[ DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_____________________________ No. 13

- 138 00

_____________________________ D.C. Docket No. 7:12

- cv - 00089

- HL THOMAS HAYDEN BARNES , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
versus RONALD M. ZACCARI, individually and in his official capacity as President of Valdosta State University, VALDOSTA STATE UNIVERSITY, BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, LAVERNE GASKINS, individually and in her official capacity as in

- house counsel at Valdosta State University, KURT KEPPLER, individually and in his official capacity as Vice President for Student Affairs at Valdosta State University, et al., Defendant s - Appellee s .

_______________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia

_______________________ ( January 12, 2015) Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 1 of 362 Before JORDAN and BENAVIDES, * Circuit Judges, and BARTLE , ** District Judg e. PER CURIAM : I. BACKGROUND This action was brought by Plaintiff

- Appellant Thomas Hayden Barnes (“Barnes”) against Valdosta State University (“VSU”) and various VSU officials and employees, alleging constitutional and statutory violations and breach of
contract. During the relevant time period in 2007 , Barnes was a student at VSU.
Barnes had previously been enrolled at VSU in the fall of 2005 as a transfer student, but he subsequently left while on academic probation to attend paramedic school in Savannah, Georgia in 2006. I n January 2007, Barnes re

- enrolled at VSU and contacted the VSU Access Office , which provides services to students with disabilities, to register as an on

- campus di sabled student suffering from a panic disorder with agoraphobia. Dr. Kimberly Tanner, Director of the VSU Access Office, assisted Barnes in submit ting the proper documentation of his disability and to assist him in secur ing housing accommodations that V SU had available for
Barnes. After re

- enrolling at VS U , Barnes resumed therapy sessions with Leah McMillan (“McMillan”), a licensed therapist at VSU’s counseling center

.

* The Honorable Fortunato P. Benavides, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

** The Honorable Harvey Bartle III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 2 of 363 VSU had experienced a growth in student population, and VSU had a long

t erm development plan to accommodate th at growth. Part of that plan included the construction of a parking garage. In March of 2007, Barnes became concerned about the potential environmental impact of the parking garage and put up flyers protesting the construction

. Af ter Def endant

- Appellee Dr. Ronald Zaccari (“Zaccari”) , the President of VSU , became aware of the flyers, he asked his assistant to find out who was responsible for them. S he informed him that Barnes had made the flyers. On March 26, Zaccari had an unrelated meeting with an environmental campus organization named “S.A.V.E.” During that meeting, he inquired whether the members knew Barnes. They told him that Barnes had been part of their organization but had decided to “go off on his own.” After the meeting, one of the members apparently informed Barnes that Zaccari had made a comment about the flyers. Barnes then wrote a letter of apolog y and took down the flyers. Zaccari believed that this meant Barnes was no longer protesting the constr uction of the parking garage. However, Barnes had been contacting the individual members of the VSU Board of Regents by telephone and email in anticipation of the Board’s upcoming meeting on April 17, 2007 , to voice his opposition to the parking garage

. Zaccari learned of these communications when Linda Daniels (“Daniels”) , a Vice

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 3 of 364 Chancellor , contacted Zaccari and informed him that she was concerned that
Bar nes might disrupt the Board meeting. Daniels asked campus police at Georgia Southern University, w here the meeting was to be held, to provide additional security as a precaution. On April 16, Zaccari learned of the fatal shootings that had taken place on Virginia Tech ’s campus

. The se fatal shootings caused Zaccari to have a heightened concern regarding campus safety at VSU

. That same day, Barnes called Zaccari to request a meeting, and Zaccari met with Barnes at 5pm. Russ Mast (“Mast”), Dean of Students, was also present at this meeting. They discussed
Barnes ’s opposition to the parking garage. Zaccari explain ed how VS U had approved the construction and funding of the parking garage. Zaccari felt that Barnes was unresponsive despite what he believed were attempts to have a productive discussion. Zaccari admitt ed that he was “stern” with Barnes. Zaccari told Barnes that he was “personally offended ” by Barnes’s activities and “ didn’t know what to do with [Barnes ].” Zaccari “was upset that Hayden had [gone] to the members of the Board of Regents and [said] that he was embarrassed that [Barnes] did not come and talk to him about that.” Ultimately, Barnes assure d them that he did not plan to attend or protest at the board meeting. After meeting with Barnes , Zaccari learned that Barnes had been writ ing about the parking garage on his Facebook page. Zaccari was subsequently given a

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 4 of 365 copy of what Barnes had posted on Facebook , a collage titled “S

. A

. V

. E

. – Zaccari Memorial Parking Garage,” which included a picture of Zac c ari. Zaccari told his staff tha t he felt threatened by the posting. On April 19, VSU’s newspaper published Barnes’s letter to the editor criticizing the construction of the parking garage. On April 20, Zac c ari met with Mast, Campus Police Major Ann Farmer (“ Major Farmer”) , Dr. Kurt Keppler (“Keppler”) , Vice President of Student Affairs, and Tanner, to discuss Zaccari’s

concerns and to begin an investigation of Barnes

. Zac c ari informed the group that Barnes had distributed flyers on the campus protesting the parking garage and made phone calls to indivi d ual members of the Board of Regents. He showed the group the collage that Barnes had posted on his Facebook page. He also told the group that an intruder had tripped the alarm at his residence and that he had been receivin g calls from a male individual asking for the “business office” and then hanging up the phone. No evidence ever connected Barnes to the alarm or the phone calls. Tanner told the group that Barnes was registered with the Access Office and revealed some o f his medical background, including that Barnes had a thought depressive disorder, ago ra phobia, and panic disorder. She also said that Barnes

was now on medication but had previously b e e n hospitalized due to an inability to

