1710, the second wave was

ashore, but Company B had only succeeded in establishing a rather insecure beachhead .22

The enemy greeted the company with automatic

weapons, RPGs, mortars, and heavy small arms fire ,

*On December 26 1973, then Major Vargas legally changed hi s

name from Manuel Sando Vargas to Jay R . Vargas. Col Jay R. Varga s

Biographical File (Ref Sec, MCHC).

not only from inside An Loc but also from the hamlet

of Dai Do to the north, and from the hamlet of Dong

Lai, about 1,000 meters to the northwest and across th e

second or western stream in the Dai Do sector. NVA

recoilless rifles damaged several of the amphibian tractors, disabling one of the amtracs and destroyin g

another. Despite the strong enemy resistance, in its ini -

tial assault, the company pushed through into about

half of An Loc . At this point, the casualty toll force d

the advance to falter. Lieutenant Norris, the company

commander, was dead . A hidden enemy sniper kille d

the Marine lieutenant as he was being helped to the

rear after being seriously wounded . According to Lieutenant Colonel Weise, who had carefully monitored th e

events ashore, about an hour before dark, he "ordered

Bravo Company (now confused, disorganized, and with

only one officer left) to halt, reorganize, form a defensive perimeter in the western half of the hamlet . . . ."2 3

Concerned at the same time about being able t o

coordinate three separate perimeters, the battalion

commander also told Captain Butler of Company F t o

gather his unit together as best he could outside of Dai

Do and withdraw to the positions held by Company H

in Dong Huan. Under cover of darkness and with sup -

porting fires provided by Company B and Compan y

H, Company F reached Dong Huan without sustaining further casualties. In fact, Captain Butler discovered that when he had reassembled his company he had

about twice the force that he thought he had. With the

establishment of the two defensive perimeters at Dong

Huan in the north and An Loc in the south, the fighting on the 30th was about over.

During the night of the 30th, the enemy made several probes at Dong Huan, but Companies F and H

with the assistance of friendly artillery easily repulsed

them. At 2330, although under artillery bombardment by enemy guns north of the DMZ, Company G

to the east completed its night march to Mai Xa Chanh

from Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan . Company E, however,

was still under operational control of the division an d

remained in its defensive positions on Highway 1 ,

northwest of the Dai Do complex . In the day's action,

both the North Vietnamese and the Marine BLT

including Company B from the 3d Marines had sustained heavy casualties . The Marines reported approximately 90 enemy killed while suffering losses of 16

dead and 107 wounded .2 4

At the end of the long day, Lieutenant Colone l

Weise remained frustrated . He believed that if he had

Companies E and G attached to him from the ver y

beginning that he could have seized both Dai Do and
298 THE DEFINING YEAR

An Loc after Company H had captured Dong Huan .

Moreover, he had requested additional airstrikes* and

8-inch artillery missions which were not forthcoming .

He was especially disappointed that he "did not get a

radar controlled 2,000 pound bomb strike by Marin e

A—6 Intruder aircraft ." He asserted that the heavy air

and artillery ordnance with delayed fuses would hav e

"cracked some of the enemy's . . . fortifications" and

"followed by napalm" would possibly have destroye d

the enemy's defenses. It was obvious to Weise that his

unit did not have priority for either air or artillery support. He did not blame Colonel Hull who had give n

him all the reserve force he had available—Company

B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. With the piecemealing of

his forces into the battle, Weise declared later "I felt a n

hour late and a dime short' throughout the fight ."2 5

From the perspective of General Tompkins at the 3 d

Marine Division command post, he could not be sure

that the main thrust of the enemy was in the Dai D o

sector. At the same time that BLT 2/4 fought in Dai

Do, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at Cam Phu, abou t

three miles to the west, had engaged other elements of

the 320th NVA Division, the same place where Tas k

Force Robbie had run into trouble the day before .**

Along Route 1, the 2d ARVN Regiment also reporte d

continuing contact with enemy forces. Together wit h

the attacks on the Navy river boats, Tompkins believe d

the North Vietnamese poised a real threat to the entire

coastal plain from Cam Phu south to Quang Tri . Still,

according to Major William H . Dabney, recently promoted and a former company commander at Khe Sanh

reassigned to the 3d Marine Division G—3 staff at thi s

*Up to this point, possibly because of the new single manager system that had just been established " fixed-wing air support required a

36-hour notice before it could be planned on . This caused problems

when situations would change between the planning stage and actua l

execution of an operation order ." According to the BLT 2/4 after actio n

report, " as the battle of Dai Do proceeded it became less difficult to ge t

the close air support that the BLT requested . " BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon, pp . 3-4. Colonel Max McQuown, who at the tim e

commanded BLT 3/1, observed, however, that in the 3d Marine Division, " close air support was always a crap shoot . Requesting units jus t

never knew if the requested strike would occur ." He claimed that these

air support problems existed even before the advent of "Single Manager." McQuown stated that the "glaring problem was that all air sup -

port requests had to be forwarded to the 3d Division air officer instea d

of going directly to the DASC, . . . the agency that was supposed t o

coordinate and control all air." McQuown Comments.

**In fact a contemporary Army historical account of the battle

gives much more emphasis on the ARVN and Cam Phu action and

does not even mention the fighting in Dai Do on 30 April, but begin s

its description with events there on 1 May. Waldron and Beavers, "The

Critical Year, " pp . 57-59 .

time, General Tompkins entered the division FSI C

(Fire Support Information Center) on the evening o f

the 30th and ordered the artillery commander, "to tak e

every tube that is in range of Dai Do . . . to shift its trai l

so that it is pointing at the Dai Do area and . . . fire max

sustained rate with every tube all night."26

In an interview a few days after the initial action, a

reporter quoted General Tompkins as stating, "Yes, I

can tell you the exact moment when I made up my

mind it was going to be a real battle—it was at 9 :1 5

Tuesday morning (April 30). " According to the Tompkins interview, when the general looked at the map ,

the "situation was pretty obvious . " He believed, "the

whole picture adds up to one of two things-the

enemy was either driving through to Dong Ha itself,

or he was planning to . . . slip by one or both sides of

Dong Ha, and go for the provincial capital of Quan g

Tri, just eight miles due south ." According to Tompkins such a threat was more than the 2d ARVN Regiment could handle, "it was time to call in th e

Marines."2 7

The 3d Marine Division commander only had a

limited number of reserves that he could throw int o

the battle .*** Tompkins believed that the insertion o f

the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at Cam Phu contained

the enemy forces to the west . He still remained concerned, however, about the capability of the ARVN t o

hold the center and also about the uncovering of the

northern approaches to Dong Ha with the withdrawa l

of Company G from Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan . As Lieutenant Colonel Weise later observed, "Nhi Ha had

always been a key staging area for NVA infiltratin g

south along `Jones Creek' . " With BLT 2/4 committed

to Dai Do, only the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines remaine d

in the Napoleon/Saline sector, safeguarding the south -

ern banks of the Cua Viet. General Tompkins request-

*** While the 26th Marines had deployed to the Quang Tri base

after Khe Sanh on 18 April, the regiment was basically recuperating

from its ordeal at Khe Sanh . Colonel Bruce F. Meyers, who had just

assumed command of the 26th Marines in April, recalled that the regiment was " being reequipped and obtaining replacements (the bulk of

the regiment's artillery, motor transport, generators, mess equipment ,

virtually all of the 'heavy' TO/E gear had been shot up and/or left at

Khe Sanh when we pulled out . " Temporarily the regiment conducte d

a rice protection operation appropriately named " Operation Rice " i n

the area south of the Quang Tri base . Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments

on draft, dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File). On the other hand ,

Colonel Max McQuown, who commanded BLT 3/1 at the time, asserted that either his battalion or the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines were bot h

at Ca Lu, and therefore, " there was a 'swing ' battalion available to go

anywhere in the division TAOR . It could have been 2/9 or BLT 3/1 —

it turned out to be neither ." McQuown Comments.
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 299

ed a battalion of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the

Prov Corps reserve, from Lieutenant General Willia m

B. Rosson, the corps commander, to fill any gaps in the

division's defenses. General Rosson remembered

Tompkins telling him "that the 320th NVA Divisio n

had Dong Ha in its sights."28 At 0900, 1 May, the 3 d

Battalion, 21st Infantry arrived by helicopter in a landing zone just north of Dong Ha . Later that day, General Tompkins turned over operational control of the

Army battalion to the 3d Marines to insert into th e

Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan area .2 9

The Continuing Fight for Dai Do

The fighting in the Dai Do area, however, was far

from over. Just before daybreak on 1 May, a reconnaissance patrol from Company B in An Loc notice d

that the North Vietnamese had slipped out of the

hamlet. At that point, on order of Lieutenant Colonel

Weise, who had come ashore by skimmer boat, th e

company took over all of An Loc . At daybreak, Company H in Dong Huan noticed about 60 enemy soldiers moving across an open field rice paddy west o f

Dai Do and north of An Loc . Calling in supporting

arms as well as employing their own rifle and automatic weapons, the Marines of both Companies H

and B participated in what amounted to a "turke y

shoot." Lieutenant Colonel Weise later speculated

that the North Vietnamese may have been "a reinforcing unit looking for the village of Dai Do " or possibly " stragglers . . . from An Loc . "30

After this initial action, there was a relative lull i n

the fighting largely confined to the continuous artiller y

shelling of Dai Do, as both sides attempted to marsha l

and reinforce their forces. At first, Lieutenant Colonel

Weise had planned to have Captain Vargas' Company

G make a night landing at An Loc and then launch a

predawn attack on Dai Do. The Navy landing craft

that were to carry the Marine company from Mai X a

Chanh to An Loc, however, were not available. Instead

Company G, reinforced by the BLT's two tanks, waited at Mai Xa Chanh until about 0830 to board two

Two Marines from BLT 2/4 survey the ruins of the hamlet of Dai Do after several days of heavy fighting. The Marine on the left is carrying three LAAWs (light antiarmor weapons) strapped to his back .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A191498
300 THE DEFINING YEA R

LCM-6s. Lieutenant Colonel Weise, once more in hi s

"skimmer" boat, intercepted Company G on the water .

He joined Captain Vargas on the lead LCM and briefe d

the company commander on the situation and the

revised plans. The company was to come ashore at An

Loc, pass through Company B's lines, and then take the

hamlet of Dai Do. Company B was to remain i n

reserve, while Companies F and H would provide covering fire from Dong Huan .3 1

As planned, around 1000, Company G landed at

An Loc and prepared to launch its attack on Dai Do .

So as not to reveal the presence of the two M4 8

tanks, the amphibian tractors with Company B

revved up their engines and made several false starts .

Marine artillery and naval gunfire continued t o

pound the North Vietnamese troops in Dai Do an d

just after the artillery fire lifted, two Marine A—4 s

swooped low and dropped bombs and napalm on th e

hamlet. Passing by the eastern flank of Company B,

the Marines of Company G with the tanks betwee n

the two assault platoons and under covering smok e

and white phosphorous rushed forward to cover th e

500 meters of open rice paddy between them an d

Dai Do. While heavy mortar and automatic weapon s

stopped the left flank about 200 meters short of Dai

Do, the rest of the company reached the enemy's first

line of bunkers. As one company officer told a news -

paper reporter later: "We could have used 10 tanks .

We had two and we had to send both of them to th e

rear with damage ." The fighting in Dai Do reverted t o

intensive short-range fighting, with the Marine s

blowing holes in the enemy bunkers with satche l

charges and grenades. Bypassing some of the defenses ,

by 1400, the company attained the northern reaches o f

Dai Do. Indicative of the heavy combat, Captain Vargas later related that "I started out with 123 men and

by the time I got through the village I was down to

41 . . . . Every trooper had a captured AK-47 . " The

Marines also had taken several prisoners.3 2

The North Vietnamese were not about to allow the

Marines to stay in Dai Do and mounted a counterattack in about battalion strength from both north an d

west of Dai Do . Employing both well-aimed artillery

from positions north of the DMZ and mortars, the

enemy troops forced Company G to give ground. Also

North Vietnamese troops in Dai Do who had been

bypassed, especially in the southwestern part of th e

hamlet, opened fire on the Marines of Company G

from the rear. Given the situation, Lieutenant Colonel

Weise ordered Vargas "to fall back and establish a

defensive perimeter in the eastern part of Dai Do." By

1700, Company G had established its new perimeter,

called in supporting arms, and waited for resupply and

reinforcements and a new enemy attack . In the process,

Captain Vargas was wounded but not seriously enough

to relinquish command .

While sitting in its new perimeter, Company G

reported the sighting of a large number of enemy

troops in the vicinity of Truc Kinh, about 3,000 meters

northeast of Dai Do. At about the same time, an aerial

observer spotted the troop movement at Truc Kinh and

also a North Vietnamese artillery forward observatio n

team and called in fixed-wing and helicopter gunship s

on both positions. According to one report, the fixed -

wing sorties killed all 13 of the NVA artillery spotter

team, which resulted in a reduction of the effectiveness

of the enemy artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Weise

remembered that "on our air net we could hear th e

excited pilots as they strafed, bombed, and rocketed

enemy in the open in daylight, a rare sight!" BLT 2/ 4

now had priority for close air support, although Weise

later asserted not as much as "we requested nor as

quickly as we needed it ."3 3

At An Loc, Lieutenant Colonel Weise tried to rein -

force Company G . At first, he ordered Company F to

attack from Dong Huan to relieve the embattle d

company. Enemy artillery and automatic weapon s

and small arms fire stopped the attack far short of its

objective . Although the North Vietnamese attempted to jam the Marine radios, the battalion by changing frequencies was able to call in supporting arm s

including airstrikes to provide protective cover fo r

the second Marine company. At this point, around

1700, Weise had few reserves that he could send int o

the battle. Although earlier in the day, he had

requested and received operational control of hi s

Company E from the 3d Marine Division, the company had not yet arrived from its former positio n

along Route 1 . With the number of casualties that i t

sustained the day before, Company H in Dong Huan

was not in any position for "a major effort." This left

only Company B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines at A n

Loc, where its parent battalion had sent in severa l

replacements including a new company commander,

executive officer, and several experienced noncommissioned officers. ;4

About 1700, Lieutenant Colonel Weise ordered

Company B, 3d Marines into the attack. According

to Weise, the plan was for the company, on top of th e

LVTs, to cross rapidly the 500 meters of rice padd y

separating it from Dai Do, "dismount and fight its
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 30 1

way to link up with Golf [Company G]." It did no t

work. The enemy laid down a tremendous amount of

both automatic and small arms fire that literall y

stopped the attack dead in its tracks . Both the new

company commander, First Lieutenant Thomas A .

Brown, and many of his key personnel were wound -

ed. According to Weise, Company B was in very ba d

straits—a young, inexperienced Marine officer had

assumed the command and was close to panic . At that

point, Captain Vargas of Company G made radio con -

tact with him and in a "calm, confident voice settled

the excited Marine down, enabling him to gain better control of the situation."3 5

Fortunately, Weise 's Company E under Captain

James E. Livingston, after crossing the dangerous

stream* to the west, arrived at An Loc about 173 0

from its former position on Route 1 . With the coming of darkness, Lieutenant Colonel Weise ordere d

Company B to pull back to An Loc. Both Captain

Livingston and First Lieutenant Clyde W. Mutter, the

commanding officer of the reconnaissance platoon ,

"personally led a number of small expeditions during

darkness, across the fire-swept rice paddies, and

helped Bravo Company successively withdraw bac k

to An Loc with all its wounded ." By this time, Company F had rejoined Company H in Dong Huan. In

its tight perimeter in the northeastern part of Dai Do ,

with supporting arms and light provided by flar e

ships, Company G repulsed several attempts of th e

North Vietnamese to overwhelm its positions. Casualties had been heavy for both sides on 1 May. The

Marines suffered 24 dead and 44 wounded and evacuated . BLT 2/4 took 2 prisoners and reported 9 1

enemy dead.3 6

With enemy probes all along his positions, Lieutenant Colonel Weise spent a long sleepless night as h e

prepared his plans for the next day . Worried about the

ability of Company G to continue to hold out in Dai

Do, after learning according to one prisoner that th e

North Vietnamese had at least 12 companies in Dai

Do, Weise decided upon a predawn attack . Company

E was to attack to the northwest from An Loc into Dai

Do and link up with Company G. The two companies

would then clear the hamlet. If the attack stalled ,

Weise planned to send in Company H . Companies F

*According to Lieutenant Colonel Weise the scream was " nearly

unfordable," being about five and a half feet deep and fairly swift running . Livingston solved the problem by having a "half dozen of his

tallest Marines strip down, plant themselves in the deepest part of th e

stream, and pass the shorter, heavily laden Marines hand-to-hand t o

the shallow water. " Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " p. 19 .

and B would continue to secure Dong Huan and An

Loc, respectively, and be prepared to reinforce .3 7

About 0500 on 2 May, while Company G provided

covering fire, Company E left its line of departure fo r

attack positions south of Dai Do .** Heavy enemy fir e

caused two of the Company E platoons to hesitate, bu t

Captain Livingston personally led his reserve platoo n

to regain the momentum . At the same time, Company G attacked the enemy positions in southern Dai Do

from the rear. The fighting would continue for several

hours at close range with the Marines using

flamethrowers, white phosphorous, grenades, satche l

charges, and LAAWs (light antitank assault weapons )

to crack the NVA bunkers and kill the enemy troops

inside them. As one Marine squad leader with Company E observed, the NVA were "in fortified positions

and bunkers and not moving."38 Although wounded

by grenade fragments, Captain Livingston continued

to encourage and prod his men forward . By about

0930, the two companies had secured Dai Do.3 9

About a half-hour earlier, Colonel Hull made another visit to Lieutenant Colonel Weise's temporary command post at An Loc . Satisfied with the progress of the

attack, Hull directed the BLT commander to continue

"to keep the pressure on the enemy." Weise remonstrated that his unit "had just about run out of steam . "

He recommended instead reinforcement by other battalions to his north and on both his flanks. Using anvi l

and hammer tactics, the battalions on the north would

attack south and squeeze the NVA between them an d

the Marines in Dai Do. At this point, however, Colone l

Hull had few available resources and could onl y

promise Weise that he would try to get the 2d ARVN

to cover BLT 2/4's western flank 4 0

About noon, Colonel Hull informed the BLT 2/4

commander that an ARVN mechanized battalion

would be available . Using the stream to the west of Dai

Do as a boundary, the ARVN were to capture the ham -

**Master Gunnery Sergeant James W. Rogers, who at the tim e

was the 1st Squad Leader, 3d Platoon, Company E, recalled that during the night of 1—2 May his squad had the mission of establishing a n

" ambushVistening post outside of An Loc and to remain in positio n

until dawn ." He and his squad emplaced their position near a buria l

mound about 75—100 yards in front of the company perimeter . Just

before daylight, they heard voices in front of them . Assured by Captai n

Livingston that this was not a friendly patrol, Rogers thought tha t

they may be NVA attempting to surrender and called out to them i n

Vietnamese asking if they were Chieu Hoi . The NVA opened fire an d

the Marines responded with their M16s and a M60 machine gun . Th e

firefight ended and the Marine squad pulled back to the compan y

perimeter to take part in the attack . MGySgt James W. Rogers, Comments on draft, dtd 21Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
302 THE DEFINING YEA R

lets of Dong Lai and Thong Nghia across the stream .

The Marines would attack north into the hamlets o f

Dinh To and Thuong Do.

Following his orders to continue the pressure, Lieutenant Colonel Weise ordered Company H into the

assault. He told First Lieutenant Prescott, the company commander, to pass through the lines of Companie s

E and G and seize Dinh To . Leaving the line of departure about 1300, Company H fought its way int o

about a third of the hamlet. At that point, the enem y

counterattacked . While the company maintained it s

positions, Lieutenant Prescott radioed for assistance ,

believing that he would be overwhelmed by the nex t

enemy attack4 1

According to Lieutenant Colonel Weise, Captai n

Livingston in Dai Do did not wait for orders . He gathered up what remained of his company, about 30 men ,

and rushed forward into Dinh To . Lieutenant Prescott

remembered the change in his men when they learne d

that Company E was on its way :

We were really desperate . Then my radio operato r

told me, "Captain Livingston is coming ." I knew then

that we would be O.K. I yelled "Echo is coming ." The

cry was repeated by others, " Echo is coming . . . Echo is

coming ." Everyone felt like I did . 42

For a time, both companies rallied and appeared to

have gained the upper hand, but not for long .

Although Lieutenant Prescott sustained a serious

wound and was evacuated to the rear, Second Lieutenant Bayard V. Taylor assumed command of Company H and effectively took control . The two companies

fought their way through a series of trenches until

stopped by an enemy machine gun . At that juncture,

the North Vietnamese mounted yet another attack .

According to Lieutenant Taylor:

The enemy counterattack dwarfed the fighting that

had gone before in intensity and volume . I recall seein g

banana trees and the masonry walls of a hootch cu t

down by the [NVA] automatic weapons fire . The bush -

es to our front seemed to be alive with heavily camouflaged NVA soldiers.4 3

Sergeant James W. Rogers, an acting platoon leader

with Company E, remembered much the same : "NVA

soldiers were all over . . . as soon as you shot one, anoth -

er would pop up in his place . We were receiving a lo t

of machine gun fire." Rogers credited the "coolness and

calmness" of the Company E commander, Captain Livingston, "who seemed to be everywhere," with keeping

the Marines "from panicking ."44

About 1430, Lieutenant Colonel Weise, who ha d

moved his forward command post to Dai Do,

ordered the two companies to disengage and retur n

to the battalion command post . An injured Captai n

Livingston, unable to walk because of machine gun

rounds in both his legs, insisted that he not b e

helped to the rear until the rest of the wounded ha d

been evacuated . Under the cover of Marine airstrike s

and supporting artillery, the two companies pulled

back with all of their wounded to the relative safet y

of Dai Do.

By this time, Weise received the information that

the ARVN mechanized battalion had occupied Dong

Lai, about 500 meters to the west of Dai Do . Wit h

the approval of Colonel Hull, the Marine battalio n

commander worked out a plan for the Marine an d

ARVN battalion to advance abreast along both side s

of the stream—the Marines again to move into Din h

To and the ARVN to push from Dong Lai to Thuon g

Nghia, a distance of some 1,000 meters to the north -

west. According to Weise, " coordination and communication was difficult at best," but he had no

spare officer to send as a liaison to the ARVN . Both

he and his operations officer, Major George F. Warren, however, talked by radio to the U .S. Army advisor with the ARVN unit who assured them that th e

ARVN battalion commander understood and agree d

to the plan. 4 5

For the attack, Weise selected Companies G and

F. Although Company G was down to about 40 men ,

it still had four officers . Company F, which had been

reinforced by the platoon at My Loc, had about 8 0

men. Captain Vargas' Company G was to be in th e

lead followed "in trace by Company F." The idea was

for Company G to advance rapidly until it encountered enemy resistance and then for Company F to

push through and continue the attack . Lieutenan t

Colonel Weise and a small command group accompanied Company G. Major Warren, the operations

officer, assumed command of the perimeter formed

by Companies E and H in Dai Do . Company B

remained in An Loc in what had become the BLT

rear sector. 46

Close to 1600, under cover of Marine air and

artillery, the two companies moved into the attack .

This time, Company G only met sporadic small arms

fire as it pushed through Dinh To . Company F, however, became bogged down in the rice paddies east o f

the hamlet where it came under artillery and heav y

automatic weapons fire from its northeast . Unaware

that Company F was not behind it, Company G drove

to the southern edge of Thuong Do. At that point,

however, the company took fire from its front and
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 303

right flank. According to Weise, he told Captain Vargas to halt and for Company F to move up, only then

to discover that the latter company was not where he

thought it was. About the same time, about 1700,

Company G came under automatic weapons fire on its

left flank and left rear from across the stream, an are a

supposedly secured by the ARVN mechanized battalion in its armored personnel carriers (APCs). In fact,

Lieutenant Colonel Weise remembered that when "w e

first received fire from over there, we thought it wa s

them [the ARVN} . . . We saw a large number ove r

there to the left and we didn't realize that they were

NVA and not ARVN that were on the move until w e

realized that we saw no APCs. Ten or 15 minutes we

looked at those guys."4 7

BLT 2/4 was in an untenable situation . In effect, its

lead companies were in unprotected perimeters with

enemy troops in between them. Weise later related ,

"There was just one hell of a donnybrook and `Charlie,

bar the door situation . – The battalion commande r

called in artillery, "all around and top of us ." An enemy

RPG round killed Weise's Sergeant Major, John Malnar, and Weise himself was seriously wounded by a n

NVA AK–47 rifle . The battalion commander praised

Captain Vargas, who also had sustained a minor

wound, for his conduct of the battle: "He was every -

where at once . . . ." 4 8

Company G stopped the initial enemy fronta l

attack and then turned around "and picked off most of

the enemy" coming at it from the rear. According to

Weise, "every Marine who was able to shoot, including

wounded who could handle a weapon, fired and the

fighting was violent and close ." Using the tactic of

withdrawal by fire teams, with two able-bodie d

Marines dragging a wounded man, the compan y

fought its way back to the positions held by Compan y

F. The two companies then retreated to Dinh To wher e

they were met by Major Warren, the operations officer,

who had organized a provisional platoon supported b y

amphibian tractors 49

After evacuating the most seriously wounded ,

including Lieutenant Colonel Weise,* by 1800, the

battalion had once more consolidated its perimeter i n

Dai Do. With replacements and some reorganization ,

each company consisted of 40 men and 1 officer.

*An Associated Press photograph taken at the time shows a stil l

feisty Lieutenant Colonel Weise with a fat cigar in his mouth lying

on a litter holding his own plasma bottle in an evacuation area nea r

Dai Do . Clipping from the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, p . 2 (Weise

Folder, Dai Do).

Photo courtesy of BGen William Weise, USMC (Ret )

A seriously wounded but still feisty LtCol William Weise ,

with a cigar in his mouth, lies on a litter holding his own

albumin serum bottle awaiting medical evacuation. In the

background, Navy medical personnel and Marines attend to

other wounded.

Major Warren had assumed command of the battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Weise and was in turn

relieved later that night by Major Charles W. Knapp,

the battalion executive officer, who had maintained

the BLT rear headquarters on board the Iwo Jima

(LPH 2). In the fighting for the Dai Do village complex on 2 May, the 3d Marines reported casualties o f

40 Marines dead and 111 wounded and the killing o f

nearly 380 of the enemy.

The fight for Dai Do was practically over. Althoug h

there were further probes on the night of 2–3 May on

the Marine lines in the hamlet of Dai Do, by daybreak

there was little sign of the enemy. Aerial observers saw

small groups of North Vietnamese retreating nort h

from Thuong Do and called in airstrikes . Later that

day, Lieutenant Colonel Charles V. Jarman's 1st Battal -

ion, 3d Marines took over from BLT 2/4 responsibilit y

for the Dai Do sector. The 1st Battalion made a sweep

through the hamlets of Dinh To and Thuong Do with -

out incident. Companies' G and H of BLT 2/4, whic h

were temporarily under the operational control of Jarman, followed in trace and collected the Marine dead
304 THE DEFINING YEA R

over 600. According to Lieutenant Colonel Weise ,

based on the estimates and counts made by other unit s

around Dai Do, the Marines found 600 bodies in th e

immediate area of the battle and another 500 to 60 0

in the extended battle area. Admitting that "body

count figures are always suspect, " Weise, nevertheless

argued that even if one " cut these figures in half fo r

inflation, you're talking about the equivalent of two

enemy regiments that were decimated in that area. "

Lieutenant Colonel Weise later received the Navy

Cross and Captains Vargas and Livingston were late r

awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions in th e

Dai Do battles. "

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19144 7

Marines of BLT 2/4 board a "Mike" boat (landing craft,

mechanized) for return to their base area in th e

Napoleon/Saline area of operations, after inflicting and sustaining large casualties in the Dai Do village complex.

from the previous day's fighting who could not be

evacuated.* By 1935, on 3 May, Companies G and H

had completed their grisly mission and began to depar t

the Dai Do area . Shortly after 2100, the last elements

of the two companies had returned to the BLT's ol d

command post at Mai Xa Chanh .50

The three-day fight for the Dai Do complex had

been a bloody one for both sides. From 30 April

through 2 May, BLT 2/4 had sustained casualties of 8 1

dead and nearly 300 wounded.** Marine estimates of

the number of enemy dead ranged from nearly 500 t o

*Colonel Charles V. Jarman, whose 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

relieved BLT 2/4, recalled that several of the Marine dead had thei r

hands tied behind their back. It was his belief that these Marines wer e

captured and subsequently executed by the NVA when the battl e

appeared to be going against them. " Col Charles V. Jarman, Comments

on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

**All of the sources basically agree about the number of Marine

dead . The listing of the number of wounded, however, vary from 24 7

mentioned by III MAF to 297 according to Brigadier General Weise .

According to General Weise, his personnel officer gave the figures of 8 1

KIA and 297 wounded and evacuated while he was in the hospital

ward aboard the U .S .S . Iwo Jima ." BGen William Weise (Ret) Itr, dtd

11Mar83 to BGen Edwin H . Simmons (Ret) (Weise Folder, Dai Do).

The End of the First Offensive

While the Dai Do sector may have been the sit e

of the heaviest fighting during this period, the 320th

NVA Division had not limited its efforts only to this

area . Throughout the three-day period, from 3 0

April through 2 May, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marine s

near Cam Phu continued to have sporadic contac t

with scattered units of the enemy division . The 2d

ARVN Regiment also reported continuous actio n

during the night of 1—2 May. Its 1st Battalion sustained 5 dead and 16 wounded in taking Dong La i

to the west of Dai Do and claimed killing 39 of the

North Vietnamese .5 2

To the northeast, the Army's 3d Battalion, 21st

Infantry ran into the most intense combat outside o f

that in Dai Do in the Nhi Ha sector along Jones

Creek. The departure of Company G from the Nhi H a

and the Lam Xuan village complexes on the night of

30 April—1 May, left the entire Jones Creek area ope n

to the North Vietnamese . With the assignment of the

Army battalion of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade to

the operational control of the 3d Marines on th e

evening of 1 May to fill that gap, Colonel Hull

ordered the commander of the 3d Battalion, Arm y

Lieutenant Colonel William P. Snyder, to reenter th e

area the following morning .53

About 0800 on 2 May, the battalion landed in a

helicopter landing zone near Lam Xuan East (locate d

on the eastern bank of Jones Creek and so designate d

to differentiate it from its neighboring hamlet with th e

same name located on the opposite bank about 1,00 0

meters to the northwest). The battalion occupied th e

two Lam Xuans with relative ease, and then moved o n

to Nhi Ha. At this juncture, the North Vietnames e

sprung one of their traps. In close combat, the enem y

killed 9 of the American soldiers and wounded 15 .
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 305

Another four were missing . The Army battalion fel l

back to night positions in Lam Xuan West and calle d

in supporting arms on the enemy in Nhi Ha.

On 3 May, while BLT 2/4 and the 1st Battalion, 3 d

Marines had a relatively quiet time in the Dai Do sec -

tor, the Army battalion again fought a see-saw battl e

with the North Vietnamese in Nhi Ha. After Marine

artillery softened the enemy defenses, the 3d Battalion

launched another attack into Nhi Ha . The troops

recovered the bodies of the four members of the battalion reported missing the night before . About noon,

the enemy struck back with the first of three counterattacks. While repulsing the attacks, the Army unit

fell back to permit Marine air once more to hit the

enemy defenses. The airstrikes were accurate bu t

North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns downed one of the

Chance Vaught F–8 Crusaders, killing the pilot .

Although unable to take Nhi Ha and returning agai n

to their night positions at Lam Xuan West, the Army

battalion sustained relatively light casualties during

the day, 1 dead and 7 wounded while accounting for

67 of the enemy.54

The fighting at Nhi Ha the following day was a repetition of that of the 3d . Once more, Marine air an d

artillery bombarded the enemy in Nhi Ha . At 0936,

the Army troops again attacked, but only to find themselves once more enmeshed in the North Vietnames e

field fortifications and bunkers. The 3d Battalion spen t

another night in defensive positions in Lam Xua n

West. At 0940 on the morning of 5 May, after the

usual air and artillery bombardment, the 3d Battalio n

again moved into the attack . Encountering almost no

resistance, the battalion reported at 1135, "Nhi Ha was

secured." The Army soldiers found 64 North Vietnamese bodies in the hamlet, all killed by supporting

arms. All told, the 3d Battalion suffered 16 dead an d

33 wounded while it estimated that the North Vietnamese lost more than 200 men in the three-day struggle for Nhi Ha.5 5

In the meantime, the fighting had shifted westward . After a short hiatus in the Dai Do area, on the

morning of 5 May, Lieutenant Colonel Jarman's 1st

Battalion, 3d Marines attacked north from Thuong D o

towards Truc Kinh, a distance of 1,200 meters to th e

northwest. The 2d ARVN regiment was to protect the

battalion's western flank. With Companies C and D in

the lead and Company B following in trace, the Marin e

battalion reached its first objective, the hamlet of Som

Soi, about 300 meters southeast of Truc Kinh, encountering only token resistance . Within a short time, however, about 1130, the Marine battalion came under

heavy fire from Truc Kinh and some scattered fire from

the southeast. Calling in artillery and fixed-wing

airstrikes, especially against Truc Kinh, the battalion

fought its way through Som Soi.56

At this point, about 1250 on the 5th, the North

Vietnamese launched a counterattack from Truc Kin h

with Company D on the eastern flank bearing th e

brunt of the assault . Lieutenant Colonel Jarman the n

ordered Company C to swing around to the right t o

contain the enemy attack while Company B screened

the movement. This maneuver, however, exposed th e

battalion's western flank since the 2d ARVN Regiment's attack to the southwest had already stalled and

the South Vietnamese were in no position to support

the Marines. According to Jarman, an aerial observer

radioed him that "500 Charlies were preparing to flank

our position ."57 Colonel Hull, the 3d Marines commander, upon learning of the situation, immediatel y

requested reinforcements. The 3d Division released

Companies I and M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines to th e

operational control of the 3d Marines. Marine helicopters brought the two companies into a landing zon e

near Thuong Do . Despite the loss of one helicopter, th e

two 4th Marines companies quickly advanced to th e

northwest to provide protection for Jarman's wester n

flank. After consolidating his positions in a defensive

perimeter established by Companies I and M in a tre e

line, about 1,000 meters to the south of Truc Kinh,

Lieutenant Colonel Jarman described the situatio n

"relatively routine " as Marine air and artillery continued to pound the enemy.58 About 1800, the North

Vietnamese broke contact .

On the morning of the 6th, Companies C and D

again reoccupied Soi Son without meeting any resistance . While Company D provided protective fire ,

Company C then advanced upon Truc Kinh . By 1400

that afternoon, the 1st Battalion had secured the latter hamlet . Most of the North Vietnamese had fled

except for the dead from the previous fighting, and

three NVA soldiers who surrendered to the Marines.

In the two-day action for Truc Kinh, the Marine s

reported 173 of the enemy dead, captured 3 prisoners, and recovered 75 rifles and 19 crew-served

weapons. The Marines sustained casualties of 15 dea d

and 71 wounded. While Lieutenant Colonel Jarman's comman d

enjoyed a relatively uneventful day on the 6th, abou t

five miles to the northeast, the U .S . Army 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry's Nhi Ha sector again became

active . The North Vietnamese ambushed the battalion's Company A which was conducting a sweep
306 THE DEFINING YEAR

northwest of Nhi Ha. Before the Army unit could disengage under cover of air and artillery support and

return to Nhi Ha, it lost 5 men dead and 17 wounded. Company A reported another 14 soldiers missing .

Two of the missing returned to the company's lines

that evening, and the battalion recovered the bodies o f

11 of the others. One soldier remained on the rolls as

missing in action.5 9

With the continuing contact with elements o f

the 320th by the Army battalion in the Nhi Ha are a

and by the ARVN 2d Regiment, whose 4th Battalion on the 6th engaged a North Vietnamese uni t

just east of Route 1, Major General Tompkins

decided to insert the two-battalion 2d Brigade of

the 1st Air Cavalry Division into the fight to exploi t

the situation. Earlier he had asked General Rosso n

for and received permission to redeploy the brigad e

if needed from the Scotland II area of operation s

near Khe Sanh into the Dong Ha sector. With few

other reserves available to him, the Air Cavalry

brigade provided Tompkins, not only additional

troops, but a force, with sufficient helicopters, "ideally configured for operations against a retreatin g

enemy force operating in small formations" and t o

"patrol large areas effectively and move forces quickly to exploit sightings and contacts."60

At 1715 on 6 May, the first battalion of th e

brigade, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, under Lieu -

tenant Colonel C. E. Jordan, landed in a landing zon e

about 3,000 meters east of the 1st Battalion, 3 d

Marines in Truc Kinh . Temporarily, General Tompkins placed the Cavalry battalion under the operational control of Colonel Hull of the 3d Marines. From

7–8 May, the 1st Cavalry battalion made a careful

sweep northwest toward the Marine battalion. At Tru c

Kinh, Lieutenant Colonel Jarman's Marines continued

to patrol, finding a few more enemy dead and capturing three more prisoners . On the morning of the 9th,

the 2d Brigade of the Air Cavalry under Army Colone l

Robert N. McKinnon, with the 2d Battalion, 5th

Cavalry, arrived and took over the sector . The 3d

Marines relinquished operational control of the 1st

Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and Lieutenant Colonel Jarman's battalion returned to its former operational area

south of the Cua Viet River.6 1

On the morning of the 9th, the 2d Brigade then

began Operation Concordia Square in an area of operations carved out of that of the 2d ARVN Regiment ,

sandwiched between the ARVN on the west and the

3d Marines in Operation Napoleon/Saline to the east .

Its heaviest action of the operation actually occurred

on that very day. About 5,000 meters southeast of

Gio Linh, about 0800, a North Vietnamese forc e

heavily engaged two companies of the 1st Battalion ,

5th Cavalry, cutting off one and preventing the othe r

from coming to its assistance . The brigade quickly

deployed units of its 2d Battalion into blocking positions north of the action and ordered the remainin g

two companies of the 1st Battalion to relieve th e

embattled companies. In the fast-moving action supported by Marine fixed-wing aircraft and helicopte r

gunships, enemy gunners shot down one UH–1 H

helicopter, the Army version of the Bell "Huey, " and

hit eight others. By 1300, the North Vietnamese ha d

disengaged leaving behind an estimated 80 enem y

dead. The Army troopers sustained casualties of 1 6

dead and 52 wounded .62

Except for scattered action in Concordia Square ,

and one large engagement on 10 May north of Nh i

Ha involving the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, th e

320th Division was no longer engaging the allie d

forces. In the action on the 10th, Company C, 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry in predawn darkness spotte d

about 300 enemy troops moving toward its positions .

The company pulled back all of its night patrols an d

called in continuous illumination and artillery upon

the NVA. The enemy answered with artillery fro m

north of the DMZ and mortars, and then about 060 0

launched a ground assault against the entire battalio n

front . With the support of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter gunships, artillery, and naval gunfire, th e

Army troops broke the back of the enemy attack in a

one-sided battle . By 1500, all enemy resistance had

ended . The 3d Battalion suffered only 1 soldier dead

and 16 wounded . It reported killing 159 of th e

enemy, took 2 prisoners, and recovered 55 rifles an d

18 crew-served weapons .63

After the one assault on Nhi Ha on the 10th, rathe r

than attempting to infiltrate south to close the Cu a

Viet and possibly attack Dong Ha, the 320th was now

breaking into small groups who were trying their best

to make their way north into the Demilitarized Zone.

Operation Concordia Square ended on 17 May. From

9–17 May, the 2d Air Cavalry Brigade reported enem y

casualties of 349 dead while sustaining 28 killed and

117 wounded . Both the Air Cavalry Brigade and the

Americal's 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry returned t o

their base camp at Camp Evans. The enemy offensive

had petered out. 64

With what appeared to be the end of the "most

awesome battle by the standards of the Vietnames e

War," General Tompkins asked his operations staff to
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 30 7

Photo courtesy of Col Francis I . Fenton, USMC (Ret )

U.S. Army LtGen William B . Rosson, CG Prov Corps, officiates at a 3d Marine Division change

of command ceremony. Standing behind Rosson is MajGen Raymond G . Davis, left, who is relieving MajGen Rathvon McC . Tompkins, right, as the commanding general of the division .

come up with a statistical summary of the action

since 30 April. According to the division account, in

an 18-day period, the allies killed over 2,100 of th e

enemy (including 221 by air). Perhaps more reliable

and indicative figures were the 41 prisoners capture d

by the allies and the recovery of more than 500 enemy

weapons including 132 crew-served weapons . The

cost, however, had been high . In the fighting, the

Army and Marine units under the operational contro l

of the 3d Marine Division suffered losses of 23 3

killed, over 800 wounded, and 1 missing soldier fro m

the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. Task Force Clearwater took casualties of 15 dead and 22 wounded, whil e

the ARVN lost 42 dead and 124 wounded . With the

extensive bloodletting, Major General Tompkins

"had good reason to believe . . . that the 320th NVA

Division would not pose a serious threat to the allie d

positions along the DMZ for some time to come . "

General Tompkins also had received word that he wa s

about to relinquish his command .65

The Second Offensive

Contrary to General Tompkins' expectations, th e

320th was to come south again and the results were

to be much the same, but even more one-sided the n

the previous attempt . Within the brief interlude

between the two enemy thrusts, the enemy had been

relatively quiescent except for an artillery attack o n

the 3d Marine Division base area at Dong Ha . On 14

May, a North Vietnamese artillery barrage explode d

there about 110 tons of ammunition, killing 1

Marine and wounding 15 . The division's Kentucky

and Napoleon/Saline sectors, however, remained relatively inactive through 21 May. 6 6

On 21 May, there was a sort of a musical chairs shift

throughout the Marine Corps Vietnam comman d

structure . Major General William J . Van Ryzin, the

III MAF Deputy Commander, received a promotio n

to lieutenant general and became the Chief of Staff t o

the Commandant at Headquarters, Marine Corps in
308 THE DEFINING YEA R

Washington.* Since Major General Tompkins was the

next senior Marine ranking officer in country, Lieu -

tenant General Cushman, the III MAF commander,

selected Tompkins to become his new deputy. With

the concurrence of the Commandant, General Chap -

man, Cushman appointed Marine Major General Raymond G. Davis, the deputy commander of Prov

Corps, to take Tompkins place as commander of the

3d Marine Division .

On 21 May, in a brief change of command ceremony at Dong Ha, Major General Davis, a native o f

Georgia and holder of the Medal of Honor from the

Korean War, assumed command of the 3d Marine

Division . From his former vantage point at Pro v

Corps, Davis had become impressed with the airmobile tactics of the 1st Air Cavalry Division durin g

Operation Pegasus. As one Army officer remembered, the senior members of Rosson 's Prov Corps

staff would "take turns having dinner with him every

night in the headquarters mess, giving him our ideas

on mobile warfare, and during the day we flew

around with him." Davis was well aware of the purposes of the attentions of the Prov Corps staff. As he

declared later, he had known the Prov Corps commander for some time and when Davis arrived at Prov

Corps headquarters, Rosson began "orienting me

towards . . . the effectiveness of forces [an euphemism

for the airmobile tactics] ." Davis believed that the 3 d

Marine Division had become tied down to its fixe d

positions and too defense-minded . As he confided t o

Marine Brigadier General John R. Chaisson on Westmoreland's staff, it was his opinion that the 3d Division earlier in May at Dai Do and afterwards had

"missed a great opportunity" and allowed the Nort h

Vietnamese to "get away."67* *

*General Van Ryzin lacer recalled that he received a telephone cal l

from General Chapman, the Commandant, who had already spoken t o

General Cushman . The Commandant told Van Ryzin that "I'm goin g

to ask you to come back as my Chief of Staff. I'm going to give you

exactly two hours to say yes or no ." General Van Ryzin talked the matter over with General Cushman who told him that, " I was stupid if I

didn ' t take it . " Van Ryzin accepted the position . LtGen William J. Va n

Ryzin intvw, 2Apr75, p . 218 (Oral HistColl, MCHC). In his comments, General Van Ryzin observed that he " was still becoming

acquainted with the situation [in Vietnam] when I returned to th e

U .S ." LtGen William J. Van Ryzin, Comments on draft, n .d . [Oct94 ]

(Vietnam Comment File) .

**General Rosson years later observed : "Unhappily, a substantia l

portion of the 320th was able to elude us, reorganize and return in a

matter of days. General Davis, who had followed the action as my

Deputy, harbored the view that the 320th should have been destroyed

south of the DMZ ." Gen William B . Rosson, Comments on draft, dui

27Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File).

General Davis was to have his "opportunity" almost

as soon as he took over the 3d Marine Division . The

320th NVA had once more left the sanctuary of th e

DMZ and entered Quang Tri Province . As Davis late r

stated, "It was gone just nine days and came back to

welcome me the night I took command . . . . "

Although not expecting the enemy division to mak e

another foray so soon after the first, this time th e

Marines were ready for the 320th.68

In what the 3d Marine Division listed as the first

phase of the new offensive, the North Vietnamese divi -

sion moved into the Operation Kentucky Leathernec k

Square sector northwest of Dong Ha halfway betwee n

Con Thien and Gio Linh . This sector had been somewhat quiet since 8 May when the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines had overrun an NVA regimental headquarters,

but had sustained heavy casualties during an enemy

artillery bombardment. ®9 During this lull, Captai n

Matthew G. McTiernan assumed command of Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. He recalled that the

Marine battalions during this period would shift

boundaries between A—3 and Con Thien to confuse th e

North Vietnamese who had the tendency of working

the unit boundary lines. On the morning of 22 May,

his company had the mission of establishing "a series of

ambushes along the old AO [area of operations] line . "

The company left the perimeter about 0400 that

morning with his 3d Platoon in the lead. Just southwest of the A—3 Strong Point, the company encountered what it first thought was a small enemy patrol .

The Marines soon realized that the enemy was in a t

least company strength and called for reinforcements .

McTiernan then asked for air support and received heli -

copter gunship support "which proved too much fo r

the NVA." According to the Marine captain, the

enemy had been on the move, had no prepared positions, and were easy targets for air : "We had caught th e

NVA unit cold."7°

In the meantime, a Company A, 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines patrol ran into another enemy force just east o f

Con Thien . Given the intensity of the enemy resistance

supported by artillery, Colonel Richard B . Smith, th e

9th Marines commander, assumed that the Nort h

Vietnamese had infiltrated possibly a battalion if not a

larger force into his sector. While the 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines reinforced from A—3 and the 1st Battalion ,

4th Marines attacked east from Con Thien, Smit h

attempted to exploit the contact. He asked General

Davis for and received operational control from the 4t h

Marines of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Marine helicopters landed the battalion into blocking positions to
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 309

the south of the contact. At the same time, Colonel

Smith ordered the helicopter lift of his 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines into other blocking positions to the north .

During the next two days while the enemy sough t

to disengage, the 9th Marines with 12 companies

attempted to place a cordon around the NVA forces . When either of the two assault battalions, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines or the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines ,

found itself in too close to an action, "the unit involved

backed off and assaulted the NVA with massive sup -

porting arms. " According to a 9th Marines account :

"On one occasion, the encircled enemy attempted t o

escape across the trace; however, artillery . . ., gunships,

fixed wing and tanks were brought to bear . . . with

devastating effect. " By noon on the 24th, the fight was

over in the 9th Marines sector. Since the morning o f

the 22d, the Marines had sustained about 100 casualties, 23 dead and 75 wounded and evacuated, but had

reported killing 225 of the North Vietnamese and captured 3 prisoners.7 1

On 25 May, the flats above Dong Ha in both the 2d

ARVN regimental sector and the Napoleon/Saline area

again became the centers of action . That morning

Company E, BLT 2/4 encountered an NVA force i n

about battalion strength near Nhi Ha, while the

ARVN about 2,000 meters above Dong Ha ran into a

similarly sized force . Once more the Marines rapidl y

reinforced both over land and by helicopter-borne

forces. In the Nhi Ha sector, Colonel Hull, the 3 d

Marines commander, ordered the helilift of Compan y

H BLT 2/4 into blocking positions to the south while

Company E attacked the hamlet from the north unde r

a rolling barrage . In fighting that lasted all day, the two

Marine companies together with supporting artillery

and air reported killing 238 of the enemy. Marine casualties were also heavy, 18 dead and 33 wounded and

evacuated. To the southwest, the 2d ARVN Regimen t

in their contact, near Thuong Nghia, just west of th e

former Dai Do perimeter, repulsed the enemy attack ,

and claimed killing 122 of the enemy.7 2

On the 26th, concerned that the North Vietnames e

320th was again attempting to cut the Cua Viet or eve n

strike at Dong Ha itself, General Davis attempted t o

cordon off the North Vietnamese units. He ordered the

helilift of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 9th Marines int o

blocking positions west of Nhi Ha and placed the tw o

battalions under the operational control of the 3 d

Marines. At the same time, he ordered Colonel Smith ,

the 9th Marines commander, to move the 3d Battalion ,

3d Marines and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines overlan d

to exploit the ARVN contact near Thuong Nghia .73

In the southern cordon on the 26th, the two

Marine battalions, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and

3d Battalion, 9th Marines, formed blocking positions about 3,000 meters north of Thuong Nghia.

The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, in the vicinity o f

Truc Kinh, twice encountered resistance from Nort h

Vietnamese in entrenched defenses. In the first clash,

about 1300, the battalion ran into a force of abou t

100 enemy troops. After first contact, the Marines

pulled back "to allow heavy pounding of enem y

positions by air and artillery." The battalion sustained casualties of 10 Marines dead and 12 wounded. At the same time, it captured 5 prisoners and

reported killing 56 of the enemy.74

In the second action later that afternoon, abou t

1630, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines outsid e

of Truc Kinh came under intensive small arms and

automatic weapons fire . Tanks attached to the infantry

attempted to reinforce the company, but became

bogged down in the rice paddies. An aerial observer

called in close air support so that the company could

withdraw before last light . Captain McTiernan, whose

Company I protected Company K's left flank, recalled

that during this action, his troops "saw a long colum n

of troops moving out of a small hamlet located 20 0

yards to our left front ." Apparently the enemy was

attempting to reinforce their units engaging Company

K. With assurances that the column was NVA, Company I opened fire with devastating effect in what Cap -

tain McTiernan described "as target practice . . . In the

course of ten or fifteen minutes the entire column was

destroyed." Still the 3d Battalion had not gon e

unscathed, Company K sustained 23 wounded an d

reported 5 missing in action . During the same day, th e

ARVN about a 1,000 meters to the north of Thuong

Nghia claimed to have killed 110 of the enemy whil e

suffering casualties of 2 dead and 7 wounded 7 5

On the 27th, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, reinforced by the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, took its objectives, meeting only scattered enemy resistance . In Tru c

Kinh, the Marines recovered the bodies of the five me n

from Company K reported missing the day before .

Throughout the day, the Marine units in the southern

cordon killed about 28 of the enemy while sustainin g

only four wounded. For the next two days, the Marine s

in the two battalions together with the ARVN maintained the cordon subjecting the North Vietnamese

units between them to "massive fixed-wing and general support ordnance . . . ." Finally on the 30th, enemy

resistance broke and the two battalions "swept throug h

the area," taking 18 prisoners and recovering 23
310 THE DEFINING YEA R

weapons. For the days of the cordon, 26–30 May, the

9th Marines reported that the two battalions killed a

total of 161 of the enemy, captured 26 prisoners, an d

retrieved over 100 enemy weapons, including 29 crew -

served weapons. Marine casualties were also heavy, 4 1

dead and 119 wounded . The ARVN during their participation in the southern cordon operation claimed t o

have killed 384 of the enemy and sustained 19 killed

and 45 wounded. 7 6

During the same period, the 3d Marines in th e

northern cordon sector around Nhi Ha encircled a

North Vietnamese battalion in the hamlet of Lai An,

about 2,500 meters northwest of Nhi Ha . While BLT

2/4 and the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines establishe d

blocking positions, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines rein -

forced by the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines attacked Lai

An. Using 11 companies to form the cordon, the 3d

Marines finally secured the hamlet on 30 May. Again

the price was high . In the taking of Lai An, the Marine s

sustained casualties of over 20 dead and 200 wounded .

From 27–30 May, the 3d Marines reported the finding

of 90 bodies and the capture of 8 prisoners in the figh t

for Lai An.7 7

The "second" battle for Dong Ha was over. Once

more the 320th NVA Division had taken heavy casual -

ties and retreated north of the DMZ. In the two phases of the second offensive, the 3d Marine Divisio n

reported killing over 770 of the enemy. Combined

with the number estimated killed by the ARVN, the

enemy division would have lost more than 1,000 dea d

from the period 22 May to the end of the month, no t

including the 61 prisoners captured by the allies.

Allied casualties including 112 dead totaled 558 .78

Thus in the two offensives mounted by the 320th

NVA Division, the North Vietnamese had lost ove r

3,000 troops. While American casualties had been

heavy, their total of dead and wounded was about half

of the reported number of North Vietnamese killed. What was even more apparent was that the second

offensive was even more futile than the first. While

the North Vietnamese may have sustained fewer casualties in the second offensive, they also fought muc h

less effectively. According to the 3d Marines, th e

enemy troops in the later encounters showed poore r

discipline and while well-equipped were less experienced and more willing to surrender. General Davis

related that one captured North Vietnamese sergean t

stated . that of the 90 men in his company, 62 were

new. One frightened enemy soldier captured near Lai

An told the Marines that his unit lost 200 out of 300

men since crossing the Ben Hai River. In any event,

the 320th remained out of action in the DMZ war for

the next two months. 7 9

In many respects, questions still remain about th e

intent of the enemy. Obviously, the thrust of the 320th

was part of the overall NVA so-called "mini-Tet offensive " that the enemy attempted in May to initiat e

country-wide, a somewhat "poor man's imitation" o f

the January-February Tet offensive . More than the earlier offensive, except for increased fighting in the capital city of Saigon, the North Vietnamese May offensiv e

was largely limited to attacks by fire at allied bases an d

acts of terrorism in the hamlets and villages . In I Corps,

while the North Vietnamese may have attempted to

cut the Cua Viet, they did not or were not able thi s

time to coordinate that attempt with attacks against

the major cities of Quang Tri, Hue, and Da Nang .

Moreover, the 320th apparently mistakenly fired earl y

upon the shipping on the Cua Viet, giving away it s

presence and triggering the Marine response, before al l

of its units were in position . After once engaged, while

showing tenacity, the North Vietnamese divisio n

revealed little imagination and an inability to counte r

the American advantages in manpower, equipment ,

and supporting arms.

For its part, the 3d Marine Division made severa l

changes in the way it was fighting the DMZ war.

Immediately upon taking command of the division ,

General Davis issued a directive to reduce the number of units manning the strongpoints. In Davis'

words, "battalion positions . . . immediately . . .

[became) company positions. " For example, in the

9th Marines sector, one battalion was responsible fo r

all the strongpoints with one company positioned at

each. The other three battalions were "'swing' units "

to reinforce a developing battle using helicopter

assault and cordon tactics.80

Some controversy has arisen over the question abou t

the 3d Marine Division tactics in the earlier offensive .

If the division had used more mobile operations an d

attempted to reinforce Lieutenant Colonel Weise's BLT

2/4 at Dai Do would it have destroyed or trapped more

of the 320th? This is one of the questions that may

never be answered and it is of course much easier to

answer with hindsight after the event . In all fairness to

Major General Tompkins and his staff, his attentio n

and that of his command had been directed toward s

Khe Sanh since the beginning of the year. He had

inherited the barrier and Dyemarker situation from his

predecessor and was under constant MACV pressure t o

maintain and man these defenses. Even if Dyemarker

and Khe Sanh were not factors, General Tompkins at
THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA 31 1

the same time as Dai Do had good reason to believe

that the attacks on Nhi Ha to the northeast and at Cam

Phu to the southwest may have been the main effort of

the 320th. With the beginning of the drawdown o f

forces from the Scotland area of operations, General

Davis had more freedom of action to implement a more

mobile concept in the 3d Marine Division sector, a

strategy that the Marines had recommended in the

DMZ area since late 1966 and early 1967 . At that

time, instead of the barrier, the Marines had recommended "a mobile defense by an adequate force—sa y

one division give or take a battalion . . . ." Different circumstances provided different opportunities.81 *

*Many of the reviewers of this chapter still had strong opinion s

about the differences between the earlier and later tactics of the division . Captain McTiernan, for example, wrote that, the decisive chang e

in tactics initiated by General Davis" was the most important factor i n

the defeat of the NVA offensive. Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n .d . [Jan 1995) (Vietnam Comment File) . Colonel Max

McQuown argued that prior to Davis assuming command there wer e

"a myriad of static defensive positions of little tactical value . These

positions and the rigid control the Division exercised over every combat unit, fragmented battalions, reduced their combat capability, and

severely limited their freedom of action . Thus, after soundly defeating

the NVA 'Tec' offensive the initiative passed to the NVA by default i n

the 3d Marine Division TAOR." McQuown Comments. On the othe r

hand, Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, who served on the division staff and

as a regimental commander later under General Davis, observed tha t

although members of the division "knew very well that we were no t

mobile, that we were not carrying the war to the enemy . . ., General

Tompkins did what he could to change the status quo ." He blamed

Tompkins' problems, in part, on the factor that the 3d Marine Divisio n

commander could not obtain enough helicopters from the 1st Marin e

Aircraft Wing . Col Vaughn R. Stuart, Comments on draft, did

20Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). See the discussion in Chapter 2 5

on this last subject. Colonel William M. Cryan, who was the 3d Marin e

Division G—3 under General Davis, agreed that the division "wa s

stymied by Dyemarker and fixed bases . . .," and credits General Davis

for getting "the division moving ." Col William M. Cryan, Comments

on draft, 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) . Colonel William H . Dabney, who served on the division staff under both Generals Tompkin s

and Davis, agreed with the statement in the text that "different circumstances provided different opportunities ." He also declared that

intelligence "was far from perfect the first time around, and that General Davis had the benefit of General Tompkins' experience for the sec -

ond round ." Dabney concluded, however, that the "difference in style "

[emphasis in the original) between Davis and Tompkins may also hav e

affected the outcome of Round II. " Col William H . Dabney, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 1 6

Khe Sanh: Final Operations and Evacuation

16 April—11 July 1968

To Stay or Not to Stay—The "Walking Dead"—Operation Scotland 11—Operation Robi n

Razing Khe Sanh : Operation Charlie

To Stay or Not to Stay

General Westmoreland originally had ordered the

defense of Khe Sanh as a block to enemy infiltratio n

along Route 9 and as a possible " jump-off point" for a

planned invasion of Laos .' By the end of the siege, th e

Paris negotiations with the North Vietnamese ha d

ended all thoughts of expanding the war into Laos . With the increased availability of additional mobil e

forces following the defeat of the enemy's Tet offensive, Westmoreland faced an entirely new tactical situation. As he recorded later:

It was clear . . . that the base had outlived its usefulness. We now had the troops and helicopters to control th e

area, . . . and we had the logistics and a secure forward bas e

at Ca Lu to support these operations. 2

In light of these new developments, Lieutenan t

General Cushman, the III MAF commander, an d

Army Lieutenant General William B . Rosson, th e

Provisional Corps commander, pressed for the evacuation of Khe Sanh immediately. According to General

Rosson, he had prepared a plan which General Cushman had endorsed and that he thought had the tacit

approval of General Westmoreland . Rosson had proposed the immediate redeployment of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to operation Delaware, and the "progressive deployment eastward" of the 3d Marine Divisio n

units. As he recalled, he talked personally by telephone with Westmoreland and told the MACV commander that the Marine and ARVN units woul d

remain at Khe Sanh only to ensure security for the

"removal of supplies" during the proposed "inactivation of the base ." In Rosson's opinion, "General Westmoreland understood the plan that General Cushma n

and I had agreed upon," and offered no objection .3

On 15 April, this understanding, if there was suc h

an understanding, fell apart at a commander's conference that General Rosson hosted at his headquarters

at Phu Bai. Rosson had called the meeting whic h

originally was to include the 3d Marine Division an d

1st Air Cavalry Division commanders and various

staff members "to finalize the plan and issue orders . "

As a courtesy, Rosson invited his immediate superior,

General Cushman, who in turn had invited Genera l

Westmoreland . The Provisional Corps commande r

remembered that he had just finished outlining th e

concept and had asked for comments when : "Genera l

Westmoreland—to Cushman's and my own surprise

and embarrassment—stated that Pegasus would no t

be terminated . " While permitting the greater part o f

the 1st Air Cavalry Division to redeploy to Operation

Delaware, one brigade of the Air Cavalry and Marine

and ARVN units would continue " to comb the area "

using Khe Sanh as their base of operations. Any decision to curtail "these activities, " dismantle the base ,

or redeploy the remaining forces "would await furthe r

developments. " General Westmoreland later woul d

say that he basically agreed with Rosson's plan, "bu t

not its timing." General Rosson remained puzzled:

"In essence, I either misunderstood General Westmoreland's approval, or he had second thoughts . . . . Why he did not communicate his disagreement to us

prior to the conference continues to perplex me . " In

any event, while Operation Pegasus did officially en d

on 15 April, U.S . units would continue to operate i n

and around Khe Sanh, for the time being, under the

operational name of Scotland II . 4 * *

**Like the meeting on 8 March (See Chapters 8 and 14) the participant s

had different interpretations about General Westmoreland's demeanor at th e

April meeting. According to Marine Brigadier General John R . Chaisson,

who headed the MACV Combat Operations Center, when General Westmoreland learned that General Cushman, the III MAF commander, and

General Rosson, the Prov Corps commander, planned to evacuate the base ,

"Westy lowered the boom . He was so mad he wouldn't stay around and tal k

with them. Instead he told me what he wanted and left me to push it wit h

Rosson and Cushman ." BGen Chaisson ter to Mrs . Chaisson, dcd 17Apr68

as quoted in Ronald H. Spector, After Tet, The Bloodier/ Year in Vietnam (N .Y. ,

N.Y.: The Free Press, 1993), p. 129 . On the other hand, General Rosson

wrote: "General Westmoreland certainly did not 'lower the boom' on me

when he learned of the plan during our telephone conference . Nor did he do

so during the commanders conference. While he was incisively firm i n

expressing himself on that occasion, he did not exhibit anger . Moreover, h e

remained after the conference for a short time to converse informally wit h

various commanders, key staff officers, Cushman and myself. I frankly do not

remember John's [Chaisson) remaining to 'push it with Rosson and Cushman .– According to Rosson, he rather recalled "resuming the conferenc e

after General Westmoreland's departure to forge a new course of action and

revise the orders." Gen William B. Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, dtd

29May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rosson Comments, May95 .

312
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 31 3

The "Walking Dead"

When the 3d Marine Division once more pre -

pared to assume control of operations at Khe San h

with the end of Operation Pegasus, General

Tompkins, the 3d Marine Division commander

had sent his Assistant Division Commander,

Brigadier General Jacob E . Glick, to comman d

the forces there . General Glick several years late r

remembered that his orders were to "close the bas e

down. . . . I went up with a minimum staff with

instructions to just hold on, without mounting

operations . . . Then the rules changed" after General Westmoreland reversed the original decision . 5

Glick's command, not surprisingly, was designated Task Force (TF) Glick and included the 1s t

Marines; the 26th Marines; the 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines; and the 2d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, which was operating east of Khe

Sanh . The 1st Marines began relocating to Kh e

Sanh from Ca Lu, relieving battalions of the 26t h

Marines, which, in turn, started to redeploy ou t

of the Khe Sanh sector. On 16 April, Colonel

Bruce F. Meyers, the 26th Marines commander,

still had one artillery and five infantry battalions

under his control and was also responsible fo r

Operation Scotland II, which had just begun .

Meyers reported directly to General Glick and

oversaw the relief of his battalions by those of th e

1st Marines . Lieutenant Colonel John J . H .

Cahill's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines remained a t

the base as part of TF Glick and continued offensive operations west of the combat base .

At 0700 on 16 April, Captain Henry D. Banks

led two reinforced platoons of Company A, 1s t

Battalion, 9th Marines on a patrol southwest o f

the battalion's perimeter on Hill 689 and a smal l

adjoining hill. Banks ordered the company to hal t

at 1000 and sent two squads to search for signs o f

the enemy on a nearby ridge that was covered

with four-to-six-foot-high elephant grass . The

squad came under small arms and mortar fire ,

then fell back and reported two Marines killed . *

Banks deployed the company with the 1st Platoon establishing a base of fire and the 2d Platoo n

*Colonel Meyers recalled that the action actually began when a

Marine fire team about 1030 or 1100 " ran into a reverse slope horseshoe shaped NVA bunker complex ." In this contact one of the members of the team was killed and two others wounded as "they creste d

the ridge . " Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dtd 20Feb9 5

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyers Comments .

attacking up the ridge against what he believed

to be the enemy's left flank . ?

First Lieutenant Michael P. Hayden led the 2d

Platoon up the north end of the ridge and agains t

the enemy position, but the North Vietnamese ,

firing from well-concealed bunkers, drove th e

Marines to the ground . In rapid succession, first

Hayden and then his platoon sergeant wer e

killed. The 2d Platoon halted in the deep grass a t

the fringe of the North Vietnamese bunker complex and returned fire, but with little effect .

Captain Banks ordered the 2d Platoon to fall

back so that he could call for supporting arms,

but word reached him that dead and wounde d

Marines still lay within 10 meters of the bunke r

complex, under the enemy's guns . The intens e

enemy fire continued and casualties mounted t o

10 dead and 20 wounded .* Banks reported to

Lieutenant Colonel Cahill that he was engage d

with an estimated North Vietnamese squad i n

heavily fortified positions, then refused Cahill's

offer of help . He again tried to evacuate casualties

and withdraw, but was unable to do so . Cahill

alerted Companies C and D . 9

At noon, Banks reconsidered and asked fo r

help. Two platoons of Captain Lawrence Himmer's Company C moved out first, with Lieu -

tenant Colonel Cahill accompanying them . On

reaching the scene of the action, Cahill found

Company A on the north end of the ridge, with

heavy casualties and unable to move . He ordered

Himmer to attack from the south. Colonel Meyers, monitoring the radio reports from the regimental command post, asked Cahill if he neede d

help, but like Banks earlier, Cahill refused .19* *

**Colonel Meyers noted that there were problems with messag e

transmission . Lieutenant Colonel Cahill at 1320 had informed Colone l

Meyers that he was committing his two other companies to the action .

Because of the necessity of the various radio relays, Meyers did no t

receive this message until 1543 . Within two minutes of receiving thi s

message, Meyers contacted Cahill to " request his current status and to

ask if he needed any additional assistance . Cahill . . . declined the proffered additional support ." Colonel Meyers also had more than th e

predicament of Company A on his mind . He recalled that on 16 April ,

"we received three direct hits of 122mm rockets which set the AS P

[ammunition supply point] three on fire . " Meyers observed that ,

" when you are the regimental commander and one of your main amm o

dumps within your perimeter is hit, burning, and blowing up, i t

became more than a line entry in the command chronology! " Meyers

Comments and Copy of Statement of Col Bruce F. Meyers to Board for

Correction of Naval and Military Records, n .d . [1968], attached to

Meyers Comments, hereafter Meyers Statement, Meyers Comments.
314 THE DEFINING YEA R

Company C deployed on line and advance d

up the ridge against what appeared to be the

enemy 's right flank . As the Marines approache d

the bunkers, enemy fire broke out from anothe r

hidden fortified position on their left flank.

Within moments, Himmer, both platoon commanders, a platoon sergeant, and several squa d

leaders fell with wounds. The acting company

executive officer, First Lieutenant William C.

Connelly, assumed command . An artillery fire

mission on the bunker complex to the company's left resulted in friendly fire impactin g

within 50 meters of the Marines, so the artillery

forward observer ended the mission .1 1

At 1500, Companies A and C were both i n

desperate straits. Casualties were high, including many unit leaders, and the Marines wer e

nearly immobilized in the elephant grass by th e

intense enemy fire from two mutually supporting bunker complexes and from nearby mortars

which steadily pounded the slopes of the ridge .

Nearby, Company D was helping Company A t o

evacuate the wounded who had been able t o

crawl away. Cahill moved toward the LZ, suffering three wounds along the way, and ordere d

Captain John W. Cargile's Company D to

deploy along Company A's right flank, the n

attack across the ridge from northwest to southeast.1 2

Heavy casualties had by now rendered Company A ineffective, and Captain Banks was concentrating on attempts to evacuate casualties as

Company D began its attack . Cargile's me n

advanced through the grass, receiving heav y

and accurate sniper fire which dropped fou r

Marines with single shots to the head. The dee p

grass and the profusion of units and individual s

on the hill firing weapons left Cargile's me n

uncertain of the enemy's exact location and dispositions . Although Company D continued t o

move forward, progress was painfully slow an d

casualties mounted .1 3

At about 1730, Banks was seriously wounded and Second Lieutenant Francis B . Lovely, Jr. ,

assumed command of Company A . Cahil l

learned by radio of increasing casualties i n

Company D and ordered his companies to evacuate their wounded and withdraw, leaving thei r

dead . Having assumed command of the battalion in the field only two weeks before, Cahil l

was not aware of General Tompkins' standing

orders emphasizing that all KIAs should b e

evacuated . 14 '

It was 0300 before the last company closed o n

the battalion perimeter, and another hour before a

casualty count reached Cahill showing 20 kille d

and 20 missing. The battalion continued taking

musters and comparing statements of participant s

which soon reduced the number of missing to 15 . 1 5

At 0630 on the morning of the 17th, severa l

Marines heard the voice of Corporal Hubert H .

Hunnicutt III, calling across the valley from th e

ridge where the battle had taken place . Two

squads moved into the valley and shouted bac k

to him, attempting to pinpoint his location .

After hearing two shots near where they though t

Hunnicutt was located, the patrol no longe r

heard his voice .1 6

A few hours later, after Cahill had presente d

Meyers and General Glick his plan to recover th e

bodies on 19 April, an air observer (AO) reporte d

seeing a live Marine about 50 meters from the

enemy bunkers. Volunteers from the battalio n

boarded two Boeing CH—46 Sea Knight helicopters for a rescue attempt . One helicopter held a

fire team and the other a body recovery detail . When the first helicopter landed atop the ridge, it

crushed an enemy soldier with the tail ramp and

the fire team ran out shooting . Four North Vietnamese who popped up from fighting holes fel l

dead immediately. Others surrounding the landing zone poured fire into the helicopter as th e

Marines quickly searched for the survivor. Finding

only dead bodies which had been decapitated an d

disemboweled, the fire team ran back on board th e

badly shot up CH—46, which flew 1,000 meters

back to Hill 689, then crash landed with about 2 0

hits in the engine . An AO watching the rescue

attempt reported that the search party had missed

the live Marine who could still be seen waving

*Several years later, General Glick declared that the division policy on recovery of MIAs and KIAs was, to my mind, not clearl y

defined, because in the previous months that I had been there, ther e

had been a general understanding that the forces should not risk additional deaths and casualties unnecessarily to recover KIAs, but that al l

reasonable effort should be made to recover MIAs. . . . yes, we always

recovered KIAs if we could . But, it definitely was considered not righ t

to go into high-risk areas if it was a known KIA . . . . If the person

might still be alive, then it would justify to take some risks with othe r

Marines." The general stated that Colonel Meyers of the 26th Marine s

"was fairly cautious about ground operations to recover people tha t

were probably KIAs." BGen Jacob E. Glick intvw, 20 Jun and

11Ju189, pp. 10—11 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 31 5

from a shell hole only meters from where the helicopter had landed .17 *

Shortly after the failed rescue attempt, an Arm y

helicopter pilot using the call sign "Blue Max 48"

volunteered to make another try. With Army helicopter gunships blasting enemy positions atop th e

ridge, Blue Max 48 sat down near the bunker complex and a crewman leaped out and carried the

wounded Marine on board. The helicopter then

delivered him directly to the field hospital. Lieutenant Colonel Cahill logically assumed that the

Marine who was rescued was the same Marine, Hunnicutt, who had called across the valley earlier in th e

day. Only later would he learn that the rescue d

Marine was not Hunnicutt, but a member of Company C named Private First Class G . Panyaninec .L 8

Certain that no live Marines remained on the ridge ,

Cahill and his staff set to work once more on a plan t o

recover the remains of those killed in the engagement

of the 16th. Attack aircraft bombed the objective

through the night of 17 April and the early mornin g

hours of the 18th . But at about 0630, 18 April,

Marines on the battalion perimeter once again reported hearing Corporal Hunnicutt calling for help . Lieutenant Colonel Cahill directed that a patrol be dispatched to rescue Hunnicutt and he informed Colone l

Meyers of his plans. Meyers approved, but ordered tha t

the patrol not proceed further than 500 meters fro m

the perimeter because the 26th Marines was schedule d

to pass control of all forces in the area to the 1st

Marines at 0800 and he did not wish to leave in the

middle of an engagement. In the meantime, he offered

to retain control of the operation until the recovery o f

*Colonel Meyers remembered the circumstances of the aborted res -

cue attempt somewhat differently. According to him, the helicopter

landed and the fire team ran out and immediately came under fire . The

helicopter also cook about 20 hits in the engine and fuel compartments .

At that point, the gunners on board the aircraft fired their .50-caliber

machine guns to suppress the enemy fire and the "fire team reboarde d

and the 46 'backed out' from the touch down point and as they did, th e

tail ramp crushed the NVA soldier . . . ." Meyers Comments. Colone l

John E. Hansen, who commanded Provisional MAG 39 which con -

trolled Marine helicopter support in Quang Tri Province, wrote that h e

and Major David L . Althoff, the executive officer of HMM-262, pilot -

ed the aircraft that landed with the fire team . Hansen could not see from

the cockpit either the fighting or the soldier crushed by the tail ramp :

" Our crew chief was in the rear of our helicopter and reporting to us on

our radio internal communications system on the progress of the searc h

. .

." Hansen recalled that as soon as the fire team returned they took

off: " We were fortunate to be able to get back to Hill 689 with the air -

craft still operating. The helicopter was later recovered by a heavy lift

copter and returned to Quang Tri . " Col John E. Hansen, Comments o n

draft, dtd 16Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).

the Marine could be accomplished, but Brigadier General Glick, envisioning that the recovery could take a

day or more, ordered that control of the operation pas s

at 0800, as scheduled . Twenty some years later, General Glick remembered:

I had instructions from the division to go ahead wit h

the relief of the 26th Marines. They had been in Kh e

Sanh for months on end, and General Tompkins wanted

them moved out . The other regiment was on the way ; it

was all set up to go at a certain time . There was a very

questionable situation as to whether sending a patro l

out was going to do anything anyway. So the decision

was made to go ahead with the relief of the 26th

Marines on schedule . l9**

In a repeat of the previous day's performance, a n

Army helicopter pilot agreed to attempt Hunnicutt's

rescue. Corporal Hunnicutt tells the story :

About noon I guess, an Army Huey started flyin g

around me, a spotter plane . The spotter plane dropped

two red smokes on me and scared me to death . I though t

they were going to blow me away. I tried to stand up and

wave to them. I threw paper all over the place and

waved, and one of the copters came right down on m e

about three times. I could see the man 's face, and the n

finally he set down and one of the machine gunners cam e

out and helped me into the plane .20

Lieutenant Colonel Cahill met Hunnicutt at th e

Khe Sanh aid station . To Cahill's astonishment, Hunnicutt claimed that Captain Himmer had still bee n

alive as late as the afternoon of the 17th . Although

wounded himself, Hunnicutt had cared for the severely injured Himmer since the 16th, moving him down

the ridge toward the battalion perimeter until they

became separated when Hunnicutt fell into a gorge.

Himmer was never seen alive again . For his courageous

**According to Colonel Meyers, he was very distressed at the situation . He remembered that General Tompkins denied his request fo r

a delay in the change of operational control between the two Marin e

regiments. Meyers immediately briefed the incoming 1st Marines

commander Colonel Stanley S . Hughes of the situation . Colonel Hughes stated that he would initiate the recovery operation at 0630 despit e

the fact that he was not to assume operational control until 0800 . Mey -

ers stated that as a "control feature" he permitted the patrol to go ou t

500 meters at which point "they would check in with whichever regi -

mental commander had opcon at the time they reached this check -

point . " According to Meyers, the rescue took place before the patrol

ever reached the 500 meter checkpoint, so the entire subject becam e

moot. Meyers Comments. In an earlier statement, Meyers stated tha t

before reaching the 500 meter checkpoint, the patrol saw Hunnicut t

who warned them not to approach since he believed the NVA were

using him as a decoy. The patrol called in gunships which provide d

cover while one of the aircraft rescued him . By this time, Colonel Mey -

ers had been relieved of responsibility for the operation and was on hi s

way to the Quang Tri base. Meyers Statement, Meyers Comments .
316 THE DEFINING YEA R

attempt to save his commanding officer's life, Corpora l

Hunnicutt was awarded the Navy Cross.2 1

In an operation conducted on 22 April, the 1st Marine s

recovered all but three of the bodies.* The final casualty

count totalled 38 Marines and 3 Navy corpsmen killed in

action and 32 Marines wounded, almost half of them seri -

ously. But the story did not end there. General Tompkins

appointed Colonel Walter H. Cuenin to investigate the

operation and its aftermath . In reviewing the report of this

investigation, General Tompkins noted " inexcusable" fail -

ures in reporting to division headquarters, as well a s

actions which "did not reflect the urgency of the occasion . "

He took administrative action to correct the problems,

and relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cahill of command 22* *

This tragic and costly incident served as a sour note o n

which to end the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines' gallant part

in the defense of the Khe Sanh Combat Base . The aftermath of the engagement, moreover, points up the extra -

ordinary depth of responsibility faced by a military com -

mander. Lieutenant Colonel Cahill, though thrice

wounded while doing his utmost in a difficult and confused situation, nonetheless, bore the burden for the mistakes and failures laid at the doorstep of the 1st Battalion,

9th Marines.** *

*Bert Mullins, who served as a radioman with the 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines, commented : "This was a truly botched mess!" H e

remembered that Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines "was scheduled to recover the bodies, but that was canceled when the air officer

transmitted the plan in the clear to the 26th Marines ." Since the 26t h

Marines departed the area on 18 April, this must have occurred probably on 17 April . After that period " Bravo went opcon to 1st Marine s

and three of their companies recovered the bodies ." Bert Mullins,

Comments on draft, dcd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

**General Tompkins also stated that Colonel Meyers "failed t o

display the initiative and force the situation called for ." Colonel Meyers in his rebuttal defended his conduct stating that he offered assistance to the battalion commander and was told it was not needed . He

did not learn about the actual seriousness of the situation until th e

early hours of 17 April . When he arrived at the 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines CP later in the morning and discovered there were 20 Marine s

still missing, he immediately made plans for a rescue operation . Meyers Statement, Meyers Comments.

***Lieutenant Colonel Cahill was later promoted to Colonel an d

continued to serve until his retirement in 1978 . Colonel Frederic S .

Knight, who also served as a battalion commander in 1968, wrote tha t

" but for the grace of God, went I and every battalion commander in the

3d Marine Division ." He recognized that Major General Tompkins ' policy on recovering the bodies of Marine dead was part of the deep traditio n

of the Marine Corps of "taking care of each other, dead or alive . . . ." Nevertheless, this policy of bringing back all the KIAs "had the effect of creating Tar Babies for the commanders; they wanted to disengage to reduce

casualties and seek a more advantageous tactical situation, but under that

stricture they could not . " He would advocate a policy of weighing " our

traditions . . . against the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for th e

greatest number and actions taken accordingly." Col Frederic S . Knight ,

Comments on draft, dtd 10Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).

Operation Scotland II

By this time, Operation Scotland II was in full

swing. General Glick recalled that his new orders

directed him now "to continue operations in . . . (the

Khe Sanh) area, at least in a limited scope," rather tha n

dismantle the base .23 The units of the 1st Marines commanded by Colonel Stanley S. Hughes had begun t o

take the places of battalions of the 26th Marines. For

example, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines left LZ Stud t o

the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and shifted west to the

hills near Khe Sanh : 558, 950, 861, and 881 South.

The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and the regimenta l

command post set up in the combat base and the 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines remained along Route 9, providing security. The operation continued to grow as

elements of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived a t

Hill 689.2 4

For the rest of April, the battalions patrolled th e

rugged country of the Huong Hoa District, occasionally making contact with the enemy, but for the most

part finding only abandoned North Vietnamese

bunkers and equipment and the remains of Communist soldiers left behind . Still, the NVA threatened t o

cut the road. On 19 April, a convoy of five trucks

belonging to Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th Marine s

ran into an enemy ambush halfway between Khe San h

and Ca Lu . In the ensuing firefight, three Marines die d

and seven others suffered wounds. Only one truck continued on to Ca Lu, as the others were either damaged ,

pressed into service by the infantry to evacuate casualties, or left without drivers as a result of the casualtie s

sustained in the ambush . Lieutenant Colonel Robert C.

V. Hughes, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 11t h

Marines, remembered that the ambush site "was up a

draw leading into the river . . . The NVA dug bunkers

into the root masses of trees lining the top of the draw

. . . The firing ports . . . were almost impossible to see

unless you observed a muzzle flash ."25 The 1st Marine s

Commander, Colonel Stanley Hughes, responded by

restricting vehicle traffic on Route 9 "to only those

vehicles performing tactical missions ." To help control

the road, he formed a "Provisional Mechanized Company" by combining elements of the 3d Tank Battalion: the Antitank Company (—); the 3d Platoon, Company B; and the 3d Platoon, Company G.2 6

Near the end of April, Brigadier General Carl W.

Hoffman relieved General Glick. For a short time the

task force was known as "TF Hoffman," but soon

became known as "TF H ." In the habit of pronouncin g

all single letters by the phonetic equivalent used on the
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 31 7

radio, the Marines referred to the new command a s

"Task Force Hotel ." General Hoffman continued t o

maintain his CP at Khe Sanh and directed the sam e

type of limited mobile operations as General Glick . He

also instituted what he called "key hole missions " consisting of four-man deep reconnaissance patrols . Using

a " touch and go" insertion system, four or five helicopters with only one carrying the team would "com e

in at various locations, set down, and be gone almost

immediately. " The same procedures would be used t o

extract the teams. According to Hoffman these reconnaissance probes brought back invaluable intelligenc e

about the location of enemy forces in the sector . 2 7

The units conducting Operation Scotland II continued to draw their supplies from the logistic support

unit at Khe Sanh, as had the units in Operation Pegasus, in an effort to reduce the stocks which had accumulated there during the siege . On 5 May, Khe Sanh

reported a five-day level of supplies and the logisti c

support unit closed down . TF Hotel transferred the

remaining stocks to Ca Lu by convoy and helicopter.

From that time on, units in northwestern Quang Tri

Province drew their supplies from Ca Lu .28

The requirement to resupply from LZ Stud once

again increased the level of traffic along Route 9,

prompting the NVA to respond with another ambush

on 14 May. A convoy enroute to the combat base from

Ca Lu encountered an enemy force along Route 9 just

over one kilometer from the intersection where the coffee plantation road led north into Khe Sanh . Company

G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, which was providing security for the convoy, deployed and engaged the enemy .

Nearby, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines was assembling for a helicopter lift to Hill 1015 . When the

ambush took place, the battalion canceled the move t o

Hill 1015 and went to the rescue of the convoy. The

NVA fled in haste, but the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

caught up with them 1,500 meters south of the

ambush site and attacked them from two sides. The

North Vietnamese, in company strength, withdrew

into a bunker complex, pursued by the 2d Battalion ,

3d Marines. The ensuing fight lasted into the following day, leaving 74 enemy dead . The Marines lost 7

killed in action and 36 wounded .2 9

The ambush of 14 May signalled the onset of

increased enemy activity in the area . While patrollin g

Marine M48 tanks patrol Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh, passing a Marine small encampment along the way . The

3d Tank Battalion formed a "Provisional Mechanized Company" to monitor road traffic in this sector.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A191580
318 THE DEFINING YEA R

Route 9, halfway between Khe Sanh and Lang Vei o n

17 May, Company H, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines spotted five enemy soldiers and gave chase . The five led th e

company into an ambush where an NVA company la y

in bunkers firing from close range and shouting, "Di e

Marine!" Company H withdrew slightly, called i n

artillery and air strikes, then assaulted and overran th e

bunkers. The Marines lost 6 dead and 8 wounded i n

the ambush, and counted 52 dead North Vietnamese .30

From 17 to 19 May, two kilometers north of Company H's engagement on Route 9, elements of the 3 d

Battalion, 4th Marines patrolled the ridge betwee n

Hill 552 and Hill 689 . A dominant terrain feature

overlooking the combat base, the ridge had been occupied or patrolled by U.S. forces regularly since the earl y

part of Operation Pegasus. The 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines encountered, nonetheless, several NVA units

there, killing a total of 84 enemy and capturing 5 others in a three-day period.3 1

An even bigger fight was yet to come . During the

night of 18—19 May, the enemy moved a battalion to

within two kilometers of the combat base. At about

0400, an enemy platoon attacked Company H, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines southeast of Khe Sanh along Rout e

9. Assaulting from all sides with heavy small arms fire ,

grenades, satchel charges, and RPGs, the North Vietnamese killed three Marines and wounded three others

before retiring. They left behind eight dead . Almost

simultaneously, an enemy company, using 60mm mortar support, probed Company I, 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines on Hill 552 . After a short fight, the Marines

heard the North Vietnamese digging in . Exchanges of

fire continued through the night . In the morning, the

Marines assaulted the nearby enemy, driving them

from their positions with 42 dead and 4 taken prisoner. Four Marines suffered wounds.32

At 0710, 19 May, while Company I was still fighting near Hill 552, a platoon of Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and two tanks headed south from Khe

Sanh along the coffee plantation road, sweeping ahea d

of a convoy bound for Ca Lu . About 300 meters from

the road's intersection with Route 9, the Marines triggered an NVA ambush at a range of 25 meters. An

enemy company, dug in, forced the Marines to tak e

cover under a storm of automatic weapons fire, RPGs ,

and grenades. The Marines attempted an assault, but

the enemy repulsed them, adding a heavy barrage o f

mortars to the Marines' discomfort. The rest of Company F, waiting at the combat base with the convoy ,

immediately reinforced the endangered platoon, the n

assaulted with the entire company. The Communists

not only threw back the Marines a second time, but

even left their own positions to counterattack . This

time, it was Company F's turn to hold fast, and the

Marines repulsed the enemy assault. Lieutenant

Colonel Billy R. Duncan, the battalion commander,

recalled that by this time he had arrived at the scen e

with a small command group . The company commander, however, had been mortally wounded and "contac t

during the next hour was mixed with serious probes by

both sides. "3 3

Company G advanced south along the road to joi n

the fight, killing three North Vietnamese who had

sneaked to the rear of Company F. After the two companies linked up, Lieutenant Colonel Duncan asked for

napalm air strikes. According to Duncan, the enem y

was anywhere between 35 to 50 yards distant from the

Marine positions and too close for artillery support ,

therefore the call for napalm. While some of the

Marines accidentally also were covered by napalm jelly,

the fixed-wing strikes broke the enemy "will to sta y

and fight."34 As the enemy retreated, Company E, 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines struck the NVA from the flank . With the ambush site cleared, the rest of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines went to the field and searched th e

area south-southwest of the combat base trying to

regain contact until 22 May, but met only minor resistance. During the operation, 8 Marines died, includin g

the commanders of Companies F and G, and 34 fel l

wounded. The battalion captured 3 North Vietnames e

and reported killing 113, of whom 69 were found i n

the ambush site . "

The enemy troops killed and captured by the 2 d

Battalion, 1st Marines were described as "clean, wel l

dressed, and neatly groomed . " 36 According to Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, one of the prisoners stated th e

enemy mission was to "stop all movement along Rout e

9."37 This did not match the depiction of the enem y

forces in the Khe Sanh area as defeated and on the run .

Coupled with the extraordinary surge in North Vietnamese offensive operations, such reports prompted th e

1st Marines to warn of "a high probability of a division-size attack on the Khe Sanh Combat Base or on e

of the outlying units."38 According to a rallier, Privat e

(who claimed to be a former Warrant Officer) Vo Manh

Hung, the NVA 308th Division had arrived in north -

western Quang Tri Province with its 88th and 102d

Regiments. The 308th Division was one of the five socalled "Steel Divisions" of the North Vietnamese Arm y

which could only be committed by the Joint Military

Staff. Claiming that the 308th had been committe d

because "the war is going to end," Hung told intelli-
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 31 9

gence officers that the 304th, 308th, 325th, and another unidentified division would attack Khe Sanh . The

North Vietnamese, he said, would cut Route 9, brin g

antiaircraft guns in from Laos and overrun the combat

base "as Dien Bien Phu was." Intelligence officers

placed little confidence in Hung's information, ratin g

it "F–6" (the lowest rating for reliability and likelihoo d

of being true). Still, III MAF sent Lieutenant Colone l

Edward J. Lamontagne's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines to

reinforce the 1st Marines for the defense of Khe Sanh

against another possible major NVA effort .39

For the rest of May, TF Hotel continued the original plan for Operation Scotland II, conducting offensive operations to maintain the initiative around Khe

Sanh. Enemy contact was frequent and sometime s

heavy, with the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines fighting a

running battle which lasted for over a week .

On 24 May, Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marine s

engaged an NVA company on a hill overlooking Route

9 four kilometers southeast of the combat base, the

same position to which enemy ambushers had retreated after attacking the convoy 10 days before. The

enemy occupied bunkers which withstood a preparation of artillery fire and air strikes . Indeed, when the

fires lifted, the enemy left their bunkers and attempted to envelop the Marines. Observing a larger enemy

force to the rear of the closest North Vietnamese positions, Company G fell back and called for additiona l

air, artillery, and mortar support . At 1800, the Marines

attacked once more, still under extremely heavy fire . With helicopter gunships, artillery, and mortars supporting their advance, Company G swept up the hill ,

reaching the high ground at 2015 that night. The

enemy broke contact, leaving behind the bodies of 5 8

dead. In the day's fighting, Company G suffered 1 5

dead and 21 wounded . The following morning, an air

observer reported a "ragged enemy withdrawal to th e

south and southeast." 4 0

The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines remained near the sit e

of the 24 May engagement. Three companies spaced

about 700 meters apart stretched to the northwest in a

line starting from Company F, on a small finger overlooking Route 9 about a kilometer west of the NVA

bunker complex. Company E was at the intersection o f

Route 9 and the coffee plantation road, and Company

G was on a finger between the other two companies .

At 0245, 28 May, Company F Marines, using a

Starlight Scope, observed enemy movement outside

their perimeter, and the acting company commander,

First Lieutenant James L. Jones, called for an artiller y

mission. Three North Vietnamese with satchel charges

suddenly leapt into one of the company's listening post s

north of the perimeter and blew themselves to bits, also

killing three of the four Marines at the post . Immediately, an NVA battalion charged up the slope from th e

north on a wide front using a very heavy volume of

small arms fire and more than 40 RPG rounds. With

the enemy already in the perimeter, Lieutenant Jone s

gave the order to employ the final protective fires. *

Noticing that the North Vietnamese were usin g

pencil flares, apparently as signals, Lieutenant Jones

fired a red pencil flare of his own, at which the NVA

precipitously broke contact.** The respite was brief,

however. After a momentary lapse, the assault continued with renewed fury as the enemy battalion poured

machine gun and rocket fire into Company F's lines.

After several minutes of fierce fighting, the enemy

drove the 1st Platoon from its holes and overran th e

company's 60mm mortar position. Under intense fire ,

the 2d and 3d Platoons restored the defensive perimete r

while the 1st Platoon regrouped to establish a new posi -

tion on a knoll to the east of the company perimeter. 4 1

At 0330, after the enemy gained a foothold in th e

Marine perimeter, their attack slackened momentarily, but as if to demonstrate coordination, 40 rounds

of 130mm artillery fire from enemy guns fell o n

Company G. A Douglas AC–47 "Spooky " gunship,

accompanied by a flareship, reported on station a t

0415 to light the battlefield and fire in support of

the Marines. The NVA took the planes under heavy

fire with .50-caliber machine guns and resumed

their attack on Company F, this time from all sides . 4 2

For two hours, the battle raged, literally withi n

Company F's original perimeter. Again and again ,

the NVA regrouped and stormed the Marines,

attempting to overwhelm their defenses with massive ground assaults as RPG gunners on dominant

high ground to the southeast smothered Compan y

F under an estimated 500 rounds of rocket fire .

With the flareship lighting the scene, "Spooky"

*The " FPF " is a defensive tactic used to stop imminent penetration of a unit's defensive lines. It employs supporting arms firing i n

pre-planned locations and the unit 's own riflemen and machine gunners firing along predetermined lines at the maximum rate to create

what is known as "interlocking bands of grazing fire ." The significance

of firing the FPF lies in the fact that it is an act of near desperation, a

final resort which, if unsuccessful, will give way to hand-to-hand combat within the fighting holes of the defending unit.

** Harold R. Blunk, who in 1968 was a PFC and a forward observer

with Company F, commented that now-Lieutenant General James L. Jones

told him in June 1996 that he fired the red flare rather than the green on e

because "'Green for go—Red for stop. It was that simple. — Harold R.

Blunk, Comments on draft, dtd 27Jun96 (Vietnam Comment File).
320 THE DEFINING YEA R

slammed machine gun fire into the enemy at th e

rate of 18,000 rounds per minute and Battery B ,

1st Battalion, 12th Marines joined the infantry battalion's own mortar platoon in pounding the Nort h

Vietnamese. 4

3

At 0700, air observers reported that "the entire

battle area was littered with NVA dead ." 44 The

observers directed attack aircraft against enemy

reinforcements moving in from the west . A napalm

strike killed 30 North Vietnamese and ended the

enemy effort but, unfortunately, also resulted i n

napalm impacting less than 20 meters from Company F. Fanned by the wind, the fire spread, soon

forcing Company F from their positions after an all -

out attack by an enemy battalion had failed. When

the flames died down, the Marines quickl y

reclaimed their positions and fired on the with -

drawing enemy .4 5

Only 20 minutes later, at 1150, Company E

arrived to help, first sweeping the ridge to the west

of Company F. After securing this area, Company E

turned on the North Vietnamese RPG gunners firing from the high ground near Company F's 1st

Platoon . Within two hours of their attack, Company E put the enemy to flight . Following an emergency resupply and the evacuation of casualties

from both companies, Company E moved out i n

pursuit. The battle cost the 2d Battalion 13 dea d

and 44 wounded . A search of the area revealed 23 0

dead North Vietnamese .4 6

The shelling which fell upon Company G during

the battle was a reminder that the enemy still

maintained artillery positions within range of Kh e

Sanh. All through the siege, these guns had kept

firing, despite many efforts to silence them . Eve n

afterwards, the North Vietnamese continued t o

pound Marine positions. General Glick, the former

Task Force commander, remembered that through

the period he was there: "Khe Sanh was receiving

heavy shelling on a daily basis . . ." and that "all

commander, service, and living facilities [at Khe

Sanh) were in underground bunkers or deep trenches." 4 7 On 30 May, TF Hotel provided security for a

convoy of four 175mm self-propelled guns and fou r

8-inch self-propelled howitzers from Camp Carrol l

to Khe Sanh . These heavy artillery weapons took up

firing positions from which they could reach the C o

Roc cliffs, where the enemy guns were believed t o

be, and fired for 48 hours in a limited duration

artillery raid dubbed Operation Drumfire II . Like

the previous attempts at counterfire, which used

even B—52s against Co Roc, Operation Drumfire I I

had no noticeable effect .48 *

The enemy's infantry showed that they could match

the annoying persistence of their gunners . At 0400, 3 1

May, the North Vietnamese attacked Company E, 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines from all sides on the very ridge

where the battle had taken place three days before . The

enemy again coordinated their attack with 130m m

artillery fire, as well as 82mm mortar fire . The ground

attack, however, in no way matched the fury of the pre -

vious engagement and the NVA disengaged in the

morning.49

Only one kilometer to the north, Company B, 1s t

Battalion, 1st Marines, moving toward Company E's

engagement at 0850, ran into a North Vietnamese platoon entrenched just off Route 9 . Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines fell in on the right of Company B . Attacking

with all three companies abreast, supported by tanks ,

the Marines closed with the North Vietnamese and

overran their trenches, finishing the fight hand-to -

hand. They killed 42 North Vietnamese and lost 8

dead and 31 wounded . A single prisoner reported his

unit to be the 102d Regiment of the 308th Division.

Total Marine casualties for the morning's fighting were

32 dead and 99 wounded . A search revealed 136

enemy dead.'°

Operation Robin

As May ended, III MAF intelligence analysts confirmed reports that the North Vietnamese had infiltrated the 88th and 102d Regiments of their 308th Division into northwestern Quang Tri Province . Further,

aerial photography revealed a new enemy road unde r

construction in the jungle south of Khe Sanh . The road

entered South Vietnam from Laos and ran parallel to

Route 9, but about 15 kilometers further south . When

discovered, the road extended approximately 30 kilo -

meters into South Vietnam along a path that seemed t o

*Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, observed that "Operation Drumfire II like most

preplanned, not observed, fire missions merely caused the NVA co pul l

back into their tunnels and wait it our. Our 'Rules of Engagement' forbid flying aerial observers over Co Roc who could have adjusted fir e

missions while the enemy was actively shelling the base . " Col Robert

C . V. Hughes, Comments on draft, n .d. [Jan95?) (Vietnam Commen t

File). Colonel William H. Dabney 's explanation for the limited effect

of Drumfire II on Co Roc was very simple: " That 's not where the gun s

were! " Col William H . Dabney, Comments on draft, n .d . (Dec 94 )

(Vietnam Comment File). For further information about the debate o n

the location of the enemy guns near Khe Sanh see the discussion i n

Chapter 14 . See Chapter 26 for a further account of Drumfire 1I .
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 32 1

lead directly toward Hue City. A III MAF intelligence

report on the road said, "agent reports have mentioned

the possibility of enemy tank battalions in eastern Laos

awaiting the completion of this road ."$ 1

TF Hotel planned a two-part operation in accordance with the 3d Marine Division's fresh emphasi s

upon mobility and firebases, under its new commander, Major General Raymond G . Davis, to counter th e

enemy buildup in the area.* The first phase, Operatio n

Robin North, called for Colonel Hughes' 1st Marines

to thrust south from the combat base into the mountains, engaging the newly introduced enemy forces

near Route 9. In the second phase, Operation Robi n

South, Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines would

conduct airmobile operations even further south t o

locate and destroy the enemy road .5 2

Preparations for Operation Robin began at the end

of May. Units garrisoning the hill positions aroun d

Khe Sanh shifted to make battalions available for the

attack. Marine Aircraft Groups 36 and 39 delivered a

five-day supply of ammunition to the units left around

Khe Sanh so that helicopter assets could concentrate on

supporting the extensive airmobile requirements of th e

operation. For the five days prior to D—Day, TF Hotel

coordinated preparation fires which included 219 sorties of attack aircraft and 30 B—52 sorties deliverin g

thousands of tons of bombs to blast landing zones i n

the jungle and to destroy enemy weapons and troop

concentrations. Nine artillery batteries representing

every caliber of artillery weapon in the Marine Corps

fired over 10,000 rounds into the area of operations.53

D—Day, 2 June, began with the 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines occupying blocking positions along Route 9

immediately south of the combat base . At midday,

Lieutenant Colonel Archie Van Winkle's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducted a helicopterborne assaul t

into LZ Robin, a newly prepared landing zone situated in the steep hills 10 kilometers southeast of Khe

Sanh. After landing, the battalion attacked north ,

hoping to drive the enemy into the blocking position s

along Route 9 . The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines flew

from Ca Lu to LZ Robin and set up a defensive

perimeter for the night.54

On 3 June, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued

its attack to the north and TF Hotel fed the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines into the operation at LZ Robin .

Relieved of the responsibility for defending LZ Robin,

the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines boarded helicopters once

*See both Chapters 15 and 18 for discussion of the tactical concepts introduced by General Davis .

12th Mar ComdC, Jan6 9

Top, from the air, Landing Zone Robin, located in the steep

hills, is about 10 kilometers southeast of Khe Sanh . Below,

LtCol Archie Van Winkle, left, with the 3d MarDiv commander, MajGen Raymond G . Davis. LtCol Van Winkle's

1st Battalion, 1st Marines opened Operation Robin with th e

helicopter assault onto LZ Robin in line with Gen Davis '

tactical emphasis upon mobility and fire support bases.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A191666
322 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19180 7

Marines of Company A, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines barely can be seen as they climb up a hill through five-foot-high

elephant grass near Landing Zone Robin.

again and assaulted 12 Loon, four kilometers to the

west. The enemy, quiet on D—Day, greeted the Marine s

at 12 Loon with light small-arms, mortar, and artillery

fire, delaying the helicopter lift but not seriously hampering the landings. %

North Vietnamese interest in LZ Loon became

apparent the following morning, only hours after th e

Marines arrived . At 0600, a company of the NVA 88th

Regiment probed Company F, 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines. After a short engagement, the enemy with -

drew at dawn, leaving 34 dead . Company F lost 2

killed and 24 wounded .5 6

With both of the new landing zones secured by the

1st Marines, TF Hotel began preparing them to serve

as firebases to support the 4th Marines during the second phase of the operation . The headquarters of the 4t h

Marines and the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines landed a t

LZ Robin and prepared to assume control as engineer s

used equipment lifted in by helicopters to construc t

artillery emplacements, bunkers, trenches, and barbed

wire entanglements. 57

Companies C and D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines

flew into LZ Loon, freeing the 2d Battalion to join

the attack north toward the blocking positions. In

keeping with the airmobile character of the operation, the 2d Battalion advanced by conducting still

another helicopterborne assault into LZ Crow, tw o

kilometers northeast of LZ Loon and near the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.58

The attack northward met its first significant resistance on 5 June, when Company C, 1st Battalion, 1s t

Marines engaged an enemy unit four kilometers sout h

of Route 9 . The enemy troops fought from bunkers

and from trees. Company C attacked the position, sup -

ported by artillery and the battalion's 106mm recoil -

less rifles. In a fight which lasted into the followin g

afternoon, the Marines overran and destroyed a North

Vietnamese bunker complex which documents identified as belonging to the 304th Division, a veteran of th e

earlier fighting during the siege of Khe Sanh .59

During the evening of 5 June, the 4th Marine s

assumed control of its own 1st Battalion, dispose d

between 12 Loon and LZ Robin, in preparation for th e

beginning of Operation Robin South the next morning. Before the Marines could strike, however, the

North Vietnamese hit first . At 0600, an enemy battalion assaulted 12 Loon, supported by artillery and mortar fire. 60 Companies C and D fought back, calling fo r

their own artillery and mortars, as well as attack aircraft and helicopter gunships. After a two-hour battle ,

the enemy withdrew slightly, leaving 154 dead, but

kept up a galling fire with their small arms, and frequent shelling from nearby 82mm mortars and the

ever-present 130mm guns. By midday, the continue d

shelling had rendered LZ Loon untenable 61 Helicopters lifted Company C back to LZ Robin at 1400 ,

followed a few hours later by Company D . The last

helicopter out, a CH–46, took heavy fire from a Nort h

Vietnamese .50-caliber machine gun and crashed i n

flames, bringing the total U.S. casualty count for the

defense of the LZ to 24 dead and 37 wounded G2

Despite the attack on 12 Loon, on 6 June, as scheduled, the 4th Marines launched Operation Robi n

South. Helicopters lifted the 3d Battalion, 9th Marine s

into a landing zone southeast of LZ Robin, near the

eastern extension of the North Vietnamese jungle road .

The battalion located the road and found it to be quit e

well-developed, up to 18 feet wide in places, wit h

stone bridges, culverts, and a surface graded smooth b y

heavy engineering equipment . The North Vietnames e

had concealed the road by bending trees over it and
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 323

tying them together to form a living archway of vegetation beneath which troops and vehicles could pass

unseen from the air. Along the road, the Marines foun d

fighting holes, living bunkers, hospitals, kitchens, and

a wealth of equipment, especially tools . There were

picks, shovels, wrecking bars, axes, and explosives.

Captain Gary E . Todd, who commanded Company I,

3d Battalion, 9th Marines and a former division intelligence officer, observed that the road "was a virtua l

clone of the Ho Chi Minh Trail." According to Todd ,

it was "more than a road, it qualified as a type of logis -

tics infrastructure ." 6 3 Prisoners and captured documents showed that the construction of the road was the

mission of the NVA 83d Engineer Battalion . One prisoner said that the construction schedule called for the

road to reach Hue by 30 July, a formidable task whic h

would have required pushing the road through th e

steep jungle terrain at a rate of over one mile—as th e

crow flies—per day.64

For several days, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marine s

advanced along the road to the west, blasting apar t

bridges and culverts (sometimes with captured North

Vietnamese explosives), cratering the road surface, and

destroying the enemy facilities found along the way .

Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion provided much of

the technical expertise for the demolition project . The

North Vietnamese avoided contact .6s

As battalions returned to Khe Sanh from participating in Operation Robin North, they freed othe r

units to join the 4th Marines in Operation Robi n

South. On 11 June, helicopters landed the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines near Lang Hole, a Montagnard village south of LZ Loon said by prisoners to be the sit e

of \ a major enemy supply cache . The battalion

searched the area for almost a week with only ligh t

contact. 66

The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines joined its parent

regiment in Operation Robin South on the mornin g

of 14 June by conducting a helicopterborne assault

onto the NVA road near the border with Laos. They

advanced east along the road, toward the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which was still moving down the

road from the other end . The 2d Battalion found th e

western portion of the road as well developed as the

rest. In one area they found a complex of over 50 0

bunkers and storage areas containing 400 pounds o f

ammonium nitrate (a crude explosive), hand tools, a

welding machine, a one-and-one-half-ton truck and a

complete machine shop mounted on a Russian three -

ton truck. Unwilling to leave the latter prize behind ,

ingenious young Marine tinkerers dismantled the

entire truck and machine shop, then transferred th e

pieces to Khe Sanh by helicopter where they reassem -

bled it for the drive along Route 9 to the 3d Marin e

Division headquarters at Dong Ha . 67

One hour before dawn on 15 June, a battalion o r

more of the North Vietnamese 88th Regiment

struck the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines south of Lang

Hole. Pressing their attack behind heavy RPG fire ,

the enemy infantry penetrated Company M's line s

and occupied several fighting holes, setting up a

machine gun in what had been the company command post. As the battle entered its third hour, th e

Marines counterattacked, ejecting the North Vietnamese from the perimeter . Helicopter gunships

harried the enemy attack formations, helping t o

reduce their enthusiasm to continue the assault .

Just before 0900, the North Vietnamese fired a

"green star cluster "* and the attack ended . The

Marines swept the area, occasionally engaging

North Vietnamese troops who feigned death, the n

"popped up" to fire their weapons . The final tally

was 219 enemy killed along with 11 prisoners, 8 2

weapons, and 20 radios captured . The Marines lost

16 killed and 58 wounded . 6 8

Despite the seemingly staggering casualties th e

North Vietnamese suffered on 15 June, the battl e

near Lang Hole appeared only to whet thei r

appetites for fighting. The very next morning at

0215, they struck LZ Torch, a new fire support

base near the jungle road which was defended by

the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines since its withdraw -

al from LZ Loon . An enemy company fell upon th e

perimeter from the south and west, using morta r

fire, RPGs, machine guns, and satchel charges t o

pave the way. Concentrating their assault on a

small part of the perimeter, the enemy penetrate d

Company I's lines and advanced on the guns o f

Battery E, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. Under th e

light of flares, the Marine gunners leveled th e

tubes of their howitzers and slammed round afte r

round of "Beehive" ammunition** into the attacking North Vietnamese . Although the enemy

reached one of Battery C's gun emplacements, the

"Beehive" proved too much for them. Leaving 2 8

dead, they fell back at 0400 . Fourteen Marine s

died in the assault . 69

The North Vietnamese continued their progra m

*A pyrotechnic signaling device .

**An artillery antipersonnel round which explodes sending thou -

sands of tiny darts, called flechettes, toward the enemy.
324 THE DEFINING YEA R

of predawn attacks on 18 June, when NVA sappers

crawled to within 30 feet of Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines near the jungle road . Preceding

their assault with a mortar preparation, the enem y

sprang from their nearby positions against Company K, quickly penetrating the lines . The Marine s

held their ground and fought back, using artiller y

and air support to help repulse the attacking

North Vietnamese battalion . After four hours of

fighting, the Marines drove back the Communist

troops. Three Douglas A—4E Skyhawks of Marine

Attack Squadron 311 pounded the retreating

enemy, killing many. Sporadic fighting continue d

through the day; the Marines engaged enemy

snipers and automatic weapons emplacements left

behind to cover the withdrawal . When the last

resistance ended, 131 North Vietnamese lay dead

in and around Company K's position . Marine casualties numbered 11 killed and 30 wounded .7 0

On the day after Company K's battle alon g

the jungle road, Operation Robin South ende d

and the 4th Marines returned to Khe Sanh having accomplished its mission. The Marine s

cratered the road in 28 places, destroyed 2

bridges and 4 culverts, and created a rock slid e

in one place. In addition, they reported killin g

635 enemy and captured 48 NVA, an extraordinary prisoner count . Large quantities of enem y

facilities were destroyed and supplies capture d

in the area of operations, dealing the Nort h

Vietnamese a hard blow.7 1

Operations Robin North and Robin South were

the first multi-regiment Marine Corps operation s

"supported entirely by helicopter."72 Marine commanders were highly enthusiastic, touting th e

"mobile offensive concept ."73 One unit's official

account recorded that the operations :

. . . confirmed that fire base techniques are well

within the operational scope of the Marine Corps,

both conceptually and doctrinally . . . . Experienc e

will improve our ability to manage the fire bas e

concept. "Robin South" gave us a running start . 7 4

Razing Khe Sanh: Operation Charli e

General Westmoreland departed Vietnam on 1 1

June, in the middle of Operation Robin South, and

was relieved by General Creighton Abrams, hi s

former deputy, as Commander USMACV. Just ove r

a week later, on 19 June, TF Hotel began executing the 3d Marine Division plan for the evacuation

and destruction of Khe Sanh Combat Base : Operation Charlie .75 '

The units returning from Operation Robin Sout h

assumed new positions to screen and support th e

evacuation . Along Route 9, battalions of the 4t h

Marines occupied key terrain from which they coul d

control the road and protect the many convoy s

between Khe Sanh and Ca Lu required to move th e

supplies and equipment out of the combat base. The

1st Marines defended Khe Sanh and the surrounding

hill positions. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines reported to the 1st Marines at the combat base to serve as a

work force to assist Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion in the physical dismantling and destruction of th e

facilities at Khe Sanh .76

The plan for Operation Charlie called for th e

Marines to withdraw all salvageable supplies an d

equipment and to destroy all fortifications and any -

thing of possible use which they could not move . They

went about the task thoroughly. Convoys rolled from

Khe Sanh to Ca Lu daily, heavily laden with stockpiled

supplies, salvaged fortification materials, and previously stranded damaged equipment. Detachments

from the 3d and 11th Engineer Battalions and the 3 d

Shore Party Battalion arrived with bulldozers and

mechanics to help with the work . Even burned out

vehicle hulks and damaged equipment were cut apar t

into smaller pieces, moved to secure areas, and buried

to prevent their use in enemy propaganda . The same

Navy Seabee unit which had toiled to repair and

upgrade the airstrip months before now returned to

General Rosson observed that he was involved "directly and personally" with the decision to deactivate Khe Sanh ." He remembere d

that after the "decision [to deactivate] had been made early in June . 1

discussed with General Davis the methodology and timing of the deactivation . " Gen William B. Rosson, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb9 5

(Vietnam Comment File). General Hoffman remarked that he receive d

a decision from higher headquarters sometime in June "that we woul d

abandon Khe Sanh combat base in favor of moving to a new comba t

base" initially called Stud . While Hoffman believed his units "were successfully conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in any directio n

we wanted to," he recognized the desirability of consolidating mobile

operations and shortening supply lines . MajGen Carl W. Hoffman ,

Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 and MajGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw,

14Nov68, pp . 151—53 (Oral HisrColl, MCHC), hereafter Hoffma n

Comments and inrvw. According to Army historian George L. Mac -

Garrigle : "Westy never wanted to abandon Khe Sanh ; Abrams certainly did . When Westy returned to Washington for his confirmation hearing [for his appointment as Army Chief of Staff], Abe was the "acting

ComUSMACV." The agreement was, the base would not be abandoned

on Westmoreland 's ' watch ' and I'm almost certain that MACV provided Westy with his ' cover' statement. " George L. MacGarrigle, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 325

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Top, Marines of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Khe Sanh salute their fallen comrades during a memorial service for those who gave their lives to defend the base . Below, a Marine from

the battalion takes a long look at the Khe Sanh airstrip before preparing to depart
326 THE DEFINING YEA R

rip up the steel matting runway. Working partie s

destroyed over 800 bunkers and 3 miles of concertina

wire, throwing the wire into the trenches and fillin g

them with soil . They slit open the countless sandbag s

and emptied them, wrecked standing structures, and

burned what remained to the ground. As a final ste p

to discourage the North Vietnamese from attemptin g

to dig through the ruins for useful material, th e

Marines sprinkled the area with CS powder, an irritant

chemical agent.77 *

The enemy could not, and did not, misinterpret the

activity at the combat base. Communist political officers proclaimed the U.S . withdrawal from Khe Sanh as

a victory for the North Vietnamese Army. III MAF

warned units at Khe Sanh that, as the withdrawal proceeded, the enemy might conduct limited offensiv e

operations to lend credibility to their claims 78**

The prophecy came true on 1 July. Three kilometers

southeast of the combat base near the old French fort ,

the NVA began a series of light probes against Company I, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at 0325 . The probes,

accompanied by mortar fire, continued for four hours .

At 0725, a NVA unit of at least company-siz e

launched a full-scale assault on the Marine perimeter t o

the accompaniment of mortar fire and 130mm guns .

Alerted by the probes, Company I quickly blunted th e

enemy attack and the North Vietnamese broke contact .

Later that morning, the Marines sighted the enemy

unit nearby and engaged it once more, calling in helicopter gunships and attack aircraft . The fighting con -

*Colonel Billy R . Duncan, the commander of the 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines, wrote that at the time his unit departed Khe Sanh, "much o f

the steel matting was still in place . Too difficult to remove . . ." an d

the enemy guns were "still a daily threat." Col Billy R . Duncan, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) . Major Gary E .

Todd, the commander of Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,

observed that the dismantling required "working parties to move

around exposed and 'non-tactical' in what was still very much a tactical situation . The more bunkers we destroyed and trenches we filled ,

the less protection we had against incoming artillery, a fact not waste d

on an ever-watchful enemy." Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft ,

dtd 28Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

**General Hoffman stated he had instituted an orderly program o f

withdrawing his units so as not to reveal his intentions to the Nort h

Vietnamese. He blamed Correspondent John S . Carroll from the Baltimore Sun for breaking news confidentiality and printing a story that th e

Marines were abandoning Khe Sanh . According to Hoffman, th e

North Vietnamese increased their bombardment after the publicatio n

of the story. MACV suspended Carroll's press credentials for -si x

months. Hoffman intvw and Comments . For the suspension of Carroll's accreditation, see also John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of

Decision, The Siege of Khe Sanh (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), p . 448 .

tinned until late afternoon, with the Marines reportin g

over 200 dead North Vietnamese, half of them within

100 meters of Company I's lines. Two Marines died i n

the engagement.79

For the next several days, the enemy continued to

step up the pressure . Occasional heavy incoming

artillery and mortar fire fell on the hill positions, and

small groups of North Vietnamese probed Marin e

perimeters attempting to cut through barbed wire barriers. There were no further attacks, however, on the

scale of that of 1 July.8 0

At 2000 on 5 July, the Khe Sanh Combat Base, no w

just a smoldering scar on the land, officially closed.8 1

On the following day, the 1st Marines sent thei r

remaining rolling stock to Ca Lu by convoy . As the last

trucks passed over Route 9, engineers removed an d

recovered the tactical bridging equipment which the y

had installed during Operation Pegasus . Just before

midnight on 6 July, Operation Charlie ended8 2

The 1st Marines remained near Khe Sanh for anoth -

er week, attempting to recover the remains of th e

Marines who died in the fighting near Hill 689. Afte r

days of seesaw battles which left 11 Marines and 8 9

North Vietnamese dead, the 1st Battalion finally

recovered 7 bodies under cover of darkness on 11 July

using small teams operating by stealth. With this

accomplished, the 1st Marines boarded helicopters and

flew east to Quang Tri City. 8 3

Twenty years after the battle, when asked to name

the decision of which he was the most proud, Genera l

Westmoreland replied, "The decision to hold Khe

Sanh."S4 It had been a controversial move in 1968, but

after the commitment in men and materiel to hold it ,

the decision to evacuate the place was even more difficult for many to understand. In fact, there were more

American casualties at Khe Sanh and its immediate

vicinity after the breakout until the final evacuation of

the base than during the siege .*** As a battle whic h

***The confusion about the number of Marine casualties in th e

Khe Sanh battle is one aspect of the controversy over the defense of th e

base. According to general Marine Corps records, the Marines sustained casualties of 205 dead from November 1967 through the end o f

March, the period of Operation Scotland . The casualty reporting system was based on named operations rather than on actual locale .

Another 92 Marines were killed in Operation Pegasus during April ,

and another 308 during Operation Scotland II through 30 June . Scot -

land II continued through the end of the year with another 72 Marines

added to the KIA list. Obviously all of the operations included a

broader area than the perimeter of the Khe Sanh base itself, thus compounding the difficulty in determining an exact number of casualties .

To do so, the researcher must "clarify the time span and geographica l

area of the so-called 'Battle of Khe Sanh .'" Jack Shulimson, Sr . Vietnam

Historian, ltr to Bert Mullins, dtd 2Sep1983 (Vietnam War, Khe Sanh
KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION 327

captured the personal interest of many Americans, to

include President Johnson, Khe Sanh became a symbol. When U.S . forces withdrew from the hills of Khe

Sanh, the inevitable question arose : "Why did we

defend it in the first place?" At that point in time, in

January 1968, there was probably no choice unless the

U.S . was prepared to air evacuate its troops and abandon its supplies there . Whether the base should hav e

been closed immediately after Pegasus or whether a

base should have been established there at all are stil l

subjects of debate as is the motivation of the North

Vietnamese in laying siege to the base .

File, RefSec, MCHC). Former Navy Chaplain Lieutenant Commande r

Ray W. Stubbe, who has done extensive research in this area, has provided the following figures based on his findings : He found the number of Marines killed for Operation Scotland to be 274 as opposed to

205 . He cautions, however, that there are differences between the figures given in the command chronologies and those in the after-actio n

reports and that none of the totals really jibe . Lieutenant Commander

Stubbe gives as the best total for Operation Scotland and Pegasus, no t

including Lang Vei, as 560, including specialized Marine, Army, an d

Air Force units. He gives a total of 219 KIA (Army and South Vietnamese) for Lang Vei . Chaplain Stubbe explained that there were man y

reasons for the discrepancies including staff officers frequently engage d

with an on-going operation, "while still attempting to write reports o n

a previous operation." He also observed that for most troops, "th e

entire period from the beginning of the siege until their departure is ,

for them, their 'Khe Sanh battle .' Dates of the beginnings and endings

of the various operations are as artificial and abstract as the border o f

Laos and Vietnam! It is the difference between 'lived' battles and 'officially recorded' battles." LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, USN, Comments o n

draft, dtd 23Oct and 25Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 1 7

Mini-Tet and Its Aftermath in Southern I Corp s

Going into the Go Noi—Mini-Tet and Operation Mameluke Thrust, May 196 8

Operation Allen Brook Continues—Mameluke Thrust Also Continues

Going into the Go No i

By the beginning of May 1968, both the Marines a t

Da Nang and the Communist forces in Quang Nam

were in the midst of preparations to launch offensive

operations against one another. While during April the

enemy in Quang Nam had largely confined its activities to guerrilla activities, the increased number of

reconnaissance Stingray sightings indicated that Communist regulars were reinfiltrating their old positions.

The Marine command was especially concerned abou t

the Go Noi Island sector, about 25 kilometers south of

Da Nang, outlined by the confluence of the Ky Lam ,

Thu Bon, Ba Ren, and Chiem Son Rivers .

In the Go Noi, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines i n

April had conducted Operation Jasper Square* in th e

western sector with relatively limited contact . Nevertheless, the Communists had controlled the area for

years. With the continued existence of both a Communist political and military command infrastructure

there, the local populace maintained a strong Vie t

Cong orientation, making the island a relatively "safe

haven" for both NVA and VC military units. III MAF

knew Go Noi was home to three local Viet Cong units,

the R—20 Battalion, V—25 Battalion, and T—3 Sapper

Battalion, as well as Group 44, the headquarters for th e

enemy's operations in Quang Nam Province . It also

suspected that elements of the 2d NVA Division were

trying to reenter the sector. '

In early May, Major General Donn J . Robertson, th e

1st Marine Division commander, ordered the 7t h

Marines into the Go Noi to forestall the NVA from staging a new offensive. On 4 May at 0500, Lieutenant

Colonel Charles E. Mueller's 2d Battalion, 7th Marine s

launched a two-company "No Name Operation" into th e

Go Noi. Crossing Liberty Bridge at 0500, Companies E

and G, supported by a platoon of tanks, attacked eastward towards the main north-south railroad tracks. On

the first day of the operation, the Marines evacuated some

220 civilians, mostly old men, women, and children, out

of the Go Noi to the district capital of Dai Loc .2

*See Chapter 13 .

In the first phase of the operation, which soon

became Operation Allen Brook,* the battalion encountered light although persistent resistance from enem y

local force and guerrilla units. For the next few days,

the 2d Battalion attacked to the east towards the mai n

north-south railroad tracks experiencing increasing bu t

still relatively scattered opposition to their advance .

Although the terrain was flat with relatively clear field s

of fire, the local units were familiar with the locale and

took full advantage of the advantages offered by th e

fortified hamlets that dotted the Go Noi . Surrounded

and interlaced by dense hedges, these hamlets wer e

connected one to another by a series of trenches an d

tunnels which provided "excellent cover and concealment" for their defenders. 3

While Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine s

relieved Company G on 7 May, Colonel Reverdy M .

Hall, the 7th Marines' commander, also reinforced th e

2d Battalion on the same day with Company K fro m

the 3d Battalion. Through 8 May, the Marine companies accounted for some 88 enemy troops at a cost of 9

Marines killed and 57 wounded . On the 9th, about

1820, the sweep forces just west of the railroad track s

came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire a s

well as a mortar salvo outside of the hamlet of Xuan

Dai (2). Taking casualties of 1 dead and 11 wounded ,

the infantry pulled back and called for artillery support

and airstrikes. After the last air mission, the Marin e

companies clambered over the tracks which fronted th e

hamlet on the west and pushed into Xuan Dai (2) .

Thirty minutes after the initial action, the Marines

secured the hamlet. As a result of this action, the

Marine battalion reported 80 enemy killed . A Stingray

patrol about 1900 observed some 200 enemy troop s

moving to the southwest of Xuan Dai and called i n

**Lieutenant Colonel Mueller recalled that the operation " ver y

quickly became operation Allen Brook" in that his two other companies "and a myriad of support was attached to my battalion ." A No

Name " operation usually involved two companies with minimum sup -

port . The concept was to " reinforce quickly when significant contac t

was made." LtCol Charles E . Mueller, Comments on draft, n .d . Uan95)

(Vietnam Comment File).

328
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 32 9

Photo is from Abel Collectio n

Liberty Bridge over the Ky Lam River and a collapsed bridge beside it are visible from the air . The

bridge connected An Hoa and Go Noi Island to Da Nang

both artillery and another air strike which resulted in a

secondary explosion. 4

For the next four days, the Marines again met onl y

sporadic resistance and encountered no regular NVA

units. In fact, up through the 13th, the indications

were that the enemy troops that the Marines had

engaged to that point except for the fight for Xuan Da i

were from the usual VC units known to be in the G o

Noi. Even the enemy force in Xuan Dai did not appear

to be an NVA tactical unit. According to recovered

documents and to a prisoner captured in that fight, the

enemy in Xuan Dai were from the 155th Battalion, 2d

NVA Regiment. Marine intelligence officers believed the

155th to be a temporary infiltration group rather than

a regular NVA battalion . 5

Hoping to find the suspected NVA regular unit s

from the 2d NVA Division believed to have returned t o

the Go Noi, the Marine command decided to reorient

Allen Brook from east to west . On 13 May, Genera l

Robertson reinforced the 2d Battalion with Company

I, 3d Battalion, 27th Marines. While the other three

companies attached to the 2d Battalion reversed their

direction, Marine helicopters lifted Company I, 27th

Marines into a landing zone in the Que Son Mountain s

to the south overlooking Go Noi Island . The followin g

day Company I moved down to blocking positions

near the Ba Ren River where it was joined by the othe r

Marine companies now advancing to the west . On the

15th, at 1400, the 2d Battalion with all four Marine

companies with the attached tanks arrived back at Liberty Bridge . In their reverse march, the Marines had

encountered the same "harassing small arms and mortar fires and fluid guerrilla tactics" that had characterized the operation for the most part up to that time . 6

Operation Allen Brook appeared to be at an end .

At least that was what the Marines wanted the enemy

to believe. At 1800, on the 15th, Marine helicopters

helilifted Company E and the command group of th e

2d Battalion, 7th Marines out of the operational area.

The commander of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,

Lieutenant Colonel Roger H . Barnard, then assumed

command of the remaining forces in Allen Brook . To

continue the "tactical deception," Lieutenant Colone l

Barnard ordered the units still in Allen Brook to cross

Liberty Bridge as if the Marines were closing out the

operation . Then shortly after midnight on the 16th,
330 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37444 2

A Marine from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines during Operation Allen Brook cautiousl y

approaches a damaged hut. The VC dominated the hamlets in the Go Noi .

the command group of the 3d Battalion togethe r

with Companies A of the 1st Battalion and G of th e

2d Battalion, 7th Marines, together with Company I,

3d Battalion, 27th Marines, recrossed the Thu Bo n

River and "moved in a single file under cover of darkness for security." Ironically, the 3d Battalion had

none of its own organic companies in the operation as

it reached its line of departure about 2,500 meters

northeast of Liberty Bridge, just north of the objective area, a few hours prior to dawn . According to

Barnard, Colonel Hall, who had monitored the radio

traffic, "was beside himself with the success" of the

plan to reenter the Go Noi .7 *

Lieutenant Colonel Barnard remembered that hi s

objective "was a suspected NVA installation . . . . We

had reason to believe they did not know we were ther e

*Colonel Barnard credited the 7th Marines commander, Colone l

Hall, with the idea of openly pulling out the 2d Battalion, and unobtrusively bringing in the 3d Battalion under cover of darkness . According to Barnard, Hall "was convinced that after a week of 2/7 stirrin g

up the AO [Area of Operations], we could fool the enemy into believing the Marines had had enough ." Col Roger H . Barnard, Comments

on draft, dtd 13Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

. . . ." According to the battalion commander he was to

attack to the south with the mission "to search for, fix ,

and destroy the enemy." As the Marines advanced wit h

two companies on line and one in reserve, they were

"hoping to execute a major surprise ." In fact, both sides

were to surprise one another. About 0900 on the morning of the 16th, the 3d Battalion encountered an NVA

battalion in the hamlet of Phu Dong (2) about 4,00 0

meters west of Xuan Dai, the scene of the latest heaviest fighting. According to Barnard, "we hit a hornet's

nest." Two of his companies came under deadl y

machine gun fire and the battalion commander

described the situation "like being in the butts at the

rifle range." The Marine battalion tried to flank the

enemy position, but as Barnard recalled, "we neede d

more resources than we had for the situation ." He

recalled that even maximum supporting artillery an d

mortar fire failed to break the NVA defenses . Finally,

extensive close air support, including over 50 air strikes ,

"carried the day." By early evening, the Marine infantry

which had fought continuously throughout the day i n

the oppressive heat finally forced the NVA out of thei r

trenches and bunkers. Afraid of encirclement, the
3D BN, 7TH MARINES PARTICIPATION

IN OPERATION ALLEN BROOK,

1 52400H MAY 68 THROUGH 1 80600H MAY 68

3.'? CROSSED RIVER

VC LIBERTY BRIDGE - AT240015MAYI3E -.

KILOMETER

MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 331

Map Courtesy of Col Roger H. Barnard, USMC (Ret)

enemy withdrew leaving more than 130 dead in the

hamlet. Marine losses were also heavy: 25 dead and 38

wounded. One Marine, Second Lieutenant Paul F.

Cobb, a platoon leader with Company A, and one Navy

hospital corpsman, Robert M. Casey with Company G,

were both awarded the Navy Cross posthumously for

their actions in the fight for Phu Dong (2).8

Despite the Marine losses, Colonel Hall, the 7th

Marines commander, believed that his plan had been a

success. Barnard's unit had uncovered the North Vietnamese units in the Go Noi and hit them before they

were able to mass their forces. Lieutenant Colonel

Barnard later wrote, "when all enemy resistance ceased

and the dust had settled it was clear we had . achieved a significant victory." The suspected NYA

installation was an "NVA regimental headquarters,

with attendant security and a major staging area for

supplies The battalion commander remembered

that the enemy supplies were so extensive, that they

could not evacuate them to the rear. Marine helicopters, however, took out the casualties and the battalion "received water and ammo resupply." Colonel

Hall directed Barnard to continue his southward

advance the next morning.9

After an uneventful night, in which the battalion

had moved twice, it started out at dawn from a line of

departure, just north of the hamlet of Le Bac (2).

Advancing southward, the battalion was again in a column of companies, with Company I, 27th Marines in

the lead, and Companies A and G of the 7th Marines,

and the battalion command group, following in trace.

Lieutenant Colonel Barnard remembered, "We were in

open country, without a defined objective." If Company I made contact, Barnard planned to use Company A

as a maneuver unit and Company G in reserve.t0

As events turned out, the Marine battalion ran into

even stronger resistance than the previous day. That

morning, as Company I came upon a dry river bed

with a densely wooded treeline on the northern bank

bordering the hamlet of Le Nam (1), just above Route

537, the North Vietnamese spmng an ambush from

elaborate defenses "of significant width." Strong enemy
resistance and the terrain combined to prevent Lieu- ing movement. In the meantime, as the reports from

tenant Colonel Barnard's initial efforts to come to the Company I "were not good," Barnard ordered Compa -

assistance of his embattled company. Upon hearing of ny G to join the embattled unit. Enemy resistance,

the contact and the extent of the enemy defenses, he however, proved too strong and prevented Company G

immediately ordered Company A to attempt to flank from advancing. A frustrated battalion commander

the enemy from the west . While the ground was flat, called for artillery and air support. He remembered

it was covered with tall grass which impeded the flank- that as his command group with Company A strug-
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 33 3

gled through the tall grass, he had his artillery and ai r

officers "calling mission after mission . . . ." The situation for Company I was already desperate when

Colonel Hall, the 7th Marines commander, radioe d

Barnard that the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines would

make a helicopter assault to the south in order t o

relieve the pressure on his battalion . "

Lieutenant Colonel Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., the

commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 27th

Marines, remembered that his unit had been on alert

for Allen Brook and was to relieve the 3d Battalion ,

7th Marines. In fact the 27th Marines, under Colone l

Adolph G. Schwenk, Jr., was scheduled to take

responsibility for the operation from the 7th Marine s

later that day. Early on the morning of the 17th, Lieutenant Colonel Woodham had received orders to truck

his battalion down to Liberty Bridge and then cross

the bridge on foot to make the planned relief. At this

point, he had only two of his companies with him ,

Companies K and L . His Company M was the Da

Nang Air Base security company and Company I, of

course, was attached to Barnard's battalion. Upon

learning of the predicament of his Company I, Wood -

ham conferred with Schwenk and agreed upon th e

helicopter assault. For the time being, Woodham 's

battalion would be under the operational control o f

the 7th Marines.1 2

After some unexpected delays in the arrival of the

aircraft and in coordination with the air preparation o f

the landing zone, about 1500 on the 17th, Marine

helicopters finally brought the battalion into An Tam

(1) about 1,000 meters southeast of Le Nam (1). Even

Heavily sweating Marines from the Command Group of the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines assist in the evacuation of a n

injured Capt Robert R. Anderson, who had attempted to reach the embattled Company I. With temperatures reaching 110 to

120 degrees, heat was as much the enemy as the NVA .

Photo courtesy of Col Tullis J. Wood ham, Jr. USMC (Ret)
334 THE DEFINING YEA R

as the battalion landed, it came under mortar and longrange weapons fire . Despite the enemy fire, the two

Marine companies immediately attacked northward t o

link up with the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. With

extensive air and artillery support, Company K, 27th

Marines broke through the enemy defenses in Le Nam

(1), and finally linked up with Company I about 1930

that evening. According to Lieutenant Colonel Wood -

ham, as darkness approached, the North Vietnames e

resistance ceased and they began to withdraw from th e

battle area .1 3

The heavy fighting for Le Nam (1) had resulted i n

39 Marines dead and 105 wounded as opposed to 8 1

North Vietnamese dead. Company I especially had suffered grievous losses. Of the total Marine casualties i n

the battle, Company I had sustained 15 killed and 5 0

wounded. Among the dead were Captain Thomas H.

Ralph and two of his platoon leaders. The casualties of

the company may have been even higher if it had not

been for the heroics of Private First Class Robert C .

Burke . A machine gunner with the company, he quickly took his weapon "and launched a series of one-ma n

assaults" against the enemy emplacements . Providing

covering fire, he permitted other members of Company I to come up and remove the wounded fro m

exposed positions. He continued to advance upon th e

enemy and to suppress enemy fire until he fell mortally wounded. He was awarded the Medal of Honor

posthumously. 14

During the night of 17—18 May, the two Marin e

battalions, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and the 3 d

Battalion, 27 Marines, remained in separate positions, but in radio contact. Lieutenant Colonel

Barnard had moved to a night position near Cu Ban

(4), about 1,000 meters to the northwest of Le Na m

(1), while Lieutenant Colonel Woodham retained his

command group at An Tam (1). About 1900, Lieutenant Colonel Barnard had turned over operational

control of Company I to Woodham and then bega n

preparations to start out at dawn on the 18th for Liberty Bridge. Essentially, Operation Allen Brook was

over for the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which would

leave as planned the next day and be replaced by the

3d Battalion, 5th Marines.I 5

By that time the 27th Marines, under Colone l

Schwenk, had assumed responsibility for Operatio n

Allen Brook which would continue in the Go Noi . On

the morning of the 18th, Lieutenant Colonel Woodham began to expand his perimeter around Le Nam

(1). About 0930, the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines began

to take sniper fire from Le Bac (2), about 300 meters to

the north . Lieutenant Colonel Woodham immediately

sent Companies K and L to clear out what he though t

were a relatively few snipers . The " few snipers " turned

out to be a formidable North Vietnamese force which

quickly brought the Marine attack to a halt . Under an

"exceedingly heavy" volume of fire, the lead elements

of both Companies I and K remained isolated an d

unable to maneuver. Woodham called for both artiller y

and air, but their effectiveness was limited because o f

the proximity of the Marines to the enemy . Both companies, but especially Company K, sustained several

casualties and the intolerable heat soon became a s

much a factor as the enemy bullets.1 6

At 1500 that afternoon, Marine helicopters brought

in Company M, which had already been alerted to

replace the combat-impaired Company I . As the latte r

company boarded the helicopters for the return trip t o

Da Nang, Woodham thrust the newly arrived Company M into the battle for Le Bac (2) . With the reinforcements, Company K, which had taken the most

casualties, was able to pull back and Lieutenant

Colonel Woodham placed it in reserve . The fighting

raged on until the night when the NVA withdrew . The

Marine companies pulled back to Le Nam (1) and

Woodham brought in air and artillery to the rear of the

former NVA positions. The battalion had sustained

serious casualties: 15 Marines were dead, another 3 5

were wounded, and 94 troops had succumbed to the

heat. In and around the abandoned enemy position la y

20 dead North Vietnamese .

Operation Allen Brook would continue to focus

through 27 May largely on the Cu Ban, Phu Dong, and

Le Bac village complexes. Beginning with the action o f

the 16th, the 7th, and later the 27th Marines, were i n

a more or less a conventional battle against well dug-i n

and relatively fresh and well-trained North Vietnamese

regulars. Colonel Schwenk, the 27th Marines commander, commented that while the enemy troops di d

not initiate any offensive actions, they fought back

"tenaciously" from concealed positions within treeline s

and in the hamlets themselves . To offset the Marin e

advantage in supporting arms, the NVA would allo w

"the point of advancing units to pass through" and

then open up on the "main body" with both intens e

small arms fire and mortars. At this close range, th e

Marine command could then make only limited use o f

artillery and air support.1 7

To counter this tactic, the 27th Marines used heavy

preparatory fires from both U.S. Navy gunfire ships

offshore and artillery in coordination with air strikes t o

blast the enemy out of their bunkers and trenches
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 33 5

Photo courtesy of Col Tullis J . Woodham, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., commander of the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, left, waits to hear about the situation in L e

Bac from his operations officer, Maj Ernest T. Fitzgerald, using the radio, during Allen Brook .

before moving into an area. If a Marine unit encountered heavy small arms fire, it was either to hold its

position or move back so that supporting arms could

be employed as much as possible under the circumstances. Colonel Schwenk remarked that tanks wit h

their 90mm guns proved most effective in these circumstances, both with high explosive rounds to breach

enemy fortifications and with canister rounds against

troops in the open. Schwenk wrote that once he committed the tanks, "the enemy would break contact

almost immediately." The tanks were also at a disadvantage, however, in that the terrain "caused . . .

{them} to become channelized making them highl y

vulnerable to RPG fire and mines." On 24 May, two

Marines from the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, Corporal Richard W. Buchanan from Company M and Private First Class Charles R. Yordy, from Company K ,

were later awarded the Navy Cross for their actions

that day in Le Bac (1) about 800 meters northwest of

Le Bac (2). The fight for Le Bac (2) lasted until the

27th and featured some of the heaviest combat of th e

campaign until a torrential rain storm ended the fighting. Lieutenant Colonel Donald N . Rexroad, the commander of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, remembered

that his battalion near the end of the month overran

"an apparent NVA regimental command post ." 18

Casualties on both sides had been heavy . For the

entire operation through the end of May, the Marine s

reported to have killed over 600 of the enemy. They

themselves sustained since the beginning of the operation 138 killed, 686 wounded including 576 seriou s

enough to be evacuated, and another 283 non-battl e

casualties that had to be evacuated . The number of heatinduced "non-battle casualties" had soared towards th e

end because of the extreme high temperatures averaging almost 110 degrees and the physical exertio n

expended in the firefights . In many engagements, th e

number of heat casualties equalled or exceeded th e

number of Marines killed and wounded .' 9

In Operation Allen Brook, the Marines believed

they had broken the back of a planned enemy attack o n

*The 7th Marines in its account reported only seven non-battl e

casualties through 17 May. It can be assumed then that the bulk ofth e

heat casualties occurred after the 27th Marines cook over the operation .

For the period 4—17 May, the 7th Marines account showed that th e

Marine units in Allen Brook sustained 85 killed and 359 wounded ,

323 of whom were evacuated in addition to the non-battle casualties .

1/7 AAR, Allen Brook .
A OPERATION MAMELUKE THRUST

MAY1968

5 10 Kilometers I I

H

*id(' t'

.1

.1

336 THE DEFINING YEAR

Da Nang. Colonel Hall of the 7th Marines later wrote

that his 3d Battalion's reentry into the Go Noi under

cover of darkness in the early morning hours of 16 May

foiled the designs of the enemy which had begun to

stage its forces. Hall observed that the North Vietnamese unit engaged by his units was from the 36th

Regiment, 3 08th NVA Division. According to a North

Vietnamese prisoner from the 2d Battalion of that regiment, his unit had departed North Vietnam in February and only arrived in the Go Noi the night of the

15th with orders to assault allied positions north of the

Thu Bon and Ky Lam Rivers. The 27th Marines would

engage both the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 36th during the fighting in the Cu Ban and Le Bac complex.20

The appearance of the 36th Regiment in the Go Noi

was of some concern to the Marine command. III MAF

and the 1st Marine Division had expected to find elements of the 2d NI/A Division which previously had

used the sector during the Tet offensive. This was the

first evidence that any unit of the 3 08th NVA Division

had ventured so far south. There were already indications that the North Vietnamese had built up their

regular forces in the Da Nang sector. From 16—25 May,

just to the east of the Marine units on the Go Noi, the

51st ARVN regiment, reinforced by two Ranger battalions, in a series oi running battles engaged approximately two enemy battalions. While sustaining casualties of 53 dead and 144 wounded, the ARVN claimed

to have killed 284 of the enemy during this period.

Mini-Tet and Operation Mameluke Thrust,

May 1968

By mid-May it was apparent that the enemy

buildup in the Go Noi sector was part and parcel of the

long-awaited second phase of the enemy's "Tet" offensive. Outside of the flareups in the capital city of

Saigon and especially in the eastern DMZ near Dorig

Ha with some of the bloodiest combat of the war, the

renewed fighting elsewhere was only a pale reflection

of the first "Tet." Called "Mini-Tet" by the allies, this

second enemy offensive largely confined itself to rocket and mortar fire and small ground probes against the

major bases and attacks against the most vulnerable of

the Special Forces camps near the Laotian border.

Still the enemy "Mini-Tet" could not be taken lightly. At Da Nang, in all probability it was the Marine

thrust into the Go Noi that forestalled a renewed enemy

ground assault on either the airfield or city itself. While

enemy infantry units were unable to penetrate the

Marine defenses, NVA rocketeers increased their efforts

throughout I Corps. [See Chart) At Da Nang, from 5

May through 29 May, enemy rockets fell on major

installations, including Marble Mountain, the main airfield, the FLC, and III MAE headquarters, on 12 separate occasions with the highest number of incidents, 4,

on the first day of the attacks. In the Da Nang TAOR,

*See Chapter 15.
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 337

ENEMY EFFORTS AGAINST MAIOR III MAF BASES : MAY 1968

DATE TIME INSTALLATION TYPE ATTACK CASUALTIES MATERIAL DAMAG E

5 May 0120 III MAF Hq 5-122mm Rkts 4 KIA, 8 WIA Mino r

5 May 0150 Airbase 1-122mm Rkt None None

5 May 0200 FLC 15-122mm Rkts 3 KIA, 15 WIA Minor

5 May 0600 FLC 5-122mm Rkts None Non e

8 May 2100 NSA Bridge Cargo Complex 4-122mm Rkts None None

9May 0031 Airbase 4-122mm Rkts None None

9 May 0155 Airbase 5-122mm Rkts 5 WIA 1 Air Force F-101and 1 C-130 (light), 1 crater in runwa y

11 May 2345 Airbase 6-140mm Rkts None 2 EA-6A and 1 RF-4B (minor) .) crater in runway

12 May 1758 Airbase 4-122mm Rkts 1 WIA 2 VNAF A-1 (minor)

22May 0004 FLC 12-122mm Rkts 1 WIA 10 2 1/2 ton trucks and 1 supply building damaged

29May 0140 Airbase 5-140mm Rkts None 1 C-117 (substantial) and 1 TA-4F (limited )

MARBLE MOUNTAIN

DATE TIME INSTALLATION TYPE ATTACK CASUALTIES MATERIAL DAMAGE

5 May 0151 Air Facility 41 Rds MtrlRkts 1 WIA 2 CH-53 (minor)

12 May 1905 Air Facility 20 Rds Rkts 1 KIA, 17 WIA 4 CH-53 (2 substantial, 2 minor), 3 CH-46 and 1 0-1 (minor )

20 May 0120 Air Facility 11 Rds Mtr 3 WIA 7 UH-1E (1 substantial, 1 minor 5 limited )

4 CH-46 (limited),Control Tower tminor) and

Base Operations Building (minor )

22 May 0211 Air Facility 12 Rds Mtr 4 WIA 2 CH-46 (limited), 2 UN-1E (minor )

DATE TIME INSTALLATION TYPE ATTACK CASUALTIES MATERIAL DAMAG E

5 May 0151 MAG-13 and Runway 27-122mm Rkts None 3 F-4B (minor), 1 HAWK missile launcher and

_ 3 missiles destroyed

8 May 1750 MATCU-67 2-122mm Rkts 1 KIA, 2 WIA Ground Approach Radar Installation destroyed

11 May 2207 MAG-13 Ordnance Area 3-122mm Rkts None Minor

14 May 2317 MAG-13 Barracks Area 2-122mm Rkts 2 KIA, 15 WIA 1 Living Quarters destroyed, 5 Living Quarters and

1 Supply Building damage d

23 May 0155 MAG-13 Area 10-122mm Rkts None MAG-13 )'X destroyed

, 26 May 0125 Runway 7-122mm Rkts None Non e

PHU BAI/CAMP EVANS/CAMP EAGLE

DATE TIME INSTALLATION TYPE ATTACK CASUALTIES MATERIAL DAMAGE

5 May (205 Camp Eagle I4-Rkts None None

19 May 1925 Camp Evans 12-I22mm Rkts I K IA, 13 WIA 5 US Army helicopters destroyed . 107 helicopters an d

6 fixed wing aircraft damage d

21 May 0(130 -

0630

Camp Eagle 300 Rds I22m m

and GroundAtk

8 K IA . 20 W IA Minor

21 May 0057 Phu Bai (Camp Hochmuthl 153-82mm Mtr 33 WIA Minor

27 May (250 Phu Bai Airfield 98-82mm Mtr 5 K IA, 32 WIA 5 US Army fixed wing aircraft (minor). 6 CH-46 (minor).

6 UH-1E and 3 CH-53 (limited )

DATE TIME INSTALLATION TYPE ATTACK CASUALTIES MATERIAL DAMAGE

5 May 0310 New Quang Tri Airfield 20. 122mm Rkts None I CH-46 destroyed . 2 UH-34 and 1 UH-1E (limited)

17 May 0950 Old Airfiel d

(South of Quang Tr( City)

4-122mm Rkts 4 WIA 3 US Army CH-47(substantial )

_

Chart from FMFPac, MarOpsl May68, p. 58
338 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37154 3

Under a covering smoke screen, Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines crosses the Vu Gia River in Operation Mameluke Thrust . The battalion would follow the river into the western highlands near Thuong Duc .

the 7th Marines alone reported 77 mortar incidents as

opposed to 15 in April .2 1

The whereabouts of the 2d NVA Division also wa s

worrisome . In their one major success during Mini-Tet ,

on 10—12 May 1968, elements of that North Vietnamese division had overrun the Special Forces camps

at Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc in western Quang Ti n

Province near the Laotian border, about 60 miles

southwest of Da Nang . Concerned about the buildup

of enemy forces in the Go Noi and to the west near th e

Special Forces Camp at Thuong Duc about 35 mile s

closer to Da Nang than Kham Duc, General Cushman

had few troops to commit to the relief of the other two

Special Forces camps. Supported by both Generals

Abrams and Westmoreland, Cushman ordered th e

evacuation of Kham Duc . *

Even before the abandonment of Ngog Tavak an d

Kham Duc, Cushman had planned an operation i n

the western highlands to include the region near

Thuong Duc . On 9 May, III MAF had directed Majo r

General Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commander, to conduct a spoiling attack deep into the

valley region west of Da Nang, that was eventually to

*See Chapter 26 for more details about the fight and evacuation of

Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc .

be codenamed "Mameluke Thrust." While Alle n

Brook in the Go Noi delayed the initiation of the ne w

operation, the possibility that the NVA units tha t

overran the more southerly Special Forces cam p

might next try to take Thuong Duc was an ever-present consideration . This was the reason for the

replacement of the 7th Marines ' battalions in the Go

Noi by the 27th Marines.2 2

The 1st Marine Division's mission for Operation

Mameluke Thrust was to conduct "offensive operation s

to find, fix and destroy en[emy} forces in [the} tactical

area of interest ." The NVA units believed to be located

in the area of operations included the 31st Regiment,

341st Division, the 368B Rocket Regiment, two unidentified battalions, the headquarters of Military Region V,

and possibly, command elements of Group 44. The

expected duration of the operation was 21 days.23

On 19 May, the 1st Marine Division struck . Colone l

Hall's 7th Marines, with its own 1st Battalion ,

attacked west along the Song Vu Gia toward Thuong

Duc. Further north, Colonel Bruce F. Meyers' 26th

Marines, which the previous day, on short notice, had

deployed south to Da Nang from Quang Tri, attacked

with its 3d Battalion into the hills overlooking th e

eastern end of the Song Lo Dong Valley—known to
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 339

the Marines as "Happy Valley. "* The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion placed Stingray patrols under the operational control of the two regiments to support the

operation and, as the attack progressed westward, th e

artillerymen of Lieutenant Colonel Clayton V. Hendricks' 11th Marines moved firing batteries forward t o

keep up with the advance .

By the end of May, Lieutenant Colonel William S.

Fagan's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines had swept the hills

along both banks of the Song Vu Gia and its tributary,

the Song Con, to a point four kilometers beyon d

Thuong Duc, and returned to their starting point a t

the eastern end of the valley. Lieutenant Colonel John

C. Studt's 3d Battalion, 26th Marines was deep in th e

jungle-clad hills south of Happy Valley.** Neither unit

made significant contact with the enemy, but both

found large supply caches. While the much-heralded

enemy "Mini-Tet" offensive appeared to have spent

itself at least in the Da Nang area of operations, the 1st

Division decided to keep both Operations Allen Broo k

and Mameluke Thrust going and carry the fight to th e

enemy in his former strongholds.

Operation Allen Brook Continues

During the last four days of May, the 1st Marine

Division rotated fresh units into the Allen Brook area

of operations. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. McEwan's 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, veterans of the

defense of Khe Sanh, arrived on the 26th, and Lieutenant Colonel John E . Greenwood's 1st Battalion,

27th Marines relieved Lieutenant Colonel Woodham 's

3d Battalion, 27th Marines two days later. As May

*Colonel Meyers recalled that he "received an excellent briefing

from Lieutenant Colonel [Charles E .] Mueller [whose battalion, the 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines) . . . had operated on the western edge of the

valley for three weeks. " Meyers described Happy Valley as having a

triple canopy, with the first layer consisting of dense Kunai grass, elephant grass, and thick vines, extending up to 20 feet. The second layer

contained trees rising up to 60 feet, and the third layer consisted o f

large teak, mahogany, and ironwood trees which reached heights o f

110 feet. Colonel Meyers stated that he knew some jungle techniques ,

having " done deep jungle patrols with the Gurkhas in Malaya in thei r

campaign in 1959 . . .." Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dt d

20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyers Comments .

**Colonel Studt described the Happy Valley operation as "a chang e

of pace for 3/26, operating under triple canopy, constantly on th e

move ." He observed that enemy tactics counted "on neutralizing our

normally superior supporting arms by knocking down our point elements close in to their positions." Studt stated that, rather than walk

blindly into any ambush, "we used dogs extensively . . . consequently

in the several months that we spent operating in Happy Valley, we

never had a man ambushed, although we lost a few dogs." Col John C.

Studt, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

ended, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines departed Go Noi

Island and became the 1st Marine Division reserve . 2 4

Thereafter, III MAF maintained at least two battalions in Operation Allen Brook . At the beginning of

June, both the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines and the 1st

Battalion, 27th Marines were involved, still under th e

control of the 27th Marines headquarters . The 1st

Marine Division expanded the area of operations to

include the 27th Marines forward command post at

Liberty Bridge, as well as about 35 square kilometers

of rice farming area southwest of Go Noi Island .

The regiment's orders called for an ongoing "search

and clear" operation, a euphemism for the tediou s

process of methodically searching an area for enem y

personnel, facilities, supplies, and equipment . When

carried out to the degree of thoroughness which provided a measure of success, the procedure was slow and

sometimes ponderous. The extreme heat encountered

during Operation Allen Brook, combined with terrain

that included man-high elephant grass, as well as a

hostile, uncooperative local population, and frequen t

encounters with boobytraps and mines, made the

"search and clear" mission far more challenging than

its name implied.

On the morning of 1 June, a flight of nine Lockheed

C—130 Hercules aircraft conducted what was accurate -

ly known as an "inferno " mission, dropping more than

31,000 gallons of fuel in 55 gallon drums with igniters attached . While the intent was to burn away a considerable portion of the island's foliage, the mission wa s

not as successful as desired due to excessive dispersion

of the fuel and a heavy thunderstorm which followed

the drop.25

After this disappointment, the two battalions o f

Marines began the process of physically searching th e

area for signs of the enemy. The Marines trudged steadi -

ly across the island, from west to east and then back t o

the west again. Short, sharp contacts resulted when

enemy troops fired from well-concealed positions, causing the Marines to return fire and call for supportin g

arms. Upon overrunning the area from which the

enemy had fired, the Marines usually found little or

nothing. Occasionally, Marines detonated mines o r

boobytraps (referred to as "surprise firing devices" in th e

reporting system), often disguised as soft-drink cans, tea

bags, or even "Chieu Hoi" leaflets. 26 *** At night, with

the Marines in defensive positions, the enemy would

***A leaflet distributed by hand or airdrop as part of psychological

operations in support of the "Chieu Hoi " or " Open Arms" Campaign ,

which urged enemy troops to rally to the government of South Vietnam .
340 THE DEFINING YEAR

fire on listening posts from close range, or use mortar s

to harass the main perimeters . These activities caused

additional casualties and further frustration for the

Marines, who could not strike back effectively.

By 3 June, the 27th Marines had found little evidence of the enemy, causing the 1st Marine Division

to determine that the " recent lack of significant contact indicates enemy forces departed Allen Broo k

AO."27 Accordingly, the division reduced the scal e

of Operation Allen Brook, ordering the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines to depart Go Noi Island for operations elsewhere, and shrinking the Allen Broo k

AO. It would now include only that portion of Go

Noi Island west of the National Railroad and a

small area on the north bank of the Song Thu Bon,

opposite the island .

The 27th Marines ordered the 1st Battalion, 26t h

Marines to move westward along Route 537 on its

departure from the island, continuing the " search and

clear" process along the way. Simultaneously, the 1st

Battalion, 27th Marines also would move westward ,

on the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines.

By mid-morning on 5 June, the two battalions

were approaching their final objectives, having lost . 4

killed and 26 wounded to sniper fire and mines along

the way. As Company D, 26th Marines, under First

Lieutenant Daniel L . McGravey, neared the hamlet o f

Cu Ban (3), North Vietnamese hidden in a trenchlin e

and bunkers to the south fired on the 1st Platoon . The

Marines maneuvered to one flank, attempting t o

envelop the enemy, and Communist mortars joine d

the action. At the same time, 500 meters to the east ,

Company B, 26th Marines, under Captain James H.

Champion, also came under heavy fire and had a platoon caught in the open, unable to maneuver.

As the Marines called for mortars, artillery, and ai r

support to assist in suppressing the enemy fire, Lieu -

tenant Colonel Greenwood, commanding the 1st

Battalion, 27th Marines, dispatched his Company C ,

commanded by Captain Martin T. Farmer, to assist

the beleaguered 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. Company C hurried southward and made contact wit h

the northernmost flank of Company B, 26t h

Marines, then swung to the west and assaulted th e

nearby Communist positions . Almost immediately,

Captain Farmer and his second in command were

wounded by mortar fire . Attacking without "a proper base of fire" and without time to "adequatel y

reconnoiter" enemy positions, Company C, said

Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood later, "lost momentum, faltered, and stopped ."28

Company D, 26th Marines was still heavil y

engaged near Cu Ban (3) and now, both Company B,

26th Marines and Company C, 27th Marines were

being held down by enemy fire 500 meters east of th e

hamlet. The Communists, fighting from well-covere d

and expertly concealed positions, kept up heavy fire

with rifles, machine guns, and mortars. The Marines,

long accustomed to the luxury of fire superiority, found

that they were unable to employ their supporting arm s

effectively in such close quarters without endangerin g

friendly troops.

As casualties mounted, helicopters landed under fir e

to evacuate the wounded . Two Sikorsky UH—34 "Se a

Horse" helicopters suffered hits in the process, but neither were lost. In mid-afternoon, with the fight still

raging, Company A, 27th Marines, accompanied b y

three tanks, departed Liberty Bridge to join the fray.

Supported by the tanks and carefully using artiller y

and air support, the Marines attacked and overran the

enemy positions.

The Marines lost 7 killed and 55 wounded in this

hard-fought, but confused, action . They found 30

North Vietnamese dead . A machine gunner with

Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines summed u p

the battle from an infantryman's perspective : "We had

a bad-ass fire fight. . .it lasted for awhile. Then we

moved on."29

Although the Marines had finally made solid con -

tact with the enemy, the plan to reduce the Operatio n

Allen Brook commitment to a single battalion

remained in effect . On 6 June, the 1st Battalion, 26t h

Marines left the area and elements of the 1st Enginee r

Battalion arrived with the heavy equipment needed fo r

the new task assigned to Operation Allen Brook forces :

the virtual razing of Go Noi Island . The new missio n

called for the 27th Marines to "provide support and

protection for [an] engineer effort to systematicall y

eliminate all fortifications, dwellings, harbor sites, an d

hedgerows in [the] AO ."30 The first area scheduled to

be cleared was Cu Ban (3) .

The clearing project presented many challenge s

especially since Go Noi Island was thoroughly infested

with well-constructed enemy field fortifications. The

typical Go Noi bunker, based on a deep hole, had overhead protection constructed from rails and ties fro m

the nearby National Railroad . Some actually included

concrete . Covered with earth and camouflaged effectively, these positions were invisible from the air an d

only barely apparent from the ground. In some areas,

farmers had worked away the ground surrounding the
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 341

Photo courtesy of Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr. USMC (Ret)

Carrying out a program of "total destruction," Marine engineers bulldoze the hamlets in the Go No i

after the civilian population has been evacuated .

bamboo groves for so long that the groves appeared to

be raised on flat mounds of hard earth . The Communists burrowed under these groves to construct hidde n

bunkers with firing slits at ground level. In addition to

the fortifications built by the NVA and VC for their

own use, the hamlets contained bunkers built by the

local populace for family protection . These bunkers,

also built with materials salvaged from the National

Railroad, featured sloped roofs which deflected bomb s

and artillery projectiles. So strong were these bunkers

that some were undamaged by 2,000 pound bomb s

detonating 50 feet away. 3 1

As the engineers went about the business of destroying bunkers and filling in trenchlines, Lieutenan t

Colonel Greenwood provided them security and continued a program of aggressive patrolling with his fou r

companies. Contact with the enemy remained sporadic . As before the battle at Cu Ban, the enemy con -

tented themselves with occasional sniping, attacks o n

listening posts, harassing mortar fire on company

night positions, and an ever-increasing number o f

mines and boobytraps. Marines continued to fall prey

to heat, as well as to enemy action, for the daily temperature averaged 100 degrees, with humidity greate r

than 80 percent. In the still, thick air, heat casualties

sometimes ran as high as 10 percent, causing commanders to limit troop activity to the early mornin g

and late afternoon. While moving, the Marines did no t

carry excess equipment, leaving behind even their flak

jackets. To further exacerbate the Marine problems

with the intense heat, the enemy contaminated th e

water wells in the area with oil and dead animal carcasses and the local river water was seemingly impervious to the attempts to purify it with halazone tablets.32 *

The battalion continued the " search and clear" routine (while the engineers gave a whole new meaning to

the "clearing" aspects of the mission) without significant contact until 15 June . At 0330 that morning,

behind a curtain of B—40 rockets and heavy automati c

weapons fire, Communist troops fell upon Compan y

B's night position near the National Railroad . The

Marines returned fire with all organic weapons, fro m

rifles to antitank rockets, and called for artillery fir e

support. In the face of Company B's tenacious defense ,

the North Vietnamese broke off their attack an d

attempted to flee, but Company B Marines pursued

the broken enemy into the night, ending the engagement decisively. The next day, the Marines tallied 2 1

dead North Vietnamese, all victims of the abortiv e

attack. Company B suffered only three wounded .

The 1st Marine Division ordered the area of operations extended to permit the Allen Brook forces to

venture east of the National Railroad in pursuit of th e

enemy. Early on 19 June, an ad hoc force composed o f

elements of Companies B and D (under the command

*Halazone tablets were carried by the individual Marine for use i n

purifying locally gathered water.
342 THE DEFINING YEA R

of the executive officer of Company B) ran into a

North Vietnamese force near the hamlet of Bac Dong

Ban. One Marine platoon immediately went to

ground in the face of overwhelming enemy fire . As the

Marines called for air and artillery, another ad hoc

company (also composed of elements of Companies B

and D) moved to the rescue under the command of

Company B's commanding officer, First Lieutenan t

Richard M. Wozar.

The North Vietnamese were thoroughly dug in,

occupying a line of trenches and bunkers with thei r

backs to the Song Ky Lam. For nine hours, the battle

raged with neither side able to gain the upper hand .

Finally, at 1800, the battalion command group, with

Company A and a platoon from Company C, arrive d

and attacked from the west. Swinging northward, the

reinforcements assaulted the enemy positions whil e

Companies B and D provided a base of fire . By 1900,

the Marines overwhelmed the enemy, suffering 6 dead ,

19 wounded, and 12 heat casualties. By noon the nex t

day, the Marines found 17 North Vietnamese dead .33

The fight at Bac Dong Ban was the 1st Battalion's

last major battle in Operation Allen Brook . After completing a sweep of the eastern portion of Go Noi Island ,

they departed the area on 23 June and in their place, the

2d Battalion, 27th Marines assumed responsibility for

Operation Allen Brook . That night the North Vietnamese welcomed the fresh battalion to Go Noi Islan d

with 60 rounds of mortar fire on Companies E, F, and H .

The 2d Battalion, tasked to continue the land clearing

operations on Go Noi Island, arrived intent on carrying

out a program of "total destruction ." Their policy includ -

ed elimination of natural assembly areas, concealin g

foliage, treelines, bamboo groves, hedgerows, trenchlines ,

fighting holes, caves, bunkers, tunnels, building structures, and any natural or man-made feature providin g

cover. Material which could be used to build bunkers,

such as concrete blocks, beams, posts, pillars, and tree

trunks, would be destroyed by crushing or burning . In

the words of the battalion commander, Lieutenant

Colonel Albert W. Keller, "we were to level that island . "34

The 2d Battalion experienced only light enemy con -

tact throughout its stay at Go Noi Island . The enemy

appeared only in small groups, usually fleeing whe n

sighted by the Marines. Because of the sporadic nature of

enemy contact, much of the battalion's efforts centere d

on land clearing . In one 18-day period, the engineers

completely leveled the largest forested area on Go No i

Island .35 Lieutenant Colonel Keller later remarked that

"by the time we destroyed and leveled that whole area

. . . it looked almost like a parking lot for a major ball

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A65092 7

Two Mariner from BLT 2/7 step gingerly through muck and

water in a narrow ravine during Operation Swift Play in th e

Da The Mountain area south of the Go Noi. The unauthorized floppy hat worn by the Marine in the rear probably provides more protection from the elements than the helmet.

park in the United States."36 As part of its land clearing

effort, the battalion arranged two air-delivered herbicid e

missions which "were found to be quite effective."3 7

On 16 July, the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines departed Go Noi Island, having reported killing 144 enem y

at a cost of 4 Marines dead and 147 wounded . Simultaneously, the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines moved into

the area and assumed responsibility for Operatio n

Allen Brook. The character of the operation remained

unchanged as the companies of the 3d Battalion alternated between patrolling and providing security fo r

the engineers who were methodically scraping th e

island clean . The Communists continued to avoid significant engagements, but they did muster the temerity to fire on the aircraft which sprayed the island wit h

herbicides on 18 July and 21 July. Meanwhile, the

Marines continued to fire on small groups of enemy or

on Vietnamese voices heard in the night, then searched

the areas later to find an occasional body or blood trail .*

*Colonel Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., at the time the 3d Battalion ,

27th Marines commander, commented that he positioned a sniper an d

a 106mm recoilless rifle team on the north/south railroad trestle: "Th e

sniper would spot and kill or wound an enemy soldier. As other enemy

forces would attempt to aid the dead or wounded NVA the 106 woul d

take them under fire . " Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., Comments on draft ,

dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 343

Photo is from the Abel Collection

Two Boeing Vertol CH–46 helicopters from HMM–165 have landed troops from the 26th Marine s

in a landing zone in the An Hoa basin densely covered with elephant grass . The Marines will be

taking part in Operation Mameluke Thrust.

Although it appeared that the NVA battalion s

once thought to be based on Go Noi Island were

gone, intelligence sources indicated that the Communists would soon try to reoccupy the area .38 At the

request of the 1st Marine Division, Battalion Landin g

Team (BLT) 2/7 (Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force

"B") launched Operation Swift Play on 23 July 1968 ,

only 17 hours after having embarked on board

amphibious shipping at the close of Operation Eager

Yankee in Thua Thien Province .

Designed to complement Operation Allen Brook ,

Operation Swift Play was a surprise thrust into the

Da The Mountain area, six kilometers south of Go

Noi Island. After landing by helicopter, BLT 2/7

swept north toward the Song Chiem Son and the

Allen Brook area of operations . During the week-long

sweep, the Marines of BLT 2/7 uncovered numerou s

enemy caches and base areas, including what

appeared to be a training center, complete with lecture hall, carefully hidden in the steep, forested

mountains. On 31 July, BLT 2/7 crossed the Chiem

Son to Go Noi Island and relieved the 3d Battalion,

27th Marines of responsibility for Operation Alle n

Brook. Three days later, the 27th Marines ended its

participation in the operation altogether, passing control of BLT 2/7 to the 5th Marines, which had previ- On 3 June, General Robertson expanded th e

ously exchanged its area of operations near Phu Bai Mameluke Thrust area of operations eastward t o

with the 26th Marines. include the Song Thu Bon-Song Tinh Yen valley.3 9

Land-clearing operations continued until the Communists launched their long-awaited "third offensive "

on 23 August . With enemy activity on Go Noi Islan d

only minimal, the 1st Marine Division terminate d

Operation Allen Brook so that the forces could be

employed to battle the enemy forces threatening Da

Nang. Company E remained behind temporarily t o

escort the engineers to Liberty Bridge while the

remainder of BLT 2/7 departed by helicopter. On 24

August, as Company E and the engineer convoy of

trucks and earth-moving equipment headed westward

the enemy harassed them with sporadic sniper fire

until they cleared Go Noi Island .

Operation Allen Brook lasted three and one hal f

months and resulted in 917 enemy killed. An additional 11 were captured, and 2 rallied to the Government of Vietnam. The III MAF units which sought t o

bring Go Noi Island under government control lost

170 Marines and 2 sailors killed in action and a furthe r

1,124 wounded. Even more fell to heat, disease ,

snakebite, accidents, and a host of other hazards . All

the while they fought, Operation Mameluke Thrust

continued in the west.

Mameluke Thrust Also Continues
344 THE DEFINING YEA R

The western portion of this basin was the "Arizona

Territory" and the area on the east bank of the rive r

was the An Hoa sector. While the Arizona Territory, like Go Noi Island, had been tightly in the grip

of the Viet Cong for many years, the Marines had

managed to maintain a presence at An Hoa, eve n

while committed to the fighting on the nearby G o

Noi . While the 26th Marines took control of the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, General Robertson rein -

forced the 7th Marines with his only reserve, the 1s t

Battalion, 26th Marines for operations in the A n

Hoa basin.

In the western sector of Mameluke Thrust unde r

the 26th Marines, on 6 June, the 3d Battalion, 26t h

Marines established a patrol base on Hill 123 5

(known locally as Tho Thenon), the dominant peak of

the massif which overlooked the Da Nang-Hoi An -

Dai Loc Triangle, the Arizona Territory, Happy Valley ,

and the valley of the Song Thu Bon . At the same time ,

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines established its own battalion patrol base about two kilometers to the south ,

atop Hill 1062.

In the 7th Marines portion of the operation, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan's 1st Battalion, 26th Marines

began operations in the An Hoa area on the morning

of 7 June.* It did not have to wait long for action . At

0730, while moving southwest from Liberty Bridge ,

Company B came under fire from a North Vietnames e

force atop a low hill only 1,200 meters from the bridge.

The rest of the battalion quickly joined the action . As

the Marines maneuvered, the North Vietnames e

poured on a heavy fire, including machine guns an d

RPGs. The Marines called for artillery and close air

support, but the enemy doggedly held the hill for nine

hours, finally melting away at day's end . Marine casualties totaled 17 killed in action and 46 wounded .

They found 64 dead North Vietnamese . 4 °

In the mountains to the west, the enemy remaine d

elusive, avoiding contact even at the risk of losin g

large caches and base areas to the Marines. On 9 June ,

Company L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, under th e

command of Captain Jesse D . Bennett, captured a

recently abandoned NVA hospital. The complex contained 125 beds, medical supplies (including U.S . -

made antibiotics), a clean operating room, a sterilizing area, a kitchen, food, medical records, a system of

* Lieutenant Colonel McEwan related that Colonel Reverdy M . Hall ,

the commander of the 7th Marines, referred to him as the "magnet . . .

[since] 1/26 always made contact with the enemy . . . ." LtCol Frederic k

J. McEwan, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

running water built with bamboo pipes, and 1 6

pounds of marijuana . 4 1* *

On 11 June, acting on a prisoner 's information,

Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines located wha t

turned out to be the command post of the notorious

368B Rocket Regiment. The quantity of equipment captured there was staggering : rocket warheads, plottin g

boards, fire control devices, drafting tools, compasses ,

binoculars, hundreds of uniforms, and items of personal equipment. The entire haul totaled 18 helicopter loads.4 2

During the second week in June, the 1st Battalion ,

7th Marines swept eastward, down from the mountains, then terminated participation in the operation.

At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines

moved northward from An Hoa to the area bounded b y

the Thu Bon, Ai Nghia, and La Tho Rivers known a s

"Dodge City," and Lieutenant Colonel Donald N .

Rexroad's 3d Battalion, SthMarines moved to An Hoa.

The action seemed to follow the 1st Battalion, 26t h

Marines. On 13 June, only two days after entering the

Dodge City area, the battalion encountered a Nort h

Vietnamese force near the village of Ky Chau, one kilometer west of a line of ROK Marine blocking position s

along the National Railroad . The Communists were

cut off by the Song Ky Lam to the west and south, the

ROK's to the east, and the 1st Battalion, 26th Marine s

attacking from the north . They resolutely defende d

their position using heavy machine guns, 60mm mortars, and RPGs. In a nine-hour battle, the Marines lost

3 killed and 24 wounded, killing 44 of the enemy i n

the process. 43 Late that night, as Company B lay i n

ambush at the junction of a trail and the railroad bed ,

approximately 30—50 North Vietnamese attempted t o

escape to the east. In the ensuing fight, 15 of th e

enemy died, with the Marines sustaining no casualties.

Two days later, the enemy again ran afoul of the 1s t

Battalion, 26th Marines. Two kilometers southeast o f

the 7th Marines' command post on Hill 55, a large

North Vietnamese unit occupied a heavily fortified triangular-shaped position 500 meters wide, whic h

included a trenchline and a number of bunkers. The

**Colonel Bruce E Meyers, the commander of the 26th Marines,

related that under the Geneva Agreement, the medical supplies had c o

be used to treat captured prisoners of war. He remembered that all th e

supplies had to be evacuated out by helicopter. Among the supplies

were cartons of brassieres and tampons, although there was no othe r

indication of the presence of women . According to Meyers, the battalion surgeon practically cried when he had to give up the finely crafte d

East German medical instruments. He lamented to me, 'Col . Meyers,

these are better medical instruments than we get!'" Meyers Comments .
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 345

Marines fought the Communists through the afternoon of 15 June and into the early evening, makin g

liberal use of close air support and artillery. When the y

overran the enemy positions at 1930, the Marine s

reported 84 North Vietnamese dead . Their own casualties were 7 killed in action and 15 wounded 4 4

The action near Hill 55 marked the end of the

sweep through the Dodge City area and the focus o f

Operation Mameluke Thrust moved once again to the

western valleys. On 14 June, the 3dBattalion, 5th

Marines marched out from An Hoa, leaving CompanyK to guard the fire support base, and crossed the Son g

Yen into the Arizona Territory. Just across the river

from An Hoa, Company I came under attack. A Communist mortar round killed the company commander,

a platoon commander, and the company gunnery

sergeant and seriously wounded the company executive

officer, First Lieutenant Joseph T. Campbell . As the

only officer left alive, Lieutenant Campbell refuse d

evacuation and assumed command of the company. He

directed medevac helicopters into and out of the landing zone and organized suppressive fire on the Communist positions nearby. Before he himself could be

flown out, Lieutenant Campbell succumbed to his

wounds. For his heroic action, he received the Navy

Cross, posthumously.4 5

Northeast of Thuong Duc, another dramati c

action took place the following day when Compan y

K, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines received mortar fire

while escorting a convoy. Corporal David M . Sivak

volunteered to recover a machine gun abandoned during the initial contact. He crept uphill toward the

weapon until a North Vietnamese soldier in a nearby

fighting hole spotted him and began throwing hand

grenades. Although wounded in the chest by a fragment, Sivak emptied 12 full magazines from his M1 6

at his tormentor.

Sivak finally reached the machine gun and continued advancing into the enemy position . The NVA soldier suddenly stuck his head out from a hidden tunnel .

Deciding against running toward his comrades for fear

of being shot in the back, Corporal Sivak threw the

machine gun at the North Vietnamese, who then

ducked back into the tunnel .

The enemy soldier looked out from the tunnel a

second time and Sivak attacked with his bare hands .

Photo is from the Abel Collection

Marine Cpl David M . Sivak from the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines poses with various North Vietnamese weapons captured in a recent operation. In his hand he holds the K—Bar knife with which h e

killed a North Vietnamese soldier in a hand-to-hand fight.
346 THE DEFINING YEA R

The Communist fired his rifle, creasing Sivak's leg,

and Sivak knocked the weapon from the man's hands .

As the two grappled in the confines of the hole, the

North Vietnamese bit the Marine savagely on the arm .

Angered, Sivak bit him back, then drew his Kabar•

and stabbed his opponent. The enemy soldier produced his own knife and stabbed Sivak in the back ,

but it was too late. The Marine had gained the uppe r

hand. Sivak continued stabbing until he realized that

the man had died .

Corporal Sivak remained in the hole until his comrades overran the hill . From captured documents, the

Marines learned that the dead man was part of a nine -

man North Vietnamese mortar forward observer team .

Only when Sivak lost consciousness did his fellow

Marines realize that he was wounded .

Corporal Sivak's adventure was not yet over. The

story of his experience at the 1st Hospital Company is

best told in his own words, recorded only three weeks

after the incident :

I went to 1st Hospital and the doctor started checking me out for malaria and I told him that wasn't wrong

and he said, " What's wrong? " . . . . I said, "Well, I go t

stabbed in the back, I got bit in the arm, I got shrapnel

in the chest, and I got shot in the leg. " He couldn't

believe it until he looked at it . He thought it was kinda

funny. I wasn 't in a mood to laugh at it. They thought I

might have to get rabies shots from where I got bit in th e

arm, but I made out. All I had to do was get a tetanu s

shot. I was scared because rabies shots, you get 16 o f

them, they said, in the stomach. I got a weak stomach . 4 6

Corporal Sivak's platoon sergeant, reflecting on Sivak's

harrowing experience, said only, "I think the bite wa s

worser than the stab."47

Retaining control of the 3d Battalion, the 26th

Marines now absorbed the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines,

as well as Lieutenant Colonel Roger H. Barnard's 3 d

Battalion, 7th Marines. At 0815 on 17 June, two of

Barnard's companies conducted a helicopter assaul t

into the Hill 1235 area and began the task of patrolling

in the difficult terrain of Tho Thenon . After a respite

of five days for refurbishing, the 3d Battalion, 26th

Marines conducted a helicopter assault into the western end of Happy Valley, near the confluence of th e

Song Yang and the Song Iang . Meeting no opposition ,

the Marines turned to the now-familiar tasks of establishing a battalion patrol base and sweeping the

assigned area.

On 19 June, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines move d

westward from the fire support base at Hill 52, follow-

*The Marine Corps issue combat knife .

ing the Song Vu Gia toward Thuong Duc and searching the same ground covered one month before by th e

3d Battalion at the beginning of the operation. It was

the nature of the war that the only areas which wer e

known to be secure were those areas physically occupied, thus, it was often necessary to retrace old steps i n

the search for the enemy. But this time, the Communists carefully avoided contact.

The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines continued to pus h

through the valley, past Thuong Duc, then turne d

northward and followed the trace of the Song Yang to

link up with the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines in Happy

Valley on 27 June. The next day, the 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines linked up with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines

at the western edge of the Arizona Territory, southeast

of Thuong Duc, then left the operation.

Southeast of An Hoa, in the Que Son area, the U .S .

Army's Americal Division planned an offensive

dubbed Operation Pocahontas Forest. The 1st Marine

Division developed a plan to intercept Communis t

forces driven into the upper Song Thu Bon Valley b y

the Americal Division . At 1815 on 7 July, Battery A ,

1st Battalion, 13th Marines established a fire support

base on the west bank of the Song Thu Bon, near Nong

Son, about 11 kilometers southwest of An Hoa. 4 8 Its

mission was to provide artillery support to the Marin e

units which would be engaged in Operatio n

Mameluke Thrust/Pocahontas Forest . The next morning, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines conducted a helicopter assault into a landing zone along the Kh e

Dienne, also just west of the Song Thu Bon, but abou t

three kilometers upstream of the new fire support base

at Nong Son .

Elsewhere, on 9 July, Mameluke Thrust began to

expand once again as the 3d Battalion, 26th Marine s

attacked into the Dodge City area and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines entered the Song Cu De Valle y

(called "Elephant Valley") to conduct the "Northern

Phase" of the operation . In Elephant Valley, the 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines found "no signs of well-utilized trails, prepared positions, [or) camp and harbor sites of any sizeable enemy force ."49 On 19 July,

the battalion secured from the operation an d

returned to Phu Bai .

As intelligence reports continued to indicate th e

enemy planned a major attack on Da Nang during late

July, the 1st Marine Division redistributed forces to

meet the threat.50 On 20 July, the 1st Battalion, 26t h

Marines shifted from its blocking position near Non g

Son, back to An Hoa . Two days later, the 26th Marines,

with the 1st and 3d Battalions, went north to Phu Bai,
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 347

relieving the 5th Marines in Operation Houston .

The expected Communist ground assault on D a

Nang did not materialize during July. In place of it, the

enemy launched the heaviest mortar and rocket attack

on Da Nang since Tet. On 23 July, 143 rounds of rocket and mortar fire fell on the city and air base, killing

6 and wounding 76. The enemy fire damaged a runway, six helicopters, a Rockwell International OV—1 0

Bronco, and an Air Force Fairchild C—123 Provider.

Recognizing the need for further protection against th e

rocket threat, III MAF earlier had directed the erection

of a Da Nang Anti-infiltration System (DAIS) in cooperation with ARVN forces. At the beginning of July,

generally following the outer trace of the Da Nang

rocket belt, the 1st Marine Division had started work

on the DAIS, which was to include concertina and

barbed wire fencing, sensors, towers, and bunkers . By

the end of the month, Marine engineers and ARVN

had completed about 65 percent of the first of tw o

increments of the planned project. Obviously, the

uncompleted DAIS offered only a minor impedimen t

to the enemy rocketeers during the month .51 *

The Marines attributed the enemy's failure to carry

out the expected ground attacks in the city to the success of Operation Mameluke Thrust. As one unit history recorded:

Prisoners and documents continued to indicate tha t

the enemy had a definite plan for infiltration of Da

Nang city proper with sapper and related forces. . . . I t

appeared that Group 44 (Quang Da Special Zone) Headquarters endeavored to carry out such a plan . . ., but was

unable to consummate the action due to interdiction o f

his forces prior to initiation of his offensive . 5 2

During the last week of July, Colonel Paul G . Graham's 5th Marines redeployed to An Hoa from Phu Ba i

and began operations in the An Hoa basin immediately. The day it arrived, the 2d Battalion moved to th e

field, northeast of the fire support base, and soon

encountered numerous small North Vietnamese units.

After these initial engagements, contact tapered of

dramatically. By the end of the month, the enemy

appeared to have evacuated the An Hoa area.

In the Arizona Territory, the month ended with a n

unusual sighting reported by a reconnaissance team .

On 28 July, Stingray patrol "Scandinavia" sighted four

Soviet-built PT—76 tanks and a wheeled vehicle barel y

3,500 meters northwest of the An Hoa fire suppor t

base . An air observer confirmed the sighting and Scandinavia called for close air support and artillery fire o n

*See Chapter 28 for further discussion of the Da Nang barrier.

the area, resulting in four secondary explosions. 53 The

following morning, Teams Albrook and Scandinavia

reported two vehicles, at least one of which wa s

tracked, moving in circles about a kilometer northeas t

of the previous sighting . Scandinavia directed artiller y

and air attacks against the vehicles, but could no t

observe the target effectively. Later that day, an agent

report told of two destroyed armored fighting vehicles

in the same location as the first sighting. 54 To verify

these reports, Companies D and F, 5th Marine s

searched the area of the sightings, but found no evidence of tanks.

August began with a significant enemy contact fo r

Stingray patrol "Flaky Snow" in the Arizona Territory.

At 0405 on 1 August, a company of North Vietnames e

and Viet Cong rushed Flaky Snow 's position from the

north, using grenades, satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes, and RPG fire to overwhelm the Marines. The

enemy withdrew immediately, having killed 5 Marine s

and wounded 11 . To complicate matters further for

Flaky Snow, the attack temporarily knocked its radi o

out of action, which prevented it from calling for help.

The team got the radio working again at 0600, and

called for the reaction force. Within 20 minutes, hel p

arrived. The reaction force landed by helicopter, under

fire from the west, to find all of the observation post's

bunkers destroyed and a North Vietnamese flag flying

over the position. The Flaky Snow Marines claimed to

have killed seven of their attackers, but a search of th e

area revealed only three bodies. "

The frequency of enemy contact continued to rise

in the beginning of August. In the Arizona Territory

during the first two days of the month, A Troop, 1s t

Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division,

under the operational control of the 5th Marines ,

killed 96 Communists in 30 hours.5° The 5th Marine s

continued search and clear operations with Lieutenan t

Colonel Robert H. Thompson's 1st Battalion in the

Arizona Territory and Lieutenant Colonel James W.

Stemple's 2d Battalion northeast of An Hoa . Lieutenant Colonel Stemple recalled that his battalion

"was invested from the An Hoa combat base to Liberty Bridge, and was involved in activity with the

enemy on a daily basis . . . ."5 7

At 0915, on 6 August, Companies E and F engage d

a North Vietnamese company near the village of Cu

Ban, scene of many fights between the Communists

and Operation Allen Brook forces in the previou s

weeks. Corporal Robert G. Fante, a squad leader

assigned to Company F, maneuvered his men forward ,

pressing home the attack on the Communist positions.
348 THE DEFINING YEAR

Spotting a 75mm recoilless rifle, he singlehandedl y

assaulted the position, capturing the weapon and

killing or driving off its crew members. Corporal Fante

continued to lead his squad on a rampage through th e

enemy's defenses, clearing bunkers with hand grenade s

and pursuing the retreating North Vietnamese . He was

leading this advance when killed by enemy fire . For his

courageous acts, Corporal Fante was awarded the Navy

Cross posthumously.5 8

After overrunning the enemy position, the Marines

found 23 North Vietnamese dead and 34 tons of rice ,

in addition to the recoilless rifle captured by Corporal

Fante. Fante was the only Marine killed in the fight ,

but 21 others and 1 Navy corpsman suffered wounds.59

An additional 46 Marines sustained injuries when an

aircraft accidentally dropped a load of napalm bombs

on Company F's position during the fight . Lieutenant

Colonel Stemple recalled that a bomb hit the reserve

platoon of Company F and just missed his comman d

group by a few yards.60

The two battalions continued the search and clea r

operations in their assigned sectors for the next nin e

days without significant contact. The Marines searched

caves, bunkers, and dwellings, patrolled roads and ric e

paddies, and killed Communists one or two at a time .

Casualties continued to trickle into the hospitals an d

aid stations in the rear as Marines fell victim to the

familiar enemy formula : mines, boobytraps, and sniper

fire by day; harassing mortar fire by night.

Indications that the enemy was preparing to launch

his expected offensive continued to build . On 10

August, acting on intelligence reports, the 1st Marin e

Division issued instructions directing subordinat e

units to prepare to assist in the defense of the DaNan g

vital area . The order called for reduced "day workloads

. . . to allow adequate rest [for} all hands" and a concomitant increase in night activities . The tanks sighted in the Arizona Territory a few weeks earlier no w

caused a flurry of interest in reviewing and updatin g

the division's antimechanized plans.6 1

On 16 August, "usually reliable sources, in addition to two counter intelligence agents" disclose d

that the 402d Sapper Battalion, the R—20 Battalion ,

and possibly a regimental headquarters were locate d

three kilometers southeast of Liberty Bridge in th e

village of Chau Phong.G2 The location of such a larg e

concentration of enemy troops less than 30 kilometers south of Da Nang was a further indication tha t

the enemy offensive would soon begin, accompanie d

by the previously anticipated sapper attacks on th e

city proper. The 1st Marine Division acted quickly,

ordering the 5th Marines to surprise the enemy battalions at Chau Phong and to destroy them in thei r

staging areas.

At 2300, the night of 16 August, three Marin e

infantry battalions silently converged on the hamlet o f

Chau Phong (2). Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy E. Watson's BLT 2/7, participating in Operation Swift Play i n

the hills south of Go Noi Island, shifted into a blocking position 1,200 meters east of the objective along a

major stream. Stemple 's 2d Battalion, 5th Marine s

sealed the west side of the objective along anothe r

stream 2,000 meters from Chau Phong . The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, now under the command of Lieu -

tenant Colonel Rufus A . Seymour, flew into An Ho a

and conducted a night approach march into an assembly area near My Son (1), about five kilometers south -

west of the Communist positions . H—hour was set fo r

0700, 17 August .63

Lieutenant Colonel Ben A. Moore, Jr.'s gunners o f

the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines drew first blood wit h

an artillery preparation that began at 0400 and lasted

until 0700. The original plan called for the artillery

barrage to be followed by a low-level air attack, als o

dropping smoke and CS gas on the objective area .

According to Lieutenant Colonel Stemple, torrential

rains after midnight, however, forced the cancellatio n

of the air strikes until mid- and late-morning withou t

the smoke or CS. The original plan called for his battalion to initiate a predawn "attack by fir e " so as to confuse the NVA as to the direction of attack and to hol d

them in place . The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was the n

to make the main assault attacking northeast int o

Chau Pong (2). Stemple's troops opened fire, accordin g

to plan, but he recalled that inadvertently, elements of

BLT 2/7 moved in front of Seymour's battalion an d

delayed the main assault . About 200 North Vietnamese, however, attempted to flee to the east at 1200,

and Companies F and G, BLT 2/7 were waiting for

them. Marines of these two companies reported killin g

53 of the enemy while suffering only 11 men wound -

ed. At 1500, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines finall y

assaulted and captured the hamlet, finding "man y

enemy dead, weapons, equipment, and food supplies. "

The enemy cache yielded significant quantities of

stores, including 88 tons of rice and enough medica l

supplies to support 500 men .64

During the night of 17 August, the three battalions adjusted their lines . At first light, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines moved northward across a branc h

line of the National Railroad to search the hamlet of

Chau Phong (1). At the same time, BLT 2/7 crossed
MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 349

the stream toward the hamlet, then swung northward with orders to attack and seize the hamlets of

La Thap (1) and Le Nam (3), which were about 1,500

meters north of Chau Phong. At 0700, Company E,

BLT 2/7 engaged a North Vietnamese company

defending a low hill just northeast of Chau Phong .

The enemy troops, described as "fresh" and "deter -

mined," were well-equipped, even to the point of

wearing helmets and body armor. 6 5 The Marines

returned fire and attempted to envelop the enemy,

but the determined defense put up by the Nort h

Vietnamese drove them to cover. Taking up position s

600 meters away, the Marines directed artillery fire

and airstrikes (the latter including CS gas) on the

enemy, driving them from the hill . The North Vietnamese left 12 dead in the position, while Company

E lost 6 Marines killed, and 25 wounded . 66 On Company E's left, Company G, BLT 2/7 also encountere d

a North Vietnamese unit which similarly impede d

the battalion's attack to the north . With BLT 2/ 7

bogged down by these pockets of resistance, the 5t h

Marines modified the original plan and ordered the

2d Battalion, 5th Marines to capture the hamlets o f

La Thap (1) and Le Nam (3).

At 1500, as Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines

approached the objective, they engaged an enemy platoon defending the hamlet of La Thap (1). The Marines

advanced, returning fire, but enemy resistanc e

increased . A five-hour shootout ensued, during whic h

six flights of aircraft bombed the enemy, while the 2d

Battalion, 11th Marines provided a heavy dose of

artillery fire on the hamlet . At 2000, Company G

assaulted and captured the position, killing 37 Nort h

Vietnamese and effectively ending the battle of Chau

Phong. Seven Company G Marines died and 19 wer e

wounded in the fight. 6 7

Operation Mameluke Thrust continued for som e

time. But soon after the battle for Chau Phong, th e

Communists launched their long-awaited offensive i n

the Da Nang area, diverting III MAF's energies to deal

with the new threat. By this time in northern I Corps,

the 3d Marine Division had launched its own offensive

against the North Vietnamese Divisions in both th e

DMZ sector and in western Quang Tri Province .
PART IV

THE WAR CONTINUES:

OFFENSIVE AND

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
CHAPTER 1 8

3d Division Takes the Offensive

The Enemy Situation—The Offensive Takes Shape—The Eastern DM Z

The Pressure Continues—Into the Western Mountains—Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thie n

The Enemy Situatio n

In northern I Corps, enemy activity throughou t

Quang Tri Province was light and sporadic durin g

the early days of June . With the virtual destruction

of two regiments of the veteran 320th NVA Division

in the eastern sector of the DMZ in late May, enem y

ground activity in the province's northeaster n

quadrant decreased markedly . What enemy activity

there was, was generally limited to long-rang e

rocket and artillery attacks on allied positions from

within and north of the Demilitarized Zone .

Although squad- and platoon-sized enemy units

did engage wide-ranging allied patrols, no large

North Vietnamese force attempted to attack allied

installations or formations.

Further west, agent reports placed the 270th

NVA Regiment and 27th Independent Regiment in

Leatherneck Square, the area bounded by Co n

Thien (A-4), Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo .

Intelligence analysts assumed that these tw o

enemy units would not only attack allied installations in the region, but attempt to destroy th e

Cam Lo Refugee Resettlement Project and interdict Route 9 .

Within the central portion of the province, units

subordinate to the Quang Tri Liberation Front or 7th

Front, including elements of the 812th Regiment, and

the 808th and 818th Separate Battalions, although

unlocated, were poised to venture out of their jungle sanctuaries on the Quang Tri-Thua Thien

provincial border and launch attacks against Quang

Tri City and surrounding allied bases. Forward elements of the three enemy units were known to be i n

the countryside surrounding the city, attempting t o

obtain rice and recruits.

In the western reaches of the province, centered

on the Khe Sanh Plateau, the 304th NVA Divisio n

was joined in late May by the 88th and 102d Regiments, 308th NVA Division . The enemy regiments,

which had arrived recently from Hanoi, were to

reinforce the 304th and launch attacks against Khe

Sanh Combat Base and Route 9, from Ca Lu west to

the Laotian border. The number of enemy units

located within the Demilitarized Zone area and i n

Quang Tri Province at the beginning of June was

estimated at 36 infantry and 6 support battalions,

and confirmed enemy combat strength placed a t

23,100 troops. 1

The Offensive Takes Shape

Upon taking over in late May, the new 3d Marin e

Division commander, Major General Raymond G .

Davis, found the maneuver elements of the divisio n

generally occupying fixed positions in four operational areas centered on the Demilitarized Zon e

from Cua Viet to Khe Sanh . In the coastal lowlands,

or Napoleon-Saline area of operations, Colonel Milton A. Hull's 3d Marines and Lieutenant Colone l

George F. Meyers' 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

occupied Camp Kistler at the Cua Viet's port facility. The 1st and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, locate d

nearby, conducted periodic sweeps of the area north

and northwest of the port facility, while companies

of Lieutenant Colonel Meyers' battalion occupie d

the C—4 strongpoint and conducted similar sweep s

of the immediate area. Also under the operational

control of the 3d Marines were elements of Lieutenant Colonel Michael V. Palatas' 1st Battalion,

9th Marines.

Northwest of Cua Viet, in the Kentucky area o f

operations, the 9th Marines under Colonel Richard

B. Smith provided security for the outposts withi n

the area of operations, from Gio Linh to Cam Lo, a s

well as the major lines of communications, Routes

1, 9, and 561 . Under Smith's operational control

was Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Heath, Jr.'s 2d

Battalion, 26th Marines which secured the strongpoints at Con Thien, A—3, C—2, and C—2 bridge, al l

strung along Route 561, a north-south provincial

road stretching from the Demilitarized Zone t o

Cam Lo. The regimental headquarters and 1st and

3d Battalions, 26th Marines had been deployed t o

Da Nang on 18 May from the Quang Tri sector t o

351
352 THE DEFINING YEA R

participate in the 1st Marine Division's operation

Mameluke Thrust . *

Headquartered at Camp Carroll in the Lancaster II

area of operations were Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4t h

Marines and a battalion of the 9th Marines. The 1st

and 2d Battalions, 4th Marines, the latter organized a s

a battalion landing team (BLT), and the 2d Battalion ,

9th Marines secured combat bases at Camp Carroll ,

Thon Son Lam, and Ca Lu, all centered on Route 9. At

Ca Lu, under the operational control of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J .

Quick's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, which like the 2 d

Battalion, 4th Marines, was organized as a battalio n

landing team.* *

The largest of the division's four operational area s

was Scotland II, which encompassed the western thir d

of Quang Tri Province . Primary responsibility for operations within this area lay with the 3d Marine Division's Task Force Hotel, a multi-battalion task forc e

commanded by Assistant Division Commander,

Brigadier General Carl W. Hoffman. Hoffman's tas k

force consisted of two battalions of Colonel Stanley S .

Hughes' 1st Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis.

The three battalions under Brigadier General Hoffman's command were assigned the task of maintainin g

the defense of Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding outposts on Hills 881, 861, 950, and othe r

prominent terrain features. In addition, troops of the

task force secured Route 9, the vital overland resupply

route for the division's western-most fortified positions, from Landing Zone Stud and Ca Lu to Khe Sanh .

Providing artillery support for the division's ground

elements were the four organic battalions of the 12t h

Marines under the command of Lieutenant Colonel

Wilson A. Kluckman. A battery from the regiment, o r

another allied artillery unit under its operational control, was in position at every combat base and strongpoint, ready to support the maneuver battalions and to

*See Chapter 17 for Mameluke Thrust . Colonel John C. Studt,

who commanded the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, observed that hi s

battalion's stay at Quang Tri "was like R&R (rest and recreation) fo r

the troops after Khe Sanh . " Much of the mission around Quang Tri fo r

the battalion involved rice protection and night security. He recalled

that they had some success with " the idea of building small ambus h

killer teams around experienced deer hunters, i .e . if you can ambush a

deer, you should be able to ambush a VC." Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

** BLT 2/4 and BLT 3/1 were the landing forces of SLFs Alpha an d

Bravo, respectively . Both battalions had been ashore and attached t o

the 3d Marine Division since late January. On 3 June, BLT 3/ 1

returned to the operational control of SLF Bravo . See Chapter 30 .

respond to enemy attacks by fire on allied installation s

or populated areas. With the ground elements of the division generally tied to fixed positions, the tactical effectivenes s

of such a disposition of forces was limited. A considerable number of troops were needed to defend these

installations strung out along the Demilitarized

Zone . In turn, these fixed installations presente d

lucrative targets for both North Vietnamese groun d

forces and artillery gunners . Beyond immediate

allied patrol zones, large areas of Quang Tri Province

virtually belonged to the enemy.

The overall tactical situation in late May, there -

fore, might be viewed as one of balance . On the one

hand the North Vietnamese had been soundly

defeated in their attempts against major Marin e

bases at Khe Sanh and Dong Ha. On the other, allie d

forces had not attempted to penetrate the enemy 's

large base areas nor attempted to disrupt his suppl y

and infiltration routes deep in the mountainous jungles of western Quang Tri.

This tactical disposition of the division's force s

would be turned around with General Davis' assumption of command. Buttressed by the presence of two

U.S . Army divisions, which greatly strengthene d

troop density in northern I Corps, Davis prepared to

take the war to the enemy. After reducing the numbe r

of troops at fixed positions, he placed the 3d Marin e

Division in a more mobile posture, characteristic of

ongoing Army air cavalry and airborne operations.

The way to get it done," Davis later recalled, "was to

get out of those fixed positions and get mobility, to g o

and destroy the enemy on our terms—not sit there

and absorb the shot and shell and frequent penetrations that he was able to mount ." 2

As Lieutenant General Rosson's deputy at Provisional Corps, Vietnam, Davis had observed first-han d

the mobile operations of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. With extensive helicopter support, air cavalry troop s

"forgot about real estate" and applied the necessary

forces directly against enemy troop dispositions . 3

Drawing not only on these experiences, but also o n

classical amphibious concepts, and deep vertical

envelopment techniques developed during the lat e

1950s, he devised a synthesis that combined elements

of all three . 4

Davis' concept of mobile operations was dependen t

upon adequate and timely helicopter support . "I was

very fortunate in this," he was later to state, "that th e

later [and more powerful) model of the CH—46 was

arriving in-country in large numbers." In addition,
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 35 3

due to his close working relationship with Genera l

Rosson, Davis had the promise of Army helicopte r

support if needed.

This was a fine thing about my command out there ,

Rosson . . .guaranteed me that when we'd go into these

tactical operations, I never needed to look back over m y

shoulder a single time and wonder if I was going to be

supported . I knew that they were going to give me the

helicopters I would need ." 5 *

More important, however, was the creation of Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39 at Quang Tri i n

April and the assignment later, initially on a temporar y

basis, of Assistant Wing Commander, Brigadier General Homer S . Hill, to the 3d Division headquarters .

Acting as the Marine air commander for northern I

Corps, General Hill, as Davis noted, "had enough

authority delegated to him from the wing, where h e

could execute things, he could order air units to do

things." Highly flexible mobile operations and th e

lives of individual Marines taking part in such operations would be totally dependent upon air. Without a

responsive air commander on the scene, these operations, Davis continued, would be "a shambles " and

Marines would suffer.6 With helicopter transport

assured, division Marines would begin to move from

relatively static positions south of the Demilitarize d

Zone, into the mountainous regions of Quang Tri

Province in search of the enemy, his infiltration routes ,

and his supplies.* *

In addition to moving the division toward a more

mobile posture, General Davis reinstituted unit integrity. As a result of the promulgation of the M series

table of organization, Marine battalions were delegated

the capability of self-administration. The regiment was

to be "responsive to an administrative concept in whic h

fiscal, personnel, supply and maintenance functions

and transactions usually proceed directly from subordinate elements to the division ." 7 The regiment, therefore, was essentially a tactical headquarters .

*Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, who assumed command of the 3 d

Marines in July, commented, however, that there were very few Army

helicopters available to the 3d Marine Division except for command an d

control and the Army Sikorsky CH—54 Flying Crane. He recalled a situation when he was sent only two CH—46 helicopters and that " it took

all day and all that night to get the infantry and artillery into positio n

and ready to fire missions at first light the next morning ." He wondered

where the helicopter support from the Army and Provisional Corps wa s

on that occasion . Col Vaughn R. Stuart, Comments on draft, dtd

20Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stuart Comments .

**See Chapter 25 for further discussion of the relationshi p

between the 3d Marine Division and the Wing over the employmen t

of helicopters.

Prior to the reinstitution of unit integrity, there wa s

a constant rotation of battalions among regiments . The

4th Marines in early June, for example, controlled a

battalion of the 1st Marines, two battalions of the 9t h

Marines, and only one of its organic battalions. Under

such circumstances, one of Davi s' regimental comman -

ders termed regiments "warlords " and the battalions

"roving bands of mercenaries. The regiments had little

interest in the logistics, personnel, supply, and maintenance fields of the battalions ."$ Battalions, on the othe r

hand, "felt . . . they were commanded by strangers .

Every unit has kind of a personality of its own, ofte n

reflecting the personality of the commander, so you

never got to know who did what best, or who woul d

you give this mission to . "9 Davis gradually changed

that; each regiment, under normal operating circumstances, would now control its organic battalions . With

the change came unit cohesion, cooperation, esprit d e

corps, and "a greater awareness on the part of the staff

officers in the regiment and their counterparts in th e

battalions, about one another 's capabilities and personalities. "10 *** Davis later commented that this was " the

key to our success."1 1

The most lucrative targets for the division's first

mobile operation were the large enemy formation s

which remained to the south and west of Khe Sanh .

These included remnants of the defeated 304th NVA

Division and at least two regiments of the recently infiltrated 308th NVA Division . Elements of the two enemy

divisions were concentrating their main efforts at interdicting the segment of Route 9 between Ca Lu and

Khe Sanh and in constructing a new supply route fro m

***Colonel Stuart, who assumed command of the 3d Marines o n

15 July 68, cook exception to the above statements . He wrote that th e

regiment " had absolute tactical authority over chose organization s

under its Op[erational) Con[troll, and the regimental commander wit h

any leadership ability at all knew the full status of the subordinat e

units. If there were any deficiencies in supply, maintenance, or personnel, he had all of the authority necessary to get those deficiencies corrected . " He also took exception to terms such as " warlord " and " rovin g

bands of mercenaries." According to Stuart, the battalions "had missions directed by the regiments in response to missions given by th e

division ." As regimental commander, he could not worry about suc h

niceties concerning the personality or ability of a particular battalion

commander to carry out a particular mission . During this period, his

selection usually depended upon whatever "battalion was the least

occupied ." Stuart Comments. On the other hand, Colonel Billy R.

Duncan, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines from Januar y

to August 1968, wrote that the relationships of the attached battalion s

to the regiments was " . . . difficult at best. " He stated that the regiments had little interest in the logistics and support elements of th e

battalions. Col Billy R. Duncan, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File) .
354 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of Col Roger W. Peard, USMC (Ret)

The crew chiefs view through the "Hell Hole" of a Marine

Sikorsky CH–53 Sea Stallion is of an artillery piece dangling below the helicopter. The crew chief had the responsibility to report any swinging of the load to the pilot.

Laos across the southern portion of the Vietnamese

Salient, that portion of southwestern Quang Tri

Province which juts into Laos.

The primary responsibility for offensive operations

within the Scotland II area of operation rested wit h

Brigadier General Hoffman's Task Force Hotel . Working closely with representatives of the 3d Division an d

the 1st and 4th Marines, Hoffman and his staff pre -

pared an operations plan which called for a series o f

heliborne assaults far to the south and west of Route 9 .

During discussions leading up to the final plan, Hoffman noted that in moving into the operational area ,

the Marine units involved would be placing themselve s

beyond the maximum range of allied artillery at Khe

Sanh and Ca Lu. The solution was simple ; the artillery

would accompany the infantry. This was not the first

time artillery would be moved to forward positions t o

support the maneuvering elements of the division . In

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

Troops from the 9th Marines unload mortar ammunition

from a Marine Boeing Vertol CH—46 Sea Knight helicopter

on top of a mountain fire base near the Laotian border. The

fire base concept enhanced the mobility of the Marin e

infantry in the rugged terrain .

this case, fire support bases would have to be established in the very heart of enemy-held territory.

Since these fire support bases would be constructe d

in mountainous, jungle-covered terrain, almost alway s

on an easily defensible mountain peak or razorback

ridgeline, the artillery would have to be inserted an d

extracted by helicopter. All resupply for the fire support bases and maneuver elements would likewise hav e

to be accomplished by air. Once established in mutually supporting pairs, 8,000 meters apart with a 3,000 -

meter overshoot to cover enemy mortars, these fire

bases would provide continuous, overlapping artillery

support to infantry units operating beneath the fan . When infantry operations moved beyond the range of

the 8,000-meter artillery fan, another fire support bas e

would be established .

Initially, the construction of these forward artiller y

positions would prove to be a complicated and difficult
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 35 5

task. Often selected from the air, the sites had to mee t

three specific criteria in addition to satisfying the

requirement that they be at specified ranges from each

other to support the scheme of maneuver. The site

needed to be large enough to accommodate at least on e

six-gun 105mm howitzer artillery battery and it had t o

be defensible by an infantry platoon, or in rare cases b y

a reinforced platoon. To meet the third criteria, the

position itself had to be capable of being constructed

within 24 to 36 hours.1 2 Once the Marines had selected a site that met the criteria, they accomplished the

initial clearing with aerial ordnance or artillery. Engineers supported by infantry either moved overland or

were helilifted to the site and would then secure th e

area and complete the work of demolition . A small airtransportable bulldozer would be brought in to prepare

berms and pits for the artillery. Finally, helicopters

would transport to the fire support base the guns, battery personnel and their supplies, and the initial stoc k

of ammunition.

Task Force Hotel initially established two fire support bases, Robin and Loon, to support the search operations south of Route 9. As in all subsequent operations of the division that involved the use of forwar d

artillery positions, these two fire bases were positione d

so that their artillery fans overlapped.

Following five days of extensive artillery preparation, which included 30 B—52 sorties, Colonel Stanle y

S . Hughes' 1st Marines launched the first phase of th e

operation on 2 June . Early that morning, the members

of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 2d Battalion ,

4th Marines conducted heliborne assaults from thei r

assembly areas on Hill 558 and Landing Zone Stu d

into Landing Zone Robin and then further south into

Loon . Both landing zones, south of Route 9, were nea r

the limit of the range of Khe Sanh-based artillery. The

two battalions then swept north towards Route 9 ,

encountering scattered but light enemy resistance. While the 1st Marines conducted their swee p

northward, four battalions under the operational control of Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines assaulted into the area and began search operations to th e

south and west of Robin and Loon, where they encountered stiff enemy opposition . A battalion-sized enemy

ground attack on Loon coupled with heavy artillery

support from guns based at Co Roc in Laos dictate d

that Loon be abandoned in favor of a new fire base ,

Torch, five kilometers to the southwest.

Despite heavy enemy resistance, not only directed

against Torch, but also against the maneuvering elements, the 4th Marines destroyed sections of a newly

constructed enemy road and large quantities of equipment and supplies. With the operations' end on 18

June, the 1st and 4th Marines moved out of the area ,

leaving more than 650 enemy dead. Four of the six battalions committed by the 308th NVA Division were

decimated, and subsequently the division itself wa s

dropped from the allied order of battle of enemy forces .

First Lieutenant William J. Spangler, the commande r

of Company B, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, recalled th e

operation as very successful, but that the North Vietnamese "use of border sanctuaries precluded tota l

destruction." Although the Marines patrolled up to the

Laotian border and took both direct and indirect fir e

from NVA forces in Laos, Spangler observed, "we di d

not pursue them with troops or supporting arms ."i3 *

It was clear from the search operations conducte d

southwest of Khe Sanh that the enemy was not pre -

pared to cope with this new form of highly mobile warfare . Artillery batteries providing a movable support

fan under which the infantry could maneuver ; maneuver from the high ground to the low in contrast to th e

older method of moving up to search the high ground .

In these operations, each company of a battalion operated independently of the others in terms of mutual

support. As long as they remained within the 8,000-

meter artillery fan, there was no requirement that rifl e

companies operate together. Each company was

assigned a four- to nine-kilometer-square area withi n

which a landing zone was established to facilitat e

resupply and the evacuation of casualties. Patrols

would then fan out from the landing zone until th e

company's assigned square was thoroughly searched

and cleared . Once the initial square was cleared, th e

company was then lifted by helicopter to another are a

within the artillery fan and the search and clear proces s

would begin again. This type of maneuver would continue until the entire area of operations had been give n

a careful and detailed search .

An alternative method developed during thes e

operations was for a battalion to be inserted onto a

heavily wooded ridgeline where an artillery fire support base would be quickly established . One company would then move out from the fire support bas e

and seize a high knob along the ridgeline where a

landing zone would be cut out of the jungle while th e

company's platoons searched the fingers . At the same

time, a second company would pass through the first

and attack along the ridgeline, seize the next hilltop ,

*A detailed account of Operations Robin North and Robin South

can be found in Chapter 16 .
356 THE DEFINING YEAR

cut a landing zone, and again search down the fingers .

Using this technique a battalion could search a major

ridgeline thoroughly and in the process discove r

major enemy trail networks and supply caches . Both

of these search and clear methods proved highly successful in the operations carried out southwest of Kh e

Sanh and would become standard for all future division operations run in the mountainous areas o f

Quang Tri Province .

The use of these two search methods resulted i n

the disclosure of the enemy's mode of logistical support. The North Vietnamese, it was discovered ,

relied heavily on a series of pre-positioned store site s

and interconnecting trail networks to support hi s

forces . Along a trail at intervals of about an eight -

hour walk apart, Marines would find a sizeabl e

enemy way station, composed generally of bunkers ,

supply caches, huts, and a hospital . Enemy porters

apparently would carry supplies from large depots

in Laos or North Vietnam, stopping at a way statio n

where they would remain hidden during the day

and then proceed to the next station or return for

another load . In general, most enemy porters relied

on guides instead of maps and used well-marked ,

high-speed trails. "We came to realize," noted General Davis, "that if we were able to keep Marines o n

these trails, even from time to time, and were abl e

to clean out his way stations, destroy his bunkers

and his supplies periodically, that we could severel y

limit his activity." This realization, he concluded ,

"was a major reason for our change in our concept o f

operation."1 4

With the end of Operations Robin North an d

Robin South, the 1st Marines returned to the task o f

providing mobile security for Khe Sanh Combat Base,

the surrounding high terrain, Route 9, and supply convoys travelling the road from Landing Zone Stud t o

Khe Sanh . Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines,

instead of returning to Camp Carroll, were helilifted to

Ca Lu where a temporary regimental headquarters was

established, and the regiment's battalions were

assigned the task of securing vital installations along

Route 9, east from Khe Sanh to Camp Carroll .

In early June the decision was made to deactivat e

Khe Sanh Combat Base and shift the major Marine

installation in western Quang Tri eastward to Landing

Zone Stud. The 3d Marine Division units were now

operating well beyond the range of Khe Sanh-base d

artillery, and the base itself had become more of a liability than an asset since it tied down large numbers o f

division troops to defend it, while they might have

been better employed in mobile operations carried ou t

on the pattern of Robin North and Robin South . Finally, the base presented a large and continuing target for

North Vietnamese attacks, and was no longer considered as vital to allied defensive plans as it had unde r

those championed by former MACV commander,

General William C. Westmoreland . *

Echoing the views of General Creighton Abrams,

who relieved Westmoreland in mid June, Genera l

Cushman of III MAF, General Rosson of Prov Corps ,

and General Davis, the MACV press release noted :

Friendly forces must make maximum use of thei r

superior fire power and mobility. Mobile forces, tied to

no specific terrain, must be used to the utmost to

attack, intercept, reinforce or take whatever action is

most appropriate to meet the increased enemy threats.

Therefore, we have decided to continue the mobile posture adopted in western Quang Tri Province with Operation Pegasus in April . This decision makes the operation of the base at Khe Sanh unnecessary. 1 5

During the latter days of June as Marine engineers

made steady progress in converting Landing Zone Stu d

into a permanent forward operating base, the 1st

Marines, now under the command of Colonel Ross T.

Dwyer, Jr., continued with the evacuation and destruc -

tion of Khe Sanh . The regiment also provided security

for Route 9 and Fire Support Bases Shepherd and

Cates, formerly known as Landing Zones Mike and

Lima, respectively, and the development of Landin g

Zone Hawk . But the enemy, who in the past had exerted such strenuous efforts to dislodge Marine forces

from the base, now appeared reluctant to let them

leave . In a series of sharp engagements fought durin g

late June and the early days of July, elements of the 1s t

and 4th Marines thwarted repeated enemy attempts t o

break the security screen around Khe Sanh and Rout e

9 and disrupt the orderly deactivation of the base .**

The closing of Khe Sanh marked the definite abandonment of the static defense concept against Nort h

Vietnamese Army units in western Quang Tri

Province. The 3d Marine Division henceforth was

committed to what General Davis termed the

"mobile concept" of offensive operations . This concept, or combination of techniques, was to rely on forward artillery positions and deep vertical envelopment to carry the war to the enemy throughout th e

division's area of operations.

*See the discussion in Chapter 16 .

** For a more detailed examination of the deactivation of Khe San h

Combat Base, see again Chapter 16 .
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 357

The Eastern DMZ

The enemy generally avoided contact with 3 d

Marine Division forces operating within the Lancaster II, Kentucky, and Napoleon-Saline areas of operation during the month of June . Although wide-ranging division patrols did engage small groups of

enemy forces, no major engagements such as those o f

May took place . Within the Napoleon-Saline area of operations,

Colonel Hull's 3d Marines, with the assistance of th e

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and companies of

the Army's 8th and 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, continued to patrol the northern and souther n

banks and tributaries of the Song Cua Viet with the

mission to ensure both the uninterrupted passage o f

shipping and to deny the enemy access to possibl e

rocket sites. Patrols from the 3d Marines also continued to scour the coastal region of the province t o

protect the ongoing rice harvest . In addition, the

regiment provided security for both equipment and

personnel involved in dredging operations throughout the Cua Viet river system.

Throughout the month the 3d Marines conducte d

numerous daily sweeps and ambushes within its area of

operations, concentrating on trail networks, river crossings, and village complexes known to harbor enemy

sympathizers. Although finding and destroying a larg e

number of enemy bunkers, spider holes, and suppl y

caches, the Marines encountered few enemy. While avoiding direct contact with Colonel Hull's

patrols, the enemy instead relied on his DMZ-base d

artillery to inflict casualties on friendly forces . On 19

June and again on the 21st and 24th, Camp Kistle r

received a total of 111 rounds of enemy artillery resulting in 10 minor casualties and the destruction of a

large ammunition bunker and gasoline storage facility.

Artillery and naval gunfire counter-batteries produce d

several secondary explosions .

On 25 June, the 3d Marines assumed responsibility

for the eastern portion of Leatherneck Square . Despite

the lack of enemy contact, the heliborne assault and

five-day search of the area marked the first time in a

year that the regiment, its three organic battalions, an d

direct support artillery had operated together.

To the west, in the Kentucky area, Colonel Richard

B. Smith's 9th Marines continued to conduct numerous sweeps and ambushes from static positions at Co n

Thien, A-3, C-2, and C-3 . At the same time, Colone l

Smith gradually reduced the regiment's security commitment to these four positions by shifting an everincreasing proportion of Marines under his comman d

to field operations. In addition, regimental forces continued to develop a viable road network and a series o f

landing zones within the western portion of Leatherneck Square. While there was a sharp decrease in enemy contac t

and artillery, mortar, and rocket fire compared to th e

previous month, the few engagements which took

place were sharp and deadly. Shortly after noon on 6

June, for example, a reinforced platoon from Company

E, 26th Marines observed and then engaged an estimated enemy company while on patrol 1,800 meter s

southeast of Con Thien . Reinforced by the command

group and a rifle platoon from Company H, the patrol

took the enemy under fire with small arms and 81mm

mortars. The result was 14 enemy killed and 25

Marine casualties, 14 killed and 11 wounded .

The same day, the 9th Marines assumed responsibility for the Lancaster II area of operations from th e

4th Marines, and a regimental command group was

deployed from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll . Like the

Kentucky area, the Lancaster area experienced no majo r

enemy-initiated ground action during June, although

the enemy did attempt to interdict Route 9 wit h

ambushes and land mines and took Camp Carroll an d

Landing Zone Stud under rocket fire, resulting in th e

destruction of several ammunition and gasoline dump s

and the wounding of 10 Marines.

Near the end of June, Lieutenant Colonel Michae l

V. Palatas' 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, in conjunctio n

with Army Special Forces and Vietnamese regional ,

popular, and National Police Field forces, began a

deliberate cordon in the Cua Valley, southeast of Cam p

Carroll. During operations around Khe Sanh earlier i n

the year, many native Montagnards were brought to

the Cam Lo area where they were resettled temporarily with a large number of Vietnamese that had been

evacuated from Leatherneck Square following Operation Hickory in 1967 . In early June, it was decided to

resettle the Montagnards permanently in the Cua Val -

ley near the village of Thon Duc Kinh, four kilometers

southeast of Camp Carroll. Palatas' battalion was given

the task of clearing the village of known Viet Cong sus -

pects and ensuring the area was secure enough to begi n

construction of the resettlement camp .

On the night of 21 June, squad-sized patrols fro m

the battalion walked into the area, secured landin g

zone sites, and blocked likely enemy escape routes . At

dawn the following morning, a platoon was helilifted

into each landing zone, completing the cordon

around Thon Duc Kinh. Later in the day, Marine and
358 THE DEFINING YEAR

Top photo is from the Abel Collection and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A371 .56 3

Top, Marines of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion help South Vietnamese villagers pack thei r

worldly goods, even to the extent of placing a thatched roof on top of the vehicle, to be transported to

a resettlement village. Below, Navy Corpsman HM—3 Forrest G. McDonald bandages a Montagnard child's head to prevent scalp sores from becoming infected, as the mother looks on .
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 359

Vietnamese forces conducted a house-to-house searc h

of the village, arresting more than 100 Viet Cong suspects of whom half were detained . Once the villag e

was secured, Marine engineers immediately began

construction of the resettlement camp. Palatas'

Marines remained in the area for a week, conducting

medical and dental examinations of the refugees an d

participating in other civic action projects .1 6 Following the Thon Duc Kinh cordon, the 9th Marine s

passed control of the Lancaster II area of operations t o

Task Force Hotel and the regimental command group

returned to Dong Ha and the battalions to patrol and

security sweeps throughout Leatherneck Square and

the remainder of the Kentucky area of operations .

The Pressure Continues

The enemy continued to remain reluctant to commit his forces to decisive combat in large numbers

during July. Although the NVA's aversion may have

been due to a planned, periodic pause to provide

temporary respite for its combat units, it was clear

this reluctance was in part due to the continuing and

unrelenting pressure applied by 3d Marine Divisio n

forces during June. Enemy assembly and stagin g

An ammunition supply dump at Dong Ha goes up

areas, bases, supply caches, and trail networks wer e

subjected to constant allied air, artillery, naval gun -

fire, and ground attacks, taxing his capacity to maintain frontline and support units at an effective combat strength. Despite the enemy's reluctance, there

was no diminution of the 3d Marine Division effor t

in July.

On the first day of the month, a massive combined supporting arms attack was launched agains t

enemy artillery and antiaircraft concentrations located in the Cap Mui Lay Sector of North Vietnam. The

sector encompassed that region from the souther n

edge of the Demilitarized Zone, north some 14 kilometers to Cap Mui Lay, and extended from the Sout h

China Sea westward to a point approximately 2 5

kilometers inland.

Planning for the attack began on 24 March when

General Davis' predecessor, Major General Rathvo n

McC. Tompkins, proposed a combined and coordinated supporting arms attack against the Cap Mu i

Lay Sector to destroy enemy long-range shore batteries and artillery, limit the flow of enemy supplies t o

the south, and relieve the artillery threat against th e

Dong Ha-Cua Viet area . Provisional Corps, Vietnam

developed a formal plan and submitted it to III MAF,

n flames after an NVA artillery bombardment .

Photo from the Abel Collection
360 THE DEFINING YEAR

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19038 1

The photo shows the power of the resulting explosions. The axle wheels of a truck that was parked at

the dump are the only identifiable remains of the vehicle seen strewn among the wreckage .

which in turn submitted a modification to MACV fo r

approval. Following a preliminary planning conference which included representatives from MACV,

Seventh Air Force, Seventh Fleet, III MAF, and Prov

Corps, General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, approved the plan on 21 June, with D-Da y

set for 1 July.

To ensure that the operation, codenamed Thor,

would be a success, several preparatory steps wer e

taken. As a deceptive measure, work continued o n

Dyemarker or "McNamara" Line positions at A—2 ,

A—3, and Con Thien to cover the construction of sev -

eral forward artillery positions. In addition, the large

amount of artillery ammunition, heavy artillery, and

supporting ships were moved into place by 30 June .

The destruction of the Dong Ha ammunition dump

by enemy artillery on 20 June also in an ironic wa y

helped the deception . According to Marine staff officers, the blast at the dump "practically blew the 3 d

Marine Division headquarters off of the map" an d

left the division "desperately short" of artiller y

ammunition .'? The execution of a massive supporting arms attack so shortly after a huge loss of ammunition seemed out of place, especially since the bulk

of the artillery forces engaged in the attack woul d

have to depend on the Dong Ha ammunition dum p

for supply.

Preceded by three days of target reconnaissanc e

by both Marine and Air Force aircraft, the firs t

phase of the operation began as scheduled with a

massive bombing effort against the sector. Controlled by Seventh Air Force, 664 Marine, Navy,

and Air Force attack aircraft and 114 B—52 sortie s

delivered more than 4,000 tons of ordnance agains t

predetermined enemy targets during the first tw o

days of the operation . In phases two and three, the

artillery fire of 13 batteries, composed of 59 guns,

was integrated with the naval gunfire support o f

two cruisers and six destroyers and the continuing

air attacks against target lists which were continually updated by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing reconnaissance flights.

On the morning of 8 July, the artillery batteries

involved in Operation Thor began withdrawin g

from their forward positions and by the 10th ha d

returned to their normal support locations .18 Also o n

the 8th, control of the area reverted from Prov

Corps, which since 1 July was under Army Lieu-
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 361

tenant General Richard G . Stilwell,* to the Sevent h

Air Force which would coordinate future surveil -

lance and air attacks on reemerging targets.

Damage to the North Vietnamese combat capability in the Cap Mui Lay Sector as a result of Operatio n

Thor was substantial : more than 500 artillery and antiaircraft positions, numerous bunkers and storage areas ,

and at least two surface-to-air missile sites were

destroyed . Also, allied observers detected 352 secondary explosions and 236 secondary fires, providin g

evidence of probable hits on ammunition and supply

dumps. The operation, however, was to have a more

lasting effect. Artillery fire from north of the Demilitarized Zone declined significantly following Thor, as

did the frequency of antiaircraft opposition experience d

by reconnaissance aircraft at all altitudes.**

While Operation Thor was in progress, the 3d and

9th Marines, in coordination with the 2d ARVN Regiment, launched attacks against enemy troops driven

south of the Demilitarized Zone by the massive air and

artillery bombardment. On 2 July, Colonel Hull's 3 d

Marines, composed initially of the 1st and 2d Battalions, began moving from the Cua Viet into an area

north of A-1, centered on Jones Creek, a tributary o f

both the Song Cua Viet and Song Ben Hai . Lieutenant

*On 1 July, Army Lieutenant General William B . Rosson, the former Prov Corps commander, became Acting CG III MAF while General Cushman, the III MAF commander cook a month leave in the

United States. Major General Richard G. Stilwell, who had served a

short tour as Deputy Commanding General, III MAF, Army, on 1 Jul y

assumed command of Provisional Corps, Vietnam . That same day, in a

brief ceremony held at Phu Bai, he was promoted to the rank of Lieu -

tenant General by Secretary of the Army Stanley R . Resor. Fifteen day s

later, Headquarters, XXIV Corps was activated and the personnel and

equipment of Provisional Corps, Vietnam, were absorbed by the newl y

activated Army corps. Operational Report, Headquarters, XXIV Corp s

for Period Ending 31 October 1968, 15Nov68, p . 1 . In contrast t o

Rosson, who enjoyed excellent relations with the Marine command ,

Stilwell 's relations were somewhat more tenuous . Marine Brigadie r

General Earl E . Anderson, Cushman's Chief of Staff, wrote in May

1968 that Stilwell was rather " unpopular " at III MAF headquarters

and predicted that when he assumed command of Prov Corps, "he's

going to be a hard one to deal with after he gets his three stars." A few

months later Anderson wrote that Stilwell was often "by-passing General Cushman and going directly to ComUSMACV. The boss has spoken to him about this on one or two occasions . . . ." BGen E. E . Anderson ltr to MajGen Murray, did 17May68, and ltr to MajGe n

McCutcheon, dtd 9Sep68, Encls, Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments o n

draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). More diplomatically,

General Cushman stated that Stilwell "could be abrasive . . .", but that

" he was a fine combat man . " Gen Robert E . Cushman, Jr., incvw, lNov

1.982, (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp . 34-35 .

**For a detailed account of the artillery 's role in Operation Thor,

see Chapter 26 .

Colonel Charles V. Jarman's 1st Battalion, the first unit

to move out, swept north along the west bank of th e

tributary, while providing security for the ARVN engineer effort on the Lai An road . To the east, the 2d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis, swep t

north toward the village of Nui Trung .

As Jarman's Marines moved northward toward th e

abandoned and destroyed village of Lai An on the 4th ,

Captain Gary D . Dockendorffs Company C came

under mortar and small arms fire from an estimated

enemy platoon in the village ruins.' The remainder o f

the battalion immediately maneuvered to exploit the

contact, preventing the enemy from withdrawing .

Pressing the attack, Jarman's Marines, covered by air,

artillery, naval gunfire, and the direct fire of 90mm

tank guns on the flanks, advanced from position t o

position. "If it gets too tough," Lieutenant Colone l

Jarman told one of his company commanders, "pul l

back and we'll pound them some more . Then we'll see

how tough they are. " 20 By the 6th, the battalion

secured Lai An and reported 134 North Vietnamese

dead among its ruins.

The following day, after endeavoring to regain con -

tact with the retreating NVA, a battalion patro l

encountered an enemy company occupying positions

around Tai Nu, one kilometer northeast of Lai An. The

NVA company, armed with an 85mm light field gun ,

mortars, and automatic weapons, was first taken unde r

artillery fire and then overrun by a coordinated tan k

and infantry assault.21 In the Tai Nu action, the Marine

U.S. Army LtGen Richard G . Stilwell, left, the new CG,

Prov Corps, talks with South Vietnamese BGen Ngo Quan g

Truong, CG, 1st ARVNDiv. Although under III MAF,

Prov Corps had operational control of the two Army divisions and the 3d Marine Division in northern I Corps.

Photo courtesy of the U .S . Army Center of Military History
362 THE DEFINING YEA R

battalion reported another 42 NVA killed and 2 3

weapons captured, including two 82mm mortars .

Advancing on the right flank, Lieutenant Colone l

Davis' 2d Battalion had swept through Nhi Trung an d

approached a rice paddy area, one kilometer south o f

the abandoned village of An My. At that point, North

Vietnamese automatic weapons and rocket propelle d

grenades opened up on the Marines. Maneuvering

around the ARVN position at A-1, the battalion, wit h

naval gunfire support, took the enemy position .

Searching the area, the Marines found over 20 NVA

dead. Battalion losses were placed at three killed and

two wounded, all a result of sniper fire . Lieutenant

Colonel James W. Marsh's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,

which had been held in reserve, moved north on the

7th and seized the area around the destroyed village o f

Giem Ha Trung without incident . Captain Matthew

G. McTiernan, the commanding officer of Company I

of the 3d Battalion, remembered that his company's

specific mission in Operation Thor "was to seize and

then search a small abandoned fishing village on the

coast just below the Ben Hai River. " In the attack o n

the hamlet, he had a Navy cruiser in direct support .

According to McTiernan, he had the guns of the ship

"under my exclusive direction for about three to fou r

hours. " He described the effect on the troops as "truly

electric" as he used the "8-inchers directly on the village" prior to the assault and then "shifted their fire t o

the high ground across the Ben Hai during our assaul t

and search ." His troops found no bunkers and obtained

"no body counts, " but the action "had a far more intangible, positive and lasting effect on the compan y 's combat capability" 2 2

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Marines, bega n

withdrawing southward on the 8th, followed by th e

3d Battalion on the 9th . On the evening of the 9th, as

Lieutenant Colonel Davis' battalion, the last of the

regiment's battalions to displace to Quang Tri t o

undergo rehabilitation, the 3d Marines ended thei r

participation in Operation Napoleon-Saline an d

Marines of Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines throw grenades at suspected enemy positions in the coastal sector near th e

DMZ. They are taking part in the infantry portion of Operation Thor to counter any NVA forces moving south to escape th e

air, naval gunfire, and artillery bombardment of NVA positions north of the DMZ.

Department of Defense (USMC) A191.900
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 363

passed responsibility for the area of operations to th e

1st Marines. The following day, the 3d Marines

assumed responsibility for the Lancaster II area o f

operations and the regimental headquarters was

deployed to Camp Carroll .

Throughout the Napoleon-Saline area of operations

during the remainder of the month, Colonel Dwyer's

1st Marines continued search and sweep operations o n

both the northern and southern banks of the Song Cua

Viet to insure the uninterrupted passage of allied ship -

ping and to deny the enemy access to rocket position s

oriented towards Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Cua Viet .

In addition, Dwyer's Marines coordinated the defense

of outposts at C–4 and Oceanview, both within a kilo -

meter of the southern boundary of the DMZ .

While contact with elements of the 138th NVA

Regiment, known to be operating in the area, was negligible, contact with the V–51 and C–59 Local Force

Viet Cong units was light and widespread . One of the

heaviest engagements took place on the 22d when

Company H, 1st Marines, while occupying a patro l

base south of the Cua Viet, 10 kilometers east of Dong

Ha, spotted an armed enemy platoon dressed in black

pajamas, moving along the coastal sand dune east of

the village of Thon My Loc . The Viet Cong platoon

was taken under fire with small arms, artillery, and

81mm mortars. A sweep of the area by the Marin e

company revealed numerous spider holes, punji traps ,

a bamboo house with hot food for approximately 3 0

people, and 10 Viet Cong bodies .2 3

The second of the two ground operations to

exploit the results of Operation Thor began on 7 Jul y

when the 9th Marines began a west to east sweep o f

the area between Con Thien and the DMZ in th e

Kentucky area of operations. Unlike the violen t

action experienced by the 3d Marines in th e

Napoleon-Saline area, the 9th Marines attack met little enemy resistance . If enemy forces had been drive n

south of the Song Ben Hai into the Kentucky area by

the massive artillery and air attack, they quickly had

returned to their sanctuaries in the north . High temperatures and equally high humidity, however, pose d

a major hazard, and everything possible was done t o

ensure an adequate water supply. Heavy U.S. Army

ammunition trailers hooked up to ARVN armored

personnel carriers were filled with water cans, greatl y

reducing the need for continual helicopter water

resupply.2 4 Despite the precautions, Smith's regiment

suffered numerous heat casualties .

The most significant contact during the regiment's drive northward occurred on 11 July, four

kilometers northeast of Con Thien, when elements o f

Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. LaMontagne's 3d Battalion discovered a reinforced NVA platoon in th e

open. Fixing the enemy platoon in place with small

arms fire, LaMontagne 's Marines, with air, artillery,

and tank support, launched a coordinated air-groun d

attack through the area killing more than 30 enemy

troops and seizing 26 weapons.

Elsewhere in the area, attacking units of the 9t h

Marines uncovered and destroyed numerous enem y

fortifications, many of which contained ammunition

and equipment. A few of the positions were lightly

defended, but the majority were abandoned . One

bunker system discovered by LaMontagne's Marines,

4,000 meters due north of Con Thien, spanned mor e

than one kilometer. In addition to 242 well-constructed bunkers, the complex contained a large mess

hall with hot food still on the tables. Supplies and

equipment abandoned by the enemy in his fligh t

included weapons, 935 mortar rounds, 500 pounds of

explosives, 55 antitank mines, and 500 pounds o f

rice . LaMontagne's Marines also found 29 NVA bodies, killed by artillery and airstrikes during th e

advance on the complex .

After 10 months as commanding officer of the 9th

Marines, Colonel Richard B. Smith was relieved on 1 3

July by Colonel Robert H. Barrow. A veteran of China

service during World War II and the Chosin Reservoi r

campaign in Korea, Colonel Barrow was assigned t o

the division at the request of General Davis . Three days

later, the regiment displaced to Landing Zone Stud i n

preparation for future operations under Task Force

Hotel in the Lancaster II area of operations . With the

move to Stud, the regiment's battalions were brough t

together for the first time since May 1967, "to th e

enthusiasm and jubilance of all hands."2 5

As the 9th Marines departed, Colonel Dwyer 's 1st

Marines assumed tactical responsibility for the Kentucky area. The regiment also had operational contro l

of newly created Task Force Mike, consisting of a

command group from the 3d Tank Battalion and a

company of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion Marines,

and Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Heath's 2d Battalion, 26th Marines. During the remaining days o f

July, Dwyer's Marines concentrated on aggressive da y

and night ambushes, patrols, searches, an d

minesweeping operations, while concurrently securing fixed installations throughout the area of operations. Although enemy contact was very light, the 1st

Marines did take a number of casualties from mines

and surprise firing devices.
364 THE DEFINING YEA R

On 23 July, Lieutenant Colonel Heath's battalion

began assuming operational control of the rifle companies of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines as they were

phased into the battalion's positions in preparation fo r

a relief in lines. Company E, 26th Marines, relieved by

Company G, 1st Marines, proceeded to Quang Tri

Combat Base on the 24th and assumed positions

along the base's defensive perimeter. Following a brief,

unproductive, one-day sweep northward from Con

Thien along the Kinh Mon Trail to the DMZ an d

southward from A—3 through Leatherneck Square, th e

remaining elements of Heath's battalion departed th e

Kentucky area of operations. On 28 July, they proceeded to Quang Tri Combat Base to prepare and train

for service afloat with Seventh Fleet's Special Landing

Force . The battalion, by 8 August, had embarked on

board ships of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha, an d

the battalion, on the 13th, once operational control

had been passed to the 9th Marine Amphibiou s

Brigade, was redesignated Battalion Landing Team

(BLT) 2/26 .2 6

Into the Western Mountains

During June, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion patrols

reported increased enemy activity north of Thon So n

Lam, an area that had seen little enemy activity fo r

the previous several months . It appeared that the

enemy, estimated to be of battalion strength, possibl y

an element of the 64th Regiment, 320th NVA Division ,

was moving through the large valley to the north o f

the Dong Ha-Dong Ma Mountain ridgeline into the

region around Thon Son Lam.2 7

The vital allied area straddled not only Route 9 ,

the major east-west line of communication in Quan g

Tri Province, but also included two major III MAF

artillery positions, Camp Carroll and Thon Son Lam .

Although these fire support complexes presented the

enemy with inviting targets, the successful destruction of which would provide both a tactical as well as

a propaganda victory, the enemy had yet to mount a

strong attack upon either position . Instead, his force s

had concentrated on periodically interdicting Rout e

9 and harassing the installations with artillery, rock -

et, and mortar attacks. With the Demilitarized Zone

and North Vietnam less than 20 kilometers distant,

the enemy threat to the area remained constant .

In mid June, upon receipt of a warning order from

General Davis, Task Force Hotel began planning a n

operation in the area north and northwest of Camp

Carroll over which the enemy had long enjoyed con -

trol . General Davis informed Task Force Hotel, how -

ever, that the necessary forces, two Marine infantry

regiments, the 3d and 9th Marines, and elements o f

the 2d ARVN regiment, and accompanyin g

resources, would not be available until mid July. On

5 July, General Davis approved the concept for th e

proposed operation, which "for want of a better name ,

we dubbed . . . `July Action. "'2 6

The approved scheme of maneuver was one of area

saturation. Davis simultaneously placed the force s

involved at various locations throughout th e

region—including three battalions near the DMZ—

in order to "upset the enemy quickly and decisively. "29 The 9th Marines' zone of action would includ e

a wide swath of piedmont from the DMZ to Route 9 ,

west of Con Thien, while the zone assigned the 3 d

Marines embraced the rugged National Forest

Reserve, which included Dong Ha Mountain and

Mutter Ridge, a high ridgeline which generally parallels the southern boundary of the DMZ. The zone

assigned the 2d ARVN Regiment lay west and north -

west of the Rockpile and consisted of a maze of valleys and sheer ridgelines .

General Davis directed that the operation begi n

on 16 July, following a series of B—52 Arcligh t

strikes throughout the area . However, on the 15th ,

MACV canceled the proposed Arclight strikes fo r

the lack of sufficient intelligence justification .* Later

in the day, Lieutenant General Stilwell, the Pro v

Corps commander, suggested that if the operatio n

were postponed 24 hours, the strikes would be carried out. The promised B—52 strikes never occurre d

and, instead, Marine tactical air and artillery strike s

carried out the preparation of the area . While air an d

artillery strikes were effective, General Davis note d

that they " lacked the mass destructive effect and

shock power of the Arclights." According to Davis,

"intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was

surprised and confused by the operation but due t o

the protection afforded by bunkers from our fires, h e

was not disorganized to the point where he lost hi s

capacity to resist."3 0

*The selection process for Arclight targets required the submissio n

of only current, hard intelligence restricted to the proposed targe t

nomination . The division 's request for Arclights included not only specific target intelligence, but an immediate area intelligence summary.

Prov Corps forwarded the request without the area intelligence summary to MACV where it was reviewed and subsequently rejected o n

the basis of insufficient specific target intelligence in comparison wit h

other proposed targets. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGProvCorpsV, dt d

20Jul68, in III MAF Message File .
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 365

Shortly after dawn on the 17th, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines assaulted two landing zones i n

what was commonly called Helicopter Valley, thre e

kilometers south of the DMZ. At the same time, th e

1st Battalion, 9th Marines walked from the vicinity o f

C—2 into blocking positions south of the 2d Battalio n

in the area of operations most eastern sector. To the

west, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines assaulted into a

landing zone at the upper end of Helicopter Valley,

while the 1st and 3d Battalions, 2d ARVN Regimen t

moved overland into blocking positions west of th e

Song Cam Lo valley. The remaining battalions, the 1s t

and 3d, of the 3d Marines, since 15 July under Lieutenant Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, would join the

operation on the 18th and 19th, respectively, with a

heliborne assault into landing zones just north of

Dong Ha Mountain.

As Captain Jack D . Schaeffer's Company K, 9th

Marines moved from Landing Zone Sparrow north

toward Mutter Ridge, it was engaged by an estimated reinforced NVA squad deployed in an extensive ,

well-fortified bunker system. Schaeffer's Marines

immediately returned fire and moved back a sufficient distance to employ artillery and air. While four

Marine A-4 Skyhawks and two F—4 Phantoms fle w

close support missions directed at destroying enemy

automatic weapons and mortar emplacements, it

became evident that the NVA unit was at least of

company size. As the battalion's other forward companies moved into position for a flanking assault ,

Schaeffer's Marines carried the enemy complex late i n

the afternoon. The Marines lost 9 killed and 2 9

wounded while counting 38 NVA dead .

During the course of the operation, elements o f

Lieutenant Colonel Frederic S . Knight's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines maneuvered northward to secur e

the high ground in preparation for the final attack. *

Moving to within one kilometer of the DMZ on th e

afternoon of 21 July, the battalion came under a

heavy 82mm mortar attack, which caused the deat h

of one Marine and the wounding of nine others.

Within an hour of the mortar attack, First Lieu -

tenant Arthur A. Pierce's Company F observe d

approximately 35 NVA, carrying two mortars, moving west on a trail paralleling the southern bound -

*Colonel Knight remembered that General Davis had " droppe d

in " at his headquarters and told him " Fred . . . I have decided to make

you my swing battalion . " Knight asked what a swing battalion was

and received the answer " Whenever anyone finds the enemy, I' m goin g

to drop you right on top of them . " Col Frederic S . Knight, Comments

on draft, dcd 10Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

ary of the DMZ. The company took the enemy force

under fire with mortars and artillery, and then

moved to close with the NVA unit . Preceded by

eight fixed-wing sorties, one of which scored a

direct hit on an active 82mm mortar position ,

Pierce's Marines reached the trail and found over 20

NVA dead. A subsequent search of the area reveale d

10 weapons, 59 packs, 41 gas masks, and a larg e

variety of equipment, all of which were new, indicating that the enemy unit recently had infiltrate d

from the north or had been resupplied.

Lieutenant Pierce 's company contact on the 21s t

prompted Colonel Barrow to request permission t o

enter the southern half of the DMZ if the tactical situation so dictated . The request went forward rapidl y

through the chain of command to MACV, whic h

denied it to the surprise of Colonel Barrow.3' As he

later commented :

. . . it . . . still has not been sufficiently explained to m e

why at any time we seemingly arbitrarily give th e

enemy our half of the DMZ, particularly when we kno w

he uses it not only as a sanctuary, but as an area fro m

which he can launch mortar attacks against our forces . 3 2

Without the permission to enter the southern half of

the DMZ, the regiment swung its attack to the south ,

"the direction which he [the enemy} was primarily ori -

ented anyway."3 3

Although the sweep south through jungle-covered hills and valleys produced little contact, the 9t h

Marines did discover a number of large elaborat e

base areas, which the enemy had been able to construct and maintain during more than a year withou t

allied interference . One fortification, located b y

Lieutenant Colonel Knight's battalion, six kilometers southwest of Con Thien, was unique. Composed

of 60 A-frame timbered bunkers built into the sides

of bomb craters, each with an average overhead cove r

10-feet-thick, the system was connected to a larg e

command bunker by a network of interconnectin g

tunnels. The command bunker, capable of accommodating up to 40 personnel, featured an aperture overlooking Con Thien and C—2 . Documents found i n

the bunker indicated that the NVA had been plotting, tallying, and reporting the traffic patterns of

helicopters, tanks, and trucks entering and leaving

those two positions.

In addition to fortifications, the attacking forces als o

uncovered tons of enemy ordnance, ranging from

122mm rockets to small arms ammunition and explosives. On the 19th, Captain Matthew G. McTiernan's

Company I, 3d Marines unearthed the most significant
366 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

Capt David N. Buckner, right, and 1 stLt Kenneth Tolpingrud of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marine s

examine two captured NVA 12.7mm antiaircraft guns near the DMZ .

weapons cache on the northeast slope of Dong H a

Mountain . Dug into the side of the mountain were si x

large bunkers, which, upon closer inspection wer e

found to have false floors. Beneath the flooring ,

McTiernan's Marines discovered two complete 75mm

pack howitzers and 26 rounds of howitzer ammunition. The howitzers were believed to be the ones tha t

had harassed Camp Carroll sporadically during the pre -

ceding months.*

A second phase of the operation followed quickly o n

the heels of the first. One enemy infiltration corridor

within the area of operation had not been touched b y

the 9th Marines, 3d Marines, or the 2d ARVN Regiment: it was the upper Song Cam Lo basin . On 27 July,

the 1st and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines simultaneousl y

assaulted three landing zones, Joan, Margo, and Becky,

*Captain McTiernan remembered that they assembled one of th e

pack howitzers in the enemy bunker and that " you could fire and hi t

Camp Carroll by simply using line of sight to elevate and traverse th e

gun ." McTiernan Comments. Colonel Stuart recalled that the Marin e

Corps Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, directed that th e

75mm pack howitzers be sent to the Marine Barracks in Washington ,

D .C. Stuart Comments.

which subsequently were developed into fire support

bases for future operations.** In addition, a permanent

observation post was established on Dong Ha Mountain. During the two-battalion sweep of the river basin ,

"the enemy chose to avoid contact," observed Brigadie r

General Carl Hoffman, the Task Force Hotel commander, "and therefore we can't point at any statistics to

prove the worth of this particular effort." Hoffman

noted, however that "in penetrating this corridor we

demonstrated our capacity to do this and we als o

opened another half dozen landing zones . " 3`i

Colonel Barrow's 9th Marines was phased out o f

the operation on the 31st, followed on 3 August by

the 3d Marines, now under Colonel Richard L .

**Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, the 3d Marines commander at th e

time, stated that according to Marine Corps intelligence this was a majo r

NVA infiltration route into Vietnam from Laos . Stuart remembered tha t

General Davis told him "that if we made a sizeable contact, he would

give me as many battalions as I needed . . . [and] that I was free to cros s

the Laotian border, provided the contact we made was sizeable . He

attached one proviso to this verbal directive . . . I was to call before my

first troops crossed . . . . he would not stop me from going, but he wanted to know just before I commenced to cross." Stuart Comments.
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 367

Top photo is from the Abel Collection and bottom photo is courtesy of Col Vaughn R . Stuart, USMC (Ret).

Top, members of the 9th Marines stack boxes of captured enemy mortar and artillery rounds foun d

in an NVA base area. Below, members of a U .S. Army artillery battery at Camp Carroll pose with

one of the two 75mm pack howitzers captured by Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.
368 THE DEFINING YEA R

Michael, Jr., who had assumed command two day s

earlier. The operation was considered a success no t

only in terms of enemy troops and equipmen t

destroyed, but also in providing the units involve d

with additional experience in the conduct of highl y

mobile mountain warfare . The operation, as the tas k

force commander later wrote, " taught us that, wit h

effort and energy properly focused on a selected location, we can prepare LZs, build FSB's, virtually any -

where . The tougher the terrain, the more vital the

systematic application of resources. But we reject the

notion that there are areas too difficult to conquer. "

Operation July Action, he continued, "also reminde d

the enemy that he has no safe havens. . . . Most important, perhaps, our pioneering greatly facilitates ou r

return whenever we choose . "3 5

While the planning for operations in the Dong Ha

Mountain and Mutter Ridge complex took place, Tas k

Force Hotel looked longingly at the rugged terrai n

west of Landing Zone Stud in the Scotland II area o f

operations. The area was known to contain the bas e

area of the 8th Battalion, 29th NVA Regiment and was a

source of a variety of nasty enemy activities. Allied

fixed-wing planes and helicopters that wandered ove r

the region often received antiaircraft fire which resulted in a number of lost aircraft. Supply convoys travelling Route 9 to Landing Zone Stud faced a constan t

threat of ambush as they turned south at the Rockpile .

Also, with the closing of Khe Sanh and the movement

of Task Force Hotel to Landing Zone Stud, the new

combat base was increasingly a target for enemy rocket gunners.

General Hoffman's task force originally planned t o

employ a battalion of the 1st Marines, upon its departure from Khe Sanh, to land on Dong Ca Lu or Hil l

715—the area's dominant feature—and search the surrounding terrain, six kilometers west of Landing Zone

Stud or Vandegrift as it was to be renamed. Colonel

Dwyer nominated the 1st Battalion, but by 6 July ,

when the 1st Marines departed Khe Sanh, the 1st Battalion remained behind to battle an enemy force on

Hill 689. The battalion spent another six days in battle before it could retrieve eight Marine bodies from

the forward slope of the hill.

On 9 July, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines arrived at

Landing Zone Stud and relieved the 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines temporarily as the combat base's security force .

The following day, Landing Zone Stud took severa l

volleys of enemy 122mm rockets. On the 11th, Tas k

Force Hotel assumed direct operational control of th e

1st Battalion, 4th Marines, as no other battalion was

available, and the battalion was transported by helicopter to Hill 715 .°

The first wave of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H.

Galbraith's Marines scrambled from their CH—46s,

and like the two waves that followed, encountered n o

enemy opposition . But a helicopter in the fourth wave ,

while hovering a few feet above the landing zone, too k

several bursts of .50-caliber machine gun fire an d

crashed in a ball of flames. Miraculously, the CH—46's

full load of troops made it to safety, and only one of the

air crewman sustained injury.

Braving constant mortar and sniper fire as the y

swept the area, Galbraith's Marines found numerous

heavily fortified enemy positions that recently had

been occupied . On the 13th, as Company B moved

westward down a trail, the company's point elemen t

was struck by a command detonated mine . The company immediately pulled back, set up a perimeter., an d

sent a squad forward to retrieve the body of one Marine

and to look for another. As the squad inched forward ,

the enemy detonated another mine and raked the company's position with .50-caliber, mortar, and grenad e

fire . The following day, Company A assisted with th e

recovery of casualties, but it too encountered comman d

detonated mines, resulting in four additional killed ,

including the company's commanding officer, Captai n

Henry D. Banks.** The company withdrew, and on the

15th, Galbraith's battalion was flown to Landing Zone

Stud to relieve forces slated to participate in Operation

July Action.36

During the next 10 ten days, Colonel Edward J . Miller's 4th Marines conducted mobile defense operations to the west of Fire Support Bases Shepherd and

Cates with little enemy contact. In addition, elements

of the regiment secured Ca Lu, Landing Zone Stud,

and Route 9 from Ca Lu north . As the division's reserve

regiment, it could, if ordered, provide forces for operations anywhere within the division's area of operations .

On 25 July, Lieutenant Colonel Galbraith's battalion was ordered back to Hill 715, not only to expan d

*Elements of the 4th Marines were committed to assisting the 1s t

Battalion, 1st Marines with the fighting on Hill 689 and securing Fir e

Support Bases Shepherd and Cates .

**This was the same Captain Banks, who had commanded Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and had been seriously wounded i n

that company 's engagement on Hill 689 near Khe Sanh on 16 April .

See Chapter 16. Colonel Galbraith wrote that when he assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, Captain Banks was the battalion assistant S—3 and that the Company A commander had just bee n

transferred : " Hank asked for the company, and I gave it to him . His

death has always weighed heavily on me ." Col Thomas H . Galbraith ,

Comments on draft, n .d . (Dec68) (Vietnam Comment File) .
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 369

its previous search, but also to recover the bodies of the

two Marines killed on 13 July. BLT 2/4, under the

command of Lieutenant Colonel Louis A . Rann,

simultaneously massed on Hill 679, 12 kilometers

west of Stud, and began search operations to the north .

Split into two command groups of two companies

each, Galbraith's battalion advanced toward Hill 71 5

from the south and east, under heavy enemy small

arms, rocket-propelled grenade, and mortar fire . The

Marines found the hill, once secured, to be heavil y

mined and boobytrapped. While seating an 81mm

mortar baseplate, for example, Company B Marines

detonated a booby-trapped antitank mine which

killed one and wounded four. Continuing the search ,

Galbraith's Marines recovered the bodies of the tw o

missing Marines, and at the same time discovered sizable caches of weapons, ammunition, and rice scattered throughout the hill complex, but encountered

no enemy forces. While destroying the captured

weapons and ammunition, the battalion prepared to

evacuate the rice for distribution to refugees in the

province . On 4 August, after the completion of the

search mission, Marine helicopters lifted the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines out of the area and returned th e

unit to Landing Zone Stud .

By the morning of 29 July, Lieutenant Colonel

Rann's Marines had reached Hill 606, four kilometer s

north of Hill 679. Shortly before noon, Marines fro m

Company G observed and took under fire 15 enem y

troops. Later a platoon moved forward to check th e

area and encountered a well-concealed and wellentrenched enemy force . Four Marines were killed and

nine wounded by the enemy's initial heavy burst o f

claymores and small arms and grenade fire . The bodies of three of the four Marines killed remained unrecovered as artillery and air pounded the bunker complex throughout the remainder of the day. The

following morning, after an additional artillery mission, Company G moved forward and recovered th e

bodies without incident .

Landing Zone Stud has now become Vandegrift Combat Base, complete with a makeshift radio towe r

to control helicopter traffic. LCpl John L. Phillips, in the tower, is bringing in for a landing a resupply Boeing CH—46 Sea Knight aircraft

Photo is from the Abel Collection
370 THE DEFINING YEAR

On 3 August, after establishing a temporary fir e

support base, named Shoup, on Hill 606, Rann's battalion received the additional mission of searching th e

northern slope of the Khe Giang Thoan Valley, thre e

kilometers to the northeast . The area was believed to

harbor the launching sites of rockets that had harasse d

Thon Son Lam and the Rockpile for several months . As

Company F moved down Hill 606 toward the valle y

the following day, it discovered seven abandoned huts .

Below each, Marines found caches of arms, ammunition, and equipment, the total of which they estimated at 20 tons. 37

The search of the Khe Giang Thoan Valley during

the next two days produced no additional weapons

caches and few rocket launch sites. However, the companies involved were probed continually once they had

moved into night defensive positions . In one instance ,

Company E Marines heard movement along their

perimeter throughout the night, and awoke the following morning to find their claymores turned inwar d

toward the company's lines . In another, Company G's

lines were probed by an estimated force of 10 NVA

under cover of small arms and grenade fire . The company sustained four killed and six wounded in th e

attack. On 6 August, Rann's battalion ended its search

of the valley and was helilifted to Landing Zone Stud ,

now officially designated Vandegrift Combat Base .

The 3d Marine Division, during the months of June

and July, slowly and methodically shifted from the

defensive posture of the past to a more flexible mobil e

offensive posture which would characterize future division operations. It established large numbers of fire

support bases and landing zones in areas that the

enemy once considered havens and untouchable by

allied forces. In addition, these months witnessed th e

reorientation of division forces from the coastal lowlands to the mountainous region of western Quang Tri

Province . The remaining months of 1968 would see

this move accelerated .

Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien

While Marine operations were conducted in central

and western Quang Tri Province, responsibility for th e

coastal lowlands, piedmont, and jungle-covered mountains south of Dong Ha and north of Hue was shared

by the 3d ARVN Regiment and the U.S . Army's 1st

Cavalry Division . The ARVN Regiment operated

mainly in jungle canopy of enemy Base Area 114 ,

southwest of Quang Tri City, while the 1st Cavalry

Division's three brigades, under the command of Major

General John J. Tolson III, USA, secured the coast and

piedmont from Quang Tri City south to Camp Evans.

It also conducted search and clear operations in enem y

Base Areas 114 and 101 .38 *

During June and July, the division continued its

participation in Operation Jeb Stuart III, accomplishing the two-fold mission of rice denial and offensive

operations in the two enemy base areas within th e

division's area of operations. In the coastal plains, i t

conducted rice denial operations in conjunction wit h

elements of the 1st and 3d ARVN Regiments to

ensure that rice from the spring harvest was withhel d

from the enemy. In Base Area 101, west of Quang Tri

City, the division's 1st Brigade initiated combat operations in search of enemy forces . At the same time, i n

Base Area 114, elements of the division's 3d Brigad e

and a battalion of the 3d ARVN Regiment conducted

operations over rugged terrain in search of not onl y

enemy forces, but also known headquarters and sup -

port installations.

During the middle of June, advancing elements of

the 3d ARVN Regiment encountered heavy enem y

resistance in the southeastern portion of Base Area 11 4

as elements of the 803d NVA Regiment defended a

large cache area . The battle for the area continued with

sporadic, but heavy contact through the 21st . This

action resulted not only in the demolition of th e

enemy cache area and the capture of large quantities of

ammunition, but also in the destruction of the enem y

regiment's antiaircraft company and the seizure of th e

regiment's headquarters complex . South of the base

area, elements of the cavalry division's 2d Brigad e

entered what appeared to be the enemy's Tri-Thien

Military Region headquarters bunker and tunnel complex, occupied during the attack on Hue . While

searching the complex, the Army troopers capture d

numerous maps and documents relating to th e

enemy's activities from the DMZ south to Da Nang .

Among the maps was one which detailed the construction of a supply road from the A Shau Valley eas t

into Base Area 114. Reaction to this informatio n

resulted in the destruction of several enemy trucks,

construction sites, and a large portion of the road. While elements of the ARVN regiment and the

division's 2d Brigade battled the enemy's 803d Regiment in the mountains, two other enemy regiments

were on the move in the coastal lowlands, centered i n

the Trieu Phong area, northeast of Quang Tri City . On

*Major General Tolson was replaced on 15 July as division commander by Brigadier General Richard L . Irby.
3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 37 1

26 June, elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment made

heavy contact with the 4th Battalion, 812th NVA Regiment, and claimed killing 128 enemy troops . The following day, in a two-day battle, elements of the Ai r

Cavalry's 5th Armored trapped the 814th NVA Battalion in the coastal village of Binh An, 14 kilometers

northeast of Quang Tri, and reported more than 23 0

enemy soldiers dead and 44 prisoners taken .

At the conclusion of the spring rice harvest, the 1st

Cavalry Division shifted tactical emphasis to an even

more intensified campaign against the two enemy bas e

areas. Elements of all three brigades air assaulted dee p

into the base areas, established new landing zones and

constructed fire support bases capable of interdictin g

the enemy's communication routes through the A Shau

Valley. Although numerous NVA complexes, arms

caches, and training areas were discovered an d

destroyed, the enemy increasingly employed antiaircraft fire against troop-laden helicopters to limit the

mobility and flexibility of the division's ground force s

operating in the jungle-covered base areas. By the end

of July, the 1st Air Cavalry Division had driven sever -

al combat and support elements of the enemy 's 7th

Front further west, possibly into the northern A Sha u

Valley, the site of a major logistical storage area .*

In central Thua Thien Province to the south, the

101st Airborne Division, under the command of Majo r

General Olinto M. Barsanti, continued to conduct the

follow-on, division-level operation, Nevada Eagle ,

which began in mid-May with the termination of

Operation Delaware .** During June and July, the division coordinated rice denial operations in Thua Thien

Province and conducted offensive operations to defea t

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces and destroy

the enemy's base areas and lines of communication .

The division's 1st Brigade conducted reconnaissance i n

force operations along Route 547, which parallels the

Song Bo, west of Hue ; the 2d Brigade continued reconnaissance in force operations in the coastal plains nort h

and east of Hue and provided security and support for

the rice collection effort ; and the 3d Brigade, 82d Air-

*On 27 June, the Department of the Army directed that the 1st

Cavalry Division be redesignated the 1st Air Cavalry Division and th e

101st Airborne Division redesignated the 101st Air Cavalry Division .

However, the terminology was withdrawn on 26 August and the ne w

designations established were 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) an d

101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), to preserve the " heritage and traditions and to enhance further long established esprit associated with

these famous divisions." MACV ComdHist, 1968, p . 245 .

**Major General Melvin Zais assumed command of the divisio n

from Major General Barsanti on 19 July 1968 .

borne Division, to a limited extent, secured major fir e

support bases astride Route 547 and conducted search

and clear operations along major enemy entry and exit

routes to the coastal plains.** *

The division 's combat operations during the summer months were characterized by infrequent enemy

contact, increased boobytrap incidents, and the capture of rice caches. With the defeat of multi-battalion

NVA attempts to seize and hold areas of the coastal

plains in May and their retreat into mountain bas e

camps, a tactical void was created that eventually was

filled by local guerrillas and the Viet Cong infrastructure. Despite extensive reconnaissance in force operations and numerous saturation patrols and ambushes ,

the enemy, which had broken down into squad-size d

or smaller units, chose not to engage the division's

maneuver elements. When he was engaged, the contacts were of short duration and involved few casual -

ties on both sides.

As guerrilla activity increased, so did division

casualties from surprise firing devices . Of the 40 airborne troopers killed and 375 wounded during June

and July, Viet Cong-emplaced boobytraps, generall y

hand grenades or 105mm artillery rounds with tri p

wire devices attached, accounted for 18 killed an d

173 wounded . Despite increased friendly and few

enemy casualties, the division's vigorous program of

patrols and ambushes did result in the discovery and

capture of numerous rice caches. Working closely

with South Vietnamese Regional, Popular, an d

National Police Field Forces, the division's rice denia l

campaign resulted in the capture of more than 345

tons of rice and in impeding enemy movemen t

through the area of operations .

During the last week of July, the division bega n

preparations for a return to the A Shau Valley, with a

logistical build-up and the construction of fire support

bases. The plan called for one brigade of the division

and elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment to conduct a

combined helicopter and ground assault into the valley ,

***The 3d Brigade, undergoing a reorganization from its deployment task force organization to that of a light infantry brigade, was

experiencing extreme personnel turbulence . The upheaval was caused

not only by the reorganization, but also by a decision by the Department of the Army to give each individual who had deployed with th e

brigade in February the option of returning to Fort Bragg or remaining in Vietnam with the unit. Of the 3,650 personnel who deployed

from Fort Bragg, 2,513 chose to return . The training of more than

2,900 replacements therefore limited combat operations . By the end of

July, the brigade was declared combat ready and began full-time operations in its assigned area .
372 THE DEFINING YEA R

along Route 547A. The 1st Air Cavalry Division wa s

to conduct concurrent operations, partially as a deception, to the north and east of the valley.

South of the 101st Airborne Division's area o f

operations in Thua Thien Province lay that of Marin e

Task Force X-Ray, under the command of Brigadie r

General George D . Webster. On 1 June, Phase III of

Operation Houston began under the control of th e

5th Marines. National Route 1, from Phu Bai south

to the Hai Van Pass, was successfully kept open a s

elements of Colonel Paul G . Graham's regiment provided security for key bridges and installations and

conducted patrols and ambushes on avenues of

approach to the vital highway. In addition, the regiment conducted extensive rice denial operations i n

the Phu Thu and Vinh Loc Districts, east and south -

east of Phu Bai, in conjunction with South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces . During the

month, the Marines captured more than 31,00 0

pounds of rice and returned them to governmen t

control, and relocated more than 44 tons to secur e

storage areas. The regiment also conducted a numbe r

of short operations in the jungle canopy south of the

Phu Bai vital area, in the Phu Loc and Hai Van Pass

areas of the operation, to locate and destroy enem y

forces, supply caches, and base areas.

During Phase IV of Operation Houston, whic h

began on 1 July, Task Force X-Ray assumed operational control of BLT 2/7, which on 9 July assaulte d

into the Vinh Loc District by helicopter and amphibian tractors, and continued the task force's vigorous ric e

denial campaign . A week later, the battalion landing

team joined the 5th Marines and was helilifted to th e

Thon Mu Kham Valley, southwest of Phu Bai, wher e

fire support bases were constructed and search operations begun . With the departure of the battalion landing team and the 5th Marines, Colonel Bruce F Meyers' 26th Marines, assumed tactical responsibility fo r

the Task Force X-Ray area of operations and bega n

Phase V of Operation Houston on 25 July . "

Throughout the summer months, Marine, U .S.

Army, and ARVN troops continued the relentless

and successful pursuit and destruction of enemy

forces in northern I Corps. From Thon Mu Kha m

Valley in the south to the Demilitarized Zone in the

north, allied forces aggressively and repeatedly

forced the North Vietnamese troops and their Viet

Cong allies to withdraw deeper into their border

sanctuaries, thereby delaying any enemy attempt at

initiating a major offensive in the northern tw o

provinces of South Vietnam .

*For the beginning of Operation Houston see Chapter 1 .3 .
CHAPTER 19

The Third Offensive : Da Nang

Indicators—The Storm Breaks—Counterattack—Pursuit—Typhoon Bess

Indicators

As the 1st Marine Division Operations Allen Broo k

and Mameluke Thrust entered their later stages in th e

summer of 1968, the Communists cautiously avoided

decisive contact, giving rise to the theory that they

were husbanding their resources for another offensive .

Rumors of an impending major attack by the enem y

began to take on lives their own. The expected Communist thrust was referred to variously as the "third

offensive" (the Tet and the May offensives being the

first and second, respectively), the "autumn offensive, "

or the " summer offensive ." South Vietnamese President Thieu had warned on 10 July that "the expected

Communist summer offensive against Saigon an d

other major cities might come in two weeks and coul d

be the last battle, the last all-out effort by the Communists. " " Ironically, 10 days later, North Vietnames e

President Ho Chi Minh seemed to have confirmed thi s

statement when he exhorted his countrymen to "a fina l

victory during the third offensive ."2

Marine infantry units captured prisoners, who ,

and documents, which, further indicated Communist intentions. By late July, III MAF intelligenc e

officers knew enough about the enemy's plan to b e

certain that Da Nang was the target of the threatened offensive . The Da Nang National Police servic e

captured a North Vietnamese officer who reveale d

details of what he referred to as the "X2 Offensive . "

The objective of this attack, he claimed, was to create a "favorable political situation for the Nort h

Vietnamese delegation at the Paris peace talks t o

commemorate the forthcoming VC holidays and t o

attempt to gain the support of the civilian populace . "

According to his account, the Communist forces

would conduct the campaign in several phases. First,

Viet Cong sappers would infiltrate Da Nang disguised as ARVN troops and National Police . During

a series of attacks on cities and military facilitie s

throughout the country, these "fifth columnists "

would seize control of key facilities in the city . Group

44 Headquarters assigned two of these Viet Cong

units, Reconnaissance Team X.2/89 and the C.23 Reconnaissance Company, the tasks of assassinating South

Vietnamese government officials, hanging propaganda flags, distributing propaganda leaflets, an d

harassing U.S. and ARVN units in Da Nang . 3

While rocket and mortar batteries shelled the airbases and U.S . headquarters facilities within the city,

ground units would attack from the west, south, and

east (the latter across the Trinh Minh The Bridge

north of Marble Mountain Air Facility). Finally, the

Communists would "call upon ARVN and U .S . forces

to stage military revolts and desert to the VC forces . "

The prisoner claimed that the VC had collected 3 0

U.S . servicemen (deserters) who would assist them i n

fomenting an uprising .* If the attack on Da Nang and

the military revolt were successful, the Communist s

would gather South Vietnamese intellectuals to coordinate with the National Liberation Front for the formation of local coalition governments in Da Nang an d

other captured areas and eventually, a national-leve l

coalition government. 4

The enemy appeared to be throwing everything h e

had into the effort against Da Nang . Enemy units

scheduled to participate in the attacks in the Da Nan g

TAOR included the 31st, 36th, and 38th North Vietnamese Army Regiments, the R—20, V—25, and T—89 Battalions, as well as the 368B Rocket Regiment.** A rallier

later reported that the Communist plan even include d

a contingency for the use of North Vietnamese tank s

and aircraft to turn the tide as a last resort. 6 Indeed, i n

late July, Marine reconnaissance teams and air

*Indeed, Marine reconnaissance and infantry units operating in th e

Da Nang TAOR during this period reported numerous sightings o f

Caucasians moving with enemy units . One reconnaissance team sho t

and wounded one of the Caucasians in an ambush, then heard the ma n

call for help in English .

**The 38th NVA Regiment represented no actual increase of enem y

units in the Da Nang TAOR. It was basically a coordinating head -

quarters for several VC battalions that had operated there over th e

years. According to Marine intelligence sources, it was established i n

early May 1968 and collocated with Group 44 "to afford greater control" during the mini-Tet and Third offensives . It consisted of th e

V–25, R–20, and V–7 VC Infantry Battalions, and the 3d and T–8 7

Sapper Battalions. III MAF PerIntRep No . 35–68, dtd 3Sep68, p .

A–47, in III MAF PerintReps, 14Jul–31Aug68 .

373
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374 THE DEFINING YEAR

observers had twice sighted enemy armored fighting

vehicles west of An Hoa.

Originally, intelligence estimates had set the start

date for the offensive on 20 July, to coincide with the

new moon when illumination would be low. Although

speculative, this theory fit a pattern of increased enemy

activity during the darkest nights of a given month.7

However, when this date passed without serious incident, intelligence officers revised their estimates to

reflect the next new moon phase as the start date: 23

August 1968. In tenuous confirmation of this supposition, a prisoner revealed that the month of August was

to bring the "decisive battle for revolutionary history."s

As III MAF developed intelligence concerning the

third offensive, subordinate units prepared for the coming battle. Acting on the reports of enemy tanks and

extensive Communist road-building activity southwest of Da Nang, the 1st Marine Division revised its

anti-mechanized defense plan to meet the new threat.9

Major General Carl A. Youngdale, who had relieved

Major General Robertson as division commander in

June, directed his subordinate commanders to review

plans for the defense of the Da Nang TAOR and to

increase the readiness of their units. Anticipating that

the enemy would strike during darkness, he ordered

that all units maximize night activities and "reduce

day workloads accordingly to allow adequate rest for all

hands."io In the area surrounding Da Nang, Operations Allen Brook and Mameluke Thrust continued

with the participating units frequently shifting their

areas of operations in an effort to engage and destroy

the major Communist units which would have to concentrate to conduct an offensive of the magnitude III

MAF anticipated.

Just past noon on 18 August, less than a kilometer

west of Marble Mountain Air Facility, a patrol from

Company B, 1st Military Police Battalion apprehended a 16-year-old Vietnamese boy who confessed that he

was a member of a VC platoon which was hiding nearby. The MPs cordoned off the area and, with the assistance of the South Vietnamese 106th Regional Force

Company and Company C, 3d Military Police Battalion, conducted a thorough search. Several light contacts with small groups of VC resulted, leading to the

discovery of weapons, ammunition, and explosives

caches as well as a radio receiver."

Major General Youngdale, in a report to Lieutenant

General Robert E. Cushman at III MAF headquarters,

noted:

enemy activity has increased . . . . there are indications that the enemy may be in the latter stages of

preparation for his third offensive. As yet, however, there

are no indications that the enemy is prepared to conduct

a major attack within the next twenty-four hours)2
THE THIRD OFFENSIVE : DA NANG 37 5

Photo from Abel Collectio n

From an observation tower in his company sector, Capt Charles S . Robb, the son-in-law of President John -

son and commander of Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, points out key terrain features to the South

Vietnamese Chief of the Joint General Staff, Gen Cao Van 'Wen, who is on an official visit to Da Nang.

MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, the new commander of the 1st Marine Division, is seen directly behind Robb.

Early the following day, 19 August, a Viet Con g

company attacked and overran Combined Action Platoon 2—4—3 northeast of Hoi An . At 2100 that night ,

30 to 40 VC attacked recon team "Trailer Park," atop

Hon Coc Mountain, south of Go Noi Island . Only the

quick intervention of a Douglas AC—47 Spooky gun -

ship, with its potent, multiple Gatling guns, saved the

team from destruction .

Following a battalion-sized VC attack on Combined Action Platoon 2—3—4 during the early mornin g

hours of 20 August, Youngdale's view of the situation

changed. In a report to General Cushman that day, he

estimated that the enemy could "close on principal tar -

gets in the First Division area in one night in launching his 3d phase offensive ."1 3

While the 5th Marines, under Colonel Paul G . Graham, pursued Communist survivors of the Battle o f

Chau Phong south of Da Nang,* the 27th Marines continued final preparations for redeployment to the U .S .

and the 1st Marines began arranging its move from

Quang Tri Province to the Da Nang TAOR.** It was a

*See Chapter 17 .

**From the beginning, the President had indicated that the deployment of the 27th Marines to Vietnam was temporary and in March he and

his advisors directed that the regiment return in July. This was later delayed

until September. See Chapter 27 for the deployment and redeployment o f

the 27th Marines. See also Chapter 13 for the initial deployment.

hectic period in the 1st Marine Division and the

specter of the heralded third offensive continued t o

grow. General Youngdale made minor adjustments t o

the plan for the defense of Da Nang, reinforcing thos e

sectors which appeared to be most in danger.' 4 His

daily report for 21 August concluded that :

The enemy appears to have completed his preparation for his offensive . Small scale mortar attacks on Dai

Loc and Thuong Duc in the last 24 hours possibl y

reflect last minute registration . The enemy may launc h

his offensive at any time . . . . t 5

The Storm Breaks

The streams which drain the rugged mountains of

central Quang Nam Province follow the slope of th e

land toward the South China Sea, growing in size and

strength as they meet other streams. By the time the y

reach the flat coastal plain, the streams have become

rivers which twist through the populated farmlands,

branching and rejoining again in a crazy patchwork . I n

every area through which a river passes, the local Vietnamese give it a name, so that by the time it reache s

the South China Sea, it has acquired many titles along

the way. The river which flows along the souther n

boundary of Da Nang, separating the city from the fertile paddy region of the coastal plain, is called Son g

Cau Do, at least along that particular stretch . About
376 THE DEFINING YEA R

two kilometers south of the river, Highway 1 forks,

sending each of its branches across the Song Cau D o

toward Da Nang on its own bridge . The easternmost

of these, called the Cam Le Bridge, after the hamlet o n

its northern side, led directly to the Da Nang Airbase ,

less than two kilometers away. Two kilometers

upstream from the Cam Le Bridge, to the west, lay a

combination highway bridge-railroad trestle known a s

the Song Cau Do Bridge .

Marines guarded these bridges, both to prevent VC

saboteurs from destroying them and to prevent enem y

infiltrators from crossing them with weapons and

explosives for use in the city. The numerous support

units stationed in Da Nang each assumed responsibility for a sector within the city and its suburbs. The 1st

Tank Battalion's area included the Song Cau D o

Bridge ; the 1st Military Police Battalion's area included the Cam Le Bridge . For the most part, bridge security consisted of checking the identification papers and

packages of civilians crossing the bridge and keeping a

lookout beneath the bridge to foil sapper attacks . At

random intervals, bridge sentries dropped small explosive charges into the water nearby to discourage enem y

swimmers from approaching the pilings.

At the Song Cau Do and Cam Le Bridges, the dut y

was routine, the only excitement being the occasiona l

detention of a Vietnamese whose identity papers wer e

not in order. South of the river, infantry units of the 1s t

Marine Division formed an additional screen protecting

the city from major attacks, so it seemed unlikely tha t

the enemy, in force, would ever get as far as the bridges .

Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion wa s

responsible for security at the Cam Le Bridge . The

company command post was in a bunker at the nort h

end of the bridge, alongside of which stood an observation tower. An old French bunker and anothe r

observation tower stood at the approach to the sout h

end. Normally, one of Company D's platoons occupied the bunkers, towers, and several listening post s

and ambush sites on both sides of the river, while th e

other two platoons remained in the company's rea r

area at the edge of the Da Nang Airbase, two kilo -

meters to the north.

On the afternoon of 22 August, the company commander departed Da Nang for an "R&R" in Hawaii,

leaving his executive officer, First Lieutenant Michae l

J. Kelly, in command .* Lieutenant Kelly was scheduled

*Abbreviation commonly used for " Rest and Recreation . " Eac h

Marine was authorized one " R&R" during his 13-month tour of dut y

in Vietnam . Many sites were available throughout the Pacific area ,

including Hong Kong, Australia, Thailand, Japan, and Malaysia .

to begin his own R&R in Hawaii on 28 August, but

for the next six days, he would bear responsibility for

the protection of the Cam Le Bridge .1 6 Unknown to

him, during the early morning hours of 22 August, 8 0

Viet Cong of the Q.91 Company, 2d District, Quang Da

Special Zone, in disguise and using forged identification

papers, had individually crossed the Cam Le Bridge ,

then took a city bus to a safe house on Quang Tun g

Street to retrieve previously cached weapons and equipment and to await the hour for their attack .' ?

At 2130, responding to reports of movement alon g

the Song Cau Do, Lieutenant Kelly ordered the 2d Platoon to move from its barracks to reinforce the 3d Platoon at the bridge . Within an hour, the Marines had

reached the bridge and took up positions on the peninsula that curves out from the north bank to touch th e

span itself. At midnight, the Marines of the 1st Tan k

Battalion who were guarding the Song Cau Do Bridge ,

two kilometers to the west, spotted six people in th e

water and took them under fire, but because of th e

extreme darkness, could not determine whether the fir e

was effective .ls

The Marines at the Cam Le Bridge did not have t o

wait long for their share of the action . At 0100, 2 3

August, Sergeant Larry K . Bucklew, the platoon

sergeant of the 2d Platoon, spotted six sampans crossing the river near his position on the peninsula . The 2 d

Platoon opened fire, driving some of the sampans back

across the river, while others pressed on, landing on the

north bank .1 9

Before the Marines on the Cam Le Bridge could

react to the firefight on the river to their west, exploding RPG rounds and mortar shells engulfed the security position on the south bank . The 1st Squad, 3d Platoon, under Lance Corporal Stephen D . Hott, was

taken by surprise as Communist troops swarmed ove r

its position. Lance Corporal Arthur Costello, mannin g

a .50-caliber machine gun mounted in an old French

bunker, tried to get his gun into action, but an enemy

soldier outside the bunker held the barrel fast, an d

Costello could not bring it to bear.20

Lance Corporal Hott, in the nearby observatio n

tower with Private First Class Pedro L. G. Francisco ,

ordered Costello to disable the machine gun and with -

draw. Hott then grabbed an M60 machine gun an d

ammunition and ran for the bridge . Costello, finding

the enemy already inside his bunker, fought his wa y

out, then paused to throw in a fragmentation grenad e

in hopes of "spiking" the machine gun .21 Making his

way onto the bridge, Costello joined Lance Corporals

John W. Thomas and Hylan L . Crowder running with
THE THIRD OFFENSIVE : DA NANG 37 7

Hott towards the company command post on th e

north bank. Francisco was still on the south side, hi s

fate unknown. The rest of the squad, dispersed in listening posts and ambush sites near the bridge's south -

ern approaches, remained in their positions, unseen b y

the enemy.

Moments after the Communists struck, Lieutenan t

Kelly organized a counterattack from the north bank o f

the river. Corporal Wayne D. Brown led his squad

across the bridge toward the fight, meeting Hott's

squad halfway. Hott had been wounded in the head, s o

Brown ordered him back to the command post at the

north end for treatment and, in the confusion, Hot t

took the machine gun with him. Unwilling to risk an

attack without the machine gun, Brown organized hi s

men for a defense of the middle of the bridge, using a

sandbagged position already in place, then sent Lance

Corporal John A . Eller back for the gun .

Eller returned with the gun, but with no ammunition. Brown himself went back to the north side ,

which was now under heavy mortar and rocket fire, an d

retrieved the ammunition . Finally ready to counterattack, the Marines charged across the bridge, huggin g

the sides for protection as Eller, leading the way ,

sprayed the enemy with machine gun fire. Reaching

the observation tower, Eller was felled by a long burst

from an enemy automatic weapon . While down, a ricochet struck him in the chest, wounding him a secon d

time . He tossed a grenade into an enemy fighting hole ,

then died . 22 *

Within one minute of Eller being hit, Brown himself and two of his men were wounded. With the

machine gun lost and enemy fire mounting, Brow n

ordered a withdrawal to the bridge . As the Marines

assumed new fighting positions near the water's edge ,

the enemy hit them with either tear gas or CS gas .* *

Only one Marine in the squad had a protective mask ,

and the effects of the gas soon made the position untenable . The Marines withdrew further, to the sandbagge d

position in the middle of the bridge from which they

had counterattacked. The gas, although still present,

was not as strong there and the men were able to kee p

fighting. Brown reported the situation to Lieutenant

Kelly. The lieutenant's response was, "Hang tight . "

*For his courageous action, Lance Corporal Eller was posthumously decorated with the Silver Star.

** "CS" is the designation of a chemical riot control agent used i n

Vietnam . Its effects are similar to chose caused by tear gas : burning o f

the eyes, throat, and mucous membranes. Although powerful, th e

effects are temporary, usually disappearing within minutes of the ga s

dissipating .

At that moment, there was little Lieutenant

Kelly could do to help Corporal Brown . Enemy

troops on the north bank were pressing hard against

the company command post, advancing under heavy

mortar, RPG, and small arms fire. The north ban k

observation tower, pounded by Communist shells ,

collapsed at 0200, burying three Marines shelterin g

beneath it, and immediately afterwards, the enemy

used gas against the Marines on the north bank. As

with Corporal Brown's squad, the Marines had n o

protective masks . Some withdrew to the middle of

the bridge where the gas was not as strong, whil e

others dipped their heads in the water to clear thei r

eyes and throats, and desperately tried to hang onto

their positions.2 3

While Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion

fought to hold the Cam Le Bridge, the third offensiv e

erupted all over the Da Nang area . The security force

at the nearby Song Cau Do Bridge, although no t

under ground attack, was shelled by enemy mortars .

Downstream from them, toward the Cam Le Bridge ,

Communists continued to cross the river in sampan s

and the Marines on the Song Cau Do Bridge kept up

steady machine gun fire into the enemy boats .

Between 0245 and 0315, 19 units in the Da Nang

area recorded over 300 rounds of mortar and 122mm

rocket fire detonating on or near their positions .

Enemy infantry attacked the 1st Tank Battalion ,

three company positions held by the 27th Marines,

the headquarters of the 11th Marines, and three Combined Action platoons in the 7th Marines TAOR.

Many other units received mortar fire . Viet Cong sappers struck the Special Forces compound two kilometers south of Marble Mountain Air Facility. Advancing under a mortar barrage, the sappers penetrated

the perimeter and swept through the position wit h

satchel charges, killing 16 Special Forces and Civilia n

Irregular Defense Group personnel and wounding

125 more . When finally driven off, the enemy left

behind 32 dead . Later, a prisoner revealed that this

enemy force was a company of the R—20 Battalion ,

reinforced by a platoon of the Q.92 Sapper Company .

Their mission was to seize the Marble Mountain Air

Facility and hold it for one day, destroying as man y

aircraft and facilities as possible .2 4

The 2d and 3d Platoons of Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion were still under heavy attack at

the Cam Le Bridge when the 1st Platoon left the airbase shortly after 0300 to relieve them . Moving i n

trucks down Highway 1, the rescuers came to a sudde n

stop after moving only a few hundred meters from the
378 THE DEFINING YEAR

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19181 6

In fighting for the Hoa Vang headquarters in August, Marines take cover from an unseen VC sniper .

The interior of a destroyed structure can be seen with only the floor and a chair still undamage d

airbase because a battle was raging around the Ho a

Vang District headquarters, which lay along the highway, midway between Da Nang and the north end o f

the bridge . A company of the 402d Sapper Battalion had

assaulted the district headquarters and blocked movement along Highway 1 . In their initial attack, the sappers penetrated the headquarters defenses and were

repulsed only after hand-to-hand fighting inside the

compound with U .S . advisors, South Vietnames e

National Police, and even local government official s

taking part.3 2 The attack waned at about 0400, allowing the relief force to move into the headquarters where

they left eight Marines as reinforcements before continuing toward the bridge. No sooner had the platoon

started toward the bridge than the enemy sappers

resumed their attack.26

The 1st Platoon reached the river at 0430, just i n

time to meet another enemy onslaught directed agains t

the bridge. From the airbase, a larger, combined relie f

force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Josep h

J. N. Gambardella, Commanding Officer, 3d Militar y

Police Battalion, moved south toward the bridge .* This

force, designated Task Force Kilo, consisted of two pla -

*Colonel Gambardella, the MP battalion commander, recalled tha t

this was the second call for assistance on the night of 22—23 August .

Just before midnight, he responded to a request for assistance from th e

commander of the ARVN Special Forces headquarters in the center o f

Da Nang city which was under attack . He deployed two platoons fro m

his battalion who cordoned off the headquarters. Four of the attackers

were killed and two were captured . Col Joseph J. N. Gambardella ,

Comments on draft, dtd 16Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).

toons from the 3d Military Police Battalion ; Compan y

K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines; Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion; and Ontos antitank vehicles, reinforced by a company of ARVN Rangers mounted i n

armored personnel carriers. Behind them,, crash crews

from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing followed with fire -

fighting equipment, attempting to extinguish the fire s

caused by the attack on the Hoa Vang District headquarters.27

At 0500, Lance Corporal Henry Lowery, leading a

nine-man ambush patrol southwest of the bridge ,

radioed Lieutenant Kelly that he intended to attac k

and recapture the south end . Lowery's squad advanced

to within 25 meters of the south tower, receiving onl y

sniper fire. Two Bell UH—1 Iroquois "Huey" helicopter 'gunships appeared overhead and Lower y

attempted to signal them to provide supporting fire

on the tower. The helicopters mistakenly attacked th e

Marines instead of the entrenched Communists. With

one man killed and two wounded, Lowery withdrew

his squad to the relative safety of a nearby rice padd y

to await help.2 8

When dawn broke over Da Nang just after 0600 ,

aircraft began attacking the Vet Cong in the bunkers

at the south end of the Cam Le Bridge . The two

"Hueys" were joined by a Douglas AC—47 Spooky

gunship, a Douglas A—1 Skyraider, and McDonnellDouglas F—4 Phantom jets which unsuccessfull y

pounded the enemy bunkers with napalm, high explosive bombs, and cannon fire .29
THE THIRD OFFENSIVE : DA NANG 379

Counterattack

The infantry unit nearest the south end of th e

bridge was the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, with it s

command post at Duong Son, four kilometers to the

southwest . At 0645, the battalion commander,

Major Kenneth J. Skipper, ordered Company A,

located at the battalion command post, to launch an

immediate counterattack to recapture the Cam Le

Bridge. Two of the company 's three platoons were

already detached, with one deployed to Christmas

Island, 1,000 meters northeast of the bridge, and th e

other supporting a Combined Action platoon in th e

hamlet of Lo Giang (1), 1,000 meters southeast of

the bridge . Further, one squad from the remainin g

platoon was on a patrol, leaving a total of two rifle

squads available to the company. The company commander, Captain William O. Moore, reinforced these

two squads with other members of the company wh o

were present in the command post . Marines trained

to operate mortars, rocket launchers, and even type -

writers suddenly became riflemen again. Said Captain Moore, "we took our clerks, we took our sick,

lame, and lazy, we took everybody we had and moved

out."30 Within five minutes of receiving the order ,

the small force was on the march .

Having departed without full knowledge of th e

enemy situation, Captain Moore tried to gather information along the way. Passing through an ARVN

compound, he spoke with the U .S . Army advisors who

pointed out suspected Communist positions lining

both sides of Highway 1 . The company continue d

north along the highway, stopping outside of Ca m

Nam, only two kilometers from the Communist positions on the south end of the bridge . While there, Captain Moore received orders from Major Skipper t o

detach yet another squad from his seriously deplete d

force to assist the platoon in Lo Giang (1), which had

reported being surrounded and under attack . He sent

16 Marines to reinforce the supposedly beleaguere d

garrison and requested permission to proceed toward

the bridge. Major Skipper, however, told him t o

remain in position and wait for a platoon of tanks

which would support the attack .

The Marines sent to Lo Giang (1) soon radioed back

that they had arrived to find the hamlet quiet, with th e

Combined Action Marines reporting they had not ha d

contact with the enemy for three hours . Captai n

Moore, assuming that someone had "cried `wolf," '

asked for the return of the 16 Marines, but Major Skipper denied his request.

At 1145, the tanks arrived: four 90mm gun tanks

and a flame tank from Company B, 5th Tank Battalion. The Marines of Company A had never operated

with tanks before . Indeed, many of those with Captai n

Moore had never participated as riflemen in any operation before . Nevertheless, the "company," reduced i n

strength once again to two ad-hoc squads, pressed forward toward the hamlet of Cam Nam on their way t o

the Cam Le Bridge. The road was raised above the surrounding paddies with a sharp drop down on both

shoulders, so the tanks were forced to advance in column, with one infantry squad on either side . At the

same time, Company D, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines

prepared to attack Cam Nam from the west .

When Captain Moore and his men were less than

400 meters from Cam Nam, the enemy opened fire

with RPGs, mortars, and small arms. The initial burst

killed two Marines and wounded four others, but th e

rest continued the attack, firing and maneuvering

toward the enemy, inching forward with only low

paddy dikes for cover. Two hundred meters from the

hamlet, an RPG hit the lead tank, causing minor

damage. Captain Moore spotted the RPG and pointed it out to the tankers, who returned fire with 40

rounds of high explosive, 4 rounds of "Beehive, " and 3

rounds of white phosphorous.31 With this, Communist troops began to run from one dwelling to another within the hamlet, the tanks cutting them down

with machine gun fire and blasting with 90mm

rounds any structure they entered . A machine gun

fired at the Marines from within a straw hut, and the

flame tank drenched the hut liberally with burnin g

fuel. Soon, the entire hamlet was ablaze, with virtually every structure leveled . "This, " related Captain

Moore, "about ended our problem."3 2

The Communists had blocked the highway wit h

vehicles, which also provided cover for the enemy . Five

more rounds of 90mm fire blasted away this makeshift

obstacle and the tiny force again surged forward toward

the Cam Le Bridge . As they passed through the burning hamlet, the company received word that a platoo n

from Company E, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines would

soon join them. Captain Moore ordered his platoon o n

Christmas Island, which had already made one unsuccessful bid to recapture the bridge, to join the counterattack from the east.

The .50-caliber machine gun abandoned in the

bunker the previous night had not been destroyed b y

Lance Corporal Costello's hand grenade and the Vie t

Gong now had it in action against the Marines . Even

after a fearful pounding by aircraft, there was no sign
380 THE DEFINING YEA R

that the Communists in the old French bunker wer e

ready to quit. The tanks led the attack toward the

south end of the bridge, pumping round after round o f

90mm cannon fire into the bunker and the nearb y

observation tower. The accurate, concentrated fire

proved to be too much for the Communists, who

rushed from their positions, attempting to escape . Several of them jumped into a vehicle and tried to drive

away, but a tank fired into the vehicle, sending it up i n

flames. Other enemy soldiers leaped into the river an d

tried to swim to safety, but the Marines rushed to th e

riverbank and shot them in the water.

At 1545, nine hours after receiving the order t o

counterattack, Captain Moore reported to his battalio n

headquarters that the objective was secured, then se t

about reorganizing the position . Several local Popular

Marine Cpl Henry A . Casselli, holding his M16 rifle, is

seen returning to the northern end of the Cam Le Bridge over

the Cau Do River after helping to secure the bridge . Other

Marines cross in the background. An ad hoc force from the

1st and 2d Battalions, 27th Marines and including

tankers and MPs had taken part in the fighting .

Department of Defense (USMC) A191818

Force troops were found under the bridge where the y

had been hiding since the previous night . Beneath the

tower, the Marines found the body of the gallant John

Eller, and in the vicinity of the bridge, 22 enemy dead .

Company A had suffered three dead and eight wound -

ed. Captain Moore linked up with Lieutenant Kelly's

military policemen on the north bank and his own platoon from Christmas Island, then sent a squad down

the riverbank to the west to ferret out any 'Viet Cong

who might be hiding there.

To the north, Lieutenant Colonel Gambardella's

Task Force Kilo fought through the remnants of th e

enemy sapper company which had laid siege to the

Hoa Vang District headquarters, reaching the north

bank of the river at approximately 1900 . Lieutenant

Colonel Gambardella recalled that in the attack south

to the Cam Le Bridge, Task Force Kilo came unde r

heavy fire and took several casualties . In the two fights,

the Marines sustained 4 killed and 12 wounded an d

the RVN forces with them 3 dead and 21 wounded.

Among the casualties was Navy Hospitalman Allan R .

Gerrish, who placed himself between a wounded

Marine and enemy machine gun fire and posthumously was awarded the Navy Cross for this action . Enemy

casualties in the battles for the district headquarters

and the Cam Le Bridge totaled 184 . ARVN Rangers

took control of the area, allowing Captain Moore and

his company to move to Christmas Island. Although

weary from the day's hard fighting, Company A maintained 100 percent alert in their new positions. 33

Through the night of 23—24 August, there wer e

several incidents, relatively minor as compared to th e

events of the previous night, indicating that the "third

offensive," though seriously compromised locally, wa s

not yet over. At 2200, a short firefight erupted at the

Song Cau Do Bridge when two sampans filled wit h

enemy troops attempted to cross the river from sout h

to north under the cover of small arms fire and a brie f

mortar barrage. Return fire directed at the Communist

positions resulted in 11 secondary explosions.34

Between 0200 and 0400, over 100 rounds of morta r

fire fell on the command post of the 5th Marines, positions held by Company M, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines ,

and Battery H, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.3 5

With the situation in Da Nang restored, i t

remained for III MAF to pursue and destroy the

escaping Communist units while at the same time

remaining vigilant for another wave of attacks on the

city. The heaviest fighting of the "third offensive" was

yet to come.
THE THIRD OFFENSIVE : DA NANG 38 1

Pursuit

At dawn on 24 August, a patrol from Company C ,

1st Battalion, 27th Marines made contact with two

companies of the Viet Cong V–25 Battalion, five kilometers south-southwest of the Cam Le Bridge in a

hamlet named Qua Giang (2) . The ARVN 1st Battalion, 51st Infantry, an ARVN armored cavalry unit ,

Company F, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, and the 3 d

Platoon, Company B, 5th Tank Battalion surrounded

the hamlet and directed supporting arms fire on enemy

positions throughout the day and night.36

On 24 August, elements of the 1st Military Polic e

Battalion, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalio n

and the South Vietnamese 111th Regional Force Company swept Highway 1 from the airbase to the bridge .

Despite the previous sweep by Task Force Kilo, pockets of enemy resistance remained . Rooting them out,

the task force counted 1 prisoner and 30 enemy dead a t

a cost of 6 Marines wounded . 37 South of Marble Mountain Air Facility, in a rare daylight attack, a dozen

122mm rockets fell in the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion compound during mid-morning, but the y

caused only minor structural damage and no personne l

casualties or equipment losses. 3 8

General Youngdale felt that the Communists had

not yet played their full hand . On 24 August, he predicted that the enemy would continue attacking th e

Cam Le Bridge, Marble Mountain Air Facility, and

major installations within the city. He also expressed

concern that another Viet Cong sapper battalion migh t

attempt to infiltrate Da Nang from the northwest .39

On 25 August, after pounding the V–25 Battalion

at Qua Giang (2) with supporting arms for two day s

and a night, the combined Marine-ARVN force

entered the hamlet, finding approximately 150 North

Vietnamese dead and the remnants of what appeared t o

be a battalion command post, complete with radios4 °

That evening, Youngdale reported to General Cushman that :

. . . infantry and sapper units may have aborted thei r

attempts to penetrate Da Nang from the south and may

move to the south to reposition in the vicinity of Go

Noi Island . However, rocket and mortar attacks ma y

resume . 4 1

Acting on this analysis, General Youngdale issue d

orders to mount an operation which would block the

withdrawal of the Communists from the Da Nang area

and defeat them in detail . 4 2 Named Operation Susse x

Bay, it would employ elements of the 5th Marines and

the 7th Marines, supported by ARVN and Republic of

Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) units . H-hour was se t

for 0900, 29 August .

At 0815, 29 August, while occupying a blockin g

position in preparation for Operation Sussex Bay, Company M, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines made heavy contac t

with the enemy in the "Dodge City" area, four kilo -

meters south of Hill 55 . While maneuvering against

the enemy flank, the company came under heavy fire

from three sides which wounded several men . A corpsman, Hospitalman Richard L. Powell, braved the

enemy fire to assist the wounded and was himself hi t

by machine gun fire, rendering his arm useless . Despite

his wounds, Powell continued to treat the casualties, at

one point advancing to assist a fallen Marine who la y

within 15 meters of a Communist machine gun . Here,

Powell was hit again and killed. For his selfless act,

Powell posthumously received the Navy Cross 4 3

Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Company G, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines joined the action

with tanks. Assisted by aircraft and artillery, the

Marines dislodged the North Vietnamese. Friendly

losses totalled 2 dead and 41 wounded and the Marine s

reported killing 42 of the enemy. 4 4

While Company M fought, the other units involve d

in Operation Sussex Bay assumed their positions. Just

east of the National Railroad, a contingent of Korea n

Marines established a blocking position along the C o

Ca stream. To the south, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine s

occupied its own blocking position in the western half

of Go Noi Island, along the Song Ky Lam, while th e

2d Battalion, 5th Marines began a sweep of the eastern

half of the island . The 3d Battalion, 7th Marine s

hemmed in the area of operations by establishing a

defensive line two kilometers west of the railroad .

Finally, two ARVN units, the 21st and 37th Ranger

Battalions, attacked south along the railroad from their

line of departure along the Song La Tho .

Shortly after launching their sweep, the ARVN

Ranger battalions engaged a large enemy unit sprea d

out between the hamlets of Dong Lien and Ha Non g

Tay (2). The Rangers returned fire and called for fire

support from the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines an d

ARVN artillery units. The battle resulted in over 80

North Vietnamese dead at a cost of 8 ARVN Ranger s

killed and 33 wounded4 5

Further south, in the Arizona Territory, Marin e

units participating in Operation Mameluke Thrust

recorded significant contact with the enemy. An NVA

platoon ambushed a platoon of Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines on 29 August near the Song Tinh

Yen, killing 12 Marines and wounding 18 . The
382 THE DEFINING YEA R

Marines directed 5 airstrikes and over 700 rounds of

artillery fire onto enemy positions only 200 meters

away, reporting as a result 25 Communists dead 46

General Youngdale remained convinced that th e

enemy intended to attack Da Nang from the west an d

northwest. 4 7 To counter this threat, he requested that a

B—52 mission be diverted from a previously schedule d

target to strike the valley of the Song Cu De (calle d

Elephant Valley by the Marines), 10 kilometers northwest of the city. 4 8

The action, despite Youngdale's analysis, remained

centered to the south, mainly in the Operation Sussex

Bay area . Just after midnight on 30 August, Compan y

H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ambushed a group o f

approximately 30 North Vietnamese fording the Son g

Ky Lam in an apparent effort to reach Go Noi Island .

A search of the area conducted at first light revealed 2 9

enemy dead. There were no Marine casualties .49 Late r

that morning, the ARVN Ranger battalions swep t

south once again, claiming to have killed 27 Viet Con g

and 4 North Vietnamese .50

On 31 August, the units involved in Operation Sussex Bay closed the net around the escaping Communists. During the morning, both of the ARVN battalions pressed the enemy into a bend in the Song K y

Lam on the other side of which the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines waited in blocking positions . The encircled

Communists fought desperately, but artillery an d

airstrikes flown by Marine helicopter gunships an d

RVNAF fixed-wing aircraft smashed them in the trap .

The attack resulted in over 80 North Vietnamese dead

and netted 1 prisoner at a cost of 7 ARVN Rangers

killed and 45 others wounded .5 1

The fighting of 31 August crushed the major

Communist force attempting to flee south after th e

failed attack on Da Nang, but small units still

slipped through the net and continued to work their

way toward Go Noi Island. At 2000, 31 August,

Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ambushe d

one of these groups, approximately 30 North Vietnamese attempting to cross the Song Ky Lam .

Unlike the group engaged two nights earlier, thes e

Two Marines from Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines rush to a landing zone to pick up sup -

plies left by a Boeing Vertol CH—46 Sea Knight helicopter from HMM-164, during Operation Sussex Bay near An Hoa and Go Noi Island sectors.

Photo from Abel Collection
THE THIRD OFFENSIVE : DA NANG 383

latest prey of Company H started to cross the river i n

boats. Under illumination provided by the battalion's 81mm mortar platoon, the Marines sunk both

boats with small arms fire .5 2

Amid the efforts to defend Da Nang and the pursuit of the fleeing enemy by Operation Sussex Ba y

forces, the 1st Marine Division continued its preparations for the redeployment of the 27th Marines . As

elements of Colonel Robert G . Lauffer's 1st Marine s

arrived at Da Nang, they took up positions in the

27th Marines sector, the first phase of an orderly

turnover. By 1 September, Colonel Lauffer had two o f

his battalions in place and controlled two others of

the 27th Marines. Those battalions, the 1st and 2d ,

still occupied defensive positions in the area . General Youngdale reorganized the Da Nang TAOR ,

extending the 1st Marines' new area of operation s

east to the sea, thereby relieving the 3d Amphibia n

Tractor Battalion of the responsibility for securin g

the area south of the Marble Mountain Air Facility.

This move allowed the amphibian tractor Marines t o

concentrate on their primary mission of supportin g

infantry units in the field.5 3

Operation Sussex Bay continued into September,

but the area of operations shifted to Go Noi Island.

During the evening of 1 September, Battery E, 2 d

Battalion, 11th Marines moved by helicopter to th e

Go Noi to support an operation to be carried out by

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines. On 2 September, the 5th Marines launched its attack into th e

eastern half of the island. Lieutenant Colonel James

W. Stemple, the commander of the 2d Battalion ,

remembered that the aim was "to sweep Go Noi

from the railroad berm to the eastern end of the

island with the two battalions advancing abreast b y

phase lines." Contact was light. By 5 September, th e

Marines had rooted out and killed only 6 Nort h

Vietnamese and 5 Viet Cong, and had suffered 5

dead and 22 wounded. Of the Marine casualties, 4

dead and 11 wounded were the direct result o f

enemy action, while the remainder were victims of

accidents and incidents including short mortar

rounds and a friendly airstrike . The last two Marines

to become casualties during this phase of Operatio n

Sussex Bay were wounded by an aroused denizen o f

Go Noi Island, a water buffalo who embodied th e

hostile attitude held by the rest of the island's population toward the Marines. The heavy rains of

Typhoon Bess would force the Marines temporaril y

off the Go Noi . 54

Typhoon Bess

On 5 September, Typhoon Bess struck the I Corps

Tactical Zone, catching many units far afield . Winds

in excess of 50 knots, accompanied by heavy rain an d

a ceiling of less than 100 feet, grounded all aircraft fo r

two days. 55 The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines quit Go

Noi Island and marched to nearby Liberty Bridge .

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was not as lucky, sinc e

it was, as Lieutenant Colonel Stemple recalled, "occupying positions at the very east end of the island . "

The battalion moved to what high ground there was

along the railroad berm as Stemple "knew ther e

would be no way we would be able to 'walk off th e

island." The next day Marine Corps helicopters lifted

the 2d Battalion out of the Go Noi except for Company H . This latter company was supposed to remain

on the island, directly under the operational control

of the 5th Marines, and then sweep back to Liberty

Bridge the following morning . According to Lieu -

tenant Colonel Stemple, he convinced Colonel Graham, the 5th Marines commander, to helilift this

company out after one Marine in the company

drowned in the attempt.5 6 By this time ground units

all over ICTZ suspended operations and moved to

high ground to wait out the storm .

Even units in base areas were not safe from th e

typhoon's effects. Rising water flooded defensive

perimeters, filling trenches and washing away

bunkers. Some minefields were under a foot of

water.57 The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, scheduled to

relieve the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, halted movement, as the storm's effects threatened the fragil e

timetable for the 27th Marines' redeployment to th e

United States.5 8

The civilian populace suffered as well . A III MAF

intelligence report estimated that, in addition to th e

thousands of homes blown down or washed away b y

Typhoon Bess, the storm destroyed 60 percent of th e

rice crop and 55 percent of the stored rice . Intelligence officers speculated the flooding damage d

enemy caches, bunkers, and tunnels, as well.5 9

By 7 September, the storm abated and the weather improved enough that field operations coul d

resume, although the flooding still hampered movement considerably. Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines provided security for a recovery unit of Com -

pany B, 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion attemptin g

to retrieve two inoperative amphibian tractors abandoned by the 5th Marines on Go Noi Island durin g

the storm . Normally, when a vehicle broke down in
384 THE DEFINING YEA R

the field, it was guarded until it could be repaired or

recovered . To abandon a vehicle was highly unusual ,

but in this instance necessary, because of the flooding .

When the Marines reached the vehicles on the morning of 8 September, they found both destroyed by

demolition and fire, the result of enemy action 6 0 *

The Communists, hardly heard from during th e

typhoon, also resumed operations. At 1800, 8 September, a Stingray patrol in the mountains west of the Arizona Territory sighted 146 enemy moving through a

rice paddy at the base of Charlie Ridge. The reconnaissance team called for air and artillery support, killing

25 of the Viet Cong . The following morning, an enemy

burial party appeared to recover the bodies . The

Stingray patrol directed an airstrike against them, as

well, accounting for another 20 Viet Cong . 6 1

The 1st Marine Division ended Operation Susse x

Bay on 9 September, citing as the reason the disruption caused by the "unfavorable weather condition s

which prevailed during Typhoon `Bess' . "G2 In fact,

* Both the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines had to abandon tank s

and LVTs that had accompanied the battalions into the Go Noi . Th e

VC or NVA burned two LVTs that had been left by the 3d Battalion ,

but Colonel Stemple, the 2d Battalion commander, recalled that th e

Navy several months later provided a LCU (Landing Craft Utility )

with a tank retriever and recovered all of the tanks and the two remaining LVTs. According to Stemple, " miraculously, the enemy had not

discovered them and except for the water damage, they were recovere d

intact." Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n .d . [1995] (Vietnam Comment File) .

enemy activity in the Da Nang TAOR and the are a

to the immediate south was minimal, indicating that

the combination of Operation Sussex Bay an d

Typhoon Bess had taken the fight out of the Communist units which had originally struck Da Nang

on 23 August.

Group 44, the Communist unit which carried out

the third offensive in the Da Nang TAOR, suffere d

heavily during the effort . According to Marine intelligence sources, Group 44 units lost 637 killed while

staging for the offensive . In the attacks of 23 August,

the main effort of the offensive, III MAF estimated over

230 enemy died . The heaviest Communist casualties,

however, occurred during the next two weeks, when III

MAF intelligence reports listed another 1,200 enemy

killed, thus bringing the total estimated enemy losses

during their offensive to more than 2,000 dead 63

Although not everyone in III MAF was certain a t

the time, the "third offensive " was over. m Bold in concept but unspectacular in results, the offensive did no t

materially affect the progress of the negotiations i n

Paris, nor the balance of power in the Da Nang TAOR.

In fact, it signalled the end of an enemy effort begu n

during Tet and continued in May, whose purpose wa s

to inflict a decisive military defeat on Free World

Forces in the Republic of Vietnam . Communist losses

in these offensives were staggering, forcing them to

change tactics. For now, their timetable would b e

delayed once more.
CHAPTER 20

Autumn Offensive Halte d

A New Orientation—The Eastern DMZ—Defeat of the 320th Divisio n

Coastal Quang Tri and Thua Thien: A Shift

A New Orientatio n

Combat action throughout Quang Tri Province had

been intermittent during June and July. Enemy forces

engaged by 3d Marine Division, U.S . Army, and

ARVN forces were, by and large, elements of th e

304th, 308th, and 320th NVA Divisions, and the 27th,

138th, and 270th Independent NVA Regiments. Only

occasionally encountered or employed in strength ,

these units primarily undertook reconnaissance in forc e

missions, shellings, ambushes, probing attacks, and

assisted in the movement of arms and supplies to local

force Viet Cong units and guerrillas . The aggressive air

and infantry attacks had caused the enemy to keep his

forces dispersed, off balance, and denied him access t o

many areas and avenues of approach necessary to carry

out a large-scale ground attack against major population centers and allied military units and installations .

By the end of July, allied forces in the north had blunted but not curtailed the forward deployment and positioning of forces for the forthcoming autumn or "Thir d

Wave" Offensive by elements of the 320th NVA Division and the three independent regiments. With an area of operation that encompassed mor e

than 3,000 square kilometers, the 3d Marine Division could not continue to rely on battalion- or regimental-sized operations as it had done in the past . "In

my field visits," Major General Raymond G. Davis

noted, "I find that battalion level operations mentality still exists in most instances."l With the dispersal

of enemy forces over such a large area, General Davis,

in an effort to standardize operations, reemphasized

the need for the employment of numerous coordinated infantry company patrols working under the protective umbrella of supporting arms. The idea was

not only to increase coverage, but also to deny the

enemy sanctuary and discourage him from developing extensive logistics bases and resupply caches during the coming months. 2

Incorporating lessons learned during June and Jul y

as the division moved toward a more mobile posture,

Davis urged his regimental and battalion commanders

to reorient "their thinking and staff planning toward

infantry company operations to find and fix enem y

forces within their AO 's. "3 Even though an operation

would be planned at the regimental- and battalionlevel, it was not now necessary for it to be executed b y

the regiment or battalion as a single unit . Companies

would be given specific objectives within the area o f

operations and encouraged to operate independentl y

within a particular area oriented to terrain rather tha n

grid lines and within reinforcing distance of another

company. Night operations would be emphasized .

The division commander, likewise, encouraged rifle

company commanders to employ the highly successfu l

tactics developed during the past two months. Once a

company entered the area of operations, either by foot

or by air, it would immediately and unobtrusively

select the first of what would become a series of defensible patrol bases. Before eating or resting, Marines dug

in and registered the company's defensive weapons o n

all possible avenues of enemy approach.

In sweeping out from the base toward a series of pre -

selected, limited objectives, companies and platoons

would move cross-country in two or more mutuall y

supporting columns. They were to avoid well-travelled

trails and draws, while remaining within supportin g

and reinforcing distance of the patrol base . Supportin g

arms would be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters to the front and flanks of the column.

In addition, landing zones would be cut to facilitate

the evacuation of casualties and resupply. The Marine

unit on the move, Davis stressed, would have "what i t

needs, where it needs it, and at the time it needs it ."4

The pursuit of small groups of enemy troops, composed of fewer than five individuals would be avoided ,

as the North Vietnamese frequently relied on this tactic to lure the advancing unit into an ambush .

Once the advancing Marine unit established contact, massive, coordinated supporting arms fire would

be employed prior to launching an assault on the

enemy's position . Blocking forces, simultaneously,

would be moved up or inserted to seal off all possibl e

avenues of escape . Upon the lifting of supporting arms

fire, the combined force would then conduct a method385
386 THE DEFINING YEA R

ical search of the area with the objective of destroyin g

the enemy position and capturing weapons, equipment, and personnel .

While both reemphasizing time-honored infantry

company operations and incorporating a number o f

recently learned tactics, General Davis reiterated tha t

"any tactic which denies the enemy sanctuary—physical or psychological for rest, resupply and security—

will enhance the effectiveness of future operations b y

the Division . " 5*

In addition to placing a greater emphasis on

infantry company operations as the basis for all future

division operations, Davis also stressed the importanc e

of intelligence, specifically intelligence gathered by

long-range reconnaissance patrols, which would b e

continuously employed throughout the division's are a

of responsibility. Lieutenant Colonel Donald R . Berg's

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced by the 3 d

Force Reconnaissance Company, would continue t o

maintain a large number of teams in the field at any

one time .** "This has meant," Davis noted, "that every

indication of enemy activity from whatever means i s

explored by the insertion of reconnaissance teams . . . .

everywhere—on a continuing basis, a massive reconnaissance team effort is maintained ."6

Reconnaissance Marines generally employed two

types of long-range patrols in this massive intelligenc e

effort. The 8- to 12-man, heavily armed Stingray

patrols operated within range of friendly artillery.

Their mission was to seek, fix, and destroy the enemy

with all available supporting arms . These patrols

would be reinforced by "Sparrow Hawk" or "Bald

*Colonel Thomas H . Galbraith, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines at the time, observed that actual company tactic s

employed by his battalion differed very much in practice than the ideal

described by General Davis. Galbraith wrote that these tactics "ma y

have been feasible in the eastern portion of Quang Tri Province, but i n

the mountainous jungle terrain of the western portion, particularl y

north of Route 9, they were virtually impossible to employ . " H e

explained that " conditions simply would not permit companies an d

platoons to 'sweep out' of patrol bases in ' mutually supportin g

columns, ' registering supporting arms and cutting LZs as they went . "

Col Thomas H. Galbraith, Comments on draft, n .d . (Dec94) (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Galbraith Comments .

**See Chapter 26 for chart showing average number of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion daily patrols for the months July—December 1968 .

Lieutenant Colonel Berg observed that the number of patrols varied fo r

several reasons. For example during September and October, monsoon

rains "made inserts and extraction schedules unpredictable and difficult." Other variables besides the weather included operations by othe r

battalions and changes in enemy locations. LtCol Donald R. Berg ,

Comments on draft, dtd 4Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Berg Comments.

Eagl e" rapid-reaction forces, if the opportunity arose t o

destroy the entire enemy force . In the more remote

areas of Quang Tri Province, beyond artillery range ,

"Key Hole " patrols would be used . Much smaller in

size, normally composed of four to five men, and armed

with only essential small arms, ammunition, and communications equipment, "Key Hole" patrols were to

remain out of sight and observe. If discovered, the y

were to evade the enemy and attempt escape . These

long-range patrols would not normally be reinforce d

unless artillery could be inserted ; if under fire and taking casualties, the team would be extracted by helicopter.7 The 3d Marine Division, as Davis later stated ,

"never launched an operation without acquiring clea r

definition of the targets and objectives through intelligence confirmed by recon patrols. High mobility operations [were) too difficult and complex to come up

empty or in disaster. 's

The increased number of operations and clea r

weather experienced during the mid-summer month s

increased the ability of Marine forces to observe th e

enemy's movement, provide close air support, an d

interdict his lines of communication and logistic operations, causing him difficulties in the resupply of personnel and equipment. This, coupled with a steady

increase in the loss of food, ammunition, personnel ,

and previously prepared forward positions, forced th e

North Vietnamese to reassess or alter their plans fo r

the major offensive, slated to be launched sometime i n

mid-August. Despite inroads by the 3d Division, th e

infiltration of personnel, supplies, and equipment int o

Quang Tri Province continued, but at a slower pace .

Division intelligence analysts, however, still considered the 320th Division and three independent regiments to be combat ready and capable of conducting

regiment or division-sized attacks on allied units, fire

support bases, and installations along the Demilitarized Zone . In addition, the disposition of these fou r

enemy units was such that a large-scale attack coul d

come at any time. 9

The Eastern DMZ

As August began, allied forces continued the pressure on enemy units throughout Quang Tri Province .

The heaviest fighting was to take place in the northeastern portion of the province in the Napoleon-Salin e

area of operation. The first significant contact occurred

on 2 August when several squads of North Vietnames e

attacked the forward naval gunfire observation post a t

Oceanview, 10 kilometers north of Cua Viet . Support-
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 387

ed by Marine tanks, amphibian tractors, and nava l

gunfire, the defenders drove off the enemy who left

eight dead . Later the same day, allied observers spotted

a platoon of NVA in the same area and called i n

artillery and naval gunfire, resulting in two reported

additional enemy killed .

On 8 August, two battalions of Lieutenant Colone l

Vu Van Giai's 2d ARVN Regiment engaged elements

of the lst Battalion, 138th NVA Regiment, two kilometers east of Gio Linh and two and one-half kilometers

south of the DMZ . As the engagement intensified during the afternoon, the ARVN committed the remaining two battalions of the regiment . Despite receiving

more than 150 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar

fire, the ARVN battalions pressed the attack, supported by artillery and tactical airstrikes . Suffering more

than 100 casualties the enemy battalion withdrew

northward under the cover of darkness after the sixhour battle .

Following a week of brief, but sharp clashes around

Gio Linh, Lieutenant Colonel Giai's 2d ARVN Regiment launched an attack into the southern half of th e

Demilitarized Zone in an effort to reestablish contac t

with the enemy regiment . Early on the morning of 1 5

August, elements of Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, with 15 LVTs and 2 tanks, rolled out o f

Outpost C–4 and proceeded to within one kilometer o f

the zone's southern boundary, turned, and proceeded

back to C-4. Company A's diversion was to set the

stage for the ARVN attack .

The raid into the DMZ, planned and controlled b y

the South Vietnamese, was to be executed by the elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment, 11th ARVN

Armored Cavalry, and the 3d Marine Division's tan k

battalion, organized into four cross-reinforced task elements. According to the plan, the combined infantry

and tank force was to attack north of the Song Cua Viet

into the DMZ. The task force would then turn west ,

envelop the 1st Battalion, 138th NVA Regiment, and

attack south.

The combined elements of the ARVN and Marine

task force departed their respective bases at 0400 on

the 15th, and by dawn had moved up the beach to the

northernmost point of advance without detection. The

task force then turned west, moving from the beac h

into an area composed of abandoned rice paddies .

Although a number of tracked vehicles and tanks

became mired in the swampy ground, 10 tanks from

Companies A and B, 3d Tank Battalion, continued t o

sweep northwestward toward the Song Ben Hai an d

then south, where they surprised the enemy "who were

eating breakfast. " 10 After preplanned B–52 Arclight

strikes and under covering artillery and tank fire, th e

allied task force eventually overran the well-entrenche d

enemy command post, supported by its own 105mm

artillery. Marine tankers, who described the day's

action as a " turkey shoot, " were credited with 189

killed and 70 probables out of a total of 421 reported

enemy dead .] Although the Marine tank companie s

suffered no casualties, two tanks and a retriever wer e

damaged by mines.

Lieutenant Colonel Giai in his report on the raid ,

stated the mission was only 50 percent accomplished ;

Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, the XXIV

Corps (formerly Prov Corps) commander, was less

restrained in his observations about the success of th e

ARVN. He reported to General Creighton Abrams, the

MACV commander, that the 1st Battalion, 138th NVA

Regiment, "was, . . . to have attacked south across DMZ

last night; it will do no attacking for some time to

come . Meanwhile, the morale of the 2d ARVN Regiment has never been higher. It was a good days work . " 1 2

Several days later, in Paris, Ambassador W. Averill

Harriman informed North Vietnamese negotiators

that South Vietnamese infantrymen had conducted a

reconnaissance of a suspected North Vietnamese concentration south of the Song Ben Hai in the "Sout h

Vietnamese portion of the Demilitarized Zone . Here

they encountered the 1st Battalion of the 138th Nort h

Vietnamese Army Regiment . . . . Once again, I urge

that you accept my proposal for restoration of th e

Demilitarized Zone to its original status."1 3

For the balance of the month, the remaining elements of the 138th NVA Regiment evaded all but minor

engagements with Marine and ARVN patrols in th e

area . The North Vietnamese, however, continued t o

use the Demilitarized Zone as a base for attacks into

South Vietnam, especially into the central and wester n

portions of Quang Tri Province .

In the Kentucky area of operations, to the west ,

Colonel Ross T. Dwyer's 1st Marines experienced littl e

activity other than minor squad-sized encounters during the first half of August. The exception was an

encounter with 30 enemy troops by First Lieutenan t

Arthur A. Pierce's Company F, 9th Marines, three kilo -

meters east of Con Thien . In the face of U .S . artillery

and fixed-wing support, the enemy broke contact an d

Pierce's Marines began a sweep through the area. During the sweep, the Marines regained contact, but the

enemy again broke and ran, and Company F moved

through the area, capturing a number of weapons an d

packs while counting 11 enemy dead .
388 THE DEFINING YEA R

With enemy activity in the eastern DMZ, particularly north of Con Thien, on the rise, General Davis

decided to act. In addition to sightings of enemy tanks ,

Marine tactical fighter pilots and aerial observers

reported spotting trucks, truck parks, camouflage d

revetments, storage bunkers, and trenchlines . Of special interest were repeated sightings of low, slow moving lights during hours of darkness which, it wa s

assumed, emanated from enemy helicopters or som e

other vertical take-off and landing aircraft . The enemy,

it was thought, "might well be using aircraft to resupply forward positions with high priority cargo such a s

ammunition and medical supplies or conducting

medevacs after our techniques."1 4

Having strengthened his tactical position, but having committed all of his available forces, General Davis

requested that Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/26 be

made available to conduct a raid into the DMZ . In the

event the landing team could not be committed to the

incursion, Davis asked that the battalion relieve the 2 d

Battalion, 1st Marines, so that it could initiate the raid .

On 17 August, Lieutenant General Cushman approve d

Davis' request for BLT 2/26 to relieve the 2d Battalion ,

1st Marines, but stipulated that the battalion landin g

team would have to return to its amphibious shipping

by 20 August .

Davis, however, was concerned. In a message t o

General Stilwell the following day, Davis noted that

the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines had been alerted t o

deploy to the Da Nang area on 22 August. In addition, "there are other indications, that two battalion s

of the First Regiment will be moved prior to the firs t

of September. These moves follow on the heels of the

loss of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in May and th e

2d Battalion, 26th Marines earlier this month ." The

Army's 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), over which the division had assumed operational control on 1 August, not only would not offse t

the loss, but also was not scheduled to be fully operational before September. "It is obvious," he concluded ,

"that a severe draw down on 3d Mar Div capability a t

this time will seriously limit my ability to maintai n

the present flexible, mobile posture which I feel is necessary if I am to continue the effective suppression o f

enemy activity in this area ." He therefore recommended that the present 12 maneuver battalion

strength of the division be maintained . '

In discussions with General Cushman, Stilwell

reported Davis' concern. General Cushman responde d

that only the two battalions of the 1st Marines were to

be reassigned to the 1st Marine Division . General Stilwell immediately informed Davis of the decision:

"You are advised to plan on moving the two bns of th e

First Marines to First Mar Div in the latter part of this

month and to plan on retaining the Second Bn, Third

Marines, as an organic element of Third Mar Div."1 6

The maneuver strength of the division would remai n

at 12 battalions, nine Marine and the equivalent o f

three Army. *

In the event of a crisis in the northern sector, Stilwell notified the 101st Airborne Division to prepare to

assume Task Force X-Ray's area of operations in Thu a

Thien Province, which was occupied by the 1st and 3 d

Battalions, 26th Marines. These two battalions the n

could be airlifted to Quang Tri Province to reinforc e

the 3d Marine Division.

On 18 August, Marine helicopters brought BLT

2/26 ashore into the Mai Xa Thi area on the Song Cu a

Viet, relieving the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Following two days of vigorous day and night patrols an d

ambushes, the battalion returned to its amphibiou s

shipping off Cua Viet .' 7

Within a hour of the last of 60 B—52 Arcligh t

strikes on 19 August, Lieutenant Colonel John E .

Poindexter's 2d Battalion, 1st Marines assaulted thre e

landing zones in the Trung Son region of the souther n

DMZ, five kilometers north of Con Thien . Covered by

Companies A and B, 1st Marines and a platoon of tank s

from Companies A and B, 3d Tank Battalion, deploye d

near Hill 56, 4,000 meters to the east, Poindexter's

Marines swept east for approximately four kilometers ,

*The 1st Marines was to replace the 27th Marines, which regimen t

would return to the United States in September. In personal correspondence in September 1968, Brigadier General E . E. Anderson, th e

III MAF Chief of Staff, outlined the hard bargaining that occurred ove r

the displacement of the 1st Marines . He wrote: " We 've had a considerable hassle over the move of the 1st Marines . . . ." He declared that

General Cushman made the original decision because the 3d Divisio n

would have operational control of the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized

Division, but that "Davis [the 3d Division commander) really complained that he just couldn't get along with eight maneuver battalion s

plus an SLF, but had to have a minimum of nine, plus a BLT ." According to Anderson, " General Cushman stood his ground for quite som e

time, but then Stilwell and Davis came down and came forth with a

counter-proposal . . . ." According to the proposal, XXIV Corps woul d

assume responsibility for the area between Phu Bai and Phu Loc, the n

controlled by the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray. The III MA P

commander then " reluctantly accepted the proposal . . . ." III MAP and

XXIV Corps, however, continued to discuss the specific details abou t

responsibilities and command structure in the former Task Force X -

Ray sector. BGen E. E. Anderson to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd

11Sep68, End, Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd

18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Anderson Itr to Va n

Ryzin, Sep68 and Anderson Comments, Dec94 .
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 389

exploiting the effects of the Arclight strikes. The battalion found many potential landing zone sites, bu t

discovered no evidence of current or past use of the are a

by enemy aircraft.

As Companies G and H consolidated at several

landing zones in preparation for extraction by helicopter, Poindexter's Marines suffered their only casualty during the day-long raid. While one flight of helicopters attempted to set down at one of the landing

zones, a command detonated claymore rigged to an

82mm mortar round exploded, destroying one CH–46

helicopter and damaging several others . Three of th e

CH–46's crewmen and one of the battalion 's Marines

were killed, while two Marine pilots were wounded .18

Because of darkness and sporadic enemy fire, Companies E and F and the battalion command group

remained in the DMZ until the following morning . At

0700 they began moving south on foot. The heat was

overwhelming, making the cross-country movemen t

slow and, as a result, helicopters eventually extracte d

the battalion at 1730 from landing zones five kilometers north of Con Thien .

Although the raid into the DMZ uncovered no evidence of enemy helicopter or other air activity, it di d

force out a large number of enemy troops from the area .

Scattered by the combination of air and artillery attack s

and Poindexter's heliborne assault, the fleeing enemy

fell prey to other Marine blocking forces in both th e

Kentucky and Lancaster areas of operation . The first

contacts were initiated by Company B, 1st Marine s

and the Army's Company A, 77th Armored Regimen t

near Hill 56. On the morning of the 19th, both companies, whose defensive positions had been probed continuously during the night, engaged an enemy platoo n

attempting to escape to the east. Supported by the platoon of tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion, which at the

time was advancing toward the hill from the east, the

combined Army and Marine force killed a reported 26

enemy troops.

Also on the 19th, while moving eastward throug h

the piedmont, six kilometers southwest of Con Thien ,

Company M, 9th Marines intercepted an estimated

reinforced enemy platoon fleeing in its direction . Company M Marines suppressed the enemy's small arms ,

automatic weapons, and RPG fire, and maneuvered

toward the commanding terrain under an umbrella o f

artillery fire and fixed-wing airstrikes . A later search o f

the area resulted in the discovery of over 30 enemy

bodies and the capture of two prisoners of war.

Sporadic contact with fleeing enemy forces continued throughout the night of the 19th and into the following day. As five tanks of the 3d Tank Battalio n

returned to Hill 56 on the morning of 20 August ,

with Companies G and H, 9th Marines serving as

blocking forces, two enemy squads attacked th e

advancing Marines with small arms, rocket propelled

grenades, mortars, and artillery. Responding with a

similar combination of weapons, the Marines force d

the two enemy units to withdraw northward, leavin g

their dead, all of whom were credited to the marksmanship of Marine tankers.

Less than 1,000 meters northwest of Company M's

encounter on the 19th, shortly after noon on the 21st ,

Company I, 9th Marines began receiving sniper fire . Within a hour, the company had engaged an enemy

unit of undetermined size, firing small arms an d

grenades at the Marines. Countering with accurate

rocket, mortar, and artillery fire, the Marine compan y

forced the enemy to break contact and withdraw to the

north. In one instance during the two-hour engagement, a grenadier with an M72 (LAAW) rocke t

destroyed an enemy 60mm mortar emplacement . A

search of the area before dark revealed a reported 1 4

North Vietnamese bodies and 12 weapons.

While the enemy seemed reluctant to expose hi s

large units to combat along the eastern DMZ, he displayed no hesitation in attacking small Marine reconnaissance patrols in the Kentucky area of operation s

during the month. In two Leatherneck Square actions,

he paid a high price for his efforts, miscalculating o n

the proximity of reinforcing units and the immediate

availability of supporting arms.

At 1000 on 15 August, an estimated enemy company attacked a four-man reconnaissance team south -

east of Con Thien near the abandoned airstrip at Nam

Dong. The patrol returned fire and requested reinforcement, while simultaneously calling in preplanned

artillery fires. Within minutes a platoon from Company A, 1st Marines, accompanied by three tanks, moved

out of positions a kilometer away and headed south t o

assist. The coordinated attack, which included more

than 150 rounds of 105mm artillery, 40 rounds of 4 .2 -

inch mortar, 75 rounds from the 90mm guns of the

tanks, and airstrikes by Marine UH–1E gunship s

accounted for several enemy dead.

In a second attack, the enemy paid an even greater

price. At 1700 on 24 August, reconnaissance team

"Tender Rancho" was moving north through hig h

grass, seven kilometers southeast of Con Thien nea r

Dao Xuyen, when the point man observed 15 khakiclothed enemy troops cooking and talking. The team

in a burst of small arms fire killed three, then another
390 THE DEFINING YEAR

three . Within minutes the team received a barrage o f

82mm mortars and immediately formed a 360-degre e

security. A hour and a half after the first burst of fire ,

gunships arrived on station and informed the team tha t

enemy troops surrounded them . The team later reported that 30 to 40 enemy "to the east, north and west "

got up and ran when the gunships arrived . '

In immediate response to Tender Rancho 's request

for assistance, a Marine helicopter lift brought in a

reinforced platoon from Company D, 1st Marines to

help. Despite receiving .50-caliber and mortar fire i n

the landing zone, the Company D platoon fough t

through to link up with the reconnaissance team a t

1930. Once consolidated, the team and reactio n

force received "a fire for effect" of 60 82mm morta r

rounds, resulting in the death of three and wounding

of eight Marines .20

Moving overland from the east, additional platoons from Company D, along with Company C,

reached blocking positions just north of the encircle d

reconnaissance team before dark . At daylight on 2 5

August, Marine helicopters inserted the remainder of

Company D. During the insertion, however, a

UH—34, while dodging enemy fire, struck a tre e

breaking off the tail section, killing 3 and wounding

14. With the arrival of elements of the 1st Battalion ,

3d Marines and Company M, 9th Marines later in th e

day, the Marines effectively cordoned the area, pre -

venting an enemy withdrawal .

During the remainder of the 25th and into the

26th, as Companies C and D, 1st Marines pushed

southward toward the other blocking forces, the enem y

made several determined, but unsuccessful attempts t o

break the cordon . Just before midnight on the 25th ,

Company B, 1st Marines, which anchored the western

portion of the cordon, began to receive enemy artillery

fire . For the next seven hours the company was subjected to an artillery attack of more than 220 rounds.

The enemy fire was so inaccurate that only one Marin e

was wounded . By 26 August, after three days of fighting, the enemy had lost a reported 78 killed and 2 8

weapons captured ; Marine casualties were 11 killed

and 58 wounded.

With the end of the cordon in Leatherneck Square ,

the 1st Marines, now commanded by Colonel Robert

G. Lauffer, with its 1st and 2d Battalions, was relieve d

of the responsibility for the Napoleon-Saline and Kentucky areas of operations. The regiment boarded trucks

for Dong Ha and then flew in Air Force C—130s to D a

Nang, while Navy LCUs and LSTs carried the regiment's equipment south . On 31 August, the 1st

Marines assumed the area of operations and missio n

formerly assigned to the 27th Marines . *

Upon the departure of the 1st Marines from Quan g

Tri Province, the Army's 1st Brigade, 5th Infantr y

Division (Mechanized) assumed control of the Kentucky and Napoleon-Saline areas of operation . Composed of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry ; 1st Battalion,

61st Infantry (Mechanized) ; and 1st Battalion, 77t h

Armored Regiment, Colonel Richard J . Glikes'

brigade was reorganized at Fort Carson, Colorado i n

late March for movement to Vietnam .** After months

of training, the brigade's main body began moving on

22 July, and by the 31st the brigade had completed th e

movement of personnel from Fort Carson to Da Nang

and then to Quang Tri . At Da Nang, the brigade offloaded 148 armored personnel carriers and 67 tank s

which were then transshipped to Wunder Beach,

southeast of Quang Tri City.

Glikes ' brigade originally was to assume the area o f

operations then assigned to the Army's 1st Cavalr y

Division, and possibly a portion of the Napoleon -

Saline area . But because of enemy pressure and th e

approaching monsoon season, the 3d Marine Divisio n

ordered a realignment of forces and changes in areas o f

operations. The brigade, in conjunction with the 1s t

Amphibian Tractor Battalion, would assume responsibility for a reduced Kentucky and Napoleon-Salin e

area of operation . The remaining portion of the secto r

was to be given to the 2d ARVN Regiment . The 3d

Marines would take over a modified Lancaster area o f

operation, while the 4th Marines retained responsibility for the slightly altered Scotland II area of operations. The 9th Marines, the division's "swing" regiment, would be given the responsibility for a new are a

of operations, southwest of Quang Tri City .

In addition, General Davis requested that the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group 76 .4, with its

accompanying special landing force be held off ashore ,

near the entrance to the Song Cua Viet. The landing

*At Da Nang, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, which had move d

south in late May to participate in operations during " Mini-Tet " in the

Elephant Valley, northwest of Da Nang, rejoined its parent regimen t

on 7 September. The same day, the 1st Marines passed operational control of the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines to Regimental Landing Tea m

(RLT) 27 . See Chapter 19 relative to the arrival of the 1st Marines and

departure of the 27th Marines at Da Nang .

**Included as part of the 24,500 additional military personne l

spaces approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deployment to South -

east Asia in 1968, was a 4,769-man mechanized brigade (separate )

requested by U.S . Army, Vietnam . The mechanized brigade was to

replace the 1st Marines who, in turn, would replace RLT 27 . MAC V

ComdHist, 1968, pp . 225-228 . See also Chapter 27 .
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 39 1

force was to be prepared to assume responsibility fo r

the Napoleon-Saline area of operations on six-hours

notice . General Cushman approved the request an d

asked the task force commander to place a hold on th e

movement of the amphibious ready group .

The shift of forces in Quang Tri Province was par t

of a general realignment of units then taking place i n

Northern I Corps Tactical Zone . In early June, MACV

undertook a study to determine the feasibility and

desirability of reassigning tactical responsibilities

within I Corps, a continuation of the long-range forc e

deployment planning study, "Military Posture, Northern I Corps, 1 September 1968, " submitted on 3 1

March 1968 . The March study expressed the desirability of having the two Marine divisions operate in contiguous areas, areas which included deep-water port

facilities and existing Marine logistic installations.

Over the next several months the proposals containe d

in the March study were refined, and in June th e

MACV study group suggested that the 1st and 3d

Marine Divisions be assigned the three southern

provinces of I Corps under III MAF, while the 23d

Infantry (Americal) Division and 101st Airborne Division be given the northern two provinces of the corp s

tactical zone .21 *

While the proposal had a number of obvious tactical and logistical advantages, there were a number o f

drawbacks. First, if such a readjustment were to take

place, the Army would, in all probability, create anoth -

er field force that would report directly to MACV.

More importantly, Lieutenant General Hoang Xua n

Lam, as Commanding General, I Corps Tactical Zone ,

would be placed in the position of having to deal with

two separate and competing commands within the

zone, each of which reported directly to MACV. The

proposed transplacement of Army and Marine units

within I Corps, however, would be quashed for th e

moment by General Cushman with the support of

Lieutenant General Rosson, who at the time was still

Provisional Corps commander. In a message at the end

of June, General Cushman observed that "Gen Rosson

continues to share my views [and] . . . that current

command relationships and projected troop dispositions should not be disturbed at this crucial period o f

the conflict . . . . However, if COMUSMACV decide s

to transplace . . . the earliest practical time to consider

changes of this nature is late spring 1969 ."22 General

Chapman, the Marine Corps Commandant, noted tha t

* See Chapter 13 for earlier discussion of the 31 March 1968 planning effort .

the Marines would acquiesce to the plan only if "CG,

III MAF retains overall command of U .S . forces in

ICTZ for the purpose of facilitating coordination wit h

ARVN, CORDS and the advisory effort, and for coordinating tactical operations."23

As a collateral result of the proposed transplacemen t

of Army and Marine units within I Corps was th e

approval in early August of the exchange of the 3d

Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, under the operational

control of the 101st Airborne Division, with the

101st's own 3d Brigade, then operating in III Corps.

Conversion, involving the formation of two new companies per battalion of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne t o

a separate light infantry brigade, was to be completed

before the exchange, scheduled to take place in September or October.24

While Lieutenant Colonel George F. Meyers' 1st

Amphibian Tractor Battalion, split between two positions on the Song Cua Viet and outposts at C—4 an d

Oceanview, continued a vigorous program of patrols

and ambushes throughout the Napoleon-Saline area o f

operations, elements of Colonel Glikes' 1st Brigade

concentrated on company and platoon patrols in Leatherneck Square, that area bounded by Con Thien, Gi o

Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo.25 On 4 September, a platoon from Company A, 61st Mechanized Infantry was

sent to the relief of Company M, 9th Marines, engaged

in battle with a reinforced NVA company in bunker s

west of Con Thien. Joined by a reaction force from

Company C, 61st Infantry, and supported by artillery

and airstrikes, the combined Marine and Army force

fought back. In the two-and-one-half hour battle that

followed, the American units reported killing more

than 20 enemy soldiers. Friendly losses were placed at

6 killed and 55 wounded, the majority as a result o f

enemy rocket-propelled grenade hits on armored personnel carriers. Darkness and typhoon warnings prevented further exploitation of the battle area .26

Beginning late on 4 September, the rains came t o

Quang Tri Province and the Marine command too k

precautions to prepare for Typhoon Bess. First MAW

units in Quang Tri either secured their helicopters o r

flew them to safe areas away from the storm . Other

Marines sandbagged the collections of Southeast Asia

huts with their tin roofs and other structures that characterized U.S . bases in the province . These preparations

together with the expected heavy downpours and high

winds greatly hampered military operations .

The typhoon struck the coast of northern I Corps

between Da Nang and Phu Bai on the afternoon of th e

5th. As the rains and wind began to subside, the
392 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

A member of the 9th Marines operating near the DMZ

hunches up as best he can under his poncho to protect him -

self from the torrential rains that struck Quang Tr i

Province in September.

typhoon instead of moving on shore and dissipating ,

had moved back to sea and was rapidly regaining

strength. During the night of the 5th and the earl y

morning hours of the 6th, Typhoon Bess began slowly

to move up the South Vietnamese coastline . At a poin t

almost due east of Hue, the typhoon plunged ashor e

with heavy rains and strong winds.

Slamming into the mountains, west of Hue, late i n

the day, the typhoon began to dissipate and by lat e

afternoon, Bess was relegated to a tropical storm . But

as the typhoon roared across northern I Corps, Bes s

dropped torrents of rain, collapsing tents and bunkers ,

and flooding much of the low-lying areas of Quang Tri

and Thua Thien Provinces. Disaster relief operations

initiated by the division took priority over all othe r

activities not directly related to combat support .

Although the torrential rains sharply curtailed bot h

allied and enemy ground combat activity, it did not

halt future planning . Due to steadily increasing enemy

ground, artillery, and mortar activity along the eastern

half of the DMZ, south of the Ben Hai, the 3d Marine

Division again proposed a one-day raid into the zone ,

scheduled for 12 September. The plan called fo r

Colonel Glikes' 1st Brigade to conduct an armored

attack to the Ben Hai, composed of three task forces :

one tank heavy, one mechanized infantry heavy, and an

armored cavalry force . As before, the armored attack

was to exploit B—52 Arclight strikes. To the brigade's

east, Lieutenant Colonel Giai's 2d ARVN Regimen t

would also launch an armor attack into the Demilitarized Zone. Both forces were to withdraw to positions

south of the zone before darkness.

As Glikes' forces prepared for the DMZ strike, the

enemy resumed artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks o n

allied installations throughout Quang Tri Province ,

following a three-day lull brought about by Typhoon

Bess. In addition, small groups of enemy began to b e

sighted along the DMZ. On the 8th, Companies A an d

C, 61st Infantry, dismounted, and Company B, 11t h

Infantry assaulted into three landing zones, eight kilometers northwest of Cam Lo . Meeting no resistance i n

the landing zones, the companies attacked to th e

southwest the following day, encountering only a fe w

pockets of enemy resistance .

Shortly after noon on 11 September, Company D ,

11th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknow n

strength occupying bunkers near the "Market Place, "

four kilometers northeast of Con Thien . The company

called for Marine tactical airstrikes against the enemy,

followed by artillery. A platoon of tanks from the 1st

Battalion, 77th Armor moved up to reinforce. At 1830

the enemy attempted to break contact, but the artiller y

hampered the enemy withdrawal . Fixed in position by

the heavy shelling, one group of enemy raised a whit e

flag. The American gunners ceased fire momentarily to

allow the group to surrender. Instead the North Vietnamese broke and ran and the artillery barrage

resumed . A later sweep of the area revealed more tha n

40 enemy bodies. Of seven enemy soldiers captured ,

one identified his unit as belonging to the 27th Independent NVA Regiment, a unit identified in frequent contacts with allied forces in the area since March .

On 10 September, General Abrams informed General Davis that the proposed allied raids into th e

Demilitarized Zone had been approved and that tw o

Arclight strikes would be provided . Preceded by th e

pre-planned B—52 strikes and a 55-minute artiller y

and naval gunfire barrage of the objective area, th e

attacking force moved into the DMZ on the mornin g

of 13 September. Two 1st Brigade reinforced company -

size task forces, one tank heavy and the other mechanized infantry heavy, attacked on an axis to the north -

east of Con Thien . A third brigade task force, armore d

cavalry heavy, moved into position five kilometers west

of Gio Linh . Lieutenant Colonel Giai's 2d Battalion,
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 393

with the 1st Squadron, 7th ARVN Armored Cavalry ,

supported by two platoons from Company A, 3d Tank

Battalion, simultaneously attacked to the north and

northeast of A—2 and Gio Linh .

South Vietnamese infantry troops on the right flan k

achieved almost immediate contact. Providing a base

of fire for the advancing ARVN infantry, Marine tanks ,

firing 90mm canister and high-explosive rounds, led

the assault, killing a reported 73 North Vietnamese

troops. Contact was so close at times that Marine

tankers were forced to use machine gun, as well as mai n

gun fire, to break through the enemy's defenses an d

reach their objective .27 Following in the wake of the

tanks, and supported by helicopter gunships, the

ARVN infantry claimed to have killed an additiona l

68 enemy and captured one NVA soldier. On the left

flank, after encountering mines and antitank fire, th e

three Army task forces soon joined the action, accounting for another reported 35 dead enemy soldiers an d

seizing a large cache of mortar rounds. 28 The allied

forces reached their northernmost objectives, turned

south, and returned to their bases by late afternoon.

Demoralized and unable to defend against ye t

another combined ground and massive supporting

arms attack, the enemy withdrew northward . The captured North Vietnamese soldier identified his unit as

an element of the 138th NVA Regiment . He further

indicated that the 138th Regiment had assumed control

of the 27th Independent Regiment's area of operations, due

to the heavy casualties suffered by the regiment i n

recent months.2 9

On 20 September, continuing the mission of denying the enemy freedom of action and movement

throughout the Kentucky area of operations, Colonel

Glikes' brigade began a series of search and clear operations in the Khe Chua Valley, eight kilometers nort h

of Cam Lo . While elements of the 1st Battalion, 61st

Infantry occupied blocking positions stretching for

2,000 meters at the head of the valley, Companies B

and C, 77th Armor moved from positions at C—2

Bridge and C-4, along Route 561, and swept up th e

valley toward the 61st's blocking positions .30 During

the next three days, the units cleared the valley of smal l

enemy units that could threaten not only nearby

brigade outposts, but also Cam Lo. At the same time,

the Army troops discovered and destroyed several large

enemy tunnel complexes.

Heavy monsoon rains during the later part of September had swollen the Ben Bai, forcing remnants of

the 320th NVA Division and independent regiments

northward across the river. Intelligence, however, indicated that some groups had been trapped in the sout h

by the rising water. Despite the weather, Companies B ,

C, and D, 11th Infantry moved out from C—2 and C— 2

Bridge at 0400 on the morning of 26 September . In

coordination with the 2d and 3d Battalions, 2d ARVN

Regiment, and the 3d Marines, the companies moved

to a position west of Con Thien and then attacked

north across the southern boundary of the DMZ,

toward the Dong Be Lao mountain complex .

During an eight-day foray into the DMZ, the

attacking elements of the 11th Infantry encountered

no opposition . What few engagements took place were

with the enemy's rear guard, which attempted to slow

the advance . Searches of numerous bunkers and other

complexes indicated that the enemy had abandone d

the positions only recently. In his hasty retreat the

enemy left behind numerous poorly concealed booby -

traps and mines, and several large caches of ammunition and equipment which were destroyed by advancing forces. From all indications what enemy troops ha d

been in the area had withdrawn north across the Be n

Hai to the relative safety of North Vietnam.3 '

The battleship New Jersey (BB 62), arrived on station, off the DMZ, on 29 September, and fired her firs t

mission in support of division and ARVN troops th e

following day. The arrival of the New Jersey considerably enhanced the range and destructive power of fir e

support available to the division . Her nine 16-inc h

guns could each hurl a 2,760-pound shell to a maximum range of more than 38,000 meters, exceeding th e

range of a cruiser's 8-inch gun by 9,000 meters.

By the end of September enemy forces normally

positioned along the eastern DMZ had withdraw n

north of the Ben Hai, possibly into North Vietnam .

The enemy had not been able, because of continued

Army, Marine, and ARVN pressure, to initiate any

portion of his planned Autumn Offensive . His attacks

by fire and attempts at interdicting friendly lines o f

communication continued . Allied installations and

tactical units in the northern portion of the provinc e

received periodic mortar, artillery, and rocket attacks.

The heaviest attack occurred on 3 October when elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment received 170 rounds

of 105mm artillery fire while engaged in a search and

clear operation northeast of Gio Linh .

In addition, enemy sappers continued in thei r

attempts to deny friendly forces the use of the Cua Viet .

There were several instances when Navy patrol craft

were hit by rocket propelled grenades, small arms, an d

automatic weapons fire from the banks of the river.

Although the Navy continually swept the river for
394 THE DEFINING YEAR

mines, mining incidents along the vital waterway continued.

In October the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,

under Lieutenant Colonel George F. Meyers, maintained security of the Cua Viet waterway and conducted numerous patrols, cordons, and sweeps in th e

Napoleon-Saline area of operations. North of Lieutenant Colonel Meyers' battalion, elements of the 2d

ARVN Regiment continued reconnaissance-in-forc e

operations in the vicinity of A—1 and Gio Linh. To the

west, in the Kentucky area of operations, Colonel

Glikes' 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) emphasized offensive actions away from fixed

positions, focusing on the enemy rather than terrain ,

employing infantry/armored task forces.

The first significant ground contact occurred on th e

11th, when a brigade mechanized infantry and tank

force, composed of Companies B and C, 61st Infantr y

and Company B, 77th Armor, engaged an estimated

platoon of well-entrenched NVA troops . From heavil y

fortified bunkers, 2,500 meters northeast of Con

Thien, the enemy effectively employed rocket propelled grenades and 60mm mortars, crippling thre e

tanks and one armored personnel carrier (APC). Mines

disabled another two tanks and one APC, killing a

total of 3 and wounding 20 brigade troops. Fighting

back with 90mm tank, artillery, and small arms fire ,

the companies swept through the area after five hour s

of battle and counted 26 North Vietnamese bodies.3 2

Heavy monsoon rains again fell throughout the are a

during mid-October, curtailing both ground and ai r

operations. On 15 October, nevertheless, elements o f

the 2d ARVN Regiment engaged an estimated enem y

company, four kilometers east of Gio Linh . Artillery,

gunships, and Marine tactical air supported the ARV N

infantrymen . One troop of the 11th ARVN Armored

Cavalry moved up to reinforce, but was delayed due to

the water-logged ground. Fighting continue d

throughout the 15th and into the next day. On the

morning of 16 October, the 1st and 3d Troops, 11t h

Cavalry joined with the ARVN infantry, and by noo n

the enemy force now estimated at battalion-size was

supported by artillery and mortar fire . The proximity

of the opposing forces prohibited the use of airstrike s

and the ARVN, like their opponent, relied heavily o n

accurate artillery fire . When the enemy force, though t

to be an element of the 138th NVA Regiment, broke

contact at the end of the day, it had suffered more tha n

a reported 105 killed in two days of fighting, while th e

ARVN units sustained 5 killed .

Marines from the 3d Marine Division visiting the New Jersey (BB 62) watch as the 16-inch gun s

of the battleship blast North Vietnamese positions near the DMZ .

Photo from the Abel Collection
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 395

South of the ARVN encounter on the 16th, in the

Napoleon-Saline area of operations, Lieutenant Colone l

Meyers' battalion assumed operational control of BLT

2/26. The following day, the battalion landing team

cordoned the Xuan Khanh Resettlement Hamlet, fiv e

kilometers northeast of Cua Viet, in conjunction with

a sweep and search of the hamlet by elements of th e

Vietnamese Coastal Group 11, National Police, an d

the local Marine Combined Action company . While

detaining no villagers, the Marines evacuated two civilians for medical treatment. Before returning to its

amphibious shipping on the 19th, the BLT conducted

a search and destroy mission from Oceanview to th e

DMZ, uncovering and destroying numerous bunkers

and boobytraps. 3 3

Despite extended periods of torrential rains

brought on by the northeast monsoon during October,

both ground and aerial reconnaissance missions indicated the presence of a sizable enemy force south of th e

Ben Hai between Gio Linh and Con Thien. On 1 5

October, the 3d Marine Division set in motion ye t

another one-day raid into the DMZ to prevent an y

further enemy build-up in the area.34 Weather caused

the Marines to postpone the raid from 18 Octobe r

until the 22d.35 The scheme of maneuver called for a

coordinated armored attack into the Demilitarize d

Zone by a 1st Brigade task force from Con Thien ,

Marine infantry and armor from the Napoleon-Salin e

area of operations, and a 2d ARVN Regiment task

force from Dong Ha.

In preparation for the strike, on 21 October, Lieu -

tenant Colonel Meyers' battalion assumed operationa l

control of Company H, 9th Marines, which unit, LVTs

transported to Outpost C-4, five kilometers northeas t

of Cua Viet. The following morning Company H, sup -

ported by tanks and amtracs, moved up the coast and

took up blocking positions in the vicinity of Ha Loi

Trung, within one kilometer of the southern boundar y

of the DMZ.3 6

At 0800 on 23 October, elements of the 2 d

ARVN Regiment attacked on two axes into th e

DMZ, north of Ha Loi Trung. The main attack, led

by the 1st Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment, supported by two troops of the 11th ARVN Armored Cavalry and a platoon of tanks from Company C, 3 d

Tank Battalion, moved across the boundary, approximately two kilometers from the coast . Three kilometers to the west, the secondary attack, led by the

2d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment, supported b y

Company H, 9th Marines and a platoon of tank s

from Company A, 3d Tank Battalion, was launched.

By noon, the two ARVN and Marine task forces wer e

not only heavily engaged, but also had trapped an

enemy unit of undetermined size between their positions and the sea . With artillery, U.S . Army gunships, and naval gunfire reinforcing friendly tan k

fire, the combined tank and infantry assault swep t

through the area, killing a reported 112 enemy soldiers, 63 of whom were credited to the tank crewmen of Company A. By dusk, the enemy broke con -

tact and what remained of the North Vietnamese

unit escaped further up the coast.37

On the same day, attacking north from A–3 and

Con Thien into the DMZ and then eastward along

the Ben Hai toward the site of the Marine and ARVN

action, the brigade task force, composed of three companies of the dismounted 1st Battalion, 61st Mechanized Infantry, encountered only light resistance . As

the task force continued eastward during the 24th ,

through Kinh Mon, Tan Mon, and An Xa along an

abandoned railroad, Company A engaged an enem y

platoon, reporting another seven NVA killed . At

0830 the following morning, Company A reestablished contact, this time with an estimated enemy

battalion in well-fortified bunkers . Minutes later,

Company B took a volley of heavy small arms an d

mortar fire . By 1030 the engaged companies ha d

linked up, and while Company A attacked to th e

northeast against the enemy's flank, Company B

assaulted and overran the enemy position, capturin g

one 82mm mortar, two 60mm mortars, and two .50-

caliber antiaircraft weapons. Both companies, later

reinforced by Company B, 77th Armor, remained i n

contact until 1800, during which time they mad e

maximum use of air, artillery, and naval gunfire sup -

port. As a result of the action, the Americans reported 231 enemy dead . Brigade losses were 4 killed and

24 wounded. The task force withdrew southward o n

the 26th and during the remainder of the month ,

brigade troops continued to exploit minor contacts

north of A–3 and recover their destroyed and dam -

aged tanks in the DMZ .38

Despite the destruction of major elements of th e

138th and 270th NVA Regiments, the victory was caus e

for concern. The reappearance of these two regiments

in northeast Quang Tri Province, after suffering heavy

casualties in several engagements during the past

three months, not only confirmed their capacity to

regroup rapidly and assimilate replacements, but als o

attested to both their flexibility and their maneuverability in frequently attacking and then withdrawin g

across the Ben Hai .
396 THE DEFINING YEAR

The combined ARVN, U .S . Army, and Marine

attack into the Demilitarized Zone during the last

week of October would be the last. Effective 2100

hours, 1 November, Saigon time, as announced b y

President Lyndon Johnson, the United States woul d

cease all offensive operations against the territory o f

North Vietnam. The halt in no way applied to offensive operations within the Republic of Vietnam, bu t

it did apply to offensive operations north of the

Demilitarized Zone's southern boundary. The preNovember rules of engagement authorizing operations by ground forces in the DMZ south of the Pro -

visional Military Demarcation Line were now

revoked . However, General Abrams later sought

authority, and gained approval from the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, to send squad-size patrols into the souther n

portion of the DMZ to "capture prisoners and

obtain other positive proof that the NVA rathe r

than the VC are operating in the southern portion o f

the DMZ."39 What these patrols would find woul d

be disturbing .4o

Defeat of the 320th Division

Unlike the Napoleon-Saline and Kentucky areas

of operations at the beginning of August, the Lancaster II and Scotland II areas remained relativel y

quiet . Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines continued extensive company patrol operations

throughout the central portion of the Scotland area

of operations with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H .

Galbraith's 1st Battalion searching the jungl e

canopy 10 kilometers west of LZ Stud . The battalion

also retained responsibility for security operations i n

the immediate area of the combat base . Lieutenan t

Colonel Louis A . Rann's 2d Battalion operated fro m

Fire Support Base Cates and the 3d Battalion, under

Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Bourne, Jr., operated

out of Fire Support Base Shepherd .

To the east, in the Lancaster area of operations, the

3d Marines, under the command of Colonel Richar d

L. Michael, Jr., continued to conduct search and

destroy operations and to provide security for Thon

Son Lam, Camp Carroll, and Route 9. Lieutenan t

Colonel Charles V. Jarman's 1st Battalion provide d

security for the Marine installation at Thon Son Lam ,

Khe Gio Bridge, and conducted company patrols an d

daily road sweeps of Route 9 . The 2d Battalion, under

Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis, secured not onl y

Thon Son Lam, but Camp Carroll, Dong Ha Mountain Observation Post, and the battalion's assigned

portion of Route 9. Commanded by Lieutenan t

Colonel William H. Bates, who, on 28 July, had

replaced Lieutenant Colonel James W. Marsh, the 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines continued anti-infiltratio n

operations from Fire Support Bases Margo and Joan ,

northwest of Camp Carroll.

To the south of the Lancaster area, lay a small are a

of operations in the Ba Long Valley, carved out o f

the east portion of the Scotland area and wester n

portion of that assigned to the 1st Air Cavalry Division, being swept by Colonel Robert H. Barrow's

9th Marines. Originally planned as a multi-battalion sweep of the long fertile valley, which extends

west from Quang Tri City to LZ Stud, the 9t h

Marines soon lost Lieutenant Colonel Francis X .

Colleton's 1st Battalion to the defensive needs o f

both LZ Stud, now renamed Vandegrift Comba t

Base, and Ca Lu, and Lieutenant Colonel Frederic S.

Knight's 2d Battalion to a competing operation in

Leatherneck Square .

On 2 August, following a 48-hour delay due to a

lack of helicopter transports, Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines under Captain Gary E . Todd, was

helilifted onto Hill 385, 12 kilometers southeast o f

Ca Lu. After the infantry company had established a

defensive perimeter and had the artillery register sup -

porting fires, Marine helicopters brought in the following day an engineer detachment and its equipment to begin construction of a new fire base there ,

Fire Support Base Holcomb . As Captain Todd later

remarked, "the engineers couldn't contribute muc h

until we established security." 4 1 In the meantime,

other helicopters had inserted Lieutenant Colone l

Edward J. LaMontagne, the 3d Battalion commander,

and his command group and two rifle companies int o

the Cua Valley, or Mai Loc area, to the north, who ini -

tiated a sweep south along Route 558 toward Holcomb and the Ba Long Valley.

The construction of Holcomb was, as Colonel Bar -

row recalled, a new experience for the regiment :

We went about it in a very methodical, carefull y

planned manner. We reconnoitered with the engineers,

who would have a large hand in building it; the

artillery, who would have to shoot from it ; the infantry ,

who would have to defend it ; and helicopter personnel ,

who, of course, would have to use it to resupply an d

build up the forces .42

Following two days of air preparation, whic h

included the dropping of several "daisy cutters," th e

Marines occupied the hill, and infantry and engineers

working side by side using demolitions, chain saw, and
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 397

hand tools, cleared the site .* A bulldozer was the n

brought in to build ammunition berms and gun pits ,

later to be occupied by Battery F, 12th Marines and ele -

ments of the 1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery.

Captain Todd remembered that as soon as the bulldozer arrived, "the artillery position quickly began taking

shape" after relatively slow progress by hand until tha t

time43 The building of Holcomb was, Barrow concluded, "rather amusing because we almost over-killed

the effort with detail planning . But it was an experience that led us into refining our techniques."44

During the next 13 days, LaMontagne's Marines

swept through the rice paddies and cornfields that dotted the valley floor and into the double-canopied jungle that covered the high ground to the north an d

south of the valley. LaMontagne temporarily closed

Fire Support Base Holcomb as the battalion began construction of Fire Support Base Henderson, five kilometers to the southwest . The lack of contact and any evidence to indicate recent enemy activity brought the B a

Long Valley operation to a close on 16 August . The

battalion then abandoned the two fire support base s

and returned to Vandegrift Combat Base .

Reconnaissance patrols operating north of Route 9

in the Lancaster and Scotland areas of operation reported a dramatic upsurge in enemy activity during the

first two weeks of August. In the region around Helicopter Valley, south of the DMZ, patrols sighte d

numerous small bands of enemy troops moving south ,

indicating that the area was either a much-used infiltration route or the possible site of several enemy base

camps. The area further west, and north of the Rockpile, also witnessed an increase in enemy activity. A

document captured by one patrol in the area indicated

that elements of the .52d Regiment, 320th NVA Divisio n

had moved into the region recently. The Khe Sanh

plateau and the mountains west of Thon Son Lam and

Ca Lu likewise were sites of increased enemy activity . 4 5

Taken together, these indicators pointed to the fact tha t

following several abortive attempts in the coastal flatlands during the first half of the year, the division's

*The daisy cutter was a conventional bomb, in this case a 2,000 -

pound bomb, with a pipe extension on its nose that caused it to detonate just above the ground, thereby clearing a large area . Major Gary

E . Todd, the Company I commander, recalled that "while the experiment of using daisy cutters to help with initial tree-clearing seeme d

like a good idea during the planning stage, experience quickly showe d

otherwise ." He declared that "instead of usable clearings, the firs t

troops in were faced with jumbles of fallen and partially fallen tre e

trunks intertwined into veritable logjams ." Maj Gary E. Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 19Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

three infantry regiments again were moving south

through the DMZ and into the mountains north and

west of the Rockpile, toward prepositioned caches o f

equipment and supplies 4 6

Colonel Michael's 3d Marines was the first to establish contact with the forward elements of the enem y

division. On 4 August, while conducting a two-company sweep on the southern slope of Dong Ha Mountain, Lieutenant Colonel Davis' battalion uncovered a

20-bunker complex just north of the Cam Lo River.

The following day, Davis' battalion was joined in the

area by three companies of Lieutenant Colonel Bates '

3d Battalion which assaulted into landing zones near

Cam Hung, five kilometers further north . During the

next seven days, elements of both battalions discovere d

and destroyed more than 400 newly constructed

bunkers and captured large quantities of enemy equipment and munitions .

On 12 August, a North Vietnamese sergean t

belonging to the 7th Battalion, 64th Regiment, 320t h

Division rallied to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at Co n

Thien. He informed the Marines that his regiment ha d

crossed the DMZ in the vicinity of Bay Nha, seve n

kilometers west of Con Thien, and would move sout h

along Mutter Ridge to Co Dinh within three days.

From there, the enemy planned to move southeas t

toward Cam Lo and Route 9 . 4 7 With the confirmation

of the sergeant's information by aerial and ground

intelligence, elements of Colonel Michael's regimen t

deployed rapidly to block the enemy.

On the 13th, Companies B, C, and D, 3d Marines

assaulted into Landing Zones Amy and Mack at the

western end of Mutter Ridge . Finding little activity i n

the area, the three companies, on the morning of the

15th, moved by helicopter to Landing Zone Dick, si x

kilometers further east. Lieutenant Colonel Davis' 2 d

Battalion simultaneously began deploying north ,

while Lieutenant Colonel Bates' 3d Battalion move d

into blocking positions centered on the Dong Ki o

Mountain complex . As Davis' Marines moved north of

the Cam Lo River, sporadic sniper and occasional auto -

matic weapons fire soon turned into a full-scal e

engagement. The Marine companies had run headlon g

into two companies from the 64th's 8th Battalion

entrenched on Kho Xa, one-half kilometer north of th e

river. The Marines reported 43 of the enemy kille d

during this initial engagement .

On 16 August, in a further effort to cordon elements of the enemy regiment, the 1st Battalion, 3 d

Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel

Richard B . Twohey, who had replaced Lieutenant
398 THE DEFINING YEA R

Colonel Jarman, moved by helicopter to Hill 162 ,

northwest of the supposed enemy position . With

Twohey 's Marines blocking enemy movement to the

north, Bates' battalion occupying positions to the

northwest, and Davis' troops pushing from the south ,

the forward elements of the enemy regiment could

only turn east or west. If they did so, batteries of th e

12th Marines located at Thon Son Lam, Camp Carroll ,

and C—2 could seal off the enemy's movement i n

either direction .

Learning that the assault by Twohey 's battalion ha d

split the 64th Regiment, General Davis decided to commit the 9th Marines in an effort to halt any attempt b y

the regiment to reinforce its forward elements. Early o n

the morning of the 17th, Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne's 3d Battalion helo-assaulted into Landing Zon e

Sparrow, nine kilometers southwest of Con Thien an d

the site of the battalion's 17 July engagement.* Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's 1st Battalion landed at LZ

Saturn, three kilometers west of C—2, later that morning, and with elements of Company A, 3d Tank Battalion in direct support, moved west . But as Colleton's

Marines left the open, rolling terrain and entered the

canopy, where the tanks found it impossible to maneuver, the tank company returned to C—2 . With Colleton's battalion moving west toward

the 3d Battalion, LaMontagne's Marines began a

series of intense and aggressive company-size patrol s

throughout its assigned area of search . While on

patrol near Sparrow on the morning of the 19th ,

Captain Richard A . O'Neil's Company M surprise d

and engaged a squad of North Vietnamese soldiers

with small arms fire as well as artillery and airstrikes.

As the enemy reinforced, swelling his ranks to tw o

companies, LaMontagne ordered Captain Jack D .

Schaeffer's Company K to join O 'Neil's Marines.

During Schaeffer's reinforcement of O'Neil, enemy

ground fire hit and destroyed a Marine F—4 Phantom

flying in support of the two companies . Both pilots

ejected and were later rescued . A sweep of the battl e

area resulted in a reported 38 enemy bodies and miscellaneous weapons and equipment . The Marine s

also captured two enemy soldiers from the 7th Battalion, 64th Regiment.

Two days later, on the 21st, Captain Gary E. Todd's

Company I, while on patrol one kilometer west of

Company M's contact on the 19th, encountered a n

enemy unit of undetermined size . Using artillery and

airstrikes to the maximum extent possible, Todd' s

*See Chapter 18 .

Marines forced the enemy to break contact leaving 1 4

dead behind. During a sweep of the area, the Marines

of Company I discovered a large enemy complex containing 60 well-constructed bunkers, a mess area, an d

laundry hanging out to dry. On 23 August, helicopters

returned Company I and the remainder of the battalion to Vandegrift Combat Base. While Company I was engaged west of Lang Don g

Bao Thoung on 19 August, Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's battalion assaulted into three landing zones, tw o

kilometers further west, leap-frogging over LaMontagne's Marines. Moving toward the high ground,

within one kilometer of the DMZ's southern boundary,

a patrol from First Lieutenant Stephen E . Stacy's Company B encountered an enemy company armed wit h

small arms, automatic weapons, and 60mm mortars . Within minutes an aerial observer arrived on statio n

and called in air and artillery strikes. But as darkness

fell, the patrol was unable to break contact and retur n

to the company's main position, 600 meters away.

Early the following morning, a misdirected fixed-win g

airstrike resulted in the wounding of 10 other Marines,

part of a relief force attempting to make its way to the

patrol's position . The first patrol eventually rejoined

the company, but was forced to leave its dead on th e

battlefield . Lieutenant Stacy's company, on the 24th ,

recovered the bodies of seven Marines and one Marin e

earlier reported as missing . The following day, Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's battalion rejoined the regiment at Vandegrift Combat Base 48* *

Although the 9th Marines reported 72 enemy soldiers killed in eight days, Colonel Barrow believed tha t

the 64th NVA Regiment lost many more . "I believe very

much," he later stated, "that we killed a great man y

more because we had an unusual operation in whic h

the 1st Battalion, 9th was on a narrow ridgeline an d

brought under heavy attack from within the DMZ an d

we responded with massive air, artillery, and morta r

fire on forces that were observed by the AOs as bein g

massed and large in number, and we brought great

devastation on the area, on these forces." Although

unable to enter the DMZ and confirm enemy casual -

ties, Barrow believed, "that our activities in that are a

**Colonel Thomas H . Galbraith, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines at the time, commented " What happened to Stacy's

patrol was the kind of thing we constantly worried about . Simply getting food, water, and ammo to small units that were operating any distance from an LZ was difficult, and getting help to them in a timely

manner when they were in trouble was sometimes almost impossible .

Supporting arms and air were the best you could hope for, and, of course ,

if the weather was bad, you couldn't count on air." Galbraith Comments .
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 399

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19190 9

Marines from the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines examine a LZ on Mutter Ridge as a Marine UH—1 E

helicopter sits nearby.

dealt that regiment a pretty severe blow, far beyond th e

confirmed body count."4 9

While Colonel Barrow's 1st and 3d Battalions wer e

heavily engaged to the north, Colonel Michael's 1st

Battalion, 3d Marines, under Lieutenant Colone l

Twohey, continued to sweep south down Mutte r

Ridge, finding numerous platoon- and company- size d

bunker complexes. Each find led to a more sophisticated one further south . The most significant finds wer e

an enemy supply battalion's storage area and what

appeared to be a regimental command post . The supply cache included more than 1,000 82mm morta r

rounds and close to 15,000 AK-47 rounds . In the regimental complex, the Marines found numerous ammunition storage bunkers, messhalls, kitchens, severa l

60mm and 82mm mortar positions, and an extensive

Chinese-built field phone communications system .

On 19 August, Lieutenant Colonel Twohey's battalion continued southwest along Mutter Ridge whil e

Lieutenant Colonel Davis' 2d Battalion swept wes t

through Helicopter Valley, between Dong Ha Mountain and Mutter Ridge. At the same time, Lieutenant

Colonel Bates' 3d Battalion moved four kilometers

northwest of the Rockpile to the Razorback, a large

sharp ridgeline paralleling the Cam Lo River. With

two companies conducting company-sized patrol operations on either side of the river, Bates' Marine s

engaged numerous small enemy groups in short, but

sharp encounters, and frequently came under heav y

artillery and mortar fire . With the 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines in place, blocking the western end of bot h

Mutter Ridge and Helicopter Valley, Marine helicopters lifted the 1st and 2d Battalions, once they had

completed their searches, to Thon Son Lam and Cam p

Carroll for refurbishment.

During the last week of August, the enemy wa s

once more on the move. He not only increased his

artillery and rocket attacks against Thon Son Lam and

Camp Carroll, but the large number of contacts and

sightings indicated he had entered the upper Cam Lo

Valley, north of Thon Son Lam and northwest of Don g

Ha Mountain.50 With this information in hand, General Davis decided to insert the 1st and 2d Battalions ,

9th Marines west of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines positions, into a rugged, jungle-covered, mountainou s

region never before entered by Marines in force .

Prior to the insertion of the two battalions, Marin e

aircraft dropped a large quantity of heavy ordnance to
• At a

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FIRE SUPPORT BASES IN VANtjR;FT

NORTHWESTERN QUANG TRI I COM5U3ASE

I"1- r

400 THE DEFINING YEAR

create landing zones on the ridgelines. The idea was to

facilitate entry on the high ground instead of the low,

but it did not succeed.' On the morning of 27 August,

Lieutenant Colonel Knight's 2d Battalion lifted into

three dispersed landing zones along the Suoi lien Hien

Valley floor, six kilometers west of the Rockpile, and

immediately encountered stiff resistance. The flight of

helicopters carrying Captain Joel D. Ward's Company

E, as it approached the proposed landing zone near the

river, received a heavy volume of ground fire. Enemy

gunners shot down one CH—46 in the zone and damaged two others but there were no Marine casualties.

While employing Marine UH—1E gunships in an

attempt to suppress enemy fire in the zone, however,

Ward's Marines were hit with a pod of rockets, resulting in two killed and two wounded.

Unlike elements of Knight's battalion, the insertion

of Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's battalion into the

broad Khe Giang Thoan Valley, southwest of the

Rockpile, was unopposed. Once in the area of operations, the two battalions immediately moved up the

ridges and secured positions on the high ground. The

Marines established Fire Support Base Sandy atop the

needle-point pinnacle, Dong Khe Soc, seven kilometers west of the Rockpile, to support the two battalions. Sandy, because of its size, could only accommodate one battery of 105mm howitzers, but it was the

first of many that would be constructed throughout

the area.52

As September began, Lieutenant Colonel Bates' 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines found itself heavily engaged

with elements of the enemy's 52d NVA Regiment,

attempting a reinforcing thrust north and northwest of

the Razorback. On the 3d, the enemy shelled Captain

William B. Gray's Company L with 172 rounds of

60mm and 82mm mortars and 25 rounds of 130mm

artillery. Immediately following the enemy artillery

preparation, two companies of NVA troops assaulted

the Marine company's position. But, before the enemy

had an opportunity to open fire, Ward's Marines pelted the enemy force with more than 300 hand grenades.

A search of the area revealed a reported 11 enemy bodies and 19 weapons, three of which were machine guns

that had been fired.
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 40 1

Companies B and C, 3d Marines reentered the area

of operations on 3 September, and the following da y

began search and destroy operations west and the n

south along the slopes of Mutter Ridge. Four days

later, after the torrential rains of Typhoon Bess ha d

eased, the remaining two companies of the 1st Battalion were helilifted onto the ridge to assist, while Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion secured and established blocking positions on the high ground to the

west. As Lieutenant Colonel Twohey's 1st Battalion

Marines moved southwest, they increasingly came int o

contact with the forward elements of the 48th NVA

Regiment which were endeavoring to reinforce the scattered remnants of the 52d. Late, on the 7th, First Lieu -

tenant Richard A . Andrews' Company A encountered

an enemy squad in bunkers on the southern slope of

Hill 461 . The company immediately formed a defensive position, but the enemy unit continually probe d

its lines throughout the night. A check of the area at

first light revealed an assortment of miscellaneou s

equipment and arms, but no enemy bodies . Andrews'

Marines lost three killed and an equal number of

wounded during the engagement. The most significant contact began on the 8th as Company A and th e

rest of the battalion continued to move up Hill 461 .

An estimated two companies from the 48th Regiment ,

from well-camouflaged bunkers, tenaciously defende d

themselves using 60mm and 82mm mortar and

130mm artillery supporting fires. As Twohey's

Marines pressed on, the enemy counterattacked twice ,

first on the 10th and then on the 11th, when they

attempted to employ a double envelopment of Company B. During the three-day battle, the enemy regiment lost an estimated 50 killed and numerous

weapons captured. While Twohey's battalion moved slowly throug h

the triple canopy toward the northwest, Lieutenan t

Colonel Knight's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines turned its

attention to two large hill masses southwest of th e

Rockpile, Nui Tia Pong and Nui Ba Lao.

The battalion's search of the Suoi Tien Hien Valley

had not proved fruitful . There were no trails nor evidence of the enemy which had fired on the battalio n

from the high ground to the northeast of the valley i n

late August. Knight decided to split the battalion . He

placed Bravo Command Group and Companies E an d

H on the Nui Ba Lao ridgeline and directed them t o

attack east. Alpha Command Group and Companies F

and G were lifted out of the valley, inserted into landing zones on eastern slopes of Nui Tia Pong, and

ordered to attack west up the mountain .

Both elements made contact shortly after enterin g

their new landing zones, the most significant occurring on Nui Tia Pong . As the two rifle companies,

alternating in the attack, slowly moved up the narrow

ridge, punctuated with peaks and saddles, from th e

200-meter level to the first prominent high ground a t

800 meters, they encountered a small but determined, well-dug in enemy force . " It was difficult

fighting," recalled Colonel Barrow, "there was n o

opportunity for maneuver because you could not

attempt any sort of enveloping movement because

the terrain was so precipitous. So it was a masterfu l

use of firepower and moving straight ahead agains t

the resistance . " 53 While suffering few casualties of

their own, the companies inflicted a damaging blo w

upon the defending enemy force .

Once atop Nui Tia Pong, the heavy rains associate d

with Typhoon Bess struck, cutting off resupply to the

two companies for several days. According to Barrow:

We had units down to zero availability rations; the y

tightened their belts. They conserved their rations and

had no problem with water, of course . It was an experience in learning how to endure the monsoon-typ e

weather in this very inhospitable terrain, and they did i t

well. 5 4

As soon as the heavy rains ended, Companies F an d

G moved down off the ridge, searching the fingers and

finding numerous small ordnance and ration caches.

On 8 September, in an effort to increase troop density,

Marine helicopters brought in Company C, 9th

Marines. The pattern of search during the next severa l

days had one company ahead, moving up the ridgelin e

to the west, pushing the enemy back, while th e

remaining two companies searched the fingers off th e

ridgeline and, when required, alternated with the lea d

company. This pattern of company search would continue as the regiment moved further north .

On 9 September, as the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

prepared to leave the Khe Giang Thoan Valley an d

return to Vandegrift Combat Base, Lieutenant Colone l

LaMontagne's 3d Battalion assaulted into Landin g

Zone Winchester on Dong Tien, six kilometers nort h

of Nui Tia Pong, and immediately developed contac t

to its east and west . LaMontagne's battalion easily dealt

with the enemy forces on its eastern flank, killing mor e

than an estimated 20 NVA, and then threw its weight

toward the western flank. As the battalion moved further west, it encountered successive delaying actions b y

well-dug-in enemy platoons and companies, employing command detonated mines, mortars, and automatic weapons, the same tactics experienced by the 2d Bat-
402 THE DEFINING YEA R

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Top, a covey of Boeing Vertol CH—46s carrying elements of the 4th Marines into a landing zone just

south of the DMZ is viewed through the door of one of the helicopters. The outline of the helicopter's

machine gun can be seen at the opening. In the bottom photo, Marines in the same operation, now on

the ground, wade through a stream whose water comes up to their waists.
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 403

talion on Nui Tia Pong. Colonel Barrow later reflected ,

"our tactics were to employ massive firepower, air,

artillery, and mortars, and 106s, and when the area wa s

virtually devastated, move in." He observed, "alway s

there seemed to be enough left for the infantry to have

to do a little of its own fighting, but most of it resulted in counting confirmed dead ."55 In its drive west, th e

battalion reported killing more than 200 enemy soldiers and uncovered large caches of mortar rounds, Chi -

nese Communist hand grenades, anti-personnel mines ,

and long-range rockets.

As the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines pushed

westward, the 3d Marines continued in heavy contact

north of the Razorback . Lieutenant Colonel Bates' 3 d

Battalion, with three companies on line, swept

through the low ground, northwest of Mutter Ridge ,

against dug-in enemy troops who resisted with heav y

60mm, 82mm, and artillery fire . Although Bate's

Marines reported killing more than 17 enemy, they

suffered in turn 8 dead and 87 wounded, most as a

result of the enemy's indirect fire .

Working in conjunction with Bates' Marines wer e

the other two battalions of the 3d Marines on Mutte r

Ridge. While enemy contact was light, both battalion s

discovered and then destroyed numerous enemy

bunkers complexes, fighting positions, and ammunition storage areas.

Replacing Bates' 3d Battalion on 13 September,

Lieutenant Colonel William F. Sparks' BLT 2/26 landed at LZ Margo, two kilometers north of Landing Zon e

Winchester. Three days later, as the battalion's four

companies pushed east and then north from the landing zone, a hill overlooking the deep, prominent ben d

in the Cam Lo River, the command post on Margo

underwent a 158-round 82mm mortar barrage at

1520. Despite returning fire initially with machine

gun and small arms and then with 81mm mortar and

artillery fire in an effort to silence the enemy mortars,

the command group suffered 21 killed and' 135

wounded. The command post took another 64 round s

two hours later, resulting in 1 killed and 11 wounded .

The following day, the command group was agai n

bombarded with 117 mortar rounds and lost another 1

dead and 16 wounded .

The enemy's continued use of delaying tactics suc h

as that employed against the command post of BLT

2/26 and the oftentimes tenacious defense of cache s

throughout the rest of the area of operations, indicate d

that the remnants of the three regiments of the 320th

NVA Division were endeavoring to gain time in order

to make their escape north of the DMZ . "It was apparent," General Davis later wrote, " that the situation was

ripe for the lift of two battalions into the DMZ to trap

as many of these scattered units as possible ."5 6 Colonel

Barrow noted the idea was "to move south against the

enemy that was believed to be between the Ben Hai

and Cam Lo."57

On 16 September, the regimental command post of

the 9th Marines displaced from Vandegrift to Landing

Zone, now Fire Support Base, Winchester. From Winchester, Colonel Barrow would direct the northward

deployment of additional Marine battalions and oversee the destruction of the enemy division . With the

movement of the regimental command post forward ,

the regiment assumed operational control of BLT 2/26

and the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.

The next morning following nine B—52 Arcligh t

strikes on the DMZ north of the operational area ,

Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Galbraith's 1st Battalion, 4th Marines were inserted into the DMZ ,

within a kilometer of the Ben Hai River . "The mission which we assigned 1/9 and 1/4," Colonel Barrow recalled, "was to attack on multi-axes to the

south in a most deliberate, methodical manner,

searching out ridgelines, draws, looking both for the

enemy and for any caches which he might have in the

area. It was by no means a matter of land and move

rapidly to the south . It was to be a deliberate

search."58 Meanwhile, Barrow directed Lieutenan t

Colonel Sparks' BLT 2/26 to attack rapidly to th e

north on two axes, one generally in the direction of

the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and the other towar d

the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines . *

Pushing south toward the high ground, the two

battalions captured a number of prisoners who con -

firmed that their units were moving north, attemptin g

to cross the Ben Hai and escape into North Vietnam .

They also indicated that they were plagued by severe

food shortages, low morale, and had been seriously hur t

by Arclight strikes. In addition to prisoners, both Colleton's and Galbraith's Marines, when not engaging

small groups of enemy troops moving north, found a

number of mass graves, containing the bodies of mor e

*At 1330 on 17 September, a Marine UH—1E bound for Winchester from Vandegrift, hit a tree and crashed 200 meters south of th e

fire support base . Among the passengers on board the aircraft were

Brigadier General William C. Chip, who had replaced Brigadier General Carl W. Hoffman as Commanding General, Task Force Hotel o n

22 August, and Lieutenant Colonel Frederic S . Knight, Commanding

Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines . Although injured, both men survived the crash .
404 THE DEFINING YEA R

than 150 enemy soldiers, and large stores of arms ,

ammunition, and food .

The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, which was operating

in an area generally east of Sparks' battalion and sout h

of Galbraith's battalion, was placed under the control

of Colonel Barrow's regiment on 19 September. For the

next several days, the 9th Marines controlled six battalions, two thirds of the division 's infantry battalions.

These six battalions were attacking in all directions an d

Colonel Barrow noted :

The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines . .

. [was] still attacking generally to the west with part of. . . [its] forces an d

generally to the east with another ; the 3d Battalion, 9t h

was attacking to the west ; the 1st Battalion, 9th and 1st

Battalion, 4th were attacking to the south ; the 2d Battalion, 26th was attacking to the north ; and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines was generally conducting heavy

patrol activities in all directions. So the pattern of activity was one that would frustrate the Marine Corp s

School's problem directors I am sure, but the tactical

situation dictated this type of maneuver.

According to Barrow, "this was all done from a very

austere regimental command post in the field ." He

continued: "It is a great credit to my staff that they per -

formed all of the fire control effort and the rest of th e

activities related to fire and maneuver in the mos t

exemplary fashion ."5 9

There were indications by 23 September that th e

north-south push was having an effect on the scattered

elements of the three enemy regiments. Instead of

moving north and being trapped, the enemy force s

began to reorient their attempts at escape to the east

and west. Responding to this apparent shift, Colleton's

battalion was directed to drive west while Galbraith's

Marines pushed east .

Lieutenant Colonel Twohey's 1st Battalion, 3 d

Marines would continue its attack east along Mutte r

Ridge as Lieutenant Colonel Sparks' battalion landin g

team and Lieutenant Colonel Bryon T. Chen's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines attacked north .* This maneuver,

coupled with an attack on 26 September by three companies of the Army's 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry and

two battalions of the 2d ARVN Regiment west fro m

C-2, was designed to cut the enemy's escape routes an d

destroy what remained of the three regiments. While Colleton's Marines continued to search the

400-meter high ridgeline generally paralleling the

southern boundary of the DMZ, sweep operations west

*Lieutenant Colonel Chen replaced Lieutenant Colonel Jack W .

Davis on 20 September as Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines.

of the Rockpile came to an end . On 29 September, the

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, now commanded by Majo r

Frederick E. Sisley, was helilifted to Vandegrift Combat Base, followed on 1 October, by the regimenta l

command group and Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne 's

3d Battalion, 9th Marines. With the departure of the

9th Marines from Winchester, operational control of

Sparks' BLT 2/26 was passed to the 3d Marines .

The division expanded its search operations within

the DMZ as the new month began. On 1 October, BLT

2/26 replaced the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines in th e

DMZ and was tasked with destroying a recently built

road, an extension of North Vietnam Route 102 2

southward into the DMZ. Discovered by Galbraith's

Marines,* with the assistance of an aerial observer, in

late September, the road complex generally followed the

Ben Hai River before turning south, two kilometer s

west of Dong Ong Cay, and ending 2,000 meters north

of the DMZ southern boundary. North of the river, the

road was well-developed, open and easily located from

the air as well as from prominent terrain features in th e

southern DMZ. Once it crossed the river, it was wellcamouflaged and difficult to spot because of overhead

cover. Built entirely by hand labor, the road was hacked

out of the jungle, lined with timber, and ringed wit h

base camps and fighting positions.

Sparks' battalion, with two companies in the attac k

and one in reserve, moved slowly north along the road,

destroying all enemy structures as they searched for elements of the 52d Regiment and its suspected comman d

and control complex . Continually bombarded by

artillery and mortars, the battalion's Marines fough t

small groups of determined and well-trained enem y

soldiers in well-concealed and heavily bunkere d

reverse-slope defensive positions. Once friendly supporting arms were brought to bear, the enemy woul d

withdraw, only to take up a defensive posture in ye t

another prepared position .

**Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith, then the commander of the 1s t

Battalion, 4th Marines, later remembered that his battalion discovered

the road on about the third or fourth night after they had entered th e

DMZ and started to move south : "I heard motors off in the distance .

Seems that I heard them for two or three nights and couldn't figure ou t

who had trucks operating in these hills . " His recollection was that h e

"reported hearing them to Colonel Barrow . . . and in the next day o r

so a helicopter came to pick me up to see if I could point out where th e

sounds had come from ." Galbraith wrote : "I recall having been ver y

disappointed in not being able to see anything at all—I felt like th e

boy who had cried 'wolf'—but as it turned out, the road was indee d

there, superbly hidden by canopy and camouflage, and what I had

heard was the motors of the trucks and/or heavy equipment that wer e

being used to build it." Galbraith Comments.
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 40 5

On 4 October, Company H found a 152m m

artillery position, ringed with machine gun and mortar emplacements, and 12 rounds of 152mm ammunition, 1,600 meters south of the Ben Hai . To the northeast, Marines discovered two 85mm howitzer position s

with accompanying antiaircraft guns . Several hundred

meters from the howitzer positions, they found a partially burned Soviet, six-cylinder diesel, full-tracke d

prime mover, capable of towing a 152mm artiller y

gun, which appeared to have been hit by a 105mm

howitzer round. It was suspected that the 152mm

guns were removed from the area shortly after the

insertion of the battalion . Not only were there signs

indicating the use of tracked vehicles, but one nigh t

Sparks' Marines reported hearing heavy engine noise s

to the north.

The most significant enemy contact occurred on 8

October as First Lieutenant Tyrus F. Rudd's Company

H approached Dong Ong Cay from the south . Despite

a tenacious fight the defenders lost a reported 17 dead ,

while Rudd's Company suffered 2 killed and 1 1

wounded. During the engagement the Marines

observed numerous bodies being dragged away, 11 of

which were found the following morning . In a search

of the hill, the Marines found another vehicle, a 12 -

cylinder diesel Soviet medium tracked artillery tractor

with a rear winch .

BLT 2/26 continued to search the road until 1 6

October when it returned to the Cua Viet area b y

helicopter. There it participated in two short operations, the cordon of Xuan Khanh Resettlement Village and a sweep north from Oceanview to the DMZ. With the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Sparks '

battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Twohey's 1st Battalion ,

3d Marines, which had moved into the DMZ on th e

8th and was sweeping to the east and west of the BLT ,

assumed the mission of searching the road and

destroying enemy installations in the area .

Twohey's Marines discovered more than 48 8

rounds of 152mm artillery ammunition, truck parks ,

and support camps as they moved north . By 17 October they had reached the Ben Hai, one kilomete r

north of Dong Ong Cay, where they found a shallo w

fording site built of rock and three cable bridges ove r

the river. The rock, or "underwater bridge" was rendered unserviceable by several 8-inch howitzer missions and the cable bridges were destroyed by fixed -

wing and artillery strikes. Using 422 of the captured

152mm artillery rounds, 3,000 pounds of C-44, and

cratering charges placed in and along the road ,

Twohey's battalion, working together with a detach -

ment of engineers, destroyed major portions of the

road. They also blasted holes in the canopy to make

the road more visible from the air. The 1st Battalion ,

3d Marines was helilifted from the DMZ on 22 October to provide security for installations along Rout e

9. Although both Sparks' and Twohey's Marines continually heard tracked vehicles moving north an d

responded with a massive artillery and air assault, th e

320th NVA Division was able to remove its heav y

artillery from the area .

As October began, 8,000 meters to the west, Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's 1st Battalion, 9th Marine s

continued to sweep westward in the DMZ. The search,

however proved fruitless and on the 7th the battalio n

withdrew. The same day, Lieutenant Colonel Chen's 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines was inserted into the DMZ ,

8,000 meters further west . Unlike September, whe n

enemy contact was heavy, Chen's Marines engaged fe w

enemy troops, mostly logistical support personnel wh o

seemed startled that Marines had invaded what they

considered their rear area . Although numerous caches ,

supply trails, and rest centers were discovered, the

greatest enemy soon became the weather. The rain,

constant and torrential, not only caused difficulties i n

movement and resupply, but numerous cases o f

immersion foot. After 17 days in the DMZ, the battalion was helilifted to Camp Carroll and from there by

foot moved to the Mai Loc area for operations wit h

Regional and Popular Forces. By 26 October all

Marine units had left the DMZ and the allies terminated the series of operations against the three regiments of the 320th NVA Division.

Thwarted in two attempts at victory in the low -

lands during April and May, the enemy division, i n

August, chose another route which, as Colonel Barrow

stated, led to a third defeat :

He had to choose some other way to attempt to d o

his dirty work of interdicting our roads and attacking

civilian settlements. And so he chose this inhospitable

area, northwest of the Rockpile, and if one will look at

a map you can see that to him that it was a wise choice

because, one, it was an area that made his targets quite

accessible . He was only six, eight, or ten clicks away

from the Rockpile . It was an area that was so rugged

that he could assume that it was inaccessible to us, tha t

we would not have the means to enter it unless we chose

to do it overland and we would pay a heavy price if we

did. The fact that we moved in and forced our way, if

you will, onto the ridgelines on an equal footing wit h

him and showed great determination in seeking out hi s

supplies which were so carefully concealed, upset his

plans. He had prepared this area as his battlefield . . .

We couldn't have hit him at a better time . We hit him
406 THE DEFINING YEA R

when his forces had not yet gotten to their battlefiel d

and we dealt his forces a blow. 60

During three months of fighting, the Marine command estimated that the 320th NVA Division lost more

than 1,500 killed as well as large numbers of individual and crew-served weapons. The Marines, in addition, destroyed hundreds of prepared positions an d

huge stockpiles of munitions. In contrast to the heavy

losses of the enemy, Marine casualties were less that

200, many from indirect artillery and mortar fire . When the 9th Marines left the battle with the

320th Division, they turned their efforts toward th e

expanding pacification program . At 1000 on the

morning of 1 October, as the regimental headquarters

prepared to depart Fire Support Base Winchester, it

received an order from Task Force Hotel to place a

three battalion cordon that night around the Ben g

Son-Doc Kinh or Mai Loc village complex, a know n

Viet Cong haven in the Cua Valley . Throughout the

day, Army helicopters made a visual reconnaissance o f

the area, battalions briefed down to the squad level,

and the regiment carried out coordination with Sout h

Vietnamese officials and the U .S . Army district advisor.

At dusk the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and 3d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived by truck at Camp Carroll, an d

shortly after dark, the two battalions began their overland movement . Lieutenant Colonel Bourne's 3d Battalion travelled in a easterly direction, while Major Sis -

ley's 2d Battalion headed south and then turned east.

According to Colonel Barrow :

Their movements were sort of like the pincers of a

crab, moving out into the night, getting around the village and the open side of the cordon was then to be

filled in by the 3d Battalion, 9th, landing at night int o

two landing zones, one up near where the 3d Battalion ,

4th would have the head of its column and one not to o

far from where the 2d Battalion, 9th would have th e

head of its column . 6 1

Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne's 3d Battalion ,

9th Marines lifted out of Vandegrift and touched

down in the area two hours before midnight . Within

30 minutes his lead elements made contact with

Bourne's and Sisley's Marines, closing the cordon .

Early the following morning, Colonel Barrow made a

helicopter reconnaissance of the area: "It was a vhry

dramatic sight to see the next morning an entire

infantry regiment wrapped around this large villag e

complex with a Marine every 5 to 10 meters in physical contact all the way around the cordon ."62 During

the next several days, the regiment tightened the cordon and completely searched the village complex .

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801.136

1 stLt James Luker, Jr., a member of the fire support group

with the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, pauses for a momen t

near LZ Cates in Operation Scotland to fill a canteen with

water. He apparently has the water duty as three more canteens are on the rocks waiting to be filled as well .

While detaining only 40 individuals, who were late r

identified as prominent members of the local Viet

Cong infrastructure, Barrow considered the cordon a

success. "We were particularly proud of it," he stated ,

"because it showed the versatility of this regiment an d

our capability to respond rapidly, having come out o f

a month-long mountain jungle operation and tha t

very same night of the same day we came out we con -

ducted a very successful cordon operation, which was ,

of course, entirely different and involved operatin g

with other forces and involved working in an area that

was heavily populated . "G3

While the 3d Marines, and later 9th Marines, were

pursuing the regiments of the 320th NVA Division ,

Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines continued t o

conduct mobile defensive operations within the Scotland area of operations. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H.

Galbraith's 1st Battalion, 4th Marines conducte d

extensive company patrols, searching for enemy troops ,

caches, and constructing landing zones for future heliborne assaults throughout August and into September .

On 7 August, the battalion command group and thre e

companies were helilifted to Hills 679 and 505 in the

Huong Vinh region, approximately 10 kilometers wes t

of Vandegrift. The Marines cut landing zones and con -

ducted numerous patrols throughout the area without
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 407

results. On the 23d, in an effort to assist the 3d Battalion, Galbraith's Marines assaulted into the Huon g

Phuc region, south of Route 9, approximately 17 kilo -

meters southwest of Vandegrift . Once again the troops,

except for two short encounters with small groups o f

enemy soldiers as they attacked to the northwest,

found little of interest. The Dong Ca Lu mountain

complex west of Vandegrift, a favorite harboring sit e

for the North Vietnamese, became the battalion's chief

interest during the last days of August and first two

weeks of September. Although Galbraith's Marine s

sighted several large groups of enemy in the area and

responded with mortar, artillery, and airstrikes, no significant engagements took place .

Between these series of short operations, the battalion maintained responsibility for the defense of Vandegrift Combat Base and Ca Lu. Assigned the mission of

planning a new perimeter defense, Galbraith's Marines,

in coordination with the 11th Engineers, cleared fields

of fire, laid defensive wire, and assisted with the placement of tanks, Ontos, M42 "Dusters", and searchlights

at strategic points along the perimeter. On 17 September, the battalion was placed under the operational con -

trol of the 9th Marines and assaulted into the DMZ .

Further west, Lieutenant Colonel Louis A . Rann's

2d Battalion, 4th Marines maintained a continuou s

series of patrols from Fire Support Base Cates. The 2d

Battalion also manned strategic hills overlooking th e

abandoned base at Khe Sanh . Enemy contact was ligh t

during August, consisting of small unit probes of al l

battalion defensive positions. September brought long

periods of rain and overcast weather to the wester n

mountains, hindering the battalion's long-range patro l

effort and resulting in numerous accidents and severa l

collapsed bunkers .

On 17 September, Rann's Marines observed enemy

activity around the abandoned Khe Sanh Combat Base .

Several artillery missions were called in on a possibl e

enemy truck convoy, antiaircraft positions, and on th e

former helicopter revetments, but without success .

Later, several patrols reported hearing and seeing an

unidentified aircraft near the base, but no positive

identification could be made due to heavy fog .

To the southeast of Rann's battalion, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Frank L .

Bourne, Jr., continued to defend Fire Support Bas e

FSB Shepherd, in this aerial view, overlooks Route 9 where two rivers, the Song Rao Quan and D a

Krong come together. Unfortunately neither the road nor the rivers can be made out in this picture.

Photo from the 12th Mars ComdC, Dec68
408 THE DEFINING YEA R

Shepherd, overlooking Route 9 and the confluence of

the Song Rao Quan and Da Krong. Bourne maintained

one rifle company at the fire support base and

employed the three remaining companies, on a rotating basis, in a mobile defense . According to the plan ,

the companies moved from patrol base to patrol base i n

the field every two to three days. In addition to company patrols out of Shepherd, the battalion conducted

a two-company search operation in the Huong Phuc

region to the southwest near Hills 549 and 587 . Soo n

after entering the region on 21 August, Companies L

and M came under heavy and continuous rocket-propelled grenade, 75mm recoilless rifle, 60mm, and

82mm mortar fire . The companies maintained a tigh t

defensive position on Hill 549 for several days befor e

being relieved by elements of the 1st Battalion .

Despite extended periods of inclement weather during September, Bourne's battalion continued the program of constantly patrolling its sector of the regimental area of operations. On 13 September, the battalio n

was split with the Bravo command group and Companies I and L displacing to Vandegrift Combat Base .

The Alpha command group and Companies K and M

remained on Shepherd .

Although the two remaining companies continued to send out long-range patrols, the Marine s

encountered only friendly Montagnards and n o

enemy troops during the month . However, while o n

patrol, north of Ra Co Ap, three kilometers west of

Shepherd, elements of Company M captured two

Vietnamese males, carrying a white flag . Initially

thought to be North Vietnamese soldiers, they late r

revealed that they were ARVN officers who had

been captured at Hue during the Tet Offensive i n

February. They reported that they had escaped from

an enemy prisoner of war camp, located near th e

junction of Route 9 and Xe Pon, on the Laotian border, and said to have contained at least 30 America n

prisoners . The enemy, they noted, were in th e

process of taking them and others to a camp i n

North Vietnam .

During August and early September there were

indications that the 246th Independent NVA Regiment

had reentered South Vietnam and was moving eas t

toward Huong Hoa, south of the Khe Sanh Comba t

Base . In addition, the elements of the 83d Engineer Regiment were believed to be constructing a road from Lao s

into the Vietnam Salient. The 1st Battalion, 66th NVA

BGen Frank E. Garretson, right, CG, TF Hotel, accompanies MajGen Ormond R . Simpson, center, and MajGen Raymond G. Davis, left, CG 3d MarDiv. MajGen Simpson assumed command

of the 1st Marine Division on 21 December 1968.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801184
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 409

Department of Defense (USMC) A19224 7

Marines of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on side of hill prepare to fire LAAWs (light antiarmor

weapons) at enemy positions in the valley below. The Marine with the soft hat in the background

apparently is holding a M14, rather than the M16 rifle.

Regiment also had moved into an area just north of the

abandoned Marine Combat Base ° n

Although Brigadier General Frank E . Garretson,

who assumed command of Task Force Hotel at the en d

of August, had hoped to begin operations in the area

during September, inclement weather forced a series o f

postponements. But by early October, with the completion of four fire support bases and the movement o f

Marine 155mm howitzers and 8-inch self-propelle d

guns eight kilometers west along Route 9 to Fire Support Base Stormy, and a battery of Army 175mm gun s

to Ca Lu, all was ready. While the 9th Marines secured all fire support

bases east of Khe Sanh and patrolled the high groun d

surrounding Vandegrift Combat Base, the 4th

Marines, now under the command of Colonel Marti n

J. Sexton, began search and clear operations to th e

west of Khe Sanh. On 5 October, Major John E .

O'Neill's 2d Battalion, 4th Marines assaulted int o

landing zones just south of Lang Vei (2) and Lieutenant Colonel Bourne's 3d Battalion was helilifted

into the area just north of Lang Vei (1). Seizing the

two objectives without enemy opposition, both battalions began to sweep east astride Route 9 . The following day, Lieutenant Colonel Galbraith's 1st Battalion assaulted into landing zones near Hill 503, thre e

kilometers southwest of Huong Hoa, on the souther n

flank of the two attacking battalions. The battalion's

mission was to interdict enemy movement along th e

north-south routes leading to and out of the Khe Sanh

area . Simultaneously, the 3d and 4th Battalions, 2d

ARVN Regiment were helilifted into landing zone s

seven kilometers north of Bourne's Marines an d

moved toward Hills 881 North and 881 South .

Galbraith's and O'Neill's battalions travelling eas t

toward the Da Krong Valley, uncovered numerou s

munitions caches and grave sites while engaging several small, but isolated groups of enemy soldiers. On 16

October, the 2d Battalion, now under the command o f

Major William L. Kent, returned to Vandegrift Combat Base for a period of rehabilitation prior to a helicopter lift into the northwestern portion of the Scot -

land area of operations . Elements of Galbraith's

battalion left the Khe Sanh area the same day and

deployed to various fire support bases throughout th e

regimental area . Marines of the 1st Battalion spent the

remainder of October in a normal perimeter defensiv e

posture, manning patrols, listening and observatio n

ports, and killer teams. Composed of artillery and

81mm mortar forward observers, a forward air con-
410 THE DEFINING YEA R

troller, an M60 machine gun team, grenadier,

radioman, corpsman, team leader, and a sufficient

number of riflemen to accomplish the assigned mission, the killer teams, which ranged in size from 14 t o

22 men, operated in remote areas for a three to five-day

period. Unlike long-range reconnaissance patrols, these

teams were encouraged to engage enemy forces

attempting to move within striking distance of regimental fire support bases.

By 10 October, Lieutenant Colonel Bourne's

Marines had taken their final objectives: Hills 689 ,

552, and 471 ; and the villages of Khe Sanh and

Houng Hoa. The 3d Battalion and the two ARVN

Battalions then shifted the emphasis of their attacks .

The 3d and 4th Battalions, 2d ARVN Regimen t

swept north off Hill 881 toward Lang Suat until th e

19th when they returned to Dong Ha. At the same

time, Bourne's battalion conducted extensive reconnaissance and search operations in the Khe Xa Bai Valley where it was believed that the enemy had stored

extensive caches of ammunition, food, and weapons.

After establishing Fire Support Base Gurkha, atop

Hill 632, on 12 October, 3d Battalion Marines moved

off the hill and into the surrounding river valley. During the last days of October, they were in the process

of slowly working their way toward the summit of

Dong Pa Thien, one of the highest pieces of terrain i n

South Vietnam. Their search failed to uncover any evidence of recent enemy activity in the area . What they

did find were three to four-month old grave sites ,

unserviceable bunkers, and four to six-month ol d

enemy equipment and weapons. What enemy that the

Marines sighted showed no inclination to contest the

battalion's forward movement .

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James L . Fowler, was

joined during the last week of October by Major Kent's

2d Battalion which was helilifted onto Hill 665 an d

established Fire Support Base Alpine before sweeping

north in an effort to seize a regimental objective near

Lang Ho . After Kent's Marines reached the objective ,

they conducted extensive patrols in the area, uncovering small caches of new and used medical equipment

and supplies. On 30 October, Companies F and G

assaulted into landing zones west of Alpine and began

a sweep to the east, encountering no enemy resistance .

The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, under the command

of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott R. Laine, Jr., who had

replaced Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne on the 24th ,

searched Dong Ca Lu and the hills west of Vandegrift

without success. Meanwhile, Major Sisley's 2d Battal -

ion moved into the northeast portion of the Vietna m

Salient on 26 October. Like Kent's Marines to the

north, Laine's battalion, operating 20 kilometer s

southwest of Vandegrift near the Laotian border,

encountered only token resistance as it searched the 10 -

meter-wide road running from Laos into South Vietnam. As Colonel Barrow reported : "We searched ou t

the road, interdicted it, destroyed it, conducted extensive patrol operations, killed a few, [and] picked up

some gear."65

The 246th NVA Regiment had moved back into Laos

to regroup and refit . Combined with the defeat of the

48th and 52d Regiments, 320th NVA Division, the

northwestern region of I Corps was now devoid o f

major enemy units. This lack of sizeable enemy force s

allowed the highly mobile attacking elements of the

4th and 9th Marines to cover a wide expanse of terrai n

in the far reaches of western and southern Quang Tri

Province in a series of heliborne maneuvers. The 3d

Marine Division would continue to refine these highl y

mobile tactics during the last two months of 1968 .

Coastal Quang Tri and Thua Thien : A Shift

The 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 3d ARVN

Regiment, as August began, continued to conduc t

company and battalion-sized cordon and search and

clear operations in the populated coastal plains o f

Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Their missio n

was to ferret out the Viet Cong infrastructure, destro y

enemy main force units, and support the Revolutionary Development Program. Company and battalio n

reconnaissance-in-force operations were conducte d

simultaneously in enemy Base Areas 101 and 114 i n

the mountains, aimed at destroying the enemy's logistics and command and control facilities .

There was moderate contact as elements of th e

division's three brigades searched the coastal lowland s

for the Viet Cong and his rice storage areas . Shortly

after midnight, in the early morning hours of 1 6

August, enemy forces launched a mortar and groun d

attack against Landing Zone Nancy, nine kilometers

northwest of Camp Evans. The positions of Companies D and E, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, at Nancy,

took more than 150 rounds of 82mm mortar, followed by a ground attack by 20 enemy sappers wh o

broke through the perimeter, killing 18 soldiers and

wounding another 71 . Four days later, a helicopte r

from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry came under

heavy automatic weapons fire while conducting a

"snatch" operation in an area seven kilometers north-
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 41 1

east of Quang Tri City.* Three companies of the 1st

Battalion, 8th Cavalry and two troops of the 3 d

Squadron, 5th Cavalry air assaulted into the area and

eventually placed a cordon around the suspected villages, trapping the 808th VC Battalion . Fighting over

the next three days resulted in the capture of 14 prisoners, 58 weapons, and the reported deaths of 14 4

enemy soldiers.

During late August a gradual concentration of

Communist forces was noted in the eastern portio n

of Base Area 101, a region known to be heavily fortified and believed to contain several battalion base

areas and storage facilities . The area also lay across a

major rice route and was an important link in th e

transportation of rice from Hai Lang District to th e

western mountains. On 11 September, Operatio n

Comanche Falls-Lam Son 261 began in the base are a

in an effort to destroy enemy forces, caches an d

bunker complexes prior to the arrival of the northeast monsoon . Two battalions of the 5th and 8t h

Cavalry and two battalions from the 1st and 3 d

ARVN Regiments assaulted into landing zones

along the southern boundary of the base area. One

battalion of the 7th Cavalry seized landing zones i n

the southeast portion and a Regional Force battalion

from Quang Tri secured landing zones in the north -

east portion . As the latter two battalions establishe d

blocking positions and interdicted enemy trails in

the piedmont, the four maneuvering battalions

attacked through jungle canopy to the northeast .

After 21 days of sustained combat, the combine d

cavalry and ARVN force had succeeded in denyin g

the enemy his forward support base area and disrupting his lines of communication . In addition to

destroying several large base camps, allied force s

reported killing more than 270 NVA soldiers .

With the destruction of enemy installations i n

Base Area 101, the division began operations to

interdict enemy movement toward the A Shau Val -

ley and to destroy reported large supply installation s

west of the base area . On 2 October, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, followed by two battalions of the

*"Snatch" operations were conducted in restricted areas, alon g

waterways or roads and in populated areas. Using a UH—1H " Huey "

helicopter. with an infantry fire team, interpreter, and a national policeman on board and an armed OH—6A "Loach," the snatch tea m

patrolled restricted areas looking for targets . If individuals were discovered, the team would swoop out of the sky and round them up .

After interrogation by the policeman, Viet Cong suspects would b e

transported to detainee collection points and innocent civilians transferred to the district headquarters .

1st ARVN Regiment, assaulted into landing zone s

southwest of the base area and began a sweep to th e

western limits of the division's area of operations .

Although contact was light and sporadic during the

remainder of the month, the combined allied force

destroyed several large enemy supply installation s

and captured tons of ammunition .

As elements of the 1st Cavalry Division continue d

their search for enemy forces in the mountains an d

throughout the coastal plains, General Stilwell, o n

26 October, alerted the division's commanding general, U.S . Army Major General George Forsythe, tha t

his forces would be deployed to III Corps Tactical

Zone . Once in place, II Field Force, Vietnam woul d

assume operational control of the division . In a message to General Cushman, General Abrams outline d

the threat in III Corps which necessitated the move .

He noted:

I have directed the move on the basis of the tactical situation in South Vietnam and my continuing assessment o f

the enemy 's capabilities throughout the country to includ e

his capability to reinforce from out of country. I believe

that a part of his problem in northern I Corps is inadequate

logistic support . This may be temporary. The absence of

some enemy units from northern I Corps may also be temporary. In the meantime he has steadily built his capability in III Corps and the sanctuaries in Cambodia .

As Abrams viewed the situation, the mounting enemy

threat to III Corps had to be blunted and therefore h e

was forced to make the decision to move the 1st Cavalry Division sooner instead of later. Should a change

in situation warrant it, he concluded, the division

could be moved quickly back to I Corps. Although i t

had no bearing on his decision, Abrams saw the move

as a opportunity for the 1st ARVN Division to "shoulder a bigger part of the load ." 66**

The advance party of the Army's cavalry division

departed I Corps on 27 October. The following day the

3d Brigade was airlifted to Quan Loi and put under the

operational control of the 1st Infantry Division . Combat elements of the 1st Brigade simultaneously

deployed to Tay Ninh and came under the control o f

the 25th Infantry Division .

**General Earl E . Anderson, in 1968 the III MAF Chief of Staff,

observed that the Marine command lost the 1st Air Cavalry Division ,

" just on the basis of a phone call . " As early as 11. September 1968, III

MAF had received a message from General Abrams, "asking us to

comment on the effect upon III MAF of our furnishing an AirCa v

troop and an air-mobile brigade for use in III Corps, commencing 1

Dec . " BGen E. E. Anderson lrr to MajGen F. E. Leek, dtd 4Nov68 ,

encl, Anderson Comments, Dec94 ; Anderson ltr to Van Ryzin, Sep68 ;

Anderson Comments, Dec94 .
412 THE DEFINING YEAR

Photo from Abel Collection

An Army company commander from the 1st Air Cavalry

Division points out terrain features to Capt William O.

Moore, Jr., whose company will relieve the Army unit south

of Quang Tri City. The 1st Air Cavalry Division bega n

departing I Corps in October for III Corps .

In light of the anticipated loss of the 1st Cavalry

Division, XXIV Corps ordered an adjustment in the

boundary between the 3d Marine and 101st Airborn e

Divisions. The adjustment, scheduled to be complete d

on 8 November, would generally correspond to th e

provincial boundary between Quang Tri and Thu a

Thien. To fill the void, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry

Division would be shifted south and a brigade of th e

101st Airborne Division would move north . In an

attempt to make the transition as smooth as possible ,

the remaining elements of the cavalry division wer e

directed to cordon the village of Thon My Chanh an d

eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure from the village

to the coast . On 2 November, the cordon around Thon

My Chanh was established by an armored battalio n

task force from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division ,

an armored battalion from the 101st Airborne Division, and a cavalry squadron from the 2d Brigade, 1s t

Cavalry Division . U.S . helicopters brought into forward landing zones maneuver elements of the 1st

ARVN Regiment which began search operations

throughout the area . Although enemy resistance was

light, the combined Army and ARVN force discovered

several food caches, containing more than 12 tons o f

unpolished rice. With the end of the 2d Brigade, 1st

Cavalry Division's participation in the cordon on 7

November, the area was released to the 1st Brigade and

the 2d Brigade deployed to Phuoc Vinh.67

South of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division continued to conduct operations i n

coordination with the 1st ARVN Regiment to pro -

vide security for Hue City ; interdict Routes 547 and

547A; implement the rice denial program ; destro y

the enemy's main force units and infrastructure ; and

assist in the Thua Thien Province pacification program . In late July, the division finalized plans, marshalled forces, and constructed fire support bases fo r

a combined Army and ARVN two-brigade airmobile assault into the A Shau Valley. On 4 August ,

Army helicopters flew the 2d Battalion, 502d

Infantry and 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry into landing zones in the vicinity of A Luoi and Ta Bat .

While the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry secured

landing zones near Ta Bat, the 2d and 3d Battalions,

1st ARVN Regiment were helilifted into the valle y

on the 5th. The combined reconnaissance in forc e

encountered only a few squad- and company-size d

enemy units, much smaller than anticipated b y

intelligence sources. The enemy employed a series o f

delaying and harassing tactics to slow the advance . While finding no major enemy caches or installations, the maneuver forces implanted minefields an d

sensors at three choke points in the valley before

withdrawing on the 20th .

On the heels of the A Shau Valley operation, the 1st

Battalion, 508th Infantry assaulted into landing zone s

in the Nui Ke mountain complex southeast of Hue.

Led by a North Vietnamese Army corporal who ha d

rallied to a local Marine Combined Action platoon, th e

battalion moved west toward the suspected base camps

of the 5th NVA Regiment . Following two weeks of heavy

fighting, the 1st Battalion reported killing more tha n

180 enemy troops and captured numerous individua l

weapons and tons of munitions.

As a result of the decreasing number of engagements in August with North Vietnamese main forc e

and Viet Cong local force units in the coastal lowlands surrounding Hue, a series of operations, or

"soft cordons," were carried out to destroy the Vie t

Cong infrastructure in the area . These operations,

targeted at Vinh Loc, Phu Vang, Huong Thuy, Ph u

Thu Districts, emphasized coordination with an d

use of local South Vietnamese forces, surprise, isolation of the battlefield, detailed search, minimu m

destruction of civilian property, and population control. The soft cordon normally took place in populated areas where enemy forces were suspected to b e

widely dispersed among the civilian population .

The expectation was that the enemy forces would
AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED 41 3

attempt to escape rather than establish an organized

resistance . Preparatory fires would be placed only o n

barren areas near landing zones and fires on othe r

targets, such as known or suspected enemy locations, would be planned but not fired unless necessary to prevent friendly casualties. The soft cordon

proved to be an effective technique for the divisio n

and local South Vietnamese authorities to find th e

Viet Cong and blunt its influence .

In mid-September, in an effort to prevent enemy

reinforcement and recovery from the losses suffered i n

Phu Vang, Phu Thu, and Vinh Loc Districts, the 1st

Battalion, 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 502 d

Infantry assaulted into the Dong Truoi mountai n

complex south of Hue . For the next month, the two

battalions conducted extensive company operation s

in search of five infantry battalions of the 4th and 5th

NVA Regiments, known to be in the area . Although

not encountered in large numbers, the enemy fled t o

the southwest, relieving the pressure on Da Nang ,

Route 1 from Phu Bai to the Hai Van Pass, and o n

Phu Loc District to the east .

While the division's 2d Brigade continued to conduct the series of cordon operations in the coastal

plains and the 1st Brigade operated in the mountains

to the south and west of Hue, the 3d Brigade, 82d

Airborne Division prepared to deploy from I Corps t o

III Corps . The 82d Airborne brigade was release d

from the operational control of the division on 4

October and, simultaneously, the division 's own 3d

Brigade moved from III Corps to I Corps an d

returned to the operational control of the 101st .

As the division regained its 3d Brigade, its

boundary was extended to the east to include th e

Phu Loc District and south to include the remaining portion of Thua Thien Province, with the exception of the Hai Van Pass. With the deactivation o f

Marine Task Force X-Ray in August and the subsequent movement of the 26th Marines south, General Abrams authorized the boundary extension.68 * I n

late October, the division's area of operations was

extended north to the Thua Thien-Quang Tr i

boundary as the 1st Cavalry Division was alerted t o

deploy to III Corps.

In recalling the memory of his service, Lieutenan t

Colonel Galbraith, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, probably expressed the feeling s

of most Marine and Army officers and troops who

fought in northern I Corps during this period:

Much of what stands out in my mind . . . is the

totally miserable existence of the squad and fire team

grunt, the guy who lived day after day in a hole he jus t

dug, trying to do his job and at the same time stay

halfway dry, opening his can of C-rations, wonderin g

when he was going to get his next hot meal and a new

pair of utility trousers to replace the ripped and tor n

pair he sort of had on, and remembering the hot shower he 'd had a month ago when he was herded throug h

the shower unit at Vandegrift. 69

*See also Chapter 21 .
CHAPTER 2 1

Counteroffensive Operations in Southern ICT Z

The Situation in September—Operation Maui Peak—The End of Mameluke Thrust and Renewe d

Attacks on Da Nang—Operation Meade River—Operation Taylor Common

The Situation in September

Following the failure of the Communist "Third

Offensive" in late August, III MAF forces in souther n

ICTZ pursued enemy forces, attempting to defea t

them in detail, until Typhoon Bess brought mos t

offensive operations to a halt. During the first week i n

September, 60-knot winds and 20 inches of rain battered the Da Nang area. Rivers swelled, flooding low -

lying areas and carrying away bridges. Trenches and

bunkers collapsed, mud slides closed Route 1 over

Hai Van Pass, and aircraft remained grounded . In

consolation, III MAF Marines had the satisfaction o f

knowing that the typhoon brought misery to the

enemy, as well, flooding their many undergroun d

caches of food and arms.I *

In the wake of the typhoon, III MAF forces underwent major organizational changes. On 10 September,

the 27th Marines redeployed to the United States following seven months of combat in Vietnam, reducin g

by three the number of infantry battalions available t o

General Cushman . Colonel Robert G. Lauffer's 1st

Marines, under the operational control of the 3d Marin e

Division since late March returned at the end of August

and early September to the 1st Marine Division and

relieved the 27th Marines. The 2d Light Anti-Aircraft

Missile Battalion, based near Chu Lai, which had stood

ready to engage enemy aircraft since September 1965 ,

but had never fired one of its HAWK missiles in anger,

prepared for redeployment to the U.S . Operation Houston ended on 12 September, after more than six month s

during which the 5th Marines, and then the 26th

Marines, kept Route 1 open between Phu Bai and Da

Nang, killing a reported 702 enemy in the process . As

Houston ended, XXIV Corps units assumed control of

the area around Phu Bai, allowing General Youngdal e

to dissolve Task Force X-Ray and move the 26t h

Marines south to the Da Nang TAOR.2 *

*See Chapters 19 and 20 for accounts of the havoc that Typhoo n

Bess caused at Da Nang and in the DMZ respectively.

**See Chapters 19 and 20 as well about the departure of the 27t h

Marines and the arrival of the 1st Marines at Da Nang .

While III MAF realigned forces, the enemy bega n

recovering from the effects of the typhoon and the

defeat of the Third Offensive, albeit the recovery was

somewhat slow. At the same time, the Communists

maintained pressure through small-scale terrorist an d

sapper attacks. In one small, but spectacular incident ,

an enemy sapper, using a bamboo reed as a snorkel,

swam through heavy debris clogging the Vinh Die n

River to place an explosive charge under the Tu Ca u

Bridge. The Marines guarding the bridge saw the sap -

per and took him under fire, but could not stop th e

attack. The charge exploded, damaging a 28-meter

section of the bridge and closing it to vehicles. 3

Southwest of Da Nang, Operation Mameluke

Thrust continued, with the 5th Marines conductin g

offensive operations in the Arizona Territory and the

An Hoa area, and the 7th Marines resumed offensive

operations north of Go Noi Island immediately following the typhoon . On 14 September, Lieutenan t

Colonel Francis X. Quinn, the 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines commander, sent two of his companies, L an d

M, to establish blocking positions in support of a n

ARVN operation in the "Dodge City" sector outlined

by the Thu Bon, Ai Nghia, and La Tho Rivers . As

Company L started to move into its blocking positio n

about 4,000 meters south of Hill 55, it came unde r

automatic weapons and small arms fire as well as a

mortar barrage from a Communist force of unknown -

size, well-entrenched in concealed bunkers. In the

ambush, the Marine company suffered heavy casualties,

reporting 1 known dead, 21 wounded, and 4 Marines

missing in action (MIA) . Reinforced by Company M,

Company L "returned fire and tried to retrieve th e

MIAs, but {were} unable to do so." Pulling back to

more defensive positions, the two Marine companie s

called upon supporting artillery and airstrikes as the

fighting continued into the night. The Marines di d

capture one North Vietnamese prisoner who identifie d

his unit as the D—3 Sapper Battalion.

During the early morning hours of the 15th an d

under the cover of darkness, Lieutenant Colonel Quin n

brought up his command group and newly attached

414
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 415

Photocopy of Ill MA P Briefing Map (Nov—Dec 1968)

Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Quinn consolidated the three companies in defensive positions

about 3,000 meters to the southwest of the original

contact. By this time, Colonel Herbert L. Beckington,

the 7th Marines commander, had alerted Lieutenant

Colonel LeRoy E. Watson, whose BLT 2/7 (the SLF

battalion) was under the operational control of the 7th

Marines. While BLT 2/7 established blocking positions, Quinn's 3d Battalion was to sweep through the

previous day's contact area.5

As planned, at first light on the 15th, Marine helicopters landed the BLT 2/7 command group and Companies F and H in the southern Dodge City sector. At

the same time, the three companies of Quinn's battalion attacked to the northeast. At 1700, Company L

found the bodies of the four Marines who had been

reported the previous day as missing in action. The two

battalions linked up on the morning of 16 September

and continued to sweep the area. While encountering

no significant resistance, the Marines uncovered and

destroyed 72 heavily fortified burikers.°

Both battalions continued the search until the afternoon of 17 September. At that time, Colonel BeckingGen EarlE. Anderson Collection

ton, the 7th Marines commander, ordered a change in

plans. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines was to return to

its combat base area the following morning while BLT

2/7 was to stay in place, receive reinforcements, and

then support the 51st ARVN Regiment.7

As scheduled, on the morning of 18 September

Marine helicopters brought in Companies E and G of

BLT 2/7 and took out the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines.

BLT 2/7 advanced southeast below Route 4 toward the

main north-south railroad line. The mission of the

Marine battalion "was to conduct sweeps to find, fix

and destroy the enemy" in the new area of operations.

At the time, "the only certain information ... was that

ARVN forces of the 51 ARVN Regiment. . . were in

contact with a 'large' NVA force" north of the La Tho

River near the railroad. On the evening of the 18th, the

BLT established defensive positions just west of the

railroad berm.8

The following morning, the BLT reached the railroad near its intersection with Route 4 and prepared

for resupply. Company F sent a security element into

a treeline 250 meters east of the railroad. When the

Marines approached to within 15 meters of the heavy
416 THE DEFINING YEA R

band of kunai grass and banana trees, hidden enemy

troops opened fire . As the company mounted an

attack, North Vietnamese troops in bunkers, holes,

and trenches pounded the advancing Marines wit h

heavy, grazing fire . Enemy rifles, machine guns, mortars, RPGs, and snipers positioned on the flanks ,

where the treeline extended in a crescent, inflicted 42

casualties on Company F in the initial moments of

the battle including the company commander. Lieutenant Colonel Watson threw Companies G and H

into the fight on either flank and Company E, previously in reserve, surged forward to replace the bloodied Company E9

The heavy growth in the treeline compounded th e

Marines' problems in estimating the enemy's strength. While initial reports showed a North Vietnamese platoon in the treeline, the estimate later grew to two

companies. To make matters worse, constant overflights by RVNAF aircraft supporting a nearby ARVN

unit hampered the Marines' efforts to bring artiller y

fire on the enemy. For safety reasons, the Marines were

compelled to "check fire" the artillery during these

unannounced overflights.

Companies G and H pressed hard against the

enemy's flanks, but more and more Marines fell unde r

the ferocious hail of fire coming from the NVA position . Late in the afternoon, the 7th Marines directed

the helilift of two companies of the 3d Battalion, 7t h

Marines, who established blocking positions along th e

Suoi Co Ca, 1,000 meters to the east. The battle raged,

however, until 1900, when BLT 2/7 broke contact and

withdrew to the railroad berm so that supporting arms

could engage the enemy without endangering friendl y

troops. Casualties totalled 14 Marines dead and 5 4

wounded, as well as 19 non-battle casualties (a category which included accidental injuries, heat casualties,

and the like).' o

On 20 September, BLT 2/7 directed a heavy preparation fire against the treeline, pounding it liberall y

with artillery, mortars, and airstrikes . At first light,

the Marines moved forward in the attack once again ,

this time meeting no resistance . Inside the treeline,

they found a well-developed fortified position and

three dead enemy soldiers of the NVA 2d Battalion,

36th Regiment.' '

Companies G and H continued past the treelin e

toward the 3d Battalion blocking positions near the

Suoi Co Ca. By 0800, Company G was engaged with a

large enemy force, which it believed to include a battalion command post, in the hamlet of Nong Son (2),

about 600 meters from the river. Company G disengaged with 5 Marines dead and 19 wounded, the n

called for air and artillery support, while Company H

attacked the enemy's right flank against strong resis -

A Navy corpsman serving with BLT 2/7 south of Da Nang rushes forward toward the smoke cove r

to take care of a wounded Marine. Strands of a barbed wire fence can be seen behind him.

Photo is from the Abel Collection
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 41 7

Photo is from the Abel Collection

PFC R. R. Kransiewski, right, adjusts the antenna of

radioman LCpI A . J. Terry, who is talking on the radio during a routine sweep south of Da Nang by Company L, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Other Marines of the company can be seen

advancing in the background.

tance . At 0900, while the battle raged, Lieutenan t

Colonel Charles F Bunnell, Jr., replaced Lieutenan t

Colonel Watson as Commanding Officer, BLT 2/7 .

In the early afternoon, ARVN units to the nort h

began pushing the enemy southward . BLT 2/7 maintained steady pressure from the west, so that th e

North Vietnamese were forced into the 3d Battalion's blocking position . Airstrikes and artillery fire

tore into the trapped enemy. At 1600, with the

North Vietnamese still resisting strongly, aircraft

unloaded 500-pound bombs and napalm on them,

prompting enemy troops to begin fleeing in groups

of 20 to 30 . Aircraft and artillery continued to bombard the area, but a North Vietnamese flag still flew

over an enemy bunker.

Companies G and H moved forward in the assault ,

soon hitting antipersonnel mines and boobytraps .

Despite the heavy bombing, the remaining Nort h

Vietnamese maintained heavy and accurate fire fro m

their fortifications. At dusk, the Marines dug in, har d

by the North Vietnamese bunkers . Late that night,

Marines reported a strong odor of marijuana driftin g

from the enemy 's positions.

At dawn on the 21st, the Marines attacked once

more, and quickly captured the objective . They found

the area so liberally seeded with mines and boobytrap s

that, after three Marines suffered wounds, both companies withdrew and called an airstrike against th e

area in hopes of detonating the devices . Returning

once again, they found the usual assortment of

bunkers, trenches, and fighting holes, food, equipment, and documents. Three prisoners indicated that

the area was the command post of the NVA 36th Regiment and the main position of that organization 's 2d

Battalion. The Marines reported 69 enemy dead, and

the prisoners admitted that their battalion had lost 8 0

dead and 60 wounded in the previous day's fight at th e

treeline . Their battalion's assistant commander was

killed in the action .1 2

After another day of sweeping the area, BLT 2/7

returned to the Dai La Pass sector west of Hill 327 an d

assumed a division reserve mission . The 3d Battalion

remained south of Hill 55, searching for the enemy ,

but the destruction of the 2d Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment brought at least temporary calm to that part of

the province .1 3

As often happened, however, a hard-fought victory in one part of the province had no effect on enem y

activity elsewhere . Shortly after midnight on 21 September, three explosions rocked the Esso gasoline

depot at the northern end of Da Nang Bay . With two

large fuel storage tanks ablaze, sentries fired on a ma n

who entered the water immediately after the attack ,

but the man apparently escaped . Later, Marines found

a ladder, satchel charges, blasting caps, and a lengt h

of fuze in and around the compound .1 4

The following night, Communist rocket units

attacked Marble Mountain Air Facility, damaging 4 5

helicopters. Other rockets struck Da Nang Airbase ,

Force Logistic Command, the NSA Hospital, and I

Corps headquarters. At the same time, enemy force s

launched company-sized ground attacks on Hoi An,
418 THE DEFINING YEAR

Dien Ban, and several Combined Action Platoons.

One of these attacks, carried out against the Vinh

Dien Bridge, one kilometer north of Dien Ban, temporarily closed Highway 1.

On 29 September, south of the Thu Bon River

near Liberty Bridge in the Go Noi Island sector,

elements of the 5th Marines engaged a large enemy

force in the village of Cu Ban, a notorious Communist hideout and scene of many firefights. In a twoday battle, the Marines surrounded and pressed

hard against the North Vietnamese. Late on the

30th, Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines

assaulted the village and overwhelmed the defenders, reporting 57 enemy dead and 3 prisoners.

Seven Marines died and 12 suffered wounds in the

fight. Further to the west at the end of the month,

NVA regular forces threatened the Special Forces

Camp at Thuong Duc, resulting in a III MAF

multi-battalion operation."

Operation Maui Peak

The Special Forces camp at Thuong Duc was nestled in a valley at the confluence of the Song Vu Gia

and the Song Con, where "Green Berets" trained

and advised CIDG troops recruited from the local

villages. By controlling these two river valleys, the

Special Forces soldiers and their CIDG counterparts

forced the enemy to move troops and supplies

bound for the Da Nang area along far more difficult

routes through the mountainous jungle. Additionally, they denied the enemy access to the source of

food and recruits located in the populated areas

along the rivers.

Near the end of September, the Communists were

ready to strike. III MAF intelligence officers identified

elements of two NVA infantry regiments surrounding

the camp: the 21st from the 2dNVA Division and a new

14 1st Regiment. The 368B Rocket Regiment was in support. In a pre-dawn attack on 28 September, the enemy

overran and occupied two of the camp's outposts, seriously threatening the main compound. With bad

weather hampering normal close air support operations, a Marine Tactical Air Control Party flew into

Thuong Duc in the late afternoon. Using a radar beacon, the forward air controller directed 18 sorties of

Grumman A—6A Intruder all-weather attack aircraft

against the enemy force. By the afternoon of the 29th,

the enemy troops occupying the two outposts with-
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 41 9

drew, their position rendered untenable by the A–6A

Intruders of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing .1 6 *

With Thuong Duc temporarily safe, but still surrounded, General Youngdale moved to lift the siege ,

assigning Colonel Beckington's 7th Marines the task .

For Operation Maui Peak, Youngdale gave Beckington control of the 7th Marines' own 3d Battalion and

BLT 2/7 (still the SLF battalion, but temporaril y

under the operational control of the 7th Marines), and

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines. General Cush -

man placed one brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division on six-hour standby to reinforce, and General

Lam assigned four ARVN battalions to operate i n

coordination with the Marines.17* *

On 1 October, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was

conducting operations along the southern bank of th e

Thu Bon River in the An Hoa sector and Company G

*About mid-July, III MAF intelligence officers reported that captured enemy documents indicated that a new regiment, the 141st NVA

Regiment, 312th NVA Division, was operating in Quang Nam Province.

The first prisoner from the regiment was captured on 5 September, an d

stated that the regiment had been activated in North Vietnam in 1966 .

It left North Vietnam in January 1968 and arrived in western Quan g

Nam about the end of May. In mid-September, the 21st NVA Regiment, 2d

NVA Division had moved up from Quang Tin Province into souther n

Quang Nam. According to a Marine intelligence analysis of 15 September, three North Vietnamese Regiments, the 31st, 21st, and 141st, were

in position to pose a threat to Thuong Duc . In the attacks on the Specia l

Forces Camp on 28—29 September, the allies captured prisoners from bot h

the 21st and the 141st . See : III MAF PerintRep No . 30—68, dtd 28Ju168 ,

p. A-44, in III MAF PerintReps, 14Jul—31Aug68 ; III MAF PerintRpts,

No . 37—68, dcd 15Sep68, pp . 4 and B—3, and No. 40-68, dtd 8Occ68 ,

p. B—3, in III MAF PerIntReps, lSep-120cc68 . Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L . Bartlett, who as a captain in September 1968 assumed command of

the 13th Interrogation and Translation Team assigned to the 5th Marines ,

remembered that when he arrived at An Hoa, he " immediately formed

sub-teams of one officer, one NCO, and one ARVN each and sent the m

to the bush with the three infantry battalions of the 5th Marines ." Bartlett

recalled that the 5th Marines in September captured a North Vietnames e

private whose interrogation revealed that he was from the 141st NVA Regiment, but that intelligence officers from the 1st Marine Division refuse d

to accept that he was from that regiment . Lieutenant Colonel Bartlett

faulted the Marine intelligence system in the 1st Marine Division for

"failure to get the word down co the subordinate units, reluctance to

believe anything unless it was supported by 'usually reliable sources'

(intercepts by radio battalion or counter-intelligence agent report), an d

unwillingness to change an opinion or assessment once it was determined ." LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, Comments on draft, dtd 8Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bartlett Comments.

**There is also some confusion about the allied supporting forces .

Although some sources indicate that the only ARVN units participating were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 51st Regiment, others note tha t

two ARVN Ranger battalions were in reserve. Also, where 1st MarDi v

FragO 405—68 specifies a brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division o n

standby, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68, p. 21 claims that it was a brigade

of the 101st Airborne Division .

had engaged a small enemy force near the river edge .

Lieutenant Colonel James W. Stemple later relate d

that in the middle of this firefight he received orders

from the 5th Marines that he was being attached to

the 7th Marines for a new operation and that h e

should prepare his battalion for immediate helicopter

movement to Hill 65, about 15 kilometers east o f

Thuong Duc . Immediately detaching from the

engagement, the battalion consisting of Companies E

and G, and Company A from the 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines, arrived at Hill 65 about 1300 . At that point,

Stemple remembered he was told to report to Colone l

Beckington at the 7th Marines command post on Hill

55 . After some delay to obtain a jeep, he arrived i n

time to attend the 7th Marines briefing for the operation. Stemple later observed that he was not too

inspired when one of the briefing officers remarked, "I

don't know how we are going to support this operation; I guess we'll play it by ear. "18

According to Stemple, the concept of operations

called for his battalion to secure not only Hill 65, but als o

Hill 52, only six kilometers from Thuong Duc, befor e

nightfall. Upon his return to Hill 65 and maintaining an

outpost there, the battalion moved out in a column o f

companies following Route 4 . With an attached engineer

platoon from the 1st Engineer Battalion assisting in th e

detecting and clearing of antipersonnel, antivehicle, an d

antitank mines, the battalion arrived at Hill 52 abou t

1630 . In taking the hill, the Marines captured one pris -

oner from the 141st NVA Regiment.1 9

While the battalion gained a measure of contro l

over Route 4, which was the only road available for

ground resupply, Lieutenant Colonel Stemple vaguel y

recalled that an enemy road mine accounted for at leas t

one Marine vehicle . During the next four days, artillery

units of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines and Army

175mm guns of the 4th Battalion, 8th Field Artiller y

took up firing positions at Hills 65 and 52 . The 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines moved into the area betwee n

the two hills, guarding the road and freeing the 2 d

Battalion, 5th Marines to direct its efforts westward ,

toward the enemy.

On the morning of 6 October, attack aircraft an d

B–52s began bombarding landing zones in the hills

surrounding Thuong Duc .*** At the same time, the 2d

***Colonel Stemple remembered that several bombs from one of

the B-52s, " fell short of their objective with two bombs landing in th e

E/2/5 area to the rear of Hill 52 . " Fortunately there were no Marine

casualties and the rest of the errant bombs fell harmlessly into the river.

Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n .d . [19951 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Stemple Comments.
In this contemporary painting by Marine combat artist Mai Albert M. "Make" Leahy, the artis t

depicts a Marine Douglas A—4E Skyhawk in a close air support mission during Operation Mau i

Peak about to bomb and rocket enemy positions on a ridgeline near LZ Sparrow . Thuong Duc can b e

seen in the background.

Battalion, 5th Marines stepped off in the attack west- and surrounding area. If the fires had hurt the Nort h

ward along Route 4 toward the Special Forces camp. Vietnamese units in the vicinity, the enemy commanThis was to be a feint to distract the enemy from the der apparently made good use of the three-hour brea k

landing of the helicopter-borne elements. Soon after between the end of the preparation and the landing of

crossing the line of departure, however, the Marines the helicopters. As the first wave of aircraft touched

became decisively engaged with the NVA 1st Battalion, down in the landing zone, a hail of heavy machine gu n

141st Regiment, and Colonel Beckington canceled the fire filled the air. Unable to complete the missio n

plan for a feint and ordered the 2d Battalion to clear the against such stiff resistance, the helicopters turne d

enemy from the battlefield .20 away, carrying the 3d Battalion back to An Hoa .2 1

While the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines mounted the At 1100, BLT 2/7 and two ARVN battalions landhills overlooking Route 4 and came to grips with the ed unopposed in LZ Vulture and LZ Hawk, seven kilo -

enemy, other units joined the operation. At 1030, 1st meters northwest of Thuong Duc . While the rest of th e

Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters, carrying the 3d Bat- battalion remained at the LZ with Battery W, 3d Bat -

talion, 5th Marines, swooped down into LZ Sparrow, talion, 11th Marines, Companies E and G, 7th Marine s

four kilometers south of Thuong Duc . The preparation struck out for the high ground overlooking Thuon g

fires had ended at 0730, after severely pounding the LZ Duc from the north. The terrain was extremely chal-
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 42 1

lenging. At times, the Marines needed lifelines t o

negotiate steep hills covered by a thick jungle canopy

and dense undergrowth.2 2

Back on Route 4, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines wa s

still involved in a heated battle against North Vietnamese units in the hills overlooking the road . At one

point, where the road passed along a very narrow gap

between the river and a large, steep hill, the enemy put

up a spirited defense, beating back the Marines' firs t

two assaults. After a third pounding by supporting

arms, the battalion attacked and captured the hill ,

gaining control of the vital pass.2 3

In the late afternoon, Colonel Beckington ordered

the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, already "shot out" o f

one LZ that day, to mount a helicopter-borne assaul t

into LZ Kiwi, nine kilometers northeast of LZ Sparrow .

Accordingly, the battalion landed at 1740, the n

marched a kilometer north and established a defensive

position on a hilltop overlooking the southern bank of

the Song Vu Gia . With the exception of an assault by

two squads of North Vietnamese against the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, the night passed quietly.24

On 7 October, the 7th Marines began to close the

circle around Thuong Duc . To the west, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines attacked along the valley of the Son g

Con and along the ridges overlooking it. It did not

make contact with the enemy, but lost one Marine to

heat stroke in the torturous terrain . Likewise, southeast

of Thuong Duc, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines move d

southwest into the rugged mountains, suffering eight

casualties from a combination of heat and falls from th e

steep slopes. 25

General Youngdale assigned the 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines to the operation, and Colonel Beckington

ordered it to attempt another helicopter-borne assault

into LZ Sparrow. Since the aborted assault of the previous day, attack aircraft had thoroughly blasted th e

area around the LZ with 750-pound bombs and FuelAir Explosive (FAE)* bombs, but this, apparently,

"did not faze the defenses." As the helicopters onc e

again descended into LZ Sparrow at 0910, Communist antiaircraft gunners once more opened up with

an overwhelming fire, turning away the assault for

the second time.2 6

The main action of 7 October occurred along Rout e

4 where the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ran into stron g

enemy opposition. Company A, 5th Marines, under

*An aircraft-delivered canister which releases an explosive aerosol

vapor over an area, then ignites the vapor, creating blast overpressure

which causes casualties and explodes mines .

the control of the 2d Battalion, engaged tw o

entrenched North Vietnamese platoons on a steep hil l

adjacent to the highway, only 200 meters west of the

hill the battalion had seized the previous day. Even

after aircraft and artillery fire pounded the objective ,

the North Vietnamese still resisted fiercely. Company

A fell back with 12 wounded and occupied the same

position as it had the previous night . According t o

Marine sources, the enemy lost 42 dead in the fight.27

After another full day of preparation fires, Company E, 5th Marines, supported by four M48 tanks,

attacked the hill late in the afternoon of 8 October ,

finally capturing it just before dusk after a brisk fight

in which one Marine died and nine others suffere d

wounds. On the hill, the Marines reported 37 dead

North Vietnamese .2 8

Elsewhere in the operation, the 2d Battalion, 7t h

Marines continued its slow advance along the stee p

ridge west of Thuong Duc which separated the Song

Vu Gia from the Song Con. The 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines moved ever deeper into the mountains sout h

of the Special Forces camp, struggling against heat an d

rough terrain which combined to result, on 8—9 October, in 40 nonbattle casualties, some fatal .29* *

The North Vietnamese reserved their main effort

against the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines in the fight for

control of Route 4 . At 0400, 12 October, 82mm mortar fire began falling on Company E . Following a

preparation of about 40 rounds, an NVA compan y

struck the Marines. As the North Vietnamese infantry

attacked, the mortar fire continued, but shifted to

Company G, which was to the rear of Company E .

Using a heavy volume of small arms and RPG fire, the

enemy closed to within grenade-throwing range . Company E held fast, calling for fire support, which

involved more than 1,000 rounds of artillery (including 8-inch howitzers) and mortar fire, attack aircraft ,

and AC—47 gunships. The Marines reported killing 4 6

North Vietnamese and capturing 1 in the fight . Lieutenant Colonel Stemple, the battalion commander,

commented "this was a particularly vicious attack

against 'E' Company that almost succeeded ." He cred-

**The largest number of non-battle casualties involved Marine

helicopters. In addition to the casualties on the 8th and 9th, on 1 1

October, a resupply helicopter from HMM—265, "carrying replacements and supplies . . . was struck from below by a H—34D helo (from

HMM 362] that had just taken off." According to Colonel Stemple ,

who witnessed the accident, "both helicopters exploded in flames a fe w

hundred feet over the river [Song Vu Gia] and crashed . " There were n o

survivors. Stemple Comments. See also MAG—16 ComdC, Oct68 ;

HMM—265 ComdC, Oct68 ; and HMM—362 ComdC, Oct68 .
422 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

Troops from the 5th Marines cross a small stream in Operation Maui Peak. The second Marine in the

water is carrying a 3 .5-inch rocket launcher and a following Marine carries a rocket round for the

weapon in addition to his rifle.

ited the close air support "very instrumental in turnin g

the tide of battle . . . . " Friendly casualties totalled 8

dead and 20 wounded .30

During the next few days, enemy contact diminished. BLT 2/7 finished its sweep of the high groun d

and moved into the valley, nearer the Special Forces

camp. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines maintained its

position and conducted patrols . South of the Song Vu

Gia, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines continued to struggle through the heavily forested and treacherous slopes,

finally capturing LZ Sparrow on 14 October with th e

only enemy resistance being desultory mortar fire .

Later that day, Company F of BLT 2/7 entered th e

Thuong Duc Special Forces camp, officially lifting the

so-called "siege . " 31 "

*Lieutenant Colonel Ronald R . Welpott, who as a captain commanded Company F during the operation, recalled that his compan y

was the only one to enter the camp " as the size of the camp and heavy

rains made it more suitable for the rest of the battalion to remain i n

the hills above the camp to the northwest ." Lieutenant Colone l

Ronald R. Welpott, Comments on draft, dtd 19Mar95 (Vietnam

Comment File).

In mid-October, Tropical Storm Elaine struc k

Quang Nam, dramatically curtailing operations.** I n

the seven days ending on 18 October, 39 inches of rai n

fell around Thuong Duc, with as much as 13 inche s

falling in a single day. Swollen rivers washed awa y

many bridges and left others under six feet of water.

Air operations slowed to a near halt and many units,

particularly those in the hills, suffered a lack of critical supplies. The Special Forces unit at Thuong Duc

supplied some food to the Marines to see the m

through the crisis. Eventually, the rain washed ou t

Route 4 between Hills 52 and 65, then Route 540, to

the east, over which convoys carried supplies to Hill

65 for distribution to the forces participating in Operation Maui Peak .32

**General E . E. Anderson, the III MAP Chief of Staff, observed at

the time in personal letters that the storm had brought both U .S . an d

enemy operations "to a standstill," and that for "several days we needed wading boots and rain suits." BGen E .E . Anderson, Itrs to MajGen

McCutcheon, dtd 17Oct68 and LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 250ct68 ,

Encl to Gen E.E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 423

On 17 October, with the mission accomplished, th e

rain seriously hampering offensive operations, and the

enemy relatively quiet, Colonel Beckington ordered al l

units to prepare to withdraw. By 19 October, only the

3d Battalion, 7th Marines remained, and Operatio n

Maui Peak officially came to a close .33 *

The End of Mameluke Thrust

and Renewed Attacks on Da Nang

Operation Mameluke Thrust** ended on 23 October, after five months, with the participating units

reporting 2,730 enemy killed, 47 prisoners, and 8 ralliers. As the 5th Marines closed Mameluke Thrust, it

opened Operation Henderson Hill in the same AO .

The net result of this was a continuation of the sam e

operation, in the same area, under a new operational

codename. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple remembered

that the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines had returned to th e

An Hoa sector after Maui Peak, and on the 23d, hi s

battalion command group and two of his companies

were patrolling the area east of Liberty Road, when he

received word to disengage. The Marines boarded

trucks and returned to An Hoa where Stemple was

met by Major General Youngdale and several members of the 1st Marine Division staff. According to

Stemple, the division commander told him that a new

NVA regiment, the 90th, was suspected of having

moved into the Arizona Territory and that there had

been numerous sightings of enemy troops in the area .

After a quick aerial reconnaissance, Stemple and the

MAG—16 helicopter coordinator selected a primary

and secondary landing zone . While enemy small arm s

fire prevented the landing in the primary zone, th e

Marine battalion reached its assigned objectives in th e

Arizona before nightfall, but no indication of the

reported large numbers of North Vietnamese troops.

In a series of sweeps as part of Henderson Hill during

the next few days, both the 2d and 3d Battalions of the

5th Marines developed little enemy contact, but captured a 24-page document describing the enemy's

proposed "Winter-Spring 1968—69 Campaign ." The

*Colonel Stemple, the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion ,

5th Marines, believed it was obvious that the North Vietnamese were

" not investing too much in Thoung Duc except using it as ' bait' t o

invite a III MAF response along Route 4 where they could select an d

prepare positions from which they could attack the U .S . reactio n

force . " While stating that " 2/5 beat its head out against the 141st (wel l

dug-in)," Stemple understood that lacer reports indicated that the

NVA regiment " took such a beating that . . . [it) never recovered . "

Stemple Comments.

**See Chapters 17 and 19.

operation then continued in the An Hoa and Go No i

Island sectors into November.34

October ended as the first month since Decembe r

1967 during which the enemy launched no rocke t

attacks . NVA commissars and VC cadres, though, dra -

matically stepped up their political proselytizing . They

visited hamlets, ostensibly to "train" the populace fo r

upcoming elections which were supposed to result i n

the formation of "People's Revolutionary Committees." Enemy propagandists distributed leaflets and

used loudspeakers to appeal to ARVN troops to desert.

In the village of Nui Dat Son, which was adjacent to

the large Marine base at Hill 55, the villagers conducted an antiwar demonstration calling for an end to U .S .

bombing of villages. South Vietnamese National

Police arrested 71 of the demonstrators, 60 of who m

they later released . Intelligence reports filtering in to

III MAF indicated that the Communists planned a

nationwide demonstration during November, in

which "the people" would demand the neutralizatio n

of central Vietnam .35

On Halloween night, President Johnson announced

from Washington that, effective 0800, 1 November

(2100, Saigon time), the U .S . would halt all bombing

of North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese, who had

stridently insisted on an unconditional bombing halt ,

had finally accepted a compromise agreement which

allowed the inclusion of the South Vietnamese and Vie t

Cong in the Paris peace negotiations . The only military

conditions imposed were an end to North Vietnames e

violations of the DMZ, and an end to their attacks o n

cities and towns in South Vietnam . The President's

announcement had no noticeable effect on the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing's "out-of-country" sortie rate .

The missions previously flown over North Vietna m

were transferred to Laos .3 6** *

Again, the Communists stepped up political and

propaganda activity in the villages of ICTZ . Commissars hailed the bombing halt as a great Communist victory. They conducted further controlled elections of so-called "Liberation Committees" ,

proclaiming that "a coalition government for Sout h

Vietnam is near at hand ."3 7

Meanwhile, the war went on . In Operation Henderson Hill, the 5th Marines surrounded and attacked

the NVA 1st Battalion, 36th Regiment at the familia r

battlefield of Chau Phong, site of so many earlie r

engagements. Uncharacteristically, the enemy did no t

defend, but rather, attempted to escape, the NVA

***See also Chapters 20 and 24 .
424 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A 37182 7

Marine engineers probe for more rockets as they explore an enemy rocket site . On a mud ramp ready

to fire are three NVA 140mm rockets.

troops donning disguises, hiding their weapons, and

attempting to slip through Marine lines in the dark .38

On 16 November, the enemy went on the offensiv e

around Da Nang, conducting ground attacks and firing 122mm rockets at Da Nang Airbase and the port ,

one of which scored a direct hit on the deep-water pier,

killing 2 people and wounding 16 others. Within the

city, several small firefights erupted, in which Fre e

World security units captured seven prisoners claiming

to belong to the Q.91 Special Action Sapper Unit. North

of the city, near the Song Cu De, North Vietnamese

forces overran and annihilated a seven-man ambus h

team from the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. The dead

Marines all suffered bullet wounds to the head inflicted at close range, in execution fashion. At the opposit e

end of the Da Nang TAOR, at the Vinh Dien Bridg e

north of Dien Ban, elements of the NVA 36th Regiment

attacked ARVN bridge security units and a Combined

Action platoon. In heavy fighting that lasted throug h

the following day, the Marine command reported 30 5

North Vietnamese dead.39

The enemy offensive around Da Nang continued

for several days. In an indirect fire attack during the

night of the 19th, 13 rockets fell on the Force Logistic Command, and another 12 struck the city. At Marble Mountain Air Facility, mortar fire wounded 7 men

and damaged 13 helicopters. Mortar fire also struck

the NSA Hospital. On the morning of the 21st, 1 0

rockets hit the 1st Marine Division command post,

killing 2 American soldiers and destroying a helicopter and 2 jeeps. 4°

During the night of the 21st, an enemy battalion

attacked An Hoa . Supported by fire from 82mm an d

60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, and B -440 rockets, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops advance d

against the base's eastern perimeter. When the attac k

began at 2200, Marine tank and artillery crews on the

perimeter began direct fire against the advancin g

enemy, using "Beehive" antipersonnel ammunition . *

Amphibian tractors arrived and added the weight o f

their machine guns to the battle.

CAP 2-9-1, positioned in the hamlet of Ma u

Chanh (2), about a kilometer east of the base, lay i n

the path of the attack . The CAP Marines and thei r

PF counterparts took the enemy flanks and rea r

under fire, calling for air and artillery support . At

2330, the Communist troops fell on CAP 2-9-1 .

AC—47 gunships held back the enemy while a platoon of Marines mounted in amphibian tractors ,

with tanks and helicopter gunships escorting ,

attacked east from An Hoa to reinforce the hamlet

and bring an ammunition resupply.

The battle raged for five hours, during which the

Marines threw back four waves of attacking NVA and

VC. At 0330 the shooting died down . Despite the

*Each "Beehive" projectile contains thousands of tiny darts, calle d

flechettes, which are expelled and thrown forward at high velocity,

spreading in a deadly pattern .
MEADE RIVER AO

20 NOVEMBER-9 DECEMBER 1968

0 1000

KILOMETERS I I j

• . :

:1

-t1

W Iji 1.4 131

COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 425

heavy fighting, friendly casualties numbered only three

Marines and a PF with minor wounds. Marine sources

listed 21 dead Viet Cong in the area.41

The enemy offensive reached a crescendo on the

night of 24—25 November. Communist rocket and

mortar fire fell on Da Nang Airbase, Marble Mountain

Air Facility, the 5th Special Forces Group compound

in east Da Nang, and Hoi An. Enemy company-sized

units carried out ground assaults against Dien Ban,

Liberty Bridge, and three bridges spanning the Song

Cau Lau and the Song Vinh Dien along Highway 1.

U.S. Marines, Korean Marines, and South Vietnamese

soldiers fought off the enemy attacks, and 25 November dawned with all of the enemy's objectives still in

friendly hands 42

The attacks of 24—25 November were the last

gasp of the Communist November offensive. Fifteen

kilometers south of Da Nang, in the infamous

Dodge City Area, the 1st Marine Division had begun

an offensive of its own, the largest "County Fair"

operation conducted up to that time: Operation

Meade River.

Operation Meade River

On 1 November, the Government of Vietnam

announced the start of a country-wide "Accelerated

Pacification Campaign," named "Le Loi" in Vietnamese. Scheduled to last three months, the campaign's objective was to extend the legitimate government's influence into many hamlets still afflicted by

the three major Communist offensives launched during 1968. Of the 1,000 hamlets targeted for the campaign throughout the country, 141 were in ICTZ.43*

The 1st Marine Division planned Operation Meade

River to support the Le Loi campaign. It was to be a

cordon and search operation under the 1st Marines,

*For additional coverage of the Le Lid Campaign, see Chapter 29.

The three enemy offenses were Tet, the May Offensive, and the Third

Offensive in August.
426 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo is from the Col Robert G. Lauffer, USMC (Ret), Collectio n

In an aerial view of the 36-square-mile "Dodge City" area south of Da Nang, the Ky Lam River, the

southern boundary of the sector, is at the top.

like many which had been conducted previously, but

on a much grander scale . Rather than surround an d

search single hamlets or villages, the division planne d

a cordon around 36 square kilometers in the Dodge

City area, south of Da Nang.

Like Go Noi island to the south, Dodge City was

heavily infested with Communists. At the center of the

fertile Da Nang-Hoi An-Dai Loc Triangle, the area's

terrain was almost completely flat, reaching only fou r

to five meters above sea level . Many hamlets dotted the

countryside, homes to the farming families who tended the vast tracts of rice paddies. Waterways of various

sizes crossed Dodge City, as did the National Railroa d

and Route 4. The characteristics of the area gave it special potential as a source of food and recruits for th e

enemy. Its proximity to Da Nang, Hoi An, and the

Dien Ban District headquarters gave it tactical significance as a possible enemy staging area for attacks on

those key locations 44

Colonel Lauffer, the commander of the 1st Marines ,

recalled that the Korean Brigade had the tactical

responsibility for the area, but had failed to keep th e

Communist forces out . Since its arrival at Da Nang ,

the 1st Marines TAOR included the area to the nort h

of Dodge City, but in almost self-defense, the regiment

had conducted several small-scale operations "to familiarize units with the situation and to gain additional

intelligence." According to Lauffer, "we were full y

apprised of the fluid and rapidly changing situatio n

concerning enemy troop strength in the Dodge City

area ." For Operation Meade River, Marine intelligenc e

officers estimated that enemy forces in Dodge Cit y

numbered between 100 and 150 Viet Cong infrastructure personnel and could include up to 900 NVA o r

VC regular forces. The only identified units in the sector, however, were two VC companies, the R—20 VC

Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment,

totalling an estimated 630 enemy troops 43
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 427

Photo is from the Col Robert G. Lauffer, USMC (Ret), Collectio n

Col Robert G . Lauffer, the commander of the 1st Marines i n

Operaton Meade River, is accompanied in the field by 1stL t

Francis B. Ahearn, the S-2, or intelligence officer, of the 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines.

Early on the morning of 20 November, seve n

Marine battalions, under the control of the 1st

Marines, began moving into prearranged positions to

form a ring around part of Dodge City.* Using 72 aircraft, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in one of its larges t

helicopter operations lifted four battalions (one of them

from amphibious shipping lying offshore) . Trucks

moved another battalion, and two battalions marche d

in. By 0825, Dodge City lay within the 1st Marines'

cordon . Colonel Lauffer observed that a helicopter was

available to him throughout Meade River and that

"concerned commanders were given numerous airborne views to enhance our tactical decisions . "4 6

In the initial hours of the operation, the Marines

encountered light resistance . The Communist forces

*Colonel Lauffer commented that he actually had operational control of nine infantry battalions. While seven participated in Operatio n

Meade River, he kept two battalions in his regular area of operations ,

" particularly concentrating on the rocket and mortar belts . " Because o f

the large size of his TAOR, he normally had four battalions under hi s

control . Col Robert G . Lauffer, Comments on draft, dcd 29Nov9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Lauffer Comments .

shot down two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters

and damaged several others during the assault . On the

ground, they used a command-detonated mine t o

destroy a truck, killing 1 Marine and wounding 2 3

Marines and 2 ARVN soldiers 47* *

Along the Song La Tho, where the 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines manned the northern edge of the cordon, helicopters lifted in two towers. In the flat terrain, these

towers provided improved observation for Marine s

controlling artillery fire and airstrikes. Snipers als o

manned the towers and engaged enemy troops i n

Dodge City. Clockwise around the cordon from the 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines were: BLT 2/26; the 2d and 3d

Battalions, 5th Marines; the 3d Battalion, 26th

Marines; BLT 2/7 ; and finally, the 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines. 4 8

Just before noon, Lieutenant Colonel Neil A . Nelson's BLT 2/7 began the next phase of the operation b y

attacking from its position on the western side of the

cordon toward the railroad berm . By 1600, Company

H secured the southern end of the battalion 's objective ,

after only minor contact with the enemy. At 1630,

however, the battalion ran headlong into a stron g

Communist defensive complex located at a large bend

in a stream which Marines called the "Horseshoe . "

Company G, attacking in the center of the BLT 2/7

zone of action, made heavy contact with what prove d

to be North Vietnamese regulars. Under fierce fire

from mutually supporting bunkers, Company G with -

drew one kilometer, leaving behind six Marines,

believed dead.49

When darkness fell over Dodge City, artillery and

aircraft units illuminated the area with flares . Psychological operations (PsyOps) team used powerful loud -

speakers to advise civilians of the cordon and to direc t

them to central collection points for the questionin g

which was intended to winnow out the Communist s

among them. BLT 2/7 licked its wounds and prepare d

to resume the assault on the Horseshoe .so

Colonel Lauffer decided to reinforce BLT 2/7 for th e

attack. He ordered Company D, 1st Battalion, 1s t

Marines and Company L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marine s

to report to Lieutenant Colonel Nelson for duty. Nel-

**According to Colonel Lauffer, the mine knocking our the truc k

could have been even more devastating : " Highway 1, in many areas

was rimmed on either side with rice paddies or low wet areas. A

breech in the road could have been catastrophic . " To prevent such a

breech, the Marines had " strategically prepositioned dump truck s

loaded with gravel and marsten matting . " This precaution permitte d

the convoy to continue " to join those in front of the explosion wit h

little delay." Lauffer Comments.
428 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

Infantrymen from the 5th Marines advance through five-foot elephant grass after being dropped int o

a landing zone during Operation Meade River. In one of the largest lifts, Marine helicopters brought

four Marine battalions into the cordon operation .

son placed all four of his own companies on line for th e

assault, then used Company L as his new reserve . He

ordered Company D to move south and to sweep the

northern flank of Company F, which was on the battalion left.5 1

Nelson scheduled a preparation fire to begin on the

Horseshoe at 0630 . The fire support units found it difficult to coordinate their fires because of the proximity

of friendly units to one another, and the almost circular shape of the cordon, which required extraordinary

care to deliver fires safely. Thus, the preparation was

delayed until 0920 .

The enemy reacted violently, even before th e

infantry attack began . As Company G moved int o

positions from which it was to provide supporting fire ,

the North Vietnamese went into action . Heavy fire

drove Company G to cover. Company F attempted to

carry out a flank attack from the north to relieve th e

pressure, but, according to Captain Ronald R. Welpott, the company commander, "due to sporadi c

enemy contact, boobytraps, and difficult terrain," i t

could not find a place to ford the stream separating it

from the enemy bunkers.52 Once again, the attac k

bogged down and ground to a halt .5 3

The next day, 22 November, BLT 2/7 launched a

third attack on the Horseshoe . Following essentially

the same plan as the previous day, Company G established a base of fire while Companies D, 1st Marine s

and E, 7th Marines attacked from the north, crossin g

the stream to strike the enemy's right flank . The

North Vietnamese hid in their bunkers during th e

preparation fire, then, when the fire lifted, assumed

mutually supporting fighting positions. They usually

attempted to keep a rice paddy or other natural barrier between them and the Marines, and in this case ,

caught Company E at the stream and poured o n

extremely heavy fire from a range of 100 meters . In 10

minutes, the company lost 7 killed and 23 wounded . With the company commander among the wounded ,

Company E broke contact and withdrew to the nort h

bank of the stream .

Meanwhile, Company D crossed the Song La Tho

and attacked south along the railroad berm, about a

mile east of where the BLT 2/7 attack had stalled . The
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 429

North Vietnamese within the Horseshoe pounded th e

advancing Marines with machine guns, rifles, and

mortars, but Company D advanced to within 30 0

meters of the Communist positions as casualties continued to mount. Enemy fire struck down the radio

operators for the forward air controller and the battalion tactical radio net, greatly compounding communications problems. Finally, with 2 Marines dead and

17 wounded, Company D withdrew to the stream ,

but remained on the south bank, setting up an LZ to

evacuate the wounded . Medevac helicopters arrived ,

only to have the North Vietnamese drive them away

under heavy fire . Only after dark could Company D

begin to medevac its casualties, even then still unde r

heavy fire. Another night fell with the Horseshoe stil l

in enemy hands.

During the morning hours of 23 November, whil e

BLT 2/7 remained in position, still evacuating casualties from the previous day 's action, the 3d Battalion ,

26th Marines advanced from the southwest corner of

the cordon into Dodge City. With its right flank

anchored on the railroad berm, the battalion attacked

across Route 4, moving north . As the battalio n

approached the Horseshoe, the NVA opened fire an d

the Marines took cover. 5 4

BLT 2/7 joined the attack once again . Company G

opened fire on the Communist positions, and Company H, now on the left of the 3d Battalion, 26th

Marines swept northward and overran one group o f

enemy positions. BLT 2/7 recovered the bodies of the

six Company G Marines missing from the initial

attack. To restore the integrity of the cordon, Company H withdrew and linked up with the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines. Although the attack had been partially successful, many enemy positions remained

within the Horseshoe.

In an aerial view of the "Horseshoe" sector of Operation Meade River, looking east, from the bend of

the stream it is easy to see why the area was so named .

Photo is from the Col Robert G. Lauffer, USMC (Ret), Collection
430 THE DEFINING YEA R

Determined to eliminate the enemy bunker complex, Colonel Lauffer reinforced BLT 2/7 still again ,

placing Company K, 3d Battalion, 26th Marine s

under Nelson's control. On the 24th, after a morning

of preparatory fire, Companies H, BLT 2/7 and K ,

26th Marines '.ttacked from the south, in th e

Marines' fifth attempt to eject the North Vietnamese

from the Horseshoe . At 1530, the two companie s

came under extremely heavy fire from enemy troop s

in bunkers and a treeline 100 meters to the front .

Unable to force the position by frontal assault, both

companies tried to drive in an enemy flank, but to no

avail. Colonel Lauffer added yet another unit, Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, to the attack .

Company C moved in from the north, but not in tim e

to help. At 1830, once again frustrated by the

enemy's stiff resistance, the Marines broke contac t

and withdrew with 5 dead and 31 wounded.

On the morning of the 25th, the Marines near th e

Horseshoe pulled back and began pounding the area

Marine Sgt H. D. Vines, a section leader of an 81 mm morta r

section with BLT 2/7, snaps off a shot with his M79 grenade

launcher at an enemy-held treeline during Meade River. A

puff of smoke from the grenade can be seen by the trees.

Photo from the Abel Collection

with artillery . Low clouds over Dodge City preclude d

airstrikes. Following the preparation, BLT 2/7 surged

forward, encountering no resistance. By noon, the

Marines overran the entire Horseshoe and the battalio n

consolidated its position along the railroad berm . A

search of the area revealed bunkers constructed of rein -

forced concrete, railroad ties, and rails, covered with six

feet of earth. Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, the BLT com -

mander, remembered an order "to destroy" the railroad

berm, but "after many tons of explosion being wasted

the destruction was called off."5 5

It was apparent that the enemy forces trapped

within the cordon was somewhat larger than originally anticipated . At the Horseshoe, the Marines had

encountered regular enemy troops, specifically the

3d Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment. While pushed

back, the NVA battalion remained a formidabl e

fighting force . 5 6

Since the beginning of the operation, South Vietnamese troops and police had worked to evacuate

2,600 civilians from Dodge City to interrogation centers. With these civilians out and the Horseshoe finally cleared, Colonel Lauffer launched the next phase o f

the operation. BLT 2/26 and the 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines attacked from the eastern edge of the cordon

toward the Suoi Co Ca to relieve the 51st ARVN Regiment which had earlier established blocking position s

at the river.

Over the next four days, the Marine battalion s

tightened the cordon as they advanced . Using probes

fashioned from metal stock especially for Operatio n

Meade River, the Marines located many caches of

enemy arms and supplies . Enemy troops attempted to

evade at night, but almost continuous flare illumination and Marine ambushes turned them back . When

engaged, the enemy would break contact and flee . Captain James F. Foster, the commander of Company A ,

1st Battalion, 7th Marines, later related that hi s

Marines not only found several enemy caches, but als o

captured "13 North Vietnamese soldiers who all ha d

automatic weapons and a large amount of South Vietnamese Piasters."57

As the cordon grew smaller, fire support coordination problems grew larger. Units in contact with th e

enemy often experienced interruptions in fire support

caused by interference from neighboring units. Worse

still, the close quarters created by seven battalions in a

constantly shrinking area resulted in severe safety

problems and occasional instances of friendly fir e

impacting Marine positions. One unit reported, "continuing problems with friendly artillery fire which
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 43 1

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

South Vietnamese Maj Tran Phouc Xang, a battalion commander with the 51st ARVN Regiment ,

hatless in the left center of the picture, tries to explain to Vietnamese villagers why they have to b e

evacuated from their homes during Operation Meade River .

inflicted casualties, destroyed confidence in the sup -

porting units, and lowered morale ."5 8

On 28 November, Thanksgiving Day, BLT 2/26 and

the 2d Battalion 5th Marines reached the Suoi Co Ca .

On the same day, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines whic h

had been helilifted earlier into the southern Dodge Cit y

area, relieved the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines along

Route 4. The latter battalion was then to attack north

toward a series of phase lines between the railroad berm

and Suoi Co Ca . Lieutenant Colonel John W. P. Robertson, the commander of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines,

remembered that his unit "enjoyed" a Thanksgiving

dinner of turkey loaf and prepared to follow the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines in the attack.59

At midnight on the 28th, Marine artillery began a

heavy and concentrated barrage on the now greatl y

diminished area within the cordon. Following si x

hours of intense artillery fire, PsyOps teams used

loudspeakers in an attempt to convince the enemy t o

surrender or rally. The broadcasts continued for an

hour between 0600 and 0700 on the morning of 2 9

November and painted a grim, but true picture :

Why is your unit still surrounded? Why have your

leaders found no way for you to escape? There is no way

to escape . North, south, east, and west, you are completely surrounded and the circle is getting smaller.

Today, you cannot go a thousand meters in any direction. Tomorrow, will you be killed in your bunker?

Tomorrow, will your legs be blown from your body an d

will you die in a hole in the ground far from your home ?

There is a way to avoid being killed. Many of you r

friends have become Hoi Chanh [miners] ; surrende r

today, or will you be killed tomorrow ?

For awhile, now, the artillery and bombs will stop

falling. Put down your weapons, pick up your wounded

comrades and Chieu Hoi [rally]. Your wounded will

receive medical treatment and you will not be harmed.

You are completely surrounded . You cannot move a

thousand meters in any direction . Will you Chieu Hoi

today or die tomorrow? Chieu Hoi now, while th e

bombs and artillery are stopped for a little while. 60
432 THE DEFINING YEA R

The enemy troops were unimpressed by the broadcasts. As the 1st Marines reported, " they chose to

fight. "6 1

After the broadcasts, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine s

launched its attack. Although the enemy resisted i n

isolated groups, clearing even small fortified positions

was dangerous and difficult . It took the Marine battalion the entire day of 29 November to secure the

first objective, Phase Line Alpha, about 800 to 1,00 0

meters above Route 4 .62

On 30 November, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine s

continued its northward advance, reaching Phas e

Line Bravo, where the area between the railroad berm

and the Suoi Co Ca becomes narrow, constricting

maneuver and further compounding fire support

coordination problems. Still, the blocking forces on

the eastern bank of the river, BLT 2/26 and the 2 d

Battalion 5th Marines ambushed and took under fire

enemy troops attempting to avoid the tightening cordon. Marines called nightly upon Air Force AC—4 7

gunships to add their deadly fires to those of th e

Marines on the ground. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple ,

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines commander, remembered that enemy troops tried to swim the river a t

night to escape to the south.G3

On 1 December, about two kilometers north o f

Route 4 and just above Phase Line Bravo, at a smal l

bend in the Suoi Co Ca which would become know n

as the "Hook," the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines ran

into a strong bunker complex . As the 1st Marine s

reported, "the Hook was not to be taken in a fe w

hours. The enemy fire from well entrenched, reinforced bunkers was devastating ." In the first

encounter, Company L sustained 2 dead and 2 8

wounded . The Marine battalion pulled back and

called for artillery and air support . 64

An aerial view of the bend of the Suoi Co Ca River, called the "Hook" by the Marines, makes it

obvious how the "Hook," like the Horseshow obtained its name .

Photo is from the Col Robert G . Lauffer, USMC (Ret), Collection
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 43 3

The fighting for the Hook would continue for the

next four days. On 2 December, even after heavy ai r

and ground bombardment, the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines failed to make any headway against the Nort h

Vietnamese defenders. That evening the battalion

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harry E . Atkinson,

left one company to isolate the Hook, while the rest o f

the battalion moved north another 1,000 meters to

Phase Line Charlie . On 3 December, the 3d Battalion ,

26th Marines advanced from Route 4 to Phase Lin e

Bravo to continue the attack on the Hook 6 5

Lieutenant Colonel Robertson, the battalion commander, recalled that Colonel Lauffer, the 1st Marines

commander, took him and his battalion operations officer up in a helicopter to make an aerial reconnaissanc e

of the enemy defenses there . According to Robertson ,

he saw a tremendous bunker and trench complex an d

it was obvious that the only stratagem was to enfilade

the area and then make the final assault on the Hoo k

defenses from the rear. With continuing heavy resistance, the Marines again called upon air and artillery,

using 750-pound bombs, napalm, and "danger clos e

supporting arms. " Across the Suoi Co Ca, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines pulled back and dug into the soft

mud, but Lieutenant Colonel Stemple, the battalion

commander, remembered that the exploding bomb s

from across the river covered his Marines with debris .

After the aerial bombardment, an artillery officer,

according to Stemple, suggested and Colonel Lauffe r

approved, " the pin-point destruction of the bunkers

using a single 8-inch artillery piece, controlled by a n

airborne spotter."66

With the supporting destructive fires, Company I

punched its way into the Hook and by nightfall on 4

December, the battalion had maneuvered to the rear

of the bunker complex. After continuing artillery

support and airstrikes through the night, at first

light the next morning, the "field commander and I

Corps Commander both taped broadcasts to entic e

the enemy out . . . ." With only a few takers, the 3 d

Battalion prepared its final assault . After fixed-wing

aircraft gave the defenders a final dousing of napal m

and bombs, the battalion overran the position . The

heavy preparation fires had done the job. Without a

single casualty, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines

seized the objective, where the Marines, according to

differing reports, found 75 to 100 enemy dead an d

pulled out some 5 to 15 prisoners from "partially

destroyed tunnels and bunkers ." G 7

With the securing of the Hook, the 3d Battalion ,

5th Marines started a sweep to the west and Robertson's battalion prepared to take its place on Phase Line

Charlie . At the same time, the changing shape of the

cordon squeezed out the two battalions on the easter n

side of the Suoi Co Ca, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine s

and BLT 2/26 . The latter battalion except for its Company E departed the area of operations and Lieutenan t

Colonel Stemple ordered his 2d Battalion, 5t h

Marines to prepare for helicopter extraction and th e

return to An Hoa . 6 8

Captain Ronald J. Drez' Company H, on the 2d

Battalion's southern flank, waited for the lift . After 15

days of what had been, for them, a very unexciting

operation, the Hotel Company Marines were anxious

to return to the base. They sat eating C–rations and

idling away the time until the helicopters arrived . At

1400, Stemple radioed Drez, ordering him to prepar e

his company, not to return to base, but to conduct a

helicopter-borne assault under the operational contro l

of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines. Even more startling ,

Drez learned that the assault lift was to begin in five

minutes! Lieutenant Colonel Stemple later remembered that he selected Drez ' company since it was closest to the 3d Battalion . He made the turnover just as

the rest of his unit departed the area. 6 9

Drez and his company gunnery sergeant quickl y

put together a plan for what Drez later characterized a s

one of the "shortest tactical airlifts in history. "70 The 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters which lifted the still

surprised Company H Marines from the eastern bank

of the Suoi Co Ca set them down again less than 1,000

meters away. At about the same time, helicopters also

brought in Captain James F. Foster's Company A, 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, which "landed in a `hot' landing zone, dispatched the enemy" and took up positions

west of Company H?'

Lieutenant Colonel Robertson's 3d Battalion, 26th

Marines, now reinforced with two additional companies, lined up with five companies abreast to continu e

the move to Phase Line Charlie . In the meantime ,

Company E, BLT 2/26, which had been under th e

operational control of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine s

remained in "a reconnoitering role" north of the Phas e

Line . On the 6th, while the 3d Battalion, 26th Marine s

reached Phase Line Charlie without incident, Company E encountered strong NVA forces in a bunker complex that the Marines called the "Northern Bunke r

Complex," about 1,000 meters to the north, just below

the La Tho River. The company remained in position

until first light the next morning and then crossed th e

La Tho River and joined the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine s

in blocking positions there .72
434 THE DEFINING YEAR

Photo is from the Col Robert G. Lauffer, USMC (Ret), Collectio n

Aerial view of the Northern Bunker Complex reveals its location just below the La Tho River,

near the top of the picture. This was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting during Meade River.

On the 7th, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marine s

launched its assault into the Northern Bunke r

Complex . Companies I, K, and L, maintaining

their line, swung to the left like a huge door, pivoting on Company H, 5th Marines and formed th e

battalion in a giant inverted "L ." With the railroa d

berm on their left and a three-company blockin g

position on their right, Company A, 7th Marine s

and Drez' Company H launched a frontal attack .

Soon, the Marines ran headlong into stiff enemy

resistance. Company H made contact in a cemeter y

where North Vietnamese troops fighting from tw o

pagodas laid down heavy fire . Much of the ground

was under water, forming a quagmire through

which the Marines were unable to maneuver. On

the left flank, NVA units in a fortified hamle t

opened fire on Company A and casualties began to

mount. Soon, 10 Marines were dead and another 2 3

were wounded . Under the intense fire, the attacking companies recovered their wounded only wit h

great difficulty. Both companies halted, dug in for

the night, and called for preparation fires. After

dark, volunteers moved forward to recover the

dead. Captain Foster, the commander of Compan y

A, recalled that he, six Marines, and a Navy corpsman participated in the recovery of the dead an d

the wounded of his company. According to Foster,

the Navy corpsman continued treating casualties

although wounded himself and was among the last

to be evacuated.73
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 435

Having had a taste of the enemy's tenacious defense ,

the Marines prepared themselves for the coming battle .

Captain Drez remembered that :

We dug in and prepared for what we knew would be a

real hard push the next day. The enemy had shown them -

selves to be there in force, and they also showed that they

were not going to give up easy. The word came down from

battalion that we could expect . . . the 3d Battalion, 36th

NVA Regiment to die fighting. They had shown no inclination to surrender or to become Hoi Chanhs [ralliersl .

They were good, hard North Vietnamese Army troops .74

At 1120 on the 8th, the 3d Battalion, 26t h

Marines attacked to the north with five companies

abreast. The 2d Troop, 4th ARVN Cavalry, whic h

had arrived the previous evening, consisting of 1 2

armored personnel carriers (APCs), reinforced th e

Marine assault . In their path, the Marines reporte d

79 dead North Vietnamese near the site of the previous day's battle . When Company H reached a ric e

paddy a few hundred meters from their startin g

point, Communist troops hidden in a treeline suddenly opened fire, trapping Marines in the paddy.

For 30 minutes, the Marines returned fire individually, then began moving in small groups toward a

large bunker which appeared to be the linchpin o f

the Communist defenses. Just beyond the bunker

and treeline, they could see the Song La Tho, on th e

other side of which the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine s

remained in its blocking position . 7 5

The Marines requested air support. Because of the

proximity of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, the aircraft

had difficulty attacking targets without endangering

friendly troops. In one instance, a napalm bomb

impacted directly on Company H, but miraculously

bounced safely away before detonating . Captain

George B. Meegan, the commander of Company L,

26th Marines in another sector, recalled that a "napalm

strike landed" by his 1st Platoon and that severa l

Marines sustained minor burns?° Neither the airstrike s

nor mortar and 3.5-inch rocket fire overcame the

enemy resistance . When supporting arms failed to silence the enemy

in the bunker facing him, Captain Drez requeste d

Lieutenant Colonel Robertson to provide him with

some of the ARVN APCs. The APCs arrived, armed

with recoilless rifles, and halted in the rice paddy.

According to Drez, however, the ARVN refused t o

help. Instead, Drez had his attached combat engineer,

Private First Class Michael A . Emmons, jerryrig a

satchel charge consisting of C-4, hand grenades, tw o

3 .5-inch rockets, and a five-second fuze . With the

assistance of another Marine, they carried the satchel

charge to the top of the bunker where Drez lit the fuz e

and Emmons flipped the charge through an embrasure .

When the others ran, Emmons momentarily remained

atop the bunker. The explosion tossed him into the air,

but he landed unhurt .* The blast smashed the bunker,

killing all but one of the North Vietnamese inside . The

Marines reported 39 enemy dead and 1 prisoner in th e

vicinity of the bunkers.7 7

The other attacking companies also had their shar e

of fighting. Captain Foster's Company A overran a n

enemy fortified position containing 12 bunkers and

30 covered fighting holes, reporting 47 North Vietnamese dead. Several hours later, Company A

attacked and killed nearly 20 North Vietnamese in a

firefight which ended with 6 Marines dead and 1 2

wounded . Late in the afternoon, Captain Meegan 's

Company L engaged an enemy platoon . In a short,

but fierce encounter, Lima Company accounted fo r

another reported 15 enemy killed, at a cost of 5

Marines dead and 11 wounded .7 8

The combat on 8 December was so intense tha t

some senior Marines said that it was "the fiercest

fighting they had ever seen . "79 That night Staff

Sergeant Karl G. Taylor of Company I led a rescue

effort to relieve the company's lead platoon, cut off

by enemy fire . After his Marines took out several o f

the most severely wounded, Sergeant Taylo r

returned with another four volunteers to reach ye t

another group of seriously wounded men lyin g

near an enemy machine gun position . Finding th e

position too strong, Taylor told his Marines to go

back and then armed with a grenade launche r

charged across the open paddy . Although wounded

several times, Sergeant Taylor silenced the enemy

weapon . The sergeant was posthumously awarde d

the Medal of Honor.8 0

On the morning of 9 December, the enemy stil l

occupied a narrow strip of ground between the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines and the Song La Tho . It would

take another push to finish the job .

After supporting arms, including the battleshi p

New Jersey lying off the coast with its 16-inch guns ,

bombarded the enemy's last remaining toehold al l

night and most of the morning, the 3d Battalion

launched its final drive at 1000 on the 9th . The

Marines assaulted violently, yet methodically, destroying and searching every bunker and fighting hole i n

their path . Enemy resistance was tenacious, but lacked

*Emmons was later awarded a Silver Star Medal for his action .
436 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

Marine engineer LCpI Jerry Kanone runs a detonating cor d

from a charge placed inside an enemy bunker that can be see n

at the right of the picture.

the organization encountered earlier. Lieutenant

Colonel Robertson credited the ARVN 2d Troop, 4t h

ARVN Cavalry with their APCs in providing the necessary shock action to break the final NVA resistance81 *

It was apparent that the fighting had taken its toll o n

the NVA. Collapsed bunkers and scores of dead Nort h

Vietnamese gave evidence of the ferocity of the fighting. Within some bunkers, the Marines found stacks of

enemy bodies. Other dead were undoubtedly buried

under the rubble of their destroyed bunkers82

Company A was first to shoot its way through the

North Vietnamese and reach the river. Captain Foster,

the Company A commander, later wrote that hi s

Marines chased "the enemy at a sprint into the Song La

*The role that the ARVN APC troop played still remains a matter

of controversy. Captain Drez complained that the ARVN failed to com e

to his aid on 8 December and then claimed credit for participating i n

the battle by reporting the serial numbers of captured weapons . Mr.

Ronald J. Drez incvw, 29Mar89, Tape 6512 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

Captain George B. Meegan, the commander of Company L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines in his comments supported Captain Drez, writin g

the same APCs milled around [the] L/3/26 position [on the] last day

and then claimed credit for NVA dead that had been killed the previous evening by my machine gunner . . . ." Capt George B. Meegan ,

Comments on draft, dtd 2Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Tho . . . {and a} ` turkey shoot ' ensued. "8 3 Company H

followed shortly afterward, killing a reported 9 enem y

only 20 meters from the river's banks . The battalion

swept through the Communist stronghold thoroughly ,

tabulating 130 dead North Vietnamese—some kille d

during the preceding days—and took 8 prisoners . Captain Meegan, the Company L commander, remembered that one of his platoons captured an enemy warrant officer who told the Marines that it took him si x

months to reach the Dodge City sector.84

At 1800, 9 December, the 1st Marines terminated

Operation Meade River. What had begun as a gian t

"County Fair" had turned into a major battle pitting

determined Marines in the assault against equall y

determined North Vietnamese soldiers defending fro m

heavily fortified positions.

According to Marine sources, the immediate, tangible results of Operation Meade River included 1,02 3

enemy dead, 123 prisoners, and 6 ralliers.** Intelligence personnel, working with South Vietnamese

police, questioned 2,663 civilians, identifying 7 1

members of the VC political infrastructure . The

attacking Marines destroyed 360 bunkers and capture d

20 tons of rice. The price the Marines paid for their

success was high, 108 dead and 510 wounded. The

ARVN sustained 2 killed and 37 wounded . In a message to General Cushman, General Youngdale speculated that " . . . these results should signify the end of

the enemy's stranglehold on the Dodge City Area. "8 5

The aftermath of Operation Meade River, however,

is more a statement on the nature of counterinsurgency.

After the other units departed the area, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines crossed the Song La Tho into Dodge

City to exploit the success of the operation . By 1 1

December, the battalion added to its tabulation o f

enemy dead, 20 more North Vietnamese while taking

1 prisoner. A week later, patrols observed an increase i n

sniper fire . As 1968 ended, the 1st Marine Divisio n

reported that " . . . the enemy is persistent. By the end

of [December] he had reoccupied the Meade Rive r

** Records disagree on the number of enemy casualties. Figures in th e

text are from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, p. 3 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC,

Dec68, p. 17 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p . II-C-4, 5 ; 1st Mar AAR, Mead e

River. Other reports were prepared so soon after the end of the operatio n

(in one case, only 57 minutes later) that they did not include enemy dea d

later found on the battlefield . See 1st MarDiv SicRep No. 78, Opn Meade

River, in 1st MarDiv Operation SitReps. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L .

Bartlett, who served as commander of the 13th Interrogation and Translation Team, commented that he personally believed some of the statistic s

were "suspect, especially the number of enemy captives. " He believed tha t

many of the prisoners listed as VC POWs were either Vietnamese civilian s

or possibly members of the VC infrastructure . Bartlett Comments.
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 437

Photo is from the Col Robert G . Lauffer, USMC (Ret), Collection

One can see the formidable nature of the enemy bunkers with their reinforced timbers that the Marine s

encountered during Meade River. This bunker was in the Hook sector.

area, and gave indications of again preparing for a

thrust against Dien Ban/Hoi An and Da Nang . . . . "8 6

By that time, though, the 1st Marine Division ha d

turned its attention to another operation . Far to the

west, a new subordinate command of the division wa s

to strike at a major enemy base area in an operatio n

named Taylor Common .

Operation Taylor Common

As Operation Meade River ground to a close ,

MACV ordered a strike into Base Area 112, the rugged

mountainous region southwest of the Arizona Territory, between the Song Thu Bon and the Song Cai. Bas e

Area 112 was a staging and logistic base for enemy

units operating in southern Quang Nam Province .

Multi-layered jungle canopy 70-feet thick concealed a n

estimated 7,000 North Vietnamese troops of the 21st

Regiment, the 3d Battalion, 68B Rocket Regiment, and the

2d Battalion, 141st Regiment, as well as support and

headquarters units.87

Under the codename Operation Taylor Common ,

Brigadier General Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., one of the two

assistant division commanders, would form and command an ad hoc organization under the 1st Marin e

Division, dubbed Task Force Yankee.* The Task Force

was built around Colonel James B. Ord's 5th Marines,

which would include BLT 2/7, with the normal complement of supporting organizations . Lieutenant

Colonel Raymond B. Ingrando's 1st Field Artillery

Group served as the higher headquarters for a force o f

two direct support artillery battalions and elements of

other units, including 8-inch howitzers, 155mm guns ,

and 175mm guns.88

*General Dwyer, who as a colonel commanded the 1st Marine s

until 14 August, became a 1st Marine Division ADC on ] 5 Augus t

upon his promotion to brigadier general . Brigadier General Carl W.

Hoffman on 18 August became the second ADC with the division .

General Hoffman was previously an ADC with the 3d Marine Divisio n

until his transfer to the 1st Marine Division . Hoffman while with th e

1st Marine Division served in a dual capacity as G—3 or operations officer for III MAF. He later wrote that Major General Ormond R. Simpson, who relieved General Youngdale as division commander on 2 1

December 1968, called him [Hoffman], his phantom ADC . " Genera l

Youngdale on that date relieved Major General Rathvon McC . TonSpkins as Deputy Commanding General, III MAF. See Command an d

Staff list and MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, Comments on draft, dtd

15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
OPERATION TAYLOR COMMON

DECEMBER 1968

a 10 H 4? KILOMETERS t I

I ç" tIr

A

4. N .

- A )fl_)-

438 THE DEFINING YEAR

On 6 December, General Dwyer issued the order

launching Operation Taylor Common. The task force's

mission was to "neutralize" Base Area 112 and to

develop Fire Support Bases (FSBs) to interdict Communist infiltration routes leading from the Laotian

border. The plan included three phases. The first step

was to be a search and clear operation to ensure that An

Hoa was secure. Units of the task force, in coordination

with the ARVN 1st Ranger Group would sweep the

Arizona Territory and the area between Liberty Bridge

and An Hoa. In the second phase, TF Yankee would

penetrate Base Area 112, establish a series of fire support bases in the eastern half of the area, and begin

reconnaissance-in-force operations to locate and destroy

the enemy. Phase three was to be an extension of the

second phase, with Marine battalions operating out to

the western edge of Base Area 112 in search of enemy

units and facilities.89

In order to free the 5th Marines for assignment to

TF Yankee, the 1st Marine Division ended operation

Henderson Hill at midnight, on 6 December. Exactly

one minute later, Operation Taylor Common began.9°

At 0830, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons

165 and 364 delivered BLT 2/7 to the Arizona Territory to act as a blocking force for the 1st ARVN

Ranger Group. Other units, including the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, were already in the field when the

operation began. To these Marines, the fact that

Operation Henderson Hill had given way to Operation Taylor Common made little difference, at least

initially, for the mission of the units around An Hoa

remained the same as before. Having completed

Operation Meade River, the 2d and 3d Battalions of

the 5th Marines departed Dodge City, sweeping the

area from Liberty Bridge to the hills south and southwest of An Hoa. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple recalled

that during this sweep his Company G "flushed a

group of six Vietnamese in civilian clothes." The

company commander sent a platoon to investigate.

As the Marines approached, someone among the

Vietnamese fired a weapon. The troops dropped to

the ground, but soon discovered they were not the
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 43 9

target. When the shots ended, one of the Vietnamese

stood up with his hands in the air. The other five were

dead, killed "execution style by a bullet to the back of

the head, apparently while in a kneeling position . "

The sole survivor refused to answer any questions,

but, according to Stemple, his "manner and dress

indicated that this was not a run-of-the-mill local

VC." The battalion commander later learned that his

prisoner turned out to be the chief political officer of

the North Vietnamese Command Group 4 .9 1

Starting on 11 December, a major reshuffling of II I

MAF units occurred as a result of Operation Taylo r

Common. The requirement to penetrate and "neutralize" the vast reaches of Base Area 112, while simultaneously maintaining the security of the Da Nang

TAOR, called for the employment of a large force .

With the 27th Marines no longer in Vietnam, the 1s t

In a formal change of command ceremony, MajGen Ormond

R. Simpson, left, accepts the colors of the 1st Marine Division from his predecessor as division commander, MajGen

Carl A. Youngdale. Gen Youngdale became the Deputy

Commander, III MAE

Photo from the Abel Collection

Marine Division did not have enough units to accomplish both tasks. To assist in the effort, General Cush -

man ordered Colonel Michael M. Spark's 3d Marines

to redeploy from Quang Tri Province to Quang Nam .

General Raymond G . Davis' success in reducing the

3d Marine Division's requirement for fixed garrisons

by employing his forces in mobile operations mad e

this move possible .9 2

Colonel Spark's headquarters moved to An Hoa on

9 December, ahead of the regiment's subordinate battalions. The plan called for the 3d Marines to conduct

the actual penetration of Base Area 112 while the 5t h

Marines secured An Hoa. As the enemy situation

around An Hoa did not indicate the need for a full regiment to protect the base, General Dwyer ordered elements of the 5th Marines placed under Colonel Spark's

control. Lieutenant Colonel Harry E. Atkinson's 3d

Battalion reported on 11 December and became th e

first unit to penetrate Base Area 112 during Operatio n

Taylor Common .9 3

On the morning of the 11th, artillery and aircraf t

blasted and bombed Hill 575, about eight kilometers

southwest of An Hoa, in an attempt to create a suitabl e

landing zone in the heavily forested terrain . When the

fires lifted, some trees remained, so a platoon from

Company B, 3d Engineer Battalion and a platoon from

Company K, 5th Marines rappelled from helicopters

into the LZ to complete the job. At 0950, the rest of

Company K landed and the Marines set to work developing the hilltop into what would be called FSB Lance,

part of Dwyer's planned network of fire support base s

from which TF Yankee units could range throughou t

Base Area 112 .94

Two days later, on the 13th, Spark assumed control

of Lieutenant Colonel Stemple's 2d Battalion, 5t h

Marines. Again a platoon of Company B, 1st Engineers Battalion accompanied this time by a platoo n

from Stemple's Company E rappelled onto a hillto p

near the southwest corner of the Arizona Territory and

blasted out an LZ. By evening, the rest of the 2d Battalion had landed and was busy establishing FSB Pike .

Just as in the landings at FSB Lance, there was no

enemy resistance.95

The organic units of the 3d Marines began arrivin g

in Quang Nam on 13 December. By the following day,

both the 1st and 3d Battalions were at An Hoa, preparing to enter Base Area 112 .9 6

Meanwhile, TF Yankee was employing a new

weapon to prepare LZs for the introduction of th e

newly arrived battalions. The M—121 Combat Trap

was a 10,000 pound bomb which parachuted to the
440 THE DEFINING YEA R

Both photos from the Abel Collection

Top, Marine engineers have just cleared with explosives a landing zone for Operation Taylor Common to take place in Base Area 112 in the rugged terrain southwest of An Hoa . After the "big blast"

some stubborn trees and brush remain to be cleared . Below, artillerymen from the 11th Marines a t

Fire Support Base Lance watch as a Sikorsky CH—53 Sea Stallion brings in ammunition. A

105mm howitzer can be seen in the foreground.

earth and detonated over a potential LZ at a heigh t

which would blow down trees without creating a

crater. General Dwyer personally directed this experimental operation from a helicopter. Air Force C—130s

dropped the M—121s from high altitude, aiming for

small hilltops selected by Dwyer and his staff. In terms

of explosive power, the Combat Traps proved impressive . In General Dwyer's words, " . . . it looked like a

mini-nuclear weapon burst. The concussion rocked us

in the helicopter. . . . it just really blew down this high ,

hundred f o ot canopy. . . ."97 Accuracy, however, left

something to be desired . Although some near misses

still created marginally suitable LZs, Dwyer concluded

that the technique was of little use in situations requiring pinpoint accuracy. TF Yankee returned to the

proven technique of bringing in low-flying attack aircraft with heavy ordnance, followed by engineers wit h

chain saws and explosives to finish the job »

With help from the indispensable Company B, 3 d

Engineer Battalion, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marine s

landed, unopposed, atop Hill 558 on 15 December. A

steep prominence four kilometers west of the recently established FSB Lance, Hill 558 was, by then ,

awash in a sea of splintered timber, the results o f

numerous M—121 near-misses . Following the pattern
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ 44 1

Photo courtesy of Col James W. Stemple, USMC (Ret )

Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps, at right with back to tree, receives a

briefing on use of Scout Dogs during Operation Taylor Common at Fire Support Base Pike on Christmas Day, 1968 . Other officers in the picture are, from left: LtCol James W. Stemple, commander of

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines; BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., CG of TF Yankee; Col James B. Ord, commander of the 5th Marines (standing); and MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, Deputy Commander, III

MAF (seated). Col Michael M . Spark, commander of the 3d Marines, has his back to the camera .

previously established, the battalion began constructing FSB Spear atop the hill . With Fire Support Bases

Lance and Pike, FSB Spear formed the point of a triangle which extended TF Yankee's thrust ever deepe r

into the heart of Base Area 112 .9 9

Northeast of Base Area 112, the 1st Battalion, 5t h

Marines and BLT 2/7 maintained the security of An

Hoa through constant patrolling. Having accomplished

its blocking force mission in the Arizona Territory, BLT

2/7 conducted a helicopter assault into an LZ near th e

western end of Go Noi Island, at the edge of the hug e

Taylor Common area of operations . The 1st Battalion ,

5th Marines patrolled in the vicinity of An Hoa, frequently encountering small groups of the enemy.100

TF Yankee completed the initial penetration of Bas e

Area 112 on 18 December, when the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines mounted a helicopter-borne assault on Hil l

375, about four kilometers south of FSB Spear. After

scoring yet another unopposed landing for the tas k

force, the battalion began developing the hilltop a s

Combat Operations Base (COB) Mace . *

The four battalions ensconced in the eastern half o f

Base Area 112 began a program of saturatio n

patrolling and reconnaissance-in-force operations ,

depending upon helicopters alone for all logistic sup-

*A Combat Operations Base differed from a Fire Support Base ,

primarily, in not having any artillery.
442 THE DEFINING YEA R

port. Fortunately, the seasonal monsoon did not develop, and incoming loads totalled some 250 tons per day ,

which were dispersed among the units at bases and

those on patrol . General Dwyer later characterized the

helicopter support during the operation as "a mixe d

performance," noting numerous instances of performance that was less than adequate . In the final analysis, however, he allowed that, " . . . the net effect was:

We had plenty of artillery, plenty of food, plenty o f

ammunition. . . . "1ol *

Throughout the last half of December, units of the

3d Marines searched the eastern half of Base Are a

112, frequently finding signs of the enemy's recen t

presence, but only rarely encountering Communist

troops. The area included scores of NVA rest camps ,

kitchens, small unit headquarters, surgical facilities ,

and even apparent prisons (or POW holding areas),

all abandoned. Usually, the Marines found enemy

graves, small quantities of stored food, weapons,

ammunition, medical supplies, or documents. Occasionally, patrols engaged small groups of North Viet-

*Colonel Stemple, the commander of the 2d Battalion, 5t h

Marines, remembered that while his unit established itself on Fire Support Base Pike and the battalion was in the process of building ammunition storage revetments there he was told that a large number of helicopters was to bring in the next day the entire ammunition storage leve l

to Pike . According to Stemple, he protested the order, stating that the

ammunition dumps were far from ready. Nevertheless, the following

morning, "a literal daisy chain of helicopters" brought in heavily lade n

cargo nets filled "with 155mm artillery shells and boxes of green and

white bag gun powder for the 155s and boxes of 105 and 81mm mortar ammunition ." With the operation in full swing, enemy rocketeer s

took the base under fire . Two rockets landed in one of the revetment s

containing 155mm gun powder. The battalion commander related the

"resulting explosion was visible for miles around and secondary explosions rocked the fire support base . " Miraculously only one Marine wa s

killed . A Marine and Army ordnance disposal team deemed tons of the

ammunition as unstable which had to be then helilifted to facilities a t

Da Nang . Colonel Stemple remembered that, "the ammunition stoc k

levels at the support base were reduced and the stocking completed a s

safe storage was completed ." Stemple Comments.

namese or Viet Cong, but no major contacts developed. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple remembered that

his F and H Companies, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines

during patrols on a slope west and south of FSB Pik e

had "sharp short engagements with small NVA

units. " According to Stemple, he initially assigne d

two scout dog teams to each company in this tripl e

canopy terrain " to sniff out any enemy to the front o r

flank. " Because of the restricted visibility, the advantage lay with the side who spotted the other first. The

battalion commander stated that the North Vietnamese very quickly observed that it was to their benefit to kill the dogs before shooting at Marines . In late

December, he recalled that he had the opportunity t o

make his case for more dogs during a visit to Vietna m

by the Commandant of the Marine Corps Genera l

Leonard F. Chapman. The flow of scout dogs to th e

combat units soon increased and that in the late r

stages of Taylor Common, Stemple assigned thre e

dogs to a company.10 2

The second phase of Operation Taylor Commo n

ended with 1968 on New Year's Eve . During the third

and final phase of the operation, which lasted until

March, TF Yankee pushed west to within 30 kilometers of Laos, finally encountering more enemy troops .* *

The task force accomplished its mission by locatin g

and destroying the enemy logistics infrastructure i n

Base Area 112 . Although Operation Taylor Commo n

did not attract a great deal of attention—owing this,

thought General Dwyer, to the remoteness of th e

AO—it was a successful large, mobile operation. The

multi-regiment task force, operating far from its permanent bases, carried III MAF offensive striking powe r

deep into enemy territory, using much the same tactic s

as that of the 3d Marine Division in the north .

**For a complete treatment of the closing phase of Operatio n

Taylor Common, see Charles R . Smith, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1969 :

High Mobility and Standdown (Washington, D.C. : Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC, 1988), pp. 88-102 .
CHAPTER 22

The 3d Division's Labors Bear Fruit

Elimination of the Infrastructure—Rough Soldiering—Thua Thien and the End of the Year

The 3d Marine Division's persistent mobile offensive during the autumn forced the enemy back into his

base areas in the hinterlands and the sanctuaries o f

North Vietnam and Laos. The withdrawal, motivated

more by necessity than by choice, nevertheless, afforded the enemy an opportunity to refurbish his consistently outmaneuvered and battle-depleted combat

units. Hampered both by heavier than normal monsoon rains during September and October and the

offensive mobility of the 3d Division, the enemy ,

nonetheless, retained the capability for harassing

attacks against allied installations and population centers. He also could still initiate a major offensive

against the South by marshalling his forces positione d

north of the DMZ.

The Government of South Vietnam, with Unite d

States assistance, instituted a country-wide accelerated pacification (Le Loi) campaign, on 1 November,

designed to drive the enemy from populated areas

and provide extra momentum to the 1968 Revolutionary Development Program . The purpose of the

campaign was to organize government functions ,

establish self-help projects, bolster local security, an d

eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure in a number of

selected hamlets.

The inauguration of the Government's wide-ranging pacification campaign coupled with the withdrawal north in late October of the three regiments of th e

320th NVA Division, as well as the 138th and 270th

NVA Regiments, now allowed the 3d Marine Division to

turn a large portion of its efforts toward implementin g

and expanding the pacification initiative . In the

province's populated coastal lowlands and piedmont,

the 3d Division, and forces under its control, woul d

seek out those elements actively attempting to disrup t

the campaign. At the same time, it continued the bol d

employment of Marine infantry in the mountainous

jungles to the west .

Elimination of the Infrastructure

The departure of the 1st Cavalry Division fro m

northern I Corps in early November forced a realignment of forces in the division's eastern area and a reduction in the commitment to the anti-infiltration system

along the DMZ. On 1 November, the 1st Brigade, 5th

Infantry (Mechanized), under the command of U .S .

Army Colonel James M . Gibson, was directed to move

from the Kentucky area of operations into an area near

Quang Tri City. The new area, labeled Napoleon-Salin e

II, incorporated all of the former Napoleon-Saline area,

centered on Cua Viet, and the northern, or Quang Tri ,

portion of the cavalry division's area of operations .

Lieutenant Colonel George F. Meyers' 1st Amphibian

Tractor Battalion, as a result, was placed under th e

operational control of the brigade and continued searc h

operations in the former Napoleon-Saline area, now

designated Area of Operations Green . Lieutenant

Colonel George E. Hayward's 3d Tank Battalion,

which had been operating in the Napoleon-Saline area ,

was put in direct support of the 3d Marines, whic h

assumed control of the Kentucky area . With the evacuation of the 1st Brigade from positions just south of the DMZ, General Cushman

requested and received authority from General Abram s

to close the strongpoints at A–3 and C–3 .' The two

outposts, part of the Dyemarker strongpoint and trac e

system, initially were scheduled to be manned by a

Marine regiment and a reinforced ARVN regiment .

Although all the strongpoints, with the exception o f

A–5, had been, or were in the process of being completed, by mid June, the 2d ARVN Regiment had

only secured three, A–1, A–2, and C–1. Marine forces

occupied the remaining strongpoints and combat

bases. A revised plan, codenamed Duel Blade, submitted by III MAF on 15 June, called for the ARVN regiment to relieve Marine units at A–3 and A–4 by

December and the elimination of the two westernmost

combat bases. However, in follow-on discussions

between Lieutenant General Cushman and Lieutenan t

General Lam, the I Corps Tactical Zone commander,

the Vietnamese general balked at committing ARVN

forces to the two positions until the sensors and intermediate barriers had been installed . Lam instead suggested that two battalions of the 2d Regiment continue to occupy A–1, A–2, and C–1, while the regiment's

remaining two battalions be employed in a mobile rol e

443
444 THE DEFINING YEA R

with Marine forces along the DMZ . General Cushman

recommended to General Abrams that General Lam's

suggestion be adopted and that he, General Cushman ,

would proceed on the premise that the original concep t

be abandoned in favor of a revised, more mobile posture.2 Although General Abrams subsequently accepted General Cushman's recommendation, he suggeste d

that the South Vietnamese should be eased into bot h

sites after sufficient training .

As ARVN and Marine commands continued their

Duel Blade planning with respect to construction an d

specific control procedures, General Abrams on 2 2

October ordered all construction and planning effort s

associated with the anti-infiltration effort halted . 3 The

1 November bombing halt in the DMZ and Nort h

Vietnam, aimed, in part, at restoring the DMZ to a

true buffer zone, combined with manpower demand s

on U.S . forces in the north, made the strongpoint and

obstacle barrier system no longer feasible .

Under the new concept, still referred to as Due l

Blade, allied forces, supported by air, artillery, an d

naval gunfire, would, while maintaining a mobile posture, actively resist infiltration from the North b y

maintaining a comprehensive surveillance effort .

While ground reconnaissance inserts would be a part o f

the effort, attended and unattended detection device s

or sensors would provide a majority of the around-theclock capability. By the end of December, the engineer s

had implanted three sensor fields in the eastern portio n

of the DMZ, south of the Ben Hai River. *

At the same time the American command ha d

made rapid progress in the defoliation of a 2,000 -

meter-wide trace, adjacent to the Laotian border sout h

of the DMZ, which neared completion, and began

planning to implant sensors in the western area .

Despite these efforts, little evidence existed reflectin g

a decline in the enemy's intention to continue to use

the DMZ for staging troops and supplies, infiltration ,

and, north of the Ben Hai, as a sanctuary. Marine

units, nevertheless, were now under standing orders

not to enter the DMZ.

According to the revised concept, the "A" and "C "

strongpoint sites considered essential would be used a s

fire support bases. Those of no value, such as A—3 and

C—3, would be closed . With the departure of Genera l

*Colonel John F. Mitchell recalled that from July to October 1968 ,

he was given the task of "establishing the 1st Ground Surveillance Section" in the 3d Marine Division . According to Mitchell, the group

used sensors with laser technology to track enemy forces. Col John F.

Mitchell, Comments on draft, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Westmoreland in June and the launching of more

mobile operations, III MAF halted construction an d

shifted much of the material set aside for the Due l

Blade effort to the construction of an anti-infiltration

barrier around Da Nang.

The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division move d

south into the populated coastal sand dune and ric e

paddy region, covering the districts of Trieu Phong ,

Mai Linh, Hai Lang, and Quang Tri City. Here, it

found an area largely devoid of battalion-sized Vie t

Cong or North Vietnamese Army units. These units,

having suffered a number of decisive defeats, ha d

retired west into the jungle-covered mountains bordering on Laos. The remaining Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces continued to maintain liaiso n

with local force units and the VC infrastructure . They

also continued to move rice and other supplies to mai n

force units further west. These elements included units

of the 808th NVA Battalion which endeavored to reinforce two local force companies, the C—59 in Trieu

Phong District and the H—99 in Hai Lang District.

These two companies, in an effort to avoid allied capture, had broken down into small groups of five to si x

men and tended to operate with village and hamle t

guerrilla forces, which varied in size from cells t o

squads and in some cases platoons. Allied intelligence

estimates placed Viet Cong strength in the region ,

including infrastructure members, at 4,000. Seventyeight of the 234 hamlets within the brigade 's area of

operations were considered to be under Viet Cong control. Intelligence analysts rated 18 as being conteste d

and they considered the remainder to be under Sout h

Vietnamese control .

Taking advantage of the absence of Viet Cong and

North Vietnamese main force units, Gibson's mechanized brigade concentrated on conducting strik e

operations. Emphasizing search and clear and cordo n

and search operations in cooperation and coordinatio n

with local forces and the 1st ARVN Regiment, whos e

area of operation coincided with that of the brigade 's,

Gibson's troops sought to weed out and destroy th e

Viet Cong infrastructure . Organized into two

infantry and one armored task forces, the 1st Brigad e

supported the Le Loi campaign and conducted a serie s

of large-scale cordon and search operations and

deployed numerous patrols, ambushes, and small

"Hunter Killer" teams throughout its new area o f

operations during the months of November and

December. In addition, it provided transportation ,

hauled construction materials, assisted in road building, and provided security for the long-awaited reset-
THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUIT 445

tlement of coastal fisherman and their families int o

the Gia Dang fishing village .

The cordon on Thon My Chanh, which began on 2

November as a transition operation to introduce th e

brigade into the area, involved elements of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry

(Mechanized); 1st Battalion, 77th Armor; and 4th

Squadron, 12th Cavalry. In coordination with three

battalions of the 1st ARVN Regiment, the brigad e

cordoned the village which straddled the Quang Tr i

and Thua Thien provincial boundary, while ARVN

infantry and South Vietnamese local forces swept

through the area . On 5 November, Company B, 9th

Marines and Company G, 3d Marines were placed

under the operational control of the brigade an d

assigned security duty at Landing Zone Nancy, relieving other brigade forces which began an extensive cam -

paign of local ambushes and patrols. The Thon My

Chanh cordon ended on 16 November with a total o f

60 Viet Cong reported killed, 58 of which were credited to the 1st ARVN Regiment.

The following day, Companies B, C, and D, 11th

Infantry; Company I, 4th Marines; and Companies B

and C, 9th Marines, in conjunction with two battalions

of the 1st ARVN Regiment, established a cordon

around the Thon Thuong Xa and Thon Mai Dang village complex, eight kilometers southeast of Quang Tri

City. The three Marine companies anchored the eastern

portion of the three village cordon and provided security for the checkpoint of Route 1 . While elements

continued to sweep through the Thon Mai Dang area ,

Companies B and C, 9th Marines, working with the 2 d

Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment, established a 360 -

degree cordon around the village of Thon Thuong Xa

on the 24th, and sent out patrols in all directions from

the cordon.4 With the end of the cordon on 27 November, the three Marine companies returned to their parent units and like the Thon My Chanh cordon, the 1s t

ARVN Regiment garnered the lion's share of the

enemy killed and weapons captured .

Throughout the first nine days of December, Gib -

son's brigade continued large-scale cordon and searc h

operations in the rice growing area east of Quang Tri

City at Thon Tra Loc, and in the sand dunes north of Fire

Support Base Tombstone and west of Wunder Beach.

On the 9th, Operation Napoleon-Saline came to an end .

According to Marine sources, the operation which began

at the end of February, when operations Napoleon and

Saline were combined, resulted in the death of more than

3,500 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops and th e

capture of 831 weapons. Marine, Army, and ARVN losses were put at 395 killed and 1,680 wounded.

As Napoleon-Saline ended, the brigade moved int o

Operation Marshall Mountain . Relying heavily on dismounted infantry units, Gibson's troopers continued to

operate extensively throughout their assigned area of

operation with elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment

and local Popular and Regional Forces . These combined operations included the integration of Popular

Force squads and platoons into mechanized infantr y

and tank platoons, assigning a Popular Force squad t o

one tank as a means of transportation and fire support

for the local South Vietnamese . The tank and mechanized infantry platoons would be used as blocking

units while the Popular and Regional Forces searche d

an area. Although used elsewhere, the brigade concentrated the efforts of these combined search and clear

operations during the remainder of the month on th e

area immediately south and west of Quang Tri City to

interdict enemy movement from the piedmont into

the populated coastal lowlands .

In addition to small combined operations, the 1s t

Brigade continued to conduct a large number of cordons of suspected Viet Cong-dominated villages and

initiated a series of strike operations in the mountain s

to the west. On 20 December, three companies fro m

the 11th Infantry conducted heliborne assaults into th e

southern portion of enemy Base Area 101, but encountered no sizeable enemy forces. By the end of the

month, all three companies had returned to Fire Sup -

port Base Sharon . The brigade's activities including

combat operations and civic action projects resulted i n

a heightened sense of security throughout the regio n

and an increase in the effectiveness and fighting spiri t

of local Regional and Popular Force platoons.

To the north of Gibson's brigade, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, under the command of Lieu -

tenant Colonel George F. Meyers, who was replaced i n

mid-November by Lieutenant Colonel Walter W.

Damewood, Jr., continued to conduct an extensive pro -

gram of combat patrols, and ambushes throughout the

Green area of operations. First Lieutenant Peter N .

Schneider's Company A conducted mechanized an d

infantry patrols, night ambushes, and search and

destroy missions, concentrating on the area along the

Song Cua Viet between My Loc and the Mai Xa Thi

village complex to the southwest . During the sweeps,

Schneider's Marines discovered and destroyed numerous bunkers, some of which were old and deteriorate d

and others recently constructed which indicated enemy

activity in the area . Company A, however, encountered

no enemy troops.
446 THE DEFINING YEAR

Further north, Company B, under the acting command of First Lieutenant Thomas M. Whiteside, continued the consolidation of the C–4 Strong Point an d

the outpost at Oceanview, the eastern anchors for the

Duel Blade anti-infiltration effort. Reinforced by a platoon of Marine tanks, a section of 40mm Dusters, an

Army artillery target acquisition team, and a naval

gunfire spotter team, the company maintained both

visual and radar coverage of the DMZ and requested

fire missions on sighted squad- to company-sized

enemy forces, bunker and trenchline complexes, suspected supply and staging areas, heavy trail activity,

and sampan and boat movement. While tactical air,

artillery, and naval gunfire missions destroyed or damaged many of these targets, the enemy reacted to aerial reconnaissance flights over the DMZ on several occa -

sions by firing at friendly aircraft with small arms a s

well as .30- and .50-calibep antiaircraft weapons. With the end of Operation Napoleon-Saline II i n

early December, operational control of Damewood's

battalion was transferred from the 1st Brigade to th e

newly formed Marine Task Force Bravo . The Task

Force, commanded by Colonel Thomas W. Clarke ,

took over responsibility for Operation Kentucky and ,

in addition to the amtrac battalion, consisted of the 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines and the 3d Tank Battalion .

According to Lieutenant Colonel Damewood, as part o f

Operation Kentucky, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had one of the largest area of operations in the

division sector extending from the DMZ south to the

Cua Viet and west of the mouth of the Cua Viet to Dai

Do village .5 While Company A launched numerous

mechanized and infantry patrols along the Cua Viet, i n

coordination with the Navy Task Force Clearwater,

Company B maintained both visual and night detection radar coverage of the eastern DMZ in an effort t o

prevent enemy infiltration .* The company, in late

December, joined the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines in an

extensive cordon and search of Xuan Khanh Resettlement Village, one kilometer northwest of the mouth o f

the Cua Viet. While the Marine units maintained the

cordon, elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment swep t

through the village with negative results.

To the west of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion's area, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines sup -

*Lieutenant Colonel Damewood recalled that the executive officer of the Navy Task Force was a Marine and that "extensive coordination was required between division units, especially the 1st

AmTrac Bn and Clearwater to optimize safe transit of the river. "

LtCol Walter W. Damewood, Jr., Comments on draft, did 31Nov9 4

(Vietnam Comment File).

planted the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division in earl y

November, which had moved into the 1st Cavalry

Division's former area . Operating primarily from Cam

Lo, C–2, C–3, and Con Thien, elements of both Marin e

battalions conducted extensive patrols in their new sec -

tor. They also participated extensively in the pacification effort in Cam Lo and Huong Hoa Districts.

Early in November, Lieutenant Colonel Bryon T.

Chen's 2d Battalion moved into the Cam Lo District ,

on a test basis, and began the process of integrating

with local Regional and Popular Forces in an attempt

to upgrade their training, efficiency, and overall combat effectiveness. The initial effort to place a Marin e

platoon with each of the district 's Regional Force companies met with limited success and the battalion the n

shifted to a program of total integration . Captain Donald J. Myers' Company H had a fire team with each

Regional Force squad, a squad with each platoon, an d

a platoon with each of the three Regional Force companies in Cam Lo District. Command, control, an d

coordination was maintained by appointing the

Marine unit leader as an advisor or assistant commander to a Regional or Popular Force unit one echelo n

above their own . A Marine squad leader, for example ,

was the advisor to a Regional Force platoon and its

Marines from Company H, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines integrated with South Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF) in th e

Cam Lo Sector. In the photo, Marines of the company and

RF troops ride on top of a Marine tank during a combined

sweep in the sector.

Photo courtesy of Col Donald J. Myers USMC (Ret)
THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUIT 447

Top photo is courtesy of LtCol Justin M . Martin USMC (Ret) and bottom photo is courtesy of Col Donald J. Myers USMC (Ret)

In Huang Hoa District, Marines try to integrate with South Vietnamese forces in Mai Loc Village .

Top, Marines from Company F 2d Battalion, 3d Marines stand by while the U .S. Army district

advisor talks to the commander of the South Vietnamese 220th RF Company . Below, Marines of the

2d Battalion, 3d Marines conduct a cordon and search of Mai Loc village with South Vietnames e

RF troops. South Vietnamese officials are seen talking to the assembled villagers .
448 THE DEFINING YEA R

assistant commander. First Lieutenant Justin M . Martin's Company F adopted a similar force structure i n

Huong Hoa District. While integrating at all levels, at the same time elements of the two battalions launched a series of major

cordon and search operations throughout the area o f

operations. Their mission was to capture the local Vet

Cong and disrupt his organization as well as conduc t

an accurate census of the population and civic actio n

program. On 13 November, Companies E, F, and L, 3 d

Marines; Company I, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines ; Company B, 3d Tank Battalion ; and the 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines joined the 5th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment

in a cordon and search of the Xam Rao Vinh Valley in

the northeast portion of the Mai Loc TAOR, east of

Cam Lo. The rapid cordon and search of the valley, sus -

pected to be populated by North Vietnamese and Vie t

Cong whose mission was to harass the civilian population and conduct guerrilla operations against Marin e

units in the area, yielded little and the operation ende d

four days later.6

While the 2d and 3d Battalions blanketed the Kentucky area with cordons and patrols, the remaining

battalion of Colonel Michael M . Spark's 3d Marines,

the 1st Battalion, remained in the Lancaster II area an d

provided security for Camp Carroll, Landing Zone

Mack, the Dong Ha Mountain outpost, Thon Sam

Lam, and Khe Gio Bridge . Lieutenant Colonel Richard

B. Twohey's Marines also furnished escorts for Rough

Rider truck convoys and details for the daily road

sweep of Route 9 . Although there was a marke d

increase in the use of mines and Camp Carroll receive d

an occasional enemy mortar attack, the majority o f

attacks by fire and encounters with enemy forces too k

place around Landing Zone Mack and Landing Zon e

Sierra to the north. While on patrol near Sierra on th e

afternoon of 15 November, Company A's point element came under fire from an estimated enemy platoon, which initiated the contact by detonating several directional, or claymore mines, and grenades .

Supported by 60mm mortars, the enemy platoon the n

opened fire with automatic weapons and small arms .

Captain James L. Shaw's Marines countered with direct

artillery fire and 106mm recoilless rifle and 81mm

mortar fires, and reported as a result five enemy troops

killed. During the firefight, Company A lost 7 Marines

killed and 23 wounded in addition to a scout dog .

On 21 November, as the western boundary of the

Lancaster area of operations again was shifted east ,

Twohey's battalion was helilifted from Landing Zon e

Sierra to Mack and then to C-1 . The departure of 1st

Battalion, 3d Marines from the jungle-covered mountains northwest of Camp Carroll coincided with the

termination of the 10-month-long operation, code -

named Lancaster II, and the absorption of the area int o

that of Scotland II and Kentucky. According to Marine

sources, Lancaster II, which began in late January,

accounted for more than 1,800 enemy troops kille d

and 913 weapons captured . Allied losses were placed a t

359 killed and a total of 2,101 wounded .

From C-1, on 22 November, Companies A, B, an d

C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, and Company C, 3d Tan k

Battalion, in coordination with the 2d Battalion, 2 d

ARVN Regiment moved north along Route 1 an d

established a tank and infantry cordon near Gio Linh . 7

The three-day cordon resulted in more than 3,90 0

Vietnamese being processed, of which 188 wer e

detained . Of the 188, 147 were later classified as Vie t

Cong suspects and 41 were found to be deserters o r

draft dodgers. Following the Gio Linh-Ha Thanh cordon, Lieutenant Colonel Richard B . Twohey's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines moved to the southern portion o f

the 2d ARVN Regiment's area of operation and bega n

a cordon and search of the Thon Nghia An, Tho n

Thanh Luong, and Thon Truong Xa village complex,

north and west of Dong Ha . Other than receiving a few

sniper rounds, Twohey 's Marines found little evidence

of recent enemy activity.

The last days of November witnessed the beginning

of one more cordon operation . On the 29th, Lieutenant

Colonel Chen's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines moved int o

the rice-growing area around Thon Vinh Dai, east of

Cam Lo and north of Route 9 . In seven days, workin g

with local Regional and Popular Forces, Chen's

Marines, assisted in the screening of 1,604 civilians, 8 5

of whom were classified as Viet Cong suspects.

Although heavily committed to the pacificatio n

effort, two battalions of Colonel Sparks ' 3d Marines

were alerted for deployment to Quang Nam Provinc e

in early December. The III MAF commander, General

Cushman, warned General Stilwell the commander o f

XXIV Corps that intelligence indicated that th e

enemy planned, "to press his attacks on major cities o f

Da Nang and Quang Ngai . . . to thwart our successes

in the countryside ." He told Stilwell :

To counter his plans, III MAF will embark on an

intensified campaign . . . to destroy his major means fo r

carrying out his aggression . To do this will require th e

destruction of BA 112, which contains command an d

control headquarters and support facilities. It also

requires destruction of the 2d and 3d NVA Division s

and prevention of their escape into Laos.
THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUIT 449

Since no additional forces were available to accomplis h

this mission, the existing forces in I Corps would hav e

to be reallocated . Cushman asked the XXIV Corp s

commander to furnish two battalions to the 1st

Marine Division "with proportionate share of division

combat and combat service support for the accelerate d

effort against 2d NVA Div and BA 112 . "8 The 3d

Marines regimental headquarters, two infantry battalions, and normal combat support elements were designated to move south. *

As Spark 's 1st and 3d Battalions left the field for

Quang Tri Combat Base-and rest and refitting befor e

being airlifted to An Hoa, the 3d Marine Division activated, on 7 December, Task Force Bravo for planning.

On 9 December, Colonel Clarke, the task force commander, assumed tactical responsibility for the Kentucky area of operations.

Following a short cordon encompassing a majority

of the hamlets in Huong Hoa District, on 12 December, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, now commanded

by Lieutenant Colonel James J . McMonagle, moved

into the area of operations formerly occupied by the 3 d

Battalion, 3d Marines. Stretching from the DMZ

south to the Cua Valley, the 300-square kilometer are a

included the fixed installations of Con Thien, C—2

Bridge, C—2, and C-3, three of which previously were

secured by a battalion each, now were the responsibility of two companies.

The last three weeks of December found McMonagle's battalion with two companies, Company F in

Huong Hoa District and Company H in Cam Lo District, assisting in the pacification effort through integrated operations and training with Regional and Popular Forces. Company E provided security for Co n

Thien and C—2 Bridge, as well as patrolling an d

ambushing throughout its assigned 54-square kilometer area . McMonagle's remaining Company, G, secured

C—2 and C—3, while likewise conducting patrols an d

ambushes in its area. Despite the lack of enemy activity and the insurmountable tasks assigned, the battalio n

was fully confident that the area of operations "was

being denied to the enemy due to total effort on th e

part of all companies. "9

While McMonagle's four companies blanketed

their assigned areas with patrols and ambushes, Task

Force Bravo conducted two large cordon and search

operations targeted at the Cam Lo Resettlement Village and the village of Xuan Khanh, near Cua Viet .

*See Chapter 21 .

The first, involving two companies of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and elements of the 1st and 2d

ARVN Regiments, screened more than 10,000 villagers, 93 of whom were detained as Viet Cong suspects . The target of the second was the fishing village

of Xuan Khanh, near the mouth of the Cua Viet . On

the day after Christmas, the 2d Battalion, 4t h

Marines was relieved of positions in the wester n

mountains and helilifted into the area, where Companies F, G, and H cordoned the fishing village, permitting the 3d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment to

search the area and process more than 9,000 inhabitants. Of the 174 who were detained, a majority late r

was determined to be draft evaders .

Due to the division's extensive commitment to th e

pacification effort during the last two months of 1968 ,

the local Viet Cong, noted General Davis, had t o

"rewrite his book ." According to Davis, the VC used t o

"strike and run to a hideaway, in a secure area . He doesn't have that now. Marines are on his trails, in his hideaway, in his secure areas not only in the hills but doing

the same thing" in populated areas. The effect of the

A view of Cam Lo Resettlement Village includes the surrounding hills. The U.S. and South Vietnamese built new

homes for Vietnamese refugees and resettled them here to keep

the people away from the VC and also away from the combat areas.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A371645
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450 THE DEFINING YEAR

allied pacification on Quang Tn Province, Davis continued, was to make it 'as secure internally as it's ever

going to be. . . . It compares favorably with many

places I know in the United States insofar as levels of

violence and security are concerned."lO

Rough Soldiering

As November began, Colonel MartinJ. Sexton's 4th

Marines and Colonel Robert H. Barrow's 9th Marines,

under the overall command of Brigadier General Frank

E. Garretson's Task Force Hotel, conducted offensive

operations throughout the Scotland II area of operations. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith's 1st

Battalion, 4th Marines provided security for artillery

units and radio relay sites located at Fire Support Bases

Cates and Shepherd and Hills 691 and 950, and

patrolled out from the four bases. At the same time, the

3d Battalion, 4th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel

James L. Fowler, continued the defense and development of Fire Support Base Gurkha and patrolled the

Khe Xa Bai and the Song Rao Quan Valleys. To the

northwest of her sister battalions, the 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines, commanded by Major William L. Kent, completed its sweep west of Fire Support Base Alpine, finding several abandoned North Vietnamese positions,

but no evidence of recent enemy activity. On 4

November, Company E was helilifred eight kilometers

northwest to Hill 1308 and began construction of Fire

Support Base Argonne. Positioned one-and-one-half

kilometers from the Laotian border and the highest fire

support base in South Vietnam, Argonne provided

excellent observation of the vital enemy road net in

Laos which funneled troops and supplies south.

Although the Marines on the base made numerous

sightings, higher headquarters repeatedly denied clearance for fire missions as the sighted enemy positions

were well beyond the border.

By 11 November with construction of the fire support base completed, the 1st Battalion replaced the 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines. The 2d Battalion, now under

the command of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Hopkins, displaced to Fire Support Bases Cates and Shepherd and Hills 691 and 950. It then began sweep operations north of Cates and west along Route 9 toward

the village of Khe Sanh following the closure of Shepherd. With the departure of Hopkins' Marines, Galbraith's battalion conducted a two-company search

north and east of Argonne, into an area of sharp-sloped

mountains covered in triple-canopy jungle and cut by

many small fast-rushing steams. The search yielded
THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUIT 45 1

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A80054 1

Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines cross a fast-rushing stream in Operation Scot -

land II, east of Vandegrift Combat Base. Drinking water appears to be at a premium, judging from

the extra number of canteens that each Marine is carrying.

numerous unoccupied or hastily abandoned living

areas, harbor sites, and natural caves containing a considerable number of supply, weapons, and ammunitio n

caches. But, as Companies A and B progressed east -

ward, enemy forces in the region began a series of

delaying actions which took the form of small bu t

sharp engagements between point elements of th e

companies and small groups of enemy . When contact

was broken, pursuit of the enemy inevitably led to the

discovery of further caches.

On 21 November, Companies C and D, which ha d

secured Argonne and Alpine, replaced Companies A

and B in the search to the east . Thirteen days later an d

14 kilometers further east, as the two companie s

crossed the Khe Ta Bong and moved toward highe r

ground, they began the process of developing a new

fire support base, to be named Neville, atop Hill 1103. With the positioning of Battery G, 3d Battalion, 12t h

Marines at Neville on 14 December, Task Force Hotel

ordered all search and destroy operations to the west

halted and Fire Support Bases Argonne, Gurkha, an d

Alpine closed . With Neville in full operation, Compavies C and D evacuated the area and subsequently were

placed under the operational control of Task Force

Bravo to assist in the Cam Lo Refugee Village cordon ,

while Companies A and B helilifted to Vandegrift

Combat Base .

After a short stay at Vandegrift, where it secured th e

combat base and surrounding Marine positions following the search around Gurkha, Lieutenant Colone l

Fowler's 3d Battalion moved by helicopter 14 kilometers to the north on 21 November to defend and further develop Fire Support Base Winchester and Landing Zones Mack and Sierra . Known as the Son Pha n

Cong Hoang Quoc Gia National Forest Reserve, th e

mountainous region surrounding the battalion's positions was characterized by steep slopes and long narrow

ridgelines covered with dense forest and jungle consisting of a single, but thick, canopy . The battalion was

joined on the 24th by Company E, 2d Battalion, 4t h

Marines, which assaulted into Winchester and the n

moved one kilometer east along the Dong Tien ridge -

line and began construction of Fire Support Base Russell. Other than occasional sniper fire, battalion patrols
452 THE DEFINING YEA R

encountered little enemy resistance, but did discover a

number of large, recently constructed enemy bunke r

complexes which yielded a modest amount of ammunition and equipment.

During the first week of December, as the 3d Battalion, now under the command of Lieutenant Colone l

William A. Donald, began a several-week, two-company search north of Russell, Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins' 2d Battalion assaulted into four landing zones on

two parallel ridgelines east of Mack and three kilometers north of Dong Ha Mountain. The landings were

unopposed and Hopkins' four companies fanned out

toward their first objectives, establishing perimeter s

while deploying listening posts and squad ambushes .

Moving toward new objectives on 8 December a

squad patrol from First Lieutenant Jimmie G . Bearden's Company E, as it approached Hill 208, was

taken under small arms fire from a tree- and trench -

line . Moving to engage, the patrol observed approximately 10 armed enemy troops retreating into the

heavy brush. Two squads were sent to reinforce th e

engaged unit and prevent the enemy's escape, but as

the attacking Marine platoon maneuvered forward i t

found that the enemy had taken cover in a heavily fortified trench and bunker complex . The platoon

entered the complex and immediately was caught in a

crossfire of small arms, grenades, and white smoke or

CS gas. With darkness approaching and casualties

mounting, the platoon withdrew, carrying out nine

wounded Marines, but leaving the bodies of three

dead behind.

While air, artillery, and mortars pounded the complex throughout the night, Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins rapidly moved the battalion's other three companies into blocking positions around the complex wit h

the hope of catching some of the estimated 50 North

Vietnamese soldiers attempting to escape . But the

enemy apparently "hit the ground running," and the

sweep through the area the following day, durin g

which the bodies of the three dead Marines were recovSmoldering fires and a denuded forest bear stark witness to the intensity of the combat for "Foxtrot

Ridge," named after Company F, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.

Photo from the Abel Collection
THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUIT 453

ered, went unchallenged.

Two days later, Hopkins ordered Captain Richard J .

Murphy's Company F to cross the Song Ngan valle y

and assault the ridgeline extending along the southern

boundary of the DMZ, the site of several suspected

enemy mortar positions. After heavy air and artillery

strikes, the company seized the western portion of the

ridgeline under fire . As Murphy's Marines moved eastward, hidden NVA opened up with small arms and

automatic weapons on the lead elements of the company. The enemy was well entrenched and dense vegetation made it difficult to spot the sources of enemy fire .

Having fought its way into the middle of a large, well -

laid out bunker complex, the company now found i t

hard to maneuver without taking additional casualtie s

and leaving its wounded .

Despite overwhelming odds, Murphy's company

extracted its casualties, reorganized, and followin g

another heavy air and artillery strike, prepared to

assault. Turning to his troops, platoon leader Secon d

Lieutenant Steven P. Brodrick shouted: "All right

Marines, take this hill and earn your pay!" Brodric k

then led his platoon back into the enemy complex an d

maneuvered forward until he was killed by a direc t

burst of automatic weapons fire) !

Alerted earlier in the day to follow in trace of Company F, Hopkins quickly committed Company H to

reinforce Murphy's Marines. Attempting to envelop

the enemy complex from the north, it too ran into

heavy enemy fire and a fierce firelight ensued . However, once Company H was able to bring its full firepower to bear, the enemy withdrew and by the time Company G moved in to reinforce its engaged siste r

companies, the battlefield had quieted . Enemy losse s

were unknown, but the battalion suffered 13 killed an d

31 wounded . Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins remembered that the battle, " took place on a hill on which the

southern boundary of the DMZ ran across the topographical crest." The NVA kept its forward defensive

positions south of the DMZ, "while the bulk of his

forces" remained in the so-called demilitarized area . 1 2

Following air, artillery, and mortar missions, Captain Joseph M. Dwyer's Company G led out in the

assault on 12 December. Those of the enemy, who

could, had escaped, and the attacking companie s

searched the area without contact. One North Vietnamese soldier was found alive and unharmed in a

bunker and he quickly was relieved of his loaded light

machine gun and whisked off to the battalion command post. Under interrogation, he told his captors

that the position had been occupied by the 1st Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment, and that the battalion commander and his staff had died in the fighting . Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins later wrote about his frustration of not being permitted "to pursue the fleeing 27th

NVA Regiment . . . ." He recalled bitterly, "standing o n

the topographical crest . . . showing various media representatives the blood-stained trees on both sides of th e

trails leading into the DMZ . . . ." Hopkins was convinced "that a significant volume of enemy casualties

and materiel could have been captured or uncovere d

before being moved back across the Ben Hai ."1 3

During the next two weeks, Hopkins' battalion

searched east and west along the ridgeline, dubbe d

"Foxtrot Ridge . " Employing tactics to draw the enemy

south of the DMZ, the battalion repeatedly maneuvered out of the area as if leaving, then quickly struc k

back. But, because of his losses, the enemy apparently

had decided not to contest the terrain, and no furthe r

engagements occurred . On the day after Christmas, th e

2d Battalion, 4th Marines departed the area by helicopter for the Cua Viet sector where they participate d

with the 3d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment in cordoning the village of Xuan Thanh. *

The first days of November found Colonel Rober t

H. Barrow's 9th Marines scattered throughout th e

southern portion of the division's area of operations,

where the Scotland area was expanded due to th e

departure of the 1st Cavalry Division . Lieutenan t

Colonel George W. Smith's 1st Battalion, which had

relieved elements of the Cavalry division's 1st Brigad e

at Fire Support Base Anne, southwest of Quang Tri ,

continued to conduct company-sized patrols of the surrounding area in search of the enemy, his supplies, an d

base camps. Later in the month, the battalion participated in two combined cordon operations : the first

with the 3d Marines in the Mai Loc area and the second with elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry

Division around the Thuong Xa and Mai Dang village

complexes south of Quang Tri City.

The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, under Major Frederick E . Sisley, which had been inserted into the east -

ern portion of the Vietnam Salient in late October, by

*Brigadier General Hopkins remembered that the week before

Christmas, bad weather restricted helicopter resupply and then the

weather cleared a few days before the holiday. When resupply resumed ,

the battalion faced the dilemma of either receiving C—rations or " the

Christmas packages stacked up in the rear awaiting delivery." The

Marines decided upon the "Christmas packages . " Hopkins quoted one

of his troops, "if we don't get enough food in the Christmas packages,

we can always find a few more rice caches. " BGen Joseph E . Hopkins,

Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
454 THE DEFINING YEA R

early November had moved around the horn and was

patrolling in the northern portion of the area betwee n

the Da Krong and the Laotian border. Lieutenan t

Colonel Elliott R. Laine's 3d Battalion, located at Vandegrift Combat Base, secured the base and surroundin g

Marine installations at Ca Lu and Signal Hill . On 8

November, Company L assaulted into landing zones

near Hill 512, 15 kilometers southeast of Vandegrift

and began construction of Fire Support Base Tun Tavern. Upon completion of Tun Tavern several days later,

the remaining three companies of Laine's battalio n

moved into the area and began patrol operations in the

Da Krong Valley and the ridgeline to the east, betwee n

the Da Krong and Ba Long Valleys.

Despite the rugged, mountainous terrain and th e

physical problems it caused the individual Marine, the

two battalions conducted a methodical search of thei r

assigned areas, as Colonel Barrow later described :

Each battalion has four companies operating out o f

company operating bases, each separated from the other

by about 2 to 3,000 meters. A company will spend ,

characteristically, two, three, or four days in one of thes e

operating bases and conduct extensive patrolling by platoon or squads in all directions. So that after three o r

four days the area extending in a radius of a couple o f

thousand meters out from the operating base has bee n

covered . The operating base represents a place of resupply and for a patrol that has been out perhaps for two

days to rest for a day, preparatory for renewing its

patrolling activities. 1 4

According to Barrow, when the companies ha d

worked over one area completely, Marine helicopters

would then helilift the battalion into a new adjoining

or nearby sector. In leapfrog fashion, the aircraft would

bring the two companies of the battalion that were th e

farthest away into the new area . In turn, the remaining

two companies would be " leapfrogged over them . "

Barrow explained there was, therefore "a constant heliborne move of companies to new areas, but no company passes overland, covering an area that has alread y

been covered by another company." The methodical

Photocopy of Northern I Corps Briefing Map (Nov—Dec 1968) From Gen E . E. Anderson Collection
THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUIT 45 5

search produced large caches of rice and grain in addition to numerous bunkers and fighting positions

which were destroyed . Operating in small groups, th e

enemy chose to avoid contact whenever possible, posing little or no threat to the maneuvering companies. "

On 14 November, Company A, 9th Marines wa s

lifted by helicopter into Landing Zone Miami an d

assaulted, seized, and occupied Hill 618, beginning

the construction of Fire Support Base Dick . Three

days later, Company E took Hill 347, overlooking th e

horseshoe bend in the Da Krong and began construction of Fire Support Base Shiloh . With the completion of Shiloh, the remaining three companies o f

Major Sisley's battalion shifted their patrol operation s

west and south to the Laotian border, meeting little

enemy resistance . With a realignment of divisional boundarie s

between the 3d Marine and 101st Airborne Division s

in late October, the Marine division's area of operation s

was expanded southward presenting it an opportunity

to conduct major offensive operations in and west o f

enemy Base Area 101 and the Ba Long Valley 1 6 The

first of a series of offensive operations, codename d

Dawson River, began on 28 November, as Colonel Barrow's regiment moved deeper into the new area ; an

area, he noted, "which had never been entered befor e

by any forces, other than enemy, of course . " "7 Lieutenant Colonel Smith's 1st Battalion simultaneously

relieved Major Sisley's 2d Battalion, which assume d

the security for major Marine installations throughou t

the division's western area of operations .

Broken down into companies and platoons, Laine's

and Smith's battalions thoroughly covered their

assigned areas, finding numerous small caches o f

enemy equipment, supplies, and a large number of

graves. Although they anticipated encounters with

major elements of the 7th Front, the only groups met i n

large numbers were Bru and other Montagnard tribes -

men who voluntarily surrendered and subsequentl y

were resettled to the east. In his assessment of the operation, which ended on 25 December, Colonel Barrow

noted that while the number of enemy killed was low,

the regiment provided a measure of security for the

entire province :

We have kept him on the move, which combined

with the activity that has taken place in the piedmon t

area to the east and the lowlands still further east, keep s

him entirely on the move in this area so that he has n o

place that he can withdraw to as a sanctuary when pressure becomes too great in one, in say the piedmont o r

the lowlands. We have . . . given a measure of reassurance to the people operating in the lowlands and pied -

mont that there are no large-scale enemy forces marshalling in these mountains, in these jungles, preparatory to coming down to harass or interdict their operations being conducted in those areas) $

Following a short, two-day stay at the division's incountry rest and recreation center at Cua Viet, Lieutenant Colonel Smith's 1st Battalion and the 2d Battalion, now under the command of Lieutenant Colone l

George C. Fox, prepared to assault landing zones north

of Route 9 and begin search operations west of Kh e

Sanh to the Laotian border.» Concerned about the possibility of a Tet offensive on the scale of 1968, Task

Force Hotel and division staffs, as the year ended ,

began planning for a foray into the lower Da Krong

Valley, north of the A Shau Valley, an area of increasin g

enemy activity and an area that had not been searche d

or explored since early April .

Thua Thien and the End of the Yea r

To the south of the 3d Marine Division, in Thu a

Thien Province, the 101st Airborne Division continued the division-level operation, Nevada Eagle . Targeted against local force units and the Viet Cong infra -

structure in the lowlands, and main and Nort h

Vietnamese Army forces in the mountains, the operation's central objective was to maintain a favorabl e

environment for the South Vietnamese Government's

Accelerated Pacification Campaign in the heavily populated lowlands around Hue . Working closely with local and Regional Forc e

companies and elements of the 3d and 54th ARV N

Regiments, the division again concentrated its efforts

of elimination of Viet Cong forces from the districts of

Phu Vang, Huong Thuy, and Phu Thu . Technique s

such as cordons, intensive searches, saturation patrols ,

night ambushes, and the rapid exploitation of intelligence appeared to be successful in rooting out enem y

forces and dissolving the existing lines of continuity

within the local Viet Cong infrastructure .

In addition to uprooting the Viet Cong and his

sympathizers in the populated lowlands, Major General Melvin Zais' airborne troops launched a series o f

mobile operations into the mountains southwest of

Hue. Throughout the first, Nam Hoa I, Zais used

combat assaults, flanking maneuvers, and massed fire -

power to trap and destroy elements of the 5th NUA

Regiment. During the second, Rawlins Valley, elements

of the division employed similar techniques against th e

6th NVA Regiment with minimal results. However,

both operations forced the enemy to withdraw deepe r

into the mountains thereby abandoning his forward
456 THE DEFINING YEAR

positions to allied destruction and at the same time losing the capacity to launch attacks into the lowlands i n

the immediate future.

Throughout the last seven months of 1968 ,

Marine, Army, and ARVN troops continued th e

relentless and successful pursuit and destruction o f

enemy forces in northern I Corps. But as the year

ended, the enemy avoided contact while maintainin g

widely dispersed elements of his main force units i n

the northern two provinces of South Vietnam an d

regrouping, resupplying, and retraining in his sanctuaries in Laos and North Vietnam .

For the 3d Marine Division, the tactical situation

throughout Quang Tri Province during the latte r

half of 1968 dictated the maximum use of its combat elements in a highly mobile posture . This was a

change from the relatively static posture during the

early part of the year. Continually on the offensive

with hard-hitting mobile operations, troops of the

3d, 4th, and 9th Marines in rapid succession drove

North Vietnamese forces from the coastal plains,

crushed the 320th NVA Division, and penetrated and

systematically destroyed the enemy's mountai n

bases, areas once considered inviolate. Still as on e

Marine veteran of the 3d Marine Division later commented that all he remembered was "the rain, the

mud, the heat and the misery that were so much a

part of our existence . " The last two months of th e

year were a blur of "routine patrols marked by little

or no contact with the enemy. "20

In both Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, nevertheless, a concerted campaign featuring the integration of American, South Vietnamese Army, and territorial forces disrupted the Viet Cong military and

political structure in the population centers. The two

allied offensives against the North Vietnamese Army

and Viet Cong had, by year 's end, rendered the enem y

incapable of conducting an effective campaign i n

northern I Corps.
PART V

SUPPORTING THE TROOPS
CHAPTER 2 3

Marine Air at the Beginning of the Year and

Air Support of Khe Sanh

Marine Air at the Beginning of the Year—Marine Control of Ai r

Proposed Changes in Command and Control over Marine Air; Operation Niagara, January 196 8

Operation Niagara and Air Resupply in the Defense of Khe San h

Marine Air at the Beginning of the Yea r

In January 1968, like the other elements of III

MAF, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faced a daunting

task. Supporting two reinforced Marine divisions as

well as flying supplemental missions for the allied an d

U.S . ground forces in I Corps and the Seventh Air

Force, the Marine aviators were stretched to the ver y

limits of their capability in both aircraft and personnel .

In addition to the difficult operational environment,

doctrinal questions relative to control of both fixedwing aircraft and helicopters would arise that would

further blur the entire picture of Marine aviation during 1968 . Many of these problems would never be

completely resolved, even after the conclusion of th e

Vietnam War.

As the year began, Major General Norman J .

Anderson, a veteran naval aviator who served in the

Guadalcanal campaign in World War II and in Korea

in 1950, commanded the wing, having done so sinc e

June 1967 . The 1st MAW now contained over 15,000

men and more than 400 aircraft. This latter figure

included nearly 200 fixed-wing planes and more tha n

220 helicopters. The wing consisted of three Marine

fixed-wing and two Marine helicopter aircraft groups

plus supporting elements. The fixed-wing groups wer e

at Da Nang and Chu Lai while the helicopter groups

were based at Marble Mountain and Phu Bai . All told,

in January, the Marine Corps had 10 out of its 2 7

attack or fighter/attack squadrons and 11 out of its 2 5

helicopter squadrons in Vietnam . This did not include

the two attack and fighter/attack squadrons at Iwakuni, Japan, or the two helicopter squadrons of the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, which could readil y

reinforce the in-country squadrons. '

At the overcrowded Da Nang base where Anderson

maintained his headquarters, the wing shared space

with Seventh Air Force components, the South Vietnamese Air Force, an Army aviation company, and II I

MAF ground forces. Marine Wing Headquarters Group

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A14084 3

MajGen Norman J. Anderson, here in an official portrait,

commanded the 1st MAW in January 1968. Gen Anderson, a naval aviator, had commanded the wing since Jun e

1967 and was a veteran of the Guadalcanal Campaign of

1942 and of Korea in 1950.

(MWHG) 1, Marine Wing Service Group (MWSG)

17, Marine Air Control Group (MACG) 18, and

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 11 were all at Da Nang.

MWHG-1, under Colonel Tolbert T. Gentry, furnished

general command and control and administrative sup -

port for the wing while MWSG-17, commanded by

Colonel John E . Hansen, provided logistics, facilities,

and intermediate and organizational maintenance on all

aircraft and other equipment. Colonel Lyle V. Tope's

458
MARINE AIR 45 9

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

A Marine Chance-Vought F–8 Crusader from VMF(AW)–235 takes offfrom Da Nang Airbase

in January 1968. Its landing gears are beginning to retract into the wing .

MACG—18 had the responsibility for all air contro l

and air defense support in the wing . *

Colonel Leroy T. Frey commanded MAG—11, th e

Marine fixed-wing group at Da Nang. Under

MAG—1 1 were a headquarters and maintenanc e

(H&MS) squadron, an airbase (MABS) squadron, an d

four fixed-wing squadrons. These included: Marine

Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1** ;

* In January 1968, the group consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron (H&HS) 18, Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 2, Marin e

Air Support Squadron (MASS) 3, Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4

and the 1st and 2d LAAM Battalions. Until the activation ofMACG–18 the

previous September these units had belonged to MWHG–1 . MASS–3 an d

the 2c1 LAAM Battalion were both located at the Chu Lai base.

** The VMCJ squadron flew photo reconnaissance missions in both Nort h

and South Vietnam and also electronic jamming missions to foil North Vietnamese radars and communications in support of both the Seventh Fleet and

Air Force Rolling Thunder campaign in the north . In January 1968, th e

squadron had assigned to it 20 aircraft . These included eight Douglas EF–10B,

a modified version of the Navy F3D Skynight, a two-engine jet night-fighter .

The EF–10B, nicknamed " Willie the Whale, " flew both electronic countermeasure (ECM) and electronic intelligence missions. In addition to the

" Whales," the squadron inventory included four EA–6A, the electronic coun -

termeasures version of the Intruder, and eight RF–4B, the photo-reconnaissance version of the Phantom II . FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 58a. Colonel

Eric B. Parker, who assumed command of the squadron in March, observe d

that the Marines were the "pioneers of stand-off electronic jamming ." He

remembered that his pilots "were proud ofthe effectiveness of our equipment

and personnel . .

. Our call sign was 'cottonpicker' and to identify yourself as a

'cottonpicker' in an AF [Air Force] or Navy club where deep-strike pilots were,

would almost always result in free drinks. We were appreciated ." Col Eric B .

Parker, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 122 flying

13 McDonnell Douglas F—4B Phantom Its designed fo r

both air superiority and ground support ; Marine AllWeather Fighter Squadron (VMF(AW)) 235, used in a

close-air support role and equipped with 15 of the soonto-be-phased-out F—8 Chance-Vought Crusader je t

fighters; and a Marine all-weather attack squadro n

VMA(AW)—242 with the newest attack aircraft in the

Marine inventory, 12 Grumman A—6A Intruders,***

equipped with the latest in electronic and radar navigational and target acquisition systems . 2 *** *

From the nearby Marble Mountain Air Facility, across

***The two-man, twin-jet Intruders which could carry an 18,00 0

pound payload were equipped with a digital-integrated attack navigation system and an electronic-integrated display system which provided the pilot at night and in bad weather images of targets and geographical features on two viewing screens in the cockpit .

****Attached to H&MS–11 was a three-plane detachment o f

TA–4Fs, two-seater trainer versions of the Douglas A–4 Skyhawk, used

generally for forward air control missions . In Vietnam, both the Ai r

Force and the Marine Corps employed forward air controllers (PAC )

(airborne), who in a variety of aircraft like the TA–4F jets, UH–l E

helicopters, and small light fixed-wing prop-driven aircraft controlled

attack, fighter, and fighter/attack fixed-wing aircraft and armed helicopters in close air support missions . In addition, H&MS–ll owned

one Douglas C–117D Skytrain fixed-wing transport (a military counterpart of the civilian DC–3) which the squadron employed for a multitude of purposes including night illumination . Three more of the relatively venerable transports belonged to MWSG–17 at Da Nang . Al l

told, including the four C–117Ds, there were over 60 Marine fixed -

wing aircraft based at Da Nang .
460 THE DEFINING YEA R

the Da Nang River and on the lower end of the Tiensha

Peninsula, MAG—16, a helicopter group, conducted it s

operations. Under the command of Colonel Edwin O.

Reed, MAG—16 consisted of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) 16 ; Marine Air Base Squadron

(MABS) 16 ; an observation squadron, VMO—2 ; and three

medium (HMM—262, — 265, and -363) and one heav y

(HM1H—463) helicopter squadrons . VMO—2 had in its

inventory 27 armed and unarmed Bell UH—1E (Hueys )

single-engine light helicopters, used for a diverse numbe r

of missions including observation, forward air contro l

(airborne), and ground support.* The 30 relatively new

single-rotor Sikorsky CH—53A Sea Stallion heavy-lift

helicopters in III MAF, each powered by two-shaft turbine engines and able to carry a payload of over six tons,

were all in HAIR—463 . Two of the medium helicopter

squadrons, HMM—262 and -265, flew the twin-turbin e

tandem rotor Boeing Vertol CH—46A Sea Knight aircraft

that had replaced the older and smaller Sikorsky single

rotor UH—34 Sea Horse. With the shortage of helicopters

caused by the grounding and refitting of the CH—46s in

1967 because of rear pylon failures in flight, the third

medium helicopter squadron, HMM—363, still retained

the UH—34D." In early January, HMMs -262 and -26 5

had 47 CH—46s between them while HMM—363 owne d

24 of the UH—34s. 3

In addition to the helicopters assigned to the flyin g

*The armed Hueys carried air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns and proved to be formidable close air support aircraft . The unarmed Hueys, nicknamed

"slicks," were used for medical evacuation, reconnaissance, air control ,

and occasionally for insertion of reconnaissance teams . Later in the

spring of 1968, there was a reduction of the number of Hueys in th e

VMO squadrons because of the introduction of the fixed-wing Nort h

American turbo-prop OV—10A Bronco into the Marine Corps inventory and to III MAF. See Chapter 25 . Colonel Samuel J. Fulton, wh o

assumed command of VMO—2 in May, remembered that his squadro n

then had only 14 Huey gunships and the only 'slick ' I recall is the on e

that was used for III MAF." Col Samuel J. Fulton, Comments on draft ,

n .d . [Nov94) (Vietnam Comment File).

** Designed to hold a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops ,

the CH—46 carried approximately double the load of the UH—34 an d

with its cruising speed of 115 knots was approximately 25 knots faste r

than the older aircraft . For detailed discussion of the problems experienced with the CH—46 in 1967, see Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S .

Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp . 210—11 and LtCol William R. Fails,

Marines and Helicopters, 1962—1973 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC, 1978), pp. 101—02 and 121—24 . Major General Anderson, th e

wing commander, commented that he believed that there was "onl y

one instance of catastrophic failure [of the CH—46), the weakness was

identified and grounding ensued immediately ." According to Anderson, it was "fuselage and pylon cracks . . . [in several aircraft that) gav e

rise to this essential refit program ." MajGen Norman J. Anderson ,

Comments on draft, n .d . (Jan95) (Vietnam Comment File) .

squadrons, Colonel Reed retained a detachment of 14

Cessna light single-engine fixed-wing 0—1C and 0—1 G

bird dog aircraft in H&MS—16 for both air control an d

observation purposes. Like H&MS—11 at the main base ,

H&MS—16 at Marble Mountain also possessed one Douglas C—117D Skytrain transport . MAG—16 also had

operational control of the U.S . Army 245th Surveillanc e

Aircraft Company, equipped with 18 OV—1 Mohawk

aircraft designed for tactical aerial reconnaissance . For

the most part, MAG—16 supported the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang but also flew missions on behalf of th e

3d Marine Division, Korean Marine Brigade, and Arm y

Americal Division . It also performed a myriad of task s

for the South Vietnamese military units and the relate d

Revolutionary Development pacification campaign .4

About 50 miles to the south of Da Nang, at Chu Lai ,

two Marine Aircraft Groups, MAGs—12 and -13, fle w

out of the airfield located there . MAG—12, under Colonel

Dean Wilker, consisted of three Douglas A4E Skyhawk

attack squadrons, VMAs—121, -211, and -311, and on e

A—6A Intruder all-weather squadron, VMA (AW)-533 .

All told the group possessed 12 of the Intruders and nearly 60 of the Skyhawks. The maneuverable Skyhawk wa s

a formidable close support aircraft . An extremely accurate

bomber, the single-seat A—4 belied its relative small size

and could carry a variety of ordnance and a payload of

nearly 8,000 pounds. Three F—4B Phantom II squadrons,

VMFAs -115, -314, and -323, with a total of 33 air -

craft, constituted MAG—13 . The versatile Phantom ,

capable of a speed nearly equal to the fastest interceptors,

could also carry a payload of nearly 16,000 pounds, second only to the A—6A . Two C—117D transports, five

Douglas TA—4Fs, and three Korean War- vintage Grumman two-seater, single-engine TF—9J fighter trainer s

rounded out the Marine aircraft inventory at Chu Lai .5 *

*Lieutenant General Richard E . Carey, who commanded VMFA—11 5

until 16 January 1968, commented in 1994 that the Phantom was th e

"fastest interceptor in the American inventory and its speed has not bee n

equaled by any American interceptor to this dare ." He observed that i n

addition to its fighter escort and close air support role, it also had an ai r

defense role . His squadron maintained a strip alert against possible MIG

incursions into South Vietnam and that on two occasions, General Care y

stated, he personally chased MIG aircraft near the North Vietnamese cit y

of Vinh until " told to abort by my GCI (Ground Control Intercept) con -

troller. " According to Carey, the " Phantom was the primary reason ou r

ground forces were never attacked by North Vietnamese Air. " General

Carey wrote that the Douglas TA—4Fs and the Grumman TF—9Js "were

constantly used as TAC(A) [Tactical Air controller (Airborne)] when a

FAC [Forward Air Controller) was not available . " He mentioned tha t

" throughout the war they also provided a fast FAC capability for strikes

north of the DMZ and recovery of downed air crews when the slow moving FAC(A) could not survive." LtGen Richard E . Carey, Comments on

draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carey Comments.
MARINE AIR 46 1

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Top, a Cessna 0—1 Bird Dog light single-engine observation and air control aircraft fro m

MAG—16 is seen in flight. The Bird Dog was in the Marine inventory from WW 11 and wa s

to be phased out . Below, passengers are seen boarding a Marine Douglas C—117D Skytrain, a

twin-engine transport aircraft. The C—117D was an improved version of the C—47, the military

version of the DC—3 .
462 THE DEFINING YEA R

Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A421997 and bottom photo is from the Abel Collectio n

Top, two Grumman A6A Intruders (only the wing tip can be seen of the second aircraft) from

VMA(AW)—533 return to Chu Lai after a mission . Note that the bomb racks of the first air -

craft are empty. Below, a fully loaded Douglas A—4A Skyhawk from VMA—211 is located a t

the Chu Lai airstrip . The small maneuverable Skyhawk could carry a variety of ordnance and a

payload of nearly 8,000 pounds.
MARINE AIR 463

Photo from the Abel Collection

A Marine McDonnell Douglas F4B Phantom ll from VMFA—323 lands at Chu Lai. The tail parachute slowed the speed of the aircraft and the arresting cable brought the Phantom to a complete stop .

Until October of 1967, Chu Lai had also been the

home of the second Marine helicopter group ,

MAG—36. While supersonic Marine jets could cove r

the distance from Da Nang and Chu Lai to the DM Z

in 18 and 27 minutes, respectively, it was quite another matter for the relatively plodding rotary aircraft .

With the Americal Division having ample organi c

helicopter support, III MAF decided to upgrade an d

expand the small airfield at Phu Bai, build a new one

near Quang Tri City out of range of the North Vietnamese artillery positions north of the Ben Hai, and

move MAG—36 closer to the northern battlefront . 6

By January 1968, with the focus of the war on th e

north, Colonel Frank E . Wilson, the MAG—36 commander, in addition to his H&S squadron, had six helicopter squadrons attached to his command. Four of

them, HMMs-164, -362, and -364 and VMO-3 ,

were with the group headquarters at Phu Bai . The

remaining two squadrons, VMO—6 and HMM—163 ,

were with the forward headquarters at the newly constructed Quang Tri Airfield, and joined on 10 Januar y

by HMM—262 . Equipped with 23 UH—lEs each, both

armed and "slick," VMOs—3 and -6 performed similar

missions in their sectors as their sister squadron,

VMO—2, at Marble Mountain . HMMs—163 and -36 2

were both UH—34 squadrons with 49 aircraft betwee n

them while the remaining squadrons flew the Boeing

CH-46. HMM—164 had 19 of the older CH—46As

while -364 had acquired 32 of the newer and

improved D Models, which had fewer problems than

the older craft. Finally, one C—117D and 18 UH—34s

belonged to H&MS—36 for various logistic runs and

other miscellaneous missions. While mainly supporting the 3d Marine Division along the DMZ and in

Thua Thien Province and eventually the 1st Marine

Division's Task Force X-Ray, MAG—36, lik e

MAG—16, had a variety of missions to accomplish an d

several masters to service .?

Besides the main airbases, the wing maintained forward airfields at Dong Ha, An Hoa, Tam Ky, and Kh e

Sanh, large enough to land Marine Lockheed Hercule s

KC—130 transports which required about 3,000 feet o f

runway. While Marine Refueller Transport Squadron

(VMGR) 152 remained based at Okinawa, it alway s

kept a small detachment or detachments of approximately four aircraft in Vietnam at all times. With a

15—17 ton capacity, the KC—130s flew resupply an d

reinforcements throughout the Western Pacific from

bases in Vietnam, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. They played a large role in the resupply of Dong

Ha in the eastern DMZ and especially of the 26t h

Marines at Khe Sanh with the land lines of communication closed to that isolated base . Configured for in -

flight refueling missions, the KC—130s were an important ingredient in the air war as they serviced attack

and fighter aircraft in the skies over both North and

South Vietnam.8*

January 1968 proved to be an extremely bus y

month for the aviators of the 1st Wing . During the

month, Marine attack and fighter aircraft flew 4,891

*Prior to the Vietnam War there had been some question whethe r

the Marine Corps would be permitted to have the KC—130, the tanke r

configuration version of the C—130 Lockheed transport . Air Force officials claimed that the Hercules KC—130 was primarily a transport an d

should remain only in the Air Force. The Marines successfully argue d

that it was both and used it as such . See Jack Shulimson, U .S. Marines

in Vietnam, An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv,

1982), p. 268 .
464 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from Abel Collection

A Marine Lockheed KC—130 Hercules transport/refiueler from VMGR—152 refuels two Douglas

A—4 Skyhawks from MAG—12 at 10,000 feet over South Vietnam . VMGR—152, based on Okinawa, kept one detachment in Vietnam for both refuelling and transport missions .

combat sorties in South Vietnam, of which 1,17 4

were close air support missions. Of the remainin g

sorties, 3,651 were in direct support of groun d

forces, and 66 were helicopter support, armed reconnaissance, or air defense .* These aircraft dropped

some 9,000 tons of bombs, which according t o

Marine statistics resulted in an estimated 400 dead .

Marine fixed-wing aircraft also made 476 visua l

reconnaissance and 216 sensor reconnaissance flights

in providing battlefield surveillance for ground commanders in South Vietnam . 9

The record was about as impressive in the skies over

North Vietnam and Laos. These numbers represented

1,434 combat and combat support sorties, 1,180 of

which were strike sorties. The other "out of country "

sorties included 226 reconnaissance sorties and 2 8

combat air patrols. Over North Vietnam, the Marine

strike sorties, 739 out of 796, hit targets in Route

Package 1, that area immediately north of the Ben Hai

River. Marine participation in the bombing of the

northernmost sector of North Vietnam, Route Packag e

4, required an especially integrated effort . The A—6As,

EA—6As, F-4Bs, and the KC—130s had to meet precise

*Close air support missions were conducted in such close vicinit y

of the ground force that they required detailed coordination and integration with the ground supporting fires. While coordination with th e

supported ground force remained important in direct air support missions, these sorties were conducted at a sufficient distance that the integration with the supporting ground fires was less involved .

time schedules "with fully operational systems " to

carry out a successful mission. The two Marine A—6A

squadrons, VMA (AW)s—242 and 533, struck more

than 1,000 targets, most of them moving, in 350 sorties, 34 of them in the northern route packages ove r

North Vietnam. Marine aviators also flew over 38 0

strikes against the lines of communication in Laos . All

told, the Marine airmen, exclusive of the transports and

the helicopters, completed a total of more than 7,000

sorties over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos ,

the largest number since July 1967 ." '

The helicopter and transport pilots also could boast

of similar achievements during January. Marine

C—117s and KC—130s carried nearly 30,000 passengers and more than 6,600,000 pounds of cargo during

the month. Not to be outdone, the CH—53s of

HMH—364 hauled slightly over 19,000 passengers

and over 7,500,000 pounds of food, arms, and equipment in January. For the month, Marine helicopters

from both III MAF and the SLF of the Seventh Flee t

flew 34,957 sorties, lifting nearly 60,000 troops an d

6,617 tons of cargo.' '

These accomplishments had come at some cost to

the Marine wing in both personnel and aircraft . Communist antiaircraft fire downed seven fixed-wing

planes including three A4E Skyhawks, one F—4B

Phantom II, one F—8 Crusader, one EF—10B Whale ,

and one A—6A Intruder. The enemy gunners also shot

down six helicopters, three Ch-46s, one UH—34, on e

CH—53, and one UH—1E . Enemy rocket and mortar
MARINE AIR 465

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19080 6

A completely destroyed Grumman A—6A Intruder is the victim of a rocket and mortar bombardmen t

on the Da Nang Airfield

men also destroyed six F—4Bs and one A—6A in their

shelling of the Da Nang and Chu Lai airfields. In addition, enemy machine gun fire caused some impairmen t

to 328 Marine aircraft, 38 of them sustaining seriou s

damage. Communist mortar and rocket attacks on th e

airfields also hit another 104 aircraft, 13 of whic h

required extensive repairs.* Even more costly were the

losses of trained Marine airmen—enlisted crewme n

and Marine aviators—adding to the already existin g

shortage of aviation personnel .1 2

*The Communists rocketed Da Nang Air Base on 3 January and followed with rocket and mortar attacks at the Da Nang and Marble Mountain Airfields on 30 January, and hit the Marble Mountain facility once

again on 31 January. They hit the new Quang Tri airstrip with both rockets and mortars on 24, 27, and 29 January. They also mortared and rocketed MAG—13 at Chu Lai on 31 January 1968 . 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68 ,

pp . 3—5—3—8 . Colonel Robert Lewis, at the time the commander o f

VMCJ—1, photographed the Chu Lai Air Base from an RF—4B the da y

after the attack . He recalled that at Chu Lai, the rockets " hit the MAG—1 3

bomb dump. The ensuing explosion severely damaged two squadro n

hangars and absolutely flattened the VMA [AW)—533 hangar ." Col

Robert W. Lewis, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Commen t

File). Colonel Dean Wilker, who commanded MAG—12 at Chu Lai ,

remembered the attack somewhat differently . According to Wilker, the

rockets hit " the Navy bomb dump "—rather than the one belonging t o

MAG—13—located between the shoreline and the MAG—12 hangars . He

stated that "bombs exploded and left a huge hole in the sand dune area .

The blast caved in one of my hangars and damaged the others . " Col Dean

Wilker, Comments on draft, dtd 18Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

The coming months would bring even more problems. For the entire III MAF staff and particularly fo r

General Anderson, it would be a frustrating experience . It would be a period of conflicting responsibilities, in which Marine Corps doctrine relative to th e

mission and employment of fixed-wing air in suppor t

of ground forces would be called into question .

Marine Control of Air

By the end of the month, the siege of Khe Sanh, th e

insertion of the 1st Air Cavalry into northern I Corps ,

and the launching of the Communist Tet offensive

would bring several Marine aviation issues to a head .

Especially sensitive was the issue of control of Marin e

fixed-wing air in Vietnam. According to Marine Corps

doctrine, the purpose of Marine air was to provide clos e

and direct air support to the Marine infantry divisio n

on the ground. The Marine Corps had worked out, as

noted by Major General Anderson, "detailed and effective procedures," particularly for amphibious operations, but applicable to extended ground operations,

which closely integrated Marine aviation and infantry

units into "air-ground task forces."13 As Marine Major

General Keith B. McCutcheon, serving in 1968 as

Deputy Chief of Staff (Aviation) [DCS (Air)] at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps and one of the major architects of Marine aviation doctrine, later emphatically
466 THE DEFINING YEAR

wrote, the Marine Corps " jealously guards the integrity of its air-ground team."14

From the very beginning of the Marine Corp s

involvement in Vietnam, Marine officers sought t o

avoid any repetition of the Korean War experienc e

where for the last two years of that conflict the Marine

ground force "worked for the 8th Army and th e

[Marine) air forces worked for the Fifth Air Force ." In

1963, then Marine Brigadier General McCutcheon ,

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, CinCPac ,

headed a 12-man board with representatives from th e

Pacific Command staff and from all of the CinCPac

Service component commands to "examine the full

spectrum of tactical air support" in the theater and t o

come up with recommendations for its organizatio n

under a joint command . Without going into all of th e

ramifications, the "McCutcheon Board" propose d

MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Marine Deputy Chief of Staf f

(Air) in 1968, was a former commander of the 1st MAW.

Gen McCutcheon was a pioneer Marine aviator who played a

large role in the development of Marine close air support doctrine as well as in Marine employment of the helicopter.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A413010

that a joint force commander under CinCPac shoul d

appoint a Service commander (in most instances th e

Air Force component commander) to be the "coordinating authority for tactical air operations . " This distinction was important since under the then existing

joint definitions, "coordinating authority " permitted

a commander " to require consultation between th e

agencies involved, but does not have authority t o

compel agreement . "1 5

Although Admiral Ulysses S . Grant Sharp and his

predecessor failed to approve the "McCutcheon

report," the CinCPac commander used the " coordinating authority" solution as the basis for comman d

of aviation resources in Vietnam . In fact, when in

March 1965, General Westmoreland informe d

CinCPac that he planned to place Marine fixed-wing

units under the overall operational control of his Ai r

Force component commander, at that time the Commanding General, 2d Air Division, Admiral Shar p

overruled him. In no uncertain terms, in a messag e

probably drafted by General McCutcheon, Sharp

told Westmoreland that he would exercise operational control of Marine aviation through III MA F

and that authority could not be "delegated to the 2 d

Air Division."1 6

The resulting MACV Air Directive 95—4 on ai r

support issued in July 1965 provided the 2d Air Division commander "coordinating authority," but

retained operational control of all Marine air in III

MAF. At the same time, however, the Marines were to

notify the 2d Air Division on a daily basis of the number of aircraft in excess of III MAF needs and mak e

them available as needed . While modified slightly i n

1966, this basic directive remained in effect int o

1968. As a member of the 1st MAW staff, Lieutenan t

Colonel Richard E. Carey later observed that the

Marines "were very careful to ensure we provided dail y

reports of the number of aircraft in excess of III MA F

needs," but that by January 1968, "there were seldom

excess sorties or aircraft available ."1 7

Lieutenant General Krulak, the FMFPac commander, pointedly stated a few months earlier that th e

Marines had the air-ground team in Vietnam tha t

they had wanted in Korea. According to Krulak, this

was, "no accident. We have CinCPac to thank fo r

putting his foot down and saying 'No . . . .' We hav e

to thank him, plus the stubborn persuasion on hi m

by a few Marines." Furthermore, the FMFPac commander correctly observed that notwithstanding al l

the talk about the Marine air-ground relationship th e

Vietnam arrangement provided the Marine Corps for
MARINE AIR 467

one of the first times in combat, the air-ground tea m

"in its classic sense. "t8

Despite the operational control retained by III

MAF and the 1st MAW of its fixed-wing assets, th e

Marines recognized the primacy of the Seventh Air

Force commander as the MACV air coordinator. The

air directive permitted ComUSMACV in the even t

of emergency to direct the Commander of the Seventh Air Force to assume operational control o f

Marine aircraft . Moreover, in August 1965 in a n

agreement between General McCutcheon, wh o

commanded the 1st MAW from May 1965 throug h

May 1966, and General Joseph H. Moore, the commander of the 2d Air Division, which later became

the Seventh Air Force, the Marines acknowledge d

that the Air Force command had overall responsibility for air defense in the unlikely event of a Nort h

Vietnamese air attack.1 9

In accordance with this agreement, the Marines

designated a certain number of aircraft for air defens e

purposes. The Air Force, through its control an d

reporting center (CRC)* in I Corps, codename d

Panama, located on Monkey Mountain on Tiensha

Peninsula, had the authority to alert or scramble and

assign air defense targets to these Marine fighters.

Moreover, the CRC determined when and if the 1st

and 2d Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalions

"were free to engage a target presumed to be hostile "

with its HAWK** surface-to-air guided missiles .

Part of MACG—18, the two battalions, each with a

basic load of 108 missiles, were responsible fo r

ground antiair defense at Da Nang and Chu Lai . In

January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Marshall J. Treado, the commander of the 1st LAAM Battalion at D a

Nang, had one battery near the Hai Van Pass, another on Monkey Mountain, and the third west of th e

*The Panama CRC was an element of the U .S . Air Force tactical

air control system from which the Air Force directed radar control

and warning operations within its sector. It was subordinate to the

Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center in Saigon which con -

trolled all Air Force tactical air operations and air-warning function s

in South Vietnam. The TACC in Saigon "did not have authority ove r

operations in the northern route packages of North Vietnam ; Air

Force operations there were controlled by the Seventh Air Forc e

Command Center. Until Mar 1968, the Seventh Air Force Command

Center also controlled operations in Route Package One . " Dr. Wayne

Thompson, USAF Historical Office, Comments on draft, dt d

23Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

**The acronym HAWK stands for Homing-All-the-Way-Killer.

The HAWK air defense is a mobile, surface-to-air guided missile system designed to defend against enemy low-flying aircraft and shortrange rocket missiles.

airbase near the 1st Marine Division headquarters .

The 2d LAAM Battalion, under Lieutenant Colone l

Stanley A. Herman, disposed its batteries in similar

fashion around Chu Lai to provide adequate protection. Lieutenant Colonel David S . Twining, who

later commanded Marine Air Control Squadron

(MACS) 4, credited the LAAM Battalions with "permitting the allocation of virtually all of the Marin e

fighter/attack resources to the attack role. " He noted

that by 1968, only two "Air Force F—4 aircraft maintained on strip alert for launch against unidentified

inbounds were the only additional routine air defense

measures required . . . ."20** *

Outside of the specific air defense measure s

directed by the Seventh Air Force, the heart of the

Marine air command and control system was the 1s t

MAW tactical air direction center (TADC) .**** A

component of MACG-18, the TADC oversaw th e

use of all Marine aircraft, both fixed-wing and rotary ,

and determined the requisite number for specifi c

missions. The TADC consisted of two subordinate

agencies, the tactical air operations center (TAOC) ,

responsible for air defense, air surveillance, and ai r

control, and the direct air support centers (DASCs )

which maintained control of close and direct air support missions.2 1

The wing TAOC, manned by Marines from

MACS-4, had the latest in technology to carry ou t

its duties . When the squadron arrived in June 1967 ,

it brought with it a "modern semi-automated, computer-oriented TAOC" to replace the older manual

procedures. MACS—4 emplaced the TAOC on Mon -

key Mountain near the HAWK firing positions ther e

and the Air Force "Panama" CRC. The squadron

required ample space for its sundry radars and antennae . It took four huts to house the Tactical Dat a

*** While there was discussion of rotating the 2d LAAM Battalion out of Vietnam, the Tet offensive and the Khe Sanh crisis resulte d

in the battalion remaining at Chu Lai . Brigadier General Earl E.

Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, even proposed co move the battalion from Chu Lai to Quang Tri because of a postulated increased ai r

threat. Anderson argued, "we all recognize that it is vital to intercep t

enemy aircraft as far from the troops installation as possible . " BGen E.

E . Anderson ltrs to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 19Feb and

14Mar68, Encl to Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd

18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Later in the year, the possibility o f

the enemy air threat had diminished again and the 2d LAAM Battalion departed Vietnam on 12 October 1968 . See also Chapter 21 .

****Although the Marine Corps normally designated its senior ai r

command and control organization the Tactical Air Control Center, i t

used the usually subordinate term, TADC, in Vietnam to avoid confusion with the Seventh Air Force TACC in Saigon .
468 THE DEFINING YEAR

Communications Central (TDCC) and another 1 6

huts for the TAOC proper. Part of the recently developed Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS), compatible with the Navy's Airborne Tactical Data System

(ATDS), the new TAOC permitted the Marine controllers to monitor about 250 airborne aircraft at one

time, both friendly and hostile, and to handle abou t

25 air intercepts at the same instance .22 *

The new Marine system had a larger capacit y

and more sophisticated air control capability tha n

the Air Force Panama station . More importantly,

the Marines could electronically exchange ai r

defense and air control data instantly with th e

ships of the Seventh Fleet operating both in th e

Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea. For the

time being, however, the only way that the Ai r

Force CRC could communicate with either th e

fleet or the Marine TAOC was by voice relay.* *

Brigadier General Earl E . " Double E" Anderson, a

Marine aviator who had previously worked on th e

DCS (Air) staff at HQMC and was now the III

MAF chief of staff, wrote to General McCutcheo n

in Washington that the "Air Force colonel who

now commands Panama finally swallowed hi s

pride." According to Anderson, the Air Forc e

commander had "asked MACS–4 if they woul d

permit him to send Air Force controllers to wor k

with the TAOC. " The Marines agreed and " they

have Air Force controllers working on the MTD S

*Lieutenant Colonel William A . Cohn observed that "when th e

MTDS replaced the manual system, approximately 1700 a mont h

missions were being handled . . . in a few months the MTDS system was handling over 17,000 missions a month ." He declared this

was a "quantum leap" and contrasted it with the Air Force system

at Panama, "where all aircraft were put on punch cards and the n

introduced into the system, while MTDS acquired aircraft automatically as soon as they were airborne ." LtCol William A . Cohn ,

Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), here -

after Cohn Comments.

**Colonel David S . Twining, a commander of MACS-4 i n

1968, recalled that "the TAOC/TDCC had the capability to similarly exchange digital target information with HAWK Missile Battalions and also with adjacent Air Force control agencies. As earl y

as 1965 the JCS had agreed on joint technical standards for suc h

information exchange . The Marine Corps and Air Force implemented these standards in both the MTDS and Air Force 407-L

development programs but the Air Force equipment at the site

' Panama ' CRC was the older Back-Up Intercept Compute r

(BUIC-2) which had only the Air Force unique SAGE/BUIC dat a

link . Using the Marine Corps TDCC equipped with mission-specific modems a special data link translator was devised which eventually succeeded in automating the link between the two centers.

Col David S . Twining, Comments on draft, dtd 15Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Twining Comments .

equipment and passing plots by phone to th e

Panama site . " 23** *

The several DASCs made up the second componen t

of the 1st Wing's Tactical Air Direction Center. Personnel from the two Marine air support squadrons ,

MASS–2 and -3, manned the five DASCs, usually col -

located with the Marine fire support coordinating center (FSCC) of the supported unit . MASS–3 ran the

DASC with the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang, a

mini-DASC with the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh established there in mid January, and the one at Chu Lai .

The two remaining DASCs, manned by MASS–2 ,

were both in early January with the 3d Marine Division, one at the division's main CP at Phu Bai and th e

other at the division's forward headquarters at Don g

Ha. When the 3d Division turned its CP at Phu Ba i

over to the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray i n

mid-month, the Phu Bai DASC remained behind an d

provided the same service to the new command . 24

Supplementing the DASCs, the two MASS

squadrons also maintained five air support rada r

***General Anderson had more than a passing interest in the

MTDS equipment . He recalled that as a colonel in 1963, he was tol d

that "the MTDS program (which was the largest R&D Program the

Marine Corps had ever undertaken) was in serious trouble and despite

the Commandant's reluctance the Marine Corps decided to take th e

Program Manager route. Despite my protestations, I was assigned tha t

billet and while physically located within DC/S Air, I reported directly to the Chief of Staff." Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft,

dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) . Lieutenant General Richard E .

Carey, who after his stint as a squadron commander served on the 1st

MAW staff, recalled that he "had numerous conversations with Panama in which they sang the praises of our MTDS capability." Carey

Comments. Both Lieutenant Colonel Cohn who commanded MACS-4

until April 1968, and his successor, Colonel Twining, commenced o n

their relations with the Air Force commander of the "Panama" station .

Lieutenant Colonel Cohn wrote, " the Air Force colonel commanding

Panama brought his VIP visitors to see 'his' Marine air control syste m

in action . At this time MTDS was handling Army, Navy, and Air Forc e

aircraft to such locations as Udorn, Piraz, and many other bases. This

in addition to the normal day-to-day operations with 1st Wing AC. "

Cohn Comments. Colonel Twining observed that he had excellen t

working relations with local Air Force commanders at Da Nang, bu t

contrasted this with the "political agenda" of the Seventh Air Forc e

headquarters in Saigon . He cited as an example where he had worke d

out a particular working agreement with the Panama commander i n

which MACS-4 would control returning certain Air Force flights i n

bad weather when the Air Force equipment " was not up to the task . "

According to Twining the new procedures worked well until the Panama Commander "made the mistake of relating this to Saigon, where -

upon he was summarily relieved and was not even allowed to return fo r

his personal gear. His successor made one call on me upon his arrival

and told me that he was under orders to break off all cooperative ai r

control procedures and that he was furthermore prohibited from further meetings with his Marine counterparts . " Twining Comments.
MARINE AIR 469

teams (ASRT) which used the TPQ—10 radar syste m

to control air strikes in poor and marginal weather.

Like the DASCs, each team was usually collocate d

with the supported unit . At the beginning of 1968 ,

there were two ASRTs at Dong Ha with the 3 d

Division, one at Phu Bai, one with the 1st Marin e

Division at Da Nang, and one at Chu Lai, whic h

later in the month moved to Khe Sanh and wa s

operational there on 23 January. From these locations, with the 50-mile range of the TPQ—10 radar,

the operators could cover most of I Corps . The

Marine A-4s, A—6s, and F—4Bs all came equippe d

with beacons that the TPQ—10 could track for th e

entire 50 miles.25 *

In January, the MASS—2 DASCs controlled nearly

5,000 missions, about 3,000 fixed-wing and 2,00 0

helicopter. MASS—3 directed only slightly fewer, abou t

3,000 missions equally divided between helicopters

and fixed-wing aircraft. The ASRTs belonging to the

two squadrons ran about 3,400 radar-controlled missions between them .26

The Marine close and direct air support system

called for an intimate relationship between the air an d

ground commands. With each Marine infantry battalion usually having its own forward air control (FAC)

or air liaison party (ALP) attached to it, consisting

usually of a Marine aviator and radio operators and

equipment so as to be able to communicate with both

aircraft and the DASC, ground commanders had thei r

own aviation advisor on their staff. Although the

ground FACs had the capability to control both fixedwing and helicopter airstrikes, usually airborne controllers handled most of these missions because of limitations caused by terrain features and the elusiveness

of the enemy. The ground FAC, nevertheless, contributed important assistance to the ground commander. He provided the infantry the ability to talk to th e

air and perhaps more important was able to advise th e

*Colonel Twining provided the following description of

TPQ—10 operations: "The TPQ—10 computer compared the aircraft

radar track with the operator-entered target location, taking int o

account bomb ballistics and winds . The indicated aircraft track corrections and bomb release signal was relayed by the operator to th e

pilot. For the A—4 aircraft this information was designed to be sen t

automatically by data link to the aircraft autopilot but equipmen t

problems on both ends of the link resulted in the almost exclusiv e

use of the voice relay. The TPQ–10 operator and aircraft pilots

became so skillful that all-weather bomb miss distances were typically less then 50 meters. The chief problem with TPQ–10 operations was the occasional entry of gross errors in target location resulting in 'bad drops' which in a number of instances caused casualties t o

friendly forces and civilians. " Twining Comments.

infantry commander just what type of air support an d

ordnance to use.* *

Fixed-wing direct and close air support was of two

kinds, preplanned and immediate . In the preplanne d

strikes, the infantry battalion commanders, usuall y

with their air liaison officer, determined the day preceding the mission what targets he wanted to hit . The

battalion then sent the list through channels to division headquarters where the collocated DASC an d

FSCC consolidated the air requests. The division the n

forwarded the complete package to III MAF which i n

turn relayed the information to the wing TADC.At the

TADC, the wing prepared the preliminary or fragmentary order for the next day. In this order, usually

called the "frag," *** the TADC designated the numbe r

of missions, time on target, and the type of ordnance .

The "frag" then went out to the various aircraft group s

to carry out and to the Marine DASCs to control .

Despite the complexity of the system, the proces s

allowed for flexibility. Ground commanders could still

call for modifications in the preplanned missions unti l

2000 of the night before . Normally, a battalion commander could expect the air strike within 20 hours of

the initial request.27*** *

Marine fixed-wing immediate support was even

more responsive. In the event of need, battalion commanders could send in their request at any time . If nec -

essary, the TADC or DASCs, in an emergency, could

divert aircraft from preplanned missions and brief the

pilots in mid-flight to the new targets. Lieutenant

Colonel Twining, a commander of MACS 4, later

**Ground units used VHF radio nets while aircraft employed

UHF radios. All FACs, both airborne and on the ground, could emplo y

either system. Otherwise, the air could not talk to the ground .

***Among both aviators and ground officers this process wa s

called " fragging," not to be confused with the slang term later identified with the attempted killing or injuring of officers and senior non -

commissioned officers by throwing fragmentation grenades at them .

****Colonel Joel E. Bonner, the 1st MAW G–3, related that i n

Vietnam, the wing modified somewhat the formal procedure describe d

above : " . .

. due to improved communications both encrypted an d

unencrypted most of the required info[ormation) was in the hands o f

the G—3 action officers long before the formal info arrived . Much o f

this info came from the Divisions Air Officer and the Ops officers running specific operations. Also, at Da Nang the Wing G—3 and th e

TADC . . . were collocated in the same building and the G–3 produce d

the frag order. " Bonner noted that the TADC worked for the G—3 as its

control center: "The TADC was the instrument that was used not only

to carry out those control functions dictated by the Frag Order, bu t

also by the Commanding General to redirect Tactical Air for highe r

priority missions and emergencies as the tides of battle changed ." Co l

Joel E. Bonner, Comments on draft, dtd 25Oct92 and 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bonner Comments .
470 THE DEFINING YEAR

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A42285 7

Marines of the 1st LAAM (Light Antiaircraft Missile) Battalion talk on the radio next to thei r

HAWK surface-to-air guided missiles at the missile site overlooking the Da Nang Airbase from the west.

observed that, "moreover, there were generally sufficient preplanned missions canceled after launch to pro -

vide a `divert pool ' from which aircraft could be

assigned to immediate requests. "28 The TADC could

also launch strikes from any of the three "hot pads. "

Each of the fixed-wing groups usually kept four aircraft

on strip alert. Completely fueled and armed with an

assortment of ordnance, these planes usually would b e

airborne under 10 minutes from receipt of the initial

request. Other aircraft would immediately take thei r

place on the hot pad . In the event of an intense combat

situation, the wing would prebrief pilots and then sen d

them aloft in aircraft on airborne alert . If circumstance s

dictated the wing could also call upon the Seventh Ai r

Force and even Seventh Fleet fixed-wing attack aircraft

for assistance .29

For the most part, Marine air flew about 80 percen t

of its missions in support of the two Marine divisions .

The wing gave the remaining 20 percent to the Seventh Air Force . Up to this point, Marine air normally

did not support Army units except upon request of th e

Seventh Air Force . The Korean Marines, however,

came directly to the wing which in part was the reason

for maintaining the Marine DASC at Chu Lai . Major

General Norman Anderson remembered several years

later that the Army's Task Force Oregon, later to

become the Americal Division, when it arrived in I

Corps in 1967, "provided their own communication s

into the TADC of the 1st MAW at Da Nang . " ` The

Army division could then lodge requests for preplanned and emergency close air support with the

Marines. Mostly, however, the "Americal relied . . . o n

the Seventh Air Force for preplanned support, "

although the Marine wing made supplementary sortie s

available . Anderson, nevertheless, insisted that the

arrangement required that the supported unit provide

"its own communications into the Marine system . . .

*Army General William B. Rosson, who commanded Task Force

Oregon in the Spring of 1967, remembered that he was supported b y

both the Seventh Air Force and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing then and ,

the support was timely and effective overall . Admittedly, the Tas k

Force required duplicate Air Force and Marine liaison and control part y

assets, but this did not pose a difficult problem for Ill MAP. (We had

deployed with normal Air Force liaison and control party elements ;

Marine elements joined us from Chu Lai)" Gen William B . Rosson ,

USA, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb96 (Vietnam Comment File) .
MARINE AIR 47 1

Photo courtesy of LtCol William A . Cohn, USMC (Ret )

The Marine Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC), located on Monkey Mountain on the Tiensha

Peninsula east of Da Nang, was equipped with the latest in computer technology . The TAOC, run by

Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4, required ample space for its sundry radars and antennae .

it being manifestly impossible for a Marine Air Wing

to possess equipment and personnel to net with all possible supported units. " By January 1968, with the situation at Khe Sanh drawing more attention and th e

planned deployment of more Army units north, General Westmoreland worried not only about whethe r

Marine air could continue to operate independently,

but whether he had to alter the entire fabric of command relations in I Corps .30

Proposed Changes in Command and Control ove r

Marine Air; Operation Niagara, January 196 8

Early in 1968, General Westmoreland planned to

launch an air offensive in northwestern I Corps to protect the Marine base at Khe Sanh and to counter th e

North Vietnamese Army buildup there. Based on the

previous late summer-early fall air effort, Operatio n

Neutralize in support of Con Thien, the MACV ai r

commander decided upon what he called another

SLAM (seek, locate, annihilate, and monitor) campaign. Conceived in an imagery "of cascading bombs

and shells," Westmoreland labeled the new endeavo r

Operation Niagara. According to the concept, U .S . Air

Force Strategic Air Command's eight-engine Boeing

B—52 Stratofortresses would fly massive carpetbombing "Arclight" missions in support of Khe Sanh fro m

their bases in Guam and Thailand . In coordination, Air

Force, Marine Corps, and Navy tactical aircraft would

make precision air strikes against identifiable enemy

forward positions . Marine and Army artillery from

both firing positions at Khe Sanh and Camp Carroll i n

the DMZ sector would supplement the air bombardment. The idea was to surround the Marine base wit h

both a "steel curtain" and a "ring of fire" to keep the

North Vietnamese out.31 *

On 5 January, General Westmoreland implemente d

the first phase of Operation Niagara, which was primarily an intelligence gathering effort employing air

and ground reconnaissance resources. This included

the use of sensors** and the monitoring of enemy com -

munications. At the same time, the MACV comman -

*For discussion of the Khe Sanh campaign from January throug h

June 1968, see Chapters 4, 14, and 16 .

**Navy Captain Bernard D . Cole, who as a Navy lieutenant was

attached to the 26th Marines as the assistant target intelligence officer,

wrote that " air dropped sensors were a primary source of targeting dat a

for us." Capt Bernard D . Cole, USN, Comments on draft, dtd 27Oct9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Cole Comments .
472 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of Office of Air Force History

A USAF Boeing B—52 Stratofortress drops its bombs during an Arclight mission over Vietnam .

Gen Westmoreland proposed during Operation Niagara to drop a cascade of bombs and shells on th e

NVA force around Khe Sanh .

der ordered his staff to come up with a plan for the sec -

ond phase of the operation. Most importantly, Westmoreland placed his deputy for Air, Air Force Genera l

William W. "Spike" Momyer in charge .

General Momyer made no secret about his unhappiness with the air arrangements in Vietnam, especially with Marine aviation. As his nickname implied ,

Momyer, who had replaced General Moore as Commanding General, Seventh Air Force in the summer o f

1967, was a strong, opinionated commander wh o

argued his case forcefully. He bluntly shared his views

even with Marine generals. Momyer told both Major

General Louis B . Robertshaw, the previous commande r

of the 1st MAW, and Brigadier General John R . Chaisson, the director of the MACV combat operations center, that he wanted operational control of Marine air

and "didn't think we should have two air forces supporting the battle in South Vietnam ." While Marin e

commanders held up the Korean War aviation

arrangement as the one precedent to avoid at all costs ,

Momyer frankly declared that it was his objective "to

get the air responsibilities straightened out as we had

them in Korea . . . ." He believed that the Marine system of air control failed to make priorities and, i n

effect, wasted valuable air assets in attempting to mee t

all of the needs of the ground commanders.32''

With the impetus now on Operation Niagara,

Momyer used the opportunity to try to alter the ai r

relationships at Khe Sanh . He convinced General

*General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., who was Marine Corps Commandant from 1964 through 1967, recalled that during one visit t o

Vietnam he had an " extremely angry exchange [with General Momyer) which culminated in 'Spike' and his staff following us to the cur b

on our departure! Verbal fists flying! " Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. ,

Comments on draft, dtd 11Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) . According to a still unpublished Air Force history, General Momyer was

selected as commander of the Seventh Air Force because of "his convictions about the best way to employ fighter aircraft . . . No Army

commander was apt to get the best of an argument with Momyer ove r

air power. " Wayne Thompson, " The United States Air Force in South -

east Asia, From Rolling Thunder to Line Backer, The Air War ove r

North Vietnam, 1966-1973," ms, Center of Air Force History, Chap -

ter 1, pp . 21-22 .
MARINE AIR 473

Westmoreland that changes had to be made . From a

Marine Corps perspective, General Chaisson, who was

very close to General Westmoreland, later related tha t

the MACV commander "was weak as hell on his comprehension of tactical air support on a day-to-day basis .

That's why I think he got hooked on that one . " During

these discussions, interestingly enough, General Chaisson was on home leave in Maine and did not return to

Vietnam until later in the month . Also both Lieu -

tenant General Cushman, the III MAF commander,

and Major General Norman Anderson, the Marine

wing commander, at this point, were unaware of the

implications of the Niagara plan .33

While obviously influenced by General Momyer,

General Westmoreland also had his own agenda .* The

MACV commander already had other concerns with

the Marine Corps command . Moreover, Westmoreland

did not always acquiesce to Seventh Air Force desires .

He had resisted previous attempts by the Air Force to

have a larger representation on the MACV staff. Indeed ,

he kept most strike targeting authority for both B—52s

and Air Force tactical air in the Army-dominated Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) of his own staff rathe r

than delegating that function to the Seventh Air Force .

Even General Chaisson admitted that Momyer an d

Westmoreland had a relationship based on mutual

respect and trust and that the Air Force general was " a

very competent component commander. "34

For whatever his motivation, on 18 January, General Westmoreland proposed to Admiral Sharp tha t

because of the "impending major battle, " that he

planned to give operational control of the 1st MAW

aircraft "less the helicopters" to General Momyer, hi s

deputy for air. He wanted "rapid decision making"

and the ability to concentrate all air, which he did no t

believe existed under the present system . Westmoreland stated that he was considering the move a "temporary measure," but made no mention of the emergency provision available to him under his own air

directive 95-4 . In fact, the MACV commander sev -

*Army historian Graham A . Cosmas observed that "this is a vali d

and necessary point ." According to Cosmas, "the Marine comman d

throughout the single management fight tended to view Westmoreland as little more than a 'useful idiot' for Momyer, whom they identified as their principal antagonist . This may have cost the Marines

politically, since they failed to address the problem ComUSMAC V

thought he saw and instead concentrated on a hard-line doctrina l

argument against the Air Force . This in turn exasperated Westmoreland, who became as a result more susceptible to Momyer's arguments. " Dr. Graham A . Cosmas, CMH, Comments on draft, 23Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File) .

eral years later stated that he was unaware that he ha d

that authority : "I didn't worry about things like that.

I had a deputy {Momyer] and he never told me anything like this ." 3 5

At this point, Admiral Sharp denied Westmoreland's request. In a return message on the same day, h e

asked the MACV commander to consider all the ramifications including the probable inter-Service wrangl e

that would result in a change of the existing order.

Before making a final decision, the CinCPac commander stated that he wanted to review the recommendations and viewpoints of both Generals Momyer

and Cushman on the matter.3 6

After the shelling of the Khe Sanh base on 2 1

January and believing that the long-awaited battl e

may have started, Westmoreland decided agains t

pursuing the subject of control over Marine air an y

further. Instead, he immediately implemented th e

second phase of the Niagara operation . In a message

to Admiral Sharp explaining his actions and futur e

plans, he stated that it had never been his "intention to in any way interfere with the close air supGen William W. Momyer, USAF, seen here as a lieutenant general, was commander of the Seventh Air Force and the MAC V

deputy for air. Momyer was a strong advocate of the Air Force

position relative to controlling aviation assets in Vietnam .

Photo courtesy of Office of Air Force History
474 THE DEFINING YEA R

port so essential to the Marines. " Westmoreland

radioed, however, that he still required the "authority to delegate to my deputy commander for air, the

control that I deem appropriate ." He declared that

in Niagara II, he had charged Momyer, "with th e

overall responsibility for air operations for the execution of the plan ." While the Seventh Air Force

would coordinate and direct the employment o f

tactical air in Niagara II, General Westmoreland

carefully added that the Marine wing would make

only available those sorties not required for th e

"direct air support" of Marine units. The MACV

commander observed that the Seventh Air Forc e

commander and the Marine command would wor k

out the details for the coordination of their effort .

Interestingly, both III MAF and the Seventh Air

Force received a copy of this message which was not

the case of the earlier communications betwee n

Westmoreland and Sharp .3 7

III MAF and the Seventh Air Force quickl y

resolved the particulars between the two relative t o

Niagara II. Major General Norman Anderson, the

1st MAW commander, visited the Seventh Air Force

headquarters at Tan Son Nhut in Saigon to complet e

the coordination between the two. During his stay a t

Saigon, General Anderson inspected the Seventh Ai r

Force intelligence control center for the operation ,

which eventually produced some 300 targets during

a given week . According to Anderson, the intelligence center was designating targets, but was no t

sure whether they were being hit . The 1st Wing

commander and Momyer agreed "to exchange attac k

information on a 24-hour basis." About midnight ,

the Seventh Air Force would inform III MAF of th e

number of targets struck, their coordinates, and any

available battle damage assessment (BDA). III MAF

in turn would turn over its target data and BDA to

the Air Force .38 *

For the Khe Sanh sector, the Seventh Air Forc e

established an airborne command and control center (ABCCC), an electronically equipped Lockhee d

C—13OE transport. From its orbit over easter n

Laos, the ABCCC controlled all aircraft in Niagara

II, except Marine close air support fixed-wing

* According to General Carey, who at the time served on the 1st

MAW staff, " the concept of intelligence center targeting proved to b e

ineffective principally because of its lack of timeliness . Targets for th e

most part were fleeting targets and required quick response . BDA for

the most part was unrealistic . We looked upon the system as ' Bi g

Thinking' strategic targeting but not very practical from a tactica l

standpoint. " Carey Comments.

planes and helicopters.** At Khe Sanh, on 22 January, the 1st MAW moved a mini-DASC from Ch u

Lai to Khe Sanh, backed by a Marine airborne

DASC in a KC—130 .*** The Marine wing and the

Seventh Air Force divided the air space over the

Marine base into six concurrent zones . In the three

closest to the base, aircraft reported into the Kh e

Sanh FSCC and DASC, which, of course, were col -

located. The 1st Wing and 3d Marine Divisio n

Dong Ha DASC and FSCC controlled the easternmost zone. The Air Force ABCCC had complet e

authority over the two remaining zones. 3')

Although somewhat formalized, the aviation arrangements at Khe Sanh were at best ad hoc and sometimes confusing. As General Norman Anderson described it, at first,

all sorties within the range of the Marine air support radar

teams would be "directed by our forward air controllers "

and would be a 1st Wing responsibility. With the beginning of the B—52 sorties, however, "this became a jumble d

arrangement as well" and air control became a matter o f

"expediency" rather than "doctrine." Air Force controllers

complained that Marine aircraft over Khe Sanh too ofte n

ignored the Seventh Air Force ABCCC . From an Air Force

viewpoint, this duo-air-control relationship "perpetuated

the existence of two air forces operating in a compresse d

area ." General Momyer believed that the Niagara compro -

mise placed "too much emphasis on geographical considerations." He believed that Marine air was fighting its " own

private war at Khe Sanh" rather than fitting into the overall

air campaign. As Air Force historian Bernard C. Natty late r

**Colonel Bonner, the\~1st MAW G—3, commented that the lac k

of airbases in I Corps limited`Generil—komyer in his ability "due t o

time, distance, and weather to place a 'Hallmark USAF stamp' on Ai r

Support in I Corps. Therefore the C—130 Airborne Command and Control Center was invented for Khe Sanh and Niagara with B—52s was th e

Momyer way of getting the Air Force involved . " Bonner Comments.

General Carey, who at the time as a lieutenant colonel, worked fo r

Colonel Bonner, recalled that "feedback from the Seventh Air Forc e

ABCCC was non existent . On the other hand our communications

with the Khe Sanh and Dong Ha DASC were excellent and as a resul t

the TADC had a good picture of our sectors ." Carey Comments.

*** Colonel Twining recalled that there was some thought to moving one of the two TPQ—10 ASRTs at Dong Ha co an area west o f

Camp Carroll, probably at Ca Lu, to support Khe Sanh . The NVA

interdiction of Route 9 in that sector prevented the move . According

to Twining the "most logical solution was an ASRT located at Kh e

Sanh itself, along with elements of a DASC . Accordingly, Genera l

Anderson moved one of the TPQ–10's and a mini-DASC fro m

MASS–3 assets at Chu Lai to Khe Sanh . . . To provide interim contro l

of air support operations while the Khe Sanh DASC was being move d

into position and set up, MASS–2 provided an airborne DASC in a

KC–130 which orbited Khe Sanh at 20,000 ft, out of range of th e

NVA antiaircraft guns. " Twining Comments.
MARINE AIR 47 5

wrote : "Momyer thought in terms of using a limited number of aircraft to attack an increasing number of targets over

a wide area ; the Marines focused on providing the swiftest

and deadliest support for the man with the rifle . "40

*

In contrast to Momyer, Marine Generals McCutcheon

and Norman Anderson were relatively satisfied with the

arrangements for Niagara II . While still uneasy about

MACV and Seventh Air Force motivations, they believed

that for the most part the questions about air control had

been put to bed. On 23 January, in Washington, General McCutcheon informally wrote to Anderson, the wing

commander, that Headquarters Marine Corps was

"watching with great interest the OpCon command relationship game and the flurry of message traffic between

the powers-to-be. " McCutcheon acknowledged, however,

that the Niagara implementing order was "simply a

restatement of existing procedures. " In reply, about two

weeks later, the wing commander assured General

McCutcheon that III MAF relations with the Seventh Air

Force "have again normalized. " According to Anderson ,

the heat is temporarily off in doctrinal matters . . . We

both can live and perform our jobs while respecting th e

others' doctrinal position. For the time being, it appears

that Spike Momyer is willing to do this ."4 1

*In 1996, Lieutenant Colonel Richard E . Donaghy, who as a captain in 1968 was the 26th Marines regimental air officer, remembere d

that sometime in late February an "Air Force Jolly Green [helicopter)

arrived at Khe Sanh unannounced . . . . Into the Regimental Comman d

Bunker walked Gen Momyer complete with utilities, flak jacket, an d

helmet ." After a briefing, the Air Force general asked to speak to th e

"senior Marine aviator on the regimental staff," which of course wa s

Donaghy. According to Lieutenant Colonel Donaghy, "General Momyer gave me the impression that he wanted to help us get the job don e

at Khe Sanh, but only on his terms. " General Momyer stated that "he

could send us more air than I could control with the ground and air -

borne FACs I had available." Donaghy replied that the Air Force air -

craft "were carrying the wrong ordnance and were dropping too high .

They always carried 'slick' bombs and were dropping so high that the y

rarely hit the point targets we so often were after (bunkers) . " Th e

Marine officer continued that what he needed were "snake and nape . "

["Snake" pertained to 250- and 500-pound bombs configured with a

special tail called "snake-eyes," while "nape" referred to napalm] . I n

Donaghy's account, General Momyer "smiled and told me to get th e

high drag ordnance from the Marines . His pilots would continue to do

as they had over the past months because he didn't want to lose planes

'down in the weeds. — Donaghy stated that after Momyer left, he started to obtain Air Force aircraft and eventually worked out a syste m

"where we would use the Air Force planes with their low drag ordnanc e

for Marine TPQs on targets well away from friendlies, with FACs tha t

had 'area targets' , or pass them . . . for use in Laos where the NVA bi g

guns were always shooting at us from Co Roc . The Marine air we used

in close because of their ordnance loads and their release altitudes —

they could see who they were going after. " LcCol Richard E. Donagh y

Itr to Jack Shulimson, n .d . [Jul96] and 4Oct96 (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Donaghy Comments.

Operation Niagara and Air Resupply in the

Defense of Khe Sanh

While the issue of command and control over ai r

operations still simmered below the surface, the allie s

unleashed their air offensive in Operation Niagara . From

22 January through the end of March, American airpower in a massive onslaught bombarded the North Vietnamese forces surrounding the Marine base at Khe Sanh

with over 95,000 tons of ordnance .** Within the first

week, Marine and Air Force fighter bombers flew about

3,000 sorties and the B—52 stratofortresses over 200 . On

7 February, General Anderson, the 1st Wing commander, observed that "some fantastic amounts of ordnance

are delivered daily, hopefully with a beneficial effect . "42

A key element of the Niagara air offensive was th e

B—52 Arclight strikes. During the period 22 January—31 March, the stratofortresses, each plane able t o

hold 27 tons of ordnance, released nearly 60,000 tons o f

high explosive upon the enemy. To enhance the concussion effects, the big bombers carried mixed bombloads

of 250—, 500-, and 750-pound bombs. Beginning at

the end of February, employing van-mounted Comba t

Skyspot radar MSQ-77, Air Force ground radar opera -

tors directed some of the Arclight missions as close a s

1,000 meters to the Marine lines. Thinking that they

had a 3,000 meter comfort range, the North Vietnamese had stored some of their ammunition withi n

those limits. The results were some spectacular explosions. Marine defenders at Khe Sanh came ,out of thei r

bunkers to watch, calling the display of pyrotechnics

from the sky, "Number One on the hit parade . "43** *

* *The exact tonnage dropped varies from the figure of 95,430 mentioned by MACV in its history to 103,500 tons listed by FMFPac . Air Force

historians Bernard Nalty and John Schlight use the figures 98,000 an d

100,000 tons, respectively. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 423 ; FMFPac ,

MatOpsV, Mar68, p . 3 ; Nalty " Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Sieg e

of Khe Sanh, " p . 39 ; Schlight, Years ofthe Offensive, 1965-68, p . 285 .

***Colonel Bonner, the 1st MAW G—3, observed that the safety

zone for the Arclight strikes were three kilometers, and " undoubtedl y

there were some missions conducted closer than three kilometers bu t

probably not many. " According to Bonner, the Air Force briefers tol d

the wing staff that " the Arclight targets would be made by map gri d

coordinates rather than geographical features and the target woul d

always be one kilometer square . Their rational was the dispersion of a

full load of 250, 500, and 750 pound bombs would safely land in th e

one kilometer square, ie . Carpet bombing ." Bonner Comments. Navy

Captain Bernard D . Cole, who at the rank of lieutenant served as th e

assistant target intelligence officer with the 26th Marines, remembere d

that the B—52 strikes " were devastating, but their very effectiveness precluded accurate body counts: many enemy were undoubtedly buried b y

the detonations; there were also interesting POW accounts about th e

deafening and psychological effects of the strikes . . . ." Cole Comments.
476 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19163 2

The Marine Air Traffic Control Unit (MATCU) 62 detachment area at Khe Sanh displays it s

radar equipment. Notice the fire truck in the revetment in the foreground.

While the 26th Marines FSCC at Khe Sanh provided the targeting data for 90 percent of the B—52

missions, General Westmoreland personally approved

each of the Arclight strikes and occasionally diverte d

missions from his headquarters at Tan Son Nhut. The

26th Marines sent their requests for the massive air

raids with specific targets to the 3d Marine Divisio n

air officer about 15 hours prior to the scheduled dro p

time . Up to three hours prior to the strike, the 26t h

Marines target intelligence officer could request a n

alternate target. After that time, no changes were permitted in the targeting process 4 4

The MACV timetable for the Arclights called fo r

eight strikes every 24 hours. Later, the Strategic Air

Command pared the response time of the big bombers

even further, sending out three-plane cells every thre e

hours from Guam and Thailand and eventually fro m

Okinawa. Every 90 minutes, a Combat Skyspot unit

would pick up the bombers and direct them to a particular target block or alternate target. To avoid predictable

patterns and to keep the enemy off balance, the B—5 2

cells would vary their intervals over their targets from an

hour to 90 minutes, or even two hours. In the last week

of February, the Air Force changed the number and intervals of aircraft once more, dispatching six B—52s ever y

three hours instead of three aircraft every 90 minutes4 5

While allied intelligence attempted to assess the

effectiveness of this heavy intensive bombardment, several factors impeded the collection effort. More than

half of the B—52 strikes occurred at night and heavy

cloud cover during the day often frustrated aerial photographic coverage . According to an Air Force historian, the aerial photographic experts could only interpre t

"accurately" about seven percent of the total of Southeast Asia Arclight missions. From the available sources ,

Air Force BDA officers concluded that for the period

15 January through 31 March, the stratofortresse s

destroyed over 270 defensive positions includin g

bunkers and trenches and another 17 weapon positions. The raids damaged nearly 70 more of the enem y

bunkers and trenches and another eight weapons .

B—52 crewmen claimed "1,382 secondary explosions

and 108 secondary fires."4 6

Any estimate of the number of enemy casualties as

a result of the B—52 bombardment around Khe Sanh

would only be a guess. Still, enough impressionisti c

evidence exists that the bombing created havoc wit h

enemy morale and at the same time lifted that of th e

Marine defenders at Khe Sanh . In March 1968, a

North Vietnamese noncommissioned officer from th e

9th Regiment, 304th NVA Division, near Khe Sanh ,

entered in his diary : "Here the war is fiercer than in all
MARINE AIR 477

other places. . . . All of us stay in underground trench -

es . . . . We are in the sixtieth day and B—52s continue

to pour bombs . . . this is an area where it rains bombs

and cartridges. Vegetation and animals, even those

who live in deep caves or underground, have bee n

destroyed." Another enemy diarist wrote, "the heav y

bombing of the jets and B—52 explosions are so strong

that our lungs hurt . " Marine Captain William H .

Dabney, the company commander of Company I, 3 d

Battalion, 26th Marines on the isolated outpost on Hill

881 South, observed that "B—52s make excellent CA S

[close air support] birds." He then exclaimed: "Not

much for bombing trails and base areas, but God! Give

them a target and get them to it quickly and scratch

one target. "4 7

Despite the dramatic aspects of the Arclights, th e

26th Marines relied heavily on the close air suppor t

missions flown by the tactical fighter-bomber aircraft ,

especially those controlled by Air Support Radar Team

Bravo (ASRT—B) from MASS-3 . For much of the period of Niagara, especially through February, the atmospheric conditions called by the French, crachin, consisting of low-lying clouds, morning fog, and intermitten t

rain showers, dominated the weather over Khe Sanh .

With the resulting overcast skies and reduced visibility, the pilots flew a greater percentage of radar-controlled strikes. On 18 February, in a record-setting 24-

hour period, Marine and Air Force aircraft, all under

Marine ground radar control, dropped over 480 tons o f

ordnance on 105 separate targets. An indication of th e

confidence that both ground and air commanders had

in the accuracy of the radar, TPQ strikes as close as 50 0

meters to friendly lines were routine . An Air Force liaison officer believed that the Marine radar operators

*Marine TPQ ground controllers at Khe Sanh could handle as

many as four aircraft on " the same pass as long as the pilots flew in a

tight formation and radar did not break lock ." The Khe Sanh FSCC

generally used a rough rule of thumb relative to the weight of the ordnance and distance from friendly lines to determine targets for TP Q

missions. Normally 500-pound bombs, because of their large fragmentation pattern, would not be dropped within 500 meters of friendly troops while 250-pound ordnance would not be dropped within 25 0

meters of Marine lines. Shore, Battle for Khe Sanh, p . 104 . Lieutenan t

Colonel Donaghy, who served in 1968 as the 26th Marines regimenta l

air officer, commented : " I cannot imagine what would have happene d

at Khe Sanh had we not had ASRT–B . They were always ' up ' , always

' on target and always innovative . " He recalled that the Khe Sanh

defenders wanted to use napalm against the ever expanding NVA

trenches at night, which would have "had to be done under flares and

were extremely difficult in mountainous terrain . . . We asked ASRT— B

if they could control napalm drops using TPQ radar. At first they said

no, because that weapon was not in their ballistic tables, but after som e

thought said they ' d give it a try. We scheduled several flights of A–4

could safely bring a bombing mission in as close as 5 0

meters while a Marine member of the Khe Sanh FSCC

stated in an emergency, "he would have no qualms

about calling in an ASRT—B . . . TPQ within 35

meters of his position . " During Niagara, ASRT—B controlled nearly 5,000 missions.* All told, excluding th e

B—52 raids, Marine, Navy, and Air Force pilots exceeded 22,000 fixed-wing strikes in support of Khe Sanh ,

with the Marines flying more than 7,000 of those missions and dropping over 17,000 tons of high explosive s

upon the enemy. 48

In their bombing campaign around Khe Sanh, the

Marines experimented with several techniques. Two of

the most unique were the "Mini" and "Micro "

Arclights, which were used for area bombing and

required close coordination with ground supportin g

fire . Devised by Captain Kent O . W. Steen, the 26th

Marines assistant fire support coordinator, and Captai n

Mirza M. Baig, the regimental target intelligence officer, the concept behind the Mini Arclight was to ac t

upon fast breaking intelligence when B—52 strike s

were not available .** When the regiment received indications that North Vietnamese units were moving int o

a specific area, the Khe Sanh FSCC would plot a 500 -

by 1,000-meter zone in the center of the suspecte d

enemy sector. The regiment then asked for Marine

fixed-wing aircraft on station to conduct a TPQ mission and at the same time alerted artillery batteries at

Khe Sanh, Camp Carroll and the Rockpile for fire mis -

sions. With the bombing runs, usually flown by tw o

A—6 Intruders, carrying 28 500-pound bombs, and

artillery batteries firing mixed caliber ranging fro m

4.2-inch mortars to 175mm guns, the FSCC and

ASRT computed the data so that the initial shells and

aircraft carrying napalm to arrive at Khe Sanh during daylight . We

flew them at several thousand feet over a safe target area and let the

ASRT–B folks develop their own ballistics for a napalm canister. They

got accurate enough that we later did it at night against the trenc h

lines." Donaghy Comments.

**Colonel Steen commented that the Marine "'culture' of fire support planning and coordination integrated with the infantry they support" played a large role in the defense of the base . He wrote that th e

" integration of the ASRT (ground support radar team) and Marin e

Corps fire support coordination apparatus was a brilliant but overlooked accomplishment which saved our bacon many times during lo w

visibility . . . when other close air support couldn' t be used . " Col Ken t

O. W. Steen, Comments on draft, dtd 14Dec94 (Vietnam Commen t

File). Navy Captain Cole who was Captain Baig's assistant related tha t

the mini Arclights involved " several aircraft . .

. [usually A—6As)

timed for a simultaneous time on target with an artillery barrag e

(everything from 105s to 175s) . . . ." He stated the concept " was

thought up by Harry Baig (as was the idea of flooding the NVA trench -

es with napalm ; he was a real wild man)." Cole Comments.
478 THE DEFINING YEAR

bombs hit the target at the same time. Obviously the

calculations of trajectory and flight information had to

be carefully dovetailed to have the desired effect an d

yet avoid shooting down an aircraft . The "Micro

Arclight" was a smaller version of the Mini Arcligh t

using smaller targets and lighter ordnance 4 9

Even with the Arclights, the TPQ missions, and the

Mini and Micro Arclights, a basic ingredient of Marin e

air at Khe Sanh remained the visual close air support

missions.* Despite the crachin, the breaks in the weather permitted the Marines to provide their traditional

support of the Marine ground forces. Upon arrival in

the sector, the fixed-wing aircraft would report into th e

Khe Sanh DASC who in turn would assign the pilot s

to a Marine or Air Force airborne controller. These con -

trollers were from the Air Force 20th Tactical Air Sup -

port Squadron or from Marine H&MS—36 and

VMO-6. At least five pilots flying either Cessna Ol E

"Birddogs" or Huey "Slicks" remained overhead during the day in radio communication with both the

ground and air. Once in visual and radio contact wit h

the attack aircraft, the controller would make a "marking run" where he fired either a smoke rocket or

dropped a colored smoke grenade upon the target .

Given the correct headings by the airborne controlle r

and possibly after a few "dummy" passes, the jets

would then strike the enemy positions . In the meantime, the controller would be in contact with the

ground and make any necessary adjustments in his

instructions to the attack pilots. Once the attack aircraft released their ordnance, the air controller made a n

assessment of the strike and radioed the results to the

fixed-wing pilots. A typical transmission would be :

Your BDA follows: 5 KBA [killed by air]; 2

bunkers, 1 automatic weapons, and 50 meters of trench -

line destroyed; one secondary explosion . You have bee n

flying support of the 26th Marines; your controller ha s

been SOUTHERN OSCAR. Good shooting and good

afternoon, gentlemen . 50

Air support involved more than dropping bombs.

With Route 9 cut, Khe Sanh depended upon airdelivered supplies for its survival . Even with its

3,900-foot airstrip, this was not always a simple task.

The first challenge faced by an aircrew inbound t o

Khe Sanh was to find the combat base . In addition t o

*While the TPQ missions in many instances could be classified

close support, Marine close air support usually refers to missions wher e

the pilots under the direction of an airborne or ground controller visually obtain and attack the target.

the crachin which for much of the morning made navigation difficult, the Khe Sanh airstrip was locate d

hard by a " fog factory," which complicated the tas k

even further. Just off the east end of the runway, the

ground dropped away sharply into a gorge over 1,10 0

feet deep. The wind channelled warm, moist air fro m

the coast into the gorge, producing the right conditions for thick, heavy banks of fog which spilled onto

the plateau to obscure the combat base and the surrounding area. Before the siege began, the structure s

at Khe Sanh showed up vividly on aircraft radar,

allowing pilots to "see" through the fog . But soon ,

heavy shelling forced the Marines further underground and leveled many bunkers and revetments,

resulting in poor radar return . A detachment from

Marine Air Traffic Control Unit—62, MAG—36, operated a ground control approach (GCA) radar from th e

airstrip to guide aircraft, but enemy fire knocked it

out on 19 February. As an expedient, the ground air

controllers pressed into service the ASRT TPQ—1 0

radar, normally used to control bombing, to direc t

landings, with some success . 5 1**

If the weather was clear, as occasionally happened ,

or if a pilot had the skill or luck to find the airstrip

despite the fog, he and his crew next had to brave

North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire . The enemy cleverly concealed heavy machine guns and some 37mm

antiaircraft guns along the approaches to the runway

and invariably engaged aircraft on landing and take -

off. Even when the supply planes approached the fiel d

in dense fog under radar control, the NVA gunners

fired away, "in the dark," so to speak, presumably firing at the sound of the engines. For an aircraft loaded

with several tons of fuel or ammunition, a single hi t

could be disastrous.52** *

**Lieutenant General Carey then on the wing staff commented

that ASRT at Khe Sanh "proved to be invaluable in a multitude o f

roles. We utilized it in conjunction with aerial delivery on the tin foi l

strip, for supplementary positioning and control of A–6 . . . strikes

which we conducted when the Arclights were not available, and w e

used them for Special Close Air Support on the hill positions surrounding Khe Sanh ." Carey Comments.

***Colonel Twining observed that one of the problems with th e

Khe Sanh defense was that the terrain overlooking the airfield was clos e

enough for the NVA to cover the base with direct fire but too far t o

include within the Marine perimeter. The covering artillery wa s

emplaced in caves with narrow embrasures, making it almost invulnerable to counter-battery or air strikes. According to a defector, the

guns were aimed with an awkward but ingenious system of mirrors ,

moved by lines and pulleys . Once completed, it was possible to fire on

aircraft that were in the process of landing or caking off, as well as those

stationary and unloading ." Twining Comments .
MARINE AIR 479

Photo from David Douglas Collection

An enemy mortar shell impacts below a just-landed Marine Lockheed KC—130 Hercules transpor t

at the Khe Sanh airstrip. One of the Marine crew members can be seen on the ground under the wing .

The necessary sequence of landing, offloadin g

cargo and replacements, loading wounded and evacuees, then taking off again created a precarious time

for all concerned . When an aircraft touched down ,

the enemy immediately fired on the runway with a

variety of weapons ranging from small arms to rockets, often damaging the aircraft or causing casualtie s

among the exposed personnel gathered to service o r

board it. Every moment spent on the ground wa s

fraught with hazard . Pilots soon developed the technique of "speed offloading" for cargo, in which th e

plane continued to taxi after landing and the carg o

was simply rolled out the back. This reduced offloading time from the 10 minutes required with a forklift

to less than 30 seconds. Fairchild C—123K Providers ,

equipped with auxiliary jet engines, could land ,

offload, take on passengers, turn around and lift off

again in as little as one minute . Of course, when leaving the combat base, the planes were once agai n

exposed to enemy antiaircraft guns.5 3

The workhorses of the fixed-wing air delivery effort

were the Lockheed C—130 (or KC—130) Hercules, th e

Fairchild C—123 Provider, and the C—7 Buffalo, wit h

cargo capacities of 15 tons, 5 tons, and 3 tons, respectively.* VMGR—152 provided the KC—130s while the

Air Force flew all three types of transports into Kh e

*The C—7, sometimes also called the " Caribou, " is a turboengine version of the C—2 . All the Marine Lockheed Hercules transports were configured as refuelers and were thus designate d

KC—130s rather than C-130s .

Sanh. While the C—130 had the obvious advantage of

greater carrying capacity, the smaller aircraft coul d

land on shorter spaces of open runway, spend less time

on the ground, and present a smaller target on the

ground as well as in the air.5 4

Prior to 10 February, seven C—130s were hit and

damaged on resupply missions to Khe Sanh . On the

10th, North Vietnamese heavy machine gun fire struc k

a 1st Marine Aircraft Wing KC—130, with a crew of six

and five passengers, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer 3

Henry Wildfang and Major Robert E. White on th e

approach to the combat base . The plane was carrying

flamethrowers and bulk fuel in bladders. According to

Wildfang, the enemy fire " set the #3 engine ablaze,

punctured the fuel cells in the cargo compartment, and

ignited the fuel." He recalled that "two explosions

rocked the . . . {aircraft} in-flight, with a third occurring at touchdown." Oily black smoke and flames

entered the cockpit area and "limited visibility to near

zero." Wildfang and White had contacted the base "to

keep the approach area and landing zone clear of operating helicopters, and to alert the base fire equipmen t

personnel." They were able to maneuver the aircraft

clear of the runway upon landing so that the airstri p

could remain in use . He and White escaped the aircraft

through their respective "cockpit swing windows "

although White had difficulty in extricating his foot,

caught in the window. Warrant Officer Wildfang

opened the crew door, but "a wall of fire and dense

smoke" forced him back. At that point, the crash crews

arrived and rescued another three men, two of whom
480 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

An Air Force Fairchild C—123K Provider transport brings in supplies for the Marines at Kh e

Sanh . This version of the Provider was equipped with auxiliary jet engines and could land, unload ,

and take offin less than one minute.

later died of their wounds. All told, of the 11 persons

on board the aircraft, 8 perished . %

The following day, a North Vietnamese 122mm

rocket exploded 15 feet from an Air Force C—13 0

which was offloading troops, killing one and wounding four. Fragments damaged the tail section and the

aircraft could not fly until repaired . On 12 February,

enemy gunners once again hit the transport, whic h

finally departed the next day, sporting 242 new holes .

At this point, General Momyer, the Seventh Air Forc e

commander, ordered the cessation of Air Force C—13 0

flights into Khe Sanh . Ten days later, General Cushman followed suit, issuing the same prohibition for

Marine Corps KC—130s.56

The supply needs of the garrison were too great

to be satisfied without the heavy lift capability of

the C—130s. On the average, the defenders of Kh e

Sanh consumed or expended 125 .6 tons of supplies

per day, compared to Marine Corps planning figure s

for a force of that size which estimated a consumption of 131 .4 tons per day. Initially, however, the

need to replenish stocks consumed or destroyed, as

in the explosion of ASP No. 1, drove the dail y

requirement up to 235 tons. The combination of

weather and hostile fire prevented the smaller aircraft from flying a sufficient number of daily sortie s

to fulfill this requirement . "

To maintain the flow of supplies without landing

C—130s, logisticians switched to other methods o f

employing these aircraft. The most familiar was th e

simple parachute drop, known officially as the Container Delivery System. The Marines established a

drop zone to the west of the combat base, near th e

1st Battalion, 9th Marines. C—130s parachuted bundles of supplies into this zone to be recovered by th e

Marines of Company A, 3d Shore Party Battalion ,

assisted by working parties from other units an d

trucks from the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. The

system was largely successful, but occasionall y

equipment suffered damage through improper packing or heavy bundles crashed into the 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines perimeter, destroying bunkers. Some

drops drifted into enemy territory, or could not b e

recovered from the drop zone because of enemy fire .
MARINE AIR 48 1

In these cases friendly artillery fire or air strike s

destroyed the supplies to prevent them from falling

into the hands of the enemy.58*

The Americans introduced two more exotic methods in the air resupply of Khe Sanh . These were th e

Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES) an d

the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System

(LAPES), techniques tested by the Air Force just

prior to the Vietnam War, but not in general use .

With the GPES, loadmasters positioned palletize d

cargo on rollers inside the aircraft with a hook

attached to the pallet in such a manner that it would

hang down like the tailhook of a carrier plane . To

drop his cargo, the pilot made a low pass over the

drop zone trailing the hook and engaged an arrestin g

cable, much like a plane making a carrier landing .

The cargo slid out of the back hatch of the aircraft

and onto the ground . GPES only had limited use a t

Khe Sanh, not for any fault with the system, but

rather because of faulty installation of the arrestin g

gear. The enemy took the Marines who attempted t o

install the arresting apparatus under mortar fire forcing them repeatedly to leave their work and take

cover. As a result, they failed to anchor it properly . In

the first attempt, the Air Force C—130 ripped the

arresting cable out of the ground . After the Marine s

repaired the cable, other efforts were more successful .

In one instance, the system extracted from a C—13 0

a pallet containing 30 dozen eggs, "without a singl e

eggshell being cracked . " Another source allowe d

that two of the eggs were broken . 59

LAPES missions, on the other hand, were mor e

numerous, 52 deliveries as compared to 15 GPES, i f

not more uneventful. For a LAPES delivery, the load -

masters prepared the cargo in much the same manner as for GPES, except that, instead of attaching a

hook to the pallet, they attached a parachute . The

pilot flew over the runway at an altitude of five fee t

and fired a small explosive charge which cut a

restraining cable and allowed the parachute t o

*Colonel John F. Mitchell, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines at Khe Sanh, recalled that the drop zone was a "'no-man's land '

from the valley floor west of Khe Sanh and north/northwest of . . . [th e

combat base)." He assigned Company C the recovery mission, sup -

ported by Company A . He recalled that the Marines were frequentl y

subjected to sniper fire and an occasional ambush . The North Vietnamese often competed in attempts to recover the supplies, but the

Marines seldom lost . Mitchell believed his Marines recovered about 9 5

percent of the material dropped in their zone . Occasionally th e

dropped material landed in nearby minefields, which required extrem e

caution and his men took some casualties as a result . Col John F.

Mitchell, Comments on draft, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

deploy out of the rear cargo hatch . The parachut e

pulled the palletized cargo out of the aircraft to dro p

the few feet to the ground . LAPES was extremely

accurate, with some crews able to place their carg o

within a 25-meter square . One LAPES delivery malfunctioned, however, sending a nine-ton palle t

careening a quarter of a mile off the runway at high

speed, crashing into a messhall and killing a Marine .

LAPES also caused some damage to the runway, the

result of repeated pounding by nine-ton loads moving at over 100 knots, slamming down from five fee t

and skidding along the strip .* *

Near the end of February, the Air Force resume d

C—130 landings at Khe Sanh. A few days later, on 1

March, North Vietnamese fire hit and destroyed a

C—123 attempting to take off, causing Genera l

Momyer to end the experiment and forbid C—13 0

landings once again . Enemy gunners continued to

take a toll, however. On 5 March, they hit a C—12 3

caught on the ground while changing a flat tire ,

wrecking the transport completely. Only a day later,

49 died when another C—123 fell to antiaircraft fire

while approaching Khe Sanh to land . 60

Despite the many problems and risks encountered ,

both the Air Force and Marine transport aircraft kept

the base supplied when they were the only mean s

available to do so. The Air Force aircraft delivered

over 12,000 tons of supplies to the garrison, with tw o

thirds of that amount arriving by parachute, LAPES ,

or GPES. From the period 5 January through 1 0

April 1968, Marine fixed-wing transports, mostly

KC—130s from VMGR-152, hauled 1,904 tons into

Khe Sanh and carried 832 passengers. 6 1 While fixed-wing aircraft largely provided for the

needs of the units located within the Khe Sanh base

itself, the Marines on the isolated hill posts depended

upon Marine helicopters for everything from ammunition to water. The 1st Marine Aircraft Win g

mounted a monumental helicopter effort using aircraft from both helicopter groups, MAGs—16 and

-36. This massive helicopter lift also resulted in new

techniques involving close coordination betwee n

**Colonel Rex O. Dillow, who served as the G—4 or logistics officer for III MAF, described LAPES as an "experimental U .S . Air Force

system, which was used effectively until all the equipment was torn up .

Although not as efficient as air landed resupply, it was much more efficient than airdrop due to less dispersion . However, it required a larg e

smooth surface ; the aircraft came in at such a low altitude that they ha d

the landing gear down in case of an inadvertent touch down . This limited its use ." Col Rex O . Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd 1.0Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File).
482 THE DEFINING YEA R

Both photos are from the David Douglas Duncan Collectio n

Top, Marines on the ground stand back and watch as the KC—130 piloted by CWO—3 Henry Wildfang and Maj Robert E. White burns on the Khe Sanh runway after enemy fire set ablaze the carg o

of flame throwers and bulk fuel. A member of the ground rescue team can be seen at the tip of th e

wing. Below, a rescue team chief stands exhausted looking at the foam-covered wreckage of the air -

craft. Eight of the 11 persons on board the aircraft died in the crash and resulting fire.
MARINE AIR 483

Marine fixed-wing and rotary aircraft as well as with

supporting artillery fire . *

Helicopter flights to the hills were at least as dangerous as the C—130 runs to the combat base . The helicopters were exposed to small arms fire from hundreds

of North Vietnamese positions in proximity to th e

Marines' lines as well as to mortar fire while in th e

landing zone or hovering above it. The enemy quickl y

learned that the Marines ignited smoke grenades t o

mark their landing zones when helicopters were

inbound. As a result, mortar fire almost always greeted

the resupply aircraft and harassed the Marines detaile d

to recover the supplies from the landing zone . Weather also was a factor. Using visual approach and landing

techniques, helicopters were subject to the vagaries o f

the fog and of low-lying clouds which sometime s

dipped down to enshroud the peaks of the higher hills,

even when the combat base remained clear.**

The Marines on the outposts attempted to alleviate

somewhat the problems for the aviators of resupplyin g

the hills. On Hill 881 South, Captain William H.

Dabney always tried to obtain needed fire support fro m

external sources, rather than from the mortars an d

howitzers on his own hill . In this manner, he conserve d

his ammunition, thereby reducing the number of

resupply helicopters. To confuse NVA mortar crews,

Dabney would set off numerous smoke grenades of different colors when expecting helicopters, then he

would tell the pilot by radio which color smoke

marked the correct landing zone . 6 2

The Marine helicopters brought supplies to the

hill positions directly from Dong Ha, rather tha n

from the combat base at Khe Sanh, itself. This

*Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Shauer, who as a major commanded HMM—362, a UH—34 squadron assigned to MAG—36, recalled that

he kept several helicopters at Khe Sanh for three- or four-day periods

during January and February, and would relieve them with replacement crews and aircraft : "During the siege there was of course no aircraft maintenance support, only fuel . The . . . [aircraft] were parked i n

Khe Sanh's revetments, and the crews bunkered underground in th e

26th Marines CP. We primarily engaged in emergency medevac, an d

emergency resupply of ammo and water, to the various adjacent Marin e

hilltop positions." LtCol Walter H . Shauer, Comments on draft, dtd

1Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Shauer Comments .

**Lieutenant General Carey, then serving on the 1st MAW G—3

staff, observed that helicopters were not always able to use a "visua l

approach ." According to Carey, the "skies were overcast more ofte n

than not . " The helicopters flew on instruments to Khe Sanh and the n

" let down through the overcast under control of a TPQ or on a selfdevised instrument approach on the Khe Sanh beacon . Once underneath they would pick up their fixed-wing escort . This operation

required a great deal of coordination, generally conducted by an air -

borne TAC(A) in a TA4 ." Carey Comments.

reduced the number of times cargo handlers had t o

package and stage the supplies, as well as the amoun t

of time the aircraft had to remain airborne in the hazardous environment around Khe Sanh . This system

was not without problems of its own. One battalion

commander complained that priority requests

required up to five days for delivery, while routine

resupply took 10 days. Further, carefully assemble d

loads, packaged to fulfill specific requests, sometime s

arrived at the wrong position .63

By mid-February, with the enemy shooting down

on a single day three helicopters attempting to reach

the Khe Sanh hill outposts, Marine commanders realized that they had to take steps to remedy the situation .

According to Major General Norman Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel William J. White, the commander of

VMO—6, came to him and stated that the wing needed to work up a plan to keep the outposts resupplied .

Anderson agreed and had White sit down with his

operations staff to iron out the details . On 23 February,

with the assistance of the assistant wing commander,

Brigadier General Robert P. Keller, the small planning

group, within a day drew up an operational resupply

concept, later dubbed the "Super Gaggle . "64***

The idea was to establish a small task force consisting of 8 to 16 resupply CH—46 helicopters, about a

dozen A—4 Skyhawks and four Huey gunships to fly

cover, a Marine KC—130 to refuel the aircraft, and a

TA—4F with a TAC (A) in the backseat to orchestrat e

the entire affair. The Khe Sanh DASC and FSCC

insured the coordination of the air and ground fires. I n

***Gen Cushman, the III MAF commander, claimed to have conceived the idea for the "Super Gaggle. " LtGen Robert E . Cushman ,

Comments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh, " dtd 23Mar69 (Vietnam Comment File). MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, however, credited Colone l

Joel E. Bonner, Lieutenant Colonel William J. White, and LtCo l

Richard E. Carey, with the further comment that Carey named the procedure. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on " The Battle for

Khe Sanh, " n .d . (Vietnam Comment File). This latter version appears to

be in conformity with MajGen Anderson 's recollections. MajGen Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp . 225—6 . Lieutenan t

General William J. White noted in his comments that the MAG—3 6

group commander, Colonel Frank E . Wilson, was the one who decide d

that White should see the wing commander and accompanied him t o

the meeting with General Anderson . LtGen William J. White, Comments on draft, dtd 1Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File). In his comments,

General Carey wrote: "it became apparent that we had to do somethin g

fast . In discussion with Col Bonner and Gen Keller, Bill White and I

suggested that we could come up with an answer. I was the considere d

authority on the fixed-wing participation and Bill provided the helicopter expertise . When all the details were sorted out I suggested th e

name super gaggle as that is a favorite fighter pilot term meaning, ' perceived confusion of the first order. – Carey Comments.
484 THE DEFINING YEA R

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

With the closing of the airfield to larger aircraft, aerial parachute drops were the most familia r

method of resupplying the Marines at Khe Sanh. Top, an Air Force Lockheed C—130 transport drops

supplies for the embattled Marines at the base. Below, Marines on the ground at Khe Sanh watch a s

the supplies come floating down. Several collapsed parachutes can be seen in the background.
MARINE AIR 485

the first "Super Gaggle " mission flown on 24 February, under cover of suppressive fixed-wing and artillery

support, each of eight CH–46s successfully droppe d

off a 3,000-pound external load " covering less than

five minutes when they could have been taken unde r

fire . " One helicopter took a hit, but landed safely a t

the Khe Sanh airstrip. All the rest of the aircraft

returned to base safely. General Anderson, the 1st

Wing commander, exulted "today, was a small victory." He then wrote, "the only way to beat the enemy

is to bludgeon the hell out of him. . . . These coordinated resupply missions under marginal weather conditions undoubtedly will be required again and agai n

in the next few weeks. "65 *

In a typical "Super Gaggle" mission, a TA–4 woul d

fly to Khe Sanh on weather reconnaissance. When the

TA–4 reported favorable conditions, the A–4 s

launched from Chu Lai, enroute to Khe Sanh, and the

helicopters took off from Quang Tri, enroute to Don g

Ha where prestaged supplies waited . After picking up

their loads and carrying them externally underneath in

especially designed cargo slings, the helicopters bega n

the short trip to Khe Sanh flying on instruments an d

then letting down through a hole in the cloud cover.

Just before they arrived, four A–4s struck enemy positions with napalm and two others saturated antiaircraf t

positions with CS gas carried in spray tanks . About 3 0

seconds prior to the helicopters' final approach to th e

designated hills, two A–4s laid a smoke screen on both

sides of the planned flight path . As the helicopters fle w

in behind the smoke, four more Skyhawks carrying

bombs, rockets, and 20mm cannons suppressed known

and suspected North Vietnamese gun positions. The

Hueys followed closely to pick up any downed crews ,

and a Lockheed KC–130 Hercules orbited high over -

head to refuel any A–4s in need . At times, the entire

"gaggle" operated in the hills where some peaks

reached 3,000 feet with less than 1,500 feet ceiling s

and occasionally the helicopters took off and landed a t

Dong Ha with less than 400 feet clearances.66

Using the "Super Gaggle" technique, groups o f

helicopters could resupply the hills four times per da y

*General Carey observed that the coordination of the Super Gaggl e

originated at the TADC. The procedure required A4s from Chu Lai an d

" helos from Dong Ha/Quang Tri to take off at appropriate intervals so as

to arrive at Khe Sanh at the same time. When the delivery was successfully completed and aircraft safely egressed [the area] the cycle [was]

restarted for subsequent delivery ." He observed that Marine groun d

crews were the unsung heroes: "Helos and strike fixed-wing aircraft wer e

often reloaded in as little as 30 minutes time and sent again on their wa y

to support their fellow Marines at Khe Sanh . " Carey Comments.

with little danger of losses . Indeed, only two CH—46s

fell to enemy fire during "Super Gaggle " missions, and

in both cases, the Hueys picked up the crews immediately. During the month of March, the helicopters i n

"Super Gaggles" delivered about 80,000 pounds o f

cargo per day to the hill outposts. Brigadier Genera l

Henry W. Hise,** one of two assistant wing commanders, observed, however, that without the fixed-win g

support, "the 46s could no longer have supplied the

hills." He noted that the Super Gaggle reduced the

"hit rate" among the helicopters from 10 per 1,00 0

sorties to 5 per 1,000 sorties. According to Captain

Dabney on Hill 881 South, with the suppression of th e

North Vietnamese antiaircraft batteries by the fixed -

wing aircraft, "you could get in 10 helicopter loads o n

the hill in one minute and get the birds the Hell out o f

there and into smoke where the NVA couldn 't see to

shoot. " With obvious Service pride, Dabney late r

praised the Super Gaggle : "It was a massive, complex,

well rehearsed, gutsy and magnificent performance and

only the Marines could have pulled it off. "67***

On 31 March, with the coming of better weathe r

and the beginning of the pullback of enemy forces

from Khe Sanh, the allied command ended Operation

Niagara . For the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing it had been

an immense effort. In addition to the nearly 7,100 sorties contributed by Marine tactical air to Niagara ,

Marine helicopters flew over 9,000 . Including the

Super Gaggle flights, the Marine rotary aircraft carrie d

more than 10,600 passengers and brought in over

3,300 tons of supplies to the Khe Sanh defenders .

While the helicopters mostly delivered their cargo to

the hill outposts, they also played a part in the resupply of the main base, especially after the enemy gunners curtailed the landings of the large transports . In

support of the Niagara operations, 23 Marine fixed -

wing aircraft and 123 helicopters sustained some combat damage . 68

Little question remained that without air support ,

the entire defense of Khe Sanh would have been untenable . All the U.S . major aviation commands, including

the Strategic Air Command, the Seventh Air Force, th e

**Because of the extended operations in the north, the 1st MAW

in January 1968 like the two Marine divisions was authorized two

assistant commanders.

***Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Shauer, the commander o f

HMM-362, expressed a minority view about the effectiveness of th e

Super Gaggle . He wrote the "'Gaggle' turned out to be what its name

connotates. Uncoordinated event waiting to crash . " He believed that

the reduction of the hit rate occurred because the NVA had begun t o

withdraw and just " weren 't there . " Shauer Comments.
486 THE DEFINING YEA R

Seventh Fleet, and the 1st Marine Aircraft Win g

demonstrated remarkable coordination over the skies o f

Khe Sanh . This coordination also was tied in very close -

ly with both the Khe Sanh ground defenses and th e

Marine and Army artillery positions along the DMZ . While obviously the massive airlift and air bombardment permitted the Marines to hold the base and kep t

the enemy at bay, it still remained unclear how badly

the enemy was hurt. The amount of ordnance dropped ,

as one historian observed, only measured the effort

rather than the results.* Moreover, despite the inter-Ser -

vice cooperation in the Khe Sanh operation, the Niagara

Operation reopened the old dispute about the role of

*Navy Chaplain Lieutenant Commander Ray W . Stubbe, who has

researched and written extensively on Khe Sanh, commented "the US

Air Force's count of 'secondary explosions' at Khe Sanh, by whic h

MACV determined through their complex mathematical formulae just

how many NVA were killed, is grossly faulted since many of the 'secondary explosions' they counted were actually conjointly-fired artillery

missions: What they counted as a secondary explosion being, actually,

a 'friendly explosion!" LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, USN, Comments on draft,

Marine air in the overall air campaign . Indeed, on 10

March, with the approval of Admiral Sharp, General

Westmoreland issued his Single Manager directive

placing Marine fixed-wing tactical and reconnaissance

aircraft, at least as far as fragging purposes, under th e

operational control of General Momyer. While the Single Manager issue had little impact on the Niagara

operations since it came out so late in the campaign, it

would dominate, however, MACV, III MAF, and Seventh Air Force relations throughout the rest of the yea r

and in reality throughout the remainder of the war .G9

25Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).Lieurenanr Colonel Richard E.

Donaghy, who served as the 26th Marines air officer, also had hi s

doubts, commenting that it was "nearly impossible to measure the rea l

effectiveness of sorties in those days (BDAs were in the eyes of th e

beholder) . . . ." Donaghy, nevertheless, commended General Momyer,

the Seventh Air Force commander, for visiting Khe Sanh and "comin g

to where the action was . . . . General Momyer obviously wanted to se e

where he was devoting so many of his assets ." Donaghy Comments .
CHAPTER 24

A Matter of Doctrine : Marine Air and Single Manager

The Establishment of Single Manager—Point, Counterpoint—The Continuing Debat e

The Establishment of Single Manager

While the Khe Sanh situation influenced the implementation of the "single manager" system at the time ,

General Westmoreland 's doubts about the ability of III

MAF and its limited staff provided an underlyin g

motivation for his action . He especially worried about

the capability and even willingness of Marine aviatio n

to support the new Army divisions he was sendin g

north. From a senior and joint commander's perspective, the MACV commander also sympathized wit h

the desire of General Momyer, the Seventh Air Forc e

commander, to centralize the air assets in Vietnam . All

of these factors played a role in his final decision )

Apparently accepting with relative good grace (a t

least outwardly) Admiral Sharp's initial denial of his

effort to bring Marine fixed-wing air under the Seventh

Air Force in Operation Niagara, General Westmoreland yet remained concerned about air support for th e

newly arrived 1st Air Cavalry Division in northern I

Corps. With the establishment of the 1st Cavalry command post near Phu Bai on 20 January and its subsequent deployment to Camp Evans by the end of th e

month, Westmoreland became even more agitated o n

the subject. According to the MACV commander at a

meeting with both Generals Cushman and Norman

Anderson, the 1st MAW commander, he told them

that with the new deployments and the impracticalit y

of Seventh Air Force direct support for the division, he

wanted the Marines to provide that air coverage . Westmoreland claimed that he received assurances from

both Marine commanders that the Marine wing woul d

establish liaison with the Army division and the necessary arrangements would be made .2

The three commanders had different impression s

about the results of their meeting . While Generals

Anderson and Cushman promised that III MAF

would furnish air support, their understanding about

the undertaking was at great variance from that of

General Westmoreland . General Cushman late r

recalled that the Marines flew air support for the 1st

Air Cavalry, but that the Army division did not know

how to employ it. The 1st MAW commander, Major

General Norman Anderson, related that the problem

was one of communication . According to Anderson ,

he told General Westmoreland that the Marine wing

would support the Air Cavalry, but that there woul d

be need for the Army division to establish a communications network with the Marine air command an d

control system. 3 *

The upshot of the situation was that the 1st Ai r

Cavalry still had not tied into the Marine Tactical Ai r

Direction Center after it deployed to Camp Evans.

According to General Westmoreland, about 24 hour s

to 48 hours after he had broached the subject to th e

Marine commanders, he visited Major General John J.

Tolson, the 1st Air Cavalry Division commander at hi s

CP and discovered that there had been no liaison wit h

the wing. Until that juncture, Westmoreland claime d

he had been content not to alter the air command system, but now "I blew my top . . . [this) was absolutely the last straw. . . . I go up there and nothing has happened and here I've got a division up there . . . and they

[III MAF} just ignored me . " The result, according t o

the MACV commander, was his decision to go ahea d

with the single manager directive.4

*General Earl E. Anderson, who at the time as a brigadier genera l

was the III MAF Chief of Staff, recalled that he also attended this meeting, and it became a little 'testy' at times . General Cushman state d

that any excess sorties would be made available to Army units o n

request, but that the 7th AF had the primary responsibility to provid e

air support for the Army units. " According to the former III MAP

Chief of Staff, " the lack of communication between the 1st MAW commander and the CG of the 1st Air Cav at the outset, in my opinio n

exacerbated the problem and brought the matter to a 'boil' in Westmoreland 's mind. " Anderson further stated that " we should have take n

the initiative . By not doing so, we got off on the wrong foot as MACV

and 7th AF were looking for anything for which they could, rightly o r

wrongly, assess blame to Ill MAF or the 1st MAW. " Gen Earl E.

Anderson, USMC (Ret), Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter E . E. Anderson Comments. Colonel Joel E .

Bonner, the 1st MAW G-3, also emphasized that for Westmorelan d

the support of the 1st Air Cavalry " was priority ONE!! " Col Joel E .

Bonner, Comments on draft, dtd 18Jan93 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Bonner Comments. Brigadier General Henry W. Hise, wh o

was one of the two assistant wing commanders, observed, nevertheless ,

that the Army units needed the appropriate " radios and frequencies t o

enter Marine nets . . . [and] this was clearly an Army responsibility . "

BGen Henry W. Hise, Comments on draft, dtd 22Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Hise Comments.

487
488 THE DEFINING YEA R

Much of the ensuing unhappiness between

MACV and III MAF revolved around the expectations of the various commanders and their differing

recollections of their various meetings . This was

especially true about the debate over the communication net with the 1st Air Cavalry. While General

Anderson remembered emphasizing this matter,

General Westmoreland denied that the subject was

ever brought up and fully anticipated that th e

Marines would have provided liaison parties with the

1st Air Cavalry Division. In a letter several years

later, Major General Anderson recalled that Genera l

Cushman accompanied General Westmoreland during the latter's visit to General Tolson. According to

Anderson, Cushman sensed the MACV commander' s

vexation about the situation and " directed my personal immediate attention to the issue . " The wing

commander then visited the 1st Air Cavalry with his

communications officer. He discovered that the

Army division lacked the technical ability to connec t

into the Marine aviation close-air-support radio net.

Anderson remembered "that we had a problem finding within the wing assets " the necessary communication equipment to provide the link. He recalled

that it took about 24 to 48 hours to make the connection and this was "unacceptable" to General

Westmoreland. As far as the wing commander was

concerned, however, this resolved the problem and

that General Tolson told him a few days later that

the Air Cavalry had no complaint about the qualit y

of its air support. Apparently, however, the damage

had been done . Westmoreland, obviously, had

Gen William C. Westmoreland, ComUSMACV, walks with LtGen Robert E. Cushman, CG, III

MAF, on a formal visit to III MAF headquarters . The dispute over single manager of air complicated relations between MACV and III MAF during 1968.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A191509
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 489

expected the Marines to take the initiative while th e

wing commander believed that the Army divisio n

should have taken the first steps to ensure that it was

in the Marine air radio net .5 *

Despite General Westmoreland's later contentio n

that it was the dispute over the air support to the 1s t

Air Cavalry Division that caused him to go ahead with

the single manager issue, it would appear that it was

only one of many contributing factors . The discussion

over air support to the 1st Cavalry occurred over a two -

or three-week span at a series of meetings where it wa s

*Lieutenant General Richard E . Carey, who as a lieutenant colone l

served on the 1st MAW staff in 1968, commented, "The major problem was that the Army divisions were not tied into our air control system and thus could not, by normally accepted means, submit request s

for pre-planned missions. Of course the problem was one of communi -

cations. We did not have sufficient organic communications to provid e

them with communications capability. Our Wing was already sup -

porting two Marine Divisions. Granted over time we had significantl y

augmented our communications capability to support our Divisions ,

but we were already stretched very thin with all the widespread communications supporting our Marines . I do recall however that the

Comm 0 was directed to find a way." LtGen Richard E. Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Care y

Comments. Colonel David S . Twining, who in January and February

1968 commanded the MASS—2 detachment at the Dong Ha DASC,

recalled an investigation that he conducted concerning "a 'bad '

TPQ—10 drop" in support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division . An Air Cav -

alry battalion had made a request for air support which had bee n

" passed up to the 1st Air Cav TOC [Tactical Operations Center] . " This

agency had forwarded the request through the Seventh Air Force head -

quarters who then passed it to the Air Force Airborne DASC. Ther e

were no Air Force aircraft available and the request ended up at th e

Marine Corps Dong Ha DASC . Twining stated the " elapsed time was

72 hours and the initiating battalion had considered the request 'overtaken by events.— The Dong Ha DASC, however, was not aware of thi s

and sent the request to the collocated 3d Marine Division FSCC for

clearance . The Marine FSCC observing that the target was in the " 1st

Air Cav area of responsibility, . .

. called the Air Cav Division TOC for

verification . This was given and the target cleared ." The DASC

assigned the TPQ—10 mission to a flight of Navy A—4s who struck th e

target about 30 minutes later . By this time the Army Air Cavalry battalion had " physically occupied " the target area . According to Twining ,

it was fortunate that " only unmanned helicopters were on the targe t

when the bombs were dropped and no personnel were injured . "

Colonel Twining discovered in the course of his investigation at "Cam p

Evans that targets, air support requests and troop dispositions were no t

centralized at the senior TOC but rather at the battalion level . The air

support coordination element was expected to query the supported

battalion directly for clearance. The Army maintained a special net fo r

this purpose but this was not known to the Marine Corps FSCC . "

Twining recommended that the FSCC should first check directly wit h

requesting Army units down to battalion level and not clear any targe t

area "for which the FSCC lacked direct and current information o n

friendly troops dispositions . . . ." His recommendations were no t

implemented . Col David S. Twining, Comments on draft, dtd

15Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

only one of several topics .** General Norman Anderso n

believed that it became a matter of concern sometim e

before Tet, but was not sure exactly when . On 28 January, Marine Brigadier General John R . Chaisson, th e

director of the MACV combat operations center, wrot e

home to his wife relative to deteriorating relation s

between III MAF and MACV. He mentioned that

"Wesry [Westmoreland) is a bit jumpy and is up t o

some major moves which [would] have an adverse

impact on U.S . Marines. " Chaisson claimed that he

"worked on him [Westmoreland] considerably and go t

him to give a little, but not entirely." While aviation

support may have been one of the disputed areas, th e

Marine brigadier made no reference to the 1st Air Cavalry Division and implied that his concern was over the

general tenor of the MACV and III MAF relationship .

In his own general entry in his historical summaries for

this period, General Westmoreland made little reference to air control, but wrote of the limitations of th e

III MAF staff to handle the number of divisions in I

Corps and the necessity of establishing the MACV Forward Headquarters. Finally, in his book, the MACV

commander implied that it was the meeting on 7 February with General Cushman that resulted in his final

disillusionment with the Marine command and forced

his hand on single management .6

While Westmoreland 's accounts of the 7 February

meeting deal largely with his unhappiness concerning

the fall of Lang Vei and the slowness of the Marin e

command at Da Nang to react to the NVA threat t o

Da Nang,*** the subject of air control must also hav e

been a factor. Up to this point, at least at the III MAF

and 1st Wing level, neither General Cushman no r

General Anderson appeared to worry about the air control situation . Indeed, on 7 February, General Anderson wrote to Major General Keith B. McCutcheon i n

Washington that the "heat . . . [was] temporarily off '

that subject. Less than a week later, however, Anderso n

informed McCutcheon that he had been "too optimistic" relative to the Seventh Air Force . According to

**In his interview with Marine Corps historians, General Westmoreland insisted that the difficulty with air support related to th e

101st Airborne Division . This apparently was incorrect as the head -

quarters of the 101st did not arrive in I Corps until the beginning o f

March . Major General Anderson is adamant that he had no problems

with the 101st Division and moreover in his book, General Westmoreland mentions only the 1st Air Cavalry relative to this matter .

Westmoreland intvw, 1983, p. 42 ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports,

pp . 342—3 ; N. Anderson ltr, 8Sep83 ; Anderson intvw, 3d Session ,

17Mar81, pp . 192, 194-95 .

***See Chapters 8 and 14 relative to the 7 February meeting .
490 THE DEFINING YEA R

the wing commander, his liaison officer to the Sevent h

Air Force had told him that General Westmorelan d

was about to approve a proposal for General Momyer

to " take over all air operations in defense of Khe Sanh ."7

Despite General Westmoreland 's protestations

about the support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, he

apparently was only waiting for an opportunity to centralize the air command in the north . Such a move fit

in with the steps he had already initiated with th e

establishment of MACV (Forward) to assume more

direct control of the northern battlefield . Admiral

Sharp in his message of 18 January denying such centralized authority for Niagara had left room for the

MACV commander to implement his request at a late r

date . On 28 January, Westmoreland implied in a message to Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, who ha d

protested Westmoreland 's earlier appeal to change the

air command arrangements, that the matter was no t

settled. While denying that centralization of air control and resources meant an "abrogation of the traditional service roles and missions," the MACV commander observed that the new tactical situatio n

required "careful planning and control of our ai r

resources to assure maximum effective use of this valu -

able and limited resource in countering major enem y

initiatives. " Between 13 and 17 February, the Sevent h

Air Force "presumedly at the direction" of MACV

issued several directives which in effect positioned

General Momyer "to command and control air operations, including those of the . . . [Marine wing] in a

wide area and encompassing most of Quang Tri

Province. " 8

Worried about the ramifications of these messages ,

on 17 February 1968, Major General Anderson met a t

III MAF headquarters with Major General Gordon F.

Blood, the Seventh Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff fo r

Operations. According to Anderson, Blood related tha t

with the number of increasing Arclight strikes at Khe

Sanh, the Seventh Air Force believed that "adequat e

coordination requires firm scheduling, firm targeting ,

and rigid control of airborne flights." Furthermore ,

General Momyer wanted "to establish now a contro l

and coordination system which could handle all [italics in the original text] sorties that could be made

available under emergency conditions ." Anderson concurred with the necessity of scheduling and "indicated

my willingness to proceed along these lines, to include

the fixing of altitudes and orbit points as . . . means fo r

preventing mutual interference ." At that point, Blood

stated that General Momyer planned to ask for the

extension of the original Niagara operating area t o

include almost all of Quang Tri Province, includin g

the sector east of Dong Ha, and to extend as far south

as the city of Hue in Thua Thien Province. Anderson

countered that was too large an area " to be directl y

associated with the defense of Khe Sanh ."9

According to the 1st Wing commander, the meeting resulted "in no meeting of the minds. " General

Anderson fully expected the Seventh Air Force commander "to attempt to influence General Westmoreland to issue a flat order " for the 1st Wing to turn over

its control and scheduling of Marine fixed-wing asset s

to the Air Force . While General Cushman would

appeal any such order, Anderson predicted a troubled

time ahead for the Marine air-ground team .' °

III MAF anticipated the worst. On 18 February,

General Cushman sent a message to General Krula k

warning that he expected continuing difficulty over ai r

control and complained that "Mom yer attacks us at

every opportunity. " In a private letter to General

McCutcheon on the 19th, Brigadier General Earl E.

Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, observed tha t

"some of our biggest battles are with the other Services ,

rather than with the VC and NVA ." He accused

Momyer of being more concerned with the "Air Forc e 's

party line, " rather than " getting this job done within a

reasonable period of time . "1 1

The Marines did not have long to wait for the othe r

shoe to drop . On 19 February, General Westmorelan d

radioed Admiral Sharp that with the reinforcement o f

the Army divisions in the north and the establishmen t

of MACV (Forward) the situation required "a new an d

objective look at the control of tactical air." The

MACV commander mentioned the added complication of the B—52 strikes further dictated "the creatio n

of a single management arrangement . " He wanted on e

man to bear the responsibility for this air effort and

that man logically was General Momyer, who already

commanded the Seventh Air Force and was his deput y

for air. Westmoreland told Sharp that he had directe d

Momyer to develop a plan "that will give him [Momy -

er] control of the air assets" excluding helicopters an d

fixed-wing transport . The plan was to contain provisions that would permit "Marine aircraft to continue

direct support to their deployed ground forces . "

Momyer was to coordinate his effort with III MAF1 2

*General Earl E. Anderson remembered that he and other members of the III MAF staff attended the meeting with General Blood . H e

may have confused this meeting, however, with the one that occurred

three days later. E. E. Anderson Comments .
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 491

On 20 February, General Momyer came to Da

Nang to brief both Generals Cushman and Norman

Anderson on his proposed plan to modify the air control situation . At the outset of the meeting, Momyer

stated that he was there to discuss General Westmoreland's desire to have a single manager for air and to

bring back to the MACV commander the III MAF

perspective . In a sense, the conferees generally talked

past one another.* The Marine generals emphasize d

responsiveness to the ground forces while General

Momyer and his staff members stressed the need "to

mass more of our efforts ." In some frustration and obviously as a jab at the Air Force, General Cushman stated it made as much sense to centralize control of helicopters as that of fixed-wing aircraft. The Marine

general knew very well that Momyer had no desire t o

take on the Army on this subject. The Seventh Air

Force commander merely stated that helicopters were

another matter and had " to be treated separately. "

According to the proposed outlines of the MACV plan ,

Momyer in his dual capacity as Commanding General,

Seventh Air Force, and the MACV Deputy Commander for Air Operations, would have the responsibilit y

for most Marine fixed-wing aviation . 1 3

General Cushman immediately protested and forwarded his concerns to General Westmoreland . On

22 February, the MACV commander attempted to

placate Cushman and told him that as the ground

field commander in I Corps, the III MAF commande r

would still retain the "tactical air assets available to

support your forces, subject to modifications that I

might invoke as the situation dictates." At the same

time, Westmoreland stated that his air deputy ,

Momyer, "would have general direction of all routin e

matters relating to the procedures for requesting ,

fragging and controlling air support ." On the cover

sheet of the message from Westmoreland, a Marin e

staff officer penned in green ink: "These two positions

are in direct contradiction in my opinion ." In Saigon,

a week later, Brigadier General Chaisson jotted dow n

in his diary: "AF [Air Force] is doing real job on II I

MAF. Will get op con [operational control] of wing .

Very unprofessional work ." The Marines had lost the

fight in Saigon.1 4

The battle had shifted to Honolulu and Washington. In Washington, on 21 February, Marine Corp s

Commandant Leonard F. Chapman sent a memoran-

*Among the participants in the meeting were Air Force general s

Momyer and Blood and Marine generals Cushman, Norman Anderson ,

and Earl E . Anderson .

Photo courtesy of Office of Air Force Histor y

Adm U. S. Grant Sharp, CinCPac, nearly at end of his tou r

of duty, acquiesced to Gen Westmoreland's request for "singl e

manager" control of air after rejecting previous proposals .

dum to General Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, protesting General Westmoreland 's proposed action as abrogating the Marine air-ground tea m

and in violation of JCS directives establishing "III

MAF as a separate uni-Service command directly sub -

ordinate to MACV. " Wheeler in turn forwarded a copy

of the memorandum to the MACV commander. As

expected, Westmoreland denied that this was the case .

He insisted that Marine air would support the Marin e

ground forces when "the tactical situation permitted . "

Westmoreland argued that he had now, including th e

Marine divisions, the equivalent of a field army in I

Corps. He mentioned that the air support of these

forces required large elements of the Seventh Air Forc e

as well as the Marine aircraft wing . Because of the air

campaign in support of both Khe Sanh and the allie d

forces in the northern two provinces, the MACV commander contended that "Marine air therefore, has

become a junior air partner in the total air effort . . . . "

According to Westmoreland the problem was one of

"coordination and directing all of these diversified air

elements so that the air support can be put where an d

when needed in the required quantity." This needed,

the MACV commander asserted, "a single airman

[obviously General Momyer} I can hold responsible for

coordinating all the air effort that is made available t o

me." Westmoreland maintained that his proposed
492 THE DEFINING YEA R

modifications would result in "no change in Service

doctrine or roles and mission . " 1 5

Such arguments apparently convinced Admira l

Sharp at CinCPac headquarters in Honolulu to acquiesce to Westmoreland's request . On 28 February, General Westmoreland sent to Honolulu Major Genera l

Blood of the Seventh Air Force "to make sure Admiral

Sharp understood the arrangement in detail ." According to the MACV commander, he wanted to reassure

Sharp that this was not an "Air Force maneuver," but

rather his " initiative as a joint commander." This effort

apparently counterbalanced any influence that th e

Marines may have had in Hawaii to reverse the decision. Lieutenant General Krulak, the FMFPac commander whose headquarters was in the same buildin g

as that of Admiral Sharp, admitted his failure to persuade the Navy admiral . According to Krulak, Sharp

refused to listen to the Marine case, "telling me that he

already knows our side, and anyhow, that Westy is a

big commander, and should have what he wants. " In a

later interview, Admiral Sharp declared that h e

approved the single manager concept because with th e

arrival of large Army forces in I Corps, he "thought i t

a reasonable thing to do ."16

On 4 March, MACV learned that Admiral Sharp

had approved the single manager concept . Marine

Brigadier General Chaisson at the MACV Comba t

Operations Center received the assignment to prepare

the final directive . Two days later, Major Genera l

Anderson, the 1st Wing commander, sent his assistant

commander, Brigadier General Robert P. Keller t o

Saigon to iron-out any remaining differences. According to General Anderson, the Marines proposed

"slightly more palatable language" and some alterations in a couple "wiring diagrams," but no substantive changes. Although apparently acceptable to some

of the MACV staff, Air Force Major General Blood ,

supported by Generals Momyer and Westmoreland ,

vetoed the III MAF proposed alterations. General

Momyer and his staff planned to hold on to ever y

advantage they had obtained and viewed the singl e

manager issue as a "catalyst for change ."1 7

With only minor revisions, Westmoreland's implementing order differed very little from the proposal

that he had forwarded to CinCPac . Admiral Sharp had

insisted that the senior DASC in I Corps retain "scramble" and "divert" authority in the event of emergenc y

and that Lieutenant General Cushman be permitted to

communicate directly with CinCPac on "proposed

improvements in the system or in event of his dissatisfaction with the employment of Marine air assets ."

According to the directive, CinCPac would be an

addressee on any message from Cushman to Westmoreland on this subject . Contrary to the assertion b y

the ComUSMACV commander that he had given due

consideration to the Marine perspective, the III MAF

staff denied that General Westmoreland in his forwarding letter provided any evidence of its "violen t

disagreement. " 1 8

Published on 7 March, to be implemented thre e

days later, in the form of a letter from General Westmoreland to General Cushman with six enclosures, th e

single manager directive outlined the new aviatio n

command arrangements . Westmoreland officially

placed with General Momyer the " responsibility fo r

coordinating and directing the air effort throughou t

Vietnam, to include I CTZ and the extended battl e

area ." General Cushman was to make available t o

Momyer as the MACV Deputy Commander for Ai r

Operations, all strike and reconnaissance aircraft an d

that part of the Marine air command and control system that related to the employment of these aircraft.

Marine fixed-wing transports, observation aircraft, and

helicopters were exempted from the directive . According to the order, the MACV and III MAF control systems were to be joined for fixed-wing jet operations ,

but retain the "integrity of the Marine tactical contro l

system . . . ." Marine aviation officers were to augmen t

the various Air Force/MACV control systems . These

included the MACV Tactical Air Support Elemen t

(TASE) and Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Contro l

Center (TACC), both located at Tan Son Nhut Air Bas e

in Saigon ; the I DASC that the Seventh Air Forc e

maintained at I Corps headquarters in Da Nang ; and

DASC Victor that the Seventh Air Force maintained a t

Phu Bai for the MACV (Forward) headquarters, soo n

to become Provisional Corps, Vietnam .19 *

The concept was that preplanned requests for fixed -

wing air support from lower commands be consolidated at the I Corps tactical operations center, and the n

forwarded to the MACV TASE . In Saigon, the TASE

would then determine the allocation of strikes to th e

various commands and send this list to the Seventh Ai r

Force TACC. The TACC in turn would assign the targets to specific air units, establish ordnance loads, and

time on target.

As much as the tactical situation permitted, "every

effort would be made to have Marine aircraft support

Marine units." At the end of his letter, General West-

*See Chapters 8 and 13 for the establishment of the MACV For -

ward and Provisional Corps headquarters .
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 493

moreland declared that these instructions "will be

reviewed within thirty days to determine those technical and organizational changes which may prove

necessary as a result of experience in this single management system. "2 0

Despite the decision and the issuance of the orde r

on single manager, there were still several rough edge s

to its implementation . Major General Anderso n

observed that III MAF did not receive a copy of th e

directive until 9 March and then only through the

personal intervention of General Abrams, who wa s

still at Phu Bai . On the morning of the 9th as well, III

MAF received from the Seventh Air Force interi m

instructions for procedures relative to Marine fixed -

wing strike sorties and the incorporation of these sorties into the Seventh Air Force daily "frag" or fragmentary order. According to the Marine wing

commander, the Air Force wanted specific information on number of Marine aircraft, flight schedules,

and sortie rates. At this point, the Marine fighter and

fighter/attack aircraft remained exempt from the Ai r

Force frag, but "were told to continue our operations

and cross-tell with I DASC who in turn would kee p

the TACC informed."2 1

General Anderson, the wing commander, was especially unhappy about the employment of the Marine

photo reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft of

VMCJ—1 . According to Anderson, the Air Force

ignored the radar and electronic capability of the

squadron but informed the Marine wing that it

planned to reevaluate current photo reconnaissanc e

missions. Future requests for planned photo missions

were to go to the III MAF G—2 (Intelligence) (Air) sec -

tion and then forwarded to the Seventh Air Force

TACC. The TACC would then publish the mission s

and sorties in the frag order it issued to the wing . General Anderson related that the wing then reported daily

by phone and by followup message the activities of th e

squadron. When the photo aircraft were airborne, they

came under the control of the particular DASC in th e

target area. The MACV TASE had the authority to

divert any of the aircraft from any of the DASCs .22 *

*Colonel Robert W. Lewis, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded VMCJ–1 until mid March, remembered that he was "in the middl e

of the air control furor ." He recalled that "in early March we started to

get our photo recon taskings from Saigon . That meant that a Marin e

battalion commander who wanted imagery to his front had to wait 2–3

days for a response . When there was a hot operation on we carried th e

7th Air Force missions with us in the airplane along with chose slippe d

under the table to us by our inc[elligence] briefers . Usually we had

time to complete most of the Saigon missions. I, or one of my more

experienced pilots, flew the ' weather hop' at first light every morning

On 11 March, the Seventh Air Force I DASC at I

Corps headquarters and DASC Victor at Phu Bai

announced that they were now functioning under th e

new system and had assumed control of air operations .

I DASC stated that its mission was "to furnish more

equitably distributed air support throughout I Corps. "

Major General Anderson, the wing commander

remarked caustically that DASC Victor was more

"modest. " It merely stated that it had assumed "control

for PCV [Provisional Corps Vietnam) area ." On the

11th and the 16th, General Anderson met with th e

director of the Seventh Air Force TACC to discuss the

eventual location of I DASC and the phasing in of the

Marine Corps system with that of the Air Force. General Anderson wanted to collocate the I DASC with th e

1st MAW Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) in the

wing compound and recommended a three-stage

implementation. The first stage would consist o f

improving the information exchange between the

TADC and I DASC so that the latter could transmi t

the necessary data back to Saigon . In the second stage ,

the U.S . sector of I DASC would be located in the 1st

MAW G—3 building and then in the final stage would

be the collocation of I DASC with the III MAF DASC

and 1st MAW TADC. The Air Force agreed to the first

two phases as a temporary measure, but recommended

that the permanent location of the III MAF and I

and it was a simple matter to call back to Da Nang and tell them t o

brief and launch the subsequent photo missions at the Marine hot

spots, where we had observed the weather to be suitable for good picture taking ." Lewis wrote that the Seventh Air Force TACC "did no t

understand that immediate photos were required if effective CAS

[close air support] was to happen . " According to Colonel Lewis, " during the early days of the battle for Khe Sanh we would make a low leve l

run on the airfield perimeter and approaches once an hour, have th e

film to our photo interpreters 20 minutes lacer, and immediatel y

advise the 26th Marines intel . section what the threat had been 3 0

minutes before . You can't do that with 2-day tasking ." He stated tha t

the squadron tried to make the system work "to the benefit of ou r

Marines on the ground . During those periods when enemy contact was

light we would aggressively execute the Saigon photo plan—it did

have a strategic, theater intelligence benefit . However, when Marine s

were in heavy contact anywhere in I Corps TAOR they got all they

requested from us . Often we would arrange for a courier helicopter to

drop by Da Nang, pick up negatives which were exposed 20 minutes

before and deliver them to III MAF intel. We didn 't, however have to

rely on III MAF to pass intel . to the ground units . We had photo interpreters assigned to VMCJ–1 and they would read wet negatives shortly after the RF–4B landed . Hot items would then be passed directly t o

the unit involved (in some cases) . We would then deliver all th e

imagery to III MAF for further delivery to intelligence units in RVN ,

Hawaii and ConUS . What they ever did with all those pictures we

never knew . No I Corps ground units ever saw them ." Col Robert W.

Lewis, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).
494 THE DEFINING YEA R

DASC air control agencies should be at III MAF head -

quarters rather than in the 1st Wing compound . General Cushman and his staff supported the Air Force

rather than the wing commander relative to the location of the I Corps DASC at III MAF. 23

While the question of the location of I DASC

remained in abeyance, on 18 March 1968, Major General Anderson in a message to both Generals Cushma n

and General Krulak outlined what he considered th e

weakness of single manager to date . In fact, according

to the 1st MAW commander, the system was no t

working . Anderson believed that MACV and the Seventh Air Force, "in the haste to implement the procedure," overlooked too many details and the necessary

air control facilities were simply not prepared to tak e

on their new tasks. Anderson admitted, however, that

the Marine and Air Force agencies were identifying

and sorting out many of the problems and that the

wing was receiving "more cooperation than expected . "

The wing commander promised to "provide information, assistance, and assets as requested and required to

make the actual transition as smooth as possible ." At

the same time, he declared "until such time as 7t h

AF/MACV can formulate, man, and put into being a

modus operandi for I Corps, the wing will continue t o

do what is needed to operate and provide the necessary

support." As he concluded, "I see no other way to go,

without causing undue risk to our ground Marine currently in critical contact. "24

The following day, in a personal note to General

McCutcheon, Major General Anderson enclosed hi s

report of the first week's operations under single manager that he had forwarded to General Cushman . The

wing commander half humorously wrote : "If it reads

in a disjointed fashion, and therefore gives the impression of describing a disjointed maneuver, it is a perfec t

piece of writing." He observed that for III MAF and

the wing the subject of single manager was a " closed

issue . We have to, always hoping that you will be

more effective in Washington than anyone else has

been up the line . " In an earlier letter, Anderson had

assured McCutcheon that "we will break our backs t o

Adm Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, center, visits with VAdm William F. Bringle,

Seventh Fleet Commande, left. Adm Moorer, like the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Army

Chief of Staff, supported the Marine position on single manager.

Unnumbered Department of Defense (USMC) Photo
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 495

provide you with both fact and fancy if you shoul d

decide to go this route ."2 5

In many respects, the entire question of single manager had passed out of the hands of both the III MA F

and Fleet Marine Force Pacific commands to influence .

After Admiral Sharp approved the single manage r

directive, Lieutenant General Krulak advised Genera l

Cushman about future actions on the subject. Krulak

told the III MAF commander to reassure General

Westmoreland "that even a poor decision will have

your energetic and unreserved support. " At the same

time, the FMFPac commander directed that Cushma n

assemble "an honest record of the Air Force stewardship of our assets." Krulak then mentioned that he pu t

Admiral Sharp "on notice that he could be in for trouble," and that the latter had exceeded his authority i n

approving the single manager directive .2 6

In Washington, General Chapman and th e

HQMC staff had already begun its counterattack .

On 4 March, upon learning of Admiral Sharp's decision, the Marine Corps Commandant officiall y

placed the matter before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In

a memorandum to the Chairman, General Wheeler,

the Commandant protested both the Westmorelan d

directive and its approval by Admiral Sharp . Chapman argued "irrespective of the various organization -

al formats and terms of reference, the net effect . . . is

to remove Marine fighter/bomber/reconnaissanc e

assets from being directly responsive to CG III

MAF." The Commandant closed with the statement

that he could not "concur in such an arrangement "

and asked that the Joint Chiefs review the entire subject. Like General Krulak, the Commandant maintained that both General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp had exceeded their authority relative t o

Marine air in Vietnam.2 7

The Marines could expect some assistance in th e

"joint arena" from at least the Navy. Despite Admiral

Sharp's approval of the directive, Admiral Thomas H .

Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Vice

Admiral John J . Hyland, commander of the Sevent h

Fleet, both had doubts about the wisdom of the decision. Hyland feared that now that Westmoreland ha d

obtained control over Marine air, that he might wan t

to obtain similar authority over the Navy's carrier aircraft. He also worried about the MACV commander's

intentions about Navy and Marine amphibious force s

and Navy gunfire ships in Vietnamese waters . Moore r

wondered why, if the Air Force was so dedicated to centralized control, it had not placed its B—52 SAC force s

under the centralized command . In any event, Moorer

remarked that he would support the Marine Corp s

position with the Joint Chiefs.2 8

While the single manager controversy never formally went beyond the Department of Defense, General Westmoreland remembered that shortly after th e

publication of the directive, he received a telephone call

from President Johnson . According to the MACV

commander, the President asked him bluntly, "Are yo u

screwing the Marines? " Westmoreland claimed h e

explained the reasons for his decision and the Presiden t

apparently accepted for the time being his rationale . In

his book, the MACV commander wrote that the singl e

manager was the one issue "to prompt me to conside r

resigning." 2 9*

Although MACV made no public announcemen t

about the new air command relations, the press soon

had the news. According to one account, the Air Force

released the story. The article included statements fro m

both Marine aviators and ground commanders. One

Marine air commander allegedly said, "Why, oh why ,

did they have to do this to us at this time? . . . {we}are

nose deep in problems of fighting the Reds and now

we have to take on the Air Force too ." The reporter

quoted a "mud-spattered " Marine battalion commander declaring, "now we are faced with the tragic aspec t

of having this Marine air-ground team broken asunde r

simply because of the ambitions of the Air Force brass. "

As would be expected, Air Force officers welcomed th e

change, one saying, "The Marines have different way s

of doing things than we do . . . some may be better

ways, others worse, but now all are under one system

with increased efficiency and effectiveness."3 0

Senior Marine officers speculated about the reason s

behind the news releases and what their reaction

should be . According to Lieutenant General Krulak,

Marine commanders should remain silent: "Now that

the word is out, there are others who will take the Air

Force to task ." Krulak believed that the "Air Forc e

erred in making a public announcement which could

only be abrasive, and could have no beneficial effect. "

Brigadier General E . E. Anderson, the III MAF Chie f

of Staff, stated that he had not been able to locate any

Air Force announcement. General Cushman observed

that his bet was that there was no public statement :

"Spike [Air Force General Momyer} is not tha t

*Army historian Graham A. Cosmas noted that by this time,

March 1968, " Westmoreland 's resignation was somewhat academic ,

since his departure from MACV was announced on the 22d [Marc h

1968]." Dr. Graham A. Cosmas, Comments on draft, dtd 23Nov9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Cosmas Comments .
496 THE DEFINING YEA R

gauche. Stupid, he ain't ." In a later message, General

Krulak remarked that HQMC learned from the

Department of Defense Public Affairs office that i t

had no knowledge about an announcement relative t o

the single-manager issue . The FMFPac commander

suspected that the reporter was trying to use the guise

of a press statement, "to lend an official flavor to wha t

appears to be a leak . "3 1

While the story about the change in air control

arrangements received some play in the press, it fo r

the most part remained somewhat muted as did the

single-manager issue for a time . Part of the reason may

have been that the single-manager system remained i n

a somewhat grey zone until the later part of March .

According to the MACV command history, tha t

although the directive was issued on 7 March, th e

actual preplanning only began on 21 March and th e

first programmed missions did not occur until 2 2

March. MACV considered the entire period from 1 0

March, when the single manager system supposedl y

went into effect, until the end of the month, "a perio d

for training and indoctrinating air crews and controller personnel ."3 2

Major General Anderson, the wing commander,

had a harsher judgement . On 23 March, Anderson

reported to Generals Cushman and Krulak that the

past week had been one of "initial confusion . This had

to be expected in view of the urge to implement with -

out proper and prior planning ." The wing commande r

gave specific examples. On the night of 21—22 March ,

I DASC scrambled three flights of Marine attack an d

fighter/attack aircraft "for what was termed an immediate mission ." A planned rendezvous with a flare and

a forward control aircraft over Laos failed to occur and

the Marine planes returned to base nearly out of fuel .

According to Anderson, a ground radar TPQ team

provided one of the Marine flight sections with a secondary mission, but the other two sections jettisoned

their ordnance . On the following day, 22 March, I

DASC told the Marine TADC that several sorties

planned for the 1st Marine Division, "had been canceled by the `user' ." The 1st Division air officer, how -

ever, denied making any such request and declared th e

division "wanted all the air that it could get." Anderson also mentioned problems with obtaining clearanc e

from the Air Force Khe Sanh airborne command an d

control center (ABCCC). On two occasions, the

ABCCC diverted two A6As from missions in support

of Khe Sanh because of bad weather. Apparently the

Air Force controllers were unaware of the capability o f

the A6A to operate under all weather conditions 33

Anderson mentioned that the new system also

began to place an added strain on Marine air control

resources. Because of the necessity to send personnel to

help man the Air Force control centers, the Marin e

wing decided to close its Chu Lai DASC.* The Americal Division immediately protested and asked the wing

to reconsider or "to provide them some means to

replace our control ." General Anderson reactivated th e

DASC in the interim until the Air Force decided ho w

it was going to take over. The wing commander als o

mentioned problems of overcrowding and air traffi c

control problems at the Phu Bai terminal . While the

Army and Air Force helped with equipment and th e

assignment of additional personnel, Anderson suggest -

ed that the Marines might want to consider "a possibl e

withdrawal of some of our air control assets from

northern I CTZ." With the expansion of Army force s

north of the Hai Van Pass, General Anderson argue d

that the Marines were not a major logistical and sup -

port organization and would be better off to realign to

the south; "refurbish and reestablish a mount out capability; and reduce to some extent the stretch we have

on our current personnel assets."34

These and many other questions about the implications of single manager remained largely unanswered during this initial period . On 25 March, at

the weekly meeting of the Joint Chiefs, Genera l

Chapman** formally brought up the subject . Major

General McCutcheon accompanied the Commandant and made the presentation before the Chiefs .

Generals Wheeler, the Chairman, and Harold K .

Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, were both absent .

Major General Haines, Army Deputy Chief of Staff,

represented the Army; General John P. McConnell ,

the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Air Force ; and

Admiral Moorer, the Navy. According to both Generals Chapman and McCutcheon, the reception was

much what they expected . Admiral Moorer openl y

supported the Marines. The two Marine generals

believed that the Army's actual position was favor -

*According to the wing commander, he provided two additiona l

naval aviators to the Seventh Air Force TACC in Saigon making for a

total of four to assist with the daily frag order. He also provided seven

personnel each to I DASC and DASC Victor: two lieutenant colonels,

six captains or lieutenants, and six noncommissioned officers .

CG1stMAW to CGFMFPac and CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Mar68, Doc No .

23, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15—27 Mar68 .

**While not a formal member of the Joint Chiefs at that time, th e

Marine Corps Commandant had a vote on all matters relating to th e

Marine Corps, which was usually interpreted in the broadest terms . For

all practical purposes, the Commandant was a siccing member of the

Joint Chiefs.
50

25

1ST MAW

PREPLANNED SORTIES

• PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT

1ST MAW

IMMEDIATE SORTIES

SINGLE MANAGEMENT (APR-DEC 68 AVERAGE)

PREPLANNED SUPPORT

TO MARINES

75 75

50

25

1ST MAW SUPPORT TO

OTHER THAN MARINES

75

50

2:

75

50

0 0

25

0

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE: MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 497

EFFECTS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT ON

MARINE FIXED-WING OPERATIONS IN ICTZ

Source: FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68.

able but that it had "probably made some sort of a

deal with the Air Force and in all probability go

'agin' us." They had no doubt what General

McConnell's stance would be. General McCutcheon

also assumed that the chairman, General Wheeler,

"was locked in concrete against us." Actually the

meeting resolved little. General McConnell suggested that no vote on the subject be made until the

return of General Wheeler. General Chapman agreed

and observed that he would "get McCutcheon to

pitch to him [Wheeler) as soon as I can corner him."

According to General McCutcheon, the "die has

been cast, we are on record in the JCS and the Commandant will continue the fight."35

Point, Counterpoint

Although touching upon several themes including

legal and doctrinal aspects, the "strongest single factot" of the Marine Corps argument against the single

manager system was responsiveness. According to

Major General McCutcheon, "there isn't any doubt

about it that when you add more layers to the system

it is bound to take more time. We are making a bigto-do about this." On 26 March, he observed to both

Generals E. E. and Norman Anderson that it "was

absolutely necessary" that they record "in great detail

what [air) you put in for, and when, and what you

actually get and when." The Commandant reinforced

this request in a formal message to General Krulak,

remarking that Marine commanders needed to keep

detailed records: "We need an audit trail that will

stand up under any scrutiny."36

Major General Anderson needed little encouragement. On 27 March, he began a daily summary on a

statistical and narrative account of the workings of the

single manager system. This was in addition to the

weekly reports that he already had submitted to both

FMFPac and Headquarters, Marine Corps. In early

April, General Anderson began to draft for General

Cushman an evaluation of the single manager system.

He reviewed the workings of the system for the last

three weeks of March. The Marine general observed

that neither I DASC nor DASC Victor was ready to

operate when they claimed they were up and running.

According to the Marine command, "Facilities were

not ready, and personnel not assigned, and no chance to

test communication and equipment.'37*

*Differenr Marine aviation tactical commanders had different Impressions about the single manager imbroglio at the time. Brigadier General

Harry iT. Hagaman, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded VMFA—323

from January into May 1968, recalled that he was, "acutely aware of the

Air Force effort to single manage Marine air in I Corps." He stated that

during this period, the first wing "directed MAG—12, MAG—13, and

MAG—l 1 to document all delays and frequency changes that we were

requited to make when working with Air Force controllers." General

Hagaman remembered that in the second part of Match when single manager went into effect, "there were some delays in getting 'on target'

because of the increased communication requirement." BGen Harry T.
498 THE DEFINING YEA R

Because of the existing tactical situation, th e

Marines continued until 21 March operating unde r

their old procedures. Anderson then offered some com -

parisons between Marine air support during the first

part of the month under its system and that since the

21st under single management . According to the wing

commander, a reduction of Marine sorties occurred i n

support of Marine divisions from 212 for the period 1

through 11 March to 177 for the corresponding number of days from 21 through 31 March . At the same

time, the 1st MAW's fixed-wing sorties in support of

other forces increased from 135 for the first 20 days o f

the month to 154 for the last 10 days. Anderson

observed that the Seventh Air Force under single management had established a rate of 1 .2 sorties per aircraft

per day. He remarked that he was considering asking

for an exemption to this rate because of the need t o

increase air support for the ground forces.38 *

Hagaman, Comments on draft, dtd 30Nov94 (Vietnam Commen t

File).On the other hand, Colonel Dean Wilker, who commanded

MAG—12 at Chu Lai until early March just before the implementation o f

single manager, wrote : "While I knew the relations betwee n

MACV/USAF and Navy/USMC were not in accord, I did not know to

what extent. We flew our missions as fragged and had few problems communicating with the Wing or the forces we supported . I credit the Wing

& its control centers for making it simple for us ." Col Dean Wilker, Comments on draft, dtd 18Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

*According to Colonel Joel E . Bonner, the 1st MAW G—3, "the 7th

Air Force stated they were manned, supplied and funded to provide 1 .2

sorties per available aircraft per day and were rigidly enforcing such a

rate in order to sustain their effort over the long term ." Bonner argued

that "such a statement makes sense at the Air War College and to bud -

get analysts but is not worth anything when there is a fight ongoin g

and Air Strikes will reduce casualties ." He observed that the "1st MAW

flew more than 2 .0 sorties per available aircraft almost on a daily basis .

7th Air Force stated on more than one occasion that 1st MAW wa s

wasting their resources—but 1st MAW never ran out!!!" Furthermore

Colonel Bonner wrote, "the Air Force explained that the 1 .2 sortie race

was to be computed on the expected available aircraft for the day . Fo r

example: 12 aircraft are expected to be available out of 24 assigned air -

craft . A 1 .2 sortie rate would provide 14 .4 sorties for the frag order. If

you change the sortie rate from available to assigned the number of sorties for the Frag Order is 28 . This was a problem with the planners i n

the wing versus the planners at 7th Air Force ." Bonner Comments.

Lieutenant General Carey, who worked for Colonel Bonner in the G—3

section of the wing in 1968 as a lieutenant colonel, recalled that during

the transition period into single management that he "received a call

from Saigon, allegedly by direct instruction of Gen Momyer (as I recall

at the time I thought the caller identified himself as Gen Momyer) tha t

we were exceeding the desired sortie rate and that we should back off

(in rather strong language). I informed him that I was taking my direction from Gen Anderson to give the Marines what they asked for an d

unless Gen Anderson instructed me otherwise, which I sincerely doubted he would, that was what I was going to do! I never heard from Saigo n

again and the Marine requests were all filled." Carey Comments.

The basic Marine complaint, however, revolved

around the requirements for preplanned missions ,

especially in support of the Marine divisions . The

Marine command believed the entire process too cum -

bersome and unresponsive . According to the procedures outlined by the Seventh Air Force, a preplanne d

mission required a submission by the ground unit any -

where from 38 hours to over 50 hours before the mission was to be flown . This contrasted with the old III

MAF system, which permitted a ground commande r

to make his preplanned request as late as 2000 of the

night before. 39

In a representative preplanned mission under th e

new system, a Marine battalion commander would

submit his target list through his regiment to th e

division at 0500 on the first day. At 0830, the division would then consolidate all the requests and forward them to the next higher echelon . In the case o f

the 3d Marine Division it would send its requests on

to Provisional Corps, Vietnam, who in turn at 110 0

would route them to III MAF. The 1st Marine Division would transmit its requests directly to III MAF .

III MAF would then combine them into one list and

relay it about 1430 of the first day on to the MAC V

TASE . The TASE would in turn reroute th e

approved request list to the Seventh Air Force TACC

to prepare the frag order which would not be issued

until the afternoon of the second day. It would be

evening of the second day before I DASC or the 1s t

MAW TADC would retransmit the frag order to th e

proper DASCs and fire support agencies as well as to

the tactical air units. During this process, each of the

higher headquarters had the authority to determin e

priorities or even eliminate requests with the possibility of the battalion commander not knowing

whether his request had been approved or not. In any

event, it would usually not be before 0700 of the

third day before that battalion commander receive d

his air strike . 40 (See Chart).

During April, the numbers appeared to confirm the

Marine complaints. According to Marine compiled statistics for the month, the MACV TASE and Sevent h

Air Force TACC only scheduled 1,547 out of the 4,33 1

or 36 percent of the targets requested by III MAF

ground commanders. Of the remaining targets, American aircraft carried out strikes on only 680 or 44 percent of them. Instead of the preplanned strikes, Marin e

ground commanders had to rely on 2,682 "diverts" or

unscheduled strikes which made up 58 percent of the

total tactical sorties flown in support of the Marine

ground units 41
8:30 AM (1st Day)

3d Marine Division

ledq alert 'aii.ater

and submits target ;eiiueSts.

11:00 PM (1st Day)

Provisional Corps Vietnam

Headquarters consolidates

and submits target requests.

By 5:00AM (1st Day)

Battalions su:irlil

target requests

AFTERNOON (2nd Day) MACV

Tactical Air Cartrnl Center,

Saigon issues the

Fragniertar. Order

Aircraft launched

as scheduled by

Fragmentary Order.

2:30 PM (1st Day)

Ill MAF Headquarters

consolidates and subriiis

all target requests

0

Tactical Air Support Element,

Saigon c'siidate5 arc

transmitT target requests

EVENING (2nd Day)

EVENING (2nd Day)

Tact Ta Squadrons receive

tne fragmentary order.

Appropriate Di;eirl Air Support

Ceraers and Fire Support 0

Coordination Centers receive

to fraqiiicrta'y order.

GJEVENING (2ND DAY)

1st Marine .Air'r,itl Wing relays

the IraymFr liry order.

Fragmentary OrderincIudeAJrSupport RadarTeam-coritmI$edniissionsbeginnin7:OOPM (2nd Day) PMlP... drOpV My(l.

IRUTI I )t III!' .iis iii I. S lIIflL Fi,rtc Vitlilirl I')(ir

3d Marine

Division procedure.

Ill MAF Headquarters

consolidates and submits

all target requests.

Battalions receive requested

pieplanned close air support.

Elapsed time for normal

requests: 50 hours.

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE: MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 499

USAF SYSTEM FOR PREPLANNED AIR REQUESTS AFTER

10 MARCH 1968
500 THE DEFINING YEA R

On 5 April 1968, Marine assistant wing commander, Brigadier General Henry W. Hise,* contrasted the

difference between Marine responsiveness and that o f

the Air Force . According to Hise, the Air Force

achieved "rapid response and flexibility by diverting

sorties. " He observed, however, that the air commander often did not consult the ground commander, "fo r

whom the aircraft were originally scheduled . . . ." The

Marine general called this depriving "one ground uni t

of vital support to aid another." He also declared thi s

often resulted in an improper mix of ordnance to

accomplish the mission. In comparison, the Marine

system also permitted the diversion of airborne aircraft

but only after receiving the acquiescence of the ground

unit commander. For the most part, Marine aviatio n

responded "to increased requirements by scrambles off

the hot pad ." According to Hise, the Marines had "th e

responsiveness of diverts without depriving a groun d

commander of possibly crucial support and . . . [provided) additional sorties over normal schedules to meet

unforeseen needs." Furthermore, General Hise pointe d

out Marine aircraft on the "hot pad" could be fitted ou t

with the proper ordnance to accomplish the mission .42

III MAF was not the only command unhappy wit h

the progress of the single-manager system . On 5 April,

Army Major General Willard Pearson, the Deput y

Commander of Provisional Corps, indicated to General Anderson that the new system was not working well

in the northern two provinces of I Corps. In respons e

on this date as well to General Cushman's complaints

about the workings of the system, General Westmoreland acknowledged that single manager was undergoing "technical and procedural difficulties . . . ." He

understood, however, things were improving. The

MACV commander observed that from his perspectiv e

that there was "not enough tactical air capability in the

RVN to provide all commanders all the air support

they would like to have." He concluded his message

that he expected to receive from the III MAF commander an evaluation of the system at the end of th e

month as to whether single manager was meeting III

MAF requirements and if the "I DASC operation falls

short in any respect."43

In Washington, on 5 April, the full Joint Chiefs o f

Staff again took up the single-management issue, thi s

time with both the Chairman, General Wheeler, and

*Brigadier General Hise, one of the two assistant wing commanders, stated that because of his previous experience on the Joint Staff of

the JCS, General Anderson, the wing commander, used him to argue

the Marine case in the single manager dispute . Hise Comments.

the Army Chief of Staff, General Johnson, in attendance . At the meeting, much to the surprise and

delight of the Marine Corps, General Johnson reversed

the Army position and supported the Marines . In the

final vote, only General Wheeler and the Air Forc e

Chief of Staff, General McConnell, favored single man -

ager. At a second session of the JCS three days later,

General McCutcheon, who attended both meetings ,

related that General Wheeler attempted " to float " a

compromise position indicating that the Seventh Air

Force operational control of Marine fixed-wing sortie s

was a "temporary expedient and when the emergency

was over the status quo would be resumed . " General

Chapman argued if that were the case the emergenc y

was over and that the Marines should resume control of

their assets. Wheeler rejected that proposition . According to McCutcheon, "so as at the moment the Army,

Navy, and Marine Corps are lined up against the Ai r

Force and the Chairman has weakened the position t o

the temporary gimmick." The next step was to send

the matter up to the Secretary of Defense. McCutcheo n

concluded : "I feel better about it (single-manager dispute) than I have in a long time ."44

In Washington, General Chapman decided to outline formally the Marine Corps position on single manager and its status to senior Marine commanders. In a

"green letter" (so named because of the color of th e

paper) to all Marine general officers, the Commandan t

reviewed the initiation of the single-manager syste m

over the protests of all Marine commands and his

actions in the JCS . He declared there was an "essentia l

difference between the Marine and Air Force concept s

of air control and air support . . . ." Chapman emphasized in most strong terms that for Marines, air is " a

supporting arm" which was to be employed "directly

responsive to the ground commander . . . ." He

believed this basic Marine concept had been set asid e

and would result in "increased enemy success,

increased friendly casualties, and decreased advancement of the war effort." The Commandant viewed that

the "integrity" of the Marine air-ground team and

"even our force structure" was at stake. While asking

all Marine officers to "face this challenge resolutely to

forestall any future inroads" on the Corps, he ordere d

them not to comment on the subject, "either officiall y

or unofficially," and to refer all queries especially from

the press to Headquarters, Marine Corps. With the JCS

split on the subject and the possible requirement of a

Secretary of Defense decision to settle the matter,

Chapman mentioned, "we're preparing for that eventuality now."4 5
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 501

In Honolulu, Lieutenant General Krulak was not

sanguine about the probability of the Secretary o f

Defense overruling Westmoreland . As he told Genera l

Cushman, he expected the Secretary to hold a hearing

on the subject, but "knowing how those things operate, I do not believe that General Wheeler would have

permitted the matter to [go) forward to SecDef [Secretary of Defense) without first laying the groundwor k

for the decision he seeks. " Krulak suggested to General Cushman another alternative means of attack . He

recommended that the III MAF commander shoul d

avail himself of the "complaint channel to CinCPac, "

referring to the 30-day evaluation period called for i n

the initiating directive. Since all concerned agreed tha t

the system had not really been implemented until 2 2

March, this would extend the original trial period unti l

22 April. General Krulak warned : "When we go dow n

this track, we have to have the aces to a degree that will

make it absolutely impossible for CinCPac to ignore u s

or brush us o£" 4 6

The FMFPac commander then proceeded to advis e

both Generals Cushman and Anderson about how to

proceed . He counseled that General Anderson as the

senior aviation commander for III MAF should begi n

his presentation with Marine concurrence to th e

proposition that within a joint force there should be

" single management" in that the senior Air Forc e

commander should be the joint commander's "coordinating authority for all air operations . " As far as matters relating to air defense and to the interdiction air

campaign over Laos and North Vietnam, there was n o

debate that there should be a single authority. Krulak

then observed, however, that Anderson needed t o

stress that for the Marine commander, "his air support

is as inseparable to his combat team as is his artillery,

his tanks, or even his infantryman's M16 ." He then

pointed out that the Marine commander made clos e

air support a "cardinal element in his tactical plan ,

and, if it is diverted to meet a need elsewhere his operation is compromised . "47

General Krulak then cautioned the III MAF commanders not to get into a pure numbers game of how

many sorties were flown and ordnance dropped, bu t

rather to provide the context for the statistics. For

example, he declared that in the case of immediat e

requests for support, the single-manager system

LtGen Lewis W. Walt, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, talks to Marines during a visi t

to Vietnam. LtGen Walt made a strong presentation of the Marine position to Gen Westmoreland .

Photo from the Abel Collection
502 THE DEFINING YEA R

appeared to be working . For the period 3—12 April, the

new air control agencies approved over 90 percent of

them and that over 75 percent of the tactical air sup -

port aircraft arrived within 30 minutes of the request

and usually with an acceptable bomb or ordnance load .

Contrasting these figures to those relative to preplanned missions, Krulak contended that the "Marines

were being shortchanged . " For the same period in

April, the Seventh Air Force TACC only scheduled 36

percent of the targets desired by ground commanders ,

and of the remaining targets, only 51 percent of the

missions scheduled against them were carried out .

According to the FMFPac commander, nearly 41 percent of the total sorties were extra and not requested b y

the ground commander, "who could neither preplan

for this surge effort nor influence the selection of th e

ordnance available ." Krulak then concluded with the

observation that 42 percent of the preplanned sortie s

carried out were more than 15 minutes late : "This is

unacceptable and compromises the basic principle o f

integrating totally all available fire power."4 8

Perhaps partially influenced by Krulak's message ,

but largely on their own initiative, III MAF and the 1s t

MAW had begun the process of evaluating the single -

manager process and forwarding their conclusions t o

higher headquarters. On 22 April, General Cushman

sent a preliminary message to General Westmoreland

to go on record with his unhappiness with the system .

At the same time, Major General Anderson, the win g

commander, prepared a lengthy presentation for the II I

MAF commander with the possibility of giving it late r

to the MACV commander. 49

Anderson stated the usual Marine arguments. Afte r

interviewing more than 70 Marine officers involved

with the new procedures, he expanded upon his

themes with specific case studies . While acknowledging that the Marine divisions by the beginning of

April reported that air response to immediate requests

had improved, Anderson maintained that even this

part of the new system did not work as well as the statistics implied . He cited an air observer who spotted

enemy troops "running across a bomb crater one at a

time ." The observer called the Marine DASC and

asked for air strikes, stating that he had a "good target." Before he finished speaking, the DASC provide d

him with some A-4s. At about the time the A-4s

were to reach the designated rendezvous point, th e

Marine DASC radioed the observer back and stated

"they had to take the planes away because the new

DASC said they had to go through them to get planes.

It was 45 minutes after we asked for the air that we

finally got it on target." In another case, Anderso n

quoted the Marine officer in charge of the Khe San h

DASC recounting that " there was this Air Force Lieutenant Colonel at Ca Lu who said I had to get airplane s

through him, that was very slow. Then there was

Colonel Lownds who needed air and needed it bad . I

just did what I had to do . " General Anderson con -

tended that the only reason there were no more problems with the immediate response procedures was

because "people at the lower echelons, finding them -

selves faced with an unwieldy and unresponsive system, were simply forced to circumvent it. "5°

Anderson reserved his greatest criticism, however ,

for the single-manager preplanned missions and thei r

long lead time . The wing commander quoted a battalion forward aircraft controller as saying, "They ar e

telling us now that we have to turn in our CAS [close

air support] request this afternoon for the day afte r

tomorrow. We didn't know this morning what we

were going to do this afternoon ." An infantry battalion commander remarked, "When you are moving,

your air has to be flexible, now I have to program

myself so far ahead that the air' mission doesn 't fix

anything." General Anderson contrasted the 80 percent of preplanned targets hit under the forme r

Marine system with the slightly over 50 percen t

under single manager.5 1

Finally, the wing commander ended with thre e

general criticisms. According to Anderson, single

manager was "far less responsive to our tactical needs ,

it has small provision for coordination of air with th e

total effort, and it increases the administrative burden." As an example of the latter, he compared the 50 -

page frag order coming out of the Seventh Air Forc e

TACC with that of the former nine-page frag orde r

published by the wing . Anderson concluded that the

new system accomplished little that the forme r

Marine system did not do better, especially in suppor t

of ground Marines.5 2

In early May, General Cushman forwarded to General Westmoreland in message form many of the concerns that General Anderson had expressed in his formal presentation . Cushman basically stated ,that his

analysis of the period 1—30 April drew him to the following conclusions. While response time may have

improved, it occurred only because DASCs had diverted aircraft from preplanned targets. Marines had

scrambled some aircraft in certain cases to cover th e

diverted missions. He again expressed dissatisfactio n

with the long lead time for preplanned missions. He

protested the fact that while the number of Marine air-
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 50 3

craft "fragged" for Army units increased every day, th e

number of "Air Force sorties remained significantl y

below the programmed level established for Army battalions." Finally, the III MAF commander recommended " that management of Marine strike and reconnaissance aircraft . . . be returned to me and the

workable procedures outlined ' in [MACV directive

95—4) be reinstituted ."5 3

The Seventh Air Force evaluation of the system contrasted sharply with that of the Marines . General

Momyer's command reported no significant problems

"other than those associated with training and familiarity with a new system ." It praised both the efforts

and attitudes of Marine and Air Force officers in thei r

attempts to link the two tactical air systems . Whil e

admitting that single manager was not perfect, the Air

Force report asserted that "with better understanding

by the Marine ground units and more experience o n

the part of all concerned . . . this system will work . "

The Air Force insisted that "in consideration of proposed large-scale ground offensive operations in bein g

and planned . . . the air effort available must be concentrated, flexible and integrated to provide the tactical air support essential to all ground units."54

Bombarded by conflicting points of view, General

Westmoreland held to the concept of centralized control, but began to look to the modification of some o f

the workings of the system . According to Marine

Brigadier General Chaisson, the Director of the MACV

Combat Operations Center, the visit to Saigon at the

end of April by the Marine Corps Assistant Commandant and former III MAF commander, Lieutenan t

General Lewis W. Walt, played some part in the

MACV commander's changing perspective. Chaisson

wrote to his wife that when Walt met with the MACV

commander, "He scared the daylights out of Westy b y

telling him that it was the most dangerous decision h e

had made—and that it would backfire ." Apparentl y

General Westmoreland then asked Walt for his specific criticisms. The Marine general repeated what the

Marines had been saying all along: too long a delay i n

the approval of preplanned missions; too many

"diverts" which often resulted in the use of the wron g

ordnance on the target; and that the 3d Marine Division was not obtaining the "desired level of support ."5 5

Whether influenced by Walt's criticisms or not ,

General Westmoreland ordered General Momyer to

meet with Army Lieutenant General William B .

Rosson, the commander of Provisional Corps, relativ e

to what constructive changes should be made in the air

support of ground forces in northern I Corps . Because

of the implications for the Marine Corps, Genera l

Cushman with the approval of General Westmorelan d

directed that General Anderson, the wing commander,

also attend. Representatives from the MACV TASE,

the Seventh Air Force TACC, and DASC Victor wer e

also present. General Momyer presided and declare d

that the purpose was to determine what were the flaws

in the system "and how to correct them ." Anderson

believed that the question should have been "whether

or not we should continue with Single Management ."5 6

The conference began with a discussion about th e

allocation of sorties in northern I Corps. General

Momyer stated that he had told General Walt that the

reason for the reduced number of sorties for the 3 d

Marine Division were the priorities established by Pro -

visional Corps. General Rosson agreed, explaining tha t

for a time in the Provisional Corps sector, the 1st Air

Cavalry because of Operation Pegasus received abou t

50 percent of the fixed-wing air sorties. The 101st Airborne and the 3d Marine Division during that perio d

divided equally the remaining available sorties . General Rosson's perception also was that "Marines, havin g

always had more air support tend today to ask for more

than the Army units." All of the participants agreed ,

however, that because the Marine units had les s

artillery and fewer helicopter gunships than the Army ,

there was a natural tendency for the Marines to rely on

more fixed-wing support. This was especially true relative to the escort of troop transport helicopters int o

landing zones. General Momyer suggested that th e

commands should determine the number of sortie s

Marines needed "in connection with helicopter operations in order to offset the lack of gunship helicopters. "

The Air Force general then declared that the Sevent h

Air Force "Frag" order would reflect the "number of

sorties daily reserved" for helicopter escort .5 7

Even more surprising, according to Anderson, ther e

was general unanimity on the weakness of the preplanning missions and the system of diverts . All concurre d

that the present preplanning only resulted "in placin g

a certain amount of air effort airborne and available fo r

any use a specific ground commander may wish." General Rosson complained that the procedures were "to o

ponderous," although every one was trying to make

them work.* Momyer acknowledged that all concerne d

*General Rosson later commented that after he assumed comman d

of Prov Corps, " it soon became evident . . . that the system for preplanned fixed-wing support was too slow, and that coo many request s

for immediate support were being met by use of diverts . This in tur n

often meant different ordnance on target ." Gen William B . Rosson ,

USA, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb96 (Vietnam Comment File) .
504 THE DEFINING YEA R

were doing the best they could and that he hoped to

cut down on lead times and delays. In order to get the

proper ordnance for a specific mission, the Seventh Ai r

Force commander stated that he was giving some

thought to permit modification to the daily frag orde r

about six hours prior to time on target . General Anderson countered that the "downloading of ordnance and

substituting another is much too wasteful of manpower" and recommended instead the strip alert of aircraft

preloaded with a mix of bombs and ammunition .

While General Momyer made no comment about the

wing commander's suggestion, General Anderson

observed that " the tenor of this discussion leads me t o

believe that the Air Force knows it is in some trouble

on single management and is willing to modify the

system, in major respects if necessary, to keep the system in force ." The Marine commander concluded that ,

"in such an atmosphere of accommodation we will be

hard pressed to obtain a reversal of the decision t o

implement single management ."5 8

General Anderson was correct in his assumptio n

that both Generals Westmoreland and Momyer wer e

under some pressure from higher headquarters relative

to the single-management issue . Upon receiving both

the III MAF and MACV preliminary reports about the

Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, who relieved Secretary

Robert S . McNamara meets with LtGen William B. Rosson,

CG Prov Corps. Gen Rosson complained during a conferenc e

that the new control provisions were "too ponderous . . . . "

Photo is from the Abel Collection

workings of the new system, Admiral Sharp decided t o

send his own evaluation team, headed by Marin e

Brigadier General Homer G . Hutchinson, Jr., the

CinCPac Chief of Staff for Operations, to examine the

situation. According to Lieutenant General Krulak ,

General Westmoreland protested the move and asked

the CinCPac commander to defer the arrival of the

team until he held his own hearings on the subject .

Admiral Sharp apparently denied the request . At that

point, as related by General Krulak, Westmorelan d

made the statement that the CinCPac team woul d

" come back and recommend to you that the system be

returned to the old status quo . "5 9

The Hutchinson evaluation group arrived in Vietnam on 4 May and visited both MACV in Saigon an d

III MAF at Da Nang. Upon their return to Honolulu

three days later, Brigadier General Hutchinson and his

staff began to work on the report. After completion of

the draft, he wrote to General McCutcheon at Marine

headquarters in Washington that Admiral Sharp

viewed single management "pretty well cracked . "

Hutchinson enclosed a copy of the draft report in hi s

letter to McCutcheon and asked the latter to keep i t

"fairly well disguised ." Despite his own viewpoint on

Marine BGen Homer G . Hutchinson, Jr., the CinCPacJ—3

and a naval aviator, headed a CinCPac evaluation team o n

the new air control provisions.

Unnumbered Department of Defense (USMC) photo
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 505

the subject, General Hutchinson observed that th e

" report had to be written with some obvious restrain t

from [a} `joint staff standpoint." 60

While not directly criticizing the decision for singl e

management, the report discussed in detail what it

considered several shortcomings in its implementatio n

and operational procedures. Admitting that the Army

units in I Corps received in April more air support tha n

they had in the past, the report, nevertheless, pointe d

out that Marine ground units did not enjoy "as muc h

or as responsive tactical air support" as under the ol d

system. Like all the other evaluations of single manager, the report remarked upon the long lead time fo r

preplanned sorties and the resulting large number o f

diversions. It observed, moreover, that the Marine

wing met the most urgent "unfragged" requests fro m

Marine ground units by overflying by 22 percent it s

aircraft "programmed sortie rate ." At the same time ,

Air Force aircraft flew only at 96 percent of their "utilization index. " According to the report, the Air Force

wing at Da Nang conducted 1,404 missions ove r

North Vietnam and Laos. The authors of the report

commented that with the availability of Thailandbased Air Force aircraft and naval carrier aircraft in th e

Gulf of Tonkin that "it would not be necessary to use

South Vietnam-based aircraft for this purpose whe n

requests for sorties in I CTZ are not being filled ." As

Hutchinson mentioned in his personal letter to General McCutcheon, "we have pressed the point with Sharp

that 7th AF has been flying too much out of country "

with in-country-based aircraft, "thus alluding to the

fact that if this were stopped, MACV should be

relieved of his concern that the Army isn't gettin g

needed support in I Corps." 6 1

For his part, General Krulak, also in Honolulu,

continued his efforts to convince Admiral Sharp to

intervene in the single-management issue. According

to the FMFPac commander, he persuaded Sharp t o

send a message to Westmoreland again noting that

General Cushman remained unhappy with the presen t

working arrangements of the single-manager system .

The CinCPac commander stated that he wanted t o

hear the briefings that were to be presented at MACV

headquarters by III MAF, the Seventh Air Force, and

Westmoreland 's own MACV evaluation team . These

were scheduled for 8 May. In his reply, General Westmoreland agreed to have the concerned parties make

the same presentations before Admiral Sharp a few

days later in Honolulu. He observed, however, that

many of the rough spots of the system had been

worked out. General Krulak warned the Marine Corps

leadership, "Westy is not going to let us get away with

a presentation only of our gripes, but will include hi s

own story too . "6 2

At the conference in Saigon at MACV headquarters, both Generals Cushman and Norman Anderso n

represented III MAF. General Anderson presented

the III MAF position on single management. Basically, Anderson argued that the new system for II I

MAF had few advantages, but several disadvantages .

The Seventh Air Force briefer stated that all concerned including the Marines were doing their best

to make single manager work and several modifications were in the works. 6 3

After all the presentations, the senior commanders ,

including both Cushman and Anderson, met in a

closed session . According to Cushman, General Westmoreland addressed the group and emphasized that th e

issue of single management involved Service conflicts

revolving about "procedures, tactical arrangements ,

[differing) philosophies, " and the desire of "commanders to allocate total resources in the most effective

way." The deployment of the 1st Air Cavalry and 101s t

Airborne Divisions and the establishment of Provisional Corps headquarters in northern I Corps had irretrievably altered command relations including ai r

arrangements. Westmoreland believed the briefing s

helped to clarify the points of contention . The MACV

commander stated that the trial period for single management demonstrated "that the strong features of th e

Marine system are evident . The practical advantage of

[the] commandwide area of the Air Force system is also

evident." Westmoreland stated that he wanted to combine the best features of each : the responsiveness of

Marine air together with the Air Force flexibility fo r

concentrating air assets. He declared that the TASE

and the Seventh Air Force procedures for fragging aircraft were too cumbersome and Marine practices wer e

wasteful of bombs and aircraft . The MACV commander stated that it was his intention "to use our resource s

to meet the problem we face not on theory and not b y

ineffective practices."64

Following a desultory and inconclusive discussio n

about possible changes, Westmoreland turned to th e

upcoming briefing at CinCPac . He declared that his

chief of staff, Major General Walter T. Kerwin, woul d

represent him and provide the opening statement. III

MAF, the Seventh Air Force, and the MACV evaluation team would make separate briefings based from

their respective perspectives. General Kerwin, however, would field all questions. The MACV commander

concluded the meeting by declaring, "it was fiction
506 THE DEFINING YEA R

that this thing [single manager] was generated by Ai r

Force roles and mission . It was his idea—his decision

and not a maneuver by the Air Force . " General Westmoreland stressed that he wanted "this point included

in the briefing."65

The Honolulu Conference for the most part prove d

to be a restatement of already established positions . As

planned, on 10 May, the representatives from the

respective services and commands of MACV made

their standard briefings before Admiral Sharp . General Blood once more represented the Seventh Air Force .

As General Anderson, who made the case for III MAF,

remembered, the Seventh Air Force indicated its willingness to make adjustments " in accordance with any

criticism that we might have, which had the effect of

taking the rug right out from under us. " As the wing

commander recalled, Admiral Sharp "elected to not

intervene ." Anderson observed that Sharp was near th e

end of his tour and "must have felt that further protest

would have to be at [a] higher level . . . ."66

Admiral Sharp may have been aware that the

Department of Defense was about to act upon the referral of the single-management issue to the Secretary b y

the Joint Chiefs. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford ,

who replaced Robert S. McNamara in February, delegated the decision to Deputy Secretary Paul H. Nitze .

On 15 May, after listening to the formal presentations

and reviewing the various position papers by th e

respective Services, Deputy Secretary Nitze generall y

supported the position of Generals Wheeler and Westmoreland . The secretary stated that he agreed with the

Chairman that "the unified combat commander on th e

scene should be presumed to be the best judge of ho w

the combat forces assigned to him are to be organize d

. . . ." Nitze added that he considered this a temporar y

measure and not a precedent and believed that MACV

would return control of the Marine air to III MAF

"when the tactical situation permits." He, nevertheless,

expressed concern about the apparent weakness of th e

present single-manager system relative to responsiveness, but presumed that General Westmoreland wa s

taking action' to rectify the situation . Nitze directed

General Wheeler "to review personally the single-management arrangement in I Corps to determine, in coordination with CinCPac and ComUSMACV suc h

changes as he considers necessary to minimize delays

between requests for air support and execution . . . . "67 .

*General Chapman, the Commandant of the Marine Corps i n

1968, remembered that about the time Deputy Secretary Nitze mad e

his decision the House Armed Services Committee "held a hearing o n

the state of the War with JCS . Single management came up and was

In reply to the Deputy Secretary, General Wheeler

stated that he was also troubled about the lack of

responsiveness to preplanned air requests . Although he

argued that the Marines may have exaggerated th e

length of time required for such requests and that som e

of the deadlines were self-imposed, the Chairma n

admitted that the system needed modification . He

mentioned that MACV was looking to a partial decentralization "based on resource considerations " which

would permit "the majority of preplanned requests " t o

be coordinated between III MAF and the "collocated

DASCs. " Wheeler stated that General Westmoreland 's

basic interest was to "have the flexibility to employ the

tactical air resources most effectively where and when

support is required . "G8

By this time, all concerned with the issue were looking toward some settlement of the dispute. In one

instance, General McCutcheon recommended to General Chapman, the Marine Corps Commandant, tha t

the latter meet with the Air Force Chief of Staff, General McConnell . McCutcheon believed that a frank discussion between the Service chiefs might result i n

McConnell "to tell Momyer to back off a little. " On 17

May, after learning about Deputy Secretary Nitze 's

decision, McCutcheon told Major General Anderson ,

the 1st MAW commander, about a new Marine Corp s

tack, "which is to get the opcon back, let them kee p

'single management' and get on with the war. "69

Lieutenant General Krulak outlined this Marin e

Corps proposal in a back-channel message to Admiral

Sharp . Krulak conceded that MACV under the old system had some reason for dissatisfaction . He observed

that while MACV had controlled about 75 percent o f

the fixed-wing sorties in South Vietnam which included those sorties that the 1st MAW made available ,

General Westmoreland "was never sure of what number of sorties the Marines would make available . . . . "

strongly criticized by [the chairman' of the committee) for loss b y

Marines of immediate [emphasis in original], responsive close air support. Gen Wheeler presented the standard arguments to support S/M

(single manager]. I . . . elected to remain silent, as did the other chiefs ,

because I believed Congress was no place to solve a war-time operational problem ." Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Comments on draft, dtd

17Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Chapman Comments .

Army historian Graham A. Cosmas noted the "very lukewarm nature

of even Wheeler's and Nitze's support of Westmoreland . Both indicated grave doubts about the practical workings of single management ,

but were unwilling to overrule their theater commander on a questio n

of organization of his forces. However, both emphasized this was a temporary tactical expedient and urged ComUSMACV to restore the former command arrangement as soon as he felt the situation warranted ,

which of course ComUSMACV never did ." Cosmas Comments .
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 507

Moreover, even the MACV emergency authority di d

not permit "a day-in, day-out diversion of additional

Marine sorties " to other missions. Krulak observed,

however, that the single-manager system as instituted

by General Westmoreland resulted in too severe a

"surgery . . . that has left the patient extremely weak ,

with his Marine leg partially paralyzed. " The FMFPac

commander suggested instead return to III MAF operational control of Marine fixed-wing tactical and recon -

naissance aircraft sorties. In turn, III MAF would make

available to the Seventh Air Force "such sorties a s

ComUSMACV regards necessary to ensure a prope r

weight of tactical air effort. " Krulak would not limi t

this MACV authority to preplanned sorties, but would

permit the preemption of additional Marine air

resources, when "in MACV's judgement, the overall

tactical effort so requires. " The III MAF TADC would

provide the MACV TASE "with real time informatio n

on Marine air availability and status at all times . "

According to General Krulak this Marine solutio n

"would legitimize single managership without question and would still leave essential operational direction of III MAF organic air resources in CG III MA F

hands." In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs on 1 8

May 1968, General Chapman presented much the

same argument and concluded that the Marine proposal would provide a transition to normal command relations and also increase responsiveness? °

While the Marine Corps continued to presen t

alternative policies, General Westmoreland's staff

worked upon modifications relative to air control procedures. On 18 May, at a meeting with Admiral

Sharp, General Westmoreland discussed his intentio n

to make some changes in the working of the single -

management system at the end of the month . The

MACV commander wanted a 30-day trial period until

the end of June and planned to ask "III MAF to with -

hold comments" until that time . Admiral Sharp indicated his general approval of Westmoreland's course o f

action. According to Marine Brigadier General Chaisson, the head of the MACV Combat Operations Center, General Westmoreland was well aware of both the

Marine objections and suggested revisions and tried t o

accommodate them. On 20 May, Chaisson jotted i n

his notebook diary, "Got Gen West[moreland] to g o

along with our approach to single management.

Momyer is next hurdle ." General Westmoreland als o

received prodding from General Wheeler, who directed that MACV in conjunction with both III MAF and

the Seventh Air Force, "continue to evaluate the effectiveness" of single manager. Westmoreland was to

inform both CinCPac and the Chairman of JCS " each

month of the results of his evaluation and of any modification he has made to the system . "7 1

While neither General Westmoreland nor Momye r

was willing to return to III MAF frill authority ove r

Marine fixed-wing sorties, they made a drastic chang e

in the scheduling of preplanned ground support missions. On 21 May, General Westmoreland outlined th e

new procedures. MACV now divided preplanned

strikes into two categories, one to be determined weekly and the other daily in two separate frag orders.

According to the modified system, 70 percent of all

preplanned sorties were to be contained in the Sevent h

Air Force TACC weekly frag order. While the frag

order designated number of aircraft, time on target,

and basic ordnance load, the supported ground commander could use these sorties any way he desired ,

"consistent with aircraft and control capabilities. " The

Seventh Air Force daily frag order designated th e

remaining preplanned missions to meet "justifie d

requests for additional support and increased enemy

threats as they occur." In essence, as General Krulak

observed, III MAF made available all its air "attack an d

reconnaissance capability" to the Seventh Air Force ,

who in turn hands about 70 percent back "to th e

Marine command. "72

The new procedures were to go into effect on 3 0

May for a 30-day test period . At the end of that time ,

the concerned commands were to provide constructive

criticism. General Cushman observed that he was

under orders not to forward any comments on the

modifications to CinCPac until after completion of the

evaluation period. The III MAF commander, nevertheless, stated that he would provide ComUSMACV with

his views and would share them with CMC and

CGFMFPac "to preclude any action that cross pendin g

proposals to Dep Sec Def or JCS ." At the same time ,

General Cushman looked favorably on the new MAC V

directive, remarking that it "appears to offer us a considerable opportunity to regain control of our assets."73

Admitting that the modification provided more flexibility, Marine commanders and staff officers still pointed to several continuing disadvantages . While prescribed ordnance loads and time on targets could be

adjusted, III MAF still had to match the ground requirements of its subordinate Army and Marine units wit h

the predetermined 70 percent sorties in the weekly frag

order. As far as the remaining 30 percent preplanned sor -

ties outlined in the Seventh Air Force daily frag report ,

with the exception of less required detailed information ,

III MAF was to follow the same procedures as before .
508 THE DEFINING YEA R

The Marines still considered the single-management

system, even with the changes, more cumbersome tha n

necessary. Lieutenant Colonel Richard E . Carey in the

Wing G–3 section later commented that while th e

70–30 split "gave us more flexibility at the working

level, matching available sorties to the requests of th e

units was time consuming, confusing, and error prone . "

He stated his staff " affectionately termed the system,

`Momyer's Chinese Fire Drill. – In more earthy terms,

General Anderson, the wing commander, described th e

entire procedure "an ass-backwards system." General

Cushman concluded that "until Marine air assets ar e

returned to full opcon of CG III MAF, command relationships will remain more complex ."7 4

At the same time MACV was altering single manager, General Chapman and the Marine headquarters

staff in Washington proposed their own modification

to the air arrangements in South Vietnam . In mid-May,

the Commandant circulated for comment to both

Generals Krulak and Cushman a headquarters point

paper on the subject. The idea was for MACV formally to return to III MAF operational control 70 percen t

of Marine fixed-wing assets, while retaining sortie con -

trol of the remaining 30 percent . General Chapman

planned to give the point paper to the Secretary of the

Navy to forward to the Secretary of Defense 7 5

While both Generals Cushman and Krulak had

some reservations about some of the details contained in the point paper, they saw merit in the

Commandant's course of action. General Cushma n

wanted return of 100 percent of the air assets to his

control, remarking that the retention of the 30 percent by MACV would result in a "duplicative air

request, control, and direction system." He, nevertheless, believed that the CMC proposal could be the

basis for a further compromise on the single-management issue . While agreeing with Cushman an d

also taking exception to a few added minor details i n

the Commandant's proposal, Lieutenant General

Krulak's reply was more positive . Krulak believe d

that the Marine headquarters recommended modification to the air control system "gets the camel's nos e

back into the tent—most advantageous, since th e

tent happens to be our own ." The FMFPac commander then observed that he had not mentioned any o f

this to Admiral Sharp as he was of the opinion tha t

"the impetus just has to come from the top down. "

Krulak stated that if Chapman wanted, he, Krulak ,

would "take him [Sharp) on immediately . . . but my

recommendation is to give him a few thousand volt s

from above first."76

Incorporating many of the suggestions provided b y

both III MAF and FMFPac, General Chapman proceeded on two fronts to revise the air control policy i n

Vietnam. He met with the Secretary of the Navy and

provided him the point paper and at the same tim e

prepared a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs makin g

the same points. As Chapman's chief air officer, General McCutcheon wrote, "at first blush this [th e

Marine recommendations) looks similar to th e

ComUSMACV proposal where 70 percent of the missions would be fragged on a weekly basis," but insisted "there are some vital differences." The basic difference, of course, would be that the Marine proposal

would do away with the long weekly frag with its predetermined times on target and ordnance loads. In

fact, McCutcheon, like both Cushman and Krulak ,

opposed any mention of 70 percent and favored "a 100

percent recapture " of Marine sorties. 7 7

In his presentation to Secretary of the Navy Paul R.

Ignatius, General Chapman argued his case . He provided Secretary Ignatius the statistical rationale for th e

Marine strong emphasis on fixed-wing support for its

ground forces.* While appreciating the need fo r

ComUSMACV, whether General Westmoreland o r

General Abrams, to have some form of "single manager" over tactical air, Chapman stressed that even the

new MACV modification had not made the air support

*The level of air support required for Marine and Army division s

differed because of many factors. According to an analysis by FMFPac ,

a Marine division in Vietnam consisted of approximately 20,736 an d

an Army division of 17,116 men . [For further discussion of Marine

division strength see Chapter 27 and Appendices of Marine T/Os .) Th e

Marine wing supported the Marine division with 276 transport helicopters, 60 armed observation helicopters, and 159 fixed-wing attac k

aircraft. The Army division on the other hand contained 479 transpor t

helicopters and 184 authorized gunships, and required 132 fixed-win g

aircraft in support at a 1 .1 sortie race. Citing DOD SE Asia air planning criteria, FMFPac analysts figured that the 159 Marine aircraft

were to provide each Marine battalion with 200 fixed-wing sorties pe r

month . This came out to six sorties per battalion per day or 160 dail y

sorties to support the Marine units in I Corps . These were about one -

third more sorties than the Air Force programmed for fixed-wing sup -

port of Army divisions . According to FMFPac, the Air Force was t o

provide the Army four fixed-wing sorties per battalion per clay or 15 0

sorties per battalion monthly. The resulting difference in the fixedwing support between the Army and Marine divisions was based on th e

following : the Marine battalion was about a third larger than that o f

the Army; the Marine division had about 20 percent less artillery support; and the Marines had fewer armed helicopters. CGFMFPac msg to

CMC, did 30May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar-Jun68 . In his comments,

General Norman Anderson made the additional point that the 1st

MAW supported two Marine Divisions and also Army and allied units

when required . MajGen Norman J. Anderson, Comments on draft ,

n .d . [Jan95) (Vietnam Comment File).
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 509

as responsive as it should be . According to the Marine

Commandant, the "net effect is that ground operations

become responsive to air operations rather than the

converse . " Chapman recommended, instead, that III

MAF retain mission direction of 70 percent of his

available sorties and would make available to MACV

the other 30 percent based on a rate of 1 .1 sorties per

day. Such a solution, according to General Chapman ,

permitted III MAF to ensure "the immediate availability of aircraft for support of troops on the battlefield," while MACV would in effect still control 3 0

percent of Marine sorties and able to divert any Marin e

air mission when the situation demanded .78

The Commandant's efforts once more to have higher authorities in Washington reverse single manager b y

edict from above failed . While Secretary Ignatiu s

endorsed General Chapman 's recommendations to

him, Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze again refused

to dictate air policy to MACV. Using much the same

rationale as he had on 15 May, Nitze stressed that

ComUSMACV was studying the responsiveness of th e

new procedures established at the end of May and the

secretary was sure that the field commander would

make any changes that were necessary. At the same

time, while General Wheeler, the Chairman, forwarded the Commandant 's memorandum to CinCPac and

ComUSMACV, the Joint Chiefs also declined to take

any action on their own.7 9

Given Secretary 's Nitze's two unfavorable decisions,

General Chapman believed any further exertion on his

part to influence action through DOD to be selfdefeating . Instead, he planned to revert to pressure

from below. As he advised Lieutenant General Henr y

W. Buse, Jr., his former chief of staff at HQMC and

new Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, who relieved General Krulak at the end of May, " a

move from Saigon may be our best bet at this time . "S0

The Continuing Debate

The Commandant's change of course was based i n

part on the actual or scheduled reshuffling of the ke y

personalities both at CinCPac and at MACV. At

CinCPac headquarters in Hawaii, in addition to General Buse replacing General Krulak, Admiral John C.

McCain was to take over command from Admiral

Sharp at the end of July. In Saigon, on 15 June, General Abrams became ComUSMACV in place of General Westmoreland, who returned to Washington t o

become the U.S . Army Chief of Staff. Both Generals

Norman Anderson, the commander of the 1st MAW,

Photo courtesy of Center of Military History

Army Gen Creighton W Abrams, ComUSMACV right,

talks to MajGen George I. Forsythe, CG, 1st Air Ca v

Div. Upon his relief of Gen Westmoreland in June 1968,

one of the problems facing Gen Abrams was the question of

single manager.

and also General Momyer, the commander of the Seventh Air Force, were scheduled for reassignment . The

hope was that with a different cast of commanders i n

place in strategic command billets there would b e

more room for compromise. Both General Buse, th e

new FMFPac commander, and General George S .

Brown, the new Seventh Air Force commander, had

less prickly personalities than their predecessors,

Lieutenant General Krulak and General Momyer. In

his appraisal of the situation, however, General Chaisson, who also completed his tour at this time i n

Saigon, stated that he personally did not believe that

General Momyer's departure would change much ,

"essentially . . . [Momyer] was playing an Air Force

policy push here, and I don't see the Air Force falling

off on their push ."8 1

While not too much was known about Genera l

Abrams' position, except that he wanted to ensure adequate fixed-wing air support for Army units in I Corps ,

Marine commanders assumed that he was more flexible about the single-manager issue than Westmoreland. Colonel Edward L . Fossum, the III MAF liaison

officer at MACV, upon his relief, related that the bickering between III MAF and MACV over air command

relations disturbed both Westmoreland and Abrams .

Fossum believed that Abrams' solution might be t o

reduce Marine strength in the north and bring the
510 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A42224 5

LtGen Henry W. Buse, CGFMFPac, in the foreground, arrives at the 1st MAW helicopter landing pad for a visit to the wing headquarters. As it was for Gen Abrams, the question of single manager was a major priority for the new FMFPac commander.

Marine divisions together and "solve this air business . "

Fossum admitted that he "could not really read General Abrams about the Marine Corps ." General Chaisson ,

who also rotated at this time, observed that Abrams ,

while often critical* of the Marines and publicly sup -

porting the single-management policy that he inherited, was not as adamant as Westmoreland and "has i t

[single manager) up for review."8 2

In one of his first actions, Lieutenant Genera l

Buse made arrangements to visit Vietnam to discus s

the situation with General Abrams. On 16 June, the

new FMFPac commander met with Abrams in

Saigon. Buse described Abrams as "very cordial" an d

said that the two had a very frank discussion.

According to General Buse, he told the MACV commander that he "wasn't down there to critique a t

what he [Abrams) was doing operationally, nor was I

going to tell him what to do operationally ." In turn ,

Abrams replied that he had no particular problem s

in I Corps, "unless air control could be so considered." Seeing an opportunity, Buse suggested that

Abrams end the emergency in I Corps and return

control of Marine air to III MAF. The MACV commander, however, was not prepared to take such drastic action. Abrams countered that the "Marines us e

*General Chaisson noted in his diary on 15 May that at dinner,

"Abe [Abrams) took off on Marines, 'loners, small vision, won't play . —

Chaisson Diary, Jan—Jun68 (Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute) .

more air support than anyone," and not only because

of their lightness in artillery and helicopter support .

Buse explained that "air support is part of our life

and that we were structured, trained, and accustomed to use it to maximum benefit ." General Buse

then asked Abrams directly if he felt as strongly on

the subject as General Westmoreland . The MACV

commander answered "in a definite and strong negative ." In assessing his meeting with Abrams and

later that day with General Bruce Palmer, Deput y

Commander, U.S . Army Vietnam, Buse considered

Abrams still open on the subject and that "a tinkle

has been heard from the bell of freedom ."8.3

Fresh from his trip to Vietnam, Lieutenant General Buse reported to the Commandant on the favorable atmosphere he found in Saigon and the present

situation relative to single management . He

observed that from the MACV perspective there was

general satisfaction with the new modified syste m

and "with the quantity and timeliness of air support ." Although the loss of overall air control

authority over fixed-wing sorties for III MAF still

caused several deficiencies, Buse maintained the

"Marine air control system is intact and functionin g

. . . ." He stated that the weekly frag procedure s

caused less of an administrative burden for III MA F

in that it did not require specific coordinates. Still

the FMFPac commander related that the only reaso n

that single-manager system still worked was the
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 51 1

existing Marine Corps system and the "fact that the

1st MAW continually generates sorties in excess o f

the 1 .2 [sortie) rate ."84 *

Despite the apparent happiness on the part of

MACV with the new modified single-manager system, General Buse agreed with General Chapma n

that the best channel for reversal of the policy wa s

through Saigon and possibly Honolulu . The FMFPac commander stated that there was possibly a

means of compromise through reducing the span of

control of III MAF in I Corps . He posed the possibility of dividing I Corps into two sectors, on e

Army and one Marine, possibly divided at the Ha i

Van Pass. If that occurred, Buse thought Abram s

might be induced to "return control of Marine air . "

One disadvantage that he saw to this path might b e

a lopsided distribution of air support . The Marine s

in a reduced two-division sector might be receivin g

more support while "our Army neighbors, who now

have no complaints, could starve ." Buse preferred

that General Cushman, the III MAF commander, i n

his June evaluation, present "a plan for restoring th e

integrity of the air-ground team." According t o

Buse, the III MAF commander "had a good feel of

the pulse and have some local accommodations

which can be digested at this point and still lead to

full recovery." At that point, General Buse would

then approach Admiral Sharp, still CinCPac, "i n

consonance with Cushman 's efforts and rationale ,

adding to them the personal observation and staff

data I found during my trip ."8 5

On 29 June 1968, the III MAF commander provided both Generals Buse and Chapman his draft

appraisal of the May modification to Single Management and proposed recommendations to MACV an d

asked for their comments . General Cushman

acknowledged a definite improvement and reporte d

a 54-percent increase during the month in Air Forc e

sorties . For Marine air, however, he stated that th e

weekly and daily frags "has required an inordinately

high number of scrambles and add-on sorties ." He

concluded that the present preplanned sortie leve l

fell far short of the number of air missions require d

by the ground commanders.86

*Lieutenant General Carey made the observation that "our salvation in operating under the single-management concept was that ou r

Marine Air had more flexibility than Seventh Air Force in that we were

able to generate and maintain a higher sortie rate, we could surge to a s

high as a 3 .0 sortie rate if required . In many informal conversation s

with my Air Force counterparts they marveled at our endurance and

questioned, 'How do you do it?'" Carey Comments.

General Cushman 's suggested revisions to singl e

manager were much more moderate than earlier pro- '

posals he had made to MACV and those already bein g

forwarded by the Commandant . He recommende d

that MACV retain the present system, but improv e

its coordination with supporting arms and basicall y

refine the preplanned procedures. Cushman suggested that MACV give to III MAF, in a weekly bloc k

frag order, control over all Marine preplanned sorties,

with the exception of those interdiction strike s

against Laos and North Vietnam . III MAF woul d

determine time on target and ordnance loads based o n

the needs of the respective Army and Marine divisions in I Corps. In turn, the Marine command woul d

provide the Seventh Air Force control centers "real

time reports" on Marine sorties. 87

Both Generals Buse and Chapman were some -

what disappointed with the III MAF proposal an d

wanted a stronger statement from General Cush -

man. While agreeing with Cushman's evaluation

and understanding his delicate position as a subordinate to MACV, they still desired the III MAF

commander to preface his recommendations with a

"positive statement reaffirming our collective position on the return of air assets" to Marine control .

General Buse argued that this may be "our last shot "

to reverse the situation because Abrams "and no on e

else will make this decision and once made we can

expect it to last for the duration." According t o

Buse, the new MACV commander was "practical ,

apolitical, not necessarily bound by prior arrangements, and not intimidated by Seventh Air Forc e

pressure." While Abrams possibly was impressed

with the improvement in support of the Army divisions under the revised single-manager system, Bus e

believed the Army general susceptible to an appea l

based on the relationship between infantry and supporting arms. The FMFPac commander though t

that Cushman could make a convincing case that i t

was the Marine interface with the cumbersome Seventh Air Force mission control procedures tha t

resulted in the enhanced air support for the Army

divisions, not the centralization of air assets unde r

the Seventh Air Force .88

In his revision of his reply to MACV, Genera l

Cushman made some minor cosmetic changes but

decided against the direct approach suggested b y

General Buse. Cushman thanked the FMFPac commander for his advice, stating he incorporated "as

many as possible under the circumstances prevailing." The III MAF commander declared that he had
512 THE DEFINING YEAR

advanced "much of the philosophy" recommended b y

Buse several times to Abrams and "to repeat it once

again could be counterproductive ." Moreover, according to Cushman, if Abrams accepted the III MAF

proposals, "I will once again have control of all my ai r

assets . . . ." General Cushman, nevertheless,

expressed his doubts about a positive outcome for the

Marine position, but that his present tactic was "more

saleable than our past direct approaches."89

As General Cushman predicted, the MACV evaluation, despite the Marine arguments to the contrary,

saw no need to alter the arrangements over air contro l

in Vietnam. In fact, the author of a Marine Corps

Headquarters memo on the subject wrote that th e

tenor of General Abrams most recent comment s

" seem to indicate the system may have reached a poin t

of equilibrium unless some additional force i s

applied." In Washington, Major General McCutcheo n

expressed little surprise that General Abrams was relatively satisfied with the modified single-manager system. As McCutcheon* wrote to Major General Charles

J. Quilter, the new 1st MAW commander who had

relieved General Anderson on 22 June, "it is only us

Marines who have noticed the diminution in effectiveness." McCutcheon even admitted that this so -

called reduction in effectiveness "isn't very much now

since they [the Air Force] incorporated all our suggested changes." The nub of the matter was, according to McCutcheon, "we still don't have the OpCo n

[operational control)."90

The Commandant and General McCutcheon wer e

in hopes that the selection of Admiral John C. McCain to be the new CinCPac might provid e

another avenue to challenge single manager in Vietnam. As early as 23 May, just after his nomination

for the command, the Marine headquarters staff i n

Washington briefed the admiral on its perspective of

the single-manager dispute . The Marines continued

*As Deputy Chief of Staff for Air at Headquarters Marine Corps ,

General McCutcheon was not in any chain of command relative to th e

administration or operations of Marine aviation in Vietnam . Whil e

fully aware of this, General McCutcheon kept himself fully informe d

about Marine aviation matters in the country through an informal correspondence. As he wrote earlier to General Quilter, he would writ e

"from time to time as I did Norm [General Anderson] and Ben (Majo r

General Louis B. Robertshaw, an earlier commander of the 1st MAW ]

and occasionally get on the phone . . . I think we both understand tha t

FMFPac is sensitive to being passed over so in most cases the kind o f

information that will be passed personally will be of such a nature tha t

it will not compromise FMFPac's command prerogatives. "

McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Charles J . Quilter, dtd 5Ju168 (Ltr No . 34 ,

File Q, 1968 Correspondence, McCutcheon Papers).

to update McCain from time to time before he took

over his new post. As General McCutcheon observed

in his letter to Quilter, the new CinCPac would no t

be able "to jump in . . . right away and right the

wrong that was done, but I think we have a solid

friend in him."9 '

At the same time in Honolulu, Lieutenant General Buse tried to use his influence with Admira l

Sharp to endorse the Marine proposal of giving

General Cushman, as CG III MAF, the authority t o

frag directly the 70 percent of preplanned missions

in the weekly frag order. According to Buse, Sharp

had completed his own evaluation and basically

supported General Cushman's recommende d

changes . Apparently, the admiral had discussed his

recommendations with the new Seventh Air Forc e

commander, General Brown . The Air Force general

proposed that Admiral Sharp first clear his revisions with General Wheeler, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, before sending them on to Genera l

Abrams. General Buse believed that "Sharp will

stick to his decision . . . But we now will encounte r

a day or so delay . . . ." Buse stated that he could see

MajGen Charles J. Quilter relieved MajGen Anderson as

CG, 1st MAW in June 1968.

Unnumbered Defense Department (USMC) photo
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 51 3

Unnumbered Defense Department (USMC) photo

Adm John C. McCain, CinCPac (seated with cigar in his mouth), visits Marine Fire Support Bas e

Lance in Operation Taylor Common . LtGen Cushman is seated just behind and to the right of Adm

McCain. Both Gen Quilter and Adm McCain also had to wrestle with the single manager issue .

