EMBASSY 

EVACUATIONS

State Department 

Should Take Steps to 

Improve Emergency 

Preparedness

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

July 2017

GAO-17-714

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-714, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

July 2017

EMBASSY EVACUATIONS

State Department Should Take Steps to Improve 

Emergency Preparedness

What GAO Found

The Department of State (State) has established processes to prepare overseas 

posts for crises and to conduct evacuations. In particular, posts prepare by 

developing and updating Emergency Action Plans (EAP) and conducting drills. 

EAPs are to contain information to assist posts in responding to emergencies, 

such as checklists of response procedures and decision points to help determine

when to evacuate post staff or family members. Posts are required to conduct 

nine types of drills each fiscal year to prepare for crises and evacuations. State 

also has established processes for conducting post evacuations. Following an 

evacuation, post staff are required to transmit an after-action report identifying 

lessons learned to State headquarters.

State has gaps in its crisis and evacuation preparedness for overseas posts. In 

fiscal years 2013–2016, almost a quarter of posts, on average, were late 

completing required annual EAP updates. While the completion rate improved 

from 46 percent to 92 percent of posts completing updates on time in fiscal years 

2013 and 2016, respectively, GAO’s review of a nongeneralizable sample of 

EAPs from 20 posts that had been approved by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security showed that only 2 of 20 had updated all key EAP sections. GAO also 

found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not 

readily usable in emergency situations, as required. In addition, GAO found that, 

on average for fiscal years 2013–2016, posts worldwide reported completing 52

percent of required annual drills; posts rated high or critical in political violence or 

terrorism reported completing 44 percent of these drills. As shown in the figure 

below, 78 percent of posts reported completing duck and cover drills, but only 36 

percent of posts reported completing evacuation training drills. Overall, less than 

4 percent of posts reported completing all required drills during fiscal years 2013-

2016. In addition, although posts are required to transmit an after-action report 

listing lessons learned to State headquarters following evacuations, no such 

reports were submitted in fiscal years 2013–2016. Taken together, the gaps in 

State’s crisis and evacuation preparedness increase the risk that post staff are 

not sufficiently prepared to handle crisis and emergency situations.

Percentages of Overseas Posts That Reported Completing Each Type of Required Drill

View GAO-17-714. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Courts at (202) 512-8980 or 

courtsm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

From October 2012 to September

2016, State evacuated overseas post 

staff and family members from 23 

overseas posts in response to various 

threats, such as terrorism, civil unrest, 

and natural disasters. Overseas posts 

undergoing evacuations generally 

experience authorized departure or 

ordered departure of specific post staff 

or family members, potentially leading 

to suspended operations.

GAO was asked to review State 

policies and procedures for evacuating 

overseas posts. This report examines 

(1) the processes State has 

established to prepare posts for crises 

and to conduct evacuations and (2) 

State’s implementation of 

preparedness processes for crises and 

evacuations. GAO reviewed State 

guidance and documents related to 

crisis and evacuation preparedness, 

including a sample of EAPs and State 

databases on EAP updates and post 

drills. GAO also interviewed U.S. 

officials in Washington, D.C., and in six 

countries selected because of posts’ 

experiences with evacuations. This is 

the public version of a sensitive report 

that GAO issued in June 2017. 

Information that State deemed 

sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Recommends

In GAO’s sensitive report, GAO made 

five recommendations to State focused 

on strengthening accountability for 

completion and review of posts’ annual 

EAP updates and required emergency 

drills, enhancing the usability of EAPs, 

and ensuring that lessons learned 

reports are completed. State concurred 

with all five recommendations and 

described actions planned or under 

way to address them. 
Page i GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Letter 1

Background 3

State Has Established Processes to Prepare Overseas Posts for 

Crises and to Conduct Evacuations 6

State Has Gaps in Its Crisis and Evacuation Preparedness for 

Overseas Posts 12

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments 27

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28

Appendix II U.S. Overseas Posts Late in Completing Required Annual Update of 

Their Emergency Action Plan for Fiscal Year 2016 33

Appendix III Main Sections, Annexes, and Appendixes of the Emergency Action Plan 

(EAP) and 27 Key EAP Sections 34

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 37

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Tables

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Overseas Posts Late in 

Completing the Required Annual Update of Emergency 

Action Plans (EAP) for Fiscal Years 2013–2016 and the 

Average Number of Months Late 14

Table 2: Percentage of Required Annual Drills Reported 

Completed by Overseas Posts, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 20

