```

[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 184 (Thursday, September 23, 2004)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 56958-56961]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-21337]

========================================================================
Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================


Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 184 / Thursday, September 23, 2004 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 56958]]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-78]

Robert H. Leyse; Denial of Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a petition 
for rulemaking submitted by Mr. Robert H. Leyse (PRM-50-78). The 
petitioner requested that the NRC's regulations governing domestic 
licensing of production and utilization facilities and associated 
guidance be amended to address the impact of fouling on the performance 
of all heat exchange surfaces in a nuclear power plant. The petitioner 
further stated that the fouling of heat transfer surfaces is not 
adequately considered in licensing and compliance inspections, testing 
programs, and computer codes used for nuclear power facilities.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the petition for rulemaking, the public comments 
received, and the NRC's letter of denial to the petitioner may be 
examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room, 
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Public File 
Area O1F21, Rockville, Maryland. These documents are also available 
electronically at the NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room on the 
Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, 
the public can gain entry into the Agencywide Document Access and 
Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's 
public documents. For further information contact the PDR reference 
staff at (800) 387-4209 or (301) 415-4737 or by e-mail to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim A. Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-1462, e-mail [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    The petition for rulemaking designated PRM-50-78 was received by 
the NRC on September 9, 2002. A notice of receipt of the petition and 
request for public comment was published in the Federal Register (FR) 
on October 31, 2002 (67 FR 66347). The public comment period closed 
January 16, 2003. Four letters of public comment were received in 
response to the Federal Register notice.

The Petition

    In PRM-50-78, the petitioner, Mr. Robert H. Leyse, requested that 
regulations be developed to require addressing the impact of fouling on 
the performance of all significant heat transfer surfaces in nuclear 
power plants (NPPs). The requested rule changes would also require that 
fouling impact be addressed in NRC-funded test programs and NRC-
produced computer codes that are used to assess cooling and heat 
exchanger performance. The petitioner contended that fouling of heat 
exchange surfaces is not adequately considered in the licensing and 
compliance inspection of NPPs, for example, licensing bases and 
technical specifications do not specifically limit fouling on fuel 
elements. The petitioner also requested that regulations be added to 
require publicly available performance reports on these surfaces, 
including records of mechanical degradation, and cleaning procedures 
and their effectiveness.
    In addition, the petitioner contended that fouling would restrict 
fuel element cooling and that axial growth beyond design limits would 
cause fuel rods to bow, and contact other fuel rods and control rod 
guide tubes. The petitioner claimed that this would lead to a safety 
problem. In addition, the petitioner proposed that the rules should 
require investigating grossly off-normal performance of heat exchange 
equipment. For example, the petitioner stated that fouling of steam 
generator tubes should be investigated because it has occasionally 
reduced heat transfer effectiveness to force operation at below-normal 
secondary side pressure, creating a safety issue.

Public Comments on the Petition

    Four letters of public comment were received on PRM-50-78. Two were 
from the petitioner, who noted in support of his petition that the 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) did not address fouling 
of heat exchange surfaces during a meeting with Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) in October 2002 and that one of the numerous heat 
transfer tests done for the NRC by Westinghouse (FLECHT Run 9573) 
resulted in tube failure. In addition, the petitioner noted that five 
additional ACRS subcommittee meetings did not address fouling issues.
    The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) opposed the petition, noting 
that current reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 require 
reporting any event or condition that could interfere with a safety 
function of any system needed to shutdown that plant and maintain it in 
a safe condition, remove residual heat, control radiological material, 
or mitigate accident consequences.
    The Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) group, a 
consortium of nuclear utilities, opposed the petition noting that these 
same concerns were previously addressed by industry organizations in 
comments on PRM-50-73, PRM-50-73A, and PRM-50-76. In the STARS group's 
view, this latest petition restates the same concern in a different 
context, without presenting any further evidence to provide a basis for 
revising the regulations. The STARS group believes that the requested 
additional reporting burden would not be justified by the unproven and 
questionable scenarios presented in the petition.

NRC Technical Evaluation

    The NRC reviewed each of the petitioner's requests and concluded 
that none of the requests justified the initiation of rulemaking. The 
NRC's responses to each of the petitioners' requests are as follows:
    1. Regulations are needed to address the impact of fouling on the 
performance of heat exchange surfaces throughout licensed nuclear power 
plants. The petitioner stated that this included fuel elements, steam 
generators, condensers, fan coolers, etc.
    The NRC disagrees with the petitioner's assertion. The petitioner's 
assertion that regulations are needed to address the impact of fouling 
on fuel

[[Page 56959]]

elements was addressed previously in a Federal Register notice of 
denial of PRM-50-73 and PRM-50-73A (also submitted by the petitioner) 
published at 68 FR 41963 on July 16, 2003. The petitioner did not 
submit any new information or provide any additional considerations 
that would cause the NRC to reconsider the denial of PRM-50-73 and PRM-
50-73A.
    In regard to other heat exchange surfaces, regulations and guidance 
addressing fouling effects on heat exchanger performance already exist 
for the primary and secondary sides of NPPs.
    Specifically:
     10 CFR 50.65 requires licensees to monitor performance 
parameters or to demonstrate that monitoring is not needed, and to 
provide preventive maintenance sufficient to ensure that all safety 
related structures, systems, or components (e.g., heat exchangers 
important to safety) are capable of fulfilling their intended 
functions.
     10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 14 (or plant-
specific principal design criteria in the plant design basis for plants 
issued construction permits before the effective date of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix A), requires that the reactor coolant pressure boundary 
heat exchangers critical to safety (e.g., steam generators) be designed 
and tested to ensure an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage 
that might be caused by fouling or other factors. Steam generator tube 
performance is closely monitored by inspection as detailed in plant 
technical specifications. Technical specifications vary from plant to 
plant, but each pressurized-water reactor (PWR) plant has requirements 
to monitor steam generator tube performance.
     10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 44 (and equivalent 
plant-specific criteria for pre-General Design Criteria (GDC) plants), 
requires provision of a cooling system to transfer heat from 
structures, systems, and components to an ultimate heat sink under 
normal operating and accident conditions. This heat transfer function 
is accomplished by structures and components (including heat 
exchangers) in key safety systems such as the residual heat removal and 
essential service water systems.
     10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 45 and 46 (and 
equivalent plant-specific criteria for pre-GDC plants), require the 
capability by design to perform inspection and testing of cooling water 
systems to ensure integrity and adequate performance. The technical 
specifications for each plant define limiting conditions for operation 
(LCO) for systems that mitigate design basis transients and accidents. 
The operability requirements for those systems defined in LCOs include 
the adequate performance of heat exchangers needed for the systems to 
perform their safety functions. The specific LCOs vary by plant type 
and format of the plant-specific technical specifications. However, 
each plant does have requirements related to safety-significant heat 
removal systems such as residual heat removal and safety-related 
service water. For a typical boiling water reactor, the LCOs include 
but are not limited to LCOs 3.4.9 and 3.4.10 for residual heat removal, 
LCO 3.5.1 for emergency core cooling, LCO 3.6.5.5 for drywell air 
temperature, LCO 3.7.1 for standby service water and ultimate heat 
sink, LCO 3.7.2 for high pressure core spray service water, and LCO 
3.8.1 for diesel generators. Degradation of a heat exchanger that 
renders a system covered by an LCO inoperable would require completion 
of required actions, possibly including a shutdown of the affected 
unit, within the required completion times. The administrative 
requirements defined within all plants' technical specifications also 
require licensees to establish and maintain various procedures related 
to the operation and testing of plant requirement. A partial list of 
the required procedures is provided in Regulatory Guide 1.33, ``Quality 
Assurance Program Requirements (Operation).'' The NRC routinely 
performs inspections of licensees' programs for implementing the 
required procedures.
     Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, ``Service Water System Problems 
Affecting Safety-Related Equipment,'' July 18, 1989, recommended that 
licensees initiate test programs to verify heat transfer capability of 
all safety-related heat exchangers cooled by service water and routine 
inspection and maintenance programs to ensure serviceability of safety-
related systems supplied by service water. Generic Letter 89-13 
specifies that a continuing program for periodic retesting should 
address the effects of fouling, and licensees monitor parameters such 
as coolant flow, temperature, and pressure indicative of acceptable 
heat exchanger performance.
     The NRC oversees the licensees' testing and maintenance 
programs via the inspection and assessment procedures included in the 
reactor oversight process. The NRC inspection procedure IP 71111.07, 
``Heat Sink Performance,'' defines the current sampling and review 
process for NRC inspectors assessing licensees' programs for the 
testing and maintenance of safety-significant heat exchangers.
     Standard Review Plan (SRP) 4.2 describes the NRC review of 
thermal margins, effects of corrosion products, and hydraulic loads. 
This review also addresses postulated fuel failure resulting from 
overheating of fuel cladding.
     SRP 4.2 also describes the NRC review of licensee fuel 
design analyses to ensure that dimensional changes due to thermal or 
irradiation effects (such as fuel rod bowing or growth) are addressed.
    Thus, the NRC believes that additional regulations are not needed 
to address the impact of fouling on the performance of heat exchange 
surfaces throughout licensed nuclear power plants.
    2. Fouling of heat exchange surfaces in reactors has the potential 
to cause significant safety problems.
    The NRC acknowledges that, left undetected, excessive fouling of 
key heat exchange surfaces, or other problems that challenge the safety 
function of those heat exchangers, could represent a significant safety 
problem. The classification of the important heat exchangers as safety-
related equipment, and the resultant requirements associated with their 
design and maintenance, demonstrates their importance. The NRC 
determined, for example, that the clogging of service water heat 
exchangers could have caused safety significant problems in the past 
and as a result issued several generic communications culminating in 
Generic Letter 89-13, ``Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-
Related Equipment,'' July 18, 1989. The NRC believes that the current 
regulatory requirements for the testing and maintenance of heat 
exchangers (as described in GL 89-13 along with recommendations for 
meeting the requirements) are adequate to identify and correct 
potential safety significant problems in safety-related heat 
exchangers. Consequently, the NRC has determined that no new 
regulations are required to address this issue. The NRC will continue 
to monitor the implementation of GL 89-13 and will take appropriate 
action if adverse trends are observed.
    3. NRC regulations must require publicly available reporting on the 
performance of heat exchange surfaces, including records of mechanical 
degradation of heat transfer assemblies, and cleaning procedures and 
their effectiveness.
    The NRC believes that it is not necessary to report the routine 
operational matters involving heat

[[Page 56960]]

exchanger degradation and cleaning which the petitioner proposes. The 
NRC is interested in system performance degradation when the situation 
might lead to a loss of safety function and regulations requiring such 
reporting already exist. 10 CFR 50.72, ``Immediate notification 
requirements for operating nuclear power reactors,'' and 10 CFR 50.73, 
``Licensee event report system,'' require licensees to report on 
performance of any safety system in the primary or secondary sides of 
reactors if an event occurs that might compromise safe operating 
conditions, such as a deviation from plant technical specifications 
pertaining to residual heat removal systems.
    Specifically, section 50.72(b)(3)(ii) requires reporting to the NRC 
within eight hours any event or condition that results in: (1) the 
condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety 
barriers, being seriously degraded, or (2) the nuclear power plant 
being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant 
safety. In addition, section 50.72(b)(3)(v) requires eight hour 
reporting of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could 
have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or 
systems needed to: (1) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe 
shutdown condition, (2) remove residual heat, (3) control the release 
of radioactive material, and (4) mitigate the consequences of an 
accident. Section 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) requires submittal of a Licensee 
Event Report (LER) within sixty days regarding any operation or 
condition prohibited by the plants' Technical Specifications, such as 
failure of a covered heat exchanger, and 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) requires an 
LER for any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the 
nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being 
seriously degraded. The NRC believes that existing reporting 
requirements adequately address degradation of performance of heat 
exchange surfaces in nuclear power plants.
    4. NRC regulations must address the need for investigating the 
grossly off-normal performance of heat exchange equipment in NPPs.
    The NRC believes that the existing structure of regulations, 
technical specifications, reporting requirements, and licensee programs 
subject to NRC inspection provides the necessary confidence that plant 
safety systems, including heat exchangers, are properly designed and 
maintained. A discussion of the existing structure of requirements and 
programs is provided in the NRC response to the petitioner's first 
request. An additional regulatory requirement related directly to the 
need for investigating the degradation of heat exchange equipment and 
to take those actions necessary to ensure that the performance of the 
equipment will support its safety function is provided by, Criterion 
XVI, ``Corrective Action,'' of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. This 
regulation requires that conditions adverse to quality, such as a 
significant degradation of a heat exchanger that is important to 
safety, be promptly identified and corrected. The NRC ensures 
compliance with these requirements by routinely performing inspections 
of licensees' programs for identifying and correcting problems.
    5. Severe fouling of nuclear fuel elements leads to axial growth of 
the fuel rods beyond design limits as the operating temperature of the 
fuel rods becomes greater than allowed for in design. This would cause 
fuel rods to bow and contact adjacent rods and control rod guide tubes, 
interfering with coolant flow.
    The NRC believes that pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling 
water reactor (BWR) fuel bundle designs provide ample space for fuel 
pins to expand in the axial direction. A PWR fuel pin is neither 
supported at the bottom nor at the top; instead, spacers are used to 
hold the fuel pins together. Designed space both at the bottom and at 
the top of fuel bundles permits fuel pins to expand thermally without 
touching any other structures. A BWR fuel bundle is normally seated at 
the bottom and there is no restriction to prevent thermal expansion 
into the upper plenum. Expansion springs are sometimes used between 
fuel pins to allow nonuniform axial expansion within a fuel bundle. For 
these reasons, the NRC considers it unlikely that a fuel pin will bow 
enough to contact adjacent rods and control rod tubes and interfere 
with coolant flow. SRP 4.2 requires the NRC to review licensee fuel 
design analysis to confirm that dimensional changes due to thermal or 
irradiation effects such as fuel pin bowing or axial growth are 
adequately addressed.
    6. Fouling of heat-transfer surfaces is generally not adequately 
considered in the licensing and compliance inspections of NPPs.
    The NRC believes that the effects of fouling of heat transfer 
surfaces are adequately addressed in the following NRC licensing and 
compliance inspection program elements:
     The NRC conducts an extensive review of the licensee's 
design of key safety systems, structures, and components, including 
heat exchangers in the primary and secondary sides of a plant. NRC 
staff analyses of all key safety systems, including heat exchangers, 
are performed during development of NRC safety evaluation reports 
(SERs) pertaining to a license application. As previously discussed, 
various regulatory requirements such as 10 CFR 50.65, Appendix B to 
Part 50, and plant technical specifications require that licensees 
maintain, test and restore equipment such that the safety functions are 
maintained consistent with the licensing of the plant. These processes 
are subject to NRC inspection to ensure that the requirements are met.
     Inspections of safety systems, structures, and components, 
including safety-significant heat exchangers, are designed to determine 
compliance with Appendix A to Part 50, ``General Design Criteria for 
Nuclear Power Plants.'' Specifically, in the Reactor Oversight Program, 
Inspection Procedure 71111.07, ``Heat Sink Performance,'' requires that 
a sample of safety significant heat exchangers (e.g., for the residual 
heat removal, component cooling water, emergency core cooling systems) 
be inspected both annually for specific performance issues and 
biennially for an intense review of heat transfer characteristics.
    7. The NRC must require by rule the inclusion of fouling 
considerations in NRC-funded heat transfer test programs and in the 
several heat exchanger computer programs produced by the NRC.
    The NRC believes that these requirements do not need to be included 
by regulation.
     NRC-funded computer codes used to audit emergency core 
cooling system (ECCS) performance are capable of considering the impact 
of fouling on the performance of fuel element surfaces, and these codes 
have been used for that purpose when warranted.
     Ongoing experimental and analytical test programs (e.g., 
Argonne National Laboratory study on fuel cladding performance) in the 
NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) are investigating 
transient and operational oxidation models, including effects of 
significant pre-oxidation.
     Calculations were performed by RES to support the 
evaluation of this petition using NRC computer codes. These 
calculations showed that fouling and excess pre-oxidation would not 
have a significant effect on reflood heat transfer capability.
     The NRC fuel performance code FRAPCON-3 can calculate 
enhanced oxidation from crud buildup on fuel element surfaces.

[[Page 56961]]

     The RELAP and TRACE codes use the FRAPCON information to 
calculate transient effects.
    The NRC has evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of the 
rulemaking requested by the petitioner with respect to the five 
performance goals set out by the Commission in the Strategic Plan for 
Fiscal years 2004-2009 announced on August 12, 2004.
    1. Maintaining Safety: The NRC believes that the requested 
rulemaking would not make a significant contribution to maintaining 
safety because current regulations, regulatory guidance and practices 
already provide for monitoring, detecting, and correcting possible 
fouling effects on heat exchanger performance. In addition, no data or 
evidence was provided by the petitioner to suggest that fouling of heat 
exchanger surfaces created any significant safety problems.
    2. Ensure Secure Use and Management of Radioactive Material: The 
petitioner has not established, nor has the NRC found the existence of, 
any safety issues regarding the performance of heat exchange surfaces 
that would compromise the secure use of licensed radioactive material.
    3. Ensuring Openness in the NRC Regulatory Process: The 
Administrative Procedures Act provides that any interested person has 
the right to petition an agency for issuance, amendment, or repeal of a 
rule. This statute expands on the ``right to petition'' provided by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution. The NRC implements this statute 
through 10 CFR 2.802, Petition for rulemaking, using guidance provided 
in NUREG-BR-0053, Revision 5, U.S. NRC Regulations Handbook, to ensure 
that the regulatory process takes place in an open manner.
    4. Improving Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Realism: The proposed 
revisions would not improve efficiency, effectiveness, and realism 
because licensees and the NRC would be required to generate additional 
and unnecessary information as part of the evaluation of numerous heat 
exchanger surfaces throughout the nuclear power plant. Revising the 
regulations to be more specific about effects of fouling on heat 
exchanger performance would require an expenditure of NRC resources 
with little or no added safety benefit.
    5. Ensure Excellence in NRC Management: The petitioner's request to 
revise the regulations to address the impact of fouling on all heat 
exchange surfaces in a nuclear power plant is not applicable to the 
strategic goal of continuous improvement in NRC management 
effectiveness.

Reasons for Denial

    The Commission is denying the petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-78).
    The NRC regulation and oversight of nuclear power plants includes 
the establishment of regulations, the issuance of operating licenses 
and technical specifications, and continual inspections and technical 
reviews of licensee programs and plant performance. When viewed in 
total, these regulatory requirements and related oversight practices 
provide confidence in the safety of operating nuclear power plants. The 
NRC's finding that no rulemaking is required, is based on the 
determination that the existing structure of regulations (i.e., 10 CFR 
50.65, Appendix A and B to part 50), technical specifications, and 
licensee programs subject to NRC inspection provides confidence that 
plant safety features, including heat exchangers, are properly designed 
and maintained in order to fulfill their intended function.
    The Commission concludes that the integration of the various 
requirements and related NRC oversight functions provide reasonable 
assurance that systems important to safety, such as heat exchangers, 
will perform their intended functions. The addition of specific 
requirements to a regulation to address heat exchanger performance is 
not necessary.
    For these reasons, the Commission denies PRM-50-78.

    Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of September, 2004.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 04-21337 Filed 9-22-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
```