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 5 of 366 function. Additionally, Tanner stated that Barnes had been admitted to VSU on academic probation

. Major Farmer took contemporaneous meeting notes that indicated that Mast suggested that the Facebook collage could be viewed as a veiled threat and used as

a basis for a disorderly conduct withdrawal. It is not apparent to us that this collage on its face directly or indirectly expresses a threat or suggests that harm would come to Zaccari or anyone else. The notes also provided that Za ccari pointed out that board member D aniels had been so concerned about Barnes’s phone calls that she had alerted the campus police department at Georgia Southern University prior to the board meeting. At one point during the meeting , Major Farmer advised Zaccari to apply for
a rest raining order against Barnes if he felt threatened. However, Zaccari never appl ied for a restraining order. After this meeting, Farmer investigated Barnes and determined that there was no credible threat. On April 23, Barnes sent Zaccari a letter reque sting that he be exempted from the $100 mandatory student fee that he believed was earmarked for the parking garage. Barnes also wrote that he would contribute $100 to an
“environmental

- related program on campus to compensate for the loss to the Universit y’s revenue.”

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 6 of 367 On April 2 4 , Zaccari asked McMillan, Barnes’s therapist, to obtain background information on Barnes and to provide h er assessment of Barnes , and the two met t o discuss Barnes . McMillan told Zaccari that Barnes was having difficulty with his classes and that his grades might not make the probationary level to allow him to remain at VSU. In addition, Barnes had lost his employment and his medication was not working properly. She also told Zaccari th at Barnes had not seen his psychiatrist for some period of time. During this same week, Zaccari call ed another meeting with Farmer, Mast, and Keppler. Zaccari told the group that Barnes had sent a letter requesting to be exempt from the $100 fee. Additio nally, Zaccari reported that Barnes placed a link on his Facebook page to an article that discussed the mentally ill shooter from Virginia Tech

. Zaccari informed the group that he had spoken to Barnes’s previous employer a t the South Georgi a Medical Center , where he had worked as an emergency medical technician. He had been put on probation and then terminated

. Per Z accari’s request at the meeting , Farmer arranged for two plain

clothes security officer s to guard Zaccari at certain functions.
On Ma y 1, Zaccari had a discussion with Laverne Gaskins (“Gaskins”), in

house counsel for VSU , and Betsy Neely, Vice Chancellor for Legal Affairs for the Board of Regents , regarding VSU’s medical withdrawal policy. U nder this policy, if there was an emergency situation, the student would not receive a hearing.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 7 of 368 Zaccari asked about administratively withdrawing Barnes, and Neely told him to do what he had to do to keep the campus safe and that they would worry about a lawsuit at a later date. 1 On May 3, Zaccari met with Gaskins ; Farmer ; Keppler ; Mast ; Tanner ; and Victor Morgan (“Morgan”) , Director of VSU’s C ounseling C enter. Zaccari said that if they were to proceed with a disorderly conduct withdrawal, they would have to convene a student

- faculty review. Gaskins expressed concern s that Barnes was entitled to have a hearing. Zaccari then stated that if they implemented an administrative withdrawal, they needed to show a threat to Barnes himself or the community. Zaccari mentioned that they “must be concer ned with First Amendment rights, but first we have to look at the safety issue. Ultimately, we have to have documentation to support that [Barnes] is a danger and a threat.” He then asked the group , “ H ow do we present to a third party that a threat exist s?” Zaccari then stated that Barnes’s putting up flyers, writing an apology letter, calling board members, and his writing s on Facebook were “out of the norm.” Zaccari told the group that Neely had previously asked him why he did not withdraw Barnes immediately. However, Zaccari stated that he wanted to allow Barnes to finish final exams that week , and Zaccari “didn’t want to cause an uproar that could cause a flashpoint

. ”

1 After an administrative withdrawal, a student may be eligible to be readmitted to VSU. After an expulsion, generally speaking, a student is not eligible to be readmitted.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 8 of 369 Zaccari indicated that if Barnes was administratively wi thdrawn, there was no need to have a hearing. Keppler stated that the counselors would not state that Barnes was a threat to safety. Gaskins stated that there had to be evidence of a threat. Gaskins then asked: “Do we act on the administrative withdraw al?” At that point, either Gaskins or Zaccari explained that “an administrative withdrawal would contain requirements or conditions, one of which could be a re

- evaluation [of Barnes] in three to four months from now based on information obtained over the summer.” Morgan responded that Barnes would have to follow the instructions given to him by the counseling center. Keppler interjected that they should “go the route” of Barnes ’s grade point average, apparently referring to withdrawal on an academic ba sis. Tanner responded that Barnes had told her he was not going to fail his classes t hat semester. Zaccari stated that he would meet with Gaskins on Monday to determine the conditions that would allow Barnes readmission to VSU after having been administr atively withdrawn . Gaskins sta ted that “it is not ‘if’ but ‘ when ’ will [Barnes] sue over this.” Gaskins also stated that “an emergency withdrawal must rest on mental health with a clear and present danger.” It was then discussed whether the withdrawal letter should be delivered by certified mail, campus police, or the department. It was decided that because the

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 9 of 3610 letter was coming from the President’s office, it should be delivered by th at department. On May 7, at Z accari ’s request , Gaskins drafte d the letter to administratively withdraw Barnes . Gaskins attached a memo to Zaccari, explaining that Barnes was entitled to notice and a hearing

. That same day, t he letter was delivered to Barnes’s dorm room , and it informed Barnes that “[a]s a result of recent activities directed towards me by you, included but not limited to the attached threatening document, you are considered to present a clear and present danger to this campus.” The attached document was the above

- mentioned c ollage posted by
Barnes o n Facebook . The letter provided that Barnes was administratively withdrawn from VSU effective that day. He was not afforded a hearing. However, Barnes was given 48 hours to vacate the residence hall. The letter further explained that Barnes could be r eadmitted if he submitted: (1) correspondence from a psychiatrist outside of VSU that found he was not a danger to himself and others; and (2) documentation from a mental health professional stating that he would receive on - going therapy while at VSU. Barnes appealed to the Board of Regents, and in support of his appeal, he attached, among other things, a letter written by McMillan and a letter written by Dr. Kevin Winders, his psychiatrist in Savannah, Georgia. McMillan ’s l etter stated that in her pro fessional opinion as Barnes’s counselor, he was not a threat

—

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 10 of 3611 indirectly or directly

— t o anyone on campus. 2 McMillan’s letter also provided that if Barnes returned to VSU, she would continue seeing him in the counseling center. Dr. Winders ’s letter to the Board stat ed that he did not think that Barnes was violent or a threat to campus. The Board requested a response from Zaccari regarding Barnes’s administrative withdraw al . Zaccari drafted a response for the Board, and Gaskins assisted him in editing the letter, which was sent on June 21. O n January 17, 2008, the Board set aside Barnes’s administrative withdrawal without comment

. Meanwhile, o n January 9 , 2008, Barnes brought suit in the Northern District of Georgia against Zaccari , VSU , VS U’s Board of Regents , McMillan , Gaskin s , Keppler , Mast, and Morgan . The suit alleged , among other things, violations of procedural and substantive due process, retaliation for exercising his right to free speech under the First Amendment , and breach of contract. Barnes voluntarily dismissed one d efendant , Morgan , prior to the filing of summary judgment motions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes on his claim of a violation of procedural due process against Zac cari because Zaccari did not afford Barnes a pre

- withdrawal notice of the charges against him or a hearing. Barnes v. Zaccari, 757 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1337

– 38 (N.D. Ga. 2010). The district

2 During his deposition, Zaccari descr ibed McMillan as an “integral part of investigating” Barnes. Zaccari testified that he was “surprised” by the letter and “felt a little bit blind

- sided” by it.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 11 of 3612 court also granted Barnes summary judgment against the Board of Regen ts on his breach

- of

- contract claim. Id. at 1338. 3 The district court granted s ummary judgment in favor of the D efendants on the remaining claims , including Barnes’s claim of retaliation for exercising his right to free speech under the First Amendment

. Id. at 1326

– 38. Zaccari and the Board of Regents filed an interlocutory appeal to this Court with respect to whether Zaccari was entitled to qualified immunity and whether the Board of Regents was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

. Barnes v. Zacca ri , 669 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012)

. 4 This Court held that Zaccari was not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established that although Barnes “was due some predeprivation process,” he received none. Id. at 1308. However, this Court explained that the issue of whether Zaccari was entitled to qualified immunity did “ not drop out of the case.” Id. The Court further explained that the district court could “use a special verdict or written interrogatories to determin e any disputed facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.” Id. After resolution of the factual issues , Zaccari could raise his defense of qualified immunity in a motion for judgment as a matter of law

. Id. With respect

3 The court found that VSU was an improper party to the lawsuit. Barnes, 757 F.Supp.2d at 13 34. The Board of Regents was the proper party to name as a defendant in the lawsuit. Id. 4 Barnes filed a cross appeal, and this Court held that it did not have jurisdiction over those claims because the district court had not yet entered final judgmen t. Barnes , 669 F.3d at 1302 n.6. Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 12 of 3613 to the breach

- of

- contract claim, this Court reversed the district court, holding that Georgia had not waived its sovereign immunity and thus, the district court did not have jurisdiction to reach the breach

- of

- contract claim against the Board of Regents

. Id. at 13 08

– 09. T he case was remanded to the district court with instructions to (1) dismiss the claim against the Board of Regents , and (2) proceed to trial on the issue of damages as to the procedural due process violation. Id. On remand, Zaccari filed a motion to transfer, and the case was transferred from the Northern District of Georgia to the Middle District of Georgia. The district court divided the jury trial on the issue of damages into three phases. The first phase of trial involved the a mount of damages. The second phase was to determine punitive damages , if necessary, and the third phase of trial was to resolve any outstanding evidentiary disputes regarding qualified immunity. A jury determined that Barnes was entitled to $50,000 in da mages stemming from the violation of his procedural due process rights . The jury also determined that punitive damages were not warranted, rendering the second phase of trial unnecessary. The parties waived a jury trial with respect to the third phase, a nd the district court, acting as the fact

- finder, found that “Zaccari has not been able to demonstrate a factual basis for his claim that there was an emergency situation.” Order at 24 (July 24, 2013) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582

– 83 (1975))

.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 13 of 3614 Thus, the court ruled that Zaccari was not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law with respect to Barnes’s claim of a procedural due process violation. The district court awarded Barnes $407,242 in attorney’s fees based on the successful prose cution of his claim of a procedural due process violation against Zaccari . Additionally, because the court ruled that Barnes’s claims against McMillan, Gaskins, VSU, Keppler, Mast, and Morgan were frivolous, the court awarded those defendants $396,224.50 in attorney’s fees. Barnes now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to (1) his retaliation claim against Zaccari , (2) the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to him as the prevailing plaintiff , and (3) the award of attorney’s fees to the D efendants

. We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Zaccari on the retaliation claim and therefore vacate and remand that claim to the district court. We also vacate and remand the judgment

aw arding attorney’s fees to Barnes. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees to McMillan, Keppler, Mast, and Gaskins. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees to Morgan and VSU for recalculation

.

II. FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIM Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 14 of 3615 Barnes argu es that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Zaccari with respect to his First Amendment retaliation claim. This Court

r eview s a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and view s the evidence in the light most favor able to the non

- moving party. Castle v. Appalachian Technical Coll ., 631 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011).
A. Individual Claim of Retaliation This Court has explained that to state a claim for retaliation , the plaintiff
“must establish first, that his speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant ’ s retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech. ” Bennett v. Hendrix , 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005). In his complaint before the district court , Barnes asserted that Zaccari retaliated against him by having him withdrawn from VSU for exercising his free speech rights under th e First Amendment. 5 The district court specifically noted that the complaint did not “contain a stand alone claim for retaliation against Zaccari.” Barnes , 757 F.Supp.2d at 1333 n. 28. Instead, the district court construed Barnes’s retaliation claim as raising only a conspiracy claim. The court concluded that there was “an absence of evidence to support a finding that Zaccari made an

5 In Barnes’s notice of appeal, he only sought review of the denial of his First Amendment retaliation claim against Zaccari. Barnes does not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the remai ning Defendants on his retaliation claim.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 15 of 3616 agreement with anyone else to retaliate against Barne s for exercising his freedom of speech rights.” Id. at 1333

. More specifically, the court found that the “undisputed facts show that Zaccari alone made the decision to administratively withdraw Barnes from VSU.” Id

. at 1325. T he court concluded that “Z accari did not participate in any sort of conspiracy because no one would agree with [his] decision to withdraw Barnes.” Id. at 133 3. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Zaccari on the retaliation claim. We note that the court d id not expressly reach the question of whether Zaccari retaliated against Barnes for exer cising his free speech rights under the First Amendment . Instead, it held that there was no showing that Zaccari conspired with the other D efendants to retaliate agai nst Barnes. On appeal, Barnes argues that the district court erred in ruling that Count 3 of his complaint did not raise an individual retaliation claim against Zaccari . W e
must therefore determine whether Barnes’s complaint raised an individual retaliation claim ( as opposed to only raising a claim of conspiring to retaliate) against Zaccari

. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that

a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint must give the defendants fair notice of the bases for relief and the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 16 of 3617 Count 3 of the complaint is entitled “42 U.S.C. § 1983: I ndividual Liability Free Speech Clause Violation (Individual Defendants in Personal Capacity).” Complaint at 25. Although not dispositive, we note that the title of the claim did not refer to a conspiracy. In fact , the text of Count 3 ha d only one reference to a conspiracy , alleging that the “Defendants’ actions in conspiring to expel Barnes from VSU were taken in retaliation for Barnes’s exercise of his First Amendment freedoms.” However, simply alleging a conspiracy is not enough to sufficiently plead a claim of conspiracy

. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). In any event, w e need not determine whether a conspiracy claim was adequately pleaded, because we are convinced that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a claim for individual retaliation against Zaccari.
T he complaint contains several factual allegations that support a n individual claim against Zaccari for ret aliat ing against Barnes for exercising his First Amendment rights. See , e . g ., Complaint at 10 (“Barnes was informed by classmates involved with a campus environmental advocacy organization . . . that President Zaccari was upset with Barnes’s speech activities and had contacted the group to express his displeasure, particularly with the fliers”); id. at 12 (“Zaccari told Barnes that Barnes’s speech activities had embarrassed him”); id. at 13 ( alleging that Zaccari met w ith VSU officials and faculty and “expressed

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 17 of 3618 substantial anger towards Barnes, especially regarding the fliers that previously were posted around campus”); id. (“Zaccari then decided to use the Facebook posting, along with his awareness that Barnes had ava iled himself of campus counseling services, to concoct a claim, in retaliation for Barnes’s speech activities questioning his parking garage plans, that Barnes represented some kind of danger”); 6 id. at 2 6 (Zaccari’s “stated reasons for expelling Barnes fr om VSU were pretextual and had no rational basis, being wholly contradicted by the views of mental health professionals, communicated to [Zaccari], that Barnes posed no threat to self or others at any time”). Further , the record demonstrates that Zaccari received fair notice of Barnes’s individual retaliation claim against him because Zaccari’s briefing with respect to the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment d id not even mention a conspiracy claim. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. at 93 (explaining that a defendant must receive fair notice of the bases for relief and the grounds upon which the claim rests ). In sum , we conclude that the district court erred in reading the complaint too narrowly when it ruled that there wa s no “stand

- alone” or individual retaliation claim against Zaccari. We therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment as to Barnes’s individual retaliation claim against Zaccari and

6 As noted by the district court, Barnes had “created a satirical collage protesting the [parking garage], which he posted on his Facebook website.” Barnes , 757 F. Supp. 2d at 131 7; see id. at 1317 n.6.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 18 of 3619 remand it to the district court to address in the first instance. Cf. Br anscomb v. Sec’y of the Navy , 461 F. App’x 901, 906 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (remanding a retaliation claim to the district court to allow it to address the claim in the first instance)

