Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

An increasing proportion of Special Operations Forces (SOF) have an 

interest in Africa, and especially the Maghreb, which borders the Mediterranean and is where the Arab Spring started. In this monograph, Dr. 

Roby Barrett provides a regional historical analysis of how the people 

of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have developed their views toward 

government legitimacy and religious authorities. SOF personnel from 

the U.S. and other countries have to be particularly mindful of the area’s 

French colonial legacy (one of many attempts by outside powers to 

control these countries), as well as the dichotomy between coastal and 

interior populations, when considering how foreign involvement in the 

region and democratic institutions may be perceived by its inhabitants. 

This publication is an important look at how and why past efforts at 

secular democracy have failed in this region, and why they are likely 

to do so for the foreseeable future.

ISBN 978-1-941715-21-5

Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco: 

Change, Instability, and 

Continuity in

the Maghreb

Roby Barrett, Ph.D.

JSOU Report 17-3

JSOU Report 17-3 Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco: Change in the Maghreb Barrett

French General Charles de Gaulle, the Bey of Tunis, and French General Charles Mast in 

the courtyard of the bey’s summer palace in Carthage, Tunisia, in June 1943. PHOTO BY 

MARJORY COLLINS/U.S. OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION. 
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where efforts center upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Education and 

Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 17-3

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2017

Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco: 

Change, Instability, and 

Continuity in the Maghreb

Roby Barrett, Ph.D.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in June 2017.

ISBN 978-1-941715-21-5
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

A Social Marketing Analysis for Suicide Prevention Initiatives in USSOCOM: A 

Framework for Future Research and Success, JSOU Report 17-2, R. Craig Lefebvre, Ph.D.

A Unified Theory for Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-1, Richard W. Rubright, Ph.D.

IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, JSOU Report 

16-11, Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov

Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel, JSOU Report 16-10, 

Russell D. Howard, Greta Hanson, and Carly Laywell

Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, 

Colombia, El Salvador, and Iraq, JSOU Report 16-9, Patrick Paterson

On the cover. Students (top) defy a longtime ban on protests in Algiers to march to 

the government’s headquarters and demand the resignation of the education minister 

in April 2011, and Tunisian protestors (bottom left) attend a demonstration demanding a new government free of officials of the ousted regime of former president Zine 

el Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. MAP BY THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY; PHOTOS BY LOUIZA AMMI/ABACAPRESS.COM/NEWSCOM (TOP) 

AND NASSER NOURI/XINHUA NEWS AGENCY/NEWSCOM (BOTTOM LEFT).

Back cover. French General Charles de Gaulle, the Bey of Tunis, and French 

General Charles Mast in the courtyard of the bey’s summer palace in Carthage, 

Tunisia, in June 1943. PHOTO BY MARJORY COLLINS/U.S. OFFICE OF WAR 

INFORMATION. 
v

Contents

From the Director.........................................................................vii

Foreword ......................................................................................ix

About the Author ..........................................................................xi

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

1. The Maghreb: Incubator for Revolt ............................................ 9

2. The Maghreb and the Imperial Construct ................................. 27

3. Independence Movements and the National States: 

1930–2011.................................................................................. 45

4. Conclusion: 2011 and the Future ............................................ 81

Appendix: Acronym List ............................................................ 101

Endnotes.................................................................................... 103

vii

From the Director

Dr. Roby Barrett’s latest contribution, his eighth JSOU Press title since 

2009, adds to a collection of country and area studies about the Gulf 

region and northern Africa. His examination of the Maghreb is a welcomed 

addition. As in his other monographs, he offers historical and scholarly 

analysis, informed by more than three decades of first-hand experience interacting with key actors in the region. Each title may be read as a single work 

but they are also joined by a common thread of shared history and integrated 

themes. The collection, including this monograph, serve as a quick-to-need 

primer for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and policymakers involved in 

the region. 

Taken together, Dr. Barrett’s research spans separate organizational perspectives of multiple theatre special operations commands and State Department bureaus. His description of history and trends provide a framework to 

appreciate the complexities of current politics and conflict. His projections 

have proven to be on point and often run counter to popular forecasts. Dr. 

Barrett is a consistent advocate for smaller SOF’ engagements, especially 

when successful nation-building and large conventional force solutions are 

unlikely or unfeasible. I encourage readers who are concerned with bringing 

security and stability to the greater Middle East and North Africa to examine 

all of his JSOU Press titles. 

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

ix

Foreword 

Dr. Roby Barrett’s Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco: Change, Instability, 

and Continuity in the Maghreb is a regional history monograph relevant to Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) understanding of how the people 

of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have developed their views toward government legitimacy and religious authorities. SOF personnel (from the U.S. and 

other countries) have to be particularly mindful of the area’s French colonial 

legacy, as well as the dichotomy between coastal and interior populations, 

when considering how foreign involvement in the region and democratic 

institutions may be perceived by its inhabitants. This monograph will surely 

benefit the increasing proportion of SOF who have an interest in Africa.

While the future need not resemble the past, there is much the SOF community can draw from this historical analysis that helps anticipate events in 

this region. Western proponents of democratic state-building may find disturbing the author’s arguments that only an authoritarian approach will be 

effective in controlling parts of these countries, and that “Western secularism 

in the Maghreb, and for that matter the Middle East, has failed,” however, 

the author provides ample support for these views. In addition, Dr. Barrett 

provides critiques of state-building theory and of the over-emphasis on the 

Westphalian nation-state system to frame Western approaches to problems 

and potential solutions in the Maghreb.

The detailed scope and breadth of this historical analysis is definitely its 

strongest asset. SOF personnel will benefit from learning about the region’s 

history and the many attempts by outside powers to control these countries. 

Dr. Barrett has provided an excellent and thoughtful review of historical 

events and developments that are most relevant to SOF personnel gaining 

an understanding of political, military, and cultural issues in the Maghreb. 

Dr. Barrett provides ample support for his arguments about how and why 

current or past efforts at secular democracy have failed in this region, and 

why they are likely to do so for the foreseeable future.
x

This monograph has value to both the military and policy world. It is not 

only a good explanation of the history of the Maghreb, but its greatest value 

is its succinctness in analyzing and presenting the current chaotic regional 

situation. It should be of interest to strategists, planners, and leaders involved 

in the future of U.S. policy in the region. 

Peter M. McCabe, Ph.D., Colonel USAF (Ret.) 

Resident Senior Fellow, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
xi

About the Author 

Dr. Roby C. Barrett is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations 

University, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 

where he also has been an instructor for applied intelligence, and a scholar 

at the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C. He provides subject matter 

expertise to United States Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and supports various U.S. 

government organizations, including the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, National Defense University, the 

State Department, and various organizations within 

the intelligence community. He is the author of The 

Gulf and the Struggle for Hegemony: Arabs, Iranians, 

and the West in Conflict, a policy, history, and reference work on the entire Arabian Gulf region. In 

addition to numerous JSOU monographs, including 

Saudi Arabia: Modernity, Stability, and the Twenty-First Century Monarchy

and The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, Dr. Barrett authored The Greater Middle East and the Cold 

War: U.S. Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy.

Dr. Barrett has more than 40 years of government, academic, and business experience in Africa and the Middle East. A former Foreign Service 

Officer in the Middle East, he also is an expert on the cultural and political 

dynamics of the region and historical Islamic and political development, as 

well as terrorism issues. Initially trained as a Soviet and Russian specialist, 

Dr. Barrett brings unique insights to his evaluations of regenerated competition between Russia, China, and the United States in the Middle East and 

Africa. His posting, projects, and other assignments included North and 

West Africa, the Levant, the Arabian Gulf, and Southeast Asia. 

He has been a featured presenter on Middle East affairs at USSOCOM and 

SOCCENT. From 2010 to 2012, he was a visiting professor at the Royal Saudi 

Arabian Command and Staff School War Course. He has been a featured 

expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations and with Germany’s 

Bundeswehr. Dr. Barrett also served as a Senior Fellow on Gulf affairs at the 

U.S. Air Force Special Operations School. In 2007–2008, he supported the 
xii

101st Airborne Division in the U.S. and Iraq. He has spoken at numerous 

Middle East conferences, including the Bahrain Ministry of the Interior Gulf 

Security Forum, the opening of the King Abdullah II Special Operations 

Training Center, and the Bahrain SOF Conference. 

Dr. Barrett holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern and South Asian history from 

the University of Texas at Austin. He was an Eisenhower-Roberts fellow at 

the Eisenhower Institute in Washington, D.C., a Rotary International Fellow 

at the Russian and East European Institute at the University of Munich, 

and a Scottish Rite Research fellow at Oxford University. He is a graduate 

of the Foreign Service Institute’s intensive two-year Arab Language and 

Middle East Area Studies program and attended the Counterterrorism Tactics Course and the special operations courses. 
1

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Introduction 

In the second decade of the 21st century, an examination of the political 

landscape of the Arab Middle East reveals that the façade of the artificial divisions imposed largely by Western colonialism and their indigenous 

enablers is disappearing. Particularly in the West, the reality behind the 

façade is challenging to understand. The collapse of so-called nation-states 

in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya has called into question Western perceptions of state structure, as well as the efficacy of Western approaches to policy 

implementation. While the proto-Western republics of the regime collapsed, 

the monarchies survived intact. With one exception, the republics either 

returned to authoritarian rule, as in the case of Egypt, or descended into 

chaos, as in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.

It is in this environment that the burden falls increasingly on Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) and other government organizations to be the 

policy tool that shores up allies, attempts to keep the lid on the chaos, plays 

a growing role in attempting to restore stability, and protects U.S. interests. 

The old traditional lines of responsibility between the State Department, the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, and the military have blurred, 

particularly now that entire regions are deemed too dangerous or inaccessible 

to the civilian agencies. Given this expanding role, understanding the political, economic, and socio-cultural milieu at a much deeper level is critical 

not only for evaluating tactical situations and players, but for understanding 

within the policy scheme what is actually possible and what is a pipe dream. 

It is immensely important that the military and SOF feedback—from the 

boots on the ground—be reflected in policy thinking. For that to happen 

effectively, SOF personnel must have an understanding of the deeper, broader 

context with which they are attempting to deal. While Syria, Iraq, Yemen, 

and Libya grab the headlines, another series of challenges loom that will 

demand support for traditional regimes, attempts to create political stability where it has collapsed, and finally, consideration of the potential for the 

emergence of instability that could rival anything heretofore seen in the 

region. All of this could occur within one region—the Maghreb. This study 

is a beginning point for SOF to understand that critical region and consider 
2

JSOU Report 17-3

what requirements the pressures and instability in the future may add to the 

long list of SOF responsibilities. 

In some respects, the Maghreb—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—have 

avoided the worst of the upheaval that has rocked the Arab world over the 

last five years. This is ironic for several reasons. The 2011 revolt in Tunisia was 

the catalyst that brought revolts and protests across the region. Its government now struggles with creating a democratic state that melds secular and 

Islamist groups, while fighting off radical jihadist attempts to overthrow the 

government and institute a fundamentalist Islamic state. In Morocco, the 

monarchy is now viewed as an example of traditionalist stability. Algeria, 

through oil wealth and repression, survived a bloody Islamist revolt in the 

1990s and is attempting to control a gigantic and incredibly heterogeneous 

geopolitical environment with a crippled political system and repression. 

With respect to the problems facing the region, nothing is settled. 

Like the rest of the Arab world, the events in the Maghreb underscore 

the deficiencies of traditional Western political analysis and its fixation on 

Westphalian order (i.e., the concept of the nation-state based on Westernstyle nationalism). It also highlights the fallacies of modernization theory, 

as promoted since the 1950s, as a path for stability in the developing world. 

Modernization theory as a pillar of nation-building held that strategic 

application of aid and development resources would bring states to an economic ‘takeoff point’ that would foster political stability and democracy. 

In Tunisia since Independence, Clement Henry Moore provides an example 

of modernization theory by arguing, “Tunisia’s ruling Neo-Destour Party 

has achieved possibly the most effective regime in the Afro-Asian world for 

leading its people toward a modern society.”1 In retrospect, it is clear that 

the durability of the system envisioned by the founder of the Neo-Dustur 

Party and the President for Life of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, had more to 

do with Western wishful thinking than an understanding of the geopolitical 

and socio-cultural milieu in which Bourguiba’s Tunisia functioned. Tunisia 

devolved into a police state that imploded on itself. In fact, modernization, 

particularly education and secularization, spawned the forces that undid it. 

Lisa Anderson, former president of American University of Cairo and a 

member of the Council on Foreign Relations, hits the nail squarely on the 

head stating, “Indeed, both the historical and the structural context of political behavior are striking by their absence in early modernization theory.”2 

During the 1970s, political scientists took the ‘traditions and dependence’ 
3

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

approach to explain the Middle East in terms of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Those that predicted democratization and attempted to relegate antiWestern attitudes to marginal ‘primitive’ traditionalism found themselves 

confronted with the absolute failure of not only democratic movements but 

also of pan-Arab secularism and the rise of fundamentalist Islam. All of this 

has led many analysts to the conclusion that history has to be the bedrock 

of any understanding of the region and that Western theory and prejudices 

only tend to cloud understanding.3

 To borrow from what Michael Hudson 

postulated about the future of the Arab Middle East in the 1990s and his 

expectation for an “era of turbulence,” the real stability issue is political 

“legitimacy.”4 

Why are Westphalia and modernization theory and its weaknesses 

important to SOF in the field? Both form the basis for Western ideas about 

how the Arab world, and the rest of the developing world, should progress, 

and both form a Western-centric straightjacket of sorts in which U.S. policy 

is encased. The U.S. cannot effectively deal with a situation that does not 

conform to the Westphalian theory of the nation-state, and it repeatedly 

returns to the idea that there is a way, if done correctly, for developing states 

to modernize in preconceived Western patterns—state-building theory. Confronted with the failure of both of those concepts, the task of attempting to 

salvage some stability from a given situation has a propensity to fall on the 

shoulders of the military, in general, and SOF, in particular. Understanding 

the historical context and applying that understanding to the contemporary 

reality provides a pathway both to understanding problems and challenges 

and providing timely and accurate feedback, not just with regard to tactical 

operations, but with regard to more strategic policy directions and realities.

Past, Present, and Future

The Maghreb is a model for understanding how the historical context 

connects to the contemporary reality and likely projects into the future 

by examining three different types of regimes—would-be secular democratic, traditional monarchial, and secular repressive—respectively Tunisia, 

Morocco, and Algeria. Each emerged from the last five years intact, but the 

threats to stability remain. They are inherent in the makeup of each of the 

states. This study places the Maghreb and the contemporary states within 

their particular historical context and examines them with an eye toward 
4

JSOU Report 17-3

the future of political, economic, and social development. The Maghreb is a 

region in which centrifugal forces that played havoc across the Middle East 

began. It is a region whose current relative stability is likely to be severely 

tested. A traditional area of strong French influence, the Maghreb in the 

future will require ever-increasing levels of U.S. involvement in consort with 

its Paris allies to prevent the fragmentation that that has already splintered 

Libya and shaken the stability of North Africa.

Recently, in Foreign Policy, an article entitled “Morocco’s Outlaw Country 

Is the Heartland of Global Terrorism” described: “The lines connecting the 

complex web of kinship and friendship ties across national borders are starting to resemble a Jackson Pollock drip painting 

with a disturbing message” of “deadly terrorist 

plots from conception through to execution.”5

This alarmist analytical thrust is something 

of an exaggeration—but only just. The catalyst 

for the instability that now engulfs much of 

the Arab World is North African in origin—

Tunisian to be more specific. Those that decry 

Wahhabi and Saudi Arabian influence in the contemporary Maghreb display 

a striking lack of awareness of the region. The Maghreb has a much more 

robust history of ‘jihadist’ movements than any of the conservative states 

of the Arab Middle East.

There is a tradition of militant Islamic reform movements that goes 

back almost to the introduction of Islam itself. In fact, the Wahhabi reform 

movement, a part of the Hanbali madhab (school of law and ideology), was 

predated by almost six centuries by the Zahiri madhab. Theologically and 

ideologically, the Zahiri and Hanbali movements were based almost exclusively in the Koran and al-Hadith; they were marked by militancy and Salafist ideology.6

 These movements thrived in the fertile soil of factional, tribal, 

and clan conflict in the Maghreb. Islamic doctrine provided the mantra for 

legitimacy that justified clan, tribal, and ethnic ambitions for power and 

influence. In fact, challenges to government control today are a 21st-century 

version of what Umayyad, Abbasid, Ottoman, and French administrators 

and commanders saw over the centuries. They are also an indication of the 

things to come.

Why limit this study to the Maghreb? Libya is in chaos and the ongoing conflict between the Egyptian government and its Islamist opponents 

The Maghreb has a 

much more robust history of ‘jihadist’ movements than any of the 

conservative states of the 

Arab Middle East.
5

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

continues as an issue that some believe is yet to be decided. First and foremost, the Maghreb—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—are fundamentally, 

geopolitically, and socio-culturally different from Egypt and Libya. Eastern 

Libya in particular is merely the logical extension of the Egyptian frontiers. 

In the best of times, it was a buffer against Saharan threats to upper Egypt 

and the Nile Valley, and in the worst of times, its fragmentation magnifies the 

threat. Despite his more problematic policies and practices, Muammar Gaddafi's Libya formed a buffer, a march, if you will, for Egypt against destabilizing forces from the West and a dam against the flood of illegal immigration 

from Africa to Europe. As we will see, the Maghreb has always been viewed 

as ‘different’ from its two neighbors to the east.

This study takes a more holistic perspective on the Maghreb and its components. The Maghreb constitutes a general geopolitical region where three 

different political structures are faced with surviving the natural and timehonored forces that have consistently destabilized the area. Each country 

is using a different approach to the same problem of stability in a period of 

tectonic economic and social change that threatens to inundate its political structures, and yet they survive. The cartographic lines drawn by the 

European powers on the map of North Africa basically reflect a French 

colonial land-grab as opposed to the problems inherent in administration. 

The ancient Roman limes, a defensive system, protected the coast from the 

uncontrollable interior and has many similarities to contemporary attempts 

to define borders bequeathed by colonial policies. This administrative system 

borrowed from the Romans constituted an ancient political construct that, 

for the most part, ran east-west.7 The socio-cultural structure of North 

Africa, the Sahara, and sub-Saharan regions approximates this same construct. As a result, security structures, then and now, tend to follow a roughly 

horizontal, or east-west, axis, given that threats to coastal security, stability, 

and prosperity almost always have emerged from the interior. To further 

complicate this geopolitical reality, traditional north-south trading routes 

form pathways whereby, not just commerce and goods, but ideas and peoples 

flow—colonial borders meant and mean nothing. As E.W. Bovill explained in 

the classic The Golden Trade of the Moors, “Northern Africa is divided into a 

series of natural zones running roughly parallel to each other from west to 

east.”8

 Boundaries fluctuated with attempts to control this trade.

During the last half of the 20th century, some trappings of modernity—

primarily improved communication—both mitigated and aggravated the 
6

JSOU Report 17-3

stratification. Those beyond the coastal zones now understood that they 

were being shortchanged. Sharp differences remain between the horizontal 

social and cultural layering and the north-south political structures of the 

Maghreb’s governments. West Africa provides another even more dramatic 

example. There, geographically narrow colonial positions along the coast 

tend to drive vertical north-south political constructs. The colonial experience in both North Africa and West Africa aligned the political structure 

of the northern and southern edges of the Sahara in such a way that the 

borders fail to reflect the socio-cultural reality. Political control flowed from 

the coast to the interior. Now, in the 21st century, instability is the price for 

this vertical alignment. 

Chapter 1 of this study focuses on the pre-Islamic heritage of the Maghreb, 

particularly Roman rule and how the Maghreb differed from Egypt and 

Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in Libya. The discussion then shifts to the Islamic 

conquest and how the Maghreb became a focal point for sectarian Islamic 

resistance to the great Umayyad and Abbasid empires. This underscores a 

developing motif or pattern of political behavior in the region. The destruction of the Umayyad Caliphate and the rise of the Abbasids in Baghdad in 

750 brought a more decentralized approach to administration through a 

series of emirates—the Rustamids (777–909), the Idrisids (789–920), and 

the Aghlabids (800–909). The tribal and ideological contrasts between these 

groups further emphasizes the Maghreb’s role as an incubator of ideological 

sectarianism. 

Chapter 2 begins with the Ottoman period, and then focuses on the 

European colonial conquest of the Maghreb and the implications of French 

rule. Tunisia and Morocco ultimately became French protectorates with 

an eye toward integration into the metropole. Algeria became a province 

in Metropolitan France. This narrative looks at the imposition of Western 

political constructs as they came into conflict with traditional Islamic and 

tribal socio-cultural paradigms. It examines French colonial thinking and 

the political decisions made to enhance control. This chapter focuses particularly on the French experiences in the world wars and the decisions to 

maintain their empire in the Maghreb against impossible odds, as well as 

the contribution that the colonial experience made to the challenges facing 

the states of the region today.

Chapter 3 focuses on the emergence of independent states and the challenges that each have faced since 1945. Part one discusses Tunisia, perhaps 
7

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

the most fortunate of the Maghreb states. Tunisia’s particular geographic 

location and physical structure—a more limited area to the south—provides 

the potential for more stability over the longer term. It is not an accident 

the incident that set off the ‘Arab Spring’ began in the south. The south and 

the western mountains have historically provided flashpoints for unrest 

and instability. Democracy might take hold in the coastal regions, but only 

if moderate political elements form a bulwark against radicalism from the 

western interior and south. The discussion of Morocco illustrates that, even 

after centuries of independence, many believed that the days of its monarchy 

were numbered. The monarchy has been resilient and fortunate; it now faces 

perhaps its most critical growing challenge in the form of nascent insurgencies spawned by al-Qaeda and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS). Algeria forms the last part of this trilogy. After its violent struggle 

for independence from France, the Front de Libération Nationale (National 

Liberation Front or FLN) victory seemed to fulfill the promise of national 

liberation, and yet in the 1990s, the FLN government faced the prospect of 

defeat at the ballot box and Islamist control or dictatorship. In a brutal civil 

war, the Algerian government crushed the Islamist opposition, bringing an 

uneasy—and likely temporary—peace. Obviously, given the political challenges of its size, diversity, and geographic location, the ability of Algeria to 

maintain its stability is fraught with issues. 

The conclusion connects the political, economic, and social threads that 

have created the contemporary Maghreb. It explores the contradictions of 

the sectarian, ethnic, and socio-cultural reality. There is a lesson in this contradiction for the West. The issue is not just terrorism and security. North 

Africa from Egypt to Morocco constitutes a buffer against population pressures from Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa inundating the Mediterranean 

community. The collapse of Libya breached that buffer, resulting in a flood of 

refugees and associated security problems. A similar breakdown of control 

in the Maghreb would make the situation exponentially worse; thus the state 

structures, no matter how problematic or even artificial, are the best option 

for stability. Should they fail, and they very well might, then it is critical the 

contemporary situation be viewed not through the lens of the colonial constructs and the states that followed, but through the deeper perspective of 

a region steeped in resistance, Salafi fundamentalism, militant Sufi orders, 

and major Islamic movements that have shaped not only the Maghreb, but 

the Middle East and Europe, as well. 

9

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

1. The Maghreb: Incubator for Revolt 

The setting of the Maghreb in its pre-Islamic and early Islamic context 

is important in the contemporary context for several reasons, but two 

stand out. First, what we are experiencing now and are likely to experience 

in the future is not new. The Maghreb, especially the hinterland, has been 

an incubator for resistance, revolt, and revolution since the beginning of 

recorded history. Particularly under Islam, factions that appeared to be insignificant leveraged the physical and sociological environment of the Maghreb 

to produce political and ideological explosions, some of which reordered 

the Arab and Mediterranean worlds. It is a paradigm that needs to lodge 

in the back of SOF minds as new challenges are encountered in the region. 

Second, and most important, are the issues of credibility and analysis. To 

most peoples of the Maghreb, the past is important because it defines who 

they are relative to allies and adversaries in the region. SOF personnel interfacing with indigenous allies simply require a historical political, economic, 

and socio-cultural baseline for credibility.

From an analytical point of view, knowledge allows SOF to better understand their Maghrebi counterparts in political and social terms as they interact with them. In the Middle East, how a people view the past says a lot 

about how they view the present. None of this is possible without a baseline 

understanding of past. In terms of contemporary analysis, the 70 years since 

WWII and the beginning of the nation-state concept in the Maghreb, is a historical blink. To understand what the Maghreb is today and how Tunisians, 

Moroccans, and Algerians see themselves and the Mediterranean world 

requires some level of knowledge about Carthaginians, Romans, Almoravids, 

and Almohads. That history also is an indicator of how some Islamic groups 

see their European neighbors—an increasingly critical security issue. The 

story of the Maghreb begins roughly 2,500 years ago with the rise of the 

Carthaginian Empire, based on the coast in Tunis.

Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, and Byzantines

This study begins with a glimpse of the Mediterranean world 2,500–3,000 

years ago, emphasizing that for millennia, events in Lebanon or Egypt or 

Italy or France were interconnected to the Maghreb—that has not changed. 
10

JSOU Report 17-3

Beginning as early as 1,500 years before the common epoch (BCE), the Phoenicians from bases in Lebanon became the preeminent trading power, establishing commercial centers throughout the Mediterranean Basin, including 

outposts in modern-day Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. According to multiple ancient historians, who often took some liberties with interpretation, a 

renegade Phoenician Queen Elissa (a.k.a. Dido) fled Tyre with her retainers 

and established Carthage. Carthage, in an alliance with local Berbers, eventually absorbed the Phoenician outposts and cities of the western Mediterranean and took control of the trans-Saharan trade routes. With their Berber 

allies, they also fended off challenges by the various Greek city-states and 

their trading ‘factories’ (outposts) on the coast.9

In 509 BCE, Carthage concluded a treaty with the new Roman Republic 

because the Greeks threatened both. In the 3rd century BCE, the alliance 

soured when both Carthaginian and Roman expeditions moved to displace 

strategic Greek colonies in Sicily. In three Punic wars between 264 and 146 

BCE, the western Mediterranean witnessed military campaigns that are still 

studied today. Rome became a naval power and conquered the entire Mediterranean basin. During the second Punic War (218–201 BCE), the Carthaginian general Hannibal invaded Italy and defeated a massive Roman army at 

Cannae in 216 BCE. Carthage was eventually defeated by Scipio Africanus, 

yet it continued to attempt to assert control. At this point, the Numidians, 

a Berber tribe led by King Masinissa and allied with the Romans, expanded 

their territory at Carthage’s expense. The Carthaginians allied with another 

Berber confederation, the Mauretanians, and moved against Rome’s Berber 

allies. At this point, Rome had had enough. A Roman expeditionary force 

utterly destroyed Carthage in 146 BCE. 

The drama in the Maghreb was only beginning for the Romans. The 

Numidians now became entangled in the politics of Rome itself. Numidian 

factions sided for and against Marius and Sulla in their struggle to control 

Rome. Later, Numidian factions supported Pompey against Julius Caesar. 

Under Octavian (Augustus Caesar), the client kingdoms in North Africa 

came to an end and the territories were integrated into the empire. The 

Romans suppressed Berber revolts, but never subjugated them.10 It was not a 

matter of ‘if’ a new revolt would occur, but rather ‘when’ and ‘what’ form it 

would take. This situation became a harbinger of things to come—something 

with which we can identify in the contemporary age. Inside the defensive 

system of the limes, a Roman world developed, complete with magnificent 
11

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

cities and agriculture on a scale that could feed Rome. Outside the limes, 

Berber tribes and their Saharan, and even sub-Saharan, allies held sway. 

Rome could launch an expedition deep into the hinterland, but it could not 

sustain control or change the strategic dynamic one iota.11 Eventually, control 

returned to local rulers and tribal leaders who pursued their own interests, 

often at the expense of the Romanized littoral. 

The limes, with their fortified bases and guard posts with berms and 

roads linking them, remind the observer of 21st century attempts at border 

control and counterterrorism operations. As Bovill suggests: “The defensive 

zone of the Roman limes was advanced to the foothills of what must have 

appeared to be an admirable natural line of defence. It was perhaps only 

then that it became evident to the Romans that there was no apparent limit 

to their commitments.” In fact, the Romans only succeeded in antagonizing 

the tribes: “The desert became both a refuge and a recruiting ground for all 

who rebelled against Rome.”12 As the empire declined, North African revolts 

became more frequent and Berber incursions increasingly unstoppable. 

The collapse of Roman authority in the 5th century brought the Vandals—

a Romanized, Germanic tribe—to the Maghreb. The Byzantines (Romans) 

quickly reconquered the coastal areas but this created a Berber-Christianity 

ideological problem that has a parallel within the Islamic community today. 

The Berbers were heavily Donatist Christian and the Vandals were Arian 

Christian. Arian and, particularly, Donatist beliefs were viewed as heresies 

by both the Roman Church and Byzantine Church. In fact, Saint Augustine, 

born in present-day Algeria, spent much of his career inveighing against 

the Donatists. The Byzantine restoration 

brought heavy taxation, decreased prosperity, and ideologically motivated Orthodox 

Christian persecution. This inflamed the 

Berber countryside and, even near the coast, 

towns and farming communities were fortified against raiders.13 The divide between 

the hinterland and the coast persevered no 

matter who was in control, with the hinterland having its own particular ideological overlay to justify resistance. Ideological struggles within the Christian community undermined grassroots 

support for the Byzantine administrations. In the seventh century, these 

The divide between the 

hinterland and the coast 

persevered no matter who 

was in control, with the 

hinterland having its own 

particular ideological overlay to justify resistance.
12

JSOU Report 17-3

animosities would reveal themselves in an astonishing chain of events that, 

on the surface at least, changed the face of the North Africa. 

The Coming of Islam

The ease and rapidity of the conquest was stunning, but it was not revolutionary in the sense that the language of society changed but the realities of 

power and ruler remained very much the same. Like the destruction of Sassanian Persia, the conquest of Egypt began as a ghazi, or raid, and escalated 

into a full-blown invasion and occupation. In Egypt, the Muslim presence 

was a thin veneer overlaying a Christian Coptic society. The Coptic community was the target of vicious, systematic persecution by the Byzantine 

Christian authorities. The situation was so repressive that the Muslim practice of allowing relative freedom of worship for the dhimmi, or ‘people of 

the book,’ along with the payment of the jizya, a tax on Christians and Jews, 

seemed far preferable. By 642, from bases in Palestine and Syria, Amr ibn 

al-‘As had taken Egypt. From their new military base at Fustat (Cairo), Arab 

armies moved west, taking both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania by 643. At that 

point, Caliph Umar halted the westward thrust of his armies. 

Caliph Umar was assassinated in 644 and Uthman ibn Affan, the third 

Rashidun caliph, succeeded him and authorized a raid into Ifriqiya (Tunisia). Abdullah ibn al-Sa’d became governor of Egypt and achieved a limited 

victory over the Byzantines. The ghazi prolonged Byzantine control over 

Carthage because the exarch (Byzantine governor) of Carthage, Gregory, 

had declared himself emperor and challenged imperial control. The Arabs 

killed him in battle, allowing Constantinople to reassert some control.14 

Nevertheless, the weakness of the Byzantine position became clear. Plans to 

renew the offensive fell victim to discord within the Muslim leadership.15 In 

656, Uthman was assassinated by people working for al-Sa’d. In 661, Ali ibn 

Abi Talib, the fourth caliph and first Shi’a imam, fell victim to a Kharijite 

assassin. This would have significant implications for the Maghreb.16

At this point, the Umayyad Caliphate headed by Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufian 

(r. 661–680) took control of the Muslim community (umma) from Damascus. In 670, the Umayyad commander, Uqba ibn Nafi al-Fihri (622–683) 

established a strategic garrison town—Kairouan—on the model of Fustat 

and Kufa (southern Iraq). Kairouan was a base of operations against the Byzantines on the coast, but it also served as a buffer against the Berber tribes. 
13

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Uqba’s brutal policies against the Berbers created determined resistance. Abu 

al-Muhajir Dinar (d. 683) replaced Uqba and attempted a carrot-and-stick 

approach to create alliances with the Berber tribes. After political infighting, Uqba regained his position and pushed westward, only to be killed in 

an ambush in 683 by a combined force of Byzantines and Berbers, led by 

the Berber chief, Kusaila.17 Kusaila ruled Ifriqiya from Kairouan for three 

years. In 686, the original Arab commander in Ifriqiya, Ibn Qais, defeated 

the Byzantines and killed Kusaila, but only narrowly maintained control of 

Kairouan.18 Once again, the primary resistance to the invasion was not the 

imperial forces, but rather the ability of the Berber or indigenous tribes to 

resist encroachment. 

With Kusaila dead, the resistance shifted to the Berber tribes led by alKahina (Dihya), a prophetess and queen of the Aures Berbers. Immensely 

charismatic and said to have mastered ‘magic,’ al-Kahina and her immediate tribe practiced Judaism. She united the tribes and crushed the Arab 

armies, driving them back to Tripolitania. She ruled for five years virtually 

unmolested. A new Arab commander, Hassan ibn al-Numan al-Ghassani, 

began a series of campaigns in 692 that met with mixed success until, in 

698, he captured Carthage for the final time and founded a new city, Tunis, 

nearby. Having eliminated the Byzantines, al-Ghassani began a systematic 

campaign that destroyed al-Kahina and her army, but tribal resistance, particularly from the Sanhaja Berbers, prevented penetration to the south. A 

Figure 1. The expansion of Islam in the age of the Caliphates. 

SOURCE: BRIAN SZYMANSKI
14

JSOU Report 17-3

new Egyptian governor, Musa ibn Nusayr, pushed the Arab conquest across 

the Maghreb to the Atlantic.19

In 711, Tariq ibn Ziyad (d. 720) became the commander of Musa ibn 

Nusayr’s armies. There has been a debate about his origins—Persia, Arab, or 

as most believe, Berber. There can be no debate about his accomplishments. 

Using a Berber army stiffened by Arab cadres, many of them Yemeni, he 

crossed into Spain at Gibraltar (Jabal Tariq) and destroyed the Visigoth 

Empire (418–720), killing King Roderic.20 Tariq’s relatively small army 

now controlled the entire Iberian Peninsula, leaving the Arab commanders dependent on the support of their Berber converts.21 Over the next two 

decades, Muslim armies advanced into France. In 732, near Tours, France, a 

Muslim expeditionary force under the Arab governor of Al-Andalus, Abdal-Rahman al-Ghafiqi, was decisively defeated by Charles Martel. In the 

aftermath, Martel would claim the title King of the Franks.22 Losses in the 

Muslim expeditionary force were so severe that Muslim historians referred 

to the battle site as Balat al-Shuhada, or path of the martyrs.23 Arab advances 

had been stopped before on numerous occasions only to regroup later—this 

situation was an exception. Umayyad rule had created instability across the 

empire. Success bred its own problems.

The Islamic Maghreb Fractures

Under the Umayyads, the Arabs viewed non-Arabs as second-class Muslims. During the conquest of Spain, the Arab commanders and soldiers 

were rewarded with land and other grants, and systematically discriminated against the Berbers who were the bulk of the army. In North Africa, 

former Byzantine coastal elements sided with the Arabs against the tribal 

Berbers and received preferential treatment. For many of the Berbers, it 

was now obvious that the Arabs despised and exploited them. The Berbers 

exploded in revolt across Spain (Al-Andalus) and the Maghreb. Expansion 

into Europe ended because the Arab armies were needed for the occupation 

of North Africa as Berber unrest grew. Facing growing security difficulties, 

Hassan ibn al-Numan is said to have commented, “The conquest of Africa 

is an impossible thing.”24

The Umayyads were exclusively Arab and viewed new converts as muwali, 

or clients, as opposed to full members of the Muslim umma. This problem 

was endemic across the empire. The Berbers, although removed from the 
15

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

seat of revolt in Mesopotamia and the Levant, nevertheless significantly 

weakened Umayyad control. In 720, Yazid ibn Abi Muslim became the governor of the Maghreb. He continued the extreme repression practiced by his 

predecessors. When Yazid demanded that his Berber guards be tattooed as 

his personal property, they revolted and killed him.25 In 739, a general revolt 

erupted in the Maghreb, lasting more than three years. In 741, the Berbers 

defeated an Arab army sent to subdue them and took control of Spain. It 

took the intervention of battle-hardened Syrian and Yemeni troops in 742 

to suppress the rebellion.26

In 749–750, the Abbasid revolt overthrew the Umayyad Caliphate—it 

was a revolt of the mulawi that added to the confusion in the Maghreb and 

Spain. The focus of the contending factions was on the east and the Levant, 

not on the western periphery. To further complicate matters, a member of 

the Umayyad ruling family, Abd-al-Rahman ibn Mu’awiya (d. 788), had 

escaped. He made his way first to North Africa, and then on to Spain. He 

exploited the confusion, recruiting Yemeni Arab troops and muwali soldiers, 

and by 756, he had established himself as the Umayyad emir of Muslim 

Spain. The Abbasids lacked the ‘reach’ to challenge him, but not the Berbers. 

The Umayyads would sustain their position in Spain as emirs, and later as 

caliphs, of Cordoba from 756–1031, but they never expanded their rule to 

the Maghreb because Berber animosity and resistance to the Umayyads ran 

deep.27

It was at this point that the Berbers turned to a new source of ideological 

inspiration—Kharijite teachings. The name itself comes from the Arabic verb 

kharaj, to leave or go out, and refers to the unwillingness of the Kharijites 

to compromise their principles in confronting the Umayyads. A Kharijite 

assassinated Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib in 661 for compromising with the 

Umayyads. Kharijites also figured prominently in the revolt that toppled 

the Umayyads in 750. Despite their key role, the Abbasids persecuted the 

Kharijites, who established themselves in remote places in the Islamic world 

and continued to resist domination.

One particular group, the Ibadis, was more successful than most. Oman 

would produce an Ibadi imamate, or region ruled by an imam, that lasted 

into the 20th century and a sultanate that still exists. In the Maghreb, two 

Ibadi states emerged: the Sufrite state centered on the Zanata Berber tribes 

and the Rustamid state in the mountains south of Tangier.28 The Berbers 

were attracted to the egalitarian concepts inherently a part of Kharijite 
16

JSOU Report 17-3

Ibadi beliefs. In particular, the idea that ‘any righteous Muslim’ could rule 

the umma appealed to the persecuted Berbers. There was also a connection 

between the Christian experience of the region and the Ibadi ideological 

structure. The Donatist belief structure shared an ‘ethical intransigence’ and 

obsession with ‘authority and legitimacy’ with the Kharijites. Therefore, as 

Christian Donatists converted to Islam, they brought their socio-cultural and 

ideological predispositions with them—the mantras of ideological superiority and persecution.29 The Kharijite states endured until they were displaced 

by the Almoravids (al-Murabitun) in the 11th century.

In the Maghreb, the Kharijite states were not the only fallout from the 

Islamic conflicts. In 785, Idris ibn Abdullah (d. 791), a direct descendant 

of Ali ibn Abi Talib (the first Shi’a imam and the fourth Rashidun caliph), 

escaped to Morocco after an unsuccessful Shi’a revolt in Medina against the 

Abbasids.30 Idris was said to be a Zaydi Shi’a. The Zaydis were followers of 

the Zayd, the son of the fourth Shi’a imam, Zaynu li Abi Din. They believed 

that any descendant of Ali (the Alid line) who was learned and pious could 

become the imam, and that believers had a responsibility to resist unjust 

rulers.31 The Awraba Berbers, who had fought the Umayyads with Kusaila, 

recognized him as their imam, and he quickly expanded the Idrisi control 

and founded the first Islamic state in the western Maghreb. Idris was assassinated at the specific orders of the Abbasid caliph, Harun al-Rashid (786–809). 

The Idrisi established Fez as their capital. Assailed by internal disputes and 

the Aghlabid vassals (subjects) of the Abbasids, the Idrisi state eventually 

fractured into small city-states.32

The Aghlabid dynasty (800–909) in Tunisia (Ifriqiya) was a direct outgrowth of the Umayyad collapse. Unable to control the west, the Abbasids 

desperately needed a breakwater to protect Egypt and the east from the 

unrest surging out of the Maghreb. To that end, in 800, Caliph Harun alRashid appointed Ibrahim ibn al-Aglab, originally the Sunni Abbasid governor, as the hereditary emir of Ifriqiya in return for his fealty.33 In 827, the 

Aghlabids entered Sicily at the request of the rebellious Byzantine governor 

and progressively extended their control. In 837, they besieged Naples, and 

even threatened Rome in 846.34 The dynasty reached its height in the midninth century, and declined steadily until being subsumed by the Fatimids 

in the early 10th century.

This limited explanation of the confusion and complexities of the 

Maghreb in the eighth century is a snapshot of the actual reality. The 
17

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Maghreb was a fertile field for political and social unrest legitimized by the 

ideology of splintered Islamic groups and movements. The maintenance 

of any central authority was always 

problematic and ceaselessly challenged. The coastal areas and towns 

were islands of relative order in a sea 

of tribal chaos. Resistance to authority 

and a sense of victimization were the 

two themes that permeated the Berber 

and nomadic tribal experience. Out of this experience, in the 10th and 11th 

centuries, new Islamic movements emerged that challenge the fundamental 

order of the Islamic world. 

The Fatimids

The Fatimids (909–1171) serve as a cautionary tale about the Maghreb and 

the transnational nature of ideology that resonates today. How does a virulent movement suddenly appear where it has never before existed and rapidly spread to threaten the existing order? In 892, a Yemeni from Sanaa, 

Abu Abdullah al-Hussein bin Ahmad (also known as al-Shi’i), converted to 

Ismaili ‘Sevener’ Shi’sm while living in southern Iraq. He returned to Yemen 

and studied under Ibn Hawshab Mansur al-Yaman. Both were disciples of 

Abdullah al-Mahdi, the Yemeni Ismaili imam. In 892, while on the hajj 

(the pilgrimage to Mecca), he met Kutama Berber pilgrims. Apparently the 

Kutama had some familiarity with Ismaili beliefs because two missionaries (da’is) sent by the sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq, had sojourned there. Ibn 

Hawshab instructed al-Shi’i to return with the pilgrims to the Maghreb and 

convert the Kutama.35

The assignment was challenging. The Maghreb was heavily Kharijite, 

and the Aghlabids were from the Sunni Maliki madhab and exceptionally 

hostile to alternate views. Nevertheless, the general lack of control in the 

Maghreb provided an opportunity to preach and recruit. In just a decade, 

al-Shi’i’s strict teaching and discipline had transformed the Kutama into a 

disciplined, motivated instrument of conquest. In 903, al-Shi’i launched a 

series of military campaigns that ended Aghlabid rule in Ifriqiya and Algeria. 

When the offensive began, al-Shi’i sent word to the Ismaili imam, al-Mahdi, 

to join him from Cairo. His armies captured Kairouan, the Aghlabid capital, 

The Maghreb was a fertile field 

for political and social unrest 

legitimized by the ideology of 

splintered Islamic groups and 

movements.
18

JSOU Report 17-3

in 909. The Aghlabid leader fled to Egypt. Having consolidated his position in 

Ifriqiya, al-Shi’i set off to the west and eliminated the Ibadi Kharijite Rustamid emirate (777–909) at Tahart. In January 910, al-Mahdi (now known as 

Abu Muhammad Abdullah) was proclaimed al-imam al-mahdi bi’llah (the 

imam rightly guided by God) and amir al-mu’minin (commander of the 

faithful) in the mosques of Kairouan. In effect, the Kutama had provided 

the means for a Shi’a caliphate to emerge in the stronghold of Maliki Sunni 

Islam. Theologically, for the Ismailis, the event heralded the end of the Seventh Imam’s occultation and ushered in a new Islamic era.36

In less than 20 years, the Ismailis went from a small hunted minority to 

control of a state with the military might to back it up. They used “deeprooted social ills” and the promise of justice to gain support. There was an 

added incentive, as Saunders put it: “In North Africa, the Berbers of the 

great Katama (sic.) confederation hated the racial arrogance of the Arabs 

of the towns.”37 This is not to say that establishing control in Ifriqiya was 

easy. They faced challenges from the Abbasids, the Umayyads of Spain, the 

Byzantines, the Qaramati of Bahrain, as well as the Sunni, Kharijite, and 

Berber tribes of the Maghreb. What had been a revolutionary movement now 

had to effectively wield power—a decidedly different proposition. Caliph 

al-Mahdi and al-Shi’i soon came into conflict. Fearing the latter’s influence 

with the Kutama, al-Mahdi arrested and executed al-Shi’i and his brother. 

This sparked a limited rebellion that was quickly quelled. The preeminence of 

the Kutama in the Fatimid structure created problems with the Ibadi Zanata 

Berbers in the far western Maghreb. They often found support from the 

Sunni Umayyads in Spain under their proclaimed caliph, Abd-ar-Rahman 

III (r. 929–961). Also in the west, the remnants of the Idrisid dynasty resisted 

control. Having inherited Sicily, the Fatimids faced persistent challenges 

from the Byzantines and others.38

In 969, under Caliph Abu Tamim Maad al-Mu’izz li-Din Allah (r. 953–

975), the Ismailis conquered Egypt, establishing a new city at Fustat and 

naming it Cairo (‘the victorious’). The conquest of Egypt was viewed as 

an intermediate step that would take them to victory over the Abbasids 

in Baghdad. Their success created a crisis in Abbasid Baghdad and a focus 

on discrediting the Ismailis.39 In fact, a theologian, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali 

(1055–1111), perhaps the second most important influence on Islam after 

the Prophet Muhammad, was engaged for much of his Baghdad career in 

countering Fatimid claims to legitimate caliphal authority.40 Cairo became 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

the Fatimid capital and the headquarters for a new sophisticated administrative system. It also became a center for learning and the arts. In the early 

970s, the Fatimids founded al-Azhar University, still functioning today, as 

a center for multi-sectarian Islamic learning. Their governing system was 

one generally based on merit more than ideology; therefore, there was every 

conceivable type of Muslim in the administration, as well as Christians and 

Jews. The Red Sea became a Fatimid lake, and the trade routes to India and 

the East made Cairo a critical trading link with Europe.41

In the Maghreb, the success to the east brought commensurate unraveling 

in the Maghreb under Caliph Abu Ali al-Mansur al-Hakim (r. 996–1021). 

While Berbers enabled the Fatimid triumph, positions of influence in the 

army and government went increasingly to Turkic elites from the east. Caliph 

al-Hakim came to the throne as a minor, and his vizier, Abd-al-Futut Barjawan, ruled as caliph. Confronted by Berber revolts, Barjawan’s policy of 

suppression alienated many of the core Berber supporters for the regime. In 

desperation, the Fatimids in Cairo turned to Hammad ibn Buluggin (r. 1014–

1028) to rule as their vassal in the central Maghreb, where he founded the 

Hammadid dynasty (1014–1052). With Sanhaja Berber support, he betrayed 

the Fatimids, adopting Sunni Islam and recognizing the Abbasids as the 

rightful caliphs. Powerless to intervene, the Fatimids watched a reassertion 

of Berber independence.42

Three centuries had passed since the Arab invasions and yet the region 

continued to defy political and social subjugation. For the conquerors, control was fleeting at best. The slightest provocation was invitation to revolt. 

By the mid-11th century, the Maghreb consisted more or less of three parts: 

the Zirid state in Ifriqiya (Tunisia); the weak Hammadid dynasty in the 

center (Algeria); and the various Berber tribal areas to the west in what is 

now Morocco. The Zirids are a prime example of the loss of control. Seeing 

opportunity to rid themselves of Fatimid rule, they announced their fealty 

to the Abbasids in Baghdad, infuriating the caliph in Cairo. The Hammadids, a rival of the Zirids, essentially took the same tack with Cairo, aligning 

themselves with anyone who could assist them in maintaining their independence. At this point, the Zirids reverted to Fatimid suzerainty to justify 

their attempts to conquer the Hammadids. In the west, the Zanata Berbers 

lacked the cohesion to be called a state. 

Frustrated, the Fatimid caliph found a new ally to punish the Hammadids—the Bani Hilal. The Bani Hilal were a large Bedouin tribe located on 
20

JSOU Report 17-3

the borders of upper Fatimid Egypt. On the condition that they would leave 

Egypt, the caliph offered them his blessings to raid the Maghreb43 (some 

historians called it a migration44). The Hilal, and other tribes that moved with 

them, attacked friend and foe alike. Abu Zayid Abd-al-Rahman ibn Khaldun 

al-Hadrami (Ibn Khaldun; 1332–1406) called them, “An army of locust, they 

destroyed everything in their path.”45 They devastated the countryside and 

economy. The invasion also shifted Saharan trading routes to the east, further impoverishing the region. After the initial onslaught, the Arabs settled 

into tribal districts with local sheikhs in nominal control, and the eastern 

Maghreb ceased to have any political cohesion. Change was coming.

The Almoravids

The Almoravid (1040–1147) was the first of two indigenous dynasties that 

would emerge in succession to unify the Maghreb. The situation created traumatic social and economic shifts among the Berber tribes. The Zanata Berbers 

controlled the northern ends of the transSaharan routes and the 

Sudanic state of Ghana, 

and cut the Sanhaja, and 

thus the Kutama, off from 

the south outlets. Caught 

between Zanata domination in the north and 

Sudanese-ruled Ghana, 

the pressure created an 

opening for something 

new. The spark came 

from Yahya ibn Ibrahim, 

Sanhaja tribal chieftain, 

and Abdullah ibn Yasin, 

a teacher and student of 

Islamic law. Backed by 

Ibn Ibrahim, who had 

just returned from the 

hajj, Ibn Yasin called for 

Figure 2. The Almoravid empire. 

SOURCE: OMAR TOONS
21

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

a return to strict Sunni Islamic practice. As with the Kutama, the imposition of discipline and the legitimacy flowing from the religious message 

transformed the Sanhaja into a potent military force. This is a repetitive 

pattern—the marriage of temporal necessity and leadership to an ideological justification and motivator.46 Having stamped out the Kharijite beliefs in 

the region, the Almoravids now turned to converting Ghana to their strict 

form of Maliki Islam.47

From their early beginnings near the Senegal River in the south, the 

message spread and recruits flowed into the ribats, or monastic-like military 

forts, a process not unlike what is being witnessed today among militants. 

Led by the Lamtuna clan of the Sanhaja, the al-Murabitun moved north 

against the Zanata and their impious ways and south against the pagan 

Africans that blocked their access to the southern trade routes. Heretical 

Berber tribes were brought to heel. Under their greatest leader, Yusuf ibn 

Tashfin (r. 1061–1106), they conquered most of Morocco and western Algeria. Marrakesh became their capital. This surge of Islamic revivalism and 

military power had far-reaching consequences. In Spain, the fragmented 

taifa (independent) Muslim states were on the verge of being overcome by 

the Christian Reconquista. Out of desperation, because they looked down 

on the Berbers, the taifa called on Ibn Tashfin for help and, at the Battle of 

Zallaqa in 1086, he decisively defeated the forces of King Alfonso VI of Leon 

and Castile, halting the Christian advance.48

There was a price—Ibn Tashfin systematically took control of the Muslim 

principalities and incorporated them into the Almoravid Empire. It was not 

a happy marriage; the sophisticated culture of Spain was sacked by fundamentalists from the Maghreb, sparking revolts. Nevertheless, the Almoravid 

Empire now stretched from the Senegal River to central Spain. Conquest was 

one thing; rule another. By 1140, rebellions in Spain forced them to withdraw 

and resentments in the Maghreb brought the predictable attempts to undermine their power.49 As the empire became more polyglot, they used Christian 

mercenaries, African slave cavalry, and Spanish scribes, poets, architects, 

and administrators, bringing their claims to Islamic purity under attack. The 

fact that Sunni Maliki legal scholars provided the ideological justification 

for rule did not sit well with Shi’a and Kharijite Berber tribes. It became a 

transcultural Berber empire dominated by the traditional Maliki Islamic 

practice.50 It also laid the foundations for an even more potent revivalist 

state that would follow. 
22

JSOU Report 17-3

The Almohads

In the mid-12th century, the Almoravids faced another more potent challenge 

from the Sahara, as Morocco demonstrated its ability to generate an expansionist Salafist Islamic movement. Muhammad ibn Abdullah ibn Tumart (r. 

1121–1130), a scholar from 

southern Morocco, who 

had made the hajj and 

studied in Damascus and 

Baghdad, returned home 

to preach a message of 

reform and revivalism. 

He claimed to be the 

Mahdi and preached that 

the corruption and impiety of the Almoravids was 

to be resisted. Ibn Tumart 

understood the system 

of tribal loyalty in the 

Maghreb was not static. In displacing the Almoravids, he exploited political and social fractures in a way that did not disrupt societal loyalties; he 

redirected toward a more ideological purpose and ultimate loyalty to himself 

as the Mahdi or Sheikh—Mashuk (sheikh of sheikhs).51 Esposito speculates 

that there was an element of highland Berber disdain for the lowland Berber 

Sanhaja, who were the backbone of Almoravid rule. No matter the cause, 

under their second leader, Abd-al-Mu’min, the Almohads (or al-Muwahidun) 

systematically undermined the military of the Almoravids, capturing their 

capital, Marrakesh, in 1147. The Almohads displaced the Almoravids in Spain 

and defeated Alfonso VII’s attempt to take advantage of the intra-Islamic 

struggle. In 1151, Abd-al-Mu’min organized two large expeditions and ended 

Hammadid rule in what is now Algeria, and then drove a Norman army 

from Naples out of Ifriqiya. The Maghreb and Muslim Spain were once again 

unified under a single ruler.52

Despite their astounding success, they failed to establish a state based on 

the Zahiri madhab of Sunni Islamic law. In the ninth century, two schools 

of Islamic thought emerged that rejected human reason in the interpretation 

of law (only the literal words of the Koran and Sunnah were to be used): the 

Figure 3. The Almohad empire. 

SOURCE: OMAR TOONS
23

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Hanbali school, founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbali (780–855) and from which 

the Wahhabi reform movement sprang in the 18th century, and the Zahiri 

school, established by Dawud ibn Ali al-Zahiri (819–891). Their differences 

were slight. The Zahiri believed that the meaning of the literal text could 

not be extrapolated at all. The Hanbalis believed that things clearly implied 

by the text were included. When the theological hair-splitting was done, the 

differences between the application of Zahiri Islam and Hanbali, or for that 

matter Wahhabi, Islam were almost non-existent. What this means is that 

an ultra-conservative Sunni Islamic state existed in the Maghreb well before 

one ever took root in Arabia.53 Their vision of an ideologically unified state, 

like the Fatamids and the Almoravids, failed. Ruling the Maghreb required 

compromises, and while some of their ideas may have survived in different 

forms, their ability to maintain and control a state failed. 

In the 13th century, the Almohads precipitously declined. In 1212, a 

Christian coalition in Spain destroyed a powerful Almohad army at Las 

Navas de Tolosa. It was the beginning of the end for Muslim Spain. In the 

Maghreb, the governor of Tunisia declared his independence and broke 

away from Almohad control. In the south, Bedouin from the Sahara, the 

Marinids, allied with their Zanata Berber cousins and detached swathes of 

southern Morocco. They occupied Marrakesh in 1269 and effectively ended 

the Almohad rule, establishing a new capital at Fez.54 Muslim reverses in 

Spain changed the trading and commercial structure in the Mediterranean. 

Venetian and Genoese trade proceeded into the Atlantic and along the coast 

of Africa as Muslim control further fragmented.55 By the 14th century, the 

severely reduced Muslim presence in Spain meant that Islamic dynasties 

and rulers of the Maghreb took an inward turn, focusing on stability and 

survival. 

The Maghreb: 1269–1517

For a period of more than two centuries, a series of Berber-dominated smaller 

Maghreb states competed for local control. Marinids (1244–1465) partially 

dominated the west. They supported the Muslims of Spain in resisting the 

Reconquista. Because of their Saharan origins, they were looked down on 

as uncouth nomads. Despite ferocious resistance, they controlled the urban 

areas, but never the tribal countryside. In the 15th century, the Marinids 

were replaced by the Wattasid dynasty (1472–1554).56 In the central Maghreb, 
24

JSOU Report 17-3

the so-called Zayyanid dynasty (1236–1550) actually represented no state at 

all. The Bani Abdul Wad of the Zanata Berbers was the largest tribal group, 

but they could not effectively rule it. Briefly, during the early 14th century, it 

appeared that a functioning state might emerge in what is now Algeria, only 

to be undermined by the Marinids in Morocco and the Hafsids in Tunis. As 

Marquette University history professor Phillip Naylor put it, “Of the three 

post-Almohadean Maghribi dynasties that emerged in this new political 

trilateralism, the Zayyanids were the most vulnerable.”57

In many respects, the Hafsids (1227–1574) of Ifriqiya were more cohesive. 

They retained much of their military organization and administration. They 

utilized the mobile military or administrative camp to maintain control 

and collect taxes—the mahalla.

58 The instability of the state threatened the 

dynasty on several occasions. In the late 13th century, the Maranids occupied 

Tunis. When the occupation failed, Hafsid control was restored. In the 14th 

and 15th centuries, Hafsid Tunisia underwent a renaissance, largely due to 

the longevity and good sense of two emirs, Abu Faris (1394–1434) and Abu 

‘Amr Uthman (1435–1488). Political stability brought economic prosperity. 

Uthman’s death brought a power struggle that completely undermined the 

state. By the 16th century, Tunis had become a prize in the struggle between 

Spain and the Ottoman Turks for control of the Mediterranean, and the 

subsequent Ottoman occupation would bring the dynasty to an end. The 

Maghreb became part of an imperial game that ultimately brought European 

occupation. 

Summary

In this examination of the Maghreb, three historical themes point to critical 

contemporary issues. First is the issue of control. Outsiders, no matter how 

powerful or ruthless, fail to gain anything more than superficial control. 

The Maghreb could be conquered but not controlled. In the end, occupation 

always cost more than it was worth. To repeat Hassan ibn al-Numan’s conclusion, “The conquest of Africa is an impossible thing.”59 Second, the Maghreb 

was fertile ground for revivalist fundamentalist religion. In the Christian 

era, Donatists and Arians fought the corrupt influences of orthodoxy. In the 

Islamic period, almost every brand of revolutionary or oppositionist Islam 

was represented—the Ibadi Kharijites, the Ismailis, Zaydis, Zahiri, and the 
25

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

conflicts between the Malikis and Hanafis. It was a breeding ground for 

ideologies that threaten the status quo.

