United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted July 20, 2018*

Decided July 20, 2018 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge 

Nos. 16-2284 & 17-1182 

YVONKIA STEWART, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeals from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 14-3265 

Sue E. Myerscough, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Yvonkia Stewart challenges the denial of her application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. Stewart argues principally that the 

administrative law judge erred in concluding that she was not credible. The ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence, so we affirm the judgment. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
Nos. 16-2284 & 17-1182 Page 2 

Because Stewart’s arguments on appeal are limited, we abbreviate the facts. 

Stewart injured her back in October 2008 while working in construction. She sought 

treatment for the resulting back pain and difficulty walking. Two years later she 

applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income, contending that these 

and other symptoms rendered her disabled since 2008. She asserted that she suffered 

from degenerative disc disease, myofascial pain syndrome (pain associated with 

repetitive muscular movements), sleep and mood disorders, a history of substance 

abuse, and seizures. After two hearings, the ALJ ruled that Stewart was not disabled. 

The ALJ applied the required five-step analysis for assessing disability, 

see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), and at the fourth step concluded that 

Stewart retained the capacity for some work. The ALJ observed that Stewart had not 

worked since 2008 (step one). At step two the ALJ found that Steward suffered from 

severe impairments (disc disease, pain syndrome, sleep and mood disorders, and 

substance abuse), but that her allegation about “seizures” was “not medically 

determinable.” Her impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment (step three). 

At the fourth step, the ALJ ruled that Stewart had the residual functional capacity to 

perform a limited range of sedentary work (but not her past work). Available jobs 

included office clerk or ticket-counter agent (step five). 

The fourth step requires further discussion. The ALJ had to decide if Stewart’s 

pain disabled her from work, and the ALJ found her credibility on this point “extremely 

poor.” First, since 2008, medical providers regularly had reported that she exaggerated 

her pain. They explained that she “did not give maximal effort” on physical tests, was 

uncooperative, “tested positive for symptom magnification,” and demonstrated 

inconsistent “pain behaviors” in the waiting room or when the examiner looked away 

from her. These observations appeared in two functional-capacity evaluations and in 

reports by her orthopedist, her pain-clinic doctor, a psychologist, and a referring 

physician from a stage agency. Second, the objective medical evidence did not support 

Stewart’s assertion that her functioning was severely limited by pain. Spinal MRIs 

showed “mild findings,” neural exams revealed normal muscle and electric activities, 

Stewart took no pain medication, and her pain-management doctor recommended a 

no-treatment regimen. Third, Stewart performed a “wide array of daily activities” that 

were more vigorous than sedentary work. These included caring for her son, shopping, 

climbing stairs, and completing household chores, albeit with her son’s assistance. 

This appeal arises from that 2013 ruling. After the ALJ rejected Stewart’s request 

for benefits, the Appeals Counsel denied review, and the district court affirmed the 

ALJ’s decision. Stewart appealed that decision and then asked the district court to 
Nos. 16-2284 & 17-1182 Page 3 

supplement the appellate record with new medical documents. These documents 

describe her physical ailments after the ALJ’s decision. The district court treated that 

motion as a request for relief from judgment under Federal Civil Rule 60(b)(2) and 

denied it. Stewart has appealed that decision too, and we consolidate both appeals. 

Stewart’s main argument in the first appeal is that the ALJ incorrectly found that 

she was not credible, but the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

Stewart asserts that her medical providers “colluded” to lie about her injuries and 

misdiagnose her condition. She says that she suffered “a stroke,” a “closed head injury 

and dispersed cervical and thoracic damage in the spine,” and “catastrophic injury to 

[the] brain.” But she produced no evidence of any agreement among her providers to 

lie; nor does she point to any medical evidence of these adverse conditions. 

Unsubstantiated claims are “of course, no substitute for evidence.” White ex rel. Smith v. 

Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1999). 

The ALJ’s credibility finding is “reasoned and supported” by the record. Elder v. 

Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ reasonably relied on the functionalcapacity evaluations and reports from her several healthcare providers. These observed 

Stewart’s lack of cooperation, her absence of effort, her “exaggerated” responses to 

pain, and the lack of objective evidence of pain. See Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 518–19 

(7th Cir. 2009) (finding relevant to credibility physician’s observation that patient may 

have feigned weakness); see also Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1161 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(observing that discrepancy between objective evidence and patient-reported pain “may 

suggest symptom exaggeration”). The ALJ also reasonably considered Stewart’s 

testimony about her daily activities, her lack of pain medication, and the absence of a 

pain-treatment regimen from her pain-relief clinic. See Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 

747 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding relevant to credibility that patient’s daily activities were not 

significantly restricted, he received no active treatment or therapy, and took no 

prescription medication). The ALJ permissibly concluded from these factors that 

Stewart’s claim that she was in too much pain to work was not credible. See Simila, 

573 F.3d at 517. 

We can dispatch the second appeal quickly. Stewart does not address the district 

court’s denial of her motion to supplement the record, and arguments not raised on 

appeal are waived. Snyder v. King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014). 

We have reviewed Stewart’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED