IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Transource Pennsylvania, LLC, and :

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation, :

Petitioners :

 :

v. : No. 689 C.D. 2021

 : Argued: March 7, 2022

Pennsylvania Public Utility : 

Commission, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: May 5, 2022

Transource Pennsylvania, LLC (Transource) and PPL Electric Utilities 

Corporation (PPL) (together, Petitioners) petition for review of the May 24, 2021 

Opinion and Order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission) 

that, in relevant part, denied an application and an amended application for the siting 

and construction of two high-voltage (HV) transmission lines related to the 

Independence Energy Connection (IEC) Project in Franklin and York Counties,

Pennsylvania (Siting Applications), and rescinded the provisional certificate of 

public convenience (CPC) that the Commission had previously granted Transource

for the IEC Project. The Commission concluded that there was no error or abuse of 

discretion in the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) determination that Transource

failed to establish the requisite need for the IEC Project under Section 57.76(a)(1)
2

of the Commission’s Regulations (Regulations), 52 Pa. Code § 57.76(a)(1), or met 

the requirements of Section 1501 of the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1501. The Commission held that the ALJ’s findings of fact were supported by 

substantial evidence, in the form of the credited evidence submitted by opposing or 

objecting parties. The Commission further concluded that the ALJ’s determinations, 

including that the Commission could evaluate the need for the IEC Project for 

purposes of Pennsylvania law independently of the evaluation of need for the IEC 

Project that had been performed by PJM Interconnection LLC (PJM), were 

consistent with the Code, the Regulations, and Pennsylvania law.1 

On appeal, Petitioners argue that the Commission erred in interpreting Section 

1501 of the Code and Section 57.76(a)(1) of the Regulations and used an incorrect 

standard in denying the Siting Applications. Petitioners assert that the findings of 

fact necessary to support the conclusion of a lack of need or necessity for the IEC 

Project were not supported by substantial evidence. As part of its evidentiary 

challenge, Petitioners assert that the Commission erred in rejecting PJM’s findings 

as evidence of need for the IEC Project under Pennsylvania law and in focusing only 

on the negative impacts on local rates. Finally, Petitioners maintain that the 

Commission erred in rescinding the provisional CPC and not resolving the merits of 

Petitioners’ other Exceptions based on its decision on the Siting Applications, and, 

therefore, this matter must be remanded.

1 The ALJ also recommended denying the Siting Applications because Transource did not 

establish that it met the requirements of the other subparts of Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations 

and denying applications related to the construction of structures related to the IEC Project in 

Franklin and York Counties and to exercise the power of eminent domain over properties in 

Franklin County. (Recommended Decision (R.D.) at 103-24, Order.) Petitioners filed Exceptions 

to these determinations, but because the Commission affirmed the denial of the Siting Applications

on the lack of need, it did not specifically address these Exceptions beyond finding that they were 

moot. (Commission Opinion and Order (Op. and Order) at 64-65, 67-73.)
3

The Commission and Intervenors, the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA), 

the County of Franklin (Franklin County), and Stop Transource Franklin County 

(STFC), respond that the Commission’s interpretations of the Code and the 

Regulations were not clearly erroneous and, therefore, are entitled to deference. 

They further argue that the Commission applied the correct standard in determining 

that Transource did not meet its burden of proof on the Siting Applications and 

rescinding the provisional CPC. The Commission and Franklin County also assert 

that Petitioners have waived certain of these issues as they had not been raised before

the Commission. Intervenors and the Commission further argue that the findings of 

fact are supported by substantial evidence and that Petitioners’ arguments to the 

contrary improperly seek to have this Court reweigh the evidence or to preclude the 

Commission from performing its own evidentiary review and consideration of the 

IEC Project. Finally, the Commission asserts there was no error in it not considering 

Petitioners’ other Exceptions based on its determination on the Siting Applications.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Statutory Provisions

This matter involves the denial of the Siting Applications and the rescission 

of Transource’s provisional CPC pursuant to Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations 

and Section 1501 of the Code. Section 1501 of the Code addresses, generally, the 

character of services and facilities of a public utility and provides, in pertinent part:

Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, 

and reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, 

changes, alterations, substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or 

to such service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the 

accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and 

the public. . . . Such service and facilities shall be in conformity with 

the regulations and orders of the [C]ommission.
4

66 Pa.C.S. § 1501. Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations relates to the siting and 

construction of HV lines and states: 

(a) The Commission will issue its order, with its opinion, if any, either 

granting or denying the application, in whole or in part, as filed or 

upon the terms, conditions or modifications, of the location, 

construction, operation or maintenance of the line as the 

Commission may deem appropriate. The Commission will not grant 

the application, either as proposed or as modified, unless it finds and 

determines as to the proposed HV line: 

(1)That there is a need for it.

52 Pa. Code § 57.76(a)(1). Pursuant to Section 57.75(e)(1) of the Regulations, in 

reviewing a siting application, the Commission must accept evidence of, among 

other things, the “present and future necessity of the proposed HV line in furnishing 

service to the public.” 52 Pa. Code § 57.75(e)(1).

In addition, this matter implicates Pennsylvania’s participation in regional 

interstate power pools with other states, which is addressed in Section 2805(a) of the 

Code. Section 2805(a) provides:

The [C]ommission shall take all necessary and appropriate steps to 

encourage interstate power pools to enhance competition and to 

complement industry restructuring on a regional basis. The 

Commonwealth, the [C]ommission and Pennsylvania electric utilities 

shall work with the Federal Government, other states in the region and 

interstate power pools to accomplish the goals of restructuring and to 

establish independent system operators or their functional equivalents 

to operate the transmission system and interstate power pools. The 

[C]ommission, Pennsylvania electric utilities and all electricity 

suppliers shall work with the Federal Government, other states in the 

region, the North American Electric Reliability Council [(NERC)] and 

its regional coordinating councils or their successors, interstate power 

pools, and with the independent system operator or its functional

equivalent to ensure the continued provision of adequate, safe and 

reliable electric service to the citizens and businesses of this 

Commonwealth.
5

66 Pa.C.S. § 2805(a).2 

B. The IEC Project and Transource 

In 2014, PJM, the Regional Transmission Organization charged with 

managing electric utilities transmission systems in 13 states (PJM Region), that 

includes most of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, performed 

an annual Regional Transmission Extension Plan (RTEP) of the PJM Region. 

(Commission Opinion and Order (Op. and Order) at 3.)3 As part of the RTEP, PJM 

conducted a market efficiency analysis to determine if there were areas where market 

congestion4 existed, which was found on the AP South Reactive Interface (APSRI). 

(Id.) “[O]n October 30, 2014, PJM opened a long-term RTEP proposal window”

and sought “market efficiency proposals in order to alleviate congestion on the 

AP[SRI].” (Id.) During this process, it was projected that the “[c]ongestion on the 

AP[SRI] totaled approximately $800 million from 2012 to 2016.” (Id.) 

PJM received 41 proposals, and, on August 2, 2016, approved the market 

efficiency project, known as Project 9A, submitted by Transource Energy, 

Transource’s parent, to alleviate the APSRI congestion. (Id. at 2-3.) Project 9A is 

a set of 4,500 kV transmission lines originating in West Virginia and terminating in 

Maryland. (Id. at 3.) The IEC Project is the Pennsylvania portion of Project 9A, 

and consists of IEC West, located in Franklin County, and IEC East, located in York 

2 Section 2805(a) is located in Chapter 28 of the Code, which deregulated Pennsylvania’s 

electric utility industry. See Section 2802 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 2802 (announcing the 

declaration of policy to, among other things, deregulate the electric utility industry to encourage 

greater competition in the wholesale electric market).

3 The Commission’s Opinion and Order is located at volume 7 pages 6427a through 6506a 

of the Reproduced Record. 

4

“Congestion occurs when the least costly resources that are available to serve load in a 

given region cannot be dispatched because transmission facility limits constrain power flow on the 

system.” (Recommended Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 35.) 
6

County, and involves HV transmission lines from new substations in those counties 

to the Pennsylvania/Maryland border. (Id. at 3, 5-6.) Transource was “formed solely

to carry out . . . Project 9A.” (Id. at 2-3.) 

Transource filed an “Application for All of the Necessary Authority, 

Approvals, and Certificates of Public Convenience” relating to the IEC Project on 

February 8, 2017. (Id. at 4.) The Commission recognized that Transource was “a 

new type of entity in” Pennsylvania and was formed only to “carry out a particular 

market efficiency project.” (Id. at 5 (internal quotations omitted).) On January 23, 

2018, the Commission issued the provisional CPC, and its provisional approval 

referenced, specifically, Project 9A, including the IEC Project, as a means to resolve 

congestion on the APSRI.5 (Id. at 4 (citing Application of Transource, Pennsylvania, 

LLC, Docket Nos. A-2017-2587821 & G-2017-2587822 (PUC Jan. 23, 2018)).) 

Although the provisional CPC was granted, “all parties reserved the right to 

challenge the need for the [IEC] Project when Transource file[d] a siting application 

with the Commission or to challenge any other project proposed by Transource.” 

(Id. at 5.) Transource subsequently filed additional applications relating to the 

construction of buildings or shelters and the exercise of eminent domain over various 

properties in Franklin and York Counties. (Id. at 8.) PPL, an intervenor in the 

Commission proceedings, became involved in the IEC East portion when it and 

Transource entered into an agreement allowing Transource to utilize PPL’s existing 

transmission infrastructure and rights-of-way for the IEC East portion of the IEC 

Project.

6

 (Id. at 14-16.) As the design of the IEC Project was altered, Transource 

5 The approval of the provisional CPC was part of a settlement agreement.

6 As a result of this agreement, there was no need for Transource to use eminent domain in 

York County.
7

amended its various applications, including by adding PPL to the applications 

relevant to the IEC East portion.

C. Proceedings Before the ALJ and the Recommended Decision

Transource’s applications were assigned to an ALJ7for disposition. OCA, 

STFC, and Franklin County, among others, intervened before the ALJ, with other

landowners, citizens, and entities filing protests.

8

 Between January 8, 2018, and 

September 25, 2020, the ALJ held prehearing conferences, public input sessions,site 

visits, and evidentiary hearings, and the parties served and submitted their respective 

written submissions. 

1. Evidence 

Transource filed written direct, rebuttal, and rejoinder statements setting forth 

its experts’ testimonies, as well as reports and studies, in support of its applications.

Several of its witnesses were cross-examined at evidentiary hearings before the ALJ. 

Through this evidence, Transource sought to establish that the IEC Project satisfied 

the need requirements of the Code and the Regulations through PJM’s cost-benefit 

analysis, which was approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

(FERC), and is based on a 15-year projection of costs of a proposed project and 

annual benefits for the first 15 years of the Project’s life. (Recommended Decision 

(R.D.), Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 39, 41, 66.)9 Multiple re-evaluations continued to 

show that the IEC Project met PJM’s cost-benefit analysis, thereby reflecting that it 

7

Initially, the matter was assigned to two ALJs, but the second ALJ no longer participated 

after March 1, 2020.

8 The Office of Small Business Advocate (OSBA) and various affected landowners and 

entities were also granted intervenor status. (Op. and Order at 7-8.)

9 The Recommended Decision is located at volume 5 pages 4768a through 4901a of the 

Reproduced Record. 
8

continued to meet that standard. (R.D. at 66-67.) Transource offered former 

Commission Chairman James Cawley’s testimony that no group is entitled to the 

artificially lowered costs that result from market congestion and that considering the 

benefits of congestion would be unreasonable because it would perpetrate 

discriminatory rates. (Id. at 71-72.) Transource’s witnesses further asserted that the 

IEC Project resolved congestion within the APSRI but was not intended to just 

address congestion there but also elsewhere in the region, including the AP South 

Area and “related constraints.” (Id. at 72-73.)

Transource offered the testimony of PJM’s vice president, Steven Herling, 

who stated that congestion and reliability issues are often related. (Id. at 67, 74.) It 

further presented evidence that, in November 2018, which was after OCA presented 

direct testimony on the Siting Applications, PJM ran a single generation 

deliverability study without the IEC Project. (FOF ¶¶ 83, 85.) That study revealed 

five potential NERC reliability violations that could occur in 2023, which were 

resolved by the IEC Project. (Id. ¶ 83, R.D. at 68.) Mr. Herling further testified that 

if the IEC Project is not constructed, PJM would have to find an alternative solution, 

and there was not enough time to address those reliability violations. (R.D. at 68-

69.) Transource further argued that the IEC Project provided benefits to 

Pennsylvania beyond resolving market congestion and reliability issues, including 

providing Pennsylvania generators with better access to markets and participating in 

regional planning through PJM, as testified to by Mr. Cawley. (Id. at 71.)

Intervenors filed written statements, surrebuttal and supplemental surrebuttal

statements with their experts’ testimonies in opposition to the IEC Project. This 

evidence raised questions regarding the ongoing need for the IEC Project where

Transource continued to rely on outdated data and the congestion in the APSRI did 
9

not occur as predicted and, therefore, the identified purpose for the IEC Project was 

no longer valid. (R.D. at 75-76.) For example, while congestion costs in the APSRI 

in 2014 were approximately $468.8 million, in 2016 and 2017, those costs, 

respectively, were $16.8 million and $21.6 million, and, by 2019, congestion costs 

were $14.5 million. (FOF ¶¶ 51-52, 55.) Further, evidence showed that demand for 

the PJM Region in general has decreased and that congestion event hours on the 

APSRI has dropped considerably since 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 57-58.) OCA submitted 

evidence reflecting that there have been recommendations to reevaluate PJM’s 

market efficiency process and that PJM’s cost-benefit analysis did not consider any

increased costs or negative consequences to ratepayers elsewhere in the PJM Region 

that are caused by constructing a market efficiency project. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46, 61-62, 

117.) When such consequences were considered, the savings derived from the IEC 

Project, which was estimated to cost $500 million, would decrease wholesale power 

prices in some areas by approximately $845 million but would increase those prices 

in other areas by $812 million, resulting in a net benefit of only around $32 million

over 15 years. (Id. ¶¶ 65, 110.)

OCA offered other evidence reflecting that the projected savings resulting 

from the IEC Project would not be born out when other factors, including changes 

in energy generation, were considered or under the additional simulations performed 

by PJM. (Id. ¶¶ 73-81, 89, 97-104.) Further, areas that once benefited from the IEC 

Project, both in Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the PJM Region, no longer benefited 

in PJM’s most recent simulations. (Id. ¶¶ 102, 104, 107-08.) In Pennsylvania, the 

IEC Project would lower wholesale power prices in certain areas of Pennsylvania by 

about $60 million over the first 15 years of the IEC Project but would increase power 
10

prices elsewhere in Pennsylvania by $429 million in the same period. (Id. ¶¶ 122, 

124.)10 

2. The Recommended Decision

On December 22, 2020, the ALJ issued the Recommended Decision, which 

recommended denying the Siting Applications, as well as Transource’s other 

ancillary applications. The ALJ held that the threshold issue was whether 

Transource had demonstrated, by substantial evidence, that the IEC Project was 

needed. According to the ALJ, Transource had to establish “that the IEC Project is 

necessary to maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities,” 

pursuant to Section 1501 of the Code, and that there was a need for the HV 

transmission lines under Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations. (R.D. at 53.) Noting 

that the Commission’s grant of the provisional CPC did not contain a 

predetermination of need and was narrowly tailored to the IEC Project, the ALJ 

explained that “Transource may not construct the IEC [P]roject unless it can show 

that the [P]roject is necessary or proper, and in conformity with the [R]egulations . 

. . , which govern transmission line siting” because an “unnecessary change 

constitutes inadequate service to the public.” (Id. at 53-54, 60.)

The ALJ concluded that Transource had not shown need for the IEC Project 

as required by Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations and Section 1501 of the Code, 

and that PJM’s determination of need for the IEC Project in 2014-2015 to remove 

congestion on the APSRI did not definitively establish “need” for purposes of 

Pennsylvania law. The ALJ noted the question of whether resolving “congestion,” 

10 Additional evidence was taken, and findings of fact made, related to the other factors

under Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations, such as environmental impacts and reasonable 

alternatives.
11

alone, is sufficient to meet the need requirement under the Code and the Regulations 

had not yet been answered and that this Court in Energy Conservation Council of 

Pennsylvania v. Public Utility Commission, 995 A.2d 465 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), did 

not resolve the issue, determining that reliability issues within the PJM Region 

supported the finding of need without consideration of “congestion.” (Id. at 82-83.) 

In reviewing the evidence and arguments, the ALJ was persuaded by 

Intervenors’ evidence that, even if there had been congestion on the APSRI in 2014-

2015, it was no longer congested, and, therefore, did not support a need for the IEC 

Project. The ALJ accepted as persuasive evidence that Transource continued to rely 

on outdated data and on inaccurate projections to support an ongoing claim of need. 

(Id. at 83.) The ALJ determined that Transource had, throughout the majority of the 

proceedings, cited relieving congestion on the APSRI as the purpose of the IEC 

Project and only later raised the resolution of congestion in the AP South Area and 

potential NERC reliability violations as reasons for the IEC Project. (Id. at 83, 87-

88.) Citing, among other things, the lateness of the assertion of these reasons, the 

lack of a full investigation into the reliability violations, the lack of details regarding 

the alleged new congestion, and the failure to include alternative bases to resolve the 

claimed projection in the calculation, the ALJ found the evidence was insufficient

to support need. (Id. at 83-84, 86-93.) The ALJ determined that the benefits of the 

IEC Project had to be weighed against all the detrimental impacts, both economic 

and environmental, accepting the criticisms of PJM’s cost-benefit analysis used, 

including by PJM’s Independent Market Monitor. (Id. at 94-95, 97-101.) The ALJ 

concluded that, based on the credible evidence offered by Intervenors, the IEC 

Project would “not provide sufficient benefits to Pennsylvania or the PJM [R]egion 

as [a] whole,” because there would only be a net benefit of $32.5 million to the PJM 
12

Region over a 15-year period, particularly where it was designed to “address a 

congestion constraint that has diminished to very low levels since the [IEC] Project 

was selected.” (Id. at 97-98, 101-02.)