. B. Qualified Immunity as to First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Zacca ri argues that he is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity because he withdrew Barnes from VSU based on Barnes’s threatening behavior and perceived mental instability, and not because o f Barnes’s speech activities. The district court never addressed whether Zaccari was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim because it ruled that Barnes’s complaint had not raised an individual claim of retaliation aga inst Zaccari. 7 As set forth above, we are vacating and remanding the summary judgment on th is First Amendment retaliation claim

. Thus, on remand, the district court will have the opportunity to address whether Zaccari is entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claim

. See Hart v. Hodges , 587 F.3d 1288, 1300 (11th

7 However, the district court did address the issue of whether Zaccari was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the due process claim, which is not before this Court on appeal. With respect to that issue, the parties had waived a jury trial and th erefore, the district court, acting as the fact

- finder, held that “as a matter of fact, Zaccari could not, and did not, reasonably believe there was an emergency on the campus of VSU during spring 2007.” Order at 23 (July 24, 2013). Based on that factual finding, the court held that Zaccari had no defense for violating Barnes’s due process rights by failing to give him a predeprivation hearing. The district court therefore denied qualified immunity as to the due process claim. However, the district cour t did not address whether Zaccari was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the retaliation claim, which has different elements from a due process claim.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 19 of 3620 Cir. 2009) (explaining that because the issue of qualified immunity was not decided in the district court, the Court would remand it to allow the district court to decide it in the first instance).
III. ATTORNEY’ S FEES
A. Attorney’s F ees A ward to Barnes Barnes contends that the district court erroneously discounted the attorney’s fees awarded to him as a prevailing plaintiff against Zaccari

. I n light of our holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Barnes and in favor of Zaccari on the retaliation claim, we are remanding the c laim to the district court

. Accordingly , the attorney’s fee award to Barnes will have to be recalculated once the retaliation claim is resolved. Nonetheless, in the interest of efficiency, we provide some guidance by address ing Barnes ’s arguments to the extent they may be relevant on remand. See ACLU of Ga

. v. Barnes , 168 F.3d 423 , 438 ( 11 th Cir. 1 999 ) (providing guidance for the recalculation of fees on remand)

. The applicable statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allows a district court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in civil rights c ases brought under § 1983. The Supreme Court has explained that when a plaintiff succeeds in bringing a civil rights claim, “he serves as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a successful civil

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 20 of 3621 rights plaintiff “‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee ’ from the defendant

— the party whose misconduct created the need for legal action.” Id. ( quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC , 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978)). We review a district court ’s decision to a ward attorneys ’ fees for abuse of discretion. Smalbein ex rel. Estate of Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach , 353 F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 200 3) (42 U.S.C. § 1988)

. The question of whether a district court used the proper standard to award fees is a question of law we review de

novo , and factual findings related to that question are reviewed for clear error. Id. The district court found that Barnes was a “prevailing plaintiff based on his success with his procedural due process claim against Zaccari. ” Order at 50 (July 24, 2013). The district court applied the lodestar approach in determining the award of attorney’s fees

. 8 Additionally, the district court rejected Barnes’s counsel’s contention that Washington, D.C. was the relevant community for purposes of calculati ng fees. Instead, the court ruled that Atlanta was the relevant market. The court then ordered Barnes’s counsel to supplement their original fee motion with evidence regarding appropriate billing rates in Atlanta. After c ounsel submitted evidence regarding the range of rates in Atlanta, t he district court found

8 “ In setting a reasonable attorney ’ s fee, a district court is required to utilize the ‘ lodes tar approach, ’ which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. ” Gray v. Bostic , 625 F.3d 692, 714 (11th Cir. 2010). “A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal c ommunity for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputat ion.” Id. at 714

– 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 21 of 3622 that, based on its “own knowledge and experience,” the rates claimed by counsel were excessive and reduced the rates. Id. at 52.
1. Hourly Rate Barnes contends that the district court erred in imposing a maximum hourly rate of $315 because the court ignored record evi dence submitted in support of the higher rates. Barnes’s attorneys had requested between $300 and $630 per hour , depending upon each attorney’s level of experience

. Barnes, as the prevailing plaintiff, had the burden of establishing the claimed market ra te. Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000). The determination of a reasonable hourly rate is a factual finding, which we review for clear error. Id. Here, t he court itself requested additional evidence from Barnes ’s counsel regarding the hourly rate in Atlanta and specifically referred to th at evidence in its ruling. Thus, we do not agree that the court ignored the record evidence. As set forth above, the court expressly relied upon its “own knowledge and experience. ” Id. A district court is entitled to rely on its own experience and judgment in determini ng a reasonable hourly rate. Norman v. Hous

. Auth

. of Montgomery , 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988).
2. Excessive Across

- the

- Board Reduction of Hours Barnes also conten ds that the district court erred by imposing an excessive

across - the

- board reduction of hours

. The district court found that the number of

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 22 of 3623 hours claimed by Barnes’s counsel was “ appropriate ” and that counsel “exercised appropriate billing judgment in the hours submitted to the Court. [Counsel] cut down the hours for which they seek fees from a raw number of 5,818.30 hours to 3,707.30 hours.” Order at 53 (July 24, 2013) (citations omitted). Based on the submitted hours, t he lodestar calculation was $1,01 2,587.25 in attorney’s fees. However, the district court found that the amount of attorney’s fees under the lodestar approach was excessive. One of the reasons that the district court found the amount of fees excessive was that Barnes only succeeded on the one claim of a procedural due process violation. As set forth previously, we are remanding to the district court to allow it to address the claim of retaliation. Because of these changed circumstances, the district court will have to recalculate the plaintiff’s attorney ’ s fee award after it addresses the retaliation claim on remand

. Nonetheless , we note that Barnes ’s counsel asserts that they reduced the number of hours submitted to the court in part because of the unsuccessful claims. The district court’s across

- the

- board reduction was also based in part on the unsuccessful claims. On remand, the district court must take care not to doubly discount the hours based on the same consideration. Cf. Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc. , 548 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that if a factor is considered in

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 23 of 3624 determining the lodestar figure, it should not be reconsidered to further adjust the lodestar because “doing so amounts to double

- counting”). B. Attorney’s Fees Award to Defendants
Barnes also contends that the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees
to the following D efendants : McMillan , Keppler , Mast , Gaskins, Morgan , and
VSU. 9 As set forth above, a prevailing plaintiff should generally receive attorney’s fees from the defendant in order to reimburse a plaintiff for what it cost him to vindicate his civil rights. Fo x , 131 S. Ct. at 2213. On the other hand, with respect to a prevailing defendant , th ere is a different standard that reflects the very different equitable considerations at stake. Id. In 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Congress intended “to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis.” Id. (internal quotations mark s and citation omitted). Thus, a district court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action if the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. ; Sullivan v. Sch

. Bd. o f Pinellas Cnty. , 773 F.2d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 1985). With respect to determining whether a claim is frivolous, t he Supreme Court has cautioned : [I] t is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding t hat, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate s uccess.

9 Barnes does not appeal the summary judgment in the Defendants’ favor on the merits of t he claims against them

. See supra note 5.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 24 of 3625 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C. , 434 U.S. 412, 421

– 22 (1980). Instead, when determining whether a suit is frivolous, “a district court must focus on the question whether the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or witho ut foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.” Sullivan , 773 F.2d at 1189 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A district court’s finding of frivolity has been upheld in cases in which a plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence in support of his claim. Id. (citing Beard v. Annis , 730 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Dealer s Tractor and Equip

. Co. , 634 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Cazares , 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981); Harris v. Plastics M f

g . Co. , 617 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1980) )

. In contrast, “[i]n cases where the plaintiffs introduced evidence sufficient to support their claims, findings of frivolity typically do not stand.” Id. (citing White v. S. Park Indep. Sch. Dist. , 693 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1 982); Plemer v. Parsons

- Gilbane , 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) )

. In addition, t he following factors are considered when determining whether a claim is frivolous: “(1) whether the plaintiff established a pr ima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full

- blown trial on the merits.” Id. However, t hese factors are “ general guidelines only, not hard and fast rules. ” Id. In § 198 8 cases, the Eleventh Circuit has provided an additional factor: the attention given to the

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 25 of 3626 claim. A “claim is not frivolous when it is ‘meritorious enough to receive careful attention and review.’” Cohen v. World Omni Fin. Corp. , 457 F. App’x 822, 828 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Busby v. City of Orlando , 931 F.2d 764, 787 (11th Cir. 1991)). “ Det ermination s regarding frivolity are to be made on a case

- by

- case basis. ” Sullivan , 773 F.2d at 1189

. 1. District Court Rulings With respect to the first factor, the district court held that Barnes failed to establish a prima facie case as to all six D efendants. With respect to the second factor , the court recognized that VSU had offered a $5,000 to settle all claims as to
all D efendants. 10 Nonetheless, the court opined that that offer “can hardly be considered a serious settlement negotiation, considering that Barnes asserted damages for millions of dollars.” Order at 35 (July 24, 2013) . As for the third factor, none of the cl aims against these six D efendants went to trial. In considering the fourth factor, t he district court stated that there “is no doubt that this case has been the subject of much judicial attention in the well over five years that it has been pending in fed eral court.” Order at 27 (July 24, 2013). However, the court concluded that as to these six D efendants, the level of attention afforded the claims against them did not rise to a level of extended review that would render them non frivolous.

10 Gaskins and McMillan state that they never engaged in settlement negotiations. Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 26 of 3627 2. Standard of Review Accordingly, we must now determine whether the district court err ed in ruling that Barne s’s claims were frivolous. The parties agree that we review the determination of whether the claims were frivolous for abuse of discretion. See Cordoba v. Dil lard’s , Inc ., 419 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing ruling that plaintiff’s c laims under the Americans with Disabilities Act were frivolous for abuse of discretion ); Bonner v. Mobile Energy Servs. Co. , 246 F.3d 1303, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) ( same standard of review in Title VII case). Of course, a “‘ district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. ’ ” Quintana

v . Jenne , 414 F.3d 1306 , 1309 ( 11th Cir. 2005 ) (quoting Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) ).
In determining whether a claim is frivolous, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non - prevailing plaintiff.” Cordoba , 419 F.3d at 1179 (emphasis in original)

. Thus, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
Barnes with respect to each D efendant in determining whether Barnes’s claims against them were frivolous

. As set forth below, we are persuaded that the evidence against the six
D efendants establishes that Barnes’s claims against the m were not frivolous. Cf.
i d. at 1181 (explaining that although the plaintiff’s “case was exceedingly weak on this point, it was not so weak as to make it frivolous for her to argue that [her

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 27 of 3628 supervisor’s] knowledge of her disability presented a triable issue of fact”). T he factors regarding frivolity are general guidelines only and not hard and fast rules. Sullivan , 773 F.3d at 1189. 11 Our precedent dictates that “[d] eterminations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case

- by

- case basis.” Id. As explained below, we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes. When the evidence against the D efendants is viewed in the proper light, we conclude that the claims

a re not without foundation. In other words, it was not unreasonable for Barnes to believe that the D efendants participated in his withdrawal from VSU. Cf. Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Ga. , 177 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff’s belief that he was terminated because of his disability was not unreasonable even though plaintiff did not “provide enough evidence to support denial of the [defendant’s] summary judgment motion” ). Thus, as explained below, we conclude that the district c ourt abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to four of the six D efendants.
3. Frivolousness

11 The other factors

— (1) settlement offer (2) dismissal prior to trial and (3) level of attention afforded the claims

— do not merit mu ch discussion here. We are not persuaded that the $5,000 offer did not constitute a settlement offer, as the district court found. As for the second factor, it is undisputed that all these Defendants were dismissed prior to trial. In any event, even ass uming these factors weighed in favor of the Defendants, we are convinced that the evidence proffered against the Defendants precludes finding that the claims against them are frivolous.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 28 of 3629 With respect to a claim of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must show that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that that “conduct played a ‘substantial or motivating role’ in the alleged adverse employment action.” Walden v. Ctr s . f or Disease Control & Prevention , 669 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2012). To establish a claim alleging denial of procedural due process , a plaintiff must show : “ (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally

- protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally

- inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes , 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). “ [A] t a minimum, the Due Process Clause requir es notice and the opportunity to be heard incident to the deprivation of .

. . property at the hands of the government.” Id . (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). As previously set forth, we are remanding the retalia tion claim against Zaccari to the district court , and the retaliation claims against the other Defendants are not before us . The district court found in favor of Barnes on the procedural due process claim and that is not before us on appeal. 12 To assess w hether it was frivolous to bring these

12 It is undisputed that Barnes did not receive notice of the charge ag ainst him prior to the withdrawal or any kind of a hearing to address the charge. Indeed, the district court held that “[t]here was never any question but that [Zaccari] [withdrew] Plaintiff Barnes from Valdosta State University and denied Barnes due proc ess.” Zaccari’s defense was that because Barnes was a clear and present danger, the emergency excused giving Barnes notice and a hearing. The district court, acting as fact

- finder, ruled that “Zaccari could not, and did not, reasonably believe there was an emergency on the campus of VSU during spring 2007.” Accordingly, there is no question that Zaccari violated Barnes’s procedural due process rights in withdrawing Barnes from VSU without notice and a hearing.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 29 of 3630 claims against these six Defendants, w e now consider e vidence offered by Barnes against each Defendant

.

a. McMillan (Barnes’s Therapist) Zaccari testified that McMillan was an integral part of his investigation of
Ba rnes. In her deposition, McMillan testified that she had believed that Barnes would benefit from taking off the summer semester in 2007. In Zaccari’s affidavit, he stated that he “was aware of the concerns of [Barnes’s] therapists that he was decompensat ing and could have benefitted from a semester off.” There was evidence that M cMillan , in her role as Barnes’s therapist at VSU, shared Barnes’s confidential information with Zaccari without obtaining permission from Barnes

. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, McMillan’s conduct can reasonably be interpreted as assisting Zaccari in his efforts to have Barnes withdrawn and/or to punish Barnes for exercising his right to free speech. This conduct can be construed as a retaliatory act against Barnes. Although McMillan states that she repeatedly told Zaccari that Barnes did not constitute a threat to security, Zaccari testified that McMillan did not do so

. Indeed, Zaccari testified that the first time he was aware of McMillan ’s opinion that Barnes did not constitute a threat was after the withdrawal letter was delivered to Barnes

. Based on this evidence , we conclude that it was not unreasonable for Barnes to believe that McMillan participated in having B arnes withdrawn. This evidence

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 30 of 3631 demonstrates that B arnes’s claims against McMillan were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Thus, we reverse the district court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to McMillan. b. K eppler (Vice President of Student Affairs) In determining that Keppler was entitled to attorney’s fees, the district court relied upon Keppler’s testimony that he had nothing to do with Zaccari’s “final decision” to withdraw Barnes from VSU. Order at 41 (July 24, 2013). However, the district court ignored testimony that implicated Keppler in the decision to withdraw. There were notes from a meeting attended by Keppler and Zaccari that indicated that Keppler supported attempting to w ithdraw Barnes from VSU on an academic basis. F urther, in Zaccari’s June 21, 2007 , letter to VSU’s Board of Regents, he stated that to determine what actions should be take n with respect to Barnes, he “sought the advice” of members of his administrative unit, which included Keppler . The l etter provide d that Zaccari and his administr at ive unit “collectively decided that VSU [should] take necessary steps to minimize as much as possible any security risks.” Similarly, Zaccari testified that at a meeting on April 26, 2007, which included Keppler, “there was agreement from the group for us to initiate the plan that [he had] outlined.” Zaccari further testified that no one at the meeting expressed disagreement with him. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, we conclude that it was n ot unreasonable for

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 31 of 3632 Barnes to believe that Keppler participated i n having Barnes withdrawn. Barnes’s claims against McMillan were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Keppler.

c. Mast (Dean of Students) The district court awarded attorney’s fees to Mast, stating that Barnes primarily relied upon “Mast’s alleged lack of action and his omissio ns as opposed to any affirmative action.” Order at 41 (July 24, 2013). The court further stated that Mast attended meetings that were called to discuss Barnes, “but Mast agreed with Keppler that Zaccari’s response was an overreaction.” Id. After review ing the record, we are persuaded that the district court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes. We note that although Mast may not have interpreted Barnes’s conduct as threat ening , he testified at his deposition that he did not i nform Zaccari of his opinion. Additionally, Zaccari’s letter to the Board of Regents stat e s that “Mast provided a copy of a document generated by Mr. Barnes, wherein he had posted my picture on an image of a parking deck with the words, ‘S.A.V.E.