The final issue is that of stability. Ibn Khaldun was the first to systematically assess the political and social structure of the Maghreb. His interpretation saw waves of invaders emerging from the desert unified by asabiyya, 

social and tribal cohesion, conquering and displacing corrupt regimes. This is 

a challenging concept that lies outside theoretical Western concepts of good 

governance and merit-based rule. Arab societies are based on patronage. 

Identifying the point at which patronage becomes corruption is challenging 

because, from a sociological point of view, it occurs gradually, often imperceptibly, in its early stages. Ibn Khaldun viewed urban development as the 

highest form of human achievement, but argued that the urban environment 

ruling groups paved the way for the next revolt.60 Certainly, in this short 

narrative covering a millennium, Ibn Khaldun’s judgments ring remarkably 

true. In a period of 300 years, Islamic sectarianism produced untold numbers 

of revolts and insurrections, and three large Islamic empires—the Fatimids, 

the Almoravids, and the Almohads. This was made possible by the fractured 

nature of society and the unbridgeable gulf between the coasts and the hinterland as a place of revolt and revolution. The contemporary implication is 

obvious and, as we go forward, the historical progression will have direct 

implications for the 21st century.

27

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

2. The Maghreb and the Imperial 

Construct

In the 16th century, the Mediterranean community underwent a series of 

changes that would set the set the contours of political, economic, and 

social development for more than 400 years. The Maghreb faced concerted 

imperial efforts to subdue and incorporate it into their systems. It was within 

the transcultural Ottoman system that the Maghreb found a paradigm that 

matched its fractured reality. Later, it would be in the French colonial system 

where the Westernized ideas of nationhood and identity emerged that have 

colored the politics of the 20th century. This study focuses on two general 

issues: (1) an explanation of the Ottoman system and how it functioned, 

and (2) the impact of the French colonial system and implications for today.

A brief explanation of the Ottoman system is critical because it provided 

a flexible structure within which the aggregate parts of the Maghreb could 

float in a political, economic, and socio-cultural equilibrium with 

only modest intervention from the imperial center in Istanbul. 

It is the flexibility of 

the equilibrium that 

complicates this narrative because while the 

details of local rule in 

the Maghreb were, in 

many cases, chaotic, 

the overarching system 

was not. In short, as 

long as imperial prerogatives were maintained, the Sublime Porte (central government) cared 

little for the details of how it was achieved. This allowed for a significant 

level of local autonomy and initiative. This narrative looks first at how the 

Ottomans arrived in the Maghreb. It also demonstrates the interconnectivity 

Figure 4. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire. 

SOURCE: SHUTTERSTOCK/PETER HERMES FURIAN
28

JSOU Report 17-3

of the Mediterranean world both then and now. The Ottomans, like the 

Romans and Phoenicians before them, focused on controlling the coasts 

and pacifying the interior. 

In 1453, the Ottomans captured Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire. From this new capital, now named Istanbul, they embarked on 

military campaigns that made them a European power. By the late 14th century, tribal and sectarian groups in eastern Anatolia (Turkey), most notably 

the Qizilbash, who were heterodox Shi’a and resisted Ottoman pacification, 

involved themselves in Ottoman succession issues. After 1500, the situation became more acute. In Persia, the Safaviyya, a militant Sufi order with 

Ismaili inclinations, took control. Ismail I, the first Safavid shah, sponsored 

rival claimants to the Ottoman throne. The details of the political machinations and military campaigns that began with the reign of Selim I (r. 1512–

1520), also known as ‘The Grim,’ provide excellent insight not only into the 

Ottomans and the Safavids, but also into their triangular relationship with 

the Sunni Mamluks who ruled Egypt. Selim overthrew his father, Sultan 

Bayezid II, who supported a rival sibling for the throne. The Qizilbash and 

the Safavids supported rivals, as well. In 1514, to secure his position, Selim 

destroyed the Persian Safavid army and its Qizilbash allies at the Battle of 

Chaldiran, and almost captured Shah Ismail. He then turned on the Safavid 

allies, the Sunni Mamluks. By 1517, the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks and 

conquered not only Egypt, but also the entire Hejaz in Arabia, including the 

holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the Levant, the Red Sea coast into Yemen, 

and parts of the Arabian Gulf littoral as far south as the Omani borderlands. 

Viewed holistically, these conquests fundamentally changed the scope and 

nature of Ottoman imperial ‘interests.’ 

In his campaigns, Selim used the Sunni ulema to provide justification 

for his war on the Shi’a apostates in Persia, and then later on their Sunni 

Mamluk allies in Egypt. The rapid defeats of both the Safavids and Mamluks 

completely changed the dynamics of Ottoman policy. Their claim to a caliphate was enhanced by the conquest of the Hejaz in Arabia, including the holy 

cities of Mecca and Medina. Ideological issues aside, the geopolitical implications of the thrust to the east were little short of revolutionary. Ottoman 

interests also expanded into the western Mediterranean and the Maghreb. 

The maritime trade and political polices were now interconnected, particularly since their principal adversaries, whether in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or the Indian Ocean, were Portugal and/or Spain.61 The Islamic 
29

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Maghreb became a bulwark against Spanish imperial encroachment—the 

front line in trade and shooting wars to project influence and power. 

The Ottoman Maghreb

Although Islamic ideology provided the justification for conquest, the Ottomans rarely forced their version of Islam on their subjects. Ottoman administration reflected, to the degree possible, the ethnic and sectarian makeup 

of provinces and districts of the 

empire. In Egypt, the Ottomans 

installed the defeated Mamluks as 

administrators and incorporated 

the Mamluk army into Ottoman 

service. While the Sunni notable 

elites resided at the top of the Ottoman pecking order, the administration, 

including senior advisors, were Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others, 

based on ability and not, as a rule, on ethnic or sectarian backgrounds. This 

approach to rule was remarkably well-suited for the Maghreb. In the late 

15th and early 16th centuries, as Hafsid power declined in Tunis, the coastal 

population centers emerged as more or less autonomous city-states. They 

had their own agriculture and served as trading centers, with much of their 

wealth coming from privateering (corsairs). The armed maritime activities 

had political and ideological overtones. 

In 1492, the Spanish crown conquered Granada, completing the Reconquista. In 1502, Muslims in Granada revolted against Christian persecution, 

forced conversions, and other practices of Cardinal Francisco Jimenez de 

Cisneros.62 Several of the Maghrebi corsairs supported the Muslim revolt 

and, combined with their depredations, provoked Spain. Cardinal Cisneros came up with a counter-strategy employing a Spanish corsair, Pedro 

Navarro. Navarro captured the major ports at Mers al-Kebir, Oran, Algiers, 

and Tripoli. By 1510 to 1511, the key cities on the Maghreb coast were in Spanish hands or paying tribute to Spain.63 The fractured Islamic nature of the 

political hinterland meant that Spanish control never penetrated far beyond 

the coast. They established several presidios to the more valuable ports, but 

control was limited. This also emphasized the divisions between the urban 

coastal culture and that of the interior. Some Western-centric historians 

lamented that Spain had missed the opportunity to establish a Spanish North 

Ottoman administration reflected, 

to the degree possible, the ethnic 

and sectarian makeup of provinces 

and districts of the empire.
30

JSOU Report 17-3

Africa as the natural counterbalance to the Ottoman maritime zone in the 

east. Ferdinand Braudel, in The Mediterranean, stated, “[Spain’s] failure to 

pursue the war on the other side of the Mediterranean is one of the great 

missed opportunities of history.” He argued that it made Gibraltar a “frontier” and “severed” the links between Spain and North Africa.64 This is a 

typical Western-centric misinterpretation of Spanish possibilities in the 

Maghreb. Even at its height of power, Spain was fortunate to be able to hold 

the coastal enclaves, much less take control of the Maghreb. 

In an attempt to combat Spanish incursions, the Hafsids allied with the 

Barbarossa brothers—Aruj, Khayr al-Din, and Ishaq—who operated from 

the island of Djerba off the Tunisian coast. In 1516, the brothers, who were 

the most famous of the corsairs, became involved with the citizens of Algiers, 

the Ottoman Porte, and attempts to expel the Spanish. In 1518, Aruj, who 

had lost an arm fighting the Spanish, was killed.65 Vowing revenge against 

the Spanish, Khayr al-Din, now the Ottoman governor of Algiers, focused 

on reducing the Spanish fortification at Penon, which blocked the harbor. 

In 1518, facing a Spanish counterattack, Khayr al-Din requested Ottoman 

assistance. Selim I made the pirate the representative of the Sublime Porte 

on the Maghreb coast. Ottoman troops and artillery assisted Khayr al-Din’s 

efforts to stabilize his positon at Algiers. Finally, in 1529, he gained sustained 

control of the city, executed his opponents, and dismantled the Spanish 

fortification at Penon.66 Use of ‘privateers’ became a signature policy and an 

integrated part of Ottoman naval strategy in the Mediterranean. 

Success bred more Ottoman assistance. Suleiman the Magnificent 

made Khayr al-Din an admiral in the Ottoman fleet, and provided him the 

resources to invade Ifriqiya and take Tunis, Kairouan, and Bizerte. Charles 

V (r. 1519–1555), the Holy Roman Emperor, managed temporarily to restore 

Hafsid rule in Ifriqiya and threaten Algiers, but by the late 16th century, the 

Ottomans dominated the Maghreb through regencies in Algiers, Tunis, and 

Tripoli. The ports were home to some of the most famous corsairs of the age. 

They not only extended Ottoman sway through their maritime exploits, but 

at times they intervened in the interior and in Morocco. The Ottoman Sultan 

was supreme, but in practice, the regencies acted independently. 

Of the regencies, Algiers was the most powerful, influential, and successful. The Algerian nationalist historian Ahmed Tawfiq al-Madani described 

Algiers as the “Algerian Ottoman Republic,” an overstatement that nevertheless reflects the level of independence exercised within the Ottoman 
31

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

structure. Algiers became the showplace of the Mediterranean. Contemporary chroniclers used words like ‘surprised’ and were ‘astonished’ by the 

‘diversity’ that pervaded Algiers. In 1571, even the Habsburg victory over 

Ottoman naval forces at Lepanto failed to undermine Ottoman resiliency. 

Just three years later, the Ottomans mounted a land and sea expedition that, 

once and for all, overwhelmed the Habsburg-backed Hafsids in Tunis, creating rulers that actually outlived the Ottomans. Even as late as the 18th century, it was said that the periodic French, British, and Dutch bombardments, 

a reaction to the corsairs, did little to dent commerce.67 Sustained control 

did not extend into the interior. Islamic Sufi brotherhoods—the Darqawiyya, 

Qadiriyya, and Tijaniyya, to name three—systematically incited opposition 

to the Ottomans, emerging as serious threats to the coastal regencies, pitting the rural and montane Maghreb against the coastal order. As a result, 

Ottoman control, like that of the Carthaginians, Romans, and Arabs, held 

little sway just a few short miles from the coast.

Morocco’s Independent Path

In Morocco, political development took a different path, perhaps because 

of a shared imperial Islamic path or perhaps because its Western and Saharan roots insulated it from political forces that might have destroyed it. In 

the early 16th century, Morocco was entirely geopolitically positioned to 

receive the brunt of Portuguese and Spanish imperial expansion. Between 

1497 and 1515, to secure their Asian trading routes around Africa, the Portuguese took Melilla, Agadir, Safi, and Azemmour. They also laid siege to 

Marrakesh. Taking coastal settlements, or even Marrakesh, was one thing, 

but holding them was another. It was more trouble than it was worth. Thus, 

when the Bani Saad, claiming descent from Fatima and Ali ibn Abi Talib, 

stood in resistance, the tribes of southern Morocco rallied to their banners. 

The Christians dismantled the Wattasid dynasty, but when Muhammad alQaim (d. 1518) united the Sufis, marabouts, and the southern tribes against 

the Portuguese and Spanish, it was a different proposition.68

The Sadis, as they became known, captured Marrakesh in 1524 and Fez 

in 1549.69 In the interim, they expelled the Portuguese from Agadir. Sadi rule 

(1549–1654) established Morocco as an independent state. Having curbed 

Iberian-based Christian expansion, the Sadis attempted to eradicate all 

remaining Wattasid influence. The Wattasids asked for Ottoman assistance, 
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JSOU Report 17-3

and together they captured Fez in 1554. Nevertheless, the Sadis effectively 

ended the Wattasid dynasty by killing its leader. Sultan Muhammad alShaykh (r. 1542–1557) pursued a middle path between Madrid and Istanbul 

that left Morocco unmolested. Proclaiming himself the Mahdi, he focused on 

the suppression of the Sufis, marabouts, and various Sufi brotherhoods, like 

the Yusufiyya.70 In his view, the populist religious leaders were “ignorant” 

troublemakers, and matters as important as religion should be limited to 

an educated elite.71 By the time of his assassination by the Ottomans in 1557, 

he had confirmed Moroccan independence. His foreign policy reflected his 

confidence, demanding that any Ottoman cities or forts in Morocco captured 

by the Spanish be turned over to him.72

The sultan’s assassination plunged Morocco into political chaos over succession, and the Ottomans were as big a threat as ever. The next ruler, Sultan 

Abu Muhammad Abdullah al-Ghalib (r. 1557–1574), was shrewd. First, he 

restored the religious leaders, including Abu al-Abbas al-Samlali of the powerful Jazuli order, to their previous positions in return for their recognition of 

the sultan as the paramount religious authority. The Jazuli were bitter rivals 

of the Qadiriyya order supported by the Ottomans. Second, he dropped 

attempts to create a Moroccan-Spanish alliance to mollify Istanbul. At the 

same time, Al-Ghalib maintained his understandings with Spain and refused 

to provide material support to the Morisco (Muslim) rebellion (1568–1570) in 

Spain. Third, as for succession, he attempted to follow the Ottoman practice 

of killing all his potential rivals to the throne. It was only partially successful given that his brothers wisely stayed out of reach in Ottoman territory.73

The policy appeared to secure Moroccan independence on multiple 

fronts—that is, until the new Portuguese monarch, King Sebastian (r. 1557–

1578), embarked on a grandiose plan to create a Maghrebi empire. When 

al-Ghalib died in 1574, Portugal attempted to intervene in the succession. In 

a strange alliance, the Ottomans and Spanish jointly supported their own 

claimant. In 1578, Sebastian invaded Morocco at the head of an army to 

secure rule for his claimant. At the Battle of Wadi al-Makhazin, also known 

as the battle of the three kings, the Sadis were triumphant—King Sebastian 

was killed, his claimant drowned, and the new Sadi sultan, Abd-al-Malik, 

suffered an apparent heart attack. Abd-al-Malik’s brother, Ahmed al-Mansur 

(r. 1578–1603) became sultan, thus ending the succession crisis.74

Al-Mansur’s reign was the pinnacle of Sadi rule in Morocco. In international affairs, his diplomacy from Istanbul to Madrid protected Moroccan 
33

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

independence. He created a sophisticated government structure, called the 

makhzan, placing the administrative functions under central control. He 

designated bilad al-siba a separate administrative structure to deal with 

territory under nominal control. Al-Mansur grasped the limitations that the 

geopolitical environment placed on Morocco. Blocked by Spain and Portugal 

in the north, and the Ottomans in the east, al-Mansur, despite opposition 

from the ulema, moved south, defeating the Songhay Empire in Mali and 

occupying Timbuktu and Gao. Unfortunately, the war actually destroyed 

the trade that al-Mansur was attempting to control, resulting in a Moroccan 

withdrawal in the early 17th century.75

Under al-Mansur, the Sadi state built impressive mosques, particularly 

Bab Dukkala and Mu’assim in Marrakesh. In the urban centers, there were 

prosperous Jewish quarters, and in the capital, even a hospital for Christian 

slaves. The palaces and tombs tended to reflect the ornate Mamluk style 

of architecture. The madrassas became centers for learning that attracted 

scholars from al-Andalus, across the Sahara, and to Arabia. It was a golden 

age that was totally dependent on the specific ruler. Disintegration and dislocation followed al-Mansur’s death, as rival claimants, local rulers, and 

sectarian groups vied for control. Ports, like Rabat and Salé, declared their 

independence and launched their corsairs. Waves of pandemics reduced the 

population drastically. The Sadi state fractured, and control and stability 

in Morocco suffered.76 The Sadi state finally collapsed in the face of a new 

dynasty, the Alawis. 

The Sunni Alawis rule Morocco today. They claim direct descent from 

the Prophet through Hasan, the oldest son of Ali ibn Talib, the fourth Rashidun caliph of the Sunnis or the first Shi’a imam.77 In 1664, Ahmad Mulay 

al-Rashid (r. 1664–1672) conquered Morocco and restored political control. 

The Alawi armies, comprised of abid (slave soldiers), crushed all opposition. 

Under Abd-al-Nasr Mulay Ismail (r. 1672–1727), the Alawi state recaptured 

several coastal enclaves held by the Spanish and moved into the southern 

Sahel, occupying much of Mauritania and controlling both ends of the transSaharan trade. Mulay Ismail maintained absolute authoritarian control in 

the face of numerous attempts by rivals to undermine him. The ulema in Fez 

attempted to declare the abid an institution in violation of Islamic law, and 

Mulay Ismail struck back, outlawing the ulema. Once again, state structure 

became so intertwined with the personage of the ruler that on Ismail’s death, 

political control fractured. Mulay Abdullah ibn Ismail was deposed and 
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JSOU Report 17-3

restored on five different occasions between 1728 and 1757. The abid usurped 

the power of the rulers and ruled Morocco for parts of three decades.78

In 1757, Sultan Muhammad (III) bin Abdullah (r. 1757–1790) restored order 

by disbanding the abid. After the brief rule of Yazid (r. 1790–1792), Mulay 

Sulayman (r. 1792–1822) came to power. His rule corresponded to the heyday 

of the first Saudi state, in which the Wahhabi emirs captured and occupied 

Mecca and Medina. Influenced by Wahhabi reform, the sultan denounced 

and repressed Sufis, marabouts, and the Darqawiyya brotherhood. Using 

the mantle of religious ideology, Sulayman repressed the primary internal 

opposition to political centralization. Ideologically, fundamentalist Islam 

isolated Morocco from European influences that increasingly encroached 

on North Africa and the Maghreb.79

In the late 18th century, all of North Africa faced mounting European 

pressure. The invasion of Egypt in 1798 exposed not only the weakness of 

the Mamluks, but also demonstrated the impotence of the Ottoman system. 

Short-lived as the occupation was, it set in motion a chain of events that 

would overlay the external façade of North Africa and the Maghreb with 

yet another, even more alien, external political framework. In the Maghreb, Morocco 

attempted to protect its independence through 

an inward political and ideological turn by 

embracing Hanbali Islam. The Ottomans and 

their erstwhile regencies in Algiers, Tunis, and 

Tripoli attempted to reassert their control in the face of growing encroachment. It was losing the struggle. 

North Africa and the New Imperial Order

The new rulers of Egypt modeled their state and modernization on the West. 

The ascendance of Western imperialism and, more specifically, French colonialism in the Maghreb was an outgrowth of the Napoleonic invasion. The 

British removal of the French from Egypt brought an Ottoman attempt 

to reassert their control and end Mamluk autonomy. In 1803, the Ottoman Albanian units, sent to Egypt to reestablish control, rebelled. By 1805, 

Muhammad Ali Pasha (Mehmet Ali), the Albanian commander, ruled Egypt. 

He would prove to be the most formidable ruler of Egypt since Fatimid 

Caliph Hakim.

In the late 18th century, 

all of North Africa faced 

mounting European 

pressure.
35

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

By the early 19th century, the British protected a weak Sublime Porte as 

the ideal buffer between British India and the designs of other imperial European powers. Early on, it became apparent that Muhammad Ali intended 

not only to establish himself as the power in the Red Sea region and Arabia, 

but also to take control in Istanbul. To undermine the pasha’s control, the 

British occupied Alexandria, but eventually withdrew. Between 1807 and 

1811, Muhammad Ali ruthlessly expanded his control. He neutralized the 

Islamic clergy by confiscating their property, leaving them impoverished. 

Then, in 1811, he invited all of the Mamluk elite to a banquet at the citadel 

where they were massacred—ending two-and-a-half centuries of Mamluk 

power. He opened Egypt to European—particularly French—business interests, undermining the power of the Egyptian commercial elites, and used 

his increased revenues to create a modern army and navy replete with a 

Turko-Circassian officer corps. He recaptured Mecca and Medina from the 

Wahhabis and, in 1818, destroyed the first Saudi state. In theory, he was the 

Ottoman viceroy; in practice, he was the independent ruler of Egypt with 

designs on the Levant and Istanbul itself. Fearing French influence and the 

viceroy’s ambitions, the British spent the next three decades focused on 

limiting Egyptian expansion. 

Algeria and the French Colonial Structure

The rise of Muhammad Ali in Egypt had a decisive influence on the Maghreb, 

severing the last vestiges of Ottoman suzerainty. In 1816, a combined AngloDutch fleet entered Algiers harbor under a white flag, then commenced a 

ferocious bombardment of the city’s fortifications—the European powers 

no longer countenanced piracy along the Maghrebi coast. By 1830, various 

commercial disagreements had escalated to the point that Husayn Dey (r. 

1818–1830) slapped the French consul with a fly whisk out of frustration. The 

diplomatic incident led to a French blockade. Charles X of France, who was 

deeply unpopular, saw the Algerian crisis as a domestic political opportunity.

In June 1830, the French landed 37,000 troops, overwhelmed the Ottomans and removed the dey. In Paris, the political ploy failed and the Revolution of 1830 overthrew Charles X and dumped the Algerian problem on 

Louis-Phillippe, the new French king. Louis-Phillippe commissioned a study 

that offered classic 19th-century rationales for the colonization of Algeria. 

It provided the French with significant military leverage in the western 
36

JSOU Report 17-3

Mediterranean, as well as markets for manufacturing. There was also the 

responsibility of the French “civilizing mission.”80 Most importantly, the 

Algerian occupation was immensely popular and enhanced Louis-Phillippe’s 

legitimacy. By 1834, Algerian colonization had become official French policy 

despite the fact that it was officially described as a ‘limited occupation.’ By 

1840, most of the coast was in French hands. 

The French learned the same lesson that previous ‘conquerors’ had learned 

in the Maghreb—the invasion was relatively simple, occupation more difficult, and control virtually impossible. Ahmed Dey, a former Ottoman ruler, 

fought the French on the coast and then retreated to the interior, continuing 

to resist. The marabouts and the Sufi brotherhoods resisted. Emir Abd-alQadir (1807–1883), the leader of the Sufi Qadiriyya brotherhood, defeated the 

French in 1835 in western Algeria, and in the 1837 Treaty of Tafna, he forced 

the French to recognize his authority over 

western and central Algeria. Abd-al-Qadir 

adopted the language of jihad in an attempt 

to unify the disparate tribes and religious 

groups.81 War broke out again in the 1840s, 

and a massive French army of more 100,000 

men, under Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, finally defeated and captured Abd-alQadir after chasing him into Morocco. He 

became the symbol of Algerian resistance, 

admired by Algerians and French alike. As one French general wrote, 

“Abdelkader was emir because Liberty had entrusted him with her sword 

... unhappy son of the desert, future generations will honour your name.”82

Bugeaud was the founder of French Algeria. He created the Bureaux 

arabes as a government department to mediate between the indigenous 

population and the French settlers. Policy was, of course, a contradiction. 

On the one hand, there were those in the bureau who were both arabophone 

and berberophone, and then there were the bureaucrats who knew neither 

the language nor the culture. This was set against the brutality of an unrestrained counterinsurgency and confiscation of land for sale to settlers at 

cut-rate prices. As Bugeaud put it, “Where there is fresh water and fertile 

land, there one must locate colons [colonial farmers or plantation owners], 

without concerning oneself to whom these lands belong.”83 The funds from 

the sale of confiscated land defrayed the costs of the war and occupation. 

The French learned the 

same lesson that previous 

‘conquerors’ had learned in 

the Maghreb—the invasion 

was relatively simple, occupation more difficult, and 

control virtually impossible.
37

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Between 1850 and 1871, the French fought serial Berber rebellions. Nevertheless, by 1870, the pied noir or colon population of Algeria had risen to 

200,000.84 In 1871, the Great Kabyle Revolt led by the Rahmaniyya Sufi order 

almost unhinged French control. Its defeat resulted in the confiscation of 

thousands of hectares of land by the French. The resistance to the French 

was so determined that nationalists would later argue that the French never 

actually fully conquered Algeria.85

In France, democracy empowered the Algerian settler class by allowing 

them to place direct pressure on the French government to support their 

position. The Revolution of 1848 created a constitution that declared Algeria 

an integral part of French territory. In effect, French law and administration 

was the law of land. It removed the Bureaux arabes from the administration, 

limiting their responsibilities to the ‘military zones’ of the interior. The application of French law and administration applied only to French settlers, not 

indigenous Algerians, whether Berbers or Arabs. The colons fiercely resisted 

any attempt to broaden citizenship. The French system of land confiscation 

and repression undermined and impoverished the indigenous population 

and replaced it with nothing. 

Even during the Second Empire, when Napoleon III ordered tribal lands 

returned and safeguarded, his policies were gradually undermined as the 

parliamentary faction in Paris gained more power. By the end of the empire, 

the French government decreed that tribal lands were to be broken up and 

handed to individuals for ownership. Because of debt and poverty, this 

opened the lands to European exploitation. This reality sparked the rebellion of 1871. The conclusion of the rebellion meant that the colons ruled 

Algeria virtually unhindered. The entire legal system was tilted against native 

Algerians in that Islamic and tribal law held sway only in internal civil matters—marriage, inheritance, gifts, etc. French law dominated all other aspects 

of Algerian life and criminal justice was meted out only by French juries. In 

criminal cases, the Algerians were subject to the Code de l’Indigénat of 1881, 

which provided for streamlined punishment, internment, confiscations, and 

collective punishment for non-French Algerians. The system in which the 

French were to bring ‘civilization’ and ‘Gallicize’ Algeria was actually a tool 

for colon hegemony and apartheid.86

The economy was fundamentally a colonial structure. Commerce was 

based on a commodity-for-manufactured-goods system. In Algeria, only 

the colon class, the pied noir, could participate in the system because of the 
38

JSOU Report 17-3

impoverishment of the indigenous population. Algeria furnished agricultural and mining products, and the political system placed most arable land 

in the hands of the Europeans—not just French, but also Italians, Greeks, 

Spaniards, and a very small group of co-opted Algerians who were given the 

French citizenship denied to most of the population. This system created a 

large landless peasantry but also increased agricultural output significantly.87

The land tenure practices in the Warnier Law of 1873 removed collective 

ownership in favor of individual plots. The indigenous population, functioning at a subsistence 

level, thus often 

had to sell their 

land, leaving the 

former landowners 

and their families 

in poverty. Agriculturally, mechanization required 

capital in a system 

that was largely limited to the colons; 

therefore, on indigenously owned agricultural land, the 

production fell by 

almost 75 percent. 

What educational 

system existed for 

Algerians produced a very thin veneer of elites in a sea of poverty and dispossession. It exposed the bitter contradiction between the ideals of liberty 

and nation and the reality of French rule.88 The French system virtually 

guaranteed an explosion. By the 1930s, desperation coalesced into resistance.

Tunisia and Morocco: The Protectorate System

Between 1830 and 1875, as the French attempted to consolidate their position in Algeria, Tunisia remained a part of the Ottoman Empire, in theory. 

In reality, Tunisia functioned as an independent state. In 1869, confronted 

Figure 5. Colonization of Africa through 1912. 

SOURCE: THE WORLD BANK
39

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

by creditors, the bey agreed to a Protectorat a trois in which Britain, France, 

and Italy administered the country’s finances and development projects. Of 

course, economic administration required political control. At the Congress 

of Berlin in 1878, a series of European disputes were adjudicated, particularly 

as they related to the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. France 

was given a free hand in Tunisia, while the British received similar carte 

blanche in Egypt.

In 1818, to consolidate its position, the French landed an army of 36,000 

troops and forced the bey to sign the Treaty of Bardo. Under the terms of 

the treaty, France assumed responsibility for Tunisia’s foreign affairs and 

internal security while guaranteeing the position of ruling dynasty. Clauses 

in the treaty gave the French an opening to take over the government entirely 

under certain circumstances. Shortly after the French occupation, a series 

of tribal uprisings destabilized the country, forcing the French to send more 

troops to quell the revolt against ‘intruders.’ The bey was forced to sign a 

supplemental agreement that became the Treaty of La Marsa, transforming 

Tunisia into a French protectorate.89

There was support for an outright takeover of Tunisia à la Algeria, but 

with the Algerian revolt of 1871 and the headaches associated with the country’s administration and the colons, there was strong opposition to such an 

expensive administrative system in Tunisia. Tunisia was suited for agricultural, mining, and development project exploitation, but not as much 

for settlement. In addition, the French believed that by exercising control 

through the protectorate, the system would be more acceptable to the local 

population—Paris wanted to limit the potential for the revolts and to avoid a 

‘new Algeria.’ In the Tunisian system, the bey ruled in theory, but the resident 

general approved all actions. French officials controlled the key ministries 

and the caid class of indigenous local rulers was co-opted into the system. 

The caids received a percentage of taxes collected and were allowed to usurp 

land and mete out justice as long as they maintained control. Thus, the 

interests of the caids and those of the French coincided. Over time, the caids

found themselves politically isolated and targeted by the resistance movements. Nevertheless, this reliance on the local notables for control blunted 

attempts by French colons to take over in Tunisia as they had in Algeria.90

In Morocco, the pattern of occupation and control followed the Tunisian model. The sultan, in theory, ruled the entire state, with the most of 

the Berber tribal confederations recognizing his role. In reality, many areas 
40

JSOU Report 17-3

functioned autonomously. Modernization efforts led to Western economic 

encroachments that led to capitulations over sovereignty, which in turn 

led to debt and foreign intervention. Revolts against Sultan Abd-al-Aziz 

(r. 1894–1907) created instability that also tempted European intervention. 

By 1900, the French government was in the process of establishing a legal 

framework for intervention with the other foreign powers, particularly Spain, 

Italy, and Britain. The Germans resisted, almost sparking a general war in 

1904. Eventually the French prevailed and, by 1911, Paris exercised a full 

protectorate over Morocco. 

The sultan, bending to the political winds, merely made the most of it 

by making a personal land grab of huge estates and extracting enormous 

payments for his part in the new arrangement.91 Once again, establishing a protectorate was one thing; controlling it was another. By 1912, the 

French administration behind the façade of the sultan faced serious revolts. 

Although uncoordinated, a rebellion of Moroccan troops in Fez against 

their French instructors left the city in Moroccan hands for a brief period. 

To regain control, the French ended any pretense of a behind-the-scenes 

role and named General Hubert Lyautey as High Commissioner. Lyautey 

forced the sultan to abdicate in favor of his brother Youssef, and then set 

about taming the unrest with a skillful combination of force and co-option. 

In 1912, the marabout El Hiba, with the mountain Berber population behind 

him, declared himself sultan and occupied Marrakesh.92

The revolt was put down, but instead of employing drastic measures like 

those in the aftermath of the 1871 revolt in Algeria, Lyautey pacified using a 

show of force while protecting the rights of the cadis and notables. This policy 

of recognizing and rewarding local rulers was particularly important in the 

south. The French administration allowed the notables, like Thami al-Glaoui, 

to amass great power and wealth, and protected their positions as long as 

they cooperated. The position of the sultan was maintained, along with that 

of the traditional ruling class. The sultanate and the traditional government 

structure remained intact, including the tribal and caid leadership in the 

south. This contributed to the overall stability as a traditional Maghrebi 

polity was maintained. As one observer put it, “Morocco is a cow which 

the caids milk while the French hold its horns.”93 The French protectorate 

system differed in one significant aspect from that of the British in Malaya 

or India: indirect rule involved much more intensive French supervision of 

the local rulers. The protectorates were merely a stage on the path to full 
41

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

integration with France. While any number of officials and military officers 

strongly advised against any such development, the pervasive presence of 

French administrators in the administrations of both Morocco and Tunisia 

nurtured the idea of full annexation. 

Identity and Resistance: The Early 20th Century in the Maghreb

Roughly speaking, prior to 1900, opposition to French rule in the Maghreb, 

was crushed if it was organized, or devolved into disorganized, uncoordinated local eruptions. By 1900, the nucleus of resistance began to emerge, 

not surprisingly from some of the very institutions and ideas that the French 

themselves promoted. In Tunisia in 1907, the Le Tunisien newspaper emerged, 

edited by a local lawyer, Ali Bach-Hamba. In 1908, the Jeunes Tunisiens 

(Young Tunisians) organization, modeled on the Ottoman Young Turk 

movement emerged as a loose association with political overtones. The Young 

Tunisians asserted their loyalty to France, but demanded reforms including 

a constitution, tax reform, educational improvements, and the right to elect 

representatives to the Consultative Conference. In 1911, colons accused the 

organization of inciting unrest over a dispute related to a cemetery near 

Tunis, and the newspaper and organization were disbanded. The Tunisian 

movement nevertheless inspired a similar Young Algerians movement, which 

demanded the right to enter the ‘French city’ and share the same rights as 

Frenchmen. In effect, the limited educational opportunities offered to indigenous Algerians had created a small literate elite who, when exposed to the 

ideas of the French Revolution, asked the simple question, ‘Why not us?’ This 

educated elite was, in effect, ‘French,’ and demanded the rights of Frenchmen. The colon community opposed any possibility of such a development 

because, carried to its logical conclusion, it meant that Algeria and Tunisia 

would be ruled by Algerians and Tunisians. 

WWI lit the fuse that eventually led to the end of colonialism—an outcome not evident at the time. The war in 

Europe was fought not only by the states of 

the Central Powers and the Allies, but also 

by their colonies and empires. The Maghreb 

provided hundreds of thousands of soldiers 

and workers for the war effort in Europe. 

For the most part, the Maghreb remained quiet and loyal to France during 

WWI lit the fuse that 

eventually led to the end of 

colonialism—an outcome 

not evident at the time.
42

JSOU Report 17-3

war. However, the war clearly impacted society. Rising prices and shortages 

complicated by stagnant wages added to social tensions. Politically, an Arab 

uprising in the Hejaz and Levant captured the imagination of the peoples of 

the Maghreb. The Allies own propaganda—‘fighting for democracy’—called 

into question the issue of French colonialism, as did Woodrow Wilson’s 

pronouncements on self-determination. The situation in the Maghreb stood 

in direct contradiction to stated propaganda of the Allies. 

During the war, to prevent disruptions in Algerian recruiting, Premier 

Georges Clemenceau promised broad reforms. In particular, he promised 

citizenship or naturalization with the retention of Muslim sectarian identity. 

In 1919, the reality of ‘reforms’ was disappointing, including the rejection 

of identity retention. The disappointment among young Algerians, many 

of whom had fought for France, was real, but there was no agreement on 

a common course of action. The realization that they would have to seek 

justice, not as French citizens, but as citizens of Morocco, Algeria, or Tunisia, had not yet taken shape. The colon structure stifled any real progress. 

By the end of the war, the colons themselves were only 20 percent French. 

More spoke Spanish than French. There were large numbers of Italians and 

Maltese. The French described the pied noir as mediterraneens-et-demi. This 

reality also explained their attitudes toward metropolitan France, colored by 

“resentment, love, disdain and an inferiority complex with the undertones 

of superiority that so often accompany it.”94 Given their estrangement from 

the metropole and the Algerians, the colons saw reactionary intransigence 

as the only means to maintain their privileged position. 

When Emir Khaled, a grandson of Abd-al-Kader who had served with 

distinction on the Western Front, presented modest political demands on 

behalf of the evolues, or new Algerian elite, he was vehemently attacked in 

the colon press and left Algeria in disgust. Even General Lyautey commented, 

“Our policy is criminal.”95 In 1927, the Federation des Elus Indigenes, led by 

Dr. Muhammad Saleh Bendjelloul and Ferhat Abbas, provided a new vehicle for the evolues’ protest. As late as 1936, the organization’s activities and 

polemics still refused to use the term ‘Algerian nation,’ and instead sought 

reform within the French structure. The colons blocked any move that might 

have led to citizenship for Algerians on an equal footing with the French, and 

by the mid-1930s, other voices began to be heard. An Islamic reform movement led by Abdelhamid Ben Badis called for a return to the ‘true’ Islam. 

Islamic schools were founded and a renewed focus on Islamic education 
43

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

ensued. The issue of religious reform quickly became political because the 

opponents of the movement, the marabouts and their brotherhoods, were 

accused of collaboration with the French. Published in 1931, a nationalist 

history of Algeria spread widely by the mid-1930s. It bluntly stated: “Islam 

is our religion, Algeria is our fatherland, and Arabic is our language.” 

In Tunisia, the end of WWI saw the rise of a new, more broadly based 

political organization, the Dustur (Detour) party. In 1925, the Dustur joined 

with trade unions and other progressive groups to make political demands 

on the French administration. By 1930, the French administration had alienated large sections of the Arab-Muslim elite. A new leader had emerged, 

Habib Bourguiba, and Dustur had morphed into the Neo-Dustur Party. 

During the 1930s, the party’s calls for political independence became more 

strident. The Neo-Dustur became a lightning rod for French fears about 

unrest and political demands. The colons and the French administration 

braced for the potential explosion. The Neo-Dustur was a party of the masses, 

but it was urban based; the rural population had not yet been politicized. 

The situation in Morocco was different. First and foremost, General 

Lyautey’s policies had reinforced the traditional institutions of society by 

allowing the Moroccans to share in the administration and by supporting traditional Islamic institutions. As a result, liberation movements in 

Morocco were attached to Islam. The Salafiyya reform movement called for a 

return to the real Islam, directing its criticism toward the Sufi brotherhoods 

and their practices. The Salafiyya only took on national movement trappings 

after the Dahir Berbere was promulgated by the sultan in 1930. In effect, the 

dahir attempted to split the Arab population from the Berber and use the 

latter for political leverage. A national opposition emerged, and in the 1930s, 

it challenged the French administration and the sultan on numerous levels. 

In 1936, protests and demonstrations by the Moroccan Action Committee 

resulted in arrests and suppression of political movements. The opposition 

countered this first by using the Salafiyya as a front for reform, and then by 

founding a secret party, the National Party for Realization of the Reforms 

(NPRR). The NPRR’s activities resulted in the arrest of its executive committee and the deportation of its leadership. The stage was set in Morocco 

for the independence movements that would follow on the heels of WWII.96 
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JSOU Report 17-3

Summary

Under imperial rule, the Maghreb had two distinctly different experiences. 

Ottoman rule, for the most part, allowed a local system to function without 

interference. The Ottomans might impose a governor, but they were more 

likely to use local notables to manage the system. In addition, the Ottomans 

were Muslim and their administration avoided the worst aspects of Western 

colonial rule and prejudice. Under the Ottomans, the Maghreb was allowed 

to retain identity in a system that roughly paralleled the historical experience. The impacts of the French conquest 

and rule brought the realization among 

the young and educated that there was no 

future with France, and that only through 

independence could the promise of French 

liberal reform be realized. The populations 

of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria arrived at 

that conclusion via different paths. Because 

of the administration of General Lyautey, the 

traditionalist Moroccan structure resulted in 

an Islamic movement toward independence. 

In Tunisia, the nationalist movement turned 

against both the French and their co-opted tools, the traditional caid leadership and the monarchy. In Algeria, the idea that it was a part of France and 

that, as such, all its peoples should enjoy the benefits of French citizenship 

delayed the realization that independence was the only path toward any form 

of equality before the law. 

The impacts of the French 

conquest and rule brought 

the realization among 

the young and educated 

that there was no future 

with France, and that only 

through independence 

could the promise of 

French liberal reform be 

realized.
45

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

3. Independence Movements and the 

National States: 1930–2011

The end of the WWII did not bring an immediate end to the colonial 

structure in the Maghreb, but it made independence inevitable. The 

defeat by Nazi Germany undermined French authority in the eyes of the 

indigenous independence groups in North Africa. The weakness of postwar French governments also encouraged resistance across the Maghreb. In 

hindsight, it appears foolhardy that the French attempted to maintain the 

protectorates at all. However, a deeper examination underscores what can 

only be described as the logic of domestic political bankruptcy. To understand the emergence of the independent states of the Maghreb, one must first 

examine the nature of the French Fourth Republic (1946–1958). 

The Fourth Republic had 21 different administrations under six different 

political parties with too many coalitions to enumerate. General Charles de 

Gaulle, who headed the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 

1944 to 1946, vehemently opposed its parliamentary structure as an extension 

of the Third Republic (1870–1940), the unstable system of the interwar years 

that was crushed by Nazi Germany in 1940. De Gaulle believed that only a 

strong presidential system could insure the stability of the state. The political 

struggle over the post-war government was fundamentally between Gaullists and the Left. The center-right parties were largely discredited because 

of their collaboration with the Germans.

In 1946, the Socialists and Communists outmaneuvered de Gaulle on the 

new constitution, causing him to resign. The leftists were, in turn, outmaneuvered by the center-right parties who forced a rewrite of the constitution. 

The political maneuvering resulted in a strange alliance between the Popular 

Republican Movement (MRP), or Christian-Democrats (center-right), and 

the leftists, Socialists and Communists. The alliance left the Gaullists and the 

more conservative parties out in the political cold. This odd alliance forced 

through the new constitution. The Fourth Republic was no more stable than 

the coalition that produced it. In 1947, because of irreconcilable differences 

between the MRP and leftists, a center-right alliance that included the MRP, 

the Gaullists, and the other conservative parties took power. It set the stage 
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JSOU Report 17-3

for frequent government changes, political instability, and an ongoing conflict over colonial policy. 

Despite the political instability, the period of the Fourth Republic was a 

time of great social and economic growth and progress in European France, 

and a move toward European economic integration. However, colonial policy 

and the question of decolonization became a defining policy issue between 

the political right and left. Conservative French politicians would, time and 

again, invoke the threat of leftist and Communist influence at home to secure 

support from its allies for maintaining colonial structures abroad. Indochina was the most prominent example, but the argument was used for the 

Maghreb, as well. As protectorates, Tunisia and Morocco maintained their 

monarchies and their pseudo-independence, which did not protect them 

from colonial exploitation. In Algeria, the large colon population, coupled 

with incorporation into the French metropole, meant that, in theory, the 

separation or independence of Algeria was tantamount to the secession of 

Normandy or Provence. Between 1946 and 1958, the politics of the Maghreb 

and that of the Fourth Republic were inseparable in the sense that each were 

driven by the other and by pan-Arab nationalism. The gauntlet through 

which the fully independent states of the Maghreb emerged would set the 

course for political, economic, and social development into the 21st century. 

This chapter outlines the emergence of the national states, and compares and 

contrasts their political development up to the uprisings of 2011.

Tunisia: 1930–2011

The discussion of Tunisia as an independent state requires a brief look back. 

In the 1930s, the Dustur Party split and the Neo-Dustur, and its leader Habib 

Bourguiba, emerged. Bourguiba defined Tunisian politics for more than 

seven decades. The Dustur metaphorically looked back to an idealized 

Islamic past and rejected the Westernization that had come with the French 

protectorate; the Neo-Dustur represented the younger generation and were, 

in fact, products of that Westernization. There was a clear Islamic component 

to the Neo-Dustur, as well. Many of the religious, political, and social ideas 

of Islamic reformers, like Muhammad Abduh and the Salafiyya movement 

of the 19th and early 20th centuries, found their way into Neo-Dustur policies. However, because the Neo-Dustur was secular and wrote the history 

of the independence movement, the Islamic contribution was minimized or 
47

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

ignored completely, despite the fact that the opening shot of the Neo-Dustur’s 

campaign for dominance was in defense of Tunisia’s Islamic heritage.97

In 1930, the Catholic Church received permission from the French Third 

Republic and Tunisian government of Ahmed (II) ibn Ali Bey (r. 1929–1942) 

to hold the 30th International Eucharistic Congress in Carthage. Parades 

with Catholic youths dressed as Crusaders, attempts to convert Muslims, 

and the Papal legate’s characterization of Islam in North Africa as “fourteen 

centuries of desolation and death” brought protests, strikes, and condemnation from religious and secular Tunisians alike. The Neo-Dustur challenged 

the entire concept, calling it an affront to “Tunisia’s Muslim personality.” 

Before the furor over the eucharist celebration had subsided, the French 

President created another gaffe by stating that the protectorate in Tunisia had 

embodied the “highest humanitarian principles.” This was followed in 1933 

by a dispute over an attempt to bury a naturalized French citizen in a Muslim 

Figure 6. Modern-day Tunisia. SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
48

JSOU Report 17-3

cemetery.98 Despite its largely secular leadership, the Neo-Dustur took up 

the defense of Tunisia’s national Islamic culture, increasing their credibility. 

The global Depression provided additional political inroads for the new 

party. Attempts by French authorities were frustrated by the Tunisians and 

the instability within the Third Republic. As governments changed, so did 

policies toward the independence movements. In prison under one French 

government, the Neo-Dustur would find themselves out of jail and free to 

publicly organize under the next. The Neo-Dustur had cells throughout 

the country, including at the major universities. With rising educational 

standards among women, the party also broached gender issues, but with a 

keen ear to the broader implications that it might have on political support 

in the broader, more conservative traditionalist society.99 In 1938, the collapse of the Popular Front government in Paris resulted in broad repression 

of political dissent. In 1939, Bourguiba and much of the Neo-Dustur found 

themselves imprisoned in southern France. The war in Europe actually weakened the Neo-Dustur. French policy did not change under the Vichy and 

some party members concluded that cooperation with the Germans was the 

best course of action. This was common, particularly in the Middle East and 

North Africa, because the Arabs, whether in Egypt, Iraq, or Palestine, saw 

a German victory as the pathway to independence. 

With the political opposition in prison or in hiding, support for independence came from an unexpected source. In 1942, Mohammed (VII) Moncef 

Bey came to the Tunisian throne. He asserted his independence by blocking 

Vichy propaganda against Tunisian Jews. When Vichy commanders negotiated a cease-fire with invading Allied forces, provoking a German occupation, Moncef Bey took a neutral stance between the warring powers and used 

his leverage on the Germans to appoint the first truly Tunisian cabinet since 

the beginning of the protectorate. Following the Allied victory in North 

Africa, the French removed Moncef Bey for being a ‘German collaborator,’ 

replacing him with his cousin Mohammed (VIII) Amin Bey (r. 1943–1956).

The Germans freed the Neo-Dustur prisoners held in France and transferred them to Italy, using some of them to broadcast anti-French, proGerman propaganda to their countrymen—most refused, most notably 

including Bourguiba, who staunchly believed that the path to independence 

was through an Allied victory. The Free French, no less than their Vichy 

opponents, were intent on maintaining the protectorate and made a concerted attempt to vilify Bourguiba and the Neo-Dustur. The attempt largely 
49

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

failed because Bourguiba’s wife and son convinced key American diplomats 

that he was not pro-German, but rather a Tunisian nationalist. In 1943, the 

Germans, through their Italian allies, repatriated Bourguiba to Tunisia, 

hoping that he would prove to be a thorn in the side of the Free French. 

A struggle between the Communist Party of Tunisia (PCT) and the NeoDustur ensued. The PCT, because of its ties to the French Communists and 

Moscow, supported ‘solidarity’ between France and its ‘dependencies’; the 

Neo-Dustur supported independence, and an alignment with the Americans 

and British to obtain it. Once again, Bourguiba played the Islamic card to 

gain an advantage and differentiate Neo-Dustur policy from that of the 

Communists, portraying the latter as a foreign, anti-Islamic ideology. 

With regard to the protectorate, what followed was a series of political 

maneuvers by the Neo-Dustur to bring internal and international pressure 

on Paris. In 1945, Bourguiba solicited the help of the newly formed League 

of Arab States. In 1947, he joined with Moroccan and Algerian nationalists 

in the Comité de Liberation d’Afrique du Nord, led by Moroccan resistance 

leader Abd al-Karim. In 1947, labor unrest and strikes brought violent confrontations that pushed labor and the illegal Neo-Dustur toward an alliance. 

The Neo-Dustur became the dominant opposition organization. It also began 

to attract some in the business community and civil service who saw the 

‘handwriting on the wall’ vis-à-vis France’s ability to maintain the protectorate. With Bourguiba in exile, Salah Ben Yusuf, the secretary-general of 

Neo-Dustur, established the party as the only viable opposition interlocutor 

with the French administration. In 1948, when Moncef Bey died, his followers had nowhere to turn but to the party. At this point, Ben Yusuf pointedly 

warned the French that they could either establish a clear path to end the 

protectorate or face the consequences of violent political explosion.100

From Cairo, Bourguiba fretted that his absence was hurting his own position and that Ben Yusuf might provoke a premature clash with the French 

that the Neo-Dustur had no chance of winning. He drafted a detailed NeoDustur policy paper calling for an end to French rule and oversight. The 

French accepted the paper, rejecting only the demand that ‘co-sovereignty’ 

end. Co-sovereignty was the concept that the French colon community in 

Tunisia used to rule itself on equal footing with that of the Tunisians, despite 

the fact that the colons amounted to only four percent of the population. It 

was at this point that Paris appointed a new secretary-general, Louis Perillier (r. 1950–1952). Perillier created a cabinet split between French colons 
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JSOU Report 17-3

and Tunisians, sparking a huge outcry from French nationalists. In February 1951, he unveiled a plan to create a fully Tunisian cabinet with a prime 

minister whose power could not be revoked by the secretary-general. The 

Neo-Dustur rejected the plan because it did not offer enough, and the French 

colons rejected it because it offered too much.101

The French government responded by replacing Perillier with Jean de 

Hautecloque (1952–1953), a politician known for his ties to conservative elements in the Rassemblement (colon) party. Bourguiba called for his followers 

to prepare for combat: “A revolt is going to develop and blood is going to 

flow.” The secretary-general’s reaction created almost total chaos. Arrests 

of Neo-Dustur leaders resulted in riots and confrontations that left rioters, innocent civilians, police, and soldiers dead. French Foreign Legion 

search-and-destroy operations in Cap Bon targeted rebels and locals alike, 

enflaming the entire country against the French. Increasingly desperate to 

control the situation, Hautecloque forced the king to dismiss the cabinet and 

the prime minister. Whatever benefit Hautecloque gained was temporary, 

as Tunisia dissolved into a war between colon terrorist gangs like the Main 

Rouge and groups of Tunisian fellagha attacking French farms, communications links, and security forces. French reprisals brought increased violence. 

Hautecloque’s departure in 1953 signaled the failure of French policy to stabilize the situation. By mid-1954, the fellagha had emerged as a potent guerilla 

force that tied down thousands of French soldiers. It had become apparent 

to all but the most obtuse that France could not stay, and that in going, it 

would have to work with the Neo-Dustur and its leader, Habib Bourguiba.102 

The cause of Tunisian independence was greatly aided by factors external 

to France. First, and foremost, as the crisis in Tunisia reached a fever pitch 

in 1953–1954, France’s position in Indochina collapsed with Dien Bien Phu. 

In addition, in North Africa, Libyan independence and the consolidation 

of power by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt foreshadowed a potential escalation in the Tunisian conflict with which France was ill-prepared to deal. In 

the Maghreb itself, Morocco was in revolt, as was Algeria. The new French 

prime minister, Pierre Mendes-France, head of the Radical Party, headed a 

center-left coalition that included the Communists. Mendes-France negotiated the withdrawal of French forces from Indochina over the vociferous opposition of conservative political elements. With regard to Tunisia, 

Mendes-France initiated talks with Bourguiba, which led to an agreement of 

‘internal autonomy’ for Tunisia. The terms of the agreement created a split 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

within the Neo-Dustur, with the opposition led by Ben Yusuf. Under pressure from Bourguiba elements, Ben Yusuf fled to Cairo and embraced the 

pan-Arab politics of Nasser, while attacking Bourguiba for selling out for a 

‘partial victory.’ At this point, Bourguiba received a political gift. In Morocco, 

negotiations resulted in the restoration of nationalist King Muhammad V, 

deposed two years earlier. In early March 1955, under pressure, France terminated its protectorate over Morocco. Bourguiba quickly demanded the 

same for Tunisia, and on 20 March, France terminated its protectorate and 

Tunisia was fully independent.103

After more than 20 years of struggle, Bourguiba and the Neo-Dustur had 

removed French rule. They sought to create a unified state by healing political divisions and promoting social and 

economic development. The problems 

were challenging, but only one proved 

insurmountable—the disparity between 

the coastal areas inside the old Roman 

limes and the interior. From Cairo, Ben 

Yusuf’s anti-Bourguiba message continued to resonate in the hinterland, not 

because of the ideological content of the message, but because it offered a 

justification for the interior’s struggle against the littoral. The Neo-Dustur 

now struggled against the fellagha in the south and west. 

The continuing resistance from Yusufists shocked Bourguiba, who immediately intimidated the bey into calling an election where the Neo-Dustur 

prepared the lists. Predictably, the Neo-Dustur won all the seats in the Constituent Assembly. Abstention rates were high. In Tunis, they were 41 percent. 

In Jerba, in the south, abstention exceeded 70 percent. Bourguiba secured 

the assistance of French police and army units. He also established a ‘special 

court’ where opponents of the regime and former Tunisian supporters of 

the protectorate were stripped of their property, imprisoned, and politically 

discredited. Ironically, in 1957, Bourguiba used the authority of the bey to 

promulgate a new constitution that ended the monarchy. The new system 

created the equivalent of a ‘presidential monarchy,’ with all the reins of power 

in Bourguiba’s hands.104

From an institutional point of view, the changes to the judicial code 

were little short of revolutionary. The dual sharia court system of the Hanafi 

and Maliki madhabs that had functioned in Tunisia was abolished. In the 

The problems were challenging, but only one proved 

insurmountable—the disparity between the coastal areas 

inside the old Roman limes 

and the interior. 
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JSOU Report 17-3

Personal Status Code, women were given new rights—divorce, approval 

of arranged marriages, child custody rights, and inheritance—and were 

required to contribute to the maintenance of the household, resources permitting. Polygamy was outlawed as was ‘male repudiation,’ and minimum 

marriage ages were set. Bourguiba argued that through ijtihad (a legal term 

for independent reasoning), adherence to Islamic traditions and culture did 

not lessen the desire or necessity for Tunisia to embrace modernity. Religious 

conservatives disagreed and criticized Bourguiba for undermining Islam. 

From Cairo, Ben Yusuf accused him of “prohibiting what God has authorized 

and authorizing what God has prohibited.”105

There were programs supporting an end to traditional dress. As female 

literacy and education rose, fertility rates fell. The government also created 

a bilingual system of Arabic and French. To allay traditionalist concerns, 

Bourguiba demanded a fatwa of support from the Grand Mufti of Tunis, 

and when an acceptable one was not forthcoming, he was removed. The 

Neo-Dustur also urged Tunisians to ignore the Ramadan fast. This sparked 

serious rioting, particularly in Kairouan and the interior. The ulema rejected 

the government’s position that the reforms were a logical extension of ijtihad; 

in retaliation, Bourguiba attacked the ulema as corrupt and confiscated the 

wealth of the religious charities. Increasingly, the secularization of Tunisian 

society created problems with the traditionalists that served to highlight the 

traditional split between the coastal regions and the interior. The struggle 

was cast increasingly in terms of traditional Islamic society versus the Westernized secular state.

During the 1960s, Neo-Dustur rule faced a series of challenges—both 

external and internal. Sparked by the revolt in Algeria, a series of armed 

clashes between French troops still stationed in Tunisia and the government resulted in scores of casualties and the withdrawal of French forces 

in 1963. Ongoing pressure came from radical Arab nationalists like Nasser 

and others, who derided the government for its pro-Western policies. The 

withdrawal of the French military also resulted in a mass exodus of critical French technical and administrative talent from Tunisia. This damaged 

development and the economy, and prompted a shift in policy that became 

known as ‘Neo-Dustur socialism,’ and led to the first Ten-Year Plan (1962–

1971). In 1964, the Neo-Dustur was renamed the Parti Socialiste Dusturien 

(PSD). The plan produced few of the benefits in the agricultural or industrial 

sector that had been projected, and the steady growth in tourism was a mixed 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

blessing. Often inundated by tourists in inappropriate attire (or none at all) 

who were totally ignorant of, and insensitive to, traditional Tunisian modes 

of behavior, the tourist industry produced hard currency, but the division 

between traditional and secular Tunisians threatened to become a political, 

economic, and social chasm.106

In the early 1970s, isolation at the top of the Neo-Dustur and calls for 

reform from the ranks and leadership led to a party crisis. Analysts, who 

called Tunisia the best managed, most legitimate regime in the Arab Middle 

East, were troubled by the repression of dissent and the National Assembly declaring Bourguiba president for life. The modernization fit a Western 

model, but the politics increasingly resembled autocratic rule in the rest of 

the region. Modernization did not appear to be leading toward democracy.107

A 1976 change in the constitution was indicative of party priorities. The old 

constitution read: “liberty, order, and justice.” The new constitution read: 

“order, liberty, and justice.”

Socialism was scrapped for a market approach. The industry and jobs that 

emerged created low-wage jobs that brought a migration from the countryside to the urban areas. As a result, economic cycles often resulted in unemployment rates that exceeded 20 percent in the cities. Among young males, 

it approached 50 percent. There was simply no pathway for the government 

to match the rapid population increases with opportunity and jobs; thus, 

emigration became a safety valve for unemployment at home and a source 

of hard currency from abroad. Sociologically speaking, the very classes of 

individuals that migrated to the cities were those most susceptible to nativist 

arguments about the causes of their economic plight. By 1978 and 1979, labor 

unrest and an attempt to spark a revolution at Gafsa in the south rocked the 

government, displaying the fragility of the regime and the inability of the 

now factionalized party to unify and deal with the situation.108

Bourguiba, in failing health, appointed Muhammad Mzali as prime 

minister. Known for his loyalty to the president, Mzali pursued a series of 

political ‘reforms’ that opened the political system to multi-party participation without ceding any real power. Because of prohibitions on activities, 

the participating parties were largely ineffective. At the same time, the PSD 

leadership became increasingly concerned about the emerging popularity 

of the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI). The failing economy, 

coupled with the hostility to traditional Islamic social constructs within the 

broader regional context of rising Islamic fundamentalism, posed a challenge 
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JSOU Report 17-3

to the government. Social and economic unrest undermined Mzali, and in 

1986, Bourguiba recalled General Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from a diplomatic posting abroad and made him director of national security. Ben Ali 

had successfully repressed the disturbances of 1978 and 1979.109 Ben Ali and 

Mzali attempted to suppress the MTI, enhancing MTI’s standing among the 

political opposition. Frustrated, Bourguiba appointed Ben Ali to the post 

of prime minister in October 1987 and one month later, in November, Ben 

Ali had the ailing president declared incompetent to rule and took over the 

government.110

Ben Ali became head of the party, whose name changed to Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), and the new head of state. Ben 

Ali systematically appointed his own people to key positions in the party 

and removed or marginalized those loyal to the former leader. In an attempt 

to mend fences with the traditionalists and Islamist opposition, he made a 

highly publicized pilgrimage to Mecca and invited the MTI to make inputs 

into a new statement of government policy. While the Personal Status Code 

remained in effect, the new National Pact asserted the Arab and Islamic 

nature of Tunisian society and culture, and called for greater ties with the 

Arab and Islamic world. The MTI joined the political milieu, but because of 

the secular legal requirements had to change its name to the Hizb al-Nahda, 

or Renaissance Party; the party remained excluded from providing lists of 

candidates because of its Islamist agenda. In the 1989 elections, Ben Ali 

used Bourguiba’s model from the 1956 election to exclude the opposition 

and maintain absolute RCD control. However, the necessity of excluding the 

MTI served as recognition that a new center of political power had emerged 

in Tunisia, one that would challenge Ben Ali and the RCD.111

Challenged by the Islamists, during the Gulf War (1990–1991), the Ben 

Ali regime objected to the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia and 

called for an Arab solution to the standoff. This position cost him Western 

and Gulf Arab support, but was popular on the Tunisian street. Then, events 

in Algeria undermined the Islamist cause in Tunisia. In 1990, the Islamic 

Salvation Front (FIS) emerged as a real political threat to the FLN, which had 

ruled Algeria since independence. The FIS won in municipal elections, and in 

December 1991, was ahead in balloting in legislative elections. Alarmed, the 

Algerian army deposed the president and cancelled the elections. A vicious 

civil war ensued in which tens of thousands died. The close ties between alNahda, the old MTI, and the Algerian Islamists allowed Ben Ali to suppress 
55

Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Tunisian Islamists. The economic situation for Tunisians was deteriorating 

across the board, but the fear of chaos on the scale of Algeria garnered support for repressive policies.112 The RCD began to function less as a party and 

more as a security apparatus for the regime and government.113

Ironically, it would be Ben Ali’s economic policies that eventually undermined the regime. During the 1990s and into the first decade of the 2000s, 

the Tunisian economy functioned relatively well. Tunisia achieved the highest level of per capita income of all the Arab states with the exception of 

those in the Gulf; however, the prosperity was uneven. The hinterland did 

not share to the same degree in the prosperity, feeding the dichotomy with 

the coastal areas that had always plagued stability in Ifrikiya. With prosperity 

came inflation, and with inflation came corruption that permeated the entire 

regime top to bottom. Post-colonial Tunisia had never experienced anything 

like it—from Ben Ali and his family down to local police, the corruption was 

shocking. The regime lost all legitimacy in the eyes of common Tunisians. 

From Bourguiba to Ben Ali, the Tunisian republic was an exercise in 

the autocracy behind the thin façade of political pluralism. The republic 

represented an experiment in the creation of a Western-style, secular nationstate through modernization and control from above. Both leaders viewed 

authoritarianism and control as the only possible means of implementation. 

Yet no amount of modernization or control could overcome the fundamental differences between the urban-coastal society and the hinterland. From 

the beginning of the republic, the south and west were either in revolt or 

simmering on the verge of it. From the Yusufists to the spark of 2011, the 

fundamental dichotomy of the geopolitical reality threatened the stability 

and the survival of the state.

This reality found further ideological and cultural legitimacy through 

Islam. The secular Tunisian state, despite its attempts to justify Westernization and modernization by borrowing Islamic concepts like ijtihad, viewed 

Islam and the traditionalist society as an impediment to its programs 

and a threat to its survival. By the second decade of the 21st century, the 

Islamists, like the secular nationalists of the 1950s, had become the voice that 

demanded reform and justice, albeit based on a return to Islamic principles 

and practice. To say that the popularity of the Islamic message is a byproduct 

of economic deprivation is only true in part. There exists a real sense of identity and something to be rediscovered following the six decades of attempts 

to Westernize and secularize. How that past is imagined is another issue, 
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JSOU Report 17-3

but the desire to restore a society—perhaps any society—that is perceived 

as more just is real.

Morocco: 1930 to 2011

While the Moroccan and Tunisian experiences were similar to a point—

both retained their monarchies—their experiences diverged sharply by the 

1950s. Morocco lacked Tunisia’s secularist traditions and was more tied to 

the Saharan political dynamic. Tunis was more integrated into the Ottoman 

Figure 7. Modern-day Morocco. SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

structure. The Almoravid and Almohad heritage and the independent monarchies provided Morocco with a past that neither Tunisia nor Algeria could 

duplicate. Morocco emerged as a more fully independent polity, albeit a 

beleaguered one at times. By the time of the French conquest in the early 

20th century, the Moroccan makhzan, or ruling elite, had lost control of vast 

areas, but their claims to them and the political heritage were still very real. 

Therefore, when the French conquered Morocco, they were dealing with 

political and economic elites that were far established and a more defined 

political and cultural context. 

The ‘definition’ or ‘identity,’ as we have learned, was further reinforced 

among the Moroccan elites by the French administration. Morocco teetered on the brink of chaos. A series of crises and interventions in 1904 

and 1905 almost sparked a European war, with the Germans challenging 

the French and Spanish. The problem was a weak central government at 

one level and an uncontrollable countryside at another. By 1907, the political elites, fearing escalating instability, 

moved to depose Sultan Abd-al-Aziz and 

replace him with his older brother Abdal-Hafiz ibn Hassan (r. 1907–1912). Political control was further undermined by 

the fact that the colons in Algeria sought 

to take control of commercial routes that 

had traditionally terminated in Fez. The 

French Trans-Saharan railroad provided a terminus that provided much 

of the Moroccan interior with a better connection through Algeria to the 

coast at Oran. This weakened makhzan control in the south. A consensus 

emerged in Paris that only the incorporation of Morocco into the French 

colonial construct could insure order across the Maghreb. 

In 1912, with the Treaty of Fez, the French made Morocco a protectorate and dethroned Sultan Abd-al-Hafiz. The French government appointed 

General Hubert Lyautey as High Commissioner. Lyautey instituted a colonial system of indirect control in Indochina, and since 1903, had been the 

architect of a policy of French military and colonial expansion from Algeria (largely hidden from Paris) that pushed 200 miles into the interior of 

Morocco and undermined Sultan Abd-al-Aziz’s attempts to maintain control. Lyautey believed that the only effective and efficient way to maintain 

control of colonial possessions was through indirect rule.114

A consensus emerged in Paris 

that only the incorporation 

of Morocco into the French 

colonial construct could insure 

order across the Maghreb. 
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JSOU Report 17-3

The ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Fez when resistance erupted 

against the protectorate. Anyone considered ‘foreign,’ including Moroccan Jews, found themselves the target of mobs and rebellious irregulars. At 

this point, Lyautey resurrected the Alawi dynasty and forced the ulema to 

appoint Mawlay Yusuf ibn Hassan (r. 1912–1927) as sultan. Lyautey was, in 

many respects, the French embodiment of his British colonial contemporary, Lord Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, the last British governor of the 

Northern Nigeria Protectorate (r. 1912–1914) and the first governor general 

of Nigeria (r. 1914–1919) and his ideas of a colonial ‘dual mandate.’ Lyautey 

returned the makhzan to its former position of prestige, but with all the 

refinements of civilization that French commercial interests could bring to 

Morocco. There would be absolute French control, but not French rule. As 

one traveler remarked, “At the Moorish court, scarcely a European is to be 

seen.” The system worked—for a time.115

WWI had a profound effect on Morocco. The protectorate remained 

more or less quiet during the war. Lyautey maintained control. Thousands 

of Moroccans were conscripted or volunteered to fight on the Western Front 

or to support military operations as laborers. Thousands more went to France 

to work in the factories. They returned with ideas and skills that threatened 

French rule. The French also found themselves haunted by a bargain struck 

in their rush to consolidate the protectorate. Paris had created a ‘sublease’ 

of northern Morocco to Spain in 1912. Spanish attempts to expand control 

into the Rif Mountains aroused tribal opposition, and from that opposition emerged Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi (Abd-al-Karim) 

(1882–1963). The son of prominent qadi (a Sharia court judge) and part of 

the Spanish colonial administration, Abd-al-Karim rebelled in 1921. Put succinctly, Abd-al-Karim and his rifian fighters defeated the Spanish and established the Republic of the Rif. This alarmed the French, sidelined Lyautey, 

and gave Marshal Phillipe Pétain, leader of the French military, free rein to 

crush the revolt. Pétain used poison gas, tanks, and aircraft. By 1926, Spain 

and France had defeated Abd-al-Karim, who became a rallying point for 

Moroccan independence from his exile on Reunion Island. Later, from Cairo, 

he presided over the Liberation Committee of the Arab West.116 

In 1930, the same year as the Eucharist conference in Tunis, the French 

decided to issue the first of a series of Berber Dahirs (decrees). These decrees 

created two systems of codes within the protectorate—one linked to the 

sultan and the ulema in Fez, and the other for Berbers that relied on Berber 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

tradition and tribal leadership. Despite opposition, Sultan Mawlay Yusuf 

signed the decrees. They were seen as a de jure attempt by the French to 

divide the Moroccan body politic, (forget the fact that differences really 

existed) and provoked widespread opposition, radicalizing the Moroccan 

elite. Stunned by the reaction, the French backed down, but now the problem 

of the protectorate had been internationalized. Pronouncements against 

the attempt to ‘de-Islamicize’ Morocco, not unlike the position taken by 

the secular Neo-Dustur in Tunisia, became a focal point for opposition to 

French rule. In Morocco, the language of opposition and nationalism was 

Islam—organizations like zawiya and taifa and the use of words like sha’ab, 

qawmiyya, and umma represented an attempt to bridge social and cultural 

differences in the nationalist cause. The new monarch, Muhammad V ibn 

Yusuf (r. 1927–1953, 1955–1962), became the focal point for this nationalist 

surge. The Plan of Reforms in 1934 demanded the recognition of the ‘Arabness’ of Morocco. Surprisingly, the plan did not call for independence or 

question the sultan’s authority, but it was an attack on the attitudes and 

racism inherent in the French colonial system.117 This would prove to be the 

last chance for the French system to survive. 

In Spanish Morocco, there was a marriage of convenience between the 

Moroccan nationalists and the regime of General Francisco Franco. Franco’s 

entire revolt against the Republican government in Madrid was based in 

Morocco, and Moroccan troops formed the backbone of the Nationalist war 

in Spain. As a result, Franco pandered to the Moroccan nationalists in the 

north and used his brilliant colonial administrator in the region, Colonel 

Juan Beigbeder, to maintain good relations with Abdelkhalek Torres, the 

head of the Party of National Reform. These policies embarrassed France. 

As for Abdelkhalek, some argued that he was partial to fascist ideology, and 

others that he was a romantic who saw in Spain and northern Morocco the 

opportunity to recreate Al-Andalus. Most likely, like his Iraqi, Palestinian, 

Egyptian, and Tunisian counterparts, he saw Hitler and the fascists as a 

means to escape colonial domination.118

As with Tunisia, WWII weakened French control. The fact that the Vichy 

government was headed by Marshal Pétain, who had subdued Abd-al-Kadir 

in 1926, only heightened Moroccan antipathy. In addition, Muhammad V 

absolutely refused to sign the decree to ghettoize Moroccan Jews. His position was motivated as much by resistance to the Vichy edicts as by humanitarian issues, but it was nevertheless a courageous stance. The entrance of 
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JSOU Report 17-3

the American army into Morocco and the administration of Major General 

George S. Patton quickly shifted any remaining loyalty from the Vichy to 

the Americans. Unfortunately, despite Roosevelt’s pronouncements about an 

end to the protectorate, rule eventually reverted to the French. In Morocco, 

as in Indochina and other places, the U.S. government was far more interested in the domestic political problems of its European allies, particularly 

the French, than in bringing independence to European colonies.119 That 

being said, the Moroccans were encouraged by the pronouncements, which 

spurred political agitation for independence.120 

General de Gaulle made it clear that he intended to “safeguard the 

empire,” and the Americans made it clear that Moroccan nationalists were 

on their own. Nevertheless, 1944 represented a turning point for Morocco. 

In January, the Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) issued a Manifesto of 

Independence and the center of political gravity shifted to Rabat, linking 

the urban, middle-class trade unionists and urban working class. There 

was one other critical development: despite some disagreement, the leaders 

of the independence movement came to view the monarchy as the political institution around which the independence movement could coalesce. 

“Popular enchantment with the near-mystical image of the Sharifian ruler 

had immense value that could be harnessed to the nationalist cause.”121

After the war, as the French attempted to reestablish control, the independence movements in French and Spanish Morocco merged. In 1947, Muhammad V announced his support for an Arab, Islamic, and unified Morocco. 

The popular acclaim—the so-called ‘monarchy fever’—upset the French 

colonial administration. The sultan stepped back from armed confrontation, 

but continued to support the nationalist cause, which now included the most 

powerful labor union. The French reaction was predictable—repression, 

which only strengthened the nationalist cause and the determination to be 

done with the protectorate. 

Finally, exasperated with Muhammad V’s refusal to cooperate, the French 

decided to rid themselves of the monarch.122 The French used old enemies 

of the Alawi Thami al-Glaoui, one of the so-called ‘Lords of the Atlas,’ and 

Abd-al-Hayy al-Kattani, whose family had long opposed the sultans. In 

August 1953, tribesmen loyal to the conspirators and French military units 

surrounded the palace and sent the royal family into exile on Madagascar. 

The entire nationalist cause coalesced around the plight of the royal family. 

De Gaulle called the French government move “stupidity,” stating that the 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

monarch would return. To make matters worse, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault called it a “war of civilizations,” a “fight of the Cross 

against the Crescent.” Others attempted to connect the sultan to communism 

through Istiqlal. In France, it solidified the opposition to the retention of 

Algeria. Internationally, the French government faced a storm of protest. 

Then, nine months later, the catastrophe at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina not 

only undermined the government in Paris but also demoralized Moroccan troops returning from the East. They joined the independence movement in droves. Strikes, sabotage, and attacks on French settlers and their 

supporters multiplied. Right-wing settler groups assassinated prominent 

Moroccan nationalists. The Moroccan Army of Liberation (ALN) emerged 

and began larger scale attacks on police and security units. In the end, Paris 

had no choice but to negotiate with the sultan, who returned to Morocco in 

November 1955.123

Muhammad V was enthusiastically received upon his return, but the honeymoon was short-lived. As in Tunisia, Morocco was composed of multiple 

constituencies with their own agendas. In March 1956, France agreed to end 

the protectorate. Spain agreed to withdraw from the north, but not from the 

Spanish Sahara. Istiqlal felt that the growing 

political alliance between the monarchy and 

the conservative rural elements and leaders 

threatened to sideline their aspirations. The 

party was literally and figuratively at war 

with itself and its political opponents. The 

king reconsidered the whole idea of a constitutional monarchy. Istiqlal split 

into a progressive and a revolutionary wing. By 1959, it was apparent that 

the king—who controlled the army, the security services, and the ministry 

of interior—had no intention of relinquishing control. The military, now 

under the command of Crown Prince Hassan, was largely Berber and rural 

in origin and had a decided antipathy for Istiqlal and the urban elites. The 

king allowed French forces to remain in the country, creating a situation 

where the Moroccan military received assistance in pacification operations. 

The system was based on an alliance between the monarch and the landed 

notables.124

By Muhammad V’s death in March 1961, the Crown Prince, now Hassan 

II, controlled the military and security services. In the political realm, rule 

was a balancing act between factions vying for power and a patronage system 

As in Tunisia, Morocco 

was composed of multiple 

constituencies with their 

own agendas.
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JSOU Report 17-3

controlled by the king. For those supporting constitutional monarchy, it 

was frustrating but probably unworkable. Hassan II managed to maintain 

the stability of the monarchy despite the rise of pan-Arab nationalism. He 

concentrated more power in the monarchy and courted France, Spain, and 

the United States for security assistance. Hassan II’s political skill kept the 

various political parties at bay and maintained exclusive royal authority. In 

the mid-1960s, demands for political liberalization from Mehdi Ben Barka 

and the National Union of Popular Forces met repression. In exile, Ben Barka 

would literally ‘disappear’ on a Paris street in 1965 with Hassan II claiming 

no prior knowledge of the incident. That same year, riots and demonstrations 

from student organizations brought school closures, the suspension of the 

Constitution of 1962, and the declaration of a state of emergency. Rule after 

1965 was secured through the military and security services.125

In the early 1970s, as the economy worsened and suffering became widespread, even the loyalty of the military cracked. In 1971, an attempted coup 

by military cadets almost succeeded, and then in 1972, the attempted assassination of the king and crown prince by air force officers, who attempted 

to shoot down his personal jet, resulted from a plot by his own security 

chief. Observers believed that Hassan’s rule was on life support. Shaken, he 

reorganized the military and security services, placing them under his direct 

control, and then renewed his ties to the conservative religious establishment. 

Concluding that secularism had failed him, he turned to the more traditional 

elements of Moroccan society and identified a ‘national cause’ to refocus the 

frustrations of the general population. Spain’s withdrawal from the Sahara 

offered just the opportunity. In the Green March, Morocco moved to take 

control of the former Spanish colony. A costly war that became a part of 

the Cold War confrontation, it provided legitimacy at a critical point, but 

pitted Morocco against its neighbor Algeria and undermined any unity in 

the Maghreb.126

Hassan II was a shrewd practitioner of Moroccan politics. Following 

the coup attempts, the king concluded that the inviolable position of the 

monarchy could be maintained despite expressions of opposition, as long 

as the latter occurred within certain boundaries. In 1975, the government 

announced that opposition parties of the left, long outlawed, would be 

allowed to join the political milieu. During the next decade, other parties 

emerged and the rise of political Islam added a new element. Accommodating the Islamists was simplified because, unlike in Tunisia and Algeria where 
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the governments were decidedly secular, the monarchy had always had a 

religious tone—the king was the ‘commander of the faithful.’ The government’s problem centered on how to harness a force that could easily spiral out 

of control. In sharp contrast to Algeria, or even Tunisia, Hassan II created 

a place in the political spectrum for Islamic expression while defining the 

limits of opposition. During the 1980s, the reemergence of Berber identity 

also became an issue and the king became the defender of Berber rights. 

There was government support for groups advocating Berber rights.127 The 

new political environment was somewhat chaotic, but it allowed the king to 

define the parameters for political participation and balance the competing 

groups against each other. Some decried it as a subversion of the political 

process; however, it maintained stability and civil order. In the 1990s, next 

door in Algeria, the alternative to control and political balance became all 

too apparent—outright chaos and civil war. 

In foreign policy, Hassan generally supported U.S. policies in the region 

and received political and military support and economic aid in return. 

There were always economic issues, and the restructuring of the economy in 

the late 1980s was particularly difficult. To handle its huge debt, the government worked with the World Bank and the European Economic Community, 

reforming and privatizing the economy. Morocco emerged in the 1990s with 

a two-tiered workforce—one based on the educated middle class, and one 

where common workers did not share in the benefits created by economic 

reform. This labor and social pressure had a safety valve: more than four 

million Moroccans became migrant workers in Europe. Hassan II’s reign 

defined the Moroccan monarchy. In 1999, millions poured into the streets 

at his funeral, and as Susan Miller put it, “While his people may have not 

always loved their king, they had become enamored of the concept of Kingship, seeing it as the governmental form that best suited their needs as a 

nation, albeit with a long list of complaints, caveats, and modifications.”128 

On his father’s death, Muhammad VI assumed the throne and wasted 

little time in setting a course designed to change the perception of the monarchy. Some of it was cosmetic—a more accessible monarch appearing in 

public with his family. Part of it was to heal the wounds of the past—a 

commission to look into the repression under his father, with the proviso 

that his father was not to be mentioned nor names given. In this regard, he 

fired his father’s interior minister, Driss Basri, because of his association 

with the repression. He visited the Rif, an area avoided by his father, in an 
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JSOU Report 17-3

effort to bring it back into the political fold. He addressed the Berber issue 

without undermining the Islamic-Arab basis for the state. He joined the antiterrorism efforts of the West, and in the process discovered that a radical 

group, Salafiyya Jihadiyya had cells spread around the country. Bombings in 

Casablanca led to a concerted propaganda and counterterrorism campaign 

that left thousands of populist preachers and their followers in jail. A new 

family law significantly increased women’s right, including giving them equal 

status in the courts. Despite the changes, there was a growing realization that 

the political process was an arranged affair controlled by the makhzan. In 

the 2007 election, this prompted a low voter turnout and a cynicism about 

politics and political parties. The calm of Muhammad VI’s reign—stability 

without his father’s repression—heightened the shock of 2011.129

In achieving independence and maintaining stability, the Moroccan 

experience provides another example of the durability of traditional forms 

and institutions in the Arab world. The concept of ‘Allah, Watan, Malik’ 

(God, country, king) conveys a legitimacy 

and a resiliency that allows not only for 

orderly transfers of power, but also provides the bonds for the maintenance of 

stability. Where westernized political 

constructs have failed, the monarchies 

have maintained their legitimacy and 

primacy. In the case of Morocco, this is 

all the more significant because, unlike 

the Arab Gulf, the monarchy has survived without the ability to pour oil 

on troubled waters. In the case of Morocco, the monarchy was the symbol 

of the independence movement. In a fractured political landscape, it was 

the pivotal institution around which the state emerged. It has continued to 

be the primary institution that provided the cohesion and stability that has 

allowed Morocco to escape the political upheaval that has marked the region 

for the last five years. As the challenges mount, the monarchy is likely the 

only institutional approach that offers a real chance of navigating the vicissitudes that are to come. 

In achieving independence 

and maintaining stability, 

the Moroccan experience 

provides another example of 

the durability of traditional 

forms and institutions in the 

Arab world.
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Algeria and the Struggle for Independence

In the Maghreb, the Algerian experience is, without a doubt, the most dramatic and complex. Geopolitically and socio-culturally, Algeria is the least 

coherent of the Maghreb states. As previously discussed, in the aftermath of 

WWI, the colons managed to block any changes in the status quo. In 1936, 

Figure 8. Modern-day Algeria. SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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JSOU Report 17-3

they prevented a vote in the National Assembly on giving citizenship to 

20,000 Algerians without changing their Muslim status. This obstructionism led to more demands. What might have sufficed in 1919 was no longer 

sufficient in the 1940s. 

In 1943, Ferhat Abbas published a Manifesto of the Algerian People, calling for autonomy. General de Gaulle, head of the Free French governmentin-exile, granted citizenship without a change in sectarian status to many 

Algerians. The Algerian nationalists saw it as too little, too late. They formed 

the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (AML) led by Messali Hadj. In May 

1945, AML participated in a V-E Day celebration. Their display of forbidden 

nationalist banners resulted in a confrontation that spiraled into a full-blown 

insurrection. Between 7,000 and 40,000 Algerians died in air strikes, security 

sweeps, and naval bombardments, along with about 100 colons. Thousands 

of arrests, including that of Messali Hadj, and trials followed. The revolt 

linked the impoverished rural Algerian to the political activism of the urban 

centers, and for the first time, created a consensus national movement calling for independence.130

In the aftermath of the revolt, a new organic law emerged, creating an 

independent Algerian assembly. There were to be 30 Algerian representatives in the Assembly and 14 in the upper house, or Council of the Republic. 

Despite boycotts and turmoil, Messali Hadj, recently released from prison, 

formed a new party, the Movement for the Triumph of Liberty and Democracy (MTLD), and managed to capture five seats in the Assembly. In 1947, the 

Algerian delegation pushed for an “Algerian Republic federated with Tunisia 

and Morocco within the framework of a French Union.”131 The colon faction opposed any change and the MTLD rejected the notion that the French 

should decide the future of Algeria. 

The assembly rejected these ideas and passed a new organic law in September 1947. The law granted citizenship without restriction to all citizens of 

Algeria, but it created two lists—one for colons and one for everyone else—

for representation in the National Assembly. Each list consisted of 15 places. 

Half a million voters of ‘French civil status’ received the same representation 

as 1.5 million voters of ‘local legal status.’ The law was merely the old system 

reconfigured to present a façade of reform. The MTLD, which had rejected 

any French law, won all of the key municipal elections in Algeria. Shocked, 

the French government sent hardliner Marcel-Edmond Naegelen as the new 

governor-general. In the 1948 provincial elections, Naegelen intimidated 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

voters, stuffed ballot boxes, and arrested candidates. These practices were 

repeated in elections in 1949, 1951, 1953, and 1954. It became apparent to 

most Algerians that there was no viable political path to political power or 

justice.132

While the MTLD pursued the frustrating political course, the Parti du 

Peuple Algerien established a clandestine wing, the Organisation Speciale 

(OS), with the goal of forming a nucleus for revolutionary action. The OS 

began recruiting, and by 1949 had almost 1,500 fighters. They also robbed 

banks to finance their organization. In 1950, security forces crushed the 

organization with a series of arrests, 

including its leader Ahmed Ben Bella, 

who would eventually become the first 

president of the new Algerian republic. 

The revolutionary movement was as fractured as the political landscape—class 

issues, ethnic issues, and Berber against 

Arab, threatened to split the movement. 

The conflicts brought paralysis to the movement, and many members of the 

OS moved to create a ‘third force.’ They adopted the name, Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (CRUA). CRUA decided that the political 

process offered no hope for succession and laid a course for revolution.133

On 1 November 1954, with only a skeleton plan and military structure, 

CRUA declared war on France. Its declaration called for “the restoration of 

the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state within the framework of 

Islamic principles.” It created the FLN and called for a revolt against French 

rule. The beginning was costly; arrests and deaths of movement leaders 

pointed to its early demise. Fortunately for the FLN, the French responded 

with indiscriminate force, including mass arrests of MTLD centrists. The 

government drove new recruits into the open arms of the revolution. Prime 

Minister Pierre Mendes-France had extricated France from Indochina and 

understood that Tunisia and Morocco would likely go their course, but he 

believed that suppression of the revolutionaries and reform would suffice to 

maintain a French Algeria. Whatever his intentions, it was too late and when 

his government fell, followed by a conservative one, what little chance that 

had existed evaporated.134

At this juncture, key FLN commanders decided to provoke the kind of 

French reaction that would result in mass mobilization. The colons had been 

The revolutionary movement 

was as fractured as the political landscape—class issues, 

ethnic issues, and Berber 

against Arab, threatened to 

split the movement.
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JSOU Report 17-3

little affected by the conflict; Youssef Zighout and Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, the 

commanders in the FLN’s district two, decided to change this. In a series of 

attacks, the so-called Phillipeville massacres of August 1955, FLN guerrillas 

killed 123 Europeans and Algerian sympathizers—men, women, and children. The French reaction was predictably draconian. The FLN had about 200 

active members in the region at the time of the attacks. The French claimed 

that they killed almost 1,300 guerrillas, and the FLN claimed that the total 

number of casualties among Algerians was more than 12,000. No matter 

whose numbers were correct, Zighout and Ben Tobbal judged correctly—

there was no turning back for either side after Phillipeville. The middle 

ground was gone.

By 1956, the Algerian revolution could reasonably claim the support or 

sympathy of hundreds of thousands of Algerians. The revolutionary campaign focused on Algerians who supported the French. By 1956, six Muslims 

died at FLN hands for every European. The FLN also eliminated other revolutionary groups that might challenge its primacy, including the Communist Party. On the international front, Ben Bella and others found support 

in Cairo from Nasser’s revolutionary regime, and from the Non-Aligned 

Movement at the Bandung Conference of 1955. The FLN also managed to put 

Algeria on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. To meet the 

new demands of a national movement, the FLN held the Soummam Congress in the fall of 1956 and reorganized the FLN, establishing an executive 

committee to oversee and execute its plans.135

The committee, and most prominently Abane Ramdane, its head, faced 

the prospect of counteracting the growing efficiency of the French counterinsurgency effort. The FLN launched the Battle of Algiers with bombings 

and attacks on civilians, including women and children, to undermine confidence in the French government to provoke an indiscriminate reaction. A 

strike was called to paralyze the city. General Jacques Massu instituted a 

reign of counterterror that broke the strike and eventually broke the urban 

terrorist organizations through a ruthless program of torture and intimidation. The FLN tactics horrified some Algerians. Operationally, it was disaster for the FLN. Security forces crushed their organization and forced the 

key central committee members to flee to Tunisia, where they were bitterly 

criticized for their tactics. The French erected barriers and fences to prevent 

infiltration and pursued the survivors into now independent Tunisia and 

Morocco. Strategically, the struggle for Algiers exposed the brutality on both 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

sides, drew attention to the struggle, and brought international pressure for 

a solution. Within the FLN, the military commanders, Abdelhafid Boussouf 

and Houari Boumediene, took over the leadership. In late 1957, they assassinated Abane for his opposition to the changes.136

Increasingly, reluctance on the part of Fourth Republic politicians to 

support the army’s tactics in Algeria drove the French military in Algeria 

and the colons into an uneasy alliance. In April 1958, both the colons and 

the army revolted, naming General Massu as the president of a Committee 

of Public Safety. The French government collapsed, calling on General de 

Gaulle to deal with the situation. De Gaulle, out of power since 1946, exacted 

a price. He would rule by decree for six months and submit a new constitution based on the presidential system that he had advocated in 1946. The 

politicians accepted. De Gaulle quickly flew to Algiers and gained the confidence of the army and the colons. In retrospect, de Gaulle’s declaration was 

ambiguous. “As of today, France considers that in all of Algeria there is only 

a single category of inhabitants: There are only full-fledged Frenchmen ... 

with the same rights and the same duties.” There are indications that by 1957, 

he privately believed that only independence for Algeria would rid France 

of this problem. Nevertheless, he hoped for a face saving “association.”137

De Gaulle’s success in getting the Muslim population to participate in 

elections provoked an FLN wave of violence in France and the formation of 

an FLN provisional government. Between 1958 and 1962, the lack of a political solution prompted de Gaulle to support self-determination for Algeria 

after peace had been restored. He rejected FLN participation, but it was the 

first sign of compromise on the part of the French. The colons reacted by 

threatening revolt and the army teetered on the brink of supporting them. 

From 1960 to 1962, de Gaulle struggled with the problem of arriving at 

a political solution without provoking a mutiny in the army. In 1961, the 

Organisation de l’Armée Secrète emerged and staged an attempted coup in 

Algiers. It collapsed within days when the French army remained loyal to 

the government. The path was now clear for self-determination.138

The problem now was the lack of a political consensus within the FLN. 

Most scholars discuss the issue of the divided political landscape in terms 

of the Algerian colonial experience, where the colon administration prevented the formation of a mass national movement. The problem actually 

ran much deeper, reflecting the fractured historical context of Algeria. There 

is almost no point in Algerian history with a cohesive political center that 
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JSOU Report 17-3

possessed uncontested control of the area and encompassed the geographic 

area delineated as the modern state. From earliest times, control focused 

on the individual coastal cities and their immediate environs. Control was 

always tenuous when extended in any depth from the coastal areas. There 

were conflicting interests and rivalries. When this reality is coupled with the 

physical footprint of contemporary Algeria, the problem of political cohesion 

becomes even more complex. In the case 

of revolutionary Algeria, ‘national unity’ 

was based on opposition to the French and 

little else. 

Once France was willing to discuss 

self-determination, the political, economic, and socio-cultural differences within the FLN reemerged. The conflict came in multiple forms—party conflicts, ideological conflicts, conflicts 

between central, regional, and local leadership, military-civilian conflicts, 

and personal conflicts. It reflected the lack of cohesion of Algeria as a whole. 

At a party conference in Tripoli, the leadership attempted to paper over the 

differences, but it had become apparent that the military wing intended to 

have the final say. Attempts to curb the military’s influence proved unsuccessful. Boumediene aligned himself increasingly with the imprisoned 

Ben Bella. Signed on 18 March 1962, the agreement that ended French rule 

reflected virtually every demand made by the FLN at the Soummam Congress in 1956. On 25 April, following the signing of the Evian Accords, de 

Gaulle told his cabinet, “Napoleon said that in love the only victory is flight. 

In the matter of decolonization also, the only victory is to go away.”139 French 

opponents of the agreement commented, “This government has required 

four years of war to impose on its adversary the solution which was precisely 

his final objective.” De Gaulle told his cabinet the next day to move on, “As 

for France, it will be necessary for her now to interest herself in something 

else.”140

On 1 July 1962, Algerians voted for independence. During the first five 

years of the republic, the struggle for power was tribal—literally based on 

‘clans’ within the movement, the FLN, and the military. Ben Bella emerged 

as the head of government and shored up his position against his rivals. As 

the colons left, workers in many cases took over their farms and factories and 

kept them functioning. Many leftists believed that this was the beginning of 

a new socialist era, and Ben Bella supported it as a means of broadening his 

In the case of revolutionary 

Algeria, ‘national unity’ was 

based on opposition to the 

French and little else.
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

powerbase. It was a myth that quickly collapsed. The Constitution of 1963 

was promulgated along the lines proposed by Ben Bella. Algeria was to be a 

socialist state, Arabic was the official language, and Islam the official religion. 

The FLN was the only legal political organization, and running unopposed, 

Ben Bella was elected the first president. Some experts wryly noted that a 

multi-party system was simply not feasible since there would have been one 

party for every politician. The complications of a border war with Morocco 

and factional infighting led Ben Bella to narrow his base to only those he 

could trust. The factionalism continued and sacred FLN pronouncements 

like the Algiers Charter merely served as a screen for the power struggles 

within the party. Ben Bella concentrated power in his own hands and his 

inner circle—it paralyzed the government and the economy.141

Ben Bella’s highhanded rule brought a revolt in late 1963 from the Socialist Forces Front and backed by the military commander in the Kabylia. 

When it collapsed, Ben Bella’s political opponent on the left, Mohammed 

Boudiaf, the leader of the Parti de la Révolution Socialiste (PRS), was first 

imprisoned and then fled to Morocco. He would make a dramatic reentry 

into Algeria in 1992. On the right, the Association of Algerian Ulema and 

its leader, Bachir Ibrahami, refused to work within the confines of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, arguing that the ministry had nothing to do with 

promoting Islam, but rather focused on making Muslims compliant to Ben 

Bella’s ‘state Islam.’ The greatest potential problem from the Islamists was 

the al-Qiyam religious association formed in 1964 by Abassi Madani, Ahmed 

Sahnoun, and Abdelatif Soltani. This group was associated with the Muslim 

Brotherhood through Soltani’s relationships in Egypt that dated from 1953, 

and more ominously, it became enamored with the militant views of Sayyid 

Qutb—the intellectual godfather of radical violent Islamic thought. They 

viewed the Ben Bella regime as a front that talked about Islam, but in reality was a godless state, leading Muslims to a new jahiliya, the state of man 

before the coming of the Prophet. To cap his accomplishments, Ben Bella 

blundered into a border war with Morocco over the town of Figuig, resulting 

in an Algerian defeat.142

The only ‘clan’ that Ben Bella did not control was the military Boumedienne clan. Ben Bella saw the threat from the military or ALN, and moved 

to discredit and purge its supporters from the government. The oft-used 

refrain was that the army was composed “of petit-bourgeois types and antirevolution opportunists” who only joined when the FLN victory became 
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JSOU Report 17-3

obvious. Frictions grew, and a military coup on 19 June 1965 removed Ben 

Bella.143 A Revolutionary Council took over, with Boumedienne as head of 

government. The council was dominated by the Oujda clan.144 Boumedienne 

promulgated a call for “egalitarianism, social justice and Muslim values,” or 

‘Islamo-populism.’ He quickly installed a security state model. Opposition 

of all types, including from exiles, was eliminated by his Stasi KGB–trained 

security service. In 1967, former PRS leader Mohamed Khider was assassinated in Madrid and Krim Belkacem was strangled in his Frankfurt hotel 

room. The regime wanted opponents to know that it had a long reach.145

The military suspended the Constitution of 1963 and transformed the 

party into an apparatus that executed the will of the Council. In turn, the 

membership of the Council was sharply reduced from 26 to 9 members to 

centralize and simplify decision-making. Even insignificant issues at the 

local level were decided by the Council. There were only two real paths for 

political promotion—the government or the party bureaucracy. After 10 

years in power, the leadership decided to issue a new statement of policy, the 

1976 National Charter. The Charter provided for a new constitution, but no 

fundamental change in the way the government functioned. It reinforced 

centralization under Boumedienne’s control. In foreign policy, ideological 

commitment to non-alignment did not prevent the U.S. from becoming 

one of Algeria’s largest trading partners. In the region, Algeria represented 

the ‘radical’ ideological alternative to Tunisian moderation and Moroccan 

conservatism. As a result, Algeria relied on 

the Soviet Union for military aid. 

The government attempted to follow 

socialist models for the economy. Industrialization was favored over the agricultural sector. The attempted industrial leap 

reflected unrealistic plan targets, common 

in centralized controlled economies, and 

the neglect of the agricultural sector led to 

imbalances and underperformance there, as well. The leadership in the early 

1970s focused on the financial aspects of the benefits of the oil. Boumedienne 

believed that this would provide the means for Algeria to develop the infrastructure and institutions of a modern state. The flood of revenue produced 

the façade of modernity without the structural changes to maintain it.146 

The Algerian focus on industrialization through infusions of oil created a 

The Algerian focus on 

industrialization through 

infusions of oil created a 

‘command economy’ following an East Bloc model 

that achieved few of its 

economic or social goals.
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

‘command economy’ following an East Bloc model that achieved few of its 

economic or social goals. 

From a socio-cultural perspective, the revolution was also conflicted. 

Arabic was the national language, but the FLN leadership was a product 

of the French education system. To placate conservative traditionalists, the 

Ministry of Religious Affairs required that Modern Standard Arabic replace 

French, but there were not enough teachers. Arabic teachers were imported 

from Egypt and the Gulf, and brought with them the ideas of the Muslim 

Brotherhood and other fundamentalists. French remained the language 

of social and economic success. In fact, the lofty economic goals required 

Western languages and French, not Arabic.147 Then there was the issue of 

Berber culture. What did it mean to be Berber in a state that was allegedly 

Arabizing and where French was necessary for success? Stressing Arabization 

and Islam in a basically socialist, secular state only emphasized the existing 

cleavages with enormous consequences.148

The Berbers became more assertive through organizations like the Mouvement Culturel Berbère, focusing on Berber rights. The FLN Arabizers 

attempted to restrict the organizations’ access, including radio and television 

time, in predominantly Berber regions. The Minister of Culture, Ahmed 

Taleb-Ibrahimi, claimed that the Berbers were in reality descendants of the 

Arabs—an ethnological assertion so fallacious that it does not warrant a 

response. The Islamist organizations, like al-Qiyam, rejected Boumedienne’s 

attempts to link Islam and socialism, and leaders like Soltani posed questions 

about what it meant to be a real Muslim.149

Following Boumedienne’s death in December 1978, Chadli Bendjedid 

was elected president. The economic performance of the Boumedienne years 

was not encouraging. Even with the oil revenue, the government was hardpressed to meet the minimum economic requirements for stability given 

the exploding population. Tensions over the FLN monopoly on power and 

policies escalated in the 1980s. There was opposition from economic liberals 

and leftists, as well as Islamic fundamentalists. Growing friction between 

Arabized Algeria and francophone-led elements to strike and demonstrate. 

In attempting to dismantle the Boumedienne francophone system, the Bendjedid government turned to the Arabizers because they tended to be Islamic 

traditionalists. Ironically, the government saw the Islamist political wave 

as something they wanted to co-opt. The secularism of the revolutionary 

generation had failed to deliver the ‘good life,’ and increasingly, tracts and 
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JSOU Report 17-3

preaching began to demand a ‘just’ Islamic society based on sharia, not 

the National Charter. Then came the economic crisis of the 1980s and the 

collapse of oil prices. The wheels of stability could no longer be greased.150

The economic crisis brought riots and student unrest in 1985, 1986, and 

1987. To the Algerian street, merchants and government officials were enriching themselves at the expense of the general population.151 In October 1988, 

strikes became almost continuous, and troops and security forces resorted 

to live ammunition to quell the disturbances. Hundreds of mostly young 

men were killed and thousands were arrested and tortured. Stunned, the 

general population reacted with fury to the slaughter, blaming the military and the regime. The formation of illegal organizations mushroomed. 

Frightened, Bendjedid offered to have an elected parliament and make the 

government responsible to it. There was considerable opposition from the 

FLN cadres, whose positions were threatened. Nevertheless, in February 

1989, voters approved a new constitution that guaranteed fundamental rights 

to the population. At the same time, female rights were not mentioned and 

the role of Islam was made more specific. The FIS, a coalition of Islamic 

political groups, emerged and Bendjedid, in a calculated move, recognized 

the party, even though it violated several prohibitions in the new constitution.152 In 1989, the FLN welcomed back exiles and used Islamic rhetoric in 

its programs and propaganda. Many saw it as rejuvenated and capable of 

holding its own in the elections of 1990.153

On 12 June 1990, in local and regional elections, FIS swept the secular 

parties, taking 54 percent of the vote. FIS won on the backs of the young, 

educated, Arabic-speaking population that resented the francophone elites. 

In local and regional affairs, the FIS was in control. Was it a victory for FIS 

or a defeat for the FLN? The FLN was bankrupt and could no longer compete 

at the polls. FIS channeled disaffection with the FLN into a victory. FIS also 

made France an issue, placing the FLN on the side of the former colonial 

power.154 Still in control of the National Assembly, the FLN attempted to 

gerrymander the political system and retain control at the national level. 

It aggressively fomented dissension within the Islamic movement, creating 

new Islamic parties. FIS protests became a full-scale assault on the authority 

of the state. It was at the time of the occupation of Kuwait and Operation 

DESERT STORM, and Sheikh Ali Belhaj criticized the army for not aiding 

Iraq, saying, “The Algerian Army and the War in the Gulf: a lion when it 

fights Islamists and an ostrich in a time of war.”155
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

After compromises failed, the FIS leadership demanded a full Islamic 

state. In the December election, the FIS won a resounding victory, making it 

obvious that in the second round they would dominate the National Assembly. Despite pressure from FLN cadres, Bendjedid was determined to hold 

the election, come what may. The military saw such a course as a disaster. 

In January 1991, Chief of Staff Abdelmalek Guenaiza and the FLN opposition confronted Bendjedid and forced him to resign.156 The military formed 

a High Council of State (HCE) and annulled the election of December 1990. 

The army also outlawed FIS and arrested its leadership. This sparked a decade 

of warfare with multiple Islamic groups in which more than 150,000 Algerians died. The French were drawn into the struggle because of their commercial ties with the FLN.

The war was deluge of murders, car bombs, airplane hijackings, and 

other mayhem. The security forces responded with what some called a “war 

of annihilation,” exacerbated by the inability or unwillingness of security 

forces to distinguish between militants and non-violent Islamists.157 The 

Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), composed of fighters returned from Afghanistan and other volunteers, formed the 

backbone of the resistance. The GIA 

targeted FLN officials, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) that also fought the 

FLN, other Islamists, Jews, and particularly foreign non-combatants because of 

the publicity value. FLN security units 

and shadowy militia groups eliminated 

GIA, AIS, and Groupe Salafiste pour 

la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) militants, as well as opponents of the 

regime and moderates around which opposition to the government might 

coalesce. Both sides blamed the other for atrocities. The cynical believed that 

the regime wanted the increased violence because the state of emergency 

allowed it to stifle protest against the existing order.158

Increasingly desperate, the FLN turned to Boudiaf in a bizarre attempt to 

regain some legitimacy and credibility. The army officers who had upended 

the FIS election results reached out to their old antagonist, Mohamed 

Boudiaf, asking him to return to Algeria and head the HCE. In February 

1992, Boudiaf accepted and immediately returned to Algeria. Many viewed 

him as Algeria’s chance to realize the goals of the revolution 30 years before. 

The security forces responded 

with what some called a “war 

of annihilation,” exacerbated 

by the inability or unwillingness 

of security forces to distinguish 

between militants and nonviolent Islamists.
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JSOU Report 17-3

Boudiaf recognized immediately that he lacked a power base—in fact, he 

lacked real name recognition to all but the FLN old guard.159 He stated that 

Algeria faced three crises, “a moral crisis, a spiritual crisis and an identity 

crisis,” which had divided the country against itself. He immediately worked 

to obtain foreign assistance, liberalize the petroleum sector, and initiate an 

anti-corruption campaign. In the latter, one of the first high-profile arrests 

was General Mustapha Belloucif, an insider in the Oujda ruling cabal. 

Boudiaf’s policies rattled the powers-that-be, raising questions about how 

far he would be allowed to go. Then on 29 June 1992, he was assassinated 

while giving a speech in Annaba, a port city in the east. The assassin was 

a member of Boudiaf’s security detail who quickly confessed that he was a 

secret Islamist and had acted alone.160

The sensational nature of an assassination caught on live video aside, the 

circumstances of Boudiaf’s death sparked speculation. The Islamic opposition applauded Boudiaf’s death because he was seen as an ally of the military 

in crushing the opposition. He had made it plain in his speeches that he had 

no tolerance for “a closed Islam, which harks back to 13 or 14 centuries ago,” a 

pointed attack on the Salifists. The HCE declared another state of emergency 

to deal with the Islamists. Westerners and Westernized elites viewed it as an 

assault on secularism and the state, blaming ‘Islamic Jihad.’161 Others saw his 

elimination as a plot arranged by those threatened by his anti-corruption 

programs.162 No matter what the case, the situation demonstrated the impotency of the government’s attempts to gain credibility. The FLN was either 

incompetent or complicit—the result was the same. The FLN regime had no 

pathway to legitimacy and no future if it did not survive, hence the civil war 

became an existential struggle.

In 1994, the HCE dissolved, recognizing that some path had to be found 

out of the current morass. Liamine Zeroual, the defense minister, assumed 

the presidency. He pursued a policy of ‘re-democratization,’ calling elections in 1995. In 1996, a new constitution was drafted. Although violence 

intensified in 1997 and 1998, the move toward a functioning political system 

continued.163 Zeroual held new elections in April 1999. There were problems, 

but Abdelaziz Bouteflika, an FLN protégé of Boumedienne, was elected. His 

offer of amnesty was partially successful. The amnesty, police operations, 

and internal disputes gutted GIA, which became a non-factor. By 2000, it 

was clear that the insurgency had lost much of its potency. Under Bouteflika, Algeria recouped some of its lost international prestige. He received 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

strong mandates to remain in office, but problems continued. In 2007, the 

GSPC became al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and rocked Algiers with 

a string of suicide bombings that has once again pushed the government 

toward an authoritarian posture.164 When the uprising of 2011 swept Tunisia, 

Egypt, and Libya, the government acted quickly, using its petroleum wealth 

to undermine protests. The memory of the 1990s fitna (distress) also dampened enthusiasm for another round of chaos and instability. As the second 

decade of the 21st century dawned, nothing had been settled in Algeria.

Summary 

Independence in the Maghreb provided three distinct cases for regime formation and survival in the region. Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria reflected 

three different approaches to political, economic, and social development. 

The Neo-Dustur and Habib Bourguiba used Islam and Tunisia’s Islamic 

heritage as a cudgel with which to bash the colonial administration and gain 

independence, but once that goal was attained, the Tunisian government 

dissolved the monarchy and sought to replace traditional Islamic practice 

with Western political and social practice. The promise of Westernization, 

whether in its liberal capitalist or socialist collective mode, in the end failed 

to produce benefits for the bulk of the population. The approach was not 

necessarily flawed, but rather it had applicability in only a limited political sphere. Historically, the differences between the Tunisian or Ifriqiyan 

coastal areas and the interior of west and south prevented real integration. 

Even after independence, resistance continued in the south from the Yusufist 

movement. This was in part due to the political rivalry between Ben Yusuf 

and Bourguiba and ideological differences, but it also flowed from the fundamental social and cultural differences that set the regions apart. In fact, the 

south never saw itself as a part of the political and social milieu of the coast. 

When Ben Ali displaced Bourguiba and moved to a market-driven Westernized kleptocracy, it exacerbated the coastal-interior tensions and contributed to the explosion of 2011. Despite Ben Ali’s superficial gestures to the 

Islamic communities, the Bourguibist state was secular and fundamentally 

hostile to political Islam. In addition, the Ben Ali clan lacked a pathway to 

transfer political power legitimately to a new ruler. Hence, Ben Ali attempted 

to perpetuate the malikiyyat juhurriyya, or republican monarchy, by grooming his sons. Not surprisingly, the spark that unraveled the regime came 
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from the southern interior. In Tunisia, there are fundamental political, economic, and socio-cultural problems imposed by the geopolitical reality, and 

in the aftermath of 2011, there is no reason to believe that this will change. 

Whatever political party or coalition comes to dominate Tunisia, it will, of 

necessity, have its primary base of support in the coastal regions and urban 

centers. The regional social differences, economic realities of the Tunisian 

economy, and the disadvantaged position of the south and interior will create 

an environment where resistance, most likely in the form of radical Islamic 

movements, will continue. The issue is less a matter of ideology (i.e., Islam) 

than of unsolvable economic and social differences that have always existed. 

Geopolitically, Morocco has an even more complex problem than Tunisia. 

Regional differences are more pronounced—the coastal regions, the Rif, 

the Sahara and the eastern interior are all starkly different. Nevertheless, 

Morocco has a significant political edge. It has a history of independent 

Islamic revivalism. In the Middle Ages, two cohesive Islamic empires—the 

Almoravids and the Almohads—emerged from Morocco. Depending on 

the talents of the ruler, the Alawi state functioned well at times. Rulers had 

a history of legitimacy. When rulers were weak and the political situation 

chaotic, the institutions were still recognizable. French Protectorate policy 

under General Lyautey insured not only the survival of the monarchy, but 

also the survival of traditional political and socio-cultural institutions. As 

a result, the monarchy became the vehicle for the independence movement 

as much as the political parties, like Istiqlal. 

Muhammad V’s role as the catalyst that pushed the French to withdraw 

provided a legitimacy to the movement that connected it to Morocco’s traditional Islamic past. The role of the monarchy, and the king as the ‘commander of the faithful,’ buffered the independent state from many of the 

problems faced by the secular Neo-Dustur. There were problems, but as 

Islamic political activism grew, it was far more difficult to paint the monarch, 

even the worldly Hassan II, as un-Islamic. The Sunni political view of sulta

(political authority), namely that rule itself was a manifestation of legitimacy, provided Hassan II added legitimacy during the ‘iron hand’ period 

of his rule. During the last 15 years of Hassan’s reign, he embraced emerging Islamic movements, pursued a traditional Moroccan imperialist policy 

in the Sahara, and focused on issues like Berber rights. The monarchy had 

the flexibility to broaden his base of support to accommodate new political 

realities. As important as rule itself, the monarchy provided a means for the 
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legitimate, orderly transfer of power. Muhammad VI’s claim to traditional 

Islamic legitimacy allowed the monarchy to survive the events of 2011 by 

making modest accommodations with the opposition. Where the ruling 

structure of the secular party system in Tunisia collapsed, the monarchial 

tradition in Morocco survived. 

The protectorate arrangements for Tunisia and Morocco allowed for a 

transition to independence in a relatively straightforward way. This was not 

the case in Algeria. The geopolitical footprint of Algeria creates an environment that is significantly more challenging. In addition, Algeria lacks the 

historical cohesion. Centralized rule in Algeria was, at all times, ephemeral. 

The coastal enclaves functioned as city-states based on maritime trade and 

local rulers. Thus, the French move into Algeria in 1830 took on a different 

character—Algeria became a part of metropolitan France and the colon 

influence drove the political discourse both within Algeria and with the 

government in Paris. It was, in effect, apartheid government by the colons 

for the colons. In addition, French colonial policy expanded the borders of 

Algeria to the south, making the social and ethnic stratification of Algeria 

by far the most complex in the Maghreb. 

This reality meant that independence could only come to Algeria through 

violent revolution. The colon state and French rule brought disparate factions together that likely would have been at odds in any other situation. 

After independence was won, the fractured political, economic, and social 

construct of Algeria became apparent, even within the FLN ruling party. 

Groups vying for control within the party were referred to as clans and were 

often centered on specific geographic areas or ethnic groups. The Kabyle 

region furnished much of the support of the ruling faction within the FLN, 

and their francophone heritage became an increasing source of friction 

with other groups as the republic pursued an official policy of Arabization. 

For Algeria, the combination of French colonial policy and the historically 

fractured nature of the region created an environment where survival of 

central control required an overtly coercive state, even when supplemented 

by extensive petroleum and gas reserves. 

Despite these resources, the Algerian state was almost undone. Although 

the official religion was Islam and the language Arabic, Algeria was, in fact, 

a secular state ruled by a Westernized francophone elite. It was not only 

secular, but also socialist, and looked to the Eastern Bloc for philosophy and 

approaches to rule. Central planning drove a faltering economy, requiring 
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infusions of petrodollars to keep it functioning. The instability of the 1980s 

and the Islamic revolt of the 1990s resulted in part from the economic morass 

of poor planning and low oil prices, as well as political alienation from the 

ruling FLN. When the president, Bendjedid, attempted to institute real political reforms, the prospect of the Islamists taking control of the government 

prompted a military coup and a bloody Islamist revolt. This, in turn, brought 

military rule, the provisional government, and election of Bouteflika in 1999. 

In the first decade of the 21st century, rising oil prices allowed the government to artificially pump up the economy, although none of the underlying 

political and economic dynamics had changed. Algeria avoided a serious 

popular eruption in 2011 by using its petroleum wealth and repression, but 

political, economic, and social dysfunction 

continued to afflict the state.

In the post-2011 environment, the ability of the government to sustain prosperity 

and stability is being challenged. No matter 

what the form of government—Islamist, 

secular, or monarchy—the states of the 

Maghreb face problems and challenges that 

likely exceed what has heretofore occurred. 

There is a new challenge as well. As security problems have increased and 

emigration increasingly has become an issue in Europe, the migrant- or 

emigrant-worker safety valve for poor economic opportunity at home will 

likely become less available. There is going to be more pressure on the governments of Maghreb to deliver a better life in an environment that mitigates 

against significant improvement. None of the states of the region have been 

able to change the dynamic of uneven development and friction between 

the hinterland and coastal areas, or between groups that are ethnically and 

culturally divergent. In the last chapter, this study discusses the last five years 

and the implications for the future, including the spillover of the Maghreb’s 

political, economic, and social problems into the European context and its 

implications for security. 

No matter what the form 

of government—Islamist, 

secular, or monarchy—the 

states of the Maghreb face 

problems and challenges 

that likely exceed what has 

heretofore occurred. 
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4. Conclusion: 2011 and the Future 

In early 2011, the Maghreb provided the spark for the so-called Arab Spring 

revolts. Tensions and unrest in Tunisia exploded following the self-immolation of a street vendor, and the resulting political chaos brought the rapid 

collapse of the Ben Ali government. The unrest quickly spread across much 

of the Arab world, and the calls for change increased. Resistance movements 

materialized and governments fell across the region. Many, particularly in 

the West, believed that a wave of democracy had finally broken across the 

Arab Middle East. The dictators were gone or teetering, and it was only a 

matter to time before a new order emerged in the region. The view that liberal Western-style democracy would somehow take root where it had never 

existed before proved to be largely naïve. Within a relatively short period of 

time, chaos, civil war, and collapse, or an authoritarian order in the form 

of the military or Islamists, became the primary options. The majority of 

the regimes that truly survived the chaos were the traditional monarchies 

and emirates.

The Maghreb, the region that provided the catalyst for the explosion in 

the first place, provides a laboratory for understanding the upheaval. Since 

2011, what we have seen in the Maghreb is that the ideological underpinnings 

of opposition and revolt, adjusted to 21st-century norms, remain more or 

less consistent with the past. Political alienation, economic deprivation, and 

social divisions came to a head, and the 

political order scrambled to adjust. In 

Tunisia, the chasm between the coast, 

and the interior and south toppled Ben 

Ali, and created a more unstable but 

more representative political milieu. 

It has been besieged by radicals using 

fundamentalist interpretations of Islam to justify revolt. In Morocco, the 

monarchy, behind the motto of ‘God, Country, and King,’ claimed traditional Islamic legitimacy, balancing the disparate political landscape while 

struggling to control economic and social problems. In Algeria in the 1990s, 

the FLN demonstrated the lengths to which it would go to stay in power. 

Challenged by political opponents and radical militant Islamists from the 

The Maghreb, the region that 

provided the catalyst for the 

explosion in the first place, 

provides a laboratory for understanding the upheaval.
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Sahara to Algiers, the FLN has more resources to deal with problems, but 

faces a more complex geopolitical and socio-cultural reality. 

Finally, the entire Maghreb has been the beneficiary of the worker and 

immigration policies that have made the European Union a safety valve for 

poor economic performance, unemployment, and rapid population growth. 

Emigration has provided a source of funds through remittances that have 

helped to shore up the region. Now, the social and cultural divisions, and 

inability to assimilate disparate groups that have historically plagued Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria are affecting Europe. North African ghettos and 

shrinking economic opportunity combined with social isolation have created a small, but determined, group of frustrated youths who have borrowed various radical Islamic ideologies as a justification for terror attacks 

in Europe. This reality does not portend well for the continued availability 

of the ‘European safety valve,’ and the states of the Maghreb will likely face 

a changed relationship with Europe as a result. 

Immigration has become a key issue as European populations lash out 

against what they see a threat to their own national identities. The collapse 

of Libya, although not part of the Maghreb and not included in this discussion, demonstrates that the states of North Africa form a dam that allows 

for orderly, stable relations with Europe. When that dam is breeched, as in 

the case of Libya, the situation may require radical new thinking, in human 

terms alone, about how to manage the relationship. For that reason, state 

survival—whether politically legitimate in eyes of Western idealists or not—

is critical to the stability of the Mediterranean basin, and likely to Europe 

itself. The question for this concluding chapter is: What has 2011 wrought 

and what does the future look like? 

Tunisia: 2011 and Beyond

In Tunisia, the inability to bridge the economic and social gap between 

the coast and the interior (particularly the southern and western interiors) 

ignited a revolution. For the common people in Ben Ali’s kleptocracy, even 

their minimal subsistence was threatened. The issue of replacing the authoritarian regime was problematic, in that decidedly secular middle and upper 

class Tunisia had to accommodate emerging Islamic political groups. Elections in October 2011 brought Rashid Ghannushi, the leader of the Islamist 

al-Nahda Party, to power in a coalition with two secular parties, the Congress 
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for the Republic (CPR) and the Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les 

Libertés (FDTL). Moncef Marzouki (a CPR member) was interim president, 

Hamadi Jebali (of al-Nahda) was prime minister, and Mustapha Ben Jaafar 

(an FDTL member) was president of the National Constituent Assembly 

(NCA). The primary obstacle to rule was the radical Salafists. In the ruling 

coalition, al-Nahda, the Islamist element, had responsibility for bringing the 

Salafists into the political fold. Their efforts failed. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia 

(AAS-T) made it clear that they would be satisfied with nothing less than 

a fully Islamic Tunisia, as defined by themselves. Kairouan, and the Grand 

Mosque there, became the focal point of Salafi radicalism.165

In June 2012, Salafists and their supporters, bussed in from the south, 

besieged Manouba University to protest rumors that the new constitution 

would give women the same rights as men.166 In 2013, AAS-T assassinated 

Chokri Belaid, a secular politician and critic of al-Nahda’s refusal to rein in 

the radical Salafis.167 The group struck again in July, assassinating Mohamed 

Brahmi, another secular politician and critic.168 At this point, protesters and 

parliamentarians demanded a national unity government and the outlawing 

of AAS-T—they achieved both.169

In January 2014, the NCA approved a new constitution making Arabic the 

national language and Islam the state religion, but also guaranteeing equal 

treatment for women, and civil and political rights. Mehdi Jooma became 

prime minister.170 In 2015, Habib Essid, a former member of Ben Ali’s government and minister of the interior, was chosen by the NCA as prime minister 

because of his experience in security and economics.171 In 2015, two separate 

attacks, one at the Bardo Museum in Tunis and the other at a beach resort 

in Sousse, killed scores of foreign tourists, resulting the reinstatement of the 

state of emergency powers.172 In addition, Tunisia received additional security 

and military aid from the West, and just a few days after the Sousse attack, 

a U.S. airstrike in Libya killed Seifallah Ben Hassine, the leader of AAS-T, 

the organization responsible for the attacks.173 The prime minister called it 

a war with the terrorists. 

The level of the threat was something heretofore unseen in Tunisia, 

requiring a rethinking of security policy. In security reviews following the 

2015 attacks, several security officials were arrested and more than 100 officers fired for links or sympathies with radical organizations. It reflected 

the unwillingness of the al-Nahda government to deal firmly with Islamic 

radicalism.174 Despite a new government aggressiveness, radical Islamic 
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organizations still operate in the mountainous regions of the west, along 

the Algerian border, and in the south, adjacent to their training bases and 

sanctuaries in Libya. Multiple security improvements are underway, including a berm in south, the new limes, and more aggressive operations on the 

Algerian border. 

The determination on the part of the Tunisian government to deal with 

the terrorism problem notwithstanding, limited success will likely flow from 

these efforts. Experts have called the efforts a ‘Band-Aid’ because of the difficulties in preventing local radicalization, the motivation behind several 

of the attacks. Among other things, ‘experts’ talk about a ‘structural’ solution, including economic development and the healing of social and cultural cleavages within the society.175 These suggestions may have theoretical 

efficacy, but in practical terms, they represent a fundamental ignorance and 

inability to come to terms with the reality of the Tunisian context. 

Every ruling group that has attempted to maintain stability in Ifriqiya

(Tunisia) has faced the problem of controlling and integrating the interior 

south and west with the coastal areas, and every group has failed. The talk of 

fences and berms and increased aggressive security patrolling were no doubt 

the same discussions that Roman commanders held in the first century. In 

fact, the parallels between the Roman limes and what is being attempted 

today is amazing. The fact that, historically, the mountains to the west in 

the areas bordering present-day Algeria were always a source of threats and 

instability to the settled coastal region has not changed. 

In the Christian era, the North African interior was a hotbed of sectarian 

resistance, from Donatist and Arian splinter groups to the imposed orthodoxy of Rome or the Byzantines. In the early Islamic era, the regions of the 

south and west became hotbeds of Berber resistance to rule from the coast. 

In the Islamic era, the isolation and discontent of the people in the interior 

and their hostility to the coastal societies meant they harbored sectarian 

rebels like the Kharijites—the very label applied to the Islamic State and 

al-Qaeda by orthodox Muslim scholars—and, in the case of the Fatimids, 

the first Shi’a caliphate that dominated Egypt, the Red Sea, and the eastern 

Mediterranean for 150 years. The great Kairouan mosque often became a 

center for ideological legitimacy among those opposed to the ruling order. 

Thus, the recent use of the Kairouan mosque and religious schools by radical 

Islamists as centers for indoctrination and organization is part of a tradition that dates back centuries as the government moves to control it. In the 
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colonial era, the south and west resisted French colonial domination, and 

after independence, Bourguiba’s split with Ben Yusuf resulted in an ongoing 

insurgency on the southern and western borders requiring the help of French 

security forces to subdue the Yusufists. 

Those same regions were ripe for exploitation by neighboring states hostile to Bourguiba. At different times, the Algerians and the Libyans both were 

responsible for unrest in the south and east—a 1980 incident in the Gafsa 

provides an excellent example. Libyan-backed dissidents entered Tunisia 

from the Algerian border regions and attempted to incite a general rebellion against the Bourguiba regime. In light of this history, should anyone 

be surprised that the spark and unrest that undermined the Ben Ali regime 

came from the Tunisian interior, or that Salafist radicals in AAS-T or the 

Islamic State find recruits and are able to mount an insurgency from Tunisia’s 

southern and western areas, and along its porous borders with the former 

state of Libya, as well as Algerian regions seldom if ever controlled by the 

FLN government in Algiers? The answer is obvious.

This brings the discussion back to the issue of Tunisia and the way forward. Development and integration of the south and interior is a ‘pipe dream’ 

pursued for millennia. Historically, there has been neither the will nor the 

resources to do anything more than keep a lid on the region. Given birth 

rates, economic pressures on the government in Tunis, the instability affecting both of its neighbors, and perhaps most importantly, the reality of the 

geopolitical and socio-cultural differences between the interior and coast, no 

realistic possibility of integrating the interior and south exists. The return of 

large numbers of fighters from Syria and Iraq also has the potential to have a 

dramatic effect on the security situation. That said, as the situation in Libya 

has amply demonstrated, the West, and particularly Europeans, need to 

make certain that state structure—preferably pro-Western state structure—

continues in the coastal regions and that control, albeit at times contested, 

continues in the interior. 

For the state to survive, the real focus has to be on stability and development in the large urban centers and the littoral. Whether the political party 

in control is Islamist, secular, or a national front, the priority will ultimately 

have to be the same: namely, there may be considerable rhetoric and some 

additional investment in the south and interior, but in the end, the limitations on funding and the priorities will bring a focus on the coastal regions. 

That development has to be protected from the instability emanating from 
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regions that are fundamentally different from the core of the Tunisian state 

and society if the state is to survive. 

Morocco: 2011 and Beyond

In Morocco, the events of 2011 in Tunisia brought demonstrations from 

what was described as the ‘Movement for Change.’ There were predictable 

demands—a new constitution, reduced royal power, and an independent 

judiciary. From the sidelines, many analysts predicted that events would 

follow the same course as in Tunisia and Egypt. They missed the mark. 

The monarchy and Muhammad VI’s role as ‘defender of the faithful’ seems 

archaic to the uninformed, but it has real resonance. In Tunisia, Ben Ali was 

viewed as a corrupt policeman who headed little more than a crime family. 

In Morocco, the monarchy has been the defender of Moroccan independence 

and head of a political system within the Islamic tradition. In simplistic 

terms, the ability of protesters to attack the secular government in Tunisia, 

from the right for being un-Islamic and from the left for being a tool of the 

wealthy, was simple. In Morocco, the monarch had legitimacy in the face 

of attacks, from Islamists or from the left, because it had been a progressive 

driver in the effort to modernize the country. Therefore, when Muhammad VI offered reforms and a more open political system, the propensity to 

follow the lead of the monarch, regardless of frustration with the makhzan, 

trumped those that wanted to upend the system. 

Another factor entered the equation, as well—Islamic political theory; 

instability and chaos are more feared than authoritarianism. The images 

from Cairo and Tunis dampened appetites for revolutionary change. In April 

2011, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb carried 

out a bombing in Marrakesh. Whatever their 

goal, terrorism reinforced the position of the 

monarch. Muhammad VI appointed a committee to rewrite the constitution and was criticized 

by many for not creating some kind of national 

assembly to undertake the task. The bombings 

and instability across the region muted most of 

the criticism of the monarch’s approach. The Moroccan system survived in 

large part because it represented stability and, in theory, a traditional Islamic 

system of rule.176

Another factor entered the equation, as 

well—Islamic political 

theory; instability and 

chaos are more feared 

than authoritarianism.
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The new constitution gave additional powers to the prime minister. He 

now had the power to dissolve the lower house of parliament and preside 

over the council of ministers in the absence of the king. The king agreed 

to nominate the prime minister from the political party that held the most 

seats in the majlis (house of parliament). At the same time, the monarch 

preserved virtually all of his prerogatives—command of the armed forces, 

appointment of key military and security personnel, appointment of judges, 

and appointment of key officials in state-owned enterprises. The king also 

remained ‘inviolable.’ The monarchy retained control over any decisions of 

importance, including laws enacted by the majlis. The new constitution gave 

legal status to the Berber identity and adopted Berber as the official language 

of Morocco alongside Arabic. When the constitution was put to a referendum 

in July 2011, it was estimated that 70 percent of the population participated, 

with something approaching unanimous approval.

In elections, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) won the 

largest bloc of seats in the majlis and Muhammad VI appointed its leader, 

Abdelilah Benkirane, as prime minister. The prime minister negotiated a 

coalition, the National Rally of Independents (RNI), with two other parties 

and has focused on corruption and development issues.177 One of the largest 

obstacles to investment and development is the amount of funding required 

to maintain control of the Western Sahara—there is no indication that this 

situation is going to improve. Politically, Morocco can hardly accept a solution that entails a withdrawal. Benkirane is a modernist and democratic 

Islamist who sees secularism as a threat to the integrity and identity of 

Morocco, but famously stated that the PJD was “not interested in the length 

of women’s skirts.”178 Benkirane has shown a high degree of sophistication 

in how the RNI approaches the issue of reform with the king. There have 

been no public confrontations and the system seems to have worked well. The 

RNI has apparently influenced the Justice and Charity Party, a more strident 

Islamist group that opposed the new constitution and the designation of the 

king as ‘defender of the faithful,’ to pursue their goals politically and not 

by challenging the monarchy.179 This political position of the Islamists is in 

part a recognition of the strength of the position of the monarchy and its 

general popularity.

While Morocco faces terrorism threats, particularly from Moroccan 

nationals associated with ISIS who might return to their homeland, the 

reaction to it has sparked a debate. Some assert that Moroccan authorities 
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have been “taking advantage” of the security threat to extend anti-terrorism 

laws and their authority. Mohammed Masbah, writing for the Carnegie 

Endowment, stated: “First and foremost, the Ministry of Interior wants to 

send a message to the prime minister—and consequently the PJD—that 

due to the terrorism threat, the security forces should be free from their 

oversight.” Those that hold this view believe that the reaction to security 

threats is disproportional to the threat.180 The terrorist attacks in Paris in 

2015 and Brussels in 2016, perpetrated by terrorists of European citizenship 

and Moroccan descent, sparked a round of articles on the role of Moroccans 

in international terrorism. It has also brought new attention to the Rif. The 

article calls the Rif the “heartland of global terrorism,” a title that is more 

hyperbole than journalism, but nevertheless, it touches on an issue that both 

the Europeans and the Moroccans will have to address—the perception 

that immigrants, even second-generation European offspring, represent a 

threat.181 Muhammad VI’s move to make Berber an official language and 

to court the Berbers as group under the special protection of the monarch 

aside, the Rif remains a potential flash point to both Moroccan and Algerian 

stability. In addition, the fact that Sheikh Ali Belhadj, the founder of FIS in 

Algeria, is based in Morocco and allowed to speak out against the Algerian 

government is another sore point in relations.182

The Moroccan government insists that it has found the ‘third way,’ a path 

between reform and instability. Of course, those that support Western-style 

democratic reform disagree and believe that the price of stability has been 

too high. In terms of Moroccan history, reformist calls for democracy have 

the distinct ring of naiveté. Morocco has its problems, but the traditional 

form of rule, with its authoritarianism, is certainly a better option than what 

has occurred in much of the rest of the region. For Western consumption, 

Moroccan officials cite what they call a “process of democratization” and 

“gradual reform.”183 The potential for abuse of the system aside, Morocco 

without the monarchy would disintegrate into the chaos of the late 19th 

and early 20th centuries—it is the overarching canopy of the monarchy 

that allows the makhzan to claim legitimacy over the disparate parts of the 

geopolitical and socio-cultural elements that comprise the Moroccan state. 

Frankly, the monarchy has done a far better job of maintaining stability 

without the eruptions that have faced Tunisia and certainly Algeria. Lyautey 

understood this, and so have the rulers since Muhammad V. The potential 
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remains that some set of events could cause the political and security situation to spin out of control, but it appears unlikely. 184

Algeria: 2011 and Beyond

The one crucial factor that differentiated the Algerian reaction to 2011 from 

the reactions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya was the ‘Red Decade’ from 1993–

2003; the civil war traumatized the country. The National Coordination for 

Change and Democracy, headed by Abdennour Ali-Yahia and activist Said 

Saadi, called for demonstrations, but no mass uprising occurred. When 

President Bouteflika announced the government would accede to the protesters’ demands and end the state of emergency in effect since 1992, the opposition movement fell apart. Coupled with promises of more free expression 

in the media, more jobs for the young people, a crackdown on corruption, 

and salary increases for government workers, the feared unrest dissipated.185 

The government also provided free housing, low-interest loans, and outright 

payments to the citizenry to alleviate economic pressure and to forestall an 

eruption—it worked. Activists argue that the Algerian regime has steadily 

eroded the liberalizing changes made in 2011 and that the overall social and 

economic situation continues to be grim. The security state is omnipresent, 

but stability has brought relatively good relations with the West and a model 

security state in a region in turmoil.186

There was speculation that Bouteflika’s health would prevent him from 

running for the presidency in 2014. This was not the case. He is still in office, 

described as “aging, ailing and barely able to speak.”187 Nevertheless, he provides the façade behind which the FLN maintains its hold. There is a decided 

difference between control in Algeria and control in Morocco. The Algerian 

government lacks the legitimacy of a traditional regime, like that of Morocco, 

and in the fitna of the 1990s, the army showed that it was unwilling to accept 

any political situation that might compromise its position—unlike the army 

in Tunisia. It is a country so large that it cannot be effectively controlled, 

as demonstrated by the capture of the Tiguentourine gas facility in 2013. It 

faces increasing Islamist influence and lacks new leaders that could guide a 

transition out of the current system. What it has is the memory of 200,000 

killed in the decade of rebellion, and oil wealth to tamp down threats from 

political, economic, or social unrest.188 Poverty and unemployment remain 

high, and government corruption and poor public services are notorious, 
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but the so-called revolutions that failed in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, 

in addition to Algeria’s own experience, are a reminder of the enormous 

risk of chaos.189

Nevertheless, the lack of credibility and legitimacy of the Algerian government and FLN undermines any attempts to counter increasingly radical 

Salafi discourse. Understandably, the government fears any loss of control; 

therefore, Islamic groups—moderate Islamist or non-violent Salafi—that 

cooperate with the government are viewed as stooges and find themselves 

discredited. As the political, economic, and social stagnation continues 

under the FLN, non-violent movements will increasingly lose ground to 

those advocating a radical course of 

action. The new government mantra 

of promoting what the Algerian minister for religious affairs refers to as the 

‘Andalusia’ model undermines moderation. The Salafis and others view it as 

another government ploy to maintain 

control, and the more radical see the 

model as un-Islamic. It is an impasse, and to break the impasse in favor of 

more moderate groups would require a real relinquishment of some power—

a risk the FLN is not willing to take. While this approach in theory might 

have benefits, those advocating it are likely wasting their breath.190 Perhaps, 

younger FLN members might be convinced to take a different path, but for 

the time being, they appear to have no voice in policy.

In considering present-day Algeria within its historical context, no government has ever held sway over the area contained within its current borders. Neither the French, who created modern Algeria, nor the FLN, who 

are attempting to maintain it, have exercised definitive central control. In 

looking back, stability in what is now called Algeria occurred in the relatively 

limited confines of the coastal regions and was limited to the immediate 

regions around independently ruled ports. The dynasties of the past were 

weak entities involved in feuding with their neighbors. An Algerian state 

like Tunisia and Morocco never really existed. Morocco spawned not only 

the current monarchy, but also the Almoravids and Almohads of an earlier 

age. Tunisia was a monarchy and structure until the 1950s. 

The geographic area now labelled on the map as Algeria has always been 

a source of instability in North Africa. Therefore, the question arises: If not 

As the political, economic, and 

social stagnation continues 

under the FLN, non-violent 

movements will increasingly 

lose ground to those advocating 

a radical course of action.
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

the FLN, then who? The Islamists would likely have more legitimacy than the 

FLN, but any transition would be difficult if not chaotic and violent, and the 

outcome uncertain. Another alternative is a fractured political topography, 

like that of Libya, with the nightmare of mass migration. In all likelihood, 

Algeria cannot be held together as a state without an authoritarian government. Without authoritarian central control, Algeria has greater potential 

to become a second Libya than any of the other Maghreb states, and that 

would be a disaster not only for the Maghreb, but also for the Mediterranean 

community as well. Given this reality and the chaos now afflicting the region, 

the continued rule of the FLN, limping from one demonstration or protest 

to the next, responding with infusions of petrodollars and repression, has 

been viewed as the least of all evils for the interests of the West, the Maghreb, 

and even the Algerian people. 

However, this may not suffice for much longer. President Bouteflika has 

not been seen for more than a year. Le pouvoir (the power), the shadowy FLN 

clique of military, political, and economic leaders running Algeria, seemed to 

be locked in a power struggle to the replace the ailing president. Senior leaders were pushed from power, including General Mohamed ‘Toufik’ Mediène, 

the former head of the security and intelligence service, the Département du 

Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS). The DRS was dissolved and replaced 

by three separate organizations reporting directly to the president, or to 

whomever is acting on his behalf. At the same time, the power of General 

Ahmed Gaid Saleh, the army chief of staff, has grown. As the economic situation worsens and oil prices slump, there is speculation that more changes 

are afoot.191 That said, it is unlikely that the FLN has plans to relinquish any 

real power to the opposition.

Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria have become central to many of the critical global and regional issues related to stability, terrorism, and immigration. During the second half of the 20th century, the assumption was that 

each of the states would move toward a more secular, Westernized political, 

economic, and social structure, and real constitutional government. These 

views ignored the geopolitical reality of the region on the one hand and the 

socio-cultural reality on the other. This association of a nation-state with 

the landmass included within the borders drawn by the colonial powers 

dismissed the contradictions inherent in any state in the Maghreb. This idea 

that Western liberal democratic institutions would allow for the interaction 

of the various contending factions in the states of the Maghreb proved to be 
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a false hope. In fact, it was Tunisia, the most secular of states in the region, 

that ignited the explosion of 2011 and then struggled to overcome the resulting chaos. It was Morocco, with its traditional political structure and its tie 

to Islamic legitimacy, that navigated the vicissitudes of the late 20th and 

early 21st centuries. And, finally, Algeria fought its insurgency in the ‘Red 

Decade’ of the 1990s, and in the 21st century, floats the battered FLN ship of 

state on a sea of petroleum. 

The Maghreb: Stability and the Future

Each of the states of the Maghreb learned the same lessons in somewhat 

differing ways. The fundamental division between the coast and the hinterland constitutes a real barrier to national political, economic, and social 

integration. Neither Western liberal nor planned socialist approaches to 

ideology and economics have mended the gap. Every group that has ruled or 

attempted to rule in the Maghreb from the beginning of recorded history has 

come to terms with that fact. Ibn Khaldun, the great Arab social historian of 

North Africa, would no doubt laugh at the attempts to integrate the settled 

coast with the interior factions and tribes. To maintain territorial control and 

order, the states of the Maghreb have had to fall back on authoritarian state 

structures. Morocco is an authoritarian monarchy. Algeria is an authoritarian socialist state. Even Tunisia, with its attempt to find a democratic pathway 

to the future, finds itself having to resort to more authoritarian methods 

for survival against the Islamists of the interior. To blame authoritarianism 

on political structures and rulers is to miss the point. Rule reflected the 

geographic and socio-cultural reality. As the Carthaginians, Romans, and 

Arabs knew, the more one attempts to extend control to the south, then the 

more forces of instability affect the political structure. The response is a more 

authoritarian regime. 

To assume that another system or political group could control the hinterland with anything other than an authoritarian approach ignores the lessons 

of the past. The last lesson is that, at some point, all of the regimes of the 

Maghreb will have to come to terms with a reassertion of Islam and Islamic 

traditions in their political and social spheres. Tunisia is going through the 

throes of experimenting with exactly what that means in a state that has 

been the most secular in the Arab world. With its tradition of ‘God, Country, and King,’ Morocco has managed to handle the transition of Islamist 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

participation better than the secular states. Finally, Algeria’s aborted experiment with an accommodation with the Islamists will be repeated at some 

point in the future when the FLN finally adjusts to 

the fact that it will have no option. That said, there 

is no reason to believe that the Islamists will be 

any more united or any less authoritarian than the 

secular predecessors in the FLN, because Islamic 

movements merely overlay and reflect the complex 

geopolitical, socioeconomic, and cultural reality 

of the region.192 By definition, stability will flow 

from the security services, not political consensus. 

For the time being, survival of state structures, no 

matter how imperfect, authoritarian, or internally fragmented, is the only 

real option to prevent further chaos in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean 

basin. 

In 1992, lamenting the authoritarian rule, the conflicts of the region, 

and the failure of Western political ideals to take root, Elie Kedourie stated, 

“Such seems to be the outcome of nearly two centuries of contact with Western political institutions and ideals, which one generation after another has 

passionately wished to emulate, and tirelessly worked to make a reality in 

the Middle East.” Pointing out that under the Islamists like Khomeini, subjects fared no better, Kedourie described it “as an endeavor to discard the 

old ways, which have ceased to satisfy and to replace them with something 

modern, eye-catching, and attractive. The torment does not seem likely to 

end soon.”193 In fact, the level of “torment” was unimaginable. For all the 

good intentions, Western political institutions and rules of governance are 

just that, ‘Western.’ In other words, the conflict is not about programs or 

policies, but about what the basis for political discourse will be in the future. 

Socialist or capitalist, they are secular, Western, and foreign, and can only be 

maintained through authoritarian methods. Some Islamists that hark back 

to an imaginary ‘purer’ past are no less authoritarian. 

Rashid al-Ghannushi argues in “Westernization and the Inevitability of 

Dictatorship,” that Westernization inevitably leads to dictatorship in North 

Africa because the language spoken by the ruling elite is foreign to the ruled 

masses, and that Islam as a political and social vehicle can bridge the gap.194

Western secularism in the Maghreb, and for that matter the Middle East, 

has failed—an objective fact, but whether or not Islam is a bridge to a more 

To assume that 

another system or 

political group could 

control the hinterland 

with anything other 

than an authoritarian 

approach ignores the 

lessons of the past.
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JSOU Report 17-3

stable future or merely the same elitist authoritarianism supported by just 

another ideology, is yet to be seen. Given this reality, the West is not in a 

position to take high-minded risks, stability and control is likely the best for 

which to hope. The models are actually the same for governance—an elite 

manipulating the levers of power for control. It then becomes a matter of 

which ruling groups are least objectionable and most efficient at maintaining stability and control. 

In the Western security system, despite significant U.S. military aid, the 

Maghreb has traditionally been an area of French military responsibility. 

That said, the American role in support of the French and indigenous forces 

is growing. The French military is under increasing pressure because of its 

foreign commitments and the terrorism problem at home. Over the next 

decade, the U.S. role in the Maghreb will only grow, and as that happens, it 

is important that SOF have a basic understanding of the relationship between 

the Maghreb’s context and the contemporary reality. There is no more likelihood that the states of the region—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—will 

eliminate the instability and security threats around them; but they can 

contain them with help from their allies. It is no more likely that U.S. or 

French military involvement will be any more successful than that of the 

Romans, Byzantines, Arab armies, Ottomans, or French in controlling the 

area within the current borders. Nevertheless, like those commanders in the 

past, a judicious, conservative approach to involvement in the Maghreb can 

yield a level of stability that prevents the collapse of the polities of the region 

and a new Iraq, Syria, Yemen, or Libya. 

The Maghreb: Strategic Interests and Policy in Practical Terms

When viewed within the broader North African context, the Maghreb provides a clear subset of the practical policy challenges of the broader Middle 

East and South Asia region—‘Morocco to Bangladesh.’ Although this study 

focuses on the Maghreb, the political structure of North Africa, from Cairo 

to Rabat, displays examples of the full range of policy and security challenges 

in the region. Egypt, a cohesive national state, will undoubtedly survive as a 

state as it has for five millennia—the political structure, no matter who is at 

the top, will be reliant on the military and security services. Libya, a colonial creation not unlike Iraq and Syria, has disintegrated. In the Maghreb, 

stability, in the form of ‘state structure,’ is under constant threat from the 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

forces of disintegration and disorder. For SOF, as for the remainder of the 

U.S. foreign policy and military establishment, it is time to think about the 

growing role of the U.S. and what is likely to emerge out of the historical 

context of the Maghreb. 

As this study makes clear, the usual narrative offered by the West about 

economic development, civil society, and development of democratic institutions ignores not only the reality of the contemporary situation, but also the 

lessons that should have been learned about fundamental instability—the 

structural societal conflicts—that have afflicted the region for millennia. 

In a recent conversation with a senior Maghrebi security official, he shook 

his head when asked about the possibility of a solution to the fundamental 

division between the coastal and urban areas and the hinterland. “The idea 

that the coast and hills (jibaal) can be reconciled is simply not attainable.”195 

Despite this obvious lack of a fundamental solution, a realistic view of the 

region must be accepted if any workable policies are to emerge. The security 

challenges for the West in general, and 

more specifically for Europe, require 

preservation of existing state structure 

and control. Those structures are more likely than not to be in direct conflict with Western political, economic, and social ideals. That said, it must 

be pointed out that alternatives to the current political structures are also 

in direct conflict, as well. 

From a broader North African perspective, setting aside Egypt, Libya 

provides an excellent example of the results of the collapse of state control. 

Perhaps the Gadhafi regime could have survived, but the collapse opened 

the door to the reemergence of the socially and culturally autonomous elements hidden behind the artificial colonial construct created by the Italians 

and perpetuated by the West in the aftermath of WWII. Unable to deal with 

the political, economic, and social reality that underlay the Libyan state and 

the fallout from its destruction, the West finds itself mired in the conflict 

of the pre-colonial reality and struggling to regain some semblance of control to stem terrorism and uncontrolled emigration that threaten not only 

North Africa, but Western Europe, as well. Libya is an excellent example of 

what the loss of authoritarian control can bring. The policy challenge for 

the U.S. (and SOF) becomes one of reconstituting control and authority, 

The security challenges for 

the West in general, and more 

specifically for Europe, require 

preservation of existing state 

structure and control.
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JSOU Report 17-3

but within the context of a fragmented, regionalized political, social, and 

cultural mosaic. It is exactly the type of environment that the U.S. foreign 

policy and military structure is least equipped to handle. It devolves into a 

‘whack-a-mole’ counterterrorism operation supported by attempts to reconstitute weak central control. 

Moving westward finds three states with differing security challenges 

and political structures—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. They appear to 

be almost models of stability when compared to the chaotic situation in 

what was formerly Gadhafi’s Libya. However, that ‘stability’ comes at a cost. 

Therefore, the first and most important challenge for U.S. and Western policy 

makers is the maintenance of a state structure—any state structure—that 

offers central control. The alternative is another potential Libya. 

One state has the potential of achieving over the long-term something 

that approaches a functioning Western-style democracy—Tunisia. However, the political structure is under constant pressure from Islamist radicals 

and from the fundamental societal split between the coast and the interior. 

Democracy and civil society must be tempered with increasing authoritarian 

control in the interior. This is the historical conundrum that has afflicted 

stability in Ifriqiya since the time of the Carthaginians. At that time, the 

Tunisian interior was, in effect, a security zone. The only real course of action 

is a bifurcated policy that pursues a democratic state based on rule of law for 

the urban and coastal areas, and a system of control that relies more heavily 

on security services and authoritarian control beyond the old Roman limes. 

There is little choice but to pursue policies that treat the south differently 

from the rest of the country. From a SOF and counterterrorism perspective, 

this challenge requires a recognition that perpetuating state control, and 

not democracy or civil society, is a primary goal. The focus is on protecting the urban, coastal population and the economic base, particularly the 

tourism industry, from terrorism. Additionally, Westernized, secular, even 

democratic, institutions that can function in the coastal and urban areas 

should be encouraged. 

In Algeria, the situation is entirely different from Tunisia. The maintenance of the state structure is still the priority, but the state is dominated by 

the FLN, a remnant of the Nasserist, secular Arab nationalist era of the 1960s 

and 1970s. A tight-knit political group maintains control of a gigantic and 

inherently unstable geographic region. This control is a function of intimidation, and when necessary, outright state terrorism against those elements 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

that threaten state control. The civil war of the 1990s is an excellent example 

of the lengths to which the state will go to maintain its control. 

Maintenance of the state structure, no matter how artificial or authoritarian, is preferable to collapse and chaos. Perhaps there are elements within 

the FLN that are willing to gamble on new moves to broaden the political 

base of the regime and pursue real economic and social reforms. But from 

their perspective, it would be a daunting, frightening step to contemplate 

any loss of control, even in circumstances where the alternative appeared 

to portend eventual revolution and perhaps collapse. Here again, Algeria 

requires a dual policy—support for the current regime and the maintenance 

of state structure, and an awareness of the fragility of the FLN regime and 

a willingness to encourage it to broaden its base. The objective would be to 

prevent a deluge of refugees or a significant uptick in terrorism as result of 

state collapse. SOF need to have real potential scenarios on the shelf and 

plans for dealing with the contingencies. 

The Moroccan experience reflects the survival of traditionalism and 

monarchial legitimacy in the Maghreb, but in many respects, it symbolizes the durability of monarchy in the region in general. The monarchies 

of the Arab Middle East have done substantially better than the Westernstyle republics from the perspective of maintaining stability and political 

legitimacy. There is a propensity to attribute this to oil wealth, despite the 

fact these monarchies were established and survived in a volatile region 

for almost two centuries before oil was discovered. Since the 16th century, 

monarchy has been the vehicle for independence and stability. It does not 

mean the current Moroccan monarchy cannot collapse, but it does infer 

such a collapse is unlikely. 

The mid-range and longer-term prospects for stability in Morocco are 

perhaps the best in the region. There are myriad problems and challenges, 

given the growing population and the pressure to expand the economy; 

nevertheless, the monarch has legitimacy as ‘defender of the faithful,’ which 

allows the regime political and social flexibility that neither the FLN in 

Algeria, nor the secular parties in Tunisia possess. Muhammad VI has 

legitimacy as a Muslim ruler who serves as a buffer against both Islamist 

political parties and radical jihadist movements. In the case of Morocco, U.S. 

policy since 2008 reflects a recognition of this danger and has migrated to a 

more nuanced view of monarchial authoritarianism. In practical terms, U.S. 
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JSOU Report 17-3

cooperation with and support for the government of Morocco will continue 

and likely increase. 

From a policy perspective, Western interests must focus on the reality 

that central control and the maintenance of state structures—no matter what 

form they might take—are the priority. No one 

wants another Syria, Iraq, or Libya. Because 

the three state structures are fundamentally 

different, understanding the historical context 

of each is fundamental to being able to effectively work to support the primary U.S. and 

Western strategic interests. For the U.S. and 

for SOF, this understanding is increasingly 

important as direct involvement in Tunisia 

and Morocco grows. Despite Algeria being 

principally a French area of influence, what 

happens in Algeria will have a profound effect 

on the security and stability of its two North African neighbors. Particularly for SOF, the contradictions of the region need to become a part of the 

educational process. 

With security and state structure as a given priority, the education issue 

becomes even more important. As this study explains, each state has a decidedly different historical experience reflected in the contemporary situation, 

and each state will likely have a different future flowing from the present. 

Each must be considered, understood, and supported through an individual 

unique historical experience. At the same time, the region is interconnected 

to a degree that the events in one country often have a profound impact on 

the others. Arguably, the most troubled state in the region—Algeria—has 

the potential to unravel stability and security for both Tunisia and Morocco 

should it fail. For intelligence officers, planners, and operators, giving some 

thought to the Maghreb and the conflicted context from which the present 

day reality has sprung is likely a solid investment in anticipating the future. 

Institutionally, this reality creates a challenging situation for the U.S. 

military and foreign policy establishment—for discussions to begin in earnest (that is, without another major event in the region) would require some 

organization to take the initiative. Everyone is stretched thin and there will 

likely not be much support. The more interesting, and likely more effective, approach would be an effort by SOF to informally engage the State 

Because the three state 

structures are fundamentally different, understanding the historical 

context of each is fundamental to being able 

to effectively work to 

support the primary U.S. 

and Western strategic 

interests. 
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Department, the embassies, regional contacts, and our allies, particularly 

the French, in discussions to gain a better appreciation for the challenges and 

their thinking on what will likely come next and how it should be handled. 

A modest effort and investment might yield significant benefits in the future.

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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Appendix: Acronym List

AAS-T Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia

AIS Islamic Salvation Army 

ALN Moroccan Army of Liberation

AML Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty

BCE before the common epoch

CPR Congress for the Republic

CRUA Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action 

DRS Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité 

FIS Islamic Salvation Front

FLN Front de Libération Nationale

FDTL Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les Libertés

GIA Groupe Islamique Armé

GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat

HCE High Council of State

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MRP Popular Republican Movement

MTI Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique

MTLD Movement for the Triumph of Liberty and Democracy

NCA National Constituent Assembly

NPRR National Party for Realization of the Reforms

OS Organisation Speciale

PCT Communist Party of Tunisia
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JSOU Report 17-3

PJD Islamist Justice and Development Party

PRS Parti de la Révolution Socialiste

PSD Parti Socialiste Dusturien

RCD Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique

RNI National Rally of Independents

SOF Special Operations Forces
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Endnotes

1. Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party 

Government (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 145. For more on modernization theory, also see: George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle 

East (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), 73; Walt W. Rostow and Max 

F. Millikan, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper 

& Brothers Publishers, 1957), 44–48, 140–141; Walt W. Rostow, The Process of 

Economic Growth (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1962); and William R. 

Polk, “The Nature of Modernization: The Middle East and North Africa,” Foreign 

Affairs 44, no. 1 (October 1965): 101. Post–World War II, modernization theory 

became fundamental to U.S. attempts to use Western-centric ideas and theories 

to recreate the developing world in a form that fell in line with Western interests 

or ideals. Walt Rostow argued that economic growth and military/security assistance would allow such progress in the developing world. These ideas have been 

a key element in U.S. foreign policy as well as counterinsurgency and stability 

operations thinking for almost 70 years, and contributed mightily to the most 

visible failures of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. In 1965, William Polk 

described the leadership of the Middle East and North Africa that he believed 

would lead to Westernization along secular, if not pro-Western, lines as the “new 

men” of the region—secular leaders who, as it turned out, devolved into dictators 

or whose regimes collapsed in Islamic traditionalism. 

2. Lisa Anderson, “Policy-Making and Theory Building: American Political Science 

and the Islamic Middle East,” in Theory, Politics and the Arab World: Critical 

Responses, edited by Hisham Sharabi (New York: Routledge, 1990), 57.

3. Ibid., 56.

4. Michael C. Hudson, “State, Society, and Legitimacy: An Essay on Arab Political 

Prospects in the 1990s,” in The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures, edited 

by Hisham Sharabi (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 36–37.

5. Leela Jacinto, “Morocco’s Outlaw Country Is the Heartland of Global Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, 7 April 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/

the-rif-connection-belgium-brussels-morocco-abdeslam/.

6. Jamil Muhammad Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period 

(London: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 87–89.

7. Theodor Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman Empire: From Caesar to Diocletian (New York: Barnes & Noble Publishing, 1996), 1: fn 1, 122–123. See also 

Roger Collins, Early Medieval Spain: Unity in Diversity, 400–1000 (New York: 

Macmillan, 1983), 9. Limes is a term that the Romans used to denote a military, 

not necessarily an imperial, frontier. The word is derived from the Roman limites, 

or land boundary drawn by man, thus limes denoted a man-made boundary 

that included posts or forts and roads, creating the ability to patrol it. It was also 

associated with a road embankment or berm, in modern parlance, that was often 
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fortified on both sides, given its advanced position and vulnerability to attack. 

It also moved as administration or necessity dictated. The Romans used limes 

in North Africa, Germany, Spain, and Britain.

8. E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors (London: Oxford University Press, 

1968), 1.

9. Philip C. Naylor, North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present (Austin: 

University of Texas Press, 2015), 25–29.

10. Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman Empire, 2: 305–309.

11. Ralph A. Austen, Trans-Saharan Africa in World History (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), 13–14. The Roman historian Tacitus referred to them as “a 

wild race incessantly occupied in robbing their neighbors.”

12. Bovill, Golden Trade, 29.

13. Harold D. Nelson, ed., Tunisia, a country study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army/

American University Foreign Area Studies, 1987), 12–13. There were similar 

problems in Egypt where Byzantine administrators and church officials persecuted Coptic Christians as heretics.

14. George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 

University Press, 1969), 118.

15. Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa: From the Arab Conquest to 1830

(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 5–10.

16. Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East 

from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (London: Longman, 1994), 69–81.

17. Jonathan Conant, Staying Roman: Conquest and Identity in Africa and the Mediterranean, 439–700 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 280–281.

18. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds., The Cambridge History 

of Islam, Vol. 2, The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization 

(London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 213–214.

19. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, 140–141, 158.

20. Anwar G. Chejne, Muslim Spain: Its History and Culture (St. Paul: University of 

Minnesota Press, 1974), 7–9. After a reconnaissance by Tafir ibn Mulluk, one of 

his lieutenants, Musa ibn Nasyr, gave Tariq permission to cross the straits and 

engage the Visigoths. Chejne stated that Tariq, upon reaching Spain, burned 

his boats and told his men that unless they could fly, they could either fight the 

Visigoths and win or die. Stories like this tend to be apocryphal, but it does fit 

with the view that the Tariq expedition was not a ghazi, or raid, but an invasion 

for conquest.

21. Joseph F. O’Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975), 93–94. See also Collins, Early Medieval Spain, 152–153.

22. Jabril Faraj, ed., “October 10 0732 AD: The Battle of Tours (Poitiers),” The 

World History Project, accessed 4 January 2016, https://worldhistoryproject.

org/732/10/10/the-battle-of-tours-poitiers.
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23. J.J. Saunders, A History of Medieval Islam (London: Routledge, 1965), 92. In 

the West, the battle was of enormous significance because it paved the way for 

Charles Martel’s grandson, Charlemagne, to be named Emperor of the Holy 

Roman Empire in 800.

24. Julien, History of North Africa, 19.

25. Abun-Nasr, Maghrib, 34–35.

26. Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus 

(London: Longman Press, 1996), 24–25.

27. Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal, 30–38.

28. Thomas Park and Aomar Boum, Historical Dictionary of Morocco (London: The 

Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1996), 124–125.

29. Naylor, North Africa, 68–69.

30. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (London: Cambridge University 

Press, 1988), 372.

31. Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of 

Twelver Shi’ism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 49.

32. Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World 

Civilization, vol. 1, The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1974), 492.

33. Holt, Lambton, and Lewis, The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 2, 214–218.

34. Naylor, North Africa, 71. Naylor points out that the Normans adopted Muslim 

culture to the point that Roger II of Naples and his grandson, Frederick II, who 

became Holy Roman Emperor, were labelled: “The two baptized sultans of Sicily.” 

Frederick spoke Arabic fluently and maintained Arab experts on mapping and 

astronomy at his court.

35. Farhad Daftary, The Isma’ilis: Their History and Doctrines (London: Cambridge 

University Press, 2007), 123, 126.

36. Taqi al-Din al-Maqrizi, Itti’az al-hunafa’ bi-akhbar al a’imma al-Fatimiyyin alkhulafa’, trans. Shainool Jiwa in Towards a Shi’i Mediterranean Empire: Fatimid 

Egypt and the Founding of Cairo (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2009), 6–11.

37. Saunders, Medieval Islam, 129.

38. Daftary, The Isma’ilis, 141–143.

39. Shafique N. Virani, The Ismailis in the Middle Ages: A History of Survival, A 

Search for Salvation (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5–7.

40. Farouk Mitha, Al-Ghazali and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority 

in Medieval Islam (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2001), 13–27.

41. Farhad Daftary, A Short History of the Ismailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community 

(Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1998): 65.

42. Julien, History of North Africa, 66–74.
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43. I. Hrbek, ed., General History of Africa, Vol. 3, Africa from the Seventh to the 

Eleventh Century (London: UNESCO and James Currey Ltd., 1992), 172–175.

44. Lapidus, Islamic Societies, 370.

45. Ibn Khaldun, Histoire des Berbères, William McGuckin de Slane, trans. (Algiers: 

Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1851), quoted in Julien, History of North Africa, 

72.

46. Lapidus, Islamic Societies, 372.

47. James A. Miller, “Trading Through Islam: The Interconnections of Sijilmasa, 

Ghana and the Almoravid Movement,” in North Africa, Islam and the Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the Algerian War, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith 

(London: Frank Cass, 2001), 32–33.

48. Chejne, Muslim Spain, 69–83. 

49. John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford History of Islam (London: The Oxford University 

Press, 1999), 49–50.

50. Lapidus, Islamic Societies, 373–374.

51. Allen J. Fromherz, The Almohads: The Rise of an Islamic Empire (London: I.B. 

Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2011), 58–59.

52. Esposito, History of Islam, 51.

53. John O. Voll (professor, Georgetown University), in conversation with the author, 

15 April 2016.

54. Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and 

Genealogical Manual (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 42.

55. Bailey W. Diffie, Prelude to Empire: Portugal Overseas before Henry the Navigator

(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), 50–51.

56. Abun-Nasr, Maghrib, 104–107.

57. Naylor, North Africa, 98. 

58. Dalenda Larguèche, “The Mahalla: The Origins of Beylical Sovereignty in 

Ottoman Tunisia during the Early Modern Period,” in North Africa, Islam and 

the Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the Algerian War, ed. Julia 

Clancy-Smith (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 108–109.

59. Julien, History of North Africa, 19.

60. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), x–xii.

61. In 1497–1499, Vasco de Gama opened the trading route around Africa to India. 

In securing that route and its trade, the Portuguese established trading centers 

along the African coast and closed both the Bab al-Mandeb, the entrance to the 

Red Sea, and the Straits of Hormuz, the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, to competing trade. The empire stretched from Lisbon to its trading center at Nagasaki in 

Japan.
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Barrett: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

62. Cisneros was supported by Queen Isabella, well known for her hostility to 

any opposition to the Spanish version of the Roman Catholic Church and the 

Inquisition. Cisneros’ appointment as cardinal was a result of an arrangement 

with Rome and the Spanish Pope Rodrigo de Borgia (Alexander VI), the former 

cardinal and archbishop of Valencia. 

63. Stephan and Nandy Ronart, Concise Encyclopaedia of Arabic Civilization: The 

Arab West (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1966), 158–159.

64. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 

Phillip II (New York: Harper Collins Press, 1966), 80.

65. Stephen Clissold, The Barbary Slaves (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977), 24–25.

66. “Barbarossa Pirates,” Caldwell Genealogy, http://caldwellgenealogy.com/

the-myths-legends/barbarossa-pirates/.

67. Ronart, Concise Encyclopaedia, 160.

68. L.W. Adamec, Islam: A Historical Companion (Stroud, GL, UK: Tempus Publishing 

Ltd., 2007), 173. The term marabout has two meanings. In this context, it refers 

to a religious saint and his descendants who often bestow blessings (barakah) 

on followers or pilgrims at a holy site or tomb of a saint. It is generally a Sufi 

practice that is reviled by Salafis and Wahabis. The term can also specifically 

refer to the inhabitants of a ribat—a military and religious outpost associated 

with the Almoravids.

69. Nevill Barbour, “North West Africa from the 15th–19th Centuries,” in The Last 

Great Muslim Empires: History of the Muslim World, trans. F.R.C. Bagley, (Leiden: 

E.J. Brill, 1969), 102–103.

70. Ronart, Concise Encyclopaedia, 336–337.

71. Dahiru Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African 

Foreign Policy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), 25–27.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., 28–30.

74. Marvine Howe, Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 2005), 60–61.

75. Naylor, North Africa, 128.

76. Barbour, “North West Africa,” 105.

77. Adamec, Islam, 44.

78. Barbour, “North West Africa,” 50–51.

79. Susan Gilson Miller, A History of Modern Morocco (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 2013), 8–10.

80. Naylor, North Africa, 153.

81. Ralph A. Austen, Trans-Saharan Africa in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 128–130.
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82. Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History, trans. Jane Marie Todd 

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 4–5.

83. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (New York: Penguin 

Books, 1979), 30.

84. Ibid., 32.

85. Naylor, North Africa, 155.

86. Rudolf von Albertini and Albert Wirtz, European Colonial Rule, 1880–1940: 

The Impact of the West on India, Southeast Asia, and Africa, trans. John G. Williamson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 260.

87. Charles Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 4–5.

88. Von Albertini and Wirtz, European Colonial Rule, 268. Auguste Hurbert Warnier was a deputy from Algeria elected to the French National Assembly in 1871, 

where he served until he died in 1875. His legislative programs were designed to 

encourage French immigration to Algeria and open up the province for economic 

exploitation.

89. Von Albertini and Wirtz, European Colonial Rule, 260.

90. Ibid.

91. Abun-Nasr, Maghrib, 313.

92. Ibid.

93. Von Albertini and Wirtz, European Colonial Rule, 265.

94. Horne, Savage War, 51–53.

95. Von Albertini and Wirtz, European Colonial Rule, 284.

96. Miller, Modern Morocco, 29–36. See also, Von Albertini and Wirtz, European 

Colonial Rule, 289–291 and Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco: A History

(New York: Fromm International Publishing, 1986), 293–295.

97. Kenneth Perkins, Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 92, 94, 177.

98. Kenneth Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia (London: Cambridge University 

Press, 2014), 95–97.

99. Robert Rinehart, “Historical Setting,” in Tunisia: a country study, Harold D. 

Nelson, ed., 41–48. See also Perkins, Modern Tunisia, 103–104.

100. Perkins, Modern Tunisia, 120–122.

101. Rinehart, “Historical Setting,” 48–50.

102. Perkins, Modern Tunisia, 127, 130.

103. Ibid., 131–134.

104. Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco 

from Independence to the Arab Spring (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 

38–40.
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105. Kenneth Perkins, “Playing the Islamic Card: The Use and Abuse of Religion in 

Tunisian Politics,” in The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, 

Prospects, ed. Nouri Gana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2013), 

62.

106. Rinehart, “Historical Setting,” 55–58.

107. Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East 

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 280–281.

108. Rinehart, “Historical Setting,” 64–68.

109. Alex Stark, “Arab Exceptionalism? Tunisia’s Islamic Movement,” E-International Relations, 31 January 2011, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/01/31/

arab-exceptionalism-tunisia’s-islamist-movement/

110. Paul Delaney, “Senile Bourgiba Described in Tunis,” The New York Times, 9 

November 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/09/world/senile-bourguibadescribed-in-tunis.html?scp=2&sq=senile%20bourguiba&st=cseSenile.

111. Perkins, Modern Tunisia, 188–189, 192–198.

112. Ibid., 198–199.

113. Neji Ali Dhakouani, “Tunisia Ruling Party (RCD) and the Road to Democracy,” Nawaat, 20 January 2011, http://nawaat.org/portail/2011/01/20/

tunisia-ruling-party-rcd-and-the-road-to-democracy/.

114. Miller, Modern Morocco, 70–71. General Lyautey was one of the few French 

colonial administrators that did not believe that Morocco and Tunisia would be 

incorporated into Metropolitan France as in the Algerian model. He believed 

that, at some point in the future, they would reemerge as independent states, and 

he sought to pursue a system of administration that anticipated that eventual 

outcome and that would result in very close ties between the independent states 

and Paris.

115. Ibid., 90–91. Lyautey saw the protectorate system as period of tutelage as opposed 

to a permanent state of European domination. He believed that, at some point, 

the colonial system would pass and it was his duty to create an indigenous system 

that would replace it. It was almost identical in many ways to Lord Lugard’s views 

as expressed in his 1922 publication, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. 

116. Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, 296–297.

117. Miller, Modern Morocco, 130–133.

118. Ibid., 136–138.

119. Howe, Morocco, 69–70.

120. Ronart, Concise Encyclopaedia, 257–258.

121. Ibid., 271–272.

122. Willis, Politics and Power, 29–30.

123. Miller, Modern Morocco, 153.

124. Willis, Politics and Power, 41–45.
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125. Ibid., 54–56.

126. Jerome B. Weiner, “The Green March in Historical Perspective,” Middle East 

Journal 33, no. 1 (Winter 1979): 20–33, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4325817.

127. Paul Adrian Raymond, “Morocco’s Berbers urge broader reforms,” Al Jazeera, 

6 May 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/moroccosberbers-urge-broader-reforms-2014357321228806.htm. See also Emma Schwartz, 

“Morocco’s Berbers Reclaims Their Language and Their Indigenous Culture,” U.S. 

News and World Report, 13 March 2008, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/

articles/2008/03/13/moroccos-berbers-reclaim-their-language-and-their-indigenous-culture-.

128. Miller, Modern Morocco, 212.

129. Anouar Boukhars, “The Politics of North African Salafism,” Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, 1 April 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/01/

politics-of-north-african-salafism-pub-63209.

130. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2005), 149–150.

131. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 151.

132. Stora, Algeria, 25–27.

133. Willis, Politics and Power, 30–32. See also Ronart, Concise Encyclopaedia, 71–72; 

and Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle 

East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1995), 122–123.

134. Horne, Savage War, 88–127.

135. Ted Morgan, My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 

Books, 2005), 23–27. See also, Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 167.

136. Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War (Berkeley, CA: 

University of California Press, 2001), 67–69.

137. Charles G. Cogan, Charles de Gaulle: A Brief Biography with Documents (New 

York: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 116–117.

138. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War, 178–191, 228.

139. Cogan, Charles de Gaulle, 116–117.

140. Horne, Savage War, 52–53.

141. Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed (New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 74–80.

142. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 77–78.

143. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 195–207.

144. Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East

(London: Routledge, 1992), 46.

145. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 76–78, 81.

146. Georges Corm, Fragmentation of the Middle East: The Last Thirty Years, trans. 

Raj Isar, Selina Cohen, and Margaret Owen (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 78–79.
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147. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 86–87.

148. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 201-230.

149. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 86–87, 92–93.

150. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 244–247.

151. Stora, Algeria, 193–194.

152. François Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa 

(Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 

1997), 269–274.

153. Bahgat Korany, “From Revolution to Domestication: The Foreign Policy of 

Algeria,” in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, eds. 

Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 

112–113.

154. Burgat and Dowell, Islamic Movement in North Africa, 279–281.

155. Ibid., 289–293.

156. Stora, Algeria, 210–211.

157. Ibid., 216–226.

158. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 259–262.

159. Robert Fisk, Robert Fisk on Algeria: 1992–2013 (London: The Independent Print 

Limited, 2013), 21–22.

160. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 174–180.

161. Fisk, On Algeria, 28–37

162. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 177–182.

163. Ibid., 213–223.

164. Naylor, North Africa, 225–228.

165. “Thousands of radical Salafis urge bigger role for Islam in Tunisia,” FaithWorld 

(blog), Reuters, 21 May 2012, http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2012/05/21/

thousands-of-radical-salafis-urge-bigger-role-for-islam-in-tunisia/.

166. Suzanne Daley, Tensions on a Campus Mirror Turbulence in a New Tunisia,” 

The New York Times, 11 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/world/

africa/tensions-at-manouba-university-mirror-turbulence-in-tunisia.html?_r=0.

167. Eileen Byrne, “Tunisian opposition leader shot dead,” The Guardian, 6 February 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/06/

tunisian-politician-shot-dead.

168. Carlotta Gall, “Second Opposition Leader Assassinated in Tunisia,” The New 

York Times, 25 July 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/world/middleeast/

second-opposition-leader-killed-in-tunisia.html.

169. “Tunisia declares Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist group,” BBC, 27 August 2013, http://

www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23853241.
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170. Sahar Ghoussoub, trans., “The best and worst of Tunisia’s new constitution,” 

Al-Monitor, 29 January 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/01/

tunisia-constitution-drafting-best-worst.html.

171. Reuters, “Habib Essid nominated as Tunisian prime minister,” The Guardian, 5 January 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/05/

habib-essid-tunisian-prime-minister.

172. Carlotta Gall, “State of Emergency Is Declared in Tunisia,” The New York Times, 4 

July 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/world/africa/state-of-emergencyis-declared-in-tunisia.html.

173. Carlotta Gall and Eric Schmitt, “Jihadist From Tunisia Died in Strike in Libya, 

U.S. Official Says,” The New York Times, 2 July 2015, http://www.nytimes.

com/2015/07/03/world/africa/jihadist-from-tunisia-died-in-strike-in-libya-usofficial-says.html.

174. “Tunisia sacks 110 security officers for ties with terrorist organizations,” The 

North Africa Post, 18 September 2015, http://northafricapost.com/9245-tunisiasacks-110-security-officers-for-ties-with-terrorist-organizations.html. 

175. Alessandro Bruno, “Tunisia’s Terrorism Problem Goes Beyond Islamic State,” 

Geopolitical Monitor, 14 July 2015, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/

tunisias-terrorism-problem-goes-beyond-islamic-state/.

176. Only in Bahrain, a special case because of the Shi’a-Sunni divide, did it appear 

that a traditional form of government might succumb to protests, but that did 

not happen either. 

177. Naylor, North Africa, 263–265.

178. “Benkiran: Le Maroc a besoin d’une autre âme, islamiste,” Le Parisien, 25 

November 2011, http://www.leparisien.fr/international/benkiran-le-maroc-abesoin-d-une-autre-ame-islamiste-25-11-2011-1738359.php.

179. Camille Tawil, “Morocco’s Stability in the Wake of the Arab Spring,” CTC 

Sentinel, 23 May 2013, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/moroccos-stabilityin-the-wake-of-the-arab-spring.

180. Mohammed Masbah, “Taking Advantage of Morocco’s Security Threat,” Sada, 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 October 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/56903.

181. Jacinto, “Morocco’s Outlaw Country Is the Heartland of Global Terrorism.” See 

also: Akbar Ahmed and Harrison Akins, “The plight of the Rif: Morocco’s restive 

northern periphery,” Al Jazeera, 28 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/

indepth/opinion/2012/09/2012924103333182505.html. See also: Mohamed Daadaoui, “In Defense of the Rif and the Pitfalls of Parachute Journalism,” World Post, 

11 April 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-daadaoui/in-defenseof-the-rif-and_b_9655064.html. Daadaoui takes exception to the depiction of 

the Rif as any more of a hotbed of terrorist activity than other regions.
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182. Dinah Lakehal, “Ali Belhadj Calls for Opening Morocco-Algeria Borders,” Morocco 

World News, 7 June 2016, http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/06/188448/

ali-belhadj-open-the-morocco-algeria-border/.

183. Leila Fadel, “Morocco Boasts Stability, But Critics Say The Price Is High,” NPR 

News, 17 April 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/04/17/474368034/

morocco-boasts-stability-but-critics-say-the-price-is-high.

184. Charlotte Bozonnet, “Political stability in Morocco cannot silence the murmurs 

of discontent,” The Guardian, 9 March 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/

world/2015/mar/09/morocco-reform-protest-arab-spring.

185. Martin Evans, “Algerian Specificities: Algeria’s Place in the 2011 Arab Revolutions,” Muftah, 2 March 2011, http://muftah.org/algerian-specificities-algeriasplace-in-the-2011-arab-revolutions-by-martin-evans/#.V4AZi1c4mi4.

186. Kamel Daoud, “The Algerian Exception,” The New York Times, 29 May 2015, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/the-algerian-exception.html?_r=0.

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid.

189. “Algeria Profile—Overview,” BBC, 6 May 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-africa-14118853.

190. Anouar Boukhars, “‘Quietist’ and ‘Firebrand’ Salafism in Algeria,” Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 24 November 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/11/24/quietist-and-firebrand-salafism-in-algeria-pub-62075.

191. “Algeria: Who is in charge?” The Economist, 4 February 2016, http://www.

economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21690070-rumours-swirl-aroundailing-president-who-charge.

192. Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin, TX: University of Texas 

Press, 1994), 178–179.

193. Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 

324–325.

194. John O. Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents: The Islamic Community and the 

State in North Africa,” in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, ed. 

John P. Entelis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 10–11.

195. Senior Maghrebi security official tasked with counterterrorism strategies, in 

conversation with the author in September 2016.