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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHERYL J.*

(AC 43233)

Elgo, Cradle and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of criminal violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed to this court. The trial court had issued a protective order

against the defendant, which provided that she must, inter alia, stay

away from the home of the victim, her former husband, and wherever

the victim shall reside. The protective order listed the victim’s address

as a certain property, which he had obtained through divorce proceedings with the defendant. At the time the court issued the order, the

defendant requested further clarification of the order from the court.

The court orally advised the defendant to stay away from the residence

of the victim, wherever it may be, including the residence listed on

the protective order. Thereafter, as the defendant was driving by the

property, she noticed a real estate agent’s car in the driveway and pulled

up to the driveway, telling the agent that she could not list or sell the

property because of pending legal proceedings and a court order relating

to the property. The agent notified the victim of this interaction. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that she had the requisite intent to be convicted

of criminal violation of a protective order, as that crime is not a specific

intent crime; the state was not required to prove that the defendant

specifically intended to violate a condition of the protective order, only

that she intended to perform the activities constituting the violation of

the protective order, specifically, that she intended to go to the property,

and it was undisputed that she went to the property.

2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the criminal violation

of protective order statute (§ 53a-223) was void for vagueness as applied

to her because the language of the protective order, as explained to her

by the trial court, did not provide adequate notice of what was prohibited;

the terms of the protective order provided adequate notice that going

to the property would constitute a violation of the order, the court’s

oral instruction to the defendant specifically warned her to avoid the

victim’s residence, the address of the property clearly was listed as the

victim’s address on the protective order, the language contained in the

order required the defendant to stay away from the property even if the

victim was not residing there, and the court’s oral instructions did not

alter the restrictions of the protective order in any way.

Argued December 8, 2020—officially released April 13, 2021

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crime

of criminal violation of a protective order, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of StamfordNorwalk, geographical area number twenty, and tried

to the court, McLaughlin, J.; judgment of guilty, from

which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Stephan E. Seeger, for the appellant (defendant).

Sarah Hanna, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief were Paul J. Ferencek, state’s attorney, and Justina Moore, assistant state’s attorney, for

the appellee (state).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The defendant, Cheryl J., appeals from

the judgment of the trial court finding her guilty of

criminal violation of a protective order in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-223. On appeal, the defendant

claims that (1) the evidence before the trial court was

insufficient to prove that she had the requisite intent

to violate the protective order and (2) § 53a-223 is

unconstitutionally vague as applied. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this decision. On May 17, 2016, the trial court,

Hon. Jack L. Grogins, judge trial referee, issued a protective order against the defendant pursuant to General

Statutes § 46b-38c (e).1 The order identified the protected person as the defendant’s former husband, ‘‘[M.

J.]’’ and listed his home address and mailing address

as ‘‘[R Street].’’ The protective order instructed the

defendant to ‘‘not assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with, or stalk the protected person’’; to

‘‘stay away from the home of the protected person and

wherever the protected person shall reside’’; and to

‘‘not contact the protected person in any manner,

including by written, electronic or telephone contact,

and [to] not contact the protected person’s home, workplace or others with whom the contact would be likely

to cause annoyance or alarm to the protected person.’’

Upon issuing the protective order, the court reviewed

the conditions with the defendant. The defendant does

not dispute that she received a copy of the protective

order issued by the court.

At the time the court issued the order, the defendant

sought clarification regarding the order from the court.

Judge Grogins specifically instructed the defendant that

‘‘as long as she stays away from the workplace of [M],

from his residence, or any contact with him, she’ll be in

compliance’’ with the protective order. Defense counsel

responded, ‘‘[t]hat’s our understanding.’’ Judge Grogins

further advised the defendant ‘‘to stay away from the

residence of [M], wherever it may be, including the

residence that’s listed on the protective order.’’ (Emphasis added).

M had obtained the R Street property through divorce

proceedings with the defendant in February, 2016. At

the time the protective order was issued, M was the

sole owner of the R Street property. The defendant had

a pending appeal challenging the award of the R Street

property, which prohibited M from selling or otherwise

disposing of this property without court permission.

Although M spent several nights sleeping at the R Street

property, he did not ultimately move into the R Street

property. Instead, M hired a real estate agent to list the

property for sale or for rent in August, 2016. The agent

had known both the defendant and M for many years
and had represented them in real estate transactions

in the past.

On September 22, 2016, the agent held an open house

at the R Street property. After the open house, the agent

closed the property and put a lockbox on the front

door. Simultaneously, the defendant was travelling to

pick up her mail at an address located near the R Street

property. As the defendant was driving by R Street, she

noticed the agent’s car in the driveway and pulled up

to the driveway. The defendant told the agent that she

could not list or sell the R Street property because of

the pending proceedings and court order relating to the

property. The agent removed the lockbox and sent M

a text message informing him of the exchange. On October 1, 2016, M notified the police that the defendant

had violated the protective order based on her interaction with the agent at the R Street property. The police

obtained an arrest warrant for violation of a protective

order and served the warrant on the defendant on October 17, 2016.

The state charged the defendant by way of a long

form information with one count of criminal violation

of a protective order.2 A two day court trial was held

in May, 2019, before McLaughlin, J. At trial, the state

presented evidence that the defendant had violated the

protective order by going to the R Street property and

additionally, by causing annoyance or alarm to M. After

the state’s case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The defendant argued that she did not

have the requisite general intent to violate the protective

order based on her adherence to Judge Grogins’ instruction to stay away from M’s residence, and her knowledge that M did not reside at the R Street property.

Thus, the defendant argued that any violation of the

order was based on a mistake and, therefore, she could

not be found guilty of violating the protective order.

The court denied the defendant’s motion. Following the

close of all of the evidence, the defendant once again

moved for a judgment of acquittal based upon insufficient evidence. She argued that § 53a-223 was void for

vagueness because Judge Grogins’ oral instruction did

not provide notice of what was prohibited by the protective order. The court rejected the defendant’s arguments and found the defendant guilty of criminal violation of the protective order stating, ‘‘[b]ased on all of

the evidence, in particular . . . the May 17th, 2016 protective order in this matter and . . . the transcript of

Judge Grogins entering that protective order, and canvassing [the defendant] about the same, in addition to

this court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, the

court finds [the defendant] guilty of criminal violation

of the May 17th, 2016 protective order.’’ This appeal

followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that she had the requisite intent

to be convicted of criminal violation of a protective

order. We disagree.

‘‘The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction

we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so

construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [I]n [our]

process of review, it does not diminish the probative

force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part,

of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Carter, 151 Conn. App. 527, 533, 95 A.3d 1201

(2014), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 564, 132 A.3d

729 (2016).

‘‘[T]he [trier of fact] must find every element proven

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense . . . . [P]roof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond

all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis

of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been

found credible by the trier, would have resulted in

acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there

is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support

a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead,

whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that

supports the . . . verdict of guilty.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘It is within the province of the [trier of fact] to

draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts

proven. . . . The [trier of fact] may draw reasonable

inferences based on other inferences drawn from the

evidence presented. . . . [I]n viewing evidence which

could yield contrary inferences, the [trier of fact] is not

barred from drawing those inferences consistent with

guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences

consistent with innocence. The rule is that the [trier of

fact’s] function is to draw whatever inferences from

evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems

to be reasonable and logical. . . . Our review is a fact

based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the [trier of fact] are so unreasonable

as to be unjustifiable.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 534.

Section 53a-223 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]

person is guilty of criminal violation of a protective

order when an order . . . has been issued against such

person, and such person violates such order.’’ The

defendant does not dispute the first element, that a
protective order had been issued against her. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove

that she had the requisite intent to violate the protective

order. ‘‘[T]he violation of a protective order statute is

not a specific intent crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Opio-Oguta, 153 Conn. App. 107, 119,

100 A.3d 461, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 945, 102 A.3d 1115

(2014). ‘‘All that is necessary is a general intent that

one intend to perform the activities that constitute the

violation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Binnette, 86 Conn. App. 491, 497, 861 A.2d 1197 (2004),

cert. denied, 273 Conn. 902, 868 A.2d 745 (2005).

In arguing that there was insufficient evidence to

prove that she had the requisite intent to violate the

protective order, the defendant argues that she had

relied on the court’s oral clarification of the protective

order instructing her only that she must avoid M’s residence, not that she was prohibited from going to the

R Street property. She further argues that, because she

knew that M did not reside there, she was under ‘‘an

erroneous perception of the facts as they actually exist’’

based on the court’s instruction, which ‘‘negate[s] the

criminal nature’’ of her presence at the R Street property.3

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The defendant’s reliance on Judge Grogins’ oral

instruction to support her claim that she did not have

the requisite intent to violate the protective order is

misplaced. The state was not required to prove that the

defendant specifically intended to violate a condition

of the protective order. The state had the burden to

prove only that she intended to perform the activities

constituting the violation of the protective order, specifically, that she intended to go to the R Street property.

It is undisputed that the defendant went to the R Street

property, and the defendant herself testified that she

intended to go to the property in order to speak to

the agent. Because the plain language of the protective

order prohibited the defendant from going to the R

Street property, and the only requisite intent needed to

find the defendant guilty of criminal violation of the

protective order is intent to perform the activities that

constitute the violation, we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence before the trial court to find that

the defendant violated the protective order.

II

The defendant next argues that the criminal violation

of protective order statute is void for vagueness as

applied to her because the language of the protective

order, as explained to her by the court, did not provide

adequate notice of what was prohibited. We are not

persuaded.

‘‘The determination of whether a statutory provision

is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over

which we exercise de novo review. . . . In undertaking
such review, we are mindful that [a] statute is not void

for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is

unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor

of its validity. . . . To demonstrate that [a statute] is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to [her], the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [she] had inadequate notice of what

was prohibited or that [she was] the victim of arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for

vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the

right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute

. . . and the guarantee against standardless law

enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a statute can be

fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for

vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases

there lurk uncertainties.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239, 269–70,

20 A.3d 52, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912, 27 A.3d 371

(2011).

Section 53a-223 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of criminal violation of a protective order

when an order . . . has been issued against such person, and such person violates such order.’’ We note that

the defendant makes no claim that the statute is facially

vague, but rather that it is vague as applied to her in

these factual circumstances. In other words, the defendant does not argue that the language of § 53a-233 is

unconstitutionally vague, but rather that the defendant

relied on ‘‘a last instruction from the court, as only

limiting her to avoiding [M’s] residence, work and contact with him. . . . Consequently, in light of the language in the protective order as explained to her by

the court, [the defendant] had inadequate notice of what

was prohibited.’’

We conclude that the terms of the protective order

issued in this case provided adequate notice that going

to the R Street property would constitute a violation of

the order. The court’s oral instruction to the defendant

specifically warned her to avoid M’s residence.

Although M was not permanently residing at R Street

when the defendant went to the property, the protective

order clearly prohibited the defendant from going to the

R Street property ‘‘and wherever the protected person

shall reside.’’ (Emphasis added.) The R Street address

clearly was listed as M’s address on the protective order.

The language contained in the protective order required

the defendant to stay away from the R Street property

even if M was not, in fact, residing there. The court’s

oral instructions did not alter the restrictions of the

protective order in any way. If the defendant wanted

permission to go the R Street property, she was obligated to file a motion to seek a modification of the

order in court, not alter the terms of the protective order

on her own.4 Accordingly, the defendant’s argument

that she lacked adequate notice of the condition of the
protective order or that the statute is unconstitutionally

vague as applied to her fails.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of domestic violence, we decline to identify the defendant, the victim,

or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General

Statutes § 54-86e.

Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)

(2018); we decline to identify any party protected or sought to be protected

under a protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied

for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.

1 General Statutes § 46b-38c (e) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A protective

order issued under this section may include provisions necessary to protect

the victim from threats, harassment, injury or intimidation by the defendant,

including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the defendant from (1)

imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim, (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting or sexually assaulting the victim, or (3)

entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim. . . .’’

2 The state alleged that the defendant was in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-223, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is guilty of criminal

violation of a protective order when an order issued pursuant to subsection

(e) of section 46b-38c . . . has been issued against such person, and such

person violates such order. . . .’’

3 The parties, in their appellate briefs, also address whether the defendant

violated the protective order by causing M annoyance or alarm. Because

the information charges the defendant with only one count of criminal

violation of a protective order and we agree with the trial court that the

defendant violated the protective order by appearing at the R Street property,

we decline to address the issue of whether or not the defendant caused M

annoyance or alarm.

4 See State v. Wright, 273 Conn. 418, 426, 870 A.2d 1039 (2005) (‘‘[T]he

defendant had no privilege to violate that order. If the defendant believed

that the order did not comport with the statutory requirements of § 46b38c (e), he had two lawful remedies available to him. He could have (1)

sought to have the order modified or vacated by a judge of the Superior

Court pursuant to Practice Book § 38-13; or (2) appealed the terms of the

order to the Appellate Court in accordance with General Statutes § 54-63g.’’

(Footnote omitted.))