I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4534 

To recognize the importance of the land forces of the United States Armed 

Forces and to revise the fiscal year 2016 end-strength levels for these 

Land Forces and specify new permanent active duty end strength minimum levels, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 11, 2016 

Mr. GIBSON (for himself, Mr. TURNER, Mr. WALZ, Mr. NUGENT, Mr. AUSTIN

SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. RUSSELL, Mr. WITTMAN, Mr. WILSON of South 

Carolina, Mr. O’ROURKE, Ms. STEFANIK, Mr. FLEMING, Mr. ASHFORD, 

Mr. WENSTRUP, Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. ZELDIN, Ms. GABBARD, Mr. 

YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. ZINKE, and Mr. MOULTON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To recognize the importance of the land forces of the United 

States Armed Forces and to revise the fiscal year 2016 

end-strength levels for these Land Forces and specify 

new permanent active duty end strength minimum levels, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Our Secu3 rity Through Utilizing Right-Sized End-Strength Act of 

4 2016’’ or the ‘‘POSTURE Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

6 Congress finds the following: 

7 (1) The first function of Government is to se8 cure its people and their rights. The United States 

9 is blessed that countless men and women have done 

10 so by serving in the Armed Forces, which consists 

11 of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and 

12 Coast Guard. 

13 (2) History has shown that sufficient Land 

14 Forces are critical to the security of the American 

15 people and their rights and to assure United States 

16 allies, deter aggression, shape security environments, 

17 and win wars. Furthermore, Land Forces have been 

18 proven to be essential to consolidate gains and 

19 achieve sustainable outcomes. 

20 (3) The Land Forces of the United States are 

21 comprised of the Army (Active Army, Army Reserve, 

22 and Army National Guard) and the Marine Corps 

23 (Active Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve). 

24 (4) On the day before September 11, 2001, the 

25 Land Forces of the United States included 

26 1,036,601 Soldiers and 212,744 Marines. Broken 


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1 down by component, that included 480,801 Soldiers 

2 in the Active Army, 205,300 Soldiers in the Army 

3 Reserve, 350,500 Soldiers in the Army National 

4 Guard, 172,934 Marines in the Active Marine Corps, 

5 and 39,810 Marines in the Marine Corps Reserve. 

6 (5) At the height of the Global War on Ter7 rorism, the Land Forces of the United States in8 cluded 1,138,907 Soldiers and 242,558 Marines. 

9 Broken down by component, that included 570,000 

10 Soldiers in the Active Army, 206,892 Soldiers in the 

11 Army Reserve, 362,015 Soldiers in the Army Na12 tional Guard, 202,786 Marines in the Active Marine 

13 Corps, and 39,772 Marines in the Marine Corps Re14 serve. 

15 (6) For fiscal year 2016, authorizations for the 

16 Land Forces of the United States include 1,015,000 

17 Soldiers and 222,900 Marines. Broken down by 

18 component, that includes 475,000 Soldiers in the 

19 Active Army, 198,000 Soldiers in the Army Reserve, 

20 342,000 Soldiers in the Army National Guard, 

21 184,000 Marines in the Active Marine Corps, and 

22 38,900 Marines in the Marine Corps Reserve. 

23 (7) The drawdown of the Land Forces of the 

24 United States is planned to continue through fiscal 

25 year 2018, when end strength will be approximately 


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1 970,000 Soldiers and 220,500 Marines. Broken 

2 down by component, that will be 450,000 Soldiers in 

3 the Active Army, approximately 195,000 Soldiers in 

4 the Army Reserve, approximately 335,000 Soldiers 

5 in the Army National Guard, 182,000 Marines in 

6 Active Marine Corps, and 38,500 Marines in the 

7 Marine Corps Reserve. 

8 (8) In Europe, forward-stationed Army forces 

9 have been reduced from over 215,000 at the time of 

10 the fall of the Berlin Wall to the current level of 

11 under 30,000, jeopardizing the United States stra12 tegic capability to deter adversaries by conventional 

13 force and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

14 capability to rapidly respond to Russian aggression 

15 against its front-line member states. 

16 (9) The Administration has enacted this policy 

17 of reducing the end strength of United States Land 

18 Forces based on security analysis and expectations 

19 of future force capabilities contained in the 2012 

20 Defense Strategic Guidance, the 2013 Strategic 

21 Choices and Management Review (SCMR), and the 

22 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which in23 cluded the following: 


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1 (A) Ending the wars in Iraq and Afghani2 stan by ‘‘transitioning out of Iraq and drawing 

3 down in Afghanistan’’. 

4 (B) ‘‘Building a closer relationship’’ with 

5 Russia and assuming that ‘‘most European 

6 countries are now producers of security rather 

7 than consumers of it’’. 

8 (C) No longer sizing United States Armed 

9 Forces ‘‘to conduct large-scale, prolonged sta10 bility operations’’. 

11 (D) ‘‘Increasing reliance on our allies and 

12 partners’’ to compensate for ‘‘reductions in our 

13 capacity’’. 

14 (E) Emphasizing an ability to regenerate 

15 capabilities and the use of innovation and tech16 nology to compensate for a smaller force. 

17 (10) Given developments over the past several 

18 years, the assumptions about the security environ19 ment are outdated and, unfortunately, proven 

20 flawed. 

21 (11) The United States, its allies, and their 

22 partners face new threats, including the following: 

23 (A) A civil war in Syria, triggering a hu24 manitarian crisis and destabilizing the entire 

25 region. 


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1 (B) The rise of the Islamic State which 

2 has taken control of large swaths of territory in 

3 Syria and Iraq and has more ambitious global 

4 goals, including stated intentions of additional 

5 direct attacks against the United States and 

6 United States allies, both at home and abroad. 

7 (C) Iran, which has continued its bellicose 

8 rhetoric and support for terrorist activities 

9 throughout the Middle East. 

10 (D) A resurgent Russia that annexed Cri11 mea, invaded Ukraine, and is now conducting 

12 military operations in Syria, with its posture 

13 and actions causing concern to NATO allies. 

14 (E) The continued military build-up by 

15 China and its actions in the South China Sea, 

16 which have raised concerns among nations in 

17 the Pacific and across the world. 

18 (F) A provocative and unpredictable North 

19 Korea that has escalated tensions throughout 

20 the Pacific and beyond and expanded its nu21 clear capability. 

22 (12) In response to these developments, short 

23 notice deployments of United States Land Forces 

24 have increased across the globe, including the fol25 lowing: 


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1 (A) To address a resurgent Russia, the 

2 Army deployed forces in various locations in 

3 Eastern Europe to assure NATO allies and to 

4 help train, assist, and assure their armed forces 

5 as well as sent forces to Ukraine to train and 

6 equip their armed forces. 

7 (B) To address the rise of the Islamic 

8 State, the Army deployed forces to Iraq to train 

9 and assist their armed forces. 

10 (C) To address a resurgent Taliban in Af11 ghanistan, scheduled redeployments of United 

12 States Land Forces were altered and these 

13 forces are now expected to remain in Afghani14 stan for the foreseeable future. 

15 (D) To help stabilize troubled areas across 

16 the globe, including Southeast Asia and Africa, 

17 the Marine Corps and Army have deployed to 

18 conflict-scarred countries such as Cambodia. 

19 (E) To address unique threats and to build 

20 partner capacity across the globe, United States 

21 Joint Special Operations Forces continue to 

22 constantly deploy worldwide. 

23 (F) To address widespread and desta24 bilizing natural disasters, including the Indian 

25 Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, the 


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1 earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the tsunami in 

2 Japan in 2011, the Ebola outbreak in West Af3 rica in 2014, and the earthquake in Nepal in 

4 2015, the Army and Marine Corps continue to 

5 deploy on short notice across the globe. 

6 (13) Furthermore, the assumptions about the 

7 future purpose, use, and capability of the Land 

8 Forces have also been disputed: 

9 (A) The 2014 National Defense Panel con10 cluded that the 2014 QDR’s ‘‘reduction in 

11 Army end strength goes too far.’’. 

12 (B) The National Commission on the Fu13 ture of the Army found the following: 

14 (i) ‘‘Because PB16 (FY2016 Presi15 dent’s Budget) does not address the esca16 lation of threats to global stability and na17 tional security, it is, at best, on the low 

18 end of needed resources’’ (Page 43). 

19 (ii) ‘‘. . . this force size provides only 

20 limited ability to react to unforeseen cir21 cumstances’’ (Page 51). 

22 (iii) ‘‘Using directed planning assump23 tions and with its planned fiscal year 2017 

24 force, the Army is, in fact, neither sized 

25 nor shaped for conducting any kind of 


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1 large-scale, long-duration mission at ac2 ceptable risk’’ (Page 52). 

3 (14) A comprehensive and holistic view of the 

4 Land Forces of the United States is necessary. In 

5 particular, previous assumptions about the deploy6 ment and use of reserve components no longer apply. 

7 For example, more than 600,000 members of the re8 serve components have been deployed since Sep9 tember 11, 2001. Beyond these missions conducted 

10 pursuant to the authority of title 10 of the United 

11 States Code, these forces are also responsible for all 

12 homeland defense and critical defense support to 

13 civil authority missions under title 32 of the United 

14 States Code during times of crisis response and nat15 ural disaster relief. For these reasons, the reserve 

16 components of the Land Forces are a critical piece 

17 to the overall mission of the total force. 

18 (15) Finally, senior leaders in the United States 

19 military have expressed concern regarding the cur20 rent and future reductions in the end strength of the 

21 Land Forces of the United States, including the fol22 lowing: 

23 (A) Then-Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of 

24 Staff, General Martin Dempsey, wrote in his 

25 risk assessment accompanying the 2014 QDR 


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1 that the current defense strategy ‘‘takes risk in 

2 the capacity of . . . land forces’’. 

3 (B) The current Chief of Staff of the 

4 Army, General Mark Milley disputed many of 

5 the assumptions described in finding eight in an 

6 address before the Association of the United 

7 States Army, including that ‘‘wars of the future 

8 will be short’’, ‘‘wars can be won through the 

9 use of advanced technologies’’, ‘‘allies and part10 ners can provide capable land forces in suffi11 cient scale’’, and ‘‘armies are easy to regen12 erate’’. 

13 (C) The current commander of United 

14 States European Command, General Philip 

15 Breedlove, testified before the House Appro16 priations Committee’s Subcommittee on De17 fense that ‘‘virtual presence means actual ab18 sence. . . . Further reductions of both infra19 structure and forces will reduce our access to 

20 key strategic locations during times of crisis’’. 

21 (D) The former Commandant of the Ma22 rine Corps, General James Amos, testified at a 

23 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Com24 mittee that ‘‘we are headed towards a force in 

25 not too many years that will be hollow back 


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1 home and not ready to deploy . . . there would 

2 be no rotational relief like we had in Iraq and 

3 Afghanistan’’. 

4 (E) The former commander of United 

5 States European Command, Admiral James 

6 Stavridis, recently stated that ‘‘we’re still at 

7 war . . . actively involved on multiple con8 tinents in real combat operations. We should 

9 not be drastically reducing our troop levels.’’. 

10 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

11 Given the volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous world 

12 and the need for trained and ready Land Forces of the 

13 United States, in conjunction with joint and multinational 

14 forces, to deter threats, shape the international security 

15 environment, respond to emergent situations and crises, 

16 and, if necessary, to fight and win the Nation’s wars, it 

17 is the sense of Congress that the planned drawdown of 

18 Land Forces should be immediately stopped. 

19 SEC. 4. FISCAL YEAR 2016 END-STRENGTH LEVELS FOR 

20 LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. 

21 (a) ACTIVE FORCES.— 

22 (1) ARMY.—The authorized end strength for 

23 Army active duty personnel as of September 30, 

24 2016, is 480,000. 


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1 (2) MARINE CORPS.—The authorized end 

2 strength for Marine Corps active duty personnel as 

3 of September 30, 2016, is 184,000. 

4 (b) SELECTED RESERVE.— 

5 (1) ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS.—The au6 thorized end strength for Selected Reserve personnel 

7 of the Army reserve components as of September 30, 

8 2016, are as follows: 

9 (A) The Army National Guard of the 

10 United States, 350,000. 

11 (B) The Army Reserve, 205,000. 

12 (2) MARINE CORPS RESERVE.—The authorized 

13 end strength for Selected Reserve personnel of the 

14 Marine Corps Reserve as of September 30, 2016, is 

15 38,900. 

16 SEC. 5. REVISION IN PERMANENT ACTIVE DUTY END 

17 STRENGTH MINIMUM LEVELS. 

18 Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, is 

19 amended by striking paragraphs (1) through (4) and in20 serting the following: 

21 ‘‘(1) For the Army, 480,000. 

22 ‘‘(2) For the Navy, 329,200. 

23 ‘‘(3) For the Marine Corps, 184,000. 

24 ‘‘(4) For the Air Force, 317,000.’’. 


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1 SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

2 It is policy of the United States to pursue and main3 tain peace through strength. Therefore, any proposal to 

4 lower the end strength levels established by this Act and 

5 the amendments made by this Act must first be approved 

6 by Congress through the enactment of a law to that effect. 

Æ 


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