Table 3: Overseas Posts Reporting Completion of Required 

Annual Drills, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 22

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Table 4: Overseas Posts Rated High or Critical in Political 

Violence or Terrorism Reporting Completion of Required 

Annual Drills, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 22

Table 5: Overseas Posts Late in Completing the Required Annual 

Update of Their Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for Fiscal 

Year 2016 and the Number of Months That These Posts 

Were Late 33

Table 6: Main Sections, Annexes, and Appendixes of the 

Emergency Action Plan (EAP) and 27 Key EAP Sections 

Reviewed by the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS) 34

Figures

Figure 1: Authorized Departures, Ordered Departures, and 

Suspended Operations at Overseas Posts during Fiscal 

Years 2013–2016 5

Figure 2: Nine Types of Drills Each Overseas Post Is to Complete 

Every Fiscal Year 8

Figure 3: Expenditures Reported by State Related to Post 

Evacuations from the K Fund (Emergencies in the 

Diplomatic and Consular Service), Fiscal Years 2010–

2016 11

Figure 4: Percentage of Overseas Posts That Reported 

Completing Drilling Requirements by Drill Type, Fiscal 

Years 2013–2016 21
Page iii GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Abbreviations 

CMS Crisis Management and Strategy

DOD Department of Defense

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security

EAC Emergency Action Committee

EAP Emergency Action Plan

FACT Foreign Affairs Counter Threat

FAH Foreign Affairs Handbook

FAM Foreign Affairs Manual

RSO Regional Security Officer

State Department of State

VP2 Vital Presence Validation Process

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 17, 2017

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Ranking Member Cummings:

U.S. government personnel working at diplomatic and consular posts 

overseas—as well as family members present with them—continue to 

face threats to their security, including numerous attacks in high risk 

locations in recent years. According to the Department of State’s (State) 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), there were 22 attacks against U.S. 

embassy facilities, consulates, or staff in 2013 alone, including an attack 

against U.S. Embassy Ankara in Turkey in which a suicide bomber 

detonated a concealed bomb in the embassy access pavilion. From 

October 2012 to September 2016, in response to various threats, such as

terrorism, civil unrest, and natural disasters, State evacuated post staff 

and their family members from 23 U.S. embassies and consulates. During 

this period, several overseas posts—such as Embassy Bujumbura in 

Burundi and Consulate Adana in Turkey—evacuated post staff or family 

members on more than one occasion.1 At Embassy Sana’a in Yemen and 

Embassy Tripoli in Libya, the threats were so severe and persistent that 

State decided to suspend operations, withdrawing all post staff and family 

members.

You asked us to review State policies and procedures for evacuating 

overseas posts. This report examines (1) the processes State has 

established to prepare overseas posts for crises and to conduct 

evacuations and (2) State’s implementation of preparedness processes 

for crises and evacuations at overseas posts.

This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that 

was issued on June 28, 2017, copies of which are available upon request 

 1

For the purposes of this report, we use the term overseas posts to refer to U.S. 

embassies, consulates, and other types of types of diplomatic and consular posts, such as 

multilateral missions or American presence posts. 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

for official use only by those with the appropriate need to know.2 State 

deemed some of the information in our June report to be sensitive, which 

must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits 

information identified by State as sensitive. Although the information 

provided in this report is more limited, the report addresses the same 

objectives as the sensitive report and uses the same methodology.

To examine the processes State has established to prepare overseas 

posts for crises and to conduct evacuations, we reviewed State policies 

and procedures established within the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and 

associated Foreign Affairs Handbooks (FAH), including a portion called 

the Emergency Planning Handbook. We also reviewed memoranda of 

agreement between State and the Department of Defense (DOD) 

regarding coordination of U.S. military support to posts during 

evacuations. We reviewed GAO’s most recent work regarding 

evacuations overseas as well as DOD support for State in crises 

situations. We conducted interviews with State officials at headquarters, 

including with relevant regional bureaus and other groups that assist 

posts during crises and evacuations, and with post staff at four overseas 

posts. We also conducted interviews via secure video conferences with 

two other posts and a DOD combatant command to discuss State policies 

and procedures in embassy crisis and evacuation preparedness.