As for Transource’s arguments that PJM’s determination of need would be 

binding due to this matter involving issues of interstate regional transmission subject 

to FERC oversight, the ALJ held that the Commission was obligated to make an 

independent determination based on Pennsylvania law. (Id. at 82, 86, 99-102.) The 

ALJ further observed that while FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the interstate 

transmission of electric energy and wholesale electric process, that jurisdiction was 

limited to matters that are not subject to state regulation. (Id. at 85 (citing Section 

824(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)).) According to the ALJ, FERC 

recognized this limitation by stating that there is “longstanding state authority over 

certain matters that are relevant to transmission planning and expansion, such as 

matters relevant to siting, permitting, and construction” and that the FERC was in 

no way invoking “an exercise of authority over those specific substantive matters 

traditionally reserved to the states . . . .” (Id. (quoting Transmission Planning and 

Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning & Operating Pub. Utils., 76 Fed. Reg. 

¶¶ 49,842, 49,861 (Aug. 11, 2011) (FERC Order No. 1000)).) This means, 

according to the ALJ, that FERC Order No. 1000 was “not intended to dictate 

substantive outcomes” or to allow FERC to “determine what needs to be built, where 

it needs to be built, and who needs to build it.” (Id. at 85 n.13 (quoting S.C. Pub. 

Serv. Auth. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 762 F.3d 41, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).)

For these reasons, the ALJ issued the Recommended Decision recommending 

that the Commission deny the Siting Applications and all ancillary matters based on 
13

Transource having failed to meet its burden of proving need for the IEC Project

under the Code and the Regulations. The ALJ additionally recommended that a Rule 

to Show Cause be issued on why Transource’s provisional CPC should not be 

rescinded.

D. Appeal to the Commission

Petitioners filed eight Exceptions to the Recommended Decision, to which 

Intervenors filed Reply Exceptions. Relevant to the issues before us, Petitioners

argued, in Exception 1, that the ALJ erred in concluding that Transource did not 

carry its burden of persuasion to establish the need for the Siting Applications 

pursuant to Section 1501 of the Code and Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations. This 

Exception asserted three general challenges to the ALJ’s decision: (1) the 

Commission lacked authority to make an independent determination of need 

pursuant to the Code and the Regulations separate from PJM’s determination of need 

based on PJM’s authority as a federal regional transmission planning authority; (2)

the ALJ improperly weighed the evidence; and (3) the ALJ’s analysis 

misapprehended the state and federal roles in the nature of and need for regional 

transmission planning. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) Volume (Vol.) 5 at 4935a-59a.) 

The Commission rejected each of these challenges and adopted and incorporated the 

ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, unless expressly rejected or modified.

On the first challenge, the Commission rejected the notions that federal 

jurisdiction controlled and that it was bound to accept PJM’s determinations on the 

question of need for state approval of the PJM-approved regional transmission 

project. It held that whether the Pennsylvania standards were satisfied fell under the 

Commission’s jurisdiction and discretion under the Code, the Regulations, and 

precedent. (Op. and Order at 54-55.) According to the Commission, the standard 
14

used for determining need by PJM does not necessarily meet the requirements 

established and weighed under Section 1501 of the Code, the Regulations, and 

precedent. (Id. at 54.) The Commission concluded that the ALJ considered FERC 

Order No. 1000 and “PJM’s regional planning responsibilities, and weighed those 

considerations as part of, but not dispositive of, the weight of the evidence regarding 

‘need’ under” Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations. (Id. at 55.) Citing the same 

language in FERC Order No. 1000 and South Carolina Public Service Authority, the 

Commission held that the PJM approval did “not guarantee approval for siting and 

construction of transmission lines within the borders of . . . Pennsylvania.” (Id. at 

56-58.)

The Commission explained that the determination of whether need is 

established is broad and includes considering numerous factors, including the facts 

before it and the potential impact of the project, and a weighing of all the evidence 

presented. (Id. at 56.) Part of this determination, the Commission held, was its 

discretion to consider all the economic and environmental impacts of a PJMapproved project, even if PJM did not consider those impacts as part of its analysis. 

(Id. at 58.) This included the negative impacts on ratepayers, both in Pennsylvania 

and elsewhere in the PJM Region, that resulted from resolving congestion due to the 

IEC Project. (Id. at 59.) Because the ALJ considered the regional planning impacts, 

as well as the impacts on Pennsylvania customers, the Commission rejected 

Petitioners’ argument that the ALJ improperly took a Pennsylvania-only approach. 

(Id.) Noting the main purpose of the IEC Project was to resolve regional economic 

congestion that was predicted to substantially increase utility rates elsewhere, the 

Commission held its review of the project needed to examine the underlying data 
15

and congestion trends to determine if the current data of those needs was more 

persuasive than the detrimental impact. (Id. at 60.)

Applying these conclusions, the Commission agreed with the weight the ALJ 

gave to the evidence. The Commission agreed that Intervenors’ arguments that the 

data congestion relied upon by PJM to approve the IEC Project, which was tied to 

the APSRI, was not reliable enough to meet Pennsylvania’s standard for need where 

that data reflected substantial fluctuation and, ultimately, decline in congestion in 

that area. (Id.) The Commission further cited Transource’s shifting bases for the 

need of the IEC Project, from originally relieving congestion in the APSRI, then to 

the potential reliability violations, and finally the resolution of other congestion on 

“related constraints” in the AP South Area, which the Commission did not dismiss 

outright as “new reasons,” but found reflected the nature and the scope of the IEC 

Project. (Id. at 61.) Nonetheless, the Commission “agree[d] with the ALJ[] that the 

relative weight of the evidence of the later-asserted bas[e]s for need for the project 

diminishe[d] as it [became] more tangential to the unambiguous original driver of” 

the IEC Project, which was the “alleviation of economic congestion on the 

AP[SRI].” (Id. at 62.) Finally, the Commission explained it was not persuaded by 

Petitioners’ challenges to the ALJ’s acceptance of Intervenors’ evidence criticizing 

Transource’s evidence and PJM’s analysis as credible and persuasive. (Id.) 

For these reasons, the Commission concluded:

Therefore, based upon the broad powers conferred upon [it], we find 

that the ALJ properly construed the state versus federal roles regarding 

transmission planning in the analysis and application of the relevant 

statutory authority, applicable regulations and case law to the present 

case. Accordingly, we shall reject [Petitioners’] arguments to the 

contrary.
16

Based upon our review of the record in this proceeding, the relative 

weight of the evidence presented, and the arguments of the [p]arties, 

we conclude that in the present circumstances Transource fail[ed] to 

carry the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence to 

establish need for the proposed [S]iting Applications, pursuant to our 

authority under Section 1501 of the Code and [Section 57.76(a)(1) of 

the] . . . Regulations, 52 Pa. Code [§] 57.76(a)(1). Because we have 

concluded that the evidence is insufficient to establish the required 

element of “need” under [Section 57.76(a)(1) of the Regulations,] the 

arguments related to the other required elements under [Section 

57.76(a)(2)-(4)] are rendered moot and shall not be addressed.

(Op. and Order at 63-64.) 

In addition, the Commission denied Petitioners’ Exception No. 5, which 

challenged the ALJ’s recommendation relating to the rescission of Transource’s 

provisional CPC. The Commission concluded that the grant of the provisional CPC 

was related specifically to the IEC Project and specifically deferred the statutory 

determination of need to a future proceeding. (Id. at 70.) Having found that 

Transource had not established need, a statutory requirement for retaining the 

provisional CPC, and the denial of the Siting Applications, the Commission held 

that “the provisional need for which Transource’s CPC was issued will cease to 

exist.” (Id. at 71.) Acting within its statutory authority and discretion, the 

Commission concluded that “the failure to establish necessity of the service for 

which the provisional CPC was issued . . . constitutes ‘cause’ to rescind the 

provisional CPC.” (Id.) The Commission further denied Petitioners’ Exception that 

asserted that the ALJ issued “faulty findings,” reasoning that the Exception was 

insufficiently specific, the “[f]actual [f]indings and [c]onclusions of [l]aw were 

based upon a careful review of the extensive and complex evidence presented in this 

proceeding,” and the Exception was simply a general disagreement with those 
17

findings and conclusions. (Id. at 73-74.) The Commission denied all of the 

remaining Exceptions except one as moot.11 (Id. at 64-66, 72.)

Petitioners now petition for review of the Commission’s Opinion and Order.12

11 The Commission granted Petitioners’ Exception No. 4, concluding that the challenged 

finding of fact appeared to improperly treat lay witness testimony as expert witness testimony and 

striking that finding of fact. (Op. and Order at 65-66.)

12 In addition to filing a Petition for Review in this Court, Transource filed a suit against 

the Commission in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(District Court), Transource Pennsylvania, LLC v. Dutrieuille, Docket No. 21-cv-1101, asserting 

that the Commission violated the Supremacy and Dormant Commerce Clauses of the United States 

Constitution. Petitioners included, in their Petition for Review, a reservation of the right to pursue 

those federal claims in federal court pursuant to England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical 

Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (England Reservation). This reservation was reiterated in 

Petitioners’ main brief and reply brief, and Petitioners have not provided any direct argument 

regarding the federal constitutional claims. Rather, they assert that the issue before this Court is 

whether the Commission “erred in applying state law when denying the [IEC] Project,” which is 

distinct from its federal claims that the Commission lacked the legal authority to reject PJM’s 

determinations under federal law. (Petitioners’ Reply Brief (Br.) at 29.) The Commission and 

Franklin County argue that Petitioners have impliedly placed the federal issues before this Court 

in this appeal by arguing that the Commission had to accept PJM’s determinations, and, as such, 

we should address them.

Under the England doctrine, a litigant is required to advise state courts of its federal claims 

“so that the state statute may be construed ‘in light of’ those claims,” England, 375 U.S. at 419-

21, and involves “a federal court abstain[ing] from deciding a federal constitutional issue to enable 

the state courts to address an antecedent state-law issue,” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County 

of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 339 (2005). On August 26, 2021, the District Court denied a 

challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction based on an allegation that Transource lacked standing 

and, over Transource’s objection, abstained from considering the remainder of the motion to 

dismiss. Transource Pa., LLC, (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2021), 2021 WL 3784284, at *3-4, 10-12. In 

doing so, the District Court noted, in part: resolution of the federal claims would not resolve the 

state[]law claims at issue in the Commonwealth Court; while Transource had asserted an England 

Reservation and maintained the federal claims would not be before the Commonwealth Court, it 

also represented that it may “protectively brief” the federal claims in that matter; and the issues in 

both matters, while distinctly worded, were substantially similar. Based on Transource’s 

representation that it may protectively brief the federal claims in this Court, the District Court 

reasoned that abstention was appropriate as there was “a distinct possibility that both courts may 

essentially be asked to resolve the same issues,” and, therefore, “the same issues have at least been 

presented before both courts.” Id. at *10-11 (emphasis in original). 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
18

II. DISCUSSION

A. Relevant Legal Principles

Our review of the Commission’s Opinion and Order is guided by the 

following legal principles. “Appellate review of a [Commission] order is limited to 

determining whether a constitutional violation, an error of law, or a violation of 

[Commission] procedure has occurred and whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence.” Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 910 A.2d 

38, 48 (Pa. 2006) (Popowsky II). Where an agency action involves the exercise of 

discretion, we will not find an abuse of that discretion in the absence of bad faith, 

fraud, capricious actions, or an abuse of power. Slawek v. State Bd. of Med. Educ. 

& Licensure, 586 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. 1991). Pursuant to Section 332(a) of the Code, 

66 Pa.C.S. § 332(a), the proponent of the order in a proceeding before the 

Commission bears the burden of proof and must prove its case by a preponderance 

of the evidence, which is evidence more convincing than that offered by the other 

parties. Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc. v. Marguilies, 70 A.2d 854, 855-56 (Pa. 1950); 

Samuel J. Lansberry, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 578 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1990). The burden of proof contains two distinct burdens, the burden of production 

and the burden of persuasion. Riedel v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 633 A.2d 1325, 1328 

n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). “[T]he burden of persuasion never leaves the party on 

Reviewing the issues presented and argued by Petitioners, which do not include any 

“protective[] briefing” of the federal claims, id., the issues before this Court relate to whether the 

Commission’s decision is consistent with Pennsylvania law and is supported by substantial 

evidence, also a matter of Pennsylvania law. We read Petitioners’ arguments regarding the 

Commission’s consideration of the PJM determinations as relating to substantial evidence, rather 

than relating to federal preemption. Accordingly, we will not address the federal claims that 

Transource has reserved for consideration in the District Court and focus instead on whether the 

Commission’s decision is correct under Pennsylvania law. 
19

whom it is originally cast, but the burden of production may shift during the course 

of the proceedings.” Id.

Here, Petitioners argue that Transource met its burden of proof on the IEC 

Project and that the Commission erred in interpreting Section 1501 of the Code and 

Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations to conclude otherwise. They further argue that 

the Commission’s findings necessary to support its conclusion that the IEC Project 

does not meet the standard for approval under Pennsylvania law are not supported 

by substantial evidence. Finally, Petitioners argue that the Commission erred in 

rescinding the provisional CPC and not addressing the merits of the remaining 

Exceptions.13 We address these arguments in turn.

B. Section 1501 of the Code and Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations

1. Parties’ Arguments

Petitioners argue that the Commission erred as a matter of law in interpreting 

Section 1501 of the Code as requiring the IEC Project to be both necessary and

proper when that provision requires a proposed facility to be necessary or proper for 

the service of the public. The Commission further erred in interpreting Section 

57.76(a) of the Regulations as requiring Transource to prove that the IEC Project 

was “reasonable and necessary and in the public interest,” which is inconsistent with 

Section 1501’s recognition that a service may be approved if it is proper. 

(Petitioners’ Brief (Br.) at 18 (quoting Op. and Order at 56).) Petitioners argue that 

“proper” means something that is “appropriate to the purpose or circumstance; fit; 

suitable.” (Id. at 19-20 (citing PPL Elec. Utils. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 624 C.D. 2019, filed Oct. 27, 2020), slip op. at 24) (quotation 

13 Although Petitioners set forth eight separate arguments in their brief, those arguments 

have been consolidated into these three main arguments. 
20

omitted).)

14 Petitioners assert that the IEC Project is a proper means of resolving 

market congestion and the potential NERC violations, the latter of which relate to

the provision of safe and reasonable service. According to Petitioners, had the 

Commission applied the correct standard, that is, considered whether the IEC Project 

was “proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of . . . the public,” the 

Siting Applications would have been granted. (Id. at 19-20.) 

Petitioners further argue that the Commission erred in focusing solely on the 

potential impact to Pennsylvania rates, rather than considering the mitigation of 

regional market congestion, in concluding that there was no need for the IEC Project. 

That prices may increase for Pennsylvania ratepayers due to the resolution of 

congestion and market inefficiencies is not, per Mr. Cawley, a “cost” that should be 

considered in ascertaining whether a project is proper or needed under, respectively, 

Section 1501 of the Code and Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations. (Petitioners’ Br. 

at 41-42.) Citing Section 2805(a) of the Code, Petitioners assert the Commission is 

required to consider regional concerns and to work with PJM to support and enhance 

regional transmission planning, from which Pennsylvania benefits. In focusing on

local rates in a matter involving a project related to resolving wholesale impacts to 

the PJM Region, Petitioners maintain that the Commission did not comply with its 

obligation to support regional transmission planning as required by Section 2805(a).

The Commission responds that it properly interpreted and applied Section 

1501 of the Code and Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations in reviewing whether the 

IEC Project met the standards for approval under Pennsylvania law. It considered

14 PPL Electric Utilities is an unreported opinion which, while not binding, may be cited 

for its persuasiveness pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b), Pa.R.A.P. 

126(b), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code 

§ 69.414(a).
21

whether the IEC Project was necessary or proper and if it was needed and, based on 

its evidentiary weight determinations, found that the IEC Project was not. To the 

extent that Petitioners maintain all that was required to be proven was that the IEC

Project was proper under Section 1501 of the Code, Transource did not make this 

argument before it or the ALJ and, therefore, any such claim has been waived. Even 

if not waived, the Commission contends that the propriety of a project is not so broad 

as Petitioners assert, as a project should be “suitable” and “fitting,” and substantial 

evidence supports that the IEC Project is not suitable or fitting for its purported 

purpose. (Commission’s Br. at 42 (quoting Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, available 

at https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/proper (last visited May 4, 2022)).)

The Commission also argues that necessity for proposed transmission lines 

may be found when such lines provide lower prices or improved reliability, Hess v. 

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 107 A.3d 246, 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), 

and, here, the Commission was not persuaded by the evidence offered to establish 

that the IEC Project was necessary or proper. That PJM determined that there was 

a need for the IEC Project under its standards, while relevant, is not determinative 

of the approval of siting applications under the Code and the Regulations, which is

an independent decision that belongs to the Commission. The Commission disputes 

that it relied only on the impacts to Pennsylvania rates in determining the lack of 

need for the IEC Project, pointing to findings relating to the overall regional costs 

and benefits, which likewise support its decision that the IEC Project was not 

needed, necessary, or proper. 

OCA argues the Commission applied the correct legal standard in determining 

whether Transource met its burden of proof under Section 1501 of the Code and 

Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations. OCA maintains that despite Petitioners’
22

argument that “proper” is distinct from “need,” Petitioners still connect the two by 

arguing that if a project is proper, it must be needed. (OCA’s Br. at 11 (citing 

Petitioners’ Br. at 17).) Accepting Petitioners’ broad interpretation of “proper”

would allow any utility plan that is functional to be approved irrespective of the 

consequences to the environment, consumers, or the market. Even applying a 

proper-only standard, OCA asserts, Petitioners did not meet that standard because 

the identified need for the IEC Project, resolving congestion in the APSRI, is no 

longer present. As for Petitioners’ argument that the standard under Section 

57.76(a), as interpreted by the Commission, conflicts with Section 1501, they made 

no such arguments to the Commission in the Exceptions and, even if raised, the two 

provisions have distinct purposes – one standard applies distinctly to HV 

transmission lines and the other to public utilities in general. OCA contends that the 

Commission did not ignore the importance of regional transmission needs, it 

considered those needs, as required by Section 2805(a) of the Code, but correctly 

concluded the evidence relating to the various reasons proffered by Transource did 

not establish the need for the IEC Project under Pennsylvania law, which is a 

determination independent of PJM’s determination of need. The Commission’s 

review was not limited to the impacts in Pennsylvania, OCA argues; rather, it 

examined the impacts throughout the PJM Region, much of which would see 

increases in their energy prices as a result of the IEC Project. 

Franklin County argues Petitioners waived the issue that Transource only had 

to establish that the IEC Project was proper because it was not raised before the ALJ 

or the Commission. Since the grant of the provisional CPC, the issue to be addressed 

was whether there was a need for the IEC Project under Pennsylvania law, which 

Transource attempted to prove during the ALJ proceedings without arguing that it 
23

only had to prove that the IEC Project was proper. Even if not waived, Franklin

County asserts, the Commission applied the correct standards, reviewing the IEC 

Project under the specific standards of Section 57.76(a)(1) of the Regulations, which 

must take into consideration the environmental and safety concerns of HV 

transmission lines pursuant to article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

(Environmental Rights Amendment),

15 and the general standards of Section 1501 of 

the Code. Franklin County argues the Commission did not err in considering PJM’s 

determination of need but not finding such need sufficient for purposes of 

Pennsylvania law. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, the Commission did not rely 

on Pennsylvania impacts, but examined the needs and congestion of the PJM Region, 

which is consistent with the Commission’s obligations under Section 2805(a) of the 

Code. Based on the evidence presented and credited, Franklin County maintains the 

Commission properly concluded that the IEC Project was not necessary “to ensure 

the continued provision of adequate, safe and reliable service to the citizens and 

businesses in” Pennsylvania, or in the entire PJM Region. (Franklin County’s Br. at 

24 (quoting 66 Pa.C.S. § 2805(a)) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted).)

STFC argues the Commission committed no error of law or abuse of 

discretion in interpreting Section 1501 of the Code and applied the “necessary or 

proper” standard in exercising its independent authority to analyze the Siting 

15 Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water and to the preservation of the 

natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s 

public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including 

generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 

conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
24

Applications. As to the argument that Transource only had to prove that the IEC 

Project was proper, STFC asserts that this standard, in the context of transmission 

line siting, is not an alternative, lesser standard that would allow construction of any 

transmission line proposed – such line still must be appropriate to the purpose or 

circumstance, which the IEC Project is not. According to STFC, Section 57.76(a) 

of the Regulations, which requires denial of siting applications unless need for the 

proposed HV transmission lines is shown, is not unreasonable or beyond the Code’s 

grant of authority, particularly where the Commission has recognized that such lines 

“cannot be constructed without some adverse effect upon the environment,” and 

implicates the Commission’s obligations under the Environmental Rights 

Amendment. (STFC’s Br. at 22 (citing In Re Proposed Elec. Reg., 49 Pa. P.U.C. 

709, 712, 1976 Pa. PUC LEXIS 114 (1976)).) That a regulation is burdensome does 

not make its application or interpretation an abuse of discretion, but rather to be 

invalid, “what has been ordered must appear to be so entirely at odds with 

fundamental principles . . . as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise 

of judgment.” (Id. at 18 (citing Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n v. Uniontown Area Sch. 

Dist., 313 A.2d 156, 169 (Pa. 1973)).)

In their reply brief, Petitioners assert that necessary and proper are distinct 

standards, as recognized by this Court in PPL Electric Utilities, and that this Court 

has recognized that “necessity” is present “whenever the project result[s] in a benefit 

to the public, such as an improvement to the reliability of service or lower prices,” 

which Transource established would happen through the construction of the IEC 

Project. (Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 8 (quoting Hess, 107 A.3d at 260).) According 

to Petitioners, they did not waive the right to argue that the IEC Project is proper and 

that applying Section 57.76(a) as requiring need beyond the necessary or proper 
25

standard conflicts with Section 1501 of the Code because such arguments are 

encompassed in their original argument that the IEC Project should be approved 

because it meets the Section 1501 standards. Petitioners point to their brief to the 

Commission that the IEC Project “is clearly needed and is necessary or proper for 

the accommodation, convenience and safety of its patrons, employees and the 

public,” as encompassing its current arguments before the Court. (Petitioners’ Reply 

Br. at 10 (quoting R.R. Vol. 5 at 4045a).) Further, they assert they could not know 

that the Commission would misinterpret Section 57.76(a) before it issued the 

Opinion and Order and, therefore, its current arguments could not have been raised 

earlier.

2. Analysis

Section 1501 of the Code addresses, generally, the character of services and 

facilities of a public utility and provides, in relevant part:

Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, 

safe, and reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such 

repairs, changes, alterations, substitutions, extensions, and 

improvements in or to such service and facilities as shall be necessary 

or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its 

patrons, employees, and the public. . . . Such service and facilities 

shall be in conformity with the regulations and orders of the 

[C]ommission.

66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has recognized that the 

word “or” in “necessary or proper” “must be given its ordinarily disjunctive meaning 

unless such a construction would lead to an absurd result.” Elite Indus., Inc. v. Pa. 

Pub. Util. Comm’n, 832 A.2d 428, 431 (Pa. 2003). While Elite Industries involved 

Section 1103(a) of the Code, which relates to the grant of a CPC, both that section 
26

and Section 1501 use the phrase “necessary or proper.” Compare 66 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1103(a), with 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501. 

Section 57.76(a)(1) of the Regulations relates specifically to the siting and 

construction of HV lines and states: 

(b)The Commission will issue its order, with its opinion, if any, either 

granting or denying the application, in whole or in part, as filed or 

upon the terms, conditions or modifications, of the location, 

construction, operation or maintenance of the line as the 

Commission may deem appropriate. The Commission will not 

grant the application, either as proposed or as modified, unless it 

finds and determines as to the proposed HV line: 

(1)That there is a need for it.

52 Pa. Code § 57.76(a)(1). Pursuant to Section 57.75(e)(1) of the Regulations, in 

reviewing siting applications, the Commission must accept evidence of, among other 

things, the “present and future necessity of the proposed HV line in furnishing 

service to the public.” 52 Pa. Code § 57.75(e)(1) (emphasis added). When the 

Commission promulgated these regulations, it recognized that HV transmission lines 

could not “be constructed without some adverse effect upon the environment,” and, 

therefore, its review must incorporate the requirements of the Environmental Rights 

Amendment. In Re Proposed Elec. Reg., 49 Pa. P.U.C. at 712. 

Finally, Section 2805(a) of the Code provides that

[t]he [C]ommission shall take all necessary and appropriate steps to 

encourage interstate power pools to enhance competition and to 

complement industry restructuring on a regional basis. The 

Commonwealth, the [C]ommission and Pennsylvania electric utilities 

shall work with the Federal Government, other states in the region and 

interstate power pools to accomplish the goals of restructuring and to 

establish independent system operators or their functional equivalents 

to operate the transmission system and interstate power pools. The 

[C]ommission, Pennsylvania electric utilities and all electricity 
27

suppliers shall work with the Federal Government, other states in the 

region, the . . . [NERC] and its regional coordinating councils or their 

successors, interstate power pools, and with the independent system 

operator or its functional equivalent to ensure the continued provision 

of adequate, safe and reliable electric service to the citizens and 

businesses of this Commonwealth.

66 Pa.C.S. § 2805(a).

This matter involves the interpretation of these provisions, and the 

Commission’s “interpretations of the Code, the statute for which it has enforcement 

responsibility, and its own regulations are entitled to great deference and should not 

be reversed unless clearly erroneous.” Lehigh Valley Transp. Servs. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 

Comm’n, 56 A.3d 49, 56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Energy Conservation 

Council, 995 A.2d at 478). “The statutory and regulatory scheme regarding the 

approval of the siting and construction of transmission lines is technically complex, 

and a reviewing court should put aside its discretion in favor of the Commission’s 

expertise.” Hess, 107 A.3d at 259. Thus, a Commission determination that facilities 

are “necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience or safety of 

the public” is entitled to “strong deference” and “given controlling weight unless it 

is clearly erroneous.” Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 926 A.2d 

926, 940 (Pa. 2007).

Reviewing the Commission’s Opinion and Order with these principles in 

mind, we discern no clear error in the determination that Transource did not meet its

burden of proof under Section 1501 of the Code and Section 57.76(a) of the 

Regulations on the Siting Applications. First, we agree with the Commission that 

the determination of whether a utility meets the requisite burden of proof under 

Pennsylvania law is an independent one. The Commission’s role is to regulate 

utilities for the purposes of Pennsylvania law and to determine if the proposed 
28

services and facilities comport with Pennsylvania law. That is what it did here; it 

examined the Siting Applications, the evidence offered in support of and opposition 

to those applications, and made a determination as to whether Transource met its

burden of proof on those Siting Applications under Pennsylvania law. The need for

the Commission’s independent review is particularly true where Pennsylvania law 

sets forth different requirements and considerations for approving HV transmission 

lines than may be addressed in PJM’s proceedings.

Next, examining the Opinion and Order in its entirety, the Commission did 

not deviate from the “necessary or proper” standard set forth in Section 1501 of the 

Code or interpret Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations in a way that is inconsistent 

with that standard. While there may be places where the Opinion used “necessary 

and proper,” rather than “necessary or proper,” the Commission recognized the 

statutory standard and applied it, as well as the regulatory standard of “need” as set 

forth in Section 57.76(a), to the evidence presented. After doing so, the Commission 

concluded that Transource had not met its burden of proving those standards based 

on the evidence it presented, which was found to be less persuasive than the evidence 

in opposition to the IEC Project. 

Necessity and need are corollaries, and this Court has explained that, for 

purposes of HV transmission lines, necessity can be established by showing an 

improvement in the reliability of services or lower prices. Hess, 107 A.3d at 260. 

As for any lower prices that could result from the IEC Project, the Commission

considered all the costs and benefits of the IEC Project, not just those considered by 

PJM, and, because there were considerable increases in prices to ratepayers in both 

Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the PJM Region, found that this did not support the 

grant of the Siting Applications. As for the potential NERC reliability violations, 
29

the Commission, as factfinder, found that the relative weight to this later-asserted 

basis for the IEC Project had diminished because, among other reasons, “it bec[a]me 

more tangential to the unambiguous original driver of the” IEC Project. (Op. and 

Order at 62.) As for the resolution of congestion in the APSRI, it does not appear 

that we have ever held that congestion, which is an economic consideration, is 

sufficient on its own to support need or necessity under Pennsylvania law. In Energy 

Conservation Council, we observed that while there was a challenge to the 

Commission’s reliance on congestion to find need, we did not address that challenge, 

stating that “even if the [Commission] erred in considering congestion issues,” the 

finding of public need in that case was supported on reliability grounds. 995 A.2d 

at 487. Similar to that case, we need not decide this issue here because the 

congestion in the APSRI decreased significantly over the years and, therefore, was 

rejected as being a valid basis for the IEC Project. To the extent that Transource 

later asserted that the IEC Project would resolve congestion in the AP South Area

and related constraints, like the potential NERC reliability violations, that reason 

was not given much weight for a variety of reasons. Thus, based on the evidentiary 

findings of the Commission, we discern no clear error in the Commission’s 

determination that Petitioners did not satisfy the standards under Section 1501 of the 

Code and Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations.

Alternatively, Petitioners argue that the Siting Applications should have been 

granted because the IEC Project was proper, that is, “being adapted or appropriate 

to the purpose or circumstances; fit; suitable,” for its purpose. PPL Elec. Utils., slip 

op. at 24 (quotation and citation omitted). The Commission argues that, if the issue 

is not waived, it addressed the propriety of the IEC Project, finding that the costs 

outweighed the limited benefits, and, moreover, that the proper standard is not as 
30

broad as Petitioners claim, which requires that a project be “suitable,” or 

“acceptable.” (Commission’s Br. at 42.) We agree that Petitioners’ broad

interpretation of “proper” goes beyond what is intended by Section 1501 of the Code. 

The application of the “proper” standard is dependent on the circumstances of 

each case. For example, the Supreme Court determined in Elite Industries that 

“necessary or proper” must be given its disjunctive meaning and that using a less 

stringent standard to obtain a CPC was appropriate in that case. This reasoning was 

based, at least in part, on the facts that the applicant sought to offer a private 

limousine service, the applicant “would be hard pressed to show a ‘public need’ for 

convenience,” and approval of the CPC would allow for growth and competition 

within the industry. 832 A.2d at 432. The Supreme Court explained that, in 

requiring a showing of public need, this Court had infringed upon the Commission’s 

broad discretion within which the General Assembly left the determinations 

regarding the propriety of granting a CPC. Id. Similarly, in PPL Electric Utilities, 

slip op. at 22-24, which involved a utility’s internal corporate restructuring, this 

Court recognized that “it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for [a u]tility to 

establish an affirmative and substantial benefit to the public,” and that this was a 

case in which “the Commission c[ould] conduct a disjunctive analysis,” and then

remanded the matter to the Commission to determine if the restructuring was 

proper. (Emphasis added.) Thus, in these cases, the disjunctive “proper” standard 

was used primarily because it was unlikely that the public need, i.e., necessity, 

standard could ever be met based on the type of service or action that was being 

proposed and was to be determined to apply based on the circumstances involved. 

From these cases, we discern that while the Commission is to determine whether a 

service or facility is “necessary or proper,” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added), that 
31

determination should consider the circumstances, such as the type of service or 

action being proposed, and that this determination falls within the Commission’s 

sound discretion.

Unlike the situations in Elite Industries and PPL Electric Utilities, it cannot 

reasonably be said that it is unlikely or nearly impossible to establish a public need 

for an HV transmission line – the Commission and this Court have addressed 

numerous such applications and findings of public need have been made which 

support approving those lines. See Hess, 107 A.3d at 250, 257-58, 260-61; Energy 

Conservation Council, 995 A.2d at 486-87; In Re: Application of Trans-Allegheny 

Interstate Line Co. (TrAILCo), 103 Pa. P.U.C. 554, 2008 WL 5786507 (Pa. PUC 

Dec. 12, 2008), slip op. 10-12, 16-18; Application of PP&L Elec. Utils. Corp., 2010 

WL 637064 (Pa. PUC Feb. 12, 2010) (Susquehanna-Roseland), slip op. at 9, 14, 30. 

Thus, the broad application of the “proper” standard asserted by Petitioners is not as 

warranted here as it had been in Elite Industries and PPL Electric Utilities. Further, 

we must remain cognizant that the standards for siting HV transmission lines must 

be read in the context of the Environmental Rights Amendment, with which the 

Commission’s Regulations were promulgated to be consistent. Here, the 

Commission reviewed the evidence presented and concluded that the proffered 

reasons for the IEC Project, including the later-asserted alleged resolution of

congestion outside the APSRI and the possible NERC reliability violations, when 

weighed against the detriments of the IEC Project, did not meet the standard under 

Section 1501, which necessarily includes whether such facility was “proper.” As 

this determination is within the Commission’s expertise and discretion, and because 

that determination is not clearly erroneous, we will not infringe on that discretion.
32

Finally, the Commission did not violate its obligations under Section 2805(a) 

of the Code to work with regional transmission planning groups and the Federal

Government when it denied the Siting Applications and rescinded Transource’s 

provisional CPC under Pennsylvania law. The Commission recognized the asserted 

regional planning goals of the IEC Project but found, after weighing the evidence, 

that the evidence offered to support that the IEC Project satisfied the Pennsylvania 

standards for approval was not persuasive for a variety of reasons. Further, and 

contrary to Petitioners’ arguments, the Commission did not engage in a 

Pennsylvania-only review of the costs and benefits of the IEC Project. While 

evidence of the detrimental impact to Pennsylvania ratepayers was cited and 

considered as part of the conclusion that Transource did not meet its burden of proof, 

the Commission also examined the detrimental impacts to ratepayers in other parts 

of the PJM Region in reaching that conclusion. Accordingly, this is not a reason to

find that the Commission’s determination was clearly erroneous. 

C. Evidentiary Claims

1. Parties’ Arguments

Petitioners argue the Commission made several errors in reviewing and 

rejecting Transource’s evidence in this matter. First, Petitioners argue the 

Commission erred in rejecting PJM’s determination of the need for the IEC Project, 

which was presented as evidence to establish need under the Code and the 

Regulations, despite PJM’s expertise in the area of transmission planning, including 

the management and mitigation of chronic congestion within the PJM Region. 

Petitioners maintain that the Commission should have relied on that evidence 

because PJM’s process was approved by FERC, was supported by numerous studies, 
33

and had been accepted by the Commission and this Court in the past, including in 

Energy Conservation Council, 995 A.2d 465, to support granting siting applications. 

Second, Petitioners assert the Commission’s finding that the IEC Project is 

not necessary to resolve congestion or the potential NERC violations is not 

supported by substantial evidence because the evidence relied upon, that of the 

opposing parties, constituted “a vast oversimplification of the complex electrical 

engineering analysis required to evaluate congestion on the interstate transmission 

system.” (Petitioners’ Br. at 29.) Petitioners contend that only Transource presented 

evidence of actual studies or modeling showing that the IEC Project was needed to 

resolve congestion in the AP South Area and to resolve the NERC reliability issues, 

which the Commission abused its discretion in disregarding. According to 

Petitioners, the opposing parties’ witnesses had less experience than Transource’s 

experts and their evidence regarding the IEC Project no longer being needed due to 

reduced congestion on the APSRI was speculative, particularly where the IEC 

Project was not limited to resolving congestion on that particular interface. 

Petitioners further assert that no opposing party offered substantive or empirical data 

regarding the pending NERC reliability violations. Petitioners maintain that the 

Commission improperly relied on speculation that other upgrades may resolve those 

violations and the lack of additional testing to reject PJM’s findings in this regard 

despite there being no reason for PJM to run additional testing because the IEC 

Project, a baseline upgrade, would resolve the potential reliability violations in a 

timely fashion.

The Commission responds that its findings that the IEC Project did not meet 

the standard for approval under Pennsylvania law are supported by substantial 

evidence. According to the Commission, its rejection of PJM’s need determination
34

was based on credible evidence reflecting that PJM’s cost-benefit analysis was 

flawed and did not consider costs to other parts of the PJM Region, that the 

congestion in the APSRI had decreased since the initial study that supported PJM’s 

need determination, and that there was insufficient proof of the potential NERC 

reliability violations. It maintains that there was substantial evidence to support each 

of these determinations, including that the net benefit would only be $32.5 million 

over a 15-year period, that the data relied upon to continue supporting the need for 

the IEC Project became outdated, and that the congestion cited as the purpose for 

the IEP Project was no longer an issue. As for the alleged potential NERC reliability 

violations, the Commission asserts the reasons offered for giving less weight to that 

evidence were supported by the record and reasonable. The Commission contends 

that Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary are simply a request for this Court to 

reweigh the evidence, which is beyond this Court’s appellate role.

OCA likewise argues that there was no error or abuse of discretion by the 

Commission in not relying on PJM’s determination and that PJM’s process is 

inherently unfair in ascertaining whether the benefits of a market efficiency project 

outweigh its costs. OCA maintains that the Commission considered and weighed all 

of the evidence in its role as factfinder, that Petitioners’ arguments are impermissible 

attacks on the evidentiary determinations, and that the fact that Transource presented 

evidence that supports other findings of fact is of no moment because the findings 

made are supported by substantial evidence. According to OCA, while the 

Commission has relied on PJM determinations in the past, it did so merely as 

evidence to be considered and not as the sole reason for granting relief.

Franklin County argues that the Commission’s findings regarding the lack of

need for the IEC Project are supported by substantial evidence, including by 
35

Transource’s own data, and that the evidence related to Transource’s later-asserted

reasons for the IEC Project was properly rejected as being insufficient after being 

weighed by the Commission. There was no impropriety, according to Franklin 

County, for the Commission to make its own determination as to the reliability of 

PJM’s projections based on the evidence presented or to accept evidence opposing 

the IEC Project as more persuasive. To the extent that the Commission has cited 

PJM data and witnesses in the past, it was as part of the Commission’s own analysis

and not merely accepting PJM’s determination as establishing need. 

STFC argues that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence,

Petitioners seek to have this Court reweigh the evidence by claiming only 

Transource presented substantial evidence, and the Commission is not bound by 

PJM’s determination of need for the IEC Project for purposes of Pennsylvania law. 

STFC maintains that the Commission has not historically relied solely on PJM’s 

determinations to establish need under Pennsylvania law but considered such 

determinations as evidence. STFC further argues that the Commission has not held 

that PJM-identified congestion and economic issues were sufficient, in themselves, 

to support a finding of need under Pennsylvania law. 

Petitioners respond, reemphasizing their arguments that the Commission’s 

findings as to the lack of need, congestion, and reliability violations are not 

supported by substantial evidence, pointing to Transource’s own evidence in 

support. Petitioners reassert that the Commission has accepted PJM determinations 

of need as being sufficient to meet the standard for granting siting applications under 

Pennsylvania law and it should have done so here. PJM’s determinations that the 

IEC Project is needed to relieve congestion and resolve the potential NERC 

reliability violations constitute substantial evidence to support that the project is both 
36

necessary and proper and were improperly rejected by the Commission. Petitioners 

claim that they are not asking this Court to reweigh the evidence but to reverse the 

finding that the IEC Project did not meet the standard for approval under 

Pennsylvania law because it is not supported by substantial evidence, as the 

opposing parties’ evidence was fully rebutted by Transource’s evidence. 

(Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 26.)

2. Analysis

It is well settled that the Commission “is the ultimate factfinder[] and makes 

all decisions as to the weight and credibility of evidence.” Borough of Duncannon 

v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 713 A.2d 737, 739 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). For a 

Commission finding to be supported by substantial evidence, which is “the amount 

of relevant evidence which a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support 

a determination,” Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 937 A.2d 

1040, 1054 (Pa. 2007) (Popowsky III), there must be “more than a mere trace of 

evidence or suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to be established,” HIKO 

Energy, LLC v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 163 A.3d 1079, 1094 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Lyft, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 145 

A.3d 1235, 1240 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)), aff’d, 209 A.3d 246 (Pa. 2019). Additionally, 

the record evidence, as well as the inferences that can be logically drawn from that 

evidence, must be “viewed in a light most favorable to” “[t]he party who [sic] 

prevailed before the” Commission. United Transp. Union v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

68 A.3d 1026, 1032 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). It is irrelevant if “the record may contain 

evidence that supports a different result than that reached by the [Commission] . . . 

so long as the record contains substantial evidence supporting the [Commission’s] 
37

decision.” Lyft, Inc., 145 A.3d at 1240. This Court should not “‘substitute its 

judgment for that of the [Commission] when substantial evidence supports the 

[Commission]’s decision on a matter within the [C]ommission’s expertise,’ nor 

should it indulge in the process of weighing evidence and resolving conflicting 

testimony.” Energy Conservation Council, 995 A.2d at 478 (citing Popowsky v. Pa. 

Pub. Util. Comm’n, 706 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. 1997) (Popowsky I)).

Petitioners’ evidentiary challenges focus, essentially, on the Commission’s 

acceptance of the opposing parties’ evidence over that offered by Transource. Their 

arguments challenge the Commission’s decision to: not accept PJM’s 

determinations as sufficient evidence under Pennsylvania law, despite having done 

so in other proceedings; reject evidence that the IEC Project would resolve, and was 

designed to resolve, congestion beyond the APSRI; and reject evidence that the IEC 

Project would resolve five potential NERC reliability violations. A review of the 

record under the applicable appellate standard reveals that the Commission’s 

findings are supported by substantial evidence and support the Commission’s 

conclusion that Transource did not meet its burden of proof, which includes both the 

burden of production and the burden of persuasion, on the Siting Applications.

First, Petitioners’ assertion that the Commission erred in not accepting

Transource’s evidence related to PJM’s determination of need and the testimony of 

PJM employees because the Commission has done so in the past is not persuasive. 

Petitioners cite various Commission decisions and this Court’s opinion in Energy 

Conservation Council for support because the PJM-based evidence presented in 

those cases was found sufficient to establish need under Pennsylvania law. 

However, a close reading of those Commission decisions and Energy Conservation 

Council reveals that PJM’s determinations of need and related testimony and reports 
38

were simply evidence offered by the applicant, which were found credible and 

persuasive by the Commission based on those factual records. This is apparent in 

this Court’s decision in Energy Conservation Council, which references the PJM 

submissions as evidence that had been offered by the applicant, and accepted as 

persuasive by the Commission, to support a determination that the transmission lines 

at issue met the standards of Pennsylvania law. 995 A.2d at 470-73, 480-86. The 

Commission’s decisions cited by Petitioners, which include the decision reviewed 

in Energy Conservation Council, likewise refer to the PJM submissions as evidence, 

which the Commission considered and “was persuaded by.” TrAILCo, 2008 WL 

5786507, slip op. 10-12, 16-18. See also Susquehanna-Roseland, 2010 WL 637064, 

slip op. at 9, 14, 30 (explaining that the applicant “presented extensive testimony 

and exhibits in order to support its [a]pplication” and describing the evidence 

introduced regarding PJM’s process as supporting the application and meeting the 

applicant’s burden of proof on need); Joint Application for Approval of Merger of 

GPU, Inc. with FirstEnergy Corp., 2001 Pa. PUC LEXIS 604 (Pa. PUC May 24, 

2001), slip op. at 9-10, 22-23 (accepting PJM evidence as sufficient to support the 

need for a merger of two electric utilities, but with a concurring opinion questioning 

whether such evidence was affirmative evidence that supported the relief requested).

Indeed, in the TrAILCo case, the Commission rejected the argument of one of the 

opposing parties that it was “required to accept PJM’s RTEP findings or that [it]

must in some fashion defer to PJM on transmission siting issues,” but it did “find 

that PJM’s RTEP and the testimony surrounding the need for [proposed transmission 

line facilities] compelling.” Id., slip op. at 18 n.3 (emphasis omitted). That the 

Commission found evidence persuasive in some proceedings does not require it to 

accept it as such in all. As PJM’s determinations, reports, and witnesses were offered
39

in the current proceedings as evidence for the Commission’s consideration, that 

evidence is subject to challenge by opposing parties and witnesses and to weighing 

by the Commission. Accordingly, this is not a basis to reverse the Commission’s 

factual findings.

Second, Petitioners argue that the Commission’s findings of fact regarding 

PJM’s cost-benefit analysis are flawed and not supported by substantial evidence.

This evidence was rejected because, inter alia, it did not consider the negative 

impacts of the IEC Project on other ratepayers or that the data used to support the 

ongoing need for the IEC Project was outdated, ultimately, and inaccurate, and it did 

not include other means of resolving the alleged congestion, such as future potential 

generation sources. As to the first reason, OCA’s evidence revealed that prior to 

2014, PJM considered the negative impacts in its benefit calculation but removed 

this from the cost-benefit analysis in order to “increase[] the number of projects that 

could qualify as a market efficiency project.” (OCA Cross Exhibit (Ex.) 4 at 4, 8, 

R.R. Vol. 7 at 6384a, 6388a.) It was not just OCA’s witness who criticized PJM’s 

cost-benefit analysis, but PJM’s own Independent Market Monitor who suggested 

that its market efficiency process, which includes the cost-benefit analysis, be 

reevaluated and that the actual costs and benefits of a project should be considered

and not ignored in determining whether a market efficiency project is needed. (OCA 

Cross Ex. 12 at 7-8, R.R. Vol. 7 at 6421a-22a; Hearing Transcript (Hr’g Tr.) at 2619-

22, R.R. Vol. 3 at 2894a-97a.) Because a finding of necessity may be found under 

Pennsylvania law if a project results in a decrease in prices, Hess, 107 A.3d at 260,

we do not view it an abuse of discretion for the Commission to consider evidence of 

increased consumer prices and weigh the competing cost impacts of the IEC Project 

to determine the necessity of that project. Further, the finding that the cost-benefit 
40

analysis was based on outdated data and inaccurate predictions was supported by the 

credited testimony of Edward McGavran, who testified that data from 2014 was still 

being used to support the need for the IEC Project, despite the resolution of the 

congestion on the APSRI, and the reports demonstrating the significant decrease in 

congestion in the APSRI that was contrary to the initial predictions. (Hr’g Tr. at 8-

10, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3447a-49a; OCA Statement (St.) 2 at 17 Table 3, R.R. Vol. 2 at 

1079a.) Finally, the cost-benefit analysis used to support the IEC Project did not 

consider other ways of ameliorating congestion, such as new generation, and, in fact, 

was modified in 2018 to exclude from the simulation potential future generation 

projects that had executed a Facilities Study Agreement, which is an agreement that 

identifies facility additions and upgrades. (FOF ¶¶ 73-74, 76; R.D. at 89, 93-94; 

Transource St. AA3, Ex. TJH-AA1 at 19, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3377a; OCA Hr’g Ex. 3, 

R.R. Vol. 6 at 5634a-78a; Transource Response to OCA XLIII-12, R.R. Vol. 6 at 

5648a; Hr’g Tr. at 2266-68, R.R. Vol. 3 at 2541a-43a; Hr’g Tr. at 2930-33, R.R. 

Vol. 4 at 3858a-61a.) Prior to this change, the cost-benefit ratio of the IEC Project 

in 2018 was 1.40, and after the change, the cost-benefit ratio in 2019 was 2.17. (FOF

¶¶ 77-78.) Ultimately, the cost-benefit analysis was evidence offered to support 

Petitioners’ claim that the IEC Project met the standard for approval under the Code 

and the Regulations and, as such, it was subject to challenge by the opposing parties 

and weighing by the Commission. In this instance, the Commission examined the 

evidence presented by all the parties, weighed it, and found the opposing parties’ 

evidence more persuasive. As this Court may not reweigh the evidence, this is not 

a basis for reversing.

Third, Petitioners assert that the Commission’s findings rejecting congestion 

as a basis for the need for the IEC Project are not supported by substantial evidence. 
41

The findings reflect that the IEC Project was designed to resolve congestion on the 

APSRI, and that congestion on the APRSI has decreased significantly since 2014,

such that it no longer supports the need for the IEC Project. These findings are 

supported by substantial evidence, including Petitioners’ own evidence. 

(Transource St. 2 at 7, 11, R.R. Vol. 1 at 864a; Transource St. 3 at 24-25, R.R. Vol. 

1 at 905a-06a; Transource St. 8-R, Ex. TH-5R at 2, 4-5, R.R. Vol. 2 at 1738a, 1740a41a; Transource St. No. 3-AA-RJ at 8, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3662a; Hr’g Tr. at 2132-33, 

2381, 2387-88, R.R. Vol. 3 at 2662a-63a; Hr’g Tr. at 2921-23, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3849a51a.) While Petitioners claim that the IEC Project was also intended to resolve 

congestion in the AP South Area, this evidence was not found to be persuasive 

because it was not asserted as a basis for the project from the beginning, was raised 

after the APSRI congestion had substantially resolved, little detail was provided 

regarding the related constraints in the AP South Area, and the evidence did not 

show that the congestion at the later-identified facilities was within PJM’s top 25 

most congested facilities. (R.D. at 83-84, 88; OCA Hr’g Ex. 6 at 559, R.R. Vol. 7

at 6263a; Transource St. AA3, Ex. TJH-AA1 at 19, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3377a; OCA Cross 

Ex. 7 at 2, R.R. Vol. 7 at 6505a; OCA Cross Ex. 8 at 1-2, R.R. Vol. 7 at 6408a-09a.) 

This reasoning does not reflect an abuse of discretion but is based on a review and a 

weighing of the evidence presented. Accordingly, this is not a basis for reversing. 

Fourth, Petitioners maintain the Commission’s findings rejecting the five 

potential NERC reliability violations are not supported by substantial evidence. The 

evidence of these potential reliability violations was found not to be persuasive 

because reliability violations were not the driver for the IEC Project, the potential 

reliability issues were not identified until 2018 – after OCA presented evidence in 

opposition to the congestion-based reasons, PJM did not perform its standard set of 
42

reliability tests to confirm the need in this matter, and PJM did not rerun the 

reliability tests after other projects were approved to determine if those projects 

would resolve the potential reliability concerns. (R.D. at 83-84; Op. and Order at 

61-62.) Again, these findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Transource 

St. 7-R at 21, R.R. Vol. 2 at 1358; Transource St. 7-RJ-SUPP at 3-4, R.R. Vol. 4 at 

3108a-09a; Transource St. AA-2, Ex. SRH-AA2 at 13, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3350a; OCA 

St. 1-SSR at 16-17, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3077a-78a; OCA Hr’g Ex. 3, R.R. Vol. 6 at 5634a78a; Transource Response to OCA-XLIII-10, R.R. Vol. 6 at 5647a; Hr’g Tr. at 2926-

27, R.R. Vol. 4 at 3854a-55a.) While Petitioners argue that there was no need for 

PJM to run its standard set of reliability tests or to examine whether subsequently 

approved projects would resolve the potential issues once it determined that the IEC 

Project would do so, these arguments go to the weight to be given the evidence. 

Reviewing the conflicting evidence, the Commission reasonably held that “the 

relative weight of the evidence of . . . later-asserted bas[es] for need for the [IEC 

P]roject diminishe[d] as it bec[a]me[] more tangential to the unambiguous original 

driver[, which was the] alleviation of economic congestion on the AP[SRI].” (Op. 

and Order at 62.)

To summarize, Petitioners discount all the evidence presented by the opposing 

parties that supports the Commission’s findings and attack this evidence as being 

overly simplistic and speculative. However, because these arguments go to the 

weight of the evidence presented, which is an issue for the factfinder and not this 

Court, and the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, those findings 

of fact are binding and cannot be set aside. Energy Conservation Council, 995 A.2d 

at 478.
43

D. The Rescission of the Provisional CPC and Petitioners’ Other Exceptions

Petitioners assert that the Commission erred in rescinding Transource’s 

provisional CPC because the Commission erred in concluding the IEC Project was 

not needed, necessary, or proper. Petitioners further argue that the Commission 

erred and abused its discretion in not addressing the Exceptions related to the ALJ’s 

determination that Transource did not establish that the IEC Project met the other 

requirements for approval of the Siting Applications under Section 57.76(a) of the 

Regulations. They similarly argue that the Commission erred and abused its 

discretion in not addressing Transource’s eminent domain applications and zoning 

petitions. Petitioners maintain that the Commission misinterpreted the requirements 

of Section 1511(a) and (c) of the Business Corporation Law of 1988 (BCL), 15 

Pa.C.S. § 1511(a), (c), by omitting the “proper” from “necessary or proper” language 

of that section in the Opinion and Order. (Petitioners’ Br. at 56-57 (quoting 15 

Pa.C.S. § 1511(a), (c)).) They request that, upon this Court finding that the IEC 

Project meets the requirements of Section 1501 of the Code and Section 1511 of the 

BCL, we remand for the Commission to resolve these Exceptions. 

The Commission and Intervenors respond there was no error or abuse in the 

Commission’s rescinding Transource’s provisional CPC because the CPC was 

granted only for the IEC Project. They further argue that the Commission did not 

err or abuse its discretion in not considering Transource’s other Exceptions. The

Commission and Intervenors contend that because the Commission’s determination 

that the IEC Project did not meet the necessary or proper and need standards was not 

in error and was supported by substantial evidence, the other issues raised in the

other Exceptions were moot.

In January 2018, the Commission granted Transource a provisional CPC that 

related only to the IEC Project and the parties to those proceedings expressly 
44

reserved the issue of the determination of need for the IEC Project for future 

proceedings on the siting of the HV transmission lines at issue. Having concluded 

that the Commission did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that

Transource did not meet its burden of proving that the IEC Project met the standards 

for approval of transmission lines under Section 1501 of the Code and Section 

57.76(a)(1) of the Regulations, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the 

Commission’s decision to then rescind Transource’s related provisional CPC. 

Similarly, the Commission’s decision to deny the Siting Applications pursuant to 

Section 1501 of the Code and Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations rendered the 

Exceptions that addressed other alleged errors moot, and the Commission did not err 

or abuse its discretion in not addressing those arguments on that basis.

III. CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that the Commission’s decision denying the Siting 

Applications and rescinding Transource’s provisional CPC was in accordance with 

Pennsylvania law, including Sections 1501 and 2805(a) of the Code, and Section 

57.76(a) of the Regulations, and is supported by substantial, credited evidence of 

record, we affirm.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the consideration of this matter.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Transource Pennsylvania, LLC, and :

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation, :

Petitioners :

 :

v. : No. 689 C.D. 2021

 : 

Pennsylvania Public Utility : 

Commission, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, May 5, 2022, the Order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility 

Commission, entered in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge