ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Joseph Cleary Steve Carter 

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

Brent Westerfeld Stephen R. Creason 

Indianapolis, Indiana Deputy Attorney General 

 Indianapolis, Indiana 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court 

_________________________________ 

No. 49S00-0409-PD-420 

BENJAMIN RITCHIE, 

 Appellant (Petitioner below), 

v. 

STATE OF INDIANA, 

 Appellee (Respondent below). 

_________________________________ 

Direct Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, Room 4 

No. 49G04-0010-CF-172900 

The Honorable Patricia Gifford, Judge 

_________________________________ 

November 8, 2007 

Rucker, Justice. 
Summary 

Benjamin Ritchie was convicted of murder, possession of a handgun by a serious violent 

felon, auto theft, and resisting law enforcement in connection with the 2000 shooting death of 

Beech Grove police officer William Toney. The trial court accepted the jury’s recommendation 

for a sentence of death for the murder conviction and sentenced Ritchie to a total executed term 

of twenty years for the remaining convictions. On direct appeal, we affirmed Ritchie’s 

conviction and sentence of death. Thereafter Ritchie filed a petition for post-conviction relief, 

which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. He now appeals that denial raising 

several issues for our review, some of which are waived.1

 We address the remaining issues, 

which we rephrase as follows: (1) whether Ritchie was denied the effective assistance of trial 

counsel; (2) whether Ritchie was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel; and (3) 

whether he received a fair post-conviction hearing. We affirm the post-conviction court. 

Facts2

A recitation of the essential facts in this case was set forth in our opinion on direct appeal 

as follows: 

On September 29, 2000, around 7:00 p.m, Ritchie and two others 

stole a white Chevrolet Astro van from a gas station in Beech 

Grove. The theft was reported and police were dispatched to the 

scene where Beech Grove police officer Matt Hickey filed a stolen 

 

1

 Ritchie complains the mandatory procedures for capital sentencing and independent appellate review 

were violated. Br. of Appellant at 88. Under these general headings he alleges: (1) the trial court 

improperly instructed the jury that he was eligible for a sentence ranging between forty-five and seventyfive years, but the actual range was forty-five to ninety-four years; (2) the trial court erroneously gave the 

jury a special verdict form on the weighing element; and (3) the trial court failed to issue a written 

sentencing order. Id. at 88-92. The purpose of a petition for post-conviction relief is to raise issues 

unknown or unavailable to a defendant at the time of the original trial or appeal. Reed v. State, 856 

N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 2006). These issues were known and available at the time of Ritchie’s direct 

appeal. An issue known but not raised on direct appeal is waived. Williams v. State, 808 N.E.2d 652, 

659 (Ind. 2004). 

2

 “Tr.” refers to trial transcript. “P-Cr.” refers to the transcript of the post-conviction proceedings. 

2
vehicle report. Approximately two hours later, Hickey was en 

route to a traffic accident scene and recognized the stolen van as 

Ritchie and one of his accomplices drove by. After confirming by 

radio that the van bore the license plate of the stolen vehicle, 

Hickey pursued, joined by officers Robert Mercuri and William 

Toney. After a short chase, the van pulled into the yard of a 

residence where Ritchie and his companion jumped out and ran in 

opposite directions. Officer Toney pursued Ritchie on foot, and 

ultimately Ritchie turned and fired four shots, one of which struck 

Toney in the chest. Toney died at the scene. 

Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ind. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 828 (2005). 

Procedural History 

The State charged Ritchie with murder, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious 

violent felon as a Class B felony, auto theft as a Class D felony, two counts of resisting law 

enforcement as Class D felonies, and carrying a handgun without a license, a Class C felony.3

 

Tr. at 7. The State sought the death penalty based on two aggravating circumstances: (1) the 

victim of the murder was a law enforcement officer acting in the course of duty, Ind. Code § 35-

50-2-9(b)(6)(A), and (2) at the time the murder was committed Ritchie was on probation after 

receiving a sentence for the commission of a felony. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(9)(C). 

Trial was held from July 31 through August 20, 2002. Prior to voir dire, Ritchie pleaded 

guilty to the serious violent felon in possession of a handgun charge. The jury convicted him on 

the remaining counts and recommended the death penalty for the murder conviction. The trial 

court accepted the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Ritchie to death for the murder 

conviction. Tr. at 2909. As for the remaining counts, the trial court sentenced Ritchie as 

follows: (1) twenty years for the unlawful possession of a firearm as a serious violent felon, (2) 

three years for auto theft, (3) three years for resisting law enforcement, as a Class D felony, and 

 

3

 On motion by the State the trial court dismissed the carrying a handgun without a license charge. App. 

at 52. 

3
(4) one year for resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor,4

 to be served 

concurrently. Id. at 2908-09. 

On direct appeal, we affirmed Ritchie’s convictions and death sentence. Thereafter, 

Ritchie filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which the post-conviction court granted in 

part5

 and denied in part after a hearing. This appeal followed. Additional facts are discussed 

below as necessary. 

Standard of Review for Post-Conviction Proceedings 

The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds 

for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Fisher v. State, 

810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). When appealing the denial of post-conviction relief, the 

petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Fisher, 810 N.E.2d 

at 679. To prevail from the denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the 

evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by 

the post-conviction court. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the 

post-conviction court in this case made findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance 

with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s 

legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon 

a showing of clear error – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted). 

Standard of Review for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Most of Ritchie’s claims fall under the general heading of the ineffective assistance of his 

trial and appellate lawyers. To establish a post-conviction claim alleging violation of the Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish the two 

 

4

 The record before us does not reveal at what point or how one of the resisting law enforcement 

convictions was reduced from a Class D felony to a Class A misdemeanor. 

5

 On Indiana double jeopardy grounds the post-conviction court vacated Ritchie’s sentence for resisting 

law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor. App. at 493-94. 

4
components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 390 (2000). First, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This requires a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Second, 

a defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This requires a 

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, meaning 

a trial whose result is reliable. Id. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Further, counsel’s performance is presumed 

effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this 

presumption. Ben-Yisrayl, 729 N.E.2d at 106. 

Discussion 

I.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Guilt Phase 

Ritchie raises two allegations of ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial: (A) 

“Failure to Retain Appropriate Expert Assistance” and (B) “Failure to Move for Suppression of 

Ritchie’s Videotaped Statements.” Br. of Appellant at 66, 71. 

A. Expert Assistance 

The State’s expert conducted a “laser trajectory analysis” to support the State’s theory 

that Ritchie killed Officer Toney while lying in wait. At trial, Ritchie’s defense team sought to 

undermine the State’s “lying in wait” theory and advance the defense’s theory that Ritchie acted 

recklessly in firing his handgun and did not knowingly or intentionally kill Officer Toney.6

 Br. 

of Appellant at 67. Consequently, rebutting the State’s evidence on the operation of the handgun 

 

6

 The record reveals that at Ritchie’s request the trial court instructed the jury on reckless homicide and 

voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of murder. Tr. at 2120-21. 

5
Ritchie used in the shooting – a Glock Model 26 – and the trajectory of the bullets became an 

important component of Ritchie’s defense. Tr. at 1637-43. To assist at trial, defense counsel 

retained the services of Wayne Hill, who held himself out as a crime scene reconstructionist and 

ballistics expert.7

 Problems arose during a pre-trial deposition concerning Hill’s asserted 

professional qualifications and articles he allegedly published. Hill’s deposition testimony was 

also inconsistent with the report he had previously given to the defense. According to one of 

Ritchie’s trial counsel, the prosecutor “absolutely destroyed this man’s credibility as a witness 

and I might add fairly under the rules.” P-Cr. at 170. 

One of Ritchie’s lawyers, Kevin McShane, concluded that he could not rely on Hill as a 

witness and that his testimony added no value to the defense. Id. at 171. Counsel did not consult 

with or retain another ballistics or reconstruction expert. Instead, the defense team decided the 

best strategy was to rely upon the testimony of the State’s crime scene investigator, Mickey 

French. McShane knew French to be a “straight shooter” and a “real honest expert.” Id. at 173. 

Counsel believed that favorable evidence to support their theory of the case could be elicited 

from French on direct as well as during cross-examination. French’s testimony at trial did not 

exclude the defense theory of events. 

Ritchie argues the failure to obtain another expert amounted to ineffective assistance of 

counsel. At the post-conviction hearing, Ritchie presented two experts: John Nixon and James 

Sobek. The post-conviction court found Nixon’s and Sobek’s testimony differed from that of 

French but not significantly so. App. at 454. For example, Nixon’s testimony differed from 

French’s regarding the relative safety of the handgun and a person’s ability to accurately aim the 

gun at night. Id. Nixon offered anecdotal evidence that some Glock handguns similar to 

Ritchie’s have accidentally discharged but acknowledged there is no reason to believe the gun in 

this case accidentally discharged four times. Because he had no personal knowledge, Nixon 

could not say whether Ritchie could accurately aim the handgun. Id. Sobek could only testify 

that the laser trajectory analysis conducted by the State’s witness could not pinpoint the precise 

 

7

 In his curriculum vitae Mr. Hill professed to be a expert in “homicide events reconstruction” with 

expertise in a variety of fields including: evidence collection, firearms, internal/external ballistics, 

forensic pathology, and the psychology of “high stress response.” Pet’r P-Cr. Ex. 19 at 25-39. 

6
trajectory that each bullet took, but he could not come up with a more precise trajectory location 

himself and acknowledged the analysis by the State’s witness was largely correct. Id. 

We agree with the post-conviction court’s conclusion that the decision to rely upon 

testimony from the State’s witness was reasonable under the prevailing professional norms. 

Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 520 (Ind. 1999) (“Trial counsel’s strategy to put the State to its 

burden and not present a defense, like other strategic decisions, is a legitimate trial strategy.”) 

(citation omitted). Additionally, Ritchie’s experts do not challenge the accuracy of the State’s 

expert testimony. It is at best wholly speculative that the expert testimony Ritchie provided at 

post-conviction would have affected the outcome of the trial. We will not second-guess 

counsel’s strategic decision to put the State to its burden, especially without a showing of 

prejudice. Troutman v. State, 730 N.E.2d 149, 155 (Ind. 2000). In view of all these 

considerations, counsel’s failure to procure another expert does not overcome the strong 

presumption of counsel’s competence. 

B. Suppression of Ritchie’s Videotaped Statements 

Following his arrest, Ritchie was held in custody at the Marion County jail. After being 

advised of his Miranda rights, the police began to interrogate Ritchie but stopped when Ritchie 

told police he wanted a lawyer. P-Cr. at 639. Shortly thereafter, television station reporters 

contacted Marion County correctional officers and asked to interview Ritchie. According to 

several reporters, the officers advised them that Ritchie agreed to be interviewed. Before the 

interviews began Ritchie signed a form captioned as an “Interview Release” that provided in 

pertinent part: 

I, Benjamin Ritchie, do hereby voluntarily consent to give an 

interview to the news media. I understand that I have the right to 

have counsel present during this interview. I further understand 

that no threats, promises or agreements have been made by the 

Marion County Sheriff’s Department for this interview and I 

further understand that the Marion County Sheriff’s Department 

has no vested interest in granting said interview. 

7
Resp’t P-Cr. Ex. C, D, E & F. Ritchie did not request an attorney and none was provided. The 

interviews proceeded, and Ritchie talked to the media while shackled at the wrist and ankles and 

dressed in jail clothing. Marion County correctional officers were present throughout the 

interview. At trial, the State introduced three videotaped statements made during these news 

media interviews. Ritchie contends the videotapes were inadmissible due to a violation of his 

Miranda rights and because they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be forced to 

appear in jail clothes or visibly shackled before the jury decided his fate. Ritchie complains 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object or move to suppress these videotapes. 

Br. of Appellant at 76. 

(1) Miranda Violation 

Ritchie contends that the interviews were part of a custodial interrogation, and police 

could not reinitiate questioning until counsel was provided. Id. at 73. Ritchie characterizes the 

interviews as “actions on the part of the police” because officers asked if he was willing to be 

interviewed, created the opportunity for the interviews to occur, and established the interview 

conditions. Id. He contends the officers should have known the reporters’ questions were likely 

to elicit incriminating responses and that these interviews enabled law enforcement to do 

indirectly what Miranda prohibits, questioning him about the homicide without counsel. Id. at 

73-74. 

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements 

given by a suspect during “custodial interrogation” without a prior warning. Illinois v. Perkins, 

496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990). Police officers are not required to give Miranda warnings unless the 

defendant is both in custody and subject to interrogation. See Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 

1125-26 (Ind. 1995). There is no question that Ritchie was “in custody” when he gave his 

statements. 

The post-conviction court concluded that the videotapes did not run afoul of Miranda

because these statements were “not given to the police as part of a custodial interrogation,” rather 

they were voluntary statements to the media. App. at 451. We agree. Under Miranda, 

8
“‘interrogation’ includes express questioning and words or actions on the part of the police that 

the police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” 

White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (citation omitted). Though the officers allowed 

the opportunity for the interviews, the news reporters initiated and conducted the questioning, 

not police. Miranda warnings are required in order to overcome the inherently coercive and 

police-dominated atmosphere inherent to a custodial interrogation. Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 

726, 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). However, “[t]here is no empirical basis for the assumption that a 

suspect speaking to those whom he assumes are not officers will feel compelled to speak by the 

fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess.” 

Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-97. Thus, the essential ingredients of a “police-dominated atmosphere” 

and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he 

believes is not an officer. Id. at 296. 

Additionally, civilians conducting their own investigation need not give Miranda

warnings. Trinkle v. State, 259 Ind. 114, 284 N.E.2d 816, 818 (1972). In Luckett v. State, 158 

Ind. App. 571, 303 N.E.2d 670, 671 (1973), civilians who were victims of a break-in conducting 

their own investigation questioned Luckett, whom they suspected was the culprit. He confessed 

to parts of the crime and later argued these statements were inadmissible because of a lack of a 

Miranda warning. The Court held there was no Miranda violation when “the victims of the 

break-in were acting on their own initiative as private citizens and were not under police control, 

were not agents of the police, and were not acting at the direction of police officers.” Id. 

Ritchie, like Luckett, was in custody and questioned by private citizens acting on their own 

initiative. The reporters were not under police control, agents of the police, or acting at the 

direction of police officers. Ritchie presents no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, a Miranda

warning was not constitutionally mandated in this situation. 

Even if we were to assume the reporters’ actions could be construed as police action, the 

evidence demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 

self-incrimination. Ritchie was advised of his right to counsel in writing before the interviews. 

App. at 451. Despite having not initiated the interviews, Ritchie voluntarily gave these 

9
statements to the media. Ritchie does not contend he misunderstood the “Interview Release” 

form. Nor does he contend that the police coerced him into signing the form. Any statement 

given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in 

evidence. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297. 

The post-conviction court correctly concluded the admission of the videotapes did not run 

afoul of Miranda. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance due to the failure to 

object, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the objection would have been 

sustained if made. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1192 (Ind. 2001). Finding no Miranda

violation, we cannot say there is a reasonable probability that the objection would have been 

sustained if made. Nor is there a reasonable probability that a motion to suppress would have 

been granted on this ground. Accordingly, Ritchie has not met his burden of demonstrating that 

counsel’s performance on this issue fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

(2) Appearance in Shackles 

Ritchie alleges the interview tapes were inadmissible because they depicted him dressed 

in jail clothing and shackled and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting or 

moving to suppress these videotapes. Br. of Appellant at 75-76. 

It is clearly established under both state and federal law that a criminal defendant cannot 

be forced to appear in either jail clothing or shackles during the guilt or penalty phase of trial 

without an individualized finding that the defendant presents a risk of escape, violence, or 

disruption of the trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005); Estelle v. Williams, 425 

U.S. 501, 512 (1976); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970); Stephenson v. State, 864 

N.E.2d 1022, 1032 (Ind. 2007). An accused should not be compelled to go before the jury 

dressed in jail clothes or shackled because: (1) the risk of diluting the presumption of innocence, 

(2) the risk that the jury might find guilt based on these extraneous influential factors rather than 

probative evidence subject to the rigors of cross-examination, and (3) the shackles could hinder 

the right to participate with counsel. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 630-31 (“Visible shackling 

undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process” and 

“[s]hackles can interfere with the accused’s ability to communicate with his lawyer.”) (citation 

10
omitted); Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504 (discussing the potential for jail clothing to dilute the 

presumption of innocence and the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence 

and beyond a reasonable doubt). Applying these rationales, Ritchie contends these videotapes 

were constitutionally inadmissible and prejudicial. Br. of Appellant at 76. 

However, Deck and its predecessors only discuss the use of jail clothing and visible 

shackles during courtroom proceedings. Ritchie was not forced to appear before the jury in jail 

clothing and shackles. Rather his claim is one step removed in that the jury viewed a videotape 

of Ritchie appearing in jail clothing and shackles while in police custody. The concerns with 

having a criminal defendant appear in jail clothing or shackles in a courtroom proceeding are not 

directly applicable to Ritchie’s situation. Certainly, his right to participate with counsel is not 

implicated. Additionally, it appears to this Court that the risk of diluting the presumption of 

innocence or guilt being established by an extraneous influential factor is minuscule. Ritchie 

presents no evidence of how viewing him in jail clothing and shackles on the videotape had a 

bearing on his verdict. Any reasonable juror would have expected Ritchie to be dressed in jail 

clothing and shackled when meeting with members of the public outside the security of a jail 

cell. See generally Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 326 (Ind. 2002) (stating potential jurors 

would reasonably expect that anyone in police custody would be restrained). 

We agree with the post-conviction court that this is not a case of the petitioner appearing 

before the jury wearing jail garb and shackles. App. at 452. Thus, it is clear that an objection, 

had one been made, would not have been sustained and counsel’s actions did not fall below the 

objective reasonable standard of care. But even assuming for the sake of argument counsel’s 

failure to object or move to suppress the videotapes fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, Ritchie still has failed to show that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the 

trial would have been different. That is to say, Ritchie has failed to show that, but for the 

videotapes, the jury would have returned a verdict recommending a sentence of a term of years 

rather than a death sentence. See Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(finding petitioner failed to establish prejudice because an objection to the shackling would not 

have likely altered the result); see also Davis, 770 N.E.2d at 326 (finding, absent actual harm as a 

result of the jury seeing him momentarily in handcuffs, the trial court would not have abused its 

11
discretion in denying a motion for mistrial made by counsel at trial). We agree counsel was not 

ineffective. 

II. 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Penalty Phase 

 Ritchie next complains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to do a 

better job in presenting evidence of mitigation. Br. of Appellant at 34. More specifically, 

Ritchie alleges counsel failed to: (A) investigate and present educational evidence; (B) 

investigate and prepare a social history report; and (C) obtain and present appropriate 

psychological experts. 

This Court acknowledges the importance of presenting mitigating evidence, particularly 

in capital cases. Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767, 783 (Ind. 1999). We have previously held 

that the failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence could constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel, warranting the vacation of a death sentence. Id. (citing Burris v. State, 558 

N.E.2d 1067, 1076 (Ind. 1990); Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817, 822 (Ind. 1989)); see also

Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 714 (Ind. 2001). That is not to say that counsel is required to 

present all available mitigation evidence. Counsel may make strategic judgments not to present 

certain types of mitigating evidence. Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 261 (Ind. 1997) (“As 

a matter of trial strategy, a defense counsel in a capital case may decide what is the best 

argument to present during the penalty phase.”). However, the strategic choice not to present 

mitigating evidence made after less than complete investigation may give rise to an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim for failure to investigate. We digress to elaborate upon this duty to 

investigate mitigating evidence. 

With the benefit of hindsight, a defendant can always point to some rock left unturned to 

argue counsel should have investigated further. The benchmark for judging any claim of 

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence 

12
no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Wiggins v. 

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003). This would interfere with the constitutionally protected 

independence of counsel at the heart of Strickland. Id. Rather, we review a particular decision 

not to investigate by looking at whether counsel’s action was reasonable in light of all the 

circumstances. Id. at 521-22. In other words, counsel has a duty to make a reasonable 

investigation or to make a reasonable decision that the particular investigation is unnecessary. 

Id. at 521. A strategic choice not to present mitigating evidence made after thorough 

investigation of law and relevant facts is virtually unchallengeable, but a strategic choice made 

after less than complete investigation is challengeable to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgment did not support the limitations on the investigation. Id. Thus, the Court’s principal 

concern is not whether counsel should have presented more in mitigation but whether the 

investigation supporting their decision not to introduce mitigating evidence was itself reasonable. 

Id. at 523. 

A. Educational Evidence 

Counsel assembled a defense team that included Cheri Guevara, a mitigation specialist, 

Larry Atwell, an investigator and former police officer, and Dr. Michael Gelbort, a 

neuropsychologist. App. at 432. Counsel obtained school, adoption and hospital records and 

interviewed several family members and persons familiar with Ritchie’s background and 

upbringing. Id. Ritchie argues counsel focused only on his early childhood years, stating 

“almost nothing [was] presented regarding [Ritchie’s] life after being adopted by the Ritchies.”8 

Br. of Appellant at 33. Ritchie contends teachers and school personnel should have been 

contacted in an effort to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and counsel’s 

failure to do so resulted in ineffective assistance. Id. at 34. 

 Although the focus of the defense was on Ritchie’s early childhood, counsel did in fact 

present evidence of his later years. Both Verna and Oscar Ritchie testified about Ritchie’s 

 

8

 Ritchie’s mother, Marion Martin, divorced Donald Peoples while Ritchie was still an infant. Peoples 

took custody of Ritchie’s two older half-brothers but left Ritchie with Martin upon learning he was not 

Ritchie’s father. At the age of eight, Verna and Oscar Ritchie adopted Ritchie at which time his birth 

name of Peoples was discontinued. 

13
continuing troubles throughout school and their attempts at responding to those issues. They 

recounted how they ensured Ritchie attended school, Tr. at 2721, 2751, attended numerous 

parent-teacher conferences and counseling to address ongoing behavioral problems, id. at 2722-

23, 2752, placed him in special classes to address his needs, id. at 2723-24, sought counseling 

from their minister around the third and fourth grade, id. at 2727, and took him for treatment at 

Community North Hospital at age ten. Id. at 2732. They both discussed his experience as a 

teenager going to live with his mom, who after only four weeks kicked him out because she 

could not handle him. Id. at 2727, 2756. Dr. Gelbort corroborated their testimony by recounting 

Ritchie’s difficulties in school documented in his school records, including repeating the first 

grade and dropping out in the ninth grade. Id. at 2446, 2490-91. Dr. Gelbort testified to 

Ritchie’s learning disability and diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) at age eight and 

the various treatments tried, including taking Ritalin in elementary school and his placement in 

Community North at age ten. Id. at 2490-92. Dr. Gelbort explained the severely emotionally 

handicapped classes Ritchie attended. Id. at 2447. Additionally, Dr. Gelbort recounted head 

injuries Ritchie received from a motorcycle accident at age fourteen and being hit in the head 

with a baseball bat at age sixteen. Id. at 2442. 

The post-conviction court found that Ritchie’s counsel made a thorough, in-depth 

presentation to the jury during the penalty phase of trial concerning the facts and circumstances 

of Ritchie’s unfortunate childhood. App. at 433. Counsel tied Ritchie’s earlier childhood 

experiences before the age of two to the behavioral problems he experienced throughout grade 

school and into high school. We agree with the post-conviction court. The record clearly shows 

that counsel’s investigation included Ritchie’s medical, educational, family, and social history. 

“The investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence by trial counsel was substantial and 

the fact that post-conviction lawyers have managed to find some that may be non-cumulative 

does not lead to a conclusion different from that of the post-conviction court . . . .” State v. 

McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 791 (Ind. 2007). Further, the post-conviction court found that there 

was not a reasonable probability of the jury recommending a sentence other than death even had 

counsel presented the additional testimony of his struggles in school and impressions and 

observations of his educators. App. at 442. We agree and conclude counsel was not ineffective. 

14
B. Social History Report 

As we indicated above, counsel obtained Ritchie’s school, adoption, and hospital records 

and interviewed family members and persons familiar with Ritchie’s background. However, 

counsel did not direct the mitigation specialist to prepare a social history report summarizing this 

information. Ritchie claims failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance. Br. of Appellant 

at 42. 

At the post-conviction hearing Ritchie offered a written social history report as an 

exhibit. Upon reviewing the report, the post-conviction court found that it reveals nothing that 

would have significantly altered counsel’s presentation of Ritchie’s family background and 

upbringing at trial. App. at 443. The Summary of Findings from the offered social history report 

provides: 

The social history investigation reveals that Benjamin Ritchie’s 

nuclear and extended family is steeped in dysfunction. Ben was 

raised in a family system characterized by neglect, abuse, sexual 

promiscuity, infidelity, and mental illness. There is also a 

multigenerational history of alcohol abuse and addiction, violence, 

the rejection and abandonment of children, and various forms of 

criminal and antisocial behavior. 

Pet’r P-Cr. Ex. 20 at 3. 

We first observe that because of the hearsay statements contained throughout the report, 

it is not altogether clear whether the report itself would have been admissible at trial over a 

timely objection.9

 In any event, Ritchie’s counsel presented the same information at trial, by 

way of live testimony, as that provided for in the social history report offered at the post-

 

9 An investigative report may be admissible if it meets the requirements of Indiana Evidence Rule 803(8). 

Joyner v. State, 736 N.E.2d 232, 243 (Ind. 2000). The United States Supreme Court recently discussed 

this issue in Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510. The majority found the social history report “may have been 

admissible under Maryland law,” recognizing a relaxed standard to allow for the consideration of any 

aspect of the defendant’s character the defendant would offer as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id.

at 536-37. The dissent took issue with this statement. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., 

dissenting) (finding the statements within the social history report are hearsay, “were of especially 

dubious reliability,” and would be inadmissible in a court of law).

15
conviction hearing. Ritchie’s mother testified about her use of drugs while pregnant with Ritchie 

and during his childhood, which was confirmed by other witnesses. Tr. at 2283. Tony Wheeler, 

his mother’s paramour, described the sexual promiscuity, drug, and alcohol use occurring in 

Martin’s household. Id. at 2322-27. Donald Peoples testified that this led to the deterioration of 

their marriage. Peoples stated he took custody of the other two boys, leaving Ritchie behind 

once Martin disclosed Ritchie was not in fact his son. Id. at 2350, 2355-56. Issues of 

abandonment were also introduced through Martin’s account of leaving Ritchie at the age of two 

to meet a man in Florida. Id. at 2296. Martin detailed how Ritchie was shuttled to Brenda and 

Larry Cotton, only to be retrieved by her because of allegations of child abuse. Id. at 2307-08. 

Shortly thereafter, Martin gave Ritchie to Verna and Oscar because the man she was living with 

at the time did not want him. Id. at 2309. Lillie Clifton described how twelve-year-old Ritchie 

felt he had no family and could not understand why Peoples or his mother did not want him. Id.

at 2407. The evidence of Ritchie’s dysfunctional family life was corroborated by several other 

family members, including Ritchie’s uncle, id. at 2650-51 (recounting the abandonment by 

Martin when she would fail to show for visits); id. at 2652 (describing Martin’s drug use); 

Ritchie’s half-brother, id. at 2678 (recounting the drug use and promiscuity of Martin in front of 

him at ages five and six); Oscar Ritchie, id. at 2712, 2714-15 (confirming Martin’s drug use 

during pregnancy and abandonment of Ritchie); and Verna Ritchie, id. at 2739 (describing 

Martin’s appearance as “loaded” while pregnant). As discussed previously, his continuing 

troubles and mental difficulties throughout school were presented through testimony from Verna 

and Oscar Ritchie and Dr. Gelbort. Id. at 2447, 2491, 2724, 2732. 

The evidence presented painted the exact same picture as that described in the offered 

social history report. We agree with the post-conviction court that the failure to direct the 

preparation of a written social history report did not constitute deficient performance. 

C. Failure to Obtain and Present Appropriate Psychological Experts 

Ritchie’s claims regarding the use of psychological experts are two-fold. First, he claims 

counsel was ineffective for failing to procure the testimony of Dr. Pearce, who was Ritchie’s 

psychiatrist at Community North Hospital during and following an in-patient admission. 

16
Second, he claims counsel was ineffective for not obtaining other psychological experts in 

addition to Dr. Gelbort, a neuropsychologist. Br. of Appellant at 46, 50. We address each in 

turn. 

(1) Interview and Presentation of Dr. Pearce 

Dr. Pearce was Ritchie’s attending psychiatrist when Ritchie, in 1991 at age ten, was 

admitted as an in-patient to Community North Hospital, a psychiatric facility. Dr. Pearce 

continued to follow up periodically on Ritchie’s condition after his release and through 1994. In 

preparation for trial, counsel did not interview Dr. Pearce. P-Cr. at 184. At the post-conviction 

hearing, Dr. Pearce testified about the hospitalization at Community North Hospital. He testified 

Ritchie’s attempted suicide was an indicator of a serious mental health problem with depression. 

Id. at 428. Additionally, he stated Ritchie was doing fairly well by late 1992. Id. at 433. 

The record shows, however, that evidence of Ritchie’s hospitalization at Community 

North Hospital was admitted at trial. Dr. Gelbort detailed Ritchie’s troubles as a child and 

specifically testified before the jury about Ritchie’s psychiatric intervention at Community North 

Hospital. Tr. at 2495-96. Adding cumulative evidence to Dr. Gelbort’s testimony would not 

lead to a reasonable probability that the jury would have recommended a sentence other than 

death. See Harrison, 707 N.E.2d at 784 (affirming the post-conviction court’s finding that the 

mitigating evidence offered at the post-conviction hearing was cumulative and counsel was not 

ineffective). We conclude that Ritchie has failed to show the outcome of his trial would have 

been different had this additional testimony been presented. Thus, counsel was not ineffective.

(2) Presentation of Additional Psychological Experts 

Dr. Gelbort reviewed Ritchie’s medical history and conducted a comprehensive 

neuropsychological examination. He concluded that Ritchie suffered from a cognitive disorder 

not otherwise specified. Tr. at 2498. Dr. Gelbort noted that the possible causes of Ritchie’s 

cognitive disorder included: his mother’s ingestion of drugs and alcohol during pregnancy, 

possible genetic predisposition, and possible head injuries. Id. at 2500-01. Counsel did not 

17
present any additional psychological experts for the penalty phase of trial. P-Cr. at 192. Ritchie 

claims that having competent psychological assistance would have shown that Ritchie suffered 

from a bipolar disorder. Br. of Appellant at 22. 

At the post-conviction hearing, Ritchie presented Dr. Robert Kaplan, a forensic 

psychologist, who testified Ritchie suffered from an unspecified bipolar disorder. P-Cr. at 543. 

Dr. Kaplan relied upon essentially the same facts and observations relied upon by Dr. Gelbort. 

The post-conviction court found that when asked to identify the pertinent physiological brain 

defect that was the cause of Ritchie’s afflictions, Dr. Kaplan was unable to specifically identify 

the cause but only speculated genetic factors or early childhood abuse, neglect, substance abuse, 

or abandonment could be to blame. App. at 439. 

Dr. Kaplan offered the kind of expert testimony that in most circumstances can be 

generated when an investigation is done in hindsight. Pointing to the fact that two doctors 

disagree does not show counsel conducted an unconstitutionally inadequate investigation. See

Conner v. State, 711 N.E. 1238, 1256 (Ind. 1999) (noting “psychiatrists disagree widely and 

frequently on what constitutes mental illness [and] on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to 

given behavior and symptoms”) (citation omitted). The ability of post-conviction counsel to 

locate and present expert opinion disagreeing with the psychiatric evidence at trial does not lead 

necessarily to the conclusion of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id. We agree with the post-conviction 

court that counsel was not ineffective in failing to further investigate Ritchie’s mental capacities 

for mitigation purposes or in preparing and presenting that evidence to the jury. 

III. 

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the 

same as for trial counsel in that the petitioner must show appellate counsel was deficient in 

performance and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 

192 (Ind. 1997). When raised on collateral review, ineffective assistance claims generally fall 

18
into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal, (2) waiver of issues, and (3) failure 

to present issues well. Id. at 193-95. 

Both of Ritchie’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fall under the 

second category. Ineffectiveness is very rarely found in these cases because “the decision of 

what issues to raise is one of the most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate 

counsel.” Id. at 193 (citation omitted). Accordingly, our review is particularly deferential to 

counsel’s strategic decision to exclude certain issues in favor of others. Id. at 194. We first look 

to see whether the unraised issues were significant and obvious upon the face of the record. Id. 

If so, then we compare these unraised obvious issues to those raised by appellate counsel, finding 

deficient performance “only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented.” Id.

(citations omitted). If deficient performance by counsel is found, then we turn to the prejudice 

prong to determine whether the issues appellate counsel failed to raise would have been clearly 

more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Id. 

Specifically, Ritchie claims appellate counsel failed to raise: (A) the inappropriateness of 

Ritchie’s death sentence and (B) the constitutionality of the exclusion of a juror. 

A. Inappropriateness of Ritchie’s Death Sentence 

Article VII, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[t]he Supreme Court 

shall have, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to . . . review and revise the sentence 

imposed.” Our rules authorize a revision of a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial 

court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). On direct appeal, appellate 

counsel did not raise a 7(B) challenge to the appropriateness of Ritchie’s sentence. Ritchie 

contends that counsel’s failure to do so amounts to ineffective assistance. 

19
Before the 2002 amendments to Indiana’s Death Penalty Statute,10 this Court as a matter 

of course reviewed and revised sentences in capital cases without the need of counsel raising this 

claim as a discrete issue. See, e.g., Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 760 (Ind. 1998) (“As part 

of our death penalty review, we will independently consider the jury recommendation against 

death and determine whether the death penalty is appropriate.”) (citation omitted); see also

Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 266 (“Each death penalty case receives individualized appellate 

scrutiny to ensure that the death penalty is appropriate.”); Thompson v. State, 492 N.E.2d 264, 

268 (Ind. 1986) (“[T]he State Supreme Court must review every capital sentence to ensure that 

the penalty has not been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously.”). It is true that on direct appeal in 

this case the Court did not engage in an independent evaluation concerning the appropriateness 

of Ritchie’s sentence. However, counsel cannot be criticized for failing to raise an issue that this 

Court routinely addressed on its own initiative.11

 

In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument appellate counsel’s failure to raise a 

7(B) challenge fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Ritchie has not demonstrated 

a reasonable probability that this issue would have resulted in this Court revising his death 

sentence. The nature of the offense is that the victim of the murder was a law enforcement 

officer acting in the line of duty. This Court has determined that shooting and killing an officer 

acting in the line of duty is “certainly among the most severe circumstances warranting the death 

penalty.” Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 121 (Ind. 2005). As for his character, Ritchie argues 

that he is “neither the very worst offender nor has he committed the worst offense” to warrant the 

sentence of death. Br. of Appellant at 80. This Court has observed, “[T]he maximum possible 

 

10 At the time of Ritchie’s crime, Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(e) (1998) provided in pertinent part, 

“The court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury’s 

recommendation, and the sentence shall be based on the same standards that the jury was required to 

consider. The court is not bound by the jury’s recommendation.” 

11 The 2002 amendments to Indiana’s sentencing statutes provided in pertinent part, “If the jury reaches a 

sentencing recommendation [of either the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole], the court 

shall sentence the defendant accordingly.” I.C. § 35-50-2-9(e). There has been no consensus on this 

Court concerning whether our review and revise authority survives the 2002 amendments. See Pruitt, 

834 N.E.2d at 122 (Shepard, C.J., concurring in result) (questioning the continued use of the 

appropriateness review under the new sentencing scheme where the legislature has placed the question of 

appropriateness in the hands of juries); see also Baer v. State, 866 N.E.2d 752, 766-67 (Ind. 2007) 

(Shepard, C.J., concurring) (same). 

20
sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders.” Buchanan v. State, 767 

N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted). But we have clarified: “This is not, however, a 

guideline to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined. Despite the nature of any 

particular offense and offender, it will always be possible to identify or hypothesize a 

significantly more despicable scenario. Although maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate 

for the worst offenders, we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant the 

maximum punishment. But such class encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and 

offenders.” Id. 

Ritchie’s character includes an unfortunate childhood and mental health issues. It is of 

course true that “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of 

the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are 

attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less 

culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 

(1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 

Childhood abuse and privation may, along with other mitigators, “influence[] the jury’s appraisal 

of . . . moral culpability.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 398. However, this Court has consistently held 

that evidence of a difficult childhood warrants little, if any, mitigating weight. See Coleman v. 

State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ind. 2000) (rejecting the claim that evidence of childhood abuse and 

neglect if presented to the sentencing court would have resulted in a sentence other than death); 

Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 543 (Ind. 1996) (mitigating weight warranted by a difficult 

childhood is in the low range); Loveless v. State, 642 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. 1994) (showing such 

evidence is occasionally declared not mitigating at all). 

Ritchie cites Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. 1995), to support his argument for 

a revision of his sentence. In that case this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s decision to 

set aside Spranger’s death sentence based on the (b)(6)(A) aggravating factor, the victim of the 

murder was a law enforcement officer acting in the course of duty. The post-conviction court 

determined that Spranger was a “young man of limited mental ability with no history of violence 

or criminal conduct.” Id. at 1125. These facts in Spranger are readily distinguishable. Here the 

record shows that Ritchie has an extensive juvenile history – involving three battery charges – 

21
that continued into adulthood. As the trial court observed, Ritchie’s history of juvenile offenses 

demonstrated a “pattern of violent crimes finally escalating into murder.” Tr. at 2908. As 

mentioned earlier in this opinion, at the post-conviction hearing Dr. Kaplan testified that Ritchie 

suffered from a bipolar disorder. P-Cr. at 543. However, the post-conviction court found that 

Ritchie had sufficient mental capacity to make appropriate decisions but did not make a great 

effort to control his anger and continued to engage in destructive behaviors despite longsustained efforts by those around him. App. at 466-67. The post-conviction court concluded that 

there was no evidence that Ritchie’s mental illness negated his conscious choice to fatally shoot 

Officer Toney. Id. at 467. In sum, we conclude there is nothing about Ritchie’s character or the 

nature of the offense Ritchie committed that would justify revising his capital sentence. Having 

reached this conclusion, we reach its obvious corollary that Ritchie has failed to show that the 

outcome of his direct appeal would have been any different had appellate counsel raised a 7(B) 

challenge to his sentence. 

B. Exclusion of a Prospective Juror 

During voir dire, the State challenged eight prospective jurors for cause based on their 

beliefs about the death penalty. Ritchie points to one in particular, prospective Juror McClimon 

(“McClimon”). Ritchie argues the colloquy with McClimon did not establish that her views 

about the death penalty substantially impaired her ability to follow her oath as a juror, and her 

exclusion should have been challenged on direct appeal. Br. of Appellant at 82.12 

The United States Supreme Court has established certain principles regarding the 

exclusion of jurors based upon their beliefs about the death penalty. First, a criminal defendant 

has the right to an impartial jury not tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective 

prosecutorial challenges for cause. Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224 (2007) (citing 

 

12 The post-conviction court determined that trial counsel did not object to the removal of McClimon and 

thus appellate counsel would have had to raise this issue as a fundamental error. App. at 465. The postconviction court concluded Ritchie did not show the dismissal constituted a fundamental error and 

therefore failed to show appellate counsel was deficient in not raising the issue or that he was prejudiced 

by the failure to do so. Id. The record does not support the post-conviction court’s findings. The record 

shows that counsel objected to the removal of McClimon, citing to both federal and state authority. Tr. at 

684. The trial court overruled the objection stating, “The Court is of the opinion that the prospective juror 

does meet the standard of the Indiana code and of [Wainwright v.] Witt . . . .” Id. at 687. 

22
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968)); see also Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 87 

(Ind. 1985)) (The mere disagreement with the death penalty, conscientious scruples, or even 

feelings that one would find it almost impossible to vote for death are not sufficient to exclude a 

juror for cause.). Second, the State has a strong interest in having jurors able to apply the death 

penalty within the State’s capital punishment framework. Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2224 (citing 

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985)). To balance these interests, “a juror may not be 

challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would 

prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 

instructions and his oath.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 420 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). If a 

prospective juror is barred from jury service based on his or her views about capital punishment 

on any broader basis than inability to follow the law or abide by his or her oaths, the United 

States Supreme Court has established a per se rule requiring the vacation of a death sentence 

imposed by a jury from which a potential juror had been erroneously excluded for cause. Gray 

v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1987) (discussing the continued application of the per se

rule established in Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976)). 

In determining whether the removal of a potential juror would vindicate the State’s 

interest without violating the defendant’s rights, the trial court is required to make a finding as to 

substantial impairment based in part on the demeanor of the juror. Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2224 

(citing Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-34); Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 166 (Ind. 1983) (When the 

juror’s answers are equivocal it is the duty of the trial court to pursue the matter further until it is 

established whether the juror is “irrevocably committed” to vote against the death penalty.). 

Once a trial court has made a finding of substantial impairment deference is owed to the trial 

court, and its finding is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2228. 

Here the trial court supervised a diligent and thoughtful voir dire and engaged in a 

lengthy discussion with McClimon. After indicating her feeling of not believing in the death 

penalty, the following colloquy took place between the trial court and McClimon: 

COURT: You would be required to weigh the mitigating and the 

aggravating circumstances, and then to make a recommendation of 

either the death penalty, life without parole, or a term of years. 

23
Now, if those were your options, do you feel that you would be 

able to consider with an open mind whether or not the death 

penalty should be recommended? 

PROSPECTIVE JUROR McCLIMON: Yeah, I guess so. 

COURT: Do you think that you might be able to recommend the 

death penalty? 

PROSPECTIVE JUROR McCLIMON: It’s possible. I mean I 

guess I just have to hear the case. 

COURT: Okay. That’s certainly a fair answer. It is important, so 

you’re not precluding the fact that you might not ever be able to 

recommend it? 

PROSPECTIVE JUROR McCLIMON: Right, I guess, yeah. 

Tr. at 679-80. However, when the prosecutor asked her if her beliefs would interfere with her 

ability to follow her oath as a juror and fairly consider recommending the death penalty, 

McClimon answered, “Yeah, I think it will.” Id. at 680. The prosecutor asked the same question 

again, and she replied, “Yeah, it might. I just don’t know. I’ve never been put in a situation like 

this. And before I’ve always felt that, like I said, that I just don’t – I’m not for the death penalty. 

In some situations yeah, I guess so, but I don’t know.” Id. at 681. The prosecutor also asked 

whether she could honestly see herself recommending the death penalty if Ritchie was found 

guilty of murdering a police officer. McClimon answered, “I don’t think so. I don’t really think 

I could.” Id. 

The trial court upon hearing McClimon’s conflicting and equivocal answers concluded 

that she could not fulfill her duties and sworn oath as a juror. Id. at 687. A potential juror’s bias 

cannot always be deduced in a question-and-answer session, and “many veniremen simply 

cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made 

‘unmistakably clear.’” Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2223 (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-25). Despite a 

lack of clarity in the record, “there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite 

impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.” 

Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26. When the prospective juror gives ambiguous, equivocal, or conflicting 

statements, assessing the demeanor of the venire is a critical factor in evaluating the attitude and 

qualification of potential jurors. Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2224. Thus, the deference given to the 

trial court encompasses its resolution of any equivocations and conflicts in the prospective 

jurors’ responses on voir dire. Witt, 469 U.S. at 426. 

24
Considering the voir dire as a whole and giving the requisite deference to the trial court’s 

findings, we cannot say there is a reasonable probability upon appeal that this Court would have 

found the trial court abused its discretion in finding McClimon’s views against the death penalty 

substantially impaired her ability to follow her oath. Thus, we cannot say this issue was clearly 

stronger than those presented on direct appeal. On this issue, counsel’s performance was not 

deficient. 

IV. 

Denial of a Full and Fair Post-Conviction Hearing 

Ritchie contends that he was denied a full and fair post-conviction hearing. This 

contention is based on the following facts. At the hearing, Ritchie called as an expert witness a 

lawyer with extensive experience in capital litigation. The witness provided lengthy testimony 

concerning what is expected of counsel in the preparation and trial of a capital case, the 

prevailing professional norms for a capital defense attorney, and, on a wide variety of issues, 

what he would have done differently than Ritchie’s lawyers. P-Cr. at 640-76. However, on at 

least three occasions during the witness’ testimony, Ritchie asked – sometimes worded slightly 

differently – whether the witness had “an opinion regarding the reasonableness” of trial and 

appellate counsel’s conduct. Id. at 655, 664, 671. Sustaining the State’s objection, the postconviction court would not permit the witness to give testimony on such an opinion. Ritchie 

made an offer of proof, which essentially recounted many of the allegations raised in this appeal 

which Ritchie contends amount to ineffective assistance. According to Ritchie, the witness 

would have testified that the conduct of Ritchie’s trial and appellate counsel “fell below 

prevailing professional norms and was unreasonable under the standards of the conduct of 

counsel in capital defense cases in Indiana and nationally.” Id. at 684. 

The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is entrusted to the sound discretion of 

the trial court, and we will reverse only for abuse of that discretion. Williams v. State, 706 

N.E.2d 149, 163 (Ind. 1999). Although expert witnesses may testify concerning their opinions 

generally, see Ind. Evidence Rule 702, experts may not testify “to opinions concerning intent, 

guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has 

25
26

testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” Evid. R. 704(b) (emphasis added); see also Carter v. 

State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 881-82 (Ind. 2001). And this is so because: (1) legal conclusions are not 

helpful to the trier of fact, (2) legal conclusions are reserved solely for the court’s determination, 

and (3) it is the function of the court, not the expert witness, to instruct on the law. See generally

13 Robert Lowell Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice, Indiana Evidence § 704.206, 460 (2d ed. 1995). 

Apparently contending that an opinion about the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is 

not a legal conclusion, Ritchie cites Strickland for the proposition that “[t]he reasonableness of 

performances is a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’” Br. of Appellant at 27. We first observe 

that Strickland actually declares, “Ineffectiveness is not a question of basic, primary, or historical 

fact. Rather, . . . it is a mixed question of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added); see also Coleman, 741 N.E.2d at 699 (“[B]oth the performance and 

prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.”) 

(citation omitted). In any event, even assuming for argument’s sake that Ritchie’s basic premise 

is correct, this contention does not advance his claim. When facts sufficient to demonstrate 

deficient performance are undisputed, then whether those facts show ineffective assistance 

becomes a question of law. See, e.g., Moffitt v. State, 817 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 

(declaring that where facts sufficient to create probable cause are undisputed probable cause is a 

question of law). 

In this case, the facts upon which Ritchie relies are not in dispute. The question is 

whether those facts demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. This is a question of law for 

the post-conviction court to resolve. We find no abuse. 

Conclusion 

We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.