To assess State’s implementation of preparedness processes for crises 

and evacuations at overseas posts, we conducted several analyses. First, 

we reviewed DS data to determine the dates when overseas posts 

completed required annual updates of their Emergency Action Plans 

(EAP) for fiscal years 2013–2016. Second, we analyzed a 

nongeneralizable, judgmental sample of 20 post EAPs that DS had 

reviewed and approved to assess whether this sample of EAPs contained 

evidence that key EAP sections, as identified by DS, had been updated. 

More specifically, for all 20 EAPs, we examined the dates indicating each 

key section’s most recent update to determine if the post had reviewed 

and updated the information within required time frames. We selected the 

sample of post EAPs to review to ensure that we examined posts that had 

experienced evacuations or suspended operations since September 

2012, whose evacuations or suspended operations had occurred for a 

variety of reasons (e.g., natural disasters as well as security threats), with 

 2

GAO, Embassy Evacuations: State Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency 

Preparedness, GAO-17-560SU (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2017). 
Page 3 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

different statuses regarding accompaniment of family members, and from 

different geographic regions. We determined that the EAP data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.

Third, we reviewed DS data on which overseas posts reported completion 

of required annual drills for fiscal years 2013–2016. We determined that 

these data were sufficiently reliable for that purpose. Fourth, we 

requested from State officials at headquarters any required lessons 

learned reports submitted by posts following evacuations for fiscal years 

2013–2016. We also interviewed State and DOD officials at 

headquarters, at four overseas posts, and—via secure video 

conference—at two additional posts and a DOD combatant command to 

gather their perspectives on State’s implementation of crisis and 

evacuation preparedness processes for overseas posts. See appendix I 

for further details about our scope and methodology.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted 

from March 2016 to June 2017 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

subsequently worked with State from June 2017 to July 2017 to prepare 

this version of the original sensitive but unclassified report for public 

release. This public version was also prepared in accordance with these 

standards.

Overseas posts that undergo evacuations in response to threats to post 

staff, family members, or facilities generally experience phased changes 

to their operational status, such as an authorized or ordered departure, 

potentially leading to suspended operations.

• Under an authorized departure, specific overseas post staff under 

chief-of-mission authority and family members may voluntarily choose 

to leave the post for a designated safe haven.3

 3

The designated safe haven is generally the United States, although the nature of the 

threat that led to the departure or special needs of departing staff or family members can 

result in travel to safe havens in other countries. 

Background
Page 4 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

• Under an ordered departure, specific overseas post staff and family 

members are ordered to leave for a designated safe haven. Some 

staff designated by the Chief of Mission to be critical for ongoing 

operations must remain at the post.

• Under suspended operations, all remaining overseas post staff under 

chief-of-mission authority are ordered to leave for a designated safe 

haven.

An overseas post on authorized or ordered departure status goes through 

a monthly review to determine if the threats to the post have since 

abated. According to State officials, if the threats have abated, the post 

can be taken off of departure status and placed on normal status or on 

modified operating status. Figure 1 shows authorized departures, ordered 

departures, and suspended operations that have occurred at overseas 

posts during fiscal years 2013–2016.4

 4

Several attacks and violent demonstrations occurred in the months prior to this period, 

including the attack in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012, as well as violent 

demonstrations on September 11, 2012, and after in Cairo, Egypt; Tunis, Tunisia; Sana’a, 

Yemen; Khartoum, Sudan; Chennai, India; Karachi, Pakistan; and Jakarta, Indonesia.
Page 5 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Figure 1: Authorized Departures, Ordered Departures, and Suspended Operations at Overseas Posts during Fiscal Years 

2013–2016

Note: The 31 evacuations from posts listed above include instances where posts experienced 

sequential, phased changes to their operational status. For example, Embassy Cairo in Egypt was 

initially evacuated under an authorized departure; before the authorized departure was terminated, 

the post was further evacuated under an ordered departure.

a

On March 29, 2016, an ordered departure was approved for Consulate Adana, and the Izmir and 

Mugla provinces. 

b

On June 28, 2013, an authorized departure was approved for Mission Egypt (Embassy Cairo and 

Consulate Alexandria).
Page 6 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

While overseas posts are primarily responsible for initiating evacuations 

of post staff and family members, other parts of State—and in some 

cases DOD—have supporting roles. State’s Office of Crisis Management 

and Strategy (CMS) provides posts with crisis management and 

evacuation expertise and support. DS is responsible for security services 

related to the protection of life, information, and property at overseas 

posts and coordinates with posts’ DS agents—the Regional Security 

Officers (RSO)—to respond to posts’ security needs. DS falls under the 

Under Secretary for Management, who is the State headquarters official 

responsible for approval of a number of evacuation-related decisions.

State has developed processes and requirements for overseas posts to 

prepare EAPs and conduct drills in order to prepare for crises and 

evacuations. It also has established processes for overseas posts to 

follow when considering or implementing a drawdown of post personnel, 

including evacuations under an authorized departure or an ordered 

departure. In addition, State also has established a process for 

determining whether U.S. presence in posts designated by State as high 

threat and high risk should continue, discontinue, or restart operations.

The FAH assists posts in establishing processes and requirements to 

create and annually update comprehensive, effective, and readily usable 

plans to handle emergency situations at overseas posts.5 In particular, 

checklists within a post’s EAP are to specify procedures for responding to 

particular types of emergencies at overseas posts, such as civil disorder. 

In addition, the FAH directs DS to review EAPs submitted annually by 

overseas posts to ensure that EAPs include updated information needed 

by State headquarters and other agencies to monitor or assist in 

responding to emergency situations at posts.6

The FAH also requires the EAP to identify decision points, which CMS 

officials indicate help a post’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC) 

determine when to authorize or order post staff and family members to 

leave for a designated safe haven, when to initiate the evacuation of 

 5

See 12 FAH 1 H-012, 12 FAH-1 H-036.

6

12 FAH-1 H-035.

State Has 

Established 

Processes to Prepare 

Overseas Posts for 

Crises and to 

Conduct Evacuations

Overseas Posts Prepare 

for Crises and 

Evacuations by 

Developing and Updating 

EAPs and Conducting 

Required Drills
Page 7 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

American citizens, and when to suspend operations.7 The EAC is a group 

of subject-matter experts designated by the Chief of Mission to provide 

guidance in preparing for and responding to potential changes in risk that 

might impact the safety and security of the post and the American citizens 

in country.8 The FAH lays out several important responsibilities for a 

post’s EAC, including drafting and updating the post’s EAP and 

conducting drills and other crisis preparedness functions at the post.9

The FAH also establishes requirements for overseas posts to regularly 

conduct nine types of drills to prepare for crises and evacuations.10 These 

drills are shown in figure 2. The required frequency of drills is determined 

by a post’s threat ratings in the two Security Environment Threat List 

categories: political violence and terrorism. Posts rated high or critical in 

either political violence or terrorism are required to conduct each of the 

drills at least twice every fiscal year. All other posts are required to 

conduct these drills at least once every fiscal year.

 7

The EAC at a post is required to meet periodically—the FAH recommends that meetings 

occur at least once every other month—to discuss, among other things, the current 

security environment at the post. Under 12 FAH 1 H-232, the EAC also is required to meet 

when any one of a post’s decision points is crossed; when a significant event that will 

strain a post’s security planning and capabilities is upcoming; to evaluate threats as 

necessary; to review a post’s drills or security incident responses; to regularly ensure EAC 

members are aware of ongoing work to support the safety and security of the mission; or 

in response to a specific State headquarters request for the EAC to meet. 

8

The EAC consists of many positions that vary based on the size and location of the post 

and may include the Deputy Chief of Mission, Principal Officer, Defense Attaché, Political 

Officer, Economic Officer, RSO, Management Officer, Consular Officer, Public Affairs 

Officer, Human Resources Officer, Medical Officer, U.S. Agency for International 

Development Mission Director, Community Liaison Office Coordinator, and others 

including non-State officials, as appropriate. 

9

12 FAH-1 H-765 instructs the EAC to task relevant incident commanders at posts, 

including the RