AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P U B L I C A T I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

N O . 3 3 / J U N E 2 0 1 7

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Thousands of foreign fishing vessels ply African 

waters every year seeking to tap the continent’s rich 

fish stocks. Many of these vessels are believed to be 

exploiting Africa’s fisheries illegally. Offenses include fishing without a license, fishing in protected 

areas, using banned fishing gear that is destructive 

to the fisheries sector, catching beyond limits, or 

catching protected species. Even licensed vessels 

regularly do not report catches as required. Those 

that do often underreport their actual intake. 

A Greenpeace investigation found that Chinese 

fishing vessels operating in West Africa misreport 

the size of their vessels by as much as 60 percent. 

This practice enables fishing companies to dramatically increase their catches while fishing in areas 

Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry:

A Threat to Human Security

By André Standing

u The illegal exploitation of African fisheries by foreign fishing companies deprives African governments 

of a highly valuable source of revenue and contributes to Africa being the only region in the world 

where rates of fish consumption are declining.

u African countries must substantially upgrade their capacity to monitor and prosecute illegal fishing in 

African waters.

u Weak accountability of the African fisheries sector enables the ongoing and unsustainable exploitation 

of this resource. Collusive relationships with foreign fishing companies often serve the financial 

interests of government officials responsible for overseeing the fisheries sector.

u Leading fishing nations must step up regulation of unethical practices by their fishing vessels in order to 

support fair trading practices and avoid the imminent collapse of African fish stocks.

H I G H L I G H T S

reserved for smaller vessels. In Guinea-Bissau, foreign fishing vessels are known to collude with smallscale African fishers to access waters reserved for 

artisanal fishing. The small-scale fishers catch and 

then simply unload the fish onto the main “mothership” without the larger, foreign-owned vessel ever 

requiring a fishing license. 

These problems are compounded by inadequate 

monitoring and surveillance efforts of the fishing 

sector by African governments as well as complicity 

between foreign fishing companies and the African ministries responsible for regulating fishing. At 

times, African political leaders have direct financial 

interests in joint ventures with foreign fishing companies. Fishing agreements are frequently opaque 
Dr. André Standing is an advisor at the Coalition for Fair 

Fisheries Arrangements.

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a growing global demand for fish, is compelling these 

foreign companies to ply distant African waters to 

sustain supply. So long as these global factors persist, the pressure for illegal exploitation of African 

fisheries will continue.

Although illegal fishing is not a unique problem in Africa, African countries are particularly 

vulnerable due to their under-enforcement of the 

law, limited capacity in fisheries management, inadequate awareness of the costs of the exploitation, 

and political corruption implicating both African 

governments and foreign fishing partners, all of 

which inhibit aggressive action. 

AN OVERVIEW OF THE FISHERIES SECTOR 

IN AFRICA

Fishing in Africa can be divided, somewhat 

simplistically, into the large-scale sector and the 

small-scale sector. The small-scale sector, characterized by artisanal fishing methods, is largely 

undertaken by Africans to supply local markets, 

although some fish caught by local small-scale fishers is traded regionally, such as the dried or smoked 

fish from Senegal that is sold throughout West and 

Central Africa. Small-scale fisheries support large 

numbers of Africans involved in fish processing 

and trade. There are an estimated 12 million people employed in fisheries either on a full-time basis 

or on a part-time, seasonal basis. While men tend 

to do the majority of fishing, women can make up 

the majority of those working in the post-harvest 

sector, which makes the fishing industry so important for the food security of many women and 

their children. Together, the industry represents 

an important and flexible source of employment 

and income for vulnerable, low-income Africans.

Alongside this small-scale sector, the large-scale 

sector targets a range of species predominantly for 

export. Despite efforts by development agencies 

beginning in the 1960s to establish African-owned 

industrial fisheries, today almost all of the largescale industrial sector comprises vessels owned by 

companies from the European Union (EU), Russia, 

Eastern Europe, or Asia, with China, South Korea, 

and Japan being the most significant. 

keeping basic information from public view, such 

as who is allowed to fish, how much they pay, and 

what they catch. 

Given the scope of the offenses, the range of 

actors involved, and the difficulties of detection, 

estimates of the scale of illegal fishing in Africa are 

notoriously unreliable. What is clear is that overfishing is depleting African fish stocks. Official reports 

show that some 8 million tons of fish are harvested 

in continental waters annually—a tenfold increase 

from the 1960s. For many countries, this intensification of fishing has been unsustainable, as evidenced 

by historical catch records showing dramatic peaks 

in production (often in the 1980s and 1990s), followed by stagnation and then decline—a drop that 

cannot be attributed to conservation efforts.

This expansion of foreign fishing in African 

waters has simultaneously caused declining availability of fish in local markets. This is a result of 

trade dynamics that have shifted toward high levels 

of exports from African fisheries and a greater reliance on imports—eliminating a crucial food security 

safety net. Africa is the only continent in the world 

where per capita fish consumption is declining. This 

is extremely worrying given the importance of fish 

for the health of millions of Africans who rely on 

fish as a source of protein. Meanwhile, revenues from 

commercial fishing received by African governments 

is widely considered far too low given the volume 

of fishing taking place. On its current trajectory, 

the trend of declining catches threatens to diminish 

income from what ought to be a renewable natural 

resource. The African Union has estimated that 

under sustainable management the fishing sector 

could generate an additional $2 billion annually 

for African economies.

 Criminality in Africa’s fishing industry also increasingly appears to be the outcome of a structural 

crisis. Substantial overcapacity within the highly 

subsidized fleets of foreign fishing vessels, combined 

with dwindling catches in their national waters and 
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Most of these vessels operate under short-term 

licenses (typically on an annual basis). Some operate on a charter basis. Licenses are sometimes 

linked to fisheries access agreements, established 

by the governments of foreign fishing nations or 

fishing company associations with African governments. The EU, for example, has what it calls “Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements” with 

12 African countries, and it is negotiating more. 

These agreements set the price, terms, and conditions of fishing, and are often joined by additional 

commitments for funding fisheries development 

or research. 

Outside of these agreements, a significant 

number of foreign-owned vessels have reflagged 

to local countries, or have established joint venture 

companies with local fishing rights holders. This 

is significant since under international fisheries 

laws, the flag state bears the legal responsibility 

of its fishing fleets abroad. When vessels reflag, so 

does this responsibility. 

The growth of fishing in Africa by these 

distant-water fishing fleets is partly explained by 

stagnating and dwindling catches in their national waters or traditional fishing grounds. Foreign 

fishing companies have subsequently expanded 

their operations to Africa to sustain supply. This 

is made possible through considerable subsidies. 

The world’s fishing industry receives an estimated 

$20 billion a year in capacity-enhancing subsidies. 

A significant part of this allows vessels from Asia 

and Europe to operate in developing countries.1 In 

Africa, the EU pays up to 50 percent of the costs 

of EU access agreements on behalf of its fishing 

fleet. In 2013, the Chinese government provided 

approximately $6.5 billion in subsidies for its fishing sector, 94 percent of this in the form of cheaper 

diesel.2 It is unlikely that foreign fishing would 

persist at its current intensity in Africa if subsidies 

were phased out.

A sizable part of this industrial sector is engaged in fishing for high-value migratory species 

such as tuna, billfish, and sharks. This fleet is made 

up of two main components: vessels that catch 

fish from baited hooks stretching for several miles 

(longliners) and larger boats that catch schools 

of fish via purse seine nets (seiners), with the fish 

usually located by floating platforms left at sea to 

encourage various marine life, including tuna, to 

congregate underneath. Longliners are far more 

numerous, with more than 2,000 operating in the 

West Indian Ocean, compared to fewer than 200 of 

the more expensive seiners in the same area. LongFISHING AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA

At least 200 million Africans eat fish regularly, 

although per capita fish consumption is highly 

uneven in Africa. In general, Africans eat less 

fish than people in North America, Europe, or 

Asia. Nevertheless, being high in both protein 

and macronutrients, even a small amount of fish 

can have significant health benefits. Because 

of this, in many African countries wild-caught 

fish is considered “irreplaceable.” There is no 

other affordable food source that can be used as 

a substitute.

Unfortunately, per capita fish consumption in 

many African countries is in decline. It is the 

only continent where this trend is happening. 

Meanwhile, rates of chronic malnutrition across 

the continent remain persistently high. Historically, dried or smoked sea fish, such as sardines 

and mackerel, has been a staple food for millions 

of Africans, particularly in rural areas. In the 

early 2000s, approximately 1.7 million tons were 

caught off West Africa, accounting for the bulk 

fish consumption that was estimated at just over 

10 kg per person in 2012. Yet there has been a 

steady decline in catches since then, caused by 

both overfishing and climate change. Meanwhile, foreign commercial companies that used 

to sell to African markets, such as Nigeria, are 

increasingly exporting to China. This is contributing to a decline in per capita fish consumption 

in Africa.

Given estimates of population growth on the 

continent, sustaining an annual average of 10 kg 

of fish per capita is unlikely. In fact, research predicting rates of fish consumption in Africa find 

that, by 2025, there will probably be a shortfall 

of well over a million tons of fish if the aim is to 

sustain fish consumption at the 2012 level.3 Fish 

prices will also increase as a result, meaning the 

poorest populations will suffer the most.
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liners, in particular, often transfer their catches 

at sea and fish relentlessly for many months, or 

longer, before returning to port.

A sizable number of industrial vessels specialize in landing lucrative demersel (bottom dwelling) 

species of fish, such as crustaceans, prawns, and 

octopi. Demersel fish are normally caught through 

trawling on or close to the seafloor, often close to 

coastal areas crowded with small-scale fishers. 