"no impact on anyone in Washington, if Sharp

makes this decision with exception " of the Chief of

Staff of the Air Force .9 2

With Sharp leaving his command, however, i t

was obvious that his recommendations would onl y

have validity if they were endorsed by his successor.

Obviously, the Marines believed that the chance s

were good that Admiral McCain would do so .

Marine Brigadier General Hutchinson, the CinCPa c

J-3, wrote to General McCutcheon that "we had

McCain as near fully locked in on a decision t o

return about 70 percent of our fixed-wing assets t o

Marine control as it was possible to be short of having the decision signed off."93

Again the Marine aspirations were to lead to frustration . After assuming command, in August ,

Admiral McCain together with Lieutenant General

Buse visited General Abrams in Saigon . Their visi t

also coincided with one by General Chapman t o

Vietnam. General Hutchinson related that McCai n

had "withheld his final decision for the obvious pro -

tocol reasons of being able to say he had discussed th e

subject directly with Abe . " In the meeting over single management that included the two Marine generals as well as McCain and Abrams, General Abrams

apparently was willing to modify single manager i n

return for an alteration of command relations in I

Corps . The Marine generals, at that point, decide d

not to push the issue . According to Brigadier General Hutchinson, this course of action made "it impossible for McCain to do anything but go along . "

Hutchinson stated that the admiral was not yet "i n

writing, but I would guess that after he sees Chapman . . . the issue will be closed out." In General

Chapman's version, Admiral McCain, a close person -

al friend, told him, "that he was new on the scene ,

that such an order was vehemently opposed by his

principal commander in the field . . . and that he just

didn't feel persuaded that it was a good idea and that

he ought to do it, and he never did . "

Through the rest of 1968, the Marines would continue to bring up the single-manager issue, but with
514 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

U.S. Army BGen Howard H . Cooksey, an assistant division commander of the Americal Division ,

paints a "Happy Birthday" on a 500 pound bomb at the Chu Lai airstrip in honor of the 193 d

anniversary of the Marine Corps and in appreciation of Marine close air support for the division .

Col Rex A. Deasy, commanding officer of MAG-12, looks on .

diminishing expectations.* On 9 September, General

Cushman asked General Abrams for authorization t o

have "mission direction of in-country Marine strik e

assets on a 30-day trial period within the framework of

single manager." The III MAF commander then provided Abrams with a detailed breakdown both of Ai r

Force and Marine sorties in support of ground forces in

I Corps covering the period from 30 May until 2 September. According to III MAF statistics, 61 percent o f

the total sorties were preplanned while 34 percent o f

this total were "add-ons" and scrambles" (See Table 1) .

*On the tactical level, Colonel Robert D. Slay, who commanded

MAG—1 1 from June through the end of the year, wrote that he

" insured that my FRAG orders from 1st MAW were carried out ; I

really didn 't care where the FRAG orders to Wing came from . Politics and in-fighting for control of air assets was of little concern . . .

where the flying and dying took place. The concept of the Marin e

Air-Ground Team was well understood, however, and my comman d

was briefed to give first and highest priority to any Marine groun d

unit in trouble ." Col Robert D. Slay, Comments on draft, dtd

25Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Nearly 40 percent of the Marine sorties fell into this

latter category as compared with only 29 percent of th e

Air Force sorties in I Corps. According to Cushman ,

such a high percentage of add-ons and scrambles

"points up either a shortage of preplans or less than

optimum utilization of available resources . " He

believed the 30-day trial period would demonstrate a

marked improvement in these percentages 94

Despite discussion with Seventh Air Force officials

and some optimism on the part of the 1st MAW staff

that MACV might accept this trial period, General

Abrams turned down the III MAF request . The

MACV commander opposed what he considered double management, and hoped to end the dispute once

and for all. Supported by General Wheeler, the JCS

Chairman, Abrams ended the formal monthly evaluations of the system. As he stated in November 1968 ,

"we do not wish to appear intransigent about this matter . . . but it is vital that ComUSMACV retain the

centralized control and direction of TacAir [tactical air)

in the hands of a single individual ."95
A MATTER OF DOCTRINE : MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER 51 5

Table 1

Attack Sorties Planned and Flown by

Marine and Air Force Aircraft

30 May—2 Sept 1968

Type USAF USMC Total

Percentage of

Total Flow n

Preplanned

Flown 7,731 9,960 17,691 6 1

Immediat e

Diverts 468 573 1,059 5

Scrambles 1,505 3,235 4,740 1 6

Add Ons 1,807 3,696 5,503 1 8

Totals

Flown 11,529 17,464 28,993

Preplanned

Fragged 9,473 11,980 21,453 83

While General Abrams remained firm in his support of single manager as modified in May, the Marin e

Corps continued the struggle in the following month s

and years, but in different forums. While the Commandant continued to raise the issue among the Joint

Chiefs, only the Navy, since General Westmorelan d

became the Army Chief of Staff, now supported th e

Marine position . As General McCutcheon observed to

General Quilter, the 1st MAW commander, i n

November, 1968, " I am working . . . on the philosophy that single management is here, and the way to

beat it is to join it and out-manage them."96

Using this tactic, the Marines in a series of local

arrangements and working agreements managed to

obtain in 1969 and 1970 practical control of their aviation assets. In early 1969, III MAF had succeeded i n

vetoing an attempt by MACV to modify its air directive 95 .4 to include the term "operational direction" to

define the relationship between the Seventh Air Force

and III MAF. Finally, in August 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon as CG III MAF, agreed to a ne w

MACV air directive that gave " formal sanction " to the

changes that the Marines had succeeded in obtaining

from MACV and the Air Force . The Air Force accepted

the Marine Corps interpretation of "mission" and "operational direction. " Under the new directive, III MAF

retained operational control of its aircraft and included

a provision permitting the Marine wing to withhol d

" specialized Marine support sorties " from the Seventh

Air Force . If the Marines obtained much of what they

wanted, then as Bernard Nalty, an Air Force historian,

asked, "Why the fuss?" Nalty answered his own question with the conclusion : "Tactically, the single manager meant nothing . Doctrinally, however, it affirmed a

principle, centralized control, that the Army Air Corp s

and U.S . Air Force had consistently championed, and in

doing so, it established a precedent for the future ."97 `

* The new directive defined Mission/Operational Direction a s

"The authority delegated to DepComUSMACV for Air Operation s

(Cdr, 7th AF) to assign specific fixed-wing air tasks to the CG, III

MAF, on a periodic basis as implementation of a basic missio n

assigned by ComUSMACV." MACV Directive 95 .4, dtd 15Aug70 as

quoted in Cosmas and Murray, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1970-71, p .

277 . General Chapman summed up the outcome of the dispute in th e

following manner : "1 . Marine system essentially restored—no gain o r

loss. 2 . Army gained close air support from Air Force equivalent t o

Marine scope and type—a clear important winner. 3 . Air Force lost

accordingly. " He emphasized that the precedent applied "only to join t

land operations after the conclusion of (an) amphibious operation . "

Chapman Comments.
CHAPTER 2 5

A Question of Helicopters

Another Debate—The Need for Lighter Aircraft—To Keep the Mediums and Heavies Flyin g

Another Look at Helicopter Air-Ground Relations

Another Debate

As the debate with the Air Force and MACV continued through the second half of 1968 over the control of Marine fixed-wing aircraft, a second controversy festered in Marine Corps circles. This question

involved the employment and control of anothe r

indispensable, but relatively short-supply Marine air -

craft resource, helicopters. While ComUSMACV and

the Army were on the fringes to the dispute, the principals were III MAF ground and aviation commanders. Ironically, the 1st MAW, which argued so vehemently against central control from Saigon of its

fixed-wing assets, insisted on "single management" of

its rotary aircraft.

Again it was the arrival of the Army divisions ,

especially the 1st Air Cavalry Division, into norther n

I Corps in early 1968 that provided the impetus t o

this discussion. Major General Raymond G. Davis,

as Provisional Corps deputy commander in March

and April 1968, was tremendously impressed with

the Cavalry's mobile helicopter-borne tactics in the

relief of Khe Sanh, Operation Pegasus, and later i n

the A Shau Valley in Operation Delaware . When he

took over the 3d Marine Division in mid-May, whil e

not abandoning the strongpoints along the DMZ,

Davis wanted to break free of them and strike at th e

battered North Vietnamese units in a series of free -

wheeling operations throughout the division sector .

From the aviation perspective this created an insatiable demand on the wing's already overburdened

and limited number of helicopters and crewmen .

According to Major General Norman J. Anderson,

the former wing commander, he just did not see how

his successor, Major General Charles J . Quilter, coul d

meet the desires of General Davis and at the sam e

time "still take care of the 1st Division and provide

logistic support elsewhere."1 *

The Army and Marine Corps organization o f

their helicopters differed markedly. In one sense ,

*See the discussion of the 3d Marine Division offensive operations

during this period in Chapters 15, 16, 18, 20 and 22 .

the Marine Corps viewed the rotary aircraft as a

boat and a means to land troops from ship to shor e

to exploit the situation beyond the beach in a n

amphibious landing.** On the other hand, th e

Army looked at the helicopter as a horse, as cavalry,

and a means of outmaneuvering and outflanking an

enemy. Because of the limitations of room on board

ship, the Marine Corps depended on fewer, bu t

larger helicopters, the UH—34 or CH-46, to carry

the assault force ashore. With less concern about

space restrictions and more about maneuverability,

the Army relied on an assortment of helicopters,

mostly smaller and more maneuverable than th e

Marine aircraft, to carry the assault forces into th e

rugged forested hinterlands. With the establishment of small artillery fire bases on key hills, the

1st Air Cavalry could launch fast-paced, leap-frog

airmobile operations far from its base areas irrespective of terrain . 2

Marine aviation officers were quick to respon d

that there should be no comparison betwee n

Marine and Army helicopter support, especially

that available to the 1st Air Cavalry Division . I n

contrast to the 1st Air Cavalry which had more

than 400 helicopters under its control, the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing owned slightly more tha n

300 to support two and a third Marine divisions,

ARVN units, and the Korean Marines in I Corps . Major General Norman Anderson, the wing commander, observed that the wing had inadequat e

numbers of helicopters because "the demand wa s

limitless and was stimulated by the example of th e

**One should not carry the analogy of the boat too far. As

Major General John P. Condon, a veteran Marine aviator and commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in the early 1960s commented, " The boar could never envelop any unit in position o n

land . The Marine Corps pioneered vertical envelopment, beginning

'from the sea, ' but never stopping just beyond the beach . The use

of the helo in maneuver and envelopment, as well as in movement s

of heavy equipment and logistic support of follow-on actions wa s

also visualized from the start . " MajGen John P. Condon, Comment s

on draft, dtd 3OJan1993 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Con -

don Comments.

516
A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 51 7

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in an adjacen t

area zipping about all over. " 3 *

Despite the massive and even decisive role th e

Marine helicopters played in the resupplying of th e

Marine hill outposts at Khe Sanh, ground officers

elsewhere had complaints about helicopter support .

Immediately after the recapture of Hue, newspape r

accounts circulated that Army helicopter pilots

flew under more adverse conditions than Marines.

In response to a criticism in one article about a 500 -

foot ceiling limitation during the battle, Major

General Anderson wrote that the wing placed suc h

restrictions on "all aircraft operations subject to the

exigencies of the tactical situation ." The wing commander remarked the reason for the 500-foot ceiling was "because of the extreme vulnerability t o

enemy fire of low flying helicopters . . . ." He then

argued that the "Army UH—1 type aircraft has

more capability for contour flying than the CH—46

and was therefore occasionally useable when th e

CH—46 was not . . . ."** Even with the deplorabl e

flying conditions during much of the battle of Hue ,

Anderson pointed out that the Marine helicopters

flew 823 regular sorties, transported 1,672 passengers, carried more than a million pounds of cargo ,

*Colonel David S . Twining, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded Marine Air Control Squadron 4 in 1968 and earlier served i n

the Dong Ha DASC, agreed with General Anderson that to an extent

the difference between Marine Corps concepts of helicopter usage an d

that of the Army was based on "Marine Corps conservatism as a result

of having far fewer helicopter assets." Twining, nevertheless, claime d

that Marine Corps "helicopter doctrine or practice in Vietnam was no t

only conservative but relatively unimaginative ." While stating that th e

Marine Corps was the "first of the services to institute a program t o

work out helicopter combat techniques," he believed that internal divi -

sions within the Marine aviation community between fixed-wing an d

helicopter pilots hampered Marine helicopter innovation . In Twinin g 's

opinion, "it was only due to the insistence of the ground communit y

and the Commandant himself, that we entered the war with the helicopter inventory that we had and this proved to be insufficient for th e

innovative tactics that we might have otherwise developed ." Col Davi d

S . Twining, Comments on draft, dtd 15 Nov94 (Vietnam Commen t

File). Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Miller, who served on th e

MAG—16 staff and commanded a helicopter squadron in 1968, wa s

unimpressed with the Army helicopter organization and tactics.

According to Miller, some Army helicopter operations "anticipated aircraft losses of up to 25% of the first assault wave . I don ' t believe the

Marine Corps would ever consider accepting such losses." LtCol

Thomas F. Miller, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Miller Comments .

**One experienced CH—46 helicopter pilot suggested that the

CH—46 has the same capability as the HU1 as far as contour flying, bu t

that the Army helicopter was smaller and able to fit into tighter landing zones than the larger Marine craft . LtCol Dale Johnson comment s

to author.

and conducted 270 medical evacuation sorties, lifting out 977 casualties. More to the point, he maintained provisions existed in the order to overrid e

the flying restrictions when the tactical situatio n

demanded. General Anderson admitted, however,

" that this proviso, in all honesty was little know n

or understood. The order is widely distributed, but

little read . "4 ** *

By April 1968, Brigadier General Earl E . Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff and also an aviator ,

***In a contemporary letter, Brigadier General Earl E . Anderson ,

the III MAF Chief of Staff, expressed the following opinion about th e

subject: "Regardless of what we said in our official response, the fact

remains that if the weather isn 't above 1,500 feet and two miles, th e

mission has to, be declared a priority one before the Wing will fly . If

the weather is 500 feet and a mile, the requesting organization must

declare an emergency before the helicopters will fly . If the weather is

less than 500 feet and one mile, and if helicopters are required, th e

mission must be declared as mandatory, and the only two individual s

who can approve a mandatory mission are the Wing Commander an d

the Commanding General III MAF. I should say, they were (emphasi s

in the original) the only ones who could approve such a mission ,

because following my investigation of certain allegations made durin g

the Hue battle, General Anderson, at General Cushman's insistence ,

expanded the individuals who could approve a mandatory mission to

include the two Assistant Wing Commanders, and the Chief of Staff ,

III MAF." Anderson concluded that even this was "not adequate . Th e

helicopter pilots will fly, and do fly, in almost any kind of weather, bu t

to require a requesting unit to go to the Wing Commander or the II I

MAF Commander to have a mission flown, when the ceiling is 40 0

feet, does not seem to be justified . " BGen E .E. Anderson ltr to MajGe n

McCutcheon, dcd 14Mar68, Encl, Gen . Earl E. Anderson, Comments

on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant Genera l

Richard E. Carey, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded a fixed-win g

squadron in 1968 and also served on the 1st MAW staff, recalled tha t

during the battle for Hue a "CH46 did not do a MedEvac because o f

an extremely low ceiling (allegedly on the ground) . At wing we wer e

notified that a Huey had done the Med Evac for us because of our 500-

foot restriction . We reiterated the proviso about exigencies of the tactical situation but too lace . Unfortunately, this incident gave an

impression that the Army provided better helo support than 'us . Th e

1st Cav observation helos buzzed around at low altitudes further

emphasizing the difference in equipment, numbers of birds, and methods of operations, which certainly didn 't enhance our support image to

Marine ground units. " LtGen Richard E . Carey, Comments on draft ,

dcd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) . Several Marine helicopte r

commanders emphasized their willingness to fly under adverse conditions. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Walter H . Shauer, who commanded HMM—362, wrote, "We were mission oriented merely flyin g

in whatever weather, terrain, or combat situation in a manner t o

accomplish the mission . In my briefings the only restriction was

attempt no mission that you were not capable of performing, other -

wise, attempt it later when you could get thru ." LtCol Walter H .

Shauer, Comments on draft, dtd 1Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Shauer Comments . See also Col Roger W. Peard, Comments

on draft, dtd 9Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Peard Comments and LtCol Jack E . Schlarp Comments on draft, dtd 21Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Schlarp Comments .
518 THE DEFINING YEAR

wing and the way they ran their helicopters . "5 *

General Westmoreland also believed that th e

Marines had problems with their helicopter organization. While he accepted the Air Force argument abou t

the need of centralized fixed-wing air control by the air

commander, he disagreed with the Marine concept of

keeping the helicopter assets under the wing rather

than the division . He believed the Marine Corps system was too inflexible . While crediting the Marines as

the originators of the air assault doctrine, he confide d

to Brigadier General Chaisson, "Yo u've got yourself so

wedded to this centralized control of all your air assets

over in the wing and the air-ground team, that dow n

at the working level, the battalion, the infantry battalion, he has to ask for helicopters like he normally

would have to ask for tactical air support . " He believed

the Army had advanced "way ahead of you in the wa y

we've married our helicopters right in with the tactica l

infantry command."6

Marine aviation commanders, on the other hand ,

believed that the Army system, especially that of th e

1st Air Cavalry, provided very little control and endan -

gered not only helicopters, but also fixed-wing aircraft

that were in the sector.** The Marine Direct Air SupDepartment of Defense (USMC) Unnumbered Phot o

A Marine Boeing Vertol CH—46 Sea Knight helicopter from

HMM—165 approaches the helicopter carrier USS Tripoli

(LPH 10) for a landing. Because of concern for space o n

board amphibious ships, Marines depended on larger capacity helicopters to carry the assault force so as to require fewe r

helicopters on board ship .

related that "there has been considerable fuss an d

fury over the responsiveness of the helicopters, and

both division commanders are complaining . . . . "

It may have been a matter of perspective, but General Cushman even had some doubts about the dedication of Marine helicopter pilots . The III MAF

commander remembered that "some of the helicopter pilots from Marble Mountain would go up

to Phu Bai to provide some support and hell, they' d

come all the way back to Marble Mountain to ea t

lunch, just . . . baloney as that." According to

Cushman "we had a long battle to utilize helicopters efficiently and it took great overhaul on the

part of the divisions and the way they ran their

logistics and a great overhaul on the part of the

*Observing that the Marine wing supported two and a thir d

Marine divisions, plus ARVNs and Koreans, General Condon wrot e

that "with assigned missions of that scope for the helos, it seems reasonable to me to take a centralized C&C (command and control ]

stand ." Condon went on to say, nevertheless, "Iffull coordinated planning

had been accomplished by both members of the Air-Ground Team as a meticulous doctrinal observance in all helicopterborne operations, I don't think there

would ever have been any `difficulty' to be discussed [Emphasis in the original)." Condon Comments. Lieutenant General Carey, also remarked o n

the dilemma of the wing with the "total overcommitment" of its helicopter assets to support not only Marine units but also other forces .

The wing then was "taken to task by our own Marines for not being

able to respond to a commitment . . . ." Carey, nevertheless, wrote tha t

the " argument of ground commanders that helo assets are designed fo r

the direct support of the division and should consequently be assigne d

to them for operational control has merit ." He believed that whil e

valid, "the aviation argument . . . that with the Corps' limited assets,

training, employment, and logistic support is optimized with centra l

control," there was still room for compromise . He believed that by tas k

organizing "we . . . would have been more effective in supporting ou r

Marines in Vietnam by selective assignment of certain Helo assets to

the Divisions for operational control ." Carey Comments.

**Lieutenant General Carey, who at the time was in the G—3 section of the wing, wrote that the "Army employment of their organic

helos was totally unorthodox to us. In the Marine system the HDC i n

the DASC controlled helo movement and coordination of fires . In those

cases where large helo operations were scheduled we considered i t

absolutely essential to lift or shift fires as required to ensure safe pas -

sage of our helos. On the other hand, as we observed Army operations

they appeared to ignore the requirement to monitor their helo flights

to ensure safe passage through hot areas. They generally by-passed
A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 51 9

port Centers (DASCs) controlled not only fixed-wing

sorties, but also contained a Helicopter Direction Center (HDC) to oversee rotary-wing flights. Collocated

with the divisions' FSCCs, the Marine DASCs wer e

able to coordinate their helicopter assaults with both

fixed-wing and artillery support. On the other hand,

the Army had no similar system and their helicopter

units, according to Marine commanders, " just didn't

know what each other were doing . " Major General

Anderson observed that the Army Americal Divisio n

unit commanders were "delighted" with the Marine

system "because they recognized the desirability of this

kind of coordination . " He noted that it was an entirely

different situation with the 1st Cavalry since " they had

such a mass of helicopters that the control became an

utter impossibility, except in accordance with whatever control is the result of planning."7

The Need for Lighter Aircraft

In the spring of 1968, however, no matter whethe r

the Marine Corps wanted to adopt more of the Army

airmobile tactics, it was in no position to do so . Much

of this was due to the type of aircraft . For much of its

success, the 1st Air Cavalry depended on its fleet of

light helicopters, both unarmed and armed, which i t

used to find, fix, and kill the enemy. As General

McCutcheon expressed in Washington after a visit t o

Vietnam, the Marines could match the Army in helicopter lift, but "we are woefully short of small helos ,

both slick and gunships." 8*

During March, in an exchange of messages wit h

Headquarters, Marine Corps, FMFPac, and MACV,

General Cushman discussed means of making Marin e

helicopter operations more effective, specificall y

through increasing helicopter reconnaissance and gunship assets. General Westmoreland had recommended

to III MAF that the Marines adopt more of the Air

Cavalry techniques relative to these as well as helichecking in with the DASC causing concern that they would fl y

through friendly artillery fire with its possible consequences. We frequently observed massive helo movement out of Camp Evans and di d

not know of their destination, their routes or mission until they woul d

suddenly reappear back in the landing pattern of their home field . It

was a standard question, 'Wonder how many they lost to friendly fire

today?'" Carey Comments. Colonel Joel E . Bonner, who was the Wing

G—3 in 1968, observed that the subject of helicopter usage "will b e

with both the Army and the Marines forever—like frontal assaults and

flanking maneuvers." Col Joel E. Bonner, Comments on draft, dt d

7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

*Major General Condon observed that the Marine Corps developed its helicopters under " the concept of the amphibious assault "

and in effect, this concept drove all Marine helicopter design .

copter reaction missions. While the Marine hierarchy

"appreciated" the MACV recommendations, General

Krulak, then the FMFPac commander, observed that

General Westmoreland "knows, moreover, that we

cannot lay hands on any significant number of Hueys

[UH—lEs) in a short time, any more than the Army

can." The Commandant, General Chapman, commented that the Marines needed more light helicopters

and "we need them now." Using phraseology recommended both from Washington and from Honolulu ,

General Cushman told the MACV commander tha t

given the situation it was "difficult to see how current

Marine Corps helicopter resources could be used to an

advantage greater than now is achieved in conjunction

with our fixed-wing aviation." He mentioned that he

had requested more light helicopters, UH—lEs, an d

specifically more gunships. According to Cushman,

Westmoreland agreed to a III MAF proposal for a n

exchange of Marine and Army helicopter pilots and

reconnaissance personnel . Moreover, the MACV commander would support a Marine effort to expand it s

light helicopter assets . At the same time, Cushman

allowed that he would continue to monitor III MAF

reconnaissance and reaction capability.9

At the same time, III MAF was in the midst of

reorganizing its UH—1E assets. With the planned

introduction of the fixed-wing North America n

turbo-prop OV—10A Bronco into the Marine Corp s

inventory, these aircraft were to take over from th e

Hueys more of the observation and aircraft control

missions. The "Broncos" were slated for the VMO

squadrons and the original concept was to reduce th e

number of Hueys in-country by the number of th e

new aircraft . Given the increased demand for lighte r

helicopters, General McCutcheon instead proposed in

mid-1967 that the Marines obtain permission to create new light helicopter squadrons that would b e

equipped entirely with Hueys . The VMOs woul d

According to Condon, until the Vietnam War, there was no need fo r

the gunship . Fixed-wing would provide helicopter protection an d

prepare the landing zones . On the other hand, the Army was limited

by legislation from developing fixed-wing aircraft and " to acquire

some organic airborne firepower, it was a natural step for the army t o

pursue the helicopter gunship development with vigor. " Condo n

stared that the Marine Corps had " no comparable developmental

thrust for either the high performance light helo or the growin g

capabilities of the gunship models . " In General Condon 's opinion ,

that as early as 1962, when Marine helicopters first deployed to Vietnam, the Corps should have pursued the development "of the best performing light helicopter, the helicopter gunship, and defensive armament fo r

all helicopters . . . on a high priority basis [emphasis in the original]. "

Condon Comments.
520 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of Col Warren A . Butche r

Crew members of a Bell Iroquois UH—1 E helicopter (Huey) gunship pause in the field awaiting a

new mission . By 1968, the Marines required more helicopter gunships to support operations.

retain half of the Huey inventory while the new HMIs

would acquire the surplus number displaced by the

Broncos. As McCutcheon observed, the chances for

approval were good in that the UH—lEs were alread y

on hand and the procurement needs were modest . The

Secretary of Defense agreed to the changes but only on

a temporary basis.1 0

On 8 March 1968, Headquarters Marine Corps

issued its implementing bulletin to restructure th e

VMOs and to establish the light helicopter squadrons

(HMLs). The three permanent Marine VMO

squadrons were eventually to contain 12 UH—lEs an d

18 OV—10A Broncos. According to the headquarters

directive, the Marine Corps would transform both of

its temporary VMOs into HMLs consisting of 2 4

UH—lEs. A third HML would be established at Camp

Pendleton in California . The Marine Corps was to

retain the three HML squadrons only through th e

duration of the war." "

In Vietnam, in early March, VMO—3 at Phu Bai,

the one temporary observation squadron in-country,

became HML—367 with a transfer of aircraft and personnel. On 15 March, HML—167 was established at

Marble Mountain with 13 UH—lEs assigned to it . The

first Bronco aircraft arrived in July and joined VMO—2

at Da Nang .' While the arrival of the Broncos may

have eased the burden on UH—lEs somewhat, ther e

were still too few of the new light fixed-wing aircraft

in country at the end of 1968, 13 total, and all i n

VMO—2, to make much difference . In December, there

were 74 Marine UH—lEs in Vietnam—12 attached t o

VMO—2, 14 with HML—167, 15 with HML—367, and

23 with VMO—6—only three more than were incountry in January. While there had been a change i n

designation, the HML squadrons through the yea r

*Colonel Tullis J . Woodham, Jr., who commanded the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, remembered that in July 1968, the enemy shot

down one of the new aircraft "in our area of Go Noi . The spotter aircraft was probably lower in altitude than he safely should have been

because he received a number of rounds through the bottom of th e

plane, causing it to go down ." Woodham sent a company to retriev e

any survivors and bring back what they could of the "sophisticated an d

classified equipment and manuals. " With continuous air support, " tha t

was about as close to an ' air show ' as I'd seen in Vietnam," the company accompanied by tanks found the aircraft and recovered the bodies o f

the crew . Unidentified draft, Encl, Col Tullis J . Woodham, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec1994 (Vietnam Comment File) .
A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 52 1

basically performed the same missions as the VMOs .*

It would not be until 1969 with the introduction o f

the Bell AH1G Cobra helicopter gunship into th e

Marine inventory and the arrival of additional Bronco s

that the demands upon the overworked UH—lEs

began to ease .1 2

While the Marines used the UH—1E both for observation and as a gunship, it had many disadvantages i n

comparison to the diverse light helicopter mix 'that the

Army helicopter units had available to them . The 1st

Air Cavalry already had the Cobra gunships in service .

In addition, the Army division had available the bubble-topped Hughes OH—6A Cayuse or LOH (Ligh t

Observation Helicopter) for scouting missions and

finally the UH—1H model of the Huey for command

and control and trooplift purposes. The Army still used

the UH—1B model in a gunship role . t 3

As early as March 1968, Brigadier General Henr y

W. Hise, one of the two assistant commanders of th e

1st MAW, outlined the handicaps of the Marin e

UH—1E as a gunship . Equipped with the TAT—10 1

Turret, the UH—1E armament, according to Hise, did

"not have enough range or punch. "** Also in both the

fight for Hue and in the environment around the DMZ

and Khe Sanh, the Marine general argued that "th e

armed chopper is a point target to the man on the

ground while in the great majority of cases the chopper pilot is firing at an area target . " The result was that

the helicopters were vulnerable to the enemy's

12 .7mm machine guns while pilots had difficulty "i n

pin-pointing the guns firing at them." Hise believed

"that chopper operations into 12 .7[mm machine gun)

defended areas is not good sense unless the weathe r

allows fixed-wing support ." The assistant wing commander observed that armed UH—1E pilots flying int o

these regions now "holler for longer range area

*Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Miller, who commanded

HML—167 from August through the end of 1968, recalled that out o f

the 14 UH–1E aircraft that he had assigned to his squadron, he scheduled five of these aircraft each day as VIP aircraft for the commanding

generals of the two Marine Divisions, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing ,

III MAF, and the Korean Marine Corps . While stating that the number of these especially designated aircraft by themselves were not significant, they consisted of nearly six percent of all UH—1E assets.

Miller Comments.

**According to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Miller, he did no t

recall that when he assumed command of HML—167 in August 196 8

that any of his aircraft were equipped with the TAT 101 . He state d

that his UH—1E 's " were armed with forward-firing 7 .62 machin e

guns and 2 .75 rocket pods attached to each landing skid . Two cre w

members operating 7 .62 machine guns fired out the aircraft 's sid e

doors." Miller Comments.

weapons; specifically 20mm guns or at a minimum

.50-caliber guns."1 4

In June, the new FMFPac commander, Lieutenant

General Henry W. Buse, Jr., picked up on the refrai n

for more of a mix of light helicopters for the Marine

Corps. After a visit to III MAF and especially the 3 d

Marine Division, he told the Commandant that the

division's recent mobile operations in the interior and

the western mountains "underscore the requiremen t

for the relatively small, light, and powerful helicopte r

vis a vis the CH-46. " While remarking that the latte r

aircraft was "worth its weight in gold , " he stated it was

"not the answer to the requirement for a troop carrier "

in the rugged terrain in the central and western DM Z

sector. According to Buse, the infantry and reconnaissance "insert and extraction problem in undeveloped

LZ's, often under fire, dictates the employment o f

smaller, faster, more maneuverable helos." While recognizing the yeoman service performed by the Marine

UH—lEs and the old Sikorsky UH—34s Sea Horses,***

he was especially impressed with the Army UH—1 H

"with its slightly greater capacity and increased power "

for these purposes. 1 5

Major General Davis, the 3d Marine Division commander, also had doubts about the Marine UH—1E a s

a command and control aircraft and compared it unfavorably to the Army UH—1H. While assistant Provisional Corps commander, prior to taking over the 3 d

Division, Davis recounted that the Army had provide d

him with his own Huey, an H model, and that he had

been "spoiled . " With the Army aircraft, with its

increased power, he was able to get into "all of these out

of way places and these hilltops, and through all thi s

weather . . . ." When he assumed command of the 3 d

Division, the Marine wing provided him with a

UH—1E "that couldn't hack it ." The Marine aircraft

with its comparative lack of lift would have difficult y

in the mountains. Davis remembered that he "got

***Both Lieutenant Colonels Jack E . Schlarp and Walter H .

Shauer, who both commanded HMM—362, a UH—34 squadron, i n

1968, praised the reliability and availability of the UH—34 . Lieutenan t

Colonel Shauer observed that when he arrived in Vietnam in the las t

half of 1967, the " [UH—)34's were doing the bulk of the flying . . . .

This was because the older H—34 [in comparison to the CH—46) wa s

much simpler to maintain and [had a] reliable piston engine vs sophisticated jet turbine engines [of the CH—46) subject to FOD (foreig n

object damage) and temperature limitations . " Shauer Comments. Lieu -

tenant Colonel Schlarp wrote, "if the Corps had hung on to the H—34 's

and not tried to rely on the H–46s, and/or H—53s everyone might hav e

been better served . The H–34 was a reliable helicopter that did not

suffer from the lack of availability as did the newer helicopters. "

Schlarp Comments.
522 THE DEFINING YEAR

Photo from the Abel collectio n

A Marine North American OV—I OA Bronco lands at the Marble Mountain airstrip at Da Nang .

The Bronco was to take over more of the observation and aircraft control missions from the Hueys.

flopped down two or three times with those Huey s

[UH—lEs} ." According to the 3d Marine Divisio n

commander, the Army provided him with a backup

helicopter because, "those Marine helicopters could no t

go where the H—model could go."1 6 *

While the situation was not entirely bleak, General McCutcheon commented in mid-November tha t

the improvement in the inventory of Marine gunships and other light helicopters would only be modest in the foreseeable future . As he wrote to Majo r

General Quilter, the 1st Wing commander, "I mus t

tell you in all honesty, that there just aren't any more

helos or any more pilots to make available to III MAF

in the foreseeable future ." He mentioned a combination of both personnel ceilings and an attempt to

*Colonel Roger W. Peard, Jr., who commanded HMH–463, i n

1968, observed that the greatest difference between the UH–1E an d

UH–1H models was engine power, otherwise the aircraft were ver y

similar. Peard wrote that maneuverability "relates to a machine's

ability to change direction, accelerate, and decelerate . These are

important characteristics for fighter/intercepter aircraft, but not so

crucial in a helicopter. Maneuverability in a helo may add to th e

exhilaration of flight, but most helos are flown to maintain the lift

vector from the rotor disc close to vertical to maximize lift ." Pear d

acknowledged that size considerations were another matter and tha t

" laymen " speaking of maneuverability usually refer to ability to "ge t

into a small LZ, which is a size consideration ." In any event Colonel

Peard did not believe there was enough size differentiation to quibble about between the E and H versions . He concluded, " I imagin e

that MGen Davis may just (have) liked flying in the newer H rathe r

than in a well-used 'E' ." Peard Comments.

reduce the budget as " tremendous constraints on an y

expansionist program at this stage of the game . "

McCutcheon, nevertheless, stated that he was working on "a final crack . . . to increase the number of

light helos in our structure ."1 7

To Keep the Mediums and Heavies Flying

While the Marine command remained concerned

about its shortage of light helicopters during much o f

1968, it continued to have difficulties with the availability of both its medium and heavy rotary aircraft .

After taking the drastic measure in the latter part o f

1967 of grounding all of the Boeing Vertol CH—46 Se a

Knights because of several accidents involving the rea r

pylons of the aircraft, the Marine Corps and Boeing

undertook an expensive and extensive repair program ,

including both structural and system modifications.* *

In the first phase of the solution, the Marines rotate d

the aircraft from Vietnam to Okinawa and Japan where

structural modifications were carried out. By the end o f

**Lieutenant General Louis Metzger who in 1967 and early 1968

as a brigadier general served as the 3d Marine Division Assistant Divi -

sion Commander, recalled that it took some time to identify the prob -

lem with the CH–46 as equipment failure . He remembered that i t

was sometime in the second half of 1967 that when the 3d Divisio n

assistant aviation officer, "was flying and observed the tail come off a

CH–46 . His report was the first indication of this equipment problem. This observation led to the ' expensive and extensive repair program' . . . ." LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft, dtd 20Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File).
A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 523

1967, Marine, Navy, and corporate technicians and

mechanics had replaced the rear pylons on all but 16 o f

the 105 Sea Knight aircraft in the Western Pacific .

They refitted the remaining aircraft with the structural modifications by February 1968 .1 8

During the remaining months of 1968, the Marin e

Corps and Navy initiated the second phase during regularly scheduled maintenance overhaul of the 46s or

those aircraft sent back because of extensive battl e

damage. Called Project Sigma, these modifications

consisted of the installation of a new tail section, a new

transmission mount, and a cruise guide indicating system.* While the second phase caused less of a drawdown of the CH—46 resources than the initial alterations, about 12 to 14 of the aircraft a month wer e

either at Japan or Okinawa undergoing rework . In

July, moreover, the 1st MAW reported two instances o f

the "structural failure of CH—46 rotor blades " manufactured prior to March 1967. This required th e

Marine Corps and Navy to undertake a new testing

procedure of all the blades of that vintage . While this

affected nearly half of the Sea Knights in the 1st MAW

inventory, the wing accomplished most of the retestin g

in-country without impacting greatly on the tempo o f

operations. t9 * *

*These modifications resulted "in added structural strength, an d

give the pilot a means of monitoring the structural loads imposed o n

the airframe, reducing the likelihood of overstress ." Because of th e

magnitude of these changes, they were accomplished as the aircraft

underwent "Progressive Aircraft Rework" (PAR) or Battle Damag e

Repair (BDR). There still remained, however, significant differences

about the extent of modifications needed between the Boeing Vertol

Corporation and the Marine Corps. For example General McCutcheon

in a letter to an official of the company insisted that the Phase II modifications be carried out " in order to meet the Marine Corps operational

requirements." He also expressed his concerns that a "desynch" device

[to avoid intermeshing of the rotors] be added to the list of modifications. While willing to soften his position to the extent that he

believed " it is ' highly desirable ' vice 'mandatory,'" McCutcheon wrote

"No matter how you look at it, the pilots still ask the question, 'Ho w

do I get down safely if I have desynch and blade intermeshing?'" Th e

device was never added . McCutcheon to Robert W. Tharrington, dtd

29Jan68, Ltr No . 28, File T, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers; FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 111 .

**Another modification was added to the CH—46s in 1968 tha t

had nothing to do with the structural problems. In February 1968 ,

after much hesitation, General Krulak, at FMFPac, finally approved a n

experiment of General Anderson 's, the wing commander, to replace the

7 .62mm machine guns on board the CH—46 with the .50-caliber guns.

Major General McCutcheon told Krulak after his visit to Vietnam i n

January 1968 that almost all commanders, including a division commander, were in favor of the replacement and willing to give up troo p

space to carry the heavier armament with its greater range . Accordin g

to McCutcheon, the question was which weapon was " most effective i n

the air, not on the ground . . . . Perhaps if you had a .50 to start with

While the Marine wing remained concerned about

the continuing effectiveness of the CH—46,*** severa l

minor problems with replacement parts plagued th e

large heavy-lift Sikorsky CH—53A Sea Stallion helicopter. General Anderson, the wing commander, later

observed that strictly because of the lack of spare parts

there were times in late 1967 and early 1968 whe n

only three of the aircraft "would be available fo r

flight." In January 1968, HMH-463, the CH—53A

squadron, averaged only a 31 percent availability.

During February, General McCutcheon in Washing -

ton raised "such a fuss" in Navy aviation logistic ciryou might not have been forced down ." Faced with the almost unanimous opinion from Vietnam, General Krulak relented . He told bot h

Generals Anderson and McCutcheon that while believing the issue was

"completely emotional . .

. [but] I am no fool where emotion is

involved ." With the final assent from FMFPac, General Anderso n

announced that he desired to arm all of the 46s with the .50-caliber

guns, but would "leave it to the discretion of the group and squadro n

commanders, however, as to whether or not they actually mounted th e

7 .62mm or the .50-caliber." As General Anderson stated later, he di d

not want "to make a dogmatic rule" but wanted to permit his commanders to determine the best armament according to the particula r

circumstances. MajGen Norman Anderson ltrs to McCutcheon, dtd 2

and 7Feb68, and McCutcheon to Anderson, dtd 8Feb68, Letter No 50 ,

File A and LtGen Victor H. Krulak to McCutcheon, dtd 2Feb68 an d

McCutcheon ltr to Krulak, dtd 8Feb68, Ltr No . 39, File K, 1968 Cor,

McCutcheon Papers; MajGen Norman J. Anderson, Comments o n

draft, n .d . Uan95) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Norman Anderson Comments.

***Besides the structural problems with the CH-46, Lieutenan t

Colonel Roy J. Edwards, who commanded HMM—265 which operated

with SLF Bravo in the summer of 1968, related problems with fuel filters which were unable to prevent the "super fine sand in this littora l

region . .

. [from) being drawn into the fuel tanks as the helicopters . .

. landed on or near the beaches ." After extended use, the sand "worked

its way into the fuel controls of the helicopter to prevent it from developing full power. " According to Edwards, " this [was) happening to all

[emphasis in the original] my helicopters even though they had all th e

routine prescribed maintenance ." He recalled two near-accidents

caused by the problem : "I had one a/c [aircraft] on a milk run cake off

from the carrier, climbed straight ahead, lost power and sagged bac k

on the carrier as the carrier ran up under him! He was fully loaded with

passengers, supplies, and mail . Not one got their feet wet!" In the second incident, a helicopter on the way to the beach from the carrier als o

lost power, " the pilot kept the engine running and just flew into the

water and taxied the several miles to shore ." Again there were n o

injuries nor damage . He then halted flights of all of his CH—46s unti l

the squadron could determine a "fix" . Eventually, they placed additional air filters on "the air intake to the fuel tanks of the helicopte r

plus judicious monitoring/cleaning of the fuel controls after each fligh t

onto the beach where this 'superfine' sand was being ingested . This

didn ' t prevent the contamination but we learned to live with it . "

According to Edwards, "it was a 'soul-searching' experience to have to

'ground ' my helicopters in the middle of a war, while we found out . .

. how to counteract. " LtCol Roy J. Edwards, Comments on draft, dt d

10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
524 THE DEFINING YEAR

Iles that he "got a KC–130 load of CH–53 spares . .

. under the nickname of Floodtide" sent out to the 1st

Wing . Observing that the list of parts include d

clamps, tubes, gaskets, fasteners and other "mundane

items " , McCutcheon exclaimed, "I'll be damned if I

can understand why this kind of stuff is not availabl e

in Da Nang or at least Subic the Navy base in the

Philippines at Subic Bay] ."2 0

While appreciative of the effort upon receipt of th e

Floodtide supplies on 4 March, General Anderso n

complained, "One critical item follows another in the

history of the CH–53 . " He stated that during the past

week he only had nine of the large helicopters flyin g

for a 33 percent availability rate . According to th e

wing commander, if only he had replacement windshields to install he could have another 10 of the larg e

aircraft in the air. Adding to Anderson's woes, a n

enemy rocket attack on Marble Mountain the night

before resulted in the loss of one of the CH–53s. 2 1

During the following months, the situatio n

improved, but only modestly.* For example, in April,

General McCutcheon again had to arrange a special airlift for CH–53 spare parts with "no appreciable change

in their operational readiness." Only a third of the large

choppers were operationally ready as contrasted to th e

number on hand. While not overly concerned abou t

those figures, McCutcheon observed that these statistics become "alarming" when the number of operationally ready aircraft were compared to the number o f

aircraft assigned . The availability for the CH–53s then

dropped to about 25 percent . In August, the arrival of

HMH–462 at Phu Bai with 10 additional aircraft

bringing the total of the Sea Stallions in Vietnam to 43 ,

provided some relief for the other 53 squadron,

HMH_463.** According to FMFPac, this improved

the lift capability of the wing by 34 percent .2 2

*Colonel Roger W. Peard, who commanded HMH—463 in the second half of 1968, observed that he made some changes relative to spar e

parts procurement . He recalled that when he took over, four aircraft were

being used to scavage parts for other aircraft, but that the MAG–1 6

maintenance officer did not believe in creating " hangar ' queens' for

parts." Instead when an aircraft was scheduled for its annual inspection ,

good parts were removed to replace parts needed by other aircraft . Th e

other aircraft was then sent back for rework. While this may have

increased labor costs, no perennial "hangar queens" were created .

According to Peard, " parts shortages persisted, but this system improve d

availability of the CH—53A in HMH—463 ." Peard Comments.

**Colonel Joseph L . Sadowski, who commanded HMH—463 earl y

in 1968, recalled that during Tet there were insufficient airframes t o

send a second CH—53 squadron to Vietnam, "not to mention the training pipe line for pilots/mechanics and the required flight hours state -

side to accomplish this task." Col Joseph L. Sadowski, Comments on

draft, dtd 20Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

While the CH–53 recovered some 167 downe d

helicopters and one Cessna 0–1B light fixed-win g

observation aircraft during the year, the aircraft continued to have problems. Near the end of 1968, Brigadie r

General Homer Dan Hill, the assistant wing commander, provided General Quilter his assessment about th e

CH–53 limitations. According to Hill, while the helicopter could carry about 9,000 pounds total, eve n

under normal circumstances it could lift no more tha n

8,000 pounds externally. This load was further curtailed in the heat and mountains of Vietnam. The Sea

Stallion was not capable of bringing in heavy equipment for the building of firebases or lifting in the larg e

155mm guns to these sites. In order to carry out these

missions, the 3d Marine Division relied upon nearb y

Army helicopter companies equipped with the CH–5 4

Tarhe Sky Crane that could carry an external load o f

approximately 20,000 pounds. The Army Sky Cranes

recovered 41 of the Marine CH–46s . Hill pointed to

the fact that the Marines very recently lost thre e

CH–46s that could not be field stripped and "quickly

lifted to safety by the CH-53A ." He recommende d

that the Marine Corps try to procure a heavy-lift helicopter that could match the Army Sky Crane .23** * While design factors played a role as did a continuing pilot shortage**** in helicopter availability, the on e

constant problem was the lack of spare parts, especial-

***General Carey, who in 1968 served on the wing staff, observe d

that through July the availability of the CH—53 was so low, "we frequently requested use of the CH—54 flying cranes for aircraft retrieval .

At one time the situation was so bad we even considered requestin g

emergency procurement of our own flying crane capability ." Care y

Comments. Colonel Peard, a former CH—54 squadron commander,

observed that relative to the external and internal lift capabilities of th e

CH—53A Sea Stallion, "weight is weight, wherever you put it in or o n

the aircraft ." He stated, however, that the helicopter could carry a n

internal load at a higher airspeed, because of the limitations caused b y

"load motion, that is swinging . " Colonel Peard acknowledged that the

Army CH—54 Sky Crane was the "undisputed heavy-lift champion . .

.," but noted that in contrast to the CH—53, it did not have a trooplif t

capability. According to Peard, General Quilter, the wing commander ,

"did not like going to the Army to use the Sky Crane . . . [and directed that) one of the CH–53s in HMH–463 be stripped of all possibl e

equipment to lighten is as much as possible and thus maximize its lifting capability. " Peard Comments.

****See Chapter 27 for a detailed discussion of pilot training an d

shortages. Relative to the helicopter pilot shortage, in October 1968 ,

Major General McCutcheon at HQMC witnessed the first six Marin e

officers graduate from the Army helicopter school at Hunter Airfiel d

near Savannah, Georgia . He believed that with the inauguration of this

training program earlier in the year that " finally got the pilot proble m

whipped into shape so that from here on in we should be making

progress." McCutcheon Itr to E.E . Anderson, dcd 10 Oct 68, Ltr No .

93, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, MCHC .
A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 52 5

Top photo is from the Abel Collection and bottom photo is courtesy of Col Roger W. Peard, USMC (Ret)

Top, a Marine Sikorsky CH—53 Sea Stallion lifts a damaged Marine Sikorsky UH—34D Sea

Horse from the landing strip at An Hoa . Below, a crashed CH—53 Sea Stallion, itself is lifted by

an Army Tarhe CH—54 Sky Crane back to MAG—16 at Marble Mountain . The Army helicopter

could lift up to 20,000 pounds.
526 THE DEFINING YEAR

ly for the CH—53s, but also for the 46s, and to a lesse r

extent the UH—lEs. While noting the low 25 percen t

availability in April for the Sea Stallion helicopters ,

General McCutcheon also pointed to a 33 percent an d

50 percent availability respectively for the CH—46s an d

Hueys.* Five months later, in August, the 1st MAW

commander, Major General Quilter wrote, "we are i n

deep trouble on provisioning for engine and airfram e

spares in the helos-CH-46, CH-53, UH-1E." In

October 1968, a senior naval aviation supply officer i n

a speech to his colleagues stated, "if aircraft are going

to fly, we all are going to have to get off our collective

butts and manage repairables . There is only one word

to describe the job we're doing—lousy." Throughout

1968, the resupply rate for Marine Corps helicopter

parts hovered around 70 percent .24

In an exhaustive examination of Marine helicopte r

support, a III MAF special board in the spring of 196 9

blamed the lack of spare parts on unrealistic standar d

monthly hourly flight maximums set in Washington .

It observed that the "CNO monthly hourly flight

maximum is the key against which dollars are mad e

available to DOD [Department of Defense] to buy

spare parts . . . ." The problem was that these established norms had not taken into consideration th e

demands upon the limited number of Marine helicopter assets in Vietnam and the resulting scarcity. To

meet the actual combat requirements, the Marine

helicopters constantly overflew the set maximums .**

As the board concluded, the Marines had less "total

helicopters available for daily operations and as a resul t

we fly those in commission far in excess of the hou r

rate required for good maintenance, safety of flight ,

and dependable availability."25

The statistics of helicopter sorties flown, passenger s

carried, and tonnage lifted during 1968 set a record

pace . From February through July 1968, Marine helicopters flew at an ever-increasing rate, running up th e

number of sorties, passengers carried, and tonnage lift -

ed. For example in March 1968, the rotary aircraft flew

*According to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Miller, who assumed

command of HML—167 in August 1968, the availability of UH—lEs ,

or at least for his squadron had improved in a few months. Miller stated his squadron " never suffered at a lowly 50 percent to my knowledge .

During Sept—Dec68, with 14 aircraft assigned, average operationa l

readiness was 84 .7 percent . . . ." Miller Comments .

**Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Shauer, Jr., of HMM—262, wrote

that his pilots " continuously overflew the CNO programmed monthl y

flight hour maximums (both in aircraft and pilot hours)" He mentioned that his personal log book revealed " in a ten month period 91 4

flight hours, . . . (averaging) 91 hours per month ." Shauer Comments.

more than 44,000 sorties and lifted over 53,000 troops

and nearly 7,000 tons of cargo . This was an increase o f

over 10,000 sorties for the previous month, and 3,00 0

over the monthly average of the previous year. In July,

the total number of sorties reached 71,452, a ne w

monthly high for the war.

While the Marine helicopter pilots would fly at a

slightly slower tempo after July, they still maintained

a monthly average of about 60,000 sorties, with th e

exception of a slight dip in the numbers for September. In December, the Marine helicopters carried ou t

59,838 sorties, ferried over 113,499 passengers, an d

lifted 13,835 tons of cargo . For the year, the totals

were 597,000 sorties, 122,100 tons of cargo, an d

935,000 passengers. These figures represented a 3 1

percent increase in sorties, a 39 percent increase in passengers carried, and a 39 percent increase in tonnag e

lifted over 1967 .26

Notwithstanding that most of these helicopter missions were in support of Marine forces, a substantia l

number, 43,138 sorties for the year amounting to six

percent of the total, were for other forces in Vietnam .

These included 34,094 sorties for the Koreans, 3,840

for the ARVN, 3,508 for U.S . Special Forces, 1,666 fo r

the U.S . Army, and 30 in support of the Seventh Air

Force . While a lower percentage than the previous year,

these flights in support of both allied and other Services still caused a drawdown on the scarce Marin e

helicopter resources.27

Another Look at Helicopter Air-Ground Relations

During the spring of 1968, in order to meet the

increasing demands on its resources, especially in the

north, the 1st Wing decided to alter some of its command arrangements. As early as 6 March, acting on a

suggestion of his staff, General Norman Anderson recommended the establishment of a provisional MAG at

Quang Tri Airfield with three squadrons to reduce th e

span of control for MAG—36. In the meantime,

MAG—36 maintained a forward headquarters and

three squadrons, VMO-6, HMM—163, an d

HMM—262 at Quang Tri Airfield under Colonel Joh n

E. Hansen, the group's deputy commander. Finally

after securing approval from both FMFPac and Headquarters, Marine Corps, on 15 April, General Anderson ordered the establishment of the new helicopte r

aircraft group, appropriately designated Provisional

(Prov) MAG—39. He detached the three squadrons

already at Quang Tri from MAG—36 to form Prov

MAG—39 and made Colonel Hansen the new MAG
LIFT SUMMARY

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iii

OCT NOV DEC

A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 527

MARINE HELICOPTER SORTIES

JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968

From Ooperations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

commander.* General Cushman, the III MAE commander, admitted that "splitting the helicopters was

sort of against our philosophy," but observed that they

needed the helicopters near the 3d Division in the

DMZ sector: "We had to move them up there so they'd

have them."28

Despite the establishment of Prov MAG—39, the

new group was unable to meet the demands of the

new 3d Marine Division commander, Major General

Davis, who wanted to undertake more mobile operations. According to Davis, the way he wanted to use

helicopters "was a whole new learning experience" for

both the wing and the division. Davis declared,

"instead of sitting down and looking around and saying, 'Where can we go? Where is it easier to put the

*In May, HMM—161 arrived directly from the United States

equipped with the new redesigned CH—46D models and replaced

HMM—163, a UH—34 squadron at Quang Tn. According to Colonel

Hansen, "this represented a substantial increase in the lift capability of

Prov MAG—39 when you consider that HMM—161 arrived with essentially 100 percent aircraft availability versus . . . older [and less lift

capacity] H—34s with reduced availability." Col John E. Hansen, Comments on draft, dtd 17Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

Source: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68.

helicopters?' We never said that." Instead, Davis

insisted, "We said, we're going to put the helicopters

here by making whatever effort is required to prepare

the place for the helicopters." The idea was to be

"totally flexible and responsive to the ground commander's needs." The new division commander contended that the Marine Corps had given some thought

to high-mobility operations, "but we really hadn't

done it." He stated that he was not advocating the

Army Air Cavalry solution which had too many helicopters and not enough control, but a middle course

in which his regimental and battalion commanders at

least had their own helicopters.29

From the ground commander and especially the

division commander's viewpoint, the main advantage

of the Army system was that he owned the helicopter

assets. The 1st Air Cavalry brigade and battalion commanders not only had their own personal helicopters,

but also could depend on helicopter support almost on

call. According to General Davis, in comparison, the

Marine helicopter "system was so centralized that you

have got to work out in detail the day before exactly
528 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo courtesy of Col John E . Hansen, USMC (Ret )

MajGen Norman J. Anderson, CG, 1st MAW, hands colors of new Provisional MAG—3 9 to its

commander, Col John E. Hansen. The new MAG was formed at Quang Tri to provide helicopte r

support for the 3d MarDiv.

what you want and schedule it." Davis declared:

"There's no way a ground commander can work out a

precise plan for the next day's operations unless th e

enemy is going to hold still . . . ."30•

As could be expected this attitude caused immediate problems with both the wing and III MAE A then -

junior member of the 3d Marine Division staff; Major

William H. Dabney remembered General Davis

telling III MAF: "Look, if I don't get this helicopte r

support that I'm asking for . . . from you, I'm going to

*Major General Norman Anderson commented : "Twenty-five

years later the crux of this disagreement still is numbers and types o f

helos, a fact of life exacerbated then by the proximity of helo-ric h

Army units. General Davis could not make a valid case at that time

because a decision to let him have all the helo support he wanted 'ha d

to be made at the III MAF level if not higher . At those levels the broader and deeper problems were dominant and they, of course, prevaile d

therefore at the Wing." He observed, "The Marine Corps remain s

structured primarily for assault from the sea, which is as it must be ."

Norman Anderson Comments.

get it from the Army. The devil take the hindmost . "

According to Dabney, Davis argued against dividing

the helicopter support evenly between the two divisions. The support should depend on the actual situation and requirement, not an attempt to distribute th e

same number of sorties to each command : "Hey, we

need 22 sorties, CH—46s because I got an enemy that I

can use them against, not because I'm one division an d

he's another."3 1

In personal letters to Washington, the 1st MAW

commander, General Anderson, described his perception of wing-division relations. He declared that he had

"tried at every turn to get the Marine doctrine of airground command structure accepted in III MAE "

Anderson believed that "many of our problems have

resulted from failure to inject sound air thinking int o

ground plans in a timely fashion ." The wing commander mentioned, however, that he had opened at th e

Quang Tri Airfield what he called the 1st MAW Aux-
A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 529

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

BGen Homer D. Hill, one of the assistant wing commanders, poses at the Khe Sanh airstrip before the evacuation of

the base. The wing opened an auxiliary command post at th e

Quang Tri Airfield under Gen Hill to coordinate helicopte r

operations with the 3d MarDiv.

iliary CP, under one of his assistant wing commanders ,

Brigadier General Homer D. Hill. Anderson directed

Hill, "to interest himself in all aspects (not only helos .

. .)" of the wing in northern I Corps.32

While Anderson still complained that "Davis is

totally insatiable," the establishment of the forward

headquarters improved the relations between the

wing and the division .* Major General Davis later

related that the assignment of Hill to Quang Tri "provided this division with . . . an air/ground team capability . . . ." He stated that Hill's presence made hi s

mobile concept work, "so long as he was here we were

solving problems." In October 1968, General Hill

mentioned in a letter to General Anderson that th e

division and wing had conducted about 75 "highl y

*General Davis commented on the draft that he was, "amused a t

my 'insatiable' need for choppers . .

. when I had more enemy than any -

body else!" Gen Raymond G. Davis, Comments on draft, dtd 4Sep9 5

(Vietnam Comment File) .

successful helicopter heli-borne assaults in and aroun d

the DMZ" since he had been there . Hill's assistant participated in all "3d Division planning and Task Force

operations." According to Hill, this was helpful t o

both the ground and air commanders : "We stay on top

of all operational discrepancy reports—both ways

moving fast to correct what is wrong from eithe r

side—Division or Wing ." General Hill wrote that he

attended all division briefings with General Davis an d

went with him "on many of his helo rides to his units

talking to our FACs [forward air controllers) an d

ALOs [air liaison officers) as well as the regimenta l

and battalion commanders . " Hill praised Anderson for

establishing the forward headquarters and that it ha d

paid dividends in Marine air-ground relations.3 3

This short honeymoon between the 3d Marine

Division and the wing soon came to an end . In October, the wing decided to close the forward headquarters

and bring General Hill south to be part of a joint 1s t

Marine Division and wing task force to conduct Operation Meade River in the Da Nang area of operations .

General Davis, the 3d Division commander, protested ,

but to no avail . According to Davis, when Hill departed, the situation immediately deteriorated . Davis complained that without Hill, he was left " to deal [with)

agents of the wing and agents of III MAF who were no t

in a position to make any decision short of going to Da

Nang. This was unworkable ." In an attempt to placate

the 3d Division commander, General Quilter would

honor specific requests to send General Hill "to com e

up and stay awhile" until the particular problem was

resolved . Davis stated, however, for the most part, "it

has not been a good arrangement to attempt to conduct a air/ground team effort up here with the air par t

of the team having no authority "34* *

**Both Lieutenant Colonel Shauer and Lieutenant General Care y

praised in their comments the efforts of General Hill in improvin g

relations with the 3d Marine Division . In a letter to Shauer in June

1968, General Hill wrote, "I have noticed a great improvement i n

UH—34 ops over the last few days as a result of things you have done .

I believe relationships have improved considerably between supporting and supported units. This is good . Keep up the fine work. Let me

know of any problems we can help on . " Shauer Comments and BGe n

H .D . Hill lcr to Maj Shauer, dtd 29Jun68, Encl, Shauer Comments .

General Carey declared that while General Hill was with Davis th e

relationship with the division " was superior. Simply because he spok e

for the wing and worked so closely with the Division commander. "

According to Carey, Hill "maintained a constant dialogue on bot h

fixed-wing and helo support for the Division . It was not uncommo n

for him to be on the phone at all hours of the day and night workin g

closely with us on the details of the required support . He certainl y

took the pressure off the Wing G—3 section . After he left, work had

to be conducted through an intermediary, which really slowed down
530 THE DEFINING YEAR

While there were two assistant wing commanders, the second AWC, Brigadier General Henry F.

Hise, served as the coordinator for air bases

throughout I Corps and apparently was not available to take General Hill's place . From the III MAF

perspective, Brigadier General E. E . Anderson,

General Cushman's chief of staff, believed Hise' s

function could better have been accomplished b y

the 1st MAW chief of staff. General Anderson quoted Hise to the effect "that having a second AWC i n

the 1st Wing is like having tits on a bull."' Anderson supported a move to eliminate the position altogether and convinced both General Quilter, th e

wing commander, and General Cushman . According to Anderson, Quilter was of the opinion tha t

unless given command of an air-ground task force ,

a second assistant wing commander was superfluou s

to his needs. On 19 December, the III MAF commander, General Cushman, officially asked FMFPac

that a replacement for the second AWC not be sent .

General Buse, the FMFPac commander, concurred .

Apparently no thought was given to sending General Hise or his replacement to Quang Tri to replac e

General Hill. "

Even if an aviation general officer had been sent

north, there remained some question whether th e

deteriorating relations between Marine air and

ground officers would have improved measurably .

As early as August, Major General McCutcheon i n

Washington wrote to Major General Quilter abou t

disquieting reports from returning officers fro m

Vietnam, varying "in rank from lieutenant colonel

to major general that we do not have the communication and dialogue in existence between air an d

ground units that we should have ." Even Brigadier

General Hill commented that the wing woul d

the decision process. We also lost the pulse of the dynamic, fast-moving General Davis." Carey Comments. In a dissenting opinion ,

Colonel Walter Sienko, who assumed command of Prov MAG–39 i n

July 1968, commented that " if we had a full-MAG–39 at Quang Tr i

instead of a Prov MAG with limited resources, we still would not hav e

satisfied the needs of General Davis." He believed "the decision of not

inserting a third general officer in the chain of command between ai r

and ground at the MAG level was a correct one ." Col Walter Sienko ,

Comments on draft, n .d . [Nov94) (Vietnam Comment File).

*Brigadier General Hise commented that "the West Texas saying ,

an area where I originated, is 'as useless as tits on a boar.' A boar has

up to ten vestigial tits, a bull has only four. However, as with assistan t

wing commanders, an increase in their number does not add to thei r

usefulness. " BGen Henry W. Hise, Comments on draft, dtd 22Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File).

never "satisfy the [division's] helo appetites." He

complained about lacking UH—lEs and being

"plagued by the UH—1E gunships syndrome " as

well as problems in helicopter availability. According to Hill, the only way the wing could meet the

demands of both divisions was by overflying the

maximum standards. As he later remarked : "This

can only do one or two things ; it can get you i n

trouble real fast, or sooner or later, it can drive yo u

off the deep end." 36

In October, at the III MAF staff level, Brigadie r

General Earl E. Anderson remarked that "Ray Davis

has really been shot in the fanny with the Army helicopter system, although I frankly believe that it' s

more the result of the large numbers of helicopter s

available to the Army units, together with the fac t

that the ground officer has greater control over the m

than does the Marine commander." According to

Anderson, the 3d Marine Division general had pro -

posed to III MAF the establishment of an "air cavalry group, similar to the 1st Air Cay." General Cush -

man had taken the recommendation unde r

advisement and asked for opinions from his staff an d

senior commanders. 3 7

At about the same time, one of Davis' regimental commanders, Colonel Robert H . Barrow of the

9th Marines, forwarded a memorandum throug h

command channels about modifying procedures o n

the use and control of helicopters. He wrote that

while Marine doctrinal publications " do not clearl y

express the air ground command relations for helicopter operations," he believed they implied flexibility. He suggested that Prov MAG—39 be placed

in direct support of the 3d Marine Division . According to Barrow, "essentially, the helicopter unit commander advises the helicopter-borne [ground) unit

commander, participates in planning and, withi n

his capability, provides the helicopter support an d

performs the tasks required by the helicopter-borne

unit commander. "3 8

Colonel Barrow then came to the crux of th e

matter. He urged that the ground commander b e

permitted to determine "type and adequacy of

landing zone preparation, switching from primary

to alternate landing zones, and landing in a high

risk situation." Rejecting this idea, Major Genera l

Quilter, the wing commander, wrote across the

memorandum: "This would overrule air judgment

of pilot. Pilot has no authority to do anything," At

this point, General Cushman decided against
A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS 53 1

implementing either General Davis' or Colonel

Barrow's recommendations. 39*

The controversy between the air and ground com -

manders surfaced in February 1969 in the Marine

Corps Gazette, the Corps' professional journal. In a

letter to the editor, Major General Davis publically

vented his frustrations about helicopter usage an d

control. He stated that he regularly used Army LOH

and other light helicopters for scouting and reconnaissance missions. Countering claims by the wing

that the helicopters were vulnerable to enemy heavy

machine gun fire, the division commander argued

that the Army aircraft "have not been hit by ground

fire—although they have discovered a number of

12 .7 AA [antiaircraft] machine guns near the LZ

nor any of our troop helicopters hit by ground fire . "

On the other hand, Davis declared that as many a s

nine Marine helicopters at one time sustained dam -

age in a landing zone when not using scout helicopters. He contended that "these scouts are a s

important to security of helicopter operations a s

scouts on the trail are vital to the security of groun d

maneuver units. "40

Davis then turned to the matter of command

relations between the helicopter and ground commanders. He complained that for the most part,

after the initial planning, the infantry commande r

played a secondary role "in most of the Marine helicopter assaults in Vietnam." The company, battalion, or even regimental commander found himsel f

stranded at the pick-up zone, "while the helicopter

leader with his captive load of troops decides where ,

when, and even if the troops will land ." According

to Davis, "this is more the rule rather than th e

exception." General Davis then asserted that if a

greater effort was made to include the infantry

commander in the process, "we would have less

aborts, better preps, and fewer landings made i n

the wrong LZ." 4 1

The entire subject came to a head in the spring

of 1969 . In April, Lieutenant General Herma n

*According to Lieutenant Colonel Louis J . Bacher, from his experience as commander of the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines at Da Nan g

until June, 1968, " it was necessary to schedule a helicopter for aeria l

reconnaissance of an 80 grid square TAOR days in advance . MedEvac

requests were assigned a priority category and were filled accordingly,

usually hours lacer. In contrast, Army battalion commanders had light

observation and command helicopters (LOACH) either organic o r

readily available. The KMC [Korean Marine Corps] Brigade had a t

least three cargo choppers and one Huey assigned daily . " LtCol Louis J.

Bacher, Comments on draft, Jed 7May95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Nickerson, who succeeded General Cushman a s

Commanding General, III MAF, ordered the formation of a board of senior officers, headed by his

deputy, Major General Carl A . Youngdale, "t o

examine the use and command and control o f

Marine Corps helicopter assets . . . ." After holding

extensive hearings, the Youngdale Board reported

back to Nickerson . While recognizing that the roo t

of the problem "lay in the shortage of helicopte r

assets in terms of numbers, types (particularly

armed helicopters), mix, and lift," it identified several other problems . Chief among them was a lac k

of confidence between air and ground officers concerning the other's ability to carry out his part of

the mission. Other shortcomings included the nee d

for the development of more detailed planning an d

better coordination between the air and groun d

components in helicopter operations . 4 2

While making several recommendations, th e

board realized that many of these questions require d

long-term solutions . This was especially true abou t

building mutual trust between Marine ground an d

air officers. In part, the board concluded that there

was a lack of common professional experience an d

socialization between the two groups.** The shortage

**Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Miller described two program s

that MAG—16 undertook to promote harmony between the helicopte r

and ground community. On large operations, the MAG operations officer and "the pre-selected helicopter flight leader to the ground commander's unit for the initial [emphasis in the original) planning sessions. These officers familiarized themselves with the ground unit' s

objectives. At this time they could offer their input to the OpPlan

prior to it being 'etched in stone . ' The officers returned to the groun d

unit as alterations or changes occurred ." He believed this resulted i n

the following advantages : "1 . . . . (The operations officer would] thoroughly [emphasis in the original] brief all helicopter flight crews participating in the assault . The crews were told exactly what the groun d

units were trying to achieve and where they in helicopters fit into th e

picture . (2) The selected flight leader knew exactly what the groun d

commander's objectives, time schedules, and general scheme of maneuver were ; and planned his flight accordingly. On D—day the air an d

ground commanders were on the same page . If a change in landing

zones became necessary, the flight leader made his recommendatio n

based on the known ground commander's objectives . This program was

very successful . " In the second program, " on each Friday numerou s

company-grade officers were invited and flown 'out of the bush' t o

Marble Mountain . The officers were guests of the pilots at MAG-16 .

They were treated to hot showers, great meals, movies, and/or a socializing 'adult' beverage at the club. Saturday they could hit the PX ; the n

toured the helicopter base and participated in a 'give & take' briefin g

session at the S—3 bunker. These 'give and take' sessions eliminate d

many of the misconceptions shared by both ground and the air officers

who supported them . They made working together much, much easier. " Miller Comments.
532 THE DEFINING YEA R

of pilots had exacerbated these differences . Because of

the pressing need for aviators, especially helicopte r

pilots, many went to their duty stations withou t

attending the Marine Corps Basic School at Quantico, let alone Marine Corps intermediate and senio r

schools.* The board recommended increased trainin g

in the coordination of air and ground and requirin g

all officers to attend the Amphibious Warfare School

at Quantico. 4 3

While rejecting the Army helicopter control system as not applicable to the Marine Corps, the Young -

dale board proposed that the wing reestablish its forward headquarters with the 3d Marine Division . It

also called for a reexamination of Marine Corps helicopter tactics with an increased emphasis on helicopter gunships. On the other hand, the board also

*See Chapter 27 for discussion of pilot shortages and Marine aviators attendance at Marine schools. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M . Wilson, who commanded HMM—361 in Vietnam, related that prior t o

that assignment he had commanded HMM—162 at New River, North

Carolina where, "we were primarily if not exclusively engaged in training Pensacola graduates for Vietnam—a pipeline of about three

months." When he took over HMM—361 and commanded "these sam e

pilots in combat it became ap[parent] that more operational trainin g

was desirable at least . . . so [far] as Quantico schooling ." He stated ,

"there neither were sufficient pilots nor time [for that additional training]. " LtCol Daniel W. Wilson, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

exhorted ground officers to practice "economy in the

employment of helicopters," to be used only "whe n

essential as opposed [to) when they are nice to have . "44

Even with the implementation of many of the

Youngdale Board recommendations, the question o f

control and coordination of helicopters between

Marine air and ground commanders remained to a certain extent unresolved . The departure of the 3 d

Marine Division from Vietnam in the fall of 1969 ,

however, made the availability of helicopters mor e

plentiful. This muted the debate over control.

Through the latter part of 1968, however, the differences over helicopters dominated the relation s

between Marine air and ground officers . Much of the

tension resulted from the simple fact that there was

not enough nor a sufficient variety of helicopters to g o

around. The Marine wing was supporting two and a

third divisions and as one senior Marine aviator stated, "we didn't have two and a third's divisions wort h

of helicopters." Part of the problem, however, was

organization . As another Marine aviation genera l

observed, "we should never [italics in the original) try

to support two divisions with a single Wing command, no matter how big the Wing is. " The questio n

of how much control or influence the ground commander should have over helicopter operations, nevertheless, is still a bone of contention between Marin e

air and infantry commanders .4 5
CHAPTER 2 6

Artillery and Reconnaissance Support in III MAF

Marine Artillery Reshuffles—The Guns in the North

Mini-Tet and the Fall of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc—Operations Drumfire II and Thor :

Guns Across the Border—Fire Base Tactics—Marine Reconnaissance Operation s

Marine Artillery Reshuffles

While not beset by the doctrinal debates and interand intra-Service differences that characterized air support in 1968, Marine artillery also went through a period

of trial and tribulation. At the beginning of the year, two

Marine reinforced artillery regiments, the 11th and 12t h

Marines, supported the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions,

respectively. The 11th Marines provided the artillery support for the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang while th e

12th Marines supported the far-flung 3d Division . The

12th had batteries spread from Dong Ha, near the coast,

westward to Khe Sanh, and south to Phu Bai . In effect,

Marine artillery extended from the DMZ to south of Da

Nang in support of Marine and allied infantry .

Containing about 120 pieces, not as large nor as sprea d

out as the 12th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Clayton V.

Hendricks' 11th Marines, the 1st Marine Divisio n

artillery regiment had an equally daunting task . The 11th

Marines controlled an impressive amount of firepower,

ranging from 175mm guns to 4 .2-inch mortars.* Lieutenant Colonel Hendricks had a largely expanded forc e

including two U.S . Army 175mm gun batteries. Whil e

his 1st Battalion was attached to the 12th Marines,** he

*With the arrival of the 2d Battalion, 13th Marines with the 27t h

Marines at Da Nang in February, the 11th Marines also took operational control of this battalion. The 2d Battalion included 107m m

howtars, a 4 .2-inch mortar tube mounted on the frame of the 75m m

pack howitzer of World War II vintage .

**Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, who as a lieutenant colonel in 196 8

commanded the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, noted that while the battalion was attached to the 12th Marines, it remained in direct support of th e

1st Marines, a 1st Marine Division infantry regiment, also at the tim e

under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division . In January 1968

it was at Quang Tri and then moved with the 1st Marines to Camp Evans ,

and then to Phu Bai . See Chapters 5-6 . Hughes wrote, " We were neve r

in ground contact with our rear echelon/admin support unit during th e

entire period . " He declared that " Our primary source of spare parts wa s

quite often the damaged and abandoned equipment encountered on ou r

line of march . " The 1st Battalion during this period consisted of " Hq

Btry, A and B Batteries, Prov 155mm how[itzer) Btry ; and a reduced 4 .2

Mortar Btry. " Col Robert C. V. Hughes, Comments on draft, n .d .

[Jan95?] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hughes Comments.

retained command of his other three battalions and wa s

reinforced by several general support FMF separate units.

These included the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery and th e

3d 155mm Gun Battery. He also had attached to his command the 1st Armored Amphibian Company with its

LVTH-6s, amphibian tractors equipped with a turretmounted 105mm howitzer. 1

Lieutenant Colonel Hendricks had a two-fold mission, which included both artillery support of th e

Marine infantry operations and the defense of the D a

Nang Vital Area from ground attack as the commander of the Northern Sector Defense Command . While

not facing the array of North Vietnamese artillery that

the 12th Marines did along the DMZ and at Khe Sanh ,

the 11th Marines was engaged in a counter-batter y

campaign of its own against the very real rocket threa t

to the crowded Da Nang Airbase . With the introduction by the Communist forces of long-range 122mm

and 140mm rockets in 1967 against the Da Nang

base, the Marines countered with what they termed th e

"rocket belt," extending some 8,000 to 12,000 meters ,

about the outside range of the enemy missiles .

Employing a centralized control system, the 11t h

Marines erected a series of artillery observation post s

and deployed its artillery so that each part of the rocket belt was covered by at least two firing batteries. By

the beginning of 1968, the regiment had reduced the

average response time from the launch of an enemy

rocket to answering fire from the American guns to

about three minutes.2** *

***See Chapter 6 for discussion of the rocker threat at Da Nang .

Colonel George T. Balzer, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded th e

3d Battalion, 11th Marines in early 1968, recalled that he had his command post on Hill 55, Nui Dat Son, south of Da Nang, together with

his fire direction center, Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, and hi s

4 .2-inch Mortar Battery. He observed that the amount of coordination

"necessary to deliver artillery fire into areas where friendly forces [were]

constantly dueling with enemy forces is tremendous . " The Marines a t

Da Nang manned a network of observation towers equipped with

azimuth measuring instruments and maintained a list of accuratel y

identified coordinates throughout the TAOR . With constant alerts an d

testing of the system, Balzer claimed that " utmost proficiency wa s

533
534 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37118 8

At night, the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery at Da Nang fires one of its self-propelled M55 8-inch

howitzers, which had a maximum range of nearly 17,000 meters.
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 53 5

Photo from Abel Collectio n

Col Edwin S . Schick, the 12th Marines commander, pulls the lanyard of a Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12t h

Marines M101A1 105mm howitzer. This is the 200,000th roundfired by the battery in Vietnam

By late 1967, the 12th Marines had become the

largest artillery regiment in the history of the Marine

Corps. If one included the artillery at Khe Sanh, the

achieved and maintained . " Once the Marines manning the towe r

obtained "an intersection of two, preferably three . .

. bearings] . . ., the

critical coordination of friendly forces and potential enemy locations

would precede the initiation of counter-rocket fire. " He stated that the

"authority to initiate fire was delegated to battery commanders ." His

"Golf Battery, 3/11 on Hill 10, held the response record of less than fifteen seconds . . . ." According to Balzer, the towers identified enem y

rockets about to be launched "just as Golf was prepared to fire [a ]

Harassing and Interdiction mission . . . ." After being loaded with " hig h

explosive projectiles and charge . . . [with] A minor adjustment to

azimuth and quadrant, . . . the six howitzers were ready to fire in a

direct fire mode . " This incident resulted in the capture of the 122m m

rocket launcher. Colonel Balzer observed that "the first rounds in a rock -

et attack are 'free' for the enemy . It is only for the subsequent round s

that counter-battery fire may be effective . Warning messages may b e

transmitted to potential target areas by the observers of rocket launch -

es. The observers note the angle of the flame trail and thereby exclud e

target areas which are not involved ." He concluded, "coordination o f

friendly patrol schedules, definite times for occupation of specific areas,

and continuous monitoring of same are all critical to ensure that

counter-battery fire may be initiated safely. Time lost in determining

which areas are free of friendly forces after a rocket attack has been

launched gives the enemy additional time to complete his mission wit h

impunity." Col George T. Balzer, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File).

12th Marines had some 180 field pieces of mixed caliber ranging from the 175mm gun to the 4 .2-inch

mortar. Colonel Edwin S. Schick, Jr., the regimental

commander, had under his operational control his fou r

organic battalions, the 1st Battalions of both the 11t h

and 13th Marines; the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery;

the 5th 155mm Gun Battery ; two provisional 155m m

howitzer batteries, and the 2d Platoon, 1st Armore d

Amphibian Company with its six LVTH-6s . In addition, he also had subordinate to him the U .S . Army

108th Field Artillery Group and the Marine 1st Field

Artillery Group (1st FAG). The Army group functioned as the administrative and tactical headquarters

for the Army 175mm gun and 105mm howitzer batteries attached to the Marine regiment while the 1st

FAG performed a similar role for the Marine units. All

told, as the year began, the 12th Marines controlle d

about 35 firing units positioned at 12 different locations spread from Khe Sanh to Phu Bai .3 *

*Colonel Schick, a veteran of both World War II and Korea ,

observed in his comments that his entire career "has been supportin g

arms." He had assumed command of the 12th Marines in May 1967 an d

remarked on the wide dispersion of the 12th Marines which until earl y

1968 had its main headquarters with that of the division at Phu Bai .

According to Schick the infantry often was unaware of the firepower
536 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) A19097 8

A crane replaces a barrel of one of the U.S . Army M107 175mm self-propelled guns stationed at Camp

Carroll. The 175mm gun had a maximum range of more than 32,000 meters.

During January, with the perceived increasing

threat in the north, the Marine artillery, like the

infantry units, participated in Operation Checkers ,

the northward deployment of the Marine divisions . With the establishment of the 1st Marine Division

Task Force X-Ray at Phu Bai and the relinquishmen t

of units by the 3d Marine Division, there was a corresponding shuffling of Marine artillery between th e

available to them . He pushed his own officers to offer support :

"Artillery does not do anything on its own . It's all in support of tha t

infantry commander." He did not believe his weapons were employe d

to the best of their capabilities, but the situation improved in time a s

facilities were made available . He related that he was able to convinc e

the Seventh Air Force to send Air Force personnel to become part of th e

3d Marine Division Fire Support Coordination Center to provide fo r

better coordination and to limit the number of artillery restrictive fire s

when Air Force aircraft were in artillery range . Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr. ,

Comments on draft, n .d . [1994] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Schick Comments.

two Marine divisions.* The idea was to concentrat e

the 12th Marines in northern Quang Tri and for th e

11th Marines to cover both Quang Nam and Thu a

Thien Provinces.

In mid January, Task Force X-Ray at Phu Bai an d

the 11th Marines assumed operational control of the 1s t

Field Artillery Group, now under Lieutenant Colone l

John F. Barr. The 12th Marines also gave up operational control to Lieutenant Colonel Barr of the 1s t

155mm Gun Battery and a provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery, both at Phu Bai . Lieutenant Colonel

Hendricks also received the return of his 1st Battalio n

which remained in support of the 1st Marines at Ph u

Bai and deployed his 2d Battalion from An Hoa sout h

of Da Nang to the Phu Loc sector northwest of the Hai

Van Pass area in southern Thua Thien Province . To

*See Chapter 6 also for the establishment of Task Force X-Ray .
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 537

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A37166 5

A Marine M109 self-propelled 155mm howitzer at Phu Bai fires in support of Marine infantry .

The 155mm howitzer had a range of slightly more than 15,000 meters.

take up the slack at An Hoa, Hendricks created a Pro -

visional Battery Quebec which included a section of 8 -

inch howitzers and a section of 155mm guns to sup -

port the ARVN, Marine units, and Marine

reconnaissance Stingray missions . He also moved five

LVTH—6s from the 1st Armored Amphibian Company to Hoi An to cover the operations of the Republi c

of Korea Marines operating in that sector.4

With the implementation of Operation Checkers

and the added reinforcement of Army units into I Corp s

through January, the 11th Marines controlled at th e

height of the Tet Offensive more than 190 artillery

pieces. At Da Nang, the regiment played an important

role in the disrupting of the 2d NVA Division attack

before it ever really started by the placement of accurate

artillery fires upon enemy troops in the open.* Further

north at Phu Bai, the 1st FAG supported the 1st

Marines and ARVN in the defense and recapture of Hue

city. According to the regiment's account, the Marin e

artillery during the month-long battle for the city fire d

1,821 missions, expended 12,960 rounds, and reporte d

328 enemy dead .** Even with the expansion of the 11t h

Marines during Tet, the attention of both III MAF an d

MACV remained riveted upon the 3d Marine Division

operations along the DMZ and at Khe Sanh . 5

*See Chapter 8 for the attacks of the 2d NVA Division at Da Nang .

**Nearly 800 of the missions and 5,000 of the rounds were fired

during the last few days of the operation . According to the 11t h

Marines in its February report, the artillery in support of the Hue battle had fired during the month 1,049 missions and 7,357 rounds a s

contrasted to the much higher figures contained in the March report

which covered the period 1 February—2 March 1968 . Interestingl y

enough, the March report on the number of enemy dead was about 20 0

less than the February report . 11th Mar ComdCs, Feb and Mar68 .

The Guns in the North

For the Marines at Khe Sanh, 21 January literally opened up with fireworks. While the Marine

defenders repulsed several enemy assaults on hill

outposts, enemy mortar and 122mm rocket bombardment exploded the main ammunition suppl y

point on the base itself. About three or four round s

made a direct hit "and the ammunition cooked off

for the next 48 hours." Despite the destruction o f

nearly 11,000 rounds of ordnance, the number o f

casualties was surprisingly low, 14 Marines dea d

and 43 wounded . Hundreds of "hot duds " fell near

the firing positions of three guns of Battery C, 1st

Battalion, 13th Marines. One of the enemy rounds

knocked out the artillery battalion 's generator for

its field artillery digital automatic computer

(FADAC), but the Marine artillerymen, relying o n

manually computed firing data, continued t o

return counter-battery fire at suspected NVA firing positions.** * While the enemy bombardment resulted in a temporary shortage, resupply flights soon brought the

Marine ammunition stockpile at Khe Sanh up to adequate levels. The American artillery, nevertheless,

worked at some disadvantage . With some of the

enemy's large guns at Co Roc in Laos, some 15 kilo -

meters to the west, just outside of the maximum

range of the 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 1st

Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh and the U .S.

Army 175mm guns at Camp Carroll, the North Vietnamese 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm howitzers

***See Chapter 14 for the events of 21 January at Khe Sanh.
538 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19029 2

Marines of Battery W, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh are seen preparing to load a

M114A 155mm howitzer. The M114A in contrast to the M109 is towed rather than self-propelled, but has the same range.

continued to shell the Marine base, unmolested b y

artillery counterfire . *

Still the enemy was in no position to make a final

assault on the Marine base . Complemented by a massive air effort in Operation Niagara** ranging from

B—52s to helicopters, Marine artillery supplemente d

by the Army 175mm guns kept the enemy at bay. In

one of the more climactic moments, American sensors

on 3—5 February indicated the possibility of a North

Vietnamese regiment moving into an attack position .

In coordination with supporting B—52 Arcligh t

strikes, the American artillery including both the 1s t

Battalion, 13th Marines and four batteries of 175m m

guns blasted the suspected North Vietnamese positions. While unable to confirm the extent of enem y

casualties, U.S . intelligence officers believed that the

heavy and accurate artillery fire (almost 2,000 rounds

from the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines alone) prevente d

these troops from reinforcing the North Vietnames e

attack on Hill 861A that occurred at the same time .***

While U.S. supporting arms failed to prevent th e

overrunning of the Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei

*The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh consisted of thre e

105mm howitzer batteries, a provisional 155mm howitzer (towed )

battery, and a 4 .2-inch mortar battery. See Chapter 14 about the question of the location of the enemy artillery pieces in Laos .

**See Chapter 23 for Operation Niagara.

***See Chapter 14 for the account of the attack on Hill 861A .

south of Khe Sanh a few days later, Marine gunners

still made a valiant effort . In their attempt to keep

back the North Vietnamese attackers, the 105m m

howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

employed, perhaps for the first time in Vietnam, th e

still-secret Controlled Fragmentation Munition s

(CoFraM), otherwise known as "Firecracker Munitions. " A CoFraM shell consisted of a number of smal l

bomblets, which when ejected, spread over a wide

area, with each bomblet exploding like a smal l

grenade. It was considerably more lethal against

troops in the open than the standard high explosiv e

projectile . How effective the new munitions were at

Lang Vei can only be a matter of conjecture .? 

** **Lieutenant Colonel John A . Hennelly, who commanded the

1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh, stated that he fired only a few

of the CoFraM rounds . He doubted very much their effectiveness .

LtCol John A . Hennelly, Comments on draft, dtd 30ct94 (Vietna m

Comment File). Colonel Edwin S . Schick, Jr., the 12th Marines commander, also emphasized the judicial use of the new munitions . Schic k

Comments. See Chapter 14 for further discussion of the use of CoFraM

at Lang Vei . The 11th Marines at Da Nang fired their first CoFra M

mission on 15 March 1968 . On that date, the 1st Platoon, 3d 8 " Howitzer Battery fired two rounds in support of a reconnaissance mission .

An observer reported that the " munitions . . . covered an area 200 x

300 meters with excellent target coverage ." According to the report, i t

resulted in enemy killed and that the Communist troops " appeared t o

be surprised, shocked, and quite confused . Those who were not hit b y

fragments remained standing and immobile ." 11th Mar ComdC,

Mar68, pp . 2-3 .
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 53 9

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A19080 2

Marines are seen stacking empty 105mm casings at Khe Sanh, indicative of the artillery support provided for the base . In the background, partially obscured by clouds, is Hill 950.

While Khe Sanh was the center of attention for

MACV and the press, the war along the DMZ had no t

diminished. During January and February 1968, i n

addition to Khe Sanh, the 3d Marine Division had

fought a series of heavy engagements ranging from the

sector just north of Camp Carroll to the Cua Viet alon g

the coast. During these two months, in support of al l

units, the 12th Marines fired a total of 411,644 rounds ,

212,969 in January and 198,675 in February. The

number in January represented a 12 percent increase

over the previous month, and while February's tota l

*There are differences between the total rounds reported fired i n

the 12th Marines reports and those of the division . While the figure s

are higher in the regimental reports, the ratios between the source s

remain roughly the same. The totals listed above are based upon th e

reports in the 12th Marines command chronologies as they contain a

breakdown of missions. The 3d Division reports only give totals an d

it is assumed that these did not include some of the categories liste d

by the regiment . See 12th Mar ComdCs and 3d MarDiv ComdCs ,

Dec67-Feb68 .

was six percent lower than January, it was still muc h

higher than the December figure .* It was not until

March that the 3d Marine Division artillery regimen t

reported a significant reduction in its fire support . In

some 30,000 missions, only 20 percent of which wer e

observed,** the 12th Marines expended nearly 190,00 0

rounds of all calibers as enemy activity exhibited a

"reduction in aggressiveness ." For this three-month

period, the 12th Marines fired about 15 to 17 percen t

of its total rounds in support of the 26th Marines a t

Khe Sanh with the rest in support of the other regi-

**Lieutenant Colonel John A . Hennelly, the commander of the 1s t

Battalion, 13th Marines, explained that at Khe Sanh with both th e

infantry and artillery forward observers locked into defensive positions a t

both the base and the hill outposts, " there were n 't many 'eye s ' to handle

observed fire missions." He mentioned, however, that when Marine aerial observers (AOs) were "on station . . . we could get a lot done, counterbattery and otherwise. Without Marine AOs we were in a hurt locker. "

According to Hennelly, the Air Force AOs were less effective : " They kep t

insisting that they were flying at tree top level—but I never saw an y

10,000-foot trees over there ." Hennelly Comments .
540 THE DEFINING YEAR

ments of the 3d Marine Division and in counter-battery fire along the eastern DMZ.S *

By this period there had been a change in command relations in the north. MACV (Fwd) in earl y

March became Provisional Corps Vietnam (Pro v

Corps) under Lieutenant General William B . Rosson

and in a reversal of roles became a subordinate command of III MAF.** Under III MAF, Prov Corps was

now responsible for the two northern provinces of I

Corps and took under its operational control the tw o

Army divisions there, the 1st Air Cavalry and the

101st Airborne, as well as the 3d Marine Division .

With the concurrence of MACV and III MAF, General Rosson changed the designation for the Khe

Sanh campaign from Operation Scotland to Operation Pegasus. In Pegasus, Rosson placed under the

1st Air Cavalry Division the 1st Marines, the 11t h

Engineers, and a Seabee battalion .*** This new operation resulted in the ending of the siege of Khe Sanh .

On 8 April, Army cavalrymen linked up with elements of the 26th Marines and one week later Pegasus came to an end. The 1st Cavalry then deploye d

into the A Shau Valley in Operation Delaware, bu t

left one brigade in the Khe Sanh sector under th e

operational control of the 3d Marine Division i n

Operation Scotland II .*** *

The change in command relations also affected th e

command structure of the artillery units in the north .

*FMFPac reported that Marine and Army artillery under the operational control of the 12th Marines fired slightly over 102,000 rounds

of mixed caliber in support of Operation Scotland at Khe Sanh from 1

November 1967 until its termination on 30 March 1968 . Most of th e

artillery support for Scotland was provided in the period January

through March, thus the rational for the percentage given in the text .

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 3 .

**See Chapter 13 for the discussion of command relations in th e

north .

***Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines in 1968, related that his battalion continued to support the 1st Marines throughout this period . He recalled that his battalion received a field artillery digital automatic computer (FADAC)

just prior to the Hue City battle. This permitted his Fire Directio n

Center to control the "fires of the varied caliber batteries" assigned t o

him ranging from 4 .2-inch mortars to 155mm howitzers (towed) .

According to Hughes, his battalion kept the FADAC " in continuou s

operation through all subsequent operations including Pegasus. " When the 1st Marines relieved the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh, 1/1 1

relieved 1/13 . Hughes wrote that "all of 1/11's rolling stock was turned

over to 1/13 to permit their departure from Khe Sanh . All of 1/13's

inoperative equipment had been pushed to the far side of the air stri p

along the cliff face . We were able to place all but one of the pieces back

in service ." Hughes Comments.

 See Chapters 13, 14, and 16 for Operations Pegasus, Delawar e

and Scotland II.

Provisional Corps took over direct control of the U.S .

Army 108th Field Artillery Group and the Marine 1s t

8-inch Howitzer Battery and 5th 155mm Gun Battery, which all had been subordinate to the 12t h

Marines. These units were responsible for "general sup -

port " and "reinforcing" fires of the 12th Marines,

which remained under the 3d Marine Division 9** ** *

The increasing deployment of both Marine and

Army units to northern I Corps had already resulte d

in a much more complex coordination control of sup -

porting arms . As early as the latter part of 1967, th e

3d Marine Division had taken steps to automate further its fire support control systems. By March o f

1968, the division had created in its fire suppor t

coordination center (FSCC), its staff agency for th e

coordination of all supporting arms, a fire support

information center (FSIC) . Using sophisticated computer techniques, the idea was to provide more realistic firing data that could be used in counter-battery

fire and to refine the target list based upon previous

fire missions and sightings. Limited computer memory and the use of a punch card stored data base, nevertheless, restricted "'real time' information retrieva l

in the FSIC." 10******

General Cushman recalled several years later tha t

the fire coordination and artillery support in the nort h

during 1967 and early 1968 was not all that he wishe d

that it was. While not mentioning any specific incidents such as the unusual number of "friendly fire "

*****Colonel James Leon, an experienced ordnance and artiller y

officer who served on the III MAF staff, believed that there needed to be

a further transformation of artillery command relations at the 111 MA F

level . He stated there was in his opinion, "a serious deficiency in th e

management of Marine artillery at the III MAF level . The 3d MarDi v

artillery operated under the opcon of Prov Corps at Phu Bai . 1st Mar Di v

artillery had opcon in its area ." On the 11I MAF staff, however, there wa s

only an assistant artillery operations officer " who was saddled with adcli -

tional duties that allowed him little time to perform his primary duty. "

According to Leon, "There was a need for a Field Artillery Group head -

quarters at the III MAF headquarters level . The allocation of resources

between the division and the performance of support services suffered a s

a consequence of this deficiency ." Leon wrote that as the Ill MAP ordnance officer, he " worked closely with the artillery assistant ops office r

and in effect from time to time functioned beyond my regular duties . I n

effect I acted as III MAF artillery officer. " Col James Leon, Comments o n

draft, n .d . [19931 (Vietnam Comment File).

******Colonel Edwin S . Schick, Jr., the commander of the 12t h

Marines at the time, observed that the personnel for the FSIC came

from the 1st Field Artillery Group at Phu Bai . Schick Comments. Fo r

initial developments and problems with the FSIC including its relationship with the FSCC and its computer limitations, see LtCol C. V.

Hutcheson memo to Col Schick, dtd 4Feb68, Subj : The FSIC . . . Current Status, and 12th Marines, draft SOP for the 3d Div Fire Suppor t

Information Center, Jan68, Encls, Schick Comments .
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 54 1

incidents that occurred in the 3d Division during January 1968,* he related "a lot of Marines either weren't

getting educated or had completely forgotten how . . .

to set up a fire support coordination center and get i t

operating properly" He stated he "particularly noticed

this up at Dong Ha. I noticed it, Westmoreland

noticed it, gave me hell about Marines not knowin g

their business."''**

General Cushman was not alone in his criticism.

Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the 3d Marine Division assistant division commander in January 1968 ,

later faulted U.S . artillery doctrine which called for firing artillery "at selected unobserved targets at certai n

intervals with the hope of catching the enemy at the

point of impact or denying him movement." According to Metzger, this "was not very effective . . ." and

resulted only in the "expenditure of large amounts of

ammunition." While admitting that "massive fire s

may be useful in certain combat situations," they wer e

"of uncertain value in many others. "12 ** *

Still,by the end of March, the 12th Marines and

the 3d Marine Division had taken several steps to

improve artillery support . While acknowledging less

enemy activity during the month, the author of the

division's command chronology attributed a decreas e

of artillery ammunition expenditure more to "selective targeting and increased command emphasis o n

the judicious use of ammunition ." In April, the division reported that it continued to place emphasis

upon "the selection of the number of rounds and typ e

fuze appropriate to the target under attack ." More -

over, it claimed that the FSIC continued to "improv e

the accuracy and timeliness in reporting fire suppor t

information." During May, the 12th Marines drafte d

a new SOP (Standing Operational Procedure) for th e

3d Division Fire Support Coordination Center tha t

incorporated the changes in the combat situation

and the establishment of the FSIC. By this time, th e

FSIC had largely expanded both the size and reliability of its data base .1 3

*See Chapter 3 .

**Colonel Schick, the 12th Marines commander, observed tha t

while there were occasional problems with the artillery, General Cush -

man never indicated to him that the job was not being done and tha t

he remained in his command slot for a full tour . Schick Comments.

***Colonel Peter J . Mulroney, who assumed command of the 12t h

Marines in July 1968, observed there are times when it is necessary t o

employ unobserved fires: "Harassing and Interdiction fires are a n

essential ingredient of a coordinated fire plan . While they don ' t have

to be massive they (need to} be thorough . " Col Peter J. Mulroney,

Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment Files).

The month of May was a critical one for the 3 d

Division and its artillery. It marked the beginning of

mobile operations in both western and eastern Quan g

Tri Province. In Operation Scotland II, the 3d Divisio n

Task Force Hotel would be moving into operational

areas beyond the range of the guns at Khe Sanh and C a

Lu. The only solution was to build fire support base s

for the artillery. In eastern Quang Tri, the month witnessed the successful repulse of a multi-battalio n

North Vietnamese force in the vicinity of Dong Ha ,

the main Marine base in the north. While the initial

attack and fighting ended on 2 May in the Dai Do village sector, the North Vietnamese attempted a ne w

offensive later in the month. Employing helicopterborne cordon tactics, supplemented by artillery as well

as close air support, Marine and attached Arm y

infantry units drove the North Vietnamese troops back

into the DMZ with heavy losses. In support of the May

operations, the 12th Marines fired 330,000 rounds of

mixed caliber, more than any previous month including the two months of Tet, January and February. In

fact, the May total was only about 80,000 rounds shor t

of the total of those two months.14  

Mini-Tet and the Fall of Ngog Tava k

and Kham Duc

The enemy thrust in the north in May was part of

a second phase "Tet" offensive, labeled as "Mini-Tet "

by the American command . For the most part, this

second offensive was hardly a replica of the first as fa r

as the extent and breath of the enemy actions . Except

for the fighting in the north, a new assault on Saigon ,

and renewed pressure in the Central Highlands an d

along the Laotian border in southwestern I Corps, th e

enemy limited itself to attacks by fire and mino r

ground assaults. In the large Da Nang TAOR, the 1st

Marine Division launched Allen Brook** *** as a spoiling operation to prevent any consolidation of enem y

forces in that sector. Still May was the bloodiest

month of 1968 and for those Marine units involved i n

the heavier May engagements, they equalled any of

the fighting up to that date. In the one major reversal for the allied forces during the enemy onslaught,

the fall of the U.S . Special Forces camps at Ngog

Tavak and Kham Duc, an artillery detachment from

the 11th Marines, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th

Marines, played a heroic role .

 See Chapters 15 and 16 for the battle for Dong Ha and operations in Operation Scotland II .

** ***See Chapter 17 for Operation Allen Brook .
542 THE DEFINING YEA R

From February through March, the 11th Marines

with its 190 guns surpassed the size of the 12t h

Marines. Reinforced not only by the 1st Field Artillery

Group and Army artillery in the Phu Bai sector, th e

regiment also obtained operational control of the 2 d

Battalion, 13th Marines. The latter battalion arrived

with the 27th Marines as part of the February reinforcements approved by President Johnson .15 *

As the enemy Tet attacks gradually subsided, th e

U.S. forces prepared to take the offensive . Towards the

end of March, the 11th Marines lost operational control of several of the Army artillery units and the 1st

Battalion, 11th Marines to the 1st Air Cavalry Division in preparation for that division's Pegasus operations. At the same time, the artillery regiment at D a

Nang in its own way took more aggressive actions . It

continued to support the reconnaissance Stingra y

patrols and began to employ "Firecracker Munitions" .

On 7 April, for example, the 1st Platoon, 3d 8-inc h

Howitzer Battery fired three CoFraM rounds on about

80 VC in the open and killed over 50 of them according to the reconnaissance Marines who called in the

mission. In another "Firecracker" mission, three weeks

later, the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines claimed to have

killed more than 60 enemy troops attempting to cros s

a river. Of the total 1,100 reported enemy dead in th e

1st Marine Division area of operations for the month o f

April, the 11th Marines maintained that nearly half

were the result of its artillery fire .1 6

By the end of the month, the 1st Marine Divisio n

supported by the 11th Marines prepared for extensive

offensive operations which would require more forwar d

firing positions. The division planned to conduct two

multi-battalion spoiling operations in May. In Operation Allen Brook, the 27th Marines planned to penetrate the Go Noi Island sector, while the 7th Marine s

and later the 26th Marines were to conduct Operatio n

Mameluke Thrust in the Vu Gia River Valley near th e

U.S . Special Forces camp at Thuong Duc, about 2 5

miles southwest of Da Nang .**

At the same time, American intelligence reporte d

that North Vietnamese troops posed a threat to two

other Special Forces camps Ngog Tavak and Kham

Duc, about another 35 miles southwest of Thuon g

Duc. Situated near Laos in Quang Tin Province, th e

two outposts provided the allies the ability to monitor

the North Vietnamese infiltration through the Ho Ch i

*See Chapters 13 and 27 for the arrival of the 27th Marines.

**See Chapter 17 as well for discussion of Operation Mameluk e

Thrust.

Minh Trail network across the border into South 'Vietnam. With the fall of Lang Vei near Khe Sanh earlie r

in the year, they remained the only Special Force s

camps in I Corps near the trail . With the increased likelihood that the North Vietnamese might attack, General Cushman, the III MA F

commander and the senior I Corps advisor, decided t o

reinforce the bases. Army engineers had already started

in early April to upgrade the runway at Kham Duc an d

to construct a radio navigation facility there . On 16

April, the 11th Marines alerted the 2d Battalion, 13t h

Marines to be prepared to send a 105mm howitze r

detachment of two guns from Da Nang to Kham Duc .

Thirteen days later, a fixed-wing transport ferried a pla -

toon-sized detachment from Battery D of the battalio n

consisting of one officer and 43 enlisted men with tw o

105mm howitzers to the Kham Duc airfield . On 4

May, a Marine helicopter lifted the detachment together with its guns and equipment from Kham Duc to th e

satellite camp at Ngog Tavak, a distance of some five

miles to the south. Sited on Hill 738 and within 10

miles of the Laotian border, the Marine artilleryme n

were in position to disrupt the movement of Nort h

Vietnamese troops along the nearby trails and avenue s

of approach. »

Besides the Marines, Ngog Tavak, with its defense s

dating back from the days of the French war against

the Viet Minh, was home to a 113-man CIDG Mobile

Strike Force Company. Serving with the Vietnamese

irregulars were eight U .S . Army Special Forces advisors

and three members of an Australian Army trainin g

team. For a brief period, even with the arrival of the

Marines, the North Vietnamese left the camp relatively unmolested. This all changed in the early morning

hours of 10 May. At 0240, the Marine detachment

reported that Ngog Tavak was under attack from fou r

directions. By 0330, under cover of B—40 rockets ,

grenades, mortars, and small arms, North Vietnames e

regulars had breached the wire of the outside defenses.

According to reports, some of the CIDG troops manning the outposts turned their weapons upon thei r

compatriots and Americans in the compound . The

Marine artillery gunners lowered their howitzers and

fired directly into the onrushing North Vietnamese .

Other members of the detachment grabbed whateve r

weapons were available and continued to fend off the

attackers as best they could .1 8

One Marine, Corporal Henry M. Schunck, rushed

from the protective cover of his position near the command bunker to a more exposed, abandoned 4 .2-inch

mortar emplacement in the center of the compound .
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 543

Although wounded, Schunck single-handedly

attempted to man the weapon . Unable to do so, h e

moved to the assistance of a more seriously wounded

Marine who had tried to join him. Dragging the

injured man to cover, he and another Marine moved t o

an 81mm mortar, which they continued to fire at th e

advancing enemy troops until running out of ammunition. Schunck was later awarded the Navy Cross .1 9

Another Navy Cross recipient from the same actio n

at Ngog Tavak was Marine Lance Corporal Richard E

Conklin. Once the enemy attack began, Conkli n

grabbed a machine gun and opened up on approaching

NVA troops. Frustrated in their attempts to reach the

compound, the North Vietnamese returned concentrated automatic weapons fire and tried to knock ou t

the Marine machine gun position with grenades. Conklin threw back several of the grenades and continued

to fire his weapon until he collapsed from his wounds.20

Despite such heroics, the defense of Ngog Tavak

was a hopeless cause . Both Marine First Lieutenant

Robert L. Adams, the commander of the Marine

detachment, and Army Captain Christopher J . Silva,

the Special Forces commander, had sustained sever e

wounds. About 0800, under cover of the Marine howitzers and automatic weapons, Marine and Army helicopters took out the most severely wounded . Among

them were Lieutenant Adams, Corporal Schunck ,

Lance Corporal Conklin, and 15 other Marines from

the artillery detachment. An attempt to bring in reinforcements proved futile and resulted in the loss of two

of the helicopters. Out of 105mm ammunition, th e

Marine gunners "spiked" the guns with thermit e

grenades to render them inoperative .* Led by the senior

Australian advisor, the remaining defenders of Ngog

Tavak, including 13 Marines of the detachment, abandoned the camp to the enemy. After a trek through th e

jungle for six miles, American helicopters evacuated

the survivors to Kham Duc. Of the 43 Marines and 1

Navy corpsman who made up the artillery detachment, 13 were dead and 20 were wounded . Only 1 1

men escaped relatively unscathed . In January 1969, the

Secretary of the Navy awarded the detachment of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Marines the Meritorious

Unit Commendation for its part in the defense of

Ngog Tavak .2 1

*An American air strike at noon on the then-abandoned camp

insured that the guns were indeed destroyed . The 11th Marines operations journal on 10 May contained the notation : " D/2/13 dropped two

105mm how[itzers) as result of combat loss at Ngok Tavak . " S-3 Jn l

entry, dtd 10May68, Anx C, 11th Mar ComdC, May68 . See also S- 4

Jnl entry, dtd 10May68, End 1, 2/13 ComdC, May68 .

The survivors of Ngog Tavak were not to fin d

Kham Duc a safe haven . After overrunning the former,

on the afternoon of 10 May, the North Vietnames e

turned their attention to the latter camp . At first, after

consultation with Generals Westmoreland and

Abrams, General Cushman had decided to reinforce

the camp and counter the North Vietnamese offensive

there . Air Force fixed-wing transports and Marine an d

Army helicopters brought in the Americal Division's

2d Battalion, 1st Infantry from Chu Lai reinforced b y

an additional infantry company and supported by some

Army artillery. By 11 May, Kham Duc had about a

1,500-man force, including both the U .S . Army and

Vietnamese CIDG units in the camp itself and in th e

surrounding hill outposts. That night, however, the 2d

NVA Division began to pick off these outposts.n

With concern about the obvious enemy strength

and not wanting to deplete the limited allied forces at

Da Nang, General Cushman began to have second

thoughts about engaging the North Vietnamese so fa r

out of range of any concentrated artillery. After listening to General Cushman brief the situation, General

Abrams also had little desire for a protracted battle an d

agreed to a withdrawal. General Westmorelan d

approved the decision . Under an umbrella of American

air support, Air Force transports and Marine and Arm y

helicopters lifted out the last of the defenders on 1 2

May, abandoning Kham Duc to the Communists. The

following day, some 60 B–52s participated in an

Arclight strike, dropping some 12,000 tons upon th e

former allied camp. General Abrams termed the abandonment of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc "a minor disaster." According to a former III MAF staff officer,

CIDG camps existed only for the purposes of intercepting and detecting infiltration and when enemy

"organized forces move against them—you're going t o

lose it." Brigadier General Jacob E. Glick, who was th e

III MAF operations officer at the time, later recalle d

"that the reporters and the press gave us a bad time

about this and called it a `defeat. – According to Glick,

however, "We considered that we were making th e

best decision in a tough situation and were saving people and conserving resources. " The forward deployment of the two Marine 105mm howitzers proved t o

have little deterrence upon the North Vietnamese .23

Operations Drumfire II and Thor—

Guns Across the Border

Despite the loss of the two CIDG camps, the enem y

offensive by the end of May had more or less faltered .
544 THE DEFINING YEA R

In northern I Corps, the allies prepared to take the

fight to the enemy in some of his former sanctuaries

with massive new concentrations of supporting arms

including both air and artillery. While America n

artillery had employed counter-battery campaigns

across the DMZ from time to time, the NVA gun and

rocket emplacements in Laos at Co Roc and other posi -

tions west of the Khe Sanh base, had remained relatively free from retaliation by the American guns . *

In mid-May, in support of Task Force Hotel's

expanding operations in western Quang Tri, Provisional Corps Vietnam authorized the 12th Marines t o

conduct what amounted to an artillery raid, codenamed Drumfire II, against NVA logistic centers, gu n

emplacements, and suspected troop rendezvous sites.

From 29 through 30 May, the 12th Marines moved a

total of seven large artillery pieces, four 175mm gun s

and three 8-inch howitzers, from Thon Son Lam, C-2 ,

and Ca Lu to new firing positions inside or just outside

the Khe Sanh fire base . Arriving first, the 8-inch howitzers opened up shortly after midnight on 30 May a t

the enemy guns at Co Roc across the border in Laos.24

From 30 May through 1 June in Drumfire II, the

American artillery fired a total of 158 missions (59 8 -

inch and 99 175mm) amounting to 1,825 rounds

(1002 8-inch and 823 175mm) at enemy targets in the

Laotian-South Vietnamese border region with mixe d

results . Bad weather during this period hampered th e

aerial observation over the region . Of the number o f

missions, only seven of the 175mm and five of the 8 -

inch missions were observed . Of the 175mm missions,

air observers reported a total of three bunkers and two

structures destroyed, one secondary fire, four roa d

craters, and "excellent target coverage" on an enemy

storage area . The results of the observed 8-inch fire s

were not spectacular either, with the possible exceptio n

of the bombardment of a North Vietnamese bunker

complex west of Khe Sanh just inside the South Viet-

*Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, whose 1st Battalion, l lch Marine s

had relieved the 2d battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh during Pegasus, recalled that 105 and 155mm howitzers' range limitations "did

not permit us to effectively attack the NVA gun positions on Co Roc. "

Hughes stated, however, that the Marines improvised a counter-batter y

technique by employing the platoon of M—48 tanks at Khe Sanh .

According to Hughes, the tank's " 90mm guns had a greater range than

the howitzer (and] we could compute firing data for them in an indirect fire, artillery role. We pushed up inclined ramps with dozers to

give the tank guns increased elevation and thus range . " According to

Hughes, although this return fire was " not particularly accurate, du e

in part to distance of observers from the target, we were able to cause

the enemy guns to discontinue firing on several occasions . " Hughes

Comments.

nam border that destroyed two of the bunkers wit h

"outstanding coverage . "25* *

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson A. Kluckman, who had

just assumed command of the 12th Marines on 22 Ma y

and had moved a forward control headquarters to Khe

Sanh for Drumfire II, recommended more such operations, but admitted to several shortcomings in the pas t

instance . For one thing, he observed that proximity to

nearby infantry security units determined the artillery

firing locations rather than the best judgement of th e

artillery commander. Kluckman further suggested tha t

weather forecasts "be a primary determining facto r

when selection of artillery raid time frames are established." He further complained that "observatio n

potential was far from realized ." Kluckman maintained

that "despite detailed briefings and prior coordination ,

unfamiliarity with the terrain, poor weather, and lac k

of aggressiveness combined to significantly reduce th e

desired destruction ." Other problems included a failure

to pre-position all of the 8-inch ammunition prior t o

D-Day which resulted in traffic congestion and in a

delay of the battery to occupy its position . Kluckman

also wanted a simpler convoy system that would hav e

permitted the guns to move from their former positions to Khe Sanh in "a single artillery convoy with it s

own security elements." He argued that the 3d Division system called for an exchange of infantry securit y

at LZ Stud which resulted in a "five-hour delay for th e

transfer of responsibility." Moreover one of the 8-inc h

howitzers became stuck on a bridge and had to retur n

to its former position at Ca Lu. Despite the difficulties,

Lieutenant Colonel Kluckman praised the overall fire

support coordination and observed that the enemy

failed to bring any effective counter-fire on the Marine

big guns. He concluded that Drumfire II "verified the

**While Operation Drumfire II may have had only limited success, it did provide a moral boost to the Marines at Khe Sanh . Colone l

Hughes observed that the 8-inch howitzers were placed inside the Kh e

Sanh base "along the airstrip with the primary direction of fire directly across the flight line . BGen Carl Hoffman [Commanding General ,

Task Force Hotel] . . . had a lasting impression of the first 8-inch mission (midnight 30 May), as it was fired directly over his bunker . "

Hughes Comments . General Hoffman, himself, remembered that h e

thought " Drumfire II was terrific! After being blasted daily by NVA

long-range artillery positioned at Co Roc, we thoroughly enjoyed

watching our own long-range artillery, most of which had slipped u p

to Khe Sanh under cover of darkness, hitting pre-selected targets on C o

Roc . My own morale soared as did that ofthe entire Task Force Hotel . "

MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hoffman Comments . For further discussion of Drumfire II see Chapter 16 and for discussion of the enemy

emplacements in Laos and the question of Co Roc, see Chapter 14 .
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 545

feasibility and desirability of the employment of heavy

artillery units in forward firing positions for limite d

periods of time."26

About a month later, the 3d Marine Divisio n

artillery participated in a combined arms "raid" t o

silence the enemy guns across the eastern DMZ, especially in the Cap Mui Lay sector. Enemy gun emplacements in and north of the DMZ posed a credibl e

artillery threat to American and South Vietnamese

bases and positions in northeastern Quang Tri

Province. Although employing brief sporadic volleys

rather than a continuous bombardment, the North

Vietnamese guns occasionally could disrupt U .S . operations and logistic activities. At 1615 on 20 June, for

example, North Vietnamese gunners hit Dong Ha

with six 152mm rounds which resulted in the destruction of the ammunition supply point there . Secondary

explosions and fires continued throughout that night

and the next day. In all, the enemy artillery caused the

loss of 10,500 tons of Marine ammunition, about 20

days worth of supply.27*

For more than a year, III MAF had undertaken several efforts to counter the enemy use of its relative sanc -

tuary area in and north of the DMZ . Operations Highrise, Headshed, and Neutralize all involved variation s

of the same theme: air and artillery attacks on enemy

firing positions in and north of the DMZ . These operations were frustrated by the enemy's formidable array

of antiaircraft weapons north of the DMZ, which precluded both effective bombing and the air observation

necessary for adjusting artillery fire and assessing its

effects. In each of these operations, even concentrate d

efforts failed to produce any noticeable effect on th e

Communist gunners.

On 20 June, by coincidence, the same date of the

enemy artillery attack on Dong Ha, General Westmoreland approved an earlier III MAF proposal for

another major combined arms interdiction campaig n

against the DMZ sanctuary area. Codenamed Operation Thor after the Norse god of thunder, the pla n

called for a week-long supporting arms effort involvin g

units of III MAF, Seventh Fleet, and Seventh Air Forc e

in a joint attack on North Vietnamese artillery, ai r

defense, and coastal batteries located in the Cap Mu i

Lay sector. This sector included the area extending

north of the southern boundary of the DMZ about 1 5

kilometers to Cap Mui Lay and inland about 25 kilo -

meters. The objectives were twofold : to destroy NVA

antiaircraft and field and coastal artillery, and to facilitate further surveillance and continued attacks on tar -

gets in and north of the DMZ. The III MAF commander, Lieutenant General Cushman, hoped that success

in this operation would preempt any NVA preparations for an autumn offensive, while at the same tim e

ending the threat to forward III MAF bases and lines o f

communication . 2 8

The concept of operations included four phases . In

Phase I, the first two days, B—52s and attack aircraft

would conduct heavy airstrikes to cover artillery unit s

displacing forward to positions near the DMZ . Phases

II and III, together lasting five days, were to include

integrated attacks by air, artillery, and naval gunfire ,

first on targets in the coastal area, then expanding t o

the entire Cap Mui Lay sector. The events scheduled for

Phase IV emphasized accomplishment of Operatio n

Thor's second objective : the continued attack of targets

in and north of the DMZ. In this last phase, most

artillery units would withdraw to participate in other

operations while observers would maintain surveillanc e

of the area, directing the attack of reemerging targets .

Phase IV, planned as an open-ended evolution, would

continue indefinitely.29

The staggering firepower available for Operatio n

Thor was commensurate with the magnitude of the

task at hand . Thirteen batteries of artillery would participate, including the three 155mm batteries of Major

Billy E Stewart's 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, rein -

forced by Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines and

the 1st 8-inch Battery. While these units temporaril y

came under the operational control of the U .S. Army's

108th Field Artillery Group for Operation Thor, al l

other 3dMarine Division artillery units stood ready t o

participate in the operation, if necessary.** The Seventh

Fleet provided two cruisers and six destroyers, as well

as 596 sorties of tactical air. The MACV planners allocated 861 Air Force sorties, including 210 B—5 2

strikes. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing scheduled 54 0

sorties, including 65 photo reconnaissance and electronic warfare missions to be flown by Lieutenan t

Colonel Eric B. Parker's Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1, which would provide surveillance of the DMZ throughout the operation . All III

MAF units participating in the operation were unde r

the control of Brigadier General Lawrence H.

Caruthers, Jr., USA, who commanded Provisiona l

**On 26 June, Prov Corps transferred counter-battery responsibil -

*See Chapter 3 for discussion of the enemy gun positions in Cap icy from the 12th Marines to the 108th Field Artillery Group . (12t h

Mui Lay. Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . 1-III-7 .)
546 THE DEFINING YEA R

Corps, Vietnam Artillery from his headquarters a t

Dong Ha.30

Provisional Corps, Vietnam published its order fo r

Operation Thor on 24 June 1968, barely one wee k

before D-Day. In order for the attack to proceed a s

planned, much remained to be done . While communications personnel from all participating organizations began establishing a network for command an d

control of the operation, engineers and surveyors

began repair and construction efforts which woul d

allow artillery units to displace forward to new firin g

positions along the Dyemarker line . Marine logisti c

units also had to stockpile at forward ammunition

supply points the large quantities of artillery and airdelivered ordnance required for the operation . Complicating this task was the 20 June 1968 explosion of

the Dong Ha ammunition supply point which close d

the Dong Ha Logistic Support Area for six days. In the

interim, the Quang Tri ammunition supply poin t

provided ordnance for Operation Thor. The Provision -

al Corps commander, Army Lieutenant General

Richard G. Stilwell, later stated that "the execution of

Thor so shortly after the huge loss of ammunitio n

seemed out of place with known facts . . . . " and therefore created an element of surprise .31 *

On D—3, VMCJ—1, along with units of the Seventh

Air Force, began photo reconnaissance missions of th e

Cap Mui Lay sector. Based on the intelligence thes e

missions produced, the staff of Provisional Corps, Vietnam prepared a target list and completed the plan .

Operating from their bases at Da Nang and Chu Lai ,

on 1 July, the fixed-wing squadrons of the 1st Marin e

Aircraft Wing launched into clear skies for their first

strikes of Operation Thor. Using intelligence assembled over the previous three days, Marine F-4s, A-44s,

*Colonel William H . Dabney, who as a major served on the 3 d

Marine Division staff, recalled some of the extraordinary efforts taken t o

restock the artillery ammunition . He recalled that the road from Quan g

Tri to Dong Ha was not cleared of mines and that it required Marin e

engineers to sweep the road before it could be reopened . Each morning

two Marine engineer minesweepers departed, one from Quang Tri an d

the other from Dong Ha, and when they met in the middle about noo n

the road was open and the convoys could begin ." According to Dabney,

this meant that six hours of daylight was lost before Marine truck s

could move the ammunition . At that point, drivers from the 3d Moto r

Transport Battalion "volunteered [emphasis in the original] to drive the

road each morning at first light wearing 2—3 flak jackets and with the

truck cab carpeted with sandbags, and if they made it, then the road wa s

open . If not, push their blown-up truck off the road and roll anothe r

through till it hit something ." From that point, Dabney claimed that a s

a result "the road was usually open by 0800, which almost doubled th e

time ammo could be hauled ." Col William H . Dabney, Comments o n

draft, n .d . (Vietnam Comment File) .

and A—6s rolled in on suspected and confirmed NVA

positions in the Cap Mui Lay sector. At the same time ,

Air Force and Navy attack aircraft and Strategic Ai r

Command B—52s pounded other targets while Sevent h

Fleet naval gunfire ships closed range along the Nort h

Vietnamese coast to engage Communist shore batteries. Apparently caught off guard by the large-scale

attack, the enemy reacted sluggishly. U.S . aircraft

encountered little opposition and the ships sailed t o

within 10 kilometers of the shoreline without being

engaged by the normally active NVA coastal artillery .3 2

Meanwhile, the artillery units which were to play

their part in the following phases of the operatio n

moved swiftly into position . Five Marine self-propelled

batteries, located in positions along Route 9 between

Camp Carroll and Dong Ha, rapidly displaced closer t o

the DMZ. Some batteries moved north as far as 1 2

kilometers, greatly increasing their ability to reach targets in the Operation Thor area . The 30 howitzers provided by the 3d Marine Division represented about

half of the total III MAF artillery effort committed t o

Operation Thor. An additional 31 heavy calibe r

weapons, including 20 long-range 175mm guns, cam e

from U.S . Army units.3 3

Following the carefully planned phasing of the

operation, air attacks dominated the first two days,

although artillery units conducted a few fire missions.

During this phase, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing crews

flew 194 sorties in support of Operation Thor, contributing significantly to the total Phase I ordnanc e

delivery of over 4,000 tons.3 4

On 3 July, with the number of attack sorties slightly reduced and the B—52 sorties cut to one-half of the

Phase I level, III MAF artillery and Seventh Fleet naval

gunfire ships joined the attack in earnest . Remarkably,

the ships closed to within five kilometers of the North

Vietnamese shore without a hint of NVA fire . Over

12,000 rounds of various calibers struck Communist

positions in a single day.

In an effort to exploit the effects of the powerful

combined arms attack, psychological operations personnel conducted an aerial drop of 28,000 leaflets ove r

the Cap Mui Lay sector. The leaflets, intended to take

advantage of the anticipated lowered morale of NVA

troops subjected to continuous heavy bombardment i n

what had been considered a "safe" area, advised tha t

"desertion, defection, dereliction offer the only alternative to certain death ."3 5

The success of Operation Thor hinged on fire support coordination and target intelligence . The major

challenge in fire support coordination was to engage
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 547

each target with the proper mix of accurately delivered

ordnance, while maximizing the potential of the units

and weapons systems available. Also, since this was a

joint operation on a grand scale, scores of aviation ,

artillery, and naval surface units representing four different Services, had to deliver their firepower into th e

same areas at the same time without interfering with

one another.

Although no accidents or serious incidents

occurred, the operation was not without problems in

fire support coordination. For example, the manual

target list maintained by Provisional Corps, Vietnam

and the automated list maintained by Seventh Air

Force were not compatible, so, fire support coordinators found it necessary to use both lists. This proved

difficult and time consuming. Also, the requirement

for a three-day lead time for Arclight strikes was a

burden which diminished the effectiveness of th e

powerful B—52s by preventing their use against targets of opportunity.

Target intelligence presented two problems: target

identification and damage assessment . Target identification came initially from photo imagery interpretation and was supplemented, after the start of the operation, by pilot debriefings and air observer reports .

Accurate battle damage assessments were a critical part

of the targeting process. Without them, planners could

not determine whether the attacks achieved the desired

effects, and hence, could not know whether a targe t

should be engaged further or struck from the target list

as destroyed . Post-mission pilot debriefings and

observer reports provided the initial battle damage

assessment . The photo reconnaissance missions flown

by VMCJ—1 and Seventh Air Force units provide d

additional information.* Covering the entire Cap Mui

Lay sector each day, these sorties provided target intelligence personnel information which, in some cases, led

to the engagement of new relatively stationary target s

less than eight hours after the mission.36

On the ground, other target intelligence agencie s

were at work . Artillery forward observers, operating

*Colonel Eric B. Parker, who commanded VMCJ—1 in 1968 at this

time, recalled Thor later as an operation that "starred and ended with

a mosaic of the DMZ area covering several miles north of the DMZ .

First for Target I .D ., the last for BDA [bomb damage assessment) . " He

remembered his "continuing frustration with never being told wha t

our efforts produced or, in other words, did our flights contribute i n

any way to the prosecution of the war effort . We got routine 'attaboys'

which everyone got, but never heard to my recollection of any specifi c

target being identified and subsequently destroyed ." Col Eric B. Parker, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

from positions along the DMZ, identified and

engaged some targets visually, providing their ow n

damage assessments. Another target acquisition system used during Operation Thor was the three-station sound-ranging base** installed in the northeastern portion of I Corps Tactical Zone . Modern

technology also assisted the III MAF targetin g

effort. A system called "Firewatch," installed at Co n

Thien and manned by artillerymen of the 12t h

Marines, combined night observation devices, a

laser range finder, and an acoustical system to determine accurate range and direction. During Operation Thor, "Firewatch" detected 41 enemy targets .

The 12th Marines also used five counter-morta r

radar units, capable of detecting projectiles in fligh t

and computing their point of origin . In addition ,

Battery F, 26th Field Artillery, a U . S. Army targe t

acquisition unit, manned another six counter-mortar radars .3 7

Despite this all-out surveillance effort, only abou t

one-third of the artillery, naval gunfire, and air missions reported to the 3d Marine Division Fire Support

Information Center during the month of July 1968 ,

which included the period of Operation Thor, involved

human observation and first-hand reports . Only onefifth of these observed missions reported any damage to

the targets.3 8

Still, those participating in Operation Thor realized that the weight of firepower was having immediate effects. By 5 July, antiaircraft fire over the Cap Mu i

Lay sector was so light that 0—1 aircraft carryin g

**Sound-ranging bases employ a series of microphones spread ove r

a known distance and wired to a central station . Each microphone,i n

turn, picks up the sound of an enemy gun firing and signals the central station . The sequence in which the microphones are activated and

the time between activations are used to compute the direction to th e

enemy gun . A network of sound-ranging bases can provide intersecting directions to determine an enemy gun's location . Compared with

some other systems that were available in III MAF at the time, th e

sound-ranging bases were crude, but when used as one part of a large ,

redundant target acquisition network encompassing a variety of systems, they could conceivably provide the final bit of information needed to locate a Communist firing unit . Lieutenant General Louis Metzger, who as a brigadier general served as 3d Marine Division assistan t

division commander in 1967 and early 1968, noted that the soundranging system "was brought to Vietnam in 1967 in an attempt t o

locate the enemy artillery firing from north of the Ben Hai River int o

our bases. It was basically a World War II system that was intended to

be used in a broadly held front . It was unsuited for a battle in whic h

only certain strong points were held, which did not allow for its positioning along a line so that the enemy firing position could be triangled . " LcGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft, dtd 17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
548 THE DEFINING YEAR

Marine and U. S. Army air observers ventured nort h

of the DMZ—an area previously accessible to the m

only at grave risk—to assist in adjusting fire and providing battle damage assessments . The damage to the

NVA defenses was so great that even the vulnerable

O—ls operated over the area for the rest of Operatio n

Thor without sustaining any casualties, or indeed,

receiving any hits.

The air observers reported that the Cap Mui Lay

sector was a fortified area . Most villages consisted of

a group of dug-in huts, with only their roofs abov e

ground, connected by a series of trenches. Although

rice was visible in the open in many villages, ther e

was no evidence of farming activity, indicating tha t

the enemy shipped in rice from other areas . Few personnel sightings occurred, but light antiaircraft fir e

came from several of the fortified villages . Fire missions directed against these villages often caused

secondary explosions, indicating the storage o f

ammunition or fuel. There was every sign that the

Cap Mui Lay sector was a military garrison area an d

that its villages were actually supply dumps or troo p

staging points .

During the final days of Operation Thor, III MAF

artillery continued to pump an average of about 4,00 0

rounds per day into the target area, while naval gunfire

added another 3,300 rounds per day . Air strikes totale d

a further 2,400 tons of bombs, with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing crews flying 256 attack sorties. On the

afternoon of 7 July, VMCJ—1 flew the final phot o

reconnaissance mission of Operation Thor. The next

morning, artillery units began withdrawing from the

forward positions, while air and naval units resume d

normal operations.

Operation Thor expended enormous quantities of

ordnance . Attack aircraft delivered 3,207 tons of

bombs, while B—52s dropped an additional 5,15 6

tons. III MAF artillery units fired 23,187 rounds of

155mm, 175mm, and 8-inch ammunition . Ships o f

the Seventh Fleet accounted for 19,022 rounds of 5 -

inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch naval gunfire . The human

cost of this massive application of firepower was low .

On the ground, one soldier was slightly wounded b y

NVA counterfire, while Marine, Navy, and Air Forc e

aviation units flew more than 2,000 sorties with th e

loss of three aircraft destroyed and one crewman

killed in action. Marine aviation units and artillery

units sustained no losses.

In assessing the damage to the North Vietnamese

in their former sanctuary area, the after-action report

filed by XXIV Corps stated that "severe damage was

inflicted upon the enemy." The report cited as evidence " the minimal and ineffective hostile fire from

the Cap Mui Lay Sector in the thirty days subsequen t

to THOR and the continued ability of our observation aircraft to operate over that area ."39

Damage assessments included the destruction o f

789 antiaircraft positions containing 63 weapons ; 17 9

artillery positions containing 19 guns ; 143 bunkers; 9

surface-to-air missile sites; and numerous trucks, sampans, structures, storage areas, and other miscellaneous targets . Pilots and observers noted 624 secondary explosions and fires. Unconfirmed reports o f

North Vietnamese killed totaled 125, but without th e

opportunity to send ground troops to investigate th e

area, the actual figure could not be determined.

MACV noted :

Finally, there may well have been one contribution

that could not then or perhaps at any later time be measured with assurance : If the enemy had intended usin g

the CMLS [Cap Mui Lay Sector] as a staging point fo r

staging a major infiltration program into the South ,

that possibility had been preempted. And preemption

has always been one purpose of interdiction 40

Following the completion of Operation Thor,

Lieutenant General Richard E . Stilwell, commanding the newly redesignated XXIV Corps, pressed fo r

continued overflight of the Cap Mui Lay sector by ai r

observers and forward air controllers to sustain the

success of the operation by daily engagement of

recovering NVA targets, but this was not done . On

1 November 1968, all questions of how best to

exploit the gains of Operation Thor became academic when, by order of President Johnson, all offensiv e

operations against North Vietnam and the DMZ,

including air strikes, artillery missions, and nava l

gunfire missions, were discontinued, except as necessary to retaliate to Communist attacks . Thus, the

sanctuary was restored. 4 1

Fire Base Tactics

By July 1968 with the imminent abandonment of

the Khe Sanh base, the 3d Marine Division had instituted a mobile concept of operations patterned to a

large extent upon the 1st Air Cavalry. While not

completely abandoning the Dyemarker strong points, Major General Raymond G. Davis, who assumed

command of the 3d Marine Division in May, had eac h

of them manned with as small a force as possible, usually not above company strength . Starting with the

Task Force Hotel operations in western Quang Tri ,

the 3d Division began a series of wide-flung heli-
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 549

borne operations throughout the width and breath o f

the division area . *

A central component of the new tactical mode was

the artillery fire base .** Where the infantry went, the

artillery followed, thus always keeping the maneuve r

elements within a protective fire fan . Typically blasted out of jungle-covered hill tops, the new artiller y

fire bases were mutually supporting as well as providing supporting fires to the infantry units . By the

end of the year, the 12th Marines artillery, with 1 3

fewer firing units, was operating out of 12 more " fire -

bases " than in January. Of the 21 artillery sites, 7 contained 10 of the 22 firing units, and were accessibl e

only by helicopter. 4 2** *

*See Chapters 16, 18, 20 and 22 for a description of the 3d Marin e

Division mobile operations during the latter part of 1968 .

**Colonel Edwin S . Schick, Jr., the former 12th Marines comman -

der, remembered that sometime in May before he relinquished command of the regiment, he made a reconnaissance and plans for a n

artillery fire base . He briefed Major General Rathvon McC . Tompkins,

then commanding the 3d Marine Division, who approved the concep t

as long as General Davis concurred. Schick Comments.

***The establishment of these fire bases was a learning process

for both the infantry and artillery units involved . Captain Matthew

G . McTiernan, commander of Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,

related some of the difficulties he encountered in lace July 1968

when his company helped in the preparation of a landing zone for on e

of the bases. He recounted that the artillerymen were used to "large ,

well defended positions, [and] had some difficulty understanding

why their infantry brothers were so exercised by their behavior. Their

artillery SOP for establishing firing positions seemed, to the averag e

Marine infantryman, to border on lunacy . It seemed the artillery

lacked a certain appreciation for the fact that we were the middle o f

Indian country, on the outer edge of the Camp Carroll fire fan, wit h

no nearby friendly units to call for assistance . The din was unnerving ,

shouts, loud banging, screaming, and other seemingly amplifie d

noise carrying over the surrounding jungle in all directions. First th e

Company Gunnery Sergeant made contact with his counterpart, thi s

effort lasting less than thirty minutes. Next the Company XO [executive officer] contacted his counterpart, again no relief from the din .

Night was fast approaching, and India Company was convinced Ho

himself knew of our location and strength . Finally, I called on th e

Battery Commander. This had the most promising, if not lastin g

effect . Not that the battery lacked discipline . Far from it, this was a

proud, highly motivated unit . They simply did not appreciate th e

situation as we did . Night was almost upon us and it seemed eviden t

that any NVA in the area probably knew we were up to something .

It is my contention that if in fact there were NVA units in our are a

they were as astonished as we were about the unusual activity an d

probably thought it some kind of trick on our part . In any case, I

instructed one of our LP's [listening post] to toss a couple o f

grenades. This action had an equally astonishing effect . It was as if

someone had turned off a loud radio . Complete, and from our poin t

of view, blessed silence. Silence which descended over the position a s

did the night." Capc Matthew G . McTiernan, Comments on draft ,

n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File) .

The dispersion of Lieutenant Colonel Josep h

Scoppa, Jr.'s 2d Battalion, 12th Marines in December was typical of the deployment of the 3d Division's artillery. In support of the 9th Marines Operation Dawson River in and west of the Ba Lon g

Valley, Scoppa established his battalion comman d

post on Fire Base Dick, about 5,000 meters south of

Ba Long. Collocated with the 9th Marines command

post, the artillery battalion kept in addition to its

headquarters at Dick, one of its 105mm howitzer

batteries, Battery E . At Firebase Barnett, about

5,000 meters southeast of Dick was another 105mm

battery, Battery F. Then to the southwest and about

8,000 meters south of Dick, was Firebase Shiloh

with two artillery batteries, Battery D, a 105m m

howitzer battery, and the 1st Provisional 155mm

Howitzer Battery equipped with three 155m m

towed howitzers.  Scoppa's 4 .2-inch mortar or

Whiskey Battery was with the 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines at the forward edge of the Battery D

artillery fan. This in effect permitted the infantr y

battalion "to maneuver slightly further than th e

eight clicks [8,000 meters] that would normall y

govern the outer limits of its movement ." 4 3

In the selection of the fire bases, Lieutenan t

Colonel Scoppa explained that the site must b e

within a specified range from other artillery positions for mutual support and consistent with "th e

scheme of maneuver of the infantry unit . . . ." In

addition, the battalion commander stated that ther e

were three other prerequisites: "the piece of ground

must be of adequate size" to accommodate a batter y

of artillery ; "it must be defensible by a platoon [o f

infantry)" or at most a reinforced platoon ; and finally "capable of construction within 24 to 36 hours. "

He observed that the Marines were now capable o f

placing a 105mm battery in an "area as narrow a s

15—20 meters wide and 75 meters long ." Other fir e

bases such as Shiloh were large enough to hold bot h

a 105mm battery and three additional 155m m

towed howitzers. 4 4

The artillery battalion commander provided th e

following description of Fire Base Dick . He stated

that the Marines in November carved the base out in

24 hours on the "very crest of a 618-meter-hig h

** **Major General Hoffman observed that in Task Force Hote l

and 3d Marine Division offensive operations, " We favored the cowe d

155's over the self-propelled 155's because the former were helo-transportable and therefore could be employed in places and circumstance s

where the self-propelled models could not . " Hoffman Comments.
550 THE DEFINING YEA R

hill ." In building the base, Marine engineers blew off

the top of the ridgeline and used bulldozers to dig

the gun pits . The 105mm artillery battery there had

a battery front of 75 meters . There were sheer drops

to the rear and front, as well as to the left flank of the

howitzers. For resupply, Dick depended entirely

upon helicopters. The base was large enough to

accommodate 2,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition .

According to Scoppa, the Marines carefully monitored "the levels of units [of fire) on a fire base so tha t

you can provide uninterrupted support to the

infantry as required . " 4 5

This dependence upon air delivery of supplie s

required close coordination between the artillery an d

helicopters. First of all in establishing the landing

zone on the fire base, the Marines attempted to place

it on a piece of terrain "which is at perpendicular to

the prevailing winds so that the helicopter can com e

in one smooth motion, drop his load, and proceed . "

Above, Fire Support Base Dick near the Ba Long Valley is where Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12t h

Marines established a 105mm howitzer firing site. Below, a ground view of the Fire Support Base

includes firing stakes and hootches made of empty ammunition boxes. An artillery tube can be faintly seen at the upper right of the fire base.

The top photo is from the 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68, and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801291
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 55 1

Another factor involved the use of check fires whe n

the helicopters arrived for resupply. Usually the battalion checked its fire "in order to give the helicopte r

the priority that it requires to drop its load and proceed ." On the other hand, when the artillery was

"shooting on an active mission" in support of engage d

infantry "the fires have priority and the helicopte r

must wait or return to base to resupply us at a late r

time ." There were complications also when the helicopters were resupplying ground troops or carrying

out medical evacuations. Since the fire bases were

usually on the high ground, the artillerymen fired

their guns exclusively at a high angle, thereby th e

artillery trajectory did "not interfere continuousl y

with the helicopter traffic" and permitted the clearance of "helicopter lanes beneath or below the max

ordinates of the battery." 4 6

The helicopters were important also in bringing

the artillery units into position . Marine CH—46s and

CH—53As could easily bring the 105mm howitzer s

into the rapidly expanding fire bases . Furthermore ,

Army Sky Crane CH—54s could lift into position th e

A Marine Sikorsky CH—53 Sea Stallion helicopter carrying a MIOIAl 105mm howitzer as an external load i s

about to place the artillery piece at a fire support base southwest of An Hoa during Operation Taylor Common.

Photo is courtesy of Col Joseph L . Sadowski USMC (Ret)

towed 155mm howitzers. As Lieutenant Colonel

Scoppa related, the Marines needed to provide onl y

about 48 hours advance notice to obtain the Arm y

"bird" which could transport the towed 155mm

howitzers from fire base to fire base??

In December 1968, the 2d Battalion, 12t h

Marines had three provisional 155mm batterie s

equipped with the towed howitzers attached to it s

command. While the 1st Provisional Battery was a t

Shiloh, the other two batteries were at Fire Base

Cates and at Ca Lu . From these latter two bases, the

155mm howitzers provided protective fires for the

northern and western edges of the 9th Marines area

of operations. 48

According to Lieutenant Colonel Scoppa, the new

mobility of the artillery had transformed the war in

the north. He observed that his units on the fir e

bases took relatively little incoming and attributed

this "to the fact that we do move into them quickly ,

we occupy them for a relatively short period of time ,

. . . and then move elsewhere . " Scoppa believed the

enemy did not know how to cope with this rapid

deployment : "We are now able to get into areas

where he did not expect us to be able to come into, .

. . in a matter of days span 16 clicks, sometimes 2 4

in three moves. Charlie [the Communist forces) can -

not move out quite that fast. We get in with him

where he is." 49

Further south in the 1st Marine Division sector a t

the end of the year, the 11th Marines also began t o

experiment with the fire base concept . Since April,

the Marine artillery had moved into forward artillery

positions in support of the large operations such a s

Mameluke Thrust, Allen Brook, and Maui Peak . Ye t

for the most part, the 11th Marines did not have th e

assets and command arrangements to use the fir e

base concept on a large scale . With the departure o f

the 5th Marines from the Phu Loc sector and finall y

with the transfer of the 1st Field Artillery Group

from Phu Bai to Da Nang, the 1st Marine Divisio n

was prepared to launch Operation Taylor Commo n

in Base Area 112. Under 1st Marine Division Tas k

Force Yankee in Taylor Common, Lieutenant Colone l

Raymond B. Ingrando's 1st Field Artillery Group

directed an artillery force of two direct suppor t

artillery battalions and elements of other units ,

including 8-inch howitzers, 155mm guns, an d

175mm guns . The idea was to build a series of fire

support bases between the Arizona territory and th e

Laotian border to interdict any Communist forces in

the enemy base area . The operation continued into
552 THE DEFINING YEA R

1969 . The fire support base became an integral part

of Marine Corps artillery employment and deployment for the remainder of the war . 5o *

Marine Reconnaissance Operations

The more mobile Marine operations would also

have an impact on the employment of Marine reconnaissance units. In 1968, the Marine reconnaissance

units consisted of the 1st and 3d Reconnaissance Battalions and the 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Companies. The two reconnaissance battalions remained

under the control of their respective parent divisions,

the 1st with the 1st Marine Division and the 3d with

the 3d Division. Each of the Force Reconnaissanc e

companies were attached to one of the battalions, the

1st to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and the 3d to

the 3d Battalion.

Since mid-1966, the two divisions employed thei r

reconnaissance battalions in much the same way, basically as an extension of their supporting arms i n

"Stingray" patrols, thus bringing Marine firepower to

bear deep in enemy territory. In Stingray operations,

a small reconnaissance unit (usually a squad, althoug h

platoon-sized operations were not uncommon) move d

to an objective area by helicopter and occupied a position on commanding terrain from which it could

observe enemy activity. From their observation posts,

the Marines watched for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese moving through the area. By maintaining a

radio link to their headquarters, the Marines wer e

able to engage lucrative targets with artillery fire and

* See Chapter 21 for Operation Taylor Common .

**See Chapter 8 . Lieutenant Colonel Broman C. Stinemetz, wh o

commanded the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion during this period, provided the following description of the experience of one patrol in a harbor site on the nose of Charlie Ridge west of Da Nang that overlooke d

a well-known trail on 30 January : "Suddenly a major force of NVA regulars, heavily armed, came marching single file down the trail headin g

in an easterly direction towards the Da Nang area . At the 1st Reco n

Battalion 's opcenter [operations center] came the whispered voice over

the tacnet [tactical net] of the patrol 's radio operator relaying his leaders observation . ' Ask them how far they are away, ' the battalion 's operations officer said . There was an agonizing wait as the operator relaye d

the request to his leader and waited for a response . Then in a barel y

audible whisper came: ' the six [patrol commander] says they are with -

in farting distance.' The patrol leader stuck with his position for a good

thirty minutes and then called artillery strikes on points further dow n

the trail . The darkness and the dense vegetation prohibited any damage assessment, but in debriefings patrol members reported lots of

screaming from the impact area ." Colonel Stinemetz attributed th e

success of Stingray in the 1st Division sector for the growth of the 1s t

Reconnaissance Battalion in 1967 . By the latter part of the year, th e

four reconnaissance companies of the battalion were joined by an

air strikes without revealing their position . This technique greatly extended the effectiveness of U .S . firepower by hitting the enemy in his own backyard . For

example, the 1st Division credited its Stingray

patrols in the Da Nang sector for disrupting th e

enemy main forces as they moved into attack positions just prior to Tet .51**

Although the Stingray concept called for the

patrols to remain clandestine, they went to the field

prepared for the worst. A squad, accompanied by a

corpsman and occasionally by an artillery forward

observer, would take a considerable amount of equipment for the defense of their position .*** In addition

to the squad's own rifles, the standard equipment

included M60 machine guns (occasionally, Marine s

even took M2 .50-caliber heavy machine guns an d

60mm mortars), grenade launchers, Claymore mines,

sniper rifles, as well as binoculars, spotting scopes ,

night vision devices, and, of course, radios. Such

heavy firepower was virtually a necessity because th e

observation posts used by the patrols were, for th e

most part, somewhat developed as defensive position s

with concertina wire, lightly constructed bunkers ,

and fighting holes. There were only so many pieces of

commanding terrain and the patrols returned to thes e

again and again .

Most patrols remained in position about four to

six days, although some teams were out for as long as

10 or 11 days. On the other hand, helicopters might

extract them much sooner than planned if the enem y

detected the patrol. One team which paid the price

enlarged Company E which had an additional fourth platoon . With

the introduction of the 26th Marines into country in 1967 .Compa , -

ny B, 5th Reconnaissance Battalion, was attached to the battalion .

Together with the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, which ha d

been under battalion control for some time, there were a total o f

seven reconnaissance companies, more than doubling the 1st Marin e

Division's capability to field patrols . According to Stinemetz, "at this

stage the Recon Battalion was the largest battalion in the division . I t

had more rolling stock than a motor transport battalion and mor e

communications equipment than the Communications Battalion . "

Col Broman C. Stinemetz, Comments on draft, dtd 2Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stinemetz Comments. Lieutenan t

Colonel Donald R . Berg, who commanded the 3d Reconnaissance

Battalion from July until December 1968, observed that the Stingray

patrols usually varied from 8—12 men . He noted that " patrols preferred going short rather than have a new man added to the patrol . "

In addition to the corpsman and depending up the situation, a

doghandler and dog may be attached,as well as other specially skille d

personnel such as a demolitions expert . According to Lieutenan t

Colonel Berg, one dog had two confirmed " KIAs " from Stingra y

actions. LtCol Donald R. Berg, Comments on draft, dtd 9Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File).
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 55 3

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

His face covered with camouflage paint, Marine PFC Robert L . Scheidel looks out upon a landing

zone for his Stingray team from inside a Boeing Vertol CH—46 Sea Knight helicopter. Note the smoke

canisters strapped to his chest .

for detection by the enemy was known a s

"Cayenne" .* On 30 May, Team "Cayenne" occupied a

position on a narrow finger near the Song Thu Bo n

less than one kilometer north of the border betwee n

Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. The jungl e

surrounding the position had been burned away ,

revealing a gentle slope upwards to the north wit h

steep drops to the south, east, and west . Five days

and four nights passed without a single sighting of

the enemy. At 2245, on 3 June, the Communist s

struck suddenly. A series of explosions rocked the

observation post and, almost instantly, 40 Viet Con g

overran the Marines' position . The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion lost contact with the team immedi -

*The teams were distinguished from each other by their radio cal l

signs, e .g . "Cayenne," "Elf Skin," "Auditor," and "Hanover Sue" to

name but a few.

ately following the initial report and called for help

in the form of a Douglas AC—47 "Spooky" .52* *

"Spooky 11" arrived on station over Cayenne's position at 2340 . At 2351, the patrol leader reestablishe d

radio communications with the battalion headquarters

and requested an emergency extraction for himself an d

his wounded corpsman . He reported that the other 1 3

Marines of Cayenne were either dead or missing . The

1st Reconnaissance Battalion called for the extractio n

as another AC–47 and a flareship responded to the cal l

for help and arrived to support Cayenne .

Just over 50 minutes after the request, two Boeing

Vertol CH–46 Sea Knight helicopters arrived, sup-

**The " Spooky," sometimes referred to as " Puff, the Magic Dragon, "

was an attack version of the venerable Douglas C—47 Skytrain cargo aircraft . Armed with Vulcan miniguns, "Spooky " was capable of placing

18,000 rounds of 7 .62mm machine gun fire on a target in one minute .
554 THE DEFINING YEAR

ported by a pair of Bell UH—1E "Huey" gunships.

With the flareship lighting the battlefield and th e

Hueys and AC—47s suppressing the enemy fire, the Se a

Knights moved in to pick up the patrol leader and his

corpsman, completing the extraction at 0209. Only a

quarter of an hour later, Team Cayenne, thought to b e

destroyed by the enemy, suddenly came up on the

radio. There were still six Marines alive, but wounded ,

on the hill. In the darkness and confusion of the sudden attack, the patrol leader had believed them lost .

The rescue effort went back into motion, with two

helicopter gunships arriving on station at 0254, closely followed by another pair of Sea Knights . By 0334,

the six wounded men were on board the helicopter s

and on their way to Da Nang. One of these Marines

later died of his wounds.

AC—47s remained on station over the abandoned

position for the rest of the night, shooting at fleetin g

targets. As each gunship ran out of ammunition,

another replaced it. At 0642, four CH—46s inserted a

reaction force into the ruined position to search fo r

additional survivors and to collect the remains of

those who had died . The reaction force found seven

dead Marines and one dead Viet Cong in and aroun d

the position .53

Fortunately, the experience of Team Cayenne was

the exception to the rule . Most Stingray patrols occupied their positions, remained there for several days ,

and departed again without serious incident, some -

times without even sighting the enemy. There was

even occasion for the grim humor that is prevalent i n

combat. First Lieutenant Philip D . Downey, leader of

Team "Night Scholar" during an insert atop Loi Gian g

Mountain, three kilometers southwest of An Hoa ,

turned in this report of a sighting on 10 June :

20 VC with 10 bathing beauties. 10 women were

bathing with 6 guards. Black Pis, khakis and towels;

packs, rifles, and soap . Called F[ire] M[ission], resultin g

in 3 VC KIA confirmed] and 5 VC KIA prob[able] .

Unable to observe women after this due to bushes, bu t

patrol felt the water frolics were ovec 54

Stingray patrols were capable of inflicting enem y

casualties far out of proportion to their own size . Team

"Elf Skin," occupied a position on a narrow ridge overlooking the Arizona Territory and the Song Vu Gi a

from 10 June to 16 June .* In this Communist-infeste d

area, it recorded 25 separate enemy sightings whic h

*The " Arizona Territory " was the name commonly used by th e

Marines to describe the area northwest of An Hoa bounded by the Son g

Thu Bon, the Song Vu Gia, and the mountains south of Thuong Duc .

totalled 341 Viet Cong . From its concealed position ,

the team fired 24 artillery missions, for a reported tally

of over 40 enemy dead . "

Two weeks later, a team known as "Parallel Bars, "

took up a position at the peak of the dominant Ho n

Coc Mountain, six kilometers south of Go Noi Island .

Just after noon on 25 June, it saw about 100 VC moving west along a narrow finger outside the hamlet of

An Tam (1), just southwest of Go Noi Island. An

artillery fire mission using " Firecracker " ammunition

accounted for more than 30 reported enemy dead . A

little over three hours later, another group of about 8 0

Communists moved west along the same finger, in th e

same direction. This group, too, appeared to be leaving

Go Noi Island . The Marine patrol leader contacted a n

observation aircraft on station over the area and

arranged for an airstrike, this time killing about another 30 of the enemy. At 1855 the same day, Parallel Bars

spotted another group of 16 Viet Cong, also movin g

west, 100 meters west of the previous sighting . Another "Firecracker" mission fell upon the enemy, but it was

too dark for the team to observe the results . Incredibly,

at 0800 the next morning, the team sighted a fourt h

group of 27 Viet Cong moving along the same finger,

but about 900 meters further southwest than the firs t

three groups. Parallel Bars called for fire still again, an d

reported killing five or more VC .5 6

Stingray patrols supported all major operations.

Teams occupied positions in or near the area of operations and coordinated their activities with the responsible infantry unit . As an operation ebbed and flowed

according to intelligence reports of the enemy's activity, the Stingray patrols moved to new observation posts

to maintain support of the infantry. Even while some

teams were supporting major operations, others

remained far beyond the TAOR of any friendly unit ,

directing artillery and airstrikes on Communist force s

moving to and from their base areas. For 1968, III

MAF claimed Stingray operations to have resulted i n

more than 3,800 enemy killed .""

**Colonel Stinemetz, who commanded the 1st Reconnaissanc e

Battalion until July 1968, quoted the following reconnaissance statistics for the month of May : 149 patrols, 476 sightings, 59 contacts ,

6,606 enemy sighted, 362 fire missions and 42 air strikes ; 46 enemy

KIA by small arms, 681 enemy by air and artillery. He stated tha t

the Marines captured five weapons and took two prisoners. Marin e

casualties were 6 dead and 45 wounded . Stinemetz Comments. As

with all statistics of enemy casualties and body counts, however, th e

historian and reader must take these as trends rather than absolutes .

Colonel James W. Stemple, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines in the latter half of 1968, recalled an incident in Octobe r

when his battalion entered an area where reconnaissance teams had
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

No.ofPatrols 133 147 143 165 158 105

Average Duration 2.13 2.45 2.36 3.19 8.60 3.89

Average Size 6.09 6.61 6.72 7.22 7.10 6.50

No. ci Sightings 45 54 78 71 55 20

No. of Enemy Sighted 288 778 508 289 314 114

No. of Contacts 20 52 52 34 31 22

No. of Fire Missions 16 28 39 64 64 22

No.RoundsFired 416 1203 914 1742 1363 249

No. ofAirStrikes 5 14 5 24 3 5

EnemyKlA(C) 22 63 102 25 23 13

Enemy Captured 0 0 0 1 0 0

Weapons Captured 2 5 8 0 7 1 FriendlyKIA 4 1 5 I 3 1 Friendly WIA 26 5 20 4 6 8

Includes 31 teams deployed in the field as ol' 12 December 1968

851

3,77

6.72

323

2291

211

233

5887

56

248

23

15

69

ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT IN III MAF 555

3D RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

11 JULY 1968-12 DECEMBER 1968

Chart provided by LtCol Donald R. Berg USMC (Ret).

Still there remained some question among infantry

and reconnaissance Marines whether III MAP was

making the best use of its reconnaissance assets. This

was especially true in the 3d Marine Division. Lieutenant Colonel William D. Kent, the commander of

the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion until early July 1968,

several years later expressed his concerns that the reconnaissance patrols were "fighten" the NVA rather than

"watching them," thereby losing "a lot of long-range

intelligence." He believed there was an overreliance on

radio intercepts and that the North Vietnamese "were

smart enough not to talk." Kent commented that this

was especially true in the NVA offensive in the Dong

Ha sector at the end of April and beginning of May. He

believed the system awarded "pats on the back for

KIAs," but not for obtaining the elements of combat

information.

Both Lieutenant Colonel Kent and Major General

Davis, the former deputy commander Prov Corps and

new 3d Marine Division commander, were influenced

by the tactics of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. According to Lieutenant Colonel Kent, after the relief of Khe

reported extensive enemy casualties killed by supporting arms.

When asked why his battalion had found so few enemy dead, he

turned to his questioner and replied that he was "standing on top of

what should have been 197 dead NVA." Col James W. Stemple,

Comments on draft nd. t1995) (Vietnam Comment File).

Sanh in mid-April, he began exchanging patrol leaders

with the Army units and sending some of the reconnaissance Marines to the Army schools. According to

its doctrine, the Air Cavalry employed rapid helicopter

inserts of small reconnaissance teams of four to five

men to explore a given terrain, often using decoy aircraft to keep any watching enemy forces off balance.

Combining "Red" [usually gunships) and "White"

[aero scout) teams, the Air Cavalry could make a rapid

reconnaissance and either call in the "Blues" [the aero

infantry) or move on elsewhere.59

Lieutenant Colonel Kent observed, however, that

the reconnaissance Marines also had things to teach

their Army counterparts. According to Kent, the

Marines taught them how to call in supporting arms,

especially fixed-wing airstrikes, and, surprisingly

enough, map reading. He stated that his patrol leaders

explained to him that for the Air Cavalry, "land navigation was not a big thing They told him that

the Air Cavalry reconnaissance troops "didn't have to

read maps. They depended on the airplanes. There

were airplanes up there all the time."60

In any event, encouraged by General Davis, the 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion began, as Lieutenant

Colonel Kent observed, to "loosen up" and do more

"snoopen and poopen." While still using 10-man

Stingray teams, the battalion also started deploying
556 THE DEFINING YEA R

smaller teams, about four to five men, very often ou t

of artillery range. Using both walking patrols and

helicopter inserts, these patrols were out to obtai n

information rather than fight. According to Colonel

Alexander L. Michaux, the 3d Marine Division operations officer, these teams were sent out and told "not

to call in fire or anything . . . . Just find them and tel l

us where they [the NVA] are . We'll fix them with a

battalion." Lieutenant Colonel Donald R . Berg, who

relieved Lieutenant Colonel Kent in July as commander of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, noted tha t

when he took over the battalion three of his companies were attached to other units. By mid-September,

he had these three companies returned to his command and carrying out reconnaissance missions. In

December 1968, General Davis observed that he ha d

anywhere from 58 to 60 active reconnaissance team s

with about 40 to 45 out in the field at any given

time . Within artillery range, he employed the

Stingray patrols while the smaller patrols, designated

"key hole" missions,* operated usually further ou t

with the mission of watching and reporting on enemy

troop activity . Like the artillery firebases, the 1st

Marine Division also adapted the 3d Division reconnaissance techniques in Operation Taylor Common at

the end of the year. 6 '

*Chaplain Ray W. Stubbe, who has written extensively on Marine

operations at Khe Sanh and on Marine reconnaissance forces, observed

that the keyhole missions were "a return to the original concept of th e

Force Recon Company of having 4-man patrols, very lightly equipped ,

with the mission only [emphasis in original] of gathering information ,

operating very deep in enemy controlled territory far beyond th e

artillery fan for support. (The original Force Recon concept was for 4 -

man patrols operating up to 300 miles inland). This is a very historical development of recon in Vietnam." LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, Comments on draft, did 28Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
CHAPTER 2 7

Manpower Policies and Realitie s

Personnel Turnover—The Quality Issue and Project 100,000-Training

The Search for Junior Leaders—Discipline—Morale—The Aviation Shortag e

Filling the Ranks in Vietnam : Too Many Billets, Too Few Marines

The Deployment of Regimental Landing Team 27—Reserve Callup ?

The Bloodiest Month, The Bloodiest Year—Foxhole Strength : Still Too Few Marines

The Return of RLT 27—The End of the Year—The Marine Corps and the Draft

The Marine Corps Transformed

In 1968, the Vietnam War dominated every aspec t

of Marine Corps manpower policy. Since the landing of

the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB) i n

1965, the overall strength of the Marine Corps had

increased over 60 percent . More than a quarter of all

Marines were in Vietnam; almost a third were

deployed west of Guam (see Table 1).1 Marine Corps

Commandant, General Leonard E. Chapman, Jr., later

stated that by 1968, "there were just three kinds of

Marines; there were those in Vietnam, those who had

just come back from Vietnam, and those who were getting ready to go to Vietnam ." 2* Between March and

September of 1968, 8 of the Marine Corps' 12 active

infantry regiments were in Southeast Asia . In FMFPac

only one regiment, the 28th Marines of the 5th Marine

Division, remained uncommitted. This left three battalions in California, with none in Okinawa or Hawaii .

On the east coast, most Marines in the 2d Marine Divi -

sion were awaiting either their discharge or orders t o

Vietnam, while the individual battalions of the division's three regiments continued their customar y

*General Chapman was Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1

January 1968 to 31 December 1971 .

deployments to the Mediterranean and Caribbean .

The dramatic growth of both its end strength an d

its overseas commitments compelled the Marin e

Corps to alter drastically many of its manpower policies. Between 1965 and 1969, the Marine Corps

changed from an organization which encouraged lon g

enlistments and stable units to one forced to rely o n

short-term Marines and high turnover within units.

The Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt, later

related, "we had no choice with respect to short-term

Marines and high turnover and both were a Hell of a

necessary evil."3

Personnel Turnover

Before the Vietnam buildup, new recruits entered

the Marine Corps on an enlistment of at least three

years, with over four-fifths joining for four or mor e

years.4 The Vietnam buildup that began in the fall o f

1965 required a large influx of new recruits, forcing the

Marine Corps temporarily to begin accepting men o n

two-year enlistments. Between November 1965 and

Table 1

Percent of Total Strength in Vietnam

U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Army

as of

30 June Total in VN % in VN Total in VN % in VN

1965 190,213 18,100 9 .5 969,066 27,300 2 . 8

1966 261,716 53,700 20 .5 1,199,784 160,000 13 . 3

1967 285,269 78,400 27 .5 1,442,498 285,700 19 . 8

1968 307,252 83,600 27 .2 1,570,343 354,300 22 . 6

1969 309,771 81,500 26 .3 1,512,169 360,500 23 . 8

1970 259,737 50,500 19 .4 1,322,548 298,600 22 . 6

1971 212,369 500 0 .2 1,123,810 190,500 16 . 9

557
558 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A60173 4

Marine SSgt Robert D . Iverson, a drill sergeant at the

Marine Corps Parris Island Recruit Training Depot i n

South Carolina addresses his platoon in a driving rai n

storm. Close order drill was not dependent upon the weathe r

and training schedules were to be met .

May 1966 the Marine Corps also accepted 19,573

draftees.5 After this initial surge ended in October

1966, the Marine Corps returned to three- and fouryear enlistments. This did not last long. Still faced

with a manpower shortage, on 2 May 1967, Headquarters Marine Corps once again authorized two-yea r

enlistments. To keep personnel turbulence to a minimum, the Commandant decreed that two-year con -

tracts would constitute no more than 20 percent of al l

new enlistments. Between 1 July 1966 and 30 June

1967, only 16 .9 percent of all enlistments were for tw o

years; over half were for four years

Manpower planners quickly found this high percentage of four-year enlistments a mixed blessing . The

Marine Corps tried to ensure that no one would b e

involuntarily sent overseas for a second tour befor e

spending at least 24 months in the United States . This

meant that a Marine enlisted for four years would

spend at least 4 months in initial training, normall y

followed by 13 months in Vietnam. After his required

24 months in the United States, he would have only 7

months left on his enlistment. Unless he reenlisted ,

this Marine would not have enough time left to serve a

second Vietnam tour. This would not have been a problem if the Marine Corps' authorized strength ha d

included enough billets in the United States to provide

a sufficient rotation base . It did not.

In December 1965, the Marine Corps requested a

strength increase of 85,169 Marines to support operations in Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara approved this request in full . Between September 1966 and May 1968, the Marine Corps repeatedly requested further increases in its overall strengt h

to provide a large enough rotation base for the rapidl y

growing forces in Vietnam (see Table 1). Under political pressure to keep military spending as low as possible, Secretary McNamara denied or drastically reduce d

every one of these requests.

By September 1966, the Marine Corps began t o

have difficulty sustaining its force level in Vietnam ,

and requested a further increase of 21,569 Marines to

support operations in Southeast Asia and 12,82 7

Marines to improve the training flow of new recruits ,

for a total of 34,396. Secretary McNamara approved a

strength increase of 14,464 . In September 1967, the

Marine Corps once again requested an increase in its

end strength to support operations in Vietnam and t o

improve the readiness of units in the United States,

this time for 19,293 Marines. The Defense Department approved an increase of 7,000 Marines .?

In July 1967, General Platt described to his fello w

general officers how the Marine Corps was caugh t

between large commitments in Vietnam and an insufficient rotation base in the United States. As a solution ,

he proposed increasing the percentage of two-year

enlistments. A typical two-year enlistee would spen d

five months in the United States before going overseas ,

serve a 13-month tour in Vietnam, and then spend " a

largely useless 3 months in the rotation base ." General

Platt suggested that the Marine Corps should let thes e

two-year men leave the Marine Corps before thei r

enlistment expired, and then recruit new men on twoyear contracts to replace them. Thus, in a four-year

period the Marine Corps would realize two Vietnam

tours, instead of one, for a single place in its overall end

strength authorization . While not proposing a set percentage, General Platt observed that the Marine Corp s

needed two-year enlistees "in sizeable numbers to

maintain the flow overseas."8

By late 1967 there were only a few first-term

Marines left, aside from new recruits, who had no t

already served in Vietnam. In the combat arms and

combat support fields, junior officers and staff NCO s

were barely getting their required 24 months in th e

United States before returning to Vietnam . The only

way to maintain the flow of replacements to Southeast

Asia was to increase the number of new Marines . In
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 55 9

Table 2

Male Enlisted Non-Prior Service Accessions

as Percentage of Male Enlisted Strength *

Year USMC Army Navy USAF

1961-64 18 25 15 1 3

1965 30 40 20 1 6

1966 42 53 16 2 1

1967 28 31 15 1 2

1968 35 35 19 1 4

1969 33 33 18 1 2

1970 26 26 14 1 1

1971 27 26 15 1 6

1972 31 34 20 12

*Percentages derived by dividing male enlisted end

strength as of 30 June (calculated from Selected Manpower Statistics) by total male non-prior service accessions for that calendar year (from Bernard D . Karpinos, Male Chargeable Accessions: Evaluation by Mental Categories {1953-1973 1

[SR-ED-75-18), [Alexandria, Virginia : Human Resources

Research Organization, 1977)).

order to remain within the Marine Corps' authorized

strength, for every extra man arriving at a recruit

depot, someone else had to be discharged early. To

accomplish this, the Marine Corps reluctantly allowe d

Vietnam returnees to leave the Corps up to six month s

before the end of their enlistments.* On 1 October

1967, the Marine Corps increased the acceptable quot a

of 2-year enlistments to 35 percent .'° In January 1968 ,

the Marine Corps requested a strength increase o f

10,300 to allow it to end the early release program.

The Defense Department denied this request . "

Faced with Secretary McNamara's refusal to

increase end strength, the Marine Corps turned to th e

alternative proposed by General Platt in July 1967 . In

January 1968, the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-1),

Major General Raymond G. Davis, determined tha t

"sizeable numbers" of two-year enlistments meant half

of all enlistments. Through this and other measures ,

General Davis and his staff hoped to "increase personnel turnover in lower grades."12 Between January

1968 and June 1969 just over half of all enlistments

were for two years, excluding nearly 16,400 draftee s

who also served for two years.1 3

The increased use of two-year enlistments did indee d

serve to "increase personnel turnover." In 1968, a third

*Colonel James W. Stemple, who served at Headquarters Marine

Corps after his tour in Vietnam, recalled that manpower managers at head -

quarters referred to Marines who had returned from Vietnam with stil l

time to serve in the Marine Corps as " throw away Marines. " Col James W.

Stemple, Comments on draft, n .d . [1995) (Vietnam Comment File).

of enlisted Marines had less than one year service, a s

compared to less than a fifth for the period 1961-196 4

(see Table 2). To compound the problem, in fiscal year

1968 over 280,000 Marines were ordered to a new dut y

station—almost one set of orders for every Marine .1 4

Before 1965, the Marine Corps consciously fostered

personnel stability: Marines tended to serve comparatively lengthy enlistments; a fairly small proportion o f

Marines entered or left the Corps in any given year ; and

Marines tended to serve with the same unit for lon g

periods.** By the beginning of 1968, the high level o f

personnel turnover generated by Vietnam made i t

unusual for any junior Marines to remain in the same

unit for more than a year or in the Marine Corps for

more than two years.

The Quality Issue and Project 100,000

Length of enlistment was not the only standard compromised in the Marine Corps' effort to find enoug h

new recruits to support the Vietnam deployment . The

Marine Corps was also forced to lower the mental score s

required for enlistment and to accept fewer high school

graduates. Project 100,000 has received much of the

blame for this decline. Secretary of Defense Robert S .

McNamara launched this program in October 1966 ,

directing the Services to take a set percentage of the new

recruits from men scoring below the previous minimum acceptable scores on the entry tests. McNamara

predicted that military training would provide thes e

disadvantaged youths with skills that would greatly

increase their opportunities in civilian life .1 5

Project 100,000 required the Marine Corps t o

accept between a fifth and a quarter of its ne w

recruits from men scoring in Mental Group IV o n

the Armed Forces Qualification Test, the lowest category legally allowed to serve . Half of these mental

Group IV's were "New Standards" men, men wh o

would have been barred under the enlistment standards in effect in August 1966 . From the start, th e

Marine Corps opposed Project 100,000 on th e

grounds that the quotas forced the Corps to turn

away better qualified applicants.1 6

While Secretary McNamara heralded Projec t

100,000 as a new departure and part of the "Grea t

Society" program, the Selective Service System had

already lowered its minimum mental standards a fe w

**See Shulimson and Johnson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam 1965, p .

117, and Shulimson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam 1966, n, p . 283, for a discussion of the change from unit to individual rotation policies .
560 THE DEFINING YEA R

months earlier in April 1966, in order to meet the

demands of the Vietnam buildup .17* According t o

Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Manpower in 1966, the high rejection rate for men i n

Mental Group IV created a serious problem when draft

calls increased to support the Vietnam buildup. In his

opinion, Project 100,000 would not have been implemented if the need for increased manpower had not

existed, nor would it have been launched if it had been

solely a social welfare program .1 8

After Project 100,000 began, the Marine Corp s

undermined its contention that this program forced i t

to turn away better qualified recruits by consistently

exceeding its quotas of both Mental Group IV's an d

New Standards men by considerable margins .l9 In

fact, the Marine Corps had already lowered enlistment

standards in November 1965, well before Project

100,000. Indeed, between November 1965 and October 1966 the Marine Corps, while barring some non -

high school graduates who still met the minimum

standards for induction from enlisting, accepted hig h

school graduates who scored too low on the entry tests

to be drafted .20 This, combined with the fact that at

the end of 1968 the Marine Corps was again forced t o

rely on the draft to fill its ranks,** suggests that th e

Marine Corps could not in fact attract enough highe r

quality volunteers. While the proportion of Mental Group IV's among

new Marines increased, the proportion of high school

graduates decreased . From the summer of 1965 to the

summer of 1967, 65 percent of all new Marines had

high school diplomas, 10 percent more than mal e

civilians aged 18-19. In late 1967, while the proportion of civilian males graduating from high schoo l

remained fairly stable, the proportion of Marin e

recruits with diplomas declined . From July 1967 t o

June 1968 only 57.4 percent of new recruits possessed

a diploma . This decline continued until fiscal year

1973, when only 49 .6 percent of new male recruits

had high school diplomas.2 1

Project 100,000 and the pressing need for ne w

recruits forced the Marine Corps to lower its entry stan -

dards, but these standards remained considerably high -

*President Johnson introduced the term "Great Society" in a

speech given in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 22 May 1964 . The phrase soo n

came to refer to the numerous social welfare programs created by th e

Johnson administration .

**During 1968, the Marine Corps made three draft calls : in Apri l

for 4,000 men, May for 1,900 men, and December for 2,500 men . Starting in February 1969, the Marine Corps made a draft call every month ,

with the exception of July and August 1969, until February 1970 .

er than those in effect in either World War II or Korea .

In World War II, men in Mental group IV wer e

accepted without complaint or comment, and about

25-30 percent of enlisted Marines fell in this group .

The Marine Corps did provide remedial instruction for

the roughly 5-10 percent of Marines in Mental Grou p

V*** Men in Mental Group IV constituted 40 .5 percent

of all Marine male recruits during the Korean War.22

The Korean era Mental Group IVs included men who

would have been excluded under Project 100,000 . At

the height of Project 100,000, between July 1968 an d

June 1969, 25 .7 percent of all new Marines scored i n

Mental Group IV, with New Standards men comprising 13.8 percent of all recruits .2 3

From 1965 to 1968, the educational level and tes t

scores of new Marines declined . This decline, however,

did not necessarily translate into poor combat performance. Former Marine lieutenant Lewis B. Puller, Jr. ,

related in his memoir that he had in his platoon one

older man, called "Pappy" by his fellow Marines, wh o

had entered the Marine Corps through Projec t

100,000. Puller noted that "Pappy" could keep up

with the younger members of his machine gun team

and they took care of him, although the Marine office r

wondered how the man's skills with a machine gun

"were going to help him earn a living after the Marin e

Corps."24 The quality of the leadership and training a

Marine received counted for a great deal . As Lieutenan t

Colonel Howard Lovingood, who saw combat in Vietnam as both a senior enlisted man and company grad e

officer, recalled, "I looked on it as any other Marin e

leader would . . . you take the Marines and train them

to the best of your ability and get on with the job.

"2s

Unfortunately, the manpower demands of Vietna m

forced the Marine Corps to devote less time to training

its new recruits.

***Although records of the exact mental group distribution o f

Marines are sketchy at best, Selective Service distributed men to all o f

the Services in roughly the same proportions. Even after Presiden t

Roosevelt ended all voluntary enlistments beginning in Februar y

1943, the Marine Corps managed to ensure a source of quality recruit s

by enlisting 17-year-olds into the Reserve and encouraging promisin g

young men to volunteer for induction into the Marine Corps . Th e

Army Air Corps also used these techniques, which probably kept th e

Army and Marine Corps' overall mental distribution fairly close . I n

World War II approximately 9 percent of all enlisted soldiers were i n

Mental Group V and 29 percent in Mental Group IV. Mental Grou p

Vs did not serve in Korea or Vietnam, having been barred from service by law in 1948 . Mark J. Eitelberg et al ., Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry (Washington, D .C. :

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations,

and Logistics], 1984) pp . 24-25 .
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 561

Training

Before the Vietnam War, male Marines spent 8 0

days in recruit training, and then received four week s

of Individual Combat Training before their first assignment. Marines who did not go to a formal school, a

group that included most Marines assigned to th e

ground combat arms, required a further 90 days of on -

the-job training (OJT) before the Marine Corps considered them to be fully trained in their specialty . A

new recruit was not supposed to be sent overseas until

he had completed his OJT, more than six months afte r

his first day of boot camp.

The Vietnam buildup quickly forced the Marin e

Corps to shorten its training pipeline. In Septembe r

1965, the Marine Corps reduced the time a new recruit

spent in training before going overseas to four months,

the minimum time required by law. Boot camp was

reduced from 80 to 60 days; for all Marines save

infantrymen, Individual Combat Training was reduce d

from four to two weeks; and OJT was replaced by a

short period of formal instruction, usually lasting four

weeks, called Basic Specialist Training. Infantryme n

continued to receive four weeks of Individual Comba t

Training, but almost all of them spent only two weeks

at their Basic Specialist Training . Finally, all lance corporals and below received 15 days Southeast Asia Orientation Training over a three-week period at Camp

Pendleton's Staging Battalion before leaving for Vietnam. In January 1968 recruit training was agai n

reduced, to 56 days. This reduced total training tim e

A Marine recruit platoon at Parris Island starts the day with a morning run in formation complete

with platoon guidon. Despite the shortening of the training cycle, Marine recruit training still

emphasized physical fitness.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A602339
562 THE DEFINING YEAR

to exactly 17 weeks, more than 11 weeks shorter than

the program in effect in August 1965 . 26

In many ways Basic Specialist Training proved to be

a significant improvement over OJT. Not only was

Basic Specialist Training faster than OJT, the Basic

Specialist Training graduate was "as well trained or

better trained than the Marine who previously spen t

90 or more days in on-the-job training."27

Unfortunately, the efficiency of Basic Specialis t

Training came at a price . Before September 1965, a

new Marine spent at least three months with hi s

unit before deploying overseas, plenty of time fo r

him and his squadmates to get to know each other

and learn to work as a team. After that time, recruits

rushed through a disorienting swirl of training pro -

grams and instructors, moving on before most o f

their superiors had time to learn much about them .

Most new recruits joined their first permanent uni t

in Vietnam.

While Basic Specialist Training proved a mixed

blessing, the reduced length of recruit training an d

Individual Combat Training remained a necessary evil .

In April 1968, the Commandant of the Marine Corps

regarded the ideal training program to be 10 weeks fo r

recruit training, 4 weeks for Individual Combat Training, and 4 weeks for Basic Specialist Training, a full

month more than the program in effect at that time . A

policy statement noted that the shortened trainin g

course was a temporary measure, and that

the Marine Corps intends to return to a longer training

period as soon as the international situation permits.

The present length of training is the minimum tim e

possible in an emergency situation to meet the objectives of recruit training . 2 8

In the meantime, the Marine Corps relied on th e

leadership of its captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and

corporals to compensate for the lowered standards ,

high turnover, and reduced training period .

The Search for Junior Leaders

As the Marine Corps grew, the numbers of junior

officers and noncommissioned officers increased proportionately . This expanded body of company-leve l

leaders faced the challenges of dealing with declining recruit quality, increased personnel turbulence ,

and combat .

During the first years of the Vietnam War, the experience level of junior Marine officers actually increased .

Following the practice of World War I, World War II,

and Korea, the Marine Corps quickly expanded its

junior officer corps by offering temporary commission s

to senior noncommissioned officers.29 Between Jul y

1965 and June 1967, the Marine Corps commissioned

4,059 warrant officers and senior enlisted as temporary

second lieutenants. In July 1967, these officers constituted two-thirds of all ground and aviation-ground

assignable lieutenants. By the beginning of 1968, ove r

four-fifths of the ground first lieutenants were temporary officers.30*

Between 1965 and 1968 the average length of commissioned service for Marine captains shrank from nin e

to six years, and for lieutenants from three to two years ,

but a large number of these officers had far more service than their pre-Vietnam peers. In fact, the temporary officers created an experience "hump" that slowl y

worked its way up in a bloc . On 31 December 1967 ,

almost 60 percent of all first lieutenants had over 1 0

years of service, while the same was true for only 2 0

percent of captains. Only a quarter of captains were

over 30 years old, while more than half of the first lieutenants were over 30 years old .

The temporary officers provided the Marine Corps

with capable junior officers during the initial Vietnam build-up, but this program was intended as a

stop-gap, providing lieutenants only until the normal

commissioning programs could meet the demand fo r

officers. Unfortunately, after the temporary commissioning ended in June 1967, officer recruiting did not

meet expectations . Anti-war sentiments on college

campuses made it difficult to recruit qualified youn g

men .31 As early as August 1967, the Commandant o f

the Marine Corps, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. ,

expressed his concern over the large number of candidates who quit the Officer Candidate 's and Platoo n

Leader's Courses.32 Although the total numbers were

small, the number of lieutenants commissioned from

the NROTC program also declined dramatically i n

1967 . Only the introduction of the Enlisted Commissioning Program, which produced 410 lieu -

tenants in fiscal year 1967 and 580 in fiscal yea r

*7Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L . Bartlett, who served in Vietna m

as an intelligence officer, considered the temporary program " a n

unmitigated disaster! Certainly, we can all recall temporary officer s

who were successful . At the same time, I can recall that most were

simply SNCOs (staff noncommissioned officers] wearing bars ." He

observed that his field "was fertile dumping ground for these types . "

He personally served with several and provided the following hars h

generalization : "Hardly any of them could write, most had alcoho l

problems, and many worked mostly on figuring our ways to get thei r

tours shortened or to find soft billets in the rear." LtCol Merrill L.

Bartlett, Comments on draft, dtd 8Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Bartlett Comments .
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 563

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A55667 3

New Marine second lieutenants receive realistic field training at the Marine Corps Basic School a t

Quantico, Virginia. Most new Marine officers after their commissioning attended the Basic School.

1968, enabled the Marine Corps to meet its office r

goals .33*

The noncommissioned officers' ranks expande d

faster than the officers' and the Marine Corps as a

whole. Between 1965 and 1968 the number of

sergeants increased 95 percent and the number of corporals increased 101 percent . The rapid promotions

needed to fill these billets drastically reduced the average length of service for noncommissioned officers. In

1965, more than 60 percent of sergeants had more tha n

10 years service, while fewer than 8 percent had less

than 6 years service . Almost 50 percent of corporal s

had more than four years of service and fewer than 1 5

*In the Enlisted Commissioning Program, promising enlisted

Marines attended a 10-week Officer Candidate's Course . Graduates were

commissioned as second lieutenants, U .S . Marine Corps Reserve. Captai n

Matthew G. McTiernan, who commanded Company I, 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines, remembered that in July 1968 the 3d Marine Division ha d

started a policy of sending non-infantry first and second lieutenants t o

infantry companies to serve 90 days . The intention was to make up fo r

the shortage of infantry officers then existing in the division . He recalled

that during Operation Thor in July, two of his platoon officers were a former motor transport officer and a former communications officer an d

that both men acquitted themselves well . Capt Matthew G . McTiernan ,

Comments on draft, n.d . (Dec961 (Vietnam Comment File).

percent had less than three years of service . In 1968 ,

over 50 percent of all sergeants had less than four years

service, and over 25 percent had less than three years.

More than three-quarters of all corporals had less than

three years of service, and over 95 percent had less tha n

four. A large number of these young NCOs achieved

their rank while on their first tour in Vietnam .

Despite their short service, the newly promoted

NCOs of 1968 were not necessarily less qualified than

their peers of 1965 . While the earlier NCOs had mor e

time in uniform, most had acquired all of their experience through peacetime service, whereas the youn g

NCOs of the Vietnam era "gain{ed) a lot of experience

at a very rapid rate and under combat conditions."34

The loss of experience in the face of wartime

demands was hardly new for the Marine Corps . In

1945, lieutenants averaged only one year of commissioned service, captains, two, and majors, three . By 30

June 1945, the enlisted ranks had increased over eightfold since 30 June 1942 and almost 24 times above the

Marine enlisted strength on 30 June 1939. By the end

of the war, few enlisted Marines of any rank had mor e

than four years of service, and one with more than si x

years service would have been a rarity . Unlike World
564 THE DEFINING YEAR

War II, however, during Vietnam the Marine Corp s

was unable to keep most of its junior officers and

NCOs for more than one combat tour. Despite the

Marine Corps' efforts to retain its newly promoted an d

combat-experienced leaders, as the war progressed a

sizeable portion of the career enlisted force did not

reenlist; only a tiny minority of first term Marines,

both officer and enlisted, opted to remain in the Corps.

The retention of officers became a major proble m

by 1968. In 1964, 54 percent of Marine officers completing their obligated service remained on active

duty at least one additional year. By 1967 this proportion had dropped to 42 percent.35 While regular

officer retention remained close to the establishe d

goals, every month roughly 3 regular majors and 3 6

regular captains resigned their commissions. Unfortunately, regulars (excluding temporary officers) constituted just over a third of the company-grade office r

ranks, and less than a fifth of the lieutenants. To mee t

its officer goals, the Marine Corps needed a sizeabl e

number of Reserve officers to augment into the regular Marine Corps every year.

Before Vietnam, more Reserve officers applied fo r

augmentation than the Marine Corps had room for,

and the Marine Corps enjoyed the luxury of simply

selecting the best qualified applicants. In fiscal year

1965, of 3,431 officers eligible for augmentation, 71 4

applied, approximately one out of every five eligible

officers. The Marine Corps had room for 70.4 percent

of the applicants, and accepted 66 .8 percent of them.

In FY 1966, while the number of eligible officers

dipped to 2,380, only 314 applied for augmentation ,

slightly more than one out of every seven officers. The

Marine Corps had room for every applicant, but only

88.5 percent were selected to become regulars .

This trend worsened as the war progressed . For

every fiscal year from 1966 to 1969, the Marine Corp s

had more spaces than applicants for augmentation . In

fiscal year 1968, fewer than one out of 14 eligible officers applied for augmentation . The 1968 augmentation board had a quota of 412, but only 240 officers

applied. Of those 240 applicants, the board selected

only 202, less than half its quota, apparently finding a

shortage of officers preferable to retaining the other 3 8

officers. In fiscal year 1969, fewer than one out of 1 5

eligible officers applied for augmentation . Again the

augmentation board was authorized to retain every

one of the 198 applicants, but only 115 were considered fit to become regular officers.

In July 1969, Major General Platt explained to hi s

fellow generals that the low selection rate most likely

Table 3

Unadjusted reenlistment rates for

Marine Regulars by Fiscal Yea r

Marine Corp s

wide 1st term

regula r

reenlistmen t

rate

Inf, Gu n

Crews &

Allie d

Specialists 1st

Term regulars

Marine Corp s

wide Caree r

reenlistment

rate

Inf, Gu n

Crews &

Allied

Specialists

Career

reenlistment reenlistmen t

rare rate

FY 65 16.3 15 .7 84.5 88. 3

FY 66 16.3 15 .6 88.6 90. 2

FY 67 10 .6 9 .2 77 .9 76. 1

FY 68 11 .9 10 .3 76.0 62. 0

FY 69 7 .4 6 .2 74.5 59. 8

FY 70 4 .7 3 .1 78.0 72.5

reflected the low quality of the applicants. General

Platt also concluded that one of the major reasons for

the poor retention record was the unwillingness o f

junior officers "to commit themselves to the prospect

of repeated tours in Vietnam."36

General Platt's assessment probably also applied t o

the noncommissioned officer ranks . The Marine Corps

had great difficulty keeping its NCOs. The reenlistment rate for first-term regulars,* who provided th e

bulk of the corporals and sergeants in this period ,

dropped from 16 .3 percent for fiscal years 1965 an d

1966 to 11 .9 percent in fiscal year 1968 (see Table 3).

Headquarters Marine Corps tried to stem the exodus ,

creating the Career Advisory Branch on 1 April 1968 .

This branch's sole concern was the management of a

career advisory program intended to persuade more

Marines to reenlist .37 Despite the efforts of the caree r

advisors, reenlistments plummeted . In fiscal year

1969, only 7 .4 percent of eligible first-term regulars

reenlisted. Of every 100 first-term regulars leaving th e

Marine Corps, only 4.7 reenlisted or extended.

The situation was just as bad among the career regulars. Before 30 June 1966 almost 90 percent of al l

career Marines reenlisted. Between 1 July 1968 an d

30 June 1969 this proportion dropped to less than 7 5

percent. The combat arms were hardest hit. In fiscal

years 1965 and 1966, the reenlistment rate for career

combat arms Marines was slightly higher than the

average reenlistment rate for all career Marines. This

trend ended in fiscal year 1967, when reenlistment s

for career combat arms Marines fell below the Marin e

Corps-wide average . By fiscal year 1969, combat arm s

career reenlistments ran almost 15 percentage points

below the Marine Corps average ; only 59.8 percent of

eligible career combat arms Marines reenlisted .

*Regulars describes Marines who voluntarily enlisted in th e

Marine Corps, as opposed to draftees .
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 565

By relying on experienced NCOs with temporary

commissions, rapidly trained lieutenants, and quickl y

promoted short-service NCOs to lead Marines in com -

bat in Vietnam, the Marine Corps followed a familiar

path. The same policies had been used in World Wa r

I, World War II, and Korea . Vietnam, however, differed from these conflicts in one crucial respect : during the Vietnam War, almost none of the newly

trained and experienced officers and NCOs remained

to lead Marines in combat for a second tour. By 1968,

even the pre-war senior NCOs began to leave i n

alarming numbers. Rather than continually adding t o

its pool of combat-tested leaders, the Marine Corps

had constantly to recreate it .

Discipline*

The exodus of young officers and NCOs also

meant that the older mustang officers [officers wit h

prior enlisted service] and pre-war career NCOs provided most of the continuity, experience, and senio r

leadership at the company level . This tended to exacerbate the differences between short-service Marine s

of all ranks and "lifers," placing a further strain on th e

cohesion and discipline of small units .** At the beginning of 1968, men on four-year enlistments still comprised the bulk of the Marines in Vietnam.*** As

*For a description of how the issues described in this section develope d

later in the war, see Cosmas and Murray, U.S . Mariner in -etnam, 1970—1971 :

Vietnamization and Redeployment, Chapter 20, Morale and Discipline.

**"Lifers" refers to career Marines of all ranks. There are natural frictions between leaders and the ranks as the former require the latter to perform unpleasant but necessary casks, such as digging-in or wearing hot ,

heavy body armor . See Charles R . Anderson, The Grunts (San Rafael, CA :

Presidio Press, 1976), Chapter 13, hereafter, Anderson, The Grunts. In Vietnam: The Other War (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), Anderso n

describes the difference between "lifers" and short-service Marines . He also

notes that many of the Marines who actively sought rear area assignments

were careerists, and many were on their second tour in Vietnam (pp .

17—21). Some of the " short-timer " versus lifer animosity transcended th e

officer-enlisted barrier. Both James Webb in Fields of Fire (Englewoo d

Cliffs, N .J. : Prentice-Hall, 1978) and Philip Caputo in A Rumor of War

(New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1977), portray reserve lieu -

tenants who are close to the riflemen they lead and hold careerist officers

in contempt . In Gustav Hasford, The Short Timers (New York : Harper &

Row, 1979), all of the principal characters are on their first enlistment .

***As of 24 February 1968, 12 .5 percent of all Marines in Vietna m

were career Marines and 50.6 percent were on four-year enlistments .

Only 13 .1 percent had two-year obligations . AC/S G—1 memo to CMC ,

Subj : Replies to Questions, dtd 20Feb68, attachment, tab I—E, CM C

Reference Notebook, 1968 . The proportion of Marines with two-year

obligations in Vietnam must have risen dramatically during the year as

result of the large increase in two-year enlistments . Although the exact

figures are not available, by December 1968, men with two-year con -

tracts probably accounted for around half of all Marines in Vietnam.

short-service Marines with minimum training

arrived and career Marines left in increasing numbers, signs of declining combat discipline began to

appear.

In April 1968 Major General Donn J. Robertson, the commanding general of the 1st Marin e

Division, tartly informed his subordinate commanders that it was "almost unbelievable to receive

reports of incidents in which Marines while o n

patrol, have gone off and left members of th e

patrol." General Robertson blamed leaders of all

ranks for their failure to keep strict personne l

accountability.3 8

In August, the new commanding general, Major

General Carl A . Youngdale, again lectured the 1st

Marine Division on basic discipline . This time the

subject was accidental discharges. In all of 1967, the

units of the 1st Division reported 200 accidental discharges, with 156 Marines wounded and 16 killed .

By 18 August 1968, Marines in the division had

already fired 218 accidental discharges, wounding

189 and killing 26 . A division bulletin noted that

every incident resulted from negligence .39 In October, the 1st Marine Division issued another bulleti n

addressing the same problem, noting that in September, 4 Marines died from accidental discharges ,

and another 18 were wounded .4 0 Yet another bulleti n

came out in March 1969 . In 1968, Marines of the 1st

Division committed 323 accidental discharges .

These incidents killed 40 and wounded another 309

men, more than twice the number of casualtie s

inflicted in 1967 . 4 1

As the year progressed offenses also increased, par -

ticularly drug offenses. In the first four months o f

1968, military authorities investigated 160 Marines

for marijuana use, compared to 142 for all of 1967 .

Marijuana use was heaviest in Vietnam and the West

Coast 42 Still, in July 1968, a Marine staff paper prepared for the annual General Officers' Symposium con -

tained the observation that

While the presence of marijuana and drug users in th e

Marine Corps is a problem—even the use of drugs b y

one Marine must be considered a problem—the numbe r

of drug users in the Marine Corps is not considered

alarming or threatening to the combat efficiency or th e

public image of the Marine Corps. 4 3

Shortly after this symposium, the drug problem

increased markedly. In the first six months of 196 8

the 1st Marine Division's Criminal Investigatio n

Division opened a total of 17 investigations into th e

use of illegal drugs. In the last third of 1968 this divi-
566 THE DEFINING YEA R

sion opened an average of 24 investigations into dru g

offenses a month . *

By the end of 1968 Marine leaders realized that a

problem even worse than illegal drug use ha d

emerged: "fragging," the deliberate killing of officer s

and NCOs by their own men. Although small i n

absolute numbers, the knowledge that fraggings

occurred often had a chilling effect on a leader's willingness to enforce discipline .* *

More offenses naturally resulted in more prisoners, quickly overcrowding the limited brig space i n

Vietnam. Most Marine prisoners were confined at th e

III MAF brig in Da Nang, run by the 3d Military

Police Battalion . This brig was built to house 200

prisoners. 44 In May 1968, it housed 175 prisoners,

but by August it held 298 . According to the office r

who kept the prisoner's records, "{t}he most commo n

offenses were smoking marijuana, refusing to get a

haircut, or refusing to go on a second combat operation after surviving the hell of their first ." 4 5 The prisoners tended to be poorly educated ; about 30 percen t

were functional illiterates. At least a quarter had

civilian judicial convictions. 46 Although the prisoners as a group lacked a particular ideology, they al l

shared a general resentment of and hostility toward

authority. Major Donald E. Milone, who later commanded the 3d MP Battalion, observed that most o f

the "brig population did not have formal charge s

presented to them, and they had been confined for

over 30 days awaiting charges ." 4 7

On 16 August a scuffle between prisoners an d

guards escalated into a riot . The prisoners controlled

the brig for two days, holding kangaroo courts an d

beating prisoners accused of collaborating with th e

*Colonel Poul F. Pederson, the III MAF G—1, noted that in 196 8

the Marine command introduced " sniffing dogs . . . to catch drug s

coming and going . " According to Pederson, this program was pu t

under the Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J . N. Gambardella, who also commanded the 3d MP Battalion . Col Poul F. Pederson, Comments on draft, n .d . [1994] (Vietnam Comment File), here -

after Pederson Comments.

**For further discussion of fragging, see LtCol Gary D. Solis,

Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial By Fire (Washington ,

D .C. : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1989), pp. 110—111, 133—138 ,

168—170, hereafter Solis, Trial by Fire ; and Anderson, The Grunts, pp .

187—194 . In Platoon Leader (Toronto : Bantam Books, 1986), pp .

74—76, former U.S . Army lieutenant James R . McDonough recounts

how a soldier attempted to intimidate him with the threat of fragging . Colonel William J. Davis, a Marine tank officer who served i n

Vietnam in 1968 as a lieutenant, agreed that the threat of fraggin g

had an effect on Marine officers, but most still enforced the rules an d

discipline. Col William J. Davis, Comments on draft, n .d. (Vietnam

Comment File).

guards. Finally, on the 18th, the brig guards, using

tear gas, reclaimed control of the prison .** *

In addition to disciplinary problems, racial incidents also started to attract command attention in the

latter half of 1968, and Headquarters Marine Corps

began to make an effort systematically to track racia l

incidents.48 In October, General Chapman aske d

Lieutenant General Buse, Commanding Genera l

FMFPac, to look into reports of racial trouble in III

MAF, noting that this matter warranted "carefu l

watching."49 Shortly after this request, racial incidents led Commander Linus B. Wensman, USN,

commander of Camp Tiensha at Da Nang, to put the

China Beach recreation area off limits to casua l

users .50 By July 1969, racial incidents had becom e

serious enough to receive considerable attention a t

the annual General Officer's Symposium .****

While a growing problem, offenses and racia l

troubles tended to be confined to rear areas and did

not have a serious impact on combat operations. Former corporal and squad leader Kenneth K . George

recalled that :

[I]n the rear you get a lot of flak from the guys

because they think that you are picking on them . Whe n

you are in the field and the second there is any kind of

problem . . . the minute you open your mouth, they

react and they react very quickly. 5 1

Morale

In contrast to the discipline problem, which took a

few years of fighting to appear, Marine leaders worke d

hard from the beginning to keep up morale. The

***Two weeks later, a violent prison riot occurred at the U .S .

Army's Long Binh brig . Prisoners controlled a portion of the brig fo r

more than a month . For a more detailed description of the Da Nan g

brig riot, see Solis, Trial By Fire . Major Milone, who cook over the 3 d

MP Battalion in September 1968, noted that during the three-day

riot, "no prisoner or guard was seriously injured during this 3-da y

period . If the procedure for brig riots had been put into effect the

Marine Corps would have had [as] violent a riot that occurred at th e

Army 's Long Binh Brig . During the investigation [of the III MAF

incident] the officer-in-charge was criticized for not shooting prisoners that did not obey guards commands and for not going by the SOP.

The investigation was dropped after the Long Binh riot when th e

Army went by a SOP." Maj Donald E . Milone, Comments on draft ,

n .d . [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File) .

****Colonel Maurice Rose, who relieved Colonel Pederson as II I

MAF G—1 in July 1968, noted that in the second half of 1968, " w e

set up a III MAF Watch Committee composed of G—1 Representatives which met monthly to discuss the situation in I Corps, repor t

any problems, and recommend solutions if required ." Col Maurice

Rose, Comments on draft, dtd 25Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Rose Comments.
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 567

Marine Corps went to considerable trouble to make a

Marine 's time in Vietnam as tolerable as possible .

Major General Carl W. Hoffman, who spent almost all

of 1968 in Vietnam, recalled that "it was terribly

important . . . that people had something to look forward to like a period of rest and recuperation ."52 Abou t

halfway through their tour, every Marine rated an out -

of country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) trip . In every

month of 1968, somewhere between 3,000 and 4,00 0

Marines flew to Hawaii, Australia, Japan, Thailand, o r

other Asian locales for a five-day respite . Marines coul d

also enjoy shorter R&Rs in Vietnam, and every mont h

a thousand or so spent extended liberties at the Navy's

China Beach recreational facility near Da Nang .

The protracted nature of the Vietnam conflict led

to the creation of large base camps . For troops in thes e

Noted Comedian Bob Hope, with two members of his cast ,

entertains the troops during his annual Christmas show a t

Da Nang. The Marines and U.S. military in general tried

to raise morale and relieve stress at the big base areas by providing such entertainment.

Photo from the Abel Collection

areas, the biggest enemy was boredom .53 To alleviate

this problem, the Marine Corps tried to provide a s

many distractions as possible, and rear areas include d

numerous clubs, post exchanges, and air conditioning . Troops in the rear enjoyed many of the comforts

of home, including " security, movies, free time, dry

beds with clean sheets, mail and showers every day,

radios and stereos, and plenty to eat and drink ."5 4

From January to September 1968, the China Beac h

recreation area received no fewer than 15,000 an d

often well beyond 30,000 daily visitors from the Da

Nang area. After the local Navy commander restricted the use of the facility to authorized patrons i n

October, the number of daily visitors dropped to

around 5,000 a month . "

Between operations, front-line Marines ofte n

returned to these rear areas. During these sojourns

these men undoubtedly enjoyed the security an d

amenities offered by these bases, but they could als o

plainly see the stark contrast between their lives in th e

field and the much safer and more comfortable lives of

headquarters and support personnel. Many combat

Marines resented the soft life of rear area troops,

although this resentment was often tempered by th e

desire to enjoy these benefits themselves . 56*

At times the effort to make life as comfortable a s

possible became an end in itself. Major General Hoffman observed that

[Ajlthough there's nothing wrong with getting yourself a s

comfortable as possible, there is something wrong wit h

getting so preoccupied with the creature comforts that

you don't get on with the prosecution of the job at hand . 5 7

The Marine Corps also sought to increase esprit

by following Napoleon's maxim that "a soldier will

fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon . "5 s

Beginning in 1967, the Marine Corps bega n

increasing the number of medals and ribbons awarded to Marines . At the General Officers Symposium

in July 1968, Brigadier General Ronald R . Van

Stockum, Retired, Deputy Senior Member, Navy

Department Board of Decorations and Medals ,

*The disdain of frontline troops for rear area personnel is almost a

universal part of military life . Combat troops typically invent derogatory terms to refer to non-combat men . In Vietnam, Marines usually

used the term "pogue" and even more explicit derogatory language .

Often support troops accept this disdain, acknowledging that th e

greater hardships and risks endured by combat men entitle them t o

deference from non-combat men . For a discussion of the relations o f

combat men and non-combat men in World War II, see Samuel A .

Stouffer et al ., The American Soldier (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton

University Press, 1949) 2 vols, v. 2, Ch . 6 .
568 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from the Abel Collection

The 13-month tour was an important element of troop morale as evidenced by the humorous inscription on the helmet of the Marine : "Stop!!! Don't Shoot, I'm Short." The Marines are from Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines

informed his fellow generals that the Marine Corps

presented proportionally far fewer decorations to its

members than the other services. For instance, while

the Marine Corps awarded 1 Bronze Star for every

20 Purple Hearts, the Army gave out equal numbers of each medal .

General Van Stockum felt that the Marine Corp s

needed to liberalize its standards. He argued that " a

combat Marine . . . should return from Vietnam wearing some personal award ."59 He also advocated recognizing career officers and reserve officers likely t o

stay in the Marine Corps, and greater use of uni t

awards. General Van Stockum's views were in keeping with the trend towards the creation of ne w

awards in this period, including the Meritorious

Unit Citation, Navy Achievement Medal, and Combat Action Ribbon. 60

*The Navy Achievement Medal, intended to recognize meritoriou s

performance by junior officers and enlisted Marines, was authorized o n

17 July 1967 . This award could be used to recognize meritorious service in combat (for which a "V" attachment was authorized), giving the

Marine Corps an award junior to both the Bronze Star and the Navy

Commendation Medal to award exceptional combat performance . This

award replaced the Secretary of the Navy's Commendation for Achieve -

ment; persons awarded this commendation after I May 1961 were

authorized to wear the Navy Achievement medal . The Meritoriou s

Unit Citation was created on 17 July 1967, and was intended to recognize units for exceptional performance not involving direct combat.

The Combat Action Ribbon was introduced on 17 February 1969, and

was awarded to individuals who participated in direct combat with the

enemy. This award was also retroactively awarded to Marines who had

served in direct combat since 1 March 1961 .
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 569

Awards, creature comforts, and rest and recuperation trips undoubtedly improved the spirits of man y

Marines, but none of these outweighed the most

important policy influencing morale: the 13-month

tour in Vietnam. While an R&R might be eagerl y

anticipated or an award appreciated, the most important thing to almost every Marine was his rotation

date . This policy also ensured that every unit rotated

around a tenth of its total strength every month. *

The individual replacement policy has been criticized by many, but the Marine Corps had little choice .

The Marine Corps could not keep 80,000 Marines in

Vietnam through unit rotation without tripling it s

overall strength. Nor was the policy an unmitigate d

evil . Predetermined tour lengths had a positive effec t

on morale . Unlike the soldier of World War II, who

felt (with a great deal of justification) that his only

hope of escape from combat lay in death, sever e

wounding, or the end of the war, the 13-month tour

gave the Marine in Vietnam a realistic goal. The benefits generated by the set tour length probably outweighed the reluctance of "short-timers" to take risks 6 i

In any case, it is unlikely that many men could hav e

lasted much more than a year in combat zones .62 Navy

doctors concluded that the policy of set tours significantly reduced the number of psychiatric casualtie s

among Marines in Vietnam. 6 3* *

The Aviation Shortage

As its Vietnam commitment increased, the Marine

Corps could and did expand its ground forces fairly

rapidly, albeit with growing pains. Unfortunatel y

Marine aviation, which relied on a very long training

pipeline, could not be expanded fast enough .

In fact, the Marine Corps suffered a shortage o f

pilots as early as the mid-1950s. Officers volunteering for flight training had to agree to remain o n

*Colonel Paul F. Pederson, the III MAF G-1, observed that the 13 -

month tour "to the day was a single stable element ." He noted that as a

general policy, " about two weeks prior to rotation the Marine would b e

sent to the 'rear with the gear.' Some believed that as the rotation date

approached the Marine got anxious . If he remained in combat, he migh t

be too aggressive or overly reluctant . In either case he could be a detriment to the unit." Pederson Comments. General Chapman remarke d

that all manpower considerations were "driven by the 13-month tou r

decreed by DOD . . . ." Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Comments on draft ,

did 27Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) . In late 1965 III MAF instituted Operation Mixmascer, which transferred Marines among units to

ensure that all Marines in a given unit would not rotate at the same time .

See Shulimson and Johnson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, p. 117 .

**Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L . Bartlett, an intelligence officer

who served with the 13th Interrogation and Translation Team in Vieractive duty well beyond the normal period of service ,

a daunting prospect for those not committed to a

Marine Corps career. To alleviate this concern, the

Marine Corps instituted a number of commissionin g

programs which allowed an officer to bypass the Basi c

School and go directly to flight school .64

Well before 1955, the Marine Corps accepted a

number of graduates from the Navy's Naval Aviatio n

Cadet (NavCad) pilot training program. These me n

went through flight training as cadets, and receive d

their wings and commissions on the same day. After

completion of flight training, they reported directl y

to a squadron. 6 5 In 1955, the Marine Corps instituted the Aviation Officer Candidate Course, and b y

1957 the Platoon Leader's Class (Aviation) had bee n

added . 66 Upon completing brief training periods a t

Quantico, men in these programs received their commissions and reported directly to flight school . In

1959, the Marine Corps stopped accepting NavCa d

graduates and created the Marine Aviation Cadet Pro -

gram (MarCad), which operated in the same manner

as NavCad .67 As a result of these programs, by 196 5

the majority of Marine naval aviators had not attended the Basic School. 68

With these new sources of aviators, the Marine

Corps barely managed to meet its requirements for

naval aviators. The Marine Corps' expansion after

the 9th MEB landed in Vietnam in March 196 5

threatened these hard-won gains. In an effort t o

keep the disruption from rapid growth to a mini -

mum, on 13 August 1965, the Commandan t

announced that the retirement and resignations o f

regular officers would be delayed for up to 1 2

months. 69 This helped to prevent an immediate

shortage of pilots. In the summer of 1966, the

number of qualified aviators fell just 45 short of the

authorized total of 4,284.70

nam, related that he "considered extending for purely professional reasons. By then, I couldn't imagine many officers who knew as muc h

about the enemy order-of-battle or who could interrogate as well . I als o

realized that personally I had become calloused beyond belief; the deat h

and destruction no longer bothered me . I recall spending the entire

night in the intensive-care ward of the Naval hospital, interrogating a

wounded NVA officer and seemingly oblivious to the horrible mutilation of the wounded Marines in the other beds. I can also remember

interrogating POWs in the ARVN hospital in Da Nang amidst indescribable filth and suffering . By the end of my tour, sifting through th e

pockets of dead NVA or VC, searching for documents, no longer affected me . Perhaps it was time ' to return to the world . ' Even so, the Marin e

Corps would have been better served and I would have served it better

by remaining in-country rather than by protecting Camp Pendleto n

from a seaward invasion from whatever." Bartlett Comments.
570 THE DEFINING YEA R

This comparatively rosy situation proved short -

lived, and by autumn the Marine Corps suffered a

severe shortage of naval aviators, particularly helicopte r

pilots. To alleviate this shortage, the Marine Corp s

resorted to a number of expedient personnel actions,

including again involuntarily retaining aviation officers, using ground officers to fill aviation billets, and

sharply reducing the number of naval aviators attending professional schools . *

Despite the Marine Corps' efforts, the pilot shortag e

of 1966 persisted into 1968, making it impossible t o

man squadrons in Vietnam at their wartime strength ;

the Marine Corps could barely maintain the normal

peacetime manning level .71** Helicopter pilots still

constituted the most critical shortage . In addition t o

fighting a war at peacetime strength, the pilots of th e

1st MAW found themselves tasked to support Arm y

and allied units in I Corps. By January 1968, despite

the fact that the Commandant was under the impression that the III MAF "had everything it rated," the 1st

MAW found itself forced to standdown pilots, particularly helicopter pilots, to let them get some rest 7 3

June of 1968 found the Marine Corps still short

roughly 850 naval aviators, a shortage that spilled over

to Vietnam. 63 In July 1968, the 1st MAW calculated

that it needed 703 helicopter pilots to meet its requirements. The manning level authorized 644 pilots ; 606

were actually on board . Of these, only 552 were available for flight duty. In December 1968, the number of

pilots in the 1st MAW finally reached the mannin g

level, but only after the manning level was reduced to

581 pilots. The number of helicopter pilots in the 1st

MAW available for flight duty remained at less tha n

80 percent of requirements into 1969 .74

*For a discussion of the origins of the pilot shortage and the steps

taken to correct this problem, see Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam

1966, p . 262 .

**Tables of Organization (T/O) laid out the exact composition o f

every unit, showing every billet, and the rank and military occupational specialty for that billet . Ideally, in combat, every unit shoul d

have been up to T/O strength . Since this was not possible, the Manpower Division of Headquarters, Marine Corps set " manning levels "

for units based on unit type and location . A unit with a manning leve l

of 94 percent would only receive enough replacements co keep it at 9 4

percent of its T/O strength . Manning levels were adjusted based on a

unit's mission, the availability of Marines with the appropriate skills ,

and a unit's location . Units in Vietnam generally had a higher mannin g

level than other units.

Although Headquarters, Marine Corps tried to send enoug h

replacements to each major unit to keep its subordinates up co thei r

manning level, the final distribution of replacements rested with th e

field commanders. For further explanation, See Appendix .

The Naval Air Training Command, located at Pensacola, Florida, could not train enough Marine helicopter pilots to bring the units in Vietnam up t o

strength. In June of 1967, Marine officers destined t o

become fixed-wing pilots began reporting to Air Forc e

bases for flight training. This freed Marine quotas at

Pensacola which could be used to train helicopter

pilots.75 The first 15 pilots graduated from this pro -

gram in June 1968.

A similar program with the U .S . Army attacked

the shortage of helicopter pilots directly. In January

1968, the first Marines arrived at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for rotary wing pilot training, with the first pilot s

graduating in October. Marine officers trained by the

Army and the Air Force then reported to Marine

training groups for further instruction, includin g

shipboard landings, before qualifying as naval aviators.7 6 By June of 1969, 155 Marine officers had completed Air Force flight training and 150 had completed Army flight training.77*** Even with these

programs, in early 1969 the Marine Corps had t o

order a number of fixed-wing pilots to transition t o

helicopters to fill the cockpits in Vietnam.78

In addition to the pilots, the Marine Corps had difficulty finding enough enlisted Marines to maintai n

and repair the aircraft in Vietnam . It took a long time

to train a Marine in the skills needed to maintain air -

craft, so the Marine Corps only assigned men on four -

year enlistments to these specialties. This policy created a shortage of aviation maintenance Marines in the

Western Pacific and an overage in the United States .

As with most other occupational fields, the Marin e

Corps needed to train large numbers of first-term

Marines in aviation specialties to maintain the flow o f

replacements to Southeast Asia . Most of these men

spent a year in training, and then a year in the Wester n

Pacific . Unlike most other specialties, however, upo n

returning from overseas aviation Marines still had tw o

years left on their enlistments. These Vietnam

returnees created overages in the United States an d

counted against total strength, reducing the number of

new recruits that could be enlisted and sent overseas.7 9

Despite this problem, the Marine Corps managed to

exceed the enlisted manning level for aviation units i n

Vietnam, although it still fell short of the adjuste d

table of organization (T/O) . Unfortunately, aviatio n

units had to detail many of their highly trained spe-

***For a complete discussion of helicopter pilot availability an d

training during the Vietnam war, see Fails, Marines and Helicopters

1962-1973, Chapters 4, 11, and 12 .
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 57 1

cialists to provide local security forces and to operat e

"clubs, messes, special services, exchanges, laundries,

etc. "80 Marines who were wounded, sick, or on R&R

constituted a further drain . During the last half of

1968, these commitments and losses drove the flightline strength of helicopter groups down to less than 8 0

percent of the provisional T/0 .81 In the opinion of a

board of III MAF officers, the lack of men, particularly

skilled helicopter maintenance Marines, put helicopte r

maintenance "behind the power curve ."8 2

Filling the Ranks in Vietnam : Too Many Billets,

Too Few Marines

In the summer of 1967 the Department o f

Defense's manning level for Vietnam, Program 4 ,

called for 80,500 Marines. At the time, 79,000

Marines were actually in Vietnam or in a Special

Landing Force (SLF)83* On 10 August 1967, the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, tentatively

approved Program 5, which set a goal of just ove r

82,000 Marines in Vietnam.84 McNamara officially

approved Program 5 in October. S5 If filled, this ceiling would still have left III MAF with over 6,00 0

unfilled billets.86 This point became moot as the

Marine Corps could not even meet its authorize d

strength. The number of Marines in country decline d

from 79,337 on 30 April 1967 to 73,430 on 3 1

October 1967 . This decline in strength largely resulted from a replacement shortage, administrative losse s

at the end of the year (particularly holiday leaves), and

conversion from a tour lasting at least 13 full months

in Vietnam to one lasting no more than 395 days

from the day a Marine left the United States to th e

day he returned to the United States .8 7

In order to correct this manpower shortage, th e

Commandant directed the commanding generals o f

Marine Corps Bases Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton to retrain 1,000 non-infantry Marines a month i n

August and September as infantry replacements fo r

Vietnam. Since these Marines received seven weeks o f

training, the first of them did not arrive in Vietnam

until early October 1967 . 88 October also marked the

beginning of the annual manpower surge . The Marine

Corps normally experienced a recruit "surge " during

the summer months, and the first of these summer

recruits completed their mandatory four months initia l

training and became available for overseas assignmen t

in early October.

*Throughout this chapter, III MAF strength includes the SLF s

unless specified otherwise .

On 10 November, Staging Battalion at Camp

Pendleton went to a seven-day work week to handl e

the increased number of replacements. Five days later

Headquarters, Marine Corps increased the normal

replacement flow for the period from 23 Novembe r

1967 to 13 January 1968 by 3,135 Marines. This

forced Staging Battalion to implement "Operatio n

Kicker," shortening the number of training days from

15 to 12. On 6 January 1968, the last planeload of

replacements trained under Operation Kicker left fo r

Vietnam.89 With these added inputs, overall strengt h

in Vietnam rose by over 4,500 through November

and December.

Changes to Program 5 reduced the number of

Marines authorized to be deployed to Vietnam fo r

December 1967 and January 1968 to 81,500 .

According to the MACV strength report, by 3 1

December 1967, the total number of Marines i n

country or assigned to SLFs amounted to onl y

78,013. Still, III MAF found itself in the unusual situation of having 74,058 Marines on board to fill

72,526 authorized billets.

Unfortunately for III MAF the formal tables of

organization did not provide for a number of vital billets, including the 1,097 Marines involved in the

Combined Action Program.** Despite the fact that II I

MAF was technically overstrength, the 23,77 8

Marines assigned to the 3d Division still left the division 62 Marines short of the number authorized . The

1st Marine Division, with 23,209 Marines, was 1,25 1

Marines short of its authorized strength . The average

strength for infantry battalions in Vietnam was

1,188, only five Marines short of the T/O allowanc e

of 1,193, but the infantry battalions of the 1st Marin e

Division averaged only 1,175 Marines . The two SLFs

combined were 424 Marines short of their authorize d

strength of 3,900 . Force Logistics Command contained 9,397 Marines, only 307 Marines short of it s

authorized strength. The 1st MAW had 15,308

Marines in Vietnam, 1,869 Marines more than it s

manning level, but still remained critically short of

pilots and aircraft mechanics 9 0

Total Marine Corps strength in Vietnam gre w

slightly in January 1968, reaching 78,436 by 28 Jan-

**Provisional T/Os covered the Combined Action Program, additional personnel for the III MAF headquarters, and other billets needed in Vietnam . Although technically these billets should have bee n

filled, the Marine Corps' inability to man III MAF fully meant that

these provisional billets were filled at the expense of other units. See

Chapter 29 for further discussion about the manning of the Combine d

Action Program .
572 THE DEFINING YEA R

uary, with 74,313 Marines in III MAE While th e

shortfall in the divisions continued, the averag e

strength of infantry battalions remained relatively stable at 1,186 Marines. The shortage among the battalions of the 1st Marine Division disappeared, as thei r

average strength rose to 1,193, exactly their authorize d

strength. Just before the beginning of the Tet offensive ,

infantry companies had an average of 207 .5 Marines

assigned, only 8.5 below their T/O allowance of 216 .

However, an average of 15 .4 Marines were on R&R, i n

hospital, or otherwise absent, leaving just over 19 2

Marines present for duty. Since a number of Marines

present on the unit diary were in fact occupied with a

variety of tasks, the number of Marines available for

operations was somewhat lower.

During January 1968, 539 Marines died or were

missing in action and 2,126 wounded in action?' Fo r

the month, III MAF reported that another 60 Marines

were hospitalized for injuries or illness. While these

casualties were heavy, especially compared to the ligh t

casualties suffered during October, November, an d

December 1967,* they only foreshadowed what was to

prove the costliest year of the war for the Marine Corps .

On the night of 30-31 January 1968 the Tet Offensive began. Marine counterattacks, particularly in Hu e

City, made February 1968 costlier for the Marine Corps

than any previous month of the war. In February, 691

Marines were killed and 4,197 wounded in action . While some battalions suffered terribly in this month ,

the high flow of replacements ensured that the average

strength of infantry battalions fell only slightly, t o

1,157. One of the hardest hit battalions, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which suffered 65 killed and 42 1

wounded in the battle for Hue City, saw its averag e

monthly strength drop only 111, from 1,152 in January to 1,041 in February. Many of the Marines carried

on the rolls of this and other badly bloodied battalions ,

however, were recovering from wounds.

By the end of February, while the average number

of Marines assigned to rifle companies had fallen by

only 5 .4 from late January to 202 .1, the average number physically present dropped to 174.8 . Again, some

companies were particularly bad off; while most companies numbered somewhere between 190 and 21 0

total strength, Companies E and I of the 7th Marine s

had only 172 and 176 Marines, respectively, on thei r

rolls. Still, all but 17 Company E Marines and 3 1

Company I Marines were with their company. At the

*Monthly deaths for this period averaged 240 .3, peaking i n

December 1967, when 273 Marines died in Vietnam .

end of February, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, an SL F

battalion, was still recovering from heavy fighting i n

the Cua Viet sector, and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s

was still feeling the effects of the battle for Hue . Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines showed 202 Marine s

on its rolls, but only 150 were actually with the company. Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines carried a

respectable 210 Marines on its rolls, only six shy of it s

T/O strength . However, about half, 109 Marines, were

absent, most doubtless in hospitals.

The Deployment of Regimental Landing Team 2 7

The unexpected ferocity of the Tet offensive shoo k

President Johnson . In the first days of February, while

General Westmoreland felt that he had the situation i n

Vietnam under control, the President worried that a

major reverse might still occur. President Johnso n

found the possibility of Khe Sanh falling particularl y

alarming. Although anxious to send additional troops

to forestall the possibility of an embarrassing defeat, for

political reasons Johnson could not send reinforcements to Vietnam without a clear request from Westmoreland . On 12 February, after repeated promptin g

from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, General Westmoreland finally

requested a brigade from the 82d Airborne Divisio n

and half a Marine division .

Immediately after the receipt of Westmoreland' s

request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that th e

82d Airborne Division and two-thirds of a Marin e

division/wing team should be readied for movement ,

and proposed also that enough Reserve units should b e

called up to reconstitute the strategic reserve befor e

these additional troops left for Vietnam . President

Johnson welcomed the opportunity to send reinforcements to Vietnam, but he had no desire to call up th e

Reserves. At a meeting at the White House later o n

the 12th, the Joint Chiefs "unanimously" agreed to

send one brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and a

Marine regimental landing team immediately to Vietnam. The President, however, directed them to study

the issue of the Reserve call-up further.9 2

That night, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message

to the Commandant directing the movement of a rein -

forced regiment from the 5th Marine Division to Vietnam, with one battalion moving by sea and the other

two by air. Air transport would begin by 14 February,

and the entire regiment was to be in Vietnam by 26

February.93 The Commandant promptly directed Lieu -

tenant General Victor H. Krulak, Commanding Gen-
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 57 3

eral, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, to prepare Regimental

Landing Team (RLT) 27 for deployment to Vietnam by

the afternoon of 14 February 94

Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/27, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel John E . Greenwood, normally stationed in Hawaii, was already at sea, having embarked

on board amphibious shipping for a four-month training

deployment on 10 and 12 February. On 13 February,

General Krulak simply canceled the training exercis e

and directed the battalion to steam directly to Da Nang .

The change in destination caught the BLT unprepared .

Not only was the BLT seriously understrength, wit h

only an average of 119 Marines present in the rifle companies, but nearly 400 embarked Marines and sailors di d

not meet the criteria for assignment to Vietnam.

The first element of BLT 1/27, consisting of Companies C, D, and elements of Headquarters and Servic e

Company, embarked on board the USS Vancouver (LPD

2), arrived in Da Nang on 23 February. Although the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the entire regiment to

be in Vietnam by 26 February, the rest of BLT 1/27

could only move as fast as its ships could steam . Companies A, B, and other portions of Headquarters and

Service Company, on board the USS Bexar (APA 237),

arrived a day late on 27 February, while the last of

Headquarters and Service Company arrived the nex t

day on board the USS Washburn (AKA 108).* Upo n

arrival, the battalion immediately had to transfer all

non-deployable Marines and sailors out of Vietnam . On

28 February, after this transfer, the rifle companies aver -

aged just 87 Marines. This situation quickly improved

as 400 replacements flown out from Camp Pendleton

with the rest of RLT 27 joined the battalion .

The rest of the 27th Marines also had a difficul t

time . Colonel Adolph G. Schwenk, the commanding

officer of the 27th Marines, received a verbal warnin g

order on 12 February, but the official message ordering

the regiment to deploy did not arrive until the next

day. After some initial confusion over the deployability criteria, the regiment learned that 17-year olds, sol e

surviving sons, Marines returned from Vietnam unde r

the twice/thrice wounded policy, officers and corporals

and below within four months of their discharge date ,

enlisted Marines already ordered to WestPac, and officers in receipt of transfer orders would not deploy t o

Vietnam. Marines with one year or more of duty in the

United States since their last tour in Southeast Asi a

were deployable, a major departure from the policy

*During the Vietnam War, BLT Headquarters and Service Companies included Marines and sailors attached from other units .

mandating two years between Vietnam tours .95**

Even with the reduction of the time between tour s

from two years to one, only 33 officers and 660 enliste d

men out of a regiment of 2,160 met the deployment criteria. After combing the 5th Marine Division for every

deployable Marine, the regiment still had a shortfall o f

900 infantrymen. Lieutenant General Krulak cut thi s

shortfall to 600 by administratively reducing the regiment's personnel strength objective from fully combat

ready to marginally combat ready. He then decided that

some 400 infantry billets could be filled by Marines with

other specialties. Nearly 100 infantrymen waived a disqualifying factor and volunteered to deploy with the reg -

iment, while 100 infantry replacements from Staging

Battalion rounded out the units leaving from California .

Another 200 replacements from Staging Battalion and

200 Marines culled from FMFPac security forces, head -

quarters, and 9th MAB went to fill the 400-man shortfall in BLT 1/27. In just over a week, the regiment transferred out nearly 1,500 non-deployable Marines and

sailors while simultaneously joining over 1,900 others to

bring it up to strength . Units attached to the regiment to

form an RLT added another 840 Marines and sailors .** *

**Colonel Thomas P. O'Callaghan, who was the 5th Marine Division

assistant operations officer at the time, remembered that the initial reques t

for the 27th Marines came "from FMFPac in the clear over the phone . I

pointed out to go to secure line and I would get G—3 and CG when they

called back! This was done." Colonel O'Callaghan related that the criteri a

for deployment created "a mess, but the 5th Div couldn't make the mov e

in time if we sorted everyone out before they left." Col Thomas P.

O'Callaghan, Comments on draft, n .d . [Jan95) (Vietnam Comment File) .

***Lieutenant Colonel Louis J . Bacher, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, remembered that on 12 February, Colonel Schwenk ,

the 27th Marines commander, called a conference and announced that the

regiment was deploying to Vietnam with the 2d and 3d Battalion s

departing by air and with BLT 1/27 arriving by ship. Bacher recalled tha t

the " first plane was scheduled to leave Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)

El Toro at noon " on the 14th . He stated that the 5th Marine Division staff

"did an incredible task of transferring out over 850 officers and men . . .

not qualified for deployment and replacing them with chose that were, i n

the two days prior to mount-out ." Lieutenant Colonel Bacher had a new

executive officer, S-1, S—2, S-3, and S-4 and three new company commanders. Lt Col Louis J. Bacher, Comments on draft, dtd 7May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bacher Comments . Colonel Tullis J.

Woodham, Jr., who commanded the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, recalled

that the priority for transfers of infantrymen into the 27th Marines wen t

to the 2d Battalion which was scheduled to depart first. According to

Woodham, "by the time it came to filling out 3/27, . . . it became necessary to assign non-infantry MOS's [military occupational specialty) i n

large numbers. This resulted in a'cooks, bakers, and candlestick makers '

label to be tagged to the battalion . In reality this 'hardship' worked to th e

battalion 's advantage and in Vietnam, the large numbers of cooks ,

mechanics, communicators, engineers, tankers, etc . with specialized skills

other than infantry, paid off in tight places more than once . The old adage

'Every Marine a rifle man, first ' never was more true . " Col Tullis J. Wood -

ham, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .
574 THE DEFINING YEA R

At 1335 local time, 14 February, less than 4 8

hours after the initial verbal warning had bee n

given, the first planeload of men from RLT 27 left

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro. The last planeload left just before midnight on 22 February. A

total of 3,349 Marines and sailors from RLT 27 an d

supporting units flew from El Toro in those eight

days . Another 1,956 men from units needed to sup -

port RLT 27 arrived in Vietnam by sea, with the las t

ship arriving on 12 March .9 6 Of the Marines

deployed with the RLT, 973 were involuntarily

ordered to their second tour in Vietnam after less

than two years out of Southeast Asia.97 Most of th e

Marines went on their first orientation patrol th e

day after they arrived in Vietnam . By 1 March, every

battalion of the 27th Marines had begun comba t

patrols around Da Nang.* Several years later thenLieutenant General Schwenk remembered that th e

rapid deployment of the RLT "amazed Genera l

Westmoreland," who "just couldn't believe how we

had gotten there."98* *

The arrival of RLT 27 put 24 of the Marin e

Corps' 36 active infantry battalions in or off the

shores of Vietnam. Before Tet, the Marine Corps had

been barely able to sustain 21 battalions in country .

The emergency deployment not only furthe r

strained the replacement system, but it also used up

the next month's replacement pool to bring RLT 2 7

to a marginal strength level . On 3 May, as a result of

Tet and the Pueblo incident, the Secretary of Defense

authorized an increase in the Marine Corps' active

strength of 9,700, bringing it to 311,600.99** * While helpful, this increase was not nearly larg e

enough to sustain the level of Marine forces the n

currently in Vietnam.

*For a discussion of operations by RLT 27 and subordinate units

upon arrival in Vietnam, see Chapter 13 .

**Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Bather related that his battalion the

month before had conducted a mount-out exercise involving the USA F

63d Military Airlift Wing stationed at Norton Air Force Base, California . M that time, the Marine battalion staged at Marine Corps Ai r

Station El Toro, California, where the troops boarded C—141 aircraft of

the Air Force Wing which flew them to Naval Air Station (NAS), Fallon, Nevada . After a seven-day counterinsurgency exercise, the Ai r

Force aircraft returned the Marine battalion to El Toro where it the n

motored back to its base at Camp Pendleton, California . According t o

Bather, on 14 February, "the same C—141s and crews that had lifted u s

to NAS Fallon a short time ago were going to lift us to Da Nang . Fortunately we had loading plans and manifests which, with some mino r

and some major changes served us well ." Bather Comments.

***On 23 January 1968, the North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo

(AGER 2).

Reserve Callup ?

On 13 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the President immediately activate

selected Reserve units, including one Marine RLT.

They also recommended that other Reserve units ,

including the rest of the IV Marine Expeditionary

Force, be prepared to be called up on short notice . fl a

President Johnson rejected this proposal . On 27 February, General Wheeler relayed a request from General Westmoreland for an additional 206,00 0

troops.'°' The magnitude of his request prompted the

President and his closest advisors to reexamine their

policies concerning the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

recommended that the President mobilize th e

Reserves to both meet General Westmoreland's

request and reconstitute the strategic reserve . The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler,

eagerly sought to have the Reserves activated, while

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General

Chapman, reluctantly agreed with this recommendation.  In retirement General Chapman recalled tha t

no matter how short their period of service after call -

up, by law demobilized Reservists had fulfilled thei r

obligated service . This made the Reserve "like a huge

[piece} of artillery that has only one round," whic h

"you can fire once, and then it will be 20 years, probably, before you can fire it again . "i0 2

The Marine Corps Reserve had been reorganized

recently from a collection of independent companie s

and batteries into the 4th Marine Expeditionary Forc e

(MEF), "a 'mirror like' image of the regular establishment MEF." i o3 Largely due to the influence of the draft,

in January 1968, the personnel readiness of the Marin e

Corps Reserve had never been better. The quality of

Reservists was outstanding . Between 1 July 1967 an d

30 June 1969, 80 percent of enlisted Reserve recruits

scored in Mental Groups I or II, compared to only 3 2

percent of active-duty recruits. Only one percent of

new Reservists scored in Mental Group IV Fewer tha n

8 percent of the new Reservists did not have high

school diplomas, while 10 percent were college gradu -

ates and many of the rest had some college . Still, only

48,000 Reservists received drill pay, not enough

Marines to fill IV MEF. The Marine Corps planned to

** **There are a number of excellent works on the impact of Tet

and the debate it sparked within the Johnson Administration . The Pentagon Papers, IV. C. 6. c . is perhaps the most important source; perhap s

the best treatment of the subject is Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton, N .J. : Prince -

ton University Press, 1977).
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 57 5

bring units to full strength by calling up Class III (non -

drill pay) Reservists.10 4

Before Tet, the Marine Corps had only one plan in

the event of a Reserve mobilization : to activate th e

entire IV MEE On 4 March, the Secretary of Defens e

proposed to send 22,000 reinforcements to Vietnam b y

15 June, including IV MEF (-), consisting of 18,10 0

men. The Secretary of Defense's proposal to activat e

less than the entire Reserve structure caught th e

Marine Corps unprepared, requiring frantic planning .

Creating a composite Marine Aircraft Group woul d

have undermined the readiness of the entire 4th MAW .

Task organization plans envisioned calling up detachments of combat support and combat service support,

a move which would have left the Marine Corps ope n

to serious legal challenges. Political constraints rule d

out the call up of Class III Reservists, upon whom th e

mobilization planners had relied to fill "gaping holes "

in activated Reserve units.' °

Up until the last minute, administration officials

considered calling up 26,000 Marine Reservists. t 0 6 * On

13 March, President Johnson decided to send an additional 30,000 troops to Vietnam, but his troop list did

not include any Marine units. From 14 to 28 March ,

administration officials contemplated various proposal s

with even larger numbers of Reservists to be activated ,

but still none of them included Marines. When the

President announced the callup of 62,000 Reservists

on 31 March, no Marines were activated.107

The Bloodiest Month, The Bloodiest Year

Although not as bad as February, casualtie s

remained high throughout March and April . In Ma y

1968, 810 Marines died in Vietnam, making tha t

month the bloodiest of the war for the Marine Corps .

Another 3,812 Marines were wounded in action . The

first six months of 1968 proved the costliest of the wa r

for the Marine Corps, accounting for almost one quarter of all Marine deaths during the Vietnam War. In

these months 3,339 Marines died, less than 500 shor t

of the 3,803 Marines killed in all of 1967 . During this

period the 3d Marine Division averaged around 22 0

Marines killed and over 1,250 wounded a month ,

*In mid-March 1968, Brigadier General Earl E . Anderson, the III

MAF Chief of Staff, observed in a personal letter that the Marine command had hopes at that time of obtaining another Marine and divisio n

headquarters for Vietnam together with units associated with such a n

increase . BGen E. E. Anderson la to MajGen Keith B . McCutcheon ,

dtd 14Mar68, Encl, Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft, dt d

14Mar68 (Vietnam Comment File).

while the 1st Marine Division suffered about 19 0

Marines killed and 1,450 wounded each month . The

casualty rate of the 3d Division remained fairly steady,

with a bad month in March, while the 1st Division suffered almost half of its casualties in February and May .

The high casualty rate concerned General Cushman ,

who sent a message on 20 May, telling the commanders of the 1st and 3d Divisions that "we are sufferin g

too many Marine casualties—particularly KIA ." General Cushman attributed these excessive casualties to a

misplaced reliance on "do or die assaults" more appropriate for amphibious attacks . He provided a list of tactical principles to reduce casualties, emphasizing fire -

power and supporting arms. Division commanders

were directed to school their officers from the divisio n

to the company level in these principles. General Cushman concluded by saying :

[IIt is hard to soft pedal a generation of training in the

assault as required for establishment of a beachhead, bu t

it must repeat must be done if we are to fight and wi n

this war. 10 8

Lieutenant General Krulak, Commanding General,

Fleet Marine Force Pacific, quickly responded to this

message . While agreeing that "there has been needless

loss of Marine lives" during the war, and that "we nee d

to do all we can to diminish the number of avoidabl e

white crosses," General Krulak was troubled by the

implication that the war in Vietnam required a set of

tactical values different from those used in amphibiou s

assaults. While agreeing with most of the principle s

espoused by General Cushman, he argued that "basi c

tactical principles are immutable," and that "there i s

no evidence that those basic principles should in an y

way be altered. "10 9

General Cushman's message also drew criticis m

from General Chapman. The Commandant was "convinced that in the main the offensive principles taugh t

to our Marines from Boot Camp to C&SC [Comman d

and Staff College] are sound." Although endorsing

most of the tactical techniques espoused by Genera l

Cushman, General Chapman worried that a "litera l

interpretation" of General Cushman's direction t o

assault only by firepower "could lead to a derogation

and even the loss" of the Marine Corps' traditional

—can do' offensive spirit." 11 U

Perhaps in response to General Cushman's concerns ,

Headquarters, Marine Corps directed that all majors

and lieutenant colonels bound for Vietnam, except fo r

recent graduates of professional schools, would receiv e

instruction on the use of helicopters and supporting
576 THE DEFINING YEAR

Marine Casualties in Southeast Asia, 1968.

Month Killed t Missing

t

Wounded " Total

January 439 7 1,770 2,21 6

February 691 3 4,197 4,89 1

March 504 3 2,930 3,43 7

April 450 2 2,610 3,062

May 810 4 3,812 4,62 6

June 445 1 2,962 3,408

July 357 3 2,683 3,043

August 389 0 2,210 2,599

September 348 0 1,968 2,31 6

October 180 1 1,432 1,61 3

November 227 0 1,612 1,839

December 223 2 1,134 1,359

Total 5,063 26 29,320 34,409

1 From MGySgt Lock file, compiled from records of the Vietnam War Memorial, May 1990 . Killed includes all Marines who die d

in Southeast Asia or as a direct result of injuries suffered in Southeast Asia ; Missing includes only those still officially considere d

missing as of May 1990 .

" From CMC Reference Notebook 1968 ; includes serious wounds resulting from accidents.

arms." The field grade officers course at Staging Bat- 3d Division's casualties, while mines and boobytrap s

talion, which lasted only three days before 19 June, inflicted only 18 .2 percent. The 1st Division experiexpanded to seven and a half days on 31 July. In Octo- enced exactly the reverse, suffering only 17 .9 percent of

ber 1968, the Commanding General, Marine Corps its casualties from indirect fire while mines and boobyBase, Camp Pendleton, recommended that infantry traps accounted for 50 .8 percent.11 4

corporals and sergeants also receive two days of fire sup- In 1968, the Marine Corps lost 5,063 killed or

port training. This training began in January 1969 .112 missing and 29,320 wounded, more than a third of

Shortly after this flurry of concern, the casualty all casualties during the entire war. Over half of all

picture improved markedly, due not to Marine Corps casualties had less than one year of service . Infantryaction, but to the inaction of the North Vietnamese men accounted for over four-fifths of all casualties.

Army. In June, July, and August, the reluctance of While privates, privates first class, and lance corpoNorth Vietnamese and Viet Cong units to engage in rals made up just above half of the total Marin e

combat resulted in the casualty rate falling by a quar- Corps, they accounted for almost three-quarters o f

ter.113 Throughout the rest of the year casualties in the the casualties . Their average age was about 20 years

1st Division remained fairly steady, averaging and six months ." s

approximately 120 dead and 1,000 wounded a

month . In the 3d Division, casualties dropped dra- Foxhole Strength: Still Too Few Marines

matically in July, August, and September, averaging The total number of Marines in Vietnam reache d

around 80 killed and less than 700 wounded, and its wartime peak of 85,996 on 30 April 1968, wit h

then fell to about 30 dead and 250 wounded in the 85,402 of these Marines assigned to III MAE This

last three months of 1968 . Over the course of the increase largely resulted from the deployment of

year, the 1st Division suffered somewhat more casual- RLT 27 . The average strength of line battalion s

ties than the 3d Division . actually declined . The Marine Corps had alread y

The types of casualties in the two divisions also dif- resorted to extraordinary efforts to maintain num -

fered greatly. The 3d Division was tied to the DMZ, bers in Vietnam in late 1967 . The deployment o f

and faced North Vietnamese regulars supported by RLT 27 not only increased the number of replaceartillery. In contrast, the 1st Division fought a guerilla meets needed, it had also used up much of the

war in the heavily populated coastal areas around Da March replacement pool to bring the deployin g

Nang. Between 1 January 1968 and 31 May 1969, units up to strength . Manpower planners at Head -

mortars, artillery, and rockets caused 47 percent of the quarters Marine Corps reacted by moving 300
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 57 7

infantry replacements from April into March and

adding another 400 men to the scheduled replacements for April.11 6

Despite these efforts, in the spring of 1968, the

Marine Corps could not find enough replacements to

keep up with the high rate of casualties and norma l

rotations . The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved

a new manpower ceiling for Vietnam, Program 6, on

4 April, calling for the number of Marines in Vietnam to increase to 87,700 by 30 June 1968 . Instead

of rising to this goal, however, the number of Marine s

in Vietnam declined slowly, but steadily, through th e

spring of 1968 .

Midsummer marked the nadir of manpower for the

year. In June, infantry battalions averaged only 1,04 3

Marines. At the end of June, rifle companies average d

179.6 Marines. An average of only 158 .5 Marines was

actually present, or 73 .4 percent of the T/O strength.

The 1st Marine Division continued to bear the brun t

of the manpower shortage, averaging just 1,005

Marines in its infantry battalions in July .

Naturally, some companies were worse off than others. On any given day, sick call, working parties, an d

other routine requirements siphoned off a number o f

Marines counted as "present," exacerbating the problem. In the early summer of 1968, senior officers

returning from Vietnam spoke of the fighting strengt h

of rifle companies averaging 120 men, and sometimes

falling as low as 80 or 90 men .11? *

*There were questions among the different commands as to what

amounted to effective strength of rifle companies. For example, Majo r

General Raymond G. Davis, then commanding general of the 3d

Marine Division, did nor want to count as effective, personnel wh o

were on light duty or awaiting transportation for TAD (Temporar y

Attached Duty) or R&R (Rest and Recreation)leave, but were still i n

the company sector. III MAF disagreed and was backed up by FMFPac .

See BGen E .E . Anderson Itr to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 11Sep68 ,

Encl, Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) . Colonel Pederson, the III MAF G-1, remembere d

that the term " foxhole strength " caused " a stir at various levels. Th e

media reported what . . . [they) saw and in an indicting fashion reported that many were absent from the battlefield . When the story hit th e

streets reporters milked it with questions posed at SecNav, CMC ,

CGFMFPac . These officials shot messages to CGIIIMAF for info[rmation). By then several days had passed . The same unit observed in th e

first place was now up to strength (T/O manning level etc .) . . . [bu t

now) further reduced by combat casualties, transfers, etc . Massagin g

numbers did not solve much . Commanders at all levels were aware o f

personnel shortages, some of which were caused by assigning ' trigger

pullers' to base-type functions such as R&R and China Beach R&R ,

out of country R&R. Our Combined Action Platoons used up mor e

trigger pullers. There seemed to be some variation in casualty reporting, some counted by operation and experienced difficulty in accurac y

when reporting daily by unit. " Pederson Comments .

In contrast to the field units, the Marine Corps "got

awfully heavy at [its) headquarters levels in Vietnam."1 18 The personnel situation improved on each

succeeding rung of the chain of command. Infantry

battalion headquarters and service companies averaged

91.8 percent of the T/O allowance of 329 Marines ; regimental headquarters companies, 94 .9 percent of their

authorized strength of 218 ; and division headquarters

battalions, almost 150 percent of their T/O strength of

1,248 Marines. Taken together, the headquarters over -

ages of III MAF and the two divisions amounted to

1,568 Marines, nearly half the shortfall among the

infantry battalions in country.

Much of this overmanning could not be helped . The

tables of organization for headquarters units did no t

provide for many crucial billets, such as instructors fo r

sniper, NCO, engineer, and other vital in-countr y

schools.11 9 Task forces placed a further drain on headquarters assets, particularly the creation of Task Force

X-Ray in January 1968 . 120 Still, many Marines wer e

assigned to headquarters units more as a matter of con -

venience than necessity.** Whether combat requirement or unnecessary luxury, since the Marine Corps

could never reach its programmed strength in Vietnam, every extra Marine in a headquarters unit in effec t

came out of an infantry squad .

This situation concerned both Lieutenant Genera l

Henry W. Buse, General Krulak's replacement as

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, an d

General Chapman, the Commandant of the Marin e

Corps. Between 15 and 18 July, General Buse held a

manpower conference at his headquarters to address

this and other problems. After the conference, General

Buse reported to the Commandant that while he could

not tell how much or how soon effective rifle company

strength would improve, except for Marines with medical limitations and certain overriding requirements ,

all infantrymen were being assigned to infantry and

reconnaissance units. 12 1

According to the MACV strength report, on 31

July 1968, III MAF included 82,871 Marines, 2,06 9

fewer than its authorized strength of 84,940 . The two

divisions combined, however, fell 4,130 below thei r

authorized strength, and the SLF's contained 164

Marines less than their manning levels called for. Muc h

of the difference could be found in Combined Actio n

groups, which included 1,951 Marines. As in January,

**For instance, in the summer of 1967, in the midst of a critica l

shortage of combat engineers, the 3d Marine Division had five comba t

engineer NCOs building an officer's club at its base camp . Marsh intvw.
578 THE DEFINING YEA R

the divisions bore the brunt of the personnel shortage .

The Force Logistic Command was only 227 Marine s

short of its authorized strength of 10,266, and the 1st

MAW was only three Marines short of its authorize d

strength of 16,180 .

Despite the large size of headquarters units, mos t

Marines in Vietnam were "trigger-pullers. " According

to the MACV strength report for 31 July 1968,

44,522, or 53.7 percent, of the Marines in III MAF

were assigned to infantry, artillery, tank, reconnaissance, amphibian tractor, or engineer battalions, battalion landing teams, or a Combined Action group .

At the end of July Lieutenant General Buse visited

III MAF, devoting most of his time to the manpowe r

problem. His visit convinced him that III MAF wa s

taking vigorous steps to improve foxhole, flightline ,

and cockpit strength. Even so, he felt that III MAF

needed more men, and recommended that Operation

Kicker be reinstated at Staging Battalion to bring

about an immediate improvement in the personne l

readiness of III MAF. 122 On 1 August, Staging Battalion complied with this request, maintaining the seven -

day work week of Operation Kicker from 1 to 3 1

August. Between 20 August and 13 September, the

battalion also reduced the schedule from 15 to 1 2

training days.123

In August, the strength of infantry battalions

increased somewhat, with the average strength rising

to 1,072 Marines. The short-term steps taken by II I

MAF and Staging Battalion undoubtedly helped, bu t

things were bound to improve around this time as the

unusually large number of recruits joined from Januar y

through May, including over 5,000 draftees called i n

April and May, finally worked their way through the

training pipeline and arrived in Vietnam .

The Return of RLT 2 7

RLT 27 left for Vietnam as an emergency measure ,

and was originally scheduled to spend only thre e

months in country 124 This was quickly lengthened to

six months, but the Defense Department realized tha t

the Marine Corps could not sustain this force level an d

that an Army unit had to replace the regiment as soo n

as possible. On 13 March, President Johnson and his

advisors set 15 July as the date for RLT 27 to begi n

returning to the United States.125 Twelve days later, the

Army designated the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), located at Fort Carson, Colorado, t o

relieve the 27th Marines. After a schedule which

included 13 training weeks, on 22 July, the first ele -

meets of the Army brigade departed for 'Vietnam . The

last of the brigade arriving in country on 31 July.126

The brigade still needed a full month of in-country ori -

entation training before it was ready to participate i n

major combat operations.

This meant that the 1st Brigade could not reliev e

the 27th Marines until the end of September, delaying the planned return of the regiment for over a

month and creating serious manpower problems fo r

the Marine Corps. On 15 June 1968, a key issue

paper for the Commandant contained the estimat e

that if RLT 27 did not leave Vietnam by July, th e

Marine Corps could not sustain its forces in Vietnam

without a Reserve call up, or a combination of shortening time between tours and increasing strength .1 27

About a week later, MACV informally asked II I

MAF exactly when the 27th Marines would leave

Vietnam. General Cushman recommended that th e

27th Marines not redeploy until after a relief in plac e

could be effected . The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantr y

Division (Mechanized) would not be ready for combat until a month after its arrival in Vietnam . Since

the proposed schedule actually involved having th e

brigade relieve the 1st Marines, which would in tur n

relieve the 27th Marines, General Cushman estimated that the earliest date the 27th Marines could leav e

Vietnam was 10 September.128

General Abrams, who had relieved General Westmoreland as Commander USMACV in June, concurred with this recommendation . The proposed twomonth postponement for the return of the 27t h

Marines prompted Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary o f

Defense, to note on 19 July that " this delay will have

adverse personnel implications for the Marine Corps. "

Secretary Nitze politely tasked General Wheeler to ask

General Abrams to review his relief plan, stating tha t

"[I}f feasible, the 27th RLT should be returned to the

U.S . by 15 August."129 General Cushman insisted tha t

RLT 27 could not be withdrawn before the replacement Army brigade became combat ready without

"unacceptable risk ."130 On 10 August, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff approved the redeployment of RLT 27 betwee n

10 and 15 September.131 a

*Charles F Baird, Under Secretary of the Navy, noted that th e

delay in RLT 27 's return resulted from the Army brigade 's need for 3 0

days' training after arrival in Vietnam before it began combat operations. He unfavorably contrasted this with the record of RLT 27, whic h

" took its place in the Da Nang TAOR a day after it arrived " when it

deployed to Vietnam in February. Charles F. Baird, Memorandum for

the Assistant Secretary of Defence (Systems Analyses), Subj : RLT 27 ;

return of, dtd 16Ju168, tab JJ, RLT Redeployment File .
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 579

In August, the 27th Marines had an averag e

strength of over 3,500 Marines and sailors . Only

those Marines close to the end of their enlistment s

or those who had originally deployed with less

than two years in the United States would actuall y

leave Vietnam with the regiment . Of the over

5,000 Marines and sailors deployed with RLT 2 7

in February, some 1,500 had already reached th e

end of their enlistments or become casualties an d

returned to the United States .132 Only 800 of the

remaining men met the return criteria. Under

Operation Mixmaster, the rest of the Marines an d

sailors in the 27th Marines and attached unit s

transferred to other commands to complete thei r

tours in Vietnam.* Public announcements by the

Marine Corps made it clear that most of the

Marines were staying in Vietnam and that th e

return of RLT 27 did not represent the beginning

of a withdrawal from Vietnam.13 3

On ' 12 September, the first planeload of returning Marines left for Okinawa . On 16 September,

the last of 699 Marines and sailors from RLT 2 7

arrived in California, and on 17 September the last

group of the 101 returnees from BLT 1/27 arrived

in Hawaii. Nearly 400 Marines from other units

who had completed a full tour in Vietnam returne d

with the regiment.134

The End of the Year

The redistribution of men from the 27th

Marines brought about a dramatic improvement i n

the manpower situation. In October, infantry battalions in Vietnam carried an average of 1,18 3

Marines on their rolls, only 10 Marines below thei r

T/O strength.These gains proved shortlived, for th e

departure of the 27th Marines marked the beginning of a slow but steady reduction in the numbe r

of Marines in III MAF. The Defense Department

Program 6 strength authorization set the total

number of American servicemen in Vietnam at

549,500. Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze made

it clear that this number represented an upper limi t

*See Shulimson and Johnson, U .S . Marines in Vietnam 1965, p .

117, and Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam 1966, n, p . 283, for a n

explanation of Operation Mixmaster. Since most units in Vietnam ha d

arrived before the end of 1966, in 1967 there was little need to " Mixmaster " units. RLT 27 was the first major Marine unit to return to th e

United States, and the personnel transfers it underwent foreshadowe d

the policies used when Marine Corps forces began to withdraw from

Vietnam . See Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietna m

1970-1971, pp . 331-34 .

not to be exceeded. To stay within this limit whil e

adding Army and Air Force units, the Defens e

Department reduced the Marine Corps ' Vietnam

troop ceiling to 82,100 for September, falling t o

81,600 by December.13 5

Both General Cushman and General Buse vigorously opposed the new Program 6 limits. To reduce

Marine strength to the proposed level some Marine

units would have to leave Vietnam, although the

Defense Department had no plans to reduce the

commitments of the remaining units . More importantly, the proposed Defense Department mannin g

levels not only did not allow for the previousl y

approved strength overages needed to support th e

extended operations in Vietnam, but they also failed

to authorize enough Marines to man all units at their

T/O strength.

In late September and early October the staffs o f

Headquarters, Marine Corps ; III MAF; Fleet

Marine Force Pacific ; and the Defense Departmen t

debated exactly which units would be withdrawn

or cut, with the attention focusing on amphibia n

tractor, aviation support, reconnaissance, and head -

quarters units. No units were actually withdrawn ,

and on 21 November the Deputy Secretary o f

Defense ruled out the redeployment of any units

since this might have a negative impact on th e

Paris Peace talks. At the same time he denied an y

increases in the Marine Corps' Southeast Asi a

allowance .13 6

In early November, General Cushman complained that his efforts to stay within the Program 6

ceiling had already led to a shortage of experience d

officers and decline in foxhole strength.137 This

problem was exacerbated by the lack of replacements. In contrast to the normal "summer surge" a t

the recruit depots, the number of new recruits

joined between July and September fell well belo w

the level of the previous summer, it did not eve n

reach the level met during the first six months of

1968 . The fall replacement flow was unable to keep

the battalions up to strength. By December, th e

average strength of infantry battalions had fallen to

1,136 Marines. Rifle companies averaged 197 . 9

Marines on their rolls, of whom 178.5 were actually present. The division headquarters battalion s

were still relatively well off, with well over hal f

again as many Marines as their tables of organization called for. The strength of III MAF's headquarters had grown by over 309 Marines since July. On

31 December there were 79,960 Marines in III
580 THE DEFINING YEAR

Marine Corps Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accession s

1967 1968 1969

Month Total Draft Total Draft Total Draft

Recruits Call" Recruits Call t Recruits Call °

January 3,968 8,646 7,620

February 2,523 8,000 7,653 1,500

March 3,486 7,504 7,144 1,500

April 3,984 8,894 4,000 8,261 2,500

May 5,988 9,035 1,900 7,252 2,000

June 9,394 9,429 9,273 2,000

July 9,038 7,497 8,37 2

August 8,342 7,573 7,643

September 8,664 7,573 7,606 1,500

October 5,593 7,947 7,817 1,400

November 5,468 6,898 7,224 1,000

December 5,555 8,346 2,500 6,887 1,500

Total 73,970 0 99,310 8,400 94,721 14,900

' This is the number of draftees called for, not the number of draftees actually joined in a given month . Due to the workings o f

Selective Service, none of the calls were completely filled, while the Marine Corps received a few draftees in months in which it di d

not make a call . The Marine Corps accepted 145 draftees in 1967, 7,702 in 1968, and 12,872 in 1969.

Source : Annual Report of Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower; Selected Manpower Statistics .

MAF and the SLFs, and another 468 other Marines 19,636 draftees in fiscal year 1966 . As soon as possi -

in various assignments in Vietnam, over 1,000 short ble, however, the Marine Corps returned to its tradiof the number authorized by Program 6 .1 38* tional reliance on voluntary enlistments. The Marine

The only way to maintain the flow of replace- Corps did not make another draft call until Apri l

ments to Vietnam was to further increase the num- 1968, after the Tet offensive, followed by a second cal l

ber of new recruits. In December 1968, the Marine in May. The next call came in December 1968, inau -

Corps made a draft call, and made further calls in 9 gurating a steady reliance on the draft until February

of the next 12 months. 1970, well after Marine forces had begun withdraw -

ing from Vietnam.* *

The Marine Corps and the Draft. Ostensibly, the increased reliance on the draft

Traditionally, the Marine Corps took great pride in reflected in part a need to "smooth out" the tradition -

the fact that every Marine had voluntarily enlisted . ally large summer volunteer recruit cohorts to ensure

Well before the Vietnam War, senior Marine offi cers an even flow of replacements for Vietnam.l 40 For most

recognized that the Marine Corps indirectly benefit- of the months in 1969 in which draft calls were made,

ted from the draft by recruiting draft-motivated volhowever, the total number of new recruits was actually

unteers.139 The rapid expansion of the Marine Corps in lower than that for the same month in 1968 (see chart).

late 1965 and early 1966 forced the Marine Corps to To accommodate the large flow of replacements need -

turn to Selective Service to find enough recruits to fill ed, the Marine Corps requested an end strength for f s

the ranks. The Marine Corps made four draft calls cal year 1969 of 320,700 . The Assistant Secretary of

between November 1965 and March 1966, accepting Defense (Systems Analysis), Dr. Alain C. Enthoven,

disagreed with Headquarters, Marine Corps' estimates ,

*The average strength of III MAF appeared to fluctuate from trimming over 10,000 spaces off the allowance for th e

month to month . According to Colonel Maurice Rose, who became the

III MAF G—1 in July 1968, he recalled receiving "almost daily calls **The withdrawal of Marine Forces from Vietnam began in Jul y

from MACV telling me to get down to our authorized strength . It got 1969, with the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines ; the 1st

to the point that I was making nightly calls to the G—ls of subordinate Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; and numerous supporting units. The 3 d

commands to determine strength . " He remembered that sometime in Marine Division departed Vietnam on 7 November 1969 . For a clisSeptember or October, III MAF sent a message to FMFPac "stating the cussion of the withdrawal of Marine Forces from Vietnam, see Smith ,

urgency of the situation . " Rose Comments. The U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969 : High Mobility and Standdown.
MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES 58 1

Southeast Asia surge and 4,500 off the transient

allowance to come up with a figure of 304,500 .14 The

Department of Defense eventually relented, but not by

much: the active-duty strength of the Marine Corp s

reached its Vietnam War peak on 31 March 1969, a t

314,917. Even two-year enlistments proved too lon g

to maintain the flow of replacements within this end

strength, and the Marine Corps embarked on another

round of early releases. During 1969 almost 70,000

Marines accepted "early-outs," well over half of al l

enlisted separations.

The Marine Corps Transformed

By the end of 1968, the demands of the Vietnam

War seemed to have pushed the Marine Corps man -

power system as far as it could go . In 1965, The Marin e

Corps took only volunteers on long enlistments,

invested in lengthy training, and fostered personne l

stability in units. While these policies were "inefficient," in that they did not produce the maximum

number of riflemen, they were effective, producing

exceptionally combat-ready units. By the end of 196 8

this had changed . As the need to fill foxholes in Vietnam grew, and with no hope of the oft-requested and

much needed increases in end strength, the Marin e

Corps reluctantly became an "efficient" organization ,

concentrating on producing the maximum number of

riflemen for duty in Southeast Asia . The Marine Corps

turned to short enlistments (with early outs, often as

little as 18 months), short training programs, high personnel turnover, and eventually draftees, to meet th e

needs of III MAF. Yet, even with these efforts, the

Marine Corps still did not have the resources to meet

its authorized strength in Vietnam .
CHAPTER 28

Backing Up The Troops

A Division of Responsibility—Naval Logistic Support—Marine Engineers—The FLC Continues to Cop e

A Division of Responsibility

By the beginning of 1968, III MAF had hopes tha t

its major logistical problems were over. The unexpected problems with the new M16 rifles during the past

year not only delayed the conversion from the olde r

M14 rifles, but also required the modification of all of

the M16s. Compounding the difficulties for III MA F

logisticians were the grounding of the CH-46s," personnel shortages, combat losses, accidents, and continuing threat of enemy rocket and artillery bombardment of Marine supply and ammunition points. Still,

by January 1968, Brigadier General Harry C. Olson,

Commanding General, Force Logistic Comman d

(FLC), had taken several steps to alleviate the situation .

He had implemented an M16 repair program that was

moving at an accelerating pace . Moreover, the FLC ha d

realigned its command structure to meet new deployments, had created new facilities, and had attained a

relatively full logistic pipeline .

At Da Nang, General Olson had established th e

headquarters of the FLC/lst Force Service Regimen t

together with a supply battalion and maintenance battalion. Additional elements of the FLC at Da Nang

were the 1st and 3d Military Police Battalions, the 5th

Communication Battalion,** and the 7th Motor Trans -

port Battalion . The FLC complex at Da Nang provided the logistic support for both the 1st Marine Division and the Korean Marine Brigade.

Two reinforced service battalions, the 1st and 3d,

made up the major field elements of the FLC. The 3d

Service Battalion which was redesignated Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) Alpha at Phu Bai maintained subunits at Khe Sanh and Camp Evans . In mid -

January, with the arrival of U .S . Army units into Thua

Thien, FLSG Alpha temporarily supported elements o f

*See Chapter 25 relative to the problem with helicopters.

**In addition to the 5th Communication Battalion in Vietna m

there was the 7th Communication Battalion directly under the 1st

Marine Division . The Wing had under its command Marine Wing

Communications Squadron 1 (MWCS—1) and directly under III MA F

was Sub—Unit 1, 1st Radio Battalion which at the beginning of th e

year was at Khe Sanh .

the Army's 1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborn e

Division . On 29 January, the Army assumed responsibility for its own logistic support at Camp Evans an d

the Marine logistic unit there then augmented the

Marine subunit at Khe Sanh . FLSG Alpha retained

responsibility for the 1st Marine Division Task Forc e

X-Ray elements, newly arrived in the Phu Bai and Phu

Loc areas. At Dong Ha, in the 3d Marine Division sec -

tor, FLSG Bravo, based upon the 1st Service Battalion ,

remained responsible for the logistic support of the

division units along the DMZ and at Quang Tri .***

During January 1968, III MAF supported 49,00 0

troops north of the Hai Van Pass, requiring abou t

2,000 short tons of supplies per day. '

To support the fuel needs of the augmented force s

arriving in northern I Corps, the FLC had completed

construction in January of a 3,000-barrel capacity stee l

fuel tank near the Hue LCU ramp in the city.  Unfortunately, on 2 February, during the enemy attack on

Hue, rockets slammed into the fuel farm, destroyin g

110,000 gallons of JP—4 jet aviation gas . While the

enemy offensive forced the allies to close the LCU ram p

and the fuel farm temporarily, the FLC had the facilit y

back in operation by mid-February.

Elsewhere during their Tet offensive, the Communist forces struck at other Marine logistic targets . At

Da Nang, like all other III MAF units, the FLC

Marines were on full alert . The two military police battalions, the 1st and 3d MP Battalions, assisted th e

Marine infantry and local ARVN units in turning bac k

** *FLSG Bravo also maintained a supply company at Chu Lai i n

Quang Tin Province to provide logistic support for the Marine aviation units that remained based there . Colonel Rex O . Dillow, the Ill

MAF G—4 or logistics officer, noted that with the relocation of unit s

there were constant requests for materials and engineers to build hospitals, headquarters buildings, and permanent structures at the ne w

locations. He declared that the generators practically required arme d

guards because of their limited availability. Col Rex O . Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Dillow Comments.

****The allies maintained LCU ramps at both Hue and at Don g

Ha because LCUs were the largest craft which could negotiate th e

Perfume and Cua Viet Rivers, respectively, due to silting problems i n

both rivers .

582
BACKING UP THE TROOPS 583

Photo from the Abel Collectio n

BGen Henry C. Olson, CG FLC, presents a letter of appreciation to LCpI Ralph Choate relative to donations by the

FLC to a children's hospital near Da Nang.

the aborted enemy attack on the I Corps headquarter s

compound .* While a few rockets landed nearby durin g

the offensive, the FLC complex at Red Beach remained

relatively unscathed .

The Marine logistic facilities at Chu Lai did not fare

as well. On 31 January, an enemy rocket struck the

FLSG Bravo ammunition dump, causing the destruction of 649 tons of bombs and 26 tons of bulk explosives. Scattered unexploded ordnance proved to be

troublesome for many weeks after the attack . According to the FLSG Bravo Supply Company monthl y

report: " . . . thousands of 500-pound bombs buried in

the sand. These bombs have been blown from their pallets and are being excavated, palletized, and issued ."2

According to Marine accounting, the cost of the munitions destroyed by the attack amounted t o

$2,215,358 .52 . 3

The greatest damage of the enemy offensive was t o

the Marine lines of communication .** Through January

and February, the NVA and VC attacked river convoy s

on the Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers and successfully

interdicted Route 1 at several points . In fact during

*See Chapter 8 .

**See Chapters 7—13 . Colonel Rex O . Dillow, the III MAF G-4 ,

recalled that his section created a Transportation Control Center (TCC )

that operated similar to a tactical logistic group in an amphibiou s

operation in order to determine priorities over limited resources .

While headed by an officer in the G—4 section, the TCC included representatives from the III MAF G—3 section ; the U .S . Seventh Air Forc e

Tactical Air Liaison section ; the U.S . Army 1st Logistical Command ;

the FLC, and the Naval Support Activity. Dillow Comments and Draft

of III MAF report on Logistics for General Officers' Symposium, Ju168 ,

n .d . [Iun68], Encl, Dillow Comments.

February, the Marines halted all truck convoys north

from Hue to the DMZ . Observing that "logistics was

the key" to countering the NVA offensive in the north ,

General Westmoreland, the MACV commander,

stressed in a message to Army General Earle G . Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Admira l

Sharp, CinCPac, "this means opening Highway 1 ." a

It would not be until the beginning of March, how -

ever, that the roads would be open again in the north .

Even then, as an Army historian noted, "interdiction

continued—mining, demolition of bridges, road cratering, and ambushes. " 5 Still on a typical day during

this period, 14 LCUs would be either loading cargo o r

enroute from Da Nang to northern I Corps together

with truck convoys from Da Nang to Phu Bai and

from Phu Bai to Dong Ha. From its outset, the enemy

offensive, as the Marine command noted in a mid-year

report, was aimed "against our supply lines."6

During this interval, the FLC assumed the additional responsibility for the preponderance of support

for the 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions as

they deployed into northern I Corps. With the tactical

units arriving ahead of the Army support units, the

FLC provided both divisions interim assistance wit h

food, fuel, and ammunition . Within 10 weeks, both

FLSG Alpha at Phu Bai and Bravo at Dong Ha became

responsible for 90,000 U.S . personnel of all Services ,

nearly double the number in early January . On 19 February, Brigadier General Earl E. Anderson, the III

MAF Chief of Staff, wrote in some exasperation, "Ou r

logistic problems have become immense . . . Yet, in

spite of our pleas to slow down the introduction of

troops because of the tenuousness of our land, air, an d

water LOCs (lines of communication), the four stars i n

Saigon merely wave their hands and release dispatche s

directing the units to move."7** *

Despite Anderson's misgivings, the FLC's central

control of assets and its capability to move critical

items to combat units rapidly enabled the Marine

logisticians to cope with the situation under the mos t

difficult of circumstances. To help the Marines, on 2 6

February 1968, the U.S . Army established the U .S .

Army Support Command Da Nang (Provisional) t o

***According to Army historian Joel Meyerson, "The decision to

shift troops north at a rate that exceeded the capability to create a sup -

ply base for their support . . . reflected the gravity of the situation . " H e

went on to state : " To develop combat power quickly, the four-stars i n

Saigon chose manpower over logistics, taking a calculated risk . Bu t

time, they believed was of the essence . " Joel D. Meyerson, Chief, Operational History Branch, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyerson Comments .
584 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) unnumbered phot o

An overview of the FLC compound near Red Beach at Da Nang. The sprawling FLC now supporte d

a III MAF command that numbered more than 100,000 soldiers, sailors, and Marines in January

1968 and would soon expand further.

provide both logistical support and direction for Arm y

units. This command sent out subordinate logistic tas k

forces to both the 101st Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions. The FLC logistic field units, FLSG A and FLS G

B, at Phu Bai and Dong Ha, respectively, continued t o

provide rations to the Army units in the northern two

provinces, however, until the Army logistic units

became self-sustaining .$ '

*Colonel Dillow, the III MAF G-4, praised the efforts of two Army

generals in assisting the Marine logisticians to cope with the situation .

These were Brigadier General Henry A . Rasmussen, USA, the USMAC V

J-4, and Brigadier General George H . McBride, USA, the Commandin g

General, U .S . Army Support Command, Da Nang . According to Dillow,

"here we had the largest field force ever commanded by a Marine Corps

headquarters, with multi-division Army and Marine Corps forces depend -

ing upon support from U .S. Air Force, Navy, Marine and Army units.

Despite the rapid buildup, difficulties from long and tenuous lines o f

communication and adverse weather, logistic support was steady throughout . " Dillow Comments. In letters of appreciation to the two Army generals, General Cushman, the III MAF commander, recognized their

efforts. He credited Rasmussen with providing "guidance and impetus "

to logistic planning which made it " possible to promptly deploy support

forces and commence operations in support of much larger reinforcement s

than had been expected, but which were moved to Northern I Corps on

very short notice and committed to action immediately upon arrival . "

Copy of CGIIIMAF la to ComUSMACV, Subj : Contributions to III MA F

by . . . BGen Henry A. Rasmussen, n .d . Uu168), Encl, Dillow Comments .

In his letter to General McBride, Cushman observed that the Army gen -

eral directed the " phasing i n " of some 52 U.S. Army logistical support

units of about 7,000 total personnel . CGIIIMAF kr to ComUSMACV,

Subj : Performance of duty by BGen George H. McBride . . . [USA), n .d .

(Jul68), Encl, Dillow Comments.

Through heroic efforts, III MAF was able to maintain a satisfactory logistic stock level . For example i n

February, Marine helicopters alone lifted 7,724 tons o f

cargo, attaining their highest monthly tonnage ,

despite low ceilings, rain, fog, and basically miserabl e

flying conditions.9 The following random statistics fo r

the period January through April illustrate in part the

massive effort by the Marine logisticians of the FLC:

In January, FLSG Bravo issued 362,100 C—Rations,

brought 1,747,504 pounds of ice, transported 11,21 3

tons of supplies over a total of 58,161 truck miles an d

issued 4,227 .3 tons of ammunition." )

During February, FLC processed 23,442 transients,

processed 87,000 requisitions, baked 860,692 pound s

of bread, and air delivered a daily average of 143 tons o f

supplies to Khe Sanh Combat Basel l

During March, FLSG Alpha issued more tha n

1,743,000 gallons of various types of fuel . 1 2

The FLC laundry units processed 201,000 pounds o f

laundry in the month of April, and its ammunitio n

company handled 55,415 tons of ammunition, a dail y

average of more than 1,800 tons. 1 3

Specifically during this period, the Marine command arranged for the helicopter delivery unde r

ektreme weather conditions of 300 short tons daily fro m

ships off the coast to U .S . shore facilities, as well as the

air drop of 200 short tons daily to 1st Air Cavalry units

in the Camp Evans sector. "Rough Rider" truck convoys from Da Nang north through the Hai Van Pass

involved 10,471 Marine and U.S . Army vehicles.1 4
BACKING UP THE TROOPS 585

Once the heavy Army logistic units arrived the y

were able to ease the burden on the Marines. Representatives of III MAF ; the FLC; MACV; U.S . Army Vietnam; 1st Logistical Command ; U.S . Army Support

Command, Da Nang (Provisional); and Naval Support

Activity, Da Nang, mutually agreed on the division of

support. Marine Corps and Army dumps would pro -

vide common item support, Class I (Rations), Class II I

(Petroleum), and Class V (Ammunition) to both Army

and Marine units. The respective Service logistic facility would furnish Class II (General Supply items) and

Class IV (Special Items). With this understanding ,

FLSG Alpha became responsible for common item support for all III MAF units, both Marine and Army i n

the Phu Bai sector. The Army's new Prov Corps 26th

General Support Group at Quang Tri assumed th e

same responsibility for those units located south of

Quang Tri and north of Hue . FLSG Bravo continued to

provide support for those units in the Dong Ha and

DMZ sector. By March 1968, the supply requirements

LCpI John M. Martin pulls a pan of freshly baked loaves

of bread from the oven. The FLC had the responsibility of

providing III MAF everything from bread to ammunition.

Photo is from the Abel Collection

for U.S . forces in northern I Corps had reached 3,000

short tons per day. Colonel Rex O. Dillow, the III MAF

G-4, later observed, "the rapid buildup in requirements, and the effects of enemy action and advers e

weather, presented perhaps the biggest threat of curtailing tactical operations during the Tet offensive ."1 5

During this critical period, the Naval Support

Activity, Da Nang; the Army's 1st Logistical Command; Army Support Command, Da Nang ; and the

FLC cooperated to move the supplies where they were

most needed. In March, they opened a LOTS (Logistic s

Over the Shore) Facility at Thon My Thuy. The Army

positioned a task force of over 1,000 men from its

159th Transportation Battalion, with six attached

companies, at this site (Wunder Beach) to facilitate th e

movement of supplies.* A Seabee-built 8.6-mile road

from Route 1 near Hai Lang, tied this installation int o

the major road network in northern I Corps . As an

Army historian commented, " even then Wunder

Beach was no rose garden : The Hai Lang Road

remained subject to heavy mining, and was sometimes

seeded with metal objects to impede clearance ." The

*Colonel Dillow, the III MAF G-44, remembered that in February

1968, General Cushman directed him co ask the Seventh Fleet for a

Navy pontoon causeway unit then stationed in Japan to "be brought t o

Da Nang Harbor. This required considerable effort by the Navy ; several ships were required to move the causeway sections. They objected ,

pointing out that in all probability a causeway, if installed could no t

be kept in place for any appreciable time due to the winds and title s

during the monsoon season . However, General Cushman insisted, stat -

ing that we may have to take a calculated risk and install it despite th e

odds. It was therefore available when the drawdown of supplies i n

NICTZ [Northern I Corps Tactical Zone] necessitated its installation . "

Dillow Comments. Army historian Joel Meyerson quoted the following from a 1st Logistical Command Operational Report, Lesson s

Learned for the period : " The Navy was asked to find the best locatio n

for the establishment of a LOTS site . After studying the problem, the

Navy concluded that it was impractical to establish such an operatio n

and that the results would be minimal . . . . In spite ofthis conclusion ,

the Army, faced with the need to support two divisions, proceeded t o

establish Wunder Beach . . . ." Meyerson Comments. Colonel Dillow

recalled that " installing the causeway in the high winds and heavy sea s

of the monsoon season was no small task, although it was kept in plac e

once installed . Installation was often interrupted . " According co Dillow, the Army unit operating the facility "had been commanded by a n

officer named Wunder. They referred to themselves as 'Wunder's Won -

ders.' They asked us if they could name the facility Wunder Beach ,

which was readily approved (although to the consternation of a few

Marine Corps officers!) . " Dillow Comments. The U.S . Army 159t h

Transportation Battalion was actually commanded by Lieutenan t

Colonel Charles H . Sunder. The men of the battalion called themselves

Sunder's Wonders and with a slight play of words, the LOTS facility

was named Wunder Beach . LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, The War in

the Northern Provinces, 1966-1968, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D .C.

Dept of the Army, 1975), p . 61 .
586 THE DEFINING YEAR

facility, nevertheless, remained open until the northeast

monsoon would make operations there too dangerous . *

From 6 March until its closing at the end of the summer, more than 100,000 short tons moved acros s

Wunder Beach.' 6

At the end of March, General Creighton W.

Abrams, Westmoreland's deputy, extolled the logisti c

efforts of all of the Services, with perhaps a left-handed

compliment for the Navy :

The Marines and the Army are working togethe r

realistically without any vestige of Service pride interfering with service to the common effort . The Navy

shows positive signs of moving out as the others clearly

have . I am encouraged and gratified at what has bee n

done, with clearly more to come from these men who

have thrown off the fetters of conventionality and gotten with the job .

He concluded : "The logisticians have thus fa r

accomplished the impossible by supporting the

reinforcements dumped into the northern area s o

precipitously."1 7

Naval Logistic Support

Despite Abram's rather lukewarm praise for the

naval efforts, it was the Navy logistic system that provided the fundamental support for III MAF including

the Army forces in I Corps. The Marine Corps traditionally had relied upon the Navy for medical support ,

for extensive and heavy construction efforts, and for th e

administrative and logistic tasks involved with a n

advanced naval base . Vietnam was not to be any different. In July 1965, the Navy had established the Nava l

Support Activity (NSA), Da Nang, which by January

1968 under Rear Admiral Paul L . Lacy, had become

"the Navy's largest overseas logistic command," consisting of 10,000 officers and men .1 8

The Navy command structure made for some wrinkles in the U.S . I Corps organizational charts. Originally, NSA, Da Nang was under the commanding general, III MAF, who at the time was also the MAC V

Naval Component commander, but this changed i n

1966 with the establishment of U .S. Naval Forces,

Vietnam, directly under General Westmoreland . In its

*At a III MAF logistics conference in May 1968 chaired by Arm y

Major General Richard G . Stilwell, then the Deputy CG III MAF,

Army, the conferees estimated the continuing support that would be

required in northern I Corps. At the meeting there was a general consensus that "Wunder Beach should be abandoned, since both the roa d

and the area . . . [would] be impassable" during the upcoming monsoon season . III MAF, Memo for the Record, Subj : III MAF Logistic s

Conference, dtd 15May68, Encl Dillow Comments .

command history, the NSA, Da Nang reported that i t

came under the operational control of U .S . Naval

Forces, Vietnam, under the command of Commander,

Service Force, U.S . Pacific Fleet, " less operational con -

trol," and finally under the "military control " of III

MAF. For all practical purposes, however, the NSA i n

I Corps remained a component part of III MAE1 ,

From his headquarters building in downtown Da

Nang, nicknamed the "White Elephant " after its white

decor and decorative elephant friezes, Admiral Lac y

controlled the beach and port logistic activities for U.S .

forces throughout I Corps. By January 1968, he had a

small fleet of over 100 lighterage craft including LC M

8s (landing craft, mechanized), LCM 6s, and LCU

(landing craft, utility) to move cargo from sea-goin g

vessels in the crowded harbors into the ports and ont o

the beaches. Ashore, Lac y 's command warehoused supplies, established supply points, assembled amphibiou s

fuel pipe lines, and provided fuel storage bladders i n

support of both the Marines and Army in I Corps .20

While Da Nang was the hub of port activity in I

Corps, the NSA, Da Nang established smaller detachments to assist the offloading and to provide for immediate shore storage facilities elsewhere in I Corps . By

1968, NSA Da Nang had three main port detachment s

deployed outside of Da Nang : one at Chu Lai, south o f

Da Nang, the site of a Marine air base and headquarters of the U .S . Army Americal Division; the second at

Tan My near the Cos Co causeway at the mouth of the

Perfume River; and the third at the Cua Viet Port

Facility, which supported allied forces in the DMZ sec -

tor. Later in the year, NSA, Da Nang relieved the

Army for port logistic support of the 11th Ligh t

Infantry Brigade of the Americal Division at Sa Huyen ,

which then became the southernmost supply point i n

I Corps. Each of these port detachments became a

microcosm of the larger NSA, Da Nang, and each

commander had the authority to establish direct liaison

with the commands he supported in his sector. At the

height of the U.S . buildup in northern I Corps in mid -

1968, NSA, Da Nang with its subordinate detachments were controlling on a monthly average more

than 350,000 tons of cargo for approximately 200,00 0

troops in the corps area.2 1

The 1968 Tet offensive brought home the relianc e

that the allied forces placed upon their water-born e

lines of communication . With most of the main roads

cut, the only means of resupply was by air or by water.

Given the relatively small amount of material an d

equipment that could be airlifted, the Army and

Marine forces in northern I Corps were entirely depen-
BACKING UP THE TROOPS 58 7

dent upon keeping open the vital waterways, especially the Cua Viet and the Perfume River. This necessitated the extensive convoying of the various river craft

including LCUs, LCMs, and barges bringing supplies

into the embattled city of Hue on the Perfume Rive r

and, further north, up the Cua Viet from the port facility to the 3d Marine Division's main base at Dong H a

in Quang Tri Province. While the river clearing and convoy system was a

closely coordinated effort employing both air and

ground forces, the Navy's "brown water" fleet played

an important role . Since the previous year, Task Force

116, the U.S . Navy, Vietnam's River Patrol Force, ha d

kept River Section 521 at Tan My where the sectio n

had established its headquarters on a floating barg e

complex . Thus at the breakout of the Tet offensive an d

assault upon Hue, the section was in position to support the flow of water-borne supplies up the Perfum e

River. With its mainstay consisting of four-man cre w

PBRs (patrol river boats) powered by Jacuzzi je t

pumps and capable of maneuvering at speeds of 25 t o

29 knots and equipped with surface radar, four

machine guns, and a grenade launcher, the Navy uni t

cleared the waterway to Hue . Smaller boat detachments operating on the Cua Viet also kept that passag e

open. For its participation in the Tet offensive, River

Section 521 received the Presidential Unit Citation .2 2

Given the importance of these riverine operations i n

the fight for Hue and the Cua Viet, Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, the commander of U .S . Naval Forces,

Vietnam, together with General Cushman, decided t o

establish a separate Navy river task force directly unde r

the operational control of III MAF in northern I

Corps.* On 24 February, Veth assigned Navy Captai n

Gerald W. Smith as commander of the new task force,

designated Task Force Clearwater. Smith originally

established his headquarters at Tan My, but then on th e

29th moved his mobile base to the Cua Viet Port Facil -

ity. Through the course of the year, Task Force Clear -

water would consist of armored river "monitors, "

PBRs, PACV (Patrol Air Cushioned Vehicles) ,

minesweeping craft, and other diverse watercraft .

Among its attached personnel were Marines from th e

3d Marine Division's 1st Searchlight Battery and soldiers from the U.S . Army's 63d Signal Battalion . Orga -

nized eventually into two river groups, the Hue River

*1II MAF eventually delegated operational control of Task Forc e

Clearwater to Provisional Corps, Vietnam (later XXIV Corps), whe n

that command was established in the northern two provinces of I Corp s

in March 1968 . See Chapter 13 .

Security Group and the Dong Ha/Cua Viet Securit y

Group, Task Force Clearwater protected and kept open

the two major water routes in the north—the Cua Vie t

and the Perfume Rivers.23

One area in which the Navy retained prime responsibility was medical support for the Marine command .

Navy doctors and medical personnel manned the battalion and squadron level aid stations . At an even lowe r

echelon, Navy corpsman were assigned to Marin e

infantry units down to the platoon level . Navy doctors

commanded the 1st and 3d Medical Battalions whic h

supported respectively the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. These battalions ran the intermediate medica l

facilities at Dong Ha, Phu Bai, and Da Nang, rein -

forced by the 1st Hospital Company and 1st, 3d, an d

11th Dental companies .**

In addition to these medical organizations, NSA ,

Da Nang maintained a 750-bed hospital at Da Nang ,

the equivalent of a general hospital . Finally during

1968, two Navy hospital ships, the Repose (AH 16) and

the Sanctuary (AH 17), remained off the coast eac h

with a capacity of 350 beds that could be doubled i f

needed, and within a 30-minute helicopter flight fro m

shore. 24 According to statistics maintained by the

Marine Corps, out of 100 Marines that were wounded,

44 were treated in the field and returned to duty, while

56 were admitted to a hospital . Of those admitted to a

hospital, only nine would remain in county and the

rest would be evacuated. Approximately 7 percent

would receive disability discharges, 5 .5 percent would

require long-term care, but a remarkably low percentage, 1 .5, would die of their wounds.2 5

In one other area, heavy engineering and construction support, the Navy greatly supplemented Marine

capabilities . Since the spring of 1965 when Nav y

mobile construction battalions (NMCB), popularl y

known as Seabees, helped to build the airfield at Chu

Lai, the Navy augmented the Marine engineering

effort in Vietnam. By January 1968, the Navy had

established the 3d Naval Construction Brigade, unde r

Rear Admiral Robert R. Wooding, which while unde r

the operational control of Naval Forces, Vietnam ,

made its headquarters at Da Nang . Under his control ,

were two naval construction regiments in I Corps, th e

30th at Da Nang, which directed the Seabee construction efforts there, and the 32d at Phu Bai, whic h

coordinated those projects in the northern tw o

**During the siege of Khe Sanh, a detachment from Company C ,

3d Medical Battalion, better known as "Charlie Med," operated th e

dispensary there .
588 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo from the David Douglas Duncan Collectio n

Navy doctors and corpsmen from Company C ("Charlie Med"), 3d Medical Battalion, wearing helmets and flak jackets, conduct an emergency operation on a wounded helicopter pilot at the Khe San h

dispensary. Most wounded were evacuated out of Khe Sanh as soon as possible .

provinces. Throughout most of 1968, some 12 Seabee

battalions remained assigned to I Corps and wer e

involved in almost every major I Corps constructio n

effort from reinforcing the defenses at Khe Sanh ,

building new roads and bridges, extending airfields,

erecting new cantonment buildings, to operating

stone quarries and drilling wells. 2 6

Marine Engineers

Despite the supplementing efforts of the Seabees

and Army engineering units, the Marine command

depended upon its own resources for its basic engineering requirements. Throughout 1968, the Marines

had five engineering battalions in-country to provide

both combat engineering and general construction

support. In the north, the 3d Marine Division had

Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Perrin's 3d Engineer Battalion in direct combat support, while the 1st Enginee r

Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Logan Cassedy,

came under the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang . In

addition, III MAF had three heavy engineering battalions to accomplish those tasks beyond the scope of th e

division engineers. Attached to the 1st Marine Division were both Lieutenant Colonel Ray Funderburk's

7th Engineering Battalion, which operated out of its

cantonment, Camp Love at Da Nang, and Lieutenan t

Colonel Horacio E. Perea's 9th Engineer Battalion ,

which worked out of Chu Lai. The 11th Engineer Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Victor A . Perry, rein -

forced the 3d Engineer Battalion along the DMZ .

In the 3d Marine Division sector in early 1968, th e

11th Engineer Battalion remained committed to th e

DMZ barrier project while the 3d Engineer Battalio n

was involved with the usual division engineering tasks. With its headquarters at Phu Bai, the 3d Battalio n

supported the division's regimental bases from Kh e

Sanh to Dong Ha with task-organized engineer detachments. In its January report, the battalion observe d

that the "primary work performed was mine sweeping ,

demolitions, and bunker construction ." Much of the
BACKING UP THE TROOPS 589

3d Battalion's activity was involved in road sweeps,

keeping open the main lines of communication among

Camp Carroll, Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Camp Evans and

Phu Bai. By the end of January, the battalion had con -

ducted over 300 mine sweeps, averaging nearly 38,45 6

meters per day. 2 7

At Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel Cassedy 's 1st Battalion performed much the same engineering role fo r

the 1st Marine Division. Here, the mine-clearing mission took on even more importance given the V C

emphasis on surprise explosive devices or boobytraps.

In fact, in January, the engineers suffered almost all of

their casualties in accomplishing this mission, seven

out of the eight killed and 15 out of the 18 wounded .

Like the 3d Battalion in the north, the 1st Battalio n

was spread out in support of its division's various regiments. At the beginning of the month, Cassedy's head -

quarters, Company C, and Company B were at D a

Nang in support of the 7th Marines and 5th Marine s

respectively. With the formation of Task Force X-Ra y

in mid January, Company B joined the 5th Marines a t

Phu Bai . The 1st Battalion's Company A stayed wit h

the 1st Marines throughout the month, first at Quang

Tri, then at Phu Bai.2 8

The enemy Tet offensive at the end of January an d

through most of February would impact on the engineers as much as on any of the III MAF units. In the

struggle for Hue, engineer detachments from both

Companies A and B, 1st Engineer Battalion accompanied the Marine infantry in the retaking of the city.

The engineers built a pontoon bridge to replace the

destroyed An Cuu Bridge over the Phu Cam Canal s o

that much-needed supplies could flow again into th e

city. Together with the reinforcing Army engineers and

Seabees, the Marine engineer battalions worked t o

reconstruct the blown bridges, culverts, and highway

cuts along the main lines of communication in I Corps ,

especially along Highway 1, the main north-south

artery. Finally, by 2 March 1968, Route 1 was ope n

from Da Nang to Dong Ha.2 9

During the relief of Khe Sanh in Operation Pegasus,

the Marine engineers again played a vital role . Beginning in mid-March, Lieutenant Colonel Perry's 11t h

Engineer Battalion, together with Seabees and Arm y

engineers, began the building of Landing Zone Said at

Ca Lu, the jumping-off point for the 1st Air Cavalr y

Division . While the Air Cavalry leapfrogged toward s

Khe Sanh, the 1st Marines slogged forward alon g

Route 9 with the 11th Engineers clearing the path for

them. In the advance, the engineers constructed 1 1

bridges and made 18 culvert bypasses along the road .30

The engineers had as large a role in the abandonment of Khe Sanh as they had in its relief. Company A ,

1st Engineer Battalion, which had accompanied th e

1st Marines in the relief of Khe Sanh, reported that its

most significant accomplishment was the closing o f

the base . Beginning on 18 June and ending in early

July, the engineers destroyed or buried 95 bunkers an d

more than 2,770 meters of trenchline. Using over

2,100 pounds of TNT, the engineers exploded unexpended ammunition and caved in the former Marin e

defenses. What equipment they could not carry out ,

they demolished or buried so that it could not be use d

against allied forces in the future .3 1

In the north after the enemy Tet and Mini-Tet

offensives and the closing of Khe Sanh, both the 11t h

Engineer Battalion and the 3d Engineer Battalion too k

on new missions as the 3d Marine Division took th e

offensive . While the 11th Engineer Battalion still continued to have a limited responsibility for the barrier,

the battalion confined most of this effort to some

minor road and bunker construction .* For the most

part, the 11th Engineers took on the task of establishing the permanent fire bases for the division . By July,

it had transformed LZ Stud near Ca Lu into Fire Sup -

port Base Vandegrift . Given the emphasis of the new

commander of the 3d Marine Division, Major General

Raymond G. Davis, upon mobile helicopter tactics ,

the construction of permanent and semi-permanen t

fire support bases became the major responsibilities of

both engineer battalions in the north. In a remarkabl y

short time, employing explosives, helicopter-transportable bulldozers, and chain saws, the engineers

denuded and flattened entire mountain tops and trans -

formed, them into fortified gun positions so tha t

Marine artillery could keep the fast-moving infantry

within supporting range .

In the Da Nang area, the 1st Engineer Battalion

inaugurated in the spring a series of clearing operations

in support of the 1st Marine Division . Beginning i n

April, the engineers in support of the 7th Marines i n

the western sector began Operation Woodpecker,

"designed to eliminate known or potential enemy

rocket launching and ambush sites ." After clearin g

*After the initial enemy offensives in January and February, almos t

all construction of the barrier ended for all practical purposes . Plannin g

for the barrier and some limited construction continued, however ,

under the Codename Duel Blade . On 22 October 1968, General

Abrams, now the MACV commander, ordered the halt of all plannin g

and construction for the project. Before all work came to a stop, th e

engineers had implanted three sensor fields in the eastern portion of

the DMZ, south of the Ben Hai River. See Chapter 22 .
590 THE DEFINING YEA R

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Top, a truck convoy is about to roll across the new Khe Gio Bridge on Route 9 north of Camp Carrol l

just constructed by the 11th Engineer Battalion. Below, an 11th Engineer Battalion bulldozer pulls out

a M48 tank stuck in a stream bed during Operation Pegasus on the road between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh .
BACKING UP THE TROOPS 591

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

LCplJames L. Phillips, at the wheel of a M103 bulldozer and a member of the 1st Engineer Battalion, clears a treeline in the western sector of the Da Nang area of operations during Operation Wood -

pecker. The land clearing operation was designed to deny the enemy possible ambush and rocket sites.

over four million square meters in the 7th Marines sector, the 1st Battalion in June moved into the Go Noi

Island area and joined the 27th Marines in Operatio n

Allen Brook. Clearing over two million meters from

June through August with bulldozers, tractors

equipped with rome plows, and even tanks with doze r

blades, the Marine engineers, once the civilian population was evacuated, literally razed the Go Noi .* With

the completion of the Go Noi project, the battalio n

continued with further clearing operations, Operatio n

Woodpecker II and III, in the area west of the Yen

River, and after September, in the 1st Marines sector

along the coast.3 2

The Marines at Da Nang also experimented with a

barrier project aimed at keeping enemy rocketeers

from bombarding the Marine base . Beginning in May,

the 7th Engineer Battalion started putting down a single-apron barbed wire fence along the outer edges o f

the so-called Da Nang Rocket Belt, a semi-circle centering on the airfield' and extending out to the extrem e

range of the enemy 122mm and 144mm rockets . By

*See Chapter 17 .

June, the 1st Marine Division completed the initial

plans for the project. The original concept called for a

500-meter-wide cleared strip of land consisting of two

parallel barbed wire fences, concertina wire entanglements, observation towers, and minefields . Beginning

in earnest on 2 July, the 7th Engineers completed th e

initial phase of the project in the 7th Marines sector,

clearing more than 15,000 meters by 23 August . The

task involved more than 37,000 man-hours, including

mine sweeps, security, equipment operators, and aver -

aging two 25-man platoons from the engineers and an

equal number of personnel from the supported units .

Beginning in September, but hampered by floodin g

and heavy rains, the engineers continued with Phase II

into December. Although the 7th Engineer Battalio n

would end on 12 December the laying of the two parallel barbed wire fences, the project would remai n

unfinished at the end of the year. It would not be until

the following March that the Marines would renew

their emphasis and begin anew the barrier effort .3 3

By the end of 1968, the Marine engineers together

with the Navy Seabees and Army engineers ha d

accomplished almost minor miracles in the restoration
592 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) A19242 0

Marines from the 3d Engineer Battalion construct bunkers on LZ Cates, a new fire support base fo r

the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. The fire support bases were part of the new emphasis on helicopter -

mobile operations by both Marine divisions at the end of the year.

of the I Corps lines of communications. They had no t

only helped in the restoration of the road network

including both Routes 1 and 9, but were even involve d

in the completion of the railroad link between Da

Nang and Hue .* By December 1968, both the 1st and

3d Engineer Battalions, supported by the three heavie r

battalions, the 7th, 9th, and 11th Engineer Battalions,

had taken on new tasks in establishing fire bases i n

support of the helicopter mobile tactics adopted by

both divisions. From the building of bunkers, min e

sweeps, road building, improving the living cantonments of the troops, to supporting III MAF civic actio n

engineering projects, all five engineer battalions contributed to the allied resumption of the offensive by the

end of the year.

The FLC Continues to Cope

Even with the end of the initial Tet offensive s

enemy gunners continued to threaten III MAF stock -

piles. While few attacks were as spectacular as the one

*See Chapter 29 .

on 21 January at Khe Sanh,** both conventional enem y

artillery in the DMZ and Laos and large-caliber rockets struck at facilities at Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, and Cua

Viet. In the rest of I Corps, enemy rockets throughout

the year continued to fall upon Marine base areas wit h

their large storage facilities. Despite the best efforts o f

Marine ground and air combat units to prevent them,

these attacks by fire were relatively cost effective as the

enemy with limited resources could cause extensive

damage . One of the worst incidents occurred on 1 0

March, when enemy artillery hit the Cua Viet Facility,

blowing up the ammunition dump. The resulting

explosions destroyed the mess hall and 64 10,000-gallon fuel bladders, caused American casualties of 1 dead

and 22 wounded, and knocked out communication s

for 30 hours. Even at the end of the month, more tha n

40 percent of the damaged equipment and building s

remained unrepaired .34

From mid-April through 14 May, the enemy gunners enjoyed a series of minor successes in the nort h

**See Chapter 14 .
BACKING UP THE TROOPS 593

from Khe Sanh to the Cua Viet. On 11 April, the y

rocketed the Cua Viet fuel farm, destroying 40,00 0

gallons of gas. Five days later, rockets fell on the Khe

Sanh base demolishing 300,000 rounds of small arms

ammunition and 2,705 propellant charges for 155mm

ammunition. Finally, on 14 May, Communist artillery

shelling resulted in the blowing up of the Dong Ha

ammunition supply point and the loss of 150 tons of

munitions of all types.35

The Cua Viet and Dong Ha facilities remaine d

favorite targets. Less than a month after the Dong Ha

bombardment, 13 June, the NVA artillery fired 6 1

rounds into Camp Kistler at the mouth of the Cua Vie t

River. This time the shells hit the FLSG Bravo fue l

dump and set fire to 16 10,000-gallon fuel bladders

containing 104,000 gallons of petroleum. A week

later, the North Vietnamese gunners turned their

attention to Dong Ha, once more blowing up th e

Dong Ha ammunition dump with the loss this time of

8,500 tons of munitions. Five days later, they hit the

Cua Viet fuel farm again. This time more tha n

187,000 gallons of gasoline and jet fuel went up i n

flames, resulting in the destruction of 17 of th e

10,000-gallon fuel bladders and associated pumping

equipment.36

While relatively quiet during July, the NVA struck

the Dong Ha facility again in August . While missing

the ammunition dump, some 55 enemy rounds dam -

aged some 19 buildings, destroyed 6 vehicles, an d

killed 2 Marines and wounded 3 others . Finally on 30

October, just before the so-called neutralization of th e

DMZ agreed to at Paris, the enemy hit Dong Ha once

more . Forty-eight 130mm rounds fell on the base ,

killing one Marine, wounding another, and causing

damage to buildings and vehicles . This was to be the

last major attack on Marine facilities in the north during the year.3 7

Marine logisticians also had to be concerne d

about the elements as well as enemy artillery capability. In many respects, weather patterns were more

predictable and the FLC could make some preparations for the fall monsoon season . Still, monsoon

storms could hit suddenly and create havoc . On 5

September, Typhoon Bess swept across the Sout h

China Sea with the center of its impact area just

north of Da Nang. With 60-knot winds and 20 inch -

es of rain, the storm caused landslides closing Route

1 in the Hai Van Pass sector and submerged Libert y

Bridge in the An Hoa area south of the Marine base .

Even as the storm abated the rain continued, resulting in more flooding and restricting movement of

supplies and troops. By the end of September, almost

all construction projects were at a standstill . Route 1

and the various secondary roads were in bad condition. The water and winds had damaged the LCU

ramps at Tan My and Hue as well as the Tan-My -

Quang Tri pipeline . The Marines estimated that Bess

would cost them the equivalent of 7,000 man-hour s

to make the needed repairs to the various lines of

communication and installations.

Although the worst of the damage was over, th e

weather provided little relief for the FLC in October.

Twelve inches of rain fell at Dong Ha on the 14th an d

15th, followed by 15 inches at Da Nang in the nex t

two days. Route 1 south of Camp Evans was onc e

more under water as was the Tan My causeway.

Bridges on Route 1 required reinforcement . Still the

Marine logisticians were able to cope with the situation. Based on past experience with the monsoons,

they had stockpiled the most-needed supplies at forward positions. Operations throughout the period

continued and the bad weather proved to be more of a

nuisance than an impediment.

During this period, the FLC had resolved th e

M16 rifle situation. By mid July, the FLC had

obtained enough of the modified M16 rifles, known

as the M16A1 to equip both the 1st and 3d Marine

Divisions. As a result of extensive investigations o f

charges that the M16 was prone to jamming, th e

FLC had implemented in late 1967 a program

designed to replace the original barrel/sight assembly of the rifles with a chromed chamber assembly.

The new assembly reduced chamber friction an d

facilitated extraction of the 5 .56mm ammunition

with its "ball propellant' which had caused most o f

the difficulty. By the end of September, the FLC had

completed the retrofit and replacement of the ol d

M16s for both Marine divisions and their attachments. In October, the new rifles were issued to th e

Marines of the FLC and the 1st MAW and the following month to the Korean Marines . By November,

the FLC had about completed the conversion of th e

remaining 9,100 rifles and established a reserve . In

all, under the retrofit program, the FLC had handled

more than 61,100 rifles .3 8

Despite the occasional reduction in Marine stockpiles caused by such programs as the M16 retrofit pro-

*The ball propellant was a spherical grain powder in the 5 .5 6

ammunition which speeded up the cyclic rate of the rifle beyond its

design rate and also "fouled the chamber and bore ." Moody, Donnelly,

and Shore, "Backing Up the Troops," Chap 22, pp . 23-23A.
594 THE DEFINING YEA R

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

A Marine truck convoy winds its way along Route 9, now open between Dong Ha and Vandegrift

Combat Base . The Motor Transportation Coordination Center, located at Dong Ha and operated b y

FLSG Bravo, controlled Marine truck convoys in the north .

gram, enemy actions, and monsoon rains, they wer e

relatively minor when compared to the sheer volume o f

supplies and services provided by the FLC. By midyear, the FLC had grown to 490 officers and 9,90 8

enlisted men and had made several adjustments . In

July, the FLC established a logistic support unit at Fir e

Support Base (FSB) Stud to support Task Force Hotel

after the evacuation of the Khe Sanh base . Stud, late r

named FSB Vandergrift, became the main combat support base for operations in western Quang Tri . In the

Da Nang sector, two logistic support units, LSU 1 a t

An Hoa and LSU 2 on Hill 55, provided the logisti c

support for the Go Noi Island campaigns south of th e

Ky Lam Rivers. In December 1968, the FLC was supporting 10 major operations as well as the day to day

operations of III MAF units. For the year, the FLC had

filled a staggering 420,976 requisitions, nearly 90,000

more than the previous year.39

At the end of the year, Brigadier General James A.

Feeley, Jr., who on 26 October had relieved Genera l

Olson as commander of the FLC, had some reason fo r

satisfaction . The road net in I Corps was in good condition and Marine truck convoys were moving with

relative ease through most of I Corps. For the most

part, the Marine supply "pipeline" was in relativel y

good order and the Army had taken over much of th e

logistic burden in northern I Corps. At Phu Bai, FLSG

Alpha continued to transfer most of its activities to the

Army's 26th General Support Group . The plan was to

consolidate FLSG Alpha at Da Nang, which woul d

permit more flexibility. While a difficult year for th e

Marine logisticians, they had persevered .
PART VI

OTHER PERSPECTIVES :

PACIFICATOIN AND

MARINES OUTSIDE OF III MAF
CHAPTER 29

Pacification

Prelude—The Tet Offensives and Operation Recovery—III MAF and Pacificatio n

Homicide in the Countryside—Changing Attitude s

The Boys Next Door: The Combined Action Program—The Accelerated Pacification Pla n

Prelude

From the beginning of the III MAF expansion of its

base areas during the spring and summer of 1965, th e

Marine command was involved in a pacification campaign. Employing the "ink blot" or "spreading oil

spot" theory, the Marine strategy was to build upon

success in one area to reinforce that in another to pro -

vide momentum for the linking together of the Marin e

enclaves. During their first year in country, both

through trial and error and possibly a residual institutional memory of their early 20th century Caribbea n

interventions, the Marines developed several pacification techniques that showed some promise . '

In one of its first efforts, III MAF established a civi c

action program which emphasized village and hamle t

self-help projects and medical assistance . Marine units

provided materials and equipment to local villagers i n

the building of schools and other local improvement

facilities. Navy corpsmen and occasionally doctors visited nearby hamlets where they would dispense soap ,

hold sick call, treat minor injuries and diseases, and

teach basic hygiene to the inhabitants. The idea was to

win the good will of the local populace, gain intelligence, and hopefully enhance the prestige of local government officials, especially the village and district

chiefs.

As the Marines expanded their area of operations

into the populated area south of Da Nang, they soo n

realized that security from the Viet Cong guerrillas wa s

*See also the discussion in Chapter 1 on the "inkblot" concept .

While the link to the Caribbean experience is rather indirect, Genera l

Lewis W. Walt, who commanded III MAF in 1965, observed that h e

was taught the fundamentals of his profession "from men who ha d

fought Sandino in Nicaragua or Charlemagne in Haiti ." Still, as others

have pointed out, most Marine officers who served in Vietnam wer e

much junior to Walt and obtained most of their training on counterinsurgency in U.S . Army Schools based on doctrine articulated by th e

British from their experience in Malaya and adopted by the Army . Fo r

the Walt quote and the development of III MAF pacification in 1965 ,

see Shulimson and Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, pp .

133-46. The quote is on p. 133 .

a decisive factor if the South Vietnamese government

were to retain or establish control of the countryside .'' '

In this connection, the Marine units employed relatively innovative tactics that they called "Golde n

Fleece" and "County Fair." Golden Fleece operations

were basically rice protection missions . A Marine battalion would provide a shield behind which the villagers harvested and kept their crops from the VC ta x

collectors. The County Fair operations were cordon and

search affairs with psychological overtones . A Marine

battalion would surround a hamlet, bring its population into a large clearing where the troops had erecte d

large tents. While the division band and Vietnames e

drama groups provided entertainment, the Marines

would search the village and provide medical and dental assistance . Local officials would conduct an informa l

census and hold any suspicious persons for furthe r

questioning. By the end of 1967, however, while th e

Marine units continued to use County Fair and Gold -

en Fleece tactics, III MAF no longer kept a statistica l

account of these types of operations.°° °

**Lieutenant Colonel William R . Corson, who in 1967 heade d

the Marine Combined Action Program and helped to articulat e

Marine pacification concepts, commented that pacification was no t

the equivalent of giving the Vietnamese in the countryside " th e

Great Society War on Poverty" and hoping that they in return woul d

give " their hearts and minds to those who provided them with th e

dole ." Corson defined pacification as a condition rather than merel y

a series of processes: " In the case of the hamlets in South Vietnam, i t

was the belief and perception of the Vietnamese people that they

were safe in their own homes. This idea, or feeling of safety was th e

sine qua non without which there was no 'pacification purpose' o r

potential gain simply from providing the humanitarian assistanc e

that the indigenous government had never provided . " The peopl e

needed to believe that they "at least would be protected ." LtCo l

William R . Corson, Comments on draft, dtd 30Jan95 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Corson Comments .

***As in most aspects of the pacification campaign, there are varying views of its impact in the local hamlets and villages . William D .

Ehrhart, a Marine veteran who served as an enlisted intelligence specialist with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in 1967 and early 1968 an d

participated in County Fairs, wrote, " my experience was that 'County

Fairs' worked much better in the telling than in the doing ; that is, th e

theory sounded good, but the reality fell far short of the theory . "

596
PACIFICATION 597

Perhaps the most innovative and unique of the

Marine pacification programs was Combined Action .

Growing out of the security needs of the Marine battalion at Phu Bai in the summer of 1965, the Marines

integrated the local Vietnamese militia units, the Popular Forces, with a 14-man Marine squad .* First called

a Joint Action Company, then changed to Combine d

Action Company, and finally, to avoid unfavorable con -

notations in Vietnamese by the acronym CAC, the pro -

gram became known as the Combined Action Program or CAP. CAP also stood for Combined Actio n

Platoon, the basic tactical unit . By the end of 1967, the

Marines had formed 79 platoons organized administratively into 14 companies and three Combined Actio n

groups (CAGs). As Ambassador Robert W. Komer,

who in 1967 was General Westmoreland's deputy fo r

pacification, later wrote that the Combined Actio n

Program was the "only sustained experiment wit h

encadrement in our entire Vietnam experience ." I

III MAF was also the first of the MACV commands to develop a systematic measurement of security and other aspects of pacification in its area o f

operations . Beginning in February 1966, it required

subordinate units to submit a monthly analysis of the

degree of pacification in each village in its area of

operations . Based on supposedly objective quantitative elements, the report gave a numerical grad e

which could be roughly translated into a qualitative

value and provide some basis for analysis. This program later served as the model for the MACV country-wide Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), whic h

used letters rather than numerals for grading purposes. District advisors filled out the HES reports whil e

the military unit completed the III MAF forms. At

the end of 1967, both systems were in use in I Corps .

Obviously, as one Army historian observed, all suc h

reports and documents were prepared "by American s

for American eyes and ears . . . {and} we don't know

really what the Vietnamese thought ." Still, as a senio r

operations analyst concluded, these reports containe d

*William D . Ehrhart, Comments on draft, dtd 24Oct94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Ehrhart Comments. In his somewhat fictionalized biographical account of his experience in Vietnam, Ehrhar t

describes a County Fair operation . See William D . Ehrhart, VietnamPerkasie, A Combat Marine Memoir (Jefferson & London : McFarland ,

1983), pp . 31-38 . Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, in early 196 8

the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, (CGFMFPac),

observed recently about Marine pacification accomplishments, " truth -

fully, our performance, although much the best, was spotty, because o f

ignorance, operational pressure, or shortage of means . " LtGen Victor

H . Krulak, Comments on draft, dtd 31Oct94 (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Krulak Comments .

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

Marine LCpl Edward J. Byrne, part of a Marine civic

action team from the Force Logistics Command, shares a soft

drink with a small friend at a refugee orphanage near D a

Nang. The team was on a visit to the orphanage to distribute clothing donated from the United States.

"critical patterns" that permitted analysis as long as

one did not focus on any specific element.2* *

**While allowing that there was an element of ad hoc growth o f

the Combined Action Program due to local security needs, Lieutenan t

Colonel Corson argued that the basic drive behind the program was

the perception of Marine leaders such as General Wallace M . Greene ,

Jr., the Marine Corps Commandant, and Lieutenant General Victor H .

Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and Lieu -

tenant General Lewis W. Walt, the III MAF commander, and thei r

emphasis upon the population and pacification in contrast to th e

MACV large unit strategy. Corson Comments. Despite the refine d

statistical analysis, many would still agree with Lieutenant Colone l

Corson who wrote that "anecdotal evidence" in the villages was "fa r

more accurate than spurious statistics. " According to Corson, pacification could not be "expressed as a linear function, nor could it b e

frozen in time . . . ." Corson Comments. Lieutenant General Krula k

wrote that the Combined Action platoons knew what was going on i n

the villages in contrast to the various system evaluation processes .

Krulak Comments.
598 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) A19144 2

Navy Lt Runas Powers, Jr., battalion surgeon of BLT 2/4

(with the stethoscope), bandages a baby's head with the

assistance of an unidentified Navy corpsman, as the mother

holds the child. Medical assistance was an important facto r

in Marine civic action.

III MAF also made extensive use of psychological

warfare . By 1967, the Marine command had two specialized Army units attached to it, the 29th Civil Affairs

Company and the 7th Psychological Warfare Battalion . With elements of these units, Marine line companie s

and battalions would employ both air and ground loud -

speakers as well as leaflets to influence both the civilia n

population and the enemy. Specialized South Vietnamese units, such as Armed Propaganda Teams and

drama teams, would present and act out themes in th e

countryside illustrating that the American forces wer e

present to assist the government in making a better life

for the individual Vietnamese villager. 3

At the same time, both the Vietnamese and Marine s

addressed their message to the Vet Cong and the North

Vietnamese to surrender under a special "Chieu Hoi "

(Open Arms) amnesty program, which had been i n

effect since the early 1960s. The enemy troops that

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

During a County Fair operation, a Vietnamese elder watches enthralled at a magic presentation . County Fairs were

cordon and search operations with psychological overtones.

turned themselves in were called Hoi Chanhs (ralliers) .

III MAF in early 1966 had started a pilot program usin g

the Hoi Chanhs. Taking selected and carefully screene d

former VC, and providing both language and tactica l

training, the Marines then assigned them to Marin e

infantry battalions. The Marines employed these forme r

enemy, nicknamed "Kit Carson Scouts," much as th e

cavalry units in the old American West used India n

scouts. They were to warn the American units against

likely ambushes and to locate hidden enemy stores and

marshaling areas. By the end of 1967, III MAF had 13 2

Kit Carson Scouts attached to Marine units . The 3d

Marine Division had hopes of assigning at least one scou t

to every Marine infantry company in 1968 .

By the summer of 1966, both Lieutenant General

Lewis W. Walt, then the III MAF commander, an d

Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, the FMFPac

commander, became concerned about the cultural
PACIFICATION 599

shock caused by the sudden influx of large America n

combat forces upon both the Vietnamese peasant an d

the young American Marine . In order to recognize the

extent of the problem, the Marine command undertook sample attitudinal surveys among both Marine s

and the South Vietnamese villagers . A Navy chaplain ,

Lieutenant Commander Richard McGonigal, who als o

held a master's degree in sociology, conducted the firs t

opinion survey in September 1966, using two percent

of the III MAF personnel and a much smaller percent -

age of the local civilian populace. 4

The first findings among the American troops were

not surprising . McGonigal discovered nearly 60 percent of the Marines held relatively low opinions abou t

the South Vietnamese . Only 43 percent of the sampl e

stated that they held a positive feeling toward the local

populace . Still even the negative reactions among th e

Americans revealed an ambivalence rather than a n

intense dislike of the villagers . Among the CAP units,

however, possibly as would be expected, the Marine s

tested much more affirmatively.

Perhaps more surprisingly, the South Vietnamese ,

if the survey were accurate, showed a relatively positive view toward the Marines . More than 70 percent

indicated that they personally liked the Americans.

On the other hand, over 40 percent perceived hostility towards them from the U.S. troops.

Chaplain McGonigal refined his testing procedure s

and conducted two more surveys, the last in Jun e

1967, which more or less confirmed the earlier ones. With this impetus, III MAF initiated a "persona l

response " program down to the battalion level . Eac h

command at either the G–5 or S–5 level appointed a

Personal Response officer, very often the chaplain ,

whose responsibility was to teach the troops the local

customs and culture, largely through group discussions

and class instruction. As could be expected, the program met with mixed results. As the FMFPac chap -

lain, Navy Captain John H . Craven, later observed, he

had to walk a "fine line between Marine officers on one

hand, who questioned the need for any such project ,

and chaplains on the other hand, who felt that chaplains should have nothing to do with the project ."*

*Colonel James L . Black, Jr., who as a lieutenant colonel was th e

III MAF G—5 for Civil Affairs in 1968, commented that the 29th Civi l

Affairs Company should have had the responsibility for the Persona l

Response Program rather than the Chaplains . Col James L. Black, Jr. ,

Comments on draft, n .d . [Nov94) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

James Black Comments. William D . Ehrhart, who served in Vietnam

with the 1st Marines from mid-summer 1967 until February 1968 an d

has written extensively upon his experience in Vietnam and that of

With its large commitment to the pacificatio n

campaign, III MAF also implemented the first

Corps-wide coordination effort involving not onl y

III MAF and the Vietnamese authorities, but als o

the various U.S . civilian assistance programs . As

early as August 1965, III MAF and the U .S . civilian operations mission for I Corps formed the I

Corps Joint Coordinating Council (ICJCC), an

interagency clearing committee to direct both th e

civilian and military civic action programs in th e

Corps area . With permanent representation, th e

council soon began meeting on a regular basis .

Before long, General Hoang Xuan Lam, the I Corps

commander, also assigned a representative to the

committee. By the end of 1967, ICJCC had severa l

subordinate subcommittees and had even extended

down to the provincial and district level . Genera l

Cushman had made his deputy III MAF commander, Major General Raymond L . Murray, his personal representative to the council . 5

Despite recognizing the initiatives of the

Marines relative to pacification, General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, was unhapp y

about the emphasis of the Marine Corps. He

believed that the Marines, with their concentratio n

on the security of the hamlets, were ignoring the

enemy regular forces operating outside of th e

Marine areas of operations. While supporting civi c

action on the part of American troops, the MACV

commander was concerned about incidents with

the civilian population . He desired to place , th e

main responsibility for pacification upon the

ARVN forces. 6

In February 1966, at the Honolulu Conference ,

which included the leaders of the Vietnamese government and the United States, the emphasis was

upon pacification . Still, the conference was not a

repudiation of Westmoreland's large unit strategy.

He won his point that the main responsibility for

pacification and protection of the people would li e

with the ARVN forces. ?

While the Honolulu Conference called for a

renewal and reemphasis upon pacification, the reality was largely rhetorical . The actual gains in pacification were fairly modest. The South Vietnames e

did expand their Revolutionary Development (RD)

other enlisted Marines, observed that in the several month s

between the institution of the program and his departure that h e

" never heard of, let alone participated in, any such program . "

Ehrhart Comments.
600 THE DEFINING YEA R

Program* and increased the number of Revolutionary Development teams in targeted hamlets and villages. Actually, the government had hoped to plac e

about 300 of these specially trained pacificatio n

teams in the countryside by the end of 1966 . It succeeded in achieving only about a third of that goal . While by the end of 1967 the number of RD cadre

numbered over 32,000, they had one of the largest

attrition rates of all the forces in Vietnam. The overall attrition rate among the cadre was 32 percent pe r

year with a desertion rate of 21 percent. 8

Unsatisfied with the progress and coordination i n

Vietnam among the various component civilian agencies within the U.S . mission in Saigon, the Johnso n

administration initiated an entirely new approach . One

of the chief architects was Presidential advisor Rober t

W. Komer. Nicknamed "the blowtorch" by forme r

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Komer had the sup -

port of the new Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth

Bunker. An articulate and forceful man, Komer convinced President Johnson and General Westmorelan d

to place the formal American pacification effort unde r

the U.S . military chain of command in Vietnam . 9

In May 1967, the former Office of Civil Operations

under the direct control of the American Embass y

became Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) under MACV with Robert

Komer as its head. With the rank of Ambassador,

Komer was Westmoreland's deputy for pacification .

According to the MACV commander, he assigned

*Here too, much of the change was rhetorical . While changin g

the name of their pacification program from Rural Reconstruction t o

Revolutionary Development in English, they retained the old nam e

for the program in Vietnamese . The Revolutionary Developri'en t

Ministry was headed by Vietnamese General Nguyen Duc Thang .

Later, he assumed the title, Commissioner General for Revolutionar y

Development, and additional responsibility as Assistant to the Chief,

Joint General Staff for Territorial Affairs and Pacification . Thes e

additional duties provided him with authority in both civilian an d

military aspects of pacification and jurisdiction over the Popular an d

Regional Forces.

The heart of the Revolutionary Development Program was the so -

called Revolutionary Development cadre or teams . Started under a

pilot program by the CIA in late 1964, the U .S . had assisted the Vietnamese in training at Vung Tau some 16,000 Vietnamese pacificatio n

cadre by 1966, which were then formed into what were called Political Action Teams. These teams consisted of approximately 40 of thes e

anti-Communist indoctrinated cadre, who like the Communist guerrillas dressed in black pajamas. After Honolulu, the teams were

renamed Revolutionary Development Teams, but still retained thei r

Vietnamese designation Can Bo . See Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp. 254-55, and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, Joh n

Paul Vann and America in South Vietnam (New York: Random House ,

1988), p . 608 .

Army Major General George Forsythe to Komer as hi s

assistant "to keep Komer out of my hair." Still, while

describing Komer as "volatile " and "abrasive, " Westmoreland agreed he "was the man for the job ." to m

For his part, Komer had a clear idea what change s

he wanted to make . He believed that for too long ther e

had been no unified management structure concerne d

with pacification . He argued that the solution was "to

require the U.S . and ARVN military to take on most

of the pacification job ." Up to this time, it was his

opinion that when the U.S. entered the war in Vietnam, "we further `Americanized' it—on an even

grander scale—by playing out our military repertoire . "

He perceived Westmoreland's search and destroy an d

attrition strategy as a natural response of an America n

commander "against an elusive enemy who could no t

be brought to decisive battle in a classic military style . "

In so doing, however, Komer contended that both the

Vietnamese and Americans had neglected the onl y

means of attaining their goal—the establishment of

local security and the extension of government administration into the countryside . He wanted to plac e

more resources in civilian administration, the Revolutionary Development cadre and program, and to buil d

up local defense forces, especially the Popular an d

Regional Forces. Under CORDS, Komer formed unified U.S . civilian-military teams that operated in al l

250 districts and 44 provinces. Later, he would write

that not until CORDS was formed, "did a major sustained pacification effort begin to take place ." 1 1

Still, in many respects, CORDS carried forward

what was already in place. Beginning in 1966, th e

South Vietnamese and their American advisors had

established the basis for a nation-wide pacificatio n

plan. While not developing an overall plan for 1967 ,

they together with the Revolutionary Development

Ministry designated four National Priority areas and

developed the guidelines for Revolutionary Development. Each province was to develop its own plan . The

1967 pacification plan, then, if it could be called such ,

consisted of the aggregate of the 44 provincial plans.1 2

In reviewing the progress of Revolutionary Development during 1967, the CORDS planners determined that the so-called designated National Priorit y

Areas and 26 priority provinces "did not produc e

demonstrable progress." According to the CORDS '

**Lieutenant General Krulak observed that from his perspective at

FMFPac, " at bottom, Westy (Westmoreland) did not believe in pacification . He created CORDs to decentralize the worries. He didn't care

for Komer, and vice versa ." Krulak Comments.
PACIFICATION 601

point of view, blame for the slowness of RD largely la y

in the "inefficiencies" of the respective South Vietnamese ministries. The Americans asserted that the

"most serious—and telling—flaw was the conspicuous

shortage of good Vietnamese leadership." In CORDS,

the Americans began a systematic collection of dossier s

on "incompetent or venal" province and district chiefs .

Komer later claimed that the agency had a "respectabl e

batting average " in placing pressure on the Vietnamese

government to remove the worst offenders.1 3

The CORDS leadership convinced the South Vietnamese that a new tactic was necessary . They decided that

there was a need to "concentrate resources in carefull y

chosen areas which met criteria for current progress plus

the capacity to achieve greater results with more

resources. " Planners selected only a few priority provinces

and priority areas based upon "their relative importance

to the overall pacification effort ." The emphasis was to be

upon III and IV Corps. In fact, in I Corps, only Quang

Ngai became a designated priority province where a 5 0

percent increase in pacification resources would be made .

The authors of the MACV 1967 history claimed that the

Combined Campaign Plan for 1968 contained "the first

fully integrated treatment of pacification within the

framework of a campaign plan."1 4

In Washington, Marine Corps leaders wondere d

about the new priorities and whether the III MAF pacification effort in Vietnam was to receive even less support. In October 1967, General Wallace M . Greene ,

Jr., then Commandant of the Marine Corps, voiced his

concerns to Lieutenant General Krulak at FMFPac

headquarters in Honolulu . He observed that the omission of I Corps provinces with the exception of Quang

Ngai "has an ironic twist in view of the historic fac t

that only in the III MAF area of responsibility has the

target of pacification, civic action, and Revolutionary

Development been accorded primary emphasis from

the outset of U .S . major involvement in Vietnam ."1 5

General Krulak tried to assuage the Commandant's

concerns. He observed that the reason for the change i n

priority was that I Corps had become "the battle -

ground and that RD has the best chance for success i n

areas most remote from the battle ." He mentioned that

Ambassador Komer had conveyed this idea to hi m

during recent discussions. Krulak then stated that ,

although I Corps was to have only one priority

province, this was misleading . There was not to be any

diminution of the pacification effort in the Corps area ,

and, in fact, there was to be an increase in Revolutionary Development resources for the coming year. He

observed that under the 1968 plan, I Corps was to

receive a 20 percent increase in the number of RD

teams and the number of hamlets and villages to be

developed . Moreover, the Corps would receive a 49

percent increase in funds over the previous year an d

could request additional monies if required.1 6

Krulak then compared the degree of pacificatio n

resources in I Corps, both presently available and those

planned for 1968, with those for the other Corps areas .

He noted that under the 1968 plan, I Corps was allotted an average of 33 Revolutionary Development team s

per province, the highest number in all the Corps areas.

The next closest, W Corps, was to average only 1 9

teams per province . In actual funds, I Corps was to

receive 100 million piasters, only slightly less than II

and IV Corps, which were to get 104 million and 10 3

million piasters respectively, and more than III Corps .' 7

The FMFPac commander than discussed the actua l

Revolutionary Development plans for I Corps. General Lam, the I Corps commander, had just requested

from the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff 3 1

additional Regional Forces companies, 21 of whic h

would have specific pacification missions. Furthermore, Lam planned to assign two additional ARVN

regular battalions to support the Revolutionary Development campaign. This would mean that 16 out of the

28 ARVN battalions assigned to the Corps sector

would be in support of Revolutionary Development . 1 8

He then detailed the reasons for the selection o f

Quang Ngai Province as the priority province : "relative population density, economic potential in term s

of rice and salt production, remoteness of the NVA

threat . . ., and because it is contiguous to the northernmost II Corps Priority Province of Binh Dinh . "

Krulak then speculated about the real reason for th e

choice of Quang Ngai . He believed that "the RD

planners were mesmerized by the thought of a continuous line of priority provinces along the coast, with -

out jeopardizing the stated concept that priorities

rank from south to north . "1 9

Despite all the verbiage, Krulak saw little difference

between 1967 and 1968 for I Corps, relative to th e

emphasis upon pacification . He related, for example,

that Quang Nam Province was authorized 38 Revolutionary Development teams, more than 23 of the 26 socalled priority provinces. It also received more pacification funds than another 16 priority provinces in other

Corps sectors. He concluded: "In the final analysis, th e

priority listing will not result in degradation of the RD

effort in I Corps." Instead, he believed that the "increase d

emphasis in RD in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and

Thua Thien should enhance the chances of RD success
(O2 TI IL DEFrNINc YEAR

PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN III MAF AREAS

JANUARY 1967-JANUARY 1968

Partially Complete • Complete

VILLAGE CENSUS VILLAGE VILLAGE

INTELLIGENCE NETS DEFENSE PLANS

RI

JAN JUL JAN JAN JUL JAN

_

JAN JUL JAN

67 67 68 67 67 68 67 67 68

DEFENSE FORCES TRAINED VILLAGE CHIEFS AND COMMUNICATION NETS

AND IN PLACE COUNCILS FUNCTIONING ESTABLISHED

JAN JUL JAN

iii

JAN JUL JAN

il

JAN JUL JAN

67 67 68 67 67 68 67 67 68

VILLAGE CHIEFS LIVING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND VILLAGE MARKETS nt IN VILLAGE PUBLIC INFORMATION ESTABLISHED

JAN JUL JAN JAN JUL JAN JAN JUL JAN

67 67 68 67 67 68 67 67 68

From Operations of US Marire Forces Vietnam 1968.
PACIFICATION 603

in 1968 . . . ." This would occur "without the heat of the

spotlight, absent because of the lack of priority status

which exists only in a concept, not in practice . "2 0

By the end of 1967, progress in pacification in bot h

I Corps and country-wide was very much in the eye o f

the beholder. According to the latest HES ratings mor e

than 60 percent of the population country-wide lived

in relatively secure areas. In I Corps, III MAF reported

that more than half of the people in that sector lived i n

"secure hamlets." Both of these figures, nevertheless ,

needed to be taken with several grains of salt . Thomas

Thayer, a senior Defense Department analyst, later

wrote that there were several factors that may hav e

caused the increase . These included the fact that the

secure population included urban regions, refugees,

and not the least, "optimistic evaluation of programs . "

The statistics also underestimated the strength of the

VC control in Communist-dominated hamlets . Given

all that, Thayer believed that the extension of allied

protection into the countryside accounted for most o f

the hamlet security gains.2 1

Other factors at the Saigon level reinforced this initial optimism. According to the MACV historians, the

momentum of 1967 progress "gave hope to all concerned that a workable solution to the problem of pacification had at last evolved ." CORDS officials spoke

about "Project Takeoff, a management tool designed t o

bring maximum pacification assets to bear on the most

important problems."2 2

The MACV intelligence estimate also gave impetus

to the belief that the war was finally going the allies '

way. In their analysis of enemy strength in the second

half of 1967, MACV intelligence officers began to talk

about enemy casualties reaching the "crossover point, "

where the gaps left in enemy strength could not be

filled by new replacements and recruits. Westmoreland

then approved a controversial decision to omit from the

MACV order of battle two whole classes of so-called

Communist irregulars: Self Defense Forces and the VC

infrastructure. This reduced the estimated total number of guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre from 114,348 to

81,300. All of the 81,300 irregulars carried in the pro -

posed new MACV estimate were under the category of

guerrillas. Under the classification spaces for Sel f

Defense Forces and VC infrastructure were two footnotes. According to the MACV rationale, "the selfdefense forces provide a base for recruitment as well as

for political and logistical support, but are not a fighting force comparable to the guerrilla ." While acknowledging that local VC hamlet self-defenses "cause som e

casualties and damage, they do not represent a continual or dependable force and do not form a valid part o f

the enemy's military force ." Relative to the enemy

infrastructure, " the political cadre (infrastructure) ha s

no military function ."23

As could be expected, the proposed revised MACV

order of battle caused a furor among the various intelligence agencies, especially the CIA. In an eventua l

compromise, essentially everyone agreed to disagree .

The new estimates carried the MACV changes, but

with the footnotes explaining that Self Defense Forc e

and VC figures were not included in the new figures.

MACV HES estimates, however, continued to show

an enemy guerrilla force of about 155,000 rather than

the 81,000 published by the MACVJ2 or intelligence section . Furthermore, MACV through CORDS

supported the newly initiated CIA-sponsored Phung

Hoang (All Seeing Bird) or "Phoenix" program as i t

was known in English, aimed at the elimination of

high-ranking VC cadre .2 4 *

At the end of 1967, despite some feeling of optimism, there were continuing doubts about progress in

pacification both in I Corps and the country at large .

From both American and South Vietnamese sources

came indications of increased enemy offensive intentions. This was especially true in I Corps where the

allies expected another large enemy push in the north .

At Da Nang, also, there were reports of a major enem y

attack on the base and the number of enemy small uni t

actions had increased .* *

*Although later alleged to be an assassination campaign, the stated

purpose of the Phung Hoang was "to enlist and coordinate the efforts of

local leaders police and paramilitary groups to identify and dismantle the

subversive apparatus. " Based upon the newly created District Intelligenc e

Operational Coordinating Committees, consisting of police and villag e

and hamlet officials, the idea was to target by name and arrest the loca l

enemy ranking cadre, employing force if necessary. Various Vietnamese

agencies carried out the actual campaign, including the national police ,

military security teams, armed propaganda teams, Census Grievance

cadre, RD cadre, and an especially CIA-trained group called Provincia l

Reconnaissance Units (PRU) . Colonel Black, who was responsible for II I

MAF civil affairs, recalled that because of its classification, not even th e

III MAF staff was " in the know " on the program, but that the staff

"thrived on rumor about Phoenix ." James Black Comments. Major Donald E . Milone, who commanded the 3d MP Battalion in 1968, related

that the program "failed to coordinate its activities" with Marine units,

especially the Combined Action platoons: "No one knew what was happening in a certain village. " Maj Donald E. Milone, Comments on draft ,

n .d . [Dec94} (Vietnam Comment File) . Lieutenant Colonel Corson, who

headed the Combined Action Program in 1967, considered Phoenix " a

bounty program . . . with little regard . . . for 'guilt ' or ' innocence. — H e

stated that he reached an understanding that the Phoenix teams woul d

keep away from the Combined Action hamlets. Corson Comments.

**See Chapters 1 and 6.
Killed Wounded Destroyed Damaged

KILLED AND WOUNDED STRUCTURES DESTROYED DISPLACED PERSONS

5,000 40,000 40,000

2,500 20000 20,000

ICTZ HUE ICTZ HUE ICTZ HUE

604 THE DEFINING YEAR

CIVILIAN LOSSES DURING TET IN I CTZ AND HUE

From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

The Tet Offensives and Operation Recovery

Initially, the enemy Tet offensive was a tremendous setback for both the Marine and country-wide

pacification program. With the attacks on the major

cities of Vietnam and especially the one-month battle

for Hue, the enemy added an entire new dimension to

the war. The enemy attacks during the holiday period resulted in an enormous increase of new refugees,

ranging from estimates of 750,000 to over a million,

with nearly 170,000 in I Corps and, of that number,

about 75,000 from the city of Hue. In February

1968, III MAF reported that the number of enemy

defectors was the lowest in five months. According to

pacification reports, before Tet, the allies claimed

5,331 out of 12,000 hamlets under government control. The number cited after Tet was 4,472, a loss of

859. By April 1968, Ambassador Komer related that

the total of hamlets then under government control

had risen slightly, reaching 4,559, a gain of some 87

hamlets "back in the fold." Despite the tremendous

onslaught of the enemy, the ARVN had not defected

and the South Vietnamese government apparatus had

not collapsed.25

After the first attacks and initial surprise, the South

Vietnamese government launched Operation Recovery.

At the urging of U.S. pacification officials, President

Thieu created, with American participation and support, a high-level task force "to direct and coordinate"

civilian relief activities. Thieu temporarily placed Vice

President Ky in charge of the South Vietnamese government endeavor while Ambassador Komer directed

the U.S. effort. Both men set up subordinate complementary organizations on the corps, province, and district levels, whose mission was four fold: to provide

immediate assistance to the refugees, to get the cities

functioning once more, to open lines of communication so the economy could function, and to reestablish

order. According to MACV, the major innovation in

the project was the "provision of cash and commodities

to the people so that they themselves could rebuild." In

actuality, III MAF had employed this same concept as

the basis for its civic action program since 1965, but

with fewer resources.26

In I Corps under Operation Recovery, the South

Vietnamese apparatus authorized a 57 million piaster

($485,000.00) budget for a three-month period. The

first aim was to provide for food, reconstruction of

homes, and some compensation to survivors of those

civilians killed and to the wounded as a result of the

fighting. In Hue, each displaced person was entitled to

10,000 piasters ($85.00), 20 sheets of roofing, and 10

bags of cement to begin to rebuild. By the end of

March, more than 830 families received reconstruction

material and all the displaced received a temporary

relief payment. For the most part, the initial phase of

the rebuilding of the city had been completed. Relief

workers brought in 4,100 tons of rice to feed the peo-
PACIFICATION 605

pie, work groups buried more than 6,000 bodies kille d

in the battle for the city, and other work gangs cleare d

the debris and rubble from the streets. Municipal

employees had returned both water and electricity t o

" satisfactory operation condition . " U.S. and South

Vietnamese munitions disposal specialists had disarmed or otherwise disposed of unexploded ordnance .

Work had started on the second and third phases, the

repair of public buildings and the reconstruction of private homes.2 7

Elsewhere in I Corps, the South Vietnamese also

had made some inroads on the damage caused b y

enemy assaults. Outside of Hue, displaced peopl e

were entitled to a somewhat lesser sum, 5,000

piasters ($42 .00), but the same amount of roofing an d

cement to rebuild their homes. By the end of March ,

more than 1,400 families received all or part of their

settlement. III MAF units had provided ove r

1,000,000 meals to civilians, nearly double the usual

amount of foodstuffs provided under civic action programs. Relief workers distributed more than 21,00 0

tons of rice in the Corps' five provinces . Corps officials

had also taken steps to eliminate abuses and some o f

the most ineffective leaders in local government .

They had dismissed one province chief, two distric t

chiefs, and two village chiefs.

Despite an impressive start, Operation Recovery

soon bogged down upon the unusual demands pu t

upon the overburdened and inefficient South Vietnamese administrative apparatus . While acknowledging that the government had begun reconstruction,

resettlement, and economic revival programs, American observers reported that by April the strains wer e

beginning to show. They charged: "There was a critical

decline in effectiveness when the program should have

been gathering even greater momentum." Local officials had overspent their budgets and projects came t o

a standstill.28

Under Operation Recovery, the country also made

some starts on mobilization of the populace . Vice President Ky authorized the establishment of special SelfDefense Groups in urban areas so they could defen d

themselves against any further incursions by the Communists. The idea was to distribute arms to the peopl e

South Vietnamese civilian refugees gather in a park near Hue University as the fighting continued in the city. In Operation Recovery, the South Vietnamese attempted to help the displaced residents to rebuild their homes.

Photo is from the Abel Collection
PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATION - I CTZ

TRAINED

OCT NOV DEC OCT NOV DEC OCT NOV DEC

F' or' i QI,or it ILI r, or US Marine Fe, ces ii mi 1968.

ORGANIZED

160,000

80,000

ARMED

60,000

30,000

20,000

10.000

606 THE DEFINING YEAR

so that they would be able to provide some form of

organized protection to their neighborhood or local

community to supplement the territorial forces. The

Self-Defense forces were divided into two groups: one

combat and the other support. Further divided into

three groups, the support forces consisted of youth,

women, and elders. Membership was voluntary and

open to all citizens seven years of age or above. The new

mobilization law required all youths between 16 and

17 and men between 38—50 to serve in the combat

Peoples Self Defense Corps. Within each of the combat

forces were to be specially trained personnel, organized

into 35-man teams, each man being armed.29

Like the rest of Operation Recovery after much fanfare and formation and drilling of units, the program

lacked cohesion. While a wide variety of units were

organized, they received little direction, training, or

weapons. American CORDS officials observed aimless

drift and almost no coordination. By the end of June,

according to the MACV history, 'the population was,

in effect, ahead of the government in terms of its willingness to participate actively in self-defense."3°

The second wave of the Tet offensive in May gave

a new impetus to Operation Recovery in both reconstruction and the mobilization of the population. As

North Vietnamese officials met formally with the

Americans in Paris for the first time, these negotiations reinforced the new sense of urgency. Ambassador Komer later wrote that the South Vietnamese

government's "realization that a far greater effort on

its part would be required to survive finally led to

actual national manpower mobilization, extensive

training programs for local officials, a major acceleration for pacification efforts, several economic reforms

and the like."31

At this point President Thieu called a meeting of

his Corps commanders and expressed his unhappiness.

He told them in "no uncertain terms that whatever the

anomaly involved in exercising authority, recovery was

not to wither on the vine." By July, according to American officials, the reconstruction of the rural economy

in I, II, and III Corps had reached pre-Tet levels.32

The South Vietnamese president also took the initiative relative to the Self-Defense Corps. In July, he

placed the program directly under his prime minister,

who formed a National Peoples Self Defense Comm ittee chaired by himself. By the end of the year, some

1,000,000 people were members of such groups and

nearly half of them had received training. The government had distributed some 173,000 weapons. In I

Corps, for example, at the end of October, nearly

106,000 of the civilian population had joined the Self

Defense Corps with 16 percent armed. At the end of

the year, the number had increased to 225,162 with 10

percent of them armed.33

Operation Recovery itself came to an end in October with the claim of the government that it had

accomplished its basic mission, the return of security

and extension of public services to the level enjoyed

prior to the offensives. The third enemy offensive by

this time had petered out and wreaked far less damage

than the earlier attacks. The October Hamlet Evalua-
PACIFICATION 607

tion figures showed 69 .8 percent of the population

country-wide living in generally secure areas, a record

high exceeding that of the pre-Tet period . According

to American observers, the improvement was country -

wide and reflected in all four Corps areas . The general

mobilization had not only created the Self Defens e

Corps, but had improved the caliber of the Regiona l

and Popular Forces, most of whom were no w

equipped with American M16 rifles. In all Corps

areas, pushed by the central government, provincial

and district chiefs "slowly began to increase their pacification efforts ."34

The results were equally impressive in I Corps.

Although the enemy attacks near Da Nang in August

had caused some diminishment in Revolutionar y

Development, according to the American statistics,

both the security and the economy picked up in the

following months. From the onset in mid-February o f

Operation Recovery until its end in October, the Corp s

provincial and local governments had spent in excess o f

$500,000 .00 to reestablish "normalcy to the lives o f

victimized civilians in I CTZ. " The government had

resettled more than 152,000 or 98 percent of the temporary refugees. Through the funds provided for the

purpose, local officials had given more than 131,00 0

bags of cement and 276,000 sheets of roofing tin for

the rebuilding of homes. In addition, the relief groups

had distributed nearly 50,000 tons of rice and grain t o

the devastated areas and medical workers inoculated

approximately 500,000 civilians against contagiou s

disease under the program . Yet, as one observer cautioned, these quantitative figures, which he referred t o

as a "wonderful futility," did not necessarily measur e

the qualitative aspects of the war.3 5

While not formally under Operation Recovery, on e

of the more notable accomplishments during the period was the effort to reopen the national railroad in I

Corps from Da Nang to Hue . Part of a combined U .S .-

South Vietnamese plan to have unhampered railroa d

traffic from the capital of Saigon in the south to Don g

Ha in the north by the end of 1969, the idea was t o

work simultaneously on two important sections, th e

103 kilometer Da Nang-Hue link and the 375 kilometer segment from Saigon to the I Corps/II Corps

border. While the latter had priority, the planners

called for the Da Nang-Hue portion to be completed

by the end of February 1969 .36

Despite rail communications between Da Nang and

Hue having been cut by the VC in 1964, by 1967, th e

allies had three trains a week running, but requirin g

armed escort and subject to frequent delays and sabo -

tage incidents. The enemy Tet offensive disrupted even

this small traffic . In May 1968, MACV ordered III

MAF in coordination with the Commanding General

I Corps and the Vietnamese National Railroad System

(VNRS) to " restore to operational condition the railroad from Da Nang to Hue when required securit y

forces are available . " On 19 June, General Cushman

issued a combined plan to carry out the mission. Navy

Seabees were to repair four long-span bridges in the

rugged terrain north of Da Nang while Army engineers cleared debris and mines from a vital tunne l

north of the Esso depot of Lien Chieu . Two South Vietnamese VNRS work crews would make the repairs o f

the roadbed and the track, one working south from

Hue and the other north from Da Nang . They were t o

make their junction at Phu Loc in Thua Thien

Province. The 101st Airborne Division and 1st Marine

Division were responsible for general protection of the

workers in their respective TAORs, while RF and PF

troops reinforced by a VNRS security battalion provided close-in security. 37

Starting work on 15 July, the work crews mad e

rapid progress. By 10 October, they had completed

repairs of track over half of the distance, 63 kilometers .

In the 101st Airborne sector, the crew had reached the

Truoi River Bridge while the southern crew had completed restoration in the 1st Marine Division area . As

of 10 October, there had been no incidents of sabotag e

to hamper the work. By the end of November, the

northern crew had reached a position about seven miles

north of Phu Loc. While the VC blew a bridge just eas t

of Phu Loc, the Seabees immediately started their

repairs which were completed before Christmas . This

left at the end of the year only 12 kilometers of track to

be restored . The project was nearly two months ahead

of schedule . As a III MAF report observed, completio n

of the railroad link would be "a tangible sign of retur n

to normalcy." Thus, country-wide, a MACV historian

concluded about Operation Recovery, "efficiency wa s

often lacking but the overall GVN performance i n

reestablishing over a million refugees and renewing

urban viability was one of the bright spots of 1968 ."38

III MAF and Pacification

During 1968, there was to be little of the debat e

between the MACV search and destroy strategy o f

attrition and the emphasis on pacification that marked

the Marine stance toward the war. There were of cours e

several reasons for this, not the least of which were th e

Tet offensive and the Mini-Tets in May and September.
608 THE DEFINING YEA R

At that time there was no difficulty in finding eithe r

the NVA or VC. As Ambassador Komer of CORDS

later observed, the attrition strategy appeared to work

during the offensives because the enemy "abandone d

his hit and run strategy" and more or less met the allie s

on their own terms. Through at least the first nine

months of 1968, pacification took a back seat until th e

Communists apparently reverted to their concept o f

protracted war at the end of the year.39

Still, there were other reasons for the lack of contention between MACV and III MAF over strategy an d

emphasis on pacification. With the establishment o f

the Marine base at Khe Sanh and the beginning of th e

building of the barrier along the DMZ in 1967, th e

depletion of Marine troop strength from the populated

coastal areas, especially around Da Nang and Chu Lai ,

dashed any hopes that the Marines may have had t o

push a strong population control strategy. Even the

commitment of the Army's Americal Division to I

Corps in 1967 did not provide III MAF with the density of troop strength it required, especially in the D a

Nang area . General Cushman, the III MAF commander, later commented that "the threat in the north . . .

drained the resources from pacification . I would say it

prevented us from doing more pacification ."4 0

Personality also was a consideration. While General

Cushman professed to support the pacification concepts of General Walt, he was less the crusader and

evangelical believer than his predecessor. According to

Major General Norman J. Anderson, the 1st MAW

commander, from his perspective, "there was a lessening of emphasis upon the population during the period I was in the III MAF area . I think that General

Cushman was very skeptical of that idea ."° To be fair to

the III MAF commander, in 1968, there were severa l

issues that competed for his attention, not the least of

which were Khe Sanh, the Tet Offensive including th e

battle for Hue, the insertion of Army units under his

command, the establishment of MACV Forward late r

to become XXIV Corps, and Single Manager. 4 1

*General Earl E . Anderson, who as a brigadier general served as th e

III MAF Chief of Staff, disagreed with Major General Norman Anderson, and contended that General Cushman supported Marine pacification efforts especially the Combined Action Program, " even though III

MAF had to contribute quite a bit of infantry to the program, h e

thought that it was well worth the effort. " Gen Earl E. Anderson ,

Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

E . E. Anderson Comments. Lieutenant General Krulak on the other

hand agreed with Major General Norman Anderson that General

Cushman was "more skeptical" about the possibility of pacificatio n

than General Walt . Krulak Comments.

Another factor that played a role in lessening tension over pacification with MACV was the expandin g

role that CORDS began to play in pacification . Wit h

the advent of CORDS in May 1967, Henry Koren, an

experienced foreign service officer and diplomat,

became the CORDS chief in I Corps. With the

CORDS organization now part of the military chain of

command, Koren reported directly to Cushman as wel l

as through the CORDS administrative network .

According to the III MAF commander, Koren served

as "my advisor so to speak—staff officer [on pacification] . . . he was always at briefings every morning and

worked right in with us. " Under Koren, there was a

CORDS advisor in each of the five provinces wh o

worked directly with the South Vietnamese provinc e

chief in support of the local Revolutionary Development program. Cushman described the I Corps

CORDS organization as relatively effective : responsibl e

for logistic and policy support of Revolutionary Development, "it went side by side" with the III MAF Combined Action program and "you could get down to

province capitals with supplies and so on and advice . "4 2

This cooperation in support of Revolutionar y

Development continued for the most part with Kore n 's

successor, another civilian, C . T. Cross, through 1968 ,

although questions remained about coordination o n

the local level, especially with the Combined Action

Program. The CORDS organization in I Corps reflected the new intermixture of the military and U .S . civilians in the pacification program. For example, in October 1968, the New Life Development program ,

Revolutionary Development, Psychological Operations, Public Safety, and Refugees were all run by civil -

ians. The Assistant Deputy for CORDS, L . D. Puckett,

was also a civilian . U.S . Army Lieutenant Colonel H . W. Naushuetz, the commanding officer of the 29t h

Civil Affairs Company, and U.S . Army Major R. D.

Becker, who headed the Chieu Hoi advisory office ,

both came under the I Corps CORDS organization . Of

the U.S . five province senior advisors, three were military and two were civilian 4 3

While the CORDS organization may have been a

combination of both military and civilian personnel ,

the new structure actually enhanced General Cush -

man's authority in I Corps. As the I Corps Senior Advi -

sor together with his responsibility as Commandin g

General, III MAF, Cushman already controlled all the

U.S . military forces in the Corps sector. Now with th e

CORDS organization under him, he combined in his

person both the U .S . military and pacification responsibilities for the northern five provinces .
PACIFICATION 609

As a manifestation of this added stature, the III

MAF commander ended some of the redundancies i n

the Marine pacification program . After the Tet offensive postponed the monthly meeting of the I Corp s

Joint Coordinating Council, he, together with General Lam, abolished the organization in March on th e

basis that its missions and functions "have basically

been assumed by the committees and sub-committees of Project Recovery, under the chairmanship o f

the CG, I Corps ." Finally at the end of the year, General Cushman terminated the FMFPac village evaluation system in I Corps as duplicative and not a s

accurate as the MACV hamlet evaluation system . As

Colonel Ross R. Miner, 1st Marine Division G—5

officer, explained, the FMFPac system was only effective as long as the reporting unit remained in a specific area of operations . As far as the division was

concerned, with "these [U.S .) units moving in an d

moving out . . . the whole report is fallacious." On

the other hand, the CORDS district advisor, who

was responsible for making the hamlet evaluatio n

system, was in a much better position to give a n

accurate assessment . 44

For the most part, outside of the Combine d

Action and Personal Response programs, the mai n

focus of the III MAF Marine units relative to pacification was on civic action and psychological operations. As part of this latter effort, the Marine command, augmented by the Army's 7th Psychological

Operations Battalion, placed a high priority o n

sophisticated and not so sophisticated communication techniques to get their message to the targete d

audiences . For example, after Tet, III MAF made a

special effort together with CORDS personnel to

reestablish local radio, TV, and newspaper service i n

Hue. According to III MAF, "special efforts to

reestablish these medias were immediately under -

taken and the problem solved." Local officials

appeared on both television and radio "to make the

people aware of what the GVN was doing to allevi -

A member of the psychological operations team from SLF Bravo throws out leaflets explaining to the

local population why the Marine units were operating in the sector. This was part of an overall psychological operation campaign aimed at various audiences, including the enemy .

Photo courtesy of Col Warren A. Butcher USMC (Ret)
200

1967 MONTHLY AVERAGE; 212

1968 MONTHLY AVERAGE: 260 —

610 THE DEFINING YEAR

I CTZ CHIEU HOl RETURNEES - 1968

From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

ate the critical situation." In radio broadcasts and

propaganda flyers, the command countered a prevailing VC rumor campaign that the U.S. would

support a coalition government.4'

Through the year, the III MAF psychological warfare experts mounted a three-pronged campaign to

exploit VC/NVA atrocities during Tet, to publicize

to enemy soldiers and possible civilian sympathizers

the Chieu Hoi or South Vietnamese amnesty program, and to "encourage nationalism" among the

civilians throughout the Corps area. They accomplished this through aerial loudspeaker broadcasts

and distribution of leaflets by both ground and air

means. During March, the first month of the effort,

they distributed over 268 million propaganda

leaflets and made more than a 1,000 aerial and

ground broadcasts. By the end of December, the

number of leaflets distributed per month reached

over 280 million and nearly 3,000 aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were made. At that time, the 3d

Marine Division experimented with firing artillery

"leaflet-loaded rounds" at known enemy positions

which, after solving some initial fusing and packing

problems, proved feasible.46

While impossible to measure directly the success

of the psychological warfare campaign, the increasing

numbers of Chieu Hoi and Kit Carson volunteers

indicated that enemy troops were well aware that

there were steps they could take to return or come

over to the government side. Despite a dip from 250

defectors in January 1968 to only 66 in February; the

number of Hoi Chanhs in I Corps at the end of the

year reached 3,118, exceeding the total for 1967 by

759. The Kit Carson Scouts showed an even more

impressive expansion, increasing from 132 in 1967 to

476 in 1968. In December 1968, 102 served with the

1st Marine Division, 106 with the 3d Marine Division, 153 with the 101st Airborne Division, and 115

with the Americal Division. Another 22 former VC

or NVA were undergoing training in the various division Kit Carson schools.47

In February, after two of the scouts were identified

as "suspected penetration agents for the VC," III

MAE improved and augmented its initial screening

and also provided "for continuous evaluation and

observation of individual KCS." Still, by the end of

the year, the Marines credited their Kit Carson Scouts

with apprehending 851 suspects and killing 312 of

the enemy. They also helped the American units

uncover some 720 enemy caves, tunnels, and caches.

More importantly, the scouts discovered more than

1,300 explosive devices, many set as boobytraps (surprise firing devices) to catch the unwary. As Major

General Donn J. Robertson later stated about the

entire program: "Every time you got a few Chieu

Hois and could convert them into Kit Carson Scouts

where they could give you some assistance that was a

plus that could save the lives of Marines."

For 1968, III MAE civic action had much the

same gradations as the overall pacification effort.
KIT CARSON STRENGTH NUMBER OF PATROLS ACCOMPANIED

End-Year Strength Total Patrols

1967-132 1967- 6,001

1968-476 1968- 18.615

375 2,100

250 1.400

125 700

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ENEMY LOSSES CREDITED TO KCS DETECTIONS CREDITED TO KCS

1968 Total 1968 Total

Suspects ExplosIve

Appshended: 851 Devices: 1379

150 — Enemy 225 — Caves, Tunnels,

Killed: 312 Caches: 725

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun ,Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

__

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Ccl Nov Dec

PACIFICATION 611

KIT CARSON SCOUT (KCS) PROGRAM: 1968

From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

The enemy Tet offensive hampered many civic

action projects as the allies turned most of their

effort into repulsing the Communist attacks. For

example, in February 1968, the only increase in

civic action was in two categories, the number of

pounds of food distributed and number of persons

fed, nearly double in both cases over the previous

month. The obvious reason for that expansion was

the pressing need to feed those displaced by the

Communist onslaught. During the next two

months there was a steady growth in all the civic

action classifications. Again there were dips in May

and September during the Mini-Tets and a final

push in the last quarter of the year.49*

Most civic action largely consisted of programs that

had a quick impact on the local populace such as the

distribution of clothes, food, and soap to local vil-

*Colonel James R. Black, Jr., who was the III MAF G—5 officer and

responsible for the coordination of civic action among his duties, recalled

that when he first arrived in September 1967, it was difficult to comprehend what the G—5 role really was, particularly after the III MAF had a

Deputy for CORDS. It was difficult for me to find out who I was really

working for, except (Brigadier General] E. E. Anderson (the III MAF Chief

of Staff] made it quite clear, and that provided me with the impetus to overcome all personal and professional objections James Black Comments.
612 THE DEFINING YEAR

lagers; medical assistance patrols; and assisting with

various construction efforts. The Marines, nevertheless, also supported some long-term projects. In January 1968, the 3d Marine Division in Thua Thie n

Province near Phu Bai sponsored 15 experimental

fields devoted to the cultivation of improved strains o f

rice . With the assistance of local CORDS officials and

the South Vietnamese Ministry of Land Reform an d

Agriculture, the division civic action team had introduced a higher yield rice developed in the Philippines ,

called " IR-8, " which the Ministry immediately relabeled Thon Nong 8 (literally meaning "God of Agriculture " in Vietnamese). According to the Marine

division account, "the psychological impact of attaching a Vietnamese name to an improved rice variet y

may have considerable influence upon its acceptance

by the farmers of Vietnam . "5 0

The 1st Marine Division also had similar projects .

In January, it sponsored four schools and two breedin g

farms, and assisted in the building of five wells, two

dispensaries, two maternity hospitals, and one Buddhist temple . Just prior to Tet, the Marines at Da Nan g

had overseen the giving away of more than 16,000 toy s

to children in the area . The 7th Engineer Battalion at

the Da Nang base had one of the most active civi c

action programs. It sponsored a soil brick factory in its

cantonment which provided affordable building material for local civilian projects approved by the village,

district, and provincial councils. Employing about 2 5

workers and eight simple hand block presses, the factory could produce 1,760 bricks daily. While some -

what curtailed by Tet, these enterprises continued

through the rest of the year.5 1

From the beginning, the civic action effort was larg -

er in the 1st Marine Division sector, which included i n

the Da Nang area one of the richest farming and heaviest populated regions in all of South Vietnam . This

disparity between the two divisions grew during the

year as the 1st Marine Division took over the responsibilities of the 3d Division in Thua Thien Province . In

the last two months of the year, the 1st Marine Division had completed 56 civic action projects. In December, the division was working with local authoritie s

and villagers in the building of 2 schools, a dispensary,

a market place, and 2 wells, as well as sponsoring 1 5

agricultural plots and 2 pig projects. In the 7th Engineer Battalion, for example, the engineers had begu n

an agricultural education program on improved farming techniques for the local villagers and introduce d

stronger types of produce seeds to be used on an experimental basis.52

While assigned to the less populated Quang Tri

Province, the 3d Marine Division made a significan t

contribution to the Marine civic action projects . The

division rented some 50 rice threshing machines to

local farmers in Quang Tri who had the option of purchasing them. To demonstrate the advantages of th e

machine, the civic action officer sponsored a threshin g

contest in one hamlet between a water buffalo and th e

machine . The machine threshed about twice the

amount of rice as the animal . In May, 10 of the farmers bought threshers. Both the rental and purchase

proceeds went into the 3d Marine Division civic

action fund.5 3

While introducing mobile helicopter and firebase

tactics into the 3d Marine Division, Major Genera l

Raymond G. Davis was proud of the civic actio n

exploits of the division. After reviewing his accomplishments as division commander in the spring of

1969, Davis remarked on his efforts in Cam Lo and

joint efforts with the 2d ARVN Regiment . The

ARVN and Marines conducted a series of cordon an d

search "County Fair" operations which succeeded i n

identifying the local VC infrastructure in coasta l

Quang Tri Province . With the defeat of the NVA divisions in the north, according to Davis, the division

could concentrate on pacification and civic action .54

Lieutenant Colonel Bryon T. Chen's 2d Battalion ,

3d Marines with its Companies F and H played a larg e

role in the Cam Lo Campaign . In Cam Lo District ,

Captain Donald R. Myers who commanded Compan y

H remembered, "I had squads or platoons in nearl y

every hamlet along the Cam Lo River . . . (and that) w e

even had the RFs go on patrol with us across the . . .

River. They hadn't done that in years." In nearby

Huong Hoa District, First Lieutenant Justin M . Martin's Company F adopted similar tactics . Operating i n

the villages of Mai Loc and Doc Kin, the company sup -

ported a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG )

operating with the U .S . Special Forces and the 220th

Regional Forces Company. According to Martin, h e

had two bosses, "I not only have to report to my colone l

but also an [U.S.] Army major," the District Advisor. While somewhat critical of his South Vietnames e

Regional Force counterpart, who ran his operation s

from a small cafe in Mai Loc, he believed "we hav e

given the Vietnamese some muscle that they have not

had in this area ." Both Myers and Martin viewed the

pacification campaign as a welcome change of pace

from the war of maneuver against the North Vietnamese regular units. Myers observed "we made an

impact, but it was not noted in the number of body
PACIFICATION 61 3

Photo Courtesy of LtCol Justin M . Martin USMC (Ret )

Photograph presents a street view of the village of Mai Loc in Huong Hoa District, Quang Tr i

Province . Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines operated in the village together with a Regiona l

Force Company whose commander made his headquarters in a cafe on this street .

counts. What did not happen is a better indication of

our success. Incidents dramatically went down whil e

we operated and trained the RFs. "55

Yet, one of the most ambitious of the division civi c

action projects, the establishment of a children's hospital in Quang Tri, proved how ephemeral such undertakings could be . With much fanfare and publicity, th e

division announced in August the scheduled opening

of the 30-bed Dong Ha facility of what was planne d

eventually to be the "3d Marine Division Memorial

Children's Hospital" dedicated as a "lasting memorial

to 3d Marine Division Marines and Sailors killed i n

action in Vietnam." In addition to providing medical

care for children, the hospital was to be a training center for Vietnamese medical personnel and serve as a

symbol of American and Marine concern for the Vietnamese people . According to the division plans, th e

Marines were to finance the facility from troop donations, Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action funds, and

by fund raising appeals to community and veterans

organizations in the United States. The estimated cost

of the finished modern hospital complex was $75,00 0

which was to be located in the Quang Tri Combat

Base . Despite the high hopes and auspicious beginning, the hospital never expanded beyond the smal l

Dong Ha facility. When the division left Quang Tri

Province and Vietnam in 1969, the hospital remaine d

largely on the drawing boards except for six unfinished

buildings. With the assistance of III MAF, the South

Vietnamese turned these into a combination of clinic ,

orphanage, and dormitory, a far cry from the initial

ambitious plans. As Colonel Clifford J. Peabody, the III

MAF civil affairs officer in 1970, later commented, " a

project which was outstanding in its humanitaria n

ideal of providing help . . . has proved to be a real albatross in the long run ."5 6 *

Like much of the pacification effort, the effectiveness of the III MAF civic action program was difficul t

to determine . It often challenged the best in man y

*Colonel William E. Kerrigan, who served as the G—5 of the 3d

Marine Division in the latter part of 1968, observed that " althoug h

never operated as a Children's Hospital, one wing became an infirmar y

and several were used as youth hostels for high school students wh o

lived in areas too remote to be able to commute to schools in Quan g

Tri City. " Col William E. Kerrigan, Comments on draft, dtd 14Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File).
614 THE DEFINING YEAR

Marine enlisted men and officers, but also could

bring out the worst. Captain Merrill L . Bartlett, a former Marine intelligence officer, remembered one regimental S—5 officer "already 'in his cups ' by late afternoon," ordering the scores of Vietnamese civilians

employed on the base, into a formation . According to

Bartlett, the Marine officer "would then parade th e

lines with a club, looking for contraband . Finding

something like a package of C-ration cigarettes, h e

would assault the luckless person with the club . My

last memory of this officer is . . . seeing him passe d

out in a mud puddle in front of his hooch on New

Year's Eve . " On the other hand, Charles R. Anderson ,

a former Marine lieutenant assigned to the 3d MP

Battalion at Da Nang during the latter part of 1968 ,

described his battalion's S—5 officer as one who "wore

his commission better than most who carried one "

and who had volunteered for the S—5 job with the

hopes of transferring into a combat unit . After a brief

time in his new position, "he soon became seriousl y

interested in the Vietnamese people and forgot about

going into the bush . " According to Anderson, despit e

cynicism on the part of other officers in the battalion ,

"those in S—5 labored on, determined to show th e

Vietnamese that America was trying to do things

other than burning and killing."5 7

Homicide in the Countryside

In a sense, the civic action program was part of th e

larger effort to win the so-called "hearts and minds" of

the local populace, but this called for a special interaction between different and often alien cultures. For

example, the deployment of the Korean Marin e

Brigade from the relatively unpopulated Chu Lai are a

into the Da Nang sector in January 1968 caused a deterioration of relations with the local villagers . According to General Cushman, he never really had control o f

the Koreans. Cushman stated our relationship was

"operational guidance . . . [and] they didn't do a dam n

thing unless they felt like it ." Cushman's deputy, Majo r

General Rathvon McC. Tompkins,* observed that th e

Vietnamese feared the Koreans more than anyone els e

and Cushman later confirmed that the South Vietnamese "people don't like them." According to the III

MAF commander, General Lam, the South Vietnames e

I Corps commander "hates their guts . . . He smiles,

he's polite, but he'd just as soon they'd go the hell

*MajGen Tompkins was the 3d Marine Division commander unti l

21 May when he relieved MajGen William J. Van Ryzin as Deputy

Commander, III MAE See Chapter 15 .

home or some other Corps area . " Tompkins later related that if the Korean Marines received fire "or thin k

they'd get f i r e d on f r o m a village . . . they'd divert from

their march and go over and completely level the village . . . . It would be a lesson to them . " Cushman concurred with Tompkins, remarking several years afterwards, "we had a big problem with atrocitie s

attributed to them which I sent on down to Saigon . "

According to the III MAF commander, "I don't kno w

how that ever came out . . . I doubt if anything ever

came out of it." He stated the Koreans "of course

denied it, so I don't know exactly what went on . I had

some heart to heart talks with them, but I didn't really get anywhere. "58**

Of course, incidents with the local population wer e

not confined only to Korean or to ARVN troops. In

March 1968, in the hamlet of My Lai in Quang Nga i

Province, a platoon from the Army's Company C, Tas k

Force Barker, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, America l

Division, led by 1st Lieutenant William L . Calley,

murdered over 120 villagers including old men ,

women, and children .*** It would be nearly a year late r

before the details of the massacre surfaced . A Department of the Army special board, headed by Army Lieu -

tenant General William R. Peers, discovered that th e

11th Brigade and Americal Division held only perfunctory investigations into the killings and failed to

report any suspicions through the chain of command to

either III MAF or U.S . Army, Vietnam. When asked

about My Lai several years later, General Cushma n

answered, "the administrative chain to which thes e

reports had to be made in no way went through III

MAE It went from [Major General Samuel] Koste r

[the Americal Division commander] to [Lieutenan t

General Bruce] Palmer, the Army [deputy] componen t

**According to Igor Bobrowsky, who served with Combine d

Action Platoon Delta 2 in the Thanh Quit sector, this inciden t

occurred in the nearby Phong Ni hamlets " when the Koreans mad e

their way north from Dien Ban to relieve our units . " He wrote it was

" a very serious incident of that particular type (even we (italics in original] felt it was above & beyond acceptable bounds)." Igor Bobrowsky ,

Comments on draft, n .d . Uan95) (Vietnam Comment Files). Genera l

E . E . Anderson, then the III MAF Chief of Staff, remembered that th e

incident occurred on 12 February 1968, "and a very close hold confidential investigation was held by a III MAF investigating officer . Since

the ROK Marine brigade was not a subordinate of III MAF, the investigation was limited . It was completed and typed by my scenographe r

and hand carried to MACV in an "Eyes Only" sealed envelope on Apri l

16, 1968 . Rather revealing photographs were enclosed . A few weeks

later, the package was returned to my office without any commen t

whatsoever ." E .E. Anderson Comments.

***See also Chapter 13 .
PACIFICATION 61 5

commander in Vietnam. It was an Army chain, and I

had nothing to do with it."59 *

While nothing as horrendous or on the scale of M y

Lai, the Marines had their own incidents with the local

populace as well . Obviously, when the battlefield wa s

the village or the rice paddy, civilian casualtie s

occurred, wittingly or unwittingly. While cognizant of

the difficult circumstances, the Marine comman d

attempted to hold Marine units to the highest standard. General Cushman remembered that while ther e

were a number of atrocities, "we tried them by courtmartial." He related that, in most instances, they usually involved only a few victims and Marines and "we

really came down on them . . . ."60

From 1965-1973, Marine or Navy court-martials

convicted 27 Marines of the murder of noncombatan t

South Vietnamese . Additionally another 16 were convicted of rape and another 18 of assault "with intent to

commit murder, rape, or indecent assault ." Another

15 Marines were found guilty of manslaughter an d

one of attempted murder. The most notorious Marine

court-martial of 1968 involved seven men from a

squad of the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines. Accused o f

participating in the execution style murder of five

Vietnamese men on 5 and 6 May, the seven wer e

brought to trial and five of them convicted within fiv e

months of the incident. 6 1* *

Obviously, while convictions provide some basis fo r

judging the effectiveness of the Marine discipline system, as one Marine lawyer/historian, Lieutenant

Colonel Gary D. Solis, wrote: "Acquittals can be as

revealing as sentences imposed, because acquittals ma y

indicate the reluctance of a court to convict . " In an

analysis of the 43 Marines brought up on murde r

charges of South Vietnamese civilians, Solis observe d

*General E . E. Anderson observed that while true that III MA F

was out of the administrative chain of command for the My Lai investigation, he was " later questioned by members of the Peers Commission about the subject as I had the responsibility, as Chief of Staff of II I

MAF, of releasing our nightly operations reports . I pointed out to th e

questioners that the operations report by the America) Division for th e

period when the My Lai incident occurred contained nothing tha t

would trigger any suspicion . " E . E . Anderson Comments.

**The Marines later established a Combined Action Platoon in th e

hamlet where the incident took place . Andrew Lewandowski, who

commanded this platoon, recalled that he took over this platoon i n

November 1968, but "did not learn of this incident until I sat in a doctor's office in Mt . Penn, Pa " the following year and read an account o f

the atrocity in Look Magazine. According to Lewandowski, if he had

known about the situation at the time, he would have altered some -

what his civic action program in the hamlet. Andrew Lewandowski ,

Comments on draft, dtd 30Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

that 16 Marines, or 37 percent, "were acquitted or had

their charges judicially dismissed . " He compared this

favorably with the ratio of homicide case acquittals i n

U.S . District Courts, which for 1969 was 33 percent .

Still, in examining the sentences served by the 2 7

Marines convicted of murdering South Vietnames e

noncombatants, he observed that the average incarceration was less than five years .6 2***

Despite the best efforts of the Marine command to

punish all individuals that may have been guilty of

crimes against the local populace, there were deviations. As Lieutenant Colonel Solis would later maintain "there clearly were far fewer prosecutions tha n

there were grave breaches of the law of war." Much

depended upon individual unit leadership and command sensitivity to the needs and predicament of th e

local civilian population . While never condoned an d

often condemned by the senior Marine command ,

there emerged among some troops and perhaps som e

commanders what was called the "'mere gook' rule . "

For some Marines, this permitted the "killing of Vietnamese—regardless of age, sex, or combatant status—

because 'after all the y 're only gooks,' a derogatory nickname for an Oriental which was carried over from the

Korean War." As Major W. Hays Parks, in 1968 the

1st Marine Division Chief Trial Counsel, wrote eigh t

years later, while describing the so-called rule as "a n

unfair distorted description of military attitudes and

conduct . . . [but acknowledged that) it was not altogether false, and was a key factor in most of the seriou s

incidents reported." Lieutenant Colonel Solis in his history of military justice in Vietnam observed that certain Marine defense counsels were aware of this attitude and often tried to use it to their advantage . He

described the efforts of one counsel to include senio r

enlisted men on the court-martial panel, quoting the

lawyer to the effect that they "would not be particularly disturbed about the death of another 'gook' . . . . my

hypothesis proved correct." 6 3

As Major Parks pointed out the "mere gook rule "

was not original with U .S . troops in Vietnam nor for

that matter Korea.  He quotes the American writer

Ambrose Bierce writing in the 1860s, "The soldie r

** *Colonel W. Hays Parks, a former Marine lawyer and who has

written extensively on the subject, denied, however, "that time serve d

for murder of a Vietnamese was less than time served for a simila r

crime in the U .S . against a non-Vietnamese victim .

. . ." Col W. Hays

Parks, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

****According to LtCol Solis, Marines used the term gook in reference to Nicaraguans during the Marine intervention there in th e

1920s. Solis, Trial by Fire, p . 138 .
616 THE DEFINING YEA R

never becomes wholly familiar with the conception o f

his foes as men like himself; he cannot divest himself of

the feeling that they are another order of beings, differently conditioned, in an environment not altogether

of the earth ." This obviously reinforced Chaplai n

McGonigal 's observation that it was important that th e

individual Marine view the individual South Vietnamese peasant as a 'full-fledged human being . "64*

This, of course, was much easier said than done. As

strong a supporter of the Marine pacification program a s

Major General Murray, the III MAF deputy commander, remarked, "I'd visit villages where the village chiefs

and the villagers themselves would give every appearance . . . that we were just the greatest people in th e

world," but there also remained in the back of his min d

the fugitive thought "who in this crowd of peopl e

would lead us to believe that they love us . . . [but] actually were ready to slit our throats, the first chance they

would get. " Obviously, the young Marine who took

sniper fire from a village or witnessed a comrade eithe r

killed or horrendously wounded by an enemy boobytra p

or mine set by these same villagers had his doubts about

the friendliness of the local population . The attempt to

convince him otherwise would take some doing. 65* *

*Michael E . Peterson, a former Combined Action Marine and wh o

has published a book on the Combined Action Program, questione d

"how could any Marine view the South Vietnamese peasant as a /n1/ -

fledged human being . . . when, from the very beginning . . . we were fed

"Luke the Gook" from Boot Camp onward? The enlightenment of th e

writers of the Small Wars Manual, Lew Walt, Victor Krulak, and othe r

pacification commanders simply could not offset the condescension, a t

best, or vicious . . . racism, at worst—of American commanders and soldiers toward the Vietnamese . And, given the Vietnamese tradition of

xenophobia, a single negative act was multiplied manyfold in their eyes;

and across the country by many thousands of Americans. " Michael E .

Peterson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

**In a letter to his parents in 1968, William R . Black, Jr., then a second lieutenant, wrote about some of the contradictory emotions pullin g

at the Marines as they fought the war in the villages. He wrote about his

platoon caking heavy sniper fire in a hamlet . Black permitted some of th e

men to throw hand grenades into family bunkers before entering the m

because he "felt the whole place was unfriendly and that enemy were

probably hiding in the family bomb shelters ." The troops saw " very few

civilians," but suddenly they heard a child cry. A family had been in on e

of the shelters. While sniper fire continued against his forward platoons,

he directed his Navy Corpsman, " Doc, do what you can for them immediately, [emphasis in original] we can 't leave you here. " According to Black,

this was a " sore spot among many of our troops that the corpsmen spen d

their medicine and energy helping the VN civilians . " He quoted one o f

his men saying "Damn, man! This is a war! [emphasis in the original] We

can 't go hold ' n up for no gook civilians! " The corpsman reported that th e

civilian wounds were superficial and the troops moved on . 2dLt William

R . Black, Jr., ltr to parents, dtd 20-lApr68, Encl, William R. Black, Jr. ,

Comments on draft, dtd 4Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

Changing Attitudes

Such attitudes were a disturbing factor to the

Marine command and lay behind the continuin g

efforts of the Marine Corps Personal Response Program. The Marine Corps pacification program depended upon the troops understanding the complexity o f

the situation they faced. While it might be too muc h

to expect all Marines to like the Vietnamese, the command undertook extensive efforts to ensure that the

Marines respected the rights and lives of the villagers

who depended upon their protection .

Working against the perception on the part o f

some Marines and even some commanders that it wa s

a "chaplain's program" or a "do-gooder concept," Personal Response officers tried to bring relevance to thei r

message . Each Marine infantry platoon commander

received a Personal Response notebook, a 53-page

booklet, with examples and suggestions for furthe r

discussion with the Marines under him . For example ,

it offered the case where a CAP Marine by holding

hands with a local girl destroyed the existing goo d

relationship within the hamlet between the Marines

and the villagers. In a graphic paragraph, the pamphlet observed :

Put it this way. If a foreigner squatted down on a stree t

corner in Chicago and crapped in the gutter we would

be offended . Most of us would hardly notice it, however, if a Vietnamese man walked down the street holdin g

hands with an American girl. Here it is just the othe r

way around—only worse . Holding hands with a Vietnamese girl in public is labeling all their women as

prostitutes.6 6

Of course, the effectiveness of the pamphlet depended upon the initiative of the individual platoon commander and the command interest of his seniors . Eac h

division, the wing, the Force Logistic Command, and

Naval Support Activity had Personal Response contact

teams. Each team consisted of a commissioned officer

and a senior noncommissioned officer who wer e

responsible for the conduct of schools and orientatio n

in their respective commands.

The emphasis was upon formal and informal

instruction . For example, in January 1968, the 3 d

Marine Division contact team held a two-day divisio n

Personal Response course for Personal Response officers at lower echelons. Personal contact teams gave

field lectures and held discussion groups with seve n

infantry battalions which numbered over 970 Marine s

in attendance . The division teams provided instruction

at the Combined Action Group school, the 3d Recon-
PACIFICATION 617

naissance Battalion indoctrination Course, and th e

Division staff NCO leadership course . For the month ,

the division reported that 104 officers, 139 staff

NCOs, and 931 other enlisted men (a total of 117 4

personnel) listened to 37 hours of formal school presentations and 24 hours of field lectures relative to Personal Response .67

All of the commands would accumulate similar statistics through the rest of the year. Furthermore, the III

MAF Personal Response office issued a monthly flye r

called "Spice, " which was to add "seasoning to presentations, " while another periodical called "Viewpoints "

was to depict a "`happening ' in American-Vietnames e

Relations. " At the end of September, III MAF placed

its Personal Response program under the III MA F

Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) rather than the G—5

Division, Civic Action. This, however, made little difference for the program since all the subordinate commands retained their Personal Response officers an d

teams in their G—5 or S—5 civic action sections 68

Again the question remains, how much difference

did the entire effort make? While any conclusion would

be conjecture, the evidence implies the effect was positive . In a presentation for General Walt in October

1968, who was then the Assistant Commandant of th e

Marine Corps, the briefer stated that the 3d Marin e

Division credited the Personal Response training "as a

major factor in the reduction of that comman d 's serious

incident rate by more than one-fourth over the past 1 2

months. " He observed that the 1st Marine Divisio n

reported an 11 percent decrease in non-operational serious incidents in the past year and also attributed this to

its Personal Response efforts. Later in a debriefing a t

FMFPac, Major General Tompkins, the former 3 d

Marine Division commander and Deputy CG III MAF ,

commented that while difficult to assess the effectiveness of Personal Response, he believed the entire effor t

worthwhile and brought forth unexpected benefits i n

the form of intelligence about enemy units and infra -

structure in the local communities.®

Despite the promulgation of all the various directives and the distribution of materials, their impac t

was uneven . Major Parks later concluded that most

serious incidents involved men from units in which :

those directives had not been re-promulgated or implemented . .

. . A command which implemented thes e

directives, in which the commander knew what his sub -

ordinate units were doing and in which an intoleranc e

of misconduct was manifest, seldom suffered either i n

the accomplishment of its mission or from serious incidents. Fortunately this was the rule rather than th e

exception . 70

In the final analysis, while the Personal Respons e

officer provided assistance and direction, the program's

success depended upon the effectiveness of the individ -

ual commander, down to the platoon level, to suppor t

the policy. As one Marine historian wrote, the best tha t

could be said about the Personal Response progra m

was that the Marines "never gave up the effort to maintain a measure of humanity and compassion in the con -

duct of an often savage war . . . [but] probably dislik e

and distrust, tempered by a wary tolerance dictated b y

self-interest, were the dominant sentiments " on the

part of both the Marines and the local populace? '

The Boys Next Door:

The Combined Action Program

Relationships between Marines and the villagers

were most important in the Marine Corps Combine d

Action Program. While Chaplain McGonigal found

attitudes among Combined Action (CAP) Marines

more positive than troops in line units, still there wa s

reason for concern even in this supposedly show-cas e

pacification program . As McGonigal later stated, on e

of the problems of the CAPs was that you had "peopl e

with little maturity" and "we got a lot of shitbirds . "72

During 1967, the program had expanded, but not

without difficulty. One matter of concern was the lack

of support from some infantry regimental or battalio n

commanders, who still retained operational control o f

the individual Combined Action Marines in their sec -

tors. In February 1967, to provide more direct command influence over the program, Lieutenant General

Walt, then the III MAF commander, assigned Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson as the Combined

Action Company officer in a newly created billet in th e

G—3 section. Colorful and charismatic, but lacking formal command over the Combined Action Marines,

Corson gave structure to the program. He establishe d

guidelines, formed a school at Da Nang, provide d

some initial screening of applicants, and obtaine d

approval of a table of organization for the CAPs . By the

end of May, Corson had formed a Combined Action

Group headquarters at Da Nang with administrative

responsibility over the various Combined Action Com -

panies.7 3

In June 1967, after succeeding General Walt as

Commanding General III MAF, General Cushma n

placed the Combined Action Program under hi s

deputy, Major General Herman Nickerson, the forme r

commander of the 1st Marine Division. As 1st Division commander at Da Nang, Nickerson was an enthu-
618 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) A19236 1

LtGen Herman Nickerson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower at HQMC, on a visit to Vietnam, talks

with South Vietnam Popular Force troops, part of CAP 1-3-5 . The Combined Action Program was

placed under Gen Nickerson when he was Deputy Commander, III MAF . Col Edward F. Danowitz, the

Director, CAP (wearing glasses), is to the left and behind Gen Nickerson.

siastic supporter of the Marine pacification program,

including Combined Action . General Nickerson als o

knew Corson in that the latter "was my tank battalio n

commander . . .and did a magnificent job of relating t o

the people . . . ." With confidence in Corson, Nickerson gave him a new title, III MAF Deputy Director fo r

Combined Action, and delegated authority over the

program to him. By July, Corson formed two ne w

Combined Action Groups and III MAF distributed a

formal standard operating procedure (SOP) that

defined the structure, mission, and command relation s

of the program.* Once and for all, III MAF assumed

direct operational control of the CAPs with line units

out of the chain of command, except for occasional

combat support and coordination . The 1st CAG, based

at Chu Lai, was responsible for Marine Combined

Action operations in the southern two provinces,

*Lieutenant Colonel Corson wrote that the SOP was totally illegal in that only the CMC can create a new organization . However, with

General Nickerson 's support we did it, no matter the legality. " H e

mentioned that the changes took off very quickly despite the protests

of several regimental commanders. Corson Comments.

Quang Tin and Quang Ngai . Similarly, the 2d CAG at

Da Nang controlled the CAPs in Quang Nam

Province, and the 3d CAG at Phu Bai, the CAPs in th e

two northern provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien . 7

Command relations with the Vietnamese were a little more blurred . The Combined Action Marines di d

not have operational control of the Popular Force platoons with whom they worked . Instead the relationship was one of coordination and advice . Supposedl y

the South Vietnamese platoon leader answered to th e

local district chief, and it was the responsibility of th e

commanders of the CAGs and CACOs to coordinate

with the South Vietnamese provincial and district officials relative to the CAPs. The Marine Combine d

Action platoon squad leader, in effect, was an advisor to

the platoon leader. He could not command the Sout h

Vietnamese, but only offer suggestions and advice.

Obviously, much depended upon the personal relation -

ship between the individual Marines and the Sout h

Vietnamese Popular Force troops for the effectiveness

of the program.

The finding of the ideal and idealistic Marines to

run such a program would take some doing and by
PACIFICATION 619

November, the program had floundered . Generals

Walt and Nickerson, who had both strongly pushe d

the program, had left. In August, Corson also had

departed and a few months later, very much disillusioned, wrote a bitter and biting indictment of American strategy in the war.* His handpicked successor,

Lieutenant Colonel Francis R . Hittinger, Jr., was

killed by a mine explosion in the Da Nang area o f

operations. Instead of the 114 Cap units that were

supposed to be in place at the end of the year, th e

Marines only had 79 . 7 5

According to Lieutenant Colonel Byron E. Brady, he

met on Thanksgiving Day 1967 with Major General

Raymond L. Murray, the new III MAF deputy commander, who offered him the position of III MAF

Deputy Director for Combined Action .** In contrast to

the flamboyant Corson, the relatively staid Brady was

more traditional in his approach . Joining the Marine

Corps in 1938 as a private, he received a commission

during World War II. Called back to active duty during Korea, Brady remained in the Corps as a career offi -

cer. While knowing very little about the Combined

Action Program, Brady immediately began to rea d

what was available about the concept . He was particularly impressed with Commander McGonigal 's evalua -

*Corson's book The Betrayal was published in July 1968, although

the draft was completed by April . Corson in his comments stated tha t

he did not start writing until mid-March 1968 . In the book, he condemned both the Johnson Administration and MACV, including

Ambassador Komer and General Westmoreland, for their direction of

the war and in particular for neglecting the " other war " or pacification .

He praised, however, both Marine Generals Walt and Krulak for thei r

efforts, and in particular, the Combined Action Program, although presenting an exaggerated and idealized version of the successes of the pro -

gram. There was some talk about official reprimands and possible court -

martial of Corson because he failed to submit the manuscript for review ,

according to Department of Defense regulations, prior to publication .

It was decided that such a course of action would only give undue publicity to the book . In his comments, Corson stated that a copy of hi s

unedited galley proofs was stolen from a safe in his office . He claimed

that his application for retirement to the Secretary of the Navy was firs t

approved then rescinded upon basis that he had violated some Department of Defense administrative rule . According to Corson, his lawye r

obtained a writ for the Secretaries of the Navy and of Defense to sho w

cause for the revocation of his retirement, and only after the matter had

reached the President was the decision made in his favor. See LtCo l

William R. Corson file, Biog Files, RefSec, MCHC and Corson Comments. Corson dedicated the book "To the hearts and minds of the CAP

Marines, both living and dead ." See also LtCol William R . Corson, The

Betrayal (New York : W. W. Norton & Co, 1968) .

**Lieutenant Colonel Brady noted that when he first cook over th e

biller, he only loosely controlled the Combined Action Groups, bu t

that it was " later established as a command billet . . . ." LtCol Byro n

F. Brady, Comments on draft, dtd 300ct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

tion of the program and the importance of the relationship between the Marines and the Vietnames e

Popular Force troops and the villagers. Concerned

about what he considered the degradation of the quality in the training of Marines now coming to Vietnam ,

Brady established as his first priority the recruiting o f

good men for the program.7 6

By this time the growing demands and limitation s

on Marine manpower would have its effect upon the

Combined Action Program. An exchange of messages

among the Commandant, General Wallace M . Greene ,

Jr., Lieutenant General Krulak at FMFPac, and General Cushman at III MAF highlighted this concern . As

early as August 1967, General Krulak observed to the

Commandant that he had directed General Cushman

"to proceed with CAP activations out of his presen t

resources to the extent possible, although realis m

prompts the conclusion that he may not be able to do

much." As the year came to a close these manpowe r

constraints became even tighter.77

Even more disconcerting for the Marine Corps wa s

the possible loss of CORDS support for the program ,

specifically by Ambassador Komer. General Westmoreland always had some skepticism about the Combined Action Program. Although calling the concept

"ingenious," he also wrote, "I simply had not enoug h

numbers to put a squad of Americans in every villag e

and hamlet . . . ." Apparently Komer had come to

much the same opinion. While asking for an evaluation of the program by CORDS personnel at D a

Nang, in early December 1967, Komer canceled a

Combined Action briefing by Lieutenant Colonel

Brady at an orientation course for Joint U.S . Publi c

Affairs Officers. According to a MACV official at th e

session, CORDS had concluded that "the Combined

Action Program is too expensive to continue ." On 5

December, in a message to the Commandant, General Krulak recalled that in a conversation that he had

with Komer "some time ago," the latter "spoke wit h

enthusiasm about the idea but said because of it s

broad interface with civilian affairs, that the program

probably ought to be under CORDS." The FMFPac

commander believed that the whole matter was one o f

turf: "It could be, having met no success in the

endeavor to take it over, that he [Komer] is now committed to abolishing the program."7 8

As would be expected, Ambassador Komer had a

completely different recollection of the events than Gen -

eral Krulak . According to Komer several years later, h e

remembered that when he asked "Wally Greene and

Krulak for more people for the CAPs, their answer was,
620 THE DEFINING YEA R

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A42218 6

Marine Cpl Gilbert J. Davis, a member of the CAP Mobil e

Training Team, trains two South Vietnamese Popular Forc e

troops. MACVpressed III MAF to form Mobile Assistanc e

Teams to supplement the Combined Action platoons.

Bob we haven't enough people to keep our . . . Marine

forces going—we are really people poor." The CORDS

chief explained that the CAPs performed well, but th e

program demanded an " enormous requirement for

American infantry which we did not have ."7 9

In any event, on 7 January 1968, Ambassador

Komer met with the new Marine Corps Commandant ,

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., who was in Saigon

on an information gathering visit . In the meeting,

Komer acknowledged that the Combined Action program had value and was proving effective, but that "i t

was very expensive in manpower . . . {and} is too slow

a program to accomplish the pacification ends at an

early date ." He believed that the Marines shoul d

reduce the size of their squads in the hamlets to eight -

man teams and experiment with more mobile techniques. Komer especially pushed the newly created

MACV program of Mobile Assistance Teams consisting of a five-man team including an ARVN officer, a n

American officer, and three American veteran combat

enlisted men that would move from one Popular Forc e

platoon in a province to another, to teach basic infantr y

tactics to the Vietnamese militia . General Chapman

remained noncommittal, but promised "to monito r

the program and insure that the maximum value is

gained from the personnel committed . "80

From a III MAF perspective, the Marines remaine d

skeptical about the motives of MACV. Although the

only true similarity between the MACV Mobile Assistance Teams and that of the CAPs was that they bot h

worked with the Popular Forces, General Westmoreland would later insist that the MACV teams were a n

adaptation of the CAP concept .* In April 1968, to ward

off possible Saigon tampering with the program, General Cushman and Lieutenant Colonel Brady eventually

established Mobile Training Teams (MTT) in the CA P

program. These teams, which consisted of regular Combined Action Marine squads, were assigned to a nonCAP Popular Forces platoon for about a two-week period, and would provide a crash-training course i n

infantry tactics. The teams would then move on t o

another such Popular Force platoon in the sam e

province and repeat the process. Brigadier General Ear l

E . Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, would late r

state that it was the III MAF belief that Komer wanted

to "absorb the CAPs into the RF/PF structure . . . controlled by CORDS," but that General Cushman "resisted this, and he felt that by coming up with some new

idea . . . he would get more mileage out of the CAP pro -

gram and forestall any attempt on the part of Kome r

and other people at MACV to destroy the CAP pro -

gram." Ambassador Komer, nevertheless, would late r

contend, "I was a big fan of the CAPS . "8 1

On 30 January 1968, just before Tet, III MAF submitted a revised Table of Organization for the Combined Action Program to reflect the actual comman d

structure . The old tables still retained the authority of

the individual battalion and division commanders ove r

the Combined Action Companies. General Cushma n

objected and declared that since June 1967, control

resided with the respective Combined Action Groups. With the redeployment of 1st Marine Divisio n

infantry battalions to Phu Bai from Da Nang, the situation in both sectors had become fluid. New units i n

new TAORs were unfamiliar with the Combine d

Action Marines, and III MAF worried that the CAPs

were vulnerable to enemy attack . Cushman wrote in a

letter to General Chapman that, because of the need fo r

close coordination and liaison with the South Vietnamese authorities relative to the CAPs, there was a

*In his comments, Lieutenant General Krulak called the Mobil e

Assistance Team concept " worthless. " Krulak Comments.
PACIFICATION 62 1

Photo courtesy of Igor Bobrowsky

Members of CAP Delta—1 are on patrol near the hamlet of Thanh Quit south of Da Nang . One CAP

member, Igor Bobrowsky, remembered that prior to Tet the local populace began "making coffins. "

need for "unity of command" on the Marine side . He

continued that, with the "increased mobility of

infantry units, it is impractical for the infantry uni t

commander to effect continued and close liaison wit h

Vietnamese officials." This had to be handled through

the Combined Action structure itself, pointing out fo r

example, that the 3d CAG at Phu Bai had units i n

both the 1st and 3d Marine Division area of operations .

Earlier, in a telephone conversation with FMFPac,

General Cushman observed that he was conducting a

study to find the best way to use the CAPs.8 2

The Tet offensive, however, in January and Februar y

1968, would have more effect upon the changes mad e

in the Combined Action program than the jurisdictional battles with CORDS and MACV and out of dat e

tables of organization. Even before Tet, there were

strong indications that things were different . Combined Action Platoons, both near Da Nang and Ph u

Loc, increasingly came under attack .* One CAP

Marine, Igor Bobrowsky, assigned to one of the ham-

*See Chapters 6, 7, and 8 for description of the attacks on the

CAPs during this period and during Ter.

lets of Thanh Quit below Da Nang, remembered, "it

was just that the intensity of what was going on kep t

on increasing, increasing, increasing . " He observed the

contacts with the VC became "increasingly more frequent and stronger ripples turning into waves aroun d

us . . . ." Sources of intelligence had dried up but in a

macabre way villagers provided an indication that

something big was about to occur : "As we'd walk

through some place, people were making coffins. "

Bobrowsky recalled thinking : "Who died? Was . . .

there a plague?" The people "were just getting a jump

start on the burials to come . . .," but before the

Marines realized the import of the situation, "the shi t

hit the fan, but it wasn't . . . all at once . It was just that

suddenly we found ourselves totally isolated . . . ."8 3

In any event according to a Department of Defense

analysis, from 1 November 1967 through 31 January

1968, nearly half or 49 percent of enemy initiated

attacks in I Corps occurred against the CAPs. In February the percentage dropped to 38 percent . According

to the report, "It is significant that this period of high

activity against the CAPs coincides with the buildu p

and attack phases of the Tet offensive ."8 4
622 THE DEFINING YEA R

After the heavy fighting during and after Tet ha d

died down, III MAF reexamined the entire Combined

Action structure. Colonel Harold L. Oppenheimer, a

Marine reservist on active duty, who was on specia l

assignment to III MAF, prepared a study on the pro -

gram for General Cushman . Oppenheimer basicall y

called for more centralization of the Combined Actio n

command organization and the consolidation of units

into more defensible units.S 5

More importantly, however, Lieutenant Colone l

Brady, the III MAF Deputy Director for Combined

Action, completed his own report on the program. While aware of Oppenheimer's study, he depende d

more upon the initiatives of his CAG commanders,

especially the 3d CAG commander at Phu Bai, Lieu -

tenant Colonel Robert J. Keller. Since the fall of

1967, Keller had advocated less of a "fortified village "

concept for the CAP defenses and more of a comba t

capability based upon night patrols and ambushes .

After the overrunning of CAPs Hotel 5, 6, and 7'' i n

the Phu Loc sector in January, Keller decided t o

reform these units into mobile CAPs . While assigned

to a general village sector consisting of several ham -

lets, the mobile CAP had no specific base, but moved

from hamlet to hamlet . According to Brady, the

restructured CAPs had some success "in combat situations." He talked the concept over with Keller and

then made a personal staff study.86

From his analysis of the situation, Lieutenan t

Colonel Brady noted that the preliminary evidence

would indicate that the mobile CAPs sustained fewe r

casualties in relation to VC KIA than the CAPs i n

fixed positions. Still Brady noted that both types of

Combined Action units had their advantages. The

Compound CAPs were better geared to provide civi c

action and to obtain intelligence from the villagers . On

the other hand, the mobile CAPs formed better relations with their Vietnamese Regional Force and Popular Force counterparts since they were "both living a t

the same level." At this point, Brady suggested that

when III MAF form new Mobile CAPs that they be i n

the same vicinity of a compound CAP. According to

Brady, this would insure that there would be a safe

haven for the mobile units. In June, General Cushman

concurred with Brady's recommendations .8 7

Following Tet, there were other changes in the

Combined Action Program besides the establishment

of the Mobile CAPs and the Mobile Training Teams. In

April, III MAF changed the designations of all of the

*See Chapter 6 for a description of the fighting in Hotel 6 .

CAPs to numbers. Until that time, the Combine d

Action Platoons had been identified by a combination

of letters and numbers. All of the Combined Action

Companies carried letter identifiers, similar to infantr y

and artillery companies and batteries. The platoons

then carried the letter plus a number. For example, the

Combined Action Company at Phu Loc was CACO H

or Hotel and the individual platoons under the control

of CACO H were known as H or Hotel 1 through 8 .

This made for some confusion as there was no system -

atic way to identify which platoon or company

belonged to a specific Combined Action Group . Under

the new system, the Combined Action Companies

took the number of the CAG they belonged to while

the platoons in turn took the numbers of both the

CAG and CACO plus an additional number. For

example, CAP 3—2—1 would stand for the 1st Combined Action platoon, of the 2d Combined Action

Company, of the 3d Combined Action Group .H H

Concerned about the results of a survey of CA P

Marines following Tet by Lieutenant Commande r

McGonigal that several experienced a sense of betrayal

on the part of the PFs and some of the villagers for no t

warning them, Lieutenant Colonel Brady continue d

with both the efforts to systemize the program and t o

raise the standards for Marines to enter the Combine d

Action platoons. On 18 April, III MAF issued a Force

Bulletin outlining the Combined Action Program and

urging "commanders to actively recruit highly qualified personnel as volunteers for duty with the Combined Action Program." It remarked upon the need

that every member of a CAP "must be a potential

leader, who through professional capability, persona l

example, courage and dedication can foster the respect

of Vietnamese Nationals and lead small unit combine d

forces in combat." Signed by Major General William J.

Van Ryzin, who had relieved General Murray as III

MAF deputy commander, the bulletin "requested that

command interest be directed towards the recruiting o f

volunteers and the final selection of personnel . . . ." It

ended on the high note that the "recruiting of on e

highly qualified individual is repaid at least three fol d

in terms of military combat potential alone . . . ."H9

In June, III MAF followed up the bulletin with a

new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for th e

Combined Action Program . While canceling the SO P

of the previous year, it reconfirmed many of the basi c

tenets of the Combined Action Program . It continued

the integration of a Marine squad plus a corpsman wit h

the Popular Forces platoon and the command structure

through III MAF exercised by the Director, Combined
PACIFICATION 62 3

Action Program, and the Combined Action Groups.

Again, the new SOP emphasized that the command

relationship between the Marines and the PFs was on a

"coordination and cooperation basis . The USMC squad

leader does not command the PF element of the platoon, nor does the PF platoon leader command th e

Marines." While the new SOP did not stipulate that

new Combined Action platoons should be mobile, it

emphasized that the "CAP compound is to be a n

administrative and logistical headquarters for the platoon and is not meant to be a citadel ."90

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new

order was the codification of the standards for CAP

volunteers. These were divided into two groups—one

for lance corporals and below and the other for non -

commissioned officers. For regular enlisted men, the

criteria included a minimum of six months remaining

on their current tour in Vietnam ; to be true volunteers

"and motivated to live and work with the Vietnamese

people" ; to be recommended by their commandin g

officer and to be a "mature, motivated Marine" ; to

have had "no non-judicial punishment within the pas t

three months" ; and to have had no court-martials during the past year. The selection process preferred high

school graduates and those with an infantry militar y

occupational specialty. It limited volunteers to thos e

Marines who had less than two Purple Hearts on thei r

current Vietnam tour. Noncommissioned officers wer e

not only to meet the above 'standards but in addition

were to have had combat experience, "demonstrated a

high quality of leadership, " and to be deemed "highly

qualified for promotion . " While waivers were permitted for "highly motivated" personnel recommende d

"with enthusiasm," these personnel still had to appea r

before the CAP screening board before any waiver

would be granted. All commanders were to maintain

rosters of qualified personnel for Combined Action

and were to fill quotas for the program from that list .

Although not specifically specified in the SOP, i t

would be assumed that all volunteers had to be

approved by the Screening Board .9 1

With the restructuring of the Combined Actio n

Program, there was also a growth in the number o f

Combined Action platoons and groups. From 79 platoons in January, the number increased to 85 in May,

and reached 93 in July. On 20 July, III MAF activated

the 4th Combined Action Group in Quang Tri

Province. By the end of the month with four CAGs,

the Marines assigned to the program totaled 38 officer s

and 1,913 enlisted men, not including 104 Nav y

corpsmen with the platoons 92

The establishment of the 4th CAG in Quang Tr i

was not a unanimous decision . Colonel Richard B .

Smith, who commanded the 9th Marines until 13 July,

objected to the establishment of CAP units in the

DMZ sector. Colonel Alexander L. Michaux, who had

also just completed his tour as the 3d Marine Divisio n

G-3, had his doubts, declaring "we don't have too

much use for the CAPs."* Despite these reservations,

the 3d Marine Division commander, Major Genera l

Davis, believed the Combined Action concept could

contribute to the pacification effort in his sector .9 3

With the support of the 3d Division commander,

III MAF transferred Lieutenant Colonel John E .

Greenwood, Jr., from command of the 1st Battalion ,

27th Marines, to take over the new CAG . On 9

August, the 4th CAG commander submitted a plan

that called for the establishment of one new Combined Action Company and six new Combined Action

platoons. While III MAF approved the request excep t

for one platoon, there was a delay of several weeks

until the South Vietnamese gave their consent. Finally on 30 September, Lieutenant Colonel Brad y

informed Greenwood that General Lam concurred. In

the interim, the 4th CAG commander took advantage

of this interval to organize the new volunteers int o

platoons and provide them with training . While the

delay caused some inconvenience, it resulted, according to Greenwood, in the Marines being better pre -

pared for their assignment. By the end of October,

with the activation of the new units, the 4th CAG

consisted of three companies, 12 Combined Actio n

platoons, and 2 mobile training platoons . Of the 1 2

CAPS in Quang Tri, 8 were mobile .94

*Colonel Robert J. Keller, who commanded the 3d CAG in 1968 ,

recalled that he earlier briefed General Krulak, CGFMFPac, and recommended that a 4th CAG be formed which would take over responsibility for the area north of Hue including those CAPs in Quang Tri

Province. While General Krulak, according to Keller, appeared enthusiastic, the Army 's 1st Air Cavalry Division "did not agree and preferred that Marines not operate in their TAOR. " Keller also remembered that Colonels Michaux' and Smith's objections were

"longstanding" and that he was well aware of them . He believed the

two officers failed " to recognize the fighting [qualities) as well as pacification aspects of the CAPs . " Col Robert J. Keller, Comments o n

draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Both Colonel Smith an d

Michaux reiterated their doubts about the Combined Action Progra m

in their comments. Colonel Michaux wrote, "I can empathize wit h

those Marines involved in the Pacification Program . However, fro m

the standpoint of the one with the combat units, the two program s

[the war against the regular NVA units in the DMZ sector and CAP)

appear contradictory. " Col Alexander L. Michaux, Comments on draft,

dtd 4Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). See Chapter 7 for Smith's objections to the CAPs.
(t2 I TIlE t)Hl N IN( \lAR

COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM EXPANSION-i 967-1 968

USMC

1ST CAG

378

Includes three CAPs and one company headquarters decIivated at Khe Sar*i. From Operations of US Marine Furcir, V,etria,ii 1958

STRENGTHS

2D GAG

UNITS

1 1967 1968

STRENGTHS ____

3D CAG

USN

RVN

______________ ____ STRENGTHS _____________________ I

296

18

546

28

4TH CAG

809

STRENGTHS ______________________
PACIFICATION 625

By December, the four Combined Action Groups

together totaled 19 Combined Action Companies, 10 2

Combined Action Platoons, and 7 Mobile Training

Teams. During the course of the year, III MAF had

activated one Combined Action Group, six companies,

28 Combined Action platoons, and all seven of th e

Mobile Training Teams. At the same time, one company and five CAPs had been deactivated . Accordin g

to FMFPac, the number of Marines assigned to the pro -

gram had increased by nearly 500 over 1967, fro m

1,265 in December 1967 to 1,763 in December 1968 .

Almost all of the 28 new CAPs were mobile rathe r

than fixed and a large percentage of the compound

CAPs were to be transformed into mobile ones . For

example, according to the 2d CAG at Da Nang, 7 5

percent of its CAPs were eventually to become mobile .

By the end of December, 13 of its 39 CAPs, or abou t

37 percent, were already in the mobile status 95

Despite the growth and expansion of the Combined

Action Program, many questions remained unresolved . MACV, CORDS, and even some of the Army

units in I Corps still kept the Combined Action Program at arm's length . While individual CORD S

provincial and district officials looked sympatheticall y

on the program, a III MAF staff officer in a briefing fo r

General Walt, the Assistant Commandant, referred t o

the CAP concept as an "I Corps exclusive . " In persona l

letters, Brigadier General Anderson, the III MAF Chie f

of Staff, wrote that U.S. Army Lieutenant General

Richard G. Stilwell, the XXIV Commander in north -

ern I Corps, had been "very vociferous to his staff with

respect to the CAP Program . . . [and later] voiced

strong objections to having them [Combined Actio n

Platoons] placed along the LOCs [lines of communication]." Because of that attitude, III MAF decided no t

to activate several CAP units between Hue and Quan g

Tri. According to Anderson, General Cushman agree d

since he believed "to put them in an area where they'r e

not wanted, especially when you have to rely on th e

U.S . unit in the area for supporting fires and reinforcement when under ground attack, would not be wis e

and that we can better use them elsewhere ." The III

MAF commander several years later observed, "we had

*According to General Anderson, there was a difference of attitud e

among Army units in I Corps towards the Combined Action Program . Fo r

example, he wrote that the 1st Air Cavalry Division had " no use for the

CAPs" while he had heard that the " 101st Airborne Division thinks quir e

highly of the CAPs and will take any that they can get . " BGen E. E.

Anderson Itr to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dcd 11Sep68, Encl, E . E . Anderson Comments. Throughout this period, Combined Action Platoon s

remained assigned in the U .S. Army Americal Division area of operations .

a basic philosophical difference with the Army on i t

[Combined Action]. We kept on with it. "96*

Lieutenant Colonel Brady, the Combined Actio n

Director, declared that as far as he was concerned, th e

relationship with both MACV and CORDS was "very

poor. " He later related the frustration that he experienced in attempting to ensure a coordinated U .S . pacification effort in the countryside . Brady had convinced

General Cushman in July, as the Senior U .S . Advisor to

I Corps and General Lam, to issue an order that calle d

upon each of the Corps province senior advisors to chai r

a monthly conference for that purpose . At the conference would be representatives of CORDs, military

advisors, and III MAF units including Army unit s

attached to the Marine command, and the Combine d

Action Group commander. The province senior adviso r

would then forward through all three channels—

CORDS, advisory, and III MAF—a "conference repor t

(to include minority opinions on items of controversy )

to CG III MAE" Upon the strong objection, however,

of the senior CORDS official, III MAF canceled th e

order and issued a new one . The new order only stipulated that "province senior advisors may at their discretion convene combined meetings of appropriat e

military and civilian personnel to discuss and coordinate pacification within their respective provinces . " No

specific mention was made of the Combined Action

Group commander.97* *

Even in I Corps, the effectiveness of many of th e

reforms, especially that of screening and training o f

new volunteers, remains a matter of conjecture .

Despite questionnaires, Combined Action Schools, and

screening boards, much depended upon circumstances

and events. The questionnaires consisted of little more

than 20 questions which largely dealt with the volunteer's attitudes. While statistical data remains elusive ,

anecdotal evidence in the form of oral history interviews would imply that both the initial screening and

training of Marines for the program was often haphazard. Lieutenant Colonel Brady, for example, remembered that the school at Da Nang could last anywhere

from two weeks to two months, "depending on personnel requirements in the field ." Igor Bobrowsky

recalled only very vaguely receiving any indoctrinatio n

training, but later wrote "there was a `school' at 2 d

**General Earl E . Anderson, who as the III MAF chief of staff,

believed that the problem with CORDS extended beyond I Corps . I n

a contemporary letter, he wrote : " We still have problems with Kome r

in Saigon . He is adamant about the CAP Program and wants it place d

under the CORDS advisory effort . " BGen E . E. Anderson to LtGen W.

J. Van Ryzin, dtd 16Oct68, Encl, E . E. Anderson Comments .
626 THE DEFINING YEA R

CAG. It didgive instructions on everything from Vietnamese culture to small unit tactics, ambushes, recon ,

artillery, communications . . . I did not participate in

any of it to any extent ."9 8

The selection process was also different for various

Marines . Bobrowsky, for example, stated he had littl e

choice and was selected for the program by his company commander. He recollected that his captain tol d

him that it would only be a 30-day assignment, an d

perhaps was the reason he did not go to the CAG

school. It was, however, a permanent transfer. The

captain later wrote Bobrowsky, explaining, "I had t o

pick someone who I felt was . . . a responsible perso n

who knew how to . . . work a small unit . . . . "

Bobrowsky's commanding officer, at least, made a n

attempt to send good men to the CAPs rather tha n

"stick em with anybody."9 9

This was not always the case. Eugene H. Ferguson ,

an 18-year old corporal and high school dropout, afte r

completing a Vietnamese language course in the United States, arrived in Vietnam in early 1968 . Despite his

language capability, Ferguson was assigned directly to

a Marine infantry line battalion . Outside of being used

to check on the veracity of the Kit Carson Scout wit h

his unit, Ferguson functioned like any newly assigne d

Marine squad leader. About a month after Ferguso n

was in-country, the North Vietnamese ambushed his

squad which was on a "Sparrow Hawk" mission to

assist another Marine unit . Except for his radioman,

Ferguson lost all of his squad, either dead or wounded ,

in the clash. Although physically unscathed, Ferguso n

went into a deep depression: "I just couldn't seem to

get into the hang of what everybody else was doing . "

At that point, Ferguson recalled his company commander called him in and asked, "NI wanted to go int o

CAG. I didn't know what it was or where it was or wh o

was doing what and I said `sure .' I need to get out of

here ." Ferguson suspected "they [his unit leaders] wer e

anticipating trouble from me and shipped me out t o

CAG." After a two-week familiarization course at the

3d CAG School at Phu Bai in April, the young corporal became a member of a Combined Action platoon . l o o

The only thing that can be said of both th e

Bobrowsky and Ferguson cases were that they illustrated the variegated backgrounds and motives fo r

entering the CAP Marines. Bobrowsky was the son of

immigrant Ukrainian parents and was born in a repatriation camp in Europe after World War II with ambitions to attain a commission . Ferguson was the son of a

retired 20-year Navy veteran and enlisted in the

Marine Corps because his father hated Marines .

Photo courtesy of Col Edward F. Danowitz, USMC (Ret)

Col Edward F. Danowitz, Director, III MAF Combined

Action Program, presents a certificate and an award (a pai r

of Marine combat boots) to the outstanding Popular Forc e

graduate of the Combined Action school at the Combined

Action Group headquarters. Col Danowitz assumed command of the program in October 1968.

Sergeant Andrew Lewandowski, a career Marine with a

Japanese wife and a veteran of the Khe Sanh siege, vol -

unteered for the CAPs in October, 1968, because h e

claimed he wanted to help the people. At the same

time, he admitted he was having difficulties with bot h

his platoon lieutenant and sergeant . If there was on e

common factor that all three commented upon in thei r

initial screening process was their attitude towards th e

Vietnamese people . Lewandowski remembered appearing before a CAP screening board headed by Colone l

Edward F. Danowitz, who, in October, had replace d

Lieutenant Colonel Brady as Director of the Combined

Action program.* To put the Marine sergeant at ease ,

Danowitz spoke a few phrases in Polish to Lewandows-

*Colonel Danowitz commented that upon his arrival at III MAP

on 1 October, General Cushman assigned him as the Director of th e

Combined Action Program, stating "he wished to have a senior colone l

at that post, citing his support for the program and wishing to get bet -

ter cooperation from the Vietnamese, particularly General Lam . "

According to Danowitz, Cushman and Lam agreed to weekly meeting s

"to coordinate the program." Colonel Danowitz believed this was a

good idea, " but was never fully implemented . My counterpart seldo m

appeared for scheduled meetings and passed on problems to other officers for resolution . . . . ( where there should have been) cooperation an d

coordination there was little or none . " Danowitz remained as the CAP

Director until April 1969, when he assumed command of a Marine

regiment . Col Edward E Danowitz, Comments on draft, dtd 270ct9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Danowitz Comments.
PACIFICATION 627

ki after he learned that the latter understood the language . The concern, however, of the board, according

to Lewandowski was his feeling toward Orientals i n

general and the Vietnamese in particular.lo l

A former CAP Marine, Edward E Palm, wh o

retained serious reservations about the entire program, observed that in his perfunctory interview i n

July 1967, the concern of the interviewer was his attitude towards the Vietnamese . Unlike the three previous CAP members listed above, Palm had no comba t

experience . He had served his first six months in Vietnam as a supply clerk in what he described as a "prosaic, humdrum routine. " To break loose from this

stultifying job, Palm volunteered for the Combined

Action Program. The only qualification for the pro -

gram, according to Palm, "was the enthusiastic recommendation of my commanding officer, who was

probably only too glad to get a disaffected and unmotivated supply clerk off his roles." Like Ferguson ,

Palm attended the 3d CAG School for a brief twoweek period and learned some fundamentals of squa d

tactics and how to call in artillery. The exposure to

both the Vietnamese language and the society's more s

was rudimentary at best .10 2

The Combined Action mission was a daunting one

for even the most motivated of Marines, and especially

for young Marines. With the best of intentions, the

Combined Action schools could only provide a modicum of knowledge about South Vietnamese customs,

let alone language training. Even ideal CAPs outlined

by Chaplain McGonigal in his interim report woul d

have had difficulties adjusting to the conditions of a n

alien society at war with itself in the countryside . Lieutenant Colonel Brady half seriously stated that th e

qualification for a good CAP leader was a "tough

Marine sergeant, who has a PhD in social anthropology." Obviously the young Marine lance corporals, cor -

*As a former Marine officer, now an Army historian, Charles R .

Anderson, observed, all Marines in the infantry were ill-prepared t o

serve in CAP, since their training before arrival in Vietnam was combat-oriented . " Charles R. Anderson, Comments on draft, n .d . {Dec

1994) (Vietnam Comment File) . Colonel Danowitz stated that he

insisted on obtaining the best available men . He noted that when he

cook over in October 1968, that he was unimpressed with the 'volunteers" being sent from both the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions . He stated that he had good relations with both division commanders and

"immediately, the word went out to the regiments and a board wa s

formed at each headquarters where the G—1 'culled' men sent in fro m

the field and only the better ones came to our final selection board . "

While acknowledging that some " misfits " slipped through the selection process, he noted a decided improvement in the quality of th e

Marines in the program . Danowitz Comments.

porals, and sergeants hardly met that criteria .103*

How well did these young Marines do then i n

bridging the gap between them and the villagers an d

the PFs? Again there is no hard evidence except for th e

anecdotal . Citing the example in his own CAP, Edwar d

Palm later wrote : "The cultural gulf was just unbridgeable out in the countryside ." He observed "our PFs

eventually refused to patrol with us [and] I never really knew any of the PFs I worked and lived with ." On

the other hand, another young CAP, James DuGuid ,

recalled that when, in December 1967, told that he

was going home, he replied "but I am home ." According to DuGuicl, "I felt more love from those people i n

my village than I had ever prior to Vietnam . I took tha t

back with me ."104* *

Other Marines had different experiences. According

to Bobrowsky, his exposure to the village helped him

to understand the complexity of the Vietnamese countryside . As a Marine in a line unit, he was only interested if the villagers were hostile or not, otherwise they

were neutral . As a CAP Marine, he came to understand

that there were all kinds of interrelationships that

extended from family to village . While on relativel y

friendly terms with the villagers, the members of hi s

CAP knew they were outsiders . Bobrowsky tells about

his patrol sometime after Tet 1968 coming upon an ol d

woman burying two North Vietnamese soldiers . Halfjokingly, Bobrowsky asked the woman if she would do

the same for them. The woman laughed and pointed to

the PFs with the Marines and said she would bury

them, but "No, the Americans I'd just have to thro w

them in the river." to y

**Arliss Willhite, who served in the same CAP unit as DuGuid ,

wrote that he " felt a real kinship to the people and a loyalty to my ville .

I lived in Ngoc Ngot for 15 months . Longer than I had lived at a single location in my life. . . . To me CAP was Vietnamization in reverse .

. . . I didn't let anybody mess with the people, steal chickens, bur n

hootches or shoot at Buffalo . I' m still more Vietnamese than American .

I was watching out for the people on my block." Willhite stared that

he was not typical of most of the Marines in his hamlet . He recalled

that he was teased by some of his comrades, asking him if he wa s

" going to start voting? " Arliss Willhite, Comments on draft, dtd

28Sep94 (Vietnam Comment File). Former Sergeant John J. Balanco

was another CAP Marine who identified very closely with the loca l

population, in his case the Bru tribesmen that he served with in CAP

Oscar in Khe Sanh village . Recalling in his memoirs the fate of the Br u

refugees including the CAP members who were denied entry into the

American base at Khe Sanh, Balanco wrote : "These were the people we

were fighting with and for. Now we were abandoning them? It gave

me an outraged and hopeless feeling that has never left my heart o r

soul . " John J. Balanco, " Abandoned, Reflections of a Khe Sanh Vet, "

ms, Encl, Balanco, Comments on draft, dtd 15Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File). See Chapter 14 for the description of the overrunning of

Khe Sanh village and the aftermath .
628 THE DEFINING YEA R

In remarking about the quality of the Marines in his

CAP and their qualifications, Bobrowsky remarke d

that about half had probably been "pressganged" into

the unit much the same way he had. At the same time,

they worked well together and "I saw them as bein g

guys who knew what they were doing ." Most of the

Marines had little language training, but had picked

up "rudimentary Vietnamese and fortunately, the Vietnamese picked up a lot more rudimentary English . "

Ferguson, who was fluent in Vietnamese, stated tha t

the situation was similar in the CAP platoons that h e

served in. He estimated that about 50 percent of th e

Marines in his first platoon were qualified for their role ,

while the other "fifty percent were just trying to get

away from a bad situation they were in before ." One of

the Marines in Bobrowsky's platoon, Lance Corporal

Tom Harvey, was an exception to the above . Somewhat

older than the other CAP Marines, a college graduate

and a civil engineer, Harvey had enlisted in th e

Marines rather than be drafted into the Army. After

serving in an engineer battalion, he volunteered for the

CAPs. Having some facility with languages, Harvey

had taught himself rudimentary Vietnamese .106

Despite anomalies like Harvey, Ferguson, an d

DuGuid, who had some degree of fluency, most CAP

Marines had relatively little Vietnamese language

skills. As a former South Vietnamese officer, Lam Ha,

who served as a liaison officer with the CAPs, late r

wrote, the "language barrier was a vital problem" wit h

the program. Without being able to converse with the

people or the PFs, it was almost next to impossible fo r

the Marines to have anything but a superficial knowledge of the people they were to protect .I07*

Notwithstanding all of these obstacles, there wa s

some statistical evidence that the CAPs were effective .

Although based upon American military reports an d

the hamlet evaluation system, these analyses wer e

completed at the MACV and at the DOD levels, two

agencies which at best had shown only lukewarm sup -

port for the program. According to periodic reports

from January through November 1968, prepared by

the Southeast Asia Office of the Assistant Secretary of

* Lieutenant Colonel Brady, the CAP Director until October 196 8

wrote that "Because of the importance of cross cultural communicatio n

an ongoing language program was instituted in mid-1968 . " Brady

Comments. Each CAP Marine was also provided with a phrase boo k

" designed primarily for use in the Combined Action Program . " It contained such phrases such as "100% alert tonight . . . " to make immediate contact with the PF members of the CAP. The book was also

designed for independent study of both English and Vietnamese by th e

Marines and the Vietnamese . Vietnamese/English Phrase Book, n .d., End ,

Brady Comments.

Defense for System Analysis, hamlets with Combine d

Action platoons assigned to them showed that the y

fared markedly better during and after the enemy's Te t

offensive than hamlets without them . According t o

the HES ratings, there was about a 30 percent difference between the security ratings of the CAP hamlets

and those without the platoons after Tet . In their

November report, the DOD analysts concluded tha t

"the CAP concept may provide a useful way t o

upgrade security in the short run and to ensure tha t

application of massive allied firepower does not hurt

pacification efforts."108

Still, many questions remained . One was the transformation from the stationary or compound CAP to

the mobile CAPs. Some former Combined Actio n

Marines including Lieutenant Colonel Corson criticized the change as altering the entire concept of th e

program. They suggested that instead of providin g

protection for the hamlets, the CAPs in effect became

guerrillas themselves. In their view, the CAPs "had to

maintain a demonstrably visible presence in commitment to the hamlet. It had to be an alternative to the

guerrilla, as well as a tactic against the guerrilla." Others rejected that argument, stating that the compound s

were usually outside of the hamlets and, moreover, the y

were sitting targets for the VC and NVA . Almost all of

the Marines agreed that going to the mobile concep t

probably resulted in fewer casualties . Tom Harvey, who

served in both, later wrote : "I think nearly everyone

interested in the matter now recognized the advantage s

of the mobile CAP as opposed to those bound to fixe d

bases or compounds. " Taking a middle ground,

Michael Peterson argued that there was room for th e

two different approaches depending on the area . During 1968, both continued to coexist .109

In their November 1968 report, while in genera l

praising the Combined Action Program, the DO D

analysts also pointed out some of the basic weaknesse s

of the program. Although not accepting the Komer

and Westmoreland argument that one needed to plac e

a Combined Action platoon in every hamlet in Vietnam, the analysts showed that the Marines had not me t

even their more modest goals. Two of the origina l

objectives of the Combined Action program in 1968

were to obtain three effective Popular Force members

for every Marine and to improve the PFs to the exten t

where the Marines could begin to phase out of the pro -

gram . According to the DOD report, in Novembe r

1968 there was a ratio of 1 .4 PFs per Marine and that

the prevailing trend was downwards . Even more to th e

point, the Marines were taking about twice the num-
7.500

5.000

2.500

OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

Nrqhl fl

Jan [.' Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

200

100

ENEMY KILLED

Jan Fob Mr Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nec Dec

ENEMY CAPTURED WEAPONS CAPTURED

100

50

Jer-r Feb Mar Ap May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Fob U Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sop Oct Nov Dec

Total

I January 19d" 31 December lii''

Day 27,167

90

60

30

150

Total

I January 1968-3! December 1968

780

PACIFICATION 629

COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY

From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

ber of casualties as the PFs. Moreover, the report concluded, 'in over three years of operations no evidence

exists that U.S. Marines have been able to withdraw

from a CAP solely because their Vietnamese counterparts were able to take over.110*

How successful were the CAPs? Much depended

on the effectiveness of the individual CAP. To a large

extent, most improved the security within the hamlets and the village. Some even won the begrudging

loyalty and perhaps even affection of the villagers.

But few were able to attain the loyalty of the people

to the Government of South Vietnam. When asked

about the relationship between his Combined

Action unit and villagers, on one hand, and with the

South Vietnamese authorities, on the other, Igor

Bobrowsky answered, 'the fewer the better."

Michael Peterson remarked upon the unique elan of

the CAPs "although it was a maverick, gone-barn-

*Lieutenant Colonel Brady took exception to the assertion that the

CAPs had not succeeded in turning over any hamlets to the RFs. He

stated that in the five CAP units that were deactivated during the year,

the Marines were "reassigned to other CAPs leaving trained PFs on

their own." Brady Comments.

boo, anti-brass, kind of spirit." Lawrence A. Yates

wrote in his analysis of the program: "There were

good and bad, successful and unsuccessful CAP platoons. Accomplishments varied depending on such

factors as time, place and personnel, not to mention

a host of other variables that were beyond the control of the CAP Marines."lil

One former Defense Analyst, Francis J. "Bing"

West, the author of several studies on CAP, wrote that

in his opinion the "essential problem" with the program was the "lack of a warfighting strategy" at both

MACV and III MM:

Without a strategy, there was no yardstick for measuring the amount of resources dedicated to Mission X vs

Mission Y So the CAP was seen as a drain of Marine

manpower. It, in fact, saved manpower.

He believed that the Marine TAORs should have consisted of "overlapping CAP patrol areas" with the Marine

regular battalions making up a central reserve. Instead,

according to West, "the CAP was treated as an interesting tactical study in sociology; its strategic cost-effectiveness was overlooked both by III MAE and by MACV."I 2
630 THE DEFINING YEAR

The Accelerated Pacification Pla n

With the petering out of the last phase of the enem y

"Tet" offensive from August into October, the allies

began to take the offensive in pacification operations .

Claiming that they had reached the goals of Operatio n

Recovery, MACV, CORDS, and the South Vietnamese

inaugurated a new campaign, called Le Loi in Vietnamese and the Acceleration Pacification Campaign i n

English. The campaign was to last from Novembe r

through January 1969 . Country-wide it had five objectives: to upgrade at least 1,000 contested villages to

relatively secure ratings on the Hamlet Evaluatio n

Scale ; to disrupt the Viet Cong command and contro l

system by identifying and capturing if possible 3,00 0

members of the infrastructure for the next thre e

months; to set a goal of 5,000 Hoi Chanhs a mont h

under the Chieu Hoi Program ; to continue the organization and arming of the South Vietnamese Self

Defense units; and finally to mount a propaganda campaign to the effect that the Government of Vietna m

"has seized the initiative and is moving rapidly towar d

the end of the war." Each Corps area was given its

quota in this multi-faceted effort.11 3

By the end of the year, the Accelerated Pacificatio n

Campaign was in high gear in I Corps . Both the 1st

Marine and 3d Marine Divisions as well as the Army

and ARVN regular units had launched supporting

operations using cordon and County Fair techniques to

eradicate both enemy regular units and the guerrilla

infrastructure in their assigned areas .° In each of th e

categories of the campaign, the allies had made substantial progress. During November and December,

the allied forces had entered all of the 140 hamlets targeted in I Corps. According to Marine Corps measurements the number of government controlled hamlets

had risen from 47 on 31 October to 116 on 31 December. A corresponding decrease had occurred both i n

contested and Viet Cong-controlled hamlets. By 3 1

December, the number of contested hamlets fell fro m

73 on 31 October to 46 on 31 December while Vie t

Cong-controlled hamlets fell from 48 on 31 October t o

six on 31 December. In other categories of the campaign in I Corps similar progress was shown . For th e

year, 3,118 former VC had come over to the government side as Hoi Chanhs, 4,000 VC infrastructur e

were "neutralized" under the Phoenix program, close

to 225,000 civilians were organized in Peoples Self

Defense Organization, and nearly 70 percent of th e

population of I Corps lived in what was considere d

secure areas. Enemy-initiated attacks in December fell

to the lowest level in over two years . In an obvious

change of strategy, probably because of the heavy casu -

alty rate suffered in their various offensives, the Communists reverted to a low-level war. Despite this seeming progress and some guarded optimism on the par t

of the allies, the enemy remained a formidable foe .H4

*See Chapters 21 and 22 and especially the description of Operation Meade River in Chapter 21 .
CHAPTER 3 0

Outside of III MAF :

The Special Landing Forces, Marine Advisors, and Other s

The 9th MAB and the SLFs—Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO )

Embassy Marines—Individual Marines in Saigon and Elsewhere in -VietnamAdvisors to the -Vietnamese Marine Corps

The 9th MAB and the SLFs

In January 1968, Brigadier General Jacob E . Glick

commanded the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, the

Fleet Marine Force component of the Seventh Fleet,

with its headquarters on Okinawa which controlled al l

Marine forces in the Western Pacific outside of Hawai i

and Vietnam. At this time, the MAB contained nearl y

8,000 men with nearly half assigned to the two Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces (SLF) Alpha and

Bravo.* The two SLFS each consisted of a Marine

infantry battalion, supported by a helicopter squadro n

and reinforced by small detachments of artillery, tanks ,

engineers, and other specialized units, totaling abou t

2,000 men embarked upon the ships of a Navy

amphibious ready group (ARG). 1

At the beginning of the year, SLF Alpha, commanded by Colonel John A . Conway, had just returned

control of BLT 1/3, its infantry battalion, to III MAF.

The former SLF battalion had come ashore durin g

November, operated with the 9th Marines in Operation Kentucky, and was about to take over part of th e

Operation Osceola sector near Quang Tri from the 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines. On 4 January, the latter battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colone l

William Weise, in turn, embarked in the ships of th e

amphibious ready group, Seventh Fleet Task Group

76.4, which included the USS Cleveland (LSD 7), USS

Comstock (LSD 19), and USS Wexford County (LST

1168), and the helicopter aircraft carrier the Iwo Jima

(LPH 2) with HMM–361, under Lieutenant Colone l

Daniel M. Wilson, on board as the SLF aircraft contingent. Two days later the entire SLF in its amphibious

shipping set sail for the Philippines . About a week

later, 14 January, Colonel Bruce F. Meyers assumed

command of the reconstituted SLF Alpha . 2

*The other components of the 9th MAB were the 26th Marines (Rear)

headquarters, a communications support company, and a provisional servic e

battalion on Okinawa as well as MAG—15 with squadrons at both Iwakuni ,

Japan and on Okinawa . Although the 26th Marines (Forward) and its thre e

infantry battalions together with its attached artillery, the 1st Battalion, 13t h

Marines, were in Vietnam under the operational control of III MAF, these

units remained under the administrative control of the 9th MAB.

SLF Bravo, commanded by Colonel Maynard W.

Schmidt, in the meantime, consisting of BLT 3/ 1

(Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown) and

HMM–262** (Lieutenant Colonel Melvin J . Steinberg), had just completed Operation Badger Tooth.

Reembarking on board its amphibious shipping o f

Navy Task Group 76 .5 on 3 January, the SLF deploye d

to Da Nang where both the battalion and squadro n

underwent a one week rehabilitation period . On 10

January, HMM–165, under Lieutenant Colonel

Richard E. Romine, replaced HMM–262 on board the

Valley Forge (LPH 8) and the ARG/SLF once more put

to sea, remaining off the coast of Quang Tri Province

for possible insertion into the Cua Viet sector. 3 ** *

Operation Badger Tooth had been a bloody experience for BLT 3/1 and raised some questions about th e

effectiveness of the SLF and the future employment o f

Seventh Fleet Marine amphibious forces. In Badger

Tooth, BLT 3/1 had operated in the "Street Withou t

Joy" coastal region east of Route 1 in southern Quang

Tri Province for about a week from 26 December 196 7

until 2 January 1968. After moving through the hamlet of Thom Tham Khe on the 26th, the battalio n

made another sweep of the area the following day. This

time the Marines ran into a well-sprung ambush . Calling the coastal hamlet "literally a defensive bastion, "

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown in 24 hours sustaine d

48 Marines killed and 86 wounded. According to their

body count, the Marines accounted for 31 enemy dead .

By 28 December, the NVA had slipped away an d

Marines of the SLF began to close out the operation 4 ****

**Because of the shortage of CH—46 aircraft, a small detachmen t

of HMM—262, HMM—262 Alpha, under Major David I . Althoff,

remained embarked on board the Valley Forge LPH 8, from 24 November until 4 January, when the detachment was deactivated .

***The other ships of the amphibious task group included th e

USS Navarro (APA 215), USS Alamo (LSD 33), USS Whetstone (LS D

27), and Vernon County (LST 1161).

****In his comments, Colonel McQuown wrote that ARVN force s

later found in a draw north and west of Thom Tham Ke the bodies o f

over 100 North Vietnamese from the 166th NVA Battalion . This coun t

was not included in the report of the action nor in the investigatio n

that followed . Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McQuown Comments .

631
632 THE DEFINING YEAR

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Top, a Navy corpsman from Company K, BLT 3/1 runs across an open paddy carrying a litter to assis t

a wounded Marine during Operation Badger Tooth . Below, Marines from BLT 3/1 search a hamlet

in the same operation . During Badger Tooth, the BLT suffered 48 dead and 86 wounded, which

resulted in an investigation.
OUTSIDE OF III MAF : THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 633

Following the end of the operation, higher headquarters wanted to know the reasons for the Marine

battalion suffering such heavy casualties. As Brigadier

General Glick later stated, "any time that somethin g

like that happened, there was a lot of pressure all th e

way from the White House down of 'what happened . —

On 30 December, General Glick ordered a full investigation of the matter. The investigating officer, Lieutenant Colonel George H. Benskin, Jr., visited the village the next day and began taking testimony from

various commanders and staff officers, including Lieutenant Colonel McQuown, the BLT 3/1 company commanders, and the SLF Bravo intelligence officer or S—2 .

Completing his fact-finding mission on 2 January,

Lieutenant Colonel Benskin sent his preliminary findings three days later to General Glick . In this initial

report, Benskin emphasized the strength of the enemy

positions with "fields of fire" permitting them to "neutralize efforts of all attacking units except Company K

when supported by tanks. " The enemy had withhel d

its fire "on all fronts until attacking units were draw n

into the killing zones. " According to all accounts, the

terrain together with the village defenses combined i n

the favor of the enemy "in every respect . "5 *

On 15 January, General Glick forwarded the complete report to Lieutenant General Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific . In his covering

message, General Glick observed: "I purposely did not

make a recommendation in the investigation repor t

concerning replacement of the BLT commander

*Colonel McQuown stated that he reported to General Glick afte r

he reembarked upon the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group ship -

ping and made several observations . He pointed out that the AOA

[amphibious objective area] was not a free fire zone and that Compan y

L followed the rules of engagement "to the letter. " He noted that when

the company was 25 meters from the village, " the lead elements of

Lima Company were blown away. This was, in part, a major cause of

the heavy casualties of this fight . " McQuown related that he had

" opposed Operation Badger Tooth from the onset because is was ill

conceived and tactically unsound . It failed to use any of BLT 3/1 's Tas k

Organization, except the LVT 's that would have enabled the BLT to

conduct a sustained operation ashore . " Furthermore the village was

"occupied and defended by a major DIVA force . The village had bee n

turned into a well concealed, skillfully constructed—almost impregnable defensive position that withstood heavy air strikes and nava l

gunfire. To conquer the defenders was an extremely difficult task mad e

more difficult because the BLT landed without its key supporting elements—the tanks, Oncos, artillery, and heavy mortars ." According to

McQuown, "Badger Tooth was an SLF operation in name only becaus e

SLF Marines were involved . In reality it was a water-borne/helicopter

landing of a 'bare bones' unsupported [emphasis in the original] Marin e

infantry battalion moving 8 to 10 miles from the waters edge to objectives that lacked even a shred of intelligence to justify the operation . "

McQuown Comments.

because of the channels which the report may g o

through and the possible political implications of relie f

of commanders concerned . " In that message and in a

interview over 20 years after the incident, he insisted

that Lieutenant Colonel McQuown "was an exception -

ally good battalion commander." He also observed i n

the interview that BLT 3/1 "was not the first unit tha t

ran into trouble in that 'Street Without Joy.'" Glick's

main concern was that MACV would use the casualties

sustained by BLT 3/1 as "justification for reopening th e

entire question of command relations for SLF/ARG

operations." He believed that "any relief of the BLT

commander at this time might add weight to an y

implications that serious deficiencies do exist in present arrangement. " According to Glick, "the tactical

decisions made in Badger Tooth were in no way dictated by the command arrangements in effect. "6* *

Despite the 9th MAB commander 's attempt to separate the investigation of Badger Tooth from the subjec t

of general amphibious command relations, there was to

be a reexamination of the entire subject. While representatives of MACV, III MAF, FMFPac, PacFlt, and

Seventh Fleet had worked out an agreement to stream -

line the procedures for SLF operations in Vietnam during the spring of 1966, some friction between the in -

country and the amphibious commands, especially th e

9th MAB, continued to exist . Lieutenant General Krulak the FMFPac commander in October 1967 outlined

the various perspectives on the SLF in a long extended

message . According to the FMFPac commander,

"MACV would like to see Ninth MAB units in-country continually . . . he pretty much sees them as so many

battalions, helo squadrons . . . etc ." From what Krulak

called a "parochial Marine Corps view" the best system

would be to maintain the SLFs as a separate organization, but "employed in a manner completely responsiv e

to the will of CG III MAF . . . ." While sympathizing

and identifying himself with this latter viewpoint, Krulak believed in the necessity of intra-theater rotation o f

Vietnam-based units between the SLF and rehabilitation for a brief period on Okinawa . He also insisted that

"some accommodation with the Navy as essential t o

preserve our use of the amphibious shipping

According to the FMFPac commander, unless th e

Marines worked "hand and glove with them, the Nav y

**Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt, the SLF Bravo commander

through February 1968, wrote that at the time he did " not realize that

Operation Badger Tooth caused that much attention at the higher echelons." Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt, Comments on draft, n .d . [1994]

(Vietnam Comment File) .
634 THE DEFINING YEA R

is going to take the amphibious shipping away, and

either move it out of the theater or join forces with th e

Army . . . ." Krulak, nevertheless, recognized that ther e

were circumstances where either one or both of the SLFs

would have to be committed to an in-country operatio n

for an extended period of time .?

In a sense, General Cushman, the III MAF commander, found himself betwixt and between . He

answered to both Generals Krulak, the FMFPac commander, and to Westmoreland, the MACV commander. Both of these commanders had differing bu t

equally valid concerns about the SLF. In answer to

Krulak's message, Cushman attempted to explain hi s

predicament. While agreeing in principle with th e

FMFPac commander's desire to retain the rotation

between in-country forces and Okinawa via the SLF,

Cushman declared that at that time the situation i n

Vietnam was so "fluid and dynamic that I cannot a t

present in good conscience recommend to West y

[Westmoreland) the resumption of intra-theater BL T

rotation to and from Okinawa ." He then suggested an

alternative that Krulak had suggested in his message—namely that the SLFs refit out of the U.S. naval

base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. According to the

III MAF commander, he would hope that "the issue

and turn-in at Subic could be so expedited as to permit a short but concentrated amphib[iousl trainin g

period . . . ." Both Westmoreland and Krulak eventually concurred in this policy.8*

The matter of amphibious command relations wa s

not only a dispute between Marines and Navy on one

side and MACV and the Army on the other, but als o

caused division within Marine Corps circles . Marine

commanders in III MAF shared to a certain exten t

some of the same opinions as their Army counterpart s

*Colonel Warren A . Butcher, who relieved Col Schmidt in command of SLF Bravo, wrote that the Marines had anticipated the decision to make Subic Bay the main base for the refitting of the SLF . He

noted that "sections of 9th MAB under G—4 cognizance were sent to

Subic to contact opposite numbers early on . When the directive came

out of FMFPac, we had a completed plan . I had never seen Servic e

troops in operation before, at least to the extent they were used in th e

rehabs at Subic ." He noted that the first group there did a " masterfu l

job." According to Butcher, General Krulak complimented the group

"for doing in 10 days at Subic, what it had taken 6 weeks to do on Okinawa . " Butcher stated that the Service troops accomplished their technical inspections by first identifying units to be "retrograded . The y

started in country, continued aboard ship enroute to Subic, and finished at Subic Bay. Flood lights were set up for around the clock operations. Even though the first BLT was pulled out earlier than expected, the completion percentage was in the high nineties, and the BLT

reembarked with all equipment in near new condition . " Col Warren A .

Butcher, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

and MACV about the SLF. They saw the Seventh Flee t

forces largely as a reinforcement for their own forces i n

Vietnam. With control of the air and landing areas, in -

country commanders believed there was little need for

many of the amphibious doctrinal procedures relative

to amphibious operational area and command.** The

Navy and the Marine amphibious commanders, on th e

other hand, regarded the SLFs as the Seventh Fleet o r

Western Pacific reserve force . While ready to reinforce

the forces in Vietnam when needed, they also looked to

other possible crises areas in the Pacific . They feared

any dilution of their authority might result in the loss

of the amphibious forces to the Seventh Fleet for othe r

Pacific contingencies ?

Major General Rathvon McC . Tompkins, the 3 d

Marine Division commander, later recalled when General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, "was scream -

ing his head off for more troops, there were at least two

battalions of well-trained Marines who were floating

around on the ships. " According to Tompkins "simply

from an operational point of view . . . . Better to have two

battalions ashore than two battalions floating around ,

looking at each other." One of Tompkin's staff officers,

Colonel Alexander L. Michaux carped that the SLF landings were largely administrative and designating them

as amphibious was "a joke ." According to Michaux, its

only purpose was to give the Navy amphibious commander control of the operation for a day. 1ow* *

Even while critical of the employment of the SLF,

General Tompkins maintained that if one looked

beyond Vietnam, the Navy was "well advised to have

the two battalions not under the operational control [o f

MACY)." Both Generals Cushman, the III MAF commander, and Major General Donn J. Robertson, the 1st

Marine Division commander, viewed the SLF capability positively. Robertson declared that the "SLF gave u s

**Colonel George F. Warren, who served in 1968 as the executive

officer ofBLT 2/4, wrote, " in-country commanders had a propensity fo r

breaking up the SLF into its component parts (air/ground) and the n

further breaking up the BLT into its component parts (combat, combat support and combat service support units) . Ultimately the SLF was

reconstituted into a single entity and loaded back aboard . . . (Navy)

shipping . One can imagine the movement of operational contro l

between commanders in such a situation and the administrative tim e

and effort that was consumed during SLF operations, to say nothing

about the confusion such movement generated ." Col George F. Warren ,

Comments on draft, dtd 28Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

***Colonel Butcher, the former SLF Bravo commander, concede d

the point that most SLF landings were administrative but denies th e

assertion that the purpose of the landings was to give the Navy

amphibious commander control of the operation for a day. Butcher

Comments.
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 635

a flexibility . . . It added that extra punch that we ofte n

needed." Cushman agreed, professing that "It was just

like having another couple of battalions . "1 1

In mid-December 1967, Cushman reemphasized t o

his division commanders that "first and foremost" h e

wanted the "ARG/SLF used in an amphibious role in

accordance with current doctrine for amphibious operations. " He reminded both commanders that the SLFs

were available to III MAF "for employment against

time sensitive targets. " Not only did he want the SLF

operations to be "in consonance with our amphibious

doctrine, " but that they "be based on best III MAF

intelligence estimates."1 2

Concurrent with this Marine emphasis about the

employment of the SLF, General Westmoreland's

MACV staff was involved in contingency planning fo r

a possible amphibious landing north of the DMZ. Wit h

a possible 30,000 enemy in the objective area, the planning for Operation Durango City, the codename for th e

proposed amphibious assault, by necessity involved

both Army and Marine ground forces as well as support

from the Seventh Air Force. In this planning effort ,

General William W. Momyer, the Seventh Air Forc e

commander, raised the subject of air control in the

objective area . While the chances of approval of th e

Operation Durango City plan or any amphibious operation in the north was dubious at best, any discussio n

over command relations was serious business, especially

at a time when the whole question of single manager o f

air in South Vietnam was about to surface .13 *

Thus, in this general context, General Westmoreland wanted another look at the entire subject of th e

SLF and the results of the Badger Tooth operation onl y

added fuel to this desire. In mid January, the MACV

commander expressed his doubts to Admiral Sharp ,

CinCPac, and proposed that changes be made . The

Pacific commander agreed with Westmoreland tha t

there was justifiable concern over Badger Tooth and

was willing to consider transfer of operational control

of the ashore forces from the amphibious task force

commander at an earlier time in an SLF amphibiou s

operation. Sharp also mentioned that he was thinkin g

about the possibility of basing one of the SLFs ashore as

a permanent element of III MAE. While maintaining

"that present command relations for the conduct of

*General Cushman stated that the planning for an amphibiou s

operation " never went anywhere . . .

. it was just another plan sticking

up. . . . They wanted to have one up to date, just in case, you know, go t

lucky or somebody else got to be President or some damn thing . "

(Cushman intvw, 1982, p . 46 .) See Chapters 23 and 24 for discussion

of the Single Manager controversy .

amphibious operations in South Vietnam are valid," h e

stated that he had asked Vice Admiral John J. Hyland ,

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct a broad -

based study of SLF operations in Vietnam .1 4

While CinCPacFlt established a study group wit h

representatives from both the Marine and Navy

amphibious forces, the whole question about the SLF

would be overtaken by events. While the study group

reasserted the validity of the basic command and control

system for the SLF then in effect, it would, essentiall y

permit ComUSMACV " to prescribe virtually every

important aspect of the employment of amphibiou s

forces, from specifying the mission to delineating the

characteristics of the amphibious objective area ." By the

time, the study came out both SLF BLTs were ashore .1 $

With the massing of enemy forces in the north followed by the Tet offensive, the SLF battalions, for all

intents and purposes, became part of III MAF for the

next few months. In mid January, both SLFs were in an

alert status off the coast of northern I Corps. On 22

January, SLF Alpha's BLT 2/4 initiated Operation Ballistic Armor in which the unit relieved the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at Camp Evans which in turn

deployed to Khe Sanh. Upon itself being relieved by

elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division four days later,

the BLT reembarked upon its amphibious shipping .

The following day in Operation Fortress Attack, th e

BLT went ashore near the C–2 combat base, coming

under the operational control of the 9th Marines .** I n

the meantime, the SLF Bravo battalion conducted

**Colonel Bruce E Meyers, the commander of SLF Alpha, recalled his

concerns about the irregularity and departure from normal amphibiou s

doctrine during this period . He wrote that on 26 Jan " op con was passed

back to me (CTG 79 .4) at noon and we had all elements of BLT 2/4 bac k

aboard our shipping in five hours and 15 minutes (261830) . " He was then

directed to land his tank and amtrac platoons at the mouth of the Cua Vie t

at the request of III MAE On 27 January, BLT 2/4 began Operation

Fortress Attack in the 9th Marines operational area and he passed operational control to the 9th Marines at 1500 . Meyers declared that he "recognized the exigency of the threat in the Tet offensive, and our immediat e

response and accommodation to that threat . . . ." As the SLF commander,

he " was worried that Gen . Westmoreland would pick up on this usage ou t

of our traditional 'amphibious' role . . . It was obvious to both my [Nary)

ARG [Amphibious Ready Group) counterpart . . . [and to Meyers] tha t

both Adm . Sharp and Gen. Krulak were both worried about this sam e

aspect of the use of the ARG/SLF . . . ." At his debriefing at FMFPac, Meyers referred to " grave reservations and possible implications for the futur e

of the Marine Corps role as a result of what I believed at the time to be bordering on a misuse of the ARG/SLF. In the end, we accomplished what the

ground commanders needed—an immediate 'fire brigade' response to a

perceived serious threat. In retrospect, it was probably the wisest response

to the situation that we could have achieved ." Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File) .
636 THE DEFINING YEA R

Operation Badger Catch in the Cua Viet sector fro m

23—26 January. Badger Catch became Operation Salin e

and then Operation Napoleon/Saline. Until June, both

SLF battalions remained ashore in the DMZ sector ,

often transferring from one operational area to another.

In effect, both BLTs functioned as any other infantry

battalion of the 3d Marine Division in the north .*

By June, the situation in the DMZ had clarified t o

the extent that both ComUSMACV, now Genera l

Abrams, and General Cushman believed that it wa s

time for the SLFs to be reconstituted. A member of

General Cushman's staff, Colonel Franklin L. Smith

related that III MAF wanted them back on ship : "Once

you get people . . . Nobody wants to leave them go . "

Complicating the situation was the attitude of the Seventh Fleet amphibious commander, Commander Tas k

Force 76, whom Smith believed had been intimidated

by the Operation Badger Tooth experience . According

to Smith, "Badger Tooth scared the hell out of the guy.

. . . As soon as the battalion goes ashore, he wants t o

dump it."1 6* *

Despite the various reservations, in early June 1968 ,

BLT 3/1, now under Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J .

Quick, and HMM—164, under Lieutenant Colone l

Robert F. Rick, reconstituted SLF Bravo, unde r

Colonel Warren A. Butcher, and reembarked upon the

TG 76.5 (ARG) amphibious shipping .*** From 7—1 4

June, BLT 3/1 conducted Operation Swift Saber in Elephant Valley, a known VC infiltration route just north -

west of Da Nang, under the operational control of th e

*See Chapters 7, 13, and 15 for the description of the fighting an d

the activities of the SLF BLTs in the north during this period . Colone l

McQuown, the former commander of BLT 3/1, wrote that the tw o

"SLF's should have been tremendous assets for III MAF. However, i n

order to realize their full potential the III MAF Command would hav e

had to insist that the using command select objectives based on har d

intelligence, and just as important, follow the Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine . Properly employed, the SLF's could have responde d

rapidly to requests from the 1st and 3d Divisions and would have bee n

the '911 ' forces during the Vietnam War. " He believed, however, they

were "seldom employed with sound tactics . . ." and that the 3d Marin e

Division in particular "had a myopic view of the use of the SLF's ." He ,

nevertheless, granted that his BLT's operations in the Cua Viet sector

in January and February were a "profitable use of a potent fighting

force ." McQuown Comments.

**Colonel Butcher, the SLF Bravo Commander, agreed with Colone l

Smith about the attitude of the amphibious cask force commander .

Butcher wrote that while in the "sea cabin of CTF 76 (who was a deep -

selected, 'frocked' rear admiral with expertise in the nuclear field), . . .

[Butcher] was told the conditions under which the landing force would

'chop' ashore . . . Basically, the Admiral 's idea was to toss the ball ashore

as soon as the helicopters went 'feet dry.— Butcher Comments.

***The ships of TG 76 .5 now consisted of the USS Valley Forge (LP H

8), Vancouver (LPD 2), Thomaston (LSD 28), and Washburn (AKA 108).

1st Marine Division . At the end of the operation, in

which the Marines encountered only slight resistance ,

the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, under Lieutenant

Colonel Charles E. Mueller, and HMM—265, unde r

Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Edwards, relieved BLT 3/ 1

and HMM—164 respectively as the infantry and helicopter components of SLF Bravo .I 7 *** *

Taking a respite, the newly reconstituted SLF Brav o

departed for the new SLF training and rehabilitatio n

encampment at Subic Bay in the Philippines . After a

brief stay at Subic, the SLF Bravo units returned t o

Vietnam for a one-week operation, Eager Yankee, lasting from 9—16 July, in Thua Thien Province near Ph u

Loc . Operating in support of Task Force X-Ray's Operation Houston, the SLF Marines reported killing 9 o f

the enemy and captured 6 prisoners while sustainin g

casualties of 8 dead and 34 wounded . On 16 July, BLT

2/7 joined the 5th Marines in Operation Houston an d

on 22 July reembarked on its amphibious shipping .

After reembarking, BLT 2/7 landed the following da y

at Da Nang in Operation Swift Play which lasted fro m

23—24 July in the Go Noi Island area .***** On the 25th ,

the 27th Marines assumed operational control of th e

BLT which would remain in the Hoi An sector

through October.1 8

In the meantime, BLT 2/4, the SLF Alpha battalion ,

remained in the DMZ sector as part of Operation Lan -

caster II.****** On 13 August, BLT 2/26 relieved the 2 d

Battalion, 4th Marines as the SLF Alpha infantry component. This was largely a paper transfer. The SLF BLT

 In July, USS Tripoli (LPH 10) replaced the Valley Forge as th e

helicopter carrier of TG 76 .5 . On 1 September 1968, HMM–165 ,

under Lieutenant Colonel George L. Patrick, relieved HMM–265 as

the SLF Bravo helicopter squadron . On 28 December 1968 ,

HMM—164, now under Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Trundy, once

again became the SLF squadron in place of HMM—165 .

** ***See Chapter 17 .

******HMM–363, commanded by Major James L . Harrison ,

relieved HMM–362 on 6 September 1968 as the helicopter squadron

for SLF Alpha . Lieutenant Colonel Walter H . Shauer, Jr., who commanded HMM—362 during this period, noted that " we were fragged

to support our BLT 2/4 ashore, and other division units . . . ." With its

maintenance support on board ship, the squadron was "able to achiev e

maximum aircraft availability each day averaging over 20 H—34s avail -

able for Frags. During our SLF A tenure we flew over 46,000 sorties,

and set the record on board the LPH 5 Princeton for the most shipboar d

carrier landings, 285 in a 24-hour period and supported 25 major operations. " LtCol Walter H . Shauer, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 1Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File) . Colonel Warren A . Butcher, the SLF Bravo

commander, wrote about the advantages for the Marine Corps to have

the helicopters on board ship as the SLF squadrons " benefitted from th e

more sterile conditions on board the LPH and, from, what th e

squadron commanders cold me, a more responsive supply system . "

Butcher Comments.
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 637

Both photos are from the Abel Collectio n

Above, Boeing Vertol CH—46 Sea Knight helicopters from HMM—165 take off from the Phu Bai

Airstrip to relieve HMM—265 on board the USS Tripoli (LPH 10). HMM—165 became the SL F

Bravo helicopter squadron. In bottom photo, a Sikorsky UH—34D Sea Horse from HMM—362, the SL F

Alpha helicopter squadron on board the USS Princeton (LPH 5), lands Marines from BLT 2/4 in a

LZ near Camp Carroll.
638 THE DEFINING YEA R

had been assigned to the 1st Marines in the Cua Viet

sector and returned there in Operation Proud Hunter

after a brief period of amphibious training . On the

28th, in Operation Swift Pursuit, the BLT establishe d

a new area of operations in the Mai Loc sector in the

Operation Lancaster II TAOR. Into October, the battalion essentially operated under the 3d Marines as

another infantry battalion in the Lancaster II sector . "

Thus by mid-October, the situation with the SLF s

had almost reverted to the situation that existed until

June. Both SLF infantry battalions had been operatin g

for an extended period with III MAF units ashore . The

main difference was that one was attached to the 3 d

Division and the other to the 1st Marine Division . BLT

2/26, which was still operating in the 3d Marine Division sector, was slated for rehabilitation training in th e

SLF base at Subic Bay. Concurrently, MACV had

directed III MAF to undertake an expanded pacification campaign while at the same time increasing operations against the enemy base areas and main force

units. III MAF wanted to use the SLFs in this campaign in "swift short duration operations . . . principally in cordon and search operations to root out and

eliminate the VC infrastructure ." The principle targe t

areas were to be the Batangan Peninsula just south o f

Chu Lai and the Barrier Island sector south of Hoi An .

At this point, III MAF consulted with the commander

of the 9th MAB, Brigadier General John E. Williams, *

who on the basis of these proposed new operation s

decided to cancel the BLT 2/26 rehabilitation trip t o

the Philippines.20

The SLF Alpha ARG which had embarked BLT

2/26 on 19 October at Quang Tri began to steam fo r

Da Nang.** On 25 October, the BLT landed at Da

Nang in Operation Eager Hunter. The following day,

the BLT came under the operational control of the 1st

Marines and conducted Operation Garrard Bay unti l

mid-November in the coastal hamlets between Marble

Mountain and Dien Ban . On 20 November, the BLT

joined the 1st Marines Operation Meade River in th e

"Dodge City" sector north of the Go Noi Island area i n

the Da Nang TAOR .21***

*Brigadier General Williams relieved Brigadier General William

C . Chip as CG 9th MAB on 12 August 1968 . Brigadier General Chip

had relieved Brigadier General Glick on 20 January 1968 when the latter became 3d Marine Division assistant division commander.

**Amphibious Ready Group Alpha (TG 76.4) now consisted o f

the USS Princeton (LPH 5), USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS Oak Hill (LSD

7), and USS Windham County (LST 1170).

***See Chapter 21 for discussion of the Le Lot campaign and Operation Meade River.

Photo is from the Abel Collectio n

Marines of BLT 2/26 wade through streams in the Barrier

Island area southeast of Hoi An . The BLT, the SLF Alpha

battalion, is conducting Operation Valiant Hunt.

In the meantime the SLF Bravo battalion, BLT 2/7

remained also under the operational control of the 1st

Marines until early November when it embarked upon

its amphibious shipping.  III MAF and th e

ARG/SLF Bravo commanders had planned to moun t

their first of the new amphibious cordon and searc h

operations on the Batangan Peninsula . While liaiso n

officers from the amphibious task group met with th e

Americal Division at Chu Lai, General Cushman an d

his staff decided that a similar operation on the Barrie r

Island would prove more lucrative . Landing on the

coast southeast of Hoi An, just below the Cua Dai

River, on 10 November, BLT 2/7 carried out the new

operation, called Daring Endeavor, for the next seve n

days. Although supposed to extend the operation to

the south, the battalion encountered significant opposition in the original area . Using cordon and searc h

techniques, the Marines reported killing 39 of th e

** **The 1st Marines relieved the 27th Marines in the Da Nang

area of operations when the latter regiment redeployed to the Unite d

States. See Chapter 21 . Amphibious Ready Group Bravo (TG 76.5 )

now consisted of the USS Merrick (AKA 97), USS Monticello (LSD 35),

USS Ogden (LPD 5), USS Tripoli (LPH 10), and Seminole (AKA 104).
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 639

enemy and captured 30 POWs, at a cost of 1 Marine

dead and 36 wounded. The BLT conducted no civi c

action because the population in the area was "considered to be hostile and hard line psy ops [psychologica l

operations) was used . " According to the amphibiou s

task group commander, the operation demonstrate d

the SLF ability "to temporarily deny enemy forces the

use of their territory, while destroying their fortification and supplies, was fully realized . " On 20 November, BLT 2/7 returned to the operational control of th e

1st Marines and prepared to relieve the SLF Bravo bat -

talion, BLT 2/26, in Operation Meade River.2 2

On 8 December, BLT 2/26 reembarked upo n

ARG/SLF Alpha shipping "conducting rehabilitatio n

and training for future operations. " * One week later, on

15 December, the BLT initiated SLF Alpha Operatio n

Valiant Hunt. Remaining under the operational control of the SLF Alpha commander; now Colonel John E

McMahon, the BLT conducted a cordon and search i n

the southern Barrier Island sector just south of the earlier Daring Endeavor area of operations. Operation

Valiant Hunt lasted until 5 January 1969 . Lieutenant

Colonel William F. Sparks, the battalion commander,

observed that "Operation Valiant Hunt was the first

time the BLT was responsible for conducting a tota l

cordon operation . In this respect, the operation was a

good `training exercise' . . . However, there were no sig -

nificant problems or enemy techniques encountered ."23

As the year ended, the SLF battalions were in much

the same situation as the year had begun . One battalion

was bringing a separate operation to a close while the

other was ashore attached to a Marine division. In fact

the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines was about to relieve BLT

2/7 as the infantry component of SLF Bravo. Even more

important, many of the issues over the use of the SLF had

not fully been settled . Even as late as July 1969, the 9t h

MAB operations officer, Colonel Clyde W. Hunter,

would remark that the MAB staff believed that the

"divisions were using the SLFs improperly, actually ginning up operations just to get them ashore and tie the m

down to a TAOR, or into some kind of operation, tha t

had no connection to their mission as an SLE"24

*On 7 December, HMM-362, now under Lieutenant Colonel Jac k

E . Schlarp, embarked upon the USS Okinawa (LPH 3) relieved

HMM-363, as the SLF Alpha helicopter squadron . Lieutenant Colone l

Schlarp recalled that while embarked " we conducted assault landings,

put our BLT ashore, supported them completely, evacuated the wounded and extracted them at the completion of the operation. " LtCol Jack

E . Schlarp, Comments on draft, dtd 21Nov94 (Vietnam Commen t

File). The other ships of ARG Alpha (TG 76.4) were the USS Duluth

(LPD 6), USS Fort Marion (LSD 22), USS Winslow (AKA 94).

Still, as 1969 was about to begin, Brigadier General Williams, the 9th MAB commander, was about to

embark on board amphibious shipping as Commanding General, Task Force 79, to help oversee one of th e

largest amphibious operations of the Vietnam War . In

Operation Bold Mariner, both SLFs of the 9th MAB

would land on the Batangan Peninsula under the command of Brigadier General Wilson. While beginning

in this spectacular fashion, the SLFs for the remainde r

of 1969 would follow much the same pattern as that o f

1968. For 1969, there would be 14 SLF operations as

compared to 13 in 1968, and 25 in 1967 . By the en d

of 1969, the SLFs had become a moot question fo r

operations in South Vietnam . With the reduction of

forces in Vietnam, the SLF could only be committe d

with the specific permission of the JCS .2 5

Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire

Liaison Company (ANGLICO)

In Vietnam, there was another Marine-Navy connection with both the Seventh Fleet and the in-country forces. Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO was a Flee t

Marine Force, Pacific separate organization whose pri -

mary mission was to call in U.S . naval gunfire from

ships offshore or Marine and Navy air in support of

allied or other U .S . Service forces. In Vietnam, SubUnit 1 remained outside of the regular Marine chain o f

command and under the direct operational control o f

MACV in Saigon . At the beginning of 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Carlton D . Goodiel, Jr., the unit commander, maintained his headquarters in Saigon, bu t

kept detachments in each of the Corps areas with the

largest in I Corps.

In January 1968, the I Corps Liaison Naval Gunfire Team, headed by Navy Lieutenant Commander

Philip B. Hatch, Jr., was at Da Nang and provided

direct liaison with the South Vietnamese I Corps military establishment .** Under his control were two

shore fire parties, one at Hue with the 1st ARV N

Division and a smaller one at Quang Ngai with th e

2d ARVN Division . Navy Lieutenant Robert A.

Keeling headed the naval gunfire liaison team wit h

the U.S . Army Americal Division with four shore fire

parties attached to Army units at both Chu Lai an d

Duc Pho. At this time, the largest ANGLICO

detachment in I Corps, and for that fact in the country, commanded by Marine Major Enos S . Olin, was

**No ANGLICO detachments or teams were assigned to Marine

units of III MAF since Marine units maintained in their FSCC and DASC

organizations the ability to call in their own naval gunfire and air support .
640 THE DEFINING YEA R

with the 2d ROK Marine Brigade at Hoi An . One o f

the few detachments in Vietnam with an air contro l

party, Olin had under him over 70 enlisted Marines

and usually nine officers, eight Marines and one Nav y

lieutenant (j .g.).2 6

While smaller and more scattered, Lieutenan t

Colonel Goodiel's command maintained simila r

naval gunfire liaison teams in the other corps areas of

South Vietnam. In II Corps, Navy Lieutenan t

William L. Vandiver maintained the headquarters of

his naval gunfire liaison team at Nha Trang with fiv e

shore fire control parties under his control. Further

south, from the III Corps Naval Gunfire Liaiso n

Team headquarters at Bien Hoa, Navy Lieutenan t

Dale W. Lucas controlled three shore fire control parties in the Corps area . In IV Corps, Marine Captain

Ronald K. Roth, commander of the naval gunfir e

liaison team headquartered at Can Tho in the

Mekong Delta, had two fire control parties, one a t

Ben Tre and the other at Tra Vinh . All told in January, ANGLICO Sub-Unit 1 numbered more tha n

230 personnel, both Marine and Navy, includin g

about 35 at the Saigon headquarters.27

During Tet, one of the most significant contributions of the ANGLICO teams was in the battle fo r

Hue. At the outbreak of the attack on Hue on 31 January, the naval gunfire spot team attached to the 1st

ARVN Division under Navy Lieutenant (j.g.) Marvi n

L. Warkentin, like the rest of the U.S . advisors,

remained isolated from their units at the MACV compound in the southern sector of the city and had al l

they could do to repel the enemy attack on the compound itself. In a short time, however, with the arrival

of the reinforcing Marine forces in the city, the team

resumed its primary mission .2 8

Through 13 February, all of the naval gunfire wa s

employed against suspected enemy lines of communications outside of the city. Beginning on 14 February,

with the initial onslaught of the enemy forces in th e

city contained north of the Perfume River and th e

NVA units cleared out south of the river, the nava l

gunfire support then shifted to targets in the Citade l

north of the river with the exception of the forme r

Imperial palace and its grounds. Because of the heav y

cloud cover and other hampering weather conditions ,

the ships depended upon Warkentin's team for ground

spotting. On the basis of military necessity and wit h

the permission of the 1st Marines' commander, Colone l

Stanley S. Hughes, who had operational control of the

Marine forces in the city, the spotting team occupied a

hotel which had been the headquarters in Hue of the

International Control Commission* and supposedl y

neutral ground. The building, however, provided the

best view of the targets. For the first two days, the team

directed the fires of the cruiser USS Providence (CLG 6 )

and the destroyer Manley (DD 940) against first the

Citadel walls, and then on the 17th, against specific

enemy strongholds in the old city. After the 17th, th e

Seventh Fleet gunships during the remainder of Operation Hue City turned their attention once more to

harassing and interdiction fires.** According to interro -

gations of captured enemy troops in the Hue fighting ,

the naval gunfire inflicted many casualties "and had an

extremely demoralizing effect ."29

Elsewhere in Vietnam during Tet, in II Corps, naval

gunfire contributed to the defeat of the VC attacks

against the cities. According to ANGLICO reports a t

Nha Trang, prior coordination planning with the

installation defense command there permitted Navy

Lieutenant Vandiver to call upon the destroyer USS

Mansfield (DD 728), which was in the harbor, to pro -

vide counter-rocket and counter-mortar fires and t o

interdict avenues of approach to the city. Further south

in the II Corps sector at Phan Thiet on 3 February, th e

naval gunfire liaison spot team there attached to th e

U.S . Army's 3d Battalion, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne Division directed defensive fires from th e

destroyer USS Frank E. Evans (DD 754) into the city

against the attacking 840th VC Battalion . The following day, the ANGLICO team adjusted the fires within

100 meters of friendly troops. In its after-action report ,

the team observed that the enemy troops "became disorganized, fled the area, and was soon driven out of th e

city by ARVN forces." Later in the month, the team

once more called upon the Evans and another destroyer, the USS Pritchett (DD 561), to frustrate a renewed

VC assault on Phan Thiet .30

Following Tet, naval gunfire continued to play a

large role especially in I Corps with its large buildup o f

forces especially in the north beginning even before

Tet. By mid-March 1968, III MAF contained in th e

northern two provinces of I Corps one Marine division ,

*The International Control Commission was created by the Geneva Agreement of 1954 to ensure the provisions of that treaty . It consisted of Polish, Indian, and Canadian members . Although by thi s

time, the Commission was unable to enforce anything, it still retaine d

facilities and personnel in both North and South Vietnam . See also

Chapter 10.

**Two other destroyers and the cruisers Canberra (CAG 2) an d

the Newport News (CA 148) supported Operation Hue City . See CinCPacFlt, "Pacific Area Naval Operations Review, " Feb68 p . 29, (OAI3 ,

NHD).
OUTSIDE OF III MAF : THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 641

elements of a second, and two Army divisions, and i n

addition a new command structure . Although subordinate to III MAF, Provisional Corps, Vietnam, commanded by Army Lieutenant General William B.

Rosson, had operational control of U .S . forces in

Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Provinces including the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and the 101st Airborne Division . *

These changes in command relationships and the

arrival of the new Army divisions in northern I Corps

had an effect upon the ANGLICO organization in the

corps sector. Since 26 January, Marine First Lieutenant

Pasquale J. Morocco headed the ANGLICO fire control party with the 1st Air Cavalry Division at Cam p

Evans. Prior to the establishment of Provisional Corps ,

Lieutenant Hatch, the I Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison

officer, also doubled as the MACV (Forward) Liaison

officer when that command was temporarily installed

at Phu Bai under General Creighton W. Abrams in

early February. He remained in that dual capacity unti l

10 March when Provisional (Prov) Corps came int o

existence and General Abrams returned to Saigon. On

16 March, Navy Lieutenant Dale W. Lucas became the

Provisional Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison officer. At

about the same time, Navy Lieutenant Warkentin

transferred from Hue to Camp Eagle outside of Phu

Bai to head the shore fire control party attached to th e

101st Airborne Division. On 23 April, ANGLICO

spotters called in a Marine close air strike in support of

the 101st marking the first time" during the war tha t

non-Air Force personnel controlled a close air support

mission for the division.3 1

Throughout the period from February through Jun e

1968, the tempo of naval gunfire support increased

throughout Vietnam with the bulk going to suppor t

U.S. and allied forces in I Corps. For example, in February, Navy ships off the coast of South Vietnam fired

more than 94,000 rounds. Of this total, ANGLICO

teams in I Corps controlled missions firing nearl y

18,000 of those rounds, which did not include the missions fired in support of the 3d Marine Division along

the DMZ. By June, while somewhat reduced from

February, the U.S . Seventh Fleet fired more than

79,000 rounds in support of all forces, with ANGLICO in I Corps controlling missions which provide d

*The Prov Corps command did not include the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray which operated in Phu Loc District and the Ha i

Van area of Thua Thien Province . In August 1968, Provisional Corps

became XXIV Corps. For the changes in the military structure in I

Corps, see Chapter 13 .

over 18,000 of those rounds. Again, the figures for I

Corps did not include the missions fired in support o f

the two Marine Divisions in the corps sector. For the

first half of 1968, Navy gunfire support exceeded that

of the entire previous year.3 2

In perhaps the largest demonstration of joint sup -

porting arms of the war, Operation Thor in July 1968 ,

naval gunfire ships and naval air played a large role i n

the aerial, ground, and ship bombardment of the

North Vietnamese batteries in the Cap Mui Lay secto r

of the DMZ. Although Provisional Corps exercise d

command and coordination, Navy Lieutenant Dale W.

Lucas, the Prov Corps ANGLICO naval gunfire liaison officer, and his team at the Dong Ha forward

headquarters, processed all naval gunfire and the n

passed the direction to the 3d Marine Division nava l

gunfire section for action . All told, for the first seven

days of July, nine gunships (three cruisers and si x

destroyers) fired over 19,000 rounds of 5-inch, 6-inch ,

and 8-inch ammunition against the enemy gun positions. In addition, Navy aircraft from four carriers flew

512 sorties and dropped 812 tons of ordnance upon

the NVA positions. According to aerial photograph y

and observation, the joint bombardment create d

extensive damage and hampered for the time being

the NVA artillery support and coastal defense ability

in the Cap Mui Lay area.33* *

About this time, the Navy prepared to add a powerful new arsenal to its naval gunfire capability, th e

recently refurbished battleship New Jersey (BB 62)

with its 16-inch guns. On 16 July, I Corps and Prov

Corps ANGLICO liaison teams participated in a targeting planning conference for the ship which was t o

arrive off the waters of Vietnam at the end of September. On 30 September, the battleship fired its firs t

observed mission against NVA positions in the DMZ

which "was spotted by an ANGLICO spotter flying i n

a Marine TA—4F from MAG 11 . . . ." According to

the ground data assessment (GDA), the New Jersey's

big guns silenced 1 antiaircraft site, destroyed 1 truck

and 4 bunkers, and caused 11. secondary explosions.

During her first month off the coast of Vietnam, th e

warship steamed back and forth between I and II

Corps and off the coast of the DMZ . Through the end

**See Chapter 26 for a detailed account for Operation Thor . Th e

Navy ships that took part in the operation were the cruisers Bosto n

(CAG 1), Providence (CLG 6), and St. Paul (CA 73); the destroyers Benner (DD 807), Boyd (DD 544), Cochrane (DDG 21), Turner Joy (DD

951), O'Brien (DD 725), and Henry B . Wilson (DDG 7); and the carriers Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31), Constellation (CVA 64), Ticonderoga

(CVA 14), and America (CVA 66).
642 THE DEFINING YEAR

of the year, the New Jersey, in the words of one Nav y

report, moved from one offshore position to another,

"wreaking havoc on the enemy wherever sh e

employed her might . " For ANGLICO and Lieutenan t

Colonel Frederick K. Purdum, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Goodiel as the commander of the Sub -

Unit in August, the battleship provided a convincing

argument to allied and Army commands of the capabilities and uses of naval gunfire and the services o f

ANGLICO naval gunfire liaison teams .3 4

By the end of the year, the ANGLICO Sub-Unit 1

in Vietnam was somewhat smaller than in January, but

it had become more self-sufficient . Until November,

although its headquarters was in Saigon, it drew its supplies from III MAF at Da Nang . With approval of the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Sub-Uni t

obtained its own supply account and more importantl y

through an inter-Service agreement, it was now able t o

obtain common item supplies from the U .S. Army 1st

Logistic Command in South Vietnam . By the end of the

year, the Sub-Unit contained 217 personnel, but had

expanded its operations in IV Corps. While the final six

months did not require the extensive naval gunfire sup -

port of the first half, this support was more dispersed

and employed more evenly in all four Corps areas .

Embassy Marines

Another special Marine detachment in Vietnam was

the Marine Embassy guard. In 1968, although somewhat larger than the usual Embassy security guard, the

Saigon detachment performed much the same mission s

as their counterparts elsewhere : protected classified

material and U .S . government officials and property,

especially the Ambassador and the Embassy . From

1965 through 1967, the detachment in Saigon had

shown only sporadic growth . While more than doubling in 1966, it had remained the same size for over a

year and was subordinate to Company C, Securit y

Guard Battalion (State Department) headquartered i n

the Philippines capital, Manila. In January 1968, the

detachment consisted of one officer, Captain Robert J .

O'Brien, and 67 enlisted men .3 5

Until the Tet offensive in January 1968, except fo r

increased security watch, the war had largely bypassed

the Marines assigned to the Saigon Embassy. On the

afternoon of 30 January, however, a State Department

security officer met with Captain O'Brien an d

informed him about the possibility of a VC attack that

evening or sometime during Tet in the Saigon area.

The Marine captain immediately increased the alert

status and put a second man on all one-man posts . He

also placed a rooftop watch on the Embass y 's chancery

building and assigned two men to the Norodom compound next to the Embassy compound . That night h e

and one of his sergeants visited all of the posts, finding

nothing out of the ordinary, and about 0130 on the

31st, returned to Marine House, which doubled as th e

headquarters and barracks for the guard . O'Brien then

stretched out on a sofa and gave orders to wake him i n

time so he could make another tour at 0300 .36

The Viet Cong disrupted the captain's schedule . At

0245, a group of approximately 20 members of the

VC C—10 Battalion armed with satchel charges, auto -

matic weapons, and grenades, blew a hole in the wal l

surrounding the Embassy compound near the north -

east gate . The two U.S . Army Military Police (MPs)

from the 716th Military Police Battalion raised the

alarm, but were gunned down by the intruders . Two

more MPs in a jeep patrol tried to come to the assistance of their comrades, but also died in a burst of

machine gun fire .3 7

At the time this occurred, Sergeant Ronald W.

Harper, one of the three Marines posted in the

Embassy Chancery building, was visiting and drinking coffee with the Marines in the guard shack by the

Norodom compound . He suddenly looked up and saw

a strange Vietnamese and then heard rocket and

machine gun fire. Harper made a dash back to the

chancery, finding the main entrance door stil l

unlocked. He found Corporal George B . Zahuranic at

the front receptionist desk on the telephone calling fo r

help. Sergeant Harper immediately locked the doo r

and then ran to the armory inside the building to

obtain additional weapons.3 8

At that point, the VC fired several B—40 rockets a t

the front entrance . The rockets knocked out the windows behind the steel bars and penetrated the door, bu t

failed to unlock it or force it open . Although knocked

to the ground by the initial blast, Harper was unhurt .

Corporal Zahuranic was not as fortunate—he was hi t

by a piece of metal and was bleeding profusely from th e

right side of his head and ear. Sergeant Harper provided what first aid he could for Zahuranic and the n

answered the phone from another post. He relayed the

information about the wounded Zahuranic and pressed

upon his caller the urgency of the situation .

On the roof of the Chancery was Sergeant Rudy A .

Soto, armed with a shotgun. Like Harper, Soto witnessed the VC blasting their way into the Embassy

courtyard. He tried to take the VC troops under fire ,

but his weapon jammed . Sergeant Soto had a radio
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 643

with him, but was unable to contact either Harper or

Zahuranic and presumed that the VC had entered th e

building. He then radioed Marine House and informe d

them of the situation as he knew it .

By this time, Captain O'Brien was on his way.

The duty noncommissioned officer at Marine Hous e

had awakened him with the news about the attac k

almost as soon as it had occurred . The Marine captain

with Sergeant Richard G. Frattarelli, his driver,

jumped into the sedan that had a radio and departe d

for the Embassy, some five blocks away. Three othe r

Marines, two sergeants and a corporal, followed in a

jeep . Reaching a South Vietnamese police check

point about a block away from the Embassy an d

hearing that the VC were still there, O'Brien decided that the Marines should leave the two vehicles a t

the police station .39

Covering the rest of the distance to the Embass y

compound by foot, O'Brien and his small entourag e

arrived at the northeast gate unseen by any of the V C

attackers. He called out to the MPs who were supposed

to be there, but instead of the Americans, he saw five

or six of the VC who still had their backs to the

Marines. Captain O'Brien remembered being ,

"momentarily stunned by the abrupt . . . confrontation

with the VC, " but quickly recovered, ordering the one

Marine with the Beretta submachine gun to open fire .

As the Berretta gave a long burst, the other Marine s

shot their .38-caliber pistols at the enemy inside th e

gate . A sudden automatic weapons fusillade force d

O'Brien and his men to take cover behind the compound wall and some nearby trees.

At this point, Captain O'Brien directed Sergean t

Frattarelli to return to the sedan and radio Marine

House for reinforcements. Frattarelli ran down the

street about a half a block, when some frightened

South Vietnamese police opened up upon him . The

Marine sergeant took cover in an entrance way an d

"called out American" and the police let him

through. Reaching the radio, he requested the additional men and ammunition and then retraced his

route back to O'Brien . 4 °

Back at Marine House, Gunnery Sergeant Allen

Morrison had taken charge of the situation there .

Although not in contact with Captain O'Brien until

Frattarelli had radioed him, Morrison had communicated with both Sergeant Soto and the Marine sergeant

with the Ambassador. The Ambassador was safe an d

had moved from his residence to the house of one of the

Embassy security officers. According to Morrison, the

Ambassador had delegated the defense of the Embassy

to him in that he not been able to reach anyone else .

Even before hearing from Sergeant Frattarelli, Gunner y

Sergeant Morrison had sent a reaction team consisting

of Staff Sergeant Leroy J. Banks and five other Marines

in a vehicle to the Embassy. 4 1

On the way, U.S . Army MPs stopped the Marine s

about 300 yards from the Embassy compound and tol d

Staff Sergeant Banks to take his men out of the area a s

the VC were attacking . Banks told the MPs that they

were Embassy Marines and "our job and orders were t o

get to the Embassy and save it ." The Marine staff

sergeant then directed his men to leave their vehicle

and the team went the rest of the way on foot reachin g

the Norodom building, housing the Consulate an d

other U.S . government offices, on the southwest side o f

the Embassy. Banks' Marines then tried to maneuver

north using the compound wall to find an entrance

into the Embassy compound itself. They almost

reached the police station where the first group had left

their vehicles, but like Sergeant Frattarelli, came unde r

fire from the edgy Vietnamese policemen . Unable to

advance any further, Banks led his men back to th e

Norodom Building and joined the Marine guard s

already there . 4 2

In the meantime, at the northeast end of th e

Embassy, Captain O'Brien and his group placed a s

much fire upon the VC inside the compound as bes t

they could . They tried unsuccessfully to shoot off th e

locks of one of the gates. Joined by six MPs abou t

0330, the Marines continued to lay down a base of fire

and two of the MPs took positions in a nearby building . The Marine captain also told Sergeant Frattarell i

to return to the sedan and radio for more assistance

and weapons. The Vietnamese police again shot at

Frattarelli, who once more yelled out that he was an

American, but "this time it didn't work, they just

kept firing." While taking up new positions, O'Brien

and his Marines would remain out of radio contac t

until daylight. 4 3

At the Norodom, Staff Sergeant Banks positione d

his men in defensive positions and placed several on

the roof where they could fire down on the VC in the

compound. Banks and a small group made an unsuccessful attempt to enter the Embassy compoun d

through the Norodom gate, but were forced to fal l

back as the VC had all the gates covered with automatic weapons. Although reinforced by an Army MP

lieutenant with seven MPs under him, the American s

with a few M16s, three Beretta submachine guns, and

.38 caliber pistols, were badly outgunned by the VC

armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and
644 THE DEFINING YEA R

grenades. Unlike Captain O'Brien, however, Sergean t

Banks was able to maintain radio contact with Gunnery Sergeant Morrison in Marine House and remai n

in telephone communication with Sergeant Harpe r

inside the Embassy. After consulting with Gunnery

Sergeant Morrison and Harper, Banks and the Army

lieutenant thought it best to wait until daylight and

more reinforcements before making any furthe r

moves. With American MPs and Marines surroundin g

the Embassy and the continuing harassing fire, the VC

had little chance to escape and no prospect of reachin g

the Chancery itself. 4 4

The waiting until daylight proved to be a soun d

tactic . At about 0630, a U.S . Army helicopter alighted on the Chancery roof and evacuated both Sergean t

Soto and the wounded Corporal Zahuranic . Shortly

afterward, Captain O'Brien was able to reach his radi o

and radioed Gunnery Sergeant Morrison for additional weapons and a few more men, both of which were

forthcoming . With the additional reinforcements an d

with strong covering fires, the Marines and MPs b y

0730 finally forced their way into the compound fro m

both over the northeast wall and through th e

Norodom compound gate . The VC only offered a

desultory resistance and took what refuge they could .

At 0800, another Army helicopter landed troops from

Company C, 502d Infantry, 101st Airborne Divisio n

on the roof of the Chancery. All that was left was the

moping up. At 0900, Captain O'Brien grouped his

Marines together and made a floor to floor sweep o f

the Chancery to make sure none of the attackers had

somehow taken refuge there . It would be another two

hours before the building would be clear. The Marine

captain estimated that there were about 200 people

swarming around the Embassy grounds and the building itself including " reporters, writers, cameramen ,

MPs, 101st Airborne troops, and civilians." People

were "taking pictures, asking questions, and pickin g

up anything in sight, everything was up for grabs. "

Finally by late morning, the crowd had thinned ou t

and the Marines had effected some "semblance of

order." From the onset of the attack until the last Viet

Cong was killed by retired Army Colonel Georg e

Jacobsen, the Mission Coordinator for the Embassy, i n

his house on the grounds, was about seven hours . Most

of the VC attackers were dead except for two prisoners

and the Americans suffered casualties of five dead and

five wounded. One of the dead, Corporal James C . Marshall who had been killed by a sniper bullet while

on the roof of the Norodom Building, and five of the

wounded were Marines.

While one of the most dramatic events of the Communist Tet offensive, especially considering the play it

received upon American television, the attack on th e

Embassy was in reality a sideshow. The attack had

failed miserably, and the attackers never reached th e

Chancery building, but largely milled about in the

compound until finally killed or taken prisoner.

Despite its futility, the assault on the Embassy compound provided a propaganda coup for the enemy an d

pointed out the need for further security at the

Embassy. By the end of the year, the Marine Securit y

Guard had expanded by 39 men with plans to form the

detachment into a separate company. On 1 February

1969, the Saigon detachment became Company E ,

Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Dept) .45

Individual Marines in Saigon an d

Elsewhere in Vietnam

At the beginning of the year, outside of I Corps an d

mostly stationed in Saigon were some 200 individua l

Marines almost evenly divided between officers an d

enlisted men. Most were assigned to the MACV head -

quarters staff, but others served on the MACV radio and

television staff, with the Studies and Observatio n

Group (SOG), and other special groups . On the MACV

staff, the senior officer was Brigadier General John R .

Chaisson, who as MACV Deputy J—3 for Operations ,

ran the MACV Combat Operations Center, and developed a very close relationship with General Westmoreland, the MACV commander. To a certain extent ,

Chaisson became Westmoreland's informal advisor o n

Marine matters. A frank, outspoken officer, Chaisson

was perhaps best remembered for his press conference

on 3 February 1968, when he admitted that the Vie t

Cong had surprised the MACV command with the

intensity and coordination of the Tet offensive.46

In mid-1968, Marine Brigadier John N. McLaughlin relieved Chaisson in the same capacity. By the en d

of November, for whatever reason, there was som e

reduction in the Marines assigned to MACV, now consisting of 77 officers and 53 enlisted men 4 7

In I Corps, there was another group of Marines who

served individually as advisors under MACV to Sout h

Vietnamese Army units. In late 1967, 20 Marine officers and 23 enlisted men served in that capacity .

Another 129 Marine enlisted men provided security t o

the I Corps Advisory Group at Da Nang . By the end of

1968, the total number of Marine advisors was 27, 1 5

officers and 12 enlisted men . The enlisted Marines for

security were no longer needed .48
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 645

Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps

The largest Marine advisory effort was with the

South Vietnamese Marine Corps. Beginning with one

U.S. Marine advisor in early 1955, the U .S . Marine

Advisory Unit (MAU) to the South Vietnamese

Marine Corps had by January 1968 grown to an authorized strength of 33 personnel consisting of 27 Marin e

officers, a Navy doctor, four enlisted Marines and a

Navy corpsman. Commanded by Colonel Richard L.

Michael, Jr., who held the title, Senior Marine Advisor,

the MAU was part of the Naval Advisory Group in th e

U.S . MACV advisory organization. In Saigon, Michae l

maintained a small headquarters which consisted of th e

Assistant Senior Marine Advisor, Lieutenant Colone l

Glenn W. Rodney, and a small administrative staff

The rest served in the field with the deployed units o f

the Vietnamese Marine Corps 49

Outside of the supply, ordnance, artillery, an d

amphibious specialist officers, the remaining 16 U.S .

Marine advisors served with the two South Vietnamese

Marine task force headquarters or the six infantry battalions. Each task force was allotted a U.S . Marine

major and captain as an advisor and assistant advisor . A

U.S . Marine captain and first lieutenant were assigne d

to each of the battalions as the advisor and assistant

advisor to the commander. For the individual Marine

infantry individual advisor, it meant a continued

"nomadic lonely life ." As one Marine officer wrote i t

was not "unusual for a Marine advisor to report aboard;

undergo in-processing of two or three days ; and join a

deployed unit not to return to the Advisory Unit for

months at a time ." A senior advisor to one of the Vietnamese battalions, Captain Jerry I . Simpson, commented that while serving with the Vietnamese h e

subsisted "on the same rations" as the Vietnames e

Marines and would not see any Americans, including

his assistant advisor, "for several days at a time ."50

As could be expected, the South Vietnamese Marin e

Corps attempted to pattern itself after the U .S . Marine

Corps model . It consisted of a Lieutenant General

Commandant and a small central headquarters i n

Saigon, two combat task forces, Task Force Alpha an d

Task Force Bravo, six infantry battalions, an artillery

battalion, an Amphibious Support Battalion, and a

training center. Most of the Vietnamese Marine field

officers and many of the company grade officers ha d

attended at least the U.S . Marine Corps Basic School at

Quantico, Virginia. A few of the more senior officers

also graduated from the more advanced U .S. Amphibious Warfare School at the U .S . Marine base . By January 1968, the Vietnamese Marines numbered ove r

7,300 men and prided itself like its sister service in th e

United States on its elan and its reputation as one of the

country's elite fighting force .5 1

Despite the similarities between the two Marine

Corps, there were important differences. While its officers and some of its enlisted men had receive d

amphibious warfare training, the South Vietnames e

Marine Corps actually participated in very fe w

amphibious operations. Having its origins in the Vietnamese commando and riverine companies under the

French, the Vietnamese Marine Corps at first operated

much in the French tradition after its establishment in

1954 . In fact until May 1955, a French office r

remained in command of the Vietnamese Marines.

With the growing American influence, the Vietnamese

Marine organization tended to reflect the U .S . Marine

Corps with a growing emphasis upon the amphibiou s

mission. Still, from the very beginning of their existence, the Vietnamese Marines were committed t o

campaigns against the Viet Cong . While still continuing riverine operations, especially in the MeKong

Delta and in the Rung Sat sector south of Saigon, there

was little call for assaults across a defended beach 5 2

The basic advantage that the Vietnamese Marines

offered was their national character. Recruited from th e

nation at large, rather than from any one region as most

of the South Vietnamese Army divisions were, they

could be deployed anywhere in Vietnam when the situation demanded. Together with other specialist units

such as the South Vietnamese rangers and airborne, the

Vietnamese Marines formed the National General

Reserve . Operating directly under the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), these units became

in effect fire brigades to rush to the most urgent hot

spots and put out the flames. In one sense, the most

important quality of the Vietnamese Marines was their

demonstrated loyalty over time to the central government and the Joint General Staff53

Given the dominance of the Vietnamese military in

the central government, no South Vietnamese military

organization could be entirely divorced from interna l

politics. In the coup against then-President Diem i n

1963, Vietnamese Marines played a decisive role i n

toppling the regime . While the Vietnamese Commandant, Le Nguyen Khang, did not take an active part i n

bringing down the government, he was aware of th e

plot and took no action to prevent it . Following th e

coup, Khang became the South Vietnamese militar y

attache in the Philippines, but in three months he onc e

more resumed his duties as Commandant of the Viet-
646 THE DEFINING YEA R

Both photos are courtesy of Col Talman C. Budd, USMC (Ret )

Above, U.S . Marine advisors to Vietnamese Marine Task Force Alpha in 1968 are from left : Capt

Thomas B. Bagley, Jr., Assistant Advisor, TF Alpha; 1 stLt Larry S. MacFarlane, Assistant Advisor,

1st Bn, VNMC; Capt Ronald D. Ray, Assistant Advisor, TF Alpha ; 1 stLt Louis Garcia, Senior Advisor, 1st Bn, VNMC; an unidentified U.S. Marine warrent officer; and Maj Tatman C. Budd, Senio r

Advisor, TF Alpha . Below is the main gate to the South Vietnamese Marine headquarters in Saigon . The

Vietnamese Marine Corps symbol is clearly visible on the sign above the gate.
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 647

namese Marine Corps. In 1966, Khang and his

Marines sided with the central government against th e

"Struggle Movement" in I Corps and helped to subdue

those ARVN units loyal to the former I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi.54

By January 1968, Khang, now a lieutenant general ,

not only was Commandant of the Vietnamese Marin e

Corps, but according to his count, wore as many as si x

different "hats. " In addition to his Marine Corps command, he was the Commander of the Capital Militar y

District which included the city of Saigon and its

immediate vicinity; he was the commanding general of

the South Vietnamese III Corps Military Tactical Zone ;

and also was a member of the National Leadershi p

Council, which "in effect ruled the country." Moreover,

as III Corps commander, he was the "governor-delegat e

for administration" or III Corps administrator, and as

commander of the Capital Military District, he was th e

military governor of Saigon . Despite these various

responsibilities, Khang considered that his "main jo b

was still command of the Marines . "55

While Khang still held overall control of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, he relied on his assistant an d

chief of staff, Colonel Bui Thi Lan for the day to day

running of the headquarters . The two task force commanders, for the most part, had direct operational control of the infantry battalions. In January 1968 prior to

Tet, Task Force Alpha consisting of two infantry battalions and an artillery battalion was committed to th e

Bong Son area in II Corps, encountering only light an d

sporadic resistance . The other task Force, TF Bravo ,

also with two battalions, was attached to the 7t h

ARVN Division in the IV Corps sector. Of the remaining two Marine infantry battalions, one remaine d

under the direct control of the Capital Military Distric t

just outside of Saigon and the other had retired to its

base camp at Vung Tau .56*

This all changed in the early morning hours of 3 1

January, when the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army launched their country-wide Tet offensive . In Saigon, Viet Cong sappers had entered the

Embassy compound while other Communist unit s

struck the Vietnamese Joint General Staff headquarters, the adjoining Tan Son Nhut airbase, and othe r

military bases on the outskirts of the city. After the

*Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hainsworth, who as a captain serve d

as an assistant battalion advisor to the Vietnamese Marines, noted tha t

" many of these VNMC Battalion assignments were politically sensitiv e

and motivated within the VNMC hierarchy and the Joint Genera l

Staff." LtCol John J. Hainsworth, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hainsworth Comments .

initial surprise, mixed U .S . and South Vietnamese

forces in and around the city regrouped and began the

counterattack.5 7

The Vietnamese Marines quickly becam e

enmeshed in the fighting . At the outset of the enemy

offensive the only Marine unit anywhere near Saigo n

was the 3d Battalion, attached to the Capital Military

Command, but committed to an operation severa l

thousand meters west of the city. When the Sout h

Vietnamese Joint General Staff began to realize th e

intensity of the enemy effort, they immediately calle d

upon the Marine units to reinforce the ARVN units

already in Saigon. At 0430 on the 31st, the Sout h

Vietnamese Joint General Staff alerted the 4th Battalion, which was "more or less [in] a standdown" at it s

base camp at Vung Tau for air movement into Tan So n

Nhut Airport on the outskirts of the city.58 Because of

ground fog and enemy ground fire near Tan Son Nhut ,

the aircraft carrying the Marines did not land until

0930. After an initial briefing, the battalion the n

moved to reinforce the Joint General headquarters

south of the airbase . Although killing a reported 2 0

Viet Cong but sustaining 9 wounded, the battalion

was unable to close with the enemy out of concern o f

"inflicting excessive civilian casualties ." Engaging in a

desultory fire fight until 1430 with Communist

troops who had penetrated the JGS compound, the

battalion received orders to move north in the Gia

Dinh sector of Saigon to relieve the ARVN Phu Don g

armored base that was under attack .5 9

The battalion arrived at its destination, 4,00 0

meters north of its previous position, about 1630 . It

immediately mounted a two-company assault, sup -

ported by ARVN tanks, and two U .S. helicopter gunships providing limited air support against the ARVN

compound, now held by an estimated NVA battalion .

The enemy commander warned the Marines that hi s

troops would kill the South Vietnamese civilian depen -

dents, being held as hostage . After the supporting

tanks in the lead "blew a large opening" in the surrounding wall, the Vietnamese Marines entered th e

armored compound headquarters "with machine guns

blazing" and found the charred bodies of the dependents heaped in a large pile . Among the dead were the

wife and eight children of the base commander; an

ARVN lieutenant colonel, who also had been murdered . With enemy forces still in strength in the sector,

darkness coming on, and the inability to provide continuing air support, the South Vietnamese JGS ordered

the battalion commander to withdraw to more defensible positions. For the day, the battalion had sustained
648 THE DEFINING YEA R

casualties of 7 dead and 52 wounded and claimed t o

have killed 100 of the enemy.60

In the meantime, the JGS had brought Tas k

Force Bravo headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions into Saigon . At 1500, the 1st Battalion bega n

arriving in an improvised helicopter landing zon e

inside the Joint General Staff headquarters compound from Cai Lay in IV Corps . With the completion of the helilift a half-hour later, the battalio n

occupied the positions vacated by the 4th Battalio n

when it deployed north to relieve the armored base .

U.S . C—130 transport aircraft brought the task forc e

headquarters and the 2d Battalion into Tan Son

Nhut Airport with the last elements landing at

1930 . The task force headquarters and the 2d Battalion then joined the 1st Battalion near the Joint

General Staff compound. 6 1 While making his overnight command post outsid e

of the JGS compound, the Marine task force commander received new orders for the next day. He was to turn

over operational control of his 2d Battalion to a nearb y

South Vietnamese airborne commander and then move

with the 1st Battalion to the positions of the 4th Battalion near the armor base . After taking command of

the 4th Battalion, the task force, once more, was t o

reassume the attack . 6 2

On the morning of 1 February, however, the Nort h

Vietnamese launched a counterattack on the Vietnamese forces near the armored compound . The NVA

overran a neighboring ARVN artillery base, but th e

Vietnamese Marine forces in defensive positions, sup -

ported by air repulsed the enemy in fighting whic h

even involved " some hand to hand combat." The two

battalions of Task Force Bravo then mounted thei r

own offensive. In heavy seesaw fighting that lasted

until 3 February, the Vietnamese Marines finall y

cleared the sector. The costs, however, had been heavy

on both sides. For the three days, the Vietnamese

Vietnamese Marines are seen with a Viet Cong prisoner in the streets of Saigon during the Tet offensive .

In one of the most memorable scenes of the war, captured by Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams ,

a few minutes after this scene South Vietnamese National Police Chief BGen Nguyen Ngoc Loan, woul d

personally execute the prisoner.

Photo courtesy of Col John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 649

Marines suffered casualties of 17 dead and 88 wounded and reported over 220 enemy dead . In the fighting, three of the U .S . Marine advisors were among the

wounded . These included both the senior and assistant advisors of the 4th Battalion, Major William P.

Eshelman and Captain John J . Hainsworth, and the

senior advisor to the 1st Battalion, Captain Jerry I .

Simpson. All three of the Americans recovered from

their wounds although only Major Eshelma n

returned to his battalion .63 *

Beginning on 3 February, the South Vietnames e

Joint General Staff began its official counteroffensive

in Saigon, codenamed Operation Tran Hung Dao, and

General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint Genera l

Staff, took personal command. According to the plan ,

Vien divided Saigon into five zones and gave them let -

ter designations A through E. He later added a sixt h

zone, Zone F, in the outlying southern suburbs that

became the responsibility of U.S . forces. South Vietnamese Airborne, Army, police, and Ranger units

were given Zones A, C, D, and E to clear. Task Force

Bravo assumed control of Zone B, containing the Gi a

Dinh sector which included the northeastern part of

the city and its suburbs. The 2d Battalion remained

under the operational control of the Capital Militar y

Command going wherever it was needed until 18

February when it rejoined Task Force Bravo . 64

Task Force Bravo remained committed to Operation Tran Hung Do in the Gia Dinh sector until th e

operation came to an end on 11 March . While actio n

flared up occasionally during this period, by 7 February, the Vietnamese forces supported by U .S . forces

had broken the back of the enemy offensive . Never

fewer than two battalions, more often with three, Tas k

Force Bravo and the individual Marine battalions i n

the operation reported over 700 of the enemy dead ,

captured 54, and detained over 2,000 suspects . They

recovered 44 crew-served and 241 individual Communist weapons. The cost to the Marines was als o

high, 49 dead and 227 wounded . 6 5

*Lieutenant Colonel Simpson remembered that the enemy coul d

have used " the 105mm howitzers in the artillery compound . . . to shel l

the entire Ton Son Nhut area . " He recalled that in the enemy attack o n

the artillery compound, the Vietnamese Marine 1st Battalion closel y

coordinated fires with the only American in the artillery compound, a

U .S . Army major. The ARVN artillerymen lowered their howitzers to

0 elevation and were firing point blank at the VC . " The resultin g

shelling hit a gasoline station north of the 1st Battalion and provide d

" excellent illumination of the entire area . " LtCol Jerry I. Simpson,

Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) . Lieu -

tenant Colonel Hainsworth noted that he had just joined the 4th Battalion . Hainsworth Comments.

While Task Force Bravo and at least one othe r

Vietnamese Marine infantry battalion attached to th e

Capital Military Command remained in Saigon, Tas k

Force Alpha deployed to Hue and took part in th e

retaking of the Citadel in that city. From its initial

commitment to II Corps, at the start of Tet, Tas k

Force Alpha and its battalions had returned to

Saigon to be in position to reinforce Task Force Bravo

if needed. After losing operational control of two of

its battalions, on 9 February, the task force headquarters and the 1st Battalion departed Tan Son

Nhut Airport by air for Phu Bai . By 14 February, th e

initial units were reinforced by two more battalions ,

the 4th and 5th. After some initial misunderstandings, the commander of the 1st ARVN Division ,

General Ngo Quang Truong, assigned Task Forc e

Alpha to clearing the western Citadel. Taking part i n

some of the heaviest fighting in the war, Task Forc e

A remained under the operational control of the 1s t

ARVN Division and in Hue or its environs until 2 7

March when it relieved Task Force Bravo in Saigon .

In the fighting for Hue, the Vietnamese Marine tas k

force sustained casualties of nearly 90 dead and 35 0

wounded.** All told, for the period 30 January

through 27 March which included the battles fo r

both Saigon and Hue, Vietnamese Marines reporte d

killing over 1,300 of the Communists and capture d

another 82 while detaining nearly 2,000 suspects .

The entire VNMC suffered 128 killed, 588 wounded, and 1 missing in action. 6 6

For the rest of the year, the two Vietnamese

Marine task forces and individual battalions would

be committed to combat situations without hardl y

any reprieve . While encountering little of the ferocity of Tet during most of the remaining months, the

intensity of the fighting that flared up in Saigon

again in May and June for the Vietnamese Marine s

almost matched that for the earlier period . For the

entire year, including Tet, the Vietnamese Marin e

Corps conducted 196 battalion-size operations o r

larger which resulted in 2,761 reported enem y

killed, 352 prisoners, and 1,150 captured weapons .

While on operations 98 percent of the time, the

Marines sustained losses of 369 killed, 1,651 wounded, and 4 missing in action . According to Lieutenant

Colonel James T. Breckinridge, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Rodney in April, "the Vietnames e

Marine Corps is the best unit in RVN for the amoun t

of money spent to support it . If these Marines ar e

**For description of the battle for Hue City see Chapters 9-12 .
650 THE DEFINING YEA R

properly employed and supported and given a target ,

they can and have outperformed other RVNAF

ground units. " 67

Despite such praise, the Vietnamese Marines had

come under significant criticism during the course o f

the year. Frustrated at what he considered the slow

progress of Task Force Alpha in the Hue Citadel,

General Creighten W. Abrams, then Deputy

ComUSMACV, radioed General Westmoreland tha t

he was considering recommending to the South

Vietnamese Joint General Staff the dissolution of th e

Vietnamese Marine Corps. In perhaps an even more

delicate political situation for the Vietnames e

Marines Corps, General Khang, the Vietnames e

Marine Commandant, resigned all of his positions i n

June except his command of the Marine Corps afte r

an American helicopter gunship accidentally hit a

friendly position, killing several supporters of Vice

President Nguyen Cao Ky. While Khang had bee n

identified as a supporter of Ky, he claimed that Ky

and his supporters blamed him for the incident .

Above, a Vietnamese Marine lieutenant artillery forward observer calls for a fire mission during street

fighting in Saigon during the Yet offensive. Below, Marine infantrymen supported by armor advance i n

Saigon fighting . Note that the lead Marine has his gas mask open and ready to put on.

Both Photos are courtesy of Col John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)
OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS 65 1

Photo courtesy of Col Talman C . Budd, USMC (Ret )

A Vietnamese tank protects the Vietnamese TF Alpha command post in Gia Dinh in renewed fighting i n

Saigon during May 1968 .

According to Khang, to avoid all suspicion, h e

retained only his post as Marine Corps Commandant.

Lieutenant Colonel Breckinridge observed that ther e

apparently was a rumor campaign to discredi t

Khang in October, claiming that he was about to

bring in Marine battalions into Saigon to topple th e

government . By the end of the year, however, Khan g

accompanied President Thieu on a ceremonial trip to

IV Corps. Breckinridge interpreted this fact to show

that Khang was not in disfavor.68

While the U.S. Marine advisors for the most part

respected their Vietnamese counterparts and th e

fighting qualities of the Vietnamese Marine, they

also recognized several of the shortcomings of th e

Vietnamese organization . According to Breckinridge, who reviewed all of the American advisor afte r

action and monthly reports, there was a constant

theme of lack of staff work and refusal of commanders to delegate authority, lack of tactical coordination, poor employment of mortars, and poor calibe r

of the noncommissioned officers. During the battle

for Hue, for example, the 1st Battalion was heavil y

engaged for two days while the "two other battalion s

of the task force watched the fighting from a distance

of about one kilometer." The Marine advisor to the

battalion attributed some of the heavy losses of the

Marines during the fighting on the failure of the tas k

force commander "to commit all or part of his watching idle battalions. " G9 *

Despite such obvious weakness on the part of th e

Vietnamese Marines, Breckinridge, who was serving

his second tour in Vietnam, the first being in 195 5

with the first advisory group, also saw much improvement. The Vietnamese took several steps to improve

both tactics and leadership . The Marines opened up a

school for noncommissioned officers and a school fo r

the use of mortars. In March 1968, after a review of the

entire organization with the Joint General Staff,

MACV agreed to support the transformation of the

Marine Corps into a Marine light division . In October

the Vietnamese Marine Brigade officially became the

Vietnamese Marine Corps division consisting of tw o

brigades. With the potential of continued growth and

an earned combat reputation, the Vietnamese Marine

Corps had become an even more integral part of the

Vietnamese General Reserve .7 °

*Colonel Breckinridge noted in his comments that his "after-tou r

report was a compilation of many such reports submitted by previou s

advisors and was an attempt to assist both advisors and Vietnamese .

Areas wherein . . . [it] was reported that the VNMC made mistakes ,

in many cases, are the same areas that Americans would also have fall -

en short." Col James T. Breckinridge, Comments on draft, dtd

lNov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 3 1

1968 : An Overview

The year 1968 had been a momentous one in the

Vietnam War, possibly the defining year, for the U.S .

effort in that conflict, including the Marine Corps role .

As the year began, III MAF, the Marine Corps command in Vietnam, had one of its two Marine divisions,

the 3d, strung out along the eastern DMZ in largel y

fixed positions tied to the strong point obstacle system

(SPOS) or barrier. While pressing the 3d Marine Division forces in eastern Quang Tri, the North Vietnamese

succeeded in isolating the Marine regiment, the 26th

Marines, at Khe Sanh in northwestern I CTZ, near th e

Laotian border. The enemy had cut Route 9, the mai n

east-west land artery, and forced the Marines to rel y

entirely upon air for resupply. Even in southern I

Corps, there were portents of growing enemy strength .

The newly formed U .S . Army 23d or Americal Division continued to engage NVA and VC forces . Furthermore, U .S . commanders obtained intelligence tha t

the 2d NVA Division planned attacks aimed at both the

fire support bases of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry

Division in the Que Son Valley and the 1st Marine

Division positions in the Da Nang sector.

As with most aspects of the Vietnam War, the message was mixed . Together with the intelligence about

the expansion of the war, there were continuing rumors

about new peace initiatives by the North Vietnamese .

Earlier, MACV published intelligence estimates that

claimed enemy total strength had declined . Moreover,

General William C . Westmoreland, the MACV commander, in November 1967, had proclaimed that the

end of the war was in sight and issued directives calling for a full offensive by allied forces on all fronts.

According to American pacification measurements ,

more and more villages were supposedly under allie d

control. In I Corps, for example, at the end of December, III MAF reported about 55 percent of the population living in so-called secure areas

Yet as January progressed, MACV and III MAF

focused more and more upon the north . The buildup of

enemy forces around Khe Sanh could no longer be

denied. Originally planning deep penetration operations into enemy base areas in the Do Xa and A Shau

areas in I Corps, General Westmoreland decide d

*See Chapter 1 .

instead to reinforce the Marine forces in the north with

two more Army divisions, the 1st Air Cavalry an d

101st Airborne . The MACV commander expected the

enemy major thrust either to be directly across th e

DMZ, or more likely at Khe Sanh, while launchin g

diversionary attacks throughout South Vietnam .

III MAF also prepared for the onslaught, with its

focus also on the north. Beginning in December 1967 ,

Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, the MAF

commander, directed the 1st Marine Division at Da

Nang to take over the 3d Marine Division area of operations in Thua Thien Province. In a massive relocatio n

of units between the two Marine Divisions durin g

December and January, appropriately called Operatio n

Checkers, the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the Phu Loc area and established its Task

Force X-Ray at Phu Bai, as well . The increasing enem y

strength around Khe Sanh in mid January forced th e

3d Marine Division to reinforce the garrison with ye t

another battalion. With the arrival of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in northern I Corps and the establishment of its base area at Camp Evans, about the sam e

time, made the original Checkers plans obsolete . All

eyes were now on Khe Sanh .

As General Westmoreland prepared for what h e

thought would be the decisive battle of the war, his

relationship with the Marine command had grown

rather tenuous. From the beginning of the commitment of Marine forces to Vietnam, there had been differences between the MACV approach and that of th e

Marine . From the start, the Marines emphasized pacification and population control while the MACV commander had stressed the large unit war against the V C

and NVA regular units. The commitment of large

Marine forces to the barrier project along the DMZ als o

had placed a strain upon the relationship . Although

irreverently referred to as the "McNamara Wall, "

Westmoreland fully backed the venture and believed

the Marines to be dragging their feet . Finally there wa s

the subject of Khe Sanh, itself. Only under MACV

pressure did III MAF garrison the isolated outpost in

the first place and Westmoreland was concerned that

the Marines tended to underestimate the threat to th e

base . Given these circumstances and what he considered Marine inflexibility about control of its own avia652
1968 : AN OVERVIEW: 65 3

tion, the MACV commander gave some consideratio n

about a change in command relations in the north . He

finally decided, as a half measure, to establish a MAC V

(Forward) headquarters at Phu Bai under his deputy,

General Creighton W. Abrams, and prepared the way

for single management of Marine air under his deputy

for air, Air Force General William Momyer.

While, on 21 January 1968, the Communists initiated a massive bombardment on Khe Sanh, their

main offensive thrust was not the Marine base nor the

DMZ forces, but the cities and lines of communication throughout South Vietnam from the MeKong

Delta in the south to Quang Tri City in the north .

Khe Sanh would remain under siege from 21 January

until early April. Although making several strong

probes, overrunning the Special Forces at Lang Vei ,

and maintaining large troop formations around the

base, the North Vietnamese never launched a fullfledged ground assault against Khe Sanh. Speculation

and controversy still dominate the discussion about

the siege and the motivation of the North Vietnamese .

Did the enemy hope for a replay of Dien Bien Phu, its

successful campaign against the French in 1954, o r

merely use Khe Sanh as a feint for his Tet offensive ?

Given the number of troop resources that the enem y

placed around Khe Sanh and the pounding the y

absorbed from artillery and air, there can be no doubt

that the North Vietnamese would have taken the base ,

if they could have done so . On the other hand, there

was a limit on the price they were willing to pay, an d

in all probability, Khe Sanh was only one objective

among many . The Communists hoped and possibl y

believed that their Tet offensive would bring about a

true people's revolution against the South Vietnames e

regime, resulting in the defection of the ARVN an d

the fall of the government .

Arguably, however, the Communists may never

have realistically expected their Tet offensive to caus e

an uprising throughout South Vietnam and probabl y

had in mind a more limited and attainable goal . A

case could be made that at least in I Corps, their mai n

objective was not Khe Sanh, but Hue . They perhaps

hoped that the capture of Hue would result in th e

defection of the South Vietnamese forces and the loss

of other population centers in the two norther n

provinces of South Vietnam. Such a result would have

cut the allied lines of communication and left the 3 d

Marine Division suspended without support in th e

northern regions bordering the DMZ and Laos. This

would have left the Communists in a strong positio n

for obtaining their own terms. Given both the

resources that the North Vietnamese put into the battle and the tenacity with which they fought, it was

obvious that the Hue campaign was a major component of the entire Tet offensive. According to a n

enemy account, the North Vietnamese military command in planning the offensive took into consideration that the U.S . and South Vietnamese had concentrated their forces in the north, expecting an attack

along Route 9. It viewed Hue as the weak link in th e

allied defenses in the northern two provinces .

The battle for Hue was a relatively near thing. Only

the failure of the North Vietnamese to overrun th e

Mang Ca and MACV compounds permitted the allies

to retain a toehold in both the Citadel and the new city. With the holding of these two positions, the Americans and South Vietnamese were able to bring in reinforcements to mount a counteroffensive. Even then, if

the enemy had blown the An Cuu Bridge across Rout e

1 on the first day, the Marines would not have bee n

able to send in their initial battalions and supplies int o

the city. If the enemy had made a stronger effort to cut

both the water and land lines of communications, th e

outcome of the struggle for Hue would have been less

predictable . The Marine rapid response and quic k

adaptability to street fighting together with the fact

that the South Vietnamese forces did not defect permitted the allied forces to attain the upper hand. Fortuitously, the 1st Air Cavalry Division had arrived i n

northern I Corps prior to Tet and was eventually able

to commit four battalions to the battle . By the end o f

February, the allies controlled Hue .

With the securing of the city of Hue, the enemy' s

countrywide Tet offensive had about spent itself. While the enemy offensive failed, public opinion polls

in the United States revealed a continuing disillusionment upon the part of the American public . President

Johnson also decided upon a change of course . On 3 1

March, he announced his decision not to stand for

reelection, to restrict the bombing campaign over

North Vietnam, and to authorize only a limited reinforcement of American troops to Vietnam .

Notwithstanding the mood in Washington and

ready to begin his counter-offensive, General Westmoreland altered again his command arrangements i n

I Corps. On 10 March, he disestablished his MACV

(Forward) Headquarters. He replaced it with Provisional Corps, later XXIV Corps, whose commander, a n

Army lieutenant general, was directly subordinate t o

III MAF. At the same time, however, General Westmoreland designated the Seventh Air Force commander, as "single manager for air" and gave him "mission
654 THE DEFINING YEA R

direction " over Marine fixed-wing aircraft. Despite

Marine Corps protests, Westmoreland 's order prevailed . While obtaining major modifications to the

ruling, Marine air in Vietnam would operate under the

single manager system to the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam . With the end of the enemy offensive, the allies

planned to breakout from Khe Sanh . While North

Vietnamese ground forces did not follow up on their

Lang Vei attack, they incessantly probed the hill outposts and perimeter. Employing innovative air tactics ,

Marine and Air Force transport and helicopter pilots

kept the base supplied. Finally on 14 April, the U .S.

1st Cavalry Division reinforced by a Marine regiment

relieved the base. On 14 April, the 77-day " siege" o f

Khe Sanh was over.

The North Vietnamese were far from defeated, however, and in early May launched their "mini-Tet offensive ." Except for increased fighting in the capital cit y

of Saigon and the heavy fighting in the eastern DM Z

sector, the North Vietnamese May offensive was largely limited to attacks by fire at allied bases and acts o f

terrorism in the hamlets and villages . In I Corps, the

major attempt was to cut the supply lines in the DMZ

sector which led to the very bloody fighting at Dai D o

and around Dong Ha. The result again, however, was

the defeat of the North Vietnamese forces .

.

By mid-1968, the allied forces were on the offensive throughout I Corps. General Abrams had succeeded General Westmoreland as Commander,

USMACV. Unlike Westmoreland, Abrams had littl e

or no commitment to either keeping a garrison at Khe

Sanh or to the barrier. The closing out of the base at

Khe Sanh in July 1968 permitted the 3d Marine Division under Major General Raymond G. Davis to

launch a series of mobile firebase operations rangin g

the length and breadth of the northern border area .

Long neglected, the barrier concept was officiall y

abandoned in October.

In the late summer of 1968, the Communists

launched another "mini-Tet" offensive, but were agai n

bloodily repulsed . By the end of 1968, both the 3d

Marine and 1st Marine Divisions were conductin g

large mobile operations. After a standstill for most of

the year, Marine measurements of pacification showed

progress in regaining the countryside . In December,

enemy-initiated attacks fell to the lowest level in ove r

two years.

Still, no one was about to predict victory and th e

Communists were far from defeated. The various "Te t "

offensives had provided a benchmark for both sides ,

forcing both to reassess their strategies . After the last

"mini-Tet," the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

scaled down their large-unit war, probably out of bot h

weakness and the expectation that the American s

would eventually withdraw. While Tet was a military

setback for the Communist forces with the decimatio n

of the Viet Cong and many of their political cadre i n

the South, the American government, people, and military establishment also realized that there was a limi t

to American participation in the war. As Marine Lieutenant General John R. Chaisson, later stated, the

Marine Corps "had adopted from 1969 on, the idea

that we were in the postwar period ." l
Notes

PART I

Pre-Tet 1968

CHAPTER 1

A PUZZLING WAR

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived fro m

MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff MACV, Command History, 1967, hereafter MACV ComdHisc, 1967 ; MilHistBr, Office of

the Secretary, Joint Staff MACV, Command History, 1968, hereafte r

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67—Jan68 ;

FMFPac, Marine Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, hereafte r

FMFPac, MarOpsV with specific month ; CGFMFPac, Pacific Operations, tab F, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, hereafte r

CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns; III MAF ComdCs, Dec67—Jan68 ; LtGe n

John R. Chaisson Papers (Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University), hereafter Chaisson Papers; Assessmen t

and Strategy Files (Indochina Archives, Institute of East Asian Studies,

University of California, Berkeley), hereafter A&S Files, Indochin a

Archives; LtGen Victor H . Krulak, First to Fight, An Inside View of the

U.S . Marine Corps (Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, 1984) ,

hereafter Krulak, First to Fight; Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, USN,

CinCPac, and Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, ComUSMACV,

Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 Jun 1968) (Washington : GPO,

1968), hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War; Ge n

William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, New York :

Doubleday & Co, Inc ., 1976), hereafter Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports; Edward J. Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, An Illustrated History of the U .S . Navy and the War in Southeast Asia (Washington : Nava l

Historical Center, 1994), hereafter Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land;Jac k

Shulimson and Maj Charles M . Johnson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, The

Landing and the Buildup, (Washington : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978),

hereafter Shulimson and Johnson, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 196 .5; Jac k

Shulimson, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC 1982), hereafter, Shulimson, U .S .

Marines in Vietnam, 1966 ; Maj Gary F. Telfer, LtCol Lane Rogers, and

Victor K . Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Fighting the North Vietnamese Army, 1967 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1984), here -

after Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in 1967 ; BGen Edwi n

H. Simmons, " Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam,1968," Naval

Review, 1970 (Annapolis, Maryland : U.S . Naval Institute, 1970), pp .

290—320, hereafter Simmons, " Marine Operations, 1968 . "

III MAF in January 196 8

1. HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67—Jan68 . See also III MAF ComdC,

Jan68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67—Jan68 ; and MACV ComdHist,

1967, pp . 127—8 .

2. III MAF ComdC, Jan68 ; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp . 127—8 .

3 . Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Biographical File (Ref Sec, MCHC) .

MACV and Command Relation s

4. MACV ComdHisc, 1967, p . 124 ; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report

on the War, pp . ii—iii, 79, 156, 291—4 ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports,

passim .

5. MACV ComdHist, 1968, p . 248 .

6. Ibid ., pp . 238, 345 ; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 156—7 ; HQMC,

Status of Forces, Dec67—Jan68 .

7. Gen William C. Westmoreland USA (Ret .) inrvw, dtd 4Apr83, p .

11 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp . 248, 443 ,

475—77 ; MACV ComdHist, 1967, p . 9 .

8. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p . 124 . For relations between FMFPac an d

III MAF, and between III MAF and Seventh Air Force, see the previous volumes in this series, Shulimson and Johnson, U.S . Marines i n

Vietnam, 1965 ; Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966; and Teller,

Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, passim. See also

BGen John R. Chaisson Itrs to his wife, dtd 6Sep67, 30Sep67, an d

14Nov67 (Chaisson Papers) .

9. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p . 167 ; For command relations betwee n

Army and Navy Flotilla Group see MajGen William B . Fulton, Riverine Operations 1966—69, Vietnam Studies (Washington : Dept of th e

Army, 1973), pp 85—8 .

10. MACV ComdHist 1967, p . 6 ; MACV ComdHist 1968, pp . 217 ,

222—23 .

11. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 127 . See also MACV Comd -

Hist 1968, pp . 7 and 22—3 .

12. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 240 .

13. Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, Comments on Shulimson ,

U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966, dtd 28Ju178 (Vietnam Comment File) .

14. Willard Webb, JCS Historical Office, in Vietnam Historians Work -

shop, Plenary Session, 9 May 1983 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv ,

n .d .[1984]), p . 12 .

South Vietnam and I Corp s

15. The preceding paragraphs of this section were largely drawn fro m

Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History (New York : The Viking Press, 1983),

pp . 213—311, 386, 444—452, hereafter Karnow, Vietnam; Col Dave R.

Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press,

1978), pp . 1-48, hereafter Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet; and the previous volumes in this series: Capt Robert H . Whitlow, U .S. Marines in

Vietnam, 1954—64, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era (Washington ,

D.C. : Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1977); Shulimson and Johnson, U .S.

Marines in Vietnam, 1965; Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966;

Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, passim .

16. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp . 142—3, 270, 300—01, 335, 341 ;

HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67—Jan68 . There is a slight discrepanc y

between the figures in the command history and the Status of Forces.

The text uses the figures in the Status of Forces as more representative

of the period at the beginning of 1968 . For the strength of the Navy,

see Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, p. 216 . For the powers of the Military Council, See Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 219 .

17. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp . 275, 300—01 .

18. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, pp . 10—11 .

19. MACV ComdHisr 1968, p. 376; HQMC, Status of Forces,

Dec67—Jan68 .

20. Shulimson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp . 73—91 .

655
656 THE DEFINING YEAR

21. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp 378—80 ; HQMC, Status of Forces,

Dec67 ; Simmons, "Marine Operations, 1968," p . 293 .

22. Ibid . ; III MAF msg to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 26Dec67, Encl 27, 1s t

MarDiv, ComdC, Dec67 .

23. Gen Robert E. Cushman intvw, Nov 1, 1982, (OralHist Coll ,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp . 8—9, hereafter Cushman Intvw, 1982 .

24. 3d MarDiv, III MAF Campaign Plan Review, Working Paper, n .d . ,

Subj : Command Relations with 1st ARVN Division, Encl 78, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Pt II, Supporting Documents, Dec67 .

The Enemy

Additional Sources for this section are: Douglas Pike, "The Othe r

Side," in Peter Braestrup, ed ., Vietnam as History, Ten Years After th e

Paris Peace Accords (Washington ; D.C. : University Press of America,

1984), pp . 71—7, hereafter Pike, "The Other Side ;" Robert Pringle,

"NVA Order of Battle" ms, hereafter Pringle, Order of Battle;" Davi d

Fulgham, " If MACV Hasn 't Said It, DIA Won't Say It; " ms; hereafte r

Fulgham, " If MACV Hasn 't Said It " ; Gen William C . Westmoreland,

News Conference Folder, dtd 26Jan1982 .

25. Pike, "The Other Side," p . 73 ; Television France, Transcript of

Incvw with General Giap, "La Peste Ho Chi Minh " [The Ho Chi Minh

Trail], 18Feb83, "The 10,000 Day Lie," The Washington Times, dtd

16Mar83, p . 11 . See also Karnow, Vietnam, pp . 257—9 .

26. MACV ComdHist 1967, pp. 15—7 ; MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp .

60—7, 96, 103—4, 108 ; Pike, "The Other Side," pp . 73—4 ; Pringle ,

"NVA Order of Battle. "

27. Ibid .

28. MACV, Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, dcd 23Nov67 (A& S

Files, Indochina Archives), MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp .27—8 ; CIA,

Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam, " dcd 13Nov6 7

(Westmoreland News Conference Folder, 1982); Pringle, "NVA Orde r

of Battle ;" Fulgham, "If MACV Didn't Say It. "

29. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Press Statement, dtd 26Jan198 2

(Westmoreland News Conference Folder, 1982) .

30. MACV Briefing, Nov67 ; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp . 2 and 11 ;

Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle" ; Fulgham, "If MACV Didn't Say It . "

31. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp . 2 and 11 .

32. Vo Nguyen Giap, Big Victory, Great Task (New York : Frederick A .

Praeger, 1968), pp . 18—19.

33. War Experiences Recapitulation Committee of the High-Leve l

Military Institute, The Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation,

trans by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Hanoi : People 's Arm y

Publishing Houses, 1980) [Joint Publications Research Service No .

80968, dtd 3Jun82], pp. 100—01 . For speculation about North Vietnamese internal differences, see Pike, "The Other Side" ; P.J. Honey ,

"The Offensive, Hanoi's Change of Strategy," clipping from China

News Analysis, dtd 22Mar68 and V. Zorza, " Hints from Hanoi, " Clip -

ping Washington Post, dcd 10Oct68 (A&S Files, Indochina Archives) ;

Donald Oberdorfer, Tet! (Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1971), pp .

42—46, hereafter Oberdorfer, Teti ; Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet,

163—7 ; MACV ComdHist 1967, p . 74 .

34. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp . 75, 98 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming,

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp. 132—39 ; Palmer, Summons of the

Trumpet, pp. 167—9 ; Oberdorfer, Tet!, pp . 107—8 ; Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports, pp . 236—9 .

35. Capt Moyers S . Shore III, The Battle for Khe Sanh (Washington:

Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1969), pp. 26—7, hereafter Shore, Khe Sanh.

36. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp . 128—9 .

37. Krulak, First to Fight, p . 217 .

Focus on the Nort h

38. Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp. 139—98 ; Teller,

Rogers, Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, passim.

39. Shulimson, op . cit., pp . 314—18 ; Teller, Rogers, and Fleming, op.

cit ., pp. 86—94; LtGen Louis Metzger, "Memoir," ms, pp . 57—114 .

40. This and the following paragraph are derived from : The Pentago n

Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking o n

Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition, 4 vols (Boston : Beacon Press,

1975), vol 4 ., pp . 285—89 hereafter, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition;

MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 143—49 ; Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, pp . 227—230 ; Lyndon B . Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives

of the Presidency, 1963—1969 (New York : Holt, Rinehart, & Winston ,

1971), pp . 369—71, hereafter Johnson, The Vantage Point .

41. Additional source for this paragraph is III MAF ComdC, Dec67 .

MACV vis a vis Marine s

Additional sources for this section are: Gen Wallace M. Greene ,

Personal Notes and Related material Pertaining to United States and

Marine Corps Participation in Operations in Vietnam Binder, Ge n

Wallace M . Greene, Jr., Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, hereafte r

Operations in Vietnam Binder, Greene Papers ; Victor H. Krula k

Papers, hereafter Krulak Papers; Cushman intvw, 1982 ; MajGen Raymond L . Murray Incvw, 27Jun75 (OralHist Coll, MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.), hereafter Murray intvw ; Senior Officers Debriefing Program,

U.S . Army, Military Institute, Carlisle Bks, Pa., hereafter Senior Officers Debriefing, Carlisle .

42. For examples of General Greene's views see: CMC, Memorandu m

For the Record, dtd 22Jul65, Subj : Record of Conference on Southeas t

Asia held at White House and CMC, Memorandum for the Record ,

dcd 7Nov66, Subj : I Corps Estimate "Force Requirements and Long

Range Estimates for I Corps, RVN" in Operations in Vietnam Binder,

Greene Papers. For examples of General Krulak's views see : "A Strategic Appraisal" Dec65, Box 4, Krulak Papers ; CGFMFPac, Pacific

Opns; Krulak, The First to Fight, pp . 186 and 197—203 . See also

Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp. 11—14 ; Jack Shulimso n

and Maj Edward F. Wells, " First In, First Out, The Marine Experienc e

in Vietnam, 1965—1971," Marine Corps Gazette, Jan 84, pp . 36-46 .

43. General Greene is quoted in Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam ,

1966, p . 14 . See various CMC, Memorandum for the Record in Operations in Vietnam Binder, Greene Papers relative to his efforts via th e

Joint Chiefs and even the President to present the Marine Corps perspective . For General Krulak, see Krulak Itr to Hon Robert S . McNamara, dtd 11Nov65, Box 4, Krulak Papers and Krulak, First to Fight,

p . 186 . Interestingly enough, former Secretary McNamara makes n o

mention of this letter or these conversations with Krulak in his memoir, Robert S . McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect, The

Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York : Time Books, Random House ,

Inc., 1995), passim .

44. Cushman Intvw, 1982, p . 63 .

45. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, pp . 5—7 ; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp .

319—20 .

46. LtGen Victor H . Krulak, Comments on draft, dtd 310x1994

(Vietnam comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments .

47. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 319—20 .

48. Quoted in Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p . 75 ; III

MAF ComdC, Jan68.
NOTES 657

49. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 166.

50. Cushman Intvw, 1982, pp . 43-44 .

51. Ibid ., pp . 13—16 .

52. MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins intvw, 1973, pp . 50—1 (OralHist

Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Tompkins Intvw.

53. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 342 .

54. Murray Incvw, pp . 32, 45 . See also MajGen Raymond L. Murray,

Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

55. Ibid ., pp . 48—9 . See also Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines

in Vietnam, 1967, pp . 229—31 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; III MA F

ComdC, Dec67 .

56. Tompkins Incvw, p . 88 .

57. Conversations between LtGen William R . Peers, USA, and LtCol

Jim Breen, USA, and LtCol Charlie Moore, USA, 13Apr77, pp . 77—8 ,

81, and Conversations between Gen Harold K . Johnson, USA, an d

LtCol Rupert F. Glover, USA, v. 2, intvw No . 9, p . 16 (Senior Officers

Debriefing, Carlisle) .

58. Cushman Intvw, 1982, pp . 38—9.

59. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, p . 12 .

60. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 166—7 . See also BGen John R.

Chaisson Itrs to wife, dtd 29—30 Nov67 (Chaisson Papers).

61. Cushman Intvw, 1982 pp . 64—5 .

62. BGen John R. Chaisson, Diary, entries for 26—28 Jan68 (Chaisso n

Papers). For relationship between Cushman and Westmoreland, see

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 342 ; Cushman Inrvw, 1982, passim. For description of III MAF staff see Tompkins Intvw, pp . 71—3 ,

77, 87 ; Murray Intvw, pp . 15—16.

An Ambivalent Outlook

63. Quoted in Karnow, Vietnam, p . 514 . See also Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 230—2 ; Johnson, The Vantage Point, p . 376 .

64. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp . 340—5 .

65. Ibid. ; MACV ComdHist 1968, pp . 13—7, 20—3, 781—2, 788 .

66. Ibid., 1968, pp . 23—4 .

67. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 314 . See also MACV Comd -

Hist, 1968, 773—4 ; Murray Incvw, pp . 55—6 .

68. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp . 152—3, Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming ,

U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp . 120 and 139 ; 3d MarDiv FragO

62—67, dtd 29Dec67, End 13, Plans and Orders, 3d MarDiv ComdC,

Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv, ComdC, Dec67 ; Simmons, " Marine Operations,

1968," p . 292 .

69. 3d MarDiv and 1st MarDiv, ComdCs, Dec67 .

70. III MAF ComdC, Dec67 .

71. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 46 ; Status of Forces, Dec67 .

72. MACV ComdHist, 1968, p. 375 . See also III MAF Cease Fire Ms g

Folder.

73. Johnson, Vantage Point, p . 379 .

74. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp 881—3 . See also 1st MarDiv, PerintRpt

No . 1—68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

75. III MAF ComdC, Dec67 .

76. "Dissemination of Order for the General Offensive and the General Uprising, " Trans of enemy document, dtd 12Nov67 (A&S Files,

Indochina Archives) . See also MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp . 881—3 .

77. Gen Harold K . Johnson, USA, ltr to LtGen Fred C. Weyand, USA ,

dtd 17Jan68 (19Dec—4Jan68 SEA Trip Folder, Box 45, H . K . Johnso n

Papers, U.S . Army, Military History Institute, Carlisle Bks, Pa), here -

after Johnson Papers, Carlisle .

78. Gen Harold K. Johnson, USA, to MajGen R . G. Fergusson, USA ,

dtd 11Jan68 (Personal Correspondence File, 1968, Johnson Papers ,

Carlisle).

79. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 316 .

CHAPTER 2

THE 3D MARINE DIVISIO N

AND THE BARRIER

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived fro m

MACV ComdHist, 1967 ; MACV ComdHist 1968 ; HQMC Msg Files;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan1 .967—Feb 68 ; CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns ; III

MAF ComdCs, Dec67 Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov67Jan68;

Vietnam Comment Files, MCHC ; Tompkins Intvw ; Murray Intvw;

Gen William C . Westmoreland Papers, Center of Military History ,

hereafter Westmoreland Papers; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the

War; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967 ;

Simmons,"Marine Operations, 1968 . "

The 3d Marine Division in the DM Z

1. CGFMFPac msgs to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23 and 27Sep67 (HQMC Ms g

File).

2. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, Tab F, p . 15 .

3. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Sep67 (HQMC Msg File) .

4. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, did 27Oct67 and CGFMFPac ms g

to CMC, dtd 140ct67 (HQMC Msg File) . See also General Entry, Historical Summary, 27Dec67—31Jan68, vol . 28 (Westmoreland Papers) .

5. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 12Oct67 (HQMC Msg File) .

6. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Nov67 (HQMC Msg File) .

7. MACV J—00, Memo for the Record, dtd 18Dec67, History File, vol .

26 (Westmoreland Papers).

8. MACV, C/S Action Memo, Subj : CIIB Meeting, 16Dec67, di d

17Dec67, History File, vol . 27 (Westmoreland Papers).

9. Simmons, " Marine Operations, 1968 " , pp 292—3 . III MAF, Movement Timetable, TF X-Ray Units, n .d ., 3dMarDiv Msgs, Jan68 .

10. HQMC, MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Biographical File ,

Jul71 (Ref Sec, MCHC).

11. Col James R. Stockman, Comments on draft, Telfer, Rogers, an d

Fleming, " U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, " dcd 27Jun81 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Stockman Comments, 1981 .

12. Ibid .

13. Simmons, " Marine Operations, 1968, " p . 294 .

14. Ibid .

15. Tompkins Incvw, pp . 15—16 . See also LtCol Lane Rogers an d

Jack Shulimson, Memo for the Record, Subj: Conversation wit h

MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, 7Sep76, dtd 15Sep76 (Vietnam

Comment File).

16 . Stockman Comments, 1981, and Col James R . Stockman, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 14Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

The Barrie r

Additional sources for this section are : III MAF Dyemarker Msg

File 1967—Feb68, hereafter Dyemarker File ; MajGen Louis Metzger lt r

to CGFMFPac, Subj : Debrief, dtd 22Jan68, hereafter Metzger Debrief;

LtGen Louis Metzger, " Memoir, " ms, hereafter Metzger Memoir ; Murray Intvw; Gen Wallace M. Greene Papers (Personal Papers Section,
658 THE DEFINING YEA R

MCHC), hereafter Greene Papers; Samuel T. Williams and Edward G .

Lansdale Collections (Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution, Stanford University), hereafter either Williams or Lansdale Collection ; Bruce Palmer, Jr., The Twenty-Five Year War, America's Military

Role in Vietnam (Lexington, Ky : University of Kentucky Press, 1984) ,

hereafter Palmer, The Twenty-Five Year War .

17. Samuel T. Williams Itr to Richard Stilwell, dtd 31Dec68, Box 1 9

(Williams Collection).

18. Edward G. Lansdale ltr to Robert W. Komer, dtd 31May71 (Lansdale Collection).

19. Palmer, The Twenty-Five Year War, p. 40

20. ComUSMACV msg to DCPG, dtd 25Sep66, as quoted in Shulimson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p . 316 .

21. LtGen Lewis W. Walt ltr to LtGen H . W. Buse, Jr., dtd 29 Dec66 ,

as quoted in Ibid ., p. 318 .

22. Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirements Plan of 26Nov66 an d

Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirements Plan of 26Jan67, as quoted in Ibid ., pp. 318—19 .

23. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 19Apr67, as quoted in Telfer ,

Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 89 .

24. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 30Apr67 (HQMC Msg File).

See also Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam,

1967, p . 89 .

25. III MAF OPlan 11—67, dtd 18Jun67 . See also Telfer, Rogers, an d

Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 91 .

26. Ibid ., p. 92 . For the Metzger quote, see LtGen Louis Metzger,

Comments on draft chapter, dcd 17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Metzger Comments .

27. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Jun67 (HQMC Msg File) .

28. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 91 .

29. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Jul67 (HQMC Msg File) .

30. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 30Jul67 (HQMC Msg File) .

31. III MAF, Dyemarker Phase I Brief, dcd 10Aug67, Encl 6, CMC

Trip Report 3—12 Aug 67 (Greene Papers).

32. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 16Aug67 (Dyemarker File) .

33. CGIIIMAF handwritten comments on CGlstMarDiv msg t o

CGIIIMAF, dcd 1Sep67 (Dyemarker File) .

34. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 5Sep67 (Dyemarker File) .

35. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 8Sep67 ; CGIIIMAF msg to

CGFMFPac, dtd 14Sep67 ; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 14Sep67

(HQMC Msg File) . See also Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines

in Vietnam, 1967, p . 93 .

36. III MAF OPlan 12—67, dcd 12 Sep 67 in III MAF OPlans, 1967 . See

also Telfer, Rogers and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p. 93 .

37. Metzger Memoir, pp. 105–7 .

38. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Oct67 (Dyemarker File).

39. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 22Oct67 (Dyemarker File).

40. III MAF OPlan, dtd 24Nov67 .

41. Murray Intvw, pp . 5—15, 58 . See Metzger Comments relative to

the sandbag problem.

42. 3d MarDiv, Quarterly Review . . . of III MAF Campaign Plan

1—67, dtd 5Jan68, Logistics Operations, Encl 8, 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Jan68 ; ComUSMACV msg co CinCPac, dcd 26Jan68 (HQMC Msg

File); 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, p . 40 ; MajGen Louis Metzger ,

Observations on Dyemarker, dtd 10Jan68, Encl 2, Metzger Debrief,

hereafter Metzger Observations.

43. Historical Summary, Entry 26Dec67, vol. 27 (Westmorelan d

Papers).

44. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 29Dec67 (HQMC Ms g

File).

45. Tompkins Intvw, p . 44 .

46. Murray Incvw, pp . 58—9 . See also Historical Summary, Entry fo r

14Jan68, vol . 28 (Westmoreland Papers).

47. Metzger Observations and Metzger Comments .

48. 3d MarDiv OpO 61—67, dtd 31Dec67, Encl 10, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Dec67 .

49. 9th Mar OpO 2—68, dtd 22Jan68, Tab E, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

50. See Maj Justice M. Chambers intvw, 25Apr85 (OralHistColl ,

MCHC). Major Chambers as a first lieutenant was the 9th Marines

Dyemarker officer.

51. Metzger Observations .

52. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Jan68 (HQMC Ms g

File); ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 20Jan68 in Historical File ,

vol . 28 (Westmoreland Papers).

53. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 16 .

54. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 20Jan68 (HQMC Msg File).

55. Cushman Incvw, pp . 13—16 .

56. Tompkins Intvw, pp . 12–14 .

CHAPTER 3

THE WAR IN THE DMZ SECTO R

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived fro m

MACV ComdHist, 1967 ; MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; HQMC Msg Files;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec1967—Feb 68 ; CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns ; III

MAF ComdCs, Dec67 Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov67 Jan68;

Vietnam Comment Files, (MCHC) ; Tompkins Intvw ; Murray Intvw;

Westmoreland Papers; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War;

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports ; Shulimson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam,

1966 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967 ;

Simmons,"Marine Operations, 1968 . "

The NVA in the DMZ Sector

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, "Estimate of the

Enemy Situation, DMZ Area, 1Jan68," n .d . (Jan68] (MCHC), here -

after FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ" ; Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle" ; Metzger Debrief; Metzger Memoir.

1. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp . 18 and 70 ; Pringle, "NVA Order of

Battle", pp. 10—12 ; FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 16—8 .

2. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp . 16—8 ; III MAF ComdC,

Dec67, p . 23 .

3. Ibid .

4. Ibid . See also III MAF G–2, Periodic Intelligence Report No . 2–68 ,

dtd 15Jan68 (III MAF Perint Rpts) and 9th Mar IntSum No . 61, dtd

2Jan68, tab b, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

5. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ,", pp. 16—8 .

6. Ibid ., pp . 22-4, 55, 83 .

7. Ibid ., pp . 22—4 ; Murray Incvw, p. 47; Metzger Debrief.

8. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp . 22—24, 81 ; Metzge r

Debrief.

9. FMFPac, " Enemy Estimate, DMZ, " pp. 22–29; Metzger Debrief.
NOTES 65 9

10. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Entry 16Dec67, Historical Summary, 29 Nov–16Dec67 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH); Metzge r

Memoir, pp . 94–96 ; 9th Mar IncSum No . 65, dtd 6Jan68, 9ch Ma r

ComdC, Jan 68, tab b .

11. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 38–40 .

12. Ibid ., pp . 9–11, 38–41 .

13. Ibid ., pp . 39–41 .

14. Ibid . pp. 40–1 ; Capt Moyers S . Shore II, The Battle for Khe Sanh

(Washington, D .C. : Hist Br, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1969), p . 29 .

15. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp . 55, 66–7 ; Gen William C.

Westmoreland, General Entry, 27 Dec67–31 Jan68, Historical Summary (Westmoreland Papers, CMH) ; Gen William C . Westmorelan d

intvw, 4Apr83, p . 14 (OralHist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter Westmoreland Intvw.

16. FMFPac, " Enemy Estimate, DMZ, " passim .

17. Ibid ., pp. 42–3 .

18. Ibid ., pp. 43–4 .

19. Ibid ., pp . 56–7 .

20. Ibid ., pp . 66–68 ; CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dcd 13Jan6 8

(HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68); G–2 III MAF

PerintRpt No . 2–68, dcd 15Jan68 (III MAF PerintRpts, 1968) ; Westmoreland msg to Sharp and Wheeler, dtd 15Jan68 (v. 28, Historical

File, 27Dec67–31Jan68, Westmoreland Papers) .

Operation Napoleo n

21. MACV ComdHist, 1968, v . 1, pp. 371, 374 . See also 3d MarDiv,

Rules of Engagement, anx . J, Letter of Instruction (LOI), 1–67, dc d

11Feb67 in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, tab 3–1, Supporting Documents.

22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 98 ; VAdm Edwin B . Hooper, Mobility, Support Endurance, A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965–1968 (Washington, D .C. : NHD, 1972), pp . 119–22 .

23. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdCs, Apr, May, and Nov 67 ; Rogers, Telfer,

and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp . 142 .

24. 1st AmTrac Bn, ComdCs, Nov–Dec 67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec

67, p . 21 ; Working Papers, input to III MAF Campaign Plan Quarterly Review, n .d . [Dec67}, Encl 78, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ;

Rogers, Teller, and Fleming, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp . 142 ,

145-47 .

25. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv Task Organization, dcd

31Dec67, tab 3–2, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 .

26. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv Task Organization, dcd

7Jan68, Encl 13, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan 68 .

27. Quote from letter to mother in Ron Asher, Comments on draft, dt d

10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC,

Jan68 ; CG3d MarDiv msg to 1st AmTrac Bn, dtd 6Jan68, 3d MarDiv

Msg File .

28. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

29. Ibid .

Kentucky Operations and the Barrie r

Additional sources for this section are : Col Richard B. Smit h

intvw, Jul68, Tape 3041 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D .C.),

hereafter Smith Intvw; Maj Justice M . Chambers intvw, 25Apr8 5

(OralHistColl, MCHC), hereafter Chambers Intvw ; Col Richard B.

Smith, " Leatherneck Square " Marine Corps Gazette, Aug69, pp. 34-42 ,

hereafter Smith . "Leatherneck Square . "

30. CG 3d MarDiv rpt to CG III MAF, Subj : Quarterly Review . . . o f

III MAP Campaign Plan 1–67, dtd 5Jan68, Encl 8, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Dec67, hereafter 3d MarDiv, Quarterly Review ; CG 3d MarDiv msg to CG III MAF, dtd 4Oct67, HQMC Msg File, 111 MA F

Incoming ; 9th Mar Sit Rep, Opn Kentucky, No . 257, dcd 3Jan68, ta b

A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; Smith, "Leatherneck Square, " p .36 .

31. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 142 ;

CGFMFPac msg to CMC, drd 1Nov67, HQMC Msg File .

32. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv Sit Rep No. 271, Opn Kentucky, dtd 7Jan68 (III MAP Jnl and Msg File) ; Smith, "Leathernec k

Square, " p . 36 .

33. Smith Intvw ; Chambers Intvw.

34. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p . 36 ; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68 .

35. Chambers Intvw.

36. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 94 ;

Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p .39 .

37. 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p. II–4 ; "Marines Direct Artillery at Retreating NVA Flag," Sea Tiger, dtd 19Jan68, p . 9 .

38. 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p . II–4 .

39. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . 111–1 ; 9th Mar SitRep No . 260b, dtcl

5Jan68, in !bid ; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p . 11–4 and attached S–3 Jnl .

40. 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p . II-t and attached S–3 Jnl; 3d MarDi v

SitRep No . 285, dtd 11Jan68, Opn Kentucky (III MAF Jnl & Msg

File); 9th Mar SitRep No . 283, dtd 11Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC ,

Jan68 .

41. III MAF SitRep No . 301, Opn Kentucky, dcd 15Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv SitRep No . 301, Opn Kentucky, dtd 15Jan68 ; and 3cl MarDi v

msg to III MAF, dtd 1.5Jan68 (all in III MAF Jnl and Msg File). See

also 2/1 S–3 Jnl entries for 14–15Jan68 in 2/1 ComdC, Jan68 .

42. Col Billy R. Duncan, Comments on draft, dtd 1 .5Dec94 (Vietnam

Comment File) .

43. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft, dtd 17Oct94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments .

44. Chambers Intvw ; 1/4 ComdC, Jan68, p . 13 ; Smith, "Leatherneck

Square, " p. 36 .

45. 1/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv SitRep No . 282, dtd 1.0Jan68, Opn

Kentucky (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

46. For this and the following paragraph see Smith Incvw ; 1/4 ComdC,

Jan68 .

47. In addition to the sources listed in the preceding note, some

reviewers of the draft manuscript remarked on the difficulties an d

shortcomings of the Marine fortification effort . See Metzger Comments; Col John C . Study, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File) ; Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft, dcd 28Oct9 4

(Vietnam Comment File) as cited in Chapter 1 .

48. See various msgs, 24–29 Dec67, Opn Kentucky (III MAF Jnl &

Msg File) and 2/9 ComdC, Jan68 .

49. 2/9 ComdC, Jan68 .
660 THE DEFINING YEA R

50. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p. 38 ; various msgs, 24—29 Dec67 ,

Opn Kentucky (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); 3/3 ComdC, Jan68 .

51. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," pp . 38—9; 3/3 ComdC, Jan68 .

52. 3/3 ComdC, Jan68 .

53. 3/3 ComdC, Jan 68 ; 9th Mar SitReps, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC ,

Jan68 ; various msgs, 1—19 Jan68, Opn Kentucky (III MAF msg an d

Jnl File); 2/12 ComdC, Jan68 ; Col Robert C . Needham, Comments o n

draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

54. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; LtCol Lee R. Bendell intvw, 16Jan68, Tap e

2617 (Oral HiscColl, MCHC), hereafter Bendell intvw.

55. Bendell intvw.

56. Col Lee R. Bendell, Comments on draft, n .d . (Nov94] (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Bendell Comments.

57. 3d MarDiv SitRep No . 239, dtd 30Dec67, Kentucky Msg File ; 3/ 4

ComdC, Dec67 .

58. Bendell incvw; 3/4 ComdC, Dec67, pp . 14—5 ; 3/4 Newsletter,

Dec67, End, 3/4 ComdC, Dec67 .

59. 3/4 ComdC, Dec67, pp. 14—5 .

60. For this and the following two paragraphs, see Ibid . and Bendel l

intvw . See also 3d MarDiv SitReps, Nos. 243—44 and SpotRpt No . 11 5

(Kentucky Msg File) .

61. Additional source for this paragraph is 1st MAW Press Release ,

dtd 8Jan68 in 1st MAW Information Services, Press Releases, App. 6 ,

1st MAW ComdC, Jan68 .

62. Ibid .

63. Bendell intvw .

64. Ibid . ; 3/4 ComdC, Dec67 ; FMFPac, Computerized Award Read -

out, 1965-1973 .

65. 9th Mar SitRep, Opn Kentucky, No . 263, 6Jan68, tab A, 9th Ma r

ComdC, Jan6 8

66. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . III–1 and 9th Mar

SitReps No. 269 and 270, Opn Kentucky, dcd 7Jan68, tab A, 9th Ma r

ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv SicRep No . 272 and SpotRep No. 5, dt d

8Jan68 (Kentucky Msg File); Bendell incvw.

67. Bendell incvw and 3/4 ComdC, Jan68.

68. Bendell intvw ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p .

III—1 and 9th Mar SitReps No. 269 and 270, Opn Kentucky, dt d

7Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv SitRep No . 27 2

and SpotRep No . 5, dtd 8Jan68 (Kentucky Msg File)

69. 1st MAW Press Release, dcd 16Jan68 in 1st MAW Informatio n

Services, Press Releases, App . 6, 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68 .

70. Bendell intvw ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 .

71. 3d MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 8Jan68 (Kentucky Msg File) ; Bendell Intvw.

72. This and the following two paragraphs are based upon : Bendel l

inrvw ; Capt Raymond W. Kalm, Jr., et al. incvw, 16Jan68, Tape 261 8

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter Kalm et al . incvw.

73. Bendell Comments.

74. Kalm et al . intvw.

75. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68, 9th Mar SitReps, Operation Kentucky, tab A ,

9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

76. Bendell Comments; Bendell intvw; Kalm et al . intvw.

77. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 and Bendell Comments .

Operation Lancaster and Heavy Fighting in Mid-January

78. 3d Mar, AAR, Operation Lancaster, did 18Feb68, Encl 3d Mar ComdC ,

Feb68, hereafter 3d Mar, AAR, Opn Lancaster ; 3/9 Gazette, Battalion

Newsletter, n .d . (Dec67 Jan68], End, Col Gorton C. Cook, Comments on

draft, dtd 30Nov68, hereafter Cook Comments . See also Ill MAF msg to

MACV, dtd 2Jan68 (III MAP Jnl & Msg File, Operation Lancaster) .

79. 3d Mar, AAR, Opn Lancaster.

80. 3d Mar AAR, Opn Lancaster ; 3d Mar ComdCs, Dec67 and Jan68 ;

3d Mar msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 4Jan68, pt IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68.

81. 3d Mar Staff Jnls, pc IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 and 3d MarDi v

SpotReps, dtd 12—13Jan68 and III MAF SicRep No . 292, dtd 13Jan68

(III MAF JnI&Msg File, Operation Lancaster) .

82. For this and the next four paragraphs see : 3d Mar AAR, Opn Lancaster; 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d Mar IntSum No. 13, did 13Jan68 ,

Pt IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv SitReps and Spot Rpts to Il l

MAF and III MAF msgs to MACV, dtd 13—15Jan68 (Ill MAF Jnl &

Msg File, Operation Lancaster) ; Cook Comments.

83. 3d Mar AAR, Opn Lancaster ; 3d MarDiv msgs to III MAF and II I

MAF msgs to MACV, dtd 16—17 Feb68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File, Oper -

ation Lancaster); 3d Mar, Staff Jnl, Pt IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

84. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; Bendell Comments;

Col Kenneth L. Christy, Comments on draft, dtd 8Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Christy Comments .

85. Christy Itr to Michael Madden, dcd 4Dec88, End to Christy Comments, hereafter Christy la, Dec88 .

86. The description of the ambush of Company L in this and the following paragraphs is derived largely from 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ;

9th Mar IntSum No . 80, dcd 21 Jan68, tab B, 9th Mar ComdC ,

Jan68 ; 9th Mar SitRep No . 313, Operation Kentucky, tab A, 9t h

Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv msgs and spo t

repts to III MAF, dcd 18 Jan68 (III MAP JnI&Msg File, Operatio n

Kentucky). See also Michael John Madden Statement, dtd 19Jun90 ,

Encl, Bendell Comments, hereafter Madden Statement, Jun90 an d

Christy Itr, Dec88 .

87. Christy lrr, Dec88.

88. Christy ltr, Dec88 ; Madden Statement, Jun90

89. Christy Icr, Dec88 .

90. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; Bendell Comments.

91. 3d Mar, AAR Opn Lancaster; III MAP SitRep No . 322, dtcl

20Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Operation Kentucky) ; 1st AmTrac

Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

CHAPTER 4

KHE SANH: BUILDING UP

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from FMFPac, MarOpsV, JuI67 Jan68; III MAF ComdCs,

Ju167Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Ju167 Jan68; 26th Marine s

ComdCs, Ju167 Jan68; Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File ; Kh e

Sanh Correspondence File ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports ; Ray W.

Stubbe, " Khe Sanh : Valley of Decision " ms, 1987 (Copy in Persona l

Papers Collection, MCHC), hereafter Scubbe, "Khe Sanh" ; John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Derision, The Siege of KIN San h

(Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co ., 1991), hereafter Prados and Scubbe,

Valley of Decision; Shore, Khe Sanh. Paul D . Stevens, ed ., The Navy

Cross, Vietnam, Citations of Awards to Men of the United States Navy and

the United States Marine Corps, 1964–1973, (Forest Ranch, CA : Shar p

and Dunnigan, 1987) .
NOTES 66 1

The Battlefiel d

1. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun67, p . 34 ; Mr. Thomas J. Steward, conversation with author, 27Jun88 .

2. Joann L. Shrock, et al., Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam

(Washington, DC: The American University, 1966), pp . 56—57 .

3 . Ibid .

The Early Days

4. LtGen Victor H . Krulak, First to Fight, An Inside View of the U.S.

Marine Corps (Annapolis: U .S . Naval Institute, 1984), p. 205, hereafter

Krulak, First to Fight .

5. Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, pp. 22—23 ; Stubbe, "Khe

Sanh," p . 31 ; Khe Sanh Area Report, n .d ., End, 3d MarDiv ComdC,

Jan67 ; LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, Comments on draft, dtd 23Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stubbe Comments.

6. Capt Robert K . Whitlow, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : The Advisory an d

Combat Assistance Era, 1954—1964 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv ,

HQMC, 1977) p. 139; Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, pp .

19—21 . See also Scubbe Comments .

7. LtGen John R. Chaisson intvw, 3Apr72 (Oral HistColl, MCHC),

pp . 371—372 . See also Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp.

141-43 .

8. Col Thomas M . Horne inrvw, 17—19Jan67, Tape 384 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

9. Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, pp . 75, 185—86 ; Col Bruce B.

G. Clarke, USA, Comments on draft, n .d . (Apr95l (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Clarke Comments .

10. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p . 349 ; Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p . 71 .

11 . Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 45 .

Protecting the Investment

12. Stubbe Comments. See also Clarke Comments ; LtCol Harper L.

Bohr, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 2Nov1994 (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Bohr Comments ; Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision ,

pp . 152—55 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam,

1967, p . 129 .

The Isolation of Khe San h

13. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh, " p . 48; LtGen John A . Chaisson intvw,

3Apr72, pp . 370—74 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; AC/S G—4 memo to

AC/S G—3, 4Ju167, Subj : Planning Conference, Encl, 3d MarDiv

ComdC, Ju167 .

14. LtCol James B. Wilkinson, Comments on " The Battle for Kh e

Sanh," 19Dec68 (Khe Sanh monograph Comment File, MCHC).

15. Ibid .

16. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct67, p . 85 ; George L. MacGarrigle, historian, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter MacGarrigle Comments.

17. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Nov67, p . 45 .

18. 1/26 ComdC, Nov67, p . 4 .

19. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p . 388 .

20. Ibid . p. 408 .

21. . 26th Mar ComdC, Nov67, p. 7 .

22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp . 8—9 ; 26th Mar ComdC, Dec67, p .

3 ; " Intel Estimate of Situation in the Area Between Khe Sanh and Ca

Lu, " End, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; Robert Pisor, The End of the Line

(New York : W. W. Norton & Co ., 1982), p . 17 .

23. MajGen Rachvon McC . Tompkins, Comments on draft, dt d

19Nov69, Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S . Shore II, "Ho Chi

Min h 's Gamble , " in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al ., "Marines in Vietnam,

1954—68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D .C., 1971.), pt VI (Vietnam Comment Files, MCHC) ; Tompkins Intvw, 13Apr73, p. 20.

24. LtCol Harry L. Alderman, Comments on "The Battle for Kh e

Sanh," n .d . (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File, MCHC); 1/26

ComdC, Dec67, pp . 3 and 5 .

25. Operation Scotland SitReps No . 252 and 254, End, 26th Mar ComdC,

Jan68 ; Stubbe "Khe Sanh," p . 462 ; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . 5 .

26. Maj Harper L. Bohr, Jr., Comments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh, "

18Dec68 (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File, MCHC).

27. For discussion relative to the XM—3 and other intelligence effort s

see Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft, did 28Oct94 (Vietnam

Comment File) and Stubbe Comments.

The Decision to Hol d

28. CG FMFPac msg to CG III MAF, dtd 8Jan68 (Reel No . 1, HQMC

Msg File); Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 21 .Jan68 (Fil e

No. MAC 00992, Westmoreland Papers).

29. W. Scott Thompson and Col Donaldson D . Frizzell, USAF, eds. ,

The Lessons of Vietnam (New York : Crane, Russak and Co ., 1977), pp.

137—138, 183 .

30 .CG FMFPac msg to CG III MAF, dtd 1 1 Jan68 (Reel No . 6, HQM C

Msg File). Note: This source is a message which contains a verbati m

quote of the Wheeler to Westmoreland message mentioned in the text .

See also LtGen Victor H . Krulak, Comments on draft, dtd 31Oct9 4

(Vietnam Comment File) and Krulak, First to Fight, pp . 215-16, and

Westmoreland, A Soldier's Report, p . 336 which note the Washingto n

obsession with Khe Sanh .

31. Khe Sanh Area Report, n .d ., Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67 .

32. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 337—338 ; Prados and Stubbe ,

Valley of Decision, pp. 350—51 . Westmoreland journal entry of 1 lFeb68

is quoted in Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p . 351 .

33. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 337—338 . It is interestin g

that General Krulak makes almost the identical case in his book . See

Krulak, The First to Fight, pp. 215—16 . For the account of Dien Bien

Phu, see: Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia : J .B .

Lippincott Co ., 1966), pp. 101—102 ; Jules Roy, The Battle of Dienbienphu (New York : Harper and Row, 1965), pp . 149, 162 .

34. LtGen Robert E. Cushman intvw, 1Nov82, p . 89 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Cushman Intvw; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p .

335 . For Gen Westmoreland's and the MACV staff's concerns abou t

Marine defenses at Khe Sanh, see LtGen Philip B. Davidson, Vietnam

at War, The History : 1946—1975 (Novato, CA : Presidio Press, 1988) ,

pp. 555—556, hereafter Davidson, Vietnam at War.

35. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 336 .

36. Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 15Jan68 (File No .

MAC 00686, in Westmoreland Papers); Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, pp. 171—2 ; MacGarrigle Comments.

37. Gen William C. Westmoreland ltr to Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. ,

dtd 21Apr69 (Khe Sanh Correspondence File, MCHC).

38. LtGen Robert E . Cushman, Comments on " The Battle for Khe

Sanh, " 26Dec68 (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File) ; Cushma n

Intvw, pp . 22—23 .

39. CG FMFPac msg to CINCPAC, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No. 4, HQMC

Msg File, MCHC).

40. Krulak, First to Fight, p . 218 .

41 .LtGen Victor H . Krulak intvw, 22Jun70, p. 8 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC). See also Krulak, First to Fight, pp . 218-19 .
662 THE DEFINING YEAR

42. Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp . 553–54 .

43. "Recapitulation of the Spring-Summer 1968—Khe Sanh-Route 9

Campaign Rear Service Operations," compiled by the General Directorate for Rear Services in February 1969, in People 's Army of Vietnam, General Directorate for Rear Services, Rear Service Operations-Khe

Sanh-Route 9 Campaign, Spring Summer 1968 (Hanoi, 1988). Copy an d

translation provided by Mr. Robert DeStatte .

The Stage is Se t

44. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p . 469.

45. CG 111 MAF msg to CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No . 4 ,

HQMC Msg File).

46. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p . 475 ; Lt Ray W. Stubbe, USN, Diary ,

13Jan68 (Personal Papers Coll, MCHC) .

47. 3d MarDiv SitRep No . 299 for Opn Scotland in 3d MarDi v

SitReps, Jan68 ; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pc . III.

48. 2/26 ComdC, Jan68, p . 2 ; Tompkins Intvw ; 2/26 Journal fo r

14-15Jan68, Ser. Nos. 404 and 404A, in 2/26 ComdC, Jan68 .

49. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . 3 .

50. CG III MAF msg to CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 16Jan68 (HQMC Message Files, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68).

51. LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File) .

52. Ibid . ; William J. O'Connor, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File).

53. Harry F. Fromme, Comments on draft, dtd 27Nov94 (Vietnam

Comment File).

54. PFC Leonard E . Newton award citation, n .d . (Decorations an d

Medals Branch, HQMC, Washington, D.C.).

55. 26th Mar SitRep Nos. 319 and 320 for Opn Scotland, dt d

19Jan68, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

56. Col William H . Dabney intvw, 20May82, p . 63 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC), hereafter Dabney Intvw. See also Col William H . Dabney,

Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Dabney Comments.

57. 26th Mar SitRep No . 320 for Operation Scotland, dtd 19Jan68 ,

Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; Items of Significant Interest (181), dt d

21Jan68 (HQMC Command Center File (MCCC), MCHC).

Sortie to Hill 881 Nort h

58. Maj Matthew P. Caulfield Comments on "The Battle for Kh e

Sanh," 4Jan69, p. 8, in "Khe Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History "

(Archives Section, MCHC), hereafter Caulfield Comments . [Ma j

Caulfield's comments were taped and are available on Tape 6157, Ora l

HistColl, MCHC); Col William H . Dabney intvw, 20May82, p . 6 3

(Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dabney Intvw .

59. 26th Mar SicRep Nos . 322 and 323 for Opn Scotland, Encl, 26t h

Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt . IV. See also Dabney Comments .

60. Caulfield Comments, pp . 8–9; 26th Mar SitRep No. 322 for Op n

Scotland, op . cit. ; Dabney Comments.

61. Caulfield Comments, p . 8; Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross, pp .

319–320 .

62 . Dabney intvw, p. 63 ; Shore, The Battle for Khe Sanh, p. 39 .

The Enemy Plan Unfold s

63. LtCol James B . Wilkinson, Comments on "The Battle for Kh e

Sanh, " 19Dec68 and Mai Kenneth W. Pipes, Comments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh, " n .d . (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File) .

64. Tompkins Intvw.

CHAPTER 5

THE 3D DIVISION WAR I N

SOUTHERN QUANG TRI AND

NORTHERN THUA THIEN ,

OPERATIONS OSCEOLA AND NEOSHO

Protecting The Quang Tri Base, Operation Osceola ,

1–20 January 196 8

1. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp .

139-42 .

2. Ibid . pp . 94, 119–20, 139–42 .

3. Biographical Files (Ref Sec, MCHC); 1st Mar, CAAR, Operatio n

Osceola,, n .d ., Tab K, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 1st Ma r

CAAR, Opn Osceola .

4. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola.

5. Ibid .

6. Ibid . ; 2/4 ComdC, Dec67 .

7. "Youth Alerts Marines," Sea Tiger, 12Jan68 .

8. 1st MAR CAAR, Opn Osceola ; 1st Mar SitReps 286–291 ,

31Dec67–1Jan68, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

9. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . II–C–4 and 1st Mar SitRep Osceola, No .

305, dtd 5Jan, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

10. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola ; MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dcd 6Jan68 .

11. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . II–C--4 .

12. 1st Mar SitReps No . 326 and 328, dtd 11Jan68, tab H, 1st Ma r

ComdC, Jan68 .

13. 1st Mar SitRep No . 339, dtd 14Jan68 and 1st Mar CAAR, Op n

Osceola .

14. 1/1 ComdC, Jan 68, p . 1–11–3 ; 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola .

15. III MAF ComdC, Jan68, p . 10 ; 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola .

16. 1st Mar SicRep No . 340, dtd 14Jan68, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

17. 1/1 ComdC, Jan68, p . 1–11-3 .

18. Ibid ., pp. 1–11–3–1–11-4 .

19. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola, pp . 40–1 .

20. 1st Mar FragO 1–68, dtd 6Jan68, tab d, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 ;

1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, pp. II–C–2 and II–C–5—II–C–6; 1st Ma r

CAAR, Opn Osceola .

21. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, pp.

20–1 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p . 18 .

Operation Neosho and Operations in the CoBi–Thanh Tan ,

1–20 January 196 8

22. Shulimson, An Expanding War, 1966, pp. 69, 143–44, 150–56 ,

198, 224–26 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967, pp . 142 and 168 .

23. 4th Mar ComdC, Nov 67 ; 4th Mar, CAAR, Opn Neosho,

lNov67–20Jan68, dtd 7Apr68, End 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68, here -

after 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho ; 4th Mar, CAAR, Opn Granite, 25

Oct–6 Nov 67, dtd 17Dec67, tab K, 4th Mar ComdC, Nov 67, here -

after 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Granite .

24. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 ,

pp . 173–74 ; 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Granite ; Ron Asher, Comments on

draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

25 .4th Mar ComdCs, Nov–Dec 67 ; 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho ; 4th Ma r

Sit Reps, Opn Neosho, Nov–Dec67, III MAF Jnl&Msg File, Opn Neosho .
NOTES 663

26. 4th Mar ComdCs, Nov—Dec 67 ; 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho ; CG

3dMarDiv msg to CG III MAF, dtcl 29Dec67, Encl 79, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Dec67 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, /967, pp . 176—79 .

27. CG 3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 29Dec67 .

28. Col William L. Dick, Comments on draft, dtd 1Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Dick Comments.

29. 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho ; 1/9 ComdC, Jan68 ; Col John F.

Mitchell, Comments on draft, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Mitchell Comments .

30. 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report, 550—67, dtd 4Jan68, end 3, 3 d

Recon Bn ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report ,

550—67, cltd 4Jan68 .

31. Ibid .

32. Ibid .

33. Sgt Ray Wilkinson, " Ambush Survivors Journey to Safety, " Sea

Tiger,Jan 19, 1968, p . 1, hereafter Wilkinson, "Ambush Survivors" ; 3 d

MarDiv COC telecon to III MAF COC, dtd 2Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Ms g

File).

34. 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report, 550—67, dtd 4Jan68 and Wilkinson ,

" Ambush Survivors, " p .l .

35. Ibid . and III MAF SitRep, No . 254, Opn Neosho, dtd 3Jan68 (II I

MAF Jnl & Msg File).

36. 1/9 AAR, Opn Neosho, did 4Mar68, 1/9 ComdC, Jan68, hereafte r

1/9 AAR Opn Neosho ; Mitchell Comments ; Dick Comments.

37. 1/9 AAR Opn Neosho ; 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report, 550—67, dtd

4Jan68 .

38. 1/9 AAR, Opn Neosho .

39. 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho ; 1/9 ComdC, Jan68 ; III MAF

ComdC, Jan68 .

40. 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho; Col William Dick debriefing a t

FMFPac, 21Ju168, Tape 3036 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington ,

D .C.). For enemy casualties in the 4th Marines sector, see also MSg r

Dennis R. Johnson memo to Col William Dick, did 17Nov94, Encl ,

Dick Comments. Sgt Johnson served with the Marine 15th Interrogation Translation Team (ITT) assigned to Camp Evans and gives th e

number of confirmed enemy dead in Neosho as 78 rather than 77, an d

lists enemy casualties in Operations Cove and Foster.

Operation Checkers

41. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

42. 1st Mar, 3d Mar, and 4th Mar ComdCs, Jan68 .

CHAPTER 6

HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT,

THE WAR IN CENTRAL AND

SOUTHERN I CORP S

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived from

MACV ComclHist, 1968 ; HQMC Msg File ; HQMC, Status of Forces,

1967—68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967—68 ; III MAF ComdCs,

Dec67—Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Dec67—Jan68 ; Westmorelan d

Papers, CMH ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports .

A Time of Transitio n

1 . CMH Intvw Notes with BGen Samuel W. Koster, USA (Ret), did

26Aug88 (Working Folder, Americal Division), hereafter Koster Intvw

notes; Gen Robert E. Cushman intvw, 1 Nov 82 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), pp. 29 and 37, hereafter Cushman Incvw, Nov82 .

2. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp . 10—1 .1 ; Koster Intvw notes; III MAF

msg to 1st MarDiv, dcd 24Dec67, End 22, 1st MarDiv ComdC ,

Dec67 ; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 1973—76 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), pp . 14—6, hereafter Robertson Intvw ; LtGen Robert E . Cush -

man debriefing at FMFPac, 31Mar69, Tape 4058 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), pp . 465-66, hereafter Cushman Intvw, Mar69 .

3. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, p . 8 .

4. CG III MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 21Oct67 (HQMC Ms g

File, III MAF Outgoing); HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec 67, p . 35—1 .

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley is quoted in Jeffrey J . Clarke, Advice an d

Support : The Final Years, 1965—1973 (Washington, D.C. : CMH, 1988) ,

pp . 334—35, hereafter Clarke, The Final Years.

5. HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec 67, p . 35—1 ; Koster Intvw notes ;

Cushman Intvw, Nov 82, p . 8

6. LtCol Byron F. Brady intvw, 12Oct86 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp.

1—5 ; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 6 ; Resume of Telecon, dtd 10Jan68 ,

Subj : opcon CAP ((III MAF Special Rpr to FMFPac Folder) ; FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 47 ; Michael E . Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, The U .S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam (New York : Praeger, 1989) ,

pp . 47, 50, and 56 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 191 ; Shulimson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p . 240 .

7. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov67, pp . 30-1 .

8. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 32 ; 1st Mar Div, Commanders AAR,

Ter Offensive, 29 Jan—14 Feb68, dtcl 25May68 (1st MarDiv Aclmi n

Files), p . 14, hereafter 1st MarDiv AAR Ter Offensive .

9. 1st MarDiv AAR, Tet Offensive, p . 14 ; George MacGarrigle, "Th e

2d North Vietnamese Division, " ms, pp. 32—4 (Working Papers, Americal Division), hereafter MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division .

10. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, pp . 32—4 ; ll l

MAF ComdC, Dec67, p . 22 .

11. LtCol John F. J. Kelly intvw, 23 May 1968, Tape 2760 (Oral Elise -

Coll, MCHC); III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p . 22 .

The Da Nang TAOR

12. LtGen Donn J. Robertson, USMC, Biographical File (RefSec ,

MCHC).

13. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp .

109, 222—23 .

14. Ibid . ; MajGen Raymond L . Murray intvw, 1975 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), pp . 46—7, hereafter, Murray Incvw.

15. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p. 109 ;

Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp . 50—60 ; Robertson Incvw, pp . 9—1 I .

16. 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No . 1—68, did 8Jan68, tab A, 1s t

MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

Operation Auburn : Searching the Go Noi

17. Ibid. ; 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 3—68, tied 22Jan68, tab A ,

1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p . 23 ; 1st Ma r

Div ComdC, Jan68, p . 15 ; Robertson Intvw, p . 29 .

18. 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No . 1—68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, Isr

MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 . For the 1965 activities of the 12—20, se e

Shulimson and Johnson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1965, p . 129 .

19. Col William K . Rockey, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

20. 5th Mar Frag 0 74—67, Opn Auburn, dtd 25 Dec 67, in App B,

5th Mar ComclC, Dec67 .

21. Ibid. and 1st MarDiv msg to III MAP, dtd 26Dec67 (111 MAP Jn I

& Msg File, Opn Auburn).
664 THE DEFINING YEA R

22. 3d Bn, 5th Mar CAAR, Opn Auburn, dtd 5Jan68, Encl, 3/ 5

ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 3/5 CAAR Auburn ; "Australian Captai n

Heads Marine Company," Sea Tiger, 5Jan68, pp . 1 and 9; Isherwoo d

COC telecon to III MAF COC, did 28Dec67 and 1st MarDiv CO C

msg to III MAF COC, dtd 29Dec67 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Op n

Auburn).

23. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn ; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC ,

dtd 29Dec67 and III MAF Spot Rpt to MACV, dtd 28Dec67 (III MA F

Jnl & Msg File, Opn Auburn) .

24. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn ; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC

(III MAF JnI and Msg File) .

25. Ibid . and "Being First Hurts," Sea Tiger, 26Jan68, p . 9.

26. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn ; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC

(III MAF Jnl and Msg File) ; "Sure Shot Marine Logs 'Lucky Run, – Sea

Tiger, 19Jan68, p. 5 .

27. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn ; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC,

29Dec67 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File); 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn, dtd

5Jan68, App B, 2/5 ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 2/5 CAAR, Opn

Auburn . The 3/5 AAR and 1st MarDiv msg do not break down Marin e

casualties by company for 28 December 1967 ; the 2/5 CAAR, on th e

other hand, mentions the bodies of nine Marines from the action on th e

28th recovered in the objective area the following day. Those bodies

could only have been from Company E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines .

28. 5th Mar FragO No . 75–67, Opn Auburn, dtd 28Dec67 in App B ,

5th Mar ComdC, Dec67 .

29. Ibid .

30. Ibid .

31. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn and 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn .

32. 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn .

33. 1st MarDiv to III MAF and info to 5th Mar, dtd 29Dec67 and 1s t

MarDiv to 5th Mar, dtd 30Dec67 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Op n

Auburn); 5th Mar.FragO No . 76–67, Opn Auburn, dtd 30Dec67 in

App B, 5th Mar ComdC, Dec67 .

34. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn .

35. Ibid . and 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn .

36. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn ; 1st MarDiv PerIntRpts, tab A, 1st Mar -

Div ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv AAR, Tet Offensive, p . 16 ; MajGen

Robert D . Bohn intvw, Apr–Jun, 89 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), p . 213 ,

hereafter Bohn Intvw.

A Busy Night at Da Nang

37. The following sources pertain to this and the following three paragraphs: 1st MarDiv PerintRpt, dtd 8Jan68, cab A, 1st MarDiv

ComdC, Jan68 and 7th Mar SitRep No . 265, dtd 3Jan68, tab C, 7th

Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

38. Additional source for this and the following two paragraphs are :

7th Mar JnI, tab A, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

39. Col W. J. Davis, Tet Marine, An Autobiography (San Diego, CA ,

1987), p. 103, Encl to Col William J. Davis, Comments on draft, dtd

2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Davis, Tet Marine.

40. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are : 1st

Tank Bn SitRep No . 3, dtd 3Jan68, 1st Tank Bn, ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st

MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 2Jan68 in III MAF Folder, Rocke t

Attack, 2–3 Jan 1968 .

41. Additional sources for this paragraph are : 1st MarDiv, ComdC ,

Jan68, p . 25 ; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68 ; I Corps TOC telecon to III MA F

COC, dtd 3Jan68 in III MAF Folder, Rocket Attack 2—3 Jan68 .

42. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : 7th Mar

SitRep No . 265, dtd 3Jan68, tab C, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 7th Ma r

JnI, 2–3 Jan68, tab A, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 11th Mar ComdC,

Jan68 ; 1st Tank Bn ComdC, Jan68 ; Ill MAF to FMFPac, dtd 4Jan68 i n

III MAF Special Report to FMFPac Folder; 1st MarDiv to Ill MAF,

Narrative Summary of Events of Rocket Attack, [3]Jan68 and miscella -

neous handwritten notes in III MAF Folder, Rocket Attack 2–3 Jan68 ;

1st MarDiv PerintRpt, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

43. Additional source for this paragraph is MacGarrigle, "The 2d Nort h

Vietnamese Division," ms, p. 37 .

Continuing Heavy Fighting and Increasing Uncertaint y

44. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, p. 43 and Il l

MAF ComdC, Jan68 .

45. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, pp. 34–6 .

46. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are : Ibid . ;

III MAF msg to subordinate units, dcd 2Jan68, Encl 2, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 ; III MAF ComdC, Jan68 .

47. Additional sources for this paragraph are : CGIIIMAF msg to FMFPat, dtd 4Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder) ; F. Clifto n

Berry, Jr., Air Cav, The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War (Ban -

cam Books: New York, New York, 1988), pp. 100–02 .

48. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division, " ms, pp. 38, 41—2 .

49. Ibid ., pp . 40-1 .

50. Ibid . ; (Major General Samuel B . Koster, USA,), "America) Division, 1967–1968," n .d . (Working Folder, America) Division); Ill MAF

to FMFPac msgs, 4–13Jan 68 (III MAP Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder); and III MAF Sit Reps, 4–13Jan68 (III MAP Jnl & Msg File, Op n

Wheeler/ Wallowa).

Phu Loc Operations

51. 1/5 ComdCs, Dec67 and Jan 68 .

52. 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 1–68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st

MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 ; Intelligence Annex, 5th Mar OPlan 3–67 ,

dtd 14Dec67, App 1, tab I, 1/5 ComdC, Dec67 ; III MAF ComdC,

Dec67, p . 22 .

53. James Duguid intvw, 14 Oct 1984 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), here -

after Duguid Intvw ; 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No . 1–68, dt d

8Jan68 ; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p . 22 .

54. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68, p. 3–2 .

55. Ibid ., p . 3–3 .

56. Ibid ., pp . 3-2-3-4.

57. 1st MarDiv PerintRpt No . 1-668, dcd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 ; Arliss Willhite and Thomas Krusewski intvw, 13Oct8 4

(Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Willhite and Krusewski Intvw, Oct84 .

58. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68, pp. 3-4, 3–5 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pp. 3–2 ,

3–3 ; 1st MarDiv PerintRpt No . 1–68, 8Jan68 ; 111MAF to FMFPac, dcd

7Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder); Ill MAP PerintRp t

No . 2–68, dcd 15Jan68 (III MAF PerintRpts, 1968) .

59. Cpl Arliss Willhite et al., intvw, 15Aug68, Tape 2276 (Oral Hisc -

Coll, MCHC), hereafter Willhite Intvw, Aug68 ; Willhite and

Krusewski Intvw, Oct84 .

60. Willhite Inrvw, Aug68 ; Willhite and Krusewski Inrvw, Oct84 .

61. Willhite Intvw, Aug68 ; Willhite and Krusewski Inrvw, Oct84 ; 1st

MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No . 1–68, dtd 8Jan68 .

62. Willhite Inrvw, Aug68 ; Willhite and Krusewski lntvw, Oct84 ; 1st

MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No . 1–68, dtd 8Jan68 ; 111MAF to FMFPac ,

dtd 7Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder).

63. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68 .
NOTES 665

64. Ibid . ; III MAF PerintRpt No . 2—68, 15Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv PerintRpt

No. 1—68, 8Jan68 ; IIIMAF to FMFPac, dtd 7Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt

to FMFPac Folder).

65. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68 ; IIIMAF msgs to FMFPac, dcd 11—15Jan68 (II I

MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder) .

The Formation and Deployment of Task Force X-Ray

66. " History of Task Force X-Ray, " n .d ., Attachment to Col A . J . PoilIon, comments on Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S . Shore II,

"Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al ., "Marines i n

Vietnam, 1954—68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, 1971), pt VI, dtd 30Oct6 9

(Vietnam Comment Files), hereafter " History of Task Force X-Ray, "

Poillon Comments; CG 1st MarDiv msg to CG TF X-Ray, dtd 3Dec67 ,

End 57 and 1st MarDiv OpO 309—68, 18Dec67, Encl 45, 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Dec67, hereafter 1st MarDiv OpO 309—68, 18Dec67 .

67. 1st MarDiv OpO 309—68, 18Dec67 .

68. Ibid ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, p. 18 ; CG 1st MarDiv msgs t o

CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 15Dec 67, End 58, and dtd 23Dec67, End 63, 1s t

MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; CG3d MarDiv msg co CG 1st MarDiv, n .d . ,

End 44, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; LtCol A . Van Winkle et al . intvw ,

25Jan68, Tape 2478 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Van Winkl e

Intvw ; 1/5 ComdC, Dec67 .

69. 1st MarDiv FragO 4—68, 11Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan 1968 .

70. III MAF COC, Resume of telecon, 15Jan68 in III MAF Special

Report to FMFPac, Jan68 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; TF X-Ray ComdC,

13-31Jan68 .

71. Bohn Intvw, Apr89 and May89, pp . 272—3, 278 .

72. Bohn Intvw, pp . 274—78 ; SSgc Donald O . Taylor in LtCol A . Van

Winkle et al . Intvw.

73. Bohn Intvw, pp . 274—8, 308 ; LtCol Joseph W. Malcolm debriefin g

at FMFPac, 28Oct68, Tape 3453, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; LtCol

James C. Hecker in LtCol A . Van Winkle et al . Intvw.

74. Task Force X-Ray OpO 301—68, 12Jan68, End 36, 1st MarDiv,

ComdC, Jan68 .

75. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Oct67, HQMC Msg File,

III MAF, Incoming ; Cushman intvw, Nov 82, p . 8 ; HQMC, Status of

Forces, Dec 1967 Jan68, pp . 31—1 ; Clarke, The Final Years, p . 334;

Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, The General Offensives of 1968—69, Indochin a

Monographs, (Washington . D .C. : CMH, 1981), p . 78 .

The Cavalry Arrive s

76. MACV ComdHist, 1968, v . 1, pp . 23—4 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Dec67, p. 16 ; 4th Marines, CAAR, Opn Cumberland, dtd 11Oct67

(4th Marines Miscellaneous Reports); Cushman Incvws, Nov82 and

Mar68, pp . 25 and 490 ; Murray Intvw, pp . 55—6 ; CGFMFPac msg t o

CMC, dtd 8Dec67, HQMC Msg File .

77. MACV ComdHist, 1968, v. 1, pp . 23—4 ; Entry for 16Dec67, Historical Summary, 29Nov67—16Dec67, and HQMACV C/S Actio n

Memo, No 67—178, subj: CIIB Meeting, 16 Dec 67, dtd 17 Dec 67, v .

22, History File, Westmoreland Papers, CMH ; CGIIIMAF msg c o

CGFMFPac, dcd 16Dec67, HQMC Msg File ; MajGen John J. Tolso n

intvw, 24Jun68, 14th MHD (Copy in CMH), hereafter Tolson Intvw .

78. Tolson Intvw ; Westmoreland msgs to Sharp and Wheeler, dtd

12 and 15Jan68, Backchannel Messages and C/S Memo No . 68, dtd

14Jan68, v.28, History File, 22Dec67—31Jan68, Westmoreland

Papers.

79. Westmoreland msg to Sharp and Wheeler, 15Jan68 and Entry for

17Jan68, Historical Summary, v . 28, History File, Westmorelan d

Papers.

80. See for the York II planing CGIIIMAF msgs to CGFMFPac, dtd 2 6

and 28Dec67, 3 and 12Jan68, and CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dt d

6Jan68 (HQMC Msg File) . For the Niagara planning and Genera l

Westmoreland's concerns see ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac dc d

21Jan68 and Entry for 19Jan68, Summary, v. 28, History File ,

27Dec67—31Jan68, Westmoreland Papers .

81. Westmoreland entry for 19Jan68, Historical Summary ; CinCPac

msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 19Jan68, Back Channel Messages, Westmoreland Papers.

82. Tolson Intvw; III MAF to FMFPac, 23Jan68 (Special FMFPac Rp t

Folder).

83. Tolson Intvw.

84. Ibid .; Ill MAF ComdC, Jan68 ; BGen Herbert L. Beckington ,

Comments, dtd 25Occ69 in BGen Edwin H . Simmons, Commen t

Files on May 1970 Naval Review article.

The Changed Situation in the Nort h

85. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st Mar, CAAR Opn Neosho II, dtd

22Feb68, tab J, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan 68 ; CGIIIMAF, CG3dMarDiv,

CTF76.4, CTF 79 .4, and BLT 2/4, exchange of msgs, 3d MarDiv, Messages, Jan68 .

86. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st Mar, CAAR Opn Neosho 11, dtd

22Feb68, tab J, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan 68 ; 1st Mar OpO 3—68, dtd

26Jan68, tab G, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

87. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st Mar OpO 3—68, dtd 26Jan68, tab g ,

1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; CGlstMarDiv msg to CGTFX-Ray, dtd

24Jan68, End 20, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; Bohn Incvw, pp .

279—80 .

88. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68 and 1/5 ComdC, Jan68 .

89. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 5th Mar OpO 301—68, dtd 18 Jan68 ,

Encl 17 and 5th Mar FragO 7—68, dtd 25Jan68, End 52, 5th Ma r

ComdC, Jan68 ; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68 .

90. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jan68 ; "History of Task Force X-Ray, " Poillon

Comments.

91. Historical Summary, General Entry, 27Dec67—31Jan68, Entry fo r

22Jan68, History File, v . 28, Westmoreland Papers ; Westmorelan d

msg to Wheeler, dtd 22Jan68 and Westmoreland msg to Sharp and

Wheeler, dtd 26Jan68, Westmoreland Messages, Westmorelan d

Papers; John R. Chaisson, entries for 26—28 Jan68, Diary, Chaisso n

Papers; Cushman Incvw, Mar69, pp . 459—60 and 465—66 .

92. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 27Jan68 and CGIIIMAF msg t o

CGFMFPac, dtd 27Jan68 (HQMC Msg File) ; Abrams msg to Cush -

man, dtd 31Jan68, Creighton B . Abrams Papers, CMH ; MACV msg

to III MAF, dtd 3Feb68 (III MAF Incoming Msgs) ; Cushman FMFPac

debriefing ; Maj Miles D . Waldron and Spec 5 Richard W. Beavers,

XXIV Corps, "The Critical Year, 1968," pp . 4—5 (CMH) ; LtGe n

Willard Pearson, USA, The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966—1968 ,

Vietnam Studies (Washington, D .C. Dept of the Army, 1975); Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 345 .
666 THE DEFINING YEA R

PART II

The Tet Offensive

CHAPTER 7

THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DM Z

AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI ,

20 JANUARY—8 FEBRUARY

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from :

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68 ; Maj Thomas Donnelly and Cap t

Moyers S . Shore II, " Ho Chi Minh 's Gamble, " in LtCol Ralph F.

Moody, et al ., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954—68, " 8 pcs (ms, MCHC,

Washington, D.C., 1971), pr VI, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, "H o

Chi Minh's Gamble" ; III MAF ComdCs, Jan and Feb68 ; 3d MarDi v

ComdCs, Jan and Feb68; HQMC Msg File; III MAF Jnl & Msg File ;

Vietnam Comment Files; A&S Files, Indochina Archives ; Sea Tiger,

Jan—Feb68 ; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, The War in the

Northern Provinces, 1966—1968, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D .C.

Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, The War in the Northern

Provinces; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, ARVN, The General Offensives of

1968—69, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D .C., CMH, 1981),

hereafter Lung, The General Offensives ; LtCol Pham Van Son, ARVN, e t

al ., The Viet Gong Tet Offensive, 1968 (Saigon, RVN: Joint General Staff,

RVNAF, 1968), hereafter Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive .

The Cua Viet is Threatene d

Other sources for this section are : 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68;

3/1 ComdC, Jan68 ; BLT 3/1 CAAR, Operation Badger Catch, dtd

14Mar68, End, 3/1 ComdC, Feb68, hereafter 3/1 CAAR, Operation

Badger Catch .

1. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

2. Ronald R. Asher, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

3. This and the following paragraph are based on the following sources:

1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 ; III MAF

ComdC, Jan68 .

4. See also MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 22Jan68 an d

HQMC, G—3, Point Paper, Status of WestPac Units, dtd 23Jan68 ,

HQMC Point Papers, Jan—Jun68.

5. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

6. Ibid .

7. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 22Jan68 and also CGIIIMA F

msg to ComUSMACV, dcd 22Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67—Feb68) .

8. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 5Jan68 and ComSeventhFl t

to CTG 76 .5, dcd 15Jan68, Ends 5 and 7, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

9. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 17Jan68 and CGIIIMA F

msgs to CG3dMarDiv and ComUSMACV, dtd 22Jan68 (HQMC Msg

Files, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67—Jan68).

10. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Jan68, End, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/1 CAAR, Operatio n

Badger Catch ; "Operation : Badger Catch/Saline/Napoleon-Saline, "

BLT 3/1, Newsletter Battalion Landing Team 3/1 RVN, Dec 67 Jun68,

Apr 1988, p . 6 .

11. 3dMarDiv COC msg to IIIMAFCOC, dtd 23Jan68, End 29, 3 d

MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

12. CGIIIMAF msg to CTG 76 .5, dtd 24Jan68, End 42, and CTG

79.5, SitRep, Opn Badger Tooth, dtd 2Jan68, End 87, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 .

Adjustment of Forces in Southern Quang Tri Provinc e

Ocher sources for this section are : 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d Ma r

AAR, Opn Osceola II, dtd 20Mar68, 3d Mar Miscellaneous File, here -

after 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II ; 1st AirCavDiv, Operational Report

Lessons Learned, for period ending 31Jan68, dtd 17Mar68 (CM H

Working Papers), hereafter 1st AirCavDiv, ORLL, 31Jan68 .

13. 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st Mar Operation Osceola SitRep No .

363, dtd 20Jan68, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

14. 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola 11 .

15. Ibid .

16. Ibid . and III MAF ComdC, Jan68 .

17. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 22Jan68 (HQMC Msg File ,

III MAF Outgoing, Dec67-Feb68).

18. 1st AirCavDiv, ORLL, 31Jan68 ; William Ehrhart, Itr to Shulimson, did 2Jul91 (Vietnam Comment File).

19. 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II.

Heavy Fighting Along the DM Z

Other sources for this section are : 3d MarDiv, AAR, Operatio n

Lancaster II, dtd 9Sep69[?), End, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Nov68, here -

after 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II ; 4th Mar ComdC,

Jan68 ; 3/4 ComdC, Mar68 .

20. 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II .

21. 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

22. This and the following paragraph are based on the following

sources: 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 ; III MAF ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operatio n

Lancaster II; MCCC, Items ofSignificant Interest, dtd 26Jan68 ; G—3 ,

HQMC, Point Paper, Status of Forces in WestPac, dtd 31Jan68

(HQMC Point Papers, Jan—Jun68) . For reference to Dien Bien Phu and

the 320th NVA Division, see George L. MacGarrigle, Comments o n

draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

23. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following sources :

3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

24. Col Lee R . Bendell, Comments on draft, n .d . (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Bendell Comments.

25. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: 3/4

ComdC Jan68 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

26. Additional source for this paragraph is : " Marines Blast 'Wall to

Wall, ' NVA After Ambush, " Sea Tiger, 1Mar1968, p . 4 . See also Ben -

dell Comments.

27. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II .

28. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 .

29. Ibid .

30. Ibid . See also Bendell Comments.

31. Sources for this and the following three paragraphs are : 3/ 4

ComdC, Jan68 ; "Marines Blast 'Wall to Wall,' NVA After Ambush, "

Sea Tiger, 1Mar1968, p. 4 . See also Maj John S . Leffen, Jr., Comments

on draft, n .d . (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Leffen Comments.
NOTES 667

32. Additional sources for this and the following two paragraphs are :

3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II; Abdullah Hassan (Fran k

Craven) intvw, 2Occ86 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Hassa n

Tape .

33. Leffen Comments.

34. Hassan Tape .

35. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; Bendell Comments.

36. Bendell Comments.

37. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 .

38. Ibid .

39. Sources for this and the following paragraph are : 3/4 ComdC,

Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II .

40. Messages quoted in 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 .

41. III MAF ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; 4th Ma r

ComdC, Jan68 ; 9th Mar Inc Sum, Opn Kentucky, No . 87, dt d

28Jan68, tab B 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II.

A Lull in Leatherneck Square

Additional sources for this section are : 9th Mar ComdC,

Jan—Feb68 ; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan 1968 .

42. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 20Jan68 (HQMC Msg

File); 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 ; MCCC, Items of

Significant Interest, dtd 22Jan68 .

43. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 17Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan 1968 .

44. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68 ; MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, 23—25Jan68 .

45. 9th Mar SitRep No . 354, Operation Kentucky, did 29Jan68, ta b

A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

46. 9th Mar Int Sum, Opn Kentucky, No . 87, did 28 Jan68, tab B, 9t h

Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

47. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 27Jan68 (HQMC Msg File);

exchange of messages between CG3dMarDiv and CTG 76 .4, dt d

26Jan68, Encl 116—18, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan68 .

48. Exchange of messages between CG3dMarDiv and CTG 76 .4, did

27Jan68, Encl 126–29, 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan68 ; 9th Mar SitReps,

Operation Kentucky, Nos. 347–64, dcd 27–31Jan68, tab A, 9th Ma r

ComdC, Jan68.

49. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 ; 9th Mar SitRep, Operation Kentucky ,

No. 364, cltd 31Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; CG3dMarDi v

to CGIIIMAF, dtcl 3Feb68, HQMC Message File, III MAF Incoming ,

Dec67—Feb68 .

The Cua Viet Continues to Heat U p

Other sources for this section are: 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan—Feb68 ;

3/1. ComdCs, Jan—Feb68 ; 3/1 CAAR, Operation Badger Catch .

50. 1st AmTrac Bn, ComdC, Jan68 ; CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIII MAF,

dtcl 30Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan68 .

5 L BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch ; 1st AmTrac Bn msg to CO 9th Mar an d

CO 12th Mar n .d ., attached to S—2/3 Jnl, 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

52 . BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch .

53. Ibid .

54. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan68 .

55. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 ; Enemy Order of Battle, 9th Ma r

ComdC, Feb68 ; BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch .

56. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Tooth .

57. Sources for this and the following three paragraphs are : BLT 3/ 1

AAR, Badger Tooth ; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

58. Additional source for this and the following paragraph is 3d Ma r

Div ComdC, Jan68 .

59. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Tooth .

60. Ibid .

61. Ibid ; ComUSMACV msgs to III MAF, 27—29Jan68 (III MAF Cease -

fire Policy Folder) ; Maj Gen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Comments o n

BGen Edwin H . Simmons Naval Review Article, did 19Nov69, Simmons Comment Notebook, Personal Papers, MCHC ; Maj John Regal ,

"Surprise for the 803d," reprinted from Marine Corps Gazette, Apr70 i n

BLT 3/I, Newsletter Battalion Landing Teems 3/1, RVN, Dec 67 Jun68 ,

Apr88, pp . 3–5, p. 3, hereafter Regal, " Surprise for the 803d. "

62. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch .

63. Ibid .

64. Ibid .

65. Ibid .

66. Ibid .

The Battle For Quang Tri City

Other sources for this section are : 14th Mil Hist Dec, 1st Air Cav

Div, "Battle of Quang Tri, 31Jan—6Feb68," dtd 1Apr68, CMH Working Papers, hereafter 14th MilHist, "Battle of Quang Tri " ; 3d Ma r

AAR, Opn Osceola II; Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp. 298–300 ; Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, pp . 55–6 .

67. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtcl 4Oct67, HQMC Msg File ,

III MAF Incoming .

68. Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, 1968, pp . 298–99 and 302 .

69. Ibid .

70. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Pharr Van

Son, The Tet Offensive, pp . 298–99, 302 ; 14th MilHisc, "Battle o f

Quang Tri . "

71. 14th MilHist, "Battle of Quang Tri " . See also, Pearson, The War in

the Northern Provinces, p . 55 .

72. 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II.

73. 14th MilHist, "Battle of Quang Tri " .

74. Ibid .

75. Ibid . ; Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, p . 55 .

76. Oral History intvw with apt Michael Nawrosky (USA) and

lstSgt Robert B . Fowler (USA), n .d . [Feb68) (CMH Working Papers),

hereafter Nawrosky Intvw (CMH Working Papers) .

77. This and the following paragraph are based on the followin g

sources: 14th MilHist, "Battle of Quang Tri " ; Pearson, The IVeer in the

Northern Provinces, pp . 55–6 .

78. Additional sources for this paragraph are : Nawrosky Intvw (CMH

Working Papers) ; Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, p . 300 .

79. 14th MilHist, "Battle of Quang Tri "; Pearson, The War in the

Northern Provinces, pp . 5 5–6 .
668 THE DEFINING YEA R

Tet Aftermath Along the DMZ

Additional sources for this section are : Regal, "Surprise for the

803d;" BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch ; 3/3 draft AAR, n .d ., Anx B, 3/ 3

ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 3/3 draft AAR ; Jeff Kelly, DMZ Diary, A

Combat Marine's Vietnam Memoir (Jefferson, N .C. : McFarland and Com -

pany, Inc ., 1991), hereafter Kelly, DMZ Diary .

80. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are : BLT

3/1 AAR, Badger Catch ; Regal, "Surprise for the 803d;" "'Missing '

Kilo Co Kills 144 Enemy," Sea Tiger, dtd 23Feb68 .

81. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Regal, "Surprise for the 803d;" "'Missing' Kilo Co Kills 144 Enemy," Sea Tiger,

drd 23Feb68 .

82. Additional source for this paragraph is BLT 3/1 AAR, Badge r

Catch . See also LtCol Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dt d

22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McQuown Comments.

83. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch ; McQuown Comments ; Regal, "Surprise for the 803d," p . 5 .

84. Sources for this and the following two paragraphs are : 9th Ma r

IntSum No . 90, Operation Kentucky, dtd 31Jan68, tab B, 9th Ma r

ComdC, Jan68 ; 9th Mar ComdC, Feb68 ; 9th Mar SitReps an d

IntReps, Operation Kentucky, dtd 2–3 Feb68, tabs A and B, 9th Ma r

ComdC, Feb68 ; FMFPac, MarOpV, Jan68, p . 49 .

85. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are:

"Leatherneck Unit Clobbers Enemy in Fierce Battle," Sea Tiger, dt d

23Feb68, p. 1 and Clipping "Cam Lo—Hub of the DMZ," Sea Tiger,

n .d . [Feb68), Encl, Bendell Comments.

86. Col Franklin L. Smith debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968) Tap e

2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col Richard B. Smith intvw, Jul68 ,

Tape 3041 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

87. Sources for this and the following four paragraphs are : 9th Mar

ComdC, Feb68; 3/3 ComdC, Feb68 ; 3/3 draft AAR.

88. Additional source for this and the following two paragraphs is:

Kelly, DMZ Diary, pp . 27–36 . Quotes are from pp. 27–28 .

89. Kelly, DMZ Diary, p . 33 .

90. LtCol Otto Lehrack, Comments on draft, dtd 29Oct94 (Vietnam

Comment File) . See also LtCol Otto J . Lehrack, No Shining Armor, The

Marines at War in Vietnam, An Oral History (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp . 228–29, hereafter Lehrack, No Shining

Armor.

91. The quote is from Kelly, DMZ Diary, pp . 35–6. See also Lehrack,

No Shining Armor, pp . 215–33 and 3/3 draft AAR .

92. 3d MarDiv, Lancaster II, AAR ; 3d MarDiv Periodic Intelligenc e

Rpt, dtd 18Feb68, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68 .

CHAPTER 8

THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from :

MACV ComdHisc, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68 ; Maj

Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S . Shore II, "Ho Chi Minh 's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al ., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954-68, "

8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D .C., 1971), pt VI, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, " Ho Chi Minh 's Gamble ; " 1st Mar Div, Commanders

AAR, Tet Offensive, 29 Jan-14 Feb68, dcd 25May68 (1st MarDi v

Admin Files), hereafter 1st MarDiv AAR Ter; TF X-Ray ComdC,

Jan68 ; III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Vietnam Comment Files; Sharp and

Westmoreland, Report on the War ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports ; Do n

Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City, New York : Doubleday & Co, 1971),

hereafter Oberdorfer, Tet!; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, The War in the

Northern Provinces, 1966-1968, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D .C.

Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, The War in the Northern

Provinces; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, ARVN, The General Offensives of

1968-69, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D .C., CMH, 1981),

hereafter Lung, The General Offensives ; LtCol Pham Van Son, ARVN, et

al ., The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968 (Saigon, RVN : Joint General Staff,

RVNAF, 1968), hereafter Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive.

Allied Disposition s

1. 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 14 .

2. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 5 and 17 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p .

35 ; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, p . 29, 1973-76 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Robertson Intvw .

3. Col William K. Rockey, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Rockey Comments ; Igor Bobrowsky intvw,

3Dec1982, Tape Three, p. 2 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafte r

Bobrowsky Intvw, Tape Three ; 2d ROK Bde SitRep No . 29, dtd

29Jan68 and I CorpsAdvGp, Da Nang msg to III MAP, dtd 29Jan6 8

(III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 3/5 ComdC, Jan68 .

4. ComUSMACV msgs to III MAF, dtd 27-29Jan68 (111 MAP Cease -

fire Policy Folder) .

5 . Robertson Intvw, p .32 .

The Enemy Plans His Offensiv e

6. General Entry, Historical Summary, Jan68, p . 24, v . 28, Histor y

File, 27Dec62-31Jan68 (Westmoreland Papers) ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet ,

p . 19 ; 1st MarDiv PerintRpt 3-68, dtd 22Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp . 12 and 31 ; Col W. J.

Davis, Tet Marine, An Autobiography (San Diego, CA, 1987), pp. 116-

18, Encl to Col William J . Davis, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Davis, Tet Marine.

7. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 19; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 12 an d

31 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 25-6 ; Davis, Tet Marine, pp. 117-18 .

8. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 19 ; CWO Stuart N. Duncan intvw, n .d .

[1968), Tape 2978 (Oral HiscColl, MCHC).

9. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 29Jan68 and NSA to III MAP,

Resume of celecon, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDi v

AAR Tet, p . 19 .

10. Rand Corporation, Tet Quang Ngai Interview, dui 18Apr68, No .

20, Folder No. 2, Tet (A&S Files, Indochina Archives), hereafter,

Quang Ngai intvw, 18Apr68, 20 (A&S Files) ; Ill MAF msg to MACV,

dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) .

11. Quang Ngai Interview, 18Apr68, 20 (A&S Files) ; 1st MarDiv msg

to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 and III MAF msg to I Corps TOC, dtd 31Jan6 8

(III MAF Jnl & Msg File); FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 25-6 .

12. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 19-20; ICorpsAdvGp, Da Nang msg to

III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) .

13. Hq, South Vietnam Liberation Army, Order of the Day of th e

Headquarters, All South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces, n .d ., tran s

(Ter 68, Folder 2, Indochina Archives).

The Attack

14. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 31-33 ; 1st MarDiv to Ili MAP,

resume of telecon, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) .
NOTES 669

15. Jack W. Jaunal, Vietnam `68, Jack's Journal, (San Francisco, CA :

Denson Press, 1981) p . 39, hereafter Jaunal, Vietnam `68 .

16. Maj Gen Raymond L . Murray intvw, 27Jun75, pp . 42-3 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC).

17. Robertson Intvw, pp . 32-3 ; 1st MP Bn to III MAF, Resume of telecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68, and C O

ICorpsAdvGp to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st

MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp . 31-3 ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 23-5 .

18. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : 1st MarDiv

msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) ; 1st MarDiv

AAR Tet, pp . 25-6 .

19. An additional source for this paragraph is: CGlstMarDiv msg to

HqBn, 1st MarDiv, dtd 30Jan68, Encl 25, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

20. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 25-6 ; Pham Van Son, Tee Offensive, pp .

303-04 ; CO lCorpsAdvGp to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MA F

Jnl&Msg File).

21. Lung, The General Offensives of 1968-69, pp . 47-9 .

22. Ibid . ; Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 303-04 ; 1st MarDiv AA R

Tet, pp. 25-6 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp . 21-5 ; 1st MarDiv COC,

Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 and ICorpsAdvGp msg t o

Ill MAF, did 31Jan68 (Ill MAF JnI&Msg File) .

23. Col Twyman R . Hill, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Hill Comments; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan68 ;

1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 an d

ICorpsAdvGp msg co III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) .

24. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 25-6 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp . 21 -

5 ; 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 an d

ICorpsAdvGp msg co III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) ;

Donald Oberdorfer, Tet!, pp. 125-26.

25. Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 303-04 ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp .

25-6; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp . 21 -

5 ; 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 and

lCorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) ;

Hill Comments.

26. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are : 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68, and 1st MarDiv msg to 111 MAF, did 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 23-5 ; 11th Marines ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 .

27. An additional source for this paragraph is Rockey Comments .

28. Col Franklin L . Smith intvw, 10Jun68, Tape 2878 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Smith Tape ; CO ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dt d

31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) .

29. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Pham Van

Son, Tet Offensive, p . 305 ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 26-7 . See also CO

ICorpsAdvGp msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 31Jan68 ; 2d ROKBde to CGIIIMAF, Resume of telecon, 30Jan68 ; ROKAdv to III MAF, Resume of

Telecon, did 30Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, did

30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File) .

30. Lung, The General Offensives of 1968-69, p . 46 ; Westmoreland ,

A Soldier Reports, pp . 322-23 ; LtGen Philip B. Davidson, USA, Vietnam at War, The History : 1946-1975 (Novato, CA : Presidio Press,

1988), p . 474 .

The Fighting Continues

31. CO lCorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 and Americal Di v

to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File).

32. 1st MarDiv AAR Ter, pp . 24-26 ; CAP Hy to III MAF, resume o f

telecon, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAP Jnl&Msg File).

33. Jaunal, Vietnam '8, p . 40 .

34. CAP Hq to III MAF, resume of telecon, dtd 30Jan68 (Ill MA F

Jnl&Msg File);lst MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 24-26 ; LtCol Gene W. Bowers, Comments on draft, dtd 30May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bowers Comments ; Rockey Comments ; John L. Gundersen ,

Comments on draft, dtd 9Dec94 and 11Sep96 (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Gundersen Comments ; Extract of 1st MarDiv COC

[Combat Operations Center), 30Jan68, Encl, Gundersen Comments ,

hereafter Extract of 1st MarDiv COC, 30Jan68 .

35. Gundersen Comments; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 24-6; 3/ 5

ComdC Jan68 ; ITOC co III MAF, Resume ofTelecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1st

MarDiv msg to III MAF, did 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File) .

36. Gundersen Comments; Extract of 1st MarDiv COC, 30Jan68 ;

Bowers Comments ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 24-6; 3/5 ComdC

Jan68 .

37. Gundersen Comments.

38. Bowers Comments; Gundersen Comments.

39. Bowers Comments; Rockey Comments.

40. Bowers Comments.

41. Ibid . and Rockey Comments.

42. Gundersen Comments; Bowers Comments ; 1st MarDiv AAR Ter ,

pp . 24-6 ; 3dAmTrac co III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1s t

MarDiv msg to III MAF, did 31Jan68 (III MAP Jnl & Msg File) .

43. Gundersen Comments; Bowers Comments; Rockey Comments; 1st

MarDiv AAR Ter, pp . 24-6 ; 3/5 ComdC Jan68 ; ITOC to Ill MAF,

Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1st MarDiv msg to 111 MAF, dt d

31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File) .

44. FLC to III MAF, resume of telecon, dtd 30Jan68 and 1st MarDi v

msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).

45. This and the following paragraph are derived from the following

sources: 1st MarDiv AAR Tee, pp . 26-8, 31 ; 1st MarDiv to 111 MAF,

Resumes of Telecons, dtd 30-31Jan68, and 1st MarDiv msgs to Il l

MAF, dtd 30-31Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File) .

46. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAP Jnl&Msg file) .

47. ICorpsAdvGp, Da Nang msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MA F

Jnl&Msg File); Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 303-04 .

48. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 28 ; 1st MarDiv msg to III MAP, dtd 3 0

Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p . 40.

49. Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 303-04 .

50. This and the following paragraph are derived from the followin g

sources: Ibid . ; COC ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 ; 1st

MarDiv resume of telecon to III MAF, did 30Jan68 ; ROK Lia Off,

Resume of telecon to III MAF, did 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) .

51. 1st MarDiv msg to 111 MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File) ;

1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 29.

52. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following

sources: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 29 ; 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd

30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).

53. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 ; Resume of telecon fro m

Phu Bai to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 ; 1st MarDiv COC Notes, dt d

31Jan68 ; I TOC to 111 MAF, Resume of Telecon, did 31Jan68 (Il l

MAF Jnl&Msg File). See also 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 19, 45-47 ;

Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, p . 306 .

54. Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 339-58 .
670 THE DEFINING YEA R

55. Col Dean Wilker, Comments on draft, dtd 18Nov94 (Vietnam

Comment File).

56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 56 ; 1st MAW to III MAF, Resumes

of telecon, 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).

57. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File) ;

1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 29-30 ; FMF, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 56 .

58. This and the next paragraph are based on the following sources : 1st

MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 30 ; 1st MarDiv to III MAP, Resume of Telecon ,

dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File) .

59. An additional source for this paragraph is 1st FSR/FLC msg to II I

MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File) .

60. Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 303-04 .

61. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 30-32 ; III MAF JnI&Msg File ; 1st MP

Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

62. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 31-2 ; 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd

31Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File) .

63. 1st MarDiv AAR Tee, p . 31 ; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, Resume of

Telecon, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF JnI&Msg File) .

64. I Corps to III MAF, Resumes of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68 ; CAG-2 t o

III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68 ; 2d ROK MarBde msg t o

III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 ; Americal Div to III MAF, Resume of Telecon ,

dtd 31Jan68 ; III MAF msg to MACV COC, dtd 31Jan68 ; (III MAF

JnI&Msg File).

65. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, Jan68, p . 32 .

66 . Ibid .

A Brief Lull and Renewed Fighting

67. The sources for this and the next paragraph are : 1st MarDiv AA R

Tet, p . 24 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p . 17 .

68. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 33 .

69. Ibid ., p . 20 ; LtCol John E J. Kelly intvw, 23May68, Tape 276 0

(Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

70. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 34-5 .

71. Ibid .

72. Bobrowsky intvw, Tape Three, p . 6.

73. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following

sources: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 35-6 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 .

74. An additional source for this and the next paragraph is 3/5 ComdC ,

Feb68 .

75. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 36-7 ; Robertson Intvw., pp . 32-33 .

76. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 341-2 ; General Entry, Historical Summary, 1-29Feb68, Folder 29 (Westmoreland Papers ,

CMH).

77. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 341 .

78. Robertson Intvw, pp . 30-1 ; Cushman Intvw, Nov82, p . 29 ; Smit h

Tape .

79. Smith Tape .

80. CGIIIMAF msg to CGAmericalDiv, CGlstMarDiv, CGIstMAW,

and CG2dROKMC, dtd 7Feb68, End 7, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

81. The sources for this and the following six paragraphs are : 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 37 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 .

82. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is III

MAF ComdC, Jan68 .

83. An additional source for this paragraph is FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Jan68, pp . 28-30 .

84. 1st MarDiv AAR Ter 68 ; III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp . 19-20 ;

CGIIIMAF msg to CGlstMarDiv [and other subordinate commands] ,

dcd 11Feb68, Encl 10, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 .

85. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 64 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 21-25 ;

Smith Tape.

86. Document Relating to Action and Mission South of Da Nang, dtd

31Jan68, CDEC Log No . 03-1127-68 (Ter 68, Folder No . I, Indochina Archives); 1st MarDiv AAR Ter, p. 70; Robertson lntvw., pp . 32-3 .

CHAPTER 9

THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE—

THE BATTLE BEGIN S

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from :

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68 ; Ma j

Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S . Shore 11, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al ., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954—68, "

8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D .C., 1971), pc VI, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble" ; Maj Miles D . Waldron, USA ,

and Specialist 5 Richard W. Beavers, USA, "Operation Hue City," 31st

Mil Hist Dec, Hq Prov Corps, Vietnam, Hist Study, 2—68, hereafte r

Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City " ; 1st MarDiv, Commanders AAR, Tec Offensive, 29 Jan—14 Feb68, dtd 25May68 (1st MarDi v

Admin Files), hereafter 1st MarDiv AAR Ter; TF X-Ray ComdC ,

Jan68 ; TF X-Ray AAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 14Apr68, with enclosures ,

hereafter TF X-Ray AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Hue City,

dtd 20Mar68 in TF X-Ray AAR Hue City, hereafter lst Mar AA R

Hue City ; 1/1 ComdC, Jan68 ; III MAF Jnl & Msg File ; Hue City Jn l

& Msg File in III MAF Jnl & Msg File, hereafter Hue City Jnl & Msg

File ; Vietnam Comment Files; BGen Foster C. LaHue debriefing a t

FMFPac, Apr68, Tape 2932 (Oral HiscColl, MCHC), hereafter LaHu e

debriefing ; LtCol Marcus J. Gravel intvw, 17Jul73 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Gravel intvw ; Lt Col Ernest C. Cheatham, Maj G.

Ron Christmas, Maj Mike P. Downs, and Maj Charles L . Meadows presentation, 23Jul73 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Cheatham et al .

presentation ; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Truong Sinh, "The Figh t

to Liberate the City of Hue During Mau Than Tet (1968), " translated

from Hoc Tap, Dec 1974 in Hue Folder, Ter Box, A&S Files, Indochin a

Archives, hereafter Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the Cicy o f

Hue " ; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the IVar; Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports; Keith William Nolan, Battle for Hue, Tet, 1968 (Nova -

co, CA : Presidia Press, 1983), hereafter Nolan, Battle for Hue; Eri c

Hammel, Fire in the Streets, The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968 (Chicago, Ill :

Contemporary Books, 1991), hereafter Hammel, Fire in the Streets; Don

Oberdorfer, TET! (Garden City, New York : Doubleday & Co, 1971),

hereafter Oberdorfer, TET!; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, The War in

the Northern Provinces, 1966—1968, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.

Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, The War in the Northern

Provinces; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, ARVN, The General Offensives of

1968—69, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D .C., CMH, 1981),

hereafter Lung, The General Offensives ; LtCol Pham Van Son, ARVN, e t

al ., The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968 (Saigon, RVN : Joint General Staff,

RVNAF, 1968), hereafter Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive .

The Two Faces of Hu e

1 . " The Battle for Hue, " n .p ., n .d ., Encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 ;

Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 39—40 ; Lung, The General Offensives, pp. 75—77 ; Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 248—9 ; Pete r

Braestrup, Comments on draft, n .d . (Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).
NOTES 67 1

The NVA Attac k

2. Enemy OOB, Anx A, III MAF Periodic Intel Apt, No . 2, dtd

13Jan68 (III MAF Periodic Intel Rpts); MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp.

881—3 ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp . 49—50 ;

Waldron and Beaver, " Operation Hue City, " p . 6 .

3. People 's Liberation Army Forces List of Military Objectives in Hue ,

Jan 68, trans (Hue Folder, Tet Box, A&S Files, Indochina Archives) .

4. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp . 18—20 and Feb68, pp . 8—10 ; Cush -

man Incvw, Nov 1982 ; Truong Sinh, The Fight to Liberate the City o f

Hue," p . 95 .

5. Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," p . 90.

6. Ibid . and Waldron and Beavers, " Operation Hue City, " p . 6 .

7. Truong Sinh, " The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue, " pp . 93—4 .

8. Ibid ., pp . 96—7 .

9. Ibid . p . 97 ; Lung, The General Offensives, p. 79 ; Pham Van Son, Tel

Offensive, p . 249 .

10. Ibid .; Waldron and Beaver, "Operation Hue City," pp . 7—8 ; 1st

ARVN Div Advisory Detach, "The Battle of Hue," n .d ., n .p ., pp . 2—3 ,

Encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, hereafter " The Battle of Hue " (3d

MarDiv ComdC).

11. This paragraph is based on the sources listed above and Nolan, Battle for Hue, pp . 6—8 .

12. Truong Sinh, " The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue, " p . 101 ; 1st

Mar AAR Hue City.

13. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Waldron and

Beaver, " Operation Hue City, " pp . 13—4 ; " The Battle of Hue , " pp . 3—4 ,

(3d MarDiv ComdC); Lung, The General Offensives, p . 79 ; Pham Va n

Son, Tet Offensive, p . 249 .

14. Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, p . 250 .

Redeployment at Phu Bai and the Marines Go to Hu e

15. 1/1 ComdC, Jan68 ; 1st Mar Div Sit Rep No. 1, Hue City, dt d

3Feb68, Hue City Jnl & Msg File .

16. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jan68 ; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar AA R

Hue City ; LaHue debriefing ; "History of Task Force X-Ray," n .d . ,

Attachment to Col A . J. Poillon, Comments on draft ms, dtd 30Oct69,

Donnelly and Shore, " Ho Chi Min h 's Gamble " (Vietnam Comment File).

17. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 1/1 ComdC,

Jan68 ; Col Gordon D . Batcheller, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Batcheller Comments .

18. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68 ; Batcheller Comments.

19. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68 .

20. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68, and attached Jnl and SitRep files .

21. Ibid .

22. Ibid . ; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68 ; BGen Michael P. Downs, Comments o n

draft, dtd 19Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Downs Comments.

23. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68, and attached JnI and SitRep files.

24. This and the following paragraph are based upon Ibid . and 2/ 5

ComdC, Jan68 .

25. Additional sources for this paragraph are Downs Comments,

Dec94 and BGen Michael P. Downs, Taped Comments on draft, dt d

11Dec92 (Vietnam Comment File).

26. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68 ; 1/1 ComdC, Jan68 ;

Batcheller Comments.

27. Barcheller Comments; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p . III—A—4 .

28. TF X-Ray AAR, pp . 9—10 ; III MAF Jnl and Msg File, passim . ,

30—31 Jan68 .

29. Batcheller Comments .

30. This and the following two paragraphs are based upon : Nolan, Battle for Hue, pp . 12—3 ; Hammel, Fire in the Streets, 62—68 ; Gravel intvw ;

Barcheller Comments; Medal of Honor Recommendations, clt d

25May68, in Sgt Alfredo Gonzalez Biographical File (RefSec, MCHC) ;

Paul Drew Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross, Vietnam, Citations of Awards t o

Men of The United States Navy and The United States Marine Corps ,

1964—1973, (Forest Ranch, CA : Sharp & Dunnigan, 1987) pp . 27—8 ,

54 ., hereafter Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross.

31. Maj Ernest Cook, Comments on draft ms, dtd 20Oct69, Donnell y

and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," (Comment File) ; Gravel intvw ,

PP . 22, 49 ; Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 23 .

32. Gravel intvw, pp . 51—2 .

33. Ibid . pp . 5—6 ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p . 56 .

34. 1st MarDiv COC Notes, 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File) ;

LaHue debriefing ; Gravel intvw, p . 5 .

35. Gravel intvw, pp . 5—6 .

36. Ibid ., pp. 6—7 ; Nolan, Battle for Hue, p . 20 .

37. 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; Gravel intvw, pp . 7—8 ; Cheatham et al . ,

presentation, p . 23 .

38. 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; 1st MarDiv COC Notes, 0001—0900 ,

1Feb68, III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Gravel intvw, p . 53 .

39. LaHue debriefing ; Westmoreland msg to Wheeler, dtd 31Jan68 ,

Westmoreland Messages, Westmoreland Papers, CMH .

CHAPTER 1 0

THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE ,

THE SECOND PHASE

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from :

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68 ; Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble" ; Maj Miles D . Waldron, USA ,

and Spec 5 Richard W. Beavers, USA, "The Critical Year, 1968, Th e

XXIV Corps Team, " 31st Mil Hist Det, HQ, XXIV Corps, Jan69 ,

hereafter Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year"; Waldron and

Beavers, "Operation Hue City " ; 1st MarDiv AAR Ter; TF X-Ray AA R

Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; 1/1 ComdCs, Jan—Feb 68 ; 2/5 draft

CAAR, Operation Hue City, dtd 5Mar68, hereafter 2/5 AAR Hu e

City ; III MAF Jnl & Msg File ; Hue City Jnl & Msg File; Vietnam

Comment Files; Cushman Intvw, Nov82 ; LaHue debriefing ; Grave l

intvw ; Cheatham et al . presentation ; LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., et

al . intvw, 28Feb—4Mar68, Tape 2511, (Oral HistColl MCHC), hereafter Cheatham ec al . intvw Tape 2511 . ; A&S Files, Indochina Archives;

Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue " ; Sharp an d

Westmoreland, Report on the War, Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports;

Nolan, Battle for Hue; Hammel, Fire in the Streets; Oberdorfer, TET!;

Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces ; Lung, The General Offensives;

Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive ; Peter Braestrup, Big Story : How the Amer-
672 THE DEFINING YEA R

ican Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 i n

Vietnam and Washington, 2 vols. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977) ,

hereafter Braestrup, Big Story .

More Reinforcements

1. Quoted in Braestrup, Big Story, vol . 1, pp . 294—5 .

2. 1st Lt Philip M. Scherer et al . intvw, 30Apr68, Tape 2772 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC); TF X-Ray AAR Hue City, p. 10 .

3. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 11 .

4. 1st ARVN Div Advisory Der, " The Battle of Hue, " n .d ., n .p ., Enc l

1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 ; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hu e

City," p. 15 ; Capt Denis M. Dunagan intvw, 5Mar68, Tape 2560 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC).

5. Cheatham et at . presentation, pp. 14 and 21 and BGen Michael P.

Downs, Taped Comments on draft, dtd 11Dec92 (Vietnam Commen t

File), hereafter Downs, Taped Comments, Dec92 . See also 1st Mar

ComdC, Feb68 and 1st Mar AAR Hue City .

6. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 12 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Feb68 .

7. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp. 19—20 .

8. Waldron and Beaver, " The Critical Year, " pp . 14—5 ; Pearson, The

War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 44, 55—7 ; CGlstAirCav msg t o

CGTFX-Ray, dtd IFeb68, and III MAF msg to 1st AirCav, dtd

2Feb68 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

9. 1st AirCav SitRep No . 33, dtd 2Feb68, hereafter 1st AirCav SitRep

33, 2Feb68, and III MAF msg to I Corps TOC, dtd 2Feb68 (III MA F

Msg and Jnl File).

10. Braestrup, Big Story, vol . 1, p . 314 . See also Peter Braestrup, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94—Jan95) (Vietnam Comment File) .

11. Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, p. 44 ; 1st AirCav, SicRe p

33, 2Feb68 .

12. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 13 ; 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 1, dtd

3Feb68 (Hue City Jnl and Msg File).

13. 1st Mar AAR Hue, p. 13 ; LCpI M . Vernon Jr. in Cheatham et al .

intvw Tape 2511 .

14. TF X-Ray SitRep, Operation Hue City, dtd 2Feb68, Encl, 1st Ma r

ComdC, Feb68 .

15. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 13 ; Cpl George E . Minor incvw i n

Cheatham et at . intvw Tape 2511 .

16. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 24 .

17. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 14 ; 2/5 AAR Hue City.

18. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 51 .

The Beginning of the Advanc e

19. Cheatham et al . presentation, pp . 19-20 .

20. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 14 ; Cheatham e t

al . presentation, pp . 19-20 .

21. III MAF SitRep No . 5, Hue City, dtd 4Feb68 (Hue City Jnl & Msg

File) and 1st Mar AAR Hue, p. 15 .

22. Gravel intvw, pp . 18-9.

23. Ibid ., p . 30 ; IstLt Ray L. Smith ltr to Capt Gordon D . Baccheller,

dtd 25Mar68, Encl to Col Gordon D . Batcheller, Comments on draft ,

dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Smith Itr, Mar68 .

24. Gravel intvw, p . 31 ; Medal of Honor Recommendations, dtd

25May1968, in Sgt Alfredo Gonzalez Biographical File (RefSec ,

MCHC); Smith Itr, Mar68 .

25. Gravel intvw, p. 41 .

26. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 31 .

27. SSgt James R . Long and Sgt Terry Cochrane in Cheatham et al .

intvw Tape 2511 .

28. Nolan, Battle for Hue, p. 50; LtCol Ralph J. Salvati, Comments on

draft, n .d . (1994) (Vietnam Comment File) .

29. Nolan, Battle for Hue, pp . 50—1 ; BGen Michael P. Downs, Taped

Comments on draft, dtd 11Dec92 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Downs Taped Comments, Dec92 ; 2/5 AAR Hue City.

30. TF X-Ray AAR Hue City, p . 11 ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp . 1 5

and 18 ; 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 7, Hue City, dtd 4Feb68 (Hue City Jn l

& Msg File) .

31 . 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 74—75 .

Block by Block

32. Sea Tiger, 8Mar68, p . 8 .

33. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 12 ; Gravel intvw, p . 10 .

34. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 37 .

35. Ibid ., pp . 16, 20 .

36. Ibid . p . 17 .

37. Gravel incvw, p. 28.

38. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 42 ; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City ; 3 d

Tank Bn ComdC, Feb68 ; 1st Tank Bn ComdC, Feb68 .

39. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 80—1 ; Cheatham et al . presentation, p. 43 .

40. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 44 and LtCol Cheatham in LtCo l

Cheatham et al . intvw Tape 2511 .

41. Cheatham et al . presentation, pp. 39 and 42 ; Downs Taped Comments, Dec92.

42. Gravel intvw, pp . 15, 19; Smith Itr, Mar68; 1st Mar AAR Hue

City, p. 18 .

43. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 20; 2/5 AAR Hue City.

44. 2/5 AAR Hue City.

45. Ibid . and Cpl Riley in Cheatham et al . intvw Tape 2511 .

46. 2/5 AAR Hue City ; Sgt G. B . Zachary and 2dLt Michael A . McNiel

in LCpI Charles D . Bedford et al ., intvw, 10 May 68, Tape 2673 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bedford et al . intvw Tape 2673 .

47. 2/5 AAR Hue City ; PFC George Ciprio? in LtCol Cheatham et al .

intvw Tape 2511 .

48. "Old Glory Replaces Viet Cong Flag," Sea Tiger, 1 Mar 68, p . 1 ;

Nolan, Battle for Hue, pp . 77-9 .

49. Cheatham et al . presentation, p . 56 ; Gravel intvw, p . 18; Smith Its,

Mar68 .

50. 2/5 AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p . 25 .

51. 2/5 AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 24—34 .

52. 1st MarDiv SicRep No . 33, dtd 11 Feb68 (Hue City Jnl and Msg

File); Bedford et al . intvw Tape 2673 .

53. 1st Mar AAR Hue City.
NOTES 67 3

CHAPTER 1 1

STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from : MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68 ;

1st ARVN Div Advisory Det, The Battle of Hue," n .d ., n .p ., En d

1, 3d MarDiv, ComdC, Feb68, hereafter, 1st ARVN Adv Dec, "Th e

Battle of Hue " ; Waldron and Beavers, " Operation Hue City " ; 1st

MarDiv AAR Tet ; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar AAR Hue

City ; 1/5 AAR Hue City, dtd 15Mar68, hereafter 1/5 AAR Hu e

City ; III MAF Jnl & Msg File ; Hue City Jnl & Msg File ; Vietnam

Comment Files; A&S Files, Indochina Archives ; Truong Sinh, "Th e

Fight to Liberate the City of Hue" ; Keith B. Nolan Papers, Person -

al Papers Collection, MCHC, hereafter Nolan Papers ; U.S . Army ,

14th Mil Hist Dec, 1st Cav Div (AM), "The Battle of Hue, 2–2 6

February 1968," dtd 10Mar68 (Copy in Nolan Papers), hereafte r

14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68 ; MajGen John J. Tolso n

(USA) intvw, 24Jun68 (CMH, Washington), hereafter Tolson Intvw ,

Jun68 ; Alexander W. Wells, Jr. Papers, Personal Papers Collection ,

MCHC, hereafter Wells Papers, MCHC; Sharp and Westmoreland ,

Report on the War; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Nolan, Battle fo r

Hue; Oberdorfer, TET.I ; Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces;

Lung, The General Offensives; Pham Van Son, Yet Offensive ; Pete r

Braestrup, Big Story .

A Faltering Campaign

1. 1st ARVN Adv Dec, "The Battle of Hue," p . 5 .

2. Ibid .

3. Ibid ., p . 7 .

4. Ibid . pp . 6–7 .

5. Ibid . ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City.

6. Tolson Intvw, Jun 68, pp . 3-4 .

7. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, pp . 1—2 ; Waldron an d

Beavers, " Operation Hue City, " pp . 23—4 .

8. In addition to the sources listed above, see also III MAF msg t o

MACV, dtd 4Feb68 (III MAF Msg & Jnl File, Hue City) .

9. Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, p . 44 ; F. Clinton Berry, Jr. ,

The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War—Air Cav, (New York an d

Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988), pp . 110—12 ; 14th MHD, "The Battl e

of Hue, " Mar68, pp . 1–2 ; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hu e

City," pp. 23–4 .

10. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, p . 3 ; 1st AirCav Div SitRep

No . 38, did 7 Feb68 (IIIMAF Msg & Jnl File); Tolson Intvw., p . 4 .

l 1 . 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, p . 3 ; 1st AirCav, SitSu m

No. 38, dtd 8Feb68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File) .

l2 . 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, p . 3 .

13 . 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; Braestrup, Big Story, I, pp . 316–7 .

l4. CGIIIMAF msg to 1st ACD, dtd 13Feb68 (III MAF Outgoing

Messages).

15 . Waldron and Beaver, "The Critical Year," pp . 14–5 ; TF X-Ray

AAR Hue City ; Maj Talman C. Budd II, USMC, OSMA, NAG, AAR ,

Opn Hue City (Song Than 739–68), dtd 25Jul68 in SMA, MACV,

AARs, 1968–69, hereafter Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG ,

CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68 ; 1/5 FragO 6–68, dtd 9Feb68, End 1 ,

1/5 AAR Hue City.

Going into the Walled City

16. 1 /5 AAR Opn Hue City ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; 1st MarDiv Hue

City Sitrep No . 32, dtd 10Feb68, TF X-Ray to IIIMAF COC, Resume

of Telephone Call, dtd 10Feb68, and III MAF Hue City Sitrep No . 33 ,

dtd 10Feb68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). Although the 1/5 AAR doe s

not show Company A going into Hue until 11 February, all the othe r

sources reflect that the company was in Hue city on the afternoon of

10 February 1968 .

17. 1st FAG ComdC, Feb68, p. 5 ; Col Robert C . V. Hughes, Comments on draft, n .d . [1995) (Vietnam Comment File) .

18. 1st FAG ComdC, Feb68, p . 5 ; Alexander W. Wells, Jr., "Synopsis

From Combat Report: February 1968—Vietnam," in Alexander W.

Wells, Jr. Papers, MCHC, hereafter Wells, " Excerpts from Comba t

Report" ; Alexander W. Wells, Jr., Comments on draft, dcd 3Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Wells Comments, Dec94 .

19. Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report" ; Wells Comments, Dec94 .

20. Wells Comments, Dec94 .

21. Ibid . and Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report" .

22. Although there was no specific plan, General Truong 's intentions ca n

be inferred from the following sources : 1st Infantry Division Advisory

Detachment, Advisory Team 3, CAAR, Opn NVA/VC Tet Offensive :

Hue, dtd 30Mar68 (copy in Nolan Papers), hereafter 1st InfDiv, Adv T m

3, CAAR, Hue ; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; Maj

Talman C., Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68 ; 1/ 5

AAR Hue City ; Col Richard H . Thompson ltr to Keith B . Nolan ,

16Sep80 with attached copy of briefing map (Nolan Papers), hereafte r

Thompson Itr, 16Sep80 ; Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp . 256—59.

23. Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dt d

25Ju168 and SMA, MAU, NAG, 1st Endorsement on Hue City

CAAR, 12Aug68 .

24. Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dt d

25Jul68 .

25. 1/5 AAR Hue City.

26. Thompson ltr, 16Sep80 .

27. Ibid .

28. Ibid .

29. Ibid .

30. The basis of this and the following two paragraphs are : Thompson

lcr, 16Sep80 and 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue'City. e

The Fight For the 'Fowe r

31. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Thompson

ltr, 16Sep80 and 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City .

32. For this paragraph, see also unattributed account, "The Citadel, " ms,

n .d ., in Harrington Folder, Nolan Papers, hereafter "The Citadel," ms .

33. Thompson ltr, 16 Sep 80 .

34. Ibid . ; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City ; " The Citadel, " ms; 1st Lt Andre w

C . Delaurier, 19Apr68, Tape 2667 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

35. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Thompso n

ltr, 16Sep80; Citadel ms; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.

36. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Nolan notes,

n .d . Harrington File (Nolan Papers) ; Nolan, Battle for Hue, pp .

124–27 .
674 THE DEFINING YEA R

37. Col Myron C. Harrington, Comments on Nolan ms, dtd 24May83 ,

Harrington Folder, Nolan Papers .

38. Ibid . ; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City; "Like John Wayne," Sea Tiger, did

22Mar68 .

39. 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City ; Nolan notes, n .d . Harrington File

(Nolan Papers).

Continuing the Advanc e

40. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are : 1/ 5

AAR, Opn Hue City ; "The Citadel, " ms; 1st Mar AAR, Hue City.

41. An additional source for this and the following two paragraphs is :

Thompson ltr, 16Sep80.

42. An additional source for this paragraph is: PFC Thomas L. Foste r

in Cheatham et al . intvw, Tape 2511 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

43. Edward M . Landry lit to author, dtd 7Dec86 and entry for 17 Feb

1968 in excerpts from diary, Edward M . Landry Papers, Personal

Papers Collection, MCHC . See also TF X-Ray AAR Hue City ; 1st Ma r

AAR Hue City ; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.

44. Thompson la, 16Sep80 ; "The Citadel," ms. See also 1/5 AAR, Opn

Hue City.

CHAPTER 1 2

THE TAKING OF THE CITADE L

AND AFTERMATH

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from :

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68 ; 1st ARVN

Adv Dec, "The Battle of Hue" ; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue ; Wal -

dron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City" ; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet ; TF X -

Ray AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; 1/5 AAR Hue City; 2/ 5

AAR Hue City ; III MAF Jnl & Msg File ; III MAF Outgoing Msgs; III

MAF Incoming Msgs; Hue City Jnl & Msg File; Maj Talman C. Budd II,

MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68, hereafter Budd, AAR ;

Vietnam Comment Files; Gravel intvw ; Cheatham et al . presentation ;

Cheatham et al . intvw Tape 2511 ; A&S Files, Indochina Archives ; Truon g

Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue" ; Thompson ltr, 16Sep80,

Nolan Papers; 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68 ; Tolson Intvw,

Jun68 ; Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report" ; Peter Braestrup Papers,

Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, hereafter Braestrup Papers; Westmoreland Papers, CMH ; Gen Creighton W. Abrams Papers, CMH, hereafter Abrams Papers, CMH ; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War;

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Nolan, Battle for Hue ; Oberdorfer, TET!;

Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces ; Lung, The General Offensives;

Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive; Peter Braestrup, Big Story .

The Struggle in the Western Citade l

1. Budd, AAR and Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, 257—259 .

2. Budd, AAR.

3. Ibid . ; Pham Van Son, Tee Offensive, pp. 262—66 .

4. 1st ARVN Adv Der, "The Battle of Hue," p . 8; Waldron and

Beavers, "Operation Hue City," p . 38 .

5. Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report" .

6. III MAF COC msg to MACVU2), dtd 17Feb68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg

File). See also Hallmark 62 msg to Hallmark 6, Hue City SitRep, dtd

17Feb68, App 5, tab C, 1st FAG ComdC, Feb 68 and Wells, "Excerpt s

from Combat Report ."

An Estimate of the Situation and Mounting the Offensive

7. Abrams msg to Cushman (Information to Westmoreland), clt d

16Feb68 (Abrams Papers, CMH).

8. Ibid .

9. Historical Summary and Summary of CIIB Meeting, I8Feb68, vol .

29, p . 12 and Encl 62 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH) ; TF X-Ray AA R

Hue City.

10. Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," pp . 42-3 .

11. Pham Van Son, The Viet Gong Tet Offensive, p. 267 ; Budd, AAR ;

Lung, The General Offensives, p .83 .

12. Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers; 1/5 AAR Hue City.

13. Clark Dougan, Stephen Weiss, and the editors of Boston Publishing Company, The Vietnam Experience : Nineteen Sixty-Eight (Boston, Ma :

Boston Publishing Company, 1983), p . 30 ; Clipping, Washington Post ,

dtd 19Feb68, Braestrup Papers.

14. Abrams msg to Cushman, info : Westmoreland, did 20Feb68

(Abrams Papers, CMH) .

15. Abrams msg to Tolson, dtd 20Feb68 (Abrams Papers, CMH) .

16. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, pp . 5—6 ; Waldron an d

Beavers, "Operation Hue City," pp . 43—7 .

17. Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers.

18. Ibid . ; AP despatch, dtd 22Feb68, Clipping in Polk Folder (Nola n

Papers, MCHC); 1/5 AAR Hue City . These sources are also the basi s

for the next two paragraphs.

19. See also Maj Denis J. Kiely and Capt Gary L. Post intvws,

19Apr68, Tape 2551 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

20. Budd, AAR; Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dtd 23Feb6 8

(Abrams Papers, CMH )

21. Budd, AAR; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue .

22 . 1/5 AAR Hue City ; Thompson Iv, I6Sep80, Nolan Papers .

Closing Out Operation Hue City

23. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : 2/5 AAR Hu e

City ; 1st MarDiv SitRep, Hue City, No . 86, dtd 24Feb68 (Hue Cit y

III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

24. See also 2/5 S—3 Jnl, 2/5 ComdC, Feb68, hereafter 2/5 S—3 Jnl, Feb68 .

25. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 2/5 S—3 Jnl, Feb 68 ; LtCol Ernest C.

Cheatham in Cheatham et al . intvw, Tape 2511 .

26. 2/5 AAR Hue City ; 2/5 S—3 Jnl, Feb 68 ; Robert A . Sutlack in l.stLt

P. M. Scherer intvw, 31 Apr 68, Tape 2722 (Oral HistColl, MCI-IC) .

27. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: 2/ 5

AAR Hue City ; 2/5 S—3, Feb 68 .

28. 1st Marines AAR Hue City; 2/5 AAR Hue City ; 1/5 AAR Hue

City ; Cheatham et al . presentation, pp. 11—12 and 28—29 .

A Summing U p

29. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are : TF X -

Ray AAR Hue City; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue ; Budd, AAR;

14th MHD, " The Battle of Hue, " Mar68 ; 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Div,

CAAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 23Mar68, Encl 5, TF X-Ray AAR Hu e

City ; Pham Van Son, The Tet Offensive, p . 271 .

30. Additional source for this and the following two paragraphs are :
NOTES 67 5

lstLt John R. Morse, USA, Thua Thien Sector, S—2 Order of Battl e

Advisor in Hue, RVN, intvw, 8Mar68 (U .S . Army, 45th Military History Detachment, Interview Enclosures Folder, Nolan Papers, MCHC).

31. . Additional source for this and the following paragraph is : Ran d

Interview No. 28 in Interviews concerning the NLF, May 1968, Folder 2, Tet Box, A&S Files, Indochina Archives .

32. Additional source for this paragraph is: I Corps, Tactical Opn s

Center to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 6Feb68 (Hue City III

MAF Jnl & Msg File).

33. Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," p . 90 .

34. Truong Sinh, " The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue, " pp . 105—7 ;

Pham Van Son, The Tet Offensive, pp. 271—84 ; Westmoreland and

Sharp, Report on the War, p . 160 ; Lung, The General Offensives p . 85 ;

Oberdorfer, Tet!, pp . 232—33 ; Braestrup, Big Story, vol . I, pp . 201—16 .

35. Gravel intvw, pp . 2—3 .

36. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68 ; Tolson Intvw, Jun68, p .

5 ; Col Tillman C . Budd II, Comments on draft, dtd 30Mar95 (Vietna m

Comment File) .

37. 1/5 AAR Hue City ; Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers .

38. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : TF X-Ray

AAR Hue City ; 1st Mar AAR Hue City.

39. TF X-Ray AAR Hue City .

40. 1st Mar AAR Hue City ; LtCol Ernest C . Cheatham in Cheatham

et al . intvw, Tape 2511 .

41. 1st Marines AAR Hue City.

42. Ibid . and TF X-Ray AAR Hue City.

43. 1st Marines AAR Hue City ; Maj Jack E . Walker intvw, 9 Mar 68

(U .S . Army, 45th Military History Detachment, Interview Enclosure s

Folder, Nolan Papers, MCHC).

44. Pham Van Son, The Tet Offensive, p . 281 ; Gravel intvw, p . 42 .

45. MajGen Kerwin C/S MACV msg to BGen Anderson, C/S III MAF,

did 27Feb68 and Gen Westmoreland ComUSMACV, msg to LtGe n

Cushman CGIIIMAF, dtd 28Feb68 (III MAF Incoming Messages )

46. CGIIIMAF msg to CG IstMarDiv and CGTFX-Ray, dtd 26Feb6 8

(III MAF Outgoing Msgs); Gen Abrams msg to Gen Westmoreland ,

dtd 2Mar68 (ED Files, Abrams Papers, CMH), hereafter Abrams ms g

to Westmoreland, 2Mar68 .

47. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, 2Mar68 .

48. Ibid .

49. LCpI M. Vernon Jr. in Cheatham et al . intvw, Tape 2511 ; W. Roge r

Lansbury with Daniel E Ring, editor, " Notes Between Two Worlds: Th e

Diary of Roger Lansbury, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, " The Pennsylvania

Magazine of History and Biography, Summer 1 .985, pp. 257—97, p . 296 .

50. Gravel incvw, p . 42 ; Cheatham et al . presentation, pp. 57—59 .

5 L Clipping "18 Days Under the Bed," Washington Post, n .d . and clipping, " Hue Marines: Bitter as They Are Brave, " Washington Post, dt d

20Feb68 (Washington Post Clipping File, Peter Braestrup Papers) .

52. Budd, AAR and LtCol Joseph W. Malcolm, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 28Oct68, Tape 3453 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

53. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dtd 5Mar68 (Abrams Papers,

CMH); Westmoreland msg to Abrams, dtd 26Feb68 (EO File, Abram s

Papers, CMH); CG III MAF to subordinate commands, dtd 28Feb6 8

(III MAF Outgoing Files) .

PART III

After Tet, Khe Sanh, and Mini-Te t

CHAPTER 1 3

POST-TET IN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived fro m

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; HQMC Msg File ; HQMC, Status of Forces,

1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967—1968 ; III MAF ComdCs, Feb—Apr68 ;

III MAF Jnl & Msg Files ; III MAF Provisional Corps Folder, hereafter

PCV Folder ; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year" ; 1st MarDi v

ComdCs, Feb—Apr68 ; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Feb—Apr68 ; Westmoreland Papers, CMH ; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War ; Lung, The

General Offensives ; Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces .

The Immediate Ramifications of the Tet Offensiv e

. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War, p. 161 ; MACV ComdHist,

1968, pp. 161.—62 ; LtGen Robert E . Cushman, Jr., III MAF Presentation ,

General Officers Symposium Book, July 1968, cab F, pp . 1—8, hereafte r

Cushman Presentation . See also FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p . 5 .

2. Circular from COSVN, trans ., dtd 31Jan68, in U .S . Mission, Press

Release, dtd 29Mar68, A&S Files, Indochina Archives, hereafte r

COSVN Circular, 31Jan68 ; War Experiences Recapitulation Committee of the High-Level Military Institute, The Anti-U .S . Resistance War

for National Salvation, trans by Foreign Broadcast Information Service

(Hanoi : People 's Army Publishing Houses, 1980) [Joint Publication s

Research Service No . 80968, dtd 3Jun82], p . 110 ; Pham Van Son, Tet

Offensive, pp . 475—6 .

3. COSVN Circular, 31 Jan68 ; CT/AB (Unknown provincial headquarters), Directive No . 1, dtd 1.0Feb68 ; COSVN Communique, cltd

13Feb68 ; PLAF, 3d Special Communique, dtd 26Feb68 . All in A&S

Files, Indochina Archives.

4. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War, p . 235 ; Lung, The General Offensives, pp . 39—41 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp 3—4 ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 322—23 ; LtGen Philip B . Davidson ,

USA, Vietnam at War, The History: 1946—1975 (Novato, CA : Presidi o

Press, 1988), p . 474 ; Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp . 1—8 ; 58—9 ;

BGen John R. Chaisson, ltr to wife, dtd 11Feb68 (Chaisson Papers).

5. Lyndon B . Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency ,

1963—1969 (New York : Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 384—5 .

6. Messages quoted in Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton, N.J . : Princeton University Press, 1977), pp . 92—93, 95 .

7 . Ibid ., pp . 94—5 .

Readjustment in I Corp s

8. FMFPac MarOpsV, Feb68, pp . 89—90, 103 ; 5th MarDiv, RLT 2 7

Deployment AAR, dtd 8May68 ; 27th Mar ComdC, Feb68 ; Cushma n

Intvw, Nov82, p . 80 ; BGen Foster C . LaHue debriefing at FMFPac ,

Apr68, Tape 2932 (Oral HiscColl, MCHC), hereafter LaHue debriefing .

9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p . 104 ; III MAF ComdC, Feb68 ; Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, pp . 58—9, 68 ; Waldron an d

Beavers, "The Critical Year," p . 19 ; TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, pt 2 .

Pearson states that nearly 45,000 Army reinforcements arrived in 1

Corps during January and February, but it is obvious that the autho r

confused the total number of Army troops in I Corps with the numbe r

of reinforcements.
676 THE DEFINING YEA R

10. III MAF ComdC, Feb68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p . 33 .

11. See charts of enemy attacks in I Corps from 1 May 1967—31 May

1968 in FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp . 30—1 .

12. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 13-4.

13. Ibid ., p . 13 .

14. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 and LtCol Louis J. Bacher, Comments

on draft, dtd 7May95 (Vietnam Comment File); Col Tullis T. Wood -

ham, Jr. Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Woodham Comments .

15. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p . 16 ; Col Ross R. Miner, Debriefin g

by FMFPac, dtd 5Sep68 (Tape No . 3068, Oral HistColl, MCHC).

16. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p . 7 ; Woodham Comments.

17. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 22—3 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 ,

p . 17—A ; TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, pt 2 .

18. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 23—4 ; TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, p t

2 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 22 ; Col Harold L. Oppenheimer,

debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968) Tape 6379 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

19. TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, pt 2 ; VAdm Edwin B . Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance, A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965–1968 (Washington : Naval Historical Division, 1972) ,

pp. 117–18, hereafter Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance.

20. Col Edward L. Fossum, debriefing at FMFPac, 11Jul68, Tape 291 1

(Oral HistColl, MCHC); Gen William C. Westmoreland, Historical

Summary, General Entry, v. 28, Historical File, 27Dec67—31Jan68 ,

Westmoreland Papers, CMH ; Pearson, The War in the Northern

Provinces, pp . 58—9 ; Col Rex O. Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd

10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

21. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 11—2 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, 16—7 ; 3 d

Mar AAR Osceola II, dtd 20Mar68, End, 3d Mar ComdC, Mar68 .

22. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p . 22 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp. 15 ,

22, 30—31 ; Tompkins Intvw, p . 72 .

23. Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance, p . 126 ; Pearson, The War in

the Northern Provinces, pp . 62–65 .

24. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp . 17—8, 54 ; III MAF ComdC, Feb68 ,

pp . 10—1 .

25. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp . 17—8 .

26. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p . 18; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p . 31 ;

27. Col Alexander L . Michaux debriefing at FMFPac, 18Ju168, Tape 291 5

(Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 17 ; 3d MarDiv,

AAR, Lancaster II, dcd 9Sep69?, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Nov68 .

28. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p . 16 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to II I

MAF COC, dtd 16Feb68, 3d MarDiv PerintRpc No . 5—68, dt d

18Feb68, and 3d MarDiv Oplan 4—68, dtd 17Feb68, Encls, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 .

29. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Feb68, pp. 29 and 65 ; III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p. 10 ; 3 d

MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 16 ; 3d MarDiv PerintRpt No . 6—68, dt d

23Feb68, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 . For a detailed account o f

the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines action see LtCol Otto J . Lehrack, No Shining Armor, The Marines at War in Vietnam, An Oral History (Lawrence ,

Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp . 238–40 .

30. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p . 22 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp. 3 1

and 33 ; Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance, p . 126 ; Pearson, The War

in the Northern Provinces, pp . 62–65 ; Cushman Presentation, tab F, p . 35 .

Readjustments in the U.S. I Corps Command Structure

31. CMC Notebook, Visit to Vietnam, Jan68 ; Chaisson Diary, Jan68 ,

Chaisson Papers; ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 18Jan68, an d

CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Jan68 (HQMC Msg File).

32. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Jan68 (HQMC Msg File) .

33. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan—Feb68 ; BGen Jacob Glick intvw, 20 Ju n

and 11Jul89, pp . 65—71 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

34. CGFMFPac msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 20Jan68 (HQMC Msg File);

3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan—Feb68 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan—Feb68 ;

CGIII MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 24Jan68 (HQMC Msg Files, III

MAF Outgoing); MajGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 14Nov68, pp .

129—30 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Hoffman intvw.

35. Hoffman incvw, p. 130; CGIstBde, 101st Abn Div msg to

CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Jan68 and ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd

27Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Incoming) ; CGIIIMAF msg to

ComUSMACV, dtd 25Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing).

36. LtGen Robert E. Cushman debriefing at FMFPac, 31Mar69, pp .

465—66 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; Col Franklin L . Smith debriefing a t

FMFPac (May 1968) Tape 2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Cushma n

Presentation, tab F, pp. 18—9 .

37. Murray Intvw., p . 58 ; Tompkins Intvw, pp . 82—4 .

38. III MAF ComdC, Feb68 ; Entry for 12Feb68, Chaisson Diary an d

Chaisson ltrs to wife, dtd 14 and 15Feb68, (Chaisson Papers); LtGen

William J. Van Ryzin intvw, 2Apr75, pp. 214—15 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC); Tompkins incvw, p . 74 .

39. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 18Feb68 (III MAF Outgoin g

Msgs).

40. DepComUSMACV (Fwd) msg to III MAF and other commands ,

dtd 20Feb68 (PCV Folder) .

41. ComNavForceV msg to DepComUSMACV, did 23 Feb68 an d

CGIIIMAF msg to DepComUSMACV (Fwd), dtd 23Feb68 (PC V

Folder).

42. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 28Feb68 (PCV Folder) .

43. USMACV Letter of Instruction, Subj : Role and Missions of Provisional Corps, Vietnam, dtd 3Mar68 (PCV Folder) ; FMFPac MarOpsV,

Mar68, p . 59 .

44. Hoffman incvw, p. 130 ; MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, Comments on

draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ; Smith debriefing; Cush -

man incvw, Mar69, pp . 465—66 .

Planning for the Future

45. Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp . 35—50 ; Waldron and Beavers,

"The Critical Year, 1968," p . 20.

46. Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, p . 69.

47. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : III MAP Staff

Study, Subj : Military Posture, Northern I Corps, 1 Sep 1968, dt d

31Mar68, p . 1 (III MAF Miscellaneous Documents). See also ComUSMACV msg to CMC, dtd 13Mar68 (III MAF Incoming Msgs ,

5—14Mar68) .

March Operations in the DMZ Sector

48. Sources for this and the following two paragraphs are : FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Mar 68, p. 17 ; III MAF ComdC, p . 20 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC,

Mar68, pp . 11–2 ; BLT 3/1, Newsletter Battalion Landing Team 3/1,
NOTES 67 7

RVN, Dec 67 Jun68, Apr 1988, p . 10 ; Col Max McQuown, Comments

on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

49. Additional sources for this paragraph are : 7th ITT, III MAF, ITT

Rpts, 64– and 65–68, dtd 2 and 4Mar68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg Files) ,

hereafter ITT Rpts, 64– and 65–68 .

50. ITT Rpts, 64– and 65–68 .

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68 p . 16 ; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp .

11–2 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 20 .

52. III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp . 11–2, and 22 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Mar68, p. 20 .

53. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 80 .

54. Ibid ., pp . 16–8 ; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp. 11–2 ; 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Mar68, p . 20 ; BGen William Weise intvw, 21Feb83 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC).

55. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar 68, pp . 16–18; 3d MarDiv ComdC,

Mar68, p . 49 .

56. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : FMFPac,

MarOpsV, Mar68, pp . 13–6 ; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p . 13 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 19 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC,

dtd 4Mar68, Encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68 ; Lt Col Roger Zensen ,

Comments on draft, dcd 4Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

57. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp . 13–6 ; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p .

13 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 19 .

58. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 19 ; 1st Lt Daniel J. Razaluek an d

Sgt Ronald C. Trawick in Sgt R. C. Trawick ec al . intvw, 21Mar68 ,

Tape 2762 (Oral HiscColl, MCHC) .

59. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 80 ; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp .

22–4 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp . 6, 17, 30–2, 34–6 ; Pearson, The

War in the Northern Provinces, p . 70 .

60. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp. 17, 19–20 ; 3d MarDiv Frag O

7–68, dtd 25Mar68, Encl 4, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68 .

March Operations in the Rest of I Corp s

61. III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp . 10–11 and 13 ; Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp. 58–9 .

62. Copy of UPI News Release, dtd 16Mar68 (Courtesy of Lawrence

Lichty).

63. 27th Mar ComdC, Mar68 ; Capt William R. Black intvw, 9Nov8 5

(Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Black intvw .

64. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 51 ; Col William S. Fagan, Comments on draft, dtd 310ct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

65. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 18 ; HQMC, G–3 Point Papers,

Mar68 ; 7th Mar ComdC, Mar68 .

66. Task Force X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2 .

67. Ibid . ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, p . 18 .

68. TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2 ; Waldron and Beavers, The Critical Year, " p. 22 .

69. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp . 19—20; III MAF ComdC, Mar68 ,

p . 11 ; TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2 .

70. TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2 ; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968 , " pp . 25—35 ; Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces,

PP . 69—71 .

71. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pt 2 ; TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68 ;

Black intvw .

72. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 52 ; TFX-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2 ;

HQMC A03H15, Point Paper, Subj : Attack on Phu Bai, 26Mar68, dtd

27Mar68 (HQMC, G—3 Point Papers) .

73. TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2 ; 5th Mar Spot Apt, drd 31Mar68 ,

tab N, TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68 .

74 . TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt . 2 .

Regaining the Initiativ e

75. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 6, 31, 40, 49–50 ; III MAF

ComdC, Apr68, pp . 18–20 .

76. III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p . 11 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p . 18 .

77. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 28–9 and 74–5 ; 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Apr68, pp . 35–6 .

78. LtCol John F. J. Kelly, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Kelly Comments ; TF Kelly, AAR, Opn

Quick Track, dtd 16May68, Encl to Kelly Comments.

79. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 20–1 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68 ,

pp. 14, 18, 40 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, May68, p . 40; BGen Robert D .

Bohn, Comments on Simmons, "Marine Opns, Vietnam, 1968" (Simmons Comment Notebook) .

80. Lahue debriefing; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p . 4 .

81. TF X-Ray ComdC, Apr68, pt . 2, p . 6 ; 1/27 ComdC, Apr68, pt . 2 ,

p . 5 ; Black intvw ; William R. Black, Jr., Comments on draft, dt d

4Jan95 and attached ltr to parents, dtd 20–21 Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).

82. TF X-Ray ComdC, Apr68, pt . 2, pp. 7–8 .

83. Waldron and Beavers, " The Critical Year, 1968, " pp . 40—2, 45—6 ;

Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, pp . 89—90 ; 1st MarDiv, An x

A (Intelligence), 1st MarDiv Oplan 108–68, dtd 26Apr68, pp . A—1—

A—2, Encl 9, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68 .

84. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 21–2, May68, pp . 3 and 20 ; III

MAF ComdC, Apr68, p . 19 ; LtGen Robert E . Cushman, Jr., debriefing

on A Shau Valley Operation, Da Nang, 2May68, in Cushman Transcript Book, p . 480 ; Waldron and Beavers, " The Critical Year, 1968, "

pp . 45–53, 65—6 ; Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, pp . 89—92 .

85. Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968," p . 48 ; 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Apr68, pp . 4, 19 ; 3d MarDiv SitRep No . 1, Opn Rice, dtd

21Apr68, Encl 22, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68 .

86. III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p . 10; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pp.

18 and 20 ; III MAF Opn Charlton SitRep, No . 17, dtd 16Apr68, Enc l

21, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68 .

87. Maj William Dabney, "The Battle of Dong Ha," ms, pp . 5–8 ; 11 1

MAF ComdC, Apr68, p . 22 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p . 73, May,

68, pp . 8—9 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p . 18 .

88. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History (New York, New York : Vikin g

Press, 1983, pp . 564–66 .

CHAPTER 14

THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from :

HQMC Msg Files; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May67–Apr68 ; III MAF
678 THE DEFINING YEA R

ComdC, Sep67—Apr68 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67—Apr68 ; 26th Mar

ComdC, Sep67—Apr68 ; III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File ; Khe Sanh Comment File; John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision, The Siege

of Khe Sanh (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co ., 1991), hereafter Prados

and Stubbe, Valley of Decision ; Capt Moyers S . Shore III, The Battle for

Khe Sanh (Washington : Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1969), hereafter

Shore, Khe Sanh .

Digging I n

1. Gen Westmoreland msg to Gen Wheeler, dtd 12Jan68 (File No .

091/VN Jan68, CJCS Historical Files, HistDiv, JCS, Washington ,

D .C.) ; Adm Sharp msg to Gen Wheeler, dtd 14Jan68 (File No. 091/VN

Jan68, CJCS Historical Files, HistDiv, JCS, Washington, D .C.) .

2. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No. 4, HQMC

Msg Files); CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 16Jan68 (HQM C

Msg Files, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67—Feb68) .

3. 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, p . 6 ; Peter Braestrup, Comments on draft, n .d .

[Dec94—Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File) .

4. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No . 4, HQM C

Msg Files).

5. CGIIIMAF msg to DepCOMUSMACV, dtd 19Jan68 (HQMC Message File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67—Feb68) .

6. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 21Jan68 (3d MarDiv Messages)

7. CG3dMarDiv msg to 26th Mar, dtd 21Jan68 (3d MarDiv Messages); U .S . Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings

Before the Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee of the Preparedness Investigating

Subcommittee, 91st Cong ., 2d Sess., 18, 19, and 24 Nov 1970, p . 82 ,

hereafter Hearings Electronic Battlefield.

Opening Move s

8. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No . 24, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC,

Jan68 ; 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p. 3, Encl 26t h

Mar ComdC, Mar68 ; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt . III .

9. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. III; Col William H . Dabney intvw,

20May82, p . 64 (Oral HisrColl, MCHC); 26th Mar SitRep No . 326 ,

in 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt . IV.

10. Maj Matthew P. Caulfield intvw, 4Jan69, p . 10, in Khe Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History Tapes, MCHC, hereafter Caulfield intvw.

11. Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross.

12. Caulfield intvw, p . 11 .

13. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt . III; 3/26 ComdC, Jan68, p . 10 ; LtCo l

Harry L. Alderman intvw, 10-24Feb68, p . 21, in Khe Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History Tapes, MCHC.

" Incoming! "

14. Maj Jerry E . Hudson, Comments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh, "

2Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment File, MCHC) .

15. LtCol James B. Wilkinson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe

Sanh, " 19Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File) ; Bernard Nalty, Air Power

and the Fight for Khe Sanh (Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force History, 1973) pp. 24-25, hereafter Nalty, Air Power; LtCol Kenneth W.

Pipes, Comments on draft, dtd 10Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Pipes Comments, 1995 .

16. BGen Marshall B. Garth, Memorandum for the Record, Subj :

Attack on the Khe Sanh Air Base, dtd 21Jan68 (File No . 091/VN

Jan68, JCS HistOff, Washington,D .C.) ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p.

6 ; 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, p . 7 ; Ray W. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh : Valley of

Decision" (ms., Wauwatosa, WI, 1987), p . 540, hereafter Stubbe, "Kh e

Sanh . "

17. lstLt William L . Eberhardtt incvw, 10Feb68, Tape 2535 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC); William J . O'Connor, Comments on draft, drd

29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

18. LtCol James B. Wilkinson Comments, "The Battle for Khe Sanh, "

19Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File).

19. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No . 328, Encl 26th Mar ComdC ,

Jan68, pt. IV.

20. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, Pt . Ill; 3/26 ComdC, Jan68, p . 4 ; 26t h

Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No. 329, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt .

IV.

21. MCCC Status of Forces, WestPac, 23Jan68; Stubbe, "Khe Sanh, "

pp . 560-561 .

22. Nalty, Air Power, pp . 24—25 ; TSgt Bruce W. Pollica and TSgt Jo e

R . Rickey, 834th Air Division Tactical Airlift Support for Khe Sanh ,

21Jan-SApr68, quoted in Scubbe, "Khe Sanh, " pp. 567-568.

The Fall of Khe Sanh Village

This section is based on the following sources : Col Bruce B. G.

Clarke, USA, Comments on draft, n .d . (Apr95] (Vietnam Comment

File), hereafter Clarke Comments; Capt Bruce Clarke, untitle d

account, dtd Apr68, attached to Clarke Comments, hereafter Clark e

Account, Apr68 ; John J. Balanco, Comments on draft, dtd 15Nov9 4

and 5Apr95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Balanco Comments ;

John J. Balanco, "Abandoned, Reflections of a Khe Sanh Vet," ms ,

dtd 14Nov94 and 5Apr95, attached to Balanco Comments, here -

after Balanco, "Abandoned" ; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. Ill ;

Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p . 573 ; Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision ,

pp . 255-265.

23. Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p. 263 .

24. Balanco, "Abandoned," p . 182 .

25. Col David E. Lownds intvw, 13Mar68, pp . 22-23, in Khe Sanh :

Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC .

26. Balanco, "Abandoned," p . 184 . See also Prados and Stubbe, Valley

of Decision, p. 264 .

27. Clarke Comments and Clarke Account, Apr68 .

28 . Balanco, "Abandoned," pp . 184—85 .

Reinforcement and Fighting Bac k

29. Nalty, Air Power, pp . 25—26 ; HMM—362 ComdC, Jan68, pt .11 ; 3 d

MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p . 43 ; 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No .

331, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt .IV.

30. For this and the following paragraph see Col John F. Mitchell,

Comments on draft, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r

Mitchell Comments. See also FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 10 ; 1/9

ComdC, Jan68, pt. II.

31. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No . 335, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC ,

Jan68, pt.IV.

32. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 7 .

33. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, drd 31May68, p . 5, Encl 26th Mar

ComdC, Mar68 .
NOTES 679

34. Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 28Oct94 (Vietna m

Comment File) and Capc Bernard D. Cole, USN, Comments on draft ,

cltd 27Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

35. Col William H. Dabney, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dabney Comments .

36. Ibid . See also Shore, Khe Sanh, pp . 58–9, 97–8 .

37. Dabney Comments; Shore, Khe Sanh, p . 59.

38. 26th Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos . 338, 339, End 26th Ma r

ComdC, Jan68, pt . IV; 2/26 ComdC, Jan68, pp . 7–8; S–2 Officer, 2/2 6

ltr to S–2 Officer, 26th Mar, no subject, did 25Jan68, End 2/2 6

ComdC, Jan68, pt . IV; S–2 Officer, 2/26 ltr to S–2 Officer, 26th Mar ,

Subj: Enemy Activity Vicinity of XD803457, dtd 26Jan68, in 2/26

ComdC, Jan68, pr. IV.

39. Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p . 282 .

40. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No . 351, End 26th Mar ComdC,

Jan68, pt. IV; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 10 ; Gen Westmorelan d

msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 23Jan68 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH, Washington, D.C.) ; MajGen Rathvon McC . Tompkins, Comments on " Th e

Battle for Khe Sanh," dtd 19Nov69 (Khe Sanh Comment File); LrCo l

James B. Wilkinson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," dtd

19Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File) .

41. 1/26 Journal for 28Jan68, Ser . No . 52, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pr.

IV ; 1/26 Journal for 24Jan68, Ser . No . 21, in ComdC, Jan68, pt . IV.

42. 1/26 Journal for 30Jan68, Ser. No . 12, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt . IV;

1/26 Journal for 29Jan68, Ser. No . 21, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt . IV.

43. Statement of MajGen Rathvon McC . Tompkins, Hearings Electronic Battlefield, pp . 84–85 ; ComUSMACV msg to CinCPAC, dt d

23Jan68 (File No. 091/Vietnam, Jan68, pt . II, JCS HistOff).

Round Two

44. Jack Shulimson and LtCol Lane Rogers, Memorandum for th e

Record, Subj : Conversation With MajGen Tompkins, dtd 7Sep7 6

(MajGen Rathvon McC . Tompkins intvw transcript, Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

45. 1/26 Journal for 29Jan68, Ser. No . 24, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt .

IV.

46. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No . 360, End 26th Mar ComdC ,

Jan68, pt. IV; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. 4 .

47. Nalty, Air Power, p. 82 .

48. Addresses by Gen Earle G. Wheeler, USA, 7Jul64 to 2Jul70, pt. II

(JCS HistOff, Washington, D.C.).

49. Gen William C . Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York : Doubleday & Co., Inc ., 1976), p . 337, hereafter Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports; Adm Sharp msg to Gen Wheeler, dtd 2Feb68 (File No .

091/Vietnam, JCS HistOff, Washington, D.C. )

50. This and the following paragraph are based upon : Maj Mirza M.

Baig Comments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh, " dtd 23Dec68 (Kh e

Sanh Comment File), hereafter Baig Comments .

51. Ibid . ; Capc Earle G . Breeding intvw, 8Mar68, in Khe Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC, hereafter Breeding intvw .

52. 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, p .8 .

53. Ibid . ; Breeding intvw ; 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No . 385 ,

Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pc . IV.

54. Breeding intvw.

55. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p . 3, End 26th Mar

ComdC, Mar68 ; Baig Comments; 3/26 ComdC, Feb68, p . 3 ; 3/26

AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 15Apr68, p . 9, Encl, 3/26 ComdC, Mar68 ,

pr. IV.

The Fall of Lang Ve i

56. Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, did 24Jan68, in Westmoreland Papers (CMH, Washington, D .C.).

57. 1/13 ComdC, Jan68, p . 6 ; Col David E . Lownds inrvw, 13Mar68 ,

in Khe Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC .

58. 2/26 OpO 5–68, dtd 15Mar68, Anx D (Antimechanized Plan) ,

Encl, 2/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV ; Co C, 5th SFGA AAR for Battle of

Lang Vei, 22Feb68, in 3d MarDiv, U.S .A . AARs, hereafter Co C, 5t h

SFGA AAR, Feb68 ; III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, drd 7Feb68 ,

in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File .

59. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p . 4, Encl, 26th Ma r

ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV.

60. Maj Matthew B. Caulfield incvw, 2Jan69, pp . 26–27, in Khe Sanh :

Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC ; Col Franklin L. Smith intvw,

10Jun68, Tape 2878 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

61. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 341–2 ; Prados and Stubbe ,

Valley of Decision, pp . 331–33 ; Col Jonathan F. Ladd, USA (ret) intvw,

n .d . [1977?] (U .S . Army, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks ,

PA), pp . 25–30, attached to Clarke Comments; BGen John R . Chaisson ltr to his wife, dcd 8Feb68 (Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute) .

62. Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, pp . 331–33 ; Co C, 5th SFG A

AAR, Feb68, p . 5 .

63. Gen Robert E . Cushman, Jr., intvw, 1Nov82, p . 30 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

64. LrCol Edward J. A. Castagna intvw, 13Mar68, p . 29, hereafter

Castagna intvw and LtCol Harvey M. Harper intvw, 10–24Feb68, p .

6, in Khe Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC.

The Intensifying Battl e

65. L. J . Seavy-Cioffi, "Our Victory for Alpha One," (ms., 1986 ,

MCHC), hereafter Seavy-Cioffi, "Alpha One . "

66. Col John F. Mitchell, Comments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh, " clt d

31Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment File) ; Seavy-Cioffi, "Alpha One, " p . 23 .

See also Larry J. Seavy-Cioffi, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Viet -

nam Comment File), hereafter Seavy-Cioffi Comments.

67. Seavy-Cioffi, "Alpha One," p . 49.

68. 1/9 ComdC, Feb68, pt. III ; 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pp . 48–49 ;

26th Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos. 397, 398, 399, End 26th Mar

ComdC, Feb68, pt . IV.

69. Casualty figures for this engagement vary among sources. Thre e

Marines were initially declared missing in action, but were later adde d

to the list of those killed . Counts of enemy dead range from 124 to

"over 150 ." 1/9 AAR, Opn Scotland, n .d ., p. 7, Encl, 1/9 ComdC,

Mar68, pt . IV; 1/9 ComdC, Feb68, p . 13 ; 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No . 399, End, 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pt . IV; 3d MarDi v

COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 9Feb68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Op s

File ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p . 15 .

70. 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 7 .

71. BGen Robert P. Keller, Comments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh, "
680 THE DEFINING YEA R

dcd 17Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File), hereafter Keller Comments,

Dec68 .

72. Castagna inrvw, p . 29 .

73. Keller Comments, Dec68 .

74. 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, p . 8 .

75. MajGen Rathvon McC . Tompkins intvw, 26Aug68, p . 9, in Khe

Sanh : Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC .

76. Baig Comments.

77. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p . 23 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III

MAF COC, dtd 24Feb68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File ; 3/26

ComdC, Feb68, p . 11 ; Transcript, Hanoi VNA International Servic e

English Broadcast, 24Feb68 .

78. 1/26 Journal for 25Feb68, Ser. No. 47, in 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, pt .

IV.

79. 1/26 Journal for 25Feb68, Ser. Nos. 49 and 51, in 1/26 ComdC ,

Feb68, pt. IV.

80. Author conversation with Mr. George W. Jayne, dcd 22Sep88 .

81. Maj Kenneth W. Pipes, Comments on The Battle for Khe Sanh, "

n .d . [1968?) (Khe Sanh Comment File), hereafter Pipes Comments ,

[1968?).

82. Casualty figures recorded for this action also vary, especially concerning the numbers of dead and missing . While many sources show

24 missing from the 3d Platoon, they fail to note one Marine missing

from the 1st Platoon . Also, early reports which indicated only on e

Marine killed are often cited . 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, p . 8 ; Author conversation with Mr. George W. Jayne, dtd 22Sep88 ; Pipes Comments,

(1968?); 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dcd 26Feb68, in II I

MAF Khe Sanh Ops File. According to Prados and Stubbe, a corrected

version was issued two weeks later giving the casualties as 9 dead, 2 5

wounded, and 19 missing . Valley of Decision, p. 405 .

83. 1/26 Journal for 27Feb68, Ser. No. 45, in 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, pt .

IV.

84. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No . 484, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC ,

Feb68, pt. IV.

85. Baig Comments.

86. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 3 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF

COC, dtd 2Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File .

87. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp . 18, 48 . See also the following messages in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File : 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF

COC, dtd 2Mar68 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd

3Mar68 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dcd 4Mar68 ; 3d MarDiv msg to PCV, dcd 14Mar68 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF

COC, dtd 18Mar68 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV COC, dtd

19Mar68 .

88. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 7 .

89. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 11 ; 1/9 ComdC, Mar68, pt. III.

90. 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Mar68, in III MA F

Khe Sanh Ops File .

91. 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 7Mar68, in III MA F

Khe Sanh Ops File .

92. 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV COC, dtd 15Mar68, and 3d MarDi v

COC msg to PCV TOC, dtd 25Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File .

93. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 6 .

94. Ibid . p . 7 .

95. CGProvCorpsV msg to CGIII MAF, dcd 23Mar68, and CGProv -

CorpsV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 25Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops

File .

96. 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV TOC, dtd 25Mar68, in III MAF Kh e

Sanh Ops File .

97. Seavy-Cioffi Comments, Mitchell Comments, 1995, and Mullins

Comments. See also 1/9 ComdC, Mar68, pt. II; 3d MarDiv COC ms g

to PCV TOC, dtd 27Mar68, and CGPCV msg to CGIII MAF, dt d

27Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File .

Settling the Score

98. 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 11May68, p . 8, Encl, 1/26 ComdC,

Mar68, pt . IV; LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, Comments on draft, dcd

7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

99. 1/13 ComdC, Mar68, p . 6 .

100. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pp. 9–10 ; 1/26 Journal for 30Mar68 ,

Ser. No . 20, in 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV; 26th Mar SitReps Opn

Scotland, Nos. 602 and 603, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV;

1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pp . 4–5 ; 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pp . 9–10;

Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p . 424 ; Charles E. Davis Ill, ltr

to Ray W. Stubbe, dtd 22Dec91, Encl to Pipes Comments, 1995, here -

after Davis Ltr, Dec91 .

101. 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pp . 4–5 .

102. Davis ltr; Wayne Morrison ltr to LtCol Pipes, n .d . [1980's), Encl ,

Pipes Comments, 1995 .

103. Pipes Comments, 1995 ; CO, 1/26 la to CG, 3d MarDiv, Subj :

Meritorious Unit Commendation, recommendation for, case of Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, did 5Jun68, in Pipes Comments

(1968?); lstLt John W. Dillon inrvw, 3Jan69, Tape 3716 (Oral HistColl, MCHC). .

104. Casualty figures for the raid vary among reports, with som e

claiming 3 Marines missing, and others showing 9 dead and either 4 2

or 71 wounded . The figures in the text are from 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 11May68, p . 8, in 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV. Other sources

include : 26th Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos. 602 and 603, Encl ,

26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pc . IV ; 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pp . 4–5 ; 3 d

MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 54 ; CGPCV msg to CGIIIMAF, dt d

31Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File . The Marine artillery officer

is quoted in Prados and Stubbe, Valley of Decision, p . 424 . For Genera l

Krulak's observations, see LtGen Victor H . Krulak, First to Fight, An

Inside View of the U .S. Marine Corps (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis,

Md ., 1984), p . 220 .

105. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p . 4, Encl, 26t h

Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 347 .

106. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 3 .

107. 26th Mar AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, Encl, 26th Ma r

ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV.

Operation Pegasu s

108. 3d MarDiv PerintRep, dtd 15Feb68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Mar68, pt. IV.

109. For this and the following paragraph see : MajGen Rathvon McC.

Tompkins intvw, 26Aug68, Tape 3088 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Ge n

William B. Rosson, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb95 (Vietnam Com-
NOTES 68 1

ment File); LtGen John J. Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility ,

1961—1971 (Washington : Dept of the Army, 1973), p . 169, hereafter,

Tolson, Airmobility; John R. Galvin, Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare (New York : Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1969), p. 307, hereafter, Galvin, Air Assault .

110. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 17; Tolson, Airmobility, pp .

170—171 ; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p . 25 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Mar68, p .

II—D—2 ; 1st Mar AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 3May68, p. 11, in 1st Mar

ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV.

111. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 53 ; LtGen John J . Tolson, Comments on The Battle for Khe Sanh," dtd 2Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment

File); Tolson, Airmobility, pp . 171—172 .

112. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp . 17—18, 20 ; LtGen Willard Pearson, Vietnam Studies: The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966—196 8

(Washington : Dept of the Army, 1975), p . 81, hereafter, Pearson, The

War in the Northern Provinces; CGPCV msg to CGIIIMAF, did 30Mar6 8

(III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File).

113. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 55 ; 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dt d

11May68, p. 2, in 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV; 26th Mar ComdC,

Mar68, p. 10 .

114. 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 11May68, p . 3, in 1/26 ComdC,

Mar68, pt . IV.

115. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p . 7 . Some sources report that Operation Pegasus numbered 18 infantry battalions, apparently overlooking the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion at Khe Sanh .

116. 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p . II—C—2 ; Pearson, War in the Northern

Provinces, p . 81 ; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 173 ; Galvin, Air Assault, p . 307 ;

CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Op s

File); Gen Westmoreland msg to Gen Wheeler and Adm Sharp, dt d

1Apr68 (File No . MAC 04395, Westmoreland Papers, CMH, Washington, D.C.).

117. CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Apr68 (III MAF Khe San h

Ops File); Galvin, Air Assault, p. 307 ; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 173 ;

Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, p . 81 ; 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68 ,

pp . 7—9 ; 1st AirCavDiv AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 11Jul68, p . 6, in 3d

MarDiv U .S .A . AARs, hereafter 1st ACD AAR Opn Pegasus .

118. Friendly casualty figures for this action vary. Figures in the text

are from 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 22May68, p . 4, in 1/9 ComdC,

Apr68, pt. IV and 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, pp . 4-5 . Other sources includ e

26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. 9 ; 26th Mar PerOpsSum Opn Pegasus,

No. 5 in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 10May68, in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV; III MA F

ComdC, Apr68, pp . 11—12 ; Tolson, Airmobility, p . 175 .

119. 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p . 5 ; 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 22May68 ,

p . 5, in 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV, hereafter 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p . 9. Again, casualty figures vary. On e

source even provides conflicting numbers on two different pages of th e

same document . For other reports, see 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus, p. 3 ;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 12 ; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p . 12 ;

CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 6Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops

File); 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 10May68, p . 3, in 26th Mar

ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV, hereafter 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus; 26th

Mar ComdC, Apr68, p . 10 ; 26th Mar PerOpsSum Opn Pegasus, No.

6 in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV.

120. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : 2/26

ComdC, Apr68, p. 3 ; 2/26 AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 5May68, p . 4, i n

2/26 ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV.

121. An additional source for this paragraph is: 26th Mar Opn Pegasus PerOpsSum, No . 7 in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV.

122. Ibid . .

123. 1st ACD AAR Opn Pegasus, p . 7 .

124. CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 7Apr68 (III MAF Khe San h

File); Tolson, Airmobility, p . 176 .

125. 1st ACD AAR Opn Pegasus, p . 7 .

126. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p . 10 ; 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p . 6 ; 1st

ACD AAR Opn Pegasus, p . 3 ; 2/26 ComdC, Apr68, pp . 3—8 ; Pearson ,

War in the Northern Provinces, pp . 85—86 ; Tolson, Airmobility, pp .

85—87 .

127. CGPCV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 8Apr68, and CGPCV msg to 11 1

MAF COC, dtd 9Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File) .

128. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 12 ; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 177 .

129. 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p . 6 .

130. CGPCV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 10Apr68 (III MAF Khe San h

Ops File).

131. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 7 ; Pearson, War in the Northern

Provinces, p . 88 ; Tolson, Airmobility, p . 178 .

132. CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 12Apr68 (III MAF Khe San h

Ops File).

133. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p . 10 .

134. LtCol John C. Studt, Comments on The Battle for Khe Sanh, "

dtd 24Dec68, in Khe Sanh Comment File, hereafter Studt Comments ,

Dec68 ; Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyers Comments, Feb95 .

135. LtCol John C. Studt, "Battalion in the Attack," Marine Corps

Gazette, July 1970, pp . 39—44 ; Meyers Comments, Feb95 .

136. Meyers Comments, Feb95 .

137. Studs Comments, Dec68 ; 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pp . 11—12 ; Co l

Bruce E Meyers, Comments on The Battle for Khe Sanh," dtd 16Dec68 ,

in Khe Sanh Comment File ; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p. 1.2 ; FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 10 ; 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus ; CGPCV msg to

CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File) ; Pearson, War in

the Northern Provinces, p . 87 . Quote is from Meyers Comments, Feb95 .

138. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 15Apr68 (File No . MAC 05008 ,

Westmoreland Papers, CMH, Washington, D.C.) ; CGPCV msg to II I

MAF COC, dtd 14Apr68, and CG, PCV msg to CGIIIMAF, dc d

15Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File) ; Pearson, War in the Northern

Provinces, p . 88; Tolson, Airmobility, p . 178; Dabney Comments.

Quotes in this paragraph are from Col John C . Studs, Comments on

draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 1 5

THE BATTLE FOR DONG H A

The major sources for this chapter are: FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Apr—Jun68 ; III MAF ComdCs, Apr—Jun68 ; III MAF Jnl & Msg Files ;

3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr—Jun68 ; 9th Mar ComdCs, Apr—Jun68 ; 3 d

Mar ComdCs, Apr—Jun68 ; Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S.

Shore II, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al . ,

"Marines in Vietnam, 1954-68, " 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington ,

D .C., 1971), pt VI, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, " Ho Chi Minh 's

Gamble " ; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year" ; Maj William H .
682 THE DEFINING YEA R

Dabney, "The Battle of Dong Ha," ms, Apr75, hereafter Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha" ; BGen William Weise intvw, 21Feb83 (Oral HIstColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Weise intvw, 21Feb83 ; BGen William Weise ,

"Memories of Dai Do," ms, 7Feb87, hereafter Weise, "Memories of Da i

Do" ; BGen William Weise Folder on Dai Do, hereafter Weise Folder ,

Dai Do ; BGen Edwin H . Simmons, USMC, Comment Notebook, May

1970, Naval Review article, MCHC, hereafter Simmons Commen t

Notebook, May 1970, Naval Review article.

Why Dong Ha ?

1. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p . 31 ; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha, "

passim .

2. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : CG3dMarDi v

msg to CGProvCorps, dtd 19May68, Encl 5, and 3d MarDiv, Summary Report and notes, Battle of Dong Ha, n .d ., Encls 6–10, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, May68, hereafter 3d MarDiv, Summary Report; Dabney,

"Battle of Dong Ha," pp . 2–5 . For organization of Task Force Robbie ,

see LtCol Karl J. Fontenot, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam

Comment File) .

3. 3d Mar ComdC, Apr68, p . 27; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operatio n

Napoleon/Saline, dtd 4JuI68, tab H, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul68, hereafte r

BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon ; Weise, " Memories of Dai Do. "

4. Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 5–6 ; 3d MarDiv, Summary

Report .

5. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 12–4 ; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp . 5–6 ;

3d MarDiv, Summary Report ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p . 19 ; Joh n

Randolph, "Viet Battle Pits Huge Field Units," Los Angeles Times,

8May68, pp . 1–2 (Clipping in Weise Folder, Dai Do), hereafter Randolph, "Viet Battle Pits Huge Field Units" .

6. Additional sources for this paragraph are : Weise intvw, 21Feb83 ;

BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon .

7. Dabney, "Bartle of Dong Ha, " pp . 12—5 ; 3d MarDiv, Summary

Report.

The Fight For Dai Do, The First Da y

8. Weise intvw, 21Feb83 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon ; 3d Mar ComdC,

May68 .

9. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are : Weis e

intvw, 21Feb83 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon .

10. Additional source for this and the following paragraph is : 3d MarDiv, Summary Report .

11. Additional sources for this paragraph are : 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Apr68, p . 18 ; Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " p . 2 .

12. BGen William Weise, "Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do, "

dtd 11Mar83 (Weise Folder, Dai Do) ; Weise, "Memories of Dai Do, "

p. 3 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p . 32 ; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p . 26 ;

Weise intvw, Feb83 .

13. BGen William Weise, "Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do, "

dtd 11Mar83 (Weise Folder, Dai Do) ; Weise, "Memories of Dai Do, "

p . 3 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p . 6 ; Weise intvw, Feb83 .

14. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : BGe n

William Weise, " Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do, " dtd 11Mar83

(Weise Folder, Dai Do) ; Weise, "Memories of Dai Do, " pp. 5—6 ; BLT

2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p . 32 ; 3d Mar ComdC, May 68, p . 26 ; Weis e

inrvw, Feb83 .

15. An additional source for this paragraph is: Weise, "Memories o f

Dai Do," pp . 6–7 .

16. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are : BGe n

William Weise, "Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do," dtd 11Mar8 3

(Weise Folder, Dai Do); Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp . 6–8 ; BLT

2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p . 32 .

17. Additional sources for this and the following two paragraphs are :

3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 26–7 ; Weise inrvw, Feb83 .

18. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are : Weise ,

"Memories of Dai Do," pp . 8–10 ; LtCol William Weise, Comments o n

draft ms., dtd 1Oct69, Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble "

(Comment File), hereafter Weise Comments, 1Oct69 .

19. The quote is from Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," ms ., 7Feb87 .

20. Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp . 9–10; BLT 2/4 CAAR

Napoleon, p . 32 .

21. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are : Weise,

"Memories of Dai Do," pp . 10–11 ; Weise, "Sequence of Events" ; Weis e

Comments, 1Oct69 .

22. Additional sources for this and the following two paragraphs are :

3d Mar ComdC, May68, p . 27 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p . 32 .

23. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are : Weise ,

"Memories of Dai Do," p . 12 ; Weise intvw, Feb83 .

24. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p . 27 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p . 32 .

25. Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p .13 ; Weise Comments, 1Oct69.

26. Col William H . Dabney intvw, 20May82, p . 34 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC); Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp . 12–5 ; 3d MarDiv, Summary Report ; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," pp . 57–8 .

27. Randolph, "Viet Battle Pits Huge Field Units," pp . 1–2 .

28. Gen William B . Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, dcd 27Feb9 5

(Vietnam Comment File) .

29. Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha, " pp . 12—5 ; 3d MarDiv, Summary

Report; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p . 59 ; MajGe n

Rachvon McC. Tompkins, Comments on Simmons, "Marine Opns,

Vietnam, 1968," dtd 19Nov69 (Simmons Comment Notebook, Ma y

1970, Naval Review article).

The Continuing Fight For Dai Do

30. The sources for this and the following four paragraphs are : Weise ,

" Memories of Dai Do," p . 13—4 ; Weise intvw, Feb83 ; Weise ,

"Sequence of Events. "

31. Additional sources for this and the following three paragraphs are :

3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 27–8 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operation

Napoleon, p . 33 .

32. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are : Weise,

" Memories of Dai Do, " p . 15 ; Peter Braestrup, " Daido: Marines Ope n

Supply Line," The Washington Post, 8May68, pp . D–1—D–3, p . D—2

(Clipping in Weise Folder, Dai Do).

33. Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " pp . 15—6 ; FMFPac MarOpsV,

May68, p . 64 .

34. Sources for this and the following two paragraphs are : Weise ,

"Memories of Dai Do, " pp . 17—18; Weise intvw, Feb83 ; BLT 2/ 4

CAAR, Operation Napoleon, pp . 33—4 ; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp .

28–9 .
NOTES 683

35. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is :

Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," Insert 5 .

36. An additional source for this paragraph is : Weise, "Memories of

Dai Do, " pp . 19—21 .

37. Sources for this and the following paragraph are : Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " p . 13-4 ; Weise intvw, Feb83 ; Weise, "Sequence of

Events;" 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon, pp . 33-4 .

38. MGySgt James W. Rogers, Comments on draft, dtd 21Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rogers Comments, Nov94 .

39. An additional source for this paragraph is : Weise, "Memories of

Dai Do," pp . 21–2 .

40. The sources for this and the following 12 paragraphs are : Weise ,

"Memories of Dai Do," p . 23 ; Weise intvw, Feb83 ; Weise, "Sequence

of Events. "

41. Additional sources for this and the following 10 paragraphs are :

Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " p . 24 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operatio n

Napoleon, pp . 34–5 .

42. Prescott is quoted in Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " Insert 2 .

43. Lieutenant Taylor is quoted in Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " p .

25 .

44. Rogers is quoted in Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p . 26 . See als o

Rogers Comments, Nov94 .

45. Additional source for this paragraph is Weise, " Memories of Dai

Do," p. 27 .

46. Additional sources for this and the following four paragraphs are :

Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp . 28–30 ; Weise Comments, 1Oct69 .

47. Adclitional source for this and the following three paragraphs are :

3d Mar ComdC, May68, p . 30 . Quote is from Weise intvw, Feb83 .

48. Quotes are again from Weise intvw, Feb83 .

49. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is:

Weise, " Memories of Dai Do, " pp . 30—33 . The quotes again are fro m

Weise intvw, Feb83 .

50. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 30—1 ; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operatio n

Napoleon, pp . 35–6; 1/3 ComdC, May68 ; Weise Comments, 1Oct69 .

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p . 20 ; III MAF ComdC, May68, p . 11 ;

3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 27—30 . The Weise quotes are from Weise

incvw, Feb83 .

The End of the First Offensive

52. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: Dabney,

"Battle of Dong Ha," pp . 17—8 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 18–9 ,

May68, p . 9 ; Waldron and Beavers, " The Critical Year, " p . 63 .

53. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is : 3 d

Mar ComcIC, May68, pp . 3–5 .

54. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 5–7, and Waldron and Beavers, "Th e

Critical Year, " pp . 63–4 .

55. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 5–7 .

56. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are : Dabney ,

"Battle of Dong Ha ," pp . 1.9—21 ; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 32—3 ;

1/3 ComclC, May68 .

57. LtCol Charles V. Jarman In. to wife, dtd 5May68, Encl Col Charle s

V. Jarman, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

58. Ibid .

59. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 8–9 .

60. 3d MarDiv, Summary Report ; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critica l

Year, " p. 64 ; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha, " pp . 23–4 . The quote is

from Dabney 's account . Major Dabney during this period served on the

3d Marine Division staff as the Assistant G—3 officer at Dong Ha .

61. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 8—9 and 32—33 .

62. III MAF ComdC, May68, p . 14 ; 3d MarDiv SitReps 2-4, Operation Concordia Square, dtd 9—11 May68, Encl 17—19, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, May68; Waldron and Beavers, " The Critical Year, " p . 64 ;

Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp . 23–4 .

63. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p . 10 .

64. 3d MarDiv SirRep No . 32, Opn Concordia Square, cltcl 18May68 ,

Encl 46, 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68 ; III MAF ComdC, May68, p . 14 ;

Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p . 64 ; Dabney, "Battle of

Dong Ha," pp . 25–8 .

65. 3d MarDiv, Summary Report ; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha, " pp .

25–8 . The quotes are from Dabney's account .

The Second Offensive

66. Ill MAF ComdC, May68, pp . 11–2 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68 ,

pp . 17–8 ; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp . 25–8 .

67. BGen Lawrence H . Caruthers, Jr., intvw with Dr. Lewis Sorley,

Washington, 15Sep89 (quote courtesy of Dr. Lewis Sorley); Gen Raymoncl G. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp . 11—12 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ,

hereafter Davis intvw, 2Feb77 ; BGen John R. Chaisson Icr to wife, dtd

16May68 and cliary entry, 16May68 (Chaisson Papers).

68. MajGen Raymond G . Davis debriefing at FMFPac, 15Apr69, pp .

329—30 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis FMFPac debriefing .

69. For detailed accounts of the 8 May action see : Otro J. Lehrack, N o

Shining Armor, The Marines at War in Vietnam, An Oral History

(Lawrence, KS : University Press of Kansas, 1992), PP . 269—75 ; Jeff

Kelly, DMZ Diary, A Combat Marine 's Vietnam Memoir (Jefferson, N .C. :

McFarland and Company, Inc ., 1991), pp . 80–92 .

70. The general sources for this and the following four paragraphs are :

CG3dMarDiv msg to CGPCV, dtd 4Jun68, Encl 7, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Jun68, hereafter 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68; FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, May68, pp . 11—2 ; 9th Mar ComdC, May68, p . 9 ; Dabney,

"Battle of Dong Ha, " pp . 28—9 . The quotes in this paragraph are fro m

Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n .d . [Jan 1995 1

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McTiernan Comments .

71. The quote is from 9th Mar ComdC, May68, p . 9 .

72. An additional source for this paragraph is: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p . 18 .

73. Additional sources for this paragraph are : 3d Mar ComdC, May68 ,

p. 19 ; MajGen Raymond G . Davis intvw, 1Jan69, p . 276 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

74. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: 9th Ma r

ComdC, May68, p . 9 ; 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV,

May68, pp . 13-4 ; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp . 30–3 .

75. An additional source for this paragraph is : McTiernan Comments.

76. 9th Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 9–10 ; 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68 ;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 15 .

77. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 1.9–22 ; 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68 ;

Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha, " pp. 30—3 .
684 THE DEFINING YEA R

78. 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68 .

79. Ibid ; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp . 21, 43–4 ; Davis FMFPa c

debriefing, p . 300 .

80. CG3dMarDiv msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 22May68, tab A, 9th Mar

ComdC, Jun68 ; Davis intvw, 2Feb77 ; 9th Mar ComdC, May68, pp .

3-4, 12 .

81. Quote is from Jack Shulimson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington : Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1982), p . 319 .

CHAPTER 1 6

KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AN D

EVACUATION, 16 APRIL-11 JULY 196 8

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d

from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr–JuI68 ; III MAF ComdCs, Apr–Ju168 ;

3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr–JuI68 ; 1st Mar ComdCs, Apr–Ju168 ; 4t h

Mar ComdCs, May–Ju168 ; 26th Mar ComdCs, Apr–Jun68 ; Khe San h

Comment File .

To Stay or Not to Stay

1. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 336 .

2. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Comments on "The Battle for Khe

Sanh, " dtd 29Mar69, in Khe Sanh Comment File .

3. Gen William B. Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, dtd 29May9 5

(Vietnam Comment File) .

4. Ibid . ; Gen William C. Westmoreland msg to Adm Ulysses S . G.

Sharp, dtd 15Apr68 (File No. MAC 05008, Westmoreland Papers ,

CMH, Washington, D.C.); Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 348 ;

Westmoreland, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," dtd

29Mar69, in Khe Sanh Comment File .

The 'Walking Dead '

5. 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p . II–C–6 ; BGen Jacob E . Glick intvw, 2 0

Jun and 11Ju189, pp . 2–3 and 70 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; BGen Jaco b

E . Glick, Comments on draft, dtd 25Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Glick Comments .

6. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p . 20A ; 1/26 ComdC, Apr68, p. 2 ; 2/2 6

ComdC, Apr68, p . 5 ; 3/26 ComdC, Apr68, p . 3 ; 2/1 ComdC, Apr68, pt .

II; Copy of Statement of Col Bruce F. Meyers to Board for Correction o f

Naval and Military Records, n .d . (1968), Copy attached to Col Bruce F.

Meyers, Comments on draft, dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment Files) .

7. Col Walter H . Cuenin Itr to CG3dMarDiv, Subj : Informal investigation into the circumstances of a night operation conducted by the 1st

Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, in the vicinity of Khe

Sanh, Republic of Vietnam, on the night of 16–17 April 1968, including the methods used in the recovery and accounting for, casualtie s

incurred therein, dtd 3May68, pp . 5—6, in " Informal investigation of

an Opn conducted by 1/9 in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, RVN, 16–1 8

Apr 68," hereafter Investigation ; Statement of Captain Henry D.

Banks, dtd 21Apr68, in Investigation, hereafter Banks Statement .

8. Banks Statement ; Testimony of LtCol John J. H. Cahill, p . 5, i n

Investigation, hereafter Cahill Testimony ; Statement of Col Bruce F.

Meyers, p . 2, in Investigation, hereafter Meyers Statement ; Statemen t

of Maj Joseph A . Donnelly, in Investigation, hereafter Donnelly Statement.

9. Investigation, pp . 6—7 ; Statement of LtCol John J . H. Cahill, p. 1 ,

in Investigation, hereafter Cahill Statement .

10. Investigation, pp . 7–8 ; Cahill Statement, p. 1 ; Cahill Testimony, p .

5 ; Meyers Statement, p . 2 .

11. Investigation, pp. 9–10 ; Cahill Statement, pp . 1–2 ; Cahill Testimony, pp . 8–9 ; Statement of 1stLt John K . Leblond, p . 2, in Investigation ; Statement of lstLt William C. Connelly, p . 2, in Investigation ,

hereafter Connelly Statement.

12. Investigation, p . 10 ; Cahill Statement, p . 2 ; Cahill Testimony, pp .

9–10 ; Donnelly Statement, pp . 2–3 ; Statement of Capt Charles B.

Hartzell, in Investigation, hereafter Hartzell Statement ; Statement of

Capt John W. Cargile, p . 2, in Investigation, hereafter Cargile Statement .

13. Investigation, pp . 10–11 ; Cahill Statement, p. 2 ; Cahill Testimony, p . 10 ; Donnelly Statement, p . 3 ; Testimony of Maj Joseph A . Don -

nelly, in Investigation, p . 5, hereafter Donnelly Testimony ; Banks

Statement, p . 2 ; Hartzell Statement, p. 4, 6 ; Cargile Statement, p . 2 .

14. Cahill Statement, p. 2 ; Cahill Testimony ; Meyers Testimony ; Donnelly Statement, p . 3; Donnelly Testimony ; Hartzell Testimony;

Cargile Testimony ; Connelly Testimony ; Statement of 2dLt Francis B .

Lovely, Jr., p. 2, in Investigation, hereafter Lovely Statemen t; Testimony of 2dLt Francis B. Lovely, Jr., in Investigation, hereafter Lovely Testimony. The recounting of this engagement in 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, pp .

8—9, indicates that Company D "swept up and over the ridge ." As far

as this statement implies that Company D overran the enemy, it can -

not be supported by any participant's statement or testimony include d

in the investigation report .

15. Investigation, pp . 13–14 ; Cahill Statement, p . 2 ; Cahill Testimony ; Meyers Statement, p . 5 ; Meyers Testimony.

16. Investigation, p . 14 ; Cahill Testimony ; Donnelly Testimony ; Connelly Statement, p . 3; Connelly Testimony ; Statement of Corpora l

Hubert H. Hunnicutt III, p . 5, in Investigation, hereafter Hunnicut t

Statement.

17. Investigation, p . 15 ; Hartzell Testimony; Capt Donald F. Enge l

Testimony, in Investigation, hereafter Engel Testimony.

18. Investigation, p . 16 ; Cahill Testimony.

19. Investigation, pp . 16–17 ; Cahill Testimony ; Meyers Statement, pp .

10–11 ; Meyers Supplementary Statement ; Meyers Testimony ; Statement of BGen Jacob E. Glick, pp . 1–2, in Investigation, hereafte r

Glick Statement ; Donnelly Testimony ; Hartzell Testimony ; Connell y

Statement ; Connelly Testimony.

20. Hunnicutt Statement .

21. Investigation, p. 18 ; Hunnicutt Statement .

22. 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. II–C–7 ; CG3dMarDiv ltr to CGIIIMAF

Subj : Informal investigation of an operation conducted by 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines . . ., dtd 20May68, in " Informal investigation of an Op n

conducted by 1/9 in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, RVN, 16–18 Apr 1968" .

Operation Scotland I I

23. BGen Jacob E . Glick inrvw, 20 Jun and 11JuI89, p . 12 (Oral I-list -

Coll, MCHC).

24. 3d MarDiv OPlan 10–68, dtd 15Apr68, Opn Scotland II, in 3 d

MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV ; 3d MarDiv OPlan 11–68, Opn Scot -

land II, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; 3d MarDiv ComdC,

Apr68, p . 50 ; 26th Mar Opn Scotland II SitRep No . 6, in 26th Ma r

ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV; 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p . II–C–6–9; 1/1 Jour -

nal for 16Apr68, in 1/1 ComdC, Apr68, pt . IV; 1/1 ComdC, Apr68, p.

1–II–3 ; 3/4 ComdC, Apr68, p. III–3 ; 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p . 3 .
NOTES 685

25. Col Robert C. V. Hughes, Comments on draft, n .d . [Jan95?] (Vietnam Comment File) .

26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp . 11–12 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p .

II–C–7, 9 ; 1/1 ComdC, Apr68, p . 1–1I–5 ; 1/11 ComdC, Apr68, p . 5 ;

3/4 ComdC, Apr68, p . IV–5 ; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine

Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1968, " The Marines in Vietnam,

1954–1973 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1985), hereafte r

Simmons, "1968 . "

27. MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File) ; MajGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 14Nov68 ,

pp . 144–45 (Oral HiscColl, MCHC) .

28. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p . II–E–1 .

29. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 16 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pp .

56–57 ; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p . II–C–3 ; 1st Mar SitReps Op n

Scotland II, Nos. 114, 118, 119, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV ;

2/3 ComdC, May68, pt . III.

30. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 17 ; III MAF ComdC, May68, p . 10 ;

3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, p . 19 ; 1st Mar SicReps Opn Scotland ,

Nos. 126, 128, 131, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 1st Ma r

ComdC, May68, p . II–C–5 ; 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt . III.

31. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 17 ; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p.

II-C-4 .

32. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, p . 19 ; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p .

II—C—4 ; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, Nos. 132, 133 in 1st Ma r

ComdC, May68, pt . IV ; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt . III.

33. This and the following paragraph are derived from : FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, May68, p . 17 ; III ComdC, May68, p . 10 ; 3d MarDi v

ComdC, May68, pp . 58–59 ; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p . II–C–5 ; 2/ 1

ComdC, May68, pt . II, III; 2/1 S–3 Journal for 19May68, in 2/ 1

ComdC, May68, pt . IV; Col Billy R. Duncan, Comments on draft, dt d

15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Duncan Comments .

34. Duncan Comments.

35. Some sources cite initial body counts of 66 enemy killed in th e

ambush battle. A follow up report, however, contained in 2/1 S–3

Journal for 20May68, in 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt . IV, shows that th e

battalion found three additional enemy bodies the day following th e

ambush .

36. 2/1 S–2 Journal for 19May68, in 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt . IV.

37. Duncan Comments.

38. 1/11 ComdC, May68, p . 34 .

39. III MAF PerintRep 24–68, dtd 17Jun68, p . B–1, in III MAF Per -

IncReps; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, Nos . 137, 147, in 1st Ma r

ComdC, May68, pt . IV ; 3/9 ComdC, May68, p . 6 ; Simmons, "1968, "

p . 118 .

40. III MAF ComdC, May68, p . 10 ; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II ,

Nos. 154, 156, 159, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 2/3 Comd C,

May68, pt. III.

41. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p . II–B–2 ; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland

II, No . 168, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 2/3 ComdC, May68 ,

pt. III.

42. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p . II–C–5 .

43. 1st Mar SitRep Opn Scotland II, No . 171 in 1st Mar ComdC ,

May68, pt. IV.

44. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p . II–C–5 .

45. 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt . III.

46. 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III. Casualty figures vary slightly for bot h

sides among various sources. Other counts are given in FMFPac, MarOpsV,

May68, p . 18 ; III MAF ComdC, May68, p . 10 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

May68, pp. 19–20 ; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pp. II–B–2, II-C–5 .

47. Glick Comments.

48. 3d MarDiv FragO 19–68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pt . IV.

49. III MAF ComdC, May68, p . 10 ; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II ,

Nos. 181, 183, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 2/3 ComdC,

May68, pt . III.

50. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p . II–C–6 ; 1st Mar SicReps Operatio n

Scotland II, Nos. 181, 182, 183, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV ;

1/1 ComdC, May68, p . 1—II—5 ; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt . III. Casualtie s

figures vary. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 19 shows 14 Marine s

killed and 88 wounded, 141 NVA dead .

Operation Robi n

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 7 ; III MAF PerintRep 23–68, dtd

11Jun68, p . 1, in III MAF PerintReps; III MAF PerintRep 25–68, dtd

25Jun68, p . 2, in III MAF PerintReps; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp .

24–27 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, pt . II–B–1 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68 ,

P . 11 .

52. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp . 24–27 .

53. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, pp . 8, 64, and 73 ; 1st Mar ComdC,

Jun68, p. II–C–2 .

54. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p . 8 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p . 26 ;

1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . II–C–2 ; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p . 1–11–3 .

55. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 8; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p .

II–C–2 ; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p. 1–II–5 .

56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 9 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp .

26–27 ; 1st Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No . 197, in 1st Mar ComdC,

Jun68, pc . IV; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II–B–1, II–C–3 ; 1/1 1

ComdC, Jun68, p . 5 .

57. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp . 24–27 ; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p .

1–II–5 ; 1/12 ComdC, Jun68, p . 4 .

58. 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. 3 ; 2/4 ComdC, Jun68, p . 7 .

59. 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . II–C–4 ; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p . 1–I1–3 .

60. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p . 27 ; Some sources say " approximately 150" enemy troops. Considering the outcome of the engagement,

the estimate of a battalion is probably correct .

61. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p . 6, 10 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . 6 .

62. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p . 9 ; III MAF PerintRep 23–68, dtd

11Jun68, p . 1, in III MAF PerintReps; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p . 10 ;

3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p . 27 ; 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, p . 3 .

63. Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft, dcd 280ct94 (Vietnam

Comment File).

64. III MAF PerintRep 24–68, 17Jun68, p . 2, in III MAF PerintReps;

3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p . 27 ; 3/9 ComdC, Jun68, p . 3 ; 3/9 Journal for 9–16Jun68, in 3/9 ComdC, Jun68, pc . IV ; Co A, 3d Engr Bn

AAR for Opn Scotland II, n .d ., in 3d Engr Bn ComdC, Jun68, pt . IV.

65. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 10; 4th Mar OpO 5–68, in 4th Mar

ComdC, Jun68, pt . IV.
686 THE DEFINING YEA R

66. 3/4 ComdC, Jun68, p . IV-6.

67. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, pp. 11–12 ; 2/4 ComdC, Jun68, pp. 5 ,

8 .

68. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 12 ; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p. 10;

III MAF PerintRep 24–68 and 25–68, in III MAF PerIncReps; Interrogation Report of PWs Do Van Huan, Linh Xuan Duc, Trinh Van

Chien, Nguyen Duc Huong and Dang Truong Vien, in III MAF Per -

IntRep 25–68, p . B–1, in III MAF PerIncReps; 3d MarDiv ComdC,

Jun68, p . 27 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . 6 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jun68, p.

IV–8 .

69. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 11 ; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p . 10;

4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 6 ; 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, p . 3 ; 1/4 Journal fo r

11Jun68, in 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, pt . IV; 1/12 ComdC, Jun68, p . 5 ;

1/12 S—3 Journal for 11Jun68, in 1/12 ComdC, Jun68, pt . IV.

70. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p . 12 ; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p . 10 ;

III MAF PerintRep 25–68, dtd 25Jun68, p. 1, in III MAF PerintReps;

3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p . 27 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . 6 ; 3/ 4

ComdC, Jun68, p . IV–9 .

71. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . 6 ; Other sources show different numbers of NVA dead . See also 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p . 27 .

72. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p . 26 .

73. 2/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. 5 .

74. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 7 .

Razing Khe Sanh: Operation Charli e

75. 3d MarDiv OPlan 21–68, dtd 8Jun68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Jun68, pt . IV; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . II—C—6 .

76. 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . II–C—1, II–C–6 ; 1/11 ComdC, Jun68 ,

p . 6 .

77. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 106 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p .

I1–E–2 .

78. III MAF PerintRep 27–68, pp. 4–5, in III MAF PerintReps.

79. 1st Mar ComdC, Jul68, p . 11—B—1 ; Conflicting enemy casualty figures are contained in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, pp. 15—16 ; III MAF

ComdC, Jul68, pt. III; III MAF PerintRep 27–68, drd 9JuI68, p. 1, i n

III MAF PerintReps.

80. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p . 18 ; 2/1 ComdC, Jul68, pt. III.

81. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p . 16.

82. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68 Summary, p . 106 ; 1/11 ComdC, Jul68 ,

p. 5 .

83. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p . 19 ; III MAF ComdC, Jul68, pt . III;

1/1 ComdC, Jul68, p . 1–1I—3, 1—I1—5, 1—11—6, 1—11–9 ; 1/11 ComdC,

Jul68, p . 5 .

84. Laura Palmer, The General, At Ease : An Interview with Westmoreland, " MHQ : The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Autumn88, p . 33 .

CHAPTER 1 7

MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH I N

SOUTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d

from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, May—Aug68 ; III MAF ComdCs,

May—Aug68 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, May—Aug68 ; 1st MarDiv Admi n

Files; 1st MarDiv Journal and File, May—Aug68 ; 1st MarDiv SicReps,

May–Aug68 ; TF X-Ray ComdCs, May–Aug68 ; 5th Mar ComdCs,

May–Aug68 ; 7th Mar ComdCs, May–Aug68 ; 26th Mar ComdCs,

May–Aug68 ; and 27th Mar ComdCs, May–Aug68 .

Going into the Go Noi

1. 3/7 ComdCs Apr–May68 ; 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook, dud

27Jun68, in 1st MarDiv Admin Files, hereafter 7th Mar AAR, Alle n

Brook .

2. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook .

3. Ibid . and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 21 .

4. 7th Mar AAR, Opn Allen Brook and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p .

22 .

5. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook .

6. Ibid . and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 22 . The quote is from cove r

Icr CGlstMarDiv to ComUSMACV, dtd 17Jul68, 7th Mar AAR, Op n

Allen Brook .

7. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook ; Col Roger H . Barnard, Comments on

draft, dtd 13Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Barnard Comments.

8. Barnard Comments; 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook ; FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, May68, p . 22 .

9. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook ; Barnard Comments.

10. Barnard Comments.

11. Ibid .

12. Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Woodham Comments ; "Eleven Days i n

May," ms, Encl, Woodham Comments, hereafter "Eleven Days i n

May" ; 27th Mar ComdC, May68 ; 3/27 ComdC, May68 ; 3/27 CAAR,

Operation Allen Brook, dtd 11Jun68, Encl 3/27 ComdC, May68 ,

hereafter 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68 .

13. Woodham Comments; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68 .

14. CGlstMarDiv SitRep No . 42 [misnumbered), Opn Allen Brook ,

in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 7th Mar SitRep No . 42, Op n

Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV (The 7th Mar repor t

is in the 27th Mar ComdC]; 27th Mar SicRep for Period 170001H t o

172400H May68, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pc . IV ; 3/7 ComdC ,

May68, pc . II; Woodham Comments; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook ,

Jun68 . NVA casualty figures are from 7th Mar SitRep No . 42 an d

CGlstMarDiv SicReps Nos . 48 and 49, Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Ma r

ComdC, May68, pt. IV; See also 7th Mar AAR, Opn Allen Brook an d

FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 22 .

15. Barnard Comments; 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook ; 3/27 CAAR,

Allen Brook, Jun68 .

16. This and the following paragraph are derived from these sources:

Woodham Comments; 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. 111 ; CGIstMarDiv SicRep No . 45, Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68 ,

pt. IV. ; 27th Mar AAR for Opn Allen Brook, dtd 18JuI68, in 1st Mar -

Div Admin Files, hereafter 27th Mar AAR, Allen Brook ; 3/27 CAAR ,

Allen Brook, Jun68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 23 .

17. This and the following paragraph are derived from : 27th Ma r

AAR, Allen Brook ; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68 ; FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, May68, p . 24 .

18. An additional source for this paragraph is: LtCol Donald N.

Rexroad, Comments on draft, drd 20Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
NOTES 687

19. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp . 23—24 ; 27th Mar ComdC, May68 ,

pt. III ; CGlstMarDiv SitReps Nos . 44 and 45, Opn Allen Brook, i n

27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 27th Mar SitReps for 180001H t o

182400H May68 and 240001 to 242400H May68, in 27th Ma r

ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 27th Mar SitRep No. 77, Opn Allen Brook,

in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV.

20. Sources for this and the following paragraph are : 7th Mar AAR,

Opn Allen Brook ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp . 23—24 ; 27th Ma r

AAR, Allen Brook.

Mini-Tet and Operation Mameluke Thrust, May 1968

21. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp . 56—58 ; 7th Mar ComdC, May68 ,

p . 6 .

22. CGIstMarDiv msg ro CGIIIMAF, dtd 9May68 (File No . 28, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 10May68); 1st MarDiv FragO 116—68, i n

1st MarDiv Journal and File for 18May68 .

23. 1st MarDiv FragO 116—68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File fo r

18May68 .

Operation Allen Brook Continues

24. 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pr . III; 27th Mar SitReps Nos. 85 and

93 for Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV ; 27th

Mar SitReps for periods 280001H to 282400H May68 and 300001 H

to 302400H May68, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt . IV; 1/26

ComdC, May68, pt . II; 1/27 ComdC, May68, p. 5 ; 3/5 ComdC,

May68, p . 8 .

25. 27th Mar AAR, Allen Brook, p . 18 .

26. LCpI Jackie L. Bibbs intvw, 6JuI68, Tape 3048 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

27. 1st MarDiv FragO 151—68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and Fil e

1—7Jun68 .

28. 1/27 ComdC, Jun68, p .6 .

29. PFC Michael W. Orr (?) intvw, 30Jun68, Tape 3053 (Oral Hist -

Coll, MCHC).

30. 1st MarDiv FragO 151—68, pp . 1—2, in 1st MarDiv Journal & File ,

1—7Jun68 .

31. LtCol Albert W. Keller intvw, 19Jul68, Tape 3043 (Oral HiscColl ,

MCHC), hereafter, Keller intvw .

32. Cpl Mark A. Guarinello intvw, 19Ju168, Tape 3043 (Oral Hist

Coll, MCHC).

33. 1/27 ComdC, Jun68, p .7 .

34. Keller intvw.

35. Ibid .

36. Ibid .

37. 2/27 AAR for Opn Allen Brook, p .8 .

38. CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 17Jul68 (File No . 34, 1st

MarDiv Journal File for 17Jul68).

Mameluke Thrust Also Continue s

39. 1st MarDiv FragO 151—68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File fo r

3Jun68 .

40. Ibid .

41. Sgr Randle C. Dixon intvw, 8Jul68, Tape 3054 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter, Dixon intvw ; and 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p .30 .

42. 1st MarDiv Special SitRep No . 99 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, i n

1st MarDiv SitReps, Jun68 .

43. Special SitRep No . 102 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 1st MarDi v

SitReps, Jun68 .

44. CO 7th Mar msg co CG1stMarDiv, did 15Jun68 (File No . 15, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 16Jun68).

45. Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross, p . 53 .

46. Corporal David M. Sivak intvw, 8JuI68, Tape 3054 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

47. Dixon intvw.

48. 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 829, in 1st MarDiv Daily SitReps, Ju168 .

49. 1/5 AAR for Opn Mameluke Thrust, did 20Jul68, p . 4, in 1/5

ComdC, JuI68, pt . IV.

50. 7th Mar ComdC, Jul68, p . 6 .

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, JuI68, pp . 54, 57—8 . See also C. A. Rocco ,

memo to CO 7th Engr Bn, did 23Aug68, Subj : Completion of Barrier Project, encl to LtCol Themistocles T . Annas, Comments on draft,

dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Commenr File).

52. 7th Mar ComdC, JuI68, p . 6 .

53. 1st Recon Bn PatRep, did 31Jul68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC ,

JuI68, pt . IV, tab B—185 .

54. 5th Mar FragO 72—68, in 5th Mar ComdC, JuI68, pt . IV.

55. 1st Recon Bn SitRep No . 214—68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC ,

Aug68 .

56. 1st MarDiv SirReps Nos. 297—299 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, i n

1st MarDiv SitReps, Aug68 .

57. Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n .d . (1995] (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Stemple Comments.

58. Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross, pp. 112—113 .

59. 2/5 ComdC, Aug68, pp. 4, 9 .

60. 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 317 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 1st

MarDiv SitReps, Aug68 ; Stemple Comments.

61. 1st MarDiv FragO 300—68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File fo r

10Aug68 .

62. 1st MarDiv FragO 312—68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File fo r

16Aug68 ; and 5th Mar FragO 79—68, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68 ,

pt.IV.

63. 5th Mar FragOs and SitReps, Operation Mameluke Thrust,

16—17Aug68, 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68 .

64. 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68, p . 2—1 ; Stemple Comments . See also 5th

Marines FragOs and SitReps, Operation Mameluke Thrust, 5th Ma r

ComdC, Aug68 .

65. BLT 2/7 AAR for Opn Swift Play/Allen Brook/Mameluke Thrust ,

in BLT 2/7 ComdC, Aug68, pt. IV, hereafter BLT 2/7 AAR .

66. Ibid ., p . 7 .

67. 5th Mar SpecSitRep Nos. 86, 88, and 90 for Opn Mameluke

Thrust, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68, pr. IV.
688 THE DEFINING YEA R

PART IV

The War Continues: Offensive and

Counter-Offensive

CHAPTER 18

3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

Unless otherwise noted material in this chapter is derived from :

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May Ju168; III MAF

ComdCs, MayJuI68; 3d MarDiv' ComdCs, JunJuI68; 1st Mar

ComdCs, Jun Jul68; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jun Ju168 ; 4th Mar ComdCs,

Jun Ju168; 9th Mar ComdCs, JunJu168; and 2/26 Mar ComdCs,

Jun JuI68.

The Enemy Situatio n

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, MayJun68; III MAF G—2, Periodic Intelligence Report 22—68, dtd 4Jun68 ; III MAF G—2, Periodic Intelligence

Report 23—68, dtd 9Jun68 ; and 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68 .

The Offensive Takes Shape

2. MajGen Raymond G . Davis intvw, 2Feb77, p . 17 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 2Feb77 .

3. Ibid .

4. Col Marion C. Dalby intvw, Jan69, Tape 3770 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

5. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp . 20—21 .

6. Ibid ., p. 23 .

7. HQMC, Revision 2 to Table of Organization, M—1099, Infantr y

Regiment, Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, dtd 6Jun67 .

8. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68, Tape 3772 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

9. Gen Robert H. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

10. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

11. Gen Raymond G. Davis, Comments on draft ms, "U .S . Marines i n

Vietnam, 1969, " Aug86 (Vietnam 1969 Comment File, MCHC) .

12. LtCol Joseph J. Scoppa, Jr. intvw, 9—12Dec68, Tape 3372 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC).

13. MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 1Jan69, Tape 3768 (Oral Hist -

Coll, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 1Jan69; LtCol William J. Spangler, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File).

14. Ibid .

15. "Khe Sanh Inactivated . . . New 'Mobility' Emphasized," Sea Tiger,

12Jul68 .

The Eastern DM Z

Additional sources for this section are drawn from : 3d Mar

ComdC, Jun68 ; 1/3 ComdC, Jun68 ; 2/3 ComdC, Jun68 ; 3/3 ComdC,

Jun68 ; 9th Mar ComdC, Jun68; 1/9 ComdC, Jun68 ; and 2/26 ComdC,

Jun68 .

16. Col R. B: Smith, "Leatherneck Square," Marine Corps Gazette ,

Aug69, p . 41, hereafter Smith, "Leatherneck Square ."

The Pressure Continues

Additional sources for this section are drawn from : FMFPac,

MarOpsV, Jul68 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, JuI68 ; lstMar ComdC, Jul68,

3d Mar ComdC, 4th Mar ComdC, JuI68 ; 9th Mar ComdC, JuI68 ; an d

2/26 ComdC, JuI68 .

17. Col Vaughn R . Stuart, Comments on draft, dtd 20Dec94 (Vietnam

Comment File) and Col William H . Dabney, Comments on draft, n .d .

[Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File) .

18. HQ, XXIV Corps CAAR, Operation Thor, 16Aug68, in U .S.

Army After Action Reports, 1968 .

19. 1/3 ComdC, Ju168.

20. "Marines Smash NVA Near DMZ," Sea Tiger, 2 Aug 68 .

21. 3d Mar AAR, Operation Napoleon/Saline, dtd 26Jul68 in 3d Ma r

ComdC, Ju168 .

22. Ibid . and Capt Matthew B. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n .d .

[Dec94) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McTiernan Comments.

23. 2/1 ComdC, Ju168 .

24. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," pp. 41—42 .

25. 9th Mar ComdC, July68 .

26. 2/26Mar ComdCs, Jul—Aug68.

Into the Western Mountain s

Additional sources for this section are drawn from : 3d Ma r

ComdC, Ju168 ; 1/3 ComdC, JuI68 ; 2/3 ComdC, JuI68; 3/3 ComdC,

Jul68 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Ju168 ; 1/4 ComdC, Jul68 ; 2/4 ComdC, Jul68 ;

3/4 ComdC, Ju168 ; 9th Mar ComdC, JuI68 ; 1/9 ComdC, Jul68 ; 2/9

ComdC, Ju168 ; and, 3/9 ComdC, JuI68 .

27. Task Force Hotel OpO 10—68, dtd 14Jul68 in 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Ju168; 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun68 .

28. CG, Task Force Hotel, Critique of Lancaster II "July Action," n .d . ,

in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68, p . i, hereafter TF Hotel Critique .

29. Ibid .

30. CG3dMarDiv msg co CGProvCorpsV, dtd 26Jul68, in III MA F

Message File .

31. TF Hotel Critique, pp. 6—7 ; 9th Mar AAR, " Lancaster 11 Jul y

Action," dtd 29Aug68, p . 10, in 9th Mar ComdC, JuI68 .

32. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

33. Ibid .

34. BGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 12Aug68, Tape 3482 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

35. CG, Task Force Hotel " Final Comments, " in TF Hotel Critique.

36. CG, Task Force Hotel, Critique "Canton II Action," n .d ., in 4th

Mar ComdC, JuI68 .

37 . Ibid ., pp. 6—14 .

Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thie n

38. Additional sources for this section are drawn from : 1st Air CavDiv,

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968, dt d

20Aug68 ; 101st Air CavDiv, Operational Report of 101st Air Cavalr y

Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, dtd 15Aug68 ; 3dBde, 82 d

AbnDiv, Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for
NOTES 689

period ending 31 July 1968, 15Aug68 ; Task Force X-Ray ComdCs ,

Jun Jul68.

CHAPTER 1 9

THE THIRD OFFENSIVE: DA NANG

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived

from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul—Sep68 ; III MAF Comd, Jul—Sep68 ; III

MAF PerintRep Nos. 29—35, 14Ju1—31Aug68 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC ,

Jul-Sep68 ; 1st MarDiv Journal and File, Jul—Sep68 .

Indicators

1. Facts on File, vol . XXVIII, No . 1447, 18—24Ju168, p. 289 .

2. Quoted in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p. 25 .

3. III MAF PerintRep No. 32—68, dtd 11Aug68, p . B—5 ; III MAF PerIntRep No . 34—68, dtd 27Aug68 in III MAF PerintReps, 14Jul—31Aug68 .

4. III MAF PerintRep No . 36—68, dtd 10Sep68, p . C—2, in III MAF

PerintReps, lSep—120ct68 .

5. III MAF PerintRep No . 33—68, dtd 20Aug68, pp . 7—8, in III MAF

PerintReps, 14Jul-31Aug68 .

6. III MAF PerintRep No .35—68, dtd 3Sep68, p . B—1, in III MAF PerIntReps, 14Jul—31Aug68 .

7. III MAF PerintRep No . 29—68, dtd 23Ju168, p .1, in III MAF PerIntReps, 14Jul—31Aug68 .

8. Ibid .

9.CGlst MarDiv msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 20Aug68 (File No. 37, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 20Aug68); CGlstMarDiv msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd

10Aug68 (File No. 6, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 11Aug68).

io . 1st MarDiv FragO 300—68, dtd 10Aug68 (File No . 64, 1st MarDiv

Journal and File for 10Aug68).

i i . 1st MP Bn ComdC, Aug68, p . 8 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p . 32 .

12.CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 18Aug68 (File No . 43, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 18Aug68) .

13. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 20Aug68 (File No . 38 ,

1st MarDiv Journal and File for 20Aug68) .

14. 1st MarDiv FragO 322—68, dtd 21Aug68 (File No. 54, 1st MarDi v

Journal and File for 21Aug68).

15. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 21Aug68 (File No . 30 ,

1st MarDiv Journal and File for 21Aug68) .

The Storm Breaks

16. 1st MP Bn Unit Diaries (UDs), 22Aug68 and 28Aug68 .

n . Statement of PW 2dLt Nguyen Dinh Bon, NVA in III MAF PerIntRep No . 36—68, dtd 10Sep68, p . B—7 in III MAF PerintReps,

lSep—120ct68 .

is. lsf Tk Bn ComdC, Aug68, pt. II.

19. Sgt Larry K . Bucklew intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Bucklew intvw.

20.Crane Davis, " The Bridge at Cam Le, " Marine Corps Gazette, Feb70 ,

pp . 35–36, hereafter Davis, " The Bridge. "

21. LCpI Stephen D . Hott intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC) and Davis, "The Bridge," pp . 35—36 .

22. Cpl Wayne D . Brown intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Brown intvw. .

23. SSgt Gary C. Sanders intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

24. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p . 35 .

25. Davis, "The Bridge," p . 36.

26. Ibid ., pp . 36-37 .

27. Ibid . and Col Joseph J. N. Gambardella, Comments on draft, dtd

16Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Gambardella Comments.

28.LCpI Henry Lowery and PFC Andrew Matlock, Jr., intvw, 7Sep68 ,

Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

29. Bucklew intvw and PFC David S . Levalley intvw, 7Sep68, Tap e

3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

Counterattack

30.Capt William 0. Moore intvw, 6Sep68, Tape 3233, (Oral HiscColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Moore intvw.

31. 1st Tk Bn Operational SpotRep, dtd 23Aug68 in 1st Tk Bn Journal for 23Aug68, Serial No. 11, 1st Tk Bn ComdC, Aug68, pt . IV.

32. Moore intvw.

33. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, pp . 33–34 ; Moore incvw. ; Gambardella Comments; Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross, p . 126 .

34. 1st Tk Bn ComdC, Aug68, pt . II.

35. 5th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 24Aug68 (File No. 42, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 24Aug68) and 7th Mar msgs to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 24Aug68 (File Nos . 44 and 45, 1st MarDiv Journal an d

File for 24Aug68) .

Pursuit

36.Davis, "The Bridge," p . 38 ; 1/27 ComdC, Aug68, p . 9a .

37. 1st MP Bn ComdC, Aug68, p. 9 .

38. 3d AmTrac Bn msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 24Aug68 (File No .

89, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 24Aug68).

39. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dcd 24Aug68 (File No . 62 ,

1st MarDiv Journal and File for 24Aug68) .

40. Davis, " The Bridge, " p . 38 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Aug68, p . 34 .

41. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 25Aug68, (File No .

60, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 25Aug68).

42. 1st MarDiv FragO 333–68 in 1st MarDiv Journal and File fo r

26Aug68 .

43. Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross, pp . 262–63 .

44. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC dtd 30Aug68 (1st MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68); 3/7 ComdC, Aug68, p. 4 .

45. 5th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 29Aug68 (File No . 13, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68) .

46. 1/5 AAR for Opn Mameluke Thrust, dtd 31Oct68, p . 22, in 1/ 5

ComdC, Oct68, pt . IV.

47. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 29Aug68 (File No. 55 ,

1st MarDiv Journal and File for 29Aug68) .
690 THE DEFINING YEA R

48.CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Aug68, (File No . 25, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68) .

49. 2/5 ComdC, Aug68, p . 12 .

50. 5th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 30Aug68 (File No . 89, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68) .

51. 1st MarDiv Special SitReps, Nos . 10 and 11 for Opn Sussex Bay i n

1st MarDiv SitReps, Aug68 .

52. 2/5 ComdC, Aug68, p . 13 .

53. 3d AmTrac Bn ComdC, Sep68, p . 3 .

54. 1st MarDiv Special SitReps for Opn Sussex Bay, Nos . 17—29, in 1st

MarDiv SitReps, Sep68 ; Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft ,

n.d. (1995) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stemple Comments .

Typhoon Bess

55. 1st MAW ComdC, Sep68, p . 20 .

56. Stemple Comments.

57. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 5Sep68 (File No . 33 ,

1st MarDiv Journal and File for 5Sep68) .

58. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 5Sep68 (File No . 17, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File for 5Sep68).

59.III MAF PerIntRep No. 37—68, dtd 17Sep68, p . 1 in III MAF PerIntReps, lSep-120x68 .

60. 5th Mar Special SitRep No . 41—68 for Opn Sussex Bay, in 5th Ma r

ComdC, Sep68 .

6i . 5th Mar Special SitRep No . 172 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 5th

Mar ComdC, Sep68 .

62. 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68, p . 3—2 .

63. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p . 35 .

64. Moore intvw.

CHAPTER 2 0

AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED

A New Orientatio n

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from :

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul—Oct68 ; III MA F

ComdCs, Jul—Oct68 ; 3d Mar ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 4th Mar Comd

Cs, Aug–Oct68 ; 9th Mar ComdCs, Aug–Oct68 ; and 2/26 Mar Com d

Cs, Aug–Oct68 ; and 31st MilHistDet, " The Critical Year, 1968 : Th e

XXIV Corps Team," Jan69 .

1. CG, 3d MarDiv memo to AC/S, G—3, 20JuI68, in 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Aug68 .

2. HQ, 3d MarDiv, Infantry Company Operations in northern Quan g

Tri Province (Draft), 4Aug68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68 .

3. HQ, 3d MarDiv, Infantry Company Operations in Northern Quan g

Tri Province, 26Aug68, p . 2, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68 .

4. Ibid ., p . 9 .

5. Ibid ., p . 2 .

6. MajGen Raymond G . Davis intvw, 1Jan69, Tape 3768 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 1Jan68 .

7. Ibid .

8. Gen Raymond G . Davis, Comments on draft ms, Aug86 (Vietna m

69 Comment File, MCHC).

9. III MAF ComdCs, Jul—Aug68 ; Ill MAF G—2, Periodic Intelligenc e

Report 30—68, dtd 28Jul68 ; III MAF G—2, Periodic Intelligenc e

Report 31—68, dtd 4Aug68 .

The Eastern DMZ

Additional sources for this section are drawn from : 1st InfBde, 5t h

InfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 3 1

October 1968, 7Mar69 ; 1/1 ComdC, Aug68 ; 2/1 ComdC, Aug68 ; 3/ 1

ComdC, JuI68 ; 1/3 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 2/3 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ;

3/3 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 1/9 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 2/9 ComdCs,

Aug—Oct68 ; 3/9 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdCs,

Aug—Oct68 ; 3d Recon Bn ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; and 3d Tank Bn

ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 .

10. 3d Tank Bn ComdC, Aug68, p . 8 .

11. CGXXIVCorps msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 16Aug68, in III MA P

Message File .

12. Ibid .

13. New York Times, 21 Aug68 .

14. CG3dMarDiv Warning Order, 15Aug68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Aug68 .

15. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 18Aug68, in 111 MA F

Message Files.

16. CGXXIVCorps msg to CG3dMarDiv, 20Aug68, in 111 MAF Message File.

17. BLT 2/26 ComdC, Aug68 .

18. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIVCorps, dtd 19Aug68, in 3d Ma r

Div ComdC, Aug68 .

19. CO 3d Recon Bn msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 26Aug68, in 3d Reco n

Bn ComdC, Aug68 .

20. Ibid .

21. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 21Jun68, in III MAF Messag e

File .

22. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 29Jun68, in Ill MAF Messag e

File .

23. CMC msg to FMFPac, dtd 29Jun68, in III MAF Message File.

24. Hq, 3dBde, 82dAbnDiv, Operational Report-Lessons Learned ,

Period Ending 31 July 1968, 15Aug68, pp 3—4 .

25. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Sep68 .

26. HQ, 1stBde, 5thlnfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned ,

Period Ending 31 October 1968, pp . 2–3 .

27. 3d Tank Bn, ComdC, Sep68 .

28. HQ, lstBde, 5thlnfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned ,

Period Ending 31 October 1968, dtd 13Dec68, p . 3 ; HQ, 1/77Armor,

AAR Operation Sullivan, dtd 1Nov68 .

29. III MAF ComdC, Sep68 .

30. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 19Sep68 ; CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 20Sep68 .

31. HQ, lstBn, llthlnfAAR, Pioneer I, dtd 1Nov68 .

32. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd l lOct68 ; CG3dMar
NOTES 69 1

Div msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 11Oct68 ; CGXXIV Corps telcon t o

111 MAF, dcd 12Oct68 .

33. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Occ68 .

34. CG3d MarDiv msg co CGXXIV Corps, dtd 15Oct68, in III MA F

Message File .

35. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 16Oct68, IIIMA F

Message File .

36. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Oct68 .

37. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 23Oct68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Occ68 .

38. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 25Oct68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct68 .

39. MajGen Townsend msg to LtGen Cushman, dtd 21Nov68, in II I

MAF Message File .

40. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 29Dec68, in III MA F

Message File .

Defeat of the 320th Division

Additional sources for this section are drawn from : 1/3 ComdCs,

Aug—Oct68, 2/3 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 3/3 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 1/4

ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 2/4 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 3/4 ComdCs,

Aug—Oct68 ; 1/9 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 2/9 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 3/9

ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 1/12 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68, 2/12 ComdCs,

Aug—Oct68 ; 3/12 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ; 4/12 ComdCs, Aug—Oct68 ;

MajGen R. C. Davis and 1stLt H. W. Brazier, " Defeat of the 320th, "

Marine Corps Gazette, Mar69, pp . 22—30 ; and 3d MarDiv AAR, Lan -

caster II, dtd 9Sep69 .

41. Maj Gary E . Todd, Comments on draft, did 19Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Todd Comments.

42. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68, Tape 3772 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

43. Todd Comments.

44. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

45. 3cl Recon Bn ComdC, Aug68 .

46. Davis intvw, 1Jan69 .

47. III MAF G—2, Periodic Intelligence Report 33—68, dtd 18Aug68 ,

P B—1 .

48. 9th Mar AAR, Operation Lancaster II Jupiter, dtd 12Nov68, i n

9th Mar ComdC, Aug68 .

49. Barrow incvw, 12Dec68 .

50. 3d Recon Bn ComdCs, Aug—Sep68 .

51. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

52. 9th Mar AAR, Operation Lancaster Trousdale/Trousdale North ,

dtd 26Oct68, in 9th Mar ComdC, Oct68 .

53. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

54. Ibid .

55. Ibid .

56. MajGen R. C. Davis and lstLt H . W. Brazier, " Defeat of th e

320th, " Marine Corps Gazette, Mar69, p . 28 .

57. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

58. Ibid .

59. Ibid .

60. Ibid .

61. Ibid .

62. Ibid .

63. Ibid .

64. HQ, 4th Mar, Anx B (Intelligence) to OpO 8—68, dud 1Sep68, i n

4th Mar ComdC, Sep68 .

65 . Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

Coastal Quang Tri and Thua Thien : A Shift

Additional sources for this section are : HQ, XXIV Corps, Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, dtd

10Feb69 ; HQ, 1st CavDiv(AM), Operational Report-Lessons Learned ,

Period Ending 31 October 1968, dtd 7Mar69 ; and HQ, 101stAbnDiv ,

Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968,

dtd 11Mar69 .

66. Gen Abrams msg to Gen Cushman, dtd 28Occ68, in III MAF Message File .

67. HQ, 1st CavDiv(AM), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 January 1969, dtd 6Jun69 .

68. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, did 4Oct68, in III MAF Message File.

69. Col Thomas H . Galbraith, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File) .

CHAPTER 2 1

COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN

SOUTHERN ICTZ

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d

from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep—Dec68 ; III MAF ComdCs, Sep—Dec68 ;

1st MarDiv ComdCs, Sep—Dec68 ; 1st MarDiv Journal and File ,

Sep—Dec68 .

The Situation in Septembe r

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, pp . 3-4, 61 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Sep68, p .

II—B—2, Ill—B—1 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68, p . 3—3 ; 3/26 ComdC,

Sep68, p. 5 .

2. Major Gary L. Teller, Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, and V. Keit h

Fleming, Jr., U.S. Marines in Vietnam, /967 (Washington, D.C. :

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1984), p . 139; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p .

66; Jack Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966 (Washington, DC:

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1982), p . 270 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, pp .

14—15 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Sep68, p . 17 ; 1st MarDiv FragO 349—6 8

(File No . 18, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 3Sep68) ; 1st MarDiv CO C

msg to III MAF COC, dcd 5Sep68 (File No . 41, 1st MarDiv Journa l

and File, 5Sep68) ; 1st Mar ComdC, Sep68, p. 11—G—1 ; 2/27 ComdC,

Sep—Dec68, p. 3 .

3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, p . 48 ; CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF,

dtd 15Sep68 (File No . 33, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 15Sep68) ; 1st

MarDiv SicRep No . 891, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Sep68 ; 1st Ma r

ComdC, Sep68, p . II—B—1, II—C-4, III—C—1 ; 1/1 ComdC, Sep68, pt .

III .

4. 3/7 ComdC, Sep68; 7th Mar S—3 Jnl entries for 14Sep68 and 7th Mar
692 THE DEFINING YEA R

SitRep No . 490, dtd 15Sep68 in Jnl and SitReps, Encl, 7th Mar ComdC,

Sep68, hereafter 7th Mar S—3 Jnl entries and 7th Mar SitRep 490.

5. 3/7 ComdC, Sep68 ; BLT 2/7 ComdC, Sep68 .

6. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 898, 1st MarDiv SitReps, Sep68 ; BLT 2/7

AAR, Opn Dodge City, in 2/7 ComdC, Sep68, pt . IV, hereafter BLT

2/7 AAR, Dodge City ; 2/7 ComdC, Sep68, pt . III; 3/7 ComdC, Sep68 ,

pp. 5, 10 ; 7th Mar S—3 Jnl entries for 15Sep68 and 7th Mar SitRe p

490 .

7. BLT 2/7 AAR, Dodge City.

8. Ibid .

9. This and the following six paragraphs are derived from these sources:

BLT 2/7 AAR, Dodge City, pp . 5, 7 ; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 902, i n

1st MarDiv SitReps, Sep68 ; 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dt d

19Sep68 (File No . 28, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 19Sep68).

10. Additional sources for this and the next four paragraphs are : 7t h

Mar msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 19Sep68 (File No . 205, 7th Mar Journa l

and File, 19Sep68, 7th Mar ComdC, Sep68, pt. IV); 7th Mar msg to

1st MarDiv COC, dtd 20Sep68 (File No . 6, 1st MarDiv Journal an d

File, 20Sep68).

11. An additional source for this and the next three paragraphs is: 7t h

Mar msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 20Sep68 (File No. 208, 7th Mar Journa l

and File, 20Sep68, 7th Mar ComdC, Sep68, pt . IV).

12. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 21Sep68 (File No . 50, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File, 21Sep68) ; 2/7 AAR, Dodge City, pp. 6, 8 .

13. 2/7 ComdC, Sep68, pt . III; 2/7 AAR, Dodge City, pp. 6, 9, 12 .

14. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: III MA F

ComdC, Sep68, pt . III; PerintRep No . 39—68 (III MAF PerintReps) ,

p . 3 ; . 1/26 SpotReps (File Nos. 1, 2, and 7, 1/26 Journal and File ,

21Sep68, in 1/26 ComdC, Sep68, pt . IV).

15 . FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, p . 17 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68, p . 3—2 .

Operation Maui Peak

16. 1st MarDiv FragO 397—68 (File No . 7, 1st MarDiv Journal and

File, 1Oct68), p . 1 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p. 7 ; III MAF ComdC,

Oct68, p . 21 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, pp . 4, 57 ; III MAF PerintRep

No . 39—68 (III MAF PerintReps), p . 3 .

17. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p . 7 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68, p.

21 ; 1st MarDiv FragO 405—68 (1st MarDiv Journal and File, 5Oct68),

p . 1 ; 2/7 AAR, Opn Maui Peak, in 2/7 ComdC, Oct68, pt . IV.

18. Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n .d . [1995], hereafte r

Stemple Comments.

19. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Ibid . ; 5th Mar

ComdC, Oct68 ; 7th Mar AAR, Opn Maui Peak, pp. 7—8, in 7th Mar

ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV, hereafter 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak ; 3/ 7

ComdC, Oct68, p. 5 .

20. III MAF PerintRep No . 41—68 (III MAF PerintReps), p . 3 ; 7t h

Mar AAR, Maui Peak ; 2/5 AAR, Opn Maui Peak, pp . 2, 8, in 2/ 5

ComdC, Nov68, pt . IV, hereafter 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak.

21. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p. 7 ; III MAF PerintRep No . 41—68

(III MAF PerIntReps), p . 3 ; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 1, Opn Maui Peak ,

in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct68, p . 2—1 ; 7th

Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 6, 8 ; 3/5 ComdC, Oct68, pp . 3, 7 .

22. 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp . 8—9 ; 2/7 AAR, Opn Maui Peak, p.

3, in 2/7 ComdC, Oct68, pt . IV, hereafter 2/7 AAR, Maui Peak.

23. 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p . 4 .

24. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, pp . 7—11. ; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak ,

pp . 8—9 ; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p . 4

25. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : 7th Ma r

AAR, Maui Peak, p . 9 ; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 4 .

26. Additional sources for this paragraph are: III MAF PerintRep No.

41—68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p . 3 ; 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 5, Op n

Maui Peak (1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68) ; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak,

pp. 6, 10 .

27. 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p . 9 ; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p . 3 . Another source claims the Marines suffered 19 wounded . See 1st MarDi v

SitRep No . 6, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68 .

28. 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p . 10 ; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p . 5 .

29. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 7, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps,

Oct68 ; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 10, 12 .

30. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, pp . 11—12 ; III MAF ComdC, Oct68,

p . 10 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68, p . 34 ; 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 25 ,

Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68 ; 7th Mar msg to 1st

MarDiv COC, dtd 12Oct68 (File No . 28, 1st MarDiv Journal and File,

1.2Oct68); 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p . 15 ; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p.

6 ; Stemple Comments . Enemy casualty claims for this engagemen t

vary from 31 to 61 . Figures in the text are from FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Oct68, pp . 11—12 ; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p . 1.5 ; 2/5 AAR, Mau i

Peak, p . 6 . The quotation is from Stemple Comments .

31. 1st MarDiv SitRep Nos. 23—34, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDi v

SitReps, Oct68 ; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp . 1.6—17 .

32. 1st Mar ComdC, Oct68, p . II—B—2; 1/1 ComdC, Oct68, p . 1—11—3 ;

7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp . 6, 18—19, 23—24 ; 11.th Mar ComdC ,

Oct68, pp . 8—9 ; 2/7 AAR, Maui Peak, pp . 5, 8 .

33. III MAF PerintRep No . 42—68 (III MAF PerintReps); 1st MarDi v

SitRep Nos. 43, 45-47, 49, 52—54, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDi v

SitReps, Oct68 ; 1st MarDiv FragO 420—68 (File No. 2, 1st MarDi v

Journal and File, 20Oct68) ; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp . 19—21 ; 2/ 7

AAR, Maui Peak, p . 5 ; 3/7 ComdC, Oct68, p . 5 .

The End of Mameluke Thrust and

Renewed Attacks on Da Nang

34. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p . 14 ; III MAF ComdC, Oct68, p . 10 ,

22 ; III MAF PerintRep No . 43—68 (III MAP PerintReps); 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Oct68, pp. 14, 18—19 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Occ68, p . 11—13—1 ; 5th

Mar ComdC, Oct68, p. 2—1, 3—1, 3—3 ; 5th Mar AAR, Opn Mameluk e

Thrust, p . 4, in 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, pt . IV; 5th Mar AAR, Opn

Henderson Hill, pp . 5—6, in 5th Mar ComdC, Dec68, pt. IV; 2/5

ComdC, Occ68, p . 2 ; 2/5 AAR, Opn Henderson Hill, p. 2, in 2/5

ComdC, Dec68, pt . IV; 3/5 ComdC, Oct68, p . 3 ; 3/5 AAR, Opn Henderson Hill, p . 4, in 3/5 ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV ; Stemple Comments.

35. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, pp. 4, 48 ; III MAF PerintRep Nos.

41—44 (III MAF PerIntReps) .

36. Peter Grose, "22 Days of Tension Led to Turning Point in Talks, "

The New York Times, 1Nov68, p . 1 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp . 4

and 47 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68 and Summary, p . 78 .

37. III MAF ComdC, Oct68, p . 37 .

38. 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, p . 2—1 ; 5th Mar FragO 112—68 (File No .

10, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 13Nov68); 2/5 ComdC, Nov68, p . 3 .

39. III MAF ComdC, Nov68, p . 20 ; III MAF PerintRep No. 46—68,
NOTES 693

p . 5 ; III MAF PerintRep No . 47–68, p . 4 (III MAF Per1ntReps) ; 1st

MarDiv SitRep No . 961, in 1st MarDiv Daily SitReps, Nov68 ; 1/2 6

ComdC, Nov68, pp . 7, 13 ; 1/26 SpotRep, 17Nov68 (File No . 1, 1/2 6

Journal and File, 17Nov68) .

40. III MAF PerintRep No. 47–68, p . 4 (III MAF PerintReps); 1st

MarDiv SitRep No . 965, in 1st MarDiv Daily SitReps, Nov68 .

41. 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 119 for Opn Henderson Hill (1st MarDi v

SitReps of Operations, Nov68); 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 136, Op n

Henderson Hill, in 1st MarDiv SitReps for Operations, Nov68 ; 5t h

Mar ComdC, Nov68, p. 2—1 ; 5th Mar SpotRep, 22Nov68 (File No . 4 ,

5th Mar Journal and File, 22Nov68), in 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, pt .

IV; 5th Mar SpecSitRep No . 119 for Opn Henderson Hill, 5th Ma r

ComdC, Nov68, pt . IV.

42 . III MAF PerintRep No . 48–68, pp . 4–5 (III MAF PerintReps).

Operation Meade Rive r

43. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp . 3, 28 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68

and Summary, p . 55 ; III MAF ComdC, Dec68, p . 21 ; 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Occ68, p. 21 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p . 11–F–1 .

44. 1st Mar AAR, Opn Meade River, dtd 10Jan69, Encl Col Robert G .

Lauffer, Comments on draft, dal 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

45. Col Robert G . Lauffer, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Lauffer Comments; 1st Mar AAR, Mead e

River.

46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp . 6–7 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Nov68 ,

pp . 18–19 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, pp . II–C–5, II–E–1, III–A–4 ; 1st

Mar AAR, Opn Meade River ; 1/1 ComdC, Nov68, p . 1–111-44 ; 2/ 5

AAR, Opn Meade River (2/5 ComdC, Dec68, pt . IV), p . 3; 3/ 5

ComdC, Nov68, p. 7; 2/7 AAR, Opn Meade River (2/7 ComdC,

Nov68, pt. IV), p . 4, hereafter 2/7 AAR, Meade River ; 2/26 ComdC,

Nov68, p . 5 ; 2/26 AAR, Opn Meade River (2/26 ComdC, Dec68, pt .

IV), p . 4 ; Lauffer Comments.

47. 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p . If–C–1 ; 2/26 ComdC, Nov68, pp. 7 ,

13 .

48. 1/1 ComdC, Nov68, p . 1–11–7 ; 1/1 SpocReps, drd 20Nov68 (Fil e

Nos. 19, 27, 1/1 Journal and File, 20Nov68, in 1/1 ComdC, Nov68 ,

pt. IV).

49. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p . 6 .

50. III MAF ComdC, Nov68, p . 9 ; 2/26 ComdC, Dec68, pp . 9–10.

51. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p . 7 .

52. LtCol Ronald R. Welpotr, Comments on draft, dtd 19Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File) .

53. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p . 7 ; 2/5 AAR, Opn Meade River, in 2/ 5

ComdC, Dec68, p . 9 .

54. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, pp . 7–8 ; 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, p. 5 .

55. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, pp . 8–9 ; Col Neil A. Nelson, Comments

on draft, n .d . (Dec 19941 (Vietnam Comment File) .

56. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River .

57. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 8—9 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Nov68 ,

p . 23 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p . II—C—2 ; 2/26 ComdC, Dec68, p . 6 ;

LtCol James F. Foster, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94) (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Foster Comments .

58. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, pp . 9—10 .

59. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River and LtCol John W. P. Robertson ,

"Operation Meade River," Taped Comments, n .d . [Dec68Jan691 ,

Encl Col John W. P. Robertson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Robertson Taped Comments .

60. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p . 5 ; 3/26 ComdC, Nov68, p . 15 .

61. 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. II–C–I .

62. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

63. Ibid . ; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p . 11—C—3 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Nov68, p. 8 ; Stemple Comments .

64. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

65. Ibid .

66. Ibid . ; Robertson Taped Comments; Stemple Comments.

67. 1st Mar AAR Meade River ; Robertson Taped Comments ; III MAF

ComdC, Dec68, p. 9 ; III MAF PerintRep No . 49–68, in III MAF PerIntReps; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p . 29 ; 1st MarDiv SirRep No .

62, Opn Meade River, in 1st MarDiv Operations SitReps, Dec68 ; 1st

Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. II–C–2 ; 1st Mar SirRep Nos. 62, 63, Opn

Meade River, in 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, pt . IV; 26th Mar SpotRep ,

5Dec68 (File No . 24, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 5Dec68). Most o f

the reports give differing enemy casualty figures, the lowest in Robert -

son Taped Comments and the largest in the 1st Mar AAR Meade River.

68. 1st Mar AAR Meade River.

69. Mr. Ronald J . Drez intvw, 29Mar89, Tape 6512 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Drez inrvw; Stemple Comments.

70. Drez intvw.

71. Foster Comments.

72. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

73. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, p. 10; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p .

29 ; 1st Mar SpotReps, 7Dec68 (File Nos . 34, 55, 1st MarDiv Journa l

and File, 7Dec68) ; 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, p . 6 ; Foster Comments.

74. Drez intvw.

75. 1st Mar SpotRep, 8Dec68 (File No . 47, 1st MarDiv Journal an d

File, 8 Dec68) ; Drez intvw.

76. Capt George B . Meegan, Comments on draft, dtd 2Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meegan Comments .

77. 1st MarDiv SitRep No . 75, Opn Meade River, in 1st MarDiv

Operation SitReps, Dec68 ; Drez inrvw.

78. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp . 10–11 ; III MAF ComdC, Dec68 ,

p . 9 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p . fl–C1; 1st Mar SpotRep, 8Dec68

(File Nos. 11, 12, 13, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 9Dec68) ; 1st MarDiv SitRep Nos. 74, 76, Opn Meade River, in 1st MarDiv Operation

SitReps, Dec68 ; 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, pp . 17–18 .

79. 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, p . 6 .

80. Medal of Honor Citation, SSgt Karl Gorman Taylor, Sr., 1971 .

81. Robertson Taped Comments and Col JWP Robertson, Recommendation for Army Capt Luigi Lombardi, n .d . Apr93, Encl Col John

W. P. Robertson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

82. Robertson Taped Comments; Drez intvw .

83. Foster Comments.

84. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp . 10—11 ; III MAF PerintRep No .
694 THE DEFINING YEA R

50—68 (III MAF PerIntReps) ; 1st MarDiv SicRep No . 78, Opn Mead e

River, in 1st MarDiv Operation SitReps, Dec68 ; 1st Mar SpocReps,

9Dec68 (File Nos. 63, 64, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 9Dec68) ; 3/2 6

ComdC, Dec68, p . 18 ; Meegan Comments.

85. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, p . 3 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p .

17 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p . II—C-4, 5 ; 1st MAR AAR Mead e

River; CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Dec68 (File No . 25, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File, 7Dec68) ; III MAF PerintRep No . 48—68 (III

MAF PerintReps), p . 5 .

86 . 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p . 15 ; 1/1 ComdC, Dec68, p . 1—II—3 .

Operation Taylor Common

87. CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dcd 4Dec68 (File No . 30, 1st

MarDiv Journal and File, 4Dec68); MajGen Ross T. Dwyer intvw,

17Oct77, p. 35 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dwyer intvw.

88. TF Yankee AAR, Opn Taylor Common (TF Yankee AAR, Op n

Taylor, pt . I), hereafter, TF Yankee AAR ; TF Yankee FragO 1—68 (File

No. 13, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 7Dec68) .

89. TF Yankee FragO 1—68 (File No . 18, TF Yankee Journal and File ,

7Dec68).

90. III MAF PerIntRep No . 49—68 (III MAF PerintReps), p. 5 ; 1st

MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p . 17 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 3—2 ; 1/5

ComdC, Dec68, p. 2—1 .

91. III MAF ComdC, Dec68, p . 10 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 2—1 ; 2/7

ComdC, Dec68, p. 1—5 ; 2/7 AAR, Opn Taylor Common, in 2/7 ComdC,

Dec68, pc . IV, hereafter 2/7 AAR, Taylor Common ; Stemple Comments.

92. Dwyer intvw, pp . 45-46 .

93. TF Yankee AAR, p. 39 ; 3d Mar ComdC, Dec68, p . 2—1 ; CG T F

Yankee msg to CGlstMarDiv, 12Dec68 (File No . 9, TF Yankee Journal and File, 12Dec68); CG TF Yankee msg to 3d Mar and 5th Mar,

10Dec68 (File No . 3, TF Yankee Journal and File, 13Dec68); 5th Mar

SpotRep to TF Yankee COC, 11Dec68 (File No . 4, TF Yankee Journal

and File, 11Dec68).

94. 5th Mar SpotRep to TF Yankee COC, 11Dec68 (File No . 4, TF

Yankee Journal and File, 11Dec68); TF Yankee AAR, p. 7 ; 3d Ma r

ComdC, Dec68, p . 5 .

95. TF Yankee AAR, End 41, pp. 7—8 ; Stemple Comments .

96. 3d Mar ComdC, Dec68, p . 5 .

97. Dwyer intvw, p . 44 .

98. Ibid ., p. 45 ; LtGen John H . Hay, Jr., Vietnam Studies: Tactical and

Materiel innovations (Washington, D .C. : Dept of the Army, 1974), p . 39.

99. TF Yankee AAR, End 41, p . 9; 3d Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 5 .

100. TF Yankee AAR, End 41, p . 11 ;

101. Dwyer intvw, pp . 31, 33 .

102. Stemple Comments.

CHAPTER 2 2

THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUI T

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from :

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov—Dec68 ; 11I MAF

ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ; 3d Ma r

ComdCs, Nov–Dec68 ; 4th Mar ComdCs, Nov–Dec68 ; and 9th Ma r

ComdCs, Nov–Dec68 .

Elimination of the Infrastructur e

Additional sources for this section are drawn from : 1st Infl3de, 5t h

InfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 3 1

January 1969, dtd 17Feb69 ; TF Bravo ComdC, 9—31Dec68; 1/3 Comd -

Cs, Nov—Dec68 ; 2/3 ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ; 3/3 ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ;

3d Tk Bn ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ;

3d MarDiv AAR, Napoleon Saline (Draft), n .d . ; 1st Infl3de, 5th 1nfDiv(M) AAR, Napoleon Saline II/Marshall Mountain, dcd 8Apr69 .

1. CGIIIMAF msg to COMUSMACV, did 30Oct68 ; COMUSMACV

msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Nov68, in IIIMAF msg file.

2. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dcd 17JuI68, in III MAF Message File.

3. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Oct68 .

4. 1/9 ComdC, Nov68 .

5. LtCol Walter W. Damewood, Jr. Comments on draft, dtd 31Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File) .

6. 3d Mar OpO 8—68, dtd 12Nov68, in 3d Mar ComdC, Nov68 .

7. 3d Mar OpO 9—68, dtd 21Nov68, in 3d Mar ComdC, Nov68 .

8. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIVCorps, dtd 28Nov68, in 3d MarDi v

Message File, Nov68 .

9. 2/3 ComdC, Dec68 .

10. MajGen Raymond G. Davis, FMFPac debrief, 15Apr69, Tap e

(Oral HistColl, MCHC).

Rough Soldiering

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1/4 ComclCs,

Nov—Dec68 ; 2/4 ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ; 3/4 ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ; 1/ 9

ComdCs, Nov—Dec68 ; 2/9 ComdCs, Nov—Dec68; and 3/9 ComdCs,

Nov—Dec68 .

11. 2/4 ComdC, Dec68 .

12. BGen Joseph E . Hopkins, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

13. Ibid .

14. Col Robert H . Barrow intvw, 12Dec68, Tape 3772 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

15. Ibid.

16. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIVCorps, dtd 26Nov68, in 3d MarDiv Message File, Nov68 .

17. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68 .

18. Ibid .

19 . 9th Mar OpO 1—69, dtd 30Dec68, in 9th Mar ComdC, Dec68.

Thua Thie n

Additional sources for this section are drawn from : HQ, 101 stAb n

Div(AM), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 January 1969, dcd 24Feb69 .

20. James Walters, Comments on draft, did 7Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
NOTES 695

PART V

Supporting the Troops

CHAPTER 2 3

MARINE AIR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE

YEAR AND AIR SUPPORT OF KHE SAN H

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived from

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; HQMC Msg File; HQMC, Status of Forces,

1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967—1968 ; III MAF ComdCs, Jan—Apr68 ;

III MAF Jnl & Msg Files; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan—Apr68 ; Westmoreland

Papers, CMH ; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War ; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966—1968, Vietnam Studie s

(Washington, D .C. : Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, The Wa r

in the Northern Provinces; Cape Moyers S . Shore II, The Battle for Khe San h

(Washington, D.C. : HistBr, G—3Div, HQMC, 1969), hereafter Shore, The

Battle for Khe Sanh; Bernard C . Nalty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe San h

(Washington : Office of Air Force History, 1969), hereafter Nalty, Air

Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh ; Naval Historical Center, Command and

Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War, Colloquium on Contemporary

History, January 23, 1991, No. 4 (Washington, D .C. : Naval Hist Center,

1991), hereafter Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War ;

LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70,"

Naval Review 1971 (Annapolis: U.S . Naval Institute, 1971), pp . 122—55 ,

hereafter McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70 . "

Marine Air at the Beginning of the Yea r

1. McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " pp. 134 an d

155 ; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, p . 1—4 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p .

58a. See also "Distribution of Personnel, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ,

31Dec67, " in Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in Vietnam ,

1967, App G, pp . 319—23 .

2. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 58a ;

HQMC, Status of Forces, dtd 10Jan68, " Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet ,

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, " p. 10—1, hereafter " Distribution of Aircraft," 10Jan68 . Because of the fluctuation of the number of aircraft

from time to time, the figures are taken from the "Distribution of Aircraft," 10Jan68 as reflecting the figures as of that date .

3. MAG—16 ComdC, Jan68 ; " Distribution of Aircraft, " 10Jan68 ;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p . 74 .

4. MAG—16 ComdC, Jan68 .

5. MAG—12 and MAG—13 ComdCs, Jan68 ; " Distribution of Aircraft, "

10Jan68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p . 74 .

6. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 63 ; McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation i n

Vietnam, 1962—70, " p. 131 .

7. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp . 1—4 ; MAG—36 ComdC, Jan68 ; "Distribution of Aircraft, " 10Jan68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p . 74 .

8. VMGR—152 ComdC, Jan68 ; "Distribution of Aircraft," 10Jan68 ;

Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p. 205 ;

McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " p. 132 .

9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 59—60 .

10. Ibid ., pp . 59—60 and 65—66 ; MajGen Norman J . Anderson to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 17Jan68, McCutcheon Papers, PC464 ,

1968 Correspondence, File A .

11. III MAF ComdC, Jan68, p . 27 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 5 ,

59-60 .

12 . FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 68 ; I st MAW ComdC, Jan68 .

Marine Control of Ai r

13. MajGen Norman J . Anderson, Comments on draft, n .d . [Jan95 )

(Vietnam Comment File).

14. McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " p . 132 .

15. CGFMFPac, "Pacific Operations," General Officers Symposiu m

Book, July 1967, Tab F, p . 21, hereafter CGFMFPac, " Pacific Operations; " McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " pp .

134—36 ; Gen Keith B . McCutcheon intvw, 22Apr71 , pp . 1—4, 6 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McCutcheon intvw, 22Apr71 .

16. McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " pp .

134—36 ; McCutcheon intvw, 22Apr71, pp . 1—4, 6 ; Shulimson an d

Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, pp . 151—2 ; Shulimson, U.S .

Marines in Vietnam, 1966, 268—9.

17. Shulimson and Johnson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, pp . 151—2 ;

Shulimson, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp . 268—9 . For the Carey

quote, see LtGen Richard E. Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File) .

18. CGFMFPac, "Pacific Operations," p . 2 1

19. This and the following paragraph are derived from : Shulimson an d

Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, pp . 151—2 ; Shulimson, U.S .

Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp . 268—70 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming ,

U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 200 ; McCutcheon, " Marine Aviatio n

in Vietnam, 1962—70," pp . 134—36 .

20. Col David S . Twining, Comments on draft, dtd 15Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File) .

21. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 200 ;

MACG—18 ComdC, Oct67 and Jan68 .

22. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 200 ;

McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " p . 138 .

23. Ibid . and BGen Earl E . Anderson ltr to MajGen Keith 13 .

McCutcheon, dtd 14Mar68 (McCutcheon Papers PC464, 1968 Correspondence, File A).

24. McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " p . 138 ; 1st

MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp . 2—3—2—4 .

25. McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70, " p . 138 ; 1st

MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp . 2—3—2—4 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming ,

U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 200 .

26. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp . 2—3—2—4 .

27. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp . 66—7 .

28. Twining Comments.

29. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp . 70—1 .

30. CG1stMAW ltr to CMC, dtd 24Apr68, Subj : Single Management ,

Encl 16, HQMC, DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68—15Aug70 ;

MajGen Norman J. Anderson intvw, 17Mar81, pp . 189—90 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar8l ,

and MajGen Norman J. Anderson ltr to BGen Edwin H . Simmons, dt d

8Sep1983 (Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263, MCHC) .
696 THE DEFINING YEA R

Proposed Changes in Command and Control over Marine

Air-Operation Niagara, January 196 8

31. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : MACV Comd -

Hist, 1968, I, pp . 423–4 ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 344 ;

Natty, Air Posner and the Fight For Khe Sanh, pp. 14–5 ; Bernard C. Natty,

"Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh, " Command

and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War, pp . 39–46, hereafter

Natty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh . "

32. McCutcheon intvw, Apr 1971, p . 6 ; Chaisson intvw, 19Mar69, pp .

235–6 ; Natty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Kh e

Sanh," pp . 39–46 ; Gen William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars ,

(WWII, Korea, Vietnam) (Washington, DC : GPO, 1978), pp . 285–7 .

33. MajGen John R. Chaisson intvw, Mar69, pp . 229–30 and 236– 7

(Oral HistColI, MCHC).

34. Ibid . ; Graham A . Cosmas, "General Westmoreland and Control o f

the Air War," in Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietna m

War, pp . 29–36.

35. Westmoreland msg to Sharp, dtd 18Jan68, Doc no. 2, HQMC, DCS

Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–l5Aug70; Gen William C . Westmoreland, USA, intvw, dtd 4Apr83, p . 47 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

36. Sharp msg to Westmoreland, dtd 18Jan68, Doc No . 3, HQMC,

DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70 .

37. Westmoreland msg to Sharp, dtd 21Jan68, Doc No . 4, HQMC, DCS

Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70 ; ComUSMACV msg t o

CG III MAF and CG Seventh Air Force, dtd 22Jan68 (Doc No . 58, III

MAF Incoming Msgs, Dec67–lFeb68) ; MACV ComdHist, pp . 423–4 .

38. Norman Anderson, Memo For the Record, dtd 29Jan68 (Norma n

Anderson Papers, PC 1263, MCHC) .

39. John Schlight, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The Wa r

in South Vietnam, the Years ofthe Offensive, 1965–68 (Washington : Office

of Air Force History, 1988), pp . 277–85, hereafter Schlighc, Years ofthe

Offensive, 1965–68 ; CGIIIMAF msg to Cdr, Seventh Air Force, dtd

24Jan68 (3d MarDiv, Messages, Jan68).

40. Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp . 199–201 ; Schlighc,

Years ofthe Offensive, 1965–68, pp. 277–78 ; Natty, " Operation Niagara,

Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh, " p . 44 ; Natty, Air Power and th e

Fight For Khe Sanh, pp . 72–4.

41. McCutcheon la- to Norman Anderson, dtd 23Jan68, Letter No . 4 5

and Anderson ltr to McCutcheon, dtd 7Feb68, Letter No . 50, File A ,

1968 Correspondence, Box 20 (McCutcheon Papers, PC464), hereafte r

Anderson Its to McCutcheon, 7Feb68 .

Operation Niagara and Air Resupply in the Defense of Khe Sanh

42. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 423–24 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Mar68, p . 3 ; Natty "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege o f

Khe Sanh," pp. 39–46 ; Schlight, Years ofthe Offensive, 1965–68, pp .

277–85 ; Anderson Icr to McCutcheon, 7Feb68 .

43. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp . 423–24 ; Natty, Air Power and the

Fight for Khe Sanh, pp. 83–6 ; Shore, The Battle for Khe Sanh, pp . 101–2 .

44. Shore, Battle for Khe Sanh, pp. 102–3 .

45. Natty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, pp. 82–3 .

46. Ibid ., pp . 86–8 .

47. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 423 ; Shore, Battle for Khe Sanh, p .

101 ; Col William H . Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 65 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC), pp . 21–2 . hereafter, Dabney intvw, 20May82 .

48. Shore, Battle for Khe Sanh, pp . 103–4 ; Natty, Air Power and the Fight

for Khe Sanh, p. 66 ; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar68, p . 2–2 ; Pearson, The

War in the Northern Provinces, pp . 71–2 .

49. Shore, Battle For Khe Sanh, pp . 109–1 1

50. Quoted in Ibid., p . 97 .

51. Natty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, pp . 43–50 .

52. Ibid . p . 62 ; Shore, The Battle for Khe Sanh, 72–4 .

53. Natty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, pp . 44–46 ; Shore, The

Battle for Khe Sanh, 74–6 .

54. LtGen John H . Hay, Jr., USA, Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Materiel

Innovations (Washington, D.C. : Dept of the Army, 1974), pp. 22–23 .

55. III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, 10Feb68 (III MAF Khe San h

Ops File); 1/26 Journal for 10Feb68, Ser No 19 in 1/26 ComdC, Feb68 ,

pt. IV. ; LtCol Johnny O . Gregerson, Comments on "The Battle for Kh e

Sanh," 3Jan69 (Comment File, MCHC); Natty, Air Power and the Fight

for Khe Sanh, p . 35 ; Shore, Battle for Khe Sash, p. 76 ; CWO–4 Henry

Wildfang, Comments on draft, dtd 26Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

56. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p . 30 ; Natty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe

Sanh, p . 45 ; III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 11–12Feb68, Ser. No . 100 ; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, 12Feb68 (111 MAF Khe Sanh Ops File) .

57. LtCol Robert Guay, "The Khe Sanh Airlift," 31Jan69 (1968 Back -

ground File, MCHC), p .4, hereafter, Guay, "The Khe Sanh Airlift ; "

Ray W. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh : Valley of Decision," ms, 1987 (Copy i n

Personal Papers Collection, MCHC), p . 895 .

58. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 30; Shore, Battle for Khe Sanh, pp . 78–9 .

59. This and the next paragraph are derived from the followin g

sources: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp . 83–4 ; Natty, Air Power and the

Fight for Khe Sanh, pp. 51–52 ; Shore, Battle for Khe Sassh, pp . 78–9 . Th e

quote is from Shore, p . 78 . The FMFPac account mentions only a crate

of eggs being included with two of the eggs broken .

60. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p . 30 .

61. Natty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, p . 58; Asst C/S G–3, 1st

MAW memo to CG1stMAW, dtd 12Aug68, Subj : Airlift Support of Kh e

Sanh in Meeting Notes Fldr (1968), MajGen Charles J . Quitter Papers

MCHC, hereafter 1st MAW memo, 12Aug68, "Airlift Support of Kh e

Sanh" (Quitter Papers). Both Nalry and the author of the memo note th e

fragmentary nature of the statistics cited in the text . As the 1st MAW

G–3 wrote, "we have sorted through our many reports—which contai n

some conflicting info and have arrived at the following as our best effort . "

62. Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 65 ; LtCol Harry L. Alderman, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," n .d . (Comment File, MCHC).

63. 3/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 12.

64. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following

sources: MajGen Keith B . McCutcheon, Comments on " The Battle for

Khe Sanh, " not dated (Comment File, MCHC), hereafter McCutcheo n

Comments, Khe Sanh ; BGen Robert P. Keller, Comments on " The

Battle for Khe Sanh, " 17Dec68 (Comment File MCHC); Anderso n

intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 225–6 ; MajGen Norman J . Anderso n

to McCutcheon, dtd 25Feb68, Its no. 60, 1968 cor, File A

(McCutcheon Papers), hereafter Anderson to McCutcheon, 25Feb68 .

65. Additional sources for this paragraph are: 1st MAW OPlan 3–68 ,

dtd 23Feb68, Encl Anderson to McCutcheon, 25Feb68 ; 1st MAW

ComdC, Feb68, p. 2–3 .
NOTES 697

66. An additional source for this paragraph is: BGen Henry W. Hise t o

BGen Alan J . Armstrong, dtd 13Mar68, File A, 1968 Co r

(McCutcheon Papers, PC464, MCHC), hereafter Hise to Armstron g

ltr, Mar68 (McCutcheon Papers) .

67. McCutcheon Comments, Khe Sanh ; Dabney intvw, 20May82, pp .

25—6, 69 ; Hise to Armstrong ltr, Mar68 (McCutcheon Papers) ; 1st

MAW ComdC, Mar68, p . 2—2 .

68. 1st MAW ComdC, Mar68, p . 2—2 ; 1st MAW memo, 12Aug68 ,

" Airlift Support of Khe Sanh " (Quilter Papers); Guay, " The Khe San h

Airlift," pp . 7—8 . Again there is some difference between the 1st MAW

ComdC and the memo in the Quilter papers over the figures on th e

tonnage and passengers lifted out by the helicopters . According to th e

memo, the helicopters lifted 10,677 passengers and 3,379 tons o f

cargo. On the other hand, according to the command chronology, th e

choppers lifted 14,562 passengers and 4,661 tons. The figures in th e

memo are used in the text, as the authors of the memo made som e

attempt to resolve conflicting information .

69. Nalty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh, "

pp 39-46 .

CHAPTER 2 4

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE:

MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGE R

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived fro m

MACV ComdHisc, 1968 ; HQMC Msg File ; HQMC, Status of Forces,

1968 ; HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68—15Aug70 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967—1968 ; III MAF ComdCs, Jan—Dec 1968 ; 1st

MAW ComdCs, Jan—Dec68 ; Cushman intvw, Nov 82 ; MajGen Charle s

J. Quilter Papers, MCHC; Norman Anderson Papers; Anderson inrvw,

3d Session, 17Mar81 ; McCutcheon Papers, MCHC; Westmorelan d

Papers, CMH ; Westmoreland incvw, 1983 ; Chaisson Papers, Hoove r

Institute ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Sharp and Westmoreland ,

Report on the War ; Bernard C . Nalty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh

(Washington : Office of Air Force History, 1969), hereafter Nalty, Air

Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh ; Command and Control of Air Operations i n

the Vietnam War; McCutcheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70 . "

The Establishment of Single Manager

1. Historical Summary, General Entry, 27Dec67—31Jan68, v.28, History File, Westmoreland Papers, CMH, hereafter Westmoreland, General -

Entry, 27Dec67—31Jan68 ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 344 ; Graham A. Cosmas, " General Westmoreland and Control of the Air War, "

Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War, pp . 29—38 .

2. Westmoreland inrvw, dtd 4Apr83, p . 47 . General Westmorelan d

did not recall the dace of this meeting but he did meet with Cushma n

and General Norman Anderson about aviation arrangements on 1 9

January 1968 . See Westmoreland entry for 19Jan68, Historical Summary, Westmoreland Papers, CMH .

3. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp. 33—4 ; Westmoreland incvw, 1983, p .

38 ; Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp . 192, 194—5 ; MajGen

Norman J. Anderson ltr to BGen Edwin H . Simmons, dcd 8Sep83 ,

Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263 (MCHC), hereafter N . Anderson

Icr, 8Sep83 .

4. Westmoreland intvw, 1983, pp. 38—50, quote is on p . 39 .

5. Ibid . p. 42 ; N. Anderson ltr, 8Sep83 ; Anderson intvw, 3d Session ,

17Mar81, pp . 192, 194—5 .

6. BGen John R. Chaisson la to wife, dcd 28Jan68, Chaisson Papers,

Hoover Institute ; Westmoreland, General Entry, 27Dec67—31Jan68 ;

Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp . 194—5 ; Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports, pp. 342—3 .

7. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Historical Summary, 1—29Feb68 ,

pp . 4—5, Fldr 29, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 342—3 ; N. Anderson Itrs to MajGen Keith B .

McCurcheon, dcd 7 and 13 Feb68, Letters Nos . 50 and 58, File A ,

1968 Correspondence, Box 20 (McCutcheon Papers, PC464 )

8. Sharp msg to Westmoreland, dtd 18Jan68, Doc No . 3, HQMC,

DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68—15Aug70 ; Gen Westmorelancl

to LrGen Krulak, dtd 28Jan68, Doc 68, III MAF Incoming Msgs,

Dec67—lFeb68 ; MajGen Norman Anderson, Memorandum for the

Record, dtd 17Feb68, Subj: Control of Air in the Defense of Khe San h

(Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263), hereafter Anderson memo, Control of Air, 17Feb68 .

9. Anderson memo, Control of Air, 17Feb68 .

10. Ibid .

11. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 18Feb68 (III MAF Provision -

al Corps, Vietnam Folder); BGen E . E. Anderson ltr to MajGen K. B.

McCutcheon, dtd 19Feb68, Ltr No . 56, File A, 1968 Correspondence ,

Box 20 (McCuccheon Papers, PC464) .

12. Westmoreland msg to Sharp, did 19Feb68, Doc 7, HQMC, DCS

Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68—15Aug70 .

13. Transcript of III MAF Meeting with General Momyer, n .d .

(20Feb68), Encl, Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft, 18Dec94

(Vietnam Comment File) .

14. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 437 ; ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF,

dtd 7Mar68, Subj : Single Management, Doc 14, HQMC, DCS Air Fold -

er, Single Manager, Jan68—15Aug70 ; ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF,

dtd 22Feb68, Doc No . 13, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 20Feb68—1Mar68 ;

BGen John R . Chaisson, entry 29Feb68, Diary, Jan—Jun68, Chaisso n

Papers, Hoover Institute . .

15. CMC, Memo for the Chairman, JCS, Subj : Single Management ,

did, 21Feb68, Doc 9, and MACV, Memo for the Chairman, JCS, Subj :

Single Management, dtd 24Feb68, Doc 11, HQMC, DCS Air Folder ,

Single Manager, Jan68—15Aug70 .

16. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 344 ; "Chronology of Event s

and Briefing for new CinCPac at HQMC . . ." in Command Relation s

and Air Control in ICTZ, n .d . [May68] Doc 20, HQMC DCS (Air)

Single Manager, Fldr, Jan68—15Aug70, hereafter Chronology o f

Events, Doc 20 ; CGFMFPac msg to CG III MAF, dtd 6Mar68, Doc 2 ,

III MAF Incoming Msgs, 4—14Mar68, hereafter CGFMFPac msg t o

CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Mar68 ; incvw with Sharp quoted in Nalty, Air Power

and the Fight for Khe Sanh, p. 77 .

17. CG1stMAW msg to Krulak and Cushman, dtd 18Mar68, Doc No .

8, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15—27Mar68 ; Schlight, The Years of the

Offensive, 1965—68, p . 285 .

18. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 5Mar68, and cove r

sheet, Doc No. 1, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5—14Mar68 . See als o

ComUSMACV ltr to CG III MAF, dtd 7Mar68, Subj : Single Management, Doc No . 14, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr ,

Jan68—15Aug70, hereafter ComUSMACV Itr, 7Mar68 Single Management; Schlighc, The Years of the Offensive, 1965—68, p . 285 .

19. ComUSMACV ltr, 7Mar68, Single Management .

20. Ibid .
698 THE DEFINING YEAR

21. CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac, did 18Mar68 ,

Doc No. 8, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15—27Mar68, hereafte r

CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac, 18Mar68 .

22. Ibid .

23. Ibid . ; see also CG7thAF to CGIIIMAF, dtd 14Mar68, Doc No . 38 ,

III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5—14Mar68 .

24. CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac, 18Mar68 .

25. MajGen Norman Anderson Itrs to McCuccheon, dtd 19Mar68, Lt r

No . 67, and dtd 4Mar68, Ltr No . 61, File A, McCutcheon Papers,

PC464 .

26. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Mar68 .

27. CMC memo to Joint Chiefs, Subj : Single Management, did

4Mar68, Doc No . 13, and Chronology of Events, Doc 20, HQMC DC S

(Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68—15Aug70 .

28. Admirals Hyland and Moorer are quoted in CGFMFPac msg t o

CMC, dtd 15Mar68, HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68 .

29. Westmoreland intvw, May 1983, p . 39 ; Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, pp . 344—5 . There is some contradiction between the intervie w

and the book. In his book, he makes no mention of a telephone conversation with the President, but does mention discussing the subjec t

with the President in April when on a visit to Washington .

30. Newspaper article quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd

9Mar68, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5—14Mar68 .

31. Ibid . For Cushman and Anderson quotes see cover sheet to th e

FMFPac message . See also CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd

11Mar68, Doc No. 27, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5-14Mar68 .

32. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p . 437 .

33. CG1stMAW to CGFMFPac and CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Mar68, Do c

No. 23, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15-27Mar68 .

34. Ibid .

35. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 26Mar68, in Folder, Memos for th e

Record, 1966-68, hereafter CMC msg 26Mar68, and McCutcheon lt r

to MajGen Norman and BGen E. E. Anderson, dui 26Mar68, Ltr No .

64, File A, 1968 Correspondence, (McCutcheon Papers, PC464), here -

after McCutcheon ltr, 26Mar68 .

Point, Counterpoin t

36. CMC msg 26Mar68 and McCutcheon ltr 26Mar68 .

37. CG1stMAW msg to CGlstMarDiv and CG3dMarDiv, dtd

27Mar68, Doc . No. 33, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15—27Mar68 ;

Anderson draft of msg for Cushman to Westmoreland, n.d. [Apr68 )

[Info to CinCPac], MajGen Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263, here -

after Norman Anderson draft msg for Cushman [Apr68).

38. Norman Anderson draft msg for Cushman [Apr68) .

39. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 10Apr68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar—Jun68 ; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, V, Mar68, pp . 66—7 .

40. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 68 .

41. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 58 .

42. BGen H. W. Hise personal la to MajGen Charles Quitter, dt d

5Apr68, Miscellaneous Fldr, 1950—May68, Charles J . Quitter Papers,

MCHC.

43. CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 5Apr68, Doc No . 36, and

ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 5Apr68, Doc No . 24, III MA F

Incoming Msgs, 29Mar—11Apr68 .

44. McCutcheon ltr to BGen E . E . and MajGen Norman Anderson, dtd

9Apr68, Ltr No . 68, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, PC464 .

See also Gen Leonard F. Chapman intvw, 28 Mar 1979, (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), pp . 70-6 .

45. CMC Green Ltr, 4—68, to all general officers, did 9Apr68, Subj :

Air Control in I Corps, Green Ltr Book, 1968 .

46. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 14Apr68, Doc No . 19, III

MAF Incoming Msgs, 7Mar—13Aug68 .

47. Ibid .

48. Ibid .

49. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dal 4 May68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar—Jun68 ; CG1stMAW ltr to CMC, dtd 24Apr68, Subj : Single

Management, dtd 24Apr68, End 16, H6, HQMC DCS (Air) Singl e

Manager Fldr Jan68—15Aug70, hereafter CG1stMAW la to CMC ,

24Apr68 .

50. CG1stMAW ltr to CMC, 24Apr68 .

51. Ibid .

52. Ibid .

53. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4May68, HQMC Msgs Mar—Jun68 .

54. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 437-9.

55. BGen John R. Chaisson ltr to wife, did 2May68, Chaisson Papers ,

Hoover Institute; MajGen Norman Anderson, draft of Memo for th e

Record, n .d . [2 or 4May68], Subj : Single Management, Norman

Anderson Papers, PC1263, hereafter Norman Anderson draft memo ,

Single Management; CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4May68, HQMC

Msgs, Mar-Jun68 .

56. Norman Anderson draft memo, Single Management .

57. Ibid .

58. Ibid . and CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4May68, HQMC Msgs ,

Mar—Jun68 .

59. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 3May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68 .

60. BGen Homer E. Hutchinson la to McCutcheon, n .d . [May68],

Doc No . 21, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68-15Aug70 .

61. Ibid ., and attached CinCPac Evaluation Team, draft rpt, n .d . [May

1968], Subject: Single Management of Air Support .

62. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 7May1968, HQMC Msgs ,

Mar—Jun68 .

63. MarOpsV, May68, p. 68 ; CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac msgs t o

CMC, dtd 10May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar-Jun68 .

64. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 10May68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar—Jun68 .

65. Ibid .

66. Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp . 202—04 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 60, May68, p . 68 .

67. DepSecDef, Paul H . Nitze memo to Chairman, JCS, dtd 15May68 ,

Subject: OpCon of III MAF Aviation, Assets, Doc No . 17, HQMC

DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68—15Aug70 . Relative to HQMC

presentations to DepSec Nitze, see HQMC, Briefing, Apr68, Doc No .

31, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68—15Aug70 and
NOTES 699

McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Frank C. Tharin, did 24Apr68, Ltr No 37 ,

File T, 1968 Correspondence, McCutcheon Papers, MCHC.

68. Chairman, JCS memo to DepSecDef, dtd 15May68, Subj : Singl e

Management . . ., Doc No . 1 .7, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fld r

Jan68—15Aug70 .

69. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon memo to Gen Leonard F. Chapman ,

Jr., did 1May68, Subj: Air Control, in Fldr, Memos for the Record ,

1966—68 and McCutcheon to MajGen Norman Anderson, dtd 17 Ma y

68, Ltr No . 73, File A, McCutcheon Papers .

70. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 16May68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar—Jun68 ; CMC Memorandum for the JCS, CMCM 29—68, dtd

18May68, Subj : Op Con of III MAF Aviation Assets, Doc No . 18 ,

HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68—15Aug70 .

71. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 25May68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar—Jun68 ; BGen John R . Chaisson, diary entry, 20May68, Chaisso n

Papers, Hoover Institute; JCS msg to CinCPac and ComUSMACV, dt d

20May68, Doc No . 19, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fld r

Jan68—15Aug70 .

72. CGFMFPac msgs to CMC, dtd 21 and 26 May68, and HQMC ,

ATA21 Point Paper, dtd 28May68, Subj : Change to the Single Management . . ., HQMC Msgs, MarJun68 and MarOpsV, May68, pp . 68—9.

73. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, did 26May68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar—Jun68 .

74. Ibid ; LtGen Richard E. Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 ,

(Vietnam Comment File); MajGen Norman J . Anderson, Comments

on draft, n .d . [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File); CGIIIMAF msg t o

CMC, dtd 30May68, HQMC Msgs, MarJun68.

75. ATA21, Point Paper, dtd 28May68, Subj : Change to the Singl e

Management . . . ; CGFMFPac msgs to CMC, dtd 26May68 and

30May68 ; CGIIIMAF msgs to CMC, did 26May68 and 30May68 . All

in HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68 .

76. CGIIIMAF msgs to CMC, dtd 26 and 30 May 68 and CGFMFPa c

msgs to CMC, dtd 26May68, HQMC Msgs, MarJun68.

77. HQMC AAM—7, Talking Paper, dtd 8Ju168, Subj : Air Control i n

Vietnam, in HQMC, General Officers Symposium Book, July 68, hereafter HQMC Talking Paper, Air Control in Vietnam ; ATA21, Point

Paper, dtd 28May68, Subj : Change to the Single Management . .

HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68 ; McCutcheon to Norman Anderson, dtd

3Jun68, Ltr No . 76, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers .

78. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 7 Jun 68, HQMC Msgs ,

Mar—Jun68 .

79. HQMC Talking Paper, Air Control in Vietnam ; CMC to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68, hereafter CMC t o

CGFMFPac, 19Jun68 .

80 . CGFMFPac, 19Jun68 .

The Continuing Debat e

81. BGen John R. Chaisson, debriefing at FMFPac, May68, Chaisson

Transcripts, pp . 147—73, p. 164 .

82. Ibid . and Col Edward L. Fossum, debrief at FMFPac, 11Jul68 ,

Tape No . 2911 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

83. CGFMFPac to CMC, dtd 16Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68 ;

Buse intvw, p . 191 .

84. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 20Jun68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar—Jun68 .

85. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 22Jun68, HQMC Msgs,

MarJun68.

86. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac and CMC, cltd 29Jun68, HQM C

Msgs, Mar—Jun68 .

87. Ibid .

88. CGFMFPac msg to III MAF, dcd 29Jun68 and CMC to CGFMFPac, dal 29Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68 .

89. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 30Jun68, HQMC Msgs ,

Mar—Jun68 .

90. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 62 ; HQMC Talking Paper, Air Control in Vietnam ; McCutcheon to MajGen C . J . Quilter, dtd 15Jul68 ,

Ltr No. 35, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, hereafte r

McCutcheon to Quilter, 15Ju168 .

91. Chronology of Events, Doc 20, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manage r

Fldr, Jan68—15Aug70 ; McCutcheon to Quitter, 15Jul68 .

92. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 27Jul68, HQMC Msgs,

Jul—150ct68 .

93. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : Hutch [BGe n

Homer G. Hutchinson] to McCutcheon, n.d . [Aug68], Ltr No . 48 ,

File H, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers . See also Chapman intvw, p . 76 .

94. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd lOSep68, HQMC Msgs ,

Jul—15Oct68 .

95. For the wing 's initial optimism see A/CS, G—3, 1st MAW mem o

to CGIstMAW, dtd 10Sep68 (Rpts and Letters, Jun—Dec68, Quitte r

Papers). For General Wheeler 's support see CMC msg to CGFMFPac ,

dtd 26Sep68 (HQMC Msgs, Jul—150ct68). General Abrams is quoted

in CGIIIMAF msg to CMC and CGFMFPac and CGFMFPac msg t o

CMC, dtd 8Nov66 (HQMC Msgs, Jul—Dec68) .

96. McCutcheon la to MajGen Charles Quilter, dtd 19Nov68, Ltr No .

39, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers .

97. Charles R . Smith, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, High Mobility and

Standdown (Washington : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1988), pp . 225—6 ;

Graham A . Cosmas and LtCol Terrence P. Murray, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970—71 (Washington : Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1.986), pp .

273—77 ; Bernard C. Nally, " Operation Niagara, Air Power, and th e

Siege of Khe Sanh," in Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War (Washington : NHC, 1991), p . 46 .

CHAPTER 2 5

A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived fro m

MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; HQMC Msg File; HQMC, Status of Forces,

1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967—1968 ; III MAF ComdCs, Jan—Dec

1968 ; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan—Dec68 ; Cushman intvw, Nov 82 ; Maj -

Gen Charles J. Quilter Papers, MCHC; Norman Anderson Papers ;

Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81 ; McCutcheon Papers ,

MCHC; Westmoreland Papers, CMH ; Gen Raymond G . Davis intvw,

2Feb77 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 2Feb77 ; Westmoreland intvw, 1983 ; Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute ; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War;

McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962—70 ; " LtCol William

R . Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962—1973 (Washington : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), hereafter Fails, Marines and Helicopters.
700 THE DEFINING YEA R

Another Debate

1. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp . 45—7 ; Norman Anderson incvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 248-49, 259 .

2. F. Clifton Berry, Jr., Air Cav, The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War

(New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1988), p . 85 ; LtGen Willard Pearson ,

The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966—68 (Washington, DC : Department of the Army, 1975), pp . 78—92 ; Charles R. Smith, U.S. Marines

in Vietnam, High Mobility and Standdown, 1969 (Washington, D .C. :

Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1988), pp . 239—41, hereafter Smith, U .S.

Marines in Vietnam, 1969 .

3. Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17 Mar 1981, pp . 250—51 .

4. Norman Anderson hr to McCutcheon, did 9Mar68, Ltr No . 62, Fil e

A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.

5. BGen E. E. Anderson ltr to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dt d

16Apr68, Ltr No . 70, McCutcheon Papers, File A, 1968 Cor,

McCuccheon Papers; Gen Robert E . Cushman, debriefing at FMFPac ,

Mar69, pp. 470—71 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

6. Westmoreland quoted in MajGen John R. Chaisson intvw,

19Mar69, pp. 223—25 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

7. MajGen Alan J. Armstrong intvw, 25Sep1973, pp. 15—21 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Armstrong intvw; Norman Anderso n

incvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp . 198-99 .

The Need for Lighter Aircraft

8. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Memorandum for the Record, dtd

18Jan68, Subj : Trip Report visit to West Pac with CMC, Jan68 ,

Memos for the Record, 1966-8, McCutcheon Papers.

9. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 1Mar68, Doc no. 50, III MAF

Incoming Msgs, 20Feb68—lMar68 ; CMC msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 1 2

Mar 68, Doc No. 30, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5—14 Mar68, an d

CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, did 30 Mar68, HQMC Msgs, Mar—Jun68 .

10. Fails, Marines and Helicopters, pp. 112–13 .

11. Marine Corps Bulletin 05400, dtd 8Mar68, Subj : Activation of

Fleet Marine Force Aviation Units, Accession No . 127–74–63, Central

Files Records, 1968, Box No. 13, File No . 5400 (1Jan—30Apr68).

12. HML—367 ComdCs, Mar—Dec68 ; HML—167 ComdCs,

Apr–Dec68 ; VMO–2 ComdCs, Jan–Dec68 ; VMO–6 ComdCs,

Jan–Dec68 ; VMO–3 ComdC, Mar68 ; HQMC, Status of Forces, " Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific," p . 10—1, dt d

25Jan68 and 5Dec68 ; Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, p . 238 .

13. LcGen John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961—71 (Washington : Dept o f

the Army, 1973), passim.

14. BGen Henry Hise ltr to BGen A. J. Armstrong, dtd 13Mar68, Ltr

No. 66, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers .

15. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 20Jun68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar–Jun68 .

16. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 49–51 .

17. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Charles Quilter, dtd 19Nov68, Ltr No .

39, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers .

To Keep the Mediums and Heavies Flying

18. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp .

210–11 and Fails, Marines and Helicopters, pp . 101—02, 121–24 ;

McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70," p . 145 . See

also McCutcheon, Memorandum for the Record, dtd 9Feb68, Subj :

Meeting with Mr. William Allen, President, The Boeing Company ,

Memos For the Record, 1966—68, McCutcheon Papers .

19. McCuccheon, " Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70, " p . 145 ;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p . 71 and Dec68, p . 111 .

20. McCuccheon to Norman Anderson dtd 27Feb68, Ltr No . 57 an d

Norman Anderson to McCutcheon, dtd 4Mar68 Ltr No . 61, File A ,

1968 Cor, McCuccheon Papers .

21. Norman Anderson Its to McCutcheon, dtd 4Mar68, Ltr No . 61 ,

File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers .

22. McCutcheon to LtGen V. H. Krulak, dtd 30Apr68, Ltr No . 42 ,

File K, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, hereafter McCutcheon to Krulak, 30Apr68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p . 61 .

23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p . 87 ; H. D . Hill draft ltr for MajGe n

Quilter to McCutcheon, n .d . (Nov-Dec68?), Reports and Letters ,

Jun—Dec68, Quilter Papers.

24. McCutcheon to Krulak, 30Apr68 ; MajGen C. J. Quilter to

McCutcheon, dtd 10Aug68, Ltr No . 31, File Q, 1968 Cor,

McCuccheon Papers; Helicopter Spare Parts Support, Tab A, Item 7 ,

III MAF, Board Report for Utilization, Command and Control of II I

MAF Helicopter Assets (Youngdale Report), dtd 11 and 27Apr6 9

and 17May69, hereafter the entire report will be referred to as th e

Youngdale Report.

25. Helicopter Spare Parts Support, Tab A, Item 7, Youngdale Report .

26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan–Dec68 and 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan–Dec68 .

See especially FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 4 and 56–7 ; Jul68, p . 66 ;

Dec68, pp . 74 and 86—8 ; 1st MAW ComdC, Dec68, p . 10.

27 FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p . 76 ; Dec68, pp . 86—7 .

Another Look at Helicopter Air-Ground Relation s

28. CG1stMAW msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 6Mar68, Doc No . 3, III

MAF Incoming Msgs, 5—14Mar68 ; 1st MAW ComdC, Apr68, pp . 1—4

and 2—4 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 62 ; Cushman incvw, Nov82 ,

pp. 48—9 ; Col John E . Hansen, Comments on draft, dtd 17Nov94

(Vietnam Comment File).

29. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 72, 75—6 .

30. Ibid ., pp . 45—7 .

31. Col William H . Dabney incvw, 20May1982, pp . 43—4 (Oral Hist -

Coll, MCHC). See also Col William H . Dabney, Comments on draft ,

n .d . [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File) .

32. MajGen Norman J. Anderson Itrs to McCutcheon, 12 an d

19Jun68, Ltrs Nos. 79 and 83, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers .

33. MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvws, dtd 1Jan69 and 7Apr69, pp .

294–5, 307–8 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; BGen Homer Dan Hill to

MajGen Norman Anderson, dtd 2Oct68, Ltr No . 51, File H, 196. 8

Cor, McCuccheon Papers, hereafter Hill lcr, 2Oct68 .

34. MajGen Raymond G. Davis incvw, dcd 7Apr69, pp . 308–09 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC).

35. E. E. Anderson to McCuccheon, dtd 30Nov68, Ltr No. 104, Fil e

A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd

19Dec68 and CGFMFPac msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 21Dec68 (HQMC

Msgs, 16Oct–Dec68).

36. McCuccheon to MajGen C. J. Quilter, dtd 27Aug68, Ltr No. 32 ,

File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers; Hill Itr, 2Oct68 . Last quote
NOTES 70 1

from Hill is from Smith, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1969, p. 238 .

37. BGen E. E . Anderson to McCutcheon, dtd 17 Oct 68 [No numbe r

on ltr), File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers and BGen E . E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

38. "Command Relationship," (Col Barrow's submission for broade r

consideration), n .d . [Oct–Dec68?] Undated Notes, Quilter Papers.

39. Ibid .

40. MajGen Raymond G. Davis, Letter to editor, clipping from Marine

Corps Gazette, Feb 1969, Quilter Papers .

41. Ibid .

42. Youngdale Report. For detailed discussion of the Youngdal e

Report see Smith, Marines in Vietnam, 1969, pp . 239—40 .

43. Youngdale Report .

44. Ibid .

45. Armstrong intvw, pp . 14–5 ; LtGen Thomas H . Miller, Jr., Comments on draft ms, Smith, Marines in Vietnam, 1969, dtd 5Sep88 (Vietnam Comment File) .3 .

CHAPTER 2 6

ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANC E

Unless otherwise noted the sources for this chapter are the FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan—Dec68 ; III MAF ComdCs, Jan—Dec68 ; 3d MarDi v

ComdCs, Jan—Dec68 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan—Dec68 ; 11th Ma r

ComdCs, Jan—Dec68 ; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan—Dec68 ; Charles R.

Smith, The History of the 12th Marines, (MCHC, Washington, D.C. ,

1972), hereafter Smith, 12th Marines.

Marine Artillery Reshuffle s

1. 11th Mar ComdC, Jan68 .

2. Ibid .

3. The sources for this and the following paragraph are : CG3dMarDi v

msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Jan68, Encl 13, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 ;

12th Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 1–I1–2 ; Smith, 12th Marines, p . 57 .

4. Additional sources for this paragraph are : 12th Mar ComdC, Jan68 ;

CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 11Jan68, Encl 12, 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Jan68 .

5. LtCol Ralph Moody, "Artillery and Naval Gunfire," Chapter 21, i n

LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al ., " Marines in Vietnam, 1954—68, " 8 pts

(MS, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), p . 34; 11th Mar, Opn Hue

City Resume, 1–29 Feb68, App 2, Tab C, 11th Mar ComdC, Feb68 ;

11th Mar, Hue City Resume, lFeb–2Mar68, App 2, Tab c, 11th Ma r

ComdC, Mar68 .

The Guns in the North

6. Capt Moyers S . Shore, III, The Battle for Khe Sanh (Washington :

Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1969), pp . 42—3 ; Maj Jerry E . Hudson, Com -

ments on " The Battle for Khe Sanh , " 2Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment File ,

MCHC).

7. 26th Mar AAR for Opn Scotland, 31May68, p . 4, in 26th Ma r

ComdC, Mar68, pt . IV.

8. 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan–Mar68 ; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan–Mar68 ;

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 3 .

9. 12th Mar, ComdC, Pt III, Apr68, p . 1–III–1 .

10. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 23–4, Apr68, pp . 23–4 ; 12th Ma r

ComdC, May68, pp . 1–II–2—I–11–4 .

11. Gen Robert E . Cushman intvw, 1Nov82, p . 74 (Oral HisrColl,

MCHC).

12. LtGen Louis Metzger, unpublished manuscript, n .p., n .d ., pp 99–100 .

13. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Mar—Apr68 ; 12th Mar ComdCs,

Mar–May68 .

14. 12th Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 1–III–6–1–111–8 .

Mini-Tet and the Fall of Ngog Tavak and Kham Du c

15. 11th Mar ComdC, Feb–Mar68 ; 2/13 ComdC, Jan–Feb68, p . 6 .

16. 11th Mar ComdC, Apr68, p . 2 .

17. 11th Mar ComdCs, Apr–May68 ; 2/13 ComdCs, Apr–May68 ; Ronal d

H . Spector, After Yet, The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (The Free Press, New

York, New York, 1993), pp . 166–67, hereafter Spector, After Tet .

18. S–4Jnl, 10May68, Encl 1, and CO, 2/13 ltr to CMC, dt d

25May68, Subj: Meritorious Unit Commendation ; recommendatio n

for, and Encl, App 1, S–1 Jnl, 2/13 ComdC, May68, hereafter 2/13 lt r

to CMC, 25May68 ; Spector, After Tet, p . 167 .

19. Paul Drew Stevens, ed ., The Navy Cross, Vietnam, Citations of Awards

to Men of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps,

1964—1973 (Forest Ranch, CA : Sharp & Dunnigan Publications Inc .,

1987), pp . 291—2 .

20. Ibid ., pp. 72–3 .

21. 2/13 Itr to CMC, 25May68 with enclosures; Spector, After Tet, pp .

168-9 .

22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 72 ; Spector, After Tet, pp . 169–71 .

23. Col Franklin L . Smith debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968), Tape

2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; BGen Jacob E . Glick, Comments o n

draft, n .d . [Dec94?] (Vietnam Comment File); Spector, After Tet, pp .

169—75 . For Abrams quote, see Spector, After Tet, p . 175 .

Operations Drumfire II and Thor—Guns Across the Borde r

24. 12th Mar AAR, Opn Drumfire II, dtd 3Jun68, Tab b, 12th Ma r

ComdC, Jun68 .

25. Ibid .

26. Ibid . and CO 12th Marines memo to CG3d MarDiv, dtd 4Jun68 ,

Subj : Addendum to Opn Drumfire II AAR, Tab A, 12th Mar ComdC ,

Jun68 .

27. 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p . 1—11I—7 .

28. CGProvCorpsV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Jun68, Encl 16, 3 d

MarDiv ComdC, Jun68 .

29. ProvCorpsV OpO 15–68, dtd 24Jun68, Encl 18, 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Jun68 .

30. XXIV Corps AAR, Opn Thor, dtd 16Aug68 in 3d MarDiv, US A

After Action Reports, hereafter XXIV Corps AAR ; PCV Preliminary

AAR, Opn Thor, dtd 12Ju168 in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Ju168 ; VMCJ– 1

ComdC, Ju168 .

31. XXIV Corps AAR .

32. 1st MAW ComdC, Jun68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Ju168, pp . 7–10 .

33. 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68 .

34. 1st MAW ComdC, JuI68 .
702 THE DEFINING YEA R

35. III MAF ComdC, Ju168.

36. XXIV Corps AAR.

37. 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68 .

38. 3d MarDiv ComdC, JuI68, p. 38 .

39. XXIV Corps AAR .

40. MACV Comd Hist, 1968, p . 409 .

41. Ibid ., p. 374 .

Fire Base Tactic s

42 .12th Mar ComdC, Dec68, 1–1I–3 .

43. LtCol Joseph Scoppa, III MAF intvw at Fire Base Dice, Dec 1968 ,

Tape 3372 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Scoppa incvw ; 12th Ma r

ComdC, Dec68 .

44. Scoppa intvw.

45. Ibid .

46. Ibid .

47. Ibid .

48. Ibid . and 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68 .

49. Scoppa intvw .

50. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jul–Dec68 .

Marine Reconnaissance Operation s

51. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 31–33 ; 1st MarDiv to III MAF,

resume of telecon, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).

52. Patrol Report, Cayenne B–2–2, dtd 4Jun68, in 1st Recon B n

ComdC, Jun68, pt IV, Tab B–24 .

53. 1st Recon Bn SitRep No . 156–68, p . 3, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC ,

Jun68, (SitReps) (pt 2 of 2 pts) .

54. 1st Recon Bn PatRep, dtd 12Jun68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC ,

Jun68, pt IV, Tab B–52 .

55. 1st Recon Bn PatRep, dtd 16Jun68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC ,

Jun68, pt IV, Tab B–80 .

56. 1st Recon Bn SitRep No . 176–68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC,

Jun68, [SitReps] [2 of 2 pts) and 1st Recon Bn PatRep, dtd 1Ju168 i n

1st Recon Bn ComdC, JuI68, pt IV, Tab B–6 .

57. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, pp. 49–50.

58. Col William D . Kent, incvw by Hist&Mus Div, dtd 27Aug9 1

(Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Kent Tape .

59. Ibid. ; F Clinton Berry, Jr., The Illustrated History of the Vietnam lVar—

Air Cav, (New York and Toronto : Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 86–9 .

60. Kent intvw.

61. Ibid. ; Col Alexander L. Michaux, debriefing at FMFPac, 18Jul68, Tap e

No. 2915 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; LtCol Donald R. Berg, Comments o n

draft, dtd 9Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ; MajGen Raymond G. Davis,

intvw by III MAF, Dec68–Jan69, pp. 284–6 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

CHAPTER 2 7

MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIE S

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from :

HQMC Msg File ; Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relatime, 1956–1967, 12 bks (Washington : GPO, 1971), hereafter Pentagon Papers with appropriate section title and book, and section, volume

or tab, and page number; Commandant's Reference Notebook, here -

after CMC Reference Notebook with appropriate year and tab ; Col

James W. Marsh, USMC (Ret) intvw with Capt David A . Dawson ,

26Feb92, hereafter Marsh intvw ; Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Subj : Strength Report—Vietnam, hereafte r

MACV Strength Report; III MAF ComdCs; Department of Defense,

OASD (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operation and Control, Selected Manpower Statistics, (Washington, D.C.) 1968–1975, hereafter Selected Manpower Statistics with appropriate years; Bureau of Nava l

Personnel, Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Statistics, hereafter

M .C. Personnel Statistics; Marine Corps Personnel Data Bases held b y

the Center for Naval Analyses, hereafter CNA Database ; Headquarters

Marine Corps Central Files, hereafter CF with appropriate year.

The average strength of line battalions was derived by taking the

"average monthly strength" as reported in the command chronology of

every infantry battalion not configured as a BLT in Vietnam for which this

information was available. Average rifle company strength was derived

from the unit diary report closest to the date in question for the first let -

ter company of every battalion in Vietnam, with the exception of battal -

ions for which this information was not available . The average strength of

infantry battalion headquarters and service companies was derived in th e

same manner, using all H&S companies for which information was avail -

able save those in BLTs . The average strength ofregimental headquarters

companies was derived from the unit diary reports of the headquarters

company for every regiment in Vietnam for the dace in question.

1. Marsh intvw. See also DAC/S G–1, Presentation, 14 July 1967 ,

General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, sec G, p . 2 .

2. Gen Leonard F. Chapman incvw, 17Jan79, 28Mar79, p . 66 (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Chapman incvw.

3. MajGen Jonas M . Platt, Comments on draft, dtd 60ct94 (Vietna m

Comment File).

Personnel Turnover

4. Vietnam Manpower Statistics File, RefSec, MCHC .

5. Selected Manpower Statistics, 1975, p . 52 .

6. CMC Reference Notebook 1966–67, Subj : Terms of enlistment.

7. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab I–F, Senate Armed Services

Committee insert for the record .

8. AC/S G–1, Presentation, 14 July 1967, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, sec G, pp. 6–8 .

9. AC/S G–1 Memo to DirPers, Subj : CONUS Divisions Personnel and

Readiness Status FY68–FY69, dtd 2Jan68, CF 68 ; AC/S G–1, Presenta -

tion, General Officers Symposium Book, 8–12 July 1968, sec 1, pp . 9–10 .

10. Dep Dir Personnel Memo to CMC, Subj : Status of Military Personnel Procurement Results for FY68 (as of 30 June 1968), dt d

17JuI68, Encl 1, CMC Reference Notebook 1968 .

11. Insert for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, 20Feb68 ,

cab I–F, CMC Reference Notebook 1968 ,

12. AC/S G–1 memo to DirPers, Subj : CONUS Divisions Personne l

and Readiness Status FY68–FY69, 2Jan68, CF 68 .

13. CMC Reference Notebook 1970, Personnel, Subj : Enlistmen t

Standards and Periods of Enlistment, 17Nov70; Selected Manpower Statistics, 1975 .
NOTES 703

14. DepDirPers Presentation, General Officers Symposium 1968, ta b

J, p. 2 .

The Quality Issue and Project 100,00 0

15. Homer Bigart, "McNamara Plans co 'Salvage' 40,000 Rejected i n

Draft, " The New York Times, 24Aug66, pp . 1, 18 .

16. Memo, Subj: Enlistment of Marginal Personnel, n .d ., p . 2, Fil e

1100, CF 67 .

17. Janice H . Laurence and Peter F. Ramsberger, Low-Aptitude Men in

the Military : Who Profits, Who Pays? (New York : Praeger, 1991), p . 23 .

18. Telephone intvw between Thomas D . Morris and Capt David A .

Dawson, 24May91 .

19. CMC Reference Notebook 1969, Subj : Enlistment of Margina l

Personnel—Project 100,000 ; AC/S G—1 Presentation, General Officers

Symposium Book, 1969, sec E, p 20 .

20. Mark J. Eitelberg et al ., Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education

Criteria for Military Entry (Washington, D .C. : Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], 1984),

pp . 138, 147 .

21. CMC Reference Notebook 1966—67, 1970, 1974 .

22. Office of the Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Annual Report of th e

Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower Program for 1951—195 2

and FY 1953 .

23. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserv e

Affairs), Characteristics and Performance of New Standards Men : Fina l

Report, June 1971, Table A—3, A—6 (HumRRO Collection).

24. Lewis B. Puller, Jr., Fortunate Son, The Autobiography of Lewis B.

Puller, Jr. (New York, New York : Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), pp. 77—8 .

25. LtCol Howard Lovingood intvw with Capt David A . Dawson ,

17May91 .

Trainin g

26. CMC Reference Notebook, 1965—1968 .

27. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, Subj : Basic Specialist Training ,

8Jan68 .

28. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, Subj: Recruit Training (Including

Changes to Accommodate SEAsia), 26Apr68 .

The Search for Junior Leader s

29. See Bernard C. Natty and LtCol Ralph F. Moody, A Brief History of

U. S. Marine Corps Officer Procurement (Washington, D .C. : Hist Div,

HQMC, 1970, rev ed), hereafter Nalty and Moody, Officer Procurement ,

for a description of the commissioning of senior NCO's as temporary

officers during these conflicts.

30. Based on data from M.C. Personnel Statistics . On 31 December 1967 ,

the Marine Corps had 6,326 first lieutenants on active duty . Of these,

3,800 were ground officers, and 3,493 had more than four years enliste d

service . Since almost all of the 4,059 temporary officers should have been

first lieutenants by this time, almost all of the first lieutenants with mor e

than four years enlisted service must have been temporary officers . This

is further supported by the fact that only 453 captains and 133 secon d

lieutenants had more than four years enlisted service at this time, for a

total of 4,079 company grade officers . Even allowing for casualties, othe r

attrition, and the possibility of promotion from second lieutenant t o

major in less than three years, temporary officers accounted for some -

where on the order of 3,200—3,350 first lieutenants. Since all temporary

officers were ground officers, the bulk of ground-assignable first lieu -

tenants must have been temporary officers.

31. Nalty and Moody, Officer Procurement, pp . 23—24 .

32. Gen Wallace M . Greene Itr to LtGen James M . Masters, Sr., dtd 3 1

Aug67, CF67 File 5000/5 .

33. Nalty and Moody, Officer Procurement, p . 22 .

34. DAC/S G—1 Presentation, General Officers Symposium Book ,

1967, tab G, p . 3 .

35. Director, Policy Analyses Division memo to Chief of Staff, Subj :

Questions Asked by CMC in a Review of Second Draft of SecNav

Posture Statement, dtd 22Jan68, CF 68 .

36. AC/S G—1 Presentation, General Officers Symposium Book, 1969 ,

tab E, p . 16 .

37. MCBuI 5430, Subj : Activation of Career Advisory Branch, 8Apr6 8

and HQBuI 5400, Subj : Activation of Career Advisory Branch ,

12Apr68, both in CF 68

Disciplin e

38. CGistMarDiv msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 8Apr68, End 4, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68 .

39. DivBul 5100, Subj: Accidental discharges, 24Aug68, End 15, 1st

MarDiv ComdC, Aug68 .

40. DivBul 5100, Subj : Careless Discharge of Weapons, 24Oct68, End

19, 1.st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68 .

41. 1st MarDivO 5101 .2A, Subj : Weapons Safety, 4Mar69, 1st Mar -

Div ComdC, Mar69 .

42. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab I—K, Subj: Marijuan a

involvement on the part of Marines, 21May68 .

43. Talking Paper: Narcotics, Dangerous Drugs and Marijuana, p . 5 ,

tab Y, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968 .

. Charles R. Anderson, Vietnam : The Other War .44 (Novato, California :

Presidio Press, 1982), p . 45, hereafter Anderson, Vietnam : The Other War .

45. Ibid ., p . 2 2

46. Ibid, p . 21—22 .

47. Ibid ., p . 23 ; LtCol Gary D. Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam : Trial By Fire, (Washington, D.C. : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1989),

p . 114 ; Maj Donald E. Milone, Comments on draft, n .d . [Dec94 ]

(Vietnam Comment File).

48. The earliest racial incident recorded in HQMC files occurred i n

August 1968 . Presumably there were racial incidents before this date ,

but this appears to be when HQMC began trying to keep track of racia l

incidents. CMC Reference Notebook 1972, Key Issue Paper, Subj :

Equal Opportunity and Racial Unrest/Violence, n .d .

49. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, personal for LtGen Buse from Ge n

Chapman, dtd 17Oct68, HQMC Msg File .

50. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtcl 22Oct68, HQMC Msg File .

51. Quoted in Otto J. Lehrack, No Shining Armor (Lawrence, Kansas:

University Press of Kansas, 1992), p . 326 .

Moral e

52. MajGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 14Nov84 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Hoffman intvw, p . 160 .
704 THE DEFINING YEA R

53. See Anderson, Vietnam : The Other War, Chapter 3 .

54. Ibid ., p. 2 .

55. R&R figures from III MAF ComdCs, 1968 .

56. Most Vietnam autobiographies and novels mention the disdain hel d

by front line men for those in the rear. Examples include James Webb's

Fields of Fire (Englewood Cliffs, N .J. : Prentice-Hall, 1978), Gustav Hasford's The Short Timers (New York : Harper & Row, 1979), and Philip

Caputo's A Rumor of War (New York : Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston ,

1977). Charles R . Anderson, in Vietnam: The Other War, discusses the guil t

felt by rear area troops (pp. 20—21) and also the desire of men who hav e

been in combat to find and keep these comfortable jobs (pp . 19—20) .

57. Hoffman intvw, p . 138 .

58. Col Robert D Heinl, USMC (Ret), Dictionary of Military and Naval

Quotations (Annapolis, MD : U.S . Naval Institute, 1966), p . 22 .

59. BGen R. R. Van Stockum, DepSrMbr, Navy Dept Board of Deco -

rations and Medals Presentation, tab W, p . 2, General Officers Sympo -

sium Book, 1968 .

60. Ibid .

61. For a discussion of the problems associated with men in combat

without a realistic rotation plan, and the benefits of such a plan, se e

Samuel A . Stouffer et al ., The American Soldier (Princeton, New Jersey :

Princeton University Press, 1949), 2 vols, v. 2, Chapters 2 and 8 .

62. For a discussion of how long men can stand sustained combat, see

Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), pp . 276–277 . Lord Moran, in The Anatomy of Courage (Lon -

don : Constable & Company, 1945) also argues that the effects of combat are cumulative, and that every man has a breaking point .

63. Lt Ted D. Kilpatrick, MSC, USNR, and Harry A. Grater, Jr. ,

"Field Report on Marine Psychiatric Casualties in Vietnam, " Military

Medicine, October 1971, p . 809 .

The Aviation Shortage

64. LtCol William R. Fails, USMC, Marines and Helicopters 1962—197 3

(Washington, D.C. : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), p . 61, hereafter

Fails, Marines and Helicopters.

65. News Release No . 923—57, DoD Office of Public Information ,

"NavCads Will No Longer Be Commissioned Early ; Must Complet e

18-Month Flight Training Course," 17Sep57, in Aviation : Pilot Training file, RefSec, MCHC.

66. News Release No. 414–55, DoD Office of Public Information ,

"Marine Corps Announces New Aviation Officer Candidate Course, "

1May55 and " Marine Aviation Flight Training, " July 1957, in Aviation : Pilot Training file, RefSec, MCHC.

67. Fails, Marines and Helicopters, p . 65 ; News Release No. 786–59,

DoD Office of Public Information, " Marine Aviation Cadets Begi n

Training at Pensacola," 11JuI59, in Aviation : Pilot Training file, RefSec, MCHC .

68. Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, Presentation, p . 6, tab VI.A ,

General Officers Symposium Book, 1965 .

69. Fails, Marines and Helicopters, p . 138 ; note 9 .

70. Ibid ., pp . 129—130 .

71. Ibid ., p . 139 .

72. BGen E. E. Anderson, Memo for the Record, Subj : Telecon with

LtGen V. Krulak, dtd 6Jan68, Norman J. Anderson Papers; CGFMFPac

msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 10Jan68, III MAF Incoming Msgs ; MajGen Norman J. Anderson intvw, 17Mar8l ., pp . 254—56 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

73. DepDir Pers, Presentation, tab J, pp . 3-4, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968 .

74. MajGen Carl A . Youngdale ltr to Commanding General, II I

Marine Amphibious Force, Subj : Board to Consider the Utilization ,

Command and Control of Marine Corps Helicopter Assets in Ill MAC,

dtd 27Apr69, Encl (2), pp. 20—22, hereafter Youngdale Board .

75. Fails, Marines and Helicopters, p . 141 .

76. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon Itr to MajGen William G. Thras h

et al ., Subj: Graduation of Marine Officers from U .S . Air Force Fligh t

Schools, dtd 14Feb68, and MajGen McCutcheon ltr co BGen E. E.

Anderson, dtd 100ct68, ltr No . 93, both in McCutcheon Papers, Box

20, PC464, MCHC ; DCS Air Presentation, pp . 11–13, tab G, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968 .

77. DCS Air Presentation, p . 24, tab I, General Officers Symposium

Book, 1969 .

78. Fails, Marines and Helicopters, p . 140 .

79. DC/S Air memo to ACS, G—1, Subj : Manpower Overage for Occupational Field (OF) 63, dtd 12Apr68 (CF 68 file 5310) .

80. Youngdale Board, p. 20 .

81. Ibid ., pp . 20, 22 .

82. Ibid, p . 20 .

Filling the Ranks in Vietnam

83. Unless otherwise noted, the number of Marines in Vietnam is take n

from page 14—1 of the HQMC Command Center, Status of Forces .

84. "U .S . Ground Strategy and Force Deployments," Dept of Defense ,

Pentagon Papers, bk 5, sec IV—C—6, vol . 2, pp. 213—214 .

85. Ibid ., pp . 148, 150 .

86. Ibid ., p . 218 .

87. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 270ct67, and CGFMFPac

msg to CMC, dtd 9Mar68 ; in HQMC Msg Files. MCBuI 1 .300, Subj :

Tour Lengths for Personnel Attached to Fleet Marine Force Units i n

the Far East, dtd 240x68, CF 1968, File 1300 .

88. CMC ltr to CG MCB Camp Pendleton and CG MCB Camp Lejeune, Subj : Retraining of Personnel into Occupational Field 03, di d

5Jun67, CF 1967, file 1500 .

89. Staging Battalion ComdC, Jul–Dec 1967, pp . 3—4, JanJun 1.968 ,

p . 3, in Camp Pendleton ComdC, Jul–Dec67 .

90. MACV Strength Report for 31 Dec 1967, dtd 24 Jan 68, pp . 1—3 ,

104—119.

91. KIA from Vietnam casualty reference file prepared by MGySgt H .

G . Lock, drawn from the information kept at the Vietnam Veteran s

Memorial. WIA from CMC Reference Notebook, 1968, tab II—A ,

Subj : USMC Casualties SEAsia, n .d .

The Deployment of Regimental Landing Team 2 7

92. The discussion on the high-level manpower policy in this sectio n

is drawn in part from Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1977), pp . 92—104 .

93. JCS msg to CMC, dtd 13Feb68, tab F, G—3, HQMC, 27th Marine s

Deployment .
NOTES 705

94. CMC msg to CG FMFPac, dtd 13Feb68, in G—3 HQMC, 27t h

Marines Deployment file .

95. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Feb68, in HQMC G—3 file, 27t h

Marines Deployment ; 5th Mar Div, RLT 27 Deployment AAR, dt d

8May68, hereafter RLT 27 Deployment AAR.

96. Arrival date for Co B (rein), 5th Tank Battalion, embarked on th e

USS Thomaston (LSD 28), taken from HQMC, Status of Forces,

3Dec68, p . 18—8 .

97. The section on the deployment of RLT 27 has been drawn from th e

27th Mar ComdCs and 1/27 ComdCs ; the HQMC, G—3, 27th Marine s

Deployment folder ; RLT 27 Deployment AAR ; the General Officer s

Symposium Book, 1968 ; and the unit diaries of the appropriate units.

98. LtGen Adolph G . Schwenk intvw 23Jun82, p . 19 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

99 . General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, cab I, p. 4 .

Reserve Callup ?

100. "U .S . Ground Strategy and Force Deployments," Pentagon Papers,

bk 5, sec IV—6—C, vol . 3, p . 11 .

101. Ibid ., p . 15 .

102. Chapman intvw, p . 26 .

103. General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, tab H, p. 2—3 ; CMC

Reference Notebook 1968 tab VI—B—3—a, Subj : Marine Corps Reserve

Units to be Activated upon Mobilization, 24Jan68 .

104. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab VI—B—3—c, Subj : Readiness

of 4th Division/Wing Team, 24Jan68 ; General Officers Symposium

Book, 1969, tab E, p . 26 .

105. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, cab VI—B—3—a, Subj : Marine

Corps Reserve Units to be Activated Upon Mobilization, 24Jan68 ;

Hist Div, Joint Secretariat, JCS, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960—1968, "

pc 3, 1Jul70, Chapter 49, p. 15 ; General Officers Symposium Book ,

1968, cab D, pp . 14—15 .

106. General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, tab D, p . 15 ; CMC Reference Notebook, tab VI—B—3—c, Subj : Readiness of 4t h

Division/Wing Team, 24Jan68 .

107. " U .S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, " Pentagon Papers,

bk 5, sec IV—C—6, vol . 3, pp. 71—78 .

The Bloodiest Month, The Bloodiest Yea r

108. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3d MarDiv, CG1stMarDiv, dcd 20May68 ,

HQMC Msg File .

109. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23May68, HQMC Msg File .

110. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Jun68, HQMC Ms g

File.

l i i . AC/S G—3, Presentation, cab D, p . 8, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968 .

112. Staging Battalion ComdC, Jul—Dec 68, p . 1—2 .

113. CGFMFPac msg dcd 12Sep68, quoted in CMC Vietnam Chronology, p . 748 .

114. LtGen Henry W. Buse, CGFMFPac, Presentation, cab M, pp .

14—15, General Officers Symposium Book, 1969 .

115. Data on KIA/MIA from file by MGySgt Lock, and USMC Separa -

Lion Database at the Center for Naval Analyses; data on WIA fro m

CMC Reference Notebook 1968, cab II—A, Subj : tab A, USMC Casualties SEAsia, 26Feb69, and L . A . Palinkas and P. Coben, Combat Casualties Among U .S. Marine Corps Personnel in Vietnam 1964—/972, report no .

85—11 (San Diego, California: Naval Health Research Center, 1985).

Foxhole Strength : Still Too Few Marine s

116. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 5Mar68, HQMC Msg File .

117. Col C. J. Robichaud debrief by FMFPac, 3Jun68, Tape 281 3

(Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col William L. Dick debrief FMFPac ,

21Ju168, tape 3036, Oral HistColl, MCHC). Both officers had recently returned from tours with the 3d Marine Division ; Col Robichaud

served as Commanding Officer, Task Force Robbie, and Col Dick as

DC/S, Plans.

118. LtGen John E . McLaughlin intvw, 180ct78, p. 39 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McLaughlin intvw.

119. Marsh intvw .

120. McLaughlin intvw, pp . 13—14 .

121. CGFMFPac msgs to CMC, dtd 22Jul68 in HQMC Msg File .

122. CGFMFPac msg to CGFMFPac (Fwd) (for General Chapman

(CMC)), dtd lAug68, in HQMC Msg File .

123 . Staging Battalion ComdC, Jul—Dec 68, p . 4 .

The Return of RLT 2 7

124. Impact Assessment re : Marine Corps SEA Forces, p . 9, encl, CMC

memo to DepSecDef, Subj : Marine Corps Strength and Structure ,

attached to CMC msg to CG FMFPac and CG 111 MAP, dtcl 20ct68 ,

in MCEO File .

125. " U .S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, " Pentagon Papers,

bk 5, sec 1V—C—6, vol . 3, p . 71 .

126. HQ, 1st Bde, 5th InfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lesson s

Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, pp . 1—2 .

127. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab II—E, Key Issue Paper, Subj :

Redeployment of RLT 27 .

128. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 24Jan68, HQMC Msg File .

129. JCS msg co CinCPac, dtd 23Jul68, tab N, G—3, HQMC, RLT 2 7

Redeployment file, hereafter RLT 27 Redeployment File .

130. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV dcd 26Jul68, tab N, RLT 2 7

Redeployment File .

1.31 . ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 28Ju168 and JCS msg t o

CMC and CinCPac, dtd 10Aug68, tab N, RLT 27 Redeployment File .

132. CMC msg to CGMarCRecruitDep San Diego, dtd 6Sep68, ta b

HH, RLT 27 Redeployment File .

133. See all public announcements, speeches, and press guidance

included in G—3, HQMC, RLT 27 return to Conus File, hereafter RLT

27 return to Conus File .

134. The number of returnees is based on AAR, Chronologica l

Sequence of Events of the Return and Recognition of Regimenta l

Landing Team 27, n .d ., p . 7, tab A ; Memo for Record, Subj : RLT—2 7

Return, 20Sep68, tab JJ; End 2, p . 2, no cover document, tab EE ; al l

in RLT 27 return to Conus File .

The End of the Yea r

135. Thomas C. Thayer, eel ., Forces and Manpower—A Systems Analysts
706 THE DEFINING YEA R

View of the Vietnam War 1965—1972, vol . 2, Office ofthe Assistant Sec -

retary ofDefense (Systems Analysis), 18Feb75, pp . 160-167 .

136. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, 10Sep68 ; CGFMFPac msg co CMC

n .d . ; CMC to CGFMFPac dtd 2Occ68 ; CMC to CG FMFPac dtd

23Nov68 ; all in HQMC Msg File.

137. CMC msg co CGFMFPac, dtd 14Nov68, HQMC Msg File .

138 . HQMC, Status of Forces, 2Jan69, p . 14—1 .

The Marine Corps and the Draft

139. BGen Raymond G . Davis, AC/S G—1, Presentation, tab V.A.1, p .

4, General Officers Symposium Book, 1965 .

140. Marsh intvw ; LtCol Richard J. Alger, intvw with Capt David A .

Dawson, 16Jan92 .

141. General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, cab I, pp. 5—7 ; The

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) figure

given at this Symposium is 304,500, but MajGen J . M. Platt made it

clear that this figure was still under discussion . CMC Reference Note -

book 1968, tab II—F, SecNav Summary, 3Jun68, shows 306,408 as th e

budgeted strength for the Marine Corps .

CHAPTER 2 8

BACKING UP THE TROOP S

A Division of Responsibility

1. Col Rex O . Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietna m

Comment File), hereafter Dillow Comments; Draft of III MAF report

on Logistics for General Officers Symposium, Ju168, n .d . [Jun68],

Encl, Dillow Comments, hereafter III MAF Report on Logistics.

2. FLC ComdC, Feb68, tab J, Encl 2, p . 6 .

3. Ibid ., Jan68, Encl 1, p . 6 .

4. Gen Westmoreland msg to Gen Wheeler and Adm Sharp, dt d

9Feb68, Encl, Joel D . Meyerson, Chief, Operational History Branch ,

CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Meyerson Comments.

5. Meyerson Comments .

6. ACS G—4, III MAF to Force Informational Services Officer, Subj :

Northern I Corps Logistics, n .d . [Mar—Apr68], Encl, Dillow Comments,

hereafter Northern I Corps Logistics; III MAF Report on Logistics .

7. LtCol Ralph F. Moody, Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S.

Shore II, "Backing Up the Troops" in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al .,

"Marines in Vietnam, 1954—68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington ,

D .C., 1971), pt VII, p . 22—16, hereafter Moody, Donnelly and Shore ,

"Backing Up the Troops " ; BGen E . E. Anderson to MajGen Keith B .

McCutcheon, dtd 19Feb68, Letters No. 56, File A, 1968 Correspondence, Box 20 (McCutcheon Papers, PC464 )

8. U.S . Army Support Command Da Nang (Prov), Operational Report

for Period ending 30Apr68, dtd 18May68, Encl, Meyerson Comments ,

hereafter Army Support Comd, Da Nang, Opn Apr, dtd 18May68 ,

Meyerson Comments.

9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p . 75 .

10. FLC ComdC, Jan68, tab E, Encl 2, pp . 6—8 .

11. FLC ComdC, Feb68, Encl 1, pp . 5—7 .

12. FLC ComdC, Mar68, tab D, Encl 2, p. 4 .

13. FLC ComdC, Apr68, End 1, pp . 7—8 .

14. Northern I Corps Logistics.

15. Moody, Donnelly and Shore, "Backing Up the Troops," p . 22—15 ;

III MAF Report on Logistics; Dillow Comments.

16. Moody, Donnelly and Shore, "Backing Up the Troops," p . 22—16 ;

CG III MAF ltr to ComUSMACV, Subj : Performance ofDuty by BGe n

George H. McBride . . . [USA], n .d . [Jul68], Encl, Dillow Comments ;

Meyerson Comments ; Army Support Comd, Da Nang, Opn Rpt, dtd

18May68, Meyerson Comments.

17. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dtd 24Mar68, Encl, Meyerso n

Comments.

Naval Logistic Support

Additional sources for this section are : Naval Support Activity, Da

Nang, Command History 1968, n .d . [1969] (OAB, NHD, Comd File

Post 1Jan46), hereafter NSA, Da Nang, ComdHist 68 ; Task Force

Clearwater, Command History, Feb68 JuI70 (OAB, NHD, Comd Fil e

Post 1Jan46), hereafter TF Clearwater, ComdHist, 68—70; VAdm

Edwin B. Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance, A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965—1968 (Washington : Naval

Historical Division, 1972), hereafter Hooper, Mobility, Support ,

Endurance ; Edward J. Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, An Illustrated History of the U .S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia (Washington, D .C.:

Naval Historical Center, 1994), hereafter Marolda, By Sea, Air, and

Land; Cdr Frank C. Collins, Jr., USN, "Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps," Reprinted from Naval Review; 1971, in The Marines

in Vietnam, 1954—1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, D .C. : Hist & Mus Div, 1974) (reprinted in 1983), pp.

230—53, hereafter Collins, "Maritime Support of the Campaign in I

Corps. "

18. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S. Marines in 1967, pp. 231—32 ;

Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, p . 251 .

19. NSA, Da Nang, ComdHist 68 ; Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, p.

162 .

20. NSA, Da Nang, ComdHist 68 ; Hooper, Mobility, Support ,

Endurance, p. 74 .

21. NSA, Da Nang, ComdHist 68 ; Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, p .

251 .

22. TF Clearwater, ComdHist, 68—70, pp . 1—2 ; Marolda, By Sea, Air,

and Land, pp . 186—8 .

23. TF Clearwater, ComdHist .

24. Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, p . 240 .

25. "Typical Disposition of 100 Wounded," HQMC, Status of Forces,

dtd 30Dec68, p . 20—2 .

26 . Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, pp . 244—50 .

Marine Engineers

27. 3d Engr Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

28. 1st Engr Bn ComdC, Jan68 .

29. Company A, 1st Engr Bn, CAAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 24Mar68 ,

cab A, and Company B, 1st Engr Bn, CAAR, Opn Hue City, dt d

15Mar68, tab B, 1st Engr Bn, ComdC, Mar68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Dec68, pp . 105—6 .

30. 11th Engr Bn ComdCs, Mar—Apr68 .
NOTES 707

31. 1st Engr Bn ComdC, Jul68 .

32. 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Apr–Dec68 .

33. 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jun–Dec68 ; 7th Engr Bn ComdCs,

May–Dec68 ; C. A. Rocco memo to CO 7th Engr Bn, Subj : Completion of Barrier Project, dtd 23 Aug68, End, LrCol Themistocles T.

Annas, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Commen t

File); Charles R. Smith, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, High Mobility an d

Standdown, 1969 (Washington, D.C. : Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1988) ,

p. 201 .

The FLC Continues to Cop e

34. FLC ComdC, Mar68, tab E, End 2, p . 6 .

35. FLC ComdCs, Apr68, cab E, End 2, pp . 6–7, and May68, tab E,

End 2, p. 6 .

36. FLC ComdC, Jun68, cab E, End 2, pp . 6–8 .

37. FLC ComdCs, Aug68, tab E, pp . 6–7, and Oct68, p. 7 .

38. FLC ComdC, Nov68, End 1, p . 8 .

39. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p . 90 .

PART VI

Other Perspectives: Pacification and

Marines Outside of III MA F

CHAPTER 29

PACIFICATION

Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this chapter are : MAC V

ComdHist, 1967 ; MACV ComdHist, 1968 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV wit h

specific month ; III MAF ComdCs, Dec67—Jan68 ; A&S Files, Indochi -

na Archives; Krulak, First to Fight ; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on

the War; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports ; Shulimson and Johnson, U.S .

Marines in Vietnam, 196 .5 ; Shulimson, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966 ;

Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967 .

Prelud e

1. Robert J . Komer, Bureaucracy at War, U .S. Performance in the Vietna m

Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 113, hereafter,

Komer, Bureaucracy at War; for the figures on CAP strength see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p . 64 .

2. For the Marine system, see Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam,

1966, pp . 256—58 ; for the first quote see Richard Hunt, " Pacificatio n

and Counter-Insurgency, " in Vietnam Historians Workshop, Plenary Session (Washington : Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 9 May 1983), p . 4 ; for th e

second quote see Thomas C . Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American

Experience in Vietnam (Boulder, Colo : Westview Press, 1985), pp 4–5 ,

hereafter Thayer, War Without Fronts.

3. For this and the following paragraph, see FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Dec67, p . 49 ; 3d MarDiv, Topic No. 6, Psychological Operations, 3 d

MarDiv Working Papers, Input to III MAF Campaign Plan Quarterl y

Review, n .d [Dec67], End 78, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 .

4. This and the following four paragraphs are drawn from Shulimson ,

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966. pp . 243-45 .

5. Ibid ., pp . 249—50 ; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S . Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 184 ; MajGen Raymond L . Murray intvw, 1975, pp.

18—9 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Murray intvw.

6. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp . 165—6 .

7. Ibid ., 159—61 ; Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp . 44—5 .

8. Shulimson, U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp . 44–5 ; Thomas C.

Thayer, OASD (SA) RP Southeast Intelligence Division, editor, A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965—72, v. 10, Pacification and

Civil Affairs (Springfield, VA : National Technical Information Service ,

Dept of Commerce, 1975) ADA 039317, pp . 47 and 49, hereafter ,

Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10 .

9. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, pp . 118–19 ; Westmoreland, A Soldie r

Reports, pp . 214–15 .

10. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 215 .

11. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, pp . 41 and 1.17—19 .

12. Shulimson, Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p . 254 ; MACV ComdHist ,

1967, pp . 318 and 320 .

13. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p . 320 ; MACV ComdHist, 1968, 1, pp .

561–2 ; Komer, Bureaucracy at War, pp . 33—5 .

14. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p . 320; MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp .

13–7 .

15. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 12Oct67, HQMC Msg File .

16. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 21Oct67, HQMC Msg File .

17. Ibid .

18. Ibid .

19. Ibid .

20. Ibid .

21. MACV ComdHist, 1968, 1, p . 519 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p .

53 ; Thayer, War Without Fronts, pp . 142—3 .

22. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p . 519 .

23. For an official opinion that the "crossover point" had been reached ,

see MACV J—2 estimate cited in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dc d

24Aug67, HQMC Msg File . Relative to the removal of the two categories, see MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, 24Nov67, quoted in Thayer, War Without Fronts, p . 31 and the discussion in Chapter 1 .

24. Thayer, War Without Fronts, pp . 30, 33, and 208—09 ; MACV

ComdHist, I, p . 544 .

The Tet Offensives and Operation Recovery

25. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 52 and Dec68, p . 53 ; MACV Comcl -

Hist, I, pp . 520, 536, 539, 541 ; Patrick J. McGarvey, untitled ms,

Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University, Chapter 6, p . 41 .

26. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp . 520, 536, 539, 542-44 .

27. The source for this and the following paragraph is: FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 30–2 .

28. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, 539 .

29. Ibid ., pp . 554–55 ; Thayer, War Without Fronts, p . 169.

30. MACV, ComdHisc, 1968, I, p . 520 .

31. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, p . 30 .

32. Ibid .

33. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp . 554–5 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV,

Dec68, pp . 59–60 .
708 THE DEFINING YEAR

34. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 521, 525—6 .

35. MarOpsV, Dec68, p . 54 ; Maj Edward F Palm, Comments on draft ,

dtd 28May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Palm Comments .

36. Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10, pp. 10—2 .

37. Ibid ; 1st MarDiv ltr to dist list, Subj : Restoration of Vietnam RR ,

dcd 1Aug68, and attachments, End 1, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Aug68 ; III

MAF Fact Sheet, Subj : Da Nang-Hue Railroad, dtd 15Oct68, in II I

MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct—4Nov68, hereafter III MA F

Da Nang-Hue Railroad Fact Sheet, 15Occ68 .

38. III MAF Da Nang-Hue Railroad Fact Sheet, 15Oct68 ; III MA F

ComdC, Nov68, p . 30 ; III MAF ComdC, Dec68, pp . 31—2 ; MACV

ComdHist, 1968, I, p . 544 .

III MAF and Pacificatio n

39. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, p . 59 .

40. Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., intvw, 1Nov82, 49—50 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Cushman incvw, 1982 .

41. MajGen Norman J . Anderson, incvw, 3d Session, 17Mar1981, p .

231 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

42. Cushman intvw, 1982, p . 49 .

43. III MAF Fact Sheer, Subj : New Concepts in Pacification Management, dtd 190ct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 2 8

Oct—4Nov68 . For some of the friction between the Combined Actio n

Program and CORDS, see LtCol Byron F. Brady, Comments on draft ,

dtd 300ct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Brady Comments.

See also the discussion in the section on the Combined Action Progra m

in this chapter.

44. III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p . 31 ; Col Ross R. Miner, Debriefing b y

FMFPac, 5Sep68, Tape 3068, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; FMFPac ,

MarOpsV, Dec68, pp . pp.71—2 .

45. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp . 32—3 .

46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p . 45 and III MAF ComdC, Dec68 ,

pp. 39-40 .

47. III MAF ComdC, Dec68, pp. 25—6 and 39—40 ; Chart of Chieu Ho i

Returnees, Jan—Sep68, attached to III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj : Status o f

Pacification in I Corps, dtd 18 Oct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Ass t

CMC Visit, 28 Oct—4Nov68 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p . 52 ,

Dec68, p . 51 .

48. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p . 31 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p . 51 ;

LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 1973–76, p . 12 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

49. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 122 .

50. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p . 45 .

51. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p . 23 ; 7th Engr Bn, Historical Stud y

ofCivicAction, Jan1968 June1969, dtd 1Aug69, End, LtCol Themistocles T. Annas, USMC, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec1994, hereafter

7th Eng Bn, Hist Study Civic Action .

52. 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Nov68, pp . 25—6, and Dec68, pp . 44—5 ; 7t h

Eng Bn, Hist Study Civic Action .

53. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pp . 40—1 .

54. MajGen Raymond G. Davis, debrief at FMFPac, 15Apr69, pp .

337—42, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

55. Col Donald R . Myers, Comments on draft, dtd 27Oct94 (Vietnam

Comment File); lstLt Justin M. Martin Itr to wife, did 24Nov68, En d

to LtCol Justin M . Martin, Comments on draft, n .d . 1JuI96) (Vietna m

Comment File)

56. III MAF ComdC, Aug68 ; III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj : 3d Marin e

Division Memorial Children's Hospital, did 120ct68, in 11I MAF Fac t

Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct—4Nov68 ; Graham A. Comas an d

LtCol Terrence P. Murray, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, Vietnamizatiot and

Redeployment, 1970–71 (Washington, D .C. : Hist & Mus Div, HQMC ,

1986), pp . 171–2, hereafter, Comas and Murray, U .S. Marines in Vietnam 1970—71 . Colonel Peabody is quoted in Cosmas and Murray, U.S .

Marines in Vietnam, 1970–71, p. 172 .

57. LtCol Merrill L . Bartlett, Comments on draft, dtd 8Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File); Charles R. Anderson, Vietnam, The Other War

(Novato, Cal : Presidio Press, 1982), pp. 71 and 75 .

Homicide in the Countrysid e

58. Cushman intvw, 1982, pp . 11—2 ; Cushman intvw, Mar 1969 ,

475—76 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins

intvw, 1973, pp . 62—3 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

59. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 375—80 ; Cushman incvw,

1982, pp . 35—6 .

60. Cushman intvw, 1982, p. 36 .

61. LtCol Gary D . Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam : Trial by

Fire (Washington, D. C. : Hist & Mus Div, HQMC, 1989), pp . 1.11—4 ,

hereafter Solis, Trial by Fire. The statistics of Marine court-martials ar e

from Maj W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," pt I, Marine Corps

Gazette, Aug76, v . 60, no . 8, pp . 16—22, p . 18 .

62. Solis, Trial by Fire, p . 139 .

63. LtCol Gary D. Solis, "Marine Corps War Crimes in Vietnam :

Uncounted and Unpunished? " Precis of paper (Jan 1993) to be presented at Naval Academy Historical Symposium, Oct 1993 ; Maj W.

Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities, " Conclusion, Marine Corps Gazette ,

Sept 1976, V. 60, No . 9, pp . 33—39, p. 38, hereafter Parks, "Crimes i n

Hostilities," Conclusion ; Solis, Trial by Fire, pp . 138—39 . The quote s

in the text follow the order of presentation of the sources .

64. Quoted in Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," Conclusion, p . 38 .

65 . Murray intvw, pp . 24–5 .

Changing Attitudes

66. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj : Personal Response, du] 180cc68, in II I

MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct-4Nov68, dtd 310ct68,

hereafter Personal Response Fact Sheet, Oct68 ; "III MAF Platoon

Leader 's Personal Response Notebook " (1967), given to author b y

LCdr Richard McGonigal (USN) .

67. Personal Response Fact Sheet, Oct68 ; 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jan68 ,

pp . 46—7 .

68. Personal Response Fact Sheet, Oct68 .

69. Ibid . ; MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins, debrief by FMFPac ,

17Dec68, Tape 3627 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

70. Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," Conclusion, p . 38 .

71. Comas and Murray, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–71, p . 350 . Se e

also Col Richard B . Smith, Comments on draft, dtd 14Dec94 (Vietna m

Comment File) .
NOTES 709

The Boys Next Door: The Combined Action Program

72. Personal Response Project, FMFPac (Fwd), Interim Report o n

Combined Action Units, III Marine Amphibious Force, with Special

Attention to Personal Relationships, dtd 8Feb67, hereafter Interi m

Report on Combined Action Units; LCdr Richard A. McGoniga l

intvw 12 Oct 1984 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McGoniga l

inrvw.

73. Michael E . Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, The U.S .

Marines' Other War in Vietnam (New York : Praeger, 1989), pp . 38-40 ,

hereafter Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons; Teller, Rogers, an d

Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, p . 270; III MAF ComdCs,

FebJun 67 ; LrCol William R. Corson, Biog File in Biog Files, Re f

Sec, MCHC. See also LtGen Victor H . Krulak, Comments on draft, dt d

31Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

74. III MAF ComdCs, JunJuly67; LtGen Herman Nickerson intvw,

10Jan73, p . 76 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) ; Robert A . Klyman, "The

Combined Action Program : An Alternative Not Taken," ms, Honor s

Thesis, Department of History, The University of Michigan, 1986, pp .

21—2, hereafter Klyman, "The Combined Action Program" ; Peterson ,

The Combined Action Platoons, p . 39 .

75. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, p . 50 ; III MAF ComdCs,

Jul—Dec67 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p . 64 .

76. LtCol Bryon F. Brady, intvw, Oct, 1984 (Oral HistColl, MCHC),

hereafter Brady inrvw.

77. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 19Aug67 ; CGFMFPac msg t o

CGIIIMAF, dcd 1Nov67 ; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 2

Dec67 (Reel 4, HQMC Msg File) ;

78. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 166; CGIIIMAF msg t o

CGFMFPac, dtd 2Dec67 and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 5Dec6 7

(Reel 4, HQMC Msg File).

79. Robert J. Komer, intvw with Martin Russ, 29 July 1976 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC).

80. " Discussions with Ambassador Komer, 7Jan68 " in CMC, Tri p

Visit to Vietnam, Jan68 .

81. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 216 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68 ,

p. 656; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp . 62—3 ; MajGen E . E.

Anderson intvw, Dec68, Tape 3578 (Oral HiscColl, MCHC) as quoted

in Klyman, " The Combined Action Program, " p . 34 ; Telephone conversation with Ambassador Robert Komer, dcd 29Ju185 as quoted in Kly -

man, "The Combined Action Program " footnote 19, p. 82 .

82. CGIIIMAF ltr to CMC, Subj : Change to T/O for Combined Actio n

Group etc ., dtd 30Jan68, attached to III MAF Fact Sheet, dtd 12 Oct68 ,

Subj: Combined Action Program, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CM C

Visit, 28 Oct—4Nov68, dtd 31Oct68 ; Resume of telecon, III MAF t o

FMFPac, dtd 10Jan68 in III MAF Special Report to FMFPac Fldr.

83. Igor Bobrowsky inrvw, 3Dec1982, Tape Three, pp . 2—3 (Oral Hist -

Coll, MCHC). See also Igor Bobrowsky, Comments on draft, dtd

26Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) .

84. Thayer, " Pacification and Civil Affairs, " v. 10, pp . 37-8 .

85. Col Harold L. Oppenheimer, FMFPac debrief, n .d . [1968] (Oral

HistColl, MCHC) and Col H. L. Oppenheimer, Deputy Special Projects, III MAF, memo, n .d . [May68?], Subj : Analysis Combined Actio n

Program, End Brady Comments.

86. Brady intvw ; LtCol Bryon F. Brady Presentation and Round Table

Discussion, CAP Reunion, Oct84 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafte r

Brady Round Table; Brady Comments; Dir, CAP memo to DepCG, III

MAF, Subj: Mobile CAPs, dtd 2Jun68, Encl, Brady Comments, here -

after Mobile CAP Memo, 2Jun68 ; Col Robert J . Keller, Comments on

draft, dcd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

87. Mobile CAP Memo, 2Jun68 and Brady Round Table .

88. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb-May68 .

89. McGonigal intvw ; Brady inrvw ; III MAF Force Bulletin 1306 ,

Subj: Combined Action Program Personnel Assignment, clt d

18Apr68, in III MAF Combined Action Program Personnel Assignment Folder, Apr—Ju168 .

90. III MAF Force 0 3121 .4B, Subj : Standing Operating Procedur e

for the Combined Action Program, dcd 22Jun68, in III MAP Combined Action Program Personnel Assignment Folder, AprJu168.

91. Ibid .

92. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p . 36 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p .

33 ; III MAF ComdC, Jul68 . There is some discrepancy in the numbe r

of Marines assigned to the program between FMFPac and 111 MAF . Th e

FMFPac report for July reported only 1,773 Marines in the program .

93. Col Richard B. Smith, debrief at FMFPac, Ju168, Tape 3041 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC); Col Alexander L. Michaux, debrief at FMFPac ,

18Jul68 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); MajGen Raymond G . Davis, debrief

at FMFPac, 15Apr69, p . 338 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) .

94. III MAF ComdC, Jul68; 4th CAG ComclC, Oct68 ; CO 4th CAG

ltr to Director, Combined Action Program, Subj: 4th CAG proposed

expansion plan . . ., dtd 9Aug68, tab 3, 4th CAG ComdC, Oct68 .

95. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 67 ; 2d CAG ComdCs, Oct-Dec68 .

There is again a discrepancy in numbers relative to the strength of th e

CAPs between the FMFPac report and the III MAF command chronology. The chronology showed a Combined Action strength for December as 38 officers and 1,871 Marine enlisted men as compared co 32 offi -

cers and 1,275 Marine enlisted men for January 1968, an increase o f

about 600 men . III MAF ComdCs Jan and Dec68 . One explanation fo r

the difference between the FMFPac figures and that of 11I MAF is tha t

the III MAF figures represent an average over the month . It is also possible that the FMFPac report is not including the administrative personnel assigned to the Combined Action Groups and companies.

96. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj : Status of Pacification in I Corps, dcd 1 8

Oct68, in III MAP Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct—4Nov68 ;

BGen E.E . Anderson ltrs to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 11 Sep68, an d

16Oct68, Ends, Gen Earl E . Anderson, Comments on draft, clt d

18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); Cushman intvw, 1982, pp . 52—3 .

97. Brady intvw and Brady Round Table ; III MAP, Force/Senior Advisor I Corps Order 5080 .10, Subj : Pacification Coordination, n .d .

[Ju168], and Ill MAF, Force/Senior Advisor I Corps Order 508010A,

Subj : Pacification Coordination, n .d . [Jul68], in III MAP Combined

Action Program Personnel Assignment Fldr, Apr—Ju168 ; Backgroun d

File on Proposed III MAF Order on Pacification Coordination ,

Jun—Aug?68, End, Brady Comments .

98. Questionnaire for Personnel Nominated for the Combined Actio n

Program, n .d . ; Brady intvw ; Brady Comments; Igor Bobrowsky intvw ,

3Dec1982, Tape One, p . 21 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafte r

Bobrowsky Tape One; Igor Bobrowsky, Corrections and Clarifications

(Tape One), dtd 7 Dec1983 .

99. Bobrowsky Tape One, pp. 17-8.

100. Eugene H . Ferguson inrvw, 130ct1984 (Oral HistColl MCHC) ,

hereafter Ferguson intvw.
710 THE DEFINING YEA R

101. Ibid . and Bobrowsky Tape One, p. 1 ; Andrew Lewandowski, " I

Feel Like I'm Fixin to Die . . ." Letters and Transcriptions of Vietnam

Marine Sergeant Andrew Lewandowski, Mar 1968 Jun1969, compiled

and edited by Dr. Eugene R. Slaski (ms, Andrew Lewandowski Papers,

MCHC), pp . 451–2 .

102. Maj Edward F. Palm, "Tiger Papa Three : A Memoir of the Combined Action Program, " Special preview supplement, Marine Corps

Gazette, February, 1988, pp . 1–3, hereafter Palm, "Tiger Papa Three . "

103. Brady Round Table .

104. Palm, "Tiger Papa Three," Part Two, "The Fire Next Time," p .

20, and Palm Comments. James DuGuid intvw 140ct1984 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC), hereafter DuGuid intvw.

105. Igor Bobrowsky intvw, 3Dec1982, Tape Two, pp . 2–3, and 1 2

(Oral HiscColl, MCHC), hereafter Bobrowsky intvw, Tape Two .

106. Ibid ., pp. 8–9; Thomas Harvey, Comments on draft, dt d

13Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) ; Ferguson intvw, p . 14 .

107. Lam Ha Itr to Robert Klyman, dtd 31Jan86, Robert Klyma n

Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC .

108. Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10, pp . 28–38, quot e

is from p . 38 .

109. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp . 60–3 . Harvey is quoted by Peterson, p. 61 . See also Ferguson and DuGuid intvws.

110. Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10, pp. 36-7 .

111. Bobrowsky intvw, Tape Two, p . 21 ; Michael E . Peterson, Comments on draft, did 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File); Lawrence A .

Yates, " A Feather in Their Cap? The Marines ' Combined Action Program in Vietnam" in William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, New

Interpretations in Naval History, Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium, Held at the United States Naval Academy, 18–20 October

1989 (Annapolis, MD : United States Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp .

309–22, p . 320 .

112. Francis J. West, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec1994 (Vietna m

Comment File). West's best known work on Combined Action is The

Village (New York, Harper & Row, 1972).

The Accelerated Pacification Plan

113. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp . 521–2 .

114. Ibid . 521–2 and 532–3 ; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, pp . 5, 9, 42, 47 ,

57–8, 60, 62–3, 71–2 . For continued progress in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, see Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, pp . 280-83 .

CHAPTER 3 0

OUTSIDE OF III MAF :

THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES,

MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS

The 9th MAB and the SLFs

Additional sources for this section are 9th MAB ComdCs, JanDec68 ; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Benis M . Frank, " Special Landin g

Force, " draft ms, 1972 (MCHC), hereafter Moody and Frank, " Specia l

Landing Force, " ms.

1. 9th MAB ComdC, Jan68 .

2. Ibid . ; MarOpsV, Jan68, p . 91 .

3. TG 79 .5 ComdC, Jan68 .

4. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp . 176-79 .

LtCol McQuown is quoted on p . 176 .

5. BGen Jacob Glick intvw, 20 Jun and 11Jul89, p . 62 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC), hereafter Glick intvw ; CG9thMAB msgs to CGFMFPac, dtd

3 and 5Jan68, End 3 and 4, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 .

6. CG9thMAB msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 15Jan68, HQMC Msg File ,

Reel No . 4 ; Glick intvw, pp . 62-5 .

7. Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp. 299–305 ; CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 110ct67 (HQMC Msg File, Reel 7).

8. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 160ct67 (HQMC Msg File ,

Reel 7).

9. Moody and Frank, "Special Landing Force," ms, Chapter 8 .

10. MajGen Rathvon McC . Tompkins intvw, 1973, pp . 60–I (Ora l

HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Tompkins intvw ; Col Alexander L.

Michaux debriefing at FMFPac, 18Jul68, Tape 2915 (Oral HistColl ,

MCHC).

11. Tompkins intvw, pp . 60–1 ; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw,

1973–76, p. 14 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Gen Robert E . Cushma n

intvw, 1 Nov 1982, p . 45 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Cushma n

intvw, 1982 .

12. CGIIIMAF to CGs 1st and 3d MarDivs, dtd 19Dec67 (Ill MA F

Outgoing Msgs, Oct–Dec67) .

13. For discussion of the MACV contingency plan, see CGIIIMA F

msgs to CGFMFPac, dtd 12 and 13Jan68 and CGFMFPac msg to

CGIIIMAF, dcd 6Jan68 and to CMC, did 18Jan68 (HQMC Msg File,

Reels 4 and 6).

14. CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 19Jan68 (Westmorelan d

Papers, MACV msgs, Jan68); CinCPacFlt msg to CinCPac, dt d

20Jan68 (HQMC Msg Files, Reel 6) .

15. LtCol Peter L . Hilgartner, "Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam, "

Marine Corps Gazette, v. 53, no. 1 (Jan 1969), pp . 28–31 . Quote is from

p . 31 .

16. Col Franklin L. Smith debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968) Tap e

2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

17. TG 79 .5 ComdC, Jun68 .

18. TG 79 .5 ComdCs, Jul–Oct68 .

19. BLT 2/26 ComdCs, Aug–Sep68 . See also Corn, Seventh Flt,

Monthly Summary, Aug68 (OA13, NHD), pp. 36–7 .

20. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: SLF Employment, dtd Oct 1968, En d

24, to CGIIIMAF ltr to distribution list, dtd 310ct68, Subj : III MAF

Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68, hereafter III MAP Fac t

Sheet, SLF Deployment ; 9th MAB ComdC, Oct68 .

21. III MAF Fact Sheet, SLF Deployment; BLT 2/26 ComdCs,

Oct–Nov68 .

22. CARG Bravo, Operation Daring Endeavor, Post Operation Rpt ,

dtd 13Dec68 in TG 76.5 Opn Rpts, 1967–69 ; TG 79.5 ComdC,

Nov68 .

23. Bit 2/26 ComdC, Dec68 . Quotes are from entry dtd 8Dec68, p. 9

and BLT 2/26 CAAR, Opn Valiant Hunt, 15Dec68–5Jan69, dtd

1Jan69, cab A . Although Valiant Hunt AAR is dated 1 January 1968 ,

it is obviously an error, as it contains entries through 5 January 1969 ,

and is attached to the December 1968 ComdC.
NOTES 71 1

24. TG 79 .5 ComdC, Dec68 ; Col Clyde W. Hunter incvw, 10Jul69 ,

Tape 4363 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), as quoted in Smith, U.S . Marines

in Vietnam, 1969, p . 297 .

25. Smith, U .S Marines in Vietnam, 1969, pp. 300—310 .

Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Compan y

(ANGLICO)

26. Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, FMF, ComdC, 1Jan—31Mar68, dcd

15Apr68, hereafter SU—1 ComdC, Jan—Mar68 . While the number o f

ANGLICO personnel with the Koreans probably relates to the number

at the end of March, it is assumed that this did not differ greatly fro m

the number assigned in January.

27. Ibid . and MCCC, Status of Forces, dtd 29Feb68 . Although the Status of Forces report is dated 29Feb68, the strength figure for ANGLICO Sub-Unit 1 is for 18Jan68 . The Status of Forces report does not

give the strength of the various detachments of the sub unit .

28. SU—1 ComdC, Jan—Mar68 and attached AAR, OpnHue City ,

31Jan—20Feb68 .

29. Ibid .

30. SU—1 ComdC, Jan—Mar68, p. 2—2 and Anx D, AAR, Battle of

Phan Thiec .

31. SU—1 ComdC, Jan—Mar68 ; Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO FMF,

ComdC, lApr—30Jun68, dtd 19Ju168, hereafter SU—1 ComdC ,

AprJun68.

32. SU—1 ComdC, Jan—Mar68 ; SU—1 ComdC, AprJun68; Corn Seventh Fleet, Monthly Historical Summaries, JanJun68 (OAB, NHD);

CinCPac Flt, Pacific Area Opns, Jun68 (OAB, NHD), p . 2 .

33. Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, ComdC 1Jul68—30Sep68, dtcl

25Oct68, p . 2—1, hereafter SU—1 ComdC, Jul—Sep68 ; Seventh Fleet ,

Monthly Historical Summary, Ju168, pp . 2 and 23 (OAB, NHD);

CinCPacFlt, Pacific Area Naval Operations Review, Ju168, (OAB,

NHD), pp . 36—7 .

34. SU—1 ComdC, Jul—Sep68, p . 2—1 ; Corn Seventh Flt, Monthl y

Summary, Oct 68 (OAB, NHD), p . 35 .

Embassy Marine s

35. MCCC, Status of Forces, p . 14—1, did 10Jan68 and 20Mar68;

Marine Security Guard Bn (StateDept) ComdCs, 1OFeb67—1969 ;

Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p . 318 .

36. OIC, Marine Security Guard Detachment, American Embassy,

Saigon, Incident Report, No . 1—68, Subj : Viet Cong Attack on American Embassy, 31Jan68, dud 23Feb68 (Marine Security Guard B n

(StateDept) ComdCs, lOFeb67—69, hereafter Incident Report, Vie t

Cong Attack ; Statement of Capt Robert J. O'Brien, n.d .

[3lJan—Feb68], Encl, Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack, hereafte r

O 'Brien Statement .

37. The following paragraphs are based upon Don Oberdorfer, Tet!

(New York : Doubleday & Co, 1971), pp . 2—40 ; Jack Shulimson ,

Tee—1968, The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War (New York: Banta m

Books, 1988), pp . 17—18 ; Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack .

38. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is Statement of Sgt Ronald W. Harper, n .d . [31Jan—Feb68] in Inciden t

Report, Viet Cong Attack, hereafter Harper Statement .

39. Additional source for this and the following paragraphs is O 'Brie n

Statement .

G . Frattarelli, n .d . [31Jan—Feb68], in Incident Report, Viet Con g

Attack, hereafter Frattarelli Statement .

41. Statement of GySgt Allen Morrison n .d . [31Jan—Feb681, in Incident Report, Vier Cong Attack .

42. Another source for this paragraph is Statement of SSgt Leroy J .

Banks, n .d . [31Jan—Feb68], in Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack ,

hereafter Banks Statement.

43. Another source for this paragraph is Frattarelli Statement .

44. Additional source for this paragraph is Banks Statement .

45. Marine Security Guard Bn (State Dept) ComdC, I Feb69—30Jun6 9

in Marine Security Guard Bn (State Dept) ComclCs, I OFeb67—1969 .

Individual Marines in Saigon and Elsewhere in Vietna m

46. MCCC, Status of Forces, dtd 20Mar68, p . 14—1 . For Chaisson's

relationship to Westmoreland, see Westmorelandl, A Soldier Reports, p .

343 . For Chaisson 's comments on 3Feb68, see Peter Braescrup, Big

Story, How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted th e

Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, abridged ed . (New Haven ,

CT, Yale University Press, 1983), p . 124 .

47. MCCC, Status of Forces, dtd 29Mar69, p . 14—1 .

48 . MCCC, Status of Forces, did 10Jan68 and 29Mar69, p . 14—1 .

Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corp s

Additional sources for this section are : SMA, Vietnamese Marin e

Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary 1954—1973, here -

after SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954—73 ; SMA, MACV Monthl y

Historical Reports, Jan—Dec68, hereafter SMA Monthly Rpm an d

month ; SMA After-Action Reports, 1968 ; Col James T. Breckinridge,

After Tour Report, dtd 18Apr69 in SMA, MACV After Tour Rpcs ,

1965—69, hereafter Breckinridge Rpt ; LtGen Le Nguyen Khang intvw,

30Sep75 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Khang intvw .

49. SMA Monthly Rpt, Jan68 ; Marine Advisory Unit Table of Organization Chart 1968, tab A, SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954—73 ,

hereafter, Table of Organization Chart .

50. Table of Organization Chart ; Breckinridge Rpt ; LtCol Jerry I .

Simpson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) ,

hereafter Simpson Comments .

51. SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954—73 .

52. SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954—73 .

53. Ibid . and Breckinridge Rpt .

54. SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954—73 ; Shulimson and Johnson ,

U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, p. 204 ; Shulimson, U .S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp . 84—91 .

55. Khang intvw., p . 23 .

56. SMA, MACV Monthly Rpt, Jan68 .

57. LtCol Pham Van Son et al ., The Viet Cong Tet Offensive (1968)

(Saigon : Republic of Vietnam, Joint General Staff, 1969), pp . 71—75 ,

hereafter Pham Van Son, The Viet Cong Tet Offensive; Col Hoang Ngo c

Lung, The General Offensives of 1968—69, Indochina Monographs

(Washington, D.C. : U .S . Army Center of Military History, 1981 .), pp .

53—63, hereafter Lung, The General Offensives .

58. LtCol John J. Hainsworth, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec9 4

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hainsworth Comments .

40 . Additional source for this paragraph is Statement of Sgt Richard 59 . SMA SitRep for period 28Jan—3Feb68, dtcl 10Feb68 in SMA,
712 THE DEFINING YEA R

MACV SitReps, 1965—68, hereafter SMA SitRep, 10Feb68 ; Capt Harry

J. Shane, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao, dtd 7Jun68, in SMA ,

MACV, AARs, 1968-69, hereafter SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao .

60. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68 ; Hainsworth Comments; Newspaper Clip -

pings, Encl, Hainsworth Comments.

61. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68 ; Simpson Comments.

62. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68 ; SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao .

63. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68 ; SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao ; SMA,

Monthly Rpt, Feb68 .

64. SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao; Lung, The General Offensives, p . 71 .

65. SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao.

66. SMA Monthly Rpts, Feb and Mar68 ; Maj Talman C. Budd II,

MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City dtd 25Jul68, AAR in SMA, MACV,

AARs, 1968—69 ; Tet Offensive statistical chart in Breckinridge Rpt .

67. Major Operations, Jan—Dec68 Statistical Chart and Col James T.

Breckinridge, debriefing, dcd 2May69, hereafter Breckinridge debriefing, in Breckinridge Rpt .

68. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dcd 23Feb68 (Abrams Papers ,

CMH); Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support : The Final Years, The U.S .

Army in Vietnam (Washington, D .C. : Center of Military History, U .S .

Army, 1988), p. 312 ; Khang intvw, pp . 45—48 ; Breckinridge debriefing .

69. Breckinridge Rpt .

70. Breckinridge Rpt .

CHAPTER 3 1

1968 : AN OVERVIE W

1 . LtGen John R. Chaisson presentation to the Commandant's Advisory Committee on Marine Corps History, 27Jul92 (Oral HiscColl ,

MCHC), p . 412 .
Appendix A

Marine Command and Staff List

1 January—31 December 1968

III MAF Headquarters 1Jan—31Dec68 G—2 Col Russell E. Corey Ilan—14Jan6 8

CG LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr. l J an—31 Dec68 LtCol Jack H . Butler 15Jan—21.Jan6 8

DepCG MajGen Raymond L . Murray 1Jan—14Feb68 Col Herbert E. Ing, Jr. 22Jan—23May6 8

MajGen William J. Van Ryzin 1 5 Feb—25 May68 LtCol Jack H . Butler 24May—26Oct6 8

MajGen Rathvon McC . Tompkins 26May—20Dec68 Col Anthony J. Skotnicki 27Oct—31. Dec6 8

MajGen Carl A . Youngdale 2 1 Dec—31 Dec68 G—3 Col James C. Short 1Jan—30Jan6 8

DepCG Air MajGen Norman J. Anderson 1 Jan—21 J un68 Col Paul G. Graham 31Jan—25Apr6 8

MajGen Charles J. Quitter 22Jun—31Dec68 Col Herbert Preston, Jr. 26Apr— l May6 8

DepCG Army MajGen Richard G . Stilwell 12Apr—30Jun68 Col Robert D . Bohn 2May—13Jul6 8

C/S BGen Earl E . Anderson 1Jan—31 Dec68 Col Herbert Preston, Jr. I4Ju1—6Aug6 8

G—1 Col Pout F. Pedersen 1Jan—11Jul68 Col Harry F. Painter 7Aug—30Sep6 8

Col Maurice Rose 12Jul—31Dec68 Col Adolph G. Schwenk lOct—31Dec6 8

G—2 Col Kenneth J. Houghton 1Jan—28Feb68 G—4 Col Earl K . Vickers, Jr. 1Jan—4Ju16 8

Col Herbert L . Beckington 29Feb—28Ju168 Col James E . Wilson, Jr. 5Jul—3I. Dec6 8

Col Ray N.Joens 29Jul—31 Dec68 G—5 Col Herbert L . Beckington l .Jan—18Feb6 8

G—3 Col Thomas L. Randal l

BGen Carl W. Hoffman

lJan—29Feb6 8

lMar—20May68

Col Ross R. Miner

Maj Ronald L . Payne

21Feb--4Sep6 8

5Sep—23Sep6 8

BGen Jacob E. Glick 21 May—14Aug68 Maj William T. Macy 24Sep—30Sep6 8

BGen Carl W. Hoffman 15 Aug—31Dec68 Col Harry F. Painter I Oct—3 I. Dec6 8

G—4 Col Rex O . Dillow 1Jan—3Jul68

Task Force X-Ra y

Col Lawrence C. Norton 4Jul68—31Dec6 8

G—5 LtCol James L. Black, Jr.

LtCol Elmer J. Zorn

LtCol Howard A . Westphall

lJan—5Apr6 8

6Apr—31 Occ6 8

l Nov—31 Dec68

BGen Foster C . Lahu e

BGen John N . McLaughli n

BGen George D. Webste r

*TF X-Ray was deactivated on 9Aug68.

5Jan—6Apr6 8

7Apr—2l .May6 8

22May—9Aug68 *

Attached Units, III MAF Headquarters Headquarters Battalion

CO

SubUnit—1, 1st Radio Battalio n

LtCol Alfred M. Gray, Jr. 1Jan68—31May68

CO Col Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr.

Col William R . Earne y

Col Robert G . Lauffer

1Jan—6Jan6 8

7Jan—15May6 8

16May—9Aug68

LtCol James R . Quisenberry

LtCol Patrick J. Fennell, Jr.

1Jun—16Oct6 8

17Oct—31Dec68

LrCol Charles F. Bunnell, Jr.

LtCol William S. Fagan

IOAug—17Sep68

18Sep—31 Dec6 8

CG

1st Marine Division Headquarters 1Jan—31Dec68

CO

1st Marines

MajGen Donn J Col Herbert E . Ing, Jr. lJan—20Jan6 8. Robertson 1Jan—26Jun6 8

MajGen Carl A . Youngdale

MajGen Ormond R. Simpson

27Jun—20Dec6 8

21Dec—31Dec68

Col Stanley S . Hughe s

Col Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.

2lJan—16Jun6 8

17Jun—14Aug6 8

ADC BGen Foster C . Lahue 1Jan—14Apr68 Col Robert G . Lauffer 15 Aug—31 Dec6 8

BGen John N . McLaughlin 19Feb—25May68* CO 1/1 LtCol Marcus J. Gravel 1Jan—8Jun6 8

BGen George D . Webster 15Apr—30Jun6 8

BGen John E . Williams

BGen George D . Webste r

BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.

23May—9Aug6 8

lOAug—18Aug6 8

15Aug—31Dec68 CO 2/1

LtCol Archie Van Winkl e

LtCol Albert W. Kelle r

LtCol Alphonse A. Laporte, Jr.

LtCol Evan L. Parker, Jr.

9J un—7Sep6 8

8Sep—14Oct6 8

15Oct—31Dec6 8

1Jan—8Jan6 8

BGen Carl W. Hoffman 18Aug—31Dec6 8

C/S Col Henry J. Woessner, II 1Jan—2Feb68

LtCol Billy R . Dunca n

LtCol John E . Poindexter

9Jan—9Aug6 8

10Aug—31Dec6 8

Col James C. Short 3Feb—2Aug68

CO 3/1 LtCol Max McQuown l Jan—31 May6 8

G—1

Col Samuel A . Hanna h

Col William R . Earney

3Aug—31Dec6 8

1Jan68

LtCol Daniel J. Quick 1Jun—25Oct6 8

Maj Robert B . Ranck 26Oct—22Nov6 8

Col Ernest W. Payne 2Jan—lAug68

LtCol Thomas E. Bulger 2 3Nov—31 Dec6 8

LtCol Thomas L . Cobb

Col George E. Lawrence

2Aug—31Aug6 8

lSep—31Dec68

CO

5th Marines

*Beginning on 19Feb68 there were two ADCs for the 1st Marine Division . Col Robert D . Bohn 1Jan—30Apr6 8

71 3
714 THE DEFINING YEAR

Col Paul G. Graham

Col James B. Ord, Jr.

lMay—13Oct68

14Oct—31 Dec68 CO

1st Reconnaissance Battalion

LtCol Broman C. Stinemetz 1Jan—25Jul6 8

CO 1/5 LtCol Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr. lJan—7Jan68 LtCol Larry P. Charon 26Jul—31Dec6 8

CO 2/5

LtCol Robert P. Whale n

LtCol Robert H. Thompso n

LtCol Richard F. Daley

LtCol George C . McNaughton

8Jan—lFeb68

2Feb—7Aug68

8Aug—31Dec68

1Jan—2Jan68

CO

1st Tank Battalio n

LtCol Vincent J. Gentile 1Jan—8Apr6 8

LtCol Harry W. Hite 9April—27Aug6 8

LtCol Ernest C . Cheatham, Jr. 3Jan—24Ju168 LtCol Maurice C. Ashley, Jr. 28Aug-31Dec6 8

Maj Orlo K. Steele 25Ju1—31Jul68 1st Motor Transport Battalio n

CO 3/5

LtCol James W. Stempl e

LtCol William K . Rockey

lAug—31Dec68

1Jan—27Mar68

CO Maj Charles F. Cresswell 1 Jan—12Jan6 8

LtCol Casimir C . Ksycewski 13Jan—19Sep6 8

LtCol Donald N . Rexroad 28Mar—18Ju168 Maj Robert G . Reilly 20Sep—3l Dec6 8

LtCol Rufus A . Seymour 19Ju1—15Oct68

LtCol Harry E. Atkinson 16Oct—31Dec68 1st Engineer Battalio n

CO

7th Marines

Col Ross R. Miner 1Jan—20Feb68

CO LtCol Logan Cassedy 1Jan—30Apr6 8

Maj Sven A. Johnson lMay—30Ju16 8

LtCol Donald H . Hildebrand 31Jul—31Dec6 8

Col Reverdy M . Hall 21Feb—15Aug68

Col Herbert L . Beckington 16Aug–31Dec68 1st Medical Battalio n

CO 1/7 LtCol William J. Davis 1Jan—16Mar68 CO Cdr Clinton H. Lowery, MC, USN 1Jan—27Feb6 8

LtCol William S . Fagan 17Mar—12Sep68 Cdr James V. Sharp, MC, USN 28Feb—3 1 Dec6 8

Maj Denton Carter 13Sep—22Sep68 1st Shore Party Battalio n

LtCol William F. Bethel 23Sep—31Dec68

CO 2/7 LtCol John R. Love 1Jan—24Feb68

LtCol Nicholas Kavakich 1Jan—15Oct6 8

LtCol Charles E. Mueller 25Feb—29Ju168

LtCol Donald L . Anderson 16Oct—31Dec6 8

LtCol Leroy E . Watson 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalio n 30Ju1—19Sep68

LtCol Charles F. Bunnell, Jr. 20Sep—23Sep68 CO LtCol Robert L. Shuford 1Jan—5Jan6 8

LtCol Neil A. Nelson 24Sep—31Dec68 LtCol Robert E . Haebel 6Jan—30Jul6 8

CO 3/7 LtCol Roger H. Barnard 1Jan—lAug68 Maj Frank C . Chace, Jr. 31Jul—16Oct6 8

CO

LtCol Francis X . Quin n

11th Marine s

LtCol Clayton V. Hendricks

LtCol John F. Barr, Jr.

2Aug—31 Dec68

lJan—8Ju168

9Ju1—31Jul68 CO

Maj John H. Keegan, Jr. 17Oct—4Nov6 8

LtCol Joseph E. Hennegan 5Nov—31Dec6 8

11th Motor Transport Battalio n

LtCol Joseph B. Brown, Jr. 1Jan—14Jul68

CO

Col Harry E . Dickinso n

1st Field Artillery Group

LtCol Spencer F. Thomas

LtCol John F. Barr, Jr.

LtCol Reuel W. Stephens, Jr.

LtCol Richard P. Johnson

l A ug—31 Dec68

1Jan—15Jan6 8

16Jan—4Jul6 8

5Jul—29Aug6 8

30Aug—26Nov68

CO

Maj Billy M. Floyd 15Ju1—6Sep68

LtCol John A . Kinniburgh 7Sep—31Dec68

7th Communication Battalion

LtCol Harry 0. Cowing, Jr. 1Jan—30Jun68

Maj Theodore F. Benner, Jr. 1Jul—lOct68

LtCol Charles L. Brady 2Oct—31 Dec68

LtCol Raymond B . Ingrando 27Nov—31Dec68 7th Engineer Battalio n

CO 1/11 LtCol Robert C. V. Hughes 1Jan—30Jun68 CO LtCol Ray Funderburk IJan—9Aug68

CO 2/11

Maj John A. Hamilto n

LtCol Spencer F. Thomas

Maj John A. Hamilto n

LtCol David A . Clark

lJul–9Jul6 8

10Jul—6Oct6 8

7Oct—31 Dec6 8

1Jan—9Feb68 CO

LtCol Themistocles T. Annas 10Aug—31Dec68

9th Engineer Battalio n

LtCol Horacio E . Perea 1Jan—14Sep6 8

CO 3/11

LtCol Ben A . Moore, Jr.

LtCol Robert D. Jameson

LtCol George T. Balzer

lOFeb—6Sep6 8

7Sep—31Dec6 8

1Jan—14Feb68

LtCol Darrell U. Davidson 15Sep—31Dec6 8

3d Marine Division Headquarters

CG MajGen Raymond G. Davis 21May—31Dec6 8

LtCol Harlan C. Chase 15Feb—21Aug68

Maj Andrew F. Bauer 22Aug—26Oct68

ADC MajGen Louis Metzge r

BGen Jacob E. Glick

IJan—31Jan6 8

lFeb—31May6 8

LtCol Frederick M . Woeller 27Oct—19Nov68 BGen Carl W. Hoffman 22Jan—21Aug68 °

Maj Andrew F. Bauer 20Nov—26Nov68 BGen William C. Chip 22Aug—3lAug6 8

LtCol Richard P. Johnson 27Nov—31 Dec68 BGen Frank E . Garretson 26Aug—31Dec6 8

CO 4/11 LtCol John S . Hollingshead 1Jan—3Jan68 BGen George D . Webster 26Sep—7Nov68

Maj Frank B. Wolcott III

LtCol John M . Cockey

4Jan—14Aug6 8

15Aug—13Dec68

BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr. 8Nov–3l Dec68

* With the assignment of BGen Hoffman, the 3d Division was authorized

Maj Bobby J. Ready 14Dec—31 Dec68 two ADCs.
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 71 5

C/S Col Walter H . Cuenin 1Jan—13Jul68 CO 2/4 LtCol William Weise I .Jan—2May6 8

Col Joseph E. Lo Prete

Col Joseph R. Motelewski

14Jul—31Aug6 8

lSep—31Dec68

Maj Charles W. Knap p

LtCol Louis A. Rann

3May—5May6 8

6May—30Sep6 8

G—1 LtCol James W. Mars h

Col George E. Jerue

1Jan–31Jan68

lFeb—11Jun68

Maj John E . O'Neill

LtCol William L. Kent

I.Oct—I 4Oct6 8

1.5Ocr—I 1Nov68

Col Louis R. Daze 12J u n–31 Dec68 Maj Joseph E . Hopkins I. 2Nov—31.Dec68

G—2 Col Edward J . Miller lJan—24Feb68 CO 3/4 LtCol Lee R. Bendell 1Jan—26Apr68

LtCol Frederic S . Knight 25Feb—13May68 LtCol Frank L. Bourne, Jr. 27Apr—24Oct68

LtCol Michael M. Spark 14May—8Nov68 Maj James L. Fowler 25Oct—23Nov68

LtCol Thomas P. O'Callaghan 9Nov—31 Dec68 LrCol William A . Donald 24Nov—31.. Dec68

G—3 Col James R . Stockman 1Jan—10Jan68

9th Marine s

Col Alexander L . Michaux, Jr. 1lJan—15Ju168

LtCol Paul D . LaFond 16Ju1—31 Dec68 CO Col Richard B. Smith 1Jan—13Jul68

G—4 Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr. 1Jan—31Jan68 Col Robert H . Barrow 14J ul—31 Dec68

Col Edward E. Camporin i

Col William F. Goggin

lFeb—31Aug68

lSep—31Dec68

CO 1/9 LtCol John F. Mitchel l

LtCol John J.H. Cahill

1Jan—31Mar68

1 Apr—12May68

G—5 Col Milton A . Hull 1Jan—17Feb68 LtCol James W. Quinn 13May—26May68

Col Joseph E. Lo Prete 18Feb—31 May68 LtCol Michael V. Palatas 27May—14Jul68

LrCol Robert B . Thompson 1Jun—5Oct68 LtCol Francis X. Colleton 15Jul—28Sep68

LtCol William E . Kerriga n

Headquarters Battalion

6Oct—31 Dec68 Maj Wilbur W. Dinega r

LtCol Francis X . Colleto n

LtCol George W. Smith

29Sep—30Sep68

1Oct—3Oct68

4Oct—31 Dec68

CO Col George E. Jerue 1Jan—17Jan68 CO 2/9 LtCol William M . Cryan 1Jan—13May68

Maj Will D . Isbel l

Col Alfred I . Thomas

Maj Edwin F. Vozella

18Jan—20Jan6 8

21 Jan—3May6 8

4May—12May68

LtCol Frederic S. Knigh t

Maj Frederick E . Sisle y

Maj Patrick G . Collins

14May—15Sep68

16Sep—9Dec68

I ODec—28Dec68

LtCol Edwin A . Deptula 13May—14Aug68 LtCol George C . Fox 29Dec—31 Dec6 8

Maj Gerald F. Kurth 15Aug—18Sep68 CO 3/9 LrCol Gorton C . Cook IJan—22Feb6 8

Maj Raymond D. Walters 19Sep—27Sep68 LtCol Edward J. Lamontagne 23Feb—24Oct6 8

LtCol Marshall A . Webb, Jr.

Task Force Robbie

28Sep—31Dec68 LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr.

12th Marines

25Oct—31.Dec6 8

CO Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr.

3d Marines

16Feb—2Jun68 CO Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr.

LtCol Wilson A . Kluckman

1 J an—21 May6 8

2 2 May—4J u l6 8

Col Peter J. Mulroney 5J u1—31 Dec6 8

CO Col Joseph E . Lo Prete 1Jan—17Feb68 CO 1/12 LtCol Charles H . Opfar, Jr. 1Jan68—6Apr6 8

Col Milton A . Hull 18Feb—14JuI68 Maj Raymond R. Powell 7Apr–19Ju16 8

LtCol Vaughn R. Stuart 15Ju1–31Jul68 Maj Donald J. Capinas 20Ju1–lOAug6 8

Col Richard L . Michael, Jr. 1 Aug–8Nov68 LtCol Ermil L. Whisman 11 A ug—31 Dec6 8

LtCol Michael M. Spark 9Nov—31 Dec68 CO 2/12 LtCol Ronald P. Dunwell 1Jan—5Aug6 8

CO 1/3 LtCol Richard W. Goodale 1Jan–15Apr68 LtCol Joseph Scoppa, Jr. 6Aug–31Dec68

LtCol Charles V. Jarman 16Apr—16Jun68 CO 3/12 LtCol Roger W. Greer 1Jan—29Feb68

Maj Edward J. Rochford, Jr.

LtCol Charles V. Jarman

17Jun–30Jun68

lJul—9Aug68

LtCol Joseph A . Como

LtCol Eugene D . Foxworth, Jr.

lMar—31Jul68

l Aug—31 Dec68

LtCol Richard B . Twohey l OAug—31 Dec68 CO 4/12 Maj Rudolph W. Solves 1Jan—12Mar68

CO 2/3 LtCol Henry Englisch 1Jan–25Jan68 LtCol Thomas A . McPheeters 14Mar–19Mar68

LtCol Jack W. Davis 26Jan—19Sep68 Maj Billy E Stewart 20Mar—15Oct68

LtCol Byron T. Che n

LtCol James J . McMonagle

20Sep–7Dec6 8

8Dec—31 Dec68

LtCol Earl W. Bailey 16Oct—31 Dec6 8

CO 3/3 LtCol Robert C. Needham 1Jan—20Jan68 3d Reconnaissance Battalion

LtCol James W. Marsh 21Jan—28Jul68 CO LtCol William D . Kent 1Jan–11Jul6 8

LtCol William H . Bates 29Ju1—13Dec68 LtCol Donald R. Berg 12Jul—12Dec6 8

LtCol Richard C . Schulz e

4th Marines

14Dec–31 Dec68 LtCol Aydlette H . Perry, Jr.

3d Tank Battalion

13Dec—31 Dec6 8

CO Col William L. Dick 1Jan—24Feb68 CO LtCol Duncan D. Chapman III 1Jan–21 Jan6 8

Col Edward J . Miller 25Feb—14Sep68 LtCol Karl J. Fontenot 22Jan—26Jul6 8

Col Martin J. Sexton 15 Sep—31 Dec68 Maj Conrad J. Samuelsen 27Jul—16Aug6 8

CO 1/4 LtCol Edwin A . Deptula 1Jan–27Apr68 LtCol George E . Hayward 17 Aug–31 Dec68

LtCol James H. MacLean 28Apr–25Jun68

LtCol Thomas H . Galbraith 26Jun–15Nov68 3d Anti-Tank Battalio n

LtCol George T. Sargent, Jr. 16Nov—31Dec68 CO Maj Robert M . Jordan lJan–31Jan68
716 THE DEFINING YEA R

3d Motor Transport Battalio n

CO Maj William H . Stewart, Jr. lJan—14Jul68

Maj William O. Day 15Jul—25Jul68

Maj Billy W. Adams 26Ju1—18Oct68

Capt James E. Quill 19Oct—31Oct68

Maj Guy W. Ward lNov—31Dec68

3d Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Jack W. Perrin 1Jan—6Mar6 8

Maj Richard S . Krolak 7Mar—lSep6 8

LtCol Walter L . Persac 2Sep—31Dec6 8

3d Shore Party Battalio n

CO LtCol James W. Quinn 1Jan—lOMay6 8

LtCol Richard A. Sulik llMay—50ct6 8

Maj Edwin J . Godfrey 6Oct—31Dec6 8

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO LtCol Edward R. Toner 1Jan—17Mar6 8

LtCol George F. Meyers 18Mar—12Nov68

Maj Walter W. Damewood, Jr . 13Nov—31Dec68

3d Medical Battalio n

CO Cdr Robert A . Brown, MC, USN 1Jan—31Jul68

Cdr Barton K . Slemmons, MC, USN lAug—30Nov6 8

LCdr Billy C. Roberts, MC, USN 1Dec—31Dec68

9th Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj John R. Stanley 1Jan—27Jul6 8

Maj Raymond Kulak 28Ju1—lOcc6 8

LtCol John R. Fox 2Oct—13Nov6 8

Mai Laurier J. Tremblay 14Nov—31Dec6 8

11th Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Victor A . Perry 1Jan—3Aug6 8

LtCol Robert C. Evans 4Aug—31Dec68

5th Marine Division Units in Vietnam

26th Marines*

CO 3/27 LtCol Tullis J . Woodham, Jr. 1.7Feb—31Aug6 8

*The 27th Marines arrived in Vietnam on I 7Feb and departed 10Sep68. The

regiment remained under the operational control of the 1st Marine Divisio n

during this entire period.

Battalions of the 13th Marines *

*The 1st Battalion largely supported the 26th Marines and was under th e

operational control of the 12th Marines when that regiment was with the 3d

Marine Division and tinder the operational control of the / l th Marines whe n

the 26th Marines was attached to the 1st Marine Division . The 2d Battalio n

arrived and departed with the 27th Marines and was under the operationa l

control of the 11th Marines during its entire tour in Vietnam .

CO 1/13 LtCol John A . Hennelly LJan—23May68

LtCol Anthony Novak 24May—14Nov68

Maj John B. Cantieny l5Nov—3lDec68

CO 2/13 LtCol Rhys J. Phillips, Jr. l7Feb—6Aug6 8

Maj Walter F. Dunn 7Aug—1 2Sep6 8

Headquarters, 1st Force Servic e

Regiment/Force Logistic Command (1st FSRIFLC)

CG BGen Harry C . Olson 1Jan—25Oct6 8

BGen James A . Feeley, Jr. 26Oct—31Dec6 8

C/S Col Roy I. Wood, Jr. 1Jan—31Ju16 8

Col Darwin B . Pond, Jr. IAug—31 Dec68

G—1 LtCol Minard P. Newton, Jr. 1Jan—30Jul68

Maj Donald A . Nilsen 3lJul—31Oct68

LtCol Dennis K . Gray 1Nov—31Dec68

G—2 Maj Clarence E . Watson, Jr. 1Jan—30Jun68

Maj Billy J . Fowler 1Jul—3lDec68

G—3 Col George K . Reid 1Jan—12Apr68

Col James R. Jones 13Apr—4Sep6 8

Col Francis W. Vaught 5Sep—31Dec6 8

G—4 LtCol Robert W. Howland 1Jan—2Jul6 8

LtCol Stanley G . Tribe, Jr. 3Ju1—24Jul6 8

LtCol Alvin W. Bowen 25Jul—3lDec6 8

G—5 Maj Thomas J. Smyth 1Jan—2Aug6 8

Maj John D . Crawford 3Aug—31Dec6 8

Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regimen t

CO Col David E . Lownds

Col Bruce F. Meyers

LtCol Clyde W. Hunter

lJan—17Apr68

18Apr—11Aug6 8

12Aug—31Dec68

CO LtCol William F. Koehnlein 1Jan—13Jul68

LtCol James G . McCormick 14Ju1—i8Sep68

Maj Edward Lukas 19Sep—3lDec68

CO 1/2 6

CO 2/26

LtCol James B. Wilkinso n

LtCol Frederick J. McEwan

Maj Walter T. Coo k

Maj Charles H . Knowle s

LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr.

LtCol Thurman Owens

1Jan—29Feb6 8

lMar—26Ju16 8

27Jul—17Oct6 8

18Oct—31Dec6 8

1Jan—18Ju16 8

19Jul—12Aug68

CO

Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

Col Julian G. Bass, Jr. lJan—20Mar6 8

LtCol Richard G. Eykyn 21Mar—14Sep6 8

LtCol Edward G . Usher 15Sep—31Dec6 8

Maintenance Battalion, 1st Force Service Regimen t

LtCol William F. Sparks 13Aug—31Dec68 CO LtCol Jack M. Hermes 1Jan—3Aug6 8 CO 3/26 LtCol Harry L. Alderman

LtCol John C. Studt

1Jan—14Mar68

15Mar—15Ju168

LtCol Stanley G . Tribe, Jr. 4Aug—2Nov68

LtCol Edward W. Critchett 3Nov—3lDec68 Maj Richard R. Blai r

LtCol John W. P. Robertson

16Ju1—2Aug68

3Aug—31Dec68 3d Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Alph a

* The 26th Marines transferred from the operational control of the 3d Marine

Division to the 1st Marine Division on 18May68 .

CO Col Nolan J. Beat

Col Francis W. Vaugh t

Col Horton E . Roeder

1Jan—18May68

19May—4Sep68

5Sep—3lDec68 27th Marines *

CO Col Adolph G. Schwenk, Jr. 17Feb—10Sep68 1st Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Brav o

CO 1/27 LtCol John E . Greenwood 17Feb—14JuI68 CO Col James R. Jones 1Jan—31.Mar68

Maj Kenneth J. Skipper 15Jul—12Sep68 Col Julian G. Bass, Jr. lApr—17Aug68

CO 2/27 LtCol Louis J. Bacher

LtCol Albert W. Keller

17Feb—19Jun68

20Jun—lOSep68

LtCol Raymond J. Weber

Col Harold L . Parsons

18Aug—l6Sep6 8

l7Sep—31Dec68
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 71 7

1st MP Battalio n

CO LtCol Twyman R. Hill 1Jan68—28Feb6 8

LtCol Bruce G . Brown 29Feb—11Oct6 8

Maj John E . Decoursey 12Oct—20Oct6 8

LtCol James D . Bailey 21Oct—31Dec6 8

3d MP Battalio n

CO LtCol Joseph J. N. Gambardella 1Jan—28Sep6 8

Maj Donald E . Milone 29Sep—21Oct6 8

LrCol Willard E . Cheatham 22Ocr—31Dec6 8

5th Communication Battalio n

CO LrCol Donald L. Lindemuth 1Jan—9Ju16 8

Maj Lee R. Johnson lOJul—31Aug6 8

LtCol Jack D. Hines 1Sep—31Dec6 8

7th Motor Transport Battalion

CO LtCol Lance D . Thomas 1Jan—29Aug68

Maj Lee R. Johnson 30Aug—31Dec68

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

CG MajGen Norman Anderson lJan—21Jun68

MajGen Charles J. Quilter 22Jun—31Dec68

AWC BGen Robert P. Keller 1Jan—22Apr68

BGen Homer S . Hill 23Apr68—31Dec68

BGen Henry W. Hise llFeb68—31Dec68*

C/S Col Frank C. Thomas 1Jan—7Sep68

Col Virgil D. Olson 8Sep—31Dec68

G—1 Col Robert Baird 1Jan—12Sep68

Col Edward A . Parnell 13Sep—31Dec68

G—2 Col Robert D . Limberg 1Jan—25Feb6 8

LtCol Edward H . P. Lynk 26Feb—3Ju168

Col John R . Gill 4Jul—26Sep6 8

LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr. 27Sep—31Dec6 8

G—3 Col Joel E. Bonner, Jr. 1Jan—9Jun6 8

Col Edwin H. Finlayson 10Jun—31Dec6 8

G—4 Col Charles B. Armstrong, Jr. 1Jan—9Mar6 8

Col Eugene V. Goldston 10Mar—25Mar6 8

Col Edward N . LeFaivre 26Mar—13Aug6 8

Col Steve Furimsky, Jr. 14Aug—31Dec68

*With the assignment of BGen Hise, the 1st MAW was authorized two assistant wing commanders.

Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG—1 )

CO Col Tolbert T. Gentry 1Jan—8Oct68

Col Thomas H . Nichols, Jr. 9Oct—31Dec68

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1 (H&HS—1 )

CO LtCol Albert W. Keller lJan—13Jun68

Maj Lawrence Fursrenberg 14Jun—7Oct68

LtCol Prentice A. Lindsay 8Oct—31Dec6 8

Marine Wing Communication Squadron 1 (MWCS—1 )

CO Maj David H. Tinius 1Jan—lOApr6 8

Maj Robin W. Cobble llApr—6Oct6 8

Maj Don J. Ogden 7Oct—31Dec6 8

Marine Wing Facilities Squadro n

CO LtCol Edward A. Lanin g

Maj Harry E . Taylo r

Maj Richard C. Hoffman

Maj Winston O . Golle r

Maj Esra D. Grissom

Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG—17 )

CO Col John E. Hansen IJan—23Feb6 8

Col Robert D . Limberg 24Feb—l5Jul68

Col William Farrell 16Jul—5Sep6 8

Col Richard S . Rash 9Sep—3 I Dec6 8

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 17 (H&MS—17 )

CO LtCol Eugene V. Goldston LJan—18Jan6 8

Maj Frank E. Graham 19Jan—l4Feb6 8

LtCol Grover C . Doster, Jr. I5Feb—2Aug6 8

LtCol Edward S. John 3Aug—31 Dec6 8

Wing Equipment and Repair Squadron 17 (WERS—17 )

CO LtCol John R. Hansford 1Jan—3IMar6 8

Maj William T. Lunsford lApr—5Aug6 8

Maj Duane R. Van Noce 6Aug—8Sep6 8

Maj Stanley M. Williams 9Sep—31 Dec6 8

Marine Air Control Group 18 (MACG—18 )

CO Col Lyle V. Tope 1Jan—22May6 8

LtCol James W. Dillon 23May—2Aug6 8

Col Edward S . Fris 3Aug—31Dec6 8

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 18 (H&MS—18 )

CO LtCol Paul B . Montague 1Jan—13Jan6 8

Maj Laurence A . Taylor l4Jan—17Jan6 8

LtCol Thomas W. Riggs 18Jan—6Oct68

LtCol John R. Dopler 7Oct—3l Dec68

Marine Air Suport Squadron 2 (MASS—2 )

CO LtCol John M. Johnson, Jr. 1Jan—3Jun68

LtCol Gale Harlan 4Jun—29Ju168

Maj Edward J. Dahy Ill 30Jul—31Dec6 8

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS—3 )

CO LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr. 1Jan—27Feb6 8

LtCol Johnny O . Gregerson 28Feb—l1Sep6 8

Maj William J. Sullivan 12Sep—31Dec6 8

Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS—4 )

CO LtCol William A . Cohn 1Jan—25Apr6 8

LtCol David S . Twining 26Apr—14Sep6 8

LtCol Thomas M. Kauffman 15Sep—31Dec6 8

1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (1st LAAM Bn)

CO LtCol Marshall J . Treado 1Jan—13Aug68

Maj Norman P. Fitzgerald, Jr. 14Aug—11Oct68

LtCol John W. Drury 12Oct—31Dec68

2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (2d LAAM Bn) "

CO LtCol Stanley A . Herman 1Jan68—7Feb6 8

LtCol Donald E. Gunther 8Feb—12Occ6 8

*The 2d LAAM Bn departed Vietnam for ConUS, 120ct68.

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG—1 l )

CO Col Leroy T. Frey 1Jan68—7Jun6 8

Col Robert D . Slay 8Jun—31Dec6 8

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&MS—11 )

CO LtCol Anthony L . Blair 1Jan—8May6 8

LtCol Carl R . Lundquist 9May—14Oct6 8

LtCol Robert M . Stowers 15Oct—31Dec68

1 (MWFS—1 )

1Jan—23Apr6 8

24Apr—12Jun6 8

13Jul—31Jul68

l A ug—5 Dec68

6—31 Dec68
718 THE DEFINING YEA R

Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS—11 )

CO LtCol John W. Irion, Jr. 1Jan—16Jun6 8

LtCol James W. Haskell 17Jun—30Nov6 8

LtCol Preston P. Marques, Jr. IDec—31Dec6 8

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (VMCJ—1 )

CO LtCol Robert W. Lewis 1Jan—15Mar6 8

LtCol Eric B. Parker 16Mar—16Nov6 8

LtCol Bobby R . Hall 17Nov—31Dec6 8

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA—122 )

CO LtCol John M . Verdi 1Jan—28Jan6 8

LtCol Paul B . Montague 29Jan—30Jun6 8

LtCol Eugene R. Howard, Jr. 1Jul—25Aug6 8

Maj Donald L. Waldvogel 26—30Aug68 *

*The squadron was transferred to MAG—15 in Japan on 30Aug68.

Marine Attack Squadron (VMFA—223 )

CO LtCol Arthur W. Anthony, Jr. 23Apr—30Apr68 *

LtCol Erin D . Smith 1May—150ct6 8

Maj Leonard T. Preston, Jr. 16Oct—31Dec6 8

*The squadron was transferred from MAG—15 in Japan on 23Apr68.

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA—311 )

CO LtCol Richard B . Taber tJan—lOMar68

LtCol Norman B. McCrary llMar—24Sep68

LtCol Charles 0. Hiett 25Sep—31Dec68

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533 (VMA [AWI—533 )

CO LtCol William E . H. Fitch III IJan—lApr68

LtCol Ronald L . Iverson 2Apr—31Jul6 8

LtCol Edward A . Laning lAug—31Aug6 8

LtCol Paul K . German, Jr. lSep—31Dec68

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (MAG—13 )

CO Col Edward N . Lefaivre lJan—24Mar68

Col James H . Berge, Jr . 25Mar—3Sep6 8

Col Norman W. Gourley 4Sep—31Dec6 8

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 242 (VMA [AW)—242 )

CO Maj Arthur W. D . Lavigne 1—22Jan6 8

LtCol James R . Penny 23Jan—22Ju16 8

LtCol Fred C. Rilling, Jr. 23Ju1—31Dec68

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 235 (VMA [AWI—235) CO

CO

LtCol Paul L. Siegmun d

Maj Edgar A . House

1Jan—12Aug6 8

CO LtCol Carl R 13Aug—31Dec6 8 . Lundquist lJan—8May6 8

LtCol Anthony L . Blair 9May—10May68* Marine Air Base Squadron 13 (MABS—13 )

*The squadron was transferred to MAG—15 in Japan on 10May68.

LtCol Leroy A . Mader a

LtCol George L. Bruse r

Maj Charles V. Smillie, Jr.

lJan—21Apr6 8

22Apr—12Jul6 8

13Jul—31Dec6 8

CO

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334 (VMFA—334 )

LtCol Hiel L. VanCampen 30Aug—30Sep68 *

LtCol James R . Sherman lOct—31Dec68 Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA—115 )

*The squadron arrived from CONUS on 30Aug68 . CO LtCol Richard E . Care y

LtCol Gerald W. Vaughan

Maj John I. Hudso n

LtCol Robert R . Norton

1Jan—16Jan6 8

17Jan—12Aug6 8

13Aug—27Nov6 8

28Nov—31Dec6 8

CO

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA—542 )

LtCol Robert N. Hutchinson lOMay—29Ju168 *

LtCol Henry R. Vitali 30Jul—31Dec6 8

*The squadron was transferred from MAG—15, in Japan on 10May68. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA—314 )

CO

Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG—12 )

Col Dean Wilker lJan—7Mar68

Col Charles B. Armstrong, Jr. 8Mar—31Jul68

Col Rex A . Deasy lAug—31Dec68

CO LtCol Frank D . Topley

LtCol Herbert V. Lundi n

LtCol Frank E . Petersen, Jr.

1Jan—13Jan6 8

14Jan—28Ju16 8

29Ju1—31Dec6 8

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA—323 )

CO

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12 (H&MS—12 )

LtCol Dan C. Alexander 1Jan—280ct6 8

LtCol Clifford D . Warfield 29Oct—31Dec68

CO LtCol Harry T. Hagama n

LtCol Don J. Slee

LtCol Ira L. Morgan, Jr.

1Jan—15May6 8

16May—11Dec68

I2Dec—31 Dec68

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG—16)

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS—12) CO Col Edwin 0. Reed

Col Warren L . MacQuarrie

1Jan—12Sep68

13Sep—31Dec68 CO LtCol Leo J. Leblanc, Jr. lJan—25Feb6 8

LrCol John H . Miller 26Feb—80ct6 8

Maj Lawrence Furstenberg 9Occ—31Dec6 8

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA—121)

CO

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16 (H&MS—16 )

LtCol Lawrence J. Flanaga n

LtCol Horace A . Bruce

LtCol Morris G . Robbi n

Maj William L. Whelan

1Jan—6Jan68

7Jan—30Apr68

lMay—11Jul68

12Ju1—70ct6 8

CO LtCol Richard J. Kern 1Jan—10Mar6 8

LtCol William D . Shippen 1lMar—140ct6 8

Maj David A . Lerps 15Oct—31Dec68

LtCol Charles W. Gobat 8Oct—31Dec6 8

CO

CO

Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS—16 )

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA—211)

LtCol Samuel J. Fulto n

LtCol William E . Smilanich, Jr.

1Jan—30Apr6 8

LtCol Francis H lMay—29Jun6 8. Thurston 1Jan—28Feb68

LtCol Leo J. Leblanc, Jr.

LtCol Frederic P. Salzman, Jr.

LtCol John R. Waterstreet

29Feb—26Aug6 8

27Aug—30Nov68

lDec—31Dec68

LtCol Robert F. Rick

LtCol Lowell W. Paris h

LtCol William Cunningham

30Jun—lOSep6 8

I ISep—IONov6 8

lINov—31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13 (H&MS—13 )
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 71 9

Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO—2)

CO LtCol Morris G . Robbins IJan—30Apr6 8

LtCol Samuel J. Fulton IMay—4Nov68

LtCol Thomas J . Dumont 5Nov—31Dec68

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167 (HML—167 )

CO Maj Robert C. Finn 15Mar—lOMay68 *

Maj George H. Dunn II 1 lMay—17Aug68

LtCol Thomas F. Miller 18Aug—31Dec68

*The squadron was activated on 15Mar68 at Marble Mountain Air Facility, Da Nang, Vietnam.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM—163 )

CO LtCol Richard G. Courtney 19May—31Aug68 *

*The squadron was transferred from ProvMag—39 on 19May68 and was

detached on 31 Aug68 for return to CONUS .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM—164 )

CO LtCol Robert F. Rick 16—29Jun68 *

LtCol William E . Smilanich, Jr. 30Jun—17Nov68

LtCol Richard T. Trundy 18Nov—29Nov6 8

*The squadron was detached from SLF Bravo on 16Jun68 and was reassigned

on 29Nov68 to SLF Bravo

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM—165 )

CO LrCol George L. Patrick, Jr. 4Oct—31Dec68*

*The squadron was transferred from SLF Bravo on 40ct68, then reverted to SLF

Bravo control on 290ct68, and then on 60ct68 returned to MAG—16 control.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM—265 )

CO LtCol William R . Beeler 1—12Jan68 *

Maj William L . Whelan 13Jan—4Jun6 8

LtCol Roy J. Edwards 5Jun—15Jun6 8

Maj Richard L. Yanke 16Jun—7Jul6 8

LtCol Roy J. Edwards 19Aug—18Sep6 8

LtCol Richard L . Yanke 19Sep—30Sep68

*On 15Jun68, the squadron command group of HMM—265 and a detachment

was transferred to SLF Bravo, leaving Major Yanke in command of th e

squadron . On 7Jul68, the rest of the squadron was transferred to SLF Bravo .

The squadron was detached from the SLF on 19Aug68 and returned to the control of MAG—16 . On 30Sep68, the squadron was transferred to MAG—36 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM—361 )

CO LtCol Daniel M. Wilson 1OFeb—25Mar68 *

Maj Forrest W. Crone 26Mar—18May68

*The squadron was attached from SLF Alpha on 10Feb68 and departed for

CONUS on 18May68

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM—362 )

CO Maj Walter H . Shauer, Jr. 5Sep—18Sep68 *

LtCol Jack E. Schlarp 19Sep—8Dec68

*The squadron was attached from SLF Alpha on 5Sep68 and reverted to SLF

Alpha control on 8Dec68 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM—363 )

CO LtCol Frankie E. Allgood 1Jan—9Feb68 *

*The squadron was transferred to SLF Alpha on 9Feb6 8

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM—364 )

CO LtCol Merlin V. Statzer 1ODec—31Dec68 *

*The squadron was transferred from MAG—36 on 10Dec68.

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH—463 )

CO LtCol Joseph L. Sadowski 1Jan—lApr68

LtCol Joe G . Walker, Jr. 2Apr—70ct68

LtCol Roger W. Peard, Jr. 8Oct—31Dec68

Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG—36 )

CO Col Frank E. Wilson 1Jan—30Apr6 8

Col Bruce J. Matheson IMay—31 Dec6 8

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36 (H&MS—36 )

CO LtCol Richard G. Courtney 1Jan—30Apr68

LrCol George L . Patrick, Jr. 1May—22Aug68

LtCol Ralph Thuesen 23Aug—31 Dec68

Marine Air Base Squadron 36 (MAB—36 )

CO Maj James C. Robinson 1Jan—5Mar6 8

LtCol William D . Watson 6Mar—llSep6 8

LtCol Dennis W. Wright 12Sep—31Dec6 8

Marine Air Group 36, Detachment Alpha (MAG—36, Det Alpha )

OIC Col Owen V. Gallentine 1Jan—27Feb68 *

Col John E. Hansen 28Feb—15Apr68

*Detachment Alpha was a command and control element of MAG—36 based

at Quang Tri Air Base until replaced on 15Apr68 by Provisional Marine

Aircraft Group 39 (ProvMAG—39).

Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO—3 )

CO LtCol Glenn R. Hunter 1Jan—29Feb68 *

* VM0—3 was deactivated in March and reactivated as HML—367.

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO—6 )

CO LtCol William J. White 1Jan—24Mar68 *

LtCol Bertram A. Maas 25Mar—15Apr6 8

*The squadron was transferred to ProvMAG—39 on 16Apr68.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM—163 )

CO LrCol Louis W. Schwindt 1Jan—l5Apr68 *

*The squadron was transferred to ProvMag—39 on 15Apr68 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM—164 )

CO LtCol Robert F. Rick IJan—3Mar68 *

*On 3Mar68, the squadron was transferred to SLF Bravo .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM—165 )

CO LrCol Richard E . Romine 1Jan—31Mar68 *

LtCol Elvyn E. Hagedorn 1 .Apr—22Aug6 8

LtCol George L. Patrick, Jr. 23Aug—31Aug68

*From 9Jan—18Feb68, the squadron was detached to SLF Bravo . It then

returned to MAG—36 and then once more reverted to SLF Bravo on ISep68 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM—262 )

CO LtCol Melvin J. Steinberg I.OJan—15Apr68 *

*The squadron joined MAG—36 on 10Jan68 from SLF Bravo and then later

transferred to ProvMAG—39 on 16Apr68 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM—265 )

CO LtCol Richard L . Yanke 10ct—31Dec68 *

*On 10ct68, MAG—36 assumed command of the squadron from MAG—16 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM—362 )

CO Maj Walter H . Shauer, Jr. 1Jan—14Apr68 *

*On l5Apr68, the squadron joined SLF Alpha .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM—363 )

CO Maj Duwayne W. Hoffert 15Apr68—22Aug68 *

Maj James L . Harrison 23Aug68—30Nov6 8

Maj Timothy J. Cronin, Jr. lDec—31Dec68

*The squadron was transferred to MAG—36 on 15Apr68 from SLF Alpha .

For the period 290ct-7Dec68, the squadron was under the administrative control while under the operational control of MAG—36. On 8Dec68, it reverted

once more to MAG—36 administrative control as well as operational control.
720 THE DEFINING YEA R

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM—364) Maj James V. Knapp IFeb—5Mar6 8

CO LtCol Louis A. Gulling 1Jan—16Apr68* Maj Hugh S . Jolley 6Mar—26Aug6 8

LtCol Joseph R. Dobbratz, Jr. 17Apr—11Sep68 Maj Aubrey L. Lumpkin 27Aug—31 .Dec6 8

LtCol Merlin V. Statzer 12Sep—9Dec68 G—3 LtCol Anthony Novak lJan—30Apr6 8

*The squadron was transferred to MAG—16 on 10Dec68 . Col John A . Conway IMay—5Jun6 8

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367 (HML—367)

Col Robert R. Wilso n

LtCol Ronald A . Mason

6Jun—1.1 Jul6 8

1.2Jul—27Ju16 8

CO LtCol Glenn R . Hunter Mar—7Apr68* LtCol George C. Kliefoth 28Jul—31 Dec68

LtCol Robert King, Jr. 8Apr—22Aug68

G—4 Col Warren A . Butcher 1Jan—26Feb68

LtCol Richard L. Robinson 23Aug—31Dec68

LtCol Paul R . Fields 27Feb—29Feb68

*The Squadron was formed from the personnel and equipment of VMO—3 in

March 1968. Col Maynard W. Schmidt IMar—1 1Oct68

LtCoI Stewart B . McCarty, Jr. 120ct—31 . Dec68

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 (HMH—462 )

CO LtCol Ronald E . Nelson 21Aug—31Dec68 *

*The squadron arrived from ConUS on 21Aug68.

*The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade was established on I Mar66 and

assumed responsibility for Task Force 79 (TF 79) duties on that date, On 1 5

April 1966, 9th MAB assumed responsibility for all tactical Marine aviation and ground units in the Western Pacific which were not in Vietnam .

Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39 (ProvMAG—39 )

CO Col John E. Hansen

LtCol Paul W. Niese n

Col Walter Sienko

16Apr—30Jun68 *

1Jul—4Jul6 8

5Jul—31Dec6 8

16Apr68 and replaced

CO

Regimental Landing Team 26 (RLT—26)/Task Group 79.2 *

Col David E . Lownds 1Jan—1IApr68

Col Bruce F. Meyers 12Apr—I 1Aug68

*ProvMAG—39 was formed at Quang Tri on Col Clyde W. Hunter 12Aug—31 Dec68

MAG—36, Detachment Alpha. LtCol Niesen remained commander of HM M

161 as well as ProvMAG—39 commander during the period 1—4 Jul68 .

*RLT—26 remained administratively under 9th MAB, but, only RLT—2 6

(Rear) remained on Okinawa. The regimental command group and its three

integral infantry battalions were in Vietnam. Provisional Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 3 9

(ProvH&MS—39) Regimental Landing Team 26 (Rear) (RLT—26 [Rear])

CO

CO

Maj Charles G . Gerard 16Apr—9Aug6 8

Maj Herman R. Bolen lOAug—29Nov6 8

LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson 3ONov—31Dec68

C O

CO

LtCoI Richard D . Alexander 1Jan—16Feb6 8

Maj John B. Bany, Jr. 17Feb—31Mar6 8

LtCol Jack Erwin I Apr—190ct6 8

Maj James E. Anderson 200ct—270ct6 8

LtCol Rufino Delacruz 280ct—31Dec6 8

1st Battalion, 13th Marines

LtCol John A. Hennelly 1Jan—23May6 8

LtCol Anthony Novak 24May—15Nov6 8

LtCol John B. Cantieny 16Nov—31 Dec6 8

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMM—161 )

LtCol Paul W. Niesen 17May—8Nov68 *

LtCol David L . Elam 9Nov—31Dec6 8

*The squadron joined ProvMAG—39 from CONUS on 17May68 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM—163 )

CO LtCol Richard G. Courtney 16Apr—18May68 *

*The squadron was transferred from MAG—36 to ProvMAG—39 on

16Apr68 and then transferred to AIAG—16 on 19May68. Provisional Service Battalion/Task Group 79.8

CO

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM—262)

CO Col Thomas W. Burke

Col Robert R. Wilson

LtCol James F. Conlo n

Col William C. Doty, Jr.

1Jan—17Jul6 8

18Ju1—21Aug6 8

22Aug—8Sep6 8

9Sep—31 Dec6 8

LtCol Melvin J. Steinberg 16Apr—20Sep68 *

LtCol Albert N . Allen 21Sep—31Dec6 8

* The squadron was transferred to ProvMAG—39 from MAG—36 on

16Apr68. It returned to MAG—36 on 21Sep68. Marine Aircraft Group 15 (MAG—15 )

CO

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO—6) CO

CO

Col Wilbur C. Kellogg, Jr.

Col Clement T. Corcoran

1Jan—1.20ct6 8

Maj Bertram A . Maas 130ct—31Dec6 8 16Apr—20Sep68 *

Maj Hans A. Zander 21Sep—31Dec68 Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15 (HKMS—l5 )

*The squadron was transferred to ProvMAG—39 from MAG—36 o n

16Apr68. LtCol Herman L. Mixso n

LtCol David P. Grail

LtCol Kenneth M. Scott

1Jan—18Ju168

9Jul—7Dec68

8Dec—31Dec68

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB)/Task Force 79 *

9th MAB Headquarters

CG BGen Jacob E. Glick 1Jan—21 Jan68 Marine Air Base Squadron 15 (MA13S—15 )

BGen William C. Chip 22Jan—11Aug68 CO LtCol Clement C. J. Chamberlain lJan—5Apr68

BGen John E. Williams 12Aug—31Dec68 Maj Raymond D . Fortmeyer 6Apr—21Aug68

CS Col James A. Etheridge 1Jan—30Sep68 LtCol Dock H. Pegues 22Aug—31Dec68

Col John Lowman, Jr. 10ct—31Dec6 8

G—1 Col George H. Benskin, Jr. 1Jan—10Apr68 Marine Air Control Squadron 6 (MACS—6 )

LtCol Parks H . Simpson 11Apr—160ct68 LtCoI Rollin E . Hippler 1Jan—27Feb68 °

Maj William H . Groesbeck 17Oct—31Dec68 *MACS—6 returned to CONUS on 27Feb68 after being relieved by

G—2 Maj Hugh S . Jolley lJan—3Jan68 MACS—8.
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 72 1

Marine Air Control Squadron 8 (MACS—8 )

LtCol Dirk C. Bierhaalder 27Feb—31DEc68 *

*MACS—8 joined MAG—15 from the 2dMAW at MCAS Cherry Point ,

North Carolina on 27Feb68 .

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA–122 )

CO Maj Donald L. Waldvoge 13IAug—15Sep68 *

Maj Don K . Hanna 16Sep—2Oct6 8

LtCol Lawrence J. Willis 3Oct–31Dec68

*The squadron was transferred from MAG—11 in Vietnam to MAG—15 on

31 Aug68 .

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 223 (VMFA—223 )

CO LtCol Arthur W. Anthony, Jr. 1Jan–23Apr68 *

*The squadron was transferred to MAG–12 on 23Apr68

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA–542 )

CO LtCol Richard C . Marsh 1Jan–26Jan6 8

LcCol Robert N. Hutchinson 27Jan—lOMay68 *

*The squadron was transferred to MAG–11 on 10May68.

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 235 (VMA (AW)—235 )

CO LtCol Anthony L. Blair l lMay—Sep68 *

*The squdron was transferred from MAG–1I on 11 May68 and then transferred to the 1st Marine Brigade. MCAS Kaneohe, Hawaii on 6 Sep68.

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR–1 52 )

CO LtCol Royce M . Williams 1Jan–31Mar6 8

LtCol Frank G . McLenon lApr–31Dec6 8

Special Landing Force Alpha (SLF Alpha)/

Task Group 79 .4 (TG 79 .4 )

CO Col John A . Conway 1Jan—14Jan68

Col Bruce F. Meyers 15Jan—lOApr68

LtCol Paul R. Fields 1lApr—2May68

Col Alfred I . Thomas 3May—lAug68

LtCol Paul R. Fields 2Aug—6Aug68

Col Alfred I . Thomas 7Aug—24Aug68

Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 25Aug—31 Dec68

SLF Alpha Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) *

Battalion Landing Team 1/3 (BLT 1/3 )

CO LtCol Richard W. Goodale 1Jan–2Jan68

Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4 )

CO LtCol William Weise 3Jan—2May68

Maj Charles W. Knapp 3May—4May68

LtCol Louis A . Rann 5May—13Aug68

Battalion Landing Team 2/26 (2/26)

CO LtCol Thurman Owens 13Aug—17Aug6 8

LtCol William F. Sparks 18Aug—31Dec68

*The assigned BLTs were drawn from Ill MAF on a rotating basis an d

returned to Ill MAF after their respective SLF deployment tours.

Special Landing Force Alpha Helicopter Squadron s

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM–361 )

CO LtCol Daniel M . Wilson lJan–10Feb68 *

*The squadron was transferred to MAG–16 on 10Feb68.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM–363 )

CO LtCol Frankie E. Allgood 10Feb—25Mar68*

Maj Duwayne W. Hoffert 26Mar–14Apr6 8

Maj James L . Harrison 6Sep–28Nov6 8

Maj Timothy J. Cronin, Jr. 29Nov–7Dec68

* The squadron was transferred to SLF Alpha from MAG–16 on 10Feb6 8

and detached to MAG–36 on 14Apr68 . It was reassigned to SLF Alpha on

6Sep68 and then again returned to MAG–36 on 8Dec68 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM–362 )

CO Maj Walter H . Shauer, Jr. 14Apr–6Sep68 *

LtCol Jack E. Schlarp 7Dec–31Dec68

*The squadron was transferred to SLF Alpha from MAG—36 on 14Apr6 8

and on 6Sep68 it was then transferred to MAG—16 . On 7Dec68, it reverted

once more to SLF Alpha.

Special Landing Force Bravo (SLF Bravo)/

Task Group 79 .5 (TG 79 .5 )

CO Col Maynard W. Schmidt 1Jan—28Feb6 8

Col Warren A . Butcher 29Feb—5Sep6 8

Col Robert R. Wilson 6Sep–31Dec6 8

Special Landing Force Bravo Battalion Landing Teams *

Battalion Landing Team 3/1 (BLT 3/1 )

CO LtCol Max McQuown l Jan–4Jun6 8

LtCol Daniel J. Quick 5Jun–15Jun6 8

Battalion Landing Team 2/7 (BLT 2/7

CO LtCol Charles E. Mueller 15Jun–30Jul6 8

LtCol Leroy E . Watson 31Jul—20Sep6 8

LtCol Neil A . Nelson 21 Sep–31 Dec68

*The SLF Bravo BLTs like the BLTs in SLF Alpha rotated in and out to th e

SLF from 111 MAF.

Special Landing Force Bravo Helicopter Squadron s

Detachment Alpha,

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM–262 )

CO Maj David A. Althoff lJan–2Jan68*

*Detachment Alpha, equipped with CH-46s, remained with the SLF while

the remainder of the squadron was involved in a massive helicopter repair pro -

gram. The remainder of the squadron rejoined Detachment Alpha on 3Jan68.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM–165 )

LtCol Richard E . Romine lOJan–3Mar68 *

LtCol George L . Patrick, Jr. lSep–28Dec68

* The squadron transferred to the SLF from MAG–36 on 10Jan68 . It was

relieved on 3Mar68 by HMM–164. It returned to the SLF on 1Sep68 an d

then relieved again by HMM–164 on 28Dec68 .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM–164 )

CO LtCol Robert F. Rick 3Mar– I 6J u n68 *

LtCol Richard T. Truncly 28Dec–31Dec6 8

*The squadron relieved HMM–165 on 3Mar68 and was in turn relieved by

HMM–265 on 16Jun68. On 28Dec68, it once more returned to the SLF.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM–265 )

CO LtCol Robert J. Edwards 16Jun–1 Sep6 8

*The squadron was assigned to SLF Bravo from MAG–16 on 16Jun68 and

was in turn relieved on 1Sep68 by HMM–165 .
Appendix B

Chronology of Significant Events

January—December 1968

1 January Allied and Communist forces in Vietnam begin the new year with a cease -

fire . The allies report 63 violations of the truce .

1 January The Marine Corps troop level in Vietnam reaches 81,249 . The III Marine

Amphibious Force, which is responsible for I CTZ, begins the year with a

total strength of 114,158 troops, composed of 76,616 Marines divided

among the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marin e

Aircraft Wing, and Force Logistic Command ; 3,538 Navy personnel ; an d

36,816 Army personnel, including the Americal Division and one brigad e

of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and 88 Air Force personnel .

3 January The 5th Marines concludes Operation Auburn south of Da Nan g

(28Dec67—3Jan68). The operation results in 37 reported enemy casualtie s

with 24 Marines killed and 62 wounded .

11 January As part of Operation Checkers, in an effort to rotate units of the 1st Marin e

Division north to relieve the 3d Marine Division, Task Force X-Ray head -

quarters is activated at Phu Bai . Task Force X-Ray subsequently relieve d

the 3d Marine Division headquarters at Phu Bai, which moved to Dong Ha

in Quang Tri Province .

16 January The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines reinforces the Marine base at Khe Sanh .

16 January A North Vietnamese representative states that North Vietnam will not

begin peace talks until the United States halts bombing of the North .

20 January Operation Lancaster I (1Nov67— 20Jan68), a 3d Marines operation to safe -

guard Route 9 between Cam Lo and Ca Lu, ends with a reported 46 enem y

casualties and 27 Marines killed and 141 wounded .

20 January The 1st Marines concludes Operation Osceola I (20Oct67—20Jan68) i n

the Quang Tri City region . The operation resulted in a reported 76 enem y

casualties with 17 Marines killed and 199 wounded .

20 January The 4th Marines concludes Operation Neosho I (1Nov67—20Jan68) north -

west of Hue . The operation resulted in 77 reported enemy casualties wit h

12 Marines killed and 100 wounded.

20 January A Marine patrol participating in Operation Scotland makes contact with a

heavy concentration of North Vietnamese troops around Hill 881 South nea r

Khe Sanh. The ensuing battle signaled the beginning of the siege of Khe Sanh .

21 January The 1st Air Cavalry Division, USA, is placed under the operational control

of III MAF commander, Marine Lieutenant General Robert E . Cushman, Jr.

21 January The 4th Marines begin Operation Lancaster II in the same area as Operation Lancaster I.

21 January The 3d Marines begin Operation Osceola II in the same area as Osceola I .

21 January General Westmoreland, Commander USMACV, orders a temporary hal t

to work on the "McNamara Line," the barrier and antiinfiltration system

south of the DMZ .

21 January The NVA begins the bombardment of the base at Khe Sanh and the Marin e

outposts in the surrounding hills . This rocket, mortar, and artillery barrag e

will continue for the next 77 days.

722
CHRONOLOGY 72 3

22 January The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines reinforces the garrison at Khe Sanh .

22 January The 1st Air Cavalry Division begins Operation Jeb Stuart in the norther n

part of I CTZ.

23 January The USS Pueblo (AGER 2), an American intelligence ship, is seized off th e

coast of Korea by the North Koreans .

23 January Special Landing Force Bravo consisting of BLT 3/1 and HMM—165 begins

Operation Badger Catch near the Cua Viet River.

26 January Operation Badger Catch is renamed Operation Saline . The Marines i n

Badger Catch continue to work in conjunction with Operation Napoleon ,

a similar effort by the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion to keep the Cu a

Viet River supply line open .

27 January The seven-day Communist ceasefire for the Tet holiday begins .

29 January The allied ceasefire for the Tet holiday begins in all of South Vietna m

except I CTZ.

30 January Enemy troops launch the beginning of their Tet offensive in ICorps, attacking Da Nang and several cities south of the base .

31 January The NVA opens its Tet offensive throughout South Vietnam with attacks

against 39 provincial capitals and major cities including Saigon and Hue .

31 January VC troops fail in an attempt to seize the U.S . Embassy in Saigon afte r

breaching the compound .

31 January Gen Leonard F. Chapman becomes the 24th Commandant of the Marin e

Corps, upon the retirement of the former Commandant, Gen Wallace M .

Greene, Jr.

31 January 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division launches a counter-offensive air

assault into the city of Quang Tri .

January Operation Kentucky in "Leatherneck Square," south of the DMZ, resulted in 353 reported enemy casualties.

January The Americal Division continues Operation Wheeler/ Wallowa south of

Da Nang.

1 February The 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division together with ARVN force s

successfully defend the city of Quang Tri . The enemy sustained 900

reported casualties and 100 captured .

1 February Richard M . Nixon announces his candidacy for president .

1 February Units of the 1st and 5th Marines begin Operation Hue City to drive th e

NVA out of the city.

5 February Marines from the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh repel a battalion-sized attac k

killing a reported 109 NVA soldiers with 7 Marines killed and 15 wound -

ed .

7 February NVA units overrun the Special Forces base at Lang Vei, west of Khe Sanh .

7 February Elements of the 3d Marines, 5th Marines, and the Americal Divisio n

engage the 2d NVA Division in fighting around Da Nang .

9 February III MAF units succeed in throwing back the 2d NVA Division offensive a t

Da Nang.

9 February MACV Forward, under General Creighton B . Abrams, Deputy Commander USMACV, is established in I CTZ at Phu Bai .

13 February The headquarters and combat elements of the 101st Airborne Divisio n

arrive in I CTZ.

16 February Operation Osceola II ends . This operation resulted in 21 reported enemy

casualties with 2 Marines killed and 74 wounded .

23 February NVA troops fire more than 1,300 shells into the Marine garrison at Khe

Sanh . This barrage marks the heaviest shelling of the entire siege .
724 THE DEFINING YEA R

24 February American and South Vietnamese troops capture the Citadel in Hue .

25 February American forces declare the city of Hue secure .

29 February Operation Saline is combined with Operation Napoleon .

February The 27th Marines arrives in Da Nang from the U .S . as part of the reinforcements approved by President Lyndon B. Johnson . The Presiden t

made extensive reductions to original recommendations of MACV and th e

JCS.

February Operation Kentucky results in 398 reported enemy casualties with 9 0

Marines killed and 277 wounded.

1 March Clark Clifford replaces Robert S . McNamara as Secretary of Defense .

2 March Operation Hue City ends successfully as the 1st and 5th Marines defea t

the NVA assault in Hue. The operation resulted in 1,943 enemy casualties with 142 Marines killed and 1,005 wounded .

10 March MACV Forward is deactivated .

10 March Provisional Corps Vietnam is created . This command, led by Lieutenan t

General William B. Rosson, USA, controls the 3rd Marine Division, th e

1st Air Cavalry Division, and the 101st Airborne Division and is subordinate to Lieutenant General Cushman, commander of III MA E

12 March Senator Eugene McCarthy makes a substantial showing in the Ne w

Hampshire primary, winning 40 percent of the vote, with Presiden t

Johnson winning 49 percent .

16 March Troops from the Americal Division massacre more than 100 civilians ,

mostly women and children, in the village of My Lai .

21 March As part of the Single Management System, the Seventh Air Force assume s

responsibility for coordinating and controlling all fixed-wing aircraft mis -

sions, including those of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing .

31 March Operation Scotland (lNov67—31Mar68) near Khe Sanh ends. The operation, which included the defense of the besieged garrison of Khe Sanh ,

resulted in a reported 1,631 enemy casualties with 204 Marines killed an d

1,622 wounded in action .

31 March The 1st Cavalry Division concludes Operation Jeb Stuart . This operation

resulted in a reported 3,268 enemy casualties with 284 Army personne l

killed and 1,717 wounded .

31 March President Johnson announces a partial halt in the bombing of North Vietnam and that he will send an additional 13,500 troops to South Vietnam .

In a surprise move, the President declares that he will not run for re-elec -

tion due to the war in Vietnam and public unrest at home .

March Operation Kentucky results in a reported 413 enemy casualties with 3 8

Marines killed and 217 wounded.

1 April The 1st Air Cavalry Division together with units from the 1st Marines

and the ARVN, begins Operation Pegasus from the Marine base of Ca L u

to relieve the Marine garrison at Khe Sanh .

9 April U. S. troops retake the Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei, southwest of Kh e

Sanh .

15 April Operation Pegasus ends with the relief and resupply of Khe Sanh . The

operation resulted in 1,044 reported enemy casualties, with 51 Marine s

killed and 459 wounded . The 1st Air Cavalry Division suffered 41 personnel killed and 208 wounded .

15 April With the relief of Khe Sanh and the end of Operation Pegasus, Operatio n

Scotland II, a continuation of Marine Corps action around the base at Kh e

Sanh begins.
CHRONOLOGY 725

19 April Elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division ,

and several ARVN units begin Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 . This

operation takes place in the A Shau Valley and is designed as a spoilin g

assault to disrupt enemy preparations for another attack on Hue .

30 April NVA units are engaged in the village of Dai Do by BLT 2/4 . Heavy fighting in this area continues until 3 May.

4 May The 7th Marines begin Operation Allen Brook, an operation designed t o

disrupt the growing enemy presence South of Da Nang .

30 April—17May Marine, Army, and ARVN units succeed in thwarting a possible enem y

assault on Dong Ha . The NVA suffered a reported 1,547 casualties whil e

the allies sustained casualties of nearly 300 dead and 1,000 wounded .

4 May The 7th Marines begin Operation Allen Brook, an operation designed t o

disrupt the growing enemy presence south of Da Nang .

5 May Signalling the second major offensive of the year, enemy troops launc h

119 rocket and mortar attacks on towns and cities throughout South Vietnam.

13 May Peace talks among North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United State s

begin in Paris.

17 May Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 ends with a reported 735 enemy casualties with 142 Army personnel killed and 731 wounded .

17 May 1st Air Cavalry Division begins Operation Jeb Stuart III along the borde r

of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces .

18 May Battalions from the 1st Marine Division begin Operation Mameluk e

Thrust in the central regions of Quang Nam Province .

20 May Major General Raymond G. Davis replaces Major General Rathvon McC .

Tompkins as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division .

22 May The Marine Corps makes its first use of the North American OV—10 A

Bronco as an observation and counter-insurgency aircraft .

26 May Major General Rathvon McC . Tompkins becomes Deputy Commander o f

III MAF, replacing Major General William J. Van Ryzin .

27 May Peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam break down i n

Paris.

May Operation Kentucky results in a reported 817 enemy casualties with 13 4

Marines killed and 611 wounded .

May Marine Corps force levels in Vietnam reach 89,000.

1 June Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., replaces Lieutenant General Vic -

tor H. Krulak as the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific .

5 June Robert F. Kennedy is assassinated .

26 June Major General Carl A. Youngdale relieves Major General Donn J . Robertson as Commander of the 1st Marine Division .

27 June Marine troops begin to dismantle and withdraw from their static defens e

base at Khe Sanh .

1 July General Creighton Abrams relieves General William Westmoreland a s

Commander USMACV.

1 July Operation Thor begins in the eastern part of the DMZ . Planes from the Air

Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, as well as artillery from Army an d

Marine artillery batteries in the DMZ sector and naval gunfire from cruiser s

and destroyers off the coast pound enemy artillery installations in the DMZ .

7 July Operation Thor ends.

25 July The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), USA, arrives in I

CTZ and is placed under the operational control of III MAF.
726 THE DEFINING YEA R

15 August Provisional Corps Vietnam is deactivated and replaced by XXIV Corps.

23 August Operation Allen Brook ends . This operation resulted in 1,017 reporte d

enemy casualties with 172 Marines killed and 1,124 wounded.

23 August Enemy troops mount their third major offensive by firing on 27 different

allied installations and cities including Hue, Da Nang Air Base, an d

Quang Tri City. The major thrust of this effort is the city of Da Nang . Th e

Communists fall far short of their objective due to resistance of U .S . Army,

Marine Corps, and South Vietnamese troops.

24 August The Democratic Party Convention begins in Chicago . Vietnam War pro -

testers clash violently with police for the next four days .

29 September The USS New Jersey (BB 62) arrives off the coast of the DMZ . The arrival

of this battleship greatly increases the Navy's firepower and power projec -

tion in the eastern DMZ.

September Engagements from Operation Kentucky result in 305 reported enem y

casualties with 1 Marine killed and 8 wounded .

6 October 7th Marines begin Operation Maui Peak, an effort to relieve the Specia l

Forces base at Thuong Duc in Quang Nam Province .

19 October Operation Maui Peak ends, resulting in 202 reported enemy casualtie s

with 28 Marines killed and 143 wounded.

23 October Operation Mameluke Thrust ends, resulting in 2,728 reported enem y

casualties with 269 Marines killed and 1,730 wounded .

23 October The 5th Marines begins Operation Henderson Hill in Quang Nam Province

as a continuation of Operation Mameluke Thrust .

28 October The 1st Air Cavalry Division begins to move from I CTZ to III CTZ .

31 October President Johnson announces a complete halt in the bombing and naval

bombardment of North Vietnam.

1 November North Vietnamese officials announce that they will meet in Paris wit h

representatives from the United States, South Vietnam, and the National

Liberation Front to begin peace talks .

1 November South Vietnamese units, aided by squads and platoons of American troops,

begin the Accelerated Pacification (Le Loi) Campaign in order to regai n

the trust and control of South Vietnamese villages lost due to the majo r

enemy offensives of the year.

2 November South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu states that his nation will

not negotiate in Paris if the Communist National Liberation Front is

given equal status with the other participants.

3 November Operation Jeb Stuart III ends . This operation resulted in 2,016 reporte d

enemy casualties with 212 Army personnel killed and 1,512 wounded .

5 November Richard Nixon wins the presidential election by narrowly defeatin g

Hubert Humphrey.

11 November The Americal Division ends Operation Wheeler/Wallowa after 14 month s

in the Nui Loc Son Valley. This operation resulted in a reported 10,02 0

enemy casualties with 683 Army personnel killed and 3,597 wounded .

20 November The 1st Marines begin Operation Meade River, nine miles south of Da Nang ,

in support of the South Vietnamese Accelerated Pacification Campaign .

23 November Operation Lancaster II ends . This operation resulted in a reported 1,800

enemy casualties with 359 Marines killed and 2,101 wounded .

26 November President Johnson states that the peace talks will include the Unite d

States, South Vietnam, and a Communist delegation which consists o f

representatives from North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front .
CHRONOLOGY 727

6 December Operation Henderson Hill ends . This action resulted in a reported 700

enemy casualties and 35 Marines killed and 273 wounded .

9 December Operation Napoleon/Saline ends, resulting in a reported 3,495 enem y

casualties with 353 Marines killed and 1,959 wounded .

9 December Operation Meade River ends with 841 reported enemy casualties wit h

107 Marines killed and 522 wounded .

21 December Major General Carl A . Youngdale relieves Major General Rathvon McC.

Tompkins as Deputy Commanding General, III MAF . Major General

Ormond R. Simpson relieves Major General Youngdale as Commandin g

General, 1st Marine Division .

29 December Camp Carroll, the artillery base that supported the garrison at Khe Sanh ,

is deactivated .

29 December Allied troops in Vietnam announce that they will not honor any holida y

truces.

December III MAF ends the year with operational control of the 1st Marine Division ,

the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marine Air Wing, the Marine Force

Logistic Command, the 101st Airborne Division, the Americal Division ,

and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

December The year closes with 31,691 reported enemy casualties at the hands o f

Marine units in III MAF. The cost of the year's fighting to the Marine

Corps was 4,618 Marines killed and 29,320 wounded .
Appendix C

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A–1—A–5—Designations for Strong Points which form the Dyemarker barrier.

A–IE—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attac k

aircraft.

A–4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft in service o n

board carriers of the U .S. Navy and with land-based Marine attac k

squadrons.

A–6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraft

specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completel y

obscured by weather or darkness.

AAR—After Action Report .

ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, a U .S .

Air Force aircraft equipped with communications, data link, an d

display equipment ; it may be employed as an airborne comman d

post or a communications and intelligence relay facility.

AC–47—Douglas C–47 Skytrain, twin-engine, fixed-wing transpor t

modified with 7 .62mm miniguns and used as a gunship .

AC–119—Fairchild Hiller C–119 military transport aircraft remodifled into a gunship with side-firing 7 .62mm miniguns.

ADC—Assistant Division Commander.

AdminO—Administrative Officer.

Adv—Advanced .

AFP—Armed Forces Police .

AGC—Amphibious command ship . The current designation is LCC .

AH–1G—Bell Huey Cobra helicopter specifically designed for clos e

air support .

AK–47—Russian-designed Kalashnikov gas-operated 7 .62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters . It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.

AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat -

loaded cargo in an assault landing . LKA is the current designation .

ALMAR—All Marines, a Commandant of the Marine Corps communication directed to all Marines.

ALO—Air Liaison Officer, an officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a

ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the groun d

commander on air operation matters .

ALP—Air Liaison Party.

AMERICAL—The U .S . Army's 23d Infantry Division .

AmTrac—Amphibian Tractor.

ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, an organization

composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for

control of naval gunfire and close air support . ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U.S . Army,

Korean, and ARVN units.

AO—Air Observer, an individual whose primary mission is to observ e

or to take photographs from an aircraft in order to adjust artiller y

fire or obtain military information .

AOA—Amphibious Objective Area, a defined geographical area with -

in which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force .

APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loadin g

elements ofa battalion landing team . LPA is the current designation .

APC—Armored Personnel Carrier.

APD—Airborne Personnel Detector.

APT—Armed Propaganda Team, a South Vietnamese pacification cadr e

who carried weapons in self-defense as they attempted to convinc e

South Vietnamese villagers to remain loyal to the government .

ARA—Aerial Rocket Artillery.

Arclight—The codename for B–52 bombing missions in South Vietnam .

ARG—Amphibious Ready Group .

Arty—Artillery .

ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

ASP—Ammunition Supply Point.

ASRT—Air Support Radar Team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground con -

trolled precision flight path guidance and weapons release fo r

attack aircraft.

ATDS—Airborne Tactical Data System .

B–40 rockets—Communist rocket-propelled grenade .

B–52—Boeing Stratofortress, U .S . Air Force eight-engine, sweptwing, heavy jet bomber.

BA—Base Area .

BB—Navy Battleship.

BDA—Battle Damage Assessment .

BDC—Base Defense Commander.

Bde—Brigade.

BDR—Battle Damage Repair .

BGen—Brigadier General .

BLT—Battalion Landing Team .

Bn—Battalion .

Bru—One of several non-Vietnamese ethnic groups living in the Vietnamese highlands; the inhabitants in the Khe Sanh area were primarily Brie .

Btry—Battery.

BUIC—Back-Up Intercept Computer.

C–1—C–3—Designations for base areas which support the Dyemarker barrier.

C–117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft . Th e

C–117D was an improved version of the C–47, the military version

of the DC–3 .

C–123—Fairchild Provider, two-engine, turboprop, transport aircraf t

with a maximum payload of 15,000 pounds .

C–130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.

CAAR—Combat After Action Report .

CACO—Combined Action Company .

CAF—Combined Action Force .

CAG—Combined Action Group .

728
GLOSSARY 729

CAP—Combined Action Platoon .

Capt—Captain .

CAS—Close Air Support .

CBU—Cluster Bomb Unit .

CCP—Combined Campaign Plan .

Cdr—Commander.

CG—Commanding General .

CH—46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor

transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 1 7

combat-loaded troops .

CH—53--Sikorsky Sea Scallion, a single-rotor, heavy transport helicopte r

powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload o f

12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops .

CH—54—Sikorsky Sky Crane, U.S . Army, two-engine, single-rotor,

heavy transport helicopter with three-man crew and useful payloa d

of 22,890 pounds.

Chien Hoi—The South Vietnamese amnesty program designed to attrac t

Communist troops and cadre to defect to the government cause .

CICV—Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam .

CID—Criminal Investigative Division .

CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards and advised by the

U.S . Army Special Forces.

CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific .

CinCPacFlc—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet .

CIT—Counter Intelligence Team .

Class (I—V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g ., Class I, rations;

Class 11, Uniforms and ocher individual items ; Class III, POL ;

Class IV, Construction materials ; Class V, Ammunition .

Claymore—A U .S . directional antipersonnel mine.

CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.

CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.

CNO—Chief of Naval Operations .

CO—Commanding Officer.

Co—Company .

COB—Combat Operations Base .

COC—Combat Operations Center.

CoFraM—Controlled Fragmentation Munitions.

Col—Colonel .

Combined Action Program—A Marine pacification program whic h

integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Force platoon in a Vietnamese village .

ComdC—Command Chronology .

ComdHist—Command History.

ComNavForPac—Commander, Naval Forces, Pacific .

ComNavForV—Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam .

ComUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command ,

Vietnam.

CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support ,

the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 and charged with

coordinating U.S .-Vietnamese pacification efforts .

COSVN—Central Office of South Vietnam, the nominal Communis t

military and political headquarters in South Vietnam .

County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops, police, loca l

officials, and U .S . Marines in an attempt to screen and register th e

local inhabitants.

CP—Command Post.

CPDC—Central Pacification and Development Council, the Sout h

Vietnamese government agency responsible for coordinating th e

pacification plan .

Cpl—Corporal .

CRC—Control and Reporting Center, an element of the U .S . Air Forc e

tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Contro l

Center, which conducted radar and warning operations .

CRIMP—Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Mod -

ernization Plan .

C/S—Chief of Staff.

CS—A chemical irritant which affects the upper respiratory system ,

similar to tear gas.

CSC—Communications Service Company.

CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone .

DAIS—Da Nang Anciinfiltration System .

DASC—Direct Air Support Center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control of clos e

air support and other direct air support operations.

D—Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation .

DD—Navy destroyer.

Det—Detachment.

DIOCC—District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center.

Div—Division .

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam .

DOD—Department of Defense .

DOIC—District Operations and Intelligence Center

DPP—Data Processing Platoon .

DPS—Data Processing Section .

DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) .

DSA—District Senior Advisor.

DSS—Da Nang Special Sector.

Dtd—Dated .

Duel Blade—The final codename for the DMZ barrier .

Duster—The nickname for the U .S . Army 's tracked vehicle, the M—42 ,

which mounted dual 40mm automatic weapons .

DVA—Da Nang Vital Area .

Dyemarker—Codename for the Strong Point/Obstacle System (als o

known as the " McNamara Line " and "the barrier " ) which was constructed south of the DMZ and intended to limit infiltration fro m

North Vietnam. See Practice Nine.

EA—6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A—6A Intruder .

ECM—Electronic Countermeasures, a major subdivision of electroni c

warfare involving actions against enemy electronic equipment or t o

exploit the enemy's use of electromagnetic radiations from suc h

equipment.

ELINT—Electronic Intelligence, the intelligence information gained

by monitoring radiations from enemy electronic equipment.

Engr—Engineer.

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Device .

F—4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range ,

all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber .

F—8—Chance-Vought Crusader, single-engine, single-seat carrier

fighter aircraft.
730 THE DEFINING YEA R

FAC(A)—Forward Air Controller (Airborne).

FADAC—Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer.

FAE—Fuel-Air Explosive .

FAG—Field Artillery Group.

FDC—Fire Direction Center.

FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U .S . Army commands in II an d

III Corps areas of South Vietnam .

FLC—Force Logistic Command .

FLSG—Force Logistic Support Group .

FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit .

FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

FO—Forward Observer.

FOB—Forward Operating Base.

FRG—Federal Records Center.

Front 4—A Communist headquarters subordinate to MR–5 and

responsible for Quang Nam Province .

FSB—Fire Support Base .

FSCC—Fire Support Coordination Center, a single location involved i n

the coordination of all forms of fire support.

FSIC—Fire Support Information Cente r

FSR—Force Service Regiment .

Fwd—Forward .

FWMF—Free World Military Force .

G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g ., G–1 would refer to

the staff member responsible for personnel; G–2, intelligence ;

G–3, operations; G–4, logistics, and G–5, civil affairs .

GCA—Ground Control Approach .

GCI—Ground Control Intercept .

Gen—General .

Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation .

GPES—Ground Proximity Extraction System .

Grenade Launcher, M79—U .S.-built, single-shot, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6 .5 pounds when loaded ; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire o f

five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters .

GSW—Gunshot Wounds.

Gun, 175mm, M107—U .S .-built, self-propelled gun which weigh s

62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum

range of 32,800 meters . Maximum rate of fire is one round every

two minutes.

GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

GySgt—Gunnery Sergean t

H&I fires-Harassing and Interdiction fires .

H&MS—Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.

H&S Co—Headquarters and Service Company.

HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed to defend

against low-flying enemy aircraft and short-range missiles.

HDC—Helicopter Direction Center.

HE—High Explosive .

Hectare—A unit of land measure in the metric system and equal to

2 .471 acres.

HES—Hamlet Evaluation System, the computerized statistical data

system used to measure pacification in the hamlets and villages of

South Vietnam .

H–Hour—The specific hour an operation begins.

HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Head -

quarters, U .S . Marine Corps, the Vietnam-era predecessor of th e

History and Museums Division .

HLZ—Helicopter Landing Zone .

HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron .

HML—Marine Light Helicopter Squadron .

HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron .

Hoi Chanh—A Viet Cong or North Vietnamese defector under th e

Chien Hoi amnesty program.

Howitzer, 8-inch (M55)—U .S .-built, self-propelled, heavy-artillery

piece with a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a rate of fire o f

one round every two minutes .

Howitzer, 105mm, MIOIA1—U .S .-built, cowed, general purpos e

light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters an d

maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute .

Howitzer, 155mm, M114A towed and M109 self-propelled16-U .S . -

built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters

and a maximum rare of fire of three rounds per minute . Marine s

employed both models in Vietnam . The newer and heavier selfpropelled M109 was largely road-bound, while the lighter, cowe d

M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter .

Howtar—A 4 .2 (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm pac k

howitzer frame .

HQ or Hq—Headquarters.

HST—Helicopter Support Team.

" Huey "—Popular name for UH–1 series of helicopters.

ICC—International Control Commission, established by the Geneva

Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the First Indochina

War between the French and the Viet Minh and resulting in the

partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel . The members of th e

Commission were from Canada, India, and Poland .

ICJCC—I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, consisting of U .S . an d

Vietnamese officials in I Corps who coordinated the civilian assistance program.

I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which include d

the five northern provinces of South Vietnam .

IDA—Institute for Defense Analysis .

Intel—Intelligence .

Intvw—Interview.

IOD—Integrated Observation Device .

ITT—Interrogation/Translator Team .

J—The designation for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e .g ., J–1 woul d

refer to the staff members responsible for personnel ; J–2, intelligence; J–3, operations; J–4, logistics; and J–5, civil affairs.

JCSJoint Chiefs of Staff (U .S .) .

JGS Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese) .

JTD—Joint Table of Distribution .

JUSPAOJoint U .S . Public Affairs Office.

KC–130—The in-flight refueling ranker configuration of the C–13 0

Lockheed Hercules.

KBA—Killed by Air.

KIA—Killed in Action .

Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serv e

as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.
GLOSSARY 73 1

L—Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour th e

helicopters land in the landing zone .

LAAM Bn—Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion .

LAAW—Light Anti-Armor Weapon

LAPES—Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System .

LCM—Landing Craft Mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, an d

trailers directly onto the beach .

LCpl—Lance Corporal .

LCU—Landing Craft Utility.

LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, a small craft with a bow

ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the beach .

Le Loi—The Accelerated Pacification Campaign .

LKA—The current designation for an attack cargo ship . See AKA .

LOACH—Light Observation and Command Helicopter .

LOC—Lines of Communication .

LOH—Light Observation Helicopter.

LOT—Letter of Instruction .

LOTS—Logistics Over the Shore .

LP—Listening Post .

LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport an d

land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It had both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing deck .

LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to trans -

port and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means o f

embarked helicopters.

LSA—Logistic Support Area .

LSD—Landing Ship, Dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, trans -

port, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and

embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services

to small ships and crafts. It lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD .

LST—Landing Ship, Tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy

vehicles and to land them on a beach .

Lt—Lieutenant.

LtCol—Lieutenant Colonel .

LtGen—Lieutenant General .

Ltr—Letter.

LVTE—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Engineer, a lightly armored amphibian vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance .

LVTH—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Howitzer, a lightly armored, selfpropelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer. It resembles an LVT P

with a turret for the howitzer .

LVTP—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel, an amphibian vehicl e

used to land and/or transport personnel .

LVTR—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Retriever, an amphibian vehicle use d

for repair purposes.

LZ—Landing Zone .

MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade .

MABS—Marine Air Base Squadron.

Machine gun, .50-caliber—U .S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, aircooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pound s

without mount or ammunition ; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100

rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters .

Machine gun, M60—U.S .-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled ,

7 .62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 2 0

pounds without mount or ammunition ; it has a sustained rate of fire

of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters .

MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron, provides and operates groun d

facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and

for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct o f

support operations.

MACG—Marine Air Control Group .

MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam .

MAF—Marine Amphibious Force.

MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.

Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Gong battalions and regiment s

as opposed to local guerrilla groups .

Maj—Major.

MajGen—Major General .

MarCad—Marine Aviation Cadet .

MarDiv—Marine Division .

Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e .g ., 3d Marines.

MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron, provides and operates facilitie s

for the control of support aircraft operating in direct support o f

ground forces.

MAU—Marine Advisory Unit, the Marine advisory unit under the

Naval Advisory Group which administered the advisory effort to

the South Vietnamese Marine Corps; nor to be confused with a

Marine Amphibious Unit .

MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing .

MCAF—Marine Corps Air Facility .

MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station .

MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center .

MCO—Marine Corps Order.

MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group .

MCSA—Marine Corps Supply Agency .

MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade .

MedCap—Medical Civilian Assistance Program .

MedEvac—Medical Evacuation .

MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force .

MGySgt—Master Gunnery Sergeant .

MIA—Missing in Action .

MilHistBr—Military History Branch .

Mortar, 4 .2-inch, M30—U .S .-built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fire d

weapon consisting of tube, base-place and standard ; weapon weigh s

330 pounds and has maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fir e

is 20 rounds per minute .

Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S .-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loade d

weapon, which weighs 45 .2 pounds when assembled ; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained race of fir e

of 18 rounds per minute ; the effective range is 2,000 meters. Mortar, 81mm, M29—U .S .-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, which

weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled ; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective rang e

of 2,300—3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used .

Mortar, 82mm—Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, hig h

angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds ; it

has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters .

Mortar, 120mm—Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth bore ,

drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 60 0

pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute an d

a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

MR—5—Military Region 5, a Communist political and military secto r

in northern South Vietnam, including all of 1 Corps . NVA units i n

MR—5 did not report to COSVN.
732 THE DEFINING YEA R

Ms—Manuscript .

Msg—Message .

MSgt—Master Sergeant .

MTDS—Marine Tactical Data System .

MTT—Mobile Training Team .

Montagnard—From French for "mountaineer," refers to the severa l

tribes of non-ethnic-Vietnamese nomadic tribesmen who populat e

the South Vietnamese highlands.

MWHG—Marine Wing Headquarters Group .

MWSG—Marine Wing Support Group .

NAC—Northern Artillery Cantonment .

NAG—Naval Advisory Group .

NAS—Naval Air Station .

NavCad—Naval Aviation Cadet .

NCC—Naval Component Commander.

NCO—Noncommissioned Officer .

NGLO—Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.

NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist -

led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government .

NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees) .

NMCC—National Military Command Center.

NOD—Night Observation Device .

NPFF—National Police Field Force .

NSA—Naval Support Activity.

NSD—Naval Supply Depot.

NSDC—Northern Sector Defense Command .

Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain .

Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group and probably of Chinese origin .

NVA—North Vietnamese Army, often used colloquially to refer to a

North Vietnamese soldier.

O—IC/G—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft .

OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division .

OJT—On the Job Training .

Ontos—U .S .-built, lightly armored, tracked antitank vehicle arme d

with six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles .

OpCon—Operational Control, the authority granted to a commande r

to direct forces assigned for specific missions or tasks which ar e

usually limited by function, time, or location .

OP—Outpost or observation point .

OpO—Operation Order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the execution of an operation .

OPlan—Operation Plan, a plan for a single or series of connected oper -

ations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession ; it is the

form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders .

OpSum—Operational Summary.

ORLL—Operations Report/Lessons Learned.

OSJS (MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military Assistance Command Vietnam).

OV—10—North American Rockwell Bronco, twin-engine aircraft

specifically designed for light armed reconnaissance missions.

PAR—Progressive Aircraft Rework .

PAVN—Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam) . This acrony m

was dropped in favor of NVA .

PDC—Pacification and Development Councils .

PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed i n

the defense of their own communities.

PFC—Private First Class.

Phoenix program—A covert U .S . and South Vietnamese program aime d

at the eradication of the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam .

P1IC—Photo Imagery Interpretation Center.

POL—Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants.

Practice Nine—The Codename for the planning of the anciinfilcratio n

barrier across the DMZ . See Dymarker.

PRC—25—Standard radio used by Marine ground units in Vietnam

that allowed for voice communication for distances up to 25 miles .

Prov Corps—Provisional Corps Vietnam .

PRU—Provincial Reconnaissance Unit .

PSA—Province Senior Advisor.

PSDF—Peopl e 's Self-Defense Force, a local self-defense force organize d

by the South Vietnamese Government after the enemy 's Tee offensive in 1968 .

Pvt—Private.

QDSZ—Quang Da Special Zone .

QRF—Quick Reaction Force.

R&R—Rest and Recreation .

Recoilless rifle, 1.06mm, M401A1—U .S .-built, single-shot, recoilless,

breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assemble d

and mounted for firing ; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds

per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters .

Regt—Regiment .

Rein—Reinforced .

Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification pro -

gram starred in 1966 .

Revolutionary Development Teams—Specially trained Vietnamese

political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance

tasks on a local level .

RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.

Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic ,

7 .62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a

full 20-round magazine ; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 round s

per minute and an effective range of 460 meters .

Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic ,

5 .56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 3 .1 pounds wit h

a 20-round magazine ; it has a sustained rate of fire of 12—15 round s

per minute and an effective range of 460 meters .

RLT—Regimental Landing Team.

ROE—Rules of Engagement .

ROK—Republic of Korea .

Rolling Thunder—Codename for U .S . air operations over North Vietnam.

Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted by helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to supply

Marine bases.

Route Package—Codename used with a number to designate areas o f

North Vietnam for the American bombing campaign . Route Package I was the area immediately north of the DMZ .

RPG—Rocket-Propelled Grenade .
GLOSSARY 733

RRU—Radio Research Unit.

Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor campaign to Revolutionar y

Development .

RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces .

RZ—Reconnaissance Zone .

S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S— 1

would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel ; S—2 ,

intelligence ; S—3, operations; S—4, logistics ; and S—5, civil affairs.

SAM—Surface to Air Missile .

SAR—Search and Rescue .

SCAMP—Sensor Control and Maintenance Platoon .

SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization .

SecDef—Secretary of Defense .

SecState—Secretary of State.

Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U .S . Air Force command i n

Vietnam .

Seventh Fleet—The U .S . fleet assigned to the Pacific .

SFD—Surprise Firing Device, a euphemism for a boobytrap .

SID—Seismic Intrusion Device, sensor used to monitor movemen t

through ground vibrations .

SitRep—Situation Report .

Sgt—Sergeant.

SgtMaj—Sergeant Major.

SKS—Russian-designed Simonov gas-operated 7 .62mm semiautomatic rifle .

SLAM—Seek, Locate, Annihilate and Monitor.

SLF—Special Landing Force .

SMA—Senior Marine Advisor.

SOG—Studies and Operations Group, the cover name for the organization that carried our cross-border operations.

Song—Vietnamese for " river. "

SOP—Standing Operating Procedure, sec of instructions laying out

standardized procedures .

SPIE—Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction line .

Spt Rept—Spot Report .

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft .

Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid-reaction force on standby, ready for inser -

tion by helicopter for reinforcement of units in contact with the enemy.

SSDC—Southern Sector Defense Command .

SSgt—Staff Sergeant.

Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos .

Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which smal l

Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on target s

of opportunity.

Strike Company—An elite company in a South Vietnamese infantr y

division, directly under the control of the division commander.

TAC(A)—Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an airplane, who coordinates close air support .

TACC—Tactical Air Control Center, the principal air operation s

installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functions o f

tactical air operations.

TACP—Tactical Air Control Party, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison

to land forces and for the control of aircraft .

TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center, an air operations installatio n

under the Tactical Air Control Center, which directs aircraft an d

aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.

TAFDS—Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, the expeditionary

storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields .

It uses 10,000-gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel .

Tank, M48—U .S .-built 50 .7-ton tank with a crew of four; primar y

armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30-caliber an d

one .50-caliber machine gun ; has maximum road speed of 32 miles

per hour and an average range of 195 miles .

TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component o f

the air command and control system which controls all enroute ai r

traffic and air defense operations .

TAOC—Tactical Area of Coordination .

TAOI—Tactical Area of Interest .

TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility, a defined area of land for whic h

responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as

a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.

TASE—Tactical Air Support Element.

TDCC—Tactical Data Communications Central .

TE—Task Element .

T/E—Table of Equipment .

Tet—The Vietnamese Lunar New Year; Commonly associated with th e

NVA/VC offensive launched during the Ter Holiday of January 1968 .

TF—Task Force .

TG—Task Group .

Tiger Houncl—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U .S. Air Force small fixedwing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles into southeastern Laos.

T/0—Table of Organization .

TO&E—Table of Organization and Equipment .

TOC—Tactical Operations Center .

Trung-si—A South Vietnamese Popular Force sergeant .

TPQ—10—Radar system used to control air strikes in poor and marginal weather.

TSF—Transitional Support Force .

TU—Task Unit .

UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justic e

UH—1E—Bell Iroquois (commonly referred to as a " Hue y" ), a single-engine ,

light attack/observation helicopter noted for its maneuverability an d

firepower; carries a crew of three ; it can be armed with air-to-groun d

rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns .

UH—34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transpor t

helicopter with a crew of three, carries eight to 12 combat soldiers ,

depending upon weather conditions .

USA—U .S . Army.

USAAG—U .S . Army Advisory Group .

USAF—U .S . Air Force .

USAID—U .S . Agency for International Development .

USARV—U.S . Army, Vietnam .

USASuppComDaNang—U .S . Army Support Command, Da Nang .

USIA—U.S . Information Agency.

USMC—U.S . Marine Corps.

U .S . Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U .S . Ambassador to

South Vietnam and including ComUSMACV, which develope d

and coordinated U .S . policy within South Vietnam .

USN—U .S. Navy .
734 THE DEFINING YEA R

VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrillas i n

South Vietnam; a contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meanin g

"Vietnamese Communists. "

VCI—Viet Cong Infrastructure .

VCLF—Viet Cong Local Force .

Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong

Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, whic h

actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French i n

the first Indochina War.

VIS—Vietnamese Information Service .

VMA—Marine Attack Squadron .

VMA(AW)—Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron .

VMCJ—Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron .

VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron .

VMF(AW)—Marine Fighter Squadron (All-Weather) .

VMGR—Marine Refueller Transport Squadron .

VMO—Marine Observation Squadron .

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force .

VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade .

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.

VNN—Vietnamese Navy.

VNRS—Vietnamese National Rail System .

VT—Variable timed electronic fuse for an artillery shell which cause s

airburst over the target area .

WestPac—Western Pacific .

WIA—Wounded in Action .

WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.
Appendix D

Medals of Honor Citations

1968

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ROBERT C . BURKE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty for service as a

Machine Gunner with Company I, Third Battalion, Twenty-Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in the Republi c

of Vietnam on 17 May 1968 . While on Operation Allen Brook, Company I was approaching a dry river bed with a

heavily wooded treeline that bordered the hamlet of Le Nam (1), when they suddenly came under intense mortar, rocket propelled grenade, automatic weapons and small arms fire from a large, well concealed enemy force which halte d

the company 's advance and wounded several Marines . Realizing that key points of resistance had to be eliminated to

allow the units to advance and casualties to be evacuated, Private Burke, without hesitation, seized his machine gu n

and launched a series of one man assaults against the fortified emplacements . As he aggressively maneuvered to th e

edge of the steep river bank, he delivered accurate suppressive fire upon several enemy bunkers, which enabled hi s

comrades to advance and move the wounded Marines to positions of relative safety . As he continued his combative

actions, he located an opposing automatic weapons emplacement and poured intense fire into the position, killing

three North Vietnamese soldiers as they attempted to flee . Private Burke then fearlessly moved from one position t o

another, quelling the hostile fire until his weapon malfunctioned . Obtaining a casualty's rifle and hand grenades, h e

advanced further into the midst of the enemy fire in an assault against another pocket of resistance, killing two mor e

of the enemy . Observing that a fellow Marine had cleared his malfunctioning machine gun, he grasped his weapon an d

moved into a dangerously exposed area and saturated the hostile treeline until he fell mortally wounded . Privat e

Burke's gallant actions upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country.

735
736 THE DEFINING YEA R

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT ALFREDO GONZALE Z

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving a s

Platoon Commander, Third Platoon, Company A, First Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam . On 31 January 1968, during the initial phase of Operation Hue City Sergeant Gonzalez's unit was

formed as a reaction force and deployed to Hue to relieve the pressure on the beleaguered city. While moving by truck

convoy along Route #1, near the village of Lang Van Lrong, the Marines received a heavy volume of enemy fire .

Sergeant Gonzalez aggressively maneuvered the Marines in his platoon, and directed their fire until the area wa s

cleared of snipers. Immediately after crossing a river south of Hue, the column was again hit by intense enemy fire .

One of the Marines on top of a tank was wounded and fell to the ground in an exposed position. With complete disregard for his own safety, Sergeant Gonzalez ran through the fire-swept area to the assistance of his injured comrade .

He lifted him up and though receiving fragmentation wounds during the rescue, he carried the wounded Marine to a

covered position for treatment. Due to the increased volume and accuracy of enemy fire from a fortified machine gu n

bunker on the side of the road, the company was temporarily halted . Realizing the gravity of the situation, Sergean t

Gonzalez exposed himself to the enemy fire and moved his platoon along the east side of a bordering rice paddy to a

dike directly across from the bunker. Though fully aware of the danger involved, he moved to the fire-swept road an d

destroyed the hostile position with hand grenades . Although seriously wounded again on 3 February, he steadfastly

refused medical treatment and continued to supervise his men and lead the attack . On 4 February, the enemy had agai n

pinned the company down, inflicting heavy casualties with automatic weapons and rocket fire . Sergeant Gonzalez, uti -

lizing a number of light antitank assault weapons, fearlessly moved from position to position firing numerous round s

at the heavily fortified enemy emplacements. He successfully knocked out a rocket position and suppressed much o f

the enemy fire before falling mortally wounded . The heroism, courage, and dynamic leadership displaced by Sergean t

Gonzalez reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and were in keeping with the highest traditions o f

the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country.
MEDALS OF HONOR 737

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR posthumously to

SECOND LIEUTENANT TERRENCE COLLINSON GRAVE S

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Platoon Commander with the Third Force Reconnaissance Company, Third Reconnaissance Battalion, Third Marine Division, in th e

Republic of Vietnam on 16 February 1968 . While on a long-range reconnaissance mission Lieutenant Graves ' eightman patrol observed seven enemy soldiers : approaching their position . Reacting instantly, he deployed his men, and

directed their fire on the approaching enemy. After the fire had ceased, he and two patrol members commenced a searc h

of the area, and suddenly came under a heavy volume of hostile small arms and automatic weapons fire from a numerically superior enemy force . When one of his men was hit by the enemy fire, Lieutenant Graves moved through the fire -

swept area to his radio and, while directing suppressive fire from his men, requested air support and adjusted a heav y

volume of artillery and helicopter gunship fire upon the enemy . After attending the wounded, Lieutenant Graves ,

accompanied by another Marine, moved from his relatively safe position to confirm the results of the earlier engagement. Observing that several of the enemy were still alive, he launched a determined assault, eliminating the remaining enemy troops. He then began moving the patrol to a landing zone for extraction, when the unit again came under

intense fire which wounded two more Marines and Lieutenant Graves . Refusing medical attention, he once more adjust -

ed air strikes and artillery fire upon the enemy while directing the fire of his men . He led his men to a new landing sit e

into which he skillfully guided the incoming aircraft and boarded his men while remaining exposed to the hostile fire .

Realizing that one of the wounded had not embarked, he directed the aircraft to depart and, along with another Marine ,

moved to the side of the casualty. Confronted with a shortage of ammunition, Lieutenant Graves utilized supportin g

arms and directed fire until a second helicopter arrived . At this point, the volume of enemy fire intensified, hitting the

helicopter and causing it to crash shortly after liftoff. All on board were killed . Lieutenant Graves' outstanding courage ,

superb leadership and indomitable fighting spirit throughout the day were in keeping with the highest traditions o f

the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Services. He gallantly gave his life for his country.
738 THE DEFINING YEA R

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RALPH H . JOHNSON

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving a s

a reconnaissance scout with Company A, First Reconnaissance Battalion, First Marine Division in action against th e

North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces in the Republic of Vietnam . In the early morning hours of 5 Marc h

1968, during Operation Rock, Private First Class Johnson was a member of a fifteen-man reconnaissance patrol man -

ning an observation post on Hill 146 overlooking the Quan Duc Duc Valley deep in enemy controlled territory . They

were attacked by a platoon-size hostile force employing automatic weapons, satchel charges and hand grenades . Suddenly, a hand grenade landed in the three-man fighting hole occupied by Private Johnson and two fellow Marines .

Realizing the inherent danger to his two comrades, he shouted a warning and unhesitatingly hurled himself upon th e

explosive device . When the grenade exploded, Private Johnson absorbed the tremendous impact of the blast and was

killed instantly . His prompt and heroic act saved the life of one Marine at the cost of his own and undoubtedly pre -

vented the enemy from penetrating his sector of the patrol's perimeter. Private Johnso n 's courage, inspiring valor an d

selfless devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Nava l

Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country.
MEDALS OF HONOR 739

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR to

CAPTAIN JAMES E . LIVINGSTON

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving a s

Commanding Officer, Company E, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade in actio n

against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam . On 2 May 1968, Company E launched a determined assault on th e

heavily fortified village of Dai Do, which had been seized by the enemy on the preceding evening, isolating a Marin e

company from the remainder of the battalion . Skillfully employing screening agents, Captain Livingston maneuvere d

his men to assault positions across 500 meters of dangerous open rice paddy while under intense enemy fire . Ignoring

hostile rounds impacting near him, he fearlessly led his men in a savage assault against enemy emplacements withi n

the village. While adjusting supporting arms fire, Captain Livingston moved to the points of heaviest resistance ,

shouting words of encouragement to his Marines, directing their fire, and spurring the dwindling momentum of th e

attack on repeated occasions. Although twice painfully wounded by grenade fragments, he refused medical treatmen t

and courageously led his men in the destruction of over 100 mutually supporting bunkers, driving the remainin g

enemy from their positions, and relieving the pressure on the stranded Marine company. As the two companies consolidated positions and evacuated casualties, a third company passed through friendly lines, launching an assault o n

the adjacent village of Dinh To, only to be halted by a furious counterattack of an enemy battalion . Swiftly assessing

the situation and disregarding the heavy volume of enemy fire, Captain Livingston boldly maneuvered the remainin g

effective men of his company forward, joined forces with the heavily engaged Marines, and halted the enemy's counterattack. Wounded a third time and unable to walk, he steadfastly remained in the dangerously exposed area, deploy -

ing his men to more tenable positions and supervising the evacuation of casualties. Only when assured of the safety o f

his men did he allow himself to be evacuated . Captain Livingston's gallant actions uphold the highest traditions o f

the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service .
740 THE DEFINING YEAR

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL LARRY LEONARD MAXAM

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving a s

a fire team leader with Company D, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam. On 2 February 1968, the Cam Lo District Headquarters came under extremely heavy rocket, artillery, mortar ,

and recoilless rifle fire from a numerically superior enemy force, destroying a portion of the defensive perimeter . Corporal Maxam, observing the enemy massing for an assault into the compound across the remaining defensive wire ,

instructed his Assistant Fire Team Leader to take charge of the fire team, and unhesitatingly proceeded to the weakened section of the perimeter. Completely exposed to the concentrated enemy fire, he sustained multiple fragmenta -

tion wounds from exploding grenades as he ran to an abandoned machine gun position . Reaching the emplacements,

he grasped the machine gun and commenced to deliver effective fire on the advancing enemy . As the enemy directed

maximum fire power against the determined Marine, Corporal Maxam's position received a direct hit from a rocke t

propelled grenade, knocking him backwards and inflicting severe fragmentation wounds to his face and right eye .

Although momentarily stunned and in intense pain, Corporal Maxam courageously resumed his firing position an d

subsequently was struck again by small arms fire . With resolute determination, he gallantly continued to delive r

intense machine gun fire, causing the enemy to retreat through the defensive wire to positions of cover . In a desperate attempt to silence his weapon, the North Vietnamese threw hand grenades and directed recoilless rifle fire agains t

him, inflicting two additional wounds. Too weak to reload his machine gun, Corporal Maxam fell to a prone position

and valiantly continued to deliver effective fire with his rifle . After one and a half hours, during which he was hi t

repeatedly by fragments from exploding grenades, and concentrated small arms fire, he succumbed to his wounds, hav -

ing successfully defended nearly one-half of the perimeter single-handedly. Corporal Maxam's aggressive fighting spir -

it, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and uphel d

the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country.
MEDALS OF HONOR 74 1

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

STAFF SERGEANT KARL GORMAN TAYLOR, SR .

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a

company gunnery sergeant during Operation Meade River in the Republic of Vietnam on the night of 8 Decembe r

1968 . Informed that the commander of the lead platoon had been mortally wounded when his unit was pinned dow n

by a heavy volume of enemy fire, Staff Sergeant Taylor along with another Marine, crawled forward to the beleaguered

unit through a hail of hostile fire, shouted encouragement and instructions to the men, and deployed them to covere d

positions. With his companion, he then repeatedly maneuvered across an open area to rescue those Marines who wer e

too seriously wounded to move by themselves. Upon learning that there were still other seriously wounded men lyin g

in another open area, in proximity to an enemy machine gun position, Staff Sergeant Taylor, accompanied by four comrades, led his men forward across the fire-swept terrain in an attempt to rescue the Marines. When his group was halted by devastating fire, he directed his companions to return to the company command post ; whereupon he took his

grenade launcher and, in full view of the enemy, charged across the open rice paddy toward the machine gun position ,

firing his weapon as he ran . Although wounded several times, he succeeded in reaching the machine gun bunker an d

silenced the fire from that sector, moments before he was mortally wounded . Directly instrumental in saving the live s

of several of his fellow Marines, Staff Sergeant Taylor, by his indomitable courage, inspiring leadership, and selfless ded -

ication, upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service .
742 THE DEFINING YEAR

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR to

MAJOR M. SANDO VARGAS, JR. *

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving a s

Commanding Officer, Company G, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade in actio n

against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam from 30 April to 2 May 1968 . On 1 May 1968, though sufferin g

from wounds he had incurred while relocating his unit under heavy enemy fire the preceding day, Major (then Captain) Vargas combined Company G with two other companies and led his men in an attack on the fortified village o f

Dai Do. Exercising expert leadership, he maneuvered his Marines across 700 meters of open rice paddy while unde r

intense enemy mortar, rocket and artillery fire and obtained a foothold in two hedgerows on the enemy perimeter, onl y

to have elements of his company become pinned down by the intense enemy fire . Leading his reserve platoon to th e

aid of his beleaguered men, Major Vargas inspired his men to renew their relentless advance, while destroying a num -

ber of enemy bunkers . Again wounded by grenade fragments, he refused aid as he moved about the hazardous are a

reorganizing his unit into a strong defense perimeter at the edge of the village . Shortly after the objective was secured ,

the enemy commenced a series of counterattacks and probes which lasted throughout the night but were unsuccessful as the gallant defenders of Company G stood firm in their hard-won enclave . Reinforced the following morning ,

the Marines launched a renewed assault through Dai Do on the village of Dinh To, to which the enemy retaliated wit h

a massive counterattack resulting in hand-to-hand combat . Major Vargas remained in the open, encouraging and ren -

dering assistance to his Marines when he was hit for the third time in the three-day battle . Observing his battalion

commander sustain a serious wound, he disregarded his excruciating pain, crossed the fire-swept area and carried his

commander to a covered position, then resumed supervising and encouraging his men while simultaneously assistin g

in organizing the battalion's perimeter defense . His gallant actions upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps

and the United States Naval Service .

* On 26 December 1973, Major Vargas legally changed his name from Manuel Sando Vargas to Jay R. Vargas.
MEDALS OF HONOR 74 3

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DEWAYNE T. WILLIAMS

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving a s

a rifleman with the First Platoon, Company H, Second Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division in actio n

against communist insurgent forces in the Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam . Private First Class Williams

was a member of a combat patrol sent out from the platoon with the mission of establishing positions in the company's area of operations, from which it could intercept and destroy enemy sniper teams operating in the area . On th e

night of 18 September 1968, as the patrol was preparing to move from its daylight positions to a preselected nigh t

position, it was attacked from ambush by a squad of enemy using small arms and hand grenades. Although severel y

wounded in the back by the close intense fire, Private First Class Williams, recognizing the danger to the patrol ,

immediately began to crawl forward toward a good firing position . While he was moving under the continuin g

intense fire, he heard one of the members of the patrol sound the alert that an enemy grenade had landed in their posi -

tion. Reacting instantly to the alert, he saw that the grenade had landed close to where he was lying and without hesitation, in a valiant act of heroism, he rolled on top of the grenade as it exploded, absorbing the full and tremendou s

impact of the explosion with his own body . Through his extraordinary initiative and inspiring valor in the face of certain death, he saved the other members of his patrol from serious injury and possible loss of life, and enabled them t o

successfully defeat the attackers and hold their position until assistance arrived . His personal heroism and devotion t o

duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life

for his country.
744 THE DEFINING YEAR

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL KENNETH L . WORLEY

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving a s

a machine gunner with Company L, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in action against enem y

forces in the Republic of Vietnam . After establishing a night ambush position in a house in the Bo Ban Hamlet of

Quang Nam Province, security was set up and the remainder of the patrol members retired until their respectiv e

watches. During the early morning hours of 12 August 1968, the Marines were abruptly awakened by the platoo n

leader's warning that "Grenades " had landed in the house. Fully realizing the inevitable result of his actions, Lanc e

Corporal Worley, in a valiant act of heroism, instantly threw himself upon the grenade nearest him and his comrades ,

absorbing with his own body, the full and tremendous force of the explosion . Through his extraordinary initiative an d

inspiring valor in the face of almost certain death, he saved his comrades from serious injury and possible loss of lif e

although five of his fellow Marines incurred minor wounds as the other grenades exploded . Lance Corporal Worley 's

gallant actions upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly

gave his life for his country.
Appendix E

Distribution of Personnel

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL '

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC 27 JANUARY 1968

UNITE

ASSIGNED

STAENO14

SIR R7T

DATE DANANG CHU LAM . INN BAI WHOM ONINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTTK OTHER

HEADQUARTERS

ND . M. PAC

USIC USN U51C USN USIC USN USMC USN Us)c USN USIC USN USIC USN,US1C USN USIC USN USIC US N

M. PAC (F440) 74 24150067 74 1

84.14 88, PN/ IPAL 1228 31 -1BJAR68 1228 3 1

CAMP S . N . BUTLER 1075 IIB 23JAN60 1075 11 B

CAsUAL/tRANSIEN[

I10 . V MEF

140 4

R9_ 2

23JAN6 8

IMAM

1404

7

09 2_

1ST CIV APT CRP 70 5 18.16.68 8

5

NO, 5Th NAR DIV

HORN, 5TH MAR DIV 1491 49

HQ, FORMS, FM, PAC

1491 49 18.AN68

HQ CO . FORMS 302 17 18.2A .68 302 1 7

NO, 1ST I4AR BRIO

HO CO. 15T MAR BRIO 2D7 17 19JAN50 _ 207 1 7

NO. 9711 ARAB

508 1 2

HQ CO, 9TH NAB

HO. III MAP

508 12 181..68

HMS Cps III MAP

16T L 7D LA.,

HO . 1ST MAR DIV

4

72 6

777

29

-55

11.63067

1308067

72 6

'777

2 9

6 5

74088. 16T MAR DIV 1718 34 1028868 1719 3 4

HO, 3D MAR DIV

14068, 30 MAR DIV 1949 34 27DEC67 1949 3 4

INFANTRY

1ST MARINES

HO CO 259 7 10JAN68 259 7 _~

1ST BATTALION 1220 54 100 .68 1220 54

20 BATTALION 1159 56 102151468 5 159 56

3D BATTALION 1 1718 95 27D.67 1718 9 5

3D MARINE S

HO CO

1ST BATTALION

71 9

1267

5

93

2798044 7

27DEC67

219

1267

5

9 3

20 BATTALION 1155 55 IOJAR68 1154 56

3D BATTALIO N

4TH MARINES

1210 65 270.67 1230 65

89 CO 237 5 2706067 237 5

66

1ST DATTALION

2D BATTALION 1

116 8

1799

6 6

56

270806 7

27DEC67

, 2168

64

1799 05

3D BATTALIO N

5TH MARINES

1178 64 270E067 1178

NO CO 233 5 1qJAN6B 233 5

5 6TTALI1~N 1011 53 IOJAN68 1011 4 3

-:.0 • AR . .

3D B

B

AA

TTALI ON

TTALION 1152 55 1DJAN6R 1162 5 5

7TH MINE S

HU CO 250 7 18 .7AN58 250 7

1ST BATTALION

20 BATTALION

107 5

903

5 4

52

10361468

10).1958

107 5

903

5 4

5 2

3D BATTALION

9TH MARINES

_1141 54 _10J 68 1341 54

216 5

HO CO

1ST BATTALION

216

1133

5

59

278FL67

27=67 1133 5 9

26 BATTALION

3L BATTALION

1427

1170

6 5

S 7

27Do-.67

41012.67

1227

1170

6 5

5 7

26TH MARINE S

NC CO 450 16 1OJAN68 191

65-

259 1 6

1ST BATTALIO N

2D BATTALION

1236

1186

6 5

68

10.3A2168

10302468

1236

1186 6 8

38 BATTALION

27TH MARINES

1215 64 10382266 121 .95 6 4

NO CO 217 4 18.2.6e 217 4

10T BATTALION 3 1509 66 182.68 1509 6 6

20 BATTALION 1044 33 162.6 8

I8JAR68

104 4

1044

3 3

3 2

3D BATTALION

28TH MARINES

1044 32

299 5

co

1ST BATTALION

79 9

999

5

12

18JAR6 9

182.60 999 3 2

20 BATTALION 1000 30 1820868 10 .0

999

30

3 2

30 BATTALIO N

ARTILLERY

11TH MARINES

989 32 1811506 8

HO WIRY

1ST BATTALION

295

460

7

12

10JAN6 0

10JM6R

295 7

46Q 12

20 BATTALION 515 11 10JMA9 515 1 1

3D BATTALION 595 14 10JAN68 59 5

491

1 4

1 1

4Th BATTALION

12Th MARINES

491 11 10715068

320 1 1 HD WIRY

1ST BATTALION

320

751

1 1

15

27 .EC67

2,118067 755.

489

15

6

20 BATTALION

3D BATTALION

489

582

6

10

27DE67

210=67 582 1 0

4TH BATTALION , 528 12 27DEC67

_

- 528 1 2

• 1740148469 OTHERWISE NOTED. 1134180/315 AND LOCATION ARE 711050 REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT

DAY-TODAY AQR7ST31EWT5 BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS .

T=1

745
746 THE DEFINING YEA R

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNE L

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

27 JANUARY 196 8

UNIT LATE ASSIGNED

STRENGTH

SIR RP '

DATE DANANG CUD LAI MU BAS DONG HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

13TH MARINES

USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMCi USN USIC

,

USN USMC USN USIC USN

HQ WIRY

1ST BATTALION 259 6 18JAN68 259 6

20 BATTALION

38 8

409

B

10

1614.167

187556 189 8409 1 0

3D BATTALION 18JAN68 614 1 5

4TH BATTALION 18JAN6 : - 364 N

HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG 7700967 111 2 HO BTRY STWAG . NUV, 153 5

SST 155MM GUN BTRY

30 15555 GUN BTRY E7 1 .,~ 126 3

5TH 155101 GUN BM

7TH 15555 GUN BTRY

1

3

14JAN68

2TDEC67

14 8

150

3

3

162 7

1ST 8" HOW BTRY 3

2

23NOV6 7

30110967 64 2

3D 8" LAM BTRY

5TH 8" HOW BTRY 3 1PIAN68 201 3

213 2

1ST SEARCH LICE BTRY 9'T 2

RECONNAISSANCE

1ST RECON BN

5T ' ECON BN 772 5 5

5TH RECON BN 36 ] 287 I J

1ST FORCE RECON CO

3D FORCE RECON CO 160 7 10.TAN58 160 7

5TH FORCE kECON CO 162

107 <

27DEC6 7

18JAN6B

162

f07 2

ANTI-TAN K

1ST AT BN 771 5 9100367 771 5 D AT BN 1 122 4 27DF'I'67 122 4 TH AT BN 49 1 224 6

TANK

1ST TANK BN 5 686 1 5

3D TANK BN S88 15

_

5TH TANK BN 77 SJ! ID

ANTRAC

1ST AH IRAC BN ii77i7 ®

R

®

3D AMTRAC 578 1 2

X AMTRAC BN

1ST ARM AMPHIB CO 685 1RJAN68 110 1 575 16

ENGINEER

1ST ENGR BN

266

679

1PIAN6 8

10JAN68

266

678_16

3

30 ENCA BN 621 2700967 621 1 4

511i ENGR BN 524 18JAN68 71 I 4Y! I L

7TH ENGR B N

9TH EMIR BN 933 1PIAN68 933 22

975

TH ENCR BN 97 5

1017

10JAN6 8

27DEC67

17

1011 2 6

~3TH ENGR BN _ET 5I5fl 983 16 ST BRIDGE CO

3D BRIDGE CO Lod 1OJAN6R 144

5TH BRIDGE CO 154 2 18JAN6B 154 2

MOTOR TRANSPORT

1ST MT RN 751 6 10JAN6B 253 6

30 XT BN 386 8 27DEC67 386 8

5TH MI BN 208 ] 18JAN69 11 1 197 6

7TH MT ON 401 3 IOJAN68 401 3

9TH HT BN 186 9 71T~fi7 906 9

11TH MT 88 154 1 JAH68 354 7

13TH MF BN 181 7 18JAH6R 381 7

COMMUNICATIO N

ST RADIO 8N

5TH COMM 8N 744 1BJVlA' 744 R 7TH COMM BN _

9TH COMM BN . 659 10JAN68 654 1 3

1ST RO 624 8JAN68 19Y -7

115 1

427 1 _ 225 10

SHORE PART Y

1ST SP BR 424 1 5

30 SP BN 395 21

5TH SP BN NY 5 29 1 –75

MILITARY POLICE

1ST MP BN

3D MP 811 1S IA 10,1AN68 757 1 4

5TH MP BN 161 18 .111168 161 6

SERVICE/SUPPORT

PLC . III MA P

HO, PLC/1ST FSR

XLS B N

SUPPLY BN 1521 59 10JAN68 1521 5 9

7TH SEP BR FUEL CO 144 9

128

17 10JAN6 8

10JAN6B

1448

128

1 7

9

MAIM' 80 1068 1 18JAN68 1068 1

FLSG_A 3D SERV BN 1181 25 1 JAN68 1181 2 5 FLSG_ /I5T SERV HR 1599 J lI1.I11N68 117 9 7 R

3D FM

HAS BN

SUPPLY 88 941 31 1RJAN68 941 3 3

MAINZ BN 119 7

1018 15 18JAN6818JAN68 119 71018

1 5

5TH FSR

MS BN 51R 19JAN68 518 14 SUPPLY BN 575

34

1 19,7►N08 575 2 1 MAIM' BN 641 18JAN68 64 3

5TH SERVICE BN

PROV SERVICE AN, 9TH NAB 258 10 18JAN68 258 1 8

9111 SEP BULK FUEL CO 547

791 10 18JAN68IRJAN6R 547 10 29 3

1-2
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL 747

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

RED MARIE FO , PAM 27 JANUARY 1958

UNIT NOTE ASSIGNE D

STRENGTH

STR RPT

DATE DANANO CHIP LAI PHU BAI DONG NA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

p8~

METE R

1ST MED BN

USIC USN

10JAN68

USIC USN USIC USN USNC USN USIC USN USIC USN USIC USN URIC USN USIC USN USIC US N

141 176 141 33 6

3D MED BN 91 311 2700:67 91 311 -

STH MED BN 88 185 18JAN68 1 57 . 87 13 2

1ST HOSP CO 36 93 20JAN68 36 9 3

5TH HOSP CO 37 41 18JAN68 37 41 _

1ST DENTAL CO A4 10JAN6R R A

3D DENTAL CO R 1 77D1YA7 R I

5TH DENTAL CO 11 IR,1AN69 14[

'r

11TH DENTAL CO 60 10JAN68 6 0

13TH DENTAL CO 27 18JAN68 2 f

15TH DENTAL CO 2 47 16JAN68 1 10 2 3 7

17TH DENTAL CO 3 64 18JAN68 3 64 _

~~

US N

6MOW D TOTAL

USIC 89,305 24,876 1,011 10,028 21,657 7,549 3,279 17,163 3,74 2

4,341 1,208 110 705 934 271 129 789 19 1

A.

93,646 26.084_ 1,121_ 10 .737 22,591 7,820 _ 3,408 17,952 , 3,93 3

AVIATION UNITS

HO SODA PMPPAC 74 2NOV67 7 4

1ST MAW

MMHG- 1

1461(5_1 759 39 I6JAN68 759 1 9

IWPS_I, 157 10JAN6R 157 -

M105_1 717 10JAN68 23 7

MNSG_17

H&MS_17 696 7 7

l4ERS_17 701 1nJAN6R 70 1

MACG_119

HEMS-1B 1119 10JAN68 189

MASS-2 735 10JAN6R 775 3 _

MASS_3 llf5 •9114611 705 7

MACS-4 777 1(1,1AN69 777 1

ST I .AAM BN 560 1 1

ND LAAM RN -W1 OJAN68 473 14 _

NAG-1 1

I46MS-11 70 10JAN68 470

MABS-11 325 30 10JAN68 325 3 0

VMCJ- 1 VMFA-122 7 1OJAN68 430 1

VNF1ANI-235

90 1 10JAN68

1J

390 1 A

1 A -242 115 1 10JAN68 315 1

MAD-1 2

146145-12 516 10JAN66 516

14655_12 490 31 . 10JAN6R 488 1 1

INTCU_67 86 10JAN68 86

088-121 - 191 1 10JAN68 191 1

VMA-211 186 1 10JAN68 186 1 _

VMA_311 706 1 1n,1AV69 706 1 VMA(AN(_533 771 1 19NOV67 701 l

NAG-1 3

H6M9_13 491 10JAN68 491

14665-13 5/5 75 IOTAN68 545 7 5

VHF! 115 115 1 10,74869 115 1

VMFA_314 317 1 19.1AN69 112 1 -

1111T6-323 765 10JAN68 26 5

MAG-1 6

HSMS-16 596 10JAN68 596

MARS-16 616 11 (0,7AN66 616 1 1

MA1CU_62 61 (0JAN6R 6 3

MATCV_6 : 68 10JAN68 68

WO-1 190 I0JAN6R 190 1

MR-463 R-46 3 299 1 10JAN68 299 1

1041-265 205 4 10JAN68 205 4

10114-363 _ 6JAN68 231 1

-

NAG-1 6

MASS_l616JAN6B 727 3 1

MA U_70

VMO_3 '71 1

13113X,67

mamma 771 1

1 3

18(14-161 214 16JAN68 21 4

NM1-164 706 1 18JAN68 206 1

0116-262 717 4 16JAN68 212 4

914l,-362 717 1 19,4969 217 1 _

/1114-364 771 7 10JAN11 223 2 _

YMO_6 19R 1 10JAN68 198 1

pI

)111 NAB

MAG-1 5

1469(5-15 564 111JAN48 50 514 _

MARS-15 415 77 18JAN68 435 27

HMS IWAKUNI 194 791 14DEC67 394 293 -

H1HS PUTEMA 744 6l 14DEC67 244 61 _

MACS-6 716 7 1RJAN68 216 2

MATCU-60 51 161AN6R 6 3

MA0CU_66 1R 1RJAN6R 18

VMIIR-152 A63 6 1RJAN6R 463 6

VNA_223 7115 1 18561468 18 5

295

1

1 VMFA-511 2 W04-361 1

29 5

707

2

4

16JAN68

11JAN68 20 2

239

4 _

81M_165 1

_

719, 27DEC67, _
748 THE DEFINING YEAR

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

HET MARIE FORCE, PACIFIC 27 JANUARY 196 8

UNIT NOTE STRINGED

STRENGTH

S111 RPT

DATE DA)IANG cm LAI PHU HAI DONG HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPK OTHE R

1ST USMC USN U5IC USN UDC USN USIC USN USIC USN USMC USN USMC , USN USIC USN U5M: US N

MKS 15T BRIGADE I87AN6 P MACS- : J

ma A -212 + 27 1 107A9AR 227 1

y .WW

TD MA^

,n 6951 7

M

FS - 3

C S- 3

MIC S_3 t 5

MHTG_3 0

HEMS- , Al 2

~

T-302 262 -

14TU4T- 02 ELLil~I:J.!i[.9 :1

GAG-33

3 IRJAN6R 80 5

MA

H6MS

8S-

-

3

3

3 : : 18JAN6R 805 2

MATCU-6S 85 18JAN6B 8 5

VMCJ_3 425 1 19JAN6R 425 1

V!N-21 4 VNFA_232 296

11 GANA9 24 6

295 1

V6IA_334 161

1

2

11JAN6R

It .1A869 361 2

MW50_17

HMS-17 689 3 58J91468 689 3

WERS_37 92 103 18JAN68 292 10 3

VMGR_352 453 1 18714168 451 1

MACG-38

HAHS_38 15JAN6R 24 1

MASS-5 205 18JAN68

MACS-1 316 19JAN68 -316

MKS_] ISJ]UI• 246

MACS-7 •A

A . . : lob 4

5TH LAAM 8N 18JAN68 518 9

MAG-56

H&MS_56 38 18JAN68 384 1

MA85_56

•-5 AIR 1 1RJAN6R 439 3

HMI-46 2

8814-263 255 1IJAN68 25 5ISO 3

MATCU-74 180

29

3 113/.4 58

18JAN68 29

USIC

USN

28,047 7,592 4,380 2,171 710 1,011 1,886 623 9,235 44 1

815 152 BO 36 5 69 323 1 144 5

AVIATION TOTAL :8,862 7,742 4,460 2,207 715 1,090 2,209 524 9,379 44 6

us?c

AK/ROUEN Of FMFPAC PFRSONNB DDTRIBUIN1 I

ASSIGNED DANANG CHU LAI PHU BAI DONG HA 085969A JAPAN HAWAII EASTPK OTHE R

GROUND TOTAL .~~♦ 89,305 24,876 1,011 10,028 21,657 7,549 3,279 17,163 3,74 2

APIA TOTAL

USN

USNC

4,341 1,208 110 709 934 271 129 789 19 1

28,047 7,590 4,380 2,171 710 1,011 1,886 623 9,235 44 1

USN

UC

815 152 80 36 5 69 323 1 144 5

117,352 32,466 5,391 12,199 22,367 8,560 1,886 3,902 26,398 4,18 3

GRANO TOM

►

USN 5,156 1,360 190 745 919 340 323 130 933 196

4~F~ ~ N01B 1 . FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF'S AND ARE BLT STRENGTHS

2 . FIGURES IN .OTHER' ASSIGNED VARIOUS RVN VACATIONS .

3, STRENGTHS INDICATED IS FOR BLT 1/2 7

4, AT VARIOUS I CTZ LOCATIONS .
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

MARINE CORPS COMMAND CENTER

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL *

5200 .10

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFI C

Dnit DIF 30 =EMBER 196 6

UNIT NOTE STRINGT D

STRENGTH SDR RPTDATE DANANG CHU LAI . PHU BAI No I CTZ OEINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHE R

HEADQUARTERS

Hp, FMF PAC

USMC USN USIC USN USBC USN USIC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC US N

•

H6S BN, 7147, PAC 141624

1

50

24JUL6R 1

1507 5 0 G AMP 5, D. BUTLER

CASUAL 866SRI 137 181>E106 8

2800068 866 117 120

HOSPITALIZED 955

2RRL6 R

2800068 580

472 481 H0, V MEP

HO 5TH MAR DIV

HO BN MAR DIV ~

1

EoEc

Y:

n_n__n_n_nn_n__nn__n n__n® n

_ .

Hp IVRTRPS E'14+ PAC

._.n-n.n.n.n-n-nn.

__ ~ 7 _

HO CO, FORMES 4 4111 22 18=68 _-IIm~ZF1

H• ST MAR BRIG

Hr CO ST BRIG . '

n nnnnnnnnnnnn.

• TH MM.=

]~51_~~_-1~_~_-MM_ittlJJ__~

--ME--~~~~

M= WI111 ME=TMENRNN~NNEMIINNNNNMNN>:] NNN~NN~ RRNMRM.RNRaRaRRa

HO.•IIi MM

N55 CO. III MAT

IRE COG 367

1 1

31

1RnECGR

18DEC68 977 11367 31

_

2D CAG 781 42 18DEC68 761 4 2

In BAG 257 37 1RTEC68 252 1 2

4TH CAC n 267 21 3BLEC68 267 2 HO, LOT ' DTV

HO BN ST MAR 111V UMMIMI X9,2 ~lf~~~f♦

'

/ .; E:a•8 ~~--E 7

••HORN, 35 MAR DIV 1946 37 18DEC68 1930 37 l 6

INFANTRY

1ST MARINES Hp CO 265 R 1ROEC0R 245 8

151 BATTALION

20 BATTALION 1071 59 180EC60 11171 5 9

3D BATTALION 1096

1068

5 7

61

1R11Fx0R

1R 68

109 R

1068

5 1

6 1

3U MARINE S HOST BATTALION n1187 50 18DEC68 ~~nnnnnnnnnnnnnnn

2D BATTALIO N

3D BATTALION 11AR IRDEC6R

4111 MARINES 11169 1

1AIIFC fie 1169 59

. nnnn 2~nnnnnnnnn

2DT BATTALION N n

"151 1, IA

D BATTALION 1 ,01 mil

1 50 ~n.n.n.n.n

5TH MARINES

HO CO 7AR ] IABBcAR 245 7

1ST BATTALION 11192 51 1R1R11'6R 11192 5 1

2U BATTALION

3D BATTALION

1121 51 161111066 ) 121 5 1

7TH MARINES

1086 46 181*066 1086 46

HO CO 242 6 1808068 242 6

1S ' - E

2DTBATTALIONN

gwrrmunCrIMMIENINTi1=111WIMMUINIENIMOM=EIEWMIll•111M=•111IMM .M111•=

1 ®113 IF ®~-~~.W_~-_-M-~-~-

30 BATTALION 10B 56 )8=68 110841 561 ) I I I I 1 ~ I 1 1 1 1 i 1 1

9TH MARINES HO CO n 2 1800068 ~~

I .•T BATTALION 1157 50 18=6 8

20 BATTALION 1150 52 1800068

3D MATTNEION Its] 47 1RDDCfiR 1157 47

76TH MARINES

6

.,~

P11111111

_

CO 477 12 1800068 23 8

1ST BATTALION 1097 57 MEOW 1097 57

20 BATTALION 1 1479 97 18DEC68 n

1912

3D BATTALION 1229 66 16DUC68 1779 6 fi

_ 27TH MA R INES

HO CO 215 185RCAR 7 -

1ST BATTALION 156 AA 1811RC68 156 '

2D BATTALIO N

3D BATTALION 109 71181

37

32

1A AA

18DEC68 57

2

28TH MARINES

HO CO 267 7 7

1ST

n

1176 6

nnnnnnnnnnnnnn

1376 ~

22n BATTALION N

`y

1

800068

3D BATTALION 180F)C68 _( nM11_

ARTILLER Y

11TH MARINES

HO Billy 18 DDC68 309 9

1ST BATTALION IRnAC6R '

3D BATTALION '

31) B 413 12 18DEC68 413 1 2

4TH BATTALL ION 516 1) 1801068 518 1 2

12TH

n ®in•>.K.it•~11'7 nnnnnnnnnnnnnnn

DYNES

1ST BATTALION 571 17 1611EC68 571 1 7

20 BATTALION 1161 51 11111110611 1161 5 1

3D BATTALION 652 21 18DDC68 852 2 1

4TH BATTALION 533 12 1800068 533 1 2

• UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS MID DO NOT REFLEC T

DAY_TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS .

749
750 THE DEFINING YEA R

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

20 LECEMBSR 1968

UNIT NOTE ASSIGNED

STRENGTH

STR OPT

DATE DANANG COO IA2 MU BAI No I CTZ OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHE R

USMC USN USNC USN USMC USN USMC USN USNC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN

13TH MARINES

HQ BTRY 280 6 18=6 8

ST BATTALION 511 12 IR146R 511 1

280 6

2D BATTALION

3D BATTALION 407

556 8 10=68 ~~~'~t~~

16 18=68 556 16

{ BATTSTIFN 400 11 18=68 AIM 1 18T

• BIRY ST FAG

n

HO HTNY . 5TH F

ST 55101 GUN BTRY -~IWI~_' riL i3D 155M GUN •Y ~MLD©~©~~n1~~IM~~~~~1n~~

5TH I55MH GUNNIRY

1BDEC6 B

7T' 18DEC68 ®©~n-n ~.~.~.n.n.

S GUN STA Y

1ST 8 HOW -~T•T11WIST-T • . :1~~~~~~_~In~_~n~ELM~'~nl

18 OF1C6

3D 8" HOW BTRY 18DEC6 8

5TH B" HOW STA Y

1 ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY 10 68 2

RECONNAISSANC E

ST RECON BN

IBDEC68

19

5T

5TH REECO CON B

RR

N JilIlt

1ST FORCE RECON CO 5 n-_

~~~~~~ -~

16 4

142 18D 6818DEC68 164 8

3D FORCE RECON CO

5TH FORCE RECON CO

ANTITANK

1ST AT BN 6

17{ 181RL68 171 ]

2

3D A BN 6

5TH A BN 267 IRDEC6B 1

54 213 I

TAN K

1ST TANK RN

3D HN .

762

761

: 1BRZ68 762 1B 1111 7A 1 1111 5TH TANK BN 625 1

3

0

1 1 6 B 625 t

AMTRA C

1ST AMU= RN

,

715 30

IRTMS

,

18DF1^68 71s

,

D AMTRAC B N

5TH AMTRAC BN ~

~~~.FjiT:T T:11TTMIlnln~~1n11n1~_ll1n~~n~

1ST ANPHIB CO FINLj_l: J3aIn~~n~~~=~i©~~~F111.11IJ~

ENGINEER

ST ENGR M PIMP" ......~, 3D

ENGR

BN ~ 18=60 771 1 5

3DH BN

ENG -n.n-n ~~~n.n ~ 7TH ENGR BN

9TH ENGR BN 2 S

n

1

TN ENGR BN

91 9 ,RIECAR

;C6- :

21 n.N~..n.n.n.n 13TH ENGR BN AAA 1 5

]ET BRIDGE CO

3D BRIDGE CO

5TH BRIDGE CO la 6a 149 7

MOTOR TRANSPOR T

1ST MT 8N 1BOFL 68 322 7

3o MT BN IBDFL6B 9

5TH MT RN 1An,R0 17 1

7TH MT BN IRNECAR 10A 7

9TH MT BN —M31 . ; .;. :

11TH MC BN 1 6 8

13TH MT BN 1 68 41 7

COMMUNICATIO N

1ST RADIO RN 1812568 . :

5M COMM BN lq[ECA R

7TH COMM AN . .

IS SPGLICO 18DEC68 6

SNORE PARTY

1ST SP BN

3D BN ©<FL!'4]

49 4

BD1L6 : PMIIIIiu i. 1ST SP BN 11B7

MILITARY POLIC E

1ST HD BN ,II 18

,

1RrssrR R

5TH MP BN

~

SERVICE/SUPPORT

PLC, III MAP

IR~RA,160

O. FM 1ST PSR

•&S 13N 1R0,AA 1 2 1

SUPPLY

MI

7TH SEP BK FUEL CO

BN

n TB11BC6B 1030~n

FLSCJA 3D

ER

SERV BN

-` 1 -' 1359

3D FSR

MS BN

16

AAB

1RDEL68

SUPPLY BN 110 2

aA7 W' I ~ 1RO7TAR

5TH FSR

H65 BN 111140023 SUPPLY 199 IA 1818768 39 ' MAI RN 520 1RI66R 52 0

5TH SERVICE RN

PROV SERVICE RN, 9TH MAT 715 15 1804T68

IBDEC68

715 1 5

94 7

721

TR

IRI1CAA

94 18 9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO - 32 1

1-2
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL 75 1

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC 30 IECEMBER 1968

UNIT g ASSIGNED

STRENGTH

STR RPT

DATE 0604610 CHU LAI PHU 8AI No I CITE OIQNANA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

MEDICAL

TMED ION

U51C USN USIC USN USIC USN USMC USN U5MC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USIC USN USIC US N

148 264 18171068 148 26 1

. MED ON MIN EMSI 1 nEEl=MI1I 1~I~nnEMI NM . ~

5TH D T ~nI1PI 1n1~~i•~I=~~~M~nMIEN MULTIIi7~

ST HOSP • nNM EI ETT~i.21LIMM®~~InMEEMIMN MIME=Eln 5TH HOSP CO ~EW51MI 1~I~ =~~~~~~111rM~11M111I~~

ST DE 1 ~~<fl0l: •i_:.>y.1:11n<n~MI~♦•~~nEMSn~~ n

5TH DENT • MM ME~1 1~~~~~~MIMEnEM~~EMI MM =HEMEl=

DENT MnOMI~111IM1~IM~IM~n~~~n~~~n~

3TN DENT\' C, WMT.1 T1MIWM ~=MUMII~~n~~In~~MM1~

5TH DE 1 ~'•' i-'1~~~~=EMIUM 1 ".•I

M1

MS1~

7TH DE 3 • _©EI 1:82.Nil_~-~__ ~ ~~~WE1I111,11-

USI C

~

U

A

S

~

N

GROUND TOTAL

91,065 41,982 1,315 769 17,586 6,570 483 2,716 17 528 2,11 6

4,458 1,922 142 391 647 246 151 854 10 3

95,523 43 .904 1 .457 1,160 18,233 6,818 483 2,867 18,382 2 21 9

AVIAOON UNITS

• ' .00 PIRPAC 61 n 18DEC68

ITT MAW

MMHG_

n.-

x6745 _ =

NHeS_ a.kw _cl~`>M_

nrw lra lS

MSG -

H6MS-17 •® 664 2 2

NER 17 1fl

MACG_

H6H5- . 8 1ME •8:•

MASS- _ irmlwwiiTT?•7T1

6800-3 ®©1 iMI '

MAC _4 J ''®' •' 347 3

IS 1117• :N amoiT:T•'>'•Ct1 7 1 4

=le

MAG-11

EmolmliwEn

MASS_ 3 .

V - _1

song~/m:I!:GLi:11349 2 6

tipX1 UiFS,o WVZI

MIMEFtaoss,~F7Fs

VISAm~~1=m VMFA-334 ®O1ZEMIE SI:1 •

MN6

NABS _

-112_ 2 •

1jj]!i1•IF0P1M

-

. =.

MATCU-67 ~~ 86

rawmu :nmrm‘

YHA- ass rlrnwmrml

VMA_223 FIT1 :•-;' .~-.1♦ .

VMA_ _ /FLT .L1' T 7'7 T>•

VMA ITSa~1IT:T.'vrl ,

. iGT1J•

MAG- 3

-13 'U I.4 ,S.16, :1

NABS_ 3

VMFA _

r 1winw7'?•T.{:1♦ ~

' 1 A-314

i7:T•1i7{T:IL~T1

F$I1MER]T_ .31 :7

,

.1 . 323 J_I>7 RIM

NAG_

HAMS-1 6

MARS- 6 MIME DEC . :

MA •_6 2

TCU_6 E JR:}

mils.•.'+C~•.: 1

i7

-

V ._

167 E[E1~RLT>

F~flRh:,r.l5.5•Mi1♦

. 4

"' "-463 mum.

F3F1nF71 1

3u.m.l.

8MM

Elmo. MIME N,63 =.

F1 •ZE

H614S-36 ([!•1~I815'

MABS_36 F€S>1ii71a--L_ •1:111')- - -! '

MATCU_ . .

. T "< rssIT:T.1'~ 7-

'1" " 4 . =tom=

819L363 ~n1L: •~, Y9. 0

•~"' 6

PR .

• ROV HAMS_ . I~~1t'

Ea...I8DDC . :

: •la, . 441 2 0

%NO-6

161

I11~=

EFw.-.iRT'.-~i.7

8DDC . :

2 6

9Tx MAN

MAG_

HAMS_

5

5

n.-

MA8S_

~E11~1i •' -

,

1•Ft• -

EFX I

ELC7il

1 7I

'•' 2

. . maim.

Em61E

F1

»

:r•"•rt'-)♦ ' 1

MATCU_60

MATCU_6• 0=1T:I?5'Nj

83R_152 [S{)/`180255'5f1 l 457 4

---_I

EEPEw

1-3
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC 30 DECEMBER 196 8

UNIT NOTE

STRENGT

H ASSIGNED STR RPT

DATE DANANG CHU LAI PHU MI No I CTZ OKINAWA1

JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

1ST BRIG

MAG_24

USIC USN USK USN USIC USN US)C USN USIC USN USIC USN USIC USN USIC USN USI_' USN USIC US N

RIMS-24 45T 18=68 45 4

NABS-24 435 22 180DE68 43'5 2 2

NAGS-2 223 180DE68 22 3

mu-u-70 6T 1R15FC68 67

VNFA-212 _254 1800068 25 4

0818 .235 248 18=68 24 8

3D MAW

MWBG- 3

H4~05-3 4 621 7 18DEC68 602 7 19

MNF5- 3

MWCS_3

147 , 1RDEC6R

_

14 7

08ft-103

22 8

345 ,

1RDEC6R

18DEC68

22 0

34 5

MHTG_3 0

_ 246245_30 284 18WC68 I 28 4

IUJR_301 159 1 180E068 159 1

HM4T_302 226 18DEC68 22 6

MM-3 3

88M5-33 6{2 IB DEC6R 64 7

NABS-1 3

MATC U_65

529 , 2 - 1RDEC68 529 2

8 7

21

18DEC68

18DEC68

8 7

32 1

VNFA_214 201 1 18DEC68 201 1

9818-232 279 1 18=68 279 1

VMFA_S31 258 II )8DEC68 258 1

MISG_3 7

06145_37 597 3 18DEC68 591 3

HERS-T7

VNGR-352

230 80 113=68 230 80

362 1 18=68 362 1

MKS-18 141 1 181154 DR 24 1 MASS-S 196 1REEC6R 198

MACS-1 272 JDEC~_

7

27 2

MACS-3 251 18=68

H

251

NACS_7 242 18EEC6R 242 2

5TH 1.MN EN 512 In 18=68

_

512 10

2D LOAN BN 235 18DEC68 235

NAG-56

8605-56 352 18=68 35 2

MAW-56 334 2 10=60 334 2

MA1C0-74 66 180E068 6 6

84441_163 240 18822C68 24 0

___NNN_26 3

HNL-267

256

412 5

180E068

180EC68 453 5

82411-561 259 18DEC68 25 9

USIC 29,474 8 .535 4,309 1,614 1,731 822 1,088 1,742 9 .359 27 4

058 450 139 70 30 22 5 42 22 119 1

AVIATION TOTAL 29,924 8,674 4,379 1,644 1 .753 827 1 .130 1,764 9 .478 27 5

GROUND TOTAL

USMC

♦

RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

ASSIGNED

STRENGTH

DANANG CHU LAI PHU 8AI No I CTZ OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

. 91 .065 41,982 1 .315 769 17,586 6,570 483 2,716 17,528 2,116

8524 4 .45 8 1,922 142 391 647 248 151 854 103

AVIATION TOTAL --0584+ ► 29 .474 8.535 4 .309 1,614 1 .771 822 1 .088 1 .742 9,359 274

139 70 30 22 5 42 22 119 1

GRAND TOTAL

0514

Gs1C

♦

65 0

120,539 50 .517 5,624 2,383 19,317 7,392 1,571 4,458 26,887 2,39 0

058 4,908 _ 2,06 1 212 421 669 253 42 173 973 104

f

NOT[ES: L . FIGURES IN . OTHER . ASSIGNED TO SLF'B AND ME 8LT STRENGTHS .

2, FIGURES IN "OTHER . ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS RVN LOCATIONS .

3, AT VARIOUS I CTZ LOCATIONS .

4 . PERSONNEL LISTED IN "OTHER. ARE ASSIGNED TO IT . ITT, SSG, CI TENTS, RED EYE AND NUCLEAR 080NANCE PLATOONS .

5 . STRENGTHS INCWOED IN 7TH AND 11TH ENGINEER BATTALIONS .

6 . 1ST AND 3D ANTI-TANK PERSONNEL ARE IICLUID IN 1ST AND IOTA= BATTALIONS STRENGTHS .

7 . HOSPITALIZED AT LOCATIONS OTHER THAN OKINAWA BUT CARRIED ON THE ROLLS OF CASUAL COMPANY, CAMP BUTLER .

752
Appendix F

Combined Action Program Expansion 1968

1ST CAG

UNITS 1967 196 8

GROUP HQ 1 1

COMPANY HQ 3 3

PLATOONS 15 2 1

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS 2

STRENGTHS

USMC 213 36 4

USN 19 3 4

RVN 334 664

2D CAG

UNITS 1967 196 8

GROUP HQ 1 1

COMPANY HQ 7 8

PLATOONS 40 3 8

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS - 1 _

STRENGTHS

USMC 633 57 1

USN 42 4 1

RVN 1,070 1,04 3

753
754 THE DEFINING YEA R

3D CAG

UNITS 1967 196 8

GROUP HQ 1 1

COMPANY HQ 2 5

PLATOONS 15 3 1

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS - 2

STRENGTHS

USMC 296 54 6

USN 18 2 8

RVN 378 809

4TH CAG

UNITS 1967 1196 8

GROUP HQ - 1

COMPANY HQ 2* 3

PLATOONS 9* 1 2

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS - 2

STRENGTHS

USMC 123 28 2

USN 9 1 9

RVN 229 54 0

*Includes three CAP's and one CO Hq deactivated at Khe Sah n
COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM EXPANSION—1968 75 5

Legend and Recapitulation

STATUS AS OF 31DEC68 ACTIVATED DURING 1968 STATUS AS OF 31DEC196 8

GROUP HQ 3 GROUP HQ 1 GROUP HQ 4

COMPANY HQ 14 COMPANY HQ *6 COMPANY HQ 1 9

PLATOONS 79 PLATOONS *28 PLATOONS 10 2

MOBILE TRAINING

TEAMS

- MOBILE TRAINING

TEAMS

7 MOBILE TRAININ G

TEAMS

7

STRENGTHS 'STRENGTHS STRENGTHS

USMC 1,265 USMC 498 USMC 1,763

USN 88 USN 34 USN 122

RVN 2,011 RVN 1,025 RVN 3,036

'Five CAP's (two in 2d CAG; three in 4th CAG) and one Company Hq were deactivated during 1968
Appendix G

Casualties

NVA/VC Casualties Reported by III MAF Unit s

196 8

Month

USMC Americal Division 1st Air Cav Div1 101st Airborne2

KIA IPOW KIA POW KIA I POW KIA 'POW

JAN 2126 55 2350 70 314 9

FEB 5040 92 1691 62 1879 3 9

MAR 3118 83 1621 41 1066 78 677 2 7

APR 1769 30 795 50 1259 10 859 2 9

MAY 6200 140 1393 21 473 35 1683 172

JUN 2154 65 688 15 661 85 450 121

JUL 2124 57 781 12 490 44 305 8 2

AUG 1894 57 1384 11 485 51 583 4 5

SEP 2392 105 1294 17 207 15 268 14 8

OCT 1707 24 685 11 202 28 397 207

NOV3 104 2

DEC4 161 2

TOTAL 31178 708 12682 1310 7036 _ 394 5212 1831

'U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) left I Corps Tactical Zone on 10 November 196 8

2U.S . Army 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) came under the operational control of III MAF on 1 3

February 1968 .

'Statistics for Army units are not recorded in III MAF Command Chronologies. Total casualties inflicted by III

MAF units in November 1968 are : KIA: 2355 ; POWs: 131.

'Statistics for Army units are not recorded in III MAF Command Chronologies. Total III MAF casualties inflicted in December 1968 are: KIA: 2848; POWs: 165 .

756
CASUALTIES 757

Casualties Sustained by III MAF Units

196 8

Month

USMC USA USN

KIA IWIA MIA IDOW KIA IWIA MIA DOW KIA I WIA I MIA DOW

JAN 225 1122 30 41 177 552 22 13 15 45 3 0

FEB 554 2368 18 58 215 754 35 21 27 99 1 4

MAR 364 1915 65 19 199 843 6 14 15 73 0 1

APR 368 1596 9 33 257 887 43 13 21 71 0 3

MAY 723 2670 5 37 333 1499 73 36 37 83 0 1

JUN 495 2092 8 41 146 667 32 20 20 89 0 2

JUL 259 2131 15 25 92 591 31 18 9 96 0 3

AUG 250 1947 1 35 133 1301 31 25 10 104 0 0

SEP 207 1706 14 25 80 815 34 7 6 73 0 1

OCT 117 1052 10 20 73 734 26 8 3 28 0 0

NOV 157 843 0 15 94 479 70 19 7 53 0 2

DEC 165 1099 0 12 42 350 54 15 12 48 0 1

TOTAL , 3884 20541 1175 1361 1841 9472 457 209 182 862 4 118

3d Marine Divisio n

Enemy Casualties Reported and Friendly Casualties Sustaine d

(Includes 1st Marines through 31 August )

, Month (Enemy KIA IPOWs Captured US KIA US WIA

JAN 1290 34 154 93 5

FEB 1344 61 185 127 9

MAR 2237 52 179 123 9

APR 598 23 184 120 3

MAY 5145 114 233 139 8

JUN 1099 3 244 140 9

JUL 1003 22 75 74 4

AUG 694 6 76 57 1

SEP 1399 18 92 703

OCT 679 7 23 19 9

NOV 64 12 37 32 0

DEC 217 11 35 23 1

TOTAL 15469 1363 1517 11023 1
758 THE DEFINING YEA R

1st Marine Diviso n

Enemy Casualties Reported and Friendly Casualties Sustained

(Includes 1st Marines after 1 September)

Month Enemy KIA POW's Captured US KIA US WIA

JAN 900 79 73 82 6

FEB 3228 19 336 242 5

MAR 942 23 130 116 7

APR 1096 15 163 118 2

MAY 1777 32 350 200 2

JUN 887 32 128 121 7

JUL 598 27 110 99 1

AUG 1120 26 117 122 2

SEP 945 41 133 111 1

OCT 920 17 74 82 7

NOV 976 91 110 85 7

DEC 1287 116 126 78 0

Total 15676 1518 1850 14607
CASUALTIES 75 9

All units in I Corps Tactical Zon e

Enemy Casualties Reported and Friendly Casualties Sustaine d

Month Enemy

KIA

NVA

POW

VC

POW

Total

POW

US

KIA

US

WIA

US

MIA

US

DOW

Tota l

US'

JAN2 8037 37 525 562 417 1719 55 54 224 5

FEB2 14344 111 386 497 796 3221 54 83 4154

MAR3 9203 117 406 523 578 2831 71 34 3514

APR3 7030 47 224 271 646 2554 52 49 330 1

MAY3 12820 254 278 532 1093 4252 78 74 5497

JUN3 5563 130 497 627 661 2848 40 63 3612

JUL3 5050 81 393 474 360 2818 46 46 327 0

AUG3 6954 80 584 664 393 3352 32 60 383 7

SEP3 6733 51 768 819 293 2594 48 33 296 8

OCT3 4280 36 602 638 193 1823 36 28 208 0

NOV4 4141 32 516 548 258 1393 70 36 175 7

DEC' 5047 51 1016 1067 219 1497 54 28 179 8

Total f 89202 11027 f 6195 7222 5907 30902 636 1588 138033

'Includes casualties suffered by: USMC, USA, and US N

2lncludes casualties inflicted by : USMC, Americal Division, 1st Air Cavalry, CIDG, ARVN, and ROKM C

3Includes casualties inflicted by : USMC, Americal Division, 1st Air Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division ,

CIDG, ARVN, and ROKMC

"Includes casualties inflicted by : units OpCon III MAF, ARVN, ROKMC, and USSF

'Includes casualties inflicted by : units OpCon III MAF, ARVN, ROKMC, and CID G
Apptndix H

Marine Fixed-Wing Support

IN-COUNTRY FIXED-WING SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT

From Operations of Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968

ORDNANCE DELIVERED BY MARINE AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ

From Operations of Marine Forces Vietnam 198

JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968

7,000

6.000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

1968 TOTALS

• COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES 10788

COMBAT SORTIES 65,388

•..

JAN FEB MAR

•..iiiiII

APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Appendix I

List of Reviewers

MARINES

Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMC (Ret)

Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC (Ret )

Gen Raymond G. Davis, USMC (Ret )

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret )

LtGen Richard E . Carey, USMC (Ret )

LtGen Ernest C. Cheatham, USMC (Ret )

LtGen George R. Christmas, USM C

LtGen Edward S . Fris, USMC (Ret )

LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret)

LtGen Louis Metzger, USMC (Ret )

LtGen Adolph G. Schwenk, USMC (Ret)

LtGen William J . Van Ryzin, USMC (Ret )

LtGen William J . White, USMC (Ret )

Maj Gen Norman J. Anderson, USMC (Ret)

Maj Gen Robert D . Bohn, USMC (Ret)

MajGen John P. Condon, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC (Ret )

MajGen Kenneth J. Houghton, USMC (Ret )

MajGen James R. Jones, USMC (Ret)

MajGen James E. Livingston, USMC

MajGen James J. McMonagle, USMC

MajGen Raymond L. Murray, USMC (Ret )

MajGen Jonas M. Platt, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Arthur J. Poillon, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Francis X . Quinn, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Donn J. Robertson, USMC (Ret)

BGen James H. Berge, Jr., USMC (Ret )

BGen Michael P. Downs, USMC (Ret)

BGen Jacob E . Glick, USMC (Ret)

BGen Paul G. Graham, USMC (Ret)

BGen Harry T. Hagaman, USMC (Ret )

BGen Henry W. Hise, USMC (Ret)

BGen Joseph E . Hopkins, USMC (Ret)

BGen Frederick E . Sisley, USMC (Ret )

BGen William Weise, USMC (Ret )

Col George T. Blazer, USMC (Ret )

Col Roger H. Barnard, USMC (Ret )

Col John F. Barr, USMC (Ret )

Col Julian G. Bass, Jr., USMC (Ret )

Col Gordon D. Batcheller, USMC (Ret )

Col Lee R. Bendell, USMC (Ret )

Col James L. Black, Jr., USMC (Ret )

Col Joel E. Bonner, USMC (Ret)

Col Frank L. Bourne, Jr., USMC (Ret )

Col James T. Breckinridge, USMC (Ret )

Col Talman C. Budd II, USMC (Ret)

Col Charles F. Bunnell, Jr., USMC (Ret )

Col Warren A. Butcher, USMC (Ret )

Col Edward E. Camporini, USMC (Ret )

Col John D. Carr, USMC (Ret )

Col Kenneth L. Christy, Jr. USMC

Col Thomas W. Clarke, USMC (Ret )

Col John A . Conway, USMC (Ret)

Col Gorton C. Cook, USMC (Ret )

Col William M. Cryan, USMC (Ret )

Col William H. Dabney, USMC (Ret )

Col Edward F. Danowitz, USMC (Ret)

Col William J. Davis, USMC (Ret )

Col William J. Davis, USMC (Ret )

Col William L. Dick, USMC (Ret )

Col Harry E . Dickinson, USMC (Ret)

Col James W. Dillon, USMC (Ret)

Col Rex O. Dillow, USMC (Ret )

Col Billy R . Duncan, USMC (Ret )

Col Roy J. Edwards, USMC (Ret )

Col William S . Fagan, USMC (Ret)

Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr., USMC (Ret )

Col Paul R. Fields, USMC (Ret )

Col Edward L. Fossum, USMC (Ret)

Col Samuel J . Fulton, USMC (Ret )

Col Thomas H . Galbraith, USMC (Ret)

Col Joseph J. N. Gambardella, USMC (Ret)

Col Samuel A . Hannah, USMC (Ret)

Col John E . Hansen, USMC (Ret )

Col Twyman R. Hill, USMC (Ret )

Col Robert C . V. Hughes, USMC (Ret)

Col Stanley S . Hughes, USMC (Ret )

Col Charles V. Jarman, USMC (Ret)

Col Ray N. Joens, USMC (Ret )

Col Thomas M. Kauffman, USMC (Ret )

Col Robert J. Keller, USMC (Ret )

Col William E . Kerrigan, USMC (Ret)

Col John A. Kinniburgh, USMC (Ret )

Col Frederic S. Knight, USMC (Ret )

Col Robert G . Lauffer, USMC (Ret )

Col James Leon, USMC (Ret )

Col Robert W. Lewis, USMC (Ret )

Col Robert D . Limberg, USMC (Ret)

Col Joseph E. Lo Prete, USMC (Ret)

761
762 THE DEFINING YEA R

Col John R. Love, USMC (Ret)

Col Edward H . P. Lynk, USMC (Ret)

Col Max McQuown, USMC (Ret)

Col Charles L. Meadows, USMC (Ret)

Col Bruce F. Meyers, USMC (Ret )

Col Alexander L. Michaux, USMC (Ret )

Col John F. Mitchell, USMC (Ret)

Col Peter J . Mulroney, USMC (Ret)

Col Donald J. Myers, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert C. Needham, USMC (Ret)

Col Neil A . Nelson, USMC (Ret)

Col Thomas P. O'Callaghan, USMC (Ret )

Col Virgil D. Olson, USMC (Ret )

Col Harry F. Painter, USMC (Ret)

Col Eric B. Parker, USMC (Ret )

Col W. Hays Parks, USMCR

Col Harold L. Parsons, USMC (Ret)

Col Ernest W. Payne, USMC (Ret)

Col Clifford J . Peabody, USMC (Ret )

Col Roger W. Peard, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Poul F. Pedersen, USMC (Ret)

Col Rhys J. Phillips, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col John W. P. Robertson, USMC (Ret)

Col William K. Rockey, USMC (Ret)

Col Maurice Rose, USMC (Ret)

Col Joseph L. Sadowski, USMC (Ret )

Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Maynard W. Schmidt, USMC (Ret)

Col Walter Sienko, USMC (Ret )

Col Anthony J . Skotnicki, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert D. Slay, USMC (Ret)

Col Richard B. Smith, USMC (Ret)

Col Kent O. W. Steen, USMC (Ret)

Col James W. Stemple, USMC (Ret )

Col Broman C. Stinemetz, USMC (Ret )

Col James R. Stockman, USMC (Ret)

Col Vaughn R. Stuart, USMC (Ret)

Col John C. Studt, USMC (Ret )

Col Robert H. Thompson, USMC (Ret)

Col David S . Twining, USMC (Ret)

Col Earl K. Vickers, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Raymond J. Weber, USMC (Ret)

Col Howard A . Westphall, USMC (Ret)

Col Dean Wilker, USMC (Ret)

Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtCol Themistocles T. Annas, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Louis J. Bacher, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Donald R . Berg, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Harper L. Bohr, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtCol Gene W. Bowers, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Byron F. Brady, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Justice M. Chambers, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtCol William A . Cohn, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Francis X. Colleton, USMC (Ret)

LtCol William R. Corson, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Walter W. Damewood, Jr., USMC (Ret )

LtCol Edwin A . Deptula, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Robert J . Edwards, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Karl J. Fontenot, USMC (Ret )

LtCol James F. Foster, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Vincent J. Gentile, USMC (Ret )

LtCol John J. Hainsworth, USMC (Ret )

LtCol George E. Hayward, USMC (Ret)

LtCol John A. Hennelly, USMC (Ret )

LtCol John F. J. Kelly, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Otto Lehrack, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Curtis D. McRaney, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Justin M. Martin, II USMC (Ret)

LtCol George F. Meyers, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Thomas F. Miller, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Charles E. Mueller, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC (Ret )

LtCol John E. Poindexter, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Louis A. Rann, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Donald N . Rexroad, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Robert F. Rick, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Ralph J. Salvati, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Jack E. Schlarp, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Walter H . Shauer, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtCol Jerry I. Simpson, USMC (Ret)

LtCol William J. Spangler, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Cecil V. Taylor, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtCol George F. Warren, USMC (Ret)

LtCol LeRoy E. Watson, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Ronald R. Welpott, USMC (Ret)

LtCol James B . Wilkinson, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Daniel M. Wilson, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Frank B. Wolcott, III, USMC (Ret )

LtCol Roger Zensen, USMC (Ret )

Maj John S. Leffen, USMC (Ret )

Maj Donald E. Milone, USMC (Ret)

Maj Edward Palm, USMC (Ret )

Maj Gary E . Todd, USMC (Ret)

Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, USMC (Ret )

Capt George B. Meegan, USMC (Ret )

Capt Alexander W. Wells, Jr., USMCR

lstLt Tyrus F. Rudd, USMC (Ret)

CWO 4 Henry Wildfang, USMC (Ret )

MGySgt James W. Rogers, USMC (Ret)
REVIEWERS 763

ARMY

Gen William B. Rosson, USA (Ret)

Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret )

LtGen Philip B. Davidson, Jr., USA (Ret)

Col Bruce B . G. Clarke, USA

Col Lewis Sorley, USA (Ret)

LtCol George L. MacGarrigle, USA (Ret)

Harry F. From me

John L. Gundersen

Thomas Harve y

George W. Jayn e

Andy Lewandowsk i

Michael G. McDonel l

Charles McMahon

Edward J . Marolda

Joel D. Meyerson

Bert Mullin s

William J . O'Conno r

James E. Perry

Mike Peterson

Larry J . Seavy-Cioffi

Brian Strasse r

Wayne Thompso n

James Walters

Francis West, Jr.

Arliss Willhit e

Mark Woodruff

Naval Historical Cente r

Office of Air Force History

U.S . Army Center of Military History

Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Staff

NAVY

Capt Bernard D. Cole, USN

Cdr Richard McGonigal, USN (Ret )

LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, USN (Ret )

OTHERS

Charles R . Anderso n

Dale Andrad e

Ron Asher

John J. Balanco

William R. Black, Jr.

Harold R. Blunk

Igor Bobrowsk y

Peter Braestrup

C. C. Busic k

Graham A. Cosmas

William D. Ehrhart
Appendix J

Tables of Organization

Tables of Organization

None of the major units in Vietnam followed standard Marine Corps tables of organization (T/O), and man y

smaller units were also task-organized to adapt to the circumstances of the Vietnam war. This appendix contain s

tables of organization for selected types of units.

It is worth recalling that almost no unit in Vietnam was ever staffed exactly according to its T/O. The demand s

of sustained combat forced the Marine Corps to man some units, particularly headquarters units, considerably

above their T/O . Almost every unit found that it had to detail some men to perform tasks for which the T/O had

not provided . In general, most units were consistently manned well below their T/O strength .

The Marine Divisio n

The standard T/O for a Marine Division called for a headquarters battalion, three infantry regiments, an artillery

regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an antitank battalion, an engineer battalion, a service battalion, a motor transport battalion, a shore party battalion, and a medical battalion .

Standard Marine Divisio n

Marine Divisio n

Headquarters Infantry

Battalion Regiment

I I

Reconnaissance Antitank

Battalion Battalion

Artiller y

Regiment

Engineer

Battalion

Service

Battalion

Shore Party

Battalion

Motor Transport

Battalion

Medical

Battalion

The organization of Marine divisions in Vietnam differed markedly from this standard organization, and als o

varied from time to time . By 1968, the service battalions had been transferred to the Force Logistic Command an d

the antitank battalions cadred . Units normally subordinate to the Fleet Marine Force commander, including tan k

battalions, amphibian tractor battalions, and force reconnaissance companies, had been attached . For most of 1968 ,

both divisions included four infantry regiments, a reinforced artillery regiment, and additional motor transport an d

engineer battalions. The following diagram shows what a "typical division looked like in Vietnam ." The exact units

in a given division at any given time is in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968 .

764
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION 765

Marine Division, Vietnam 196 8

Marine Division

Headquarters

Battalion

Infantry

Regiment

Artillery Regiment

(Reinforced)

Reconnaissance Bn

(Reinforced)

Tank Battalion

(Reinforced)

1

Engineer

Battalion

Shore Party

Battalion

Motor Transport

Battalion

Amphibian Tractor

Battalion

I I

Dental

Company

Marine Aircraft Wing

There was no standard organization for any Marine Corps aviation unit above the squadron level . Selecte d

squadron tables of organization are included in this appendix . The exact units making up the 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing can be found in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968 .

Combat Service Support Units

Standard Marine Corps practice placed combat service support units into a force service regiment, consisting o f

a headquarters and service battalion, a maintenance battalion, and a supply battalion . In Vietnam combat service

support units were consolidated into the Force Logistic Command, which also included the service battalions from

both divisions, two military police battalions, a communications battalion, and a motor transport battalion . Since

the organizations for the battalions in the Force Logistic command were heavily modified to enable them to sup -

port sustained ground operations, no T/O's for these units are included . The exact units making up the Force Logistic Command can be found in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968 .

Medical

Battalion
766 THE DEFINING YEA R

Infantry Regiment

T/O M-1099, Revision 2

6 June 1967

Infantry Regiment

USMC USN

Off En/ Off En/

153 3644 11 16 1

Hq Co

USMC USN

Off En/ Off En /

18 200 2 2

Regimental Hq

USMC USN

Off En/ Off En /

12 27 2 0

Comm Pit

USMC

Off Enl

2 89

Company Hq*

USMC USN

Off Enl Off En/

3 49 0 2

Scout-Sniper Pi t

USMC

Off En/

1 35

Infantry Battalio n

USMC USN

Off En/ Off En /

45 1148 3 5 3

Hq & Svc Co

USMC USN

Off Ent Off En /

21 308 3 5 3

Rifle Co

USM C

Off En/

6 21 0

* The company headquarters included a command post security platoon of 19 Marines, with a staff sergeant a s

platoon commander, and two squads of nine Marines each, consisting of a squad leader and two four-man fireteams .
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION 767

Artillery Regimen t

T/O M-1199, Revision 2

17 April 1964

Artillery Regimen t

USMC USN

Off Enl Off En l

202 2555 15 4 5

Hq Battery

USMC USN

Off Enl Off En l

30 188 2 3

Direct Support Bn

USMC USN

Off Enl Off En l

48 624 4 11

General Support Bn

USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

28 495 1 9

Hq Batter y

USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

17 142 4 3

107 mm How Batter y

USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

4 89 0 2

105 mm How Battery

USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

9 131 0 2

Hq Battery

USMC USN

Off Enl Off En l

13 144 1 3

155 mm How Battery

USMC USN

Off Enl Off En l

5 117 0 2

Direct support battalions contained 18 M101A1 towed 105mm howitzers (six per battery) and six M9 8

107mm towed mortars.

General support battalions contained 18 M109 self propelled 155mm Howitzers (six per battery) .
768 THE DEFINING YEA R

Amphibian Tractor Battalion

T/O M-4658, Revision 1

6 March 1967

The amphibian tractor battalion normally fell under force troops, but in Vietnam each division had a n

amphibian tractor battalion attached. The battalion's primary mission was to transport troops and equipment

under combat conditions, and it had only enough Marines and sailors to operate and maintain its vehicles . For

combat operations in Vietnam the battalion either had infantry units attached to ride in its vehicles or parcelle d

out its companies and platoons to support other units . Generally one amphibian tractor company could suppor t

an infantry battalion, and one amphibian tractor platoon could support a rifle company .

The headquarters and service company rated 12 LVTP5A1 personnel carrier landing vehicles, tracked, thre e

LVTP5A1 CMD command variants, one LVTRIAI recovery vehicle, and eight LVTE1 engineer vehicles . These

vehicles supported the operations of the amphibian tractor battalion . Each amphibian tractor company contained 44 LVTP5Als, three LVTP5A1 CMDs, and one LVTRIAI . Since LVTs suffered frequent mine damage

in Vietnam, both amphibian tractor battalions received an increased allowance of LVTRIAI recovery vehicles .

AmTrac Battalio n

USMC USN

Off Ed Off En/

30 681 1 1 4

Hq & Svc Co#

USMC USN

Off En/ Off En/

16 235 1 1 4

Co Hq

4 LVTP

3 LVTP (CMD)

1 LVTR

AmTrac Co*

USM C

Off En/

7 22 3

LVT Platoon

10 LVTP

* A third amphibian tractor company could be activated by order of the Commandant . During

1968 both amphibian tractor battalions in Vietnam contained two amphibian tractor companies .
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION 769

Tank Battalion

Vietnam 1968

Normally part of force troops, in Vietnam the two tank battalions were assigned to the divisions. The standard

table of organization (T/O M-4238, Revision 1, 25 September 1967) for tank battalions called for a headquarters

and service company, a heavy tank company, and three medium tank companies, with the proviso that only thre e

tank companies would be activated except by order of the commandant . Both the 1st Tank Battalion and 3d Tan k

Battalion omitted the heavy tank company in this period (which would have been equipped with 17 M103A 2

120mm gun tanks).

The headquarters and service company contained nine M67A2 flamethrower tanks (organized into a platoo n

with three sections of three tanks each), two M48A3 90mm gun tanks for the command section, and one M5 1

tank recovery vehicle. Each medium tank company rated 17 M48A3 90mm gun tanks and one M51 tank recovery vehicle, with two gun tanks and the recovery vehicle in the company headquarters and three platoons of fiv e

gun tanks each.

In December 1967 the 1st and 3d Antitank battalions were cadred, both being reduced to one reinforced anti -

tank company. These companies were then attached to the like-numbered tank battalion, adding approximatel y

100 Marines, one corpsmen, and 20 M50A1 Ontos, a small tracked vehicle mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles.

Tank Battalion *

USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

40 617 1 1 4

Hq & Svc Co lt

USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

24 287 1 14

Medium Tank C o

USMC

Off Enl

5 105

Antitank Co @

(Reinforced )

task organized

Co Hq

Co Hq* *

2 M48A3 tanks

1 M51 tan k

Retriever

Antitank Platoon

5 M50A1 Oncos

Tank Platoo n

5 M48A3 tanks

* Does not include attached antitank company.

** One of these tanks was fitted with an M8 bulldozer blade .

# Does not include additional personnel to support attached antitank company . @ The standard T/O for an antitank company called for five officers and 76 enlisted Marines (T/O M—1248 ,

Revision 2, 1 June 1967). Normally a company was divided into three platoons and equipped with 15 M50A 1

Ontos. The reinforced companies attached to the tank battalions in December 1967 contained approximately si x

officers, 90—95 enlisted Marines, and one corpsman, and contained four platoons and a total of 20 M50A1 Ontos.

Roughly one officer and six enlisted Marines were attached to the headquarters and service company to provid e

administrative support.
770 THE DEFINING YEA R

The Marine Aircraft Wing

There was no standard organization for any Marine Corps aviation unit above the squadron level . This sectio n

contains the official tables of organization for some of the more common Marine aviation squadrons present in Viet -

nam in 1968 . It must be remembered that the actual number of Marines and aircraft assigned to a given squadro n

almost certainly varied from these tables. Squadrons of the same type, but flying different types of aircraft, had dif -

ferent T/Os. Also, the Marine Corps had multiple T/Os for certain types of squadrons flying the same aircraft . For

example, some Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) were organized to fly 24 UH—1E Iroquois helicopters, som e

30 UH—1E helicopters, while others flew a mix of helicopters and 0—1B Bird Dog Cessna fixed wing light obser -

vation aircraft . In 1968 the Marine Corps introduced the OV—10A Bronco fixed wing observation aircraft to Vietnam, further complicating the picture .

Most squadron T/Os included an intermediate maintenance section. The Marines in these sections were no t

actually assigned to the squadron, but were instead an integral part of the parent group's headquarters and maintenance squadron. Still, these sections represented a manpower requirement associated with a specific squadron ,

and therefore these sections are included here .

The tables shown here are for squadrons at wartime strength . During the war, however, Marine aviation units

remained on the reduced peacetime manning level, making their actual strength considerably less than shown i n

this appendix.

The exact units making up the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing can be found in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968 . Note: Numbers in parentheses show billets filled by pilots, and are

not included in the totals.

Tables of Organization for Selected Squadron s

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA )

15 F—4J Phantom Jet Interceptor/Attack Aircraft

T/O M—8848, 23 July 1968

Pilots

USMC

NFOs Grd Off Enl

USN

Off Enl

Squadron Headquarters (3) 2 1 9

Operations 26 26 1 6

Aircraft Maintenance (5) 3 240

Motor Transport (1) 9

Medical 1 4

Squadron Total 26 26 6 274 1 4

Intermediate Maintenance 6 1

Total 26 26 6 335 1 4
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION 77 1

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA )

20 A—4C/E SkyHawk Jet Attack Aircraft

T/O M—8955, 7 November 1967 *

Pilots

USMC

Grd Off Enl

USN

Off Enl

Squadron Headquarters (3) 2 1 9

Operations 35 1 6

Aircraft Maintenance (5) 3 15 1

Motor Transport (1) 9

Medical 1 4

Squadron Total 35 6 185 1 4

Intermediate Maintenance 3 3

Total 35 6 218 1 4

* On 23 July 1968 an additional Marine was added to the intermediate maintenance section, bringing th e

enlisted total to 219 .

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron (VMA(AW))

12 A—6A Intruder Jet Attack Aircraft

T/O 8857, 25 May 1967 *

Pilots

USMC

NFOs Grd Off Enl

USN

Off Enl

Squadron Headquarters (3) 2 1 7

Operations 21 21 1 7

Aircraft Maintenance (5) 3 222

Motor Transport (1) 9

Medical 1 4

Squadron Total 21 21 6 255 1 4

Intermediate Maintenance 6 8

Total 21 21 6 323 1 4

* On 20 August the total number of enlisted Marines was increased to 324, with one Marine added to bot h

the squadron headquarters and intermediate maintenance section, and one dropped from the aircraft main -

tenance section .
772 THE DEFINING YEAR

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH)

24 CH—53A Sea Stallion Heavy Transport Helicopters

T/O M-8942, 28 December 1967 *

USMC

Pilots Grd Off Enl

Squadron Headquarters (3) 2 1 9

Operations 60 1 6

Aircraft Maintenance (5) 2 158

Motor Transport (1) 1 7

Medica l

Squadron Total 60 5 20 1

Intermediate Maintenance 43

Total 60 5 244

USN

Off Enl

1 4

1 4

1 4

* On 23 July 1968 a Marine was shifted from the aircraft maintenance section to the intermediate maintenance section .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)

24 CH—46 Sea Knight Medium Transport Helicopters

T/O M-8935, 25 May 1967 *

Pilots

USMC

Grd Off Enl

USN

Off Enl

Squadron Headquarters (3) 2 1 9

Operations 60 1 6

Aircraft Maintenance (5) 2 145

Motor Transport (1) 1 4

Medical 1 3

Squadron Total 60 5 184 1 3

Intermediate Maintenance 3 1

Total 60 5 215 1 3

* On 23 July 1968 one Marine moved from the aircraft maintenance section to the intermediate maintenance section .
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION 77 3

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)

24 UH—34D/E Sea Horse Medium Transport Helicopter s

T/O M-8932, 22 November 1967 *

Pilots

USMC

Grd Off Enl

USN

Off Enl

Squadron Headquarters (3) 2 1 8

Operations 60 1 6

Aircraft Maintenance (5) 2 146

Motor Transport (1) 1 4

Medical 1 3

Squadron Total 60 5 184 1 3

Intermediate Maintenance 4 1

Total 60 5 225 1 3

* On 23 July 1968 an additional Marine was added to the intermediate maintenance section, bringing th e

total number of enlisted Marines to 226 .

Marine Observation Squadron (VMO )

24 UH—1E Iroquois Light Attack/Observation Helicopters

T/O M-8963, 24 May 1967 *

This T/O is for a squadron with 24 UH1E helicopters

Pilots

USMC

Grd Off Enl

USN

Off Enl

Squadron Headquarters (3) 2 1 3

Operations 48 1 6

Aircraft Maintenance (4) 2 144

Services (2) 3 6

Medical 1 3

Squadron Total 48 5 199 1 3

* On 20 August 1968 one Marine was added to the squadron headquarters, bringing the total number o f

enlisted Marines to 200 .

Index

Key: p = photograph; n = informational note

A

A Shau Valley, 16, 37, 107–108, 223, 241, 249, 252–53, 254 ,

287, 291, 370–71, 411–12, 455, 516, 540, 65 2

A–1 Strongpoint, 24, 24n, 26, 28–29, 30p, 31, 38, 40, 115 ,

128, 292, 361-62, 394, 443 (See also barrier)

A-2 Strongpoint, 31, 41, 139, 292, 360, 393, 443 (See also

barrier)

A-3 Strongpoint, 28, 31, 40, 46, 46n, 47, 48p; 52, 56, 126,

139-440, 244, 308, 351, 357, 360, 364, 395, 444 (See also

barrier)

A—4 Strongpoint, 23, 23p, 24, 40 -442, 126, 443 (See also barrier)

A—5 Strongpoint, 24, 26, 28—29, 443 (See also barrier)

A—6 Strongpoint, 24, 26 (See also barrier)

Abrams, Gen Creighton W., USA, 69n, 110, 118, 194, 205—207 ,

207n, 210, 221, 223, 237–38, 238p, 239-40, 240n, 241 ,

276n, 283, 324, 338, 356, 360, 387, 392, 396, 411, 411n ,

413, 443–44, 493, 508–509, 509p, 510, 510n, 510p ,

511–15, 543, 578, 586, 636, 641, 650, 653–54

Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), 425, 443, 455, 63 0

Adams, 1stLt Robert L ., 543

Adams, Eddie, 648 p

Adkisson, Col George O ., USA, 173–7 4

Ahearn, lstLt Francis B., 427 p

Ai Nghia River, 344, 41 4

Ai Tu, 76, 118—19, 133, 13 5

Air America, 269 n

Air Force 407—L Development Program, 46 8

Air Force Airborne DASC, 489 n

Air Force Reserves, 22 6

Air Force Commands and Units, U .S .

2d Air Division, 466-6 7

20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, 47 8

63d Military Airlift Wing, 574n

315 Air Commando Wing, 26 1

4133d Bomb Wing, 65

4258th Strategic Wing, 65

Fifth Air Force, 46 6

Seventh Air Force, 3, 5, 23, 65, 108, 239- 440, 360–61, 458 ,

467, 468n, 470, 470n, 472, 473p, 474–75, 480, 485–86 ,

486n, 487, 487n, 489–90, 492–94, 498, 498n, 500 ,

502–507, 509, 511, 511n, 512, 514–15, 526, 536n ,

545-46, 635, 65 3

Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC), 474 ,

474n, 49 6

I Corps, DASC, 494–94, 496, 496n, 497–98, 500

"Panama" CRC, 467, 467n, 468, 468 n

Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 467, 467n, 492—93 ,

493n, 496n, 498, 502–503, 50 7

Tactical Air Liaison Section, 583 n

Military Airlift Command, 22 7

Strategic Air Command, 5, 471, 476, 485, 54 6

U.S . Air Forces, Pacific, 3, 5

Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) ("People Sniffer") XM—3 ,

65, 142

Aircraft types

B-26, 269 n

Bell AH–1G Cobra Helicopter, 52 1

Bell UH–1 Iroquois Huey, 261, 37 8

Bell UH–1B Huey, 52 1

Bell UH–1E Huey, 50, 56, 65, 94, 116, 119–20, 124, 140 ,

142, 151, 215p, 281–82, 315, 389, 399p, 400, 403n ,

459n, 460, 460n, 478, 483, 485, 517, 519-20, 520p ,

521, 521n, 522, 522n, 526, 526n, 530, 531n, 55 4

Bell UH–1H Huey, 306, 411, 521, 522 n

Boeing B–52 Stratofortress, 5, 65–66, 123p, 256, 471 ,

472p, 474n, 475, 47 7

Boeing Vertol CH—46 Sea Knight, 51, 82, 92, 94, 11 .7p ,

150, 158, 174, 176, 192n, 197, 232, 261n, 265, 276 ,

281, 314–15, 322, 343p, 354p, 368, 369p, 382p, 389 ,

400, 402p, 460, 463–64, 483, 485, 516–17, 517n, 518p ,

521, 521n, 522, 522n, 523, 523n, 524, 526, 527n, 551 ,

553, 553p, 554, 582, 631n, 637 p

Boeing Vertol CH–47 Chinook, 461p

C–7 Buffalo, 479, 479 n

Caribou, 479 n

Cessna 0–1, 461p, 547–48

Cessna 0–1B, 52 4

Cessna 0—1C, 46 0

Cessna 0–1E, 268, 47 8

Cessna 0–1G, 460

Chance Vought F–8 Crusader, 200, 305, 459, 464

DC–3, 459n, 461 p

Douglas A–1 Skyraider, 37 8

Douglas AC—47, 98, 154—55, 319, 375, 378, 421, 424 ,

432, 553–5 4

Douglas AC–130, 11 5

Douglas C–47 Skytrain, 553 n

Douglas EF—10B Whale, 459n, 46 4

Fairchild C–123 Provider, 52, 261, 264—65, 281, 281n ,

283n, 284, 347, 479, 480, 48 1

Grumman A–6 Intruder, 63, 148p, 279, 298, 41.8–19, 459 ,

459n, 460, 462p, 464–65, 465p, 477, 477n, 478n, 496 ,

546

Grumman EA—6A Intruder, 459n, 46 4

Grumman TF—9J Cougar, 460 n

Hughes OH–6A Cayuse, 411, 52 1

IL–14, 205 n

Lockheed C–130 Hercules, 62, 66, 151, 227, 281n, 287 ,

287n, 339, 390, 440, 463n, 479n, 481, 483, 484p, 648

Lockheed KC–130 Hercules, 73, 278, 463n, 464, 464p ,

479, 479n, 479p, 480—81, 482p, 483, 485, 524, 60 7

McDonnell-Douglas A—4 Skyhawk, 201, 212, 300, 324 ,

365, 420p, 459n, 460, 462p, 464, 464p, 469, 469n ,

477n, 483, 485, 485n, 489n, 54 6

McDonnell-Douglas C–117D Skytrain, 98, 250, 459n, 460 ,

463, 46 4

McDonnell-Douglas F–4 Phantom, 99, 151, 200, 279, 365 ,

378, 398, 459, 460, 463p, 464–67, 546

775
776 THE DEFINING YEA R

McDonnell-Douglas RF—4B Phantom II, 459n, 465n, 49 3

McDonnell-Douglas TA—4, 459n, 460n, 483, 64 1

MIG Fighter, 268, 460n

Navy F3D Skynight, 459n

North American OV—1 Mohawk, 46 0

North American OV—10A Bronco, 347, 460n, 519—20, 522 p

Sikorsky CH—53 Sea Stallion, 248, 261, 354p, 440p, 460 ,

464, 521n, 523-24, 524n, 525p, 526, 551, 551 p

Sikorsky CH—54 Sky Crane, 353n, 524, 524n, 525p, 55 1

Sikorsky UH—34 Sea Horse, 70, 245p, 340, 390, 421n, 460 ,

460n, 463—64, 483n, 516, 521, 521n, 525p, 527n, 529n ,

636n, 637p

Alamo, 195, 204 (See also Hue Citadel)

Alamo (LSD 33), 631 n

Alderman, LtCol Harry L ., 64, 71, 25 9

Allen, Capt Bernard A ., 22 1

Alsop, Joseph, 251 p

Althoff, Maj David L., 315 n

Am, LtCol Nguyen, 13 3

America (CVA 66), 641 n

Ammunition Supply Point (ASP), 260, 282, 313n, 48 0

Number 3, 27 9

An Binh, 292

An Cuu, 185, 19 1

An Cuu Bridge, 168, 172, 184p, 194, 216, 589, 65 3

An Dinh, 5 6

An Don, 74

An Hoa, 90, 97, 97n, 98, 106, 141, 144, 154, 158—59, 229 ,

248, 329p, 343p, 344 48, 374, 382p, 414, 419, 419n ,

420, 423-24, 433, 438-39, 440p, 441, 449, 463, 525p ,

537, 551p, 554, 554n, 593, 594

An Hoa Gate (Hue), 19 2

An Loc, 293-94, 296-301, 301 n

An My, 40, 46, 362

An Phu, 5 2

An Tam (1), 333-34, 55 4

An Xa, 52, 39 5

Anderson, Charles R., 614, 627 n

Anderson, BGen Earl E ., 14, 15n, 31, 84n, 145n, 162, 238,

361n, 388n, 411n, 467n, 468, 468n, 487n, 490, 491n ,

495, 497, 517, 517n, 575n, 583, 608n, 611n, 614n, 620,

625, 625n ; Gen 174n, 276n, 422 n

Anderson, MajGen Norman J., 108—109, 276n, 458, 458p,

460n, 465, 470, 473—75, 483, 483n, 485, 487, 488—89 ,

489n, 490, 490n, 491, 491n, 492-94, 496-98, 498n, 500,

500n, 501—508, 508n, 509, 512n, 516-17, 517n, 519,

523n, 524, 526, 528, 528n, 528p, 529—30, 608, 608 n

Anderson, Capt Robert R ., 333 p

Andrew, lstLt Richard A., 40 1

Ann Arbor, Michigan, 560 n

Annam, 7

Annamite Mountains, 88, 10 1

Anti-infiltration Barrier (See also barrier), 444

Anti-infiltration System (See also barrier), 2 6

Antiair Defense, 46 7

Arclight B—52 Strikes, 19, 26, 100, 123p, 124, 124n, 253,

266, 268n, 270, 270n, 271p, 281, 283, 289, 320—21 ,

355, 360, 364, 364n, 382, 387, 388p, 389, 392, 403 ,

419, 419n, 471, 472p, 474—77, 478n, 490, 495, 538 ,

543, 545—46 1

Area of Operations Green, 443

Argo, Col Reamer W., Jr., USA, 66

Arizona Territory, 247-48, 250—52, 344, 345-48, 381, 384 ,

414, 423, 437-38, 441, 551, 554, 554 n

Armed Forces Qualification Test, 55 9

Armed Forces Staff College, 3

Army Commands and Units, U.S .

8th Army, 46 6

I Field Force, 4, 239, 239n

II Field Force, 4, 239, 41 1

Provisional Corps, 238—39, 239p, 240, 240n, 241, 241n ,

248—49, 253—54, 284, 287, 307p, 308, 312, 312n, 353n ,

356, 359-60, 361n, 361p, 364, 364n, 391, 492, 493 ,

498, 500, 503, 503n, 504p, 505, 516, 540, 544, 545n ,

546, 555, 585, 587n, 641, 641n, 65 3

XXIV Corps, 361n, 387, 388n, 412, 414, 448-49, 548 ,

587n, 608, 625, 641n, 65 3

1st Logistical Command, 230, 583n, 585, 585n, 64 2

1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 12, 15, 19, 83 ,

107—11, 118, 118n, 127, 159, 177, 192, 194, 194n, 205 ,

207, 213, 216, 223, 227, 230, 238, 241, 246, 249 ,

252—54, 284, 287, 289, 308, 312, 352, 357, 370—71 ,

371n, 372, 390, 396, 410—11, 411n, 412, 412p, 413 ,

419, 419n, 443, 446, 453, 465, 487, 487n, 488-89 ,

489n, 490, 503, 505, 509p, 516—19, 521, 527, 540, 542 ,

548, 555, 582—84, 589, 623n, 625n, 635, 641, 652—5 4

Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA), 136—37, 19 3

1st Brigade, 107—109, 119, 133, 136, 136n, 137, 177, 193 ,

230, 370, 411, 45 3

2d Brigade, 252, 286, 289, 306, 313, 370, 41 2

3d Brigade, 84n, 87, 91, 92, 99—100, 109, 177, 192—93 ,

205, 207, 216, 223, 253, 256, 284—86, 411, 65 2

1st Infantry Division, 14n, 41 1

5th Infantry Division (Mechanized )

1st Brigade, 388, 388n, 390-92, 394-95, 412, 443-46 ,

453, 57 8

23d Infantry (Americal) Division, 2, 8, 11—12, 16, 83—87 ,

91—92, 99—100, 109, 142, 144, 158, 161—63, 227—28 ,

238, 240, 246, 248, 253, 306, 346, 391, 460, 463, 470 ,

519, 586, 608, 610, 615n, 625n, 638-39, 65 2

25th Infantry Division, 41 1

82d Airborne Division, 227, 57 2

3d Brigade, 227, 249, 371, 371n, 391, 41 3

101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), 12, 177, 194, 227 ,

230, 238, 252, 254, 284, 371, 371n, 372, 388, 391, 412 ,

419n, 455, 489n, 503, 505, 540, 582—84, 607, 610 ,

625n, 641, 65 2

1st Brigade, 205, 211, 213, 237, 249, 253, 256, 371, 41 3

2d Brigade, 107, 109, 371, 41 3

3d Brigade, 391, 41 3

11th Light Infantry Brigade, 16, 248, 586

196th Light Infantry Brigade, 100, 162, 246, 253, 299, 304

16th Aviation Group, 25 1

26th General Support Group, 585, 594

108th Field Artillery Group, 535, 540, 545, 545 n

1st Cavalry Regimen t

1st Squadron, 15 0

1st Infantry Regimen t

2d Battalion, 162, 54 3

3d Battalion

Company A, 22 8

5th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 245p,
INDEX 777

3d Squadron, 246, 248, 284, 41 1

5th Infantry Regimen t

1st Battalion, 136, 306

Company A, 13 6

Company B, 13 6

Company C, 13 6

6th Infantry Regimen t

1st Battalion, 162

3d Battalion, 299, 304—30 7

Company A, 305—30 6

Company C, 30 6

7th Cavalry Regiment, 41 1

1st Battalion, 17 7

2d Battalion, 28 6

5th Battalion, 19 3

8th Cavalry Regiment, 357, 41 1

1st Battalion, 136, 41 1

8th Field Artillery Regimen t

4th Battalion, 41 9

9th Cavalry Regiment, 35 7

1st Squadron, 136, 284

Troop A, 410

9th Infantry Regimen t

1st Battalion

Company C, 10 9

11th Infantry Regimen t

1st Battalion, 390, 393, 404, 445

Company B, 392, 393, 44 5

Company C, 393, 44 5

Company D, 392, 393, 445

12th Cavalry Regimen t

1st Battalion, 13 6

2d Battalion, 100, 177, 193—94, 285, 41 1

Company A, 9 9

Company B, 13 6

Company C, 99, 136

Company D, 41 0

Company E, 41 0

4th Squadron, 44 5

17th Cavalry Regiment, 22 8

17th Infantry Regimen t

7th Battalio n

Company C, 15 0

21st Infantry Regimen t

2d Battalion, 30 4

3d Battalion, 299, 304—30 7

Company A, 305—30 6

Company C, 30 6

26th Field Artillery Regimen t

Battery F, 54 7

34th Armored Regiment

2d Battalion, 246

44th Artillery Regimen t

1st Battalio n

Battery A, 11 8

Battery C, 54, 11 9

Battery D, 171 n

61st Infantry Regiment, 39 3

1st Battalion, 390, 393, 395, 44 5

Company A, 391, 392, 395

Company B, 394, 395

Company C, 391-92, 39 4

77th Armor Regimen t

1st Battalion, 390, 392, 44 5

Company A, 389

Company B, 393—9 5

Company C, 39 3

94th Field Artillery Regiment

2d Battalion, 28 3

Battery C, Third Section, 66 p

326th Infantry Regimen t

1st Battalion, 19 4

327th Infantry Regimen t

1st Battalion, 194, 230, 249, 41 3

2d Battalion, 249, 41 2

3d Battalion, 23 0

501st Infantry Regimen t

2d Battalion, 177, 20 7

502d Infantry Regiment

1st Battalion, 13 6

Company A, 13 7

Company C, 644

2d Battalion, 230, 248—49, 412—1 3

506th Infantry Regiment

3d Battalion, 64 0

508th Infantry Regiment

1st Battalion, 41 2

7th Psychological Warfare Battalion, 598, 60 9

35th Engineer Battalion, 23 0

63d Signal Battalion, 58 7

159th Transportation Battalion, 585, 585 n

716th Military Police Battalion, 64 2

29th Civil Affairs Company, 598, 599n, 60 8

245th Surveillance Aircraft Company, 251, 460

282d Assault Helicopter Company, 26 3

Army Air Corps, 515, 560 n

Army Logistic Command, 240

Army Support Command, Da Nang, 583, 584n, 58 5

Army Special Forces

Special Forces, 52 6

Special Forces, 59—60, 107, 35 7

Mobile Strike Forc e

14th Company, 25 1

5th Special Forces Group, 275—76, 42 5

Company C

Detachment A,101, 273, 27 5

Task Force Barker, 228, 248, 614

Task Force Miracle, 162—6 3

Task Force Oregon, 11, 24, 84, 238, 470, 470 n

U.S . Military Academy, West Point, 3

Army Field Manual 7—11, 2 9

Army Field Manual 7—20, 2 9

Asher, Cpl Ronald R., 115 ; Sgt 38, 7 9

Associated Press, 221, 303 n

Atkinson, LtCol Harry E ., 433, 43 9

Australia, 4, 56 7

Australian Advisors, 19 5

Australian Army, 54 2

Australian Cabinet, 1 7

Avella, LCpl James, 20 8

Aviation Gas, JP—4, 58 2

Aviation Officer Candidate School, 569
778 THE DEFINING YEA R

B

Ba Long, 168

Ba Long Valley, 54, 253, 396—97, 454—55, 549, 550p

Ba Ren River, 92, 98, 250, 328, 32 9

Bac Dong Ban, 34 2

Bac Vong, 293—96

Bach Ma Mountain, 10 1

Bacher, LtCol Louis J., 227—28, 531n, 573n, 574 n

Back-Up Intercept Computer (BUIC—2), 46 8

Bagley, Capt Thomas B ., Jr., 646 p

Baig, Capt Mirza M., 268n, 270, 273, 477, 477 n

Baird, Charles F., 578n

Balanco, Sgt John J., 263—64, 264p, 277n, 627 n

Baldwin, Col Daniel L ., III, USA, 27 6

Baltimore Sun, 326n

Balzer, LtCol George T., 533 n

Ban Houaysan, 27 3

Ban Me Thuot, 14 9

Banks, Capt Henry D., 313—14, 368, 368 n

Banks, SSgt Leroy J ., 643—4 4

Bao An Dong, 92, 9 5

Bao Dai, 6

Barnard, LtCol Roger H ., 329, 331—34, 346 ; Col, 330 n

Barr, LtCol John E, Jr., 90n, 99p, 195, 536; Col 166 n

Barrier, 21, 21p, 22, 24, 26, 27p, 28—29, 37—38, 40—41, 46 ,

127, 231, 241, 246, 311, 588, 652, 65 4

Barrier Island, 638, 638p, 63 9

Barrow, Col Robert H., 363, 365-66, 396, 398-99, 401 ,

403-404, 404n, 405, 410, 450, 453-55, 530, 530n, 53 1

Barsanti, MajGen Olinto M., USA, 249, 371, 371 n

Bartlett, Capt Merrill L ., 613 ; LtCol 419n, 436n, 562, 569 n

Base Area 78, 79—80, 114, 119, 164, 166, 37 0

Base Area 101, 108—109, 230, 370, 410—11, 445, 45 5

Base Area 112, 437—39, 441—42, 448-49, 449p, 55 1

Base Area 114, 109, 163, 230, 41 0

Base Area 510, 3 5

Base Area 511, 3 5

Base Area 512, 3 5

Base Area 607, 248, 25 3

Basic Specialist Training, 561—56 2

Batangan Peninsula, 84, 638—3 9

Barcheller, Capt Gordon D ., 77, 169, 169n, 171, 171n, 172 ,

174n, 180; Col 73n

Batchman, LCpI Frank, 264p

Bates, LtCol William H ., 396—400, 40 3

Bau tau River, 16 0

Baxley, LtCol William J ., USA, 16 2

Bay Nha, 397

Bearden, lstLt Jimmie G., 452

Becker, Maj R.D ., USA, 608

Beckington, Col Herbert L ., 415, 419—21, 42 3

Beers, Capt Robert R ., 48 p

Ben Hai River, 18—19, 24n, 32—33, 35—36, 37n, 41, 41n ,

126—28, 242, 292, 310, 361—63, 387, 392—93, 395 ,

403-405, 444, 453, 463—64, 547n, 589 n

Ben Tre, 640

Ben to River, 3 5

Bendel!, LtCol Lee R ., 47—48, 49p, 50—52, 56, 120, 122, 124 ,

126 ; Col 42p, 122n, 124 n

Benner (DD 807), 641n

Bennett, Capt Jesse D., 344

Benskin, LtCol George H ., Jr., 63 3

Berg, LtCol Donald R ., 386, 552n, 55 6

Bexar (APA 237), 227, 57 3

Bien Hoa, 640

Bierce, Ambrose, 61 5

Binh Dinh Province, 60 1

Binh Long Province, 1 1

Black, 2dLt William R ., Jr., 248, 252, 252n, 616 n

Black, LtCol James L ., Jr., 599n ; Col 603n, 611 n

Blood, MajGen Gordon E, USA, 490, 490n, 49In, 492, 50 6

Blue Beach, 11 6

Blunk, Harold R ., 319n

Bo Dieu River, 292, 292n, 293—94, 29 7

Bo Long Valley, 7 4

Bo River, 78—79, 82, 37 1

Bobrowsky, Cpl Igor, 142, 149n, 160, 160n, 163n, 614n, 621 ,

621p, 626—2 9

Bodenweiser, 2dLt Alec J ., 273 p

Boeing Vertol Corporation, 523 n

Bohn, Col Robert D ., 92, 95, 97, 106, 110, 169—70, 179, 194 ,

197, 230, 25 0

Bohr, Capt Harper L., Jr., 64; LtCol 62n

Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31), 641 n

Bong Son, 64 7

Bonner, Col Joel E ., 469n, 474n, 475n, 483n, 487n, 498n ,

519 n

Boston (CAG 1), 641 n

Bourne, LtCol Frank L., Jr., 396, 406—1 0

Bowe, Capt John J., Jr., 199

Bowers, LrCol Gene W., 94n, 95n, 97, 151—5 2

Boyd (DD 544), 64l n

Bradley, Col Ray W., USA, 85

Brady, LtCol Byron F., 85, 619, 619n, 620, 622—23, 625—27 ,

628n, 629 n

Braestrup, Peter, 61n, 164n, 177, 190, 194, 216n, 221n, 25 6

Breckinridge, LtCol James T., 649, 651 ; Col, 651 n

Breeding, Capt Earle G ., 271—72, 274 p

Brewer, Robert, 135—36, 263n, 26 4

Bridge No . 4, 25 0

Brindley, 2dLt Thomas, D ., 70, 70 n

Bringle, VAdm William F., USN, 116, 494p

Brodrick, 2dLt Steven P., 453

Brown, lstLt Thomas. A., 30 1

Brown, Cpl Bruce, 264 p

Brown, Cpl Wayne D., 37 7

Brown, Gen George S ., USAF, 509

Brown, LtCol Joseph B ., Jr., 51 2

Brown, PFC James P., 8 1

Bru Montagnards, 58—59, 59p, 60n, 263, 264, 264n, 264p,

273, 275, 275p, 276, 276n, 277n, 455, 627 n

Bruner, Capt Robert T., 8 1

Buchanan, Cpl Richard W., 335

Bucklew, Sgt Larry K, 37 6

Buckner, Capt David N., 366p

Budd, Maj Talman C. II, 216, 223, 646p ; Col 197n, 206n ,

210 n

Bunker, Ambassador Ellsworth, 5, 221, 60 0

Bunnell, LtCol Charles F., Jr., 41 7

Burdwell, LCpI David, 273p

Burke, PFC Robert C., 334
INDEX 779

Buse, LtGen Henry W., Jr., 509—510, 510p, 511—13, 521 ,

530, 566, 57 7

Butcher, Col Warren A ., 634n, 636, 636 n

Butler, Capt James H ., 295—97

Byrne, LCpI Edward J., 597 p

C

C—1 Combat Base Area, 24, 29, 31, 40, 292, 443, 448

C—2 Combat Base Area, 27p, 28—29, 40, 44, 46, 48, 127, 292 ,

351, 357, 365, 404, 446, 449, 544, 63 5

C—2 Bridge, 393, 44 9

C—3 Combat Base Area, 24, 29, 30p, 40, 46, 48, 292—93, 357 ,

443—44 446, 44 9

C—4 Combat Base Area, 26, 29, 38, 39p, 45p, 130, 351, 363 ,

44 6

C—4 Bridge, 39 3

C-Rations, 106, 223, 281n, 413, 433, 453n, 58 4

Ca Do River, 37 6

Ca Lu, 18, 26, 28—29, 31, 53p, 54—55, 55n, 57, 64, 113, 11 9

140, 232, 241, 245—46, 249, 275p, 284, 286p, 287, 289 ,

298n, 312, 316, 317, 317p, 318, 321, 324, 326, 351—54 ,

356, 368, 396—97, 407, 409, 454, 474n, 502, 541, 589 ,

590 p

Cahill, Capt Ian J ., Australian Army, 92, 94 n

Cahill, LtCol John J.H., 313, 313n, 315, 316 n

Cai River, 437

California, 227, 557, 57 9

Calley, 1stLt William L., USA, 61 4

Cam Hung, 39 7

Cam Le Bridge, 46, 150, 376—80, 380p, 38 1

Cam Lo, 18, 24, 40, 44, 46, 64, 109, 113, 120, 138—39, 253n ,

351, 357, 391—92, 397, 446, 446p, 448, 61 2

Cam Lo Basin, 366

Cam Lo Bridge, 40, 4 8

Cam Lo District, 446, 61 2

Cam Lo Hill, 4 0

Cam Lo Refugee Resettlement Project, 35 1

Cam Lo Resettlement Village, 449, 449p, 45 1

Cam Lo River, 40, 46, 55, 120, 122, 123p, 124, 124n ,

138—39, 292n, 397, 399, 403, 61 2

Cam Lo River Valley, 18, 40, 54, 365, 39 9

Cam Phu, 298, 298n, 304, 31 1

Cam Vu, 292—9 3

Cambodia, 9, 15, 41 1

Camp Carroll, 18—19, 26, 31, 46, 54—56, 61, 64, 66, 66p, 83 ,

113, 116, 118—20, 122, 123p, 124, 125p, 126—27, 140 ,

232, 233p, 242n, 253, 253n, 352, 356—57, 363—64, 366 ,

366n, 367p, 396, 398—99, 405—406, 448, 471, 474n ,

477, 536p, 537, 539, 546, 549n, 589, 590p, 637 p

Camp Eagle, 64 1

Camp Evans, 16, 20, 57, 78—79, 79p, 80, 80n, 81—83, 83n ,

105, 109—110, 118—19, 127, 171n, 177, 193—94, 230 ,

249, 253, 265n, 289, 370, 410, 487, 489n, 519n, 533n ,

582, 584, 589, 593, 635, 641, 65 2

Camp Kistler, 351, 357, 59 3

Camp Lejeune, 57 n

Camp Love, 588

Camp Pendleton, 227, 520, 561, 569n, 573, 574 n

Camp Tiensha, 143, 56 6

Campbell, Col Hubert S ., USA, 99—100, 19 2

Campbell, 1stLt Joseph T., 345

Can Bo, 600 n

Can Tho, 640

Canberra (CAG 2), 64 0

Canley, GySgt J.L., 17 2

Cao Dai Peninsula, 16 9

Cap Batangan, 8 4

Cap Mui Lay, 359, 361, 545—48, 64 1

Cap Mui Lay Hai River, 3 4

Capital Military District, 64 7

Carango, PFC Dominick J ., 179 p

Career Marines, 564—65, 565 n

Carey, LtCol Richard E., 466, 474n, 483n, 508 ; LtGen 460n ,

468n, 474n, 483n, 485n, 489n, 511n, 517n, 518n, 524n ,

529 n

Cargile, Capt John . W., 31 4

Caribbean Sea, 55 7

Carr, Capt John D., 49p, 50—51, 56—57, 57 n

Carroll, John S ., 326 n

Caruthers, BGen Lawrence H ., Jr., USA, 54 5

Casey, Robert, 33 1

Cassedy, LtCol Logan, 588—8 9

Casselli, Cpl Henry A., 380p

Cau Do Bridge, 376—77, 38 0

Cau Do River, 88, 90, 141, 145, 150, 153, 157, 159, 162 ,

375, 380p

Cau Lau River, 92, 42 5

Cau Viet River, 29 6

Caulfield, Maj Matthew P., 25 9

CBS, 190, 190n, 206p

Census Grievance Cadre, 603 n

Central Highlands, 10—11, 19, 54 1

Central Intelligence Agency, 3, 60 3

Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), 1 0

Cercle-Sportif 164

Chaisson, BGen John R ., 27p, 162, 225, 276n, 308, 312n ,

472—73, 489, 491—92, 503, 507, 510, 510n, 518, 644 ;

LtGen 65 4

Chambers, Maj Justice M., Jr., 41 n

Champion, Capt James H ., 34 0

Chapman, LtGen Leonard F., Jr., 14,; Gen 8p, 15p, 52 ,

235—36, 236p, 308, 308n, 366n, 391, 441p, 442, 491 ,

495—97, 500, 506, 506n, 507—509, 511, 513, 515n, 519 ,

557, 569n, 574—75, 577, 62 0

Charles, 2dLt Roger, 25 2

Charlie Ridge, 158, 163, 250, 252, 384, 552 n

Chau Phong, 348—49, 375, 42 3

Chau Phong (1), 34 8

Chau Phong (2), 34 8

Che Rien Ridge, 285

Cheatham, LtCol Ernest C ., Jr., 110, 169, 170—71, 179—80 ,

182—83, 185—86, 187p, 188—91, 211—13, 219, 221—2 2

Chen, LtCol Byron T., 404, 404n, 405, 446, 448, 61 2

Chi Long Camp, 14 9

Chi, LtCol Phan Huu, 168

Chiem Son River, 328, 34 3

Chieu Hoi (Open Arms), 72n, 301, 339, 339n, 431, 598, 608 ,

610, 63 0

China Beach, 567

China Beach R&R, 577 n

China Beach Recreation Area, 56 6

Chip, BGen William C ., 403n, 638n
780 THE DEFINING YEA R

Choate, LCpI Ralph, 583p

Christmas Island, 38 0

Christmas, Capt Ronald G., 170, 180, 182, 185, 188—89, 19 1

Christy, 2dLt Kenneth L ., Jr., 56, 57 n

Chu Lai, 24—25, 84, 92, 143, 155, 162—63, 227—28, 238, 246 ,

414, 458, 460, 462p, 463, 463p, 465n, 467, 467n ,

468—70, 474, 485, 485n, 514p, 543, 546, 582n, 583 ,

586—88, 608, 614, 618, 638—3 9

Chu Lai Airbase, 459n, 465 n

Chu Lai Airfield, 156p, 46 5

Chu Lai DASC, 496

Civic Action, 596, 597p, 601, 604, 609—10, 611—14, 615 n

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), 59, 59n, 60, 377 ,

418, 542-43, 61 2

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Suppor t

(CORDS), 5, 5n, 135, 221, 239, 391, 600—601, 606 ,

608—609, 611n, 612, 619—21, 625, 625n, 63 0

Clark, GySgt Jimmie C ., 140

Clarke, Capt Bruce B .G., USA, 263, 263n, 264, 264n, 270n ;

Col 62n, 72n, 245, 261n, 277n, 44 9

Clarke, Col Thomas. W., 446

Class I (Rations), 58 5

Class II (General Supply), 58 5

Class III (Petroleum), 58 5

Class IV (Special Items), 585

Class V (Ammunition), 58 5

Cleveland (LSD 7), 63 1

Clifford, Secretary of Defense Clark, 504p, 50 6

Close Air Support, 465, 466p, 469, 473—74, 477—78, 478n ,

488, 493n, 501—502, 506n, 514, 542, 64 1

Co Ca River, 416, 430—32, 432p, 43 3

Co Dinh, 397

Co Roc Mountain, 266, 320, 320n, 355, 475n, 537, 544, 544 n

Cobb, 2dLt Paul F., 33 1

CoBi-Thanh Tan, 16, 78—79, 79p, 80—81, 86, 109

CoBi-Thanh Tan Ridge, 8 2

Cochrane (DDG 21), 641 n

Cochrane, Sgt Terry, 18 3

Cohn, LtCol William A ., 468 n

Col Co/Tan My, 230, 248, 249

Cole, LtUG) Bernard D ., USN, 266 ; Capt, 266, 266n, 268n ,

270n, 279n, 281n, 289n, 471n, 475n, 477 n

Colleton, LtCol Francis X ., 396, 398, 400, 403—40 5

Colley, SSgt C .L., 4 9

Combined Action Program (CAP), 13, 60, 85, 105, 138n, 139 ,

139n, 143, 150, 156n, 157, 160, 250, 395, 571, 571n ,

596n, 597, 597n, 599, 608n, 609, 616n, 617—19, 619n ,

620, 622, 623 623n, 625n, 626p, 627, 627n, 628—29 ,

629n

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), 622—2 3

Combined Action Group, 85, 577, 617, 619n, 620, 625—26

1st Combined Action Group, 61 8

2d Combined Action Group, 618, 62 5

3d Combined Action Group, 101n, 616, 618, 621—22 ,

623n, 626—2 7

4th Combined Action Group, 623, 623 n

Combined Action Company Oscar, 256, 261, 263, 627 n

Combined Action Company Papa , 13 8

Combined Action Platoon, 60, 76, 85, 86, 101n, 102, 110 ,

155, 159, 412, 418, 424, 577n, 597, 603n, 615n, 618 ,

620, 622—23, 625, 627—28, 628n, 629

CAP 1—3—5, 618p

CAP 2—4—3, 37 5

CAP 2—9—1, 42 4

CAP 3—2—1, 62 2

CAP A—3, 171 n

CAP B—3, 15 9

CAP D—1, 86 p

CAP D—2, 160, 16 3

CAP Delta, 614, 621 p

CAP Delta 2, 149, 14 2

CAP E—3, 146

CAP E—4, 162

CAP H—3, 25 0

CAP H—4, 102 n

CAP H—5, 101, 103—104

CAP H—6, 101, 103—104

CAP H—7, 101, 103—10 4

CAP H—8, 17 0

CAP 0—1, 263, 263n, 264n, 264p

CAP 0—2, 263, 263n, 270n, 277 n

CAP 0—3, 264

CAP Q4, 153, 15 6

CAP S—1, 98

Combined Action School, 616, 626 p

Communist Central Party Military Affairs Committee, 205 n

Communist Lao Dong Party, 6

Communist Party Central Committee, 15th Plenary Session, 9

Comstock (LSD 19), 63 1

Con River, 339, 41 8

Con Thien, 11, 18—19, 23p, 24, 26—28, 28n, 29, 31—33, 40 ,

41, 41n, 42p, 43, 43n, 44, 48, 52, 56, 74, 1 .10, 126—27 ,

234, 234p, 241, 244, 246, 258, 283, 308, 351, 357, 360 ,

363—64,365,387—89,391—95,397,398,446,449,471 ,

547

Condon, MajGen John P., 516n, 518n, 519 n

Cong Hoang Quoc Gia National Forest Reserve, 45 1

Congress, U.S .

House Armed Service Committee, 506

Conklin, LCpI Richard E ., 543

Connelly, 1stLt William C31 4

Constellation (CVA 64), 641 n

Container Delivery System, 48 0

Conway, Col John A ., 63 1

Cook, LtCol Gorton C ., 54—5 5

Cook, Maj Ernest T., 17 6

Cooksey, BGen Howard H ., USA, 514 p

Corps Tactical Zones

I Corps, 2, 4, 8, 8p, 11—13, 15n, 16—17, 19, 24, 26, 35, 40 ,

47, 61—62, 68, 84, 86, 95, 105, 107, 110, 118n, 131 ,

133, 142-44, 146—47, 147n, 149, 150, 155, 161, 164,

173, 175, 177, 194, 216, 223, 223n, 225, 227—28, 230 ,

235, 238-40, 240n, 241, 245—46, 248, 250, 254, 256 ,

268, 275, 284, 291, 349, 351—53, 372, 383, 391—92 ,

410, 411, 412p, 413, 417, 425, 443, 449, 456, 458, 465 ,

467, 469—70, 474n, 487, 489, 489n, 491—92, 493n, 494 ,

496, 497n, 500, 503, 505—506, 508n, 509—11, 513—14 ,

516, 529, 530, 537, 540—42, 544, 566n, 570, 582—83 ,

584n, 585, 585n, 586, 586n, 587, 587n, 588—89, 592 ,

594, 597, 601, 603—10, 614, 625, 625n, 630, 635, 639 ,

640—41, 641n, 644, 647, 652—5 4

I Corps Advisory Groups, 644
INDEX 781

I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, 13, 59 9

II Corps, 4, 84, 107, 149, 413, 601, 606-607, 640-41, 64 7

III Corps, 4, 16, 411, 411n, 412p, 413, 601, 606, 64 7

IV Corps, 4, 601, 640, 642, 647, 65 1

Corson, LtCol William R., 596n, 603n, 617–19, 619n, 62 8

Cos Co Causeway, 58 6

Cosmas, Dr. Graham A ., 5n, 240n, 473n, 495n, 506n

Costello, LCpI Arthur, 37 6

Crachin, 58, 61—63, 66, 477—78

Craigle, Capt John W., 82

Craven, Frank (See also Hassan, Abullah), 122, 122 n

Craven, Capt John H ., USN (Chaplain), 599

Criminal Investigation Division, 56 5

Cronkite, Walter, 206 p

Cross, C.T., 608

Crowder, LCpI Hylan L ., 376

Cryan, LtCol William M., 46, 54, 138 ; Col 311 n

Cu Ban, 336, 341, 347, 41 8

Cu Ban (3), 340

Cu Ban (4), 33 4

Cu De River, 89–90, 14 5

Cu De Valley, 34 6

Cu Do River, 382, 424

Cua Dai River, 63 8

Cua Valley, 357, 396, 406, 44 9

Cua Viet, 23, 26, 37–38, 40, 117p, 118, 134p, 232, 232n ,

241n, 242, 253, 294n, 359, 443, 453, 455, 572, 592 ,

631, 636n, 638

Cua Viet Base, 242–43

Cua Viet Fuel Farm, 59 3

Cua Viet Naval Facility, 18, 113p, 232, 59 2

Cua Viet Naval Support Activity, 12 8

Cua Viet Port Facility, 37, 37p, 38, 113, 115—16, 127, 291 ,

351, 395, 586—8 7

Cua Viet River, 16, 18, 57, 113, 113p, 115–16, 127–28 ,

130–31, 133, 133p, 137, 140, 231, 231p, 232n, 235 ,

242-443, 243p, 291-92, 292n, 293-95, 306, 309-310 ,

351, 357, 361, 363, 386-88, 390-91, 393-94, 405 ,

445-46, 449, 539, 582n, 583, 587, 593, 635 n

Cuenin, Col Walter H., 316

Cushman, LtGen Robert E ., Jr., 2, 2p, 3—5, 8, 8p, 13—14, 15n ,

16–17, 17n, 19–20, 20p, 25–26, 26p, 27, 27p, 28–29 ,

31, 35, 64, 66, 67—69, 80, 84—85, 91, 107—109, 111 ,

116, 118, 126–27, 131, 142, 161–62, 175–77, 194 ,

206–207, 221, 223, 225, 225n, 227, 231, 235–40, 240n ,

241, 241n, 246, 251, 256, 258, 275–76, 276n, 283, 287 ,

308, 308n, 312, 312n, 338, 356, 361n, 374—75, 381 ,

388, 388n, 391, 411, 414, 419, 436, 439, 443-444, 448 ,

473, 480, 483, 487—88, 488p, 489—91, 491n, 492 ,

494—96, 500—503, 505, 507—508, 511, 513p, 514, 517n ,

518, 527, 530—31, 540—41, 541n, 542—43, 545, 575 ,

579, 584, 585n, 587, 599, 608, 608n, 609, 614—15, 617 ,

619—20, 622, 625, 626n, 634, 635, 635n, 636, 638, 65 2

D

Da Krong River, 407p, 40 8

Da Krong Valley, 409, 454—5 5

Da Nang, 2, 7–8, 8p, 12, 15n, 17–19, 21p, 25, 38, 73, 84–86 ,

85p, 86n, 86p, 87—88, 89p, 90, 90n, 91—92, 93p, 94, 9 7

99, 99p, 100–101, 105–109, 111, 140-447, 148n, 149 ,

149n, 153—56, 158—59, 161—63, 163n, 164, 174n,

175—76, 185, 200, 206, 221, 225, 227—28, 228p, 229,

229n, 230—31, 231p, 235p, 246p, 247—50, 251, 251p ,

252, 275, 276n, 283, 310, 328, 329p, 336, 338 ,

343-44, 347, 347n, 348-449, 359p, 370, 373, 373n ,

374-75, 375p, 376-78, 380-84, 388, 390, 390n, 391 ,

413-14, 414n, 416p, 417p, 418, 424-26, 437, 439, 442 ,

448, 458—59, 459n, 460, 463p, 467—68, 468n, 469 ,

469n, 470, 489, 491—92, 493n, 504—505, 520, 522p ,

524, 529, 531n, 533n, 534p, 537, 538n, 541-43, 546 ,

551—52, 552n, 553, 566—67, 567p, 569n, 573—74, 574n ,

576, 578n, 582—83, 583p, 584, 584p, 585n, 586,

588-89, 591p, 592-94, 596, 597p, 603-608, 612, 614 ,

617-21, 636, 638-39, 642, 644, 65 2

Da Nang Airbase, 8, 87, 89—90, 145p, 148, 155, 161, 237 ,

333, 376, 417, 424—25, 459p, 465n, 470p, 53 3

Da Nang Airfield, 90, 97, 144, 465, 465n, 465 p

Da Nang Ammunition Supply Point, 54 6

Da Nang Anti-infiltration System (Barrier), 347, 59 1

Da Nang Bridge, 14 5

Da Nang City, 91, 144, 146, 153—54, 157, 373, 378 n

Da Nang Direct Air Support Center, 489 n

Da Nang East, 15 7

Da Nang Rocket Belt, 90, 59 1

Da Nang Vital Area, 89, 141, 162, 248, 348, 53 3

Da Nang-Hue Railroad, 607

Da The Mountain, 342p, 34 3

Dabney, Capt William H ., 70, 266, 268, 477, 485 ; Maj 298 ,

528 ; Col 261n, 268n, 269n, 277n, 279n, 283n, 287, 289 ,

311n, 32 0

Dai Do, 254, 293-94, 296-98, 298n, 299, 299p, 300-303 ,

303n, 304—305, 308—11, 65 4

Dai Do Village, 254, 446, 54 1

Dai La Pass, 41 7

Dai Loc, 91, 158, 328, 344, 375, 42 6

Dai Loc Corridor, 84, 9 0

Dai Loc District, 8 7

Dak To, 1 1

Dam Cau Hai, 10 1

Damewood, LtCol Walter W., Jr., 38n, 445–46, 446 n

Danowitz, Col Edward E, 618p, 626, 626n, 626 p

Dao Xuyen, 389

Darewski, HM3 Edward E ., USN, 132 p

Davidson, BGen Philip B., USA, 67, 149 ; LtGen 17n, 69n, 256 n

Davis, Maj Charles E ., III, 28 2

Davis, Cpl Gilbert J ., 620p

Davis, LtCol Jack W., 143n, 352, 361, 396—97, 398—99, 404 n

Davis, BGen Oscar E ., USA, 207, 22 3

Davis, MajGen Raymond G., 239p, 240, 307p, 308, 308n ,

309—11, 311n, 321, 321n, 321p, 324n, 351—53, 356 ,

359, 363—64, 365n, 366n, 385—86, 388, 390, 392, 399 ,

403, 408p, 439, 449, 516, 521, 522n, 527–28, 528n ,

529, 530, 530n, 531, 548, 555, 559, 577n, 589, 612 ,

623, 65 4

Davis, LtCol William J., 98, 142, 362, 449—5 0

Davis, Col William J., 91n, 566 n

Deasy, Col Rex A ., 514p

Delaurier, lstLt Andrew C ., 200

Demilitarized Zone, 2–3, 11–13, 15–23, 23p, 25, 27, 29 ,

32—34, 36, 37n, 37p, 38, 40—41, 43, 47-448, 50—52, 54 ,

56–57, 67, 78, 80, 83, 86, 107, 113, 115–1.6, 119,

126–28, 131, 133–34, 137, 139-440, 142, 225, 227–28,
782 THE DEFINING YEA R

232, 234, 237, 241, 243, 244 46, 253—54, 283—84 ,

291—94, 297, 300, 306—308, 308n, 310—11, 336, 349 ,

351—53, 357, 359, 361, 362p, 363—65, 370, 372 ,

386—89, 392, 392p, 393, 394p, 395—98, 402p, 403—404 ,

404n, 405, 407, 414n, 423, 443-444, 446, 449, 453, 463,

471, 486, 516, 521, 527, 529, 533, 537, 539—41,

544 45, 547, 553, 576, 582—83, 585, 588, 589n, 592 ,

608, 623n, 635—36, 641, 652—5 3

Department of Defense, U .S ., 5n, 24, 495—96, 506, 509, 526 ,

559, 569n, 571, 578—79, 581, 619n, 621, 62 8

Department of the Army, U .S ., 371n, 61 4

Deptula, LtCol Edwin A ., 4 4

Destatte, Robert J., 205 n

Dick, Col William L ., 57, 78, 80, 80n, 81—82, 82n, 83, 83n ,

119, 122, 124, 124n, 397, 550 p

Diem, President Ngo Dinh, 6, 7, 21, 59, 64 5

Dien Ban, 142, 149, 158—59, 418, 424—25, 437, 63 8

Dien Ban District, 426

Dien Ban River, 88, 92

Dien Bien Phu, 6, 10, 17, 37, 65, 65n, 66, 119, 255, 289, 319,

65 3

Diller, LtCol Richard W., USA, 28 4

Dillon, lstLt John W., 282—8 3

Dillow, Col Rex O., 197n, 481n, 582, 583n, 584n, 585 n

Dinh To, 294, 302—30 3

Dinh, lstLt Nguyen Van, 7 7

Direct Air Support, 465, 469, 47 4

Direct Air Support Center (DASC), 467, 470, 474, 474n, 478 ,

483n, 492, 502

District Intelligence Operational Coordinating Committe e

(DIOCC), 603 n

District Operations and Intelligence Center (DOIC), 86

Do Xa, 65 2

Do Xa Base, 16, 10 7

Doc Kin, 61 2

Dockendorff, Capt Gary D ., 36 1

Dodge City, 46, 344—46, 381, 414—15, 425, 427, 429—30 ,

436, 438, 63 8

Dominican Crisis, 1965, 20

Donaghy, LtCol Richard E ., 475n, 477n, 486 n

Donald, LtCol William A., 45 2

Dong Ba Bridge, 19 9

Dong Ba Tower, 195, 200—201, 20 4

Dong Be Lao, 39 3

Dong Ca Lu Mountain, 368, 407, 41 0

Dong Ha, 14, 16, 18—19, 24, 26, 33—34, 34n, 37n, 38, 40—41 ,

47n, 52, 57, 61, 69, 73, 79, 83—84, 113, 113p, 116, 119 ,

127, 130, 139, 171—72, 172n, 176, 232, 235, 237, 237n ,

241, 245—46, 253, 253n, 254, 281, 284, 287n, 291—93 ,

293p, 298—99, 306—309, 323, 336, 351—52, 357 ,

359—60, 363, 368, 370, 390—91, 395, 410, 448, 463 ,

469, 474n, 483, 485, 485n, 490, 541, 541n, 545—46 ,

553, 555, 582—85, 587—89, 592—93, 594p, 607, 641, 65 4

Dong Ha Airfield, 25, 23 4

Dong Ha Ammunition Dump, 36 0

Dong Ha Ammunition Supply Point, 25, 59 3

Dong Ha Base, 24—25, 235, 291 p

Dong Ha Bridge, 293, 293 n

Dong Ha Direct Air Support Center (DASC), 517 n

Dong Ha LCU Ramp, 113p, 231p, 232, 294, 582 n

Dong Ha Medical Facility, 613

Dong Ha Mountain, 22—23, 364—66, 368, 396—97, 399, 448 ,

45 2

Dong Ha River, 29 2

Dong Ha/Cua Viet Security Group, 58 7

Dong Hoi, 3 5

Dong Huan, 293, 295—30 1

Dong Khe Soc, 40 0

Dong Kio Mountain, 397

Dong Lai, 297, 302, 304

Dong Lien, 38 1

Dong Ma Mountain, 36 4

Dong Ong Cay, 404—40 5

Dong Pa Thien, 41 0

Dong River, 582 n

Dong Tri Mountain, 25 8

Dong Truoi Mountain, 41 3

Dong Voi Mep, 6 0

Downey, lstLt Philip D ., 554

Downs, Capt Michael P., 169, 171, 176, 185, 213 ; BGe n

177n, 180n, 183, 185n, 188n, 189, 190n, 211n, 21 9

Doyle, 2dLt Albert B ., 5 0

Drez, Capt Robert J., 433—35, 436 n

Drug Offenses, 565—66

Dubuque (LPD 8), 638 n

Duc Pho, 17, 84, 228, 639

Duel Blade, 443—44, 446, 589n (See also barrier)

DuGuid, James, 101, 627, 627n, 62 8

Duluth (LPD 6), 639 n

Duncan, CWO Stuart D., 143

Duncan, LtCol Billy R ., 43—44, 318, 353n ; Col 326n

Duong Lam (1), 15 9

Duong Son, 162, 379

Duy Xuyen, 15 8

Dwyer, BGen Ross T., Jr., 356, 363, 368, 387, 437—40, 441p ,

442

Dwyer, Capt Joseph M ., 45 3

Dyemarker, 24n, 25—28, 28n, 29, 31, 44, 54—55, 231, 241 ,

255, 292, 310, 311n, 360, 443, 546, 548 (See also barrier)

E

Eades, LCpI Lawrence M., 138

Eberhardtt, lstLt William L., 260

Edward, LtCol Roy J ., 636

Ehrhart, Cpl William D ., 119, 216n, 596n, 597n, 599 n

Elephant Valley, 346, 382, 390n, 63 6

Eller, LCpI John A., 377, 377n, 380

Emmons, PFC Michael A ., 43 5

Enlisted Commissioning Program, 562, 563 n

Enthoven, Dr. Alain C., 580

Eshelman, Maj William P., 209p, 64 9

Esso Gasoline Depot, 417, 607

Estimate of the Enemy Situation, DMZ Area, Vietnam, 1 January

1968, 3 6

F

Fagan, LtCol William S ., 248, 33 9

Fante, Cpl Robert G ., 347—4 8

Farmer, Capt Martin T., 340

Feeley, BGen James A ., Jr., 59 4

Ferguson, Eugene H., 626—2 8

Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer, 537, 540n
INDEX 78 3

Findlay, Maj Raymond E, Jr., 47n, 48p, 139 Frattarelli, Sgt Richard G ., 643

Fire Support Bases French Indochina, 6

Alpine, 410, 450-51 Fromme, 2dLt Harry F., 70, 70n

Anne, 453 Fulton, Col Samuel J ., 460n

Argonne, 450-51 Funderburk, LtCol Ray, 58 8

Baldy, 10 0

Barnett, 549 G

Ca Lu, 551 Gai Le, 20 4

Cates, 368, 368n, 396, 407, 450, 551 Galbraith, LtCol Thomas H ., 368, 368n, 369, 396, 406-407 ,

Colt, 100 409, 413, 450; Col 386n, 396, 398n, 403-404, 404n ,

Dick, 455 406-407, 409, 413, 45 0

Gurkha, 410, 450-51 Gambardella, LtCol Joseph J.N., 378, 378n, 380, 566 n

Hawk, 356 Garcia, 1stLt Louis, 646 p

Henderson, 397 Garretson, BGen Frank E ., 408p, 409, 45 0

Holcomb, 396-97 Gelling, Col Louis, USA, 100, 16 2

Joan, 396 General Officers' Synposium, 565-6 7

Lance, 439-40, 440p, 441, 513p Geneva Accords, 6, 65n, 18 0

Leslie, 100 Geneva Agreement, 180n, 344n, 640 n

Mace, 441 Gentile, LtCol Vincent J., 90n

Margo, 396 Gentry, Col Tolbert T., 45 8

Neville, 451 Gerrish, Allan R ., 380

Pike, 439, 441p, 442n Gia Dang, 44 5

Ross, 99-100 Gia Dinh, 651 p

Russell, 451-52 Gia Dinh Sector, 647, 649

Sandy, 400 Gia Hai, 38

Sharon, 445 Gia Hoi, 21 1

Shepherd, 356, 368, 368n, 396, 408, 450 Gia Le, 194, 204

Shiloh, 455, 549, 551 Gia River Valley, 25 1

Shoup, 370 Giai, Maj Vu Van, ARVN, 40 ; LtCol 292, 387, 39 2

Spear, 441 Giang River, 7 3

Stormy, 409 Giap, Gen Vo Nguyen, 10-1 1

Tombstone, 445 Gibson, Col James M., USA, 443-4 5

Torch, 355 Gio Linh, 11, 18-19, 24, 30p, 31, 33, 40-41, 41.n, 47-48,

Tun Tavern, 454 137, 140, 241, 244, 246, 284, 306, 308, 351, 387, 391 ,

Vandegrift, 368, 369p, 370, 396-98, 403, 403n, 406, 393-95, 448

408-410, 413, 451, 454, 589, 594p Gio Linh District, 21 3

Winchester, 403-404, 406, 451 Glick, BGen Jacob E., 83, 236, 236p, 237, 245, 313-14 ,

Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), 468, 476, 477n, 314n, 315-17, 320, 543, 631, 633, 633n, 638n

489n, 536n, 540, 540n, 54 1

Fire Support Information Center (FSIC), 540, 540n, 541, 54 7

"Firewatch System, " 54 7

Fitzgerald, Maj Ernest T., 335 p

Flager, Capt Ralph H., 285

Flight School, 56 9

Fontenot, LtCol Karl J., 136n, 172n, 253 n

Forsythe, MajGen George, USA, 411, 509p, 60 0

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 37 1

Fort Carson, Colorado, 390, 57 8

Fort Marion (LSD 22), 639 n

Fort Rucker, Alabama, 57 0

Forward Operating Base 3, 60, 60n, 61n, 256, 263-64, 264p ,

270n, 271p, 276, 277 n

Fossum, Col Edward L ., 509

Foster, Capt James F., 430, 433-3 6

Fowler, Maj James L ., 410, 450-5 1

Fox, LtCol George C., 455

Foxtrot Ridge, 452p, 45 3

Fragging, 566, 566 n

Franciso, PFC Pedro L .G., 376-7 7

Frank E. Evans (DD 754), 640

Frank, Capt Donald . R., 139-40

Glikes, Col Richard J., 390-94

Go Noi Island, 91-92, 93p, 95, 95n, 97, 142-44, 159, 163 ,

250, 252, 328-29, 329p, 330, 330p, 331, 334, 336 ,

338-40, 341, 342, 342p, 343, 344, 348, 375, 381-82 ,

382p, 383, 384n, 426, 414, 418, 423, 441, 520n, 542 ,

554, 591, 594, 638, 64 6

Golden Throne, 166 p

Gonzalez, Sgt Alfredo, 172, 180

Goodale, LtCol Richard W., 74-76, 11 8

Goodiel, LtCol Carlton D ., Jr., 639-40, 64 2

Gound, Capt Lee C ., 152

Graham, Col Paul G ., 163n, 347, 372, 375, 383 ; BGen 91n ,

106n, 207n, 221n

Gravel, LtCol Marcus J., 74, 118-19, 169, 171, 171n, 172 ,

172n, 173-74, 174n, 175-76, 176n, 178-80, 182p ,

185-86, 188-90, 216, 221, 22 2

Gray, Maj Alfred M., Jr., 60; LtCol 63, 40 0

Great Society, 596 n

Greene, Gen Wallace M ., Jr., 5n, 12, 12n, 14, 24-25, 472p ,

562, 597n, 601, 61 9

Greenway, H .D.S, 206 n

Greenwood, LtCol John E., 227, 339, 340-41, 62 3

Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES), 48 1
784 THE DEFINING YEA R

Guadalcanal, 2 0

Guam, 65, 271p, 471, 55 7

Gulf of Tonkin, 292n, 46 8

Gundersen, John . L., 15 1

Gurkhas, 339 n

H

Ha Loc, 128

Ha Loi Toi, 3 8

Ha Loi Trung, 39 5

Ha Nong Tay (2), 38 1

Ha Thanh, 448

Hagaman, BGen Harry T., 497 n

Hai Lang, 230, 58 5

Hai Lang District, 411, 444

Hai Lang Forest Preserve, 73, 11 8

Hai Lang Road, 58 5

Hai Le, 77—7 8

Hai Phu, 77

Hai Van, 641 n

Hai Van Pass, 16, 88, 101—103, 107—108, 110, 147, 149 ,

153-54, 157, 169, 171, 230, 239—40, 372, 413-14, 467,

496, 511, 536, 582-84, 593

Hainsworth, Capt John J., 649 ; LtCol, 647n, 649 n

Haiphong, 12, 22 7

Haiti, 596 n

Hall, Col Reverdy M ., 330, 330n, 331, 333, 336, 338, 344 n

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 597, 603, 606, 609, 628 ,

63 0

Hammond, LtCol Lyman H ., Jr., USA, 16 2

Han River, 89

Hancock, Capt David, 74—7 6

Hanh, LtCol Nguyen Huu, 13 3

Hanoi, 10, 143, 227, 25 4

Hansen, Col John E., 315n, 458, 52 6

Happy Valley, 163, 247—48, 250, 252, 339, 339n, 344, 34 6

Harper, Sgt Ronald W., 642—4 4

Harper, Sgt Roy, 263

Harrell, Maj James T., III, 4 3

Harriman, Ambassador Averill W., 387

Harrington, Capt Myron C ., 200—201 ; Col 201 n

Harrison, Maj James L., 636 n

Harshman, 1stLt Richard L., 7 4

Harvey, LCpl Tom, 62 8

Hassan, Abdullah, 122n (See also Craven, Frank)

Hatch, LCdr Philip B., Jr., USN, 639, 64 1

Hawaii, 5n, 36, 111, 492, 493n, 509, 557, 567, 573, 579, 63 1

Hayden, lstLt Michael P., 31 3

Hayward, LtCol George E ., 443

Healy, Cpl Richard J., 6 8

Heath, LtCol Francis J., Jr., 69, 351, 363, 364

Hecker, LtCol James C ., 106

Helicopter Valley, 365, 397, 39 9

Helms, CIA Director Richard, 65 p

Hempel, Capt Edward S ., 13 0

Henderson, PFC Murray C ., 286 p

Hendricks, LtCol Clayton V., 339, 536—37, 55 3

Henen, Col John. E., 528p

Hennelly, LtCol John A ., 258, 258n, 260, 273, 275n, 538n ,

539n ; Col 279n

Henry B. Wilson (DDG 7), 641n

Herman, LtCol Stanley A ., 467

Hieu Duc District, 98, 100, 142, 15 9

Highway 547, 10 7

Hill 10, 98, 143, 148, 159, 535 n

Hill 22, 9 1

Hill 28, 40, 47—52, 52n, 56, 24 4

Hill 43, 9 8

Hill 51, 78—8 2

Hill 52, 155, 158, 346, 419, 419n, 422

Hill 55, 97—98, 155, 157, 159, 251, 417, 419, 423, 533n, 59 4

Hill 56, 388—89

Hill 65, 155, 419, 42 2

Hill 138, 16 6

Hill 162, 39 8

Hill 200, 14 6

Hill 208, 45 2

Hill 244, 14 6

Hill 327 (Division Ridge), 47, 89, 14 6

Hill 347, 45 5

Hill 375, 44 1

Hill 385, 396

Hill 471, 282, 41 0

Hill 476, 26 3

Hill 503, 409

Hill 505, 406

Hill 512, 45 4

Hill 549, 408

Hill 552, 286, 318, 41 0

Hill 558, 69, 271, 285, 316, 355, 440

Hill 575, 43 9

Hill 606, 369—70

Hill 618, 45 5

Hill 632, 41 0

Hill 665, 41 0

Hill 674, 78—8 0

Hill 679, 369, 40 6

Hill 689, 258, 287, 313—14, 315n, 318, 326, 368, 41 0

Hill 691, 45 0

Hill 715, 368—69

Hill 738, 54 2

Hill 861, 60, 62, 64, 72, 256, 258—60, 271, 273, 285, 31 .6 ,

35 2

Hill 861A, 271—73, 273p, 274p, 278, 538, 538 n

Hill 869, 259 p

Hill 881 North, 60, 64, 69—72, 259, 287, 289, 352, 409-441 0

Hill 881 South, 60, 62—63, 63p, 64, 68, 70—72, 255—56, 259 ,

261, 266, 267p, 268n, 270, 287, 289, 316, 352 ,

409—410, 477, 483, 48 5

Hill 950, 60n, 64, 256, 258, 316, 352, 450, 539p

Hill 1015, 258, 31 7

Hill 1062, 344

Hill 1103, 45 1

Hill 1235, 344, 346

Hill 1308, 45 0

Hill Battles (Khe Sanh), 60, 60n, 61—62, 62 n

Hill, BGen Homer D., 353, 524, 529, 529p, 530

Hill, LtCol Twyman R., 146—47, 147n, 344—45, 41 4

Himmer, Capt Lawrence, 314—1 5

Hinh, Col Nguyen Duy, 85, 14 6

Hise, BGen Henry W., 485, 487, 500, 500n, 521, 530, 530 n

Hittinger, LtCol Francis R., Jr., 619
INDEX 785

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 6, 9, 35, 61n, 64, 67, 254—55, 255n, 281 ,

323, 54 2

Hoa Vang, 146-47, 150, 162, 378 p

Hoa Vang City, 15 7

Hoa Yang District Headquarters, 378, 38 0

Hoa, LtCol Phan Ba, 10 6

Hochmuth, MajGen Bruno A ., 20, 20n, 2 8

Hoffman, BGen Carl W., 237, 237p, 240-41, 316—17, 324n,

326n, 352, 354, 366, 368, 403n, 437n, 544n, 549n ; MajGen 56 7

Hoi An, 16, 84, 85p, 86, 86n, 98, 141p, 142, 149, 154, 160, 163 ,

344, 375, 417, 425—26, 437, 537, 636, 638, 638p, 640

Hoi An River, 8 4

Hoi Chanhs (ralliers) 431, 598, 610, 63 0

Holiday, PFC John . E., 201

Hon Coc Mountain, 375, 55 4

Honolulu, 491—92, 501, 505, 511—12, 519, 60 1

Honolulu Conference, 1966, 599, 600 n

"Hook," the, 432, 432p, 433

Hope, Bob, 567 p

Hopkins, Maj John I ., 4 4

Hopkins, Maj Joseph E ., 450, 452—5 3

Horseshoe, The, 427—29, 429p, 43 0

Hott, LCpI Stephen D ., 376—7 7

Houng Hoa, 41 0

Hue, 16—18, 23, 78n, 106-108, 155, 163n, 164, 164n, 168—71 ,

171n, 172n, 173p, 175—76, 177n, 179, 179p, 180 ,

185—86, 187p, 188n, 191—92, 194, 195p, 198, 200—201 ,

205, 205n, 207, 213—14, 214p, 215p, 216, 216n, 217p,

219, 220p, 222—23, 225, 229n, 232n, 241, 249, 252, 258 ,

284, 321, 323, 392, 408, 412—13, 455, 490, 517, 517n,

537, 537n, 572, 582, 582n, 583, 585, 587, 589, 592—93 ,

604—609, 625, 640, 641, 649, 649n, 65 3

Hue Citadel, 164, 166, 166n, 166p, 167, 167p, 168, 173—76,

178p, 187p, 191—92, 192n, 194—95, 195p, 197—98, 198p ,

199, 199n, 200, 200p, 201, 202p, 203, 203p, 204, 204n ,

205, 205n, 206, 206n, 207, 207n, 208p, 209p, 210—11 ,

213, 216, 217p, 219, 220p, 223, 640, 649, 650, 65 3

Zone A, 204n

Zone B, 204n

Zone C, 204n

Zone D, 204n

Zone E, 204n

Zone F, 204 n

Hue Citadel Flag Tower, 168, 21 0

Hue City (CG 66), 190n

Hue Hospital, 18 8

Hue LCU (landing craft, utility) Ramp, 168—69, 171—72, 176 ,

174, 198, 200 204, 216, 230, 582, 582n, 59 3

Hue Massacres, 216 n

Hue River Security Group, 58 7

Hue University, 177, 177n, 177p, 179—80, 181p, 182, 183p ,

191, 198, 219, 221, 310, 370, 371, 605 p

Hue-Phu Bai, 25 6

Hughes, LtCol Robert C.V., 221, 316, 320n, 321, 540n, 544n ;

Col 211n, 219, 533 n

Hughes, Col Stanley S., 109—110, 169, 171, 172n, 176 ,

179-80, 183n, 186, 186n, 198—99, 249, 315n, 316, 352 ,

355, 640

Hull, Col Milton A ., 232, 242—43, 246, 254, 292, 294 ,

297—98, 301—302, 304—306, 309, 351, 357, 361

Hung, Pvt Vo Manh, 31 8

Hunnicutt, Cpl Hubert H ., 314—1 6

Hunter Airfield Georgia, 524n

Hunter, Col Clyde W., 639

Huong Hoa District, 58—59, 261n, 263, 316, 408—409, 446 ,

447p, 448-49, 612, 6 1

Huong Phuc, 407—40 8

Huong River, 106, 164 (See also Perfume River)

Huong Thuy District, 412, 45 5

Huong Vinh Region, 40 6

Hutchinson, BGen Homer G ., Jr., 504, 504p, 505, 51 3

Hyland, VAdm John J ., USN, 495, 63 5

I

Ia Drang Valley, 1 0

Iang River, 34 6

Ignatius, Secretary of the Navy Paul R ., 508—509

Imperial Museum, 166

Imperial Palace, 166p, 168, 192, 195, 201, 204, 204n, 206 ,

210, 210p, 21 1

Individual Combat Training, 561—62

Individual Replacement Policy, 569

Indochina, 6, 7, 65 n

Ing, Col Herbert E., Jr., 73—74, 78, 83, 10 9

Ingrando, LtCol Raymond B., 437, 55 1

Ink Blot Strategy, 12, 596, 596 n

Institute of Defense Analysis, 2 1

International Control Commission (ICC), 180, 180n, 640, 640 n

Irby, BGen Richard L., USA, 370n

Iverson, SSgt Robert D ., 55 8

Iwakuni, Japan, 458, 63 1

Iwo Jima (LPH 2), 287n, 303, 304n, 63 1

J

Jacobsen, Col George, USA, 64 4

Jacques, 2dLt Donald, 279—8 0

Japan, 463, 522—23, 567, 585 n

Jarman, LtCol Charles V., 303, 304n, 305—306, 361, 396, 39 8

Jason Report, 21—2 2

Jasper, Capt Norman J., Jr., 258

Jaunal, 1stSgt Jack W., 144, 15 0

Jennings, Capt Fernandez, Jr., 199, 22 3

Joan of Arc School and Church, 18 0

Johnson Administration, 225, 574 n

Johnson, Gen Harold K ., USA, 21, 496, 500

Johnson, President Lyndon B ., 12, 17, 65p, 226—27, 241n ,

254, 270, 272p, 288p, 327, 375n, 375p, 396, 423, 495 ,

548, 560n, 572, 578, 600, 619n, 65 3

Johnson, SSgt Dennis R., 8 0

Joint Action Company, 59 7

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U .S ., 5n, 12, 21, 24, 107, 227, 270, 272p ,

390n, 396, 468, 491, 495—96, 496n, 497, 500, 500n ,

506—509, 512, 514—15, 572—74, 578, 583, 63 9

Jones Creek, 128, 131, 242, 242n, 244, 292, 294, 298, 30 4

Jones, lstLt James L., 319 ; LtGen 319n

Jones, PFC James M ., 222 p

Jordan, LtCol C.E., USA, 30 6

K

Kalm, Capt Raymond W., Jr., 48, 49p, 52, 57n, 12 0

Kanone, LCpI Jerry, 436
786 THE DEFINING YEA R

Keegan, MajGen George, USAF, 6 5

Keeling, Lt Robert A ., USN, 63 9

Keller, LtCol Albert W., 101n, 102n, 34 2

Keller, LtCol Robert J., 622 ; Col 623 n

Keller, BGen Robert P., 483, 483n, 49 2

Kelly, Cpl Jeff "TJ," 139, 139n, 14 0

Kelly, LtCol John F.J., 15n, 87, 87n, 87p, 142, 15 9

Kelly, lstLt Michael J., 376—78, 38 0

Kennedy, President John E, 2 1

Kent, Capt Daniel W., 120

Kent, LtCol William L ., 409-410, 450, 555

Kerrigan, LtCol William E ., 61 3

Kerwin, MajGen Walter T., 505

Key Hole Missions, 317, 386, 556, 556n

Kham Duc Airfield, 54 2

Kham Duc Special Forces Camp, 338, 338n, 541-4 3

Khang, Gen Le Nguyen, 645, 647, 650—5 1

Khe Dienne, 34 6

Khe Gia Bridge, 12 0

Khe Giang Thoan Valley, 370, 400—40 1

Khe Gio Bridge, 396, 448, 590 p

Khe Sanh, 2, 10—13, 16—21, 21n, 23, 26, 31—32, 35, 37n ,

53p, 54, 57, 58n, 59p, 60, 60n, 61, 61n, 62—64, 64n, 65 ,

65p, 66—68, 68p, 69, 72, 80, 83, 83n, 86, 107—109, 113 ,

118, 127, 133, 136, 142, 161—62, 213, 223, 225 ,

227—28, 232, 232n, 237, 241, 241n, 245—46, 250 ,

252—55, 255n, 256, 256n, 258, 260—61, 263—64, 264p ,

265—66, 266n, 268, 268n, 269, 269n, 270, 270n, 271p ,

272p, 273, 275, 275p, 276, 276n, 277, 277n, 278—279 ,

280n, 280p, 281, 281n, 282—86, 286p, 287, 287n ,

289—91, 298, 298n, 306, 310, 312—13, 315—16, 317p ,

318—19, 321, 323—24, 324n, 325p, 326, 326n, 339 ,

351—52, 352n, 353—56, 356n, 368, 368n, 397, 407—409 ,

455, 463, 465, 467n, 468—69, 471—72, 472p, 473—74 ,

474n, 475n, 476, 476p, 477n, 478, 478n, 480, 480p ,

481, 481n, 482p, 483, 483n, 484p, 485, 485n, 486—87 ,

490—91, 493n, 496, 502, 516—17, 521, 535, 537, 538n ,

539, 539n, 540, 540n, 541—42, 544, 544n, 548, 553 ,

555, 572, 582, 587n, 588, 588p, 589, 590p, 592—93 ,

608, 626, 635, 652—54

Khe Sanh Airstrip, 270, 478, 479p, 485, 529 p

Khe Sanh Area Report, 66

Khe Sanh Combat Base, 59, 62p, 69n, 255p, 584, 59 4

Khe Sanh DASC, 26 6

Khe Sanh, First Battle of, 60, 6 6

Khe Sanh Village, 58—60, 62n, 256, 261, 261n, 263—64 ,

264n, 277n, 279, 286, 410, 450, 627 n

Khe Ta Bong River, 45 1

Khe Xa Bai Valley, 410, 45 0

Kho Xa, 397

Khoa, LtCol Pham Van, 214, 22 1

Kinh Mon Trail, 364, 39 5

Kit Carson Scouts, 598, 610, 62 6

Kluckman, LtCol Wilson A ., 352, 54 4

Knapp, Maj Charles W., 303

Knight, LtCol Frederic S., 289n, 316n, 365, 365n, 396 ,

400—401, 403n ; Col 58n, 59n, 64 n

Kolakowski, Capt Henry Jr., 150—5 1

Komer, Robert W., 597, 600, 600n, 601, 604, 608, 619 ,

619n, 620, 625n, 62 8

Kontum, 149

Koren, Henry, 60 8

Koster, MajGen Samuel B ., USA, 84—85, 99, 161—62, 61 4

Kransiewski, PFC R.R., 417 p

Krohn, Capt Charles A ., 100

Krulak, LtGen Victor H . "Brute, " 4, 5n, 10n, 11—14, 15p, 19 ,

24—25, 59, 65n, 67, 111, 236, 283, 289n, 466, 490, 492 ,

494—97, 501—502, 504—506, 508-509, 519, 523n ,

572—73, 575, 577, 597n, 598, 600n, 601, 608n, 616n ,

619, 619n, 623n, 633-34, 634n, 635 n

Krusewski, Thomas, 103—104

Ky Chau, 344

Ky Lam River, 88, 90, 92, 97n, 142, 158, 250, 328, 329p ,

336, 342, 344, 381—82, 426p, 594

Ky, Vice President Nguyen Cao, 6p, 205, 604, 605, 65 0

L

L-Hour, 92

La Chu, 193

La Chu Woods, 19 3

La Thap (1), 349

La Tho River, 344, 381, 414—15, 427—28, 433, 434p, 43 6

La Vang, 77, 118, 13 3

La Vang Base, 11 9

Lacy, RAdm Paul L., USN, 58 6

Ladd, Col Jonathan E, USA, 275—7 6

LaHue, BGen Foster C., 105, 105p, 106, 110, 169, 171, 171n ,

172—74, 174n, 175—76, 194, 197—98, 205, 219, 221 ,

227, 230, 237, 248—50, 25 2

Lai An, 31 0

Lai An Road, 36 1

Laine, Col Elliot R ., Jr., 410, 454

Lam, Ha, 62 8

Lam Lo Resettlement Camp, 359

Lam Xuan, 130—31, 137—38, 295, 298—29 9

Lam Xuan East, 30 4

Lam Xuan West, 30 5

Lam, LtGen Hoang Xuan, ARVN, 7—8, 8p, 24, 84—85, 110 ,

133, 143, 143n, 146—147, 173, 175-176, 205, 239, 268 ,

269, 391, 419, 443-44, 599, 601, 609, 614, 623, 625

LaMontagne, LtCol Edward J., 171-172, 172n, 319, 363,

396—98, 401, 404, 406, 41 0

Lan, Col Bui Thi, 64 7

Landing Zones

Amy, 39 7

Becky, 366

Betty, 109, 119, 133, 135—13 6

Cates, 406, 592 p

Crow, 32 2

El Paso, 109, 11 9

Hawk, 92, 94—95, 42 0

Jane, 109, 11 9

Joan, 366

Kiwi, 42 1

Lima, 35 6

Loon, 322—23, 354—5 5

Mack, 397, 448, 451—5 2

Margo, 366, 40 3

Miami, 45 5

Mike, 35 6

Nancy, 410, 44 5

Robin, 321, 321p, 322, 355
INDEX 787

Saturn, 39 8

Sharon, 109

Sierra, 448, 45 1

Sparrow, 365, 398, 420—2 2

Stud, 284, 287, 287n, 316—17, 324n, 352, 355—57, 363 ,

368-69, 369p, 396, 544, 58 9

Torch, 323

Vulture, 42 0

Winchester, 401, 403, 403 n

Landry, PFC Edward M., 202

Lang Ho, 41 0

Lang Hole, 32 3

Lang Suat, 41 0

Lang Va, 7 6

Lang Vei, 60, 318, 327n, 48 9

Lang Vei (1), 40 9

Lang Vei (2), 40 9

Lang Vei CIDG Camp, 62, 62n, 6 3

Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, 161, 161n, 162, 256, 273, 275 ,

275p, 276, 276n, 278, 289, 538, 538n, 542, 653—5 4

Lang Vei Village, 273, 27 6

Lanigan, Col John P., 6 0

Lansdale, BGen Edward F., USAF, 2 1

Lao Dong Party, 9, 1 0

Laos, 2—3, 9, 15—16, 18, 21, 23, 32, 40, 58—59, 61n, 65, 67 ,

253, 255, 255n, 256, 268, 270n, 284, 286, 312, 321 ,

323, 327n, 354—56, 366n, 423, 442—44, 450, 456, 464 ,

474, 475n, 501, 505, 511, 542, 544, 544n, 65 3

Royal Lao Arm y

BV—33 Battalion, 268, 273, 27 6

Lauffer, Col Robert G ., 383, 390, 414, 426, 427, 427n, 427p ,

430, 43 3

Le Bac, 335p, 33 6

Le Bac (2), 33 4

Le Loi Boulevard, 164, 187—88, 19 1

Le Loi Bridge, 19 1

Le Loi Campaign, 425, 425n, 444, 630, 638 n

Le Nam (1), 331, 333—3 4

Le Nam (3), 34 9

Leahy, Maj Albert M . "Mike," 420 p

Leatherneck Square, 18, 40, 126, 292, 308, 351, 357, 359 ,

364, 389-91, 396

Leffen, 2dLt John S ., 120, 122 ; Maj 120n, 124n

Lehrack, Capt Otto J., 140 ; LtCol 41n, 47n, 52n, 139n, 231n ,

234n, 244 n

Leon, Col James, 540 n

Leroy, Capt Edward O ., 49p, 5 2

Leroy, Cathy, 17 8

Lescaze, Lee, 206, 207 n

Lewandowski, Sgt Andrew, 615n, 626—2 7

Lewis, Col Robert W., 148n, 465n, 493 n

Liberty Bridge, 97, 328—29, 329p, 330, 333—34, 339—40 ,

343-44, 347, 348, 383, 418, 425, 438, 59 3

Liberty Road, 42 3

Lien Chien, 154

Lindsay, Capt Merrill J ., 7 7

Livingston, Capt James E ., 301, 301n, 30 2

Lo Dong Valley, 33 8

Lo Giang (1), 162, 37 9

Lo Giang (5), 162—6 3

Loan, BGen Nguyen Ngoc, 648p

Loc Ninh, 1 1

Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, 60 0

Loi Giang Mountain, 55 4

Long Binh Brig, 566n

Look Magazine, 61 5

Lopez, LCpI Frank, 103—104

LoPrete, Col Joseph E ., 54, 83, 118—19, 135—36, 23 2

LOTS (Logistics Over the Shore) Facility, 585, 585 n

Lovely, 2dLt Francis B., Jr., 314

Lovingood, LtCol Howard, 56 0

Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES), 481 ,

481 n

Lowery, LCpI Henry, 37 8

Lownds, Col David E., 62, 64, 64n, 68, 69, 69n, 71-72, 255 ,

264, 265, 269—70, 270n, 271, 273, 275, 276n, 277—78 ,

280, 287n, 288p, 502

Lucas, Lt Dale W., USN, 640—4 1

Lucero, PFC Jesse T., 9 4

Luker, lstLt James Jr., 406 p

Luoi, 41 2

Luong, Capt Phan Ngoc, 16 8

M

MacFarlane, lstLt Larry S ., 646 p

MacGarrigle, George L., 97, 155n, 194n, 324 n

McBride, BGen George H ., USA, 584n

McCain, Adm John C., USN, 509, 512—13, 513 p

McConnell, Gen John P., USA, 496—97, 500, 50 6

McCutheon, BGen Keith B., 466, 475, 483n, 489, 494 ,

496—97, 500, 505—506, 508, 512n, 513, 515, 519 ,

522—23, 523n, 524, 524n, 526, 530 ; MajGen 465, 466p ,

467—68, 51 2

McDonald, HM—3 Forrest G., 358 p

McDonell, Mike, 156n

McDonough, Lt James R ., USA, 566n

McEwan, LtCol Frederick J ., 61n, 69, 256n, 282, 339, 344, 344 n

McGonigal, Father Aloysius S ., 198

McGonigal, LCdr Richard, USN, 599, 616—17, 619, 62 2

McGravey, 1stLt Daniel L ., 340

McKinnon, Col Robert N ., USA, 306

McLaughlin, Capt John L ., 124

McLaughlin, BGen John N ., 644

McMacken, Capt Raymond E ., USA, 13 8

McMahon, Col John F., 63 9

McMonagle, LtCol James J., 449

McMullen, Maj Harold J ., 104

McNamara Line, 11, 13, 360 (See also barrier)

McNamara Wall, 21, 652 (See also barrier)

McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S ., 11—12, 21, 23 ,

504p, 506, 558—59, 57 1

McNaughton, LtCol George C., 9 7

McNaughton, Col Robert J ., 9 5

McQuown, LtCol Max, 116, 118, 118n, 131, 133, 137—38 ,

232, 232n, 242, 242n, 294n, 298, 631., 631n, 633n ,

636n ; Col 128, 130, 311 n

McTiernan, Capt Matthew G ., 308—309, 311n, 362, 365—66 ,

366n, 549n, 563n

MACV Radio Facility, 17 7

Madden, Sgt Michael J., 56, 57 n

Mai Dang Village, 45 3

Mai Linh District, 74, 444
788 THE DEFINING YEA R

Mai Loc, 396, 405—406, 448, 453, 612, 613p, 63 8

Mai Loc Village, 447 p

Mai Xa Chanh, 294-97, 299, 304

Mai Xa Thi, 131, 133, 137—38, 242 n

Mai Xa Thi (West), 242—4 3

Mai Xa Thi Area, 38 8

Mai Xa Thi Village, 445

Malaya, 339n, 596 n

Malnar, SgtMaj John, 30 3

Man, MajGen Chu Huy, NVA, 9 9

Mang Ca, 164, 166—67, 176, 192, 195, 197, 199, 199n, 204 ,

204n, 207, 216, 22 3

Manila, 642

Manley (DD 940), 640

Manning, lstLt John E ., 147

Mansfield (DD 728), 640

Marble Mountain, 142—44, 147, 155, 157, 336, 458, 460,

463, 518, 520, 522p, 524, 531, 535p, 63 8

Marble Mountain Air Facility, 89, 89p, 90, 248, 373—74, 377 ,

381, 383, 417, 424—25, 459, 465 n

Marshall, Cpl James C., 644

Marijuana, 565—6 6

Marine Aviation Cadet Program (MarCad), 56 9

Marine Barracks, Washington, D .C., 366 n

Marine Boot Camp, 561, 575, 61 6

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, 563n, 574, 574n

Marine Corps Bas e

Camp Lejeune, 3, 57 1

Camp Pendleton, 3, 571, 57 6

Marine Corps Commands and Unit s

Headquarters Marine Corps, 3, 307, 465, 468, 475 ,

496—97, 500, 509, 512n, 519—20, 524n, 526, 558, 559n,

564, 566, 570—71, 575—76, 579—8 0

Career Advisory Branch, 56 3

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 11, 14, 15p, 24, 32—33, 36—37 ,

59, 466, 475n, 490, 492, 495—97, 501, 505, 507—508 ,

508n, 509—10, 510p, 511, 512n, 519, 521, 523n, 526 ,

530, 540n, 557, 573, 573n, 575, 577, 577n, 579—80 ,

597n, 598-99, 600n, 601, 609, 617, 621, 633, 634n, 639

Force Logistic Command, 2, 89, 147, 153, 156, 159, 240 ,

248, 336, 417, 424, 571, 578, 582, 583, 583p, 584 ,

584p, 585, 585p, 593—94, 597p, 61 6

1st Force Service Regiment, 58 2

Force Logistic Support Group Alpha, 110, 216, 583 ,

584—85, 594

Force Logistic Support Group Bravo, 234—35, 260, 582 ,

582n, 583—85, 593, 594p

Force Logistic Support Unit 1, 594

Force Logistic Support Unit 2, 594

III Marine Amphibious Force, 2, 4, 11, 13—14, 15n, 16, 17 ,

19—20, 20n, 22—26, 26p, 27—29, 31—32, 35, 37, 60—61 ,

63—64, 68, 80, 83—85, 85p, 87, 95, 101—102, 105 ,

107—108, 111, 116, 116n, 118, 137, 139, 142—43, 145 ,

154—55, 158—59, 161—63, 163n, 173, 175, 176n, 177 ,

193—94, 223, 225, 227, 229, 230—32, 235, 237—39 ,

239p, 240, 240n, 241, 245—46, 249—54, 261, 281, 284 ,

287, 290, 304n, 307—308, 312, 312n, 320—21, 326, 328 ,

336, 338—39, 343, 347, 349, 356, 359—60, 361n, 364 ,

373—74, 380, 383—84, 388n, 391, 411n, 414, 418, 419n ,

423, 423n, 439, 442, 443—44, 448, 458, 460, 460n ,

463—69, 470n, 473—75, 481n, 483n, 486—87, 487n, 488,

488p, 489-90, 491-93, 493n, 494-95, 498, 500-502,

504—12,514—15,515n, 516, 517n, 519, 521, 521n, 522 ,

526, 527—28, 528n, 529—30, 537, 540, 540n, 542, 545 ,

547n, 555, 566n, 569n, 571n, 572, 575n, 576—57, 577n ,

578—79, 581—83, 583n, 584, 584p, 585, 585p, 586—7,

587n, 588-89, 594, 596, 596n, 597, 597n, 599, 599n ,

601, 603n, 605, 607, 608-10, 611n, 613-14, 614n ,

615n, 616-22, 625, 625n, 626n, 629, 631, 631n ,

633-35, 635n, 636n, 638, 639n, 640-42, 65 2

brig, 566

IV Marine Expeditionary Force, 574—7 5

Security Guard Battalion (State Department)

Company C, 64 2

Staging Battalion, Camp Pendleton, 561, 571, 573, 576 ,

57 8

Task Force Bravo, 446, 449, 45 1

Task Force Glick, 31 3

Task Force Hoffman, 31 6

Task Force Hotel, 317, 319, 321, 352, 354-55, 359, 363 ,

364, 366, 368, 403, 406, 408p, 409, 450, 455, 541 ,

544, 544n, 548, 549n, 594

Task Force Kelly, 25 1

Task Force Kilo, 246, 284, 292, 378, 380—8 1

Task Force Mike, 36 3

Task Force Robbie, 253, 253n, 292—93, 293p, 29 8

Task Force X-Ray, 16, 83, 105, 105p, 106, 110, 144, 168—69 ,

169n, 171, 171n, 173, 175—76, 176n, 177, 185 ,

186n, 192n, 194—95, 197, 205, 213, 219, 221, 223 ,

229n, 230, 237, 240, 248—50, 252, 372, 388 ,

388n, 413-14, 463, 468, 536, 577, 582, 589, 636,

641n, 65 2

Task Force Yankee, 437-441, 441p, 442, 55 1

1st Field Artillery Group, 90n, 110, 166n, 194, 437 ,

535—37, 540n, 542, 55 1

1st Marine Division, 2, 8, 16, 20, 25, 83, 91, 95, 105 ,

109—110, 14447, 149—50, 154, 158, 160—63, 169, 207n ,

221, 221n, 227—29, 229n, 235, 237, 239-40, 248, 250—52 ,

328, 336, 338—41, 343, 346—48, 352, 374-75, 375p, 376 ,

383-84, 388, 391, 408p, 414, 419n, 423-25, 437n,

438-39, 439p, 449, 460, 463, 467-69, 496, 498, 516, 529 ,

533, 533n, 540n, 541—42, 551—52, 552n, 556, 571—72 ,

575—77, 582, 587-89, 591, 593, 607, 610, 612, 615, 617 ,

621, 627n, 630, 634, 636, 636n, 638, 641n, 652, 654

Headquarters Battalion, 14 6

2d Marine Division, 55 7

3d Marine Division, 2, 3, 8, 11, 13—14, 14n, 16, 17n, 20, 20p,

21, 23-24, 24n, 26, 28-29, 31-32, 37-38, 52, 60-62, 64 ,

66, 69, 72—74, 78, 80, 83—84, 105—106, 109—110, 113 ,

116, 118, 126, 126n, 127, 128, 130, 133, 136, 146, 169 ,

172, 230—31, 232, 235, 235p, 236p, 237, 237n, 237p ,

238—41, 241n, 242n, 245, 245p, 246, 252—53, 256 ,

265—66, 269—70, 271p, 276n, 284, 289, 291, 291p, 292 ,

294—95, 298, 298n, 300, 307, 307p, 308, 310—311., 311n ,

312—13, 321, 321p, 323—24, 349, 351—53, 353n, 354 ,

356-57, 359-60, 370, 385-86, 388, 391-92, 394p, 395 ,

399, 408p, 410, 414, 437n, 439, 442—43, 444n, 449 ,

455—56, 460, 463, 468—69, 476, 489n, 498, 503, 516 ,

516n, 521—22, 522n, 524, 527—28, 528p, 529, 529p, 530 ,

532, 533n, 536—37, 539—40, 540n, 541, 544146, 547n ,

548—49, 549n, 552—53, 555—56, 575—76, 577n, 580n ,

582, 587—89, 593, 598, 610, 612—14, 616, 621, 623,
INDEX 789

627n, 630, 634, 636, 636n, 638, 638n, 641, 652—5 4

3d Marine Division Memorial Children 's Hospital, 61 3

5th Marine Division, 3, 557, 572-73, 573 n

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB), 83, 236, 364 ,

573, 631, 631n, 633, 638, 638n, 63 9

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB), 2, 557, 56 9

1st Marines, 16, 18—20, 35, 40—41, 46, 57, 73, 75—76, 78 ,

83, 83n, 84—86, 88—90, 90n, 91, 105—106, 110, 118—19 ,

126—27, 141, 169, 176—77, 179, 183n, 185—86, 194 ,

198, 203, 219, 221, 230, 248—49, 284, 284n, 285—87 ,

289, 313, 315—16, 316n, 318—19, 321, 324, 326 ,

352—56, 363, 368, 375, 387—88, 388n, 390, 390n, 414n ,

425—26, 427p, 432—33, 437n, 533n, 537, 540, 540n ,

578, 589, 591, 638, 638n, 640

1st Battalion, 60, 73n, 74, 76, 83, 106, 110, 119, 168—69 ,

171, 172n, 174—76, 177n, 178, 182p, 186, 188, 190—91 ,

205, 211, 216, 216n, 219, 248-49, 284, 284n, 316, 321 ,

321p, 326, 355, 364, 368, 368n, 390, 397, 421, 427 ,

427p, 429, 433, 436, 596n

1st Battalion, Company A, 110, 169, 171—72, 172n, 173 ,

177p, 179,

180, 181p, 182, 182p, 190, 388—89

1st Battalion, Company A, 3d Platoon, 172, 18 0

1st Battalion, Company B, 110, 185, 191, 211n, 320, 388—90 ,

1st Battalion, Company C, 169, 32 2

1st Battalion, Company D, 169, 381, 390, 427, 42 8

1st Battalion, Headquarters Company, 169

2d Battalion, 40—41, 43-44, 73, 106, 110, 126, 284, 286 ,

316, 326n, 353n, 38 8

2d Battalion, Company E, 44, 320, 38 9

2d Battalion, Company F, 126, 286p, 318, 389

2d Battalion, Company G, 126, 317—18, 364, 38 9

2d Battalion, Company H, 43, 318, 363, 389

3d Battalion, Company, I, 352, 383, 388, 390n, 57 2

Battalion Landing Team 3/1, 80, 80n, 116, 117p, 118, 128 ,

129p, 130, 131, 132p, 133, 133p, 134p, 137, 232, 232n ,

242, 253, 298, 298n, 352n, 631, 632p, 633, 636, 636n

Company I, 130—31, 24 2

Company K, 127—28, 131, 132p, 137—38, 632p, 63 3

Company L, 128, 130, 633n

Company M, 131, 138, 24 2

2d Marines, 3

3d Marines, 18, 20, 20n, 29, 46, 54—55, 57, 60—61, 83 ,

119, 133, 135—36, 136n, 139, 160, 230—32, 242—43 ,

246, 293—94, 297, 299, 306, 309—10, 351, 353, 357 ,

361—64, 366, 366n, 390, 393, 396—97, 404, 406, 412 ,

439, 441p, 442-43, 448-49, 453, 456, 638

1st Battalion, 38, 46, 74, 76-77, 83, 118, 230, 242, 292 ,

298, 303, 304n, 305—306, 310, 351, 361—62, 366, 368 ,

390, 396—97, 399, 401, 404—405, 440, 448-4 9

Battalion Landing Team 1/3, 78, 63 1

1st Battalion, Company A, 38, 74, 77, 401, 44 8

1st Battalion, Company A, 2d Platoon, 7 4

1st Battalion, Company A, 3d Platoon, 7 4

1st Battalion, Company B, 75—76, 297—302, 397, 401, 44 8

1st Battalion, Company C, 38, 76—78, 113, 115, 130, 305 ,

361, 397, 401, 44 8

1st Battalion, Company D, 76, 305, 39 7

2d Battalion, 60, 90, 92, 141-42, 160, 163, 228-30 ,

248—49, 284, 286, 316—17, 319, 321, 352, 361—62, 365 ,

388, 396—97, 399p, 404-405, 446, 447p, 448-49, 612

2d Battalion, Company E, 92, 94, 95, 97, 153, 318—20 ,

401, 448—4 9

2d Battalion, Company F, 160, 319, 319n, 320, 362p, 401 ,

447p, 448-49, 612, 613 p

2d Battalion, Company F, 1st Platoon, 32 0

2d Battalion, Company F, 2d Platoon, 31 9

2d Battalion, Company F, 3d Platoon, 31 9

2d Battalion, Company G, 153, 158, 160, 162, 319—20 ,

445, 44 9

2d Battalion, Company H, 318, 446, 446p, 449, 61 2

3d Battalion, 40, 41, 46, 46n, 47, 47n, 48, 52n, 60, 139 ,

140, 292, 308—309, 351, 362, 365—66, 396—97 ,

399-400, 403, 441, 446, 448-4 9

3d Battalion, Company I, 48, 231, 234n, 244, 244n,

308—309, 365, 367p, 400, 549n, 563n

3d Battalion, Company I, 3d Platoon, 30 8

3d Battalion, Company K, 139-40, 309

3d Battalion, Company K, 1st Platoon, 13 9

3d Battalion, Company K, 2d Platoon, 13 9

3d Battalion, Company K, 3d Platoon, 13 9

3d Battalion, Company L, 139—40, 244, 244n, 448

3d Battalion, Company L, 2d Platoon, 244

3d Battalion, Company M, 41, 47, 139, 244, 244 n

4th Marines, 16, 18, 20, 40, 57, 73, 78—80, 82—83, 83n, 86 ,

107, 109, 118—19, 126, 127, 140, 245—46, 293, 305 ,

321—22, 324, 352—57, 368n, 396, 402p, 406, 409—410 ,

450, 456 1st Battalion, 40, 44, 45p, 47, 79, 292, 308—309 ,

321, 322—23, 352, 355, 368, 368n, 369, 386, 396, 398 ,

403-404, 404n, 406, 408-409, 409p, 413, 449—5 0

1st Battalion, Company A, 44, 308, 322, 45 1

1st Battalion, Company B, 44, 368—69, 451, 451 p

1st Battalion, Company C, 44, 79, 244, 322, 45 1

1st Battalion, Company D, 44, 322, 45 1

2d Battalion, 73—74, 284, 321, 322, 323, 352, 355 ,

396, 406-407, 409-410, 446, 449—50, 452—53, 592p, 63 1

Battalion Landing Team 2/4, 109—110, 110n, 127, 130, 233p ,

242, 242n, 243, 243p, 245p, 246, 254, 292—93, 293n ,

294n, 297—98, 298n, 299p, 301, 303, 304n, 304p, 305 ,

310, 352n, 369, 598p, 634n, 635, 635n, 636, 636n, 637 p

Company E, 295, 297, 300—301, 301n, 302, 30 9

Company F, 127, 294-97, 300-303, 370

Company G, 127, 295—98, 300—304, 369—7 0

Company H, 294—301, 303—304, 309

Group A, 127

Group B, 127

2d Battalion, Company E, 450—5 2

2d Battalion, Company F, 410, 449, 452p, 45 3

2d Battalion, Company G, 74, 410, 449, 45 3

2d Battalion, Company H, 449, 45 3

3d Battalion, 40, 42p, 44, 47—48, 49p, 50, 52, 56 ,

120, 122, 124, 125p, 126-27, 316, 318, 323-24 ,

325p, 406-407, 409, 410, 451—45 2

3d Battalion, Company I, 48—49, 49p, 50, 120, 122 ,

124, 305, 318, 326, 408, 44 8

3d Battalion, Company K, 49p, 51—52, 40 8

3d Battalion, Company L, 50—52, 56—57, 57n, 120, 126, 408

3d Battalion, Company L, 1st Platoon, 50, 5 6

3d Battalion, Company L, 2d Platoon, 5 6

3d Battalion, Company L, 3d Platoon, 5 6

3d Battalion, Company M, 52, 56—57, 57n, 122, 123p, 124 ,

126, 305, 408
790 THE DEFINING YEAR

3d Battalion, Company M, 3d Platoon, 12 0

5th Marines, 20, 84, 88, 90, 92, 95, 101, 105—106, 110,

170, 179, 194, 197n, 198, 207n, 230, 230n, 248—50 ,

252, 343, 347-49, 372, 375, 380—81, 383, 414, 419 ,

419n, 422p, 428p, 437—39, 441p, 551, 589, 636 1st Bat -

talion, 16, 84, 86n, 101, 103—106, 169, 194—95, 197—98 ,

198p, 199—201, 204n, 206, 207n, 208p, 210p, 211, 213 ,

219, 230n, 248-49, 346, 381, 438—39, 441, 57 2

1st Battalion, Company A, 86n, 103, 194, 197, 199 ,

208, 383, 419, 421, 57 2

1st Battalion, Company A, 2d Platoon, 20 7

1st Battalion, Company B, 169—70, 194, 197, 199—201 ,

206, 208, 208p, 22 3

1st Battalion, Company B, 3d Platoon, 197—9 8

1st Battalion, Company C, 198—201, 203p, 206, 25 0

1st Battalion, Company D, 101—104, 198—201, 206, 34 7

1st Battalion, Company D, 1st Platoon, 20 1

1st Battalion, Company F, 34 7

2d Battalion, 68, 90, 92, 95, 97—98, 106, 110, 141 ,

169—71, 178—80, 181p, 183—85, 189, 191, 198, 201n ,

205, 211, 211n, 213, 219, 222, 230n, 248, 252, 347-49 ,

383, 384n, 419—23, 423n, 427, 430, 431—33, 438—39 ,

441p, 442n, 554n, 57 2

2d Battalion, Company E, 95, 97, 347, 419, 421, 43 9

2d Battalion, Company F, 169—70, 176, 180, 180n ,

182, 185, 188, 188n, 190, 211—13, 348, 418, 44 2

2d Battalion, Company G, 95, 97, 172—73, 174n, 176 ,

180, 185, 189, 211—12, 349, 419, 421, 43 8

2d Battalion, Company G, 1st Platoon, 18 9

2d Battalion, Company H, 171, 177—78, 179p, 180 ,

180n, 182, 186p, 187p, 188, 188p, 189, 190p, 191 ,

211—12, 222p, 382—83, 434, 435—36, 44 2

3d Battalion, 90, 92, 94n, 95, 97, 106, 110, 141-42, 148 ,

150, 152, 160, 162—63, 228—30, 334—35, 339, 344—45 ,

348, 381—83, 384n, 419, 421, 422—23, 427, 431—33 ,

438—3 9

3d Battalion, Company E, 17 1

3d Battalion, Company G, 17 1

3d Battalion, Company I, 92—95, 150, 152, 16 2

3d Battalion, Company I, 1st Platoon, 151—5 2

3d Battalion, Company I, 2d Platoon, 15 2

3d Battalion, Company I, 3d Platoon, 151—5 2

3d Battalion, Company K, 160, 345, 43 9

3d Battalion, Company L, 141, 157, 208, 208 p

3d Battalion, Company M, 94, 97, 160, 160n, 161p, 382p ,

568 p

7th Marines, 88, 90, 97, 97n, 141-42, 144, 155, 157, 159 ,

163, 229, 248, 251—52, 330n, 331, 333—34, 335n, 336 ,

338, 344n, 377, 381, 414—16, 418—19, 421, 542, 572, 59 1

1st Battalion, 91, 98, 141-43, 148, 153, 248, 338—39, 344 ,

42 7

1st Battalion, Company A, 148, 328, 330—32, 379, 430 ,

433, 435—3 6

1st Battalion, Company B, 41 5

1st Battalion, Company C, 99, 142, 157—59, 229p, 43 0

1st Battalion, Company D, 155, 338 p

2d Battalion, 141, 153, 156, 248, 251p, 329, 330n, 330p,

339n, 421, 63 6

Battalion Landing Team 2/7, 342p, 343, 348—49, 372, 415 ,

416, 416p, 417, 419—20, 422, 427—30, 430p, 437, 441 ,

636, 638—39

Company E, 343, 348-49, 415, 428

Company F, 415—16, 422, 42 8

Company G, 348—49, 415—17, 427—2 9

Company H, 415—17, 427, 429—3 0

2d Battalion, Company E, 157, 328—29, 420, 57 2

2d Battalion, Company F, 46

2d Battalion, Company G, 46, 145, 153—54, 328, 331 .—32 ,

420

2d Battalion, Company H, 14 1

3d Battalion, 141, 155, 157, 159, 229, 247—48, 250, 328—29 ,

330, 330n, 334, 336, 346, 381, 414—17, 419, 423

3d Battalion, Company I, 375p, 57 2

3d Battalion, Company K, 328, 37 8

3d Battalion, Company L, 47p, 157, 414—1 5

3d Battalion, Company M, 157—58, 380—81, 41 4

9th Marines, 14n, 18, 20, 29, 34, 40—41, 41n, 46-47, 48p ,

50, 52, 54, 57, 74, 79, 119, 127, 138—39, 139n, 234 ,

244, 291—92, 308—310, 351—53, 354p, 357, 361 ,

363—66, 367p, 390, 392p, 396, 398, 403-404, 406, 409 ,

450, 453, 456, 530, 549, 551, 623, 631, 635, 635 n

1st Battalion, 28n, 79—80, 80n, 81, 83, 83n, 109, 127 ,

259p, 264, 265n, 266, 269n, 270n, 276n, 277—78, 278n ,

281n, 284, 286—87, 309—310, 313, 316, 316n, 351, 357 ,

365, 396, 398—99, 401, 403-405, 453, 455, 480—81 ,

580n, 63 5

1st Battalion, Company A, 82, 265, 278, 282, 285, 313 ,

313n, 314, 368n, 455, 48 1

1st Battalion, Company A, 1st Platoon, 277, 31 3

1st Battalion, Company A, 2d Platoon, 278, 31 3

1st Battalion, Company B, 60, 81, 278, 282, 282n, 285 ,

398, 44 5

1st Battalion, Company C, 82, 285, 313—15, 401, 48 1

1st Battalion, Company D, 80n, 81—82, 267p, 278n ,

291—93, 313—1 4

2d Battalion, 20, 40, 46, 54, 57, 83, 119, 119n, 138, 139 ,

298n, 309—310, 352, 365, 366p, 396, 399—401, 403 ,

403n, 404, 406, 410, 453, 45 5

2d Battalion, Company E, 54, 400—401, 45 5

2d Battalion, Company F, 365, 387, 40 1

2d Battalion, Company G, 389, 40 1

2d Battalion, Company H, 54—55, 119, 126, 389, 395, 40 1

3d Battalion, 53p, 54, 57, 83, 119, 293, 298, 304, 308 ,

316, 319, 324, 365, 396, 397n, 398, 401, 403—404, 406 ,

410, 45 4

3d Battalion, Company I, 55, 293, 323, 326n, 389, 396, 39 8

3d Battalion, Company K, 245, 36 5

3d Battalion, Company L, 54—55, 45 4

3d Battalion, Company M, 323, 389, 390—91, 39 8

11th Marines, 89—90, 90n, 92, 94, 99, 99p, 101, 141, 144 ,

147—48, 158—60, 339, 377, 533, 533n, 535—37, 537n ,

538n, 542, 543n, 55 1

1st Battalion, 74, 83, 110, 186, 194, 202, 211n, 320n ,

533, 533n, 535—36, 540n, 542, 544 n

1st Battalion, Battery A, 83, 533 n

1st Battalion, Battery B, 316, 533 n

1st Battalion, Battery W, 194

1st Battalion, Mortar Battery, 8 3

1st Battalion, Prov 155mm How[irzer] Battery, 533 n

2d Battalion, 92, 110, 348-49, 381, 53 6

2d Battalion, Battery E, 38 3

2d Battalion, Battery F, 160
INDEX 79 1

3d Battalion, 419, 533 n

3d Battalion, Battery G, 98, 159, 535 n

3d Battalion, Battery H, 147, 380

3d Battalion, Battery W, 42 0

4th Battalion, 542

4ch Battalion, 4 .2-inch Mortar Battery, 533 n

4th Battalion, Battery K, 154, 533 n

4th Battalion, Company L, 10 1

1st Battalion, Battery D, 10 1

12th Marines, 18, 34n, 38, 41, 47, 140, 296, 352, 398, 533 ,

533n, 535, 535n, 536, 539, 539n, 540, 540n, 541, 541n ,

542, 544, 545n, 547, 549, 549n

1st Battalion, 54, 11 9

1st Battalion, Battery B, 32 0

1st Battalion, Battery C, 32 3

1st Battalion, Battery W, 5 4

2d Battalion, 38, 40, 47, 48, 549, 55 1

2d Battalion, Battery D, 549

2d Battalion, Battery E, 397, 535, 549, 550p

2d Battalion, Battery F, 54 9

2d Battalion, Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery, 54 9

2d Battalion, Whiskey Battery, 54 9

3d Battalion, 78—79, 11 8

3d Battalion, Battery G, 45 1

4th Battalion, 545

13th Marines, 535

1st Battalion, 256, 258, 260, 266, 270, 272—73, 275, 279n ,

281—83, 285, 480, 537—38, 538n, 539n, 540n, 631 n

1st Battalion, Battery A, 34 6

1st Battalion, Battery C, 69, 256n, 260, 260n, 53 7

1st Battalion, Battery W, 538p

2d Battalion, 227, 533n, 542, 544n

2d Battalion, Battery D, 541—43, 543 n

4th Battalion, Battery K, 54 5

26th Marines, 18, 61, 61n, 62, 64-65, 69, 253, 255, 263n ,

265, 266n, 269n, 270n, 271, 273, 275, 279, 284 ,

286-87, 288p, 289, 298n, 313, 315-16, 316n, 338, 343 ,

343p, 344, 344n, 372, 413-14, 468, 471n, 475n ,

476—77, 477n, 478, 483n, 486n, 493n, 539—40, 540n ,

542, 65 2

26th Marines (Forward), 631 n

26th Marines (Rear), 631 n

1st Battalion, 61—62, 64, 257p, 263, 275n, 339—40, 344 ,

346, 351, 388, 42 4

1st Battalion, Company A, 6 3

1st Battalion, Company A, 2d Platoon, 25 5

1st Battalion, Company B, 64n, 258, 260, 260n, 269, 280 ,

280n, 282—283, 285, 340, 34 4

1st Battalion, Company B, 1st Platoon, 27 9

1st Battalion, Company B, 2d Platoon, 72, 282—8 3

1st Battalion, Company B, 3d Platoon, 279, 28 2

1st Battalion, Company D, 260, 263, 285, 34 0

2d Battalion, 69, 101, 106, 256, 285, 351, 363, 40 4

Battalion Landing Team 2/26, 364, 388, 395, 403—404 ,

430—33, 636, 638, 638p, 63 9

Company E, 43 3

Company H, 405

2d Battalion, Company E, 271—73, 274p, 357, 36 4

2d Battalion, Company E, 1st Platoon, 27 2

2d Battalion, Company F, 6 9

2d Battalion, Company F, 3d Platoon, 268

2d Battalion, Company G, 28 5

2d Battalion, Company H, 35 7

3d Battalion, 61, 71, 79—80, 256n, 259, 287, 289, 338—39 ,

339n, 344, 345p, 346, 351-52, 388, 427, 429-31 ,

433-34, 63 9

3d Battalion, Company 1, 64, 68, 70—72, 255, 256n, 259 ,

261, 266, 267p, 268, 277n, 287, 344, 433—35, 47 7

3d Battalion, Company I, 1st Platoon, 70

3d Battalion, Company I, 2d Platoon, 70—7 1

3d Battalion, Company I, 3d Platoon, 69—7 1

3d Battalion, Company K, 64, 256, 258, 260, 271, 289 ,

345, 43 4

3d Battalion, Company K, 1st Platoon, 25 8

3d Battalion, Company K, 3d Platoon, 25 9

3d Battalion, Company L, 64, 256, 344, 427—28, 434—35 ,

436n, 43 6

3d Battalion, Company L, 1st Platoon, 43 5

3d Battalion, Company L, 2d Platoon, 26 1

3d Battalion, Company M, 70—71, 25 5

3d Battalion, Headquarters and Support Company, 28 7

27th Marines, 227—28, 230, 246p, 248—49, 252, 333—34 ,

335n, 338-40, 343, 375, 375n, 377, 383, 388n, 390 ,

390n, 414, 414n, 439, 533n, 542, 573, 573n, 574,

578-79, 591, 636, 638n

Regimental Landing Team 27, 309n, 573—74, 574n, 576 ,

578—7 9

Battalion Landing Team 1/27, 573, 573n, 57 9

Company A, 573

Company B, 573

Company C, 573

Company D, 57 3

1st Battalion, 227, 248—49, 252, 339—40, 379, 380p, 383, 61 5

1st Battalion, Company A, 248, 340, 38 0

1st Battalion, Company B, 341—4 2

1st Battalion, Company C, 340, 342, 38 1

1st Battalion, Company D, 341—42, 37 9

2d Battalion, 228, 342, 380p, 383, 390n, 531n, 573 n

Battalion Landing Team 2/27, 227, 43 8

2d Battalion, Company E, 342, 37 9

2d Battalion, Company F, 342, 38 1

2d Battalion, Company G, 38 1

2d Battalion, Company H, 34 2

3d Battalion, 229, 333, 333p, 334—35, 335p, 339, 342 ,

342n, 343, 520n, 573 n

3d Battalion, Company I, 246p, 329—33, 333p, 33 4

3d Battalion, Company K, 333, 33 5

3d Battalion, Company L, 33 4

3d Battalion, Company M, 333—3 5

Battalion Landing Team 3/27, 22 7

1st Amphibian Tractor (Amtrac) Battalion, 18, 20, 29 ,

37—38, 39p, 113, 115, 130, 232, 242, 292, 351, 357 ,

358p, 390—91, 394, 443, 445—46, 580 n

Company A, 387, 445—4 6

Company B, 40, 44 6

Headquarters and Support Company, 3 8

3d Amphibian Tractor (Amtrac) Battalion, 90, 141p, 142 ,

150, 152—53, 228, 381, 38 3

Company B, 383

Headquarters and Support Company, 144, 15 0

5th Communication Battalion, 58 2

7th Communication Battalion, 145—46
792 THE DEFINING YEA R

1st Engineer Battalion, 83, 419, 588—89, 591, 591p, 59 2

Company A, 324, 58 9

Company B, 439, 58 9

Company C, 589

3d Engineer Battalion, 62, 324, 588—89, 592, 592 p

7th Engineer Battalion, 145, 588, 591—92, 61 2

9th Engineer Battalion, 588

11th Engineer Battalion, 24, 26, 28, 284, 286, 324, 407 ,

504, 588—89, 590p, 59 2

1st Medical Battalion, 587, 8 3

3d Medical Battalion, 58 7

Company C, 587n, 588 p

1st Military Police (MP) Battalion, 145—46, 150, 157, 376 ,

381, 58 2

Company B, 157, 374

Company D, 376—7 7

1st Platoon ; 377—7 8

2d Platoon, 376—7 7

3d Platoon, 376—7 7

3d Platoon,

1st Squadron, 37 6

3d Military Police (MP) Battalion, 378, 565, 566n, 582 ,

603n, 61 4

Company C, 374

1st Motor Transport Battalion, 83, 18 5

3d Motor Transport Battalion, 6 2

7th Motor Transport Battalion, 58 2

Company B, 216

1st Radio Battalion, 6 3

Sub—Unit 1, 25 1

1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 90, 144, 339, 552, 552n,

553, 554 n

Company A, 378, 38 1

Company E, 552n

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 44, 55, 76, 79—80, 118 ,

363—64, 386, 552, 552n, 555, 616—1 7

Company A, 8 1

Company B, 7 0

5th Reconnaissance Battalion ,

Company B, 552 n

1st Service Battalion, 58 2

3d Service Battalion, 582

1st Shore Party Battalion, 8 3

3d Shore Party Battalion, 32 4

Company A, 480

1st Tank Battalion, 83, 89, 90n, 141, 150, 159, 186,

376—7 7

Company A, 292

3d Tank Battalion, 171, 172n, 173p, 186, 234p, 236n ,

253n, 316 317p, 363, 389, 443, 44 6

Antitank Company, 31 6

Company A, 291, 387—88, 393, 395, 39 8

Company B, 54, 387—88, 448

3d Platoon, 31 6

Company C, 118, 395, 448

Company G

3d Platoon, 31 6

1st ANGLIC O

Sub—Unit 1, 639-40, 64 2

I Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison Team, 63 9

III Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison Team, 640

1st Armored Amphibian Company, 147, 160, 533, 53 7

2d Platoon, 53 5

1st Dental Company, 58 7

3d Dental Company, 58 7

11th Dental Company, 58 7

1st Force Reconnaissance Company, 251, 552, 552 n

3d Force Reconnaissance Company, 76, 552, 38 6

1st Hospital Company, 346, 58 7

1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery, 535, 54 0

3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery, 533, 534 p

1st Platoon, 538n, 542

1st 155mm Gun Battery, 536, 54 0

3d 155mm Gun Battery, 53 3

5th 155mm Gun Battery, 53 5

1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery, 397, 55 1

Provisional Battery Quebec, 53 7

1st Searchlight Battery, 587

1st Ground Surveillance Section, 444 n

5th Counterintelligence Team, 14 3

13th Interrogation and Translation Team, 419n, 436n, 569 n

15th Interrogation and Translation Team, 8 0

Air

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 2, 4, 48, 108, 239—40, 251, 261,

265, 276n, 311n, 360, 378, 391, 419-20, 423, 427, 433 ,

458, 458p, 463, 466, 466p, 467, 468, 470n, 472—74 ,

474n, 475, 475n, 479, 481, 483n, 485-87, 487n, 489n,

490, 492—94, 496—98, 498n, 502, 506, 508n, 509, 51Op ,

511, 514n, 515—16, 516n, 517n, 521, 521n, 523—24 ,

526, 528, 528n, 528p, 532, 545—46, 548, 570, 593, 60 8

Manning Level, 570

4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 57 5

1st MAW Communications Central (TDCC), 46 8

1st MAW Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 467, 467n ,

468-69, 469n, 470, 485n, 487, 493, 496, 498, 50 7

1st MAW Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC), 468, 471 . p

1st Light Antiarcraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion, 467, 459n ,

470p

2d Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion, 414, 459n ,

467, 467 n

Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG)

MAG—11, 148, 148p, 458—59, 497n, 514n, 64 1

MAG—12, 155, 460, 464p, 465, 497n, 498n, 514 p

MAG—13, 155, 460, 465n, 497 n

MAG—15, 631 n

MAG—16, 92, 147, 423, 460, 461p, 481, 517, 525 p

MAG—36, 70, 321, 463, 478, 481, 483n, 526

MAG—39, 315n, 321, 353, 526—27, 527n, 528p, 530, 530 n

Marine Air Control Group (MACG )

MACG—18, 458—59, 459n, 467

Marine Wing Headquarters Group (MWHG )

MWHG—1, 458, 459n

Marine Wing Service Group (MWSG)

MWSG—17, 458, 459 n

Marine Air Support Squadrons (MASS )

MASS—2, 459n, 468-69, 474n, 489 n

MASS—3, 272, 459n, 468—69, 474n, 47 7

MASS-4, 459n

Marine Air Base Squadrons (MABS )

MABS—16, 460

Marine Air Control Squadrons (MACS)
INDEX 793

MACS—4, 467—69, 471p, 517 n

Marine Attack Squadrons (VMA )

VMA—121, 46 0

VMA—211, 460, 462p

VMA—311, 324, 46 0

Marine Attack Squadrons (VMA)AW

VMA(AW)—242, 148p, 459, 464

VMA(AW)—533, 460, 462p, 464, 465 n

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadrons (VMCJ )

VMCJ-1, 148, 459, 465n, 545—48, 493, 493 n

Marine All Weather Fighter Squadrons (VMF(AW))

VMF(AW)—235, 459, 459 p

Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons (VMFA)

VMFA—115, 460, 460 n

VMFA—122, 45 9

VMFA—235, 20 0

VMFA—314, 36 0

VMFA—323, 460, 463p, 49 7

Marine Refueler Transport Squadrons (VMGR)

VMGR—152, 463, 464p, 479, 48 1

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons (H&HS )

H&HS—18, 459 n

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadrons (H&MS )

H&MS—11, 459—6 0

H&MS—16, 460

H&MS—36, 463, 47 8

Heavy Helicopter Squadrons (HMH )

HMH-364, 464

HMH—453, 52 4

HMH—462, 52 4

HMH—463, 522n, 523, 524 n

Light Helicopter Squadrons (HML )

HML—167, 520, 521 n

Medium Helicopter Squadrons (HMM)

HMM—161, 527 n

HMM—162, 532 n

HMM—163, 50, 463, 526, 527 n

HMM-164, 51, 382p, 463, 636, 636 n

HMM—165, 117p, 176, 343p, 438, 518p, 631, 636n, 637 p

HMM—262, 315, 460, 526n, 631, 631 n

HMM—263, 52 6

HMM—265, 94, 421n, 460, 523n, 636, 636 n

HMM—361, 109, 127, 532n, 63 1

HMM—362, 265, 421n, 463, 483n, 485, 517n, 521n, 636n,

637p, 639 n

HMM—363, 242, 460, 636n, 639 n

HMM—364, 438, 46 3

HMM—462, 46 3

HMM—463, 46 0

Marine Observation Squadrons (VMO)

VMO—2, 94, 460, 463, 52 0

VMO—3, 463, 52 0

VMO—6, 50, 463, 478, 483, 520, 52 6

Marine Air Traffic Control Unit (MATCU)

MATCU—62, 476p, 47 8

Marine Corps Gazette, 53 1

Marine Corps Hymn, 28 9

Marine Detachment, Advisory Team 1, 6 0

Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department)

Company E, 64 4

Marine Advisors, U .S ., 197n, 213

Marine Advisory Unit (MAU) U .S ., 645

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, 20 ,

558, 561 p

Marine Corps Reserve, 560n, 563n, 57 4

Marine Corps Schools, 3, 222, 289, 404, 532, 563p, 569, 64 5

Amphibious Warfare School, 532, 64 5

Marine Command and Staff College, 57 5

Marine Corps Strength, 557—59, 570—71, 571n, 572, 574 ,

576—79, 580n, 58 1

Marine Embassy Guard, Saigon, 642—44

Marine Enlistment, Two—year, 558—59, 58 1

Marine Enlistment, Three—year, 558

Marine House Saigon, 642—44

Marine Individual Rotation, 55 9

Marine Mustang Officers, 56 5

Marine Officer Candidate's Course, 562, 56 3

Marine Officer Retention, 564

Marine Platoon Leader's Class (Aviation), 56 9

Marine Platoon Leader's Course, 56 2

Marine Recruit Training, 561, 561p, 56 2

Marine Reenlistment Rate, 564

Marine Tables of Organization, 570, 570n, 571—72, 577 ,

577n, 579, 62 0

Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS), 468

Marine Unit Rotation, 559n, 56 9

Marine Vietnam 13—month tour, 558, 568, 569, 569 n

Marines, Short Service, 565, 565 n

"Market Place, " the, 39 2

Marsh, LtCol James W., 139, 362, 39 6

Martin, lstLt Justin M., 448, 61 2

Martin, LCpl John . M., 585 p

Matheson, BGen Salve H ., 237

Mau Chanh (2), 42 4

May Offensive (Mini-Tet), 425 n

Mazure, Francois, 17 8

Meadows, Capt Charles L., 172, 174, 185, 185n, 189, 211, 222 ;

Col 174 n

"Meat Market", 5 6

Mediterranean Sea, 55 7

Meegan, Capt George B., 435—36, 436n

Mekong Delta, 4, 88, 155, 640, 645, 65 3

Mekong River, 14 4

Mental Group I, 57 4

Mental Group II, 57 4

Mental Group IV, 559—60, 560n, 57 4

Mental Group V, 560, 560 n

Merrick (APA 97), 638 n

Metzger, BGen Lewis, 25, 29, 30p, 31, 34, 83 ; MajGen, 27 ,

41n, 44, 46n, 47n, 236p, 237, 522n, 541, 547n ; LtGe n

19n, 20n, 21n, 24n, 62n ;

Meyers, Col Bruce F., 110n, 242n, 287, 287n, 288p, 289 ,

298n, 313, 313n, 314, 314n, 315, 315n, 316n, 338 ,

339n, 344n, 351, 372, 631, 635 n

Meyers, LtCol George F., 391, 394—95, 443, 44 5

Meyerson, Joel, 583n, 585 n

Michael, Col Richard L ., Jr., 366, 396—97, 399, 64 5

Michaux, Col Alexander L ., Jr., 556, 623, 623n, 63 4

Micro Arclight, 47 8

Mientay, "The Road to the West," 3 2

Mieu Giang River, 292 n

Mike's Hill, 122, 123p, 124, 126, 140
794 THE DEFINING YEAR

Milantoni, Maj P.S ., USA, 14 7

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 4, 5, 8 ,

11—16, 17n, 20, 21n, 22—23, 25—29, 31—32, 37, 59, 60 ,

66—67, 83, 98—99, 107—109, 116, 118, 126, 131, 149 ,

154, 158, 161—62, 164, 166, 168—69, 171, 172n, 173 ,

175—76, 176n, 177n, 178—80, 186n, 190, 190n, 193—94 ,

198, 205, 207, 211n 216, 219, 221, 225, 227, 231 ,

235—36, 238, 238p, 239, 239p, 240-41, 246, 253, 256 ,

276n, 310, 312, 312n, 324, 324n, 326n, 356, 360, 364 ,

364n, 365, 387, 391, 437, 467, 471—73, 473p, 475—76 ,

486, 486n, 487, 487n, 488, 488p, 489—92, 494-496 ,

498, 500, 502, 504—509, 514—16, 519, 537, 539-40 ,

571, 577—78, 580, 583, 586, 597, 599—601, 603—604 ,

606—609, 614n, 619—21, 625, 628—630, 633—35 ,

638-41, 644—45, 651—5 2

MACV Forward, 69n, 110—11, 111n, 223, 237, 237n, 238 ,

239p, 240, 240n, 241n, 489, 490, 492, 492n, 65 3

Air Directive 95-4, 466, 473, 503, 515, 515 n

Combat Operations Center, 23, 27 p

Letter of Instruction, 6 March 1966, 1 3

Order of Battle, 60 3

Studies and Observation Group (SOG), 60n, 67, 256, 270 ,

276, 644

Tactical Air Support Element (TASE), 473, 492—93, 498 ,

505, 503, 50 7

Military Posture, Northern I Corps, 1 September 1968, 39 1

Miller, col Edward J ., 321, 352, 355—56, 368, 396, 40 6

Miller, LtCol Thomas E, 517n, 521n, 526n, 53 1

Milone, Maj Donald E ., 566, 566n, 603 n

Miner, Col Ross R ., 141, 22 9

Minh Chau, 7 6

Minh, President Ho Chi, 144, 37 3

Mini Arclight, 477, 477n, 47 8

Mini-Tet, 310, 338—39, 373n, 390n, 541, 589, 607, 61 1

Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture, 16 2

Miranda, LCpI Albert, 273 p

Mitchell, LtCol John F., 28n, 80—82, 83n, 265, 266n, 270n ,

278n, 282, 282n, 444n, 481n ; Col, 80n, 269n, 276 n

Mobile Assistance Teams, 620, 620 n

Mobile Training Platoons, 62 3

Mobile Training Teams, 620, 622, 62 5

Mohr, Charles, 206 n

Momyer, Gen William W "Spike", USAF, 3, 5, 472n, 473 ,

473p, 474, 474n, 475, 475n, 480—81, 486, 486n, 487 ,

490, 491, 491n, 492, 495, 498n, 503—504, 509, 635, 65 3

Monkey Mountain, 467, 471 p

Montagnards, 58, 59n, 59p, 60, 60n, 270n, 281, 323, 357 ,

358p, 408, 45 5

Monticello (LSD 35), 638 n

Moore, Capt William O ., Jr., 379—80, 412 p

Moore, Gen Joseph H., USAF, 467, 47 2

Moore, LtCol Ben A ., Jr., 348

Moorer, Adm Thomas H., USN, 494p, 495—96

Moran, Capt Lawrence R ., 13 0

Morocco, lstLt Pasquale J ., 641

Morris, Thomas D ., 560

Morrison, GySgt Allen, 643—44

Morrison, Wayne, 28 2

Motor Transportation Coordination Center, 594p

Mount Penn, Pa ., 615 n

MTDS Program, 468n

Mu Loc, 30 2

Mueller, LtCol Charles E ., 251p, 328, 328n, 339n, 636

Mullins, Bert, 266n, 281n, 282n, 316n

Mulroney, Col Peter J., 541 n

Munroe, SSgt James, 20 7

Muong, 60 n

Murphy, Maj Dennis J., 4 6

Murphy, Capc Richard J., 45 3

Murphy, Maj Walter D ., 171n, 174, 174 n

Murray, MajGen Raymond L ., 13, 16, 26p, 28-29, 31, 34, 85 ,

90, 144, 145n, 237—38, 599, 616, 619, 62 2

Mutter Ridge, 364—65, 368, 397, 399, 399p, 401, 403-4404

Mutter, 1stLt Clyde W., 301

My Chanh River, 7 8

My Lai, 248, 614—15, 615 n

My Loc, 115, 127—28, 130—31, 295—96, 30 2

My Loc Village, 445

My Son (1), 34 8

Myer, Capt Donald J., 446

N

Nalty, Bernard C., 474, 475n, 51 5

Nam Dong, 38 9

Nam 0, 154

Nam 0 Bridge, 153, 15 6

Nam 0 Village, 153, 156-57, 157 p

National Leadership Council, 647

National Peoples Self-Defense Committee, 606

National Priority Areas, 600

National Railroad, 340-441, 344, 348, 381, 426, 60 7

B&O, 92, 9 7

Nauschuetz, LtCol H .W., USA, 608

Naval Aviation Cadet, 56 9

Navarro (APA 215), 631 n

Navy Commands and Unit s

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), 3, 107, 466, 492 ,

501, 504p, 505—506, 509, 512—13, 531p, 583, 63 5

Pacific Fleet, 633, 63 5

Service Force, Pacific Fleet, 586

Seventh Fleet, 2, 74, 80, 109, 116, 117p, 127, 360, 459n ,

464, 468, 470, 486, 494p, 545—46, 548, 585n, 631 ,

633n, 634, 64 1

Amphibious Ready Group 635, 635n, 63 9

Amphibious Ready Group Alpha, 364, 638n, 639 n

Amphibious Ready Task Group 76 .4, 39 0

Special Landing Force, 80n, 116n, 242n, 458, 464, 572 ,

580, 633n, 634—36, 63 8

Special Landing Force Alpha, 46, 46n, 74, 78, 80, 109,

110n, 127, 130, 242, 343, 352n, 364, 631, 635, 635n ,

637p, 638, 638p, 639, 639n

Special Landing Force Bravo, 80, 116, 117p, 232, 352n ,

609p, 631, 633, 634n, 636, 637p, 638, 63 9

Task Force 76, 636, 636n

Task Force 77, 5

Task Force 79, 63 9

Task Force Group 76 .4, 631, 639 n

Task Force Group 76 .5, 636, 636 n

Task Force Group 79 .4, 110n, 635 n

Naval Forces, Vietnam, 4, 239, 58 7

Naval Advisory Group, 64 5

Task Force 116 (River Patrol Force), 587
INDEX 795

River Section, 521, 587

Task Force Clearwater, 231p, 2, 232n 253, 292, 294, 297 ,

30 7

446, 446n, 587, 587 n

3d Naval Construction Brigade, 4, 58 7

30th Naval Construction Regiment, 587

32d Naval Construction Regiment, 58 7

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5, 10, 60, 284, 58 7

Naval Support Activity, 143, 583 n

Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, 4, 239, 585—86, 587, 61 6

Hospital, 417, 42 4

Naval Support Activity, Cua Viet, 57

Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada, 574n

Naval Air Training Command, 570

Navy Airborne Tactical Data System (ATDS), 468

Navy Reserves, 22 6

Nawrosky, Capt Michael, USA, 136—3 7

Needham, LtCol Robert C., 41n, 46, 46n, 47, 47n, 48p, 55 n

Nelson, LtCol Neil A ., 427, 43 0

Nelson, lstLt Scott A., 199

New Hampshire Primary, 25 4

New Jersey (BB 62), 393, 394p, 435, 64 1

New Life Development Program, 608

New River, North Carolina, 53 2

New Standard Men, 559—60

New York Times, 206 n

New Zealand, 4

Newport News (CA 148), 640 n

Newton, LtCol Donald E., 6 1

Newton, PFC Leonard E., 70, 70n

Ngoc Ngot, 10 3

Ngog Tavak Special Forces Camp, 338, 338n, 541—43, 543 n

Nha Nhan, 19 3

Nha Trang, 149, 640

Nhan Bieu, 73—7 6

Nhi Ha, 293, 295—96, 298—99, 304—306, 309—31 1

Nhi Trung, 362

Nhu Le, 73—7 5

Nicaragua, 596 n

Nickerson, MajGen Herman, 618p ; 531, 617—1 9

Niotis, Capt John . D., 208

Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H ., 506, 506n, 509,

578—7 9

Nivatoa, Cpl Molimao, 266, 26 8

Nixon, Vice President Richard M ., 3

Nolan, Keith, 199n, 201 n

Nong Son (2), 41 6

Norman, 1stLt Marion H ., 28 3

Norodom Compound, 642—44

Norris, lstLt George C., 297

North Vietna m

Vinh, 460 n

North Vietnamese Army Commands and Unit s

7th Front, 351, 371, 45 5

B—I Front, 99

B—3 Front, 1 0

Conzmand Group 4, 439

Group 44, 87, 91, 97, 97n, 99, 143, 328, 338, 347, 373 ,

373n, 384

Demilitarized Zone Front Headquarters, 3 2

Joint Military Staff, 318

Military Region 10, 87, 99, 143, 149, 225, 338

Quang Tri Liberation Front, 35 1

Tri-Thien Region Party Committee, 205 n

Tri-Thien-Hue Front, 79, 140, 21 4

Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, 32, 64, 80, 102, 37 0

2dNVA Division, 16—17, 87, 99, 100—101, 144, 143, 144n ,

155, 159, 160, 162-63, 228, 251, 328, 329, 336, 338 ,

418, 448—49, 537, 537n, 543, 65 2

3d NVA Division, 144, 44 8

24th NVA Division, 21 3

304th NVA Division, 64, 213, 275, 281, 319, 322, 351 ,

353, 38 5

308th NVA Division, 318-20, 336, 353, 355, 38 5

312th NVA Division, 3 2

320th NVA Division, 119, 126—27, 234, 242, 253—54 ,

291—94, 298—99, 304, 306—308, 308n, 309—311, 351 ,

385—86, 393, 403, 405—406, 410, 443, 45 6

324B NVA Division, 32, 126, 128, 213, 23 4

325C NVA Division, 32, 62, 64, 72, 213, 258, 28 1

325th NVA Division, 31 9

341st NVA Division, 3 2

2d NVA Regiment, 86n, 91

155th Battalion, 32 9

3d NVA Regiment, 100, 143n, 144n, 159, 16 3

4th NVA Regiment, 86, 101—102, 105, 154, 164, 166, 168 ,

190, 213—14, 41 3

1st Battalion, 10 1

2d Battalion, 10 1

5th NVA Regiment, 33, 73, 213, 412—13, 45 5

6th NVA Regiment, 79, 86, 164, 166-67, 213, 45 5

800th Battalion, 79, 167

802d Battalion, 79—80, 166—6 7

804th Battalion, 164, 168

806th Battalion, 164

9th NVA Regiment, 32, 7 3

1st Battalion, 10 5

21st NVA Regiment, 100, 155, 159, 163, 419n, 437, 41 8

27th (Independent) NVA Regiment, 351, 392—9 3

1st Battalion, 45 3

29th NVA Regiment, 32, 57, 213, 228, 25 8

8th Battalion, 32, 64, 289, 36 8

31st NVA Regiment (Red River), 87, 91, 143, 144n, 153, 157 ,

159, 163, 338, 373, 419 n

3d Battalion, 16 3

36th NVA Regiment, 336, 373, 417, 42 4

1st Battalion, 423, 42 6

2d Battalion, 336, 416—1 7

3d Battalion, 336, 430, 43 5

38th NVA Regiment, 373, 373 n

48th NVA Regiment, 126, 242, 294, 401, 41 0

52d NVA Regiment, 242, 294, 397, 400—401, 404, 41 0

56th NVA Regiment, 12 6

64th NVA Regiment, 126, 126n, 242, 364

7th Battalion, 397

8th Battalion, 397

66th NVA Regiment, 263, 281, 28 5

1st Battalion, 408

8th Battalion, 283, 28 5

68B NVA Rocket Regiment

3d Battalion, 43 7

68th NVA Artillery Regiment
796 THE DEFINING YEA R

1st Battalion, 99

83d Engineer Regiment, 40 8

88th NVA Regiment, 318, 320, 322—23, 35 1

90th NVA Regiment, 32, 43, 47, 57, 213, 42 3

7th Battalion, 3 2

2d Company, 5 2

8th Battalion, 3 2

9th Battalion, 3 2

95C NVA Regiment, 64

4th Battalion, 258, 26 0

5th Battalion, 258

6th Battalion, 258

95th NVA Regiment, 3 2

101st NVA Regiment, 258, 277, 28 3

102d NVA Regiment, 318, 32 0

138th NVA Regiment, 363, 385, 387, 393-95, 44 3

1st Battalion, 38 7

141st NVA Regiment, 418—19, 419n, 423 n

1st Battalion, 42 0

2d Battalion, 437

202d NVA Armored Regiment, 234, 27 5

203d NVA Armored Regiment, 23 4

3d Battalion, 25 3

246th (Independent) NVA Regiment, 408, 41 0

270th (Independent) NVA Regiment, 242, 385, 351, 395, 44 3

368B NVA Artillery Regiment, 91, 99, 144

368E Rocket Regiment, 338, 344, 373, 41 8

803d NVA Regiment, 32, 43, 128, 137, 213, 223, 232, 232n ,

242, 37 0

1st Battalion, 3 2

3d Battalion, 32, 130, 13 3

812th NVA Regiment, 32, 118, 133-35, 35 1

4th Battalion, 37 1

K—4 Battalion, 13 6

K—6 Battalion, 13 6

NVA Quyet Thaig Artillery Regiment, 11 8

2d Sapper Battalion, 15 4

3d Sapper Battalion, 373 n

6th NVA Independent Battalion, 3 2

10th NVA Sapper Battalion, 13 4

27th (Independent) NVA Battalion, 139, 38 5

166th NVA Battalion, 631 n

190th NVA Battalion, 95, 9 7

311th NVA Battalion (Quang Da), 95

402d Sapper Battalion, 144, 348, 37 8

804th Main Force Battalion, 25 2

808th NVA Battalion, 73, 77, 351, 444

814th NVA Battalion, 37 1

818th Separate Battalion, 35 1

D—3 Sapper Battalion, 41 4

Hue City Sapper Battalion, 168

T—3 Sapper Battalion, 32 8

T—87 Sapper Battalion, 373 n

T—89 Battalion, 37 3

H—2 Engineering Company, 15 4

Northern Bunker Complex, 433—34, 434p

Northern Sector Defense Command (NSDC), 89, 141 ,

146—47, 156n, 157, 159, 53 3

Northwest Monsoon Campaign Plan, 1 6

Norton Air Force Base, California, 574 n

NROTC, 562

Nui Ba Lao, 401

Nui Dat Son, 423, 533 n

Nui Ke Mountain, 41 2

Nui Loc Son, 22 8

Nui Tia Pong, 401, 403

Nung, 60n, 15 8

0

O'Brien (DD 725), 641 n

O'Brien, Capt Robert J., 642—44

O'Callaghan, Col Thomas P., 573 n

O'Connor, Capt William J., 69, 256n, 260, 260 n

O'Neil, Capt Richard A., 39 8

O'Neill, Maj John E., 40 9

Oak Hill (LSD 7), 638 n

Oberforder, Don, 14 7

Office of Civil Operations, 60 0

Ogden (LPD 5), 638 n

Okinawa, 3, 60, 83, 227, 237, 464p, 522—23, 557, 579, 631 ,

631n, 633-34, 634 n

Okinawa (LPH 3), 63 9

Old French Fort, 59n, 60, 263, 286, 32 6

Olin, Maj Enos S., 639

Olson, BGen Harry C., 582, 583p, 59 4

On-The-Job Training, 56 1

Operation s

Allen Brook, 251p, 252, 252n, 328, 328n, 329, 330p, 333-35 ,

335n, 335p, 338-43, 347, 373-74, 541n, 542, 551, 59 1

Ardmore, 6 2

Auburn, 91—92, 95, 9 7

Badger Catch, 116, 116n, 128, 129p, 130, 133p, 63 6

Badger Catch/Saline, 232 n

Badger Tooth, 80, 82, 118, 631, 632p, 633, 633n, 635

Ballard, 25 1

Ballistic Armor, 635

Baxter Garden, 25 2

Bold Mariner, 63 9

Charlie, 324, 32 6

Charlton, 25 3

Checkers, 16—17, 20, 57, 68, 73, 83—84, 105, 109—110 ,

118, 126, 141, 166n, 169, 536-37, 65 2

Claxon, 87, 87 p

Comanche Falls-Lam-Son, 261, 41 1

Concordia Square, 30 6

County Fair, 13, 425, 436, 596, 597n, 598p, 612, 63 0

Cove, 7 9

Crockett, 6 1

Cumberland, 107, 249

Daring Endeavor, 638—3 9

Dawson River, 455, 549

Delaware, 253—54, 291, 312, 371, 516, 540, 540 n

Drumfire II, 320, 544, 544n

Durango City, 63 5

Eager Hunter, 63 8

Eager Yankee, 343, 63 6

El Paso, 6 7

Ford, 249

Fortress Attack, 127, 635, 635 n

Fracture Jaw, 27 0

Fremont, 78

Garrard Bay, 638
INDEX 797

Golden Fleece, 596

Granite, 78-79, 80, 82

Green, 44 5

Headshed, 54 5

Henderson Hill, 423, 438

Hickory, 24, 35 7

Highrise, 54 5

Houston, 230, 248, 252, 347, 372, 414, 63 6

Hue City, 194, 210, 211, 213, 230, 248, 540, 640, 640 n

Jasper Square, 250, 32 8

Jeb Stuart, 109, 119, 137n, 230, 249

Jeb Stuart III, 37 0

July Action, 364, 368

Kentucky, 18, 20, 37—38, 40, 46, 52, 56—57, 119n, 120 ,

127—28, 138, 232, 232n, 234—35, 241n, 242, 292 ,

307-308, 351, 357, 359, 364, 387, 389—90, 393-94 ,

396, 443, 446, 448, 449, 63 1

Kicker, 571, 57 8

Kingfisher, 38, 4 0

Lancaster, 18, 20, 37—38, 46, 52, 54, 57, 83, 118—19, 119n ,

120, 127—28, 140, 232n, 242, 253, 389—90, 39 6

Lancaster I, 5 7

Lancaster II, 57, 83, 119, 126n, 232, 233p, 234, 242, 245 ,

293, 352, 357, 359, 363, 448, 636, 63 8

Mameluke Thrust, 252, 252n, 338, 338p, 339, 343, 343p,

345-47, 349, 352, 352n, 373—74, 381, 414, 423, 542, 55 1

Marshall Mountain, 44 5

Maui Peak, 419, 420p, 422, 422p, 423, 55 1

Meade River, 425, 427, 427n, 427p, 428-30, 430p ,

431p, 434p, 436—38, 529, 638, 638n, 63 9

Medina, 73, 73 n

Minefind, 74, 7 8

Mingo, 24 9

Mixmaster, 569n, 57 9

Muscatine, 228, 24 6

Nam Hoa I, 45 5

Napoleon, 18, 20, 37—38, 39p, 40, 113, 130, 232, 29 5

Napoleon/Saline, 232, 241n, 242—43, 243p, 244, 253,

292—93, 298, 304p, 306-307, 309, 351, 357, 362—63 ,

386, 390-91, 394—96, 445, 63 6

Napoleon/Saline II, 443, 446

Neosho, 78—79, 79p, 80, 82-83, 83n, 11 0

Neosho II, 109

Neutralize, 471, 54 5

Nevada Eagle, 371, 45 5

Niagara, 65, 108, 270, 270n, 271p, 471—72, 472p ,

473-75, 477, 486-87, 490, 538, 538n

Niagara I, 6 5

Niagara II, 65, 47 4

No Name, 328, 328 n

No Name No . 2, 25 2

Osceola, 18, 57, 73—74, 78, 83, 118, 63 1

Osceola I, 11 8

Osceola II, 118—19, 133, 135, 23 0

Pegasus, 241, 246, 249—50, 252—54, 281, 283, 284—85 ,

286p, 287, 289—90, 308, 312—13, 317—18, 326, 326n ,

327n, 356, 503, 516, 540, 540n, 542, 589, 590p

Pocahontas Forest, 34 6

Prairie, 6 0

Proud Hunter, 63 8

Quick Track, 251

Rawlins Valley, 45 5

Recovery, 604—605, 605p, 606—607, 609, 63 0

Rice, 298 n

Robin, 321, 321 p

Robin North, 321—24, 355n, 35 6

Robin South, 321—24, 355n, 35 6

Rock, 24 8

Saline, 116, 130, 137, 232, 63 6

Scotland, 18, 57, 62, 283, 283n, 284, 311, 326n, 327n ,

406, 540, 540 n

Scotland II, 289, 291, 306, 312—13, 316—17, 319, 326n ,

352, 354, 390, 396, 406, 409, 448, 450, 451p, 540n ,

541, 541 n

Sussex Bay, 381—82, 382p, 383—84

Swift Play, 342p, 343, 348, 63 6

Swift Pursuit, 63 8

Swift Saber, 63 6

Taylor Common, 437—39, 440p, 441p, 442, 442n, 551 ,

551p, 55 6

Thor, 360—62, 362p, 363, 545-47, 547n, 548, 563n, 641 ,

641 n

Tran Hung Dao, 64 9

Valiant Hunt, 638p, 63 9

Virginia, 6 0

Wheeler/Wallowa, 87, 92, 99, 107, 228, 24 6

Woodpecker, 589, 591 p

Worth, 247—4 8

York, 16, 107, 25 2

York I, 10 7

York II, 16, 107—10 8

York III, 1 6

Oppenheimer, Col Harold L., 62 2

Ord, Col James B., Jr., 437, 441 p

Outposts

Alpha, 266, 266 n

C-E, 387, 391, 39 5

Oceanview, 386, 391, 395, 405, 44 6

Overstreet, Capt Lee R., 28 5

P

Padley, Col John J ., 6 1

Palace of Perfect Peace, 19 5

Palatas, LtCol Michael V., 351, 357, 35 9

Palm, Edward E, 627

Palmer, LtGen Bruce, USA, 614, 51 0

Panyaninec, PFC G ., 315

Paris Agreement, January 1973, 280n

Paris Peace Talks, 73, 373, 384, 387, 579, 593, 606

Parker, LtCol Eric B., 545 ; Col, 547 n

Parker, LtCol Evan L ., Jr., 41, 43, 74, 459 n

Parks, Maj W. Hays, 615, 617 ; Col 615 n

Parsons, LCpI Stephen R., 9 4

Patrick, LtCol George L., 636 n

Patton, LCpI Jack L ., 120

Payne, Maj James C ., USA, 13 8

Peabody, Col . Clifford J., 61 3

Peard, Col Roger W., Jr., 517n, 522n, 524 n

Pearson, MajGen Willard, USA, 111, 500

Pedersen, Col Poul F., 566n, 569n, 577 n

Peers Commission, 615 n

Peers, LtGen William R., USA, 61.4
798 THE DEFINING YEA R

Pensacola, Florida, 57 0

People 's Revolutionary Party, 10, 42 3

Perea, LtCol Horacio E ., 588

Perfume River, 164, 166, 168, 173, 175—77, 178p, 179, 185,

191—92, 198, 200, 211, 211n, 216, 218p, 219, 230 ,

232n, 235, 582n, 583, 586—87, 64 0

Perrin, LtCol Jack W., 588

Perry, LtCol Victor A., 588—8 9

Personal Response Program, 599, 599n, 609, 616—1 7

Peterson, Michael E ., 616n, 628—2 9

Phan Thiet, 64 0

Philippines, 463, 524, 631, 634, 634n, 638, 642, 64 5

Phillips, LCpl James L ., 591 p

Phillips, LCpl John L ., 369p

Phillips, Col Rhys J., Jr., 227

Pho, Capt Hoang, 269

Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program, 603, 603n, 63 0

Phong Dien City, 7 8

Phong Dien District, 78, 16 6

Phong Ni, 614 n

Phu Bai, 16—18, 20, 47n, 51, 69, 73, 79—80, 83—84, 86, 88 ,

105, 105p, 106, 108, 110, 119, 127, 155, 166n, 169 ,

169n, 170—72, 172n, 175—76, 179, 188, 194, 197—99 ,

206, 211n, 216, 223, 227, 230, 235, 237, 238p, 245 ,

248-49, 252, 284, 312, 343, 346, 347, 372, 388, 391 ,

413-14, 458, 468-69, 487, 492-93, 496, 518, 520, 524 ,

535, 535n, 537, 540n, 542, 551, 553, 582, 583—84 ,

587-89, 594, 597, 612, 620-22, 626, 641, 652—5 3

Phu Bai Airfield, 106, 170, 637 p

Phu Bai DASC, 46 8

Phu Bai Vital Area, 11 0

Phu Cam Canal, 164, 172, 177, 178p, 185, 191, 194, 211 ,

58 9

Phu Dong (2), 330—3 1

Phu Dong Armored Base, 64 7

Phu Loc, 6, 16, 79, 84, 86, 97, 101n, 110, 154—55, 166, 169 ,

171, 194, 197, 230, 252, 372, 388, 551, 582, 621—22 ,

636, 65 2

Phu Loc District, 80, 101—102, 105—106, 240, 248—49, 641 n

Phu Loc Sector, 53 6

Phu Loc Town, 101—105, 11 0

Phu Tho, 13 9

Phu Thu District, 372, 412—13, 45 5

Phu Thu Peninsula, 249, 25 2

Phu Vang District, 412—13, 45 5

Phuoc Trach, 9 8

Phuoc Vinh, 41 2

Pierce, 1stLt Arthur A., 365, 38 7

Pipes, Capt Kenneth W., 72, 258, 260, 279, 282—83 ; LtCol,

64n, 260n, 280 n

PK 17, 107

Platt, BGen Jonas M., 558—5 9

Pleiku, 149

Poilane, Felix, 287 n

Poillon, Col Arthur J ., 110, 192 n

Poindexter, LtCol John E ., 388—89

Political Action Teams, 600 n

Polk, lsrLt Patrick D., 208

Pork Chop Hill, 28 7

Powell, Hospitalman Richard L., USN, 38 1

Powers, Lt Runas, Jr., USN, 598p

Practice Nine, 22—25 (See barrier)

Prados, John, 263, 263n, 283 n

Prescott, 1stLt Alexander E, 296—97, 30 2

Prichard, Capt John L ., 49, 49p, 50, 12 4

Princeton (LPH 5), 636n, 637p, 638 n

Pritchett (DD 561), 640

Program 4, 57 1

Program 5, 57 1

Program 6, 577, 57 9

Project 100,000, 559—60

Project Sigma, 52 3

Project Takeoff, 60 3

Providence (CLG 6), 640, 641 n

Provincial Reconnaissance Units, 603 n

Psychological Operations, 608—609, 609p, 63 9

Psychological Warfare, 598, 61 0

Public Health Building (Hue), 180, 18 2

Puckett, L.D ., 60 8

Pueblo (AGER 2), 225, 226n, 574, 57n

Puller, Lt Lewis B., Jr., 560

Purdum, LtCol Frederick K., 642

Q

Qua Giang (2), 38 1

Quang Da Special Sector, 8

Quang Da Special Zone, 85, 87, 9 2

Quang Nam Province, 8, 16—17, 84, 87—88, 99, 101, 143 ,

149, 252-53, 328, 375, 419n, 422, 437, 439, 448, 536 ,

553, 601, 61 8

Quang Ngai, 8, 16, 85, 155n, 63 9

Quang Ngai City, 143, 155, 225, 228, 44 8

Quang Ngai Province, 16, 84, 142—43, 228, 254, 601, 614, 61 8

Quang Tin Province, 8, 16, 85, 88, 142—43, 338, 419n, 542 ,

553, 582n, 61 8

Quang Tri, 8, 10, 18—20, 25, 33, 37n, 38, 78n, 110, 172 ,

172n, 315n, 453, 485n, 527n, 530n, 58 9

Quang Tri Airfield, 73—74, 75p, 118—19, 135, 136n, 232 ,

289, 465n, 485, 526, 528, 529p

Quang Tri Ammunition Supply Point, 54 6

Quang Tri Base, 46, 57, 73, 75, 75p, 78, 79p, 83, 113, 118 ,

235, 237, 242, 245, 253, 291, 298n, 315n, 352—53 ,

362-64, 449, 467n, 528p, 533n, 582, 585, 589, 613, 63 8

Quang Tri City, 18—19, 32, 73, 76—78, 109, 118—19, 133—36 ,

136n, 137, 137n, 140, 155, 177, 193, 227, 230, 242 ,

263n, 264n, 298, 310, 326, 351, 370, 390, 396, 411 ,

412p, 443—45, 453, 463, 613, 625, 631, 65 3

Quang Tri City Citadel, 13 5

Quang Tri Pipeline, 593

Quang Tri Province, 14, 16, 18, 31—32, 36n, 58, 61, 64, 68 ,

73, 79, 83, 85, 102, 108—110, 116, 118, 135, 149, 227 ,

230—32, 235, 246, 250, 258, 263, 270, 273, 283, 287 ,

290—91, 298, 308, 315n, 317—18, 320, 338, 349 ,

351—54, 356, 364, 370, 385—88, 390—92, 392p, 395 ,

410, 412, 439, 443, 445, 450, 456, 490, 536, 541, 545 ,

548,587,594,612—13,613p, 618, 623 ,

65 2

Quang Tri River, 5 4

Quantico, Virginia, 289, 532, 563p, 569, 64 5

Que Chu, 19 3

Que Son, 16, 99, 158, 346

Que Son Mountains, 154, 329
INDEX 799

Que Son Town, 8 7

Que Son Valley, 84, 87, 91, 99—101, 163, 228, 246, 65 2

Qui Nhon, 149, 24 0

Quick, LtCol Daniell, 352, 63 6

Quilter, MajGen Charles J ., 512, 512n, 513p 515—16, 522 ,

524, 524n, 526, 529, 53 0

Quinn, LtCol Francis X ., 414—1 5

R

Ra Co Ap, 40 8

Racial Incidents, 56 6

Radar TPQ—10, 51, 115, 127, 469, 474n, 475n, 477, 483n,

49 6

Air Support Radar Team (ASRT), 272, 469, 478, 478 n

Air Support Radar Team Bravo (ASRT—B), 477—7 8

Radcliffe, Capt Henry J.M., 82,

Radi o

UHF, 469 n

VHF, 469 n

Ralph, Capt Thomas H ., 334

Randall, Col Thomas L., 146—4 7

Rann, LtCol Louis A ., 369, 396, 407

Rao Quan River Valley, 64, 69, 256, 407p, 408, 45 0

Rasmussen, BGen Henry A ., USA, 584 n

Rattan, Col Donald V., 119, 13 5

Ray, Capt Ronald D ., 646p

Raymond, Capt John W., 6 3

Razorback, 399—40 0

Red Beach, 89, 147, 156, 159, 248, 584p

Reed, Col Edwin O ., 460

Regal, Capt John E ., 128, 130—31, 137—3 8

Repose (AH 16), 587

Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC), 38 1

2d Korean Marine Brigade, 2, 84—85, 85p, 88, 90, 142 ,

149, 154, 158, 160, 163, 229, 426, 460, 516, 531n, 537 ,

582, 593, 64 0

Reserve Call-up, 57 2

Reserve Mobilization, 57 5

Reserves, 12n, 12, 227 n

Reserves, Class III Category, 57 5

Resor, Secretary of the Army Stanley R ., 361 n

Rest and Recreation (R&R), 567, 569, 571-72, 577 n

Revolutionary Development, 246, 60 7

Revolutionary Development Cadre, 86, 600, 600n, 603 n

Revolutionary Development Ministry, 600, 600 n

Revolutionary Development Program, 85, 91, 133, 142, 410 ,

443, 460, 599, 600n, 601, 60 8

Revolutionary Development Teams, 600, 600n, 60 1

Rexroad, LtCol Donald N ., 335, 34 4

Rick, LtCol Robert F., 63 6

Ridgeway, Sgt Ronald L., 280 n

Roa Quan River, 61 n

Roach, 2dLt Terrence R ., Jr., 27 7

Robb, Capt Charles S ., 375 p

Roberts, John R., 263 n

Robertshaw, MajGen Louis B., 472, 512 n

Robertson, MajGen Donn J ., 25, 84, 88, 91, 95, 99p, 105 ,

141-42, 145—46, 150, 155, 158, 160, 161—63, 221, 249 ,

251p, 328—29, 338, 344, 374, 565, 610, 634

Robertson, LtCol John W.P., 431, 433, 435—3 6

Robichaud, Col Clifford J ., Jr., 253, 291, 293p

Rock Quarry (Khe Sanh), 60, 61n, 259p, 265, 267p, 28 5

Rocket Belt, 158, 229, 53 3

Rockey, LtCol William K., 92, 94, 95n, 97, 142, 148, 150 ,

152, 160

Rockpile, 18, 26, 53p, 54—55, 113, 116, 119, 127, 140, 293n ,

364, 368, 370, 397, 399-401, 404—405, 477

Rodney, LtCol Glenn W., 645, 64 9

Rogers, MGySgt James W., 301n, 30 2

Rolling Thunder, 5, 459n

Romine, LtCol Richard E., 631

Roosevelt, President Franklin D ., 560 n

Rose, Col Maurice, 566n, 58 0

Rosson, LtGen William B ., USA, 238—39, 239n, 239p, 240 ,

240n, 241, 241n, 253, 283—84, 287, 299, 306, 307p ,

308n, 312, 312n, 324n, 352—53, 356, 361n, 391, 470n ,

503, 503n, 504p, 540, 64 1

Rostow, Walt, W., 65 p

Roth, Capt Ronald K ., 640

Route 1, 18, 23—24, 40, 75—76, 78, 78n, 79p, 80, 82, 92 ,

100—101, 101n, 102—103, 105, 107—108, 110, 118, 133 ,

136, 140, 142, 145, 149, 149n, 150, 153—55, 160, 162 ,

168, 171, 185, 193, 216, 230—31, 244—45, 249, 252 ,

291—93, 293n, 295, 297—98, 301, 306, 312, 324, 351. ,

376—79, 381, 413—14, 425, 427n, 445, 448, 467n, 583 ,

585, 589, 592—93, 63 1

Route IA, 3 5

Route 4, 149, 158—59, 415, 419—22, 426, 429, 43 2

Route 9, 18—19, 24, 28, 36n, 40, 46, 52, 53p, 54—56, 58, 59p ,

61, 61n, 67, 69, 113, 119—20, 120n, 122, 123p, 125p ,

126, 126n, 133, 138, 214, 232, 241, 245—46, 256, 268 ,

269n, 273, 275, 275p, 281, 283—86, 286p, 287—89 ,

291—92, 316—17, 317p, 318—21, 323, 326, 351, 353—57 ,

364, 368, 386, 396—97, 405, 407, 407p, 408—409, 448 ,

450, 455, 474n, 478, 546, 589, 590p, 592, 594p, 652—5 3

Route 13, 1 1

Route 88, 292

Route 101, 35

Route 102, 35

Route 537, 92, 331, 340

Route 540, 42 2

Route 547, 223, 249, 371, 41 2

Route 547A, 372, 41 2

Route 554, 81—8 2

Route 558, 396

Route 561, 24, 28, 40, 44, 46, 127, 244n, 351, 39 3

Route 566, 28—2 9

Route 604, 76

Route 605, 40

Route 1022, 404

Route Package 1, 3, 464

Route Package 4, 464

Rudd, lstLt Tyrus E, 40 5

Rung Sat, 645

Rural Reconstruction, 600 n

S

17th Parallel, 6, 1 1

Sa Huyen, 84, 586

Sadowski, Col Joseph L ., 524 n

Saigon, 4, 11, 13, 107, 133, 158, 164, 194—95, 197, 199, 206, 227 ,

238, 310, 373, 467, 467n, 474, 491—92, 493n, 498n,
800 THE DEFINING YEA R

503—505, 509—11, 516, 541, 583, 583n, 600, 603, 607, 614 ,

625n, 639—42, 64445, 646p, 647, 648p, 649, 650p, 651p

Saipan, 2 0

Salvati, Maj Ralph J ., 183

San Diego, CA, 22 7

Sanctuary (AH 17), 587

Sandino, 596n

Sang, BGen Kim Yun, 8 4

Sante Fe Trail, 35, 255, 255 n

Sao River, 19 3

Saulsbury, lstLt Jerry N., 258—5 9

Savannah, Georgia, 524 n

Schaeffer, Capt Jack D., 365

Scheib, Capt Thomas, A ., 7 5

Scheidel, PFC Robert L., 553 p

Schick, Col Edwin S ., Jr., 34n, 535, 535n, 538n, 540n, 541n ,

549n

Schlarp, LtCol Jack E., 517n, 521n, 639 n

Schlight, John, 475 n

Schmidt, Col Maynard W., 631, 634 n

Schneider, 1stLt Peter N ., 445

Schunck, Cpl Henry M ., 542—4 3

Schwenk, Col Adolph G ., 227, 333—35, 573, 573n ; LtGen, 57 4

Scoppa, LtCol Joseph, Jr., 549—5 1

Scout Dogs, 441p, 44 2

Seabees, 18, 28—29, 31, 46—47, 54, 60—62, 62n, 64n, 105 ,

230, 246, 324, 540, 588—89, 591, 607

Search and Destroy Strategy, 600, 60 7

Seavy-Cioffi, Larry J., 282, 282 n

Selective Service System, 559, 560, 560n, 574, 580

Draft Calls, U.S., 560n, 58 0

Seminole (AKA 104), 638 n

Sensors, 266n, 269, 269n, 270—71, 281, 444, 444n, 471 ,

471n, 538, 589

Seoul, Korea, 216n

Sexton, Col Martin J., 409, 45 0

Seymoe, LtCol Joseph, USA, 263

Seymour, LtCol Rufus A ., 348

Shaeffer, Capt Jack D ., 398

Shafer, Capt Francis L., Jr., 81

Shanley, lstLt Donald E . R., 272

Sharp, Adm Ulysses S. Grant, USN, 3, 3n, 19, 21, 107—110 ,

236, 255, 466, 473—74, 486—87, 490, 491p, 492, 495 ,

504—507, 509, 511—13, 583, 635, 635 n

Shauer, LtCol Walter H ., 483n, 485n, 517n, 521n, 526n,

529n, 636n

Shaw, Capt James L ., 44 8

Ship and Boat type s

LCM (landing craft mechanized)(Mike Boat), 3, 6, 8, 113p ,

116, 127—28, 19 218p, 296, 300, 304p, 586—8 7

LCU (landing craft, utility), 38, 106, 113p, 116, 127, 198 ,

203, 216, 230, 231p, 22n, 294, 384n, 390, 583, 586—8 7

LST (landing ship, tank), 37p, 38, 39 0

River Patrol Boats (PBS) (Swift boat), 200—201, 232, 587

Sienko, Col Walter, 530 n

Signal Hill, 45 4

Silva, Capt Christopher J ., USA, 54 3

Simmons, BGen Edwin H ., 2 0

Simms, HM3 Alan B ., 140

Simpson, Capt Jerry I., 645, 649 ; LtCol 649 n

Simpson, MajGen Ormond R., 408p, 437n, 439p

Single Manager, 240n, 298n, 473n, 486—87, 488p, 489, 491 ,

491p, 492—97, 497n, 498, 498n, 500, 500n, 501—506 ,

506n, 507—508, 509p, 510, 510p, 511—13, 513p ,

514—16, 608, 635, 653—5 4

Single Manager Directive, 492, 49 5

Single Manager Honolulu Conference, 50 6

Sisley, Maj Frederick E., 404, 410, 453, 45 5

Sivak, Cpl David M., 345, 345p, 34 6

Skipper, Maj Kenneth J., 379

SLAM (seek, locate, annihilate, and monitor), 47 1

Small Wars Manual, 616 n

Smith, SgtMaj Agrippa W., 288p

Smith, Col Franklin L ., 139, 149, 154, 162—63, 238, 240 ,

636, 636 n

Smith, LtCol George W., 453

Smith, Capt Gerald W., USN, 58 7

Smith, lstLt Ray L., 180, 211 n

Smith, Col Richard B ., 40—41, 46—47, 48p, 50, 54, 126, 138 ,

138n, 139, 238, 308—309, 351, 357, 363, 455, 623, 623 n

Snead, Capt Paul L ., 28 9

Snyder, LtCol William P., USA, 30 4

Solis, LtCol Gary D ., 615, 615 n

Som Soi, 30 5

Son Phan, 45 1

Song Ngan Valley, 45 3

Soto, Sgt Rudy A ., 642-44

Sound—ranging base, 547, 547 n

Sousa, Capt Richard G., 5 1

South China Sea, 88, 92, 130, 359, 375, 468, 59 3

South Vietnamese Armed Forces, 5, 19 7

Air Force 192, 416, 45 8

Armed Propaganda Teams, 598, 603 n

Capital Military Command, 647, 64 9

General Reserve, 107, 465, 645, 65 1

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Commands and Units

1st ARVN Division, 8—9, 17—18, 31, 40, 85, 106, 116 ,

164, 167—68, 172—73, 175—76, 192, 197, 199, 204—205 ,

206n, 213, 223, 249, 411, 639—40, 64 9

Headquarters Company, 16 4

Reconnaissance Company, 164, 167, 20 6

2d ARVN Division, 8, 85, 155, 228, 239p, 63 9

1st Ranger Group, 43 8

1st ARVN Airborne Task Force, 168, 192

7th Battalion, 16 8

1st ARVN Cavalry Regiment, 41 1

1st ARVN Regiment, 133, 135, 137, 177, 192, 370 ,

371, 412, 444—45, 44 9

1st Battalion, 133

2d Battalion, 133, 44 5

3d Battalion, 13 3

2d ARVN Regiment, 20, 26, 28—29, 38, 115, 128, 244 ,

246, 253, 291—95, 298, 301, 304—305, 309, 361, 364 ,

366, 387, 390, 392—95, 404, 443, 446, 448—49, 61 2

1st Battalion, 292, 304, 365, 39 5

2d Battalion, 40, 392, 395, 44 8

3d Battalion, 365, 393, 409—410, 449, 45 3

4th Battalion, 176, 192, 292, 306, 409, 41 0

5th Battalion, 44 8

3d ARVN Infantry Regiment, 106, 168, 192, 195, 199n ,

204, 204n, 206, 210, 370, 410—11, 45 5

1st Battalion, 168, 176, 192, 204
INDEX 801

212th Company, 209p

2d Battalion, 168, 176, 21 0

3d Battalion, 168, 17 6

4th Battalion, 168

4th ARVN Regimen t

2d Battalion, 192, 199 n

4th ARVN Cavalry, 14 6

2d Troop, 435—3 6

6th ARVN Regiment, 15 5

2d Battalion, 25 0

7th ARVN Armored Cavalry, 168, 171, 173 ,

1st Squadron, 39 3

3d Troop, 16 8

11th ARVN Armored Cavalry, 387, 394—9 5

51st ARVN Regiment, 8, 85, 142—43, 149, 154, 158, 160 ,

336, 415, 430, 431 p

1st Battalion, 160, 381, 419n

2d Battalion, 160, 419 n

3d Battalion, 15 0

4th Battalion, 160

54th ARVN Regiment, 45 5

2d Airborne Battalion, 17 6

2d ARVN Airborne Battalion, 16 8

5th ARVN Ranger Battalion, 15 4

8th ARVN Airborne Battalion

84th Company, 28 5

9th ARVN Airborne Battalion, 13 3

21st ARVN Ranger Battalion, 38 1

37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, 269—70, 281, 285, 38 1

102d ARVN Engineer Battalion, 14 9

1st Ordnance Company, 16 7

101st ARVN Engineering Company, 21 1

Black Panther Company, 176, 192, 195, 195, 199, 21 0

National Police, 86, 86n, 143, 146, 153, 357, 373, 395 ,

423, 603n, 648p

Popular Forces (PF), 7, 46, 74, 85, 85p, 98, 104, 146, 149—50 ,

156—57, 357, 371—72, 380, 405, 445—46, 448, 449, 600 ,

600n, 607, 618, 618p, 619—20, 622, 626p, 627—28, 629 n

15th Popular Forces Platoon, 14 9

Regional Forces (RF), 7, 86p, 133, 146, 167, 357, 371, 372 ,

405, 411, 445-46, 446p, 448—49, 455, 600, 600n, 601 ,

607, 612—13, 613p, 622, 629 n

59th Regional Force Battalion, 8 5

111th Regional Force Company, 38 1

195th Regional Force Company, 26 4

220th Regional Forces Company, 447p, 61 2

256th Regional Forces Company, 26 3

708 Regional Forces Company, 14 9

915th Regional Force Company, 263, 26 5

South Vietnamese Marine Corps, 204, 210, 215p, 232n ,

645, 647, 651 n

1st Battalio n

Vietnamese Marine Corps, 214p, 646p, 648—4 9

4th Company, 20 4

2d Battalio n

Vietnamese Marine Corps, 649 n

3d Battalion

Vietnamese Marine Corps, 64 7

4th Battalio n

Vietnamese Marine Corps, 209p, 210, 646p, 647—49, 649 n

5th Battalion

Task Force Alpha, 194—95, 197, 204—205, 206n, 213 ,

214p, 216, 223, 645, 646p, 647, 650, 651 .p

Task Force Bravo, 645, 647—4 8

Vietnamese Marine Corps Division, 65 1

Vietnamese Marine Brigade, 65 1

South Vietnamese Nav y

Coastal Patrol Force, 11 5

South Vietnamese Self Defense Units, 605—607, 63 0

Southeast Asia, 557, 570, 579, 58 1

Southeast Asia Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defens e

for System Analysis, 62 8

Southeast Asia Orientation Training, 56 1

Southern Sector Defense Command (SSDC), 89, 90n, 98, 141 ,

145, 1 5

Spangler, lstLt William J., 35 5

Spaniel, PFC Richard C ., 93 p

Spark, Col Michael M ., 439, 441p, 44 8

Spark, LtCol William F., 403—405, 63 9

Spice, 61 7

Spreading Oil Spot Strategy, 59 6

St Joan of Arc Church (Hue), 182 p

St. Paul (CA 73), 641 n

Stacy, lstLt Stephen E ., 398

Stahl, Sgt Mykle E., 259, 259n

Stalingrad, 216 n

Stamper, lstLt Thomas B ., 263, 263 n

Starbird, LtGen Alfred, USA, 21, 23, 28 ; Gen 22—2 3

Starlight Scope, 44

State Department, U .S ., 5n, 642

Steel Tiger/Tiger Hound, 3

Steele, Maj David L ., 5 0

Steen, Copt Kent O .W., 477, 477n ; Col 256n

Steinberg, LtCol Melvin J., 63 1

Stemple, LtCol James W., 347—48, 383, 384n, 419, 419n, 421 ,

423n, 432—33, 438—39, 441p, 442, 442n, 554n, 559 n

Scent, Maj Howard N., 5 9

Stewart, Maj Billy F., 54 5

Stilwell, MajGen Richard G ., USA, 361, 361p, 364, 387—388 ,

388n, 411, 448, 546, 548, 586n, 62 5

Stinemetz, LtCol Broman C ., 144, 552n, 554 n

Stingray, 54, 54n, 55, 118, 144, 250, 251, 328, 339, 347, 537 ,

542, 552, 552n, 553p, 554—5 5

Stockman, Col James R., 20—2 1

"Street Without Joy, " 78, 78n, 80, 164, 631, 633

Strongpoint Obstacle System (SPOS), 11, 19—20, 22, 24—25 ,

27, 29, 241, 255, 652 (See also Barrier )

Struggle Movement, 7, 164, 64 7

Stuart, Col Vaughn R ., 20n, 136n, 311n, 353n, 365, 366n

Stubbe, LCdr Ray W., USN, Chaplain Corps, 58n, 59n, 6ln,

65, 263, 263n, 276n, 283n, 327n, 486 n

Studt, LtCol John C., 287—89, 339, 339n, 352n ; Col 14n, 256 n

Subic Bay Naval Base, 524, 634, 634n, 636, 638

Sunder, LtCol Charles H ., USA, 585 n

Suoi Tien Hien Valley, 400—40 1

Super Gaggle, 483, 483n, 485, 485 n

Sweet, LtCol Richard S ., USA, 193—94

T

Ta Bat, 412

Tach Han River, 76

Tactical Data Communication Center (TDCC), 468
802 THE DEFINING YEA R

Tai Nu, 361

Tam Ky, 149, 155, 250, 46 3

Tan Mon, 39 5

Tan My, 14, 232n, 586—87, 59 3

Tan My Causeway, 59 3

Tan Son Nhut Airbase, 474, 476, 492, 647—4 9

Tao Quan River, 5 8

Taon, Col Nguyen Van, 8 5

Tarawa, 2 0

TAT—101 Turret 521, 512 n

Tay Loc, 19 5

Tay Loc Airfield, 164, 166—67, 176, 192

Tay Ninh, 41 1

Taylor, 2dLt Bayard V., 302

Taylor, Gen Maxwell, USA, 2 1

Taylor, SSgt Karl G ., 435

Tchepone River, 5 8

Temporary Commissions, 56 2

Terry, LCpI A .J., 417 p

Ter, 16, 108, 111n, 126, 133, 137—38, 140—42, 144—45 ,

145n, 155, 163, 164, 166, 166n, 169, 214, 216, 221 ,

225, 225n, 230—31, 237, 241, 250, 258, 270, 289, 310 ,

311n, 336, 408, 425n, 455, 465, 489, 524n, 537,

541—42, 572, 574, 574n, 575, 580, 585—87, 589, 592 ,

604, 606—12, 621, 621n, 621p, 627—28, 630, 635n, 640 ,

642, 644, 647, 648p, 650p, 653—54, 467 n

Thach Han River, 74—75, 75p, 77, 11 9

Thailand, 3, 4, 65, 271p, 471, 56 7

Tan Son Nhut, 649n

Thang, Gen Nguyen Duc, 600 n

Thanh Quit, 86p, 88, 142, 614n, 62 1

Thanh Quit Bridge, 160

Thanh Quit River, 90, 141, 149n, 153, 160, 161 p

Thayer, Thomas, 603

The Betrayal, 619 n

Thi, LtGen Nguyen Chanh, 647 ; Gen, 7

Thieu, President Nguyen Van, 6p, 7, 19, 110, 373, 401, 604 ,

606, 65 1

Third Lieutenant Nhut, 204

Third Offensive, 385, 393, 414, 425 n

Tho Thenon, 346

Thom Tham Khe, 80, 80n, 631, 631 n

Thomas, 2dLt Michael H ., 70—7 1

Thomas, Capt Raymond A ., 131

Thomas, GySgt Frank A ., 190

Thomas, LCpI John W., 376

Thomaston (LSD 28), 63 6

Thompson, Dr. Wayne, 3n

Thompson, Maj Robert H., 197, 197n, 198—99, 201—203 ,

206—208, 216 ; LtCol 199n, 200, 34 7

Thon Duc Kinh, 357, 35 9

Thon Mai Dang, 44 5

Thon Mu Kham Valley, 37 2

Thon My Chanh, 412, 44 5

Thon My Loc, 36 3

Thon My Thuy, 58 5

Thon Nai Beiu, 7 4

Thon Nghia An, 44 8

Thon Nong (8), 61 2

Thon Son Lam, 54, 119, 127, 352, 364, 370, 396—99, 448, 54 4

Thon Thanh Luong, 448

Thon Thuong Xa, 445, 44 8

Thon Tra Loc, 44 5

Thon Vinh Dai, 44 8

Thong Nghia, 30 2

Thong Thuong Xa, 13 6

Thong, Maj Hoang, 19 7

Thu Bon River, 88, 90, 92, 97, 144, 248, 250—51, 328, 330 ,

336, 340, 343-44, 346, 414, 418—19, 437, 553, 554 n

Thu Bon Valley, 34 6

Thu, Col Vo, ARVN, 8 7

Thua Thien Province, 8, 10, 14, 16—17, 18—19, 20, 32, 73, 78 ,

80, 83—84, 101—102, 105—110, 119, 127n, 155, 164 ,

175—76, 214, 221, 227—28, 230, 239—40, 242, 246, 343 ,

371—72,388,392,410,412—13,413,445,455—56,463 ,

490, 536, 582, 607, 612, 618, 636, 641, 641n, 65 2

Thua Thien Provincial Headquarters, 188, 190, 190 n

Thuc, Col Truong Tan, 8 5

Thuong Do, 294, 302—303, 30 5

Thuong Duc, 338, 338p, 339, 345—46, 375, 420p, 554 n

Thuong Duc Special Forces Camp, 158, 418—22, 423n, 54 2

Thuong Nghia, 30 9

Thuong Phuoc, 73—74, 7 6

Thuong Xa Village, 45 3

Ticonderoga (CVA 14), 641 n

Tien Phouc, 25 0

Tiensha Peninsula, 89, 89p, 144—47, 155, 157, 460, 467, 4711 )

Tiger Tooth Mountain, 60, 60 n

Time Magazine, 206 n

Tinh Yen River, 343, 38 1

Toan, Col Quang, 239

Todd, Capt Gary E ., 323 ; Maj, 14, 17n, 32n, 34n, 50n, 256n ,

266, 276, 293n, 326n, 396—97, 397n, 39 8

Tolpingrud, lstLt Kenneth, 366p

Tolson, MajGen John J., USA, 107, 109, 118, 177, 192—93 ,

205, 207, 216, 254, 284, 286, 287n, 370, 487—8 8

Tompkins, MajGen Rathvon McC, 13—14, 18, 20, 20n, 21 ,

21n, 21p, 31, 38, 64, 68—69, 73, 80, 83, 116, 120, 124 ,

126—28, 130—31, 140, 231, 232, 236p, 237—38, 246 ,

253n, 269, 271p, 275, 283, 291—92, 298—99, 306—307 ,

307p, 308, 310, 311n, 313—15, 315n, 316, 316n, 359 ,

437n, 549n, 614, 614n, 617, 63 4

Tonc, Lt La Thanh, 72, 258, 258n, 260

Toner, LtCol Edward R., 37—38, 38n, 113, 115, 130, 23 2

Tonkin, 65 n

Tope, Col Lyle V., 458

Tra Vinh, 640

Transportation Control Center, 583 n

Treado, LtCol Marshall J., 467

Treasury Building (Hue), 18 2

Tri Buu, 133, 135, 137

Trieu Phong, 370, 444

Trinh Minh The Bridge, 37 3

Trinh, Nguyen Duy, 25 4

Tripoli (LPH 10), 519p, 636n, 637p, 638 n

Tropical Storm Elaine, 42 2

Truc Kinh, 300, 305—306, 309

Trundy, LtCol Richard T., 636 n

Truoi River Bridge, 101—102, 102n, 169—71, 171n, 249, 250, 60 7

Truong Son River, 144, 38 8

Truong, BGen Ngo Quang, ARVN, 106, 164, 107, 167—68, 171 ,

192, 195, 197—99, 204, 204n, 207, 216, 223, 361p, 649
INDEX 803

Tu Cau Bridge, 41 4

Tu Do Soccer Stadium, 21 6

Tully, LCpI Lester A ., 17 4

Tuong Van Tuong, 4 0

Turner Joy (DD 95), 641 n

Tuy Loan River, 90, 148, 153, 158—5 9

Twining, LtCol David S ., 467, 468n, 469, 474n, 478n, 489n ;

Col, 517 n

Twohey, LtCol Richard B., 397—99, 401, 404-405, 44 8

Typhoon Bess, 384, 391—92, 401, 414, 414n, 59 3

U

U.S . Consulate, Saigon, 64 3

U.S . Embassy Chancery, 642, 64 4

U.S . Embassy, Saigon, 600, 642-44

Udorn, Thailand, 468

Underdue, PFC James S ., 81

United Press, 206n, 24 8

V

Valley Forge (LPH 8), 631, 631n, 636, 636 n

Van Ryzin, MajGen William J., 238, 307, 308n, 614n, 622 ,

625 n

Van Stockum, BGen Ronald R., 567—68

Van Winkle, LtCol Archie, 321, 321p

Vancouver (LPD 2), 227, 573, 636 n

van den Berg, LtCol Oliver W., 86, 101, 101n, 104, 104 n

Vandier, Lt William L ., USN, 64 0

Vargas, Capt Manuel S., 297, 299—303 ; Maj, 297 n

Vargas, Maj Jay R., 297 n

Vaught, LtCol James B., USA, 193—9 4

Vehicles

Amphibian Tractors, 303, 383, 42 4

Armored Personnel Carrier, 133, 146, 176, 303, 378, 390 ,

394, 435, 436, 436n

LVT (landing vehicle, tracked), 153, 157, 159, 232n, 242 ,

242n, 243, 296, 387, 395, 633 n

LVTE (landing vehicle, tracked engineer), 38, 24 2

LVTH (landing vehicle, tracked howitzer), 38, 40, 131, 160 ,

242, 535, 53 7

LVTP (landing vehicle, tracked personnel), 296n, 29 7

LVTR (landing vehicle, tracked retriever), 3 8

M42 Dusters, 54—55, 118—19, 138—39, 171, 171n, 291, 40 7

M48 Tank, 54—55, 98—99, 118—19, 138—39, 173, 173p ,

175, 184p, 189, 198p, 202, 208, 234p, 293p, 294, 296 ,

300, 317p, 407, 421, 544n, 590p

M67A2 Tank, Flame, 54, 246p

M103 Bulldozer, 591 p

Mechanical Mule, 152, 182n, 21 9

Ontos, 103, 127, 130, 177, 186, 187p, 191, 201—202 ,

210n, 211, 292, 407, 633n

Patrol Air Cushioned Vehicles (PACV), 232n, 58 7

PT—76 Tanks, 234, 253, 275, 34 7

Vernon County (LST 1161), 63l n

Veth, RAdm Kenneth L ., USN, 5, 239, 58 7

Vien Dien River, 15 0

Vien, Gen Cao Van, ARVN, 7—8, 110, 375p, 649

Viet Con g

National Liberation Front, 10, 373, 190

Presidium of the Central Committee , 144

Viet Cong (VC) Self—Defense Forces, 91

Viet Cong Units

1st VC Regiment, 100, 144, 159, 16 3

401st VC Regiment, 143, 15 5

25th VC Battalion, 9 1

70th VC Battalion, 15 5

80th VC Battalion, 10 1

802d VC Battalion, 10 1

804th VC Battalion, 24 9

808th VC Battalion, 41 1

814th VC Battalion, 13 5

840th VC Battalion, 64 0

C—70 Battalion, 64 2

C—130th VC Battalion, 15 3

K—2 VC Battalion, 25 0

K—4B VC Battalion, 101, 10 5

R—20 or Doc Lap VC Battalion, 91, 97, 143, 144, 146,

149—50, 153, 160, 328, 348, 373, 373n, 377, 426

V—7 VC Battalion, 373 n

V—25th VC Battalion, 97, 146, 144, 149, 153, 160, 328 ,

373, 373n, 38 1

V—51 Battalion, 36 3

C—23 Reconnaissance Company, 37 3

C—59 Local Force Company, 363, 444

Cam Lo Local Force Company, 13 9

H—99 Local Force Company, 444

Q—15th VC Local Force Company, 15 3

Q—16th VC Local Force Company, 15 3

Q—55th VC Local Force Company, 15 7

Q—91 Company, 376, 424

Q—92 Sapper Company (Quang Da SpecialZone) 2d District, 37 7

Reconnaissance Team X 2/89, 37 3

Viet Minh, 6, 65n, 78, 54 2

Vietnamese National Railroad System (VNRS), 92, 60 7

Vines, Sgt H.D., 430 p

Vinh Dien Bridge, 418, 42 4

Vinh Dien River, 88, 153, 163, 414, 42 5

Vinh Linh District, 3 2

Vinh Loc District, 372, 412—1 3

Vu Gia River, 248, 338, 338p, 339, 346, 418, 421, 421n, 422 ,

554, 554 n

Vu Gia River Valley, 158, 542

Vung Tau, 647

W

Walker, Maj Jack E ., USA, 21 9

Wall, Gibert, 280

Walt, LtGen Lewis W., 3, 13—14, 15p, 23—24, 501p, 503 ,

596n, 597n, 598, 608, 616n, 617, 619, 619n, 62 5

Ward, Capt Alexander K., 245

Ward, Capt Joel D ., 400

Warkentin, Lt(j .g .) Marvin L., USN, 640-4 1

Warren, Maj George E, 302—303 ; Col 634n

Washburn (AKA 108), 227, 573, 636 n

Washington Post, 147, 164n, 177, 190n, 194, 206, 216n, 223, 25 6

Washington Star, 95 n

Washington, D.C., 3, 5n, 12, 12n, 13, 15—16, 20, 23, 28, 66 ,

95n, 225, 227, 254, 275n, 308, 475, 486, 489, 491 ,

494—95, 500, 504, 508, 509, 512—13, 519, 523, 526 ,

528, 530, 601, 65 3

"Washout," the, 44, 4 8

Watson, LtCol LeRoy E ., 348, 415, 417
804 THE DEFINING YEAR

Weapons and Ordnance

Antiarmor Weapon, Light (LAAW) M72, 180, 180n, 182p ,

188n, 261, 261n, 299p, 301, 389, 40 9

Bomb, 750-pound, 43 3

Bomb, Daisy Cutter, 396, 397 n

Bomb, Fuel-Air Explosive, 42 1

Cannon, 20mm, 296, 485, 52 1

Carbine, M1, 99 p

Charge, C-4, 61, 18 0

Gas, CS, 183, 183n, 184p, 189, 194, 202-203, 211n, 260 ,

272, 326, 349, 377, 377n, 452, 485

Grenade, Rocket-Propelled, 52, 55, 97-98, 120, 122 ,

127-28, 131, 138, 149, 153, 159-60, 186, 198, 202 ,

242, 242n, 263, 285, 294, 294, 297, 303, 318-19, 323 ,

344, 347, 376-77, 389, 391, 393-94, 408, 41 6

Gun, Gatling, 154, 37 5

Gun, 5-inch, 200, 204, 64 1

Gun, 6-inch, 64 1

Gun, 8-inch, 147, 200, 362, 393, 40 9

Gun, 16-inch, 393, 394p, 435, 64 1

Gun, 90mm, 98-99, 175, 175p, 202, 210, 335, 361, 379 ,

389, 393-9 4

Gun, 130mm, 33-34, 115, 137, 268n, 319-20, 322, 401, 53 7

Gun, 175mm, 61, 66, 66p, 107, 142, 270, 281, 320, 409 ,

437, 477, 477n, 535, 536p, 537-38, 544, 546, 551, 55 3

Gun, Antiaircraft, 37mm, 47 8

Gun, Antiaircraft, 40mm, 54, 118, 138, 171n, 253 n

Guns, Light Field, 85mm, 36 1

Howitzer, 8-inch, 186, 200, 207n, 253, 320, 405, 421 ,

433, 437, 534p, 544, 544n, 55 1

Howitzer, 85mm, 40 5

Howitzer, 105mm, 33-34, 38, 40, 54, 98-99, 101, 115 ,

118, 131, 160, 186n, 189, 194, 210n, 256n, 258n, 287 ,

355, 535, 551 p

Howitzer, 122mm, 53 7

Howitzer, 152mm, 33, 126-27, 405, 53 7

Howitzer, 155mm, 50, 54-55, 118, 147, 186n, 194, 200 ,

204, 205n, 409, 437, 442n, 524, 535, 537, 538n, 538p ,

540n, 544n, 549n, 550, 550p, 55 1

Howitzer, 155mm (Towed), 549, 549 n

Howitzer, Pack, 75mm, 366,366n, 367p, 533 n

Howtar, 107mm, 533 n

Knife, K-Bar, 345p, 34 6

Launchers (E-8), CS, 183, 189, 20 3

Launcher, Grenade (M79), 50-51, 129p, 176, 200p, 430p

Launcher, Rocket, 122mm, 87n, 87p, 100, 535 n

Machine Gun, .30-caliber, 94, 138, 296, 446

Machine Gun, .50-caliber, 48, 76, 98, 119-20, 131, 169 ,

171 171n, 177, 200, 210, 253n, 259, 296, 315n, 319 ,

322, 368, 376, 395, 446, 521, 523n, 552

Machine Gun, 7 .62mm, 98, 521n, 523 n

Machine Gun, M60, 51, 70, 100, 138, 179p, 185-86, 203p ,

218p, 301n, 366p, 376, 410, 521, 531, 55 2

Mines, Claymore, 8 1

Miniguns, Vulcan, 553 n

Missile, (Homing All the Way Killer) HAWK, 147, 414,

467, 467n, 468 470p, 54 8

Missiles (SAMs), 34, 12 7

Mortar, 4 .2-inch, 38, 98, 142, 194, 200, 202, 389, 477,

533, 533n, 535, 538n, 540n, 542, 54 9

Mortar, 60mm, 33, 44, 49, 51, 76, 118, 127, 129p, 159,

180, 205, 245, 247, 270, 318, 344, 389, 394-95 ,

400-401, 408, 424, 448, 55 2

Mortar, 81mm, 33, 48, 52, 55, 98-99, 103, 146, 152, 183p ,

189, 259, 280, 296, 363, 369, 383, 403, 409, 430p, 448, 54 3

Mortar, 82mm, 49, 104, 118, 126, 137, 146-47, 249, 256 ,

320, 322, 362, 365, 389-90, 395, 399-401, 403, 408 ,

410, 421, 42 4

Mortar, 120mm, 9 0

Munitions Antipersonnel, Beehive, 424, 424 n

Munitions, Controlled Fragmentation (Firecracker), 275 ,

275n, 480, 480p, 481, 538n, 54 2

Pistol, .38-caliber, 64 3

Pistol, Service, .45-caliber, 198, 296

Radar, countermortar, 54 7

Rifle, Browning Automatic, 104, 18 0

Rifle, Assault (AK-47), 50, 55, 75-76, 82, 124, 154, 169 ,

171, 193, 199, 259, 300, 303, 39 9

Rifle, M1, 168, 168n, 180, 189

Rifle, M14, 409p, 582

Rifle, M16, 14, 53, 76, 82, 85p, 115, 138, 168n, 180p ,

182, 202, 218p, 244, 345, 380p, 409p, 501, 582, 593 ,

607, 64 3

Rifle, Recoilless, 57mm, 176, 212, 42 4

Rifle, Recoilless, 75mm, 178, 348, 408

Rifle, Recoilless, 106mm, 48, 98, 130, 141, 152, 177, 182 ,

182n, 182p, 183, 183p, 186, 187p, 188-89, 203, 268 ,

275, 278, 280, 287, 289, 296, 322, 342n, 403, 44 8

Rifle, SKS, 18 9

Rifle, Spotting Scope, M49, 15 5

Rocket, 3 .5-inch, 182, 185, 188-89, 188n, 422p, 233p, 43 5

Rocket, 122mm, 87n, 90-91, 91n, 98-99, 118, 147-148 ,

154-55, 158-59, 169, 210, 235, 248-49, 261p, 268 ,

313, 365, 368, 377, 424, 480, 533, 537, 59 1

Rocket, 140mm, 90-91, 99, 119, 53 3

Rocket, 144mm, 59 1

Rocket Antitank, B-40, 146, 154, 168, 172, 180, 186, 188 ,

189, 191, 199, 205, 232, 341, 424, 542, 64 2

Rocket Pods, 2 .75, 521 n

Rounds, 85mm, 11 9

Rounds, Grenade M79, 7 6

Shell, 105mm, 5 6

Shell, 120mm, 4 3

Submachine Gun, Beretta, 64 3

Submachine Gun, M31A1, 180 p

Torpedoes, Bangalore, 281, 34 7

Webb, Alvin B ., Jr., 206 n

Webster, BGen George D., 252, 37 2

Weise, LtCol William, 74, 127, 130, 242-43, 292, 292n, 294-301 ,

301n, 303, 303n, 303p, 304, 310, 631 ; BGen 296n, 304 n

Weiss, 2dLt Peter W., 279-80

Wells, lstLt Alexander W., Jr., 195, 204, 205 n

Welpott, Capt Ronald R., 428 ; LtCol, 422 n

Wensman, Cdr Linus B ., USN, 56 6

West, Francis J. "Bing," 62 9

Western Gate Hue Citadel, 16 7

Western Pacific, 463, 57 0

Westmoreland, Gen William C., USA, 3, 3n, 3p, 4-5, 5n, 8 ,

10-14, 14n, 15, 15n, 16-17, 17n, 19, 21n, 22-27, 27p ,

29, 31, 34-38, 46n, 61n, 62n, 65-67, 69n, 84, 84n, 91 ,

107-11, 116, 118, 126, 142, 149, 161-62, 174, 176 ,

194, 205, 210, 221, 223, 225-27, 235, 237-38, 239n ,
INDEX 805

240, 240n, 241, 241n, 255, 255n, 256, 268, 270, 272p ,

275—76, 276n, 283, 308, 312, 312n, 313, 324, 326, 338 ,

356, 444, 466, 471, 472p, 473, 473n, 474, 476, 486 ,

487, 487n, 488, 488p, 489, 489n, 490, 491p, 492, 495 ,

500—501, 501p, 502—505, 506n, 507—510, 515, 518—19 ,

541, 543, 545, 572, 578, 583, 586, 597, 599—600, 600n ,

619, 619n, 620, 628, 634, 635, 635n, 644, 650, 652—5 4

Wexford County (LST 1168), 63 1

Whalen, LtCol Robert P., 169—7 0

Wheeler, Gen Earle G ., USA, 65—66, 107—108, 174, 227, 270 ,

272p, 491, 495—97, 500—501, 506, 506n, 507, 509, 512 ,

514, 572, 574, 578, 58 3

Whetstone (LSD 27), 631 n

White Elephant, 586

White, Maj Robert E ., 479, 482 p

White, LtCol William J., 483, 483 n

Whiteknight, Sgt Ronnie D., 260

Whiteside, lstLt Thomas M ., 446

Wickwire, LtCol Peter A ., 60

Wildfang, CWO—3 Henry, 479, 482 p

Wilker, Col Dean, 155, 460, 465, 498 n

Wilkinson, LtCol James B ., 62—63, 72, 28 2

Willhite, Cpl Arliss, 103—104, 104n, 627 n

Williams, Capt James L., 294—9 6

Williams, BGen John E., 638, 638n, 63 9

Williams, LtGen Samuel T., USA, 2 1

Willoughby, Capt Frank, USA, 27 5

Wilson, LtCol Daniel M ., 532n, 63 1

Wilson, Col Frank E ., 463, 483 n

Windham County (LST 1170), 638 n

Winslow (AKA 94), 639 n

Winter-Spring 1967—68 Campaign, 1 1

Winter-Spring 1968—69 Campaign, 423

Woodham, LtCol Tullis J., Jr., 227, 229, 333-34, 335p, 339,

342n, 520n, 573n

Wooding, RAdm Robert R ., USN, 58 7

Wozar, lstLt Richard M., 342

Wunder Beach, 230, 245, 291, 390, 445, 585, 585n, 586, 586 n

X

Xam Rao Vinh Valley, 44 8

Xang, Maj Tran Phouc, 431 p

Xe Pon, 40 8

Xe Pon River, 5 8

Xom Cham Plateau, 59, 62

Xuan Dai, 329

Xuan Dai (2), 328, 33 0

Xuan Hai, 49

Xuan Khanh, 449

Xuan Khanh Resettlement Village, 395, 405, 44 6

Xuan Thanh, 45 3

Y

Yale University, 5

Yang River, 34 6

Yates, Lawrence A ., 629

Yeary, 2dLt Randall D., 6 8

"Yellow Brick Road," 25 3

Yen River, 88, 91, 98—99, 153, 157, 59 1

Yordy, PFC Charles R ., 335

Young, Capt Richard K ., 5 2

Youngdale Board, 531—3 2

Youngdale, MajGen Carl A ., 374—75, 375p, 381—83, 414 ,

419, 421, 423, 436, 437n, 439p, 441p, 531, 56 5

Z

Zachery, Sgt G .B., 189

Zahuranic, Cpl George B ., 642—4 4

Zais, MajGen Melvin, USA, 371n, 45 5

Zensen, Capt Roger, 244 ; LtCol 244n
The device reproduced on the back cover is

the oldest military insignia in continuous

use in the United States . It first appeared as

shown on Marine Corps buttons adopted in

1804 With the stars changed to five points,

the device has continued on Marine Corps

buttons to the present day
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D.C.