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UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 19, 2014 

Serial No. 113–118 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

[Vacant] 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

NOVEMBER 19, 2014 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENT 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 1 

WITNESS 

The Honorable Joseph P. Clancy, Acting Director, United States Secret Service 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 32 

(1) 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob Goodlatte 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Coble, Chabot, Issa, 

Gohmert, Jordan, Poe, Chaffetz, Marino, Gowdy, Labrador, 

Farenthold, Holding, DeSantis, Conyers, Scott, Jackson Lee, 

Cohen, DelBene, Garcia, Jeffries and Cicilline. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; Sarah 

Allen, Counsel; Brian Northcutt, Secret Service Detailee; Kelsey 

Deterding, Clerk; (Minority) Perry Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle Brown, Parliamentarian; Joe 

Graupensperger, Counsel; and Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff 

Member. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Good morning. The Judiciary Committee will 

come to order. And without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee at any time. 

We welcome everyone to this morning’s hearing on oversight of 

the United States Secret Service. Before we begin, I want to make 

Members aware that the first portion of our hearing is open to the 

public. There may be items which we cannot discuss in an open 

setting, because they fall into the category of being law enforcement sensitive information; therefore, after the Director has testified and we have concluded one round of questions, we will recess 

briefly to clear the hearing room. After that, Members and staff 

will be permitted to re-enter the room and we will convene the law 

enforcement sensitive portion of the hearing. 

Today we welcome Acting Director Clancy to a hearing to conduct oversight of the United States Secret Service. We very much 

appreciate you being here today, particularly given that you have 

only been on the job for a little over a month. You had an exemplary record of service as the head of the Presidential Protective 

Division, and we’re grateful that you agreed to take the reigns of 

the Secret Service at this critical juncture. 

The Secret Service, created by President Lincoln in 1865, has a 

long and distinguished history. The agency has two primary mis-
2 

sions: criminal investigations and protection of the President, VicePresident and other dignitaries. While protection is clearly the 

most visible of its two missions, I would be remiss not to mention 

that the Secret Service has recently had a number of significant investigative accomplishments, including approximately 6,700 arrests 

for financial and cyber crimes in fiscal year 2014 alone, which prevented more than $3 billion in losses. 

It is important to note that the Service has also had many successes implementing its protective mission. In fiscal year 2014, the 

Service provided protection for 6,000 travel stops, including more 

than 2,500 visits by foreign dignitaries, and two national special security events. 

Secret Service is entrusted with protecting some of our most valuable assets, including the President, the First Family, and the 

White House. This is an extremely difficult, high-profile mission, 

for which there is no margin for error. Recent incidents give me 

great concern that the policies, procedures and training at the Secret Service are not entirely up to the task. 

Just after 7:15 p.m. on September 19, 2014, Omar Gonzalez was 

able to scale the White House fence, evade numerous Secret Service officers outside the White House and force his way through the 

unlocked front door, armed with a knife. Although it was initially 

reported to the public and Congress that Gonzalez was apprehended just inside the north portico doors, we have since learned 

that he actually made it all the way to the East Room of the White 

House before being tackled by Secret Service officers. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s review of this event uncovered a laundry list of errors that evening, including communication systems that didn’t work and that officers were not trained to 

use properly, a construction project along the White House fence 

that obscured officers’ sight lines, unlocked front doors to the White 

House late on a Friday evening, and a canine officer who was on 

a personal cell call without his radio ear piece in his ear or his tactical radio at the time Gonzalez scaled the fence. This delayed the 

officer’s response, meaning that the canine was not able to identify 

Gonzalez as the target. 

The report also discusses a number of training and staff issues 

as well as potential missed opportunities to stop Gonzalez in the 

months leading up to September 19. 

Today’s hearing will take place in two parts: A public portion and 

a closed portion, in which we will drill further down into the deficiencies that have been revealed in the Secret Service’s policies and 

procedures as well as any deficiencies with the physical security at 

the White House. In particular, I am interested in discussing how 

the Service intends to improve security at the White House when, 

as was true on September 19, the President or other protectees are 

not present. 

A month after Omar Gonzalez was able to enter the White 

House, another fence jumper was quickly apprehended by Secret 

Service officers, including the canine unit. It is my hope that this 

incident shows that the service has already implemented important 

reforms; however, the Gonzalez fence jumper is just one of many 

events in the past few years that call into question whether the 

U.S. Secret Service is doing all it can to fulfill its mission and pre-
3 

vent mistakes. Others include the Columbian prostitution scandal, 

the recent ability of a security guard with a criminal history to 

take a service weapon into an elevator with the President, and the 

incident in the Netherlands dealing with intoxicated Secret Service 

agents. 

Given the vital role the Secret Service plays in the security of the 

President and the White House, it is critical that Congress investigate the Service’s response to recent incidents and work with the 

Service to make sure it fulfills its critical mission. This hearing is 

intended to do just that. 

And since the Ranking Member has not yet arrived, we will go 

ahead and swear in our only witness, and, again, welcome him. 

So, Acting Director Clancy, if you would raise your right hand 

and repeat after me. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Thank you very much. 

Let the record reflect that the Acting Director responded in the 

affirmative, and we welcome him. 

Joseph P. Clancy was designated as the Acting Director of the 

United States Secret Service on October 1, 2014, by Secretary of 

Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson. Prior to accepting the position of 

Acting Director, Mr. Clancy served as the executive director of 

cable security at Comcast Corporation. A 27-year veteran of the Secret Service, Mr. Clancy’s career there began in 1984 in the Philadelphia field office. Mr. Clancy was appointed special agent in 

charge of the Presidential Protective Division on February 1, 2009. 

Mr. Clancy held this position until his retirement from the Secret 

Service on June 30, 2011. 

Mr. Clancy attended the United States Military Academy at 

West Point and is a graduate of Villanova University with a Bachelor of Arts in political science and criminal justice. Prior to joining 

the Secret Service, Mr. Clancy worked as a high school teacher and 

football and baseball coach for the Philadelphia Archdiocese. 

Mr. Clancy, we appreciate your presence here today and we look 

forward to your testimony. Your written statement will be entered 

into the record in its entirety, and we ask that you summarize your 

testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within that, 

there’s a timing light on your table. So welcome, Mr. Clancy. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH P. CLANCY, 

ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Let me begin by recognizing the tremendous 

support this Committee has given the Secret Service over many 

years, and acknowledge your staff, both past and present, who 

worked with us on issues as varied as protection of former Presidents, to cyber crime targeting our Nation’s banks and financial institutions. 

Forty-four days ago, I embarked on the greatest endeavor of my 

professional life: the privilege of leading the dedicated and self-sacrificing employees of the Secret Service through a challenging time 

in the agency’s storied history. While returning to public service 
4 

after beginning a second career in the private sector was not an 

easy decision, the call to restore operational excellence to the Secret Service was too urgent to ignore. 

I did not come here today expecting this hearing to be easy, but 

it is my hope that the next several hours will yield productive discussions about the state of the Secret Service. 

Without question, the agency has been severely damaged in recent years by failures ranging from disgraceful misconduct on the 

part of some employees to operational breakdowns that undermine 

the trust and confidence that previous generations worked so hard 

to establish. 

One of those operational breakdowns was the White House incursion on September 19 of this year. I understand the Committee was 

briefed last week on the Department’s review of the incident. I read 

the report. I found the findings devastating. What hits the hardest 

is the range of shortcomings that ultimately allowed Omar Gonzalez to enter the White House practically unencumbered. 

Although I firmly believe the Secret Service is better than this 

incident, I openly acknowledge that a failure of this magnitude, especially in light of other recent incidents, requires immediate action and longer term reform. 

The Department found that the level of training for Uniformed 

Division officers likely contributed to Gonzalez’s ability to breach 

the White House interior, and documented there was confusion regarding the various roles and responsibilities during a fence jumping incident. 

To address this issue, I will continue to oversee the integrated 

training for White House uniformed division officers and tactical 

teams that was initiated after the September 19 incident. This 

training involves dynamic scenario-based exercises simulating 

breaches of the White House grounds. My goal is to ensure that 

100 percent of all White House branch officers receive this training 

by the end of the calendar year. 

If someone does attempt to scale the White House fence, I want 

to ensure they are met with immediate and forceful resistance, but 

I also view the fence itself as a needed deterrent for would-be 

jumpers. The Secret Service has long held that prevention is the 

linchpin of effective security plans, which is why we are currently 

working with our partners in the National Park Service to look at 

potential changes that would assist in the detection and delay of 

any person attempting to scale the White House fence. 

Special agent and Uniformed Division staffing levels have direct 

impact on the Secret Service’s ability to conduct regular in-service 

training. Thanks to additional funding provided by Congress, in fiscal year 2014, the Secret Service was able to hire a total of 238 

new law enforcement positions, more than tripling the number of 

hired over the previous 2 years combined. This fiscal year, we hope 

to surpass that number and continue our work to achieve staffing 

levels that are commensurate with mission requirements. 

However, I recognize that staffing challenges are not remedied 

overnight. As it stands now, the recruiting and onboard process 

takes approximately 12 months, with an additional 7 months of 

training for new agents and officers. 
5 

While staffing concerns within the agency will take some time to 

resolve, I have taken immediate steps to improve the flow and 

quality of communication at all levels within the agency. An integral part of why I agreed to serve as Acting Director were troubling 

reports that some employees saw no option but to take their concerns to people outside the Secret Service rather than trusting 

their supervisors and the agency’s leadership to confront difficult 

issues head on. That is unsustainable in any organization. 

While I have the utmost respect for the employee’s right to report incidence of waste, fraud and abuse in a confidential manner 

without fear of reprisal, I also see an urgent need to reestablish 

what I view as one of the most basic tenets of a well-functioning 

workplace: trust your boss that he will stand up and do the right 

thing. 

One of the first actions I took since assuming this position was 

to foster better communication between the rank and file, their supervisors, and the agency’s executive leadership. I conducted town 

hall style meetings with the Secret Service field offices around the 

country by video conference. I personally joined officers and agents 

at the White House complex during their daily roll call. 

In the event that employees are apprehensive about discussing 

their concerns with their supervisors, I instructed the Secret Service ombudsman to establish a mechanism of elevating employee 

concerns directly to the executive review board for resolution. I 

made clear the importance of full accountability and directed that 

I be present when actions are taken. 

The core values of the Secret Service, justice, duty, courage, honesty and loyalty, have guided the agency through many challenges 

over the course of its history. Now more than ever, it is critically 

important for us to recognize that in the midst of all the turmoil, 

there is exceptional work being carried out by thousands of Secret 

Service employees around the country and around the world who 

embody these core values. 

In my view, failure can be an integral part of success, whether 

that refers to an agency or to an individual. And we are confident 

we can fulfill our mission with honor and restore the Secret Service’s rightful place as the most respected protection service in the 

world. 

Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, this concludes my opening remarks. I look forward to a good discussion, 

and will be happy to answer your questions during both the open 

and closed portions of today’s hearing as appropriate. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clancy follows:] 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Clancy. The Ranking Member 

has not yet arrived. I will begin the questioning, and when he does 

arrive, we will recognize him for both his opening statement and 

questions. 

As you know, the officers who were present when Omar Gonzalez 

jumped the fence on September 19 believed that he was not armed 

and did not present a threat that would warrant the use of lethal 

force. It was ultimately discovered that he was, however, carrying 

a knife when he entered the White House. 

Can you explain the Service’s policy for the use of lethal force? 

And given that Mr. Gonzalez did actually have a knife when he entered the White House, do you agree with the decision to withhold 

lethal force? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. DHS, Department of Homeland Security, 

and the Secret Service have a very clear policy on the use of deadly 

force. Basically what it states is that an officer, when it’s necessary, is authorized to use deadly force if the individual poses an 

immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer, 

the agent or to someone else. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And what non-lethal options does an officer 

have to subdue or stop a fence jumper? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, officers, in addition to their weapon, they have 

batons, they have CS spray, more or less the pepper spray, and obviously they’re trained to use their hands as well to transition to 

that mode. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, are you looking into other options? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, we’re always looking at other options that are 

available. We have close consultation with other agencies and we 

share information. So we’re always evaluating the equipment that 

we have for our officers and agents. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Concern has been raised that there’s an overreliance on the dogs, on the canines that may have impeded the 

Service’s ability to stop Gonzalez on September 19. Could you comment on that? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, the canine are obviously a very important asset 

that we have on the north and south grounds of the White House 

complex. It is one option of several that officers can use in the 

event of a fence jumper. It’s a decision that the officers have to 

make depending on circumstances whether to use the canine, but 

previous jumpers have been confronted with—our officers have 

used their hands, have used their baton, they’ve used other equipment to stop these fence jumpers. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. I want to give you an opportunity 

to discuss an incident that occurred back in 2011. It’s been reported that there was a period of initial confusion about whether 

gunshots had been fired toward the White House on November 11, 

2011, and that officers were told to stand down. Can you comment 

on what the Service did that evening and the days following to investigate that shooting, and did the Service realize or did it not realize that anything was wrong until the bullets were found on the 

side of the White House several days later? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Thank you. As I’ve been briefed, when we 

were aware of shots being fired, initially there was a report over 

the radio that there was a stand-down order, but that was quickly 
16 

overridden. Our officers responded appropriately. They went to 

their defensive positions at the White House complex, because they 

did hear some noise that sounded similar to gunshots. We continued to try to identify where those noises came from, we knew there 

was construction down on Constitution Avenue, but we immediately, within 2 minutes, notified the Park Police of the sounds 

down by Constitution Avenue. 

Within 5 minutes, we located the vehicle that Ortega was driving. Within 30 minutes, I believe, we built an incident command 

center on Constitution Avenue. And then we continued to stay with 

the course of the investigation for the next several days. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And how quickly was there a warrant for the 

arrest of the suspect in that case? 

Mr. CLANCY. How many days, sir? As I’ve been briefed, we identified Mr. Ortega that day as the owner of the vehicle. And then 

through the process of an investigation through our Pittsburgh 

field office, we were able to identify where he was located, and I 

believe November 15th, a warrant was served on him in the state 

of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. So within a few days? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Not one day of the event? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. With regard to the elevator incident in Atlanta 

on September 16th of this year, what steps has the Service taken 

to review and revise its policies and procedures for handling thirdparty security contractors? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Needless to say, sir, that was a break in 

our procedures. We did not follow procedures in our advance of that 

visit at the CDC. We have done an investigation on that, and in 

general, only sworn law enforcement officials should be in close 

proximity to the President, who are armed. In this case, we did not 

follow the proper procedures. 

It’s not a matter of necessarily changing policies, but more of an 

indication that we need to do better training and reshape some of 

the training that we’re doing with our folks on the protection details. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And on that, what is your policy for determining 

when third parties may be armed while in the proximity of the 

President or another protected individual? How do you go about determining that? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, the advance agenct will ask first if there’s local 

security at the site, is anyone armed? And then needless to say, we 

also do records checks on anyone who’s going to be in close proximity of the President. 

In this case, again, we failed our procedures in allowing this gentleman to operate the elevator armed. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much. My time’s expired, and 

I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the Crime Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for his questions. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Director Clancy, thank you for being 

here. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 
17 

Mr. SCOTT. One of the problems we have around here frequently 

is that when we do budgets, we don’t think tax cuts affect the 

budget and that budget cuts don’t affect your ability to provide 

services. Can you describe a little bit about the budget ups and 

downs over the last 3 or 4 years? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. When I came back to the Secret Service 

and accepted this position, I identified three main areas of concern: 

one was staffing, one was training, and obviously the morale as 

well. 

Staffing is a complicated issue. Back in 2011, we were at a high 

point with our staffing. We had appropriately 7,024 security personnel back in 2011. In 2012 and 2013, we had a severe drop-off 

and there were some uncertain times from a budget standpoint, 

and also we realized, from what I understand, is that that 7,024 

number was unsustainable. We were not able to year after year, 

continue meet our pay of those employees, so our numbers dropped 

down. 

Now, in 2014, the year 2014—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Excuse me, Director. Did you need 7,024 people? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Keep going. 

Mr. CLANCY. So in 2014, with the help of Congress, we were able 

to hire 238 new security professionals, which was a good help to 

us, but we were starting from scratch after not hiring very few people in 2012 and 2013. So we’re starting to work our way back up, 

and needless to say, in 2015, that’s a priority. Right now we’ve got 

scheduled six classes of uniformed officers and six classes of special 

agents prepared to go through training this year. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, you are understaffed. What does that do to people’s vacation time and overtime? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. It affects their vacation time, it affects 

overtime drastically. Our Uniformed Division works extremely 

hard, but very often they get their days cancelled or they have to 

extend their workday, and that has a severe effect on their morale 

and obviously has an effect on training, which is something we’re 

going to correct moving forward. 

Mr. SCOTT. When you’re understaffed, can you explain what happens to training? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. When we are understaffed, it’s difficult to 

get people out to their training assignments, because of the operational needs of the Service. So one of the things we’ve done to alleviate that in the short term is we’ve brought agents in from the 

field, to take some of these positions that Uniformed Division has 

at the White House complex so that we can get people out to training. 

Mr. SCOTT. What happens when people are not properly trained? 

Mr. CLANCY. When we’re not properly trained, sir, we fail. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, we have coming up next year another round of 

sequester, a 10 percent across-the-board cut. What will that do to 

your staffing, morale and training? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, that would have an effect on our staff and on 

our training and on our morale. We will continue to do our very 

best to fulfill the needs, and we will meet the needs of the protec-
18 

tion of the White House, the first family, we’ll do whatever we need 

to do to make sure we meet those requirements. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if you meet those requirements, then something’s got to give. What priorities will not be met if you need to 

transfer people onto the White House security? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, sometimes we do have to reach out to our field 

offices, who are doing a tremendous job, as the Chairman had mentioned in his opening remarks. We take some of those agents to 

support us in the protective mode. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you know if the transfer from Treasury to Homeland Security had any effect on your ability to perform your mission? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I don’t think I’m one to evaluate. I was a young 

manager when we were in the Treasury Department. Certainly I’ve 

had good exposure and experience with the Department of Homeland Security, and we’ve used them. As I’ve been briefed, for the 

most recent United Nations, we used our other components within 

the Department of Homeland Security to assist us in that United 

Nations security plan. We used their HSI investigators to help us 

with post standing, we used their TSA agents to assist us with 

magnetometers, we used the Coast Guard to assist us with our 

water, sea support and air support. So we were able to use the 

components of the Department of Homeland Security to assist us 

in a very critical mission. 

Mr. SCOTT. Just for the record, when the fence jumper incident 

occurred, where was the President and the First Family? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, when the fence jumper on September 19 occurred, the President had just left for Camp David and the First 

Lady was out of the residence as well. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Clancy, good to have you with us this morning. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Clancy, if I were going to pursue an activity to 

direct attention to me, I believe I would find some exercise other 

than volunteering as a fence jumper at the White House, but that’s 

me, but maybe I’m in the minority on that roll. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. But it’s been reported that the Service had multiple 

contacts with Gonzalez prior to the September 19 incident. Will 

any review of that event include a review of how information regarding the suspect prior to that date was handled, including information gathered by the Secret Service investigators following Gonzalez’s arrest on July 19, 2014? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. That’s correct, sir. And do you want me to 

explain a little bit what happened during that? 

Mr. COBLE. If you would do that. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. During that time, sir, when Mr. Gonzalez 

was arrested down in Virginia, our Roanoke office was advised of 

the arrest. There was consultation between the local authorities 

and our agents, and at that time, our agents did not interview Mr. 

Gonzalez. Subsequent to that, when Mr. Gonzalez posted bond, our 
19 

agents did interview Mr. Gonzalez. And we were aware of the 

weapons that he had in his vehicle, we were also aware of the map 

that he had in his possession. 

This is one of the most difficult decisions an agent has to make, 

make an assessment of someone that they’re interviewing with 

whether or not that individual has the potential or the motive to 

do harm to any of our protectees. And during that interview, Mr. 

Gonzalez did not exhibit any of those characteristics. He did not indicate in any way that he wanted to harm any of our protectees, 

or indicate in any way that he wanted to harm any of our 

protectees or the President. 

Subsequent to that, he did come to the White House, outside the 

White House perimeter. And as he was walking around the perimeter, one of our uniformed officers noticed he was a little suspicious 

the way he was walking and there was a bulge in the back of his 

jacket, as I’ve been briefed here. And the officer approached him 

and noticed that he had a hatchet in the back of his pants, as I 

was briefed. 

The hatchet, my understanding is, in D.C. is not in violation of 

the law if it’s considered to be used for camping-type activities, and 

that’s what this individual indicated he had the hatchet for. The 

individual also gave a consent search of his vehicle. So he was very 

cooperative during the interview. When they searched his vehicle, 

there were no weapons found in the vehicle. There were other 

hatchets, there was other camping equipment again, to his story 

that he was involved in camping activities. So again, he was released from the interview. 

Then subsequently on September 19, he did return to the White 

House. And, again, three of the officers who were familiar with the 

hatchet interview recognized him. 

And to be candid, one of the things we’ve addressed since that 

incident is that we’ve got to do a better job of communicating. 

Those officers who saw Mr. Gonzalez walking on the perimeter of 

the White House did not do a good enough job of communicating 

to everyone, including our joint operations center, that he was in 

the vicinity again. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Clancy. Let me put another question 

to you before that red light illuminates. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Do you intend to review the White House’s physical 

infrastructure for security risks? Is it solely within the discretion 

of the Service to update the physical security systems in place 

within the White House and surrounding grounds, and which other 

agencies or offices, if any, must approve any recommended improvements? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. That’s a good question. Thank you, sir. And 

we are constantly evaluating all of the security measures at the 

White House complex. In fact, the very first week, I walked the perimeter of the White House as well as the interior of the White 

House and looked at the security measures we had in place. 

Now, any adjustments we want to make, just as an example, the 

fence, we have to work with our partners, and we’re happy to do 

that, and we’ve gotten very good cooperation with our partners, to 

include the National Capital Planning Commission, the Fine Arts 
20 

Commission, the National Park Service, and we work with those 

agencies on the perimeter of the White House for any adjustments 

we want to make. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that, sir. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen, for his questions. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it’s a great honor to 

follow the gentleman from North Carolina, who has served this 

Committee so ably for so many years and been a friend to me, and 

I appreciate that. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. 

The White House protection, does the Secret Service protection 

begin on the inside of the fence or does the Secret Service have personnel on the outside of the fence on 16th? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, we have a presence on the outside perimeter as 

well, yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Do the D.C. Police normally also provide some type 

of perimeter screening? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, D.C. Police is also on the outside, but the actual 

perimeter of the protection of the White House complex would be 

the responsibility of the Secret Service, and we do have people with 

several different job descriptions on the perimeter of the White 

House. 

Mr. COHEN. On the day in question of September 19, 2014, how 

many agents were on the 16th Street side, that’s opposite Andy 

Jackson, Lafayette Square, how many folks were on the street beyond the White House perimeter? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Sir, typically we would have on the street 

two Uniformed Division officers, but we also have some 

countersurveillance units that could be in that area by Lafayette 

Park. We also have posts that are right inside the gate. 

Mr. COHEN. But on the outside—— 

Mr. CLANCY. On the outside, yes. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. You have just a couple. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. None of them saw this man jump the fence? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, they saw him prepping to jump the fence. And 

by that, they can usually see the body language of individuals 

who—as you know, so many pedestrians come up to the fence, but 

our officers and other security folks, they recognize when someone 

is starting to maybe prep to climb the fence. And they started to 

move in that direction, and as he started to make a move for the 

fence, they shouted verbal commands, sprinted to Mr. Gonzalez, 

and they were about an arm’s length or two arm’s lengths short of 

reaching him. 

Mr. COHEN. And then what did they do then? Did they jump over 

the fence too, or were they incapable of doing that? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. Protocol there, sir, is first to get on the 

radio. And one of the officers did get on the radio to announce a 

fence jumper. Then their next role is to clear the fence line of all 

the guests and all the tourists that are on Pennsylvania Avenue. 
21 

And once that individual, in this case, Gonzalez, had climbed over 

the fence, now it’s the responsibility primarily of our emergency response team and our other officers that are inside the fence. 

Mr. COHEN. And it’s easy to second-guess. I mean, you know, I 

do it every Saturday in watching football, but nevertheless, doesn’t 

it seem like that they should have tried and been able to leap the 

fence and chased him from behind, and not just done what you 

said, to become a radio communication and clear other folks? They 

didn’t try to apprehend the person other than yell? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. Everyone has a specific position to hold 

when an event like that happens, and one of the reasons is because 

of the canine. One of the tools that we have, it can affect how the 

canine react to that individual. 

But I will say that as a result of September 19, if you go by the 

White House, you’ll see that we have a bike rack there now, which 

we know is not going prevent someone from jumping the fence, but 

it’s going to allow us to have a little more time to react to someone 

who may have designs on climbing the fence, so that’s been helpful. 

Mr. COHEN. Is that the only area we’ve had any history of people 

trying to enter the White House from the outside? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. We’ve had people jump the fence on other 

parts of our perimeter. I will say that the north grounds is more 

prominent in our people jumping, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. Would a moat—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Moat? 

Mr. COHEN. Water—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yeah. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. Six feet—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yeah. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. Around be kind of attractive and effective? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yeah. Sir, it may be. One of the things we balance 

is obviously the accessibility of the White House. We recognize the 

historic nature of the White House and how the American people 

should have access to the White House. So we are now in the process of working with our partners at the National Park Services to 

see if we can do something with the fence. That’s our first step, see 

if we can do something that would still be appeasing to the eye and 

keep the historical nature of the White House. 

Mr. COHEN. Like a higher fence. 

Mr. CLANCY. Maybe a higher fence, sir, or maybe some other design. 

Mr. COHEN. Because this guy got further in the White House 

than some of my Republican colleagues have ever gotten. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. But you’re right, sir. A higher 

fence would certainly help us, and we’re looking for ways and options. In fact, we hope within the next few months to have some 

renderings, some drawings of some options for people to look at. 

Mr. COHEN. And the incident of November 11, there’s hardly anything we can do about somebody from a great distance with a rifle, 

is there? 

Mr. CLANCY. Well, it’s very challenging. Yes, sir, you’re right. 

But what we have done as a result of that is we’ve pushed out our 
22 

perimeter a little bit further out to Constitution Avenue to monitor 

that area as well. 

Mr. COHEN. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. The Chair thanks the gentleman, 

and recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POE. Thank the Chairman. 

Thank you for being here. I have a great admiration for the Secret Service. Back in the days when I was a judge in Texas, I had 

agents bring cases. They were well-prepared and they did very 

well, and well received by juries, and I think that’s still the case 

today. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. POE. The Secret Service does a lot of things. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. Is your number one priority protecting the President 

and the President’s family? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Mr. POE. So that’s number one? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. And everything else is below there and you’re in charge 

of all that? 

Mr. CLANCY. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. All right. I believe that the United States, because of 

who we are, it’s really neat that the people can go to the White 

House where the President lives. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. You can’t do that in any other countries—— 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. 

Mr. POE [continuing]. Whether it’s western countries or third 

world countries, you can’t go see who’s in charge, you can’t go to 

their house. 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. 

Mr. POE. And we get to do that, American citizens get to do that. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. I think that’s a good thing. 

Let’s go back to the fence jumpers. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. There have been 16 fence jumpers of recent years. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. And in October 22nd, I think add one to 

that. I believe it’s—— 

Mr. POE. 17. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. All right. Jumping the fence, going onto the White 

House grounds without permission, and I guess that would include 

Republicans as well going out permission, is a Federal offense, correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. Of those 16, leave out Gonzalez, what happened to 

those 16 other fence jumpers? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir—— 

Mr. POE. Were they prosecuted? Were they told not to do it 

again? Were they released at the time? What happened to those 16 
23 

fence jumpers who presumably violated Federal law by jumping the 

White House fence? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I know charges were filed. I’ll have to get back 

to you with how that played out in court, sir. I don’t have those 

figures in front of me. 

Mr. POE. I would appreciate it if you would take each one of 

those cases, date and whether they were prosecuted and then the 

results of the prosecutions. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. And send that to the Chairman of the Committee, who 

will share it with the rest of us. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. We’ll do, sir. 

Mr. POE. But that is the priority of the Secret Service, is protecting the President? 

Mr. CLANCY. It is, sir. 

Mr. POE. It seems to me that the Secret Service cannot make a 

mistake. This is one area where you’re protecting the President, 

the President’s family, there can’t be mistakes; and if there are 

mistakes, but for some other intervening reason, bad things are 

going to happen. I believe that that makes your job, I mean, as you 

know and the Secret Service knows, very serious and very important. There could be no mistakes ever. You cannot do a redo if 

there is a mistake of security of the President and the President’s 

family. 

At the White House, it’s not just the Secret Service that is there. 

There’s also the White House police. Is that correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, there’s a Uniformed Division branch of the Secret Service that protects the White House facility. 

Mr. POE. So they’re still Secret Service? 

Mr. CLANCY. They’re Secret Service, yes. 

Mr. POE. They’re not White House police? 

Mr. CLANCY. Years ago they were called White House Police, 

many years ago, yes, sir, but now it’s Uniformed Division—— 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. CLANCY [continuing]. Of the Secret Service. 

Mr. POE. So it’s all Secret Service? 

Mr. CLANCY. It is, yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. Are there protocols when people jump the fence, 16 people jump the fence, to make sure that the President and the President’s family, if that’s the ultimate goal of fence jumper to get to 

them—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE [continuing]. That will not happen? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. And obviously on September 19, we failed 

in the execution of that security plan, but we do have very specific 

assignments, responsibilities of all of our tactical units as well as 

our officers at the White House complex. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Mr. CLANCY. And they’ve been successful in all cases other 

than—— 

Mr. POE. Okay. I’ve got a couple more questions, because I have 

a minute left. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 
24 

Mr. POE. You’re not trying to say, though, this event occurred because of so-called budget problems, are you? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. This is no excuse. It’s solely—— 

Mr. POE. It has nothing to do with the budget, because that’s 

your number one priority, is protecting the President. All the other 

things the Secret Service do and do well is secondary? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Mr. POE. Colombia. How many agents were involved in the scandal in Colombia? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, as you know, I was not assigned at that 

time—— 

Mr. POE. I know you weren’t. 

Mr. CLANCY [continuing]. But my understanding is—— 

Mr. POE. I know you weren’t in charge. Do you know how many 

agents were involved? 

Mr. CLANCY. There were 13, is my understanding, sir, and I believe 10 are no longer with us. 

Mr. POE. Y’all fired 10 of them or let them retire or—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. There—— 

Mr. POE [continuing]. Some—— 

Mr. CLANCY. A mix. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. Something like that. All right. I thank you for your 

help today, and good luck to you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington, Ms. DelBene. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, Director 

Clancy, for being with us today. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you. 

Ms. DELBENE. I wanted to ask you regarding the September 19 

incident in particular, can you explain further the radio communications challenges that were experienced? There were several officers who were unable to hear ‘‘any comprehensible radio communications’’ to notify them of the fence jumper leading to, for example, a delay in deploying the canine unit. 

So is it concerning to learn that some officers experienced unclear and muffled radio communications about the alarm break, 

and can you talk about what might have caused these communications challenges, whether it was people didn’t know how to operate 

the equipment properly or whether there was actually problems 

with the communications infrastructure, the underlying infrastructure? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes. Thank you. We are very concerned with the 

radio communication. For us to execute our security plan, we’ve got 

to have good communication, and that night we did not have the 

communication we should have had. I did read the report by the 

deputy security of homeland, Deputy Mayorkas, and he highlighted 

that as one of our failings, the communication on that evening. 

We immediately went out and checked all the radios at the 

White House complex as well as our Joint Operations Center, and 

we did discover some areas at the Joint Operations Center that— 

the commander at the Joint Operations Center, when he put out 

word that there was a fence jumper, he was under the impression 
25 

that his communication would override all the handheld radios, 

and it did not, but we have now since gone back and we’ve corrected that, so when the Joint Operations Center has to get a message out, that will override any handheld radio communication. 

There was also some reports of the muffling of radio communication. Sometimes that’s in the heat of battle. People have to slow 

down, use radio discipline and explain exactly what happened. But 

subsequent to that event, we also did a review of any dead spots, 

were there any dead spots for radio communication at the complex, 

and we found that there are no dead spots, but the command post 

was one area that we had to correct, and that has been corrected. 

Ms. DELBENE. And given communication is obviously critical to 

deploying resources around in a situation like this, the report recently issued by DHS suggests that aging infrastructure may have 

contributed as well. So are there specific resources that might be 

preventing you from doing the best job you can? Is there modernization to the infrastructure that’s going to be important? And 

can you give me any feedback on what you think would be more 

helpful in terms of the tools that are available to your officers? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, ma’am. I’m sorry. As I’ve been briefed, that is 

a main concern. Some of our equipment is aging, and that’s one of 

the areas that we are looking at to try to enhance our radio communications. It’s outdated, some of it. It’s still operational, we can 

certainly fulfill our mission, but we are always looking to improve 

the assets that we have. 

Ms. DELBENE. And do you know specifically what it is that you 

would prefer to have or what would be helpful? 

Mr. CLANCY. I don’t have specifically—I think it’s a little more 

technical than I have facts today, but we’ll provide a report for you. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

I think I’ll yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman, and is 

pleased to recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, and 

also to congratulate him on his new assignment in the new Congress as Chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform 

Committee. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the Chairman. 

And, Director, I thank you for being here. The President made 

an exceptional choice by putting you in this position in a difficult 

situation, and I appreciate your service to this country and your 

taking on this role. 

You have an internal code of conduct. My understanding is that 

Offense Code 2.4 deals with false and misleading information. Do 

you expect every person in the Secret Service to live under this 

code? 

Mr. CLANCY. We do, yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. There’s no exceptions as to who should or should 

not live under this code about providing false information and the 

penalties therein? 

Mr. CLANCY. That’s correct, sir, no exceptions. 
26 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And my understanding is that if it is found that 

you’re providing misinformation, that would lead anywhere between a range of 5-day suspension to removal. Correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Secret Service put out a statement on September 

20th, 2014, after the fence jumping incident where they said, 

‘‘physically apprehended after entering the White House north portico doors.’’ 

Is that true or not true? 

Mr. CLANCY. That is not true, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. It was further said that, according to Mr. Donovan in an Associated Press article that was posted on September 

20, 2014, at 1:24 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Donovan said the— 

Ed Donovan, what’s his role for the Secret Service? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, he’s our public affairs office. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Donovan said the man appeared unarmed to officers, who spotted him climbing a fence, and a search of the suspect 

turned up no weapons. 

Is that true or not true? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, it’s not true. Can I elaborate on that, sir, or— 

I’m sorry. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let me keep going. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. How quickly after he was apprehended did you 

find the weapon on the suspect that had entered the White House? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, within minutes, I would have to assume, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And somehow Mr. Donovan evidently claimed 

that the suspect turned up no weapon. This is then posted on the 

Associated Press. Was there ever a correction given to the—posted 

on the Secret Service Web site or given to the media that this was 

inaccurate? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I don’t know the answer. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So they just let that linger out there in perpetuity. Let me go on. 

Operation Moonlight, Mr. Donovan is quoted as saying, ‘‘because 

there were no protective assets used during these checks, there was 

no impact on protective operations.’’ 

Do you believe that to be true or not true? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, from the inspector general’s report, everyone 

interviewed indicated it did not affect the protection of the President. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So you have a prowler unit that’s outside the 

White House, you have the President of the United States in the 

White House—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ [continuing]. And you don’t believe that there’s 

trouble by taking those protective assets and moving them close to 

an hour away from the President himself? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I’ve read the inspector general’s report, and we 

respect his report, and we agree with the report that there was 

poor judgment in sending the prowler unit that distance in this 

case. 
27 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, the inspector general came to the conclusion 

that the prowler unit would have been unable to respond if there 

was an incident at the White House. 

Mr. CLANCY. That particular prowler unit, yes, that’s correct, sir. 

Any agent that is—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So did the President have more or less assets 

around him from the Secret Service by moving the prowler unit 

away? He had less, right? 

Mr. CLANCY. He did not have that unit, yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So there was less protection for the President as 

opposed to more protection for the President, correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. Well, the prowler unit is a reactive unit. It’s not a 

protective unit. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We don’t know if there’s going to be an incident 

on the President. And when you take a prowler unit, how do you 

come to the conclusion that the prowler unit had no effect on the 

President’s security? You were lucky there was no incident, but 

what if there was a an incident? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I’d have to define what the prowler unit does 

here. We have agents who are assigned to our Washington field office, and when they are called to the White House to do an interview—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But—sorry. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I have the yellow light on. I need to ask the core 

question here. We’ve cited at least two, I believe three incidents, 

where the public was misled, there was false information given, it 

was not correct. 

Was there any disciplinary action, and who’s involved in that 

chain of command to review what the Secret Services say? Because 

as a Member of Congress, as a United States citizen, the Secret 

Service misled us on purpose. Was there any consequence to any 

personnel? Did you follow the code and did you actually suspend 

or remove people from their service? Was there any penalty or consequence for providing false information? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I agree with you that you, and I have the same 

outrage that you have regarding the communication—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But I want to know what you did about it. 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, we’ve got to do a much better job of communicating within the internal—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No. I want to know if there’s any consequence. 

Did anybody face disciplinary action? You have a major morale 

problem, and this is why. There doesn’t seem to be a consequence 

to doing something that’s in obvious violation of your own internal 

codes. 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, this was not an intentional violation of the 

code. We just haven’t communicated as well as we should 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. They just made a mistake, an innocent mistake? 

Was there any consequence? 

Mr. CLANCY. No. There was no discipline administered in those 

examples that you gave, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. With all due respect, and my—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ [continuing]. Time has expired—— 
28 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ [continuing]. Until you actually live by your own 

codes and you hold people responsible and accountable, you’re 

going to continue to have this problem. That’s just my own personal view of it from afar, but there have be consequences when 

people purposely and knowingly mislead the public, the press and 

consequently the Congress. 

Mr. CLANCY. With respect, sir, again, from what I’ve heard, been 

briefed, and what I’ve seen, I would not say it was intentional. 

There is a difference between misconduct, sir, I think, and operational errors, and I think there is a very clear distinction. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Did you not know immediately that he was apprehended at the doors or was he apprehended deep in the White 

House? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Clancy will be permitted to answer the 

question. You can answer that question. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Again, how that information was relayed, 

again, not being there, I don’t know how that information was relayed to our public affairs office, but needless to say, it wasn’t relayed in the proper manner and we gave bad information, and it’s 

something that we cannot do. We’ve got to slow down a little bit 

with our communication, because we know it’s critical to give accurate information, and that’s what our goal is, but we failed on that 

day. I agree with you, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Jeffries, is 

recognized for 5 minutes for his questions. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Clancy, for your service to this country, to 

the Secret Service and for your presence here today. It’s my understanding that the number of threats to this particular President, 

Barack Obama, and the White House has increased significantly 

since the President first took office in January of 2009. Is that correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir. I’d say there are spikes, sir, depending on 

world events. We’ve noticed over time that threats rise and they 

lower depending on the world events. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And so how would you characterize, from a comparative standpoint, the number of threats that this White House 

or this President has faced as compared to modern Presidents over 

the last 20 or so years? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Our protective intelligence department 

does metrics regarding just what you’re referring to here and we 

do compare it to previous Administrations, previous Presidents. 

And the last one I looked at, it does look as if the President’s threat 

level has gone up slightly, but that’s not unnatural, but it has gone 

up slightly. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. So the President’s threat level has gone up to some 

degree, and at the same time over the last 6 years, we’ve seen security breach after security breach after security breach. I think that 

is a reason for us to be concerned, if not outraged, as it relates to 

the state of the Secret Service right now. 
29 

Now, as it relates to the concerns that you’ve established upon 

your arrival, I think you mentioned three: staffing, training and 

morale. Is that correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And is it fair to say that the staffing issues that 

you confront relate to the fact that you don’t have the budgetary 

resources necessary to operate at an optimal level? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I think our staffing levels from a budget perspective are appropriate at this time. One of the things we need to 

do to build our staffing is to better our hiring process. Right now, 

as I mentioned in an opening statement here, that it takes about 

12 months for us to get people hired on, and we’ve got to do a better job of identifying good, quality people early on in the process 

so that we can streamline that process, maybe move that from 12 

months to 7 months, possibly shorter. 

First of all, there’s still an incredible interest in the Secret Service. The last job announcement, I’m told, we had 45,000 applicants, 

but only 72 of those applicants made it through the process and 

were hired. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, if I can hone in on that point—— 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JEFFRIES [continuing]. In terms of the interest in the Secret 

Service, connecting it to the morale problem that you’ve identified 

and that Members of this panel and other Members of the Congress have identified, you’ve got the Elite Presidential Protection 

Unit, correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And that is generally viewed as sort of an optimal 

assignment within the Secret Service. Is that fair to say? 

Mr. CLANCY. In my view, it is, yes, sir. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And you demonstrated yourself to be an excellent 

leader of that unit during your time there, we’re thankful for that. 

As it relates to the uniformed service division, there’s a general 

perception amongst many observers of the Secret Service that that 

is viewed as a less than desirable assignment or on a cast system, 

perhaps some may say, as it relates to Secret Service hierarchy. Is 

that fair to say? 

Mr. CLANCY. For the Uniformed Division? 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Yes. 

Mr. CLANCY. That’s a very challenging position, yes, sir. Those 

officers at the White House and the Vice-President’s residence and 

our foreign missions, they have a very challenging position. I have 

great admiration for what they do, when you consider, as was mentioned here earlier, the number of people that come into the White 

House. We have over 300,000 people that are screened coming 

through that White House every year, and these officers are confronted with a variety of issues, and I have great admiration for 

the work that they do there. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, what can you do to sort of improve both the 

morale and the operational capacity, the ability, the competence of 

the Members of the uniformed Secret Service division, who play a 

very important role, and, of course, with the most recent incident 

that we saw in terms of the fence jumping episode, clearly did not 
30 

perform at a level commensurate to what the American people, 

what the President, what the First Family deserve? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Our people desire more training and they 

have a passion to get out to our Beltsville facility in Maryland for 

more training, and we’ve got to get them out there for that additional training. That’s one thing that may help their morale. 

I think, additionally, we’ve got to do a better job of communicating and hearing their issues, and that’s why we instituted the 

ombudsman and put more focus on the ombudsman and the anonymity of the concerns that could be sent to the ombudsman, because these officers want to be heard. And the ombudsman sits on 

my director’s staff, so twice a week when I meet with the director’s 

staff, the ombudsman will bring those issues to the table where I’m 

sitting. And, as much as we want to allow people to communicate 

up, we’ve got to communicate down as well, responses to these concerns, and I think that will help the morale of the uniformed officers, too. 

So training, better communication, I think will be a good start 

for helping the uniformed officers. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, for his questions. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. Director, it’s a pleasure to 

be talking with you today. It’s nice to have a fellow Pennsylvanian 

in the position as Director of the Secret Service. I’ve worked with 

the Secret Service for 18 years as a prosecutor, as a State and Federal prosecutor, and I have nothing but praise for the Secret Service. You have the best of the best, and I have personal experience 

there, so I thank the agents for their service. The President made 

the right choice putting you in this position. I can tell instantly 

from the way you answered several of these questions, the right 

choice of assigning you as a director. You have your hands full. 

There are some changes that have to be made, but I have complete confidence in you that you will square these issues away, improve security, improve morale, et cetera. I do believe that. I’m 

kind of old-fashioned. I think Secret Service should be with Treasury, not Homeland Security. I think there was a finer system of operation there, no disrespect to Homeland Security. They have their 

hands full in many other areas. And with that, I’m going to I yield 

back because many of my questions pertain to the second round, 

so thank you for being here. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Thank you sir. 

Mr. GOWDY [presiding]. Thank the gentleman. If you will bear 

with me, I’ll recognize the next person, Mr. Cicilline from Rhode Island. I apologize. Forgive me. Would the gentleman yield to the 

Ranking Member from Michigan? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Of course. 

Mr. GOWDY. I would recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you both, and I apologize for my tardiness, 

and I, too, welcome Mr. Clancy. 

I wanted to raise a little discussion about the 10 people that 

have successfully climbed over the White House fence. Is there any 
31 

thought yet about how we’re going to repair this problem that 

keeps happening, replacement or a different design, or what are 

your thoughts as you sit here before the Judiciary Committee, sir? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. There’s several levels to this, sir. The first 

is from our own operational standpoint to address what happened 

on September 19. We immediately instituted additional training 

and integrated training between the tactical units and our Uniformed Division officers, first with a 4-hour block of classroom work 

and then additionally a 6-hour block out at our Beltsville training 

facility where we would do a much better job and not allow what 

happened on September 19 to occur again. 

But additionally there are some other things that we are looking 

at to include adjusting either the height of the fence or some modification to that fence. And again, we’ve worked very well with our 

partners at National Park Services. We’ve met with them already 

regarding this concern, and we’re meeting in the very near future 

with the National Capitol Planning Commission and the Fine Arts 

Commission. And with those meetings, we think we’re going to find 

some solutions to make it more difficult for people to get over that 

fence. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. Now, the Secret Service performs two 

huge missions: One, protecting the President, Vice President, their 

family and other dignitaries, but also investigating crimes against 

our financial system. Some have raised a question of whether Secret Service should maintain both missions and question whether 

the investigative mission reduces the effectiveness of the protective 

mission. Have you examined these issues yet? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. Let me just break it up. 

Uniformed division, the officers at the White House complex, are 

strictly there for protection. But on the agent side of the house, we 

do have very robust investigative field offices throughout the country. We think that is critical to our mission, our protective mission 

and our overall mission. But the work that our agents do in the 

field allows them to build skills from working the streets, doing 

interviews, situational awareness, those skills carry over into the 

protective mode so that you’re much more attentive; you pay attention to your details, helps you with your advance work. There’s a 

direct correlation between the investigative side of the house and 

the protection side. 

To include now with these cyber investigations where we’ve had 

great success investigatively, we use a lot of those people in our 

critical protection systems division which we use on protective 

movements. We’ve used them significantly with our national special security events. So that we see the correlation between the 

physical security of our sites as well as the cybersecurity. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. Let me ask you about the September 

19 incident. It revealed numerous problems with radio systems, 

alarm systems, officer training, physical attributes of the White 

House grounds, and officer performance. Do you have any way of 

determining, in your capacity as Acting Director, whether we have 

facilities and training to host full-scale drills to test the equipment 

so that we can be confident that it will not fail us in the future? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, just as an example, with the Beltsville training 

that we’ve instituted just recently again for retraining, we sent our 
32 

officers out there, and we’ve built a mockup of the White House 

grounds, so we have the proper distance from the north fence line 

to the north portico, but it’s a mockup out at our Beltsville facility. 

Ideally in the future, we’d love to have a true replica of the White 

House so that our dogs can feel comfortable working in the true environment of what the north grounds are like. So that would be a 

long-term goal to get a mockup of the White House at our training 

facility. 

Mr. CONYERS. Glad to hear you say that. I ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be included in the record, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. GOWDY. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary 

Today, the Committee will examine the operation of an agency that performs two 

vital missions for our country: the protection of the President and Vice President 

and other dignitaries, and the protection of our payment and financial systems. 

The Secret Service has done an outstanding job in many instances, with respect 

to both missions. The Secret Service helped protect the integrity of the nation’s 

economy by closing over 7,000 criminal cases in Fiscal Year 2014, leading to approximately 6,700 arrests. 

This year alone, the agency’s efforts in investigating financial crimes have saved 

us $3 billion. Cybercrime investigations prevented another $383 million in losses. 

With respect to the protection it provides the President, Vice President, and their 

families, there is no doubt that the determined and dedicated agents of the Secret 

Service have provided—and continue to provide—a tremendous service to the nation. 

However, in recent years, a number of incidents have shaken our trust in the 

agency, including lapses in protecting the President and the White House, and too 

many instances in which agents have engaged in misconduct while on presidential 

trips. 

Most notable is the failure, in September of this year, to prevent a man from 

climbing over the fence and running across the White House lawn into the White 

House, making it all the way to the East Room before he was apprehended. 

This incident demands that we change our approach to White House security, 

with lessons that should be applied to other aspects of presidential security as well. 

First, we must replace the current White House fence with one designed to make 

it far less likely that anyone may successfully climb over it. The current fence is 

not adequate. 

It is too low and of a design that allows for handholds that are used to propel 

climbers over the fence. 

While I understand that there may be historical considerations and concerns 

about how a more secure fence might look, I believe a new, more secure fence can 

be developed to afford greater protection while maintaining the dignity of the building and office it protects. 

Next, we must improve the plan and systems for securing the White House from 

attack from anyone who is able to successfully climb over the fence. 

When former Director Julia Pierson testified before the Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform on September 30th, she indicated that the breakdown in 

protection in the September 19 fence jumper incident was a problem of implementation and not a problem of the adequacy of the protective plan. I disagree. 

Yes, the evidence shows specific lapses in performance and the use of various 

alarm systems on September 19—but it also points to a broader set of problems. 

I am concerned that the Secret Service has taken its protective plans and preparations for granted. It is clear that the equipment, planning, and training that are 
33 

supposed to protect the White House are inadequate. All of these areas must be improved. 

Unfortunately, we only know that because their deficiencies were exposed by a 

man who eluded all the Uniform Division officers on post, the Emergency Response 

Team, and the canine unit on September 19th to make it all the way to the East 

Room. 

Finally, I believe it will be necessary for experts outside of the Secret Service to 

contribute to regular reviews of the security plans and operations that protect the 

White House. 

Secretary Johnson has appointed a panel of experts to make recommendations 

concerning the Secret Service and White House security on a one-time basis. 

However, I believe a similar group of experts should, perhaps on an annual basis, 

review the plans and operations related to the security of the White House complex. 

Two decades ago, the Delta Force of the U.S. Army evaluated White House security and made a number of recommendations. While I do not know whether these 

recommendations were good ones, I support the concept of experts from inside and 

perhaps outside the federal government providing security recommendations to the 

Secret Service. 

I have no doubt that the agency takes its critical, protective mission very seriously. 

However, the agency should not be alone in assessing the array of threats and 

types of attacks that could be attempted against the White House complex. We cannot expect that future threats will be as simple as one individual jumping over the 

fence. 

Our planning must involve thinking outside of the box. I fear that current planning and review has been too insular, even if undertaken by a dedicated agency 

with the best of intentions. 

I make these recommendations because we must improve the manner in which 

we protect our President, Vice President, and their families. 

This Committee has always afforded the Secret Service a high degree of respect 

and gratitude on a bipartisan basis. I trust that this will continue today and that 

this hearing will identify additional ways that a good agency may be strengthened 

so that it will do a better job at accomplishing its various missions. 

Mr. GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from Michigan. The Chair 

would now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, the 

former United States Attorney, Mr. Holding. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Clancy, thank 

you for being here. I think it’s very good that someone with a long 

history in the Secret Service is there to address these problems. 

Like my friend, Mr. Marino, I spent a long time working with the 

Secret Service and have nothing but the highest respect for all the 

Secret Service agents that I had the privilege of working with. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. HOLDING. The Secret Service was always willing to jump into 

a task force and bring whatever resources that they have to the 

table. And how to multi task, it’s always good when you’ve got a 

Secret Service agent working the case. They bring a lot to the table 

and pride themselves on always having the best prepared cases 

when they bring them to the U.S. Attorney’s office and so forth. 

Picking up where Mr. Marino left off, it saddens me to hear the 

Secret Service is having such morale problems considering just the 

elevated reputation and stature of the Secret Service. And in talking to agents over the years, some think that the problems with 

morale started when the Secret Service was taken out of the Treasury and lumped together with a lot of other law enforcement agen-
34 

cies, all great agencies. I’m not deriding them, but, you have a 

breadth of experience. You were in the Secret Service when the Secret Service was in the Treasury Department. Take a moment and 

just reflect on that. Do you think that some of these problems 

started then, and if so, what have you thought about ways to address morale problems that may have started when the Secret 

Service left Treasury? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. When I was a younger agent and a younger manager in the Secret Service, we were under Treasury, but I 

didn’t have a lot of exposure to those decisions at that time. So my 

true management experience has been with the Department of 

Homeland Security. To be candid, sir, the issues that we’ve had of 

late are really a reflection on some of the things we’ve done. We’ve 

got to fix our operational procedures, our conduct, and our morale. 

Obviously a concern, when I came back from the private sector and 

saw the reports on the morale issues, that was very concerning. 

So that’s one of the top three areas I think we need to fix, and 

I’m committed to working on ways to fix that morale. And as I said 

earlier, I think training is one thing. We’re going to have to build 

up the training. If we can get our folks trained, they’re going to feel 

more confident in their actions every day; so that’s one priority. 

The other is the communication. Our folks just want to be heard. 

They see things. They can see how we can be better. They’ve got 

good ideas out there. We want to hear their good ideas. If it’s an 

idea that we cannot implement, we need to get word back to them 

and explain to them why we can’t implement that idea that they 

had. 

The key here is communication. People want to be heard. My 

first day on the job here, I met with our senior staff and said that 

is one of the priorities we’ve got to have. We’ve got to communicate 

with all of our people, all of our agents, our officers, and our protective staff, and make sure that they’re being heard and respected. 

Mr. HOLDING. Good. One other follow-up question. Then I’ll I 

yield back. Regarding the security guard who was armed and 

hadn’t been cleared. Were there any other security guards armed 

but not pinned at the event in Atlanta? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, as I’ve been briefed, there were other security 

at the CDC, but they were not on the inner perimeter. They were 

on the outside of our inner perimeter which is not uncommon on 

the outside perimeter to have armed—— 

Mr. HOLDING. So there were armed security who had not been 

cleared on the outside of the perimeter. Were there any on the inside of the perimeter like the individual that we’ve noted? 

Mr. CLANCY. As I’ve been briefed, sir, not on the inside of the perimeter, other than the elevator operator was armed. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. The 

Chair will now recognize Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Mr. 

Clancy for being with us today. 

As you well understand, the protection of the President is a critical national responsibility, and I know that we all recognize that 

in many ways the work of the Secret Service, really our ability to 

defend our democracy, is directly tied to our ability to protect the 
35 

occupant of the White House, whoever he or she is at any given 

time. These issues are serious, and I think we all appreciate the 

seriousness with which you are approaching these new responsibilities, and I thank you for being here to provide some testimony 

today. 

I just want to first focus on, you’ve made some reference to staffing levels have declined over the last several years while the workload of the agency has not. I’d like to hear from you whether or not, 

recognizing there are training and personnel and scheduling and 

communications issues that relate to each of the incidents we’re reviewing in particular, are there more generally concerns you have 

about resources both at the staffing level and in terms of infrastructure, equipment, and the capacity you have to integrate new 

equipment as it becomes available? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. First with the staffing levels, we think we 

are appropriately funded for the staffing levels at this point. Our 

concern is getting people into our pipeline and getting them hired 

quicker so that we can build up our staffs. From an infrastructure 

standpoint, there are some things that we will be looking for additional funding. We’ve talked about the fence here today. Once we 

get good renderings, and once we get the approval, if we get the 

approval, from our partners in the National Capital region, that 

will be required, some additional funding for that. 

But also our communications, we’d like to update our communication systems. We saw that we had some failures on September 

19, so our communications need to be upgraded. And then the Vice 

President’s residence, we’ve got a lot of facilities that we protect. 

All of those are under constant review, and we always want to update our alarms and cameras, and that’s the main focus. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I was pleased to hear you say that with respect 

to additional training to be sure that agents are familiar with the 

grounds at the White House, that you have some expectations to 

make some requests for additional facilities at your training facility. But in addition to that, it seems as if staffing policies also 

played a role in the incident, particularly in the incident on September 19, and that agents being required to work overtime and 

many shifts in a row and that that obviously contributes to a general weariness and the way seniority plays a role in assignments. 

So can you speak to kind of what you will be doing or have already 

done to address the staffing issues to the extent that they are contributing to the kind of experiences? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. You bring up an excellent point, sir, regarding the staffing, particularly at the White House. We are making a review of our staffing in terms of experience at the White 

House. We want to make sure we have a good mix of experience 

as well as newer agents at the White House complex, and that review is ongoing now. We’ve already completed that review at our 

other branches of the Uniformed Division. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Because it appears that sometimes the least experienced officers are being assigned the most important responsibilities. Isn’t that what happens? 

Mr. CLANCY. We may have an overabundance of junior officers on 

some shifts, and that’s where we want to find that balance, to 
36 

make sure that we’ve got good experienced, good mentors for those 

junior agents who may be on duty at the same time. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And that’s an issue you’re examining currently? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I should have started with this, and I’ll end with 

this to say that I have enormous respect for the men and women 

of the Secret Service. I think they have always really represented 

the gold standard in many ways, and I’m very pleased that you 

have undertaken the responsibilities to address these deficiencies 

and to help raise the morale of this agency. It’s essential because 

of the important work that they do, and obviously I think this 

Committee and this Congress will look to be a partner and support 

you in any way that you think is necessary to achieve that mission 

successfully. And with that I yield back. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank the gentleman from Rhode Island. 

Mr. Director, I want to start by also thanking you for your service. I hold law enforcement in very high esteem. In fact, I would 

be biased toward law enforcement. I think they have been given 

unique powers in our culture, and with those unique powers come 

correspondingly unique responsibilities. It’s a difficult job, and it 

takes a different kind of person to be able to do that job. When I 

hear reports about alcohol abuse while you’re either on the job or 

about to go on the job, and when I hear reports of sexual harassment of female agents or solicitation of prostitution, with all due 

respect, that just doesn’t strike me as a training issue. That’s a 

moral issue. That’s a character issue. That’s a recruitment issue. 

If you need to go to a seminar to learn at that stage of your career 

not to send sexually explicit texts to female agents, you have no 

business being in the Secret Service. There’s a quote from the 

spokesperson: ‘‘Periodically we have isolated incidents of misconduct, just like every organization does.’’ But the Secret Service 

is not like every organization. That is not a defense to me. You 

guys are different. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOWDY. So from a recruitment standpoint, and we’re going 

to get into jurisdiction in a second. But from a recruitment standpoint, are you getting the recruits you want? Are State and local 

law enforcement folks, men and women, applying? Are you getting 

folks with no experience? Talk to me about your recruitment. 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, we’re getting a wide range of candidates in our 

recruitment, but one of the things that we feel, and in my short 

time here, is that through the USAJOBS we’re getting a lot of applicants who may get moved on because they use the right words 

in that computer system. What we need to do is if any of our people 

know good quality people, people that have served in the military, 

people that have law enforcement experience, good quality people, 

get them to our field offices, get them an interview right away, and 

then get them into the hiring process. That’s the way we used to 

do it, years ago. And we’ve got to get back to that where we can 

bring in good quality people up front. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, I’m going to defer to your expertise. I’ll probably have a different perspective on whether or not your jurisdiction should be as expansive as it is. Way back when the earth 
37 

cooled, when I used to work with Secret Service, I never got the 

connection between investigating counterfeit $100 bills that were 

created on an ink printer, and protecting the life of the President 

or the Vice President or a judge. I would rather have a State or 

local law enforcement officer who used to do homicide cases or child 

sex assault cases. 

I watched ATF in the early 1990’s kind of delve more toward 

Title 21 drug cases. Even though there was no D in ATF, they just 

found themselves matriculating toward drug cases. I just wonder if 

it wouldn’t be in the Service’s best interest to let the Marshals or 

the Bureau or somebody else handle some of these books of business and just focus on what really is incredibly important, which 

is protecting the life of our Commander in Chief and our judges 

and other important people. Why is that the not enough? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I appreciate your view. I would say additionally 

from my earlier statement that our field offices, in addition to the 

investigations they do regarding counterfeit and cyber crime and 

whatnot, they also do protective intelligence investigations, so if 

you’re sitting in Kansas City or Texas and there’s a threat made 

to the President, those same field office agents go out and do the 

investigation. So they’ve got those skills, and they’ve got to make 

judgements on is this someone who could potentially threaten or 

harm any of our protectees, so they learn those skills as well. 

Additionally, when our protectees travel, for example, the President travels to any city within the country, those same field offices, 

those agents who have already built up rapport with the locals and 

the county officers, that rapport has already been built through 

their investigations, and now we’re going to rely on them to support us in a protective mission, in a perimeter that we set up, the 

middle perimeter, the outer perimeter; so those relationships are 

very strong, and we use that from a protective standpoint. They actually start the advance work. When the President goes to Kansas 

City, the beginning of that advance work is done by the field agent. 

Mr. GOWDY. You’re the expert, and clearly I’m not. But I would, 

it’s really tough for me to draw a connection between the investigation of financial crime and the investigation of counterfeiting and 

protecting the life of X. There may be categories of crime where 

that is a more natural, seamless transition. I just don’t know. 

You’re the boss and I’m not and never will be. There may be books 

of business that do prepare your agents. I just, I don’t see that one. 

But I will say this, and I’ll share with a colleague outside, for 

whatever reason we tend to have the person who’s not responsible 

before us. The person who you could argue was responsible is no 

longer in that position, so I’m not going to expend my energy beating up on you. I do not understand not searching the White House 

when there is any evidence, even a scintilla of evidence of a shooting. I cannot understand not doing that. But it’s not fair to you for 

me to ask you about that. It’s not yours. So let the record reflect 

that I was fair at least on one occasion. And with that, I would recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Mr. CLANCY. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for yielding the time. 
38 

This is a very serious hearing, and I’m grateful to the Judiciary 

Committee for its concern. I particularly want to thank Mr. Gowdy 

for his words as I associate myself, as I imagine every single Member of Congress does, and that is to recognize, first of all, the storied history of the Secret Service. Mr. Clancy, your name has certainly traveled through many Presidents’ careers, and we thank 

you so very much for your sacrifice. As well, I associate myself with 

the concept that the most important responsibility, I believe, is the 

securing of the Commander in Chief, although you, by statute and 

otherwise, have added additional duties, and I think over the years 

you certainly have been engaged as a part of the Treasury before 

your coming into Homeland Security, and our Founding Fathers or 

fathers and later than that mothers, thought that was an appropriate role for you to be engaged. So obviously changes would require assessment and overhaul from many parties, including Members of the United States Congress. But I did want to put on the 

record that I thought that no one doubted the respect that we have 

for the Secret Service, and particularly for the important and crucial role that you have. 

As I recall, former Director Pierson was brought on to address 

the scandals and problems reported about the culture of the Service, and an independent review panel will issue a report in the 

near future. Just for the record, is that report coming soon? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, ma’am. That report has been completed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I’m not talking about the one that we received on Homeland Security. Is there another report coming? 

Mr. CLANCY. The investigation of September 19 that was conducted by the Deputy of Homeland Security, that’s completed. Now 

there’s a Blue Ribbon panel by the Secretary that was set up, and 

my understanding is by December 15, it will be completed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. That’s the one I’m asking for. I’m 

familiar with the Homeland Security. So December 15 we can expect that? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Because that ties in to the reason why Director Pierson was appointed, or at least, besides her competency; but 

the idea was that there were issues that needed to be addressed 

before. Is that correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. That’s correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We also know that every Director has to address emerging threats and resolve staffing, morale problems, et 

cetera, and so I’m hoping this report will address that question. 

Just as an aside, and I’m going into some of the aspects of September 19, but just as an aside, we know that there are issues 

dealing with morale. I think you acknowledged that? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you focusing on trying to address those 

questions? 

Mr. CLANCY. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I note that a recent order or notice came 

out for female agents to wear their hair in a bun as opposed to any 

other kind of hairstyle. Can you tell me how that helps morale, and 

how is that relevant to caring for the principles that they have concern for? 
39 

Mr. CLANCY. I’m not familiar with that directive, but I will certainly go back after this hearing. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you please check that, and I would appreciate a response back. And I would argue vigorously that that 

is inappropriate and certainly a contributor to low morale. 

Let me continue on. Who is responsible for overseeing the agency’s disciplinary processes, ensuring employees are held accountable? Is the discipline consistent and appropriate across the workforce for similar violations? So the base of my question is, who is 

responsible, and is there an attempt to make sure that there’s 

even-handed assessment of the discipline? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, ma’am. As a result of the events of Cartagena 

and some of the other events, the Office of Integrity was set up by 

Director Pierson, so the purpose of the Office of Integrity is to have 

one central location where all discipline will be filtered into, and 

there a decision is made whether or not it’s a criminal violation or 

whether it’s a misconduct violation, et cetera. But what we wanted 

to make sure is that there is a consistency and a discipline that 

is effective. We have a table of penalties now that will ensure that 

there is consistency as we are confronted with these either operational errors or misconduct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me go to two incidences, and let me say 

that I have the greatest respect for the First Amendment and the 

greatest respect for the media that has every right to interpret and 

write articles, please to our broad third estate, know that I do that. 

But I do know that sometimes we have to get to the facts, so if the 

Chairman would indulge me, let me just get two facts on the table 

without any personal acknowledgement as to what is going to happen to the gentleman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Without objection, the gentlewoman is recognized for one additional minute. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I’m going to quickly say in one instance on the 

breach, a gentleman was on the phone, on a personal phone; 

earplug was not in their ear, and their walkie talkie was locked in 

their locker. One instance. Second instance is the gentleman on the 

elevator at the CDC who, as the story is told, was certified and authorized to be there with a gun, had secret clearance from the 

CDC, and was doing his job. 

The facts have come that the time that he took pictures was as 

he was waving good-bye to the Commander in Chief after he got 

in the car. Can you tell me how does that trickle up to, if you were 

at the time the Director, how does that trickle up? Those are 

incidences that I believe if it was you, I’d want to give you an opportunity to correct it, because those are incidences that with the 

best mind you couldn’t imagine that happening. And the gentleman 

at the CDC was actually legitimately doing his job, certified, and 

just got a little star happy and took pictures. Why don’t I yield to 

you and find out because I want to get to the point that we’re not 

knocking off directors every 5 minutes because incidences happen 

that should have been taken care of by the immediate manager. 

Mr. Clancy? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, ma’am. As far as the officer at the White 

House complex on the cell phone that’s been reported by the investigation by the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. We waited 
40 

for that report to be concluded, and we’ve forwarded the facts of 

that report on to our Office of Integrity, so that’s under review now 

for any discipline that may be affected. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That would be the responsibility of the special 

agent that was over that area, the White House. 

Mr. CLANCY. It’s actually the responsibility of this specific central 

Office of Integrity so that it’s removed from his direct supervisor. 

The Office of Integrity will look at the facts, and they’ll make a decision. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But his actions were under his direct supervisor? 

Mr. CLANCY. That’s correct. Yes. In regards to the CDC events, 

that was fully investigated. It was actually self-reported. The agent 

who saw that the individual in the elevator was armed, he self-reported that. Immediately we had an after action, we had a full inquiry, and those details are also sent to that Office of Integrity to 

determine what discipline, if any, should be administered. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, for his questions. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Director, I know we are going to go into 

a classified section, so I’m going to be brief. Two predecessors ago, 

we had a scandal. It turned out that this Committee, two other 

Committees, were never given the full facts. We then had subsequent revelations time and time again. During each of these, Committees of jurisdiction, including my other Committee, Oversight, 

endeavored to work with your people and Homeland Security to get 

the full facts. In each case, we did not get the full truth. 

Will you pledge today in all cases during your tenure to give us 

more, not less, and if there’s something that may be relevant in 

even the most spurious way, at least make the staffs of the Committees of jurisdiction aware that there is something else that we 

may or may not want to pursue, at least in an in-camera format. 

Because without that, we’re playing a game that I don’t want to 

play, ever, and certainly not publicly, which is I ask; you answer. 

I ask another one to try to see if there’s anything else. I don’t want 

to ask publicly, and I don’t think the Chairman wants to ask publicly or any of the rest of us, what it is you’re not telling us. 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. You have that commitment. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Secondly, and I’ll end with this as quickly 

as I can. The term law enforcement sensitive is one that was recently used in, if you will, the two versions of this report. Now, our 

Committee, our other Committee, and I believe this Committee, got 

to look in-camera at the sensitive material. Do you know how Fox 

got what we were only allowed to look at in-camera to get it on the 

air? In other words, it was on camera while were still looking at 

it in-camera. 

Mr. CLANCY. No, sir, I’m not aware. 

Mr. ISSA. Will you pledge to see if you can find out, and if it 

came from the offices of the President or anyone else in the Administration, would you at least report back to us so that we know that 

there’s two standards, the standards for the press when convenient, 

and the standards for Congress. Because I just have to share one 
41 

thing with you. I have always felt that an in-camera review followed up with a discussion about what should be made available 

fully to the Committee and under what conditions is a reasonable 

middle ground. But if anything is withheld from Congress and 

asked to look at in-camera, by definition, I think it is fair to say 

you have, in fact, asserted a form of privilege, or at least the potential for a privilege or sensitivity or near classification, and that 

bars the Administration from willy-nilly releasing it to the press in 

order to get, if you will, either a positive spin or get ahead of a 

story. I hope you’ll appreciate the sensitivity? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. So will you come back with any findings about how 

that got to Fox before it got to Chairman? 

Mr. CLANCY. I will, sir. This is the first I’m hearing about that, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. Our staff over at oversight will be glad to share the detailed timeline with your people. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, and I do yield back the balance of my time, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for his questions. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Director. 

Mr. CLANCY. Good morning, sir. 

Mr. DESANTIS. You’ve been frank about some of the incidences 

in response to the organization of Secret Service within DHS. You 

said, look, these are just mistakes that we made. You didn’t necessarily attribute to that, and I appreciate it. But I do look, and 

I think it’s important that we in Congress will conduct oversight 

of how agencies operate. We also have to conduct oversight over 

legislative products that we’ve done because you look at the history, Congress has created a lot of problems as well in various different areas. And I think moving the Secret Service to DHS is 

something that I’ve been thinking a lot about since these incidents 

have become more public, and I think we need to do further inquiry. You did mention that when the United Nations operation, 

protective operation, was undertaken that there was there was utilization of TSA and Coast Guard at the U.N., and I appreciate that, 

but if the Secret Service was in Treasury, you still would be able 

to liaison with other agencies. Correct? 

Mr. CLANCY. That’s correct, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And being part of a bigger bureaucracy, does that 

make the Secret Service mission, is it conducted more efficiently as 

a result of that, or are there bureaucratic hurdles that the Secret 

Service has to deal with that they did not have to when they were 

part of Treasury? 

Mr. CLANCY. Again, sir, it’s difficult for me to compare the two 

because I wasn’t in a management role under Treasury. I will say 

that the Department of Homeland Security is very inclusive. The 

Secretary had me up there several times to work with the other 

components and meet with the other components, so there’s a good 

sharing of information. 

Mr. DESANTIS. What about, you mentioned you wanted to hire 

and you’re not doing that on the scale you want. Are you competing 
42 

for more resources because you’re within DHS? I would imagine 

there are all these different agencies that are being funded and 

that, and it seems like you would probably have less competition 

in that regard if you were still in Treasury. Is that accurate? 

Mr. CLANCY. Again, it would be hard for me to evaluate and compare to Treasury. I know all the agencies and components in the 

Department of Homeland Security have very important missions, 

so we are all vying for those dollars, yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I know you said you weren’t in a management position, but I have retired Secret Service agents in my district. 

They’ve served in both capacities, pre-2003, and then after, and I 

think by and large I get negative feedback about the change. So 

just when you’re talking with people, other agents who have kind 

of lived through this, is it something that you would say a substantial number of them have misgivings about? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I think when we have failures, and what we’ve 

had the last several years are really our failures. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I understand and you’ve been frank about that. 

But I think we always have to look at how are we—we’re legislating this stuff. We’re funding these different agencies, and if we 

haven’t done that in a way that best meets the needs of the American people, we always have to go back and evaluate. So I’m just 

curious, because I know there’s some morale issues with the Secret 

Service. If you’re just over the water cooler with people who have 

been in the Secret Service, is it going to be something that people 

look back and say, man, that was a great thing that Congress did 

by putting us in with DHS, or are you likely to hear people say, 

man, I liked it better when we were in Treasury? 

Mr. CLANCY. Certainly some people have said that they liked our 

time in Treasury and had good memories of that time frame. But, 

again, I have to be focused on our agency and where our failures 

are and working with our people, and that’s really my focus; and 

others can determine whether or not we’re situated properly in the 

Department of Homeland Security, but I’m really focused on our 

operational needs. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I understand. And as you should be, but we need 

to always look at this stuff. And it just seemed to me, and again, 

I’d like to do some more investigation in this. But with Treasury, 

obviously there’s less bureaucracy, but actually for Congress it’s 

good because I think we actually conduct better oversight that way. 

I think it would be easier. DHS has been problematic for us in 

terms of oversight of other functions other than the Secret Service. 

But anyways, I appreciate you stepping up to take this position. I 

know it’s a tough job, and we wish you all the best, and I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ISSA. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman for yielding back the 

remainder of his time. We now go to the gentleman from Texas, 

from east Texas, Mr. Gohmert. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Director, for being here. We’ve had different hearings. Secretary of 

Homeland Security has been here a number of times. There seemed 

to be in the past a feeling of invulnerability of the White House, 

the fences, that somehow there was bound to be more security 

there than you see. So it rattles folks when somebody can jump 
43 

over the fence and get there. Somebody else was saying, oh, I think 

there’s two rows of fences. Isn’t there just one row of fence around 

the White House? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, as a result of September 19, on Pennsylvania 

Avenue on the sidewalk there, we’ve now put bike rack in addition 

to the permanent fence, realizing that people can still get over the 

bike rack, but what it does is it gives us a little more time to react, 

so there is bike rack in front of the original fence. 

Mr. GOHMERT. How tall is the fence there? I’m not asking anything classified. You can go out there and measure it. 

Mr. CLANCY. 7 feet 6 inches, I believe, sir. 

Mr. GOHMERT. 7 feet 6 inches. Is there any thought about making it higher. Is it being discussed? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. It’s being discussed, and we have been 

working very closely with the partners in the region. We have to 

work with the National Park Service, National Capital Region 

Planning Commission and the Fine Arts Commission. And we have 

already started those discussions to work together to see if there 

is something that is amenable to all the groups so that we keep the 

historic nature of the White House, but also increase the security 

measures at the House. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I know this was before your time as Acting Director, but do you remember late 2009, there were the Christmas 

party crashers, the Salahis, that got in there, that were not on the 

list, and there was a hearing up here on the Hill about it. And it 

turned out that actually it wasn’t so much the Secret Service’s 

fault, that there was a social secretary of the White House who was 

always supposed to be there and if somebody’s not on the list gives 

the ultimate yes or no and that she had told someone she didn’t 

care about having to be the one to say no, and it left the Secret 

Service in a terrible bind. But what was obvious to those of us who 

would go over to the White House regularly was that it was all 

about appearances after the Christmas party crashers, that even 

though it really wasn’t so much the Secret Service’s fault as a 

breakdown in White House leadership, the Secret Service, who 

wore plain clothes, suits, were made to start wearing uniforms so 

that it looked like there was a lot more security there. 

And, in fact, we went from just having the one check point, you 

had to go through there at the southeast corner, to adding another 

there near the monument and then adding another down on 15th 

Street. 

So pretty clearly it was all about appearance to make it look like, 

gee, it was the Secret Service’s fault, and we’ve tripled those up, 

added a bunch of people there when really it wasn’t necessary that 

any more need to be done other than just make sure White House 

gave proper direction. So my concern has been that there’s been too 

much about appearances and not as much about actual protection. 

Has there been any thought to just eliminating the fence around 

the White House? Did Secretary Napolitano ever talk about that, 

maybe having a virtual fence or electronic fence? Has that been 

discussed at all? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, I’m not aware of any discussions in that regard. 
44 

Mr. GOHMERT. Would you be in favor of removing the fence 

around the White House and having a virtual or electronic fence 

around it? 

Mr. CLANCY. Sir, my knee jerk reaction to that would be no, sir, 

partly because of the number of tourists that come on Pennsylvania 

Avenue and come right up to that area and take pictures and 

whatnot. 

Mr. GOHMERT. You know, the Secretary has said a number of 

times, Secretary Napolitano, the fence is worthless. You put a 10- 

fence up, somebody is going to build a 12-foot ladder, so I would 

think that if the Administration is going to be consistent, it’s now 

time to remove the fence from around the White House, because if 

it isn’t good enough for our border, it shouldn’t be good enough for 

the White House. 

So I would ask you to consider that consistency and also consider 

the fact that maybe there really is some real virtue in having a 

fence that slows people down, and with that I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman. And Director, as originally 

scheduled, we’re going to take a short recess and give you a chance 

to maybe have just a short bite of lunch. Is 12:30 okay to reconvene? 

Mr. CLANCY. Yes, sir. That’s perfect. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. We’ll have the room made right, and we’ll be 

back in at 12:30. We stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the Committee was recessed, to be reconvened in executive session.] 

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