Other significant industrial fishing in African 

waters targets vast numbers of migratory small pelagics, such as sardines and mackerel, which are either destined for fishmeal production or sold frozen 

or canned as relatively cheap food-grade fish. This 

is the key fishery throughout West and Southern 

Africa supplying fish for local consumption. Small 

pelagic trawlers comprise some of the largest fishing 

vessels in the world, being at least 120 meters long 

and using nets over 600 meters in length and up to 

100 meters in diameter. Historically, a substantial 

proportion of small pelagics caught by European 

and Russian companies were sold back to African 

markets. Consequently, this fishery has been both 

an important source of local fish for people to eat, 

but also a direct competitor with the small-scale 

African fishing and fish processing sector. The 

trend appears to be shifting as a greater proportion of the industrial catch is now being exported 

directly to China.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ILLEGAL FISHING

Since the late 1990s, there has been growing awareness that the industrial fishing sector is 

highly prone to forms of dishonesty. This has been 

observed almost everywhere, and not just in developing countries. It is an outcome of a business sector 

that is increasingly competitive, subject to rising 

costs (particularly fuel prices), and beholden to a 

capricious market for its produce (prices paid for 

fish fluctuate considerably). For many fisheries there 

is also the added strain of climate change, which 

can lead to seasonal variations in the abundance of 

fish, sometimes dramatically. Added to these challenges is the widespread belief that there is a chronic 

overcapacity in the world’s industrial fishing fleet, 

which is becoming ever more efficient at finding 

and catching fish. 

The result is that fishing companies face an unpredictable environment and are, as a result, highly 

prone to risk taking and evading (or resisting) regulations. This structural crisis in fisheries globally is 

compounded in Africa by the limited capacity of 

many coastal states to manage and monitor foreign 

fishing. Madagascar is illustrative. The control of 

fishing along its extensive coastline and in its territorial waters (it is the fourth largest island in the 

world) is achieved by only 3 monitoring vessels, 8 

speedboats, 18 inspectors, and 22 observers.4

Illegal fishing in Africa covers a wide range 

of offenses, from fishing without a license, fishing 

in protected areas, the use of banned fishing gear, 

catching beyond limits, to catching protected species. And while licensed vessels are usually under 

an obligation to report catches to both the coastal 

state and their flag state, many do not. And those 

that do report data face few obstacles to being dishonest.There are additional trade-related offenses, 

such as unloading catches in nondesignated ports or 

transshipping catches at sea without the authorization to do so.

Fraudulent behavior of multinational fishing 

firms includes transfer pricing manipulation and unlawful tax avoidance. These problems are facilitated 

by the widespread use of subsidiary shell companies 

registered in tax havens, which also hide the true 

beneficial ownership of vessels. This allows fishing 

firms to operate vessels that are not under the jurisdiction of their flag state nor linked to their parent 

companies. Added to this list of offenses are the 

gross violations of workers’ rights onboard vessels, 

which are gradually gaining international concern, 

but remain poorly regulated.5

There have been several attempts to estimate 

the scale of illegal fishing in Africa. However, given 

the scope of offenses, the range of actors involved, 

“it is unlikely that foreign fishing 

would persist at its current intensity 

in Africa if subsidies were phased 

out”
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and the difficulties of detection, these estimates are 

not reliable. The most well-referenced study, undertaken in 2005, suggested that about a quarter of 

all fishing in Africa was illegal.6 That equates to a 

market value of roughly $1 billion. More rigorous 

case-study research is needed to determine this figure 

with more precision. Needless to say, it is beyond 

doubt that the economic, social, and environmental 

costs of illegal fishing in Africa is substantial and 

extremely worrying. 

Much attention of international campaigns 

against illegal fishing has been given to unlicensed 

fishers, or so-called “pirate fishers.” This is thought 

to be a problem for many West African countries, 

where foreign fishing vessels operate in the region without obtaining licenses from all affected 

countries. It is also something that is associated 

with the fleet of longliners that drift in and out 

of a country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 

may easily operate without bothering to pay their 

license fees. The chance of detection is quite low 

in many areas. 

The problem of fishing without a license has 

reached dramatic levels for countries experiencing 

armed conflicts, where fishing authorities are barely 

functioning. This happened in Liberia, for example, 

when dozens of European- and Chinese-owned ships 

were known to be fishing without permission during the two-decade-long civil conflict that began 

in the late 1980s. It is also alleged that hundreds of 

European and Asian vessels have been doing this 

in Somalia, where an effective centralized licensing 

system has been absent for many years, but where 

fishing, including for tuna, can be extremely lucrative. Indeed, fishing vessels operating in Somalia 

have in the past paid substantial sums to various 

warlords for protection from piracy. These funds are 

thought to have contributed to the escalating piracy 

threat as well as the worsening of the armed conflict. 

The practice of unlicensed fishing has also led to 

collusion with small-scale fishers. In Guinea-Bissau, 

Asian fishing vessels are known to transport dozens 

of pirogues and fishers from African countries, such 

as Senegal, to fish on their behalf and unload their 

catches onto the main “mothership.” This saves the 

larger foreign-owned vessels from requiring a fishing license.

However, unlicensed fishing may not be the 

primary concern for many developing countries. 