– Zaccar i Memorial Parking Deck.’” It would not be unreasonable for Barnes to construe Mast’s giving th is document to Zaccari as assist ance in building a case to withdraw Barnes. Moreover, the record contains

no tes from a meeting indicat ing that Mast suggested that Barnes’s “veiled threat”

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 32 of 3633 could be used as a basis for withdrawal for disorderly conduct. Again, we note that a lthough Mast testified that he did not give Zaccari the above

- referenced image generated by Barnes and that he did not remember suggesting a basis for Barnes’s withdrawal during the meeting, we must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes. In that light, we cannot say that Barnes’s suit against Mast was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation

. W e therefore reverse the district court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Mast. d. Gaskins ( VSU I n - H ouse Counsel) Gaskins met with Zaccari on April 26, 2007, to discuss possible avenues for withdrawing Barnes from VSU. In her deposition, Gaskins admitte d t hat she researched different VSU policies that could possibly be used to withdraw Barnes , and that she provided the results of that research to Zaccari

. Gaskins also attended the May 3 meeting with Zaccari and other staff members in which Zaccari announced his decision to administratively withdraw Barnes. With respect to that meeting, t his Court ’ s opinion i n the instant case’s interlocutory appeal provided that Zaccari “did not ask those present [at the meeting] if he was making the right decisio n, and no one told him he was.” Barnes , 669 F.3d at 1301. Nonetheless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, we stated ,

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 33 of 3634 “ C ollectively though, the group agreed that Barnes should be withdrawn on May 7, a full four days later.” Id. 13 At Zaccari’s request, Gaskins drafted the letter that withdrew Barnes from
VSU. On appeal, Gaskins relies heavily on the fact that she advised Zaccari in a n attached memorandum that Barnes was entitled to a hearing. Although this evidence indicates that Gaskins did not participate in violating Barnes’s d ue process rights, it does not mean that she had no involvement in assisting Zaccari in having Barnes withdrawn in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights

. D uring his deposition, Mast te stified that Zaccari said that he made the decision to withdraw Barnes from VSU “based on advice of counsel, University counsel, and Board of Regents’ attorney.” Additionally, after Barnes was withdrawn, the Board of Regents directed Zaccari to respond to Barnes’s request for a review of the withdrawal. Zaccari asked Gaskins to review the response he had drafted so that he could fully explain why he made the decision to withdraw Barnes. Gaskins testified that the draft response Zaccari gave her was in “v ery, very rough form,” and that she recommended modifications to the document. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, Gaskins : (1) researched VSU policies that could be used to withdraw Barnes; (2) drafted the

13 However, we note that Zaccari’s letter t o the Board of Regents did not name Gaskins as part of his administrative unit that “collectively decided that VSU take necessary steps to minimize as much as possible any security risks.” Zaccari’s letter never mentions Gaskins.

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 34 of 3635 withdrawal letter that she knew would violate Barnes’s due process rights if signed by Zaccari and delivered to Barnes without notice and a hearing ; and ( 3 ) a ssisted Zaccari in defend ing his actions to the Board of Regents

. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Barnes to believe that Gaskins participated in his withdrawal from VSU. W e are thus unconvinced that Barnes’s claim s against Gaski n s were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

e. VSU and Morgan (Counseling Center Direct or ) Barnes’s brief does not specifically challenge the district court’s ruling that
hi s claims against Morgan and VSU were frivolous . Thus, Barnes has abandoned any challenge to the judgment awarding those attorney’s fees

. See Timson v. Sampson , 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, because the district court awarded the attorney’s fees in a lump sum to VSU, Keppler, Mast, and Morgan, and d id not distinguish the amount of attorney’s fees awarded as to each
D efen d ant , we must remand to allo w the district court to recalculate the attorne y’s fees award to reflect only “reasonable attorney ’ s fees incurred because of, but o nly because of, frivolous claim[s]” against Morgan and VSU. Fox , 131 S. Ct. at 2215.
In sum , because there was evidence showing that each of the first four Defendants took part in the decision to withdraw Barnes, the district court erred in finding that the claims were frivolous. C ompare Richardson v. Bay Dist. Sch. , 560 F. App’x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[j]ust because this evidence

Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 35 of 3636 was ultimately not enough to create a jury question with respect to discrimination on the basis of gender discrimination does not make [the plaintiff’s] claim frivolous”) , with Cazares , 638 F.2d at 1290 ( upholding award of att orney’s fees because “there was no material, admissible evidence to support [the plaintiff’s] civil rights claim” )

. We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion
in ruli ng that Barnes’s claims against McMillan, Keppler, Mast, and Gaskins were frivolous , and we reverse the court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to those
D efendants. With respect to the fees awarded to Morgan and VSU, we vacate the judgment awarding those fees and remand to allow the distri ct court to recalculate the att orne y’s fee s award to reflect only the a ttorney ’ s fees incurred because of the frivolous claim s against Morgan and VSU.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we vacate and remand the grant of summary judgment with respect to the retaliation claim against Zaccari , and we vacate and remand the judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Barnes. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees to McMillan, Keppler, Mast, and Gaskins. Finally, w e vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees to Morgan and VSU. VACATED AND REMANDED. Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 36 of 36