Buying a license to fish is usually affordable for 

West Africa:

2.9 million tons

$7.15 billion

Asia (excl. Japan, 

South Korea):

948,000 tons

$2.45 billion

Antarctica:

48,000 tons

$7.8 million

South Korea, 

Japan:

106,000 tons

$22 million

East Africa:

181,000 tons

$50.5 million

Oceania:

198,000 tons

$71.2 million

Central and 

South America:

182,000 tons

$44 million

West Africa:

64% of total

Asia (excl. Japan, South Korea):

21% of total

Other: 15% of total

Estimated average annual catch by region, in metric tons, 2000-2011

Source: The Pew Charitable Trusts

W H E R E C H I N E S E V E S S E L S F I S H
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commercial vessels, and in many fisheries they 

face few restrictions in obtaining one. Indeed, recent research on industrial fishing in the Pacific 

Islands region, which has similarities to fishing in 

Africa, found that despite public concern with unlicensed fishing, it made up only 1 percent of the 

total estimated offenses, far less than was previously 

thought.7 The vast majority of fishing vessels were 

authorized to fish. 

Instead, the main forms of illegalities involved 

licensed vessels underreporting catches and fishers 

using banned fishing methods. Of particular concern 

was the use of fish-aggregating devices by the seiners 

targeting tuna—and their reluctance to adhere to 

a rest period to give tuna and other species time to 

recover. The research in the Pacific Islands demonstrated it was corporate crime by the licensed sector 

that was the problem, not the activities of a fleet 

of “pirates.”

The same may be true in many parts of Africa. 

One of the most high-profile cases of illegal fishing 

in Africa was investigated in the mid-2000s in South 

Africa. It involved one of the leading South African 

companies engaged in the fishing and export of rock 

lobster. At a time when the government was trying 

to reduce the total allowable catch of lobster, Hout 

Bay Fishing invested in a new fleet of larger boats, 

capable of catching far more than was subsequently 

made available to them. It was later revealed that 

the company was poaching a substantial number of 

lobsters and concealing them in containers being 

shipped to the United States, bribing many South 

African inspectors in the process. It was estimated 

that the illegal fishing added an extra 30 percent to 

the official catches of the entire lobster fishery. The 

case resulted in one of the largest fines ($22.5 million) for illegal trade in wildlife by U.S. authorities, 

prosecuted under the Lacey Act.

More recently, Greenpeace revealed new insights into illegal fishing by Chinese vessels operating in West Africa, the majority of which are bottom 

trawlers.8 Here again the primary problem was not 

unlicensed fishing (although this was documented) 

but rather substantial fraud in the misreporting of 

vessel sizes. In some African fisheries, a degree of 

management control is achieved through restricting 

the size of authorized vessels as well as prohibiting larger vessels from operating in areas used by 

artisanal fishers. Chinese companies misreported 

the size of their vessels by as much as 60 percent, 

thereby gaining cheaper licenses. This also enabled 

them to dramatically increase their catches beyond 

predicted levels as well as fish in areas reserved for 

smaller vessels.

Misreporting of vessel size arguably has the 

most devastating impact on coastal communities. 

There are fairly widespread reports, particularly in 

West Africa, that industrial fishing vessels venture 

into coastal areas reserved for local artisanal fishers. This not only undermines the availability of 

fish, but also can cause damage to local vessels and 

fishing gear. 

PROBLEMS BEYOND ILLEGAL FISHING

Many forms of crime in the African fisheries 

sector simply build on the negative tendencies evident in legal fisheries: inequitable sharing of benefits, overfishing, and the diversion of fish from local 

food processing and markets.

In highly regulated fisheries, where the number of vessels is controlled and a limit on allowable 

catch is in place, illegal fishing by licensed or unlicensed vessels poses a serious threat to sustainable 

fishing and the profitability of legitimate fishers. Yet 

African countries place few restrictions, if any, on 

the number of foreign vessels allowed to access their 

waters and what they are allowed to catch. Most 

vessels pay a flat fee loosely related to the value of 

their catch.

In many African countries, industrial fisheries 

have been allowed to operate in poorly regulated 

environments. A review of the state of fisheries management in Central and West Africa in 2016 found 

that less than a quarter of the countries had extensive fisheries management plans—the basic tool for 

“the main forms of illegalities involved 

licensed vessels underreporting catches 

and fishers using banned fishing 

methods”
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controlling and monitoring fishery performance.9

In-depth scientific research is often lacking for all 

but the most high-value fisheries. Considerable areas 

of the fisheries sector are, therefore, left unregulated, 

leaving the fishing industry highly vulnerable to unsustainable exploitation.

The best regulated fisheries are those that fall 

under the governance of the Regional Fisheries 

Management Organizations (RFMOs). These intergovernmental organizations were established to 

provide research and control of high-value migratory and shared fish stocks. Five RFMOs focus on African waters. The most developed and resourced of 

these are the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and 

the International Commission for the Conservation 

of Atlantic Tunas. These two RFMOs cover the 

highly valuable tuna fisheries on both sides of the 

continent. Their work on achieving sustainable fishing is thought to be improving, yet environmental 

organizations still complain that recommendations 

by the secretariats of the two organizations are often 

watered down or rejected by member states with the 

largest fishing interests.11 For example, both RFMOs’ 

efforts to reduce shark fishing by longliners licensed 

to fish tuna have been timid and resisted. This has 

contributed to a remarkable decline in shark numbers in African waters, as is the case in many other 

parts of the world.12

The inadequate regulation of industrial fishing in many African countries is partly caused by 

capacity constraints. As is evident in some of the 

best managed fisheries in the world, effective fisheries management requires considerable expertise 

and resources, which are simply not available in 

many African countries. However, the challenge 

of achieving sustainable and equitable fishing is not 

simply a technical one. The fisheries sector in Africa continues to be vulnerable to misgovernance. 

At times, this includes forms of rent seeking and 

corruption—problems that have been left largely 

absent from the fisheries reform agenda.

These problems implicate both African authorities and foreign fishing partners. These shortcomings are most vividly revealed in the dismally 

low levels of transparency in fisheries access agreements. Few African countries publish a list of licensed fishing vessels. Apart from the EU, fisheries 

access agreements between African coastal states 

and foreign countries and fishing companies remain confidential, for reasons that are not well 

articulated.

Several examples demonstrate that the terms 

and conditions of these opaque access agreements 

frequently permit unsustainable and destructive 

fishing and, at times, allow foreign vessels to unfairly compete in local coastal fisheries. For instance, in 2012, Mauritania decided to provide a 

Chinese company a 25-year fisheries access agree-

“the challenge of achieving 

sustainable and equitable fishing is not 

simply a technical one. The fisheries 

sector in Africa continues to be 

vulnerable to misgovernance”

T H E U N S U S T A I N A B I L I T Y O F 

U N R E G U L A T E D I N D U S T R I A L F I S H I N G

In Guinea-Bissau industrial fishing by European, 

Korean, and Japanese companies began in the 

late 1950s, later joined by Soviet and Chinese 

companies. From almost no industrial fishing in 

1950, catches reached an estimated 390,000 tons 

in 1989, when the government issued licenses 

for as many as 250 large-scale foreign vessels.10

At its peak, fishing provided nearly half of the 

government’s official revenue, although it still 

represented a small fraction of the value of the 

fish being exported. However, with virtually no 

efforts at control, there was a sharp and seemingly 

permanent decline in fish stock biomass. 

By 2010, the number of vessels choosing to 

operate off Guinea-Bissau had dropped to less 

than 100, and catches were estimated to be down 

to 73,000 tons. For decades it has been known 

that additional fishing has been undertaken in 

Guinea-Bissau by other foreign vessels licensed in 

bordering countries. Some estimates put this figure at about 40 vessels. In such cases of lax regulation, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish 

between legal and illegal fishers—or to maintain 

a sustainable fisheries sector. 
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ment that allowed at least 80 fishing vessels access to already overfished stocks, including those 

targeted by local small-scale fishers. The agreement was negotiated and signed without public 

consultation, including that of local fishers. It only 

became known to them after the text of the protocol was leaked by a member of parliament. The 

agreement required the Chinese company to invest 

in local fishing infrastructure for the benefit of the 

small-scale fisheries.13 However, this investment 

never materialized.

Similarly, during 2011, the then Senegalese 

fisheries minister granted licenses through an unpublished bilateral agreement to allow industrial 

trawlers, mostly from Russia, to target small pelagics. For several years they had been denied such access on the sound argument that small-scale fishing 

in Senegal was already at capacity. The decision 

was widely condemned amid accusations that the 

revenue from the deal was not fully accounted for.14 

In such cases there are often concerns that 

fisheries access agreements are influenced by 

bribery—or that aid and wider investment agreements (including in other sectors of geopolitical 

importance, such as mining and arms) are used as 

leverage in fisheries negotiations. These failures of 

fisheries management are made more complex and 

difficult to counter because of the prevalence of 

conflicts of interest. It is not unusual to find that 

politically well connected individuals (including 

those with roles in fisheries authorities) have direct 

financial interests in commercial fishing ventures, 

sometimes through being the local partners in joint 

venture companies, the license holders who charter 

foreign vessels to fish on their behalf, or by acting 

as local agents for foreign fishing companies. 

In Mozambique, for example, former President 

Armando Guebuza and other senior military officials have played an important role in the ownership of joint venture shrimp fishing companies 

since independence. According to some accounts, 

this was an important reason why quotas for shrimp 

were allowed to be set too high and why the allocation of fishing rights has been concentrated among 

a few large firms, as opposed to distributed more 

fairly to a wider group of people.15

Mozambique’s reputation for responsible fisheries management was further eroded by the launch 

in 2014 of a tuna fishing company owned by three 

government agencies. The company, EMATUM, 

was financed through a government-guaranteed 

Eurobond of $850 million, arranged by Credit 

Suisse and the Russian bank VTB. There was no 

publicity of the deal before it was concluded, although it substantially raised Mozambique’s debt 

and eventually contributed to a downgrading of the 

country’s credit rating and currency value when the 

government defaulted on the bond. The money was 

officially used to buy 26 longliners and 4 patrol 

vessels from France, although a substantial part 

of the loan went toward the purchase of military 

hardware. The business model justifying the investment was a sham, and the vessels have caught a 

fraction of what was needed to service the debt.16

THE WAY FORWARD

Confronting Unsustainable and Illegal Fishing

As this review demonstrates, there is a clear 

need to strengthen law enforcement efforts at both 

the national and international level for fisheries. 

This will also require expanding the applicability 

of civil and criminal penalties to include not just 

vessel owners but also the corporate structures and 

beneficial owners behind them. Such cases can be 

strengthened by considering the multiple dimensions of fisheries crimes beyond illegal fishing, such 

as money laundering and bribery. Yet a great deal 

of pressure needs to be placed on all foreign fishing 

nations to contribute effectively to this. 

Strengthen Africa’s surveillance and prosecutorial capacity. An essential step in any effort 

to confront and reduce illegal fishing in African 

waters is to substantially upgrade monitoring of 

foreign fishing vessels at sea and in ports. Better 

information is needed to mobilize political will as 

well as guide the allocation of limited enforcement 

resources. Technological advances, such as satellite 

monitoring or the use of drones, may help improve 

effectiveness in detecting some forms of crime and 

bring surveillance costs down. But they are unlikely 
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to replace the need for more traditional and expensive law enforcement activities, including paying 

for inspectors, patrol boats, and the undertaking of 

complex financial investigations. Given the costs 

to acquire and maintain surveillance vessels, many 

African countries may need external security and 

development assistance. These resources must be 

accompanied by a stringent oversight and management plan, however, if they are to have a sustainable impact (see “Support the Fisheries Transparency Initiative” below). Arguably, many of these 

costs should be borne by foreign fishing nations 

and their companies, reflected in higher access fees.

Similarly, the success of African governments 

to prosecute foreign firms for fishing illegally in 

their waters is limited. There have been several 

documented cases where vessels arrested for illegal 

fishing have managed to evade further prosecution through out-of-court settlements, bribery, 

and diplomatic pressure coming from their home 

governments. Nonetheless, there have been some 

positive cases. Liberia, for instance, enforced a ban 

on industrial trawling in 2011. The ban extended 

a zone at sea for which only local small-scale fishers could exploit. Reports suggest this is having a 

positive impact on the local supply of food-grade 

fish. True to form, several industrial vessels ignored 

the ban. Yet, it was impressive that the Liberian 

government pursued them with some vigor and 

raised over $2 million in fines as a result. 

Liberia’s experience illustrates frustrating aspects as well. EU vessels fishing for tuna formed 

part of the fleet ignoring the ban. In their defense, 

they claimed they had been issued forged licenses 

by a member of the Liberian government. With 

EU pressure, as a condition for Liberia’s first EU 

fisheries access agreement, their fines were reclassified by the Liberian government as payments for 

licenses, and their catch was deemed acceptable 

by the EU for export back home.

Enhance enforcement by fishing nations. 

Given the central role played by international fishing firms in illegal, unreported, and unregulated 

(IUU) fishing in Africa, addressing this problem 

will require cooperation at the international level. 

Over the past decade, several initiatives have been 

launched to assist governments in detecting illegal fishing offenders and increasing the severity of 

penalties. There is now a growing role played in 

investigating illegal fishing instances in Africa by 

organizations such as Interpol, the United Nations 

Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as several international nongovernmental organizations. Meanwhile, the Food and Agricultural Organization of 

the United Nations has dedicated a great deal of 

time establishing an international plan of action 

against IUU fishing, which has led to binding international agreements for improved monitoring 

and law enforcement. Some RFMOs have also 

developed lists of known offenders, and member 

states of these organizations are expected to deny 

these vessels licenses. 

The EU, Africa’s largest fishing trading partner, has also launched a system, under its Regulation No. 1005/2008 (the IUU Regulation), for both 

exporting and importing countries to verify the 

legality of catches that enter the EU. This regulation imposes warnings and eventually temporary 

trade bans for countries that fail to demonstrate 

that illegal fishing in their national waters is being addressed. To be effective, however, the IUU 

Regulation must be applied consistently including 

against major exporting countries, such as China.

The lists of known offenders compiled by 

RFMOs tend to be much smaller than would be 

expected given the reports of abuse. A weakness 

is that the process of adding vessels to these lists 

requires the support of governments (including the 

home and/or flag state of the fishing vessel in question). Moreover, if a vessel found guilty of illegal 

fishing has paid a fine, then it is exempt. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, despite having over 

6,000 registered vessels, has black-listed only 54.

A key issue in the lackluster response to illegal fishing is the feeble role of fishing nations in 

actively investigating and auditing their fishing 

firms in Africa, although as the flag state, they 

have this responsibility according to international 

fisheries laws. In fact, while vessels and crew are 

sometimes arrested, beneficial owners of fishing 

firms are rarely put at risk of criminal trials, either 

in African countries or back home.
10

One example, in Spain, involved an in-depth 

investigation into the fishing activities of several 

privately-owned multinational fishing companies 

in 2016. Through its investigative work, the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food and 

Environment successfully imposed administrative 

penalties and fines on a group of Spanish citizens 

for illegal fishing in the Antarctic, including a fine 

of over €17 million (more than $19 million). However, efforts to have the company owners criminally 

prosecuted were rejected by the Spanish Supreme 

Court on the basis that the alleged crimes were 

committed on the high seas, where the activities 

are not recognized as a crime by Spain. Nonetheless, the efforts by the Spanish government are encouraging and stand in strong contrast to the efforts 

of other fishing nations, such as China, Russia, 

Japan, and other EU member states. Importantly, 

Interpol is playing an increasingly central role in 

facilitating transnational criminal investigations 

of fishing companies.

Measures Beyond Law Enforcement

While strengthened enforcement is vital to 

reversing the trends of IUU fishing in Africa, if 

estimates of widespread criminality and corruption 

are credible, then arresting or banning individual 

offenders may prove insufficient. In fact, a focus 

on individual offenders risks obscuring the nature 

of the problem, including that a lot of damaging 

and unethical behaviors in the sector ostensibly 

remain legal and, therefore, outside the reach of 

traditional law enforcement. The answer to unethical and unsustainable fishing, therefore, needs to 

go beyond law enforcement. 

Phase out fishing subsidies. The stark reality 

is that crime and unethical activities have emerged 

as an outcome of the structural crisis in industrial 

fisheries. Its roots lie partly in the reckless use of 

subsidies by fishing nations. Frustratingly, global 

efforts to phase out capacity-enhancing subsidies 

in fisheries, including through the World Trade 

Organization (WTO), have been drawn out and 

ineffective, and thought to be blocked by several 

fishing nations including Japan, Taiwan, and South 

Korea, as well as the EU. Revitalizing WTO discussions on fisheries subsidies reform is under negotiation. However, it is not clear that any new 

agreement would be stronger than what exists presently. Exploring alternative measures to discipline 

fisheries subsidizers, including bilaterally between 

fish trading partners, has been advocated as an alternative given the growing frustration with the 

lack of progress at the multilateral level. 

In addition to subsidies, the fisheries sector 

receives speculative private investments that support the intensification of fishing in parts of the 

world that are already heavily exploited. The case 

of Credit Suisse and VTB raising $850 million for 

EMATUM is perhaps the most vivid example.17

However, there are other cases. In 2011, the U.S.-

based Carlyle Group invested $190 million in China Fishery, a subsidiary of the world’s largest fishing 

company, Pacific Andes, to help expand its fishing 

operations for small pelagics, including in parts of 

West and Southern Africa.

Expand and enhance accountability in fisheries access agreements. The design of fisheries 

access agreements is where African countries may 

have the best opportunity to create an environment that is favorable to more sustainable and lawful fishing. Yet, too often fisheries access agreements are guided by the immediate expansion of 

license fees or resource rents, which, combined 

with lack of transparency, fosters an environment 

conducive to irresponsible behaviors by both governments and companies.

In 2014, African fisheries ministers produced, 

through the auspices of the African Union, a 

comprehensive Policy Framework and Reform 

Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa, 

which included a strong commitment to improve 

public access to information and accountability. 

Unfortunately, it lacks extensive details on implementation and deadlines. In the past few years, 

“a lot of damaging and unethical 

behaviors in the sector ostensibly 

remain legal and, therefore, 

beyond the reach of traditional law 

enforcement”
11

several United Nations-led initiatives have elaborated a human rights approach in fisheries. This 

approach emphasizes strengthening political and 

civil rights for addressing corruption and weak 

governance, as well as reiterating the importance 

of participation by small-scale fishers in fisheries 

management decisions.

The World Bank, the largest single donor to 

Africa’s fisheries sector, is also increasingly designing its lending to African coastal countries to 

include a participatory governance component, 

including improving transparency, fisheries management planning, and improved participation in 

decision-making processes for small-scale fishers. 

Several large regional projects intended to improve 

fisheries governance in this way are now being financed and managed by the World Bank, such as 

the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program and 

the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Governance and Shared Growth Project.

These are all positive developments as they 

target the conflicts of interest of politically well 

connected individuals that often undermine oversight and regulatory control of African fisheries. 

To be effective, these initiatives must be coupled 

with domestic pressures for increased transparency 

in Africa’s fishing ministries so as to improve decision making in fisheries management. Specific actions would entail requiring that all fisheries access 

agreements are made public and to institutionalize 

civil society oversight boards of fisheries ministries 

as a means to enhance transparency as well as to 

ensure that the interests of small-scale fishers and 

citizens are represented. 

Support the Fisheries Transparency Initiative. The World Bank and the African Development Bank, among many others, are also developing the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI). 

Although a global initiative, several African 

countries are among the first to show a commitment to implementing FiTI, including Mauritania 

and the Seychelles. The FiTI attempts to bring together governments, representatives of the fishing 

industry, and civil society to publish and verify 

comprehensive data on the fisheries sector. This 

includes the terms of access agreements, details 

of payments by vessels and foreign investors, information on new investments and subsidies, as 

well as unprecedented levels of data on catches. 

It is hoped that FiTI can provide credible data 

that will feed into improved national discussions 

on fisheries management and access agreements. 

Media and civil society access to this information will be essential to facilitate broader public 

engagement on these issues and steer African fisheries regulations away from the special interests 

that have long dominated. 

The quest for improved governance of access 

agreements again requires the commitment of foreign fishing nations. In Africa, the EU has made 

the strongest efforts. Its access agreements with African countries remain the only ones that are made 

public. The EU is also gradually allowing for more 

participation in the negotiation process, including 

with representatives from local small-scale fisheries. The EU is concluding a new regulation that 

complements its work against IUU fishing, which 

will require all European companies to obtain authorization from the EU to fish in a third country’s 

waters. The intention is to deny authorization to 

vessels that have been engaged in illegal fishing 

and vessels targeting already overfished stocks. 

Unfortunately, the regulation does not extend to 

those EU vessels that have reflagged to non-EU 

countries. Nonetheless, the EU model is worth 

emulating elsewhere. 

In sum, the solution to unethical and unsustainable foreign fishing in Africa must be based 

on reforms at multiple levels. Strengthening law 

enforcement capacity must be combined with enduring political reforms to have lasting effectiveness. One without the other is unlikely to succeed. 

“too often fisheries access agreements 

are guided by the immediate 

expansion of license fees or resource 

rents, which, combined with lack of 

transparency, fosters an environment 

conducive to irresponsible behaviors 

by both governments and companies”
12

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

committed to building networks of African, American, European, and 

international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: 

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ISSN 2164-4047 (print)

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NOTES

1 U. Rashid Sumaila, et al., “Global fisheries subsidies: An updated estimate,” Marine Policy 69 (2016), 189-193. 

2 Tabitha Grace Mallory, “Fisheries subsidies in China: 

Quantitative and qualitative assessment of policy coherence and effectiveness,” Marine Policy 68 (2016), 74-82.

3 Pierre Failler, “Climate Variability and Food Security in Africa: 

The Case of Small Pelagic Fish in West Africa,” Journal of Fisheries & 

Livestock Production 2, no. 2 (2014), 122. 

4 Frédéric Le Manach, et al., “Reconstruction of total marine 

fisheries catches for Madagascar (1950-2008),” in “Fisheries catch 

reconstructions: Islands, Part II,” eds. Sarah Harper and Dirk Zeller, 

Fisheries Centre Research Reports 19, no. 4 (Vancouver: UBC Fisheries 

Centre, 2011), 21-37. 

5 Ian Urbina, “‘Sea Slaves’: The Human Misery that Feeds Pets 

and Livestock,” The New York Times, July 27, 2015.

6 “Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 

Fishing on Developing Countries,” Marine Resources Assessment 

Group (July 2005).

7 “Towards the Quantification of Illegal, Unreported and 

Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the Pacific Islands Region,” MRAG 

Asia Pacific (February 2016).

8 “Africa’s Fisheries’ Paradise at a Crossroads: Investigating 

Chinese Companies’ Illegal Fishing Practices in West Africa,” 

Greenpeace East Asia and Greenpeace Africa (May 2015). 

9 “Fisheries Management in the CECAF region: Status of the 

elaboration and implementation of fisheries management plans and 

uptake of CECAF management recommendations by members,” document CECAF/XXI/2016/4 submitted at the Twenty-First Session of the 

Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF), Dakar, 

Senegal, April 20-22, 2016.

10 Dyhia Belhabib and Daniel Pauly, “Fisheries in troubled 

waters: A catch reconstruction for Guinea-Bissau, 1950-2010,” in 

“Fisheries catch reconstructions: West Africa, Part II,” eds. Dyhia 

Belhabib and Daniel Pauly, Fisheries Centre Research Reports 23, no. 3 

(Vancouver: UBC Fisheries Centre, 2015), 1-16.

11 Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly, “Failing the high seas: 

A global evaluation of regional fisheries management organizations,” 

Marine Policy 34 (2010), 1036-1042.

12 “Out of line: The failure of the global tuna longline fisheries,” 

Greenpeace (November 2013).

13 Dr. Ahmed Mahmoud Cherif, “La Convention Poly-Hondone 

Fishery—Mauritanie: Analyse des Impacts Economiques, Sociaux, 

Environnementaux,” Pêchecops (July 2011).

14 “The plunder of a nation’s birthright: The fishing license scandal: a drama in five acts,” Greenpeace Africa (March 2012). 

15 Lars Buur, Obede Baloi, and Carlota Mondlane Tembe, 

“Mozambique Synthesis Analysis: Between Pockets of Efficiency and 

Elite Capture,” DIIS Working Paper No. 01 (Copenhagen: Danish 

Institute for International Studies, 2012).

16 “A tuna scandal strikes: A flagship investment in Mozambique 

is starting to stink,” The Economist, August 7, 2015. 

17 Frances Coppola, “Mozambique Is About To Default On Its 

‘Tuna Bond,’” Forbes, January 17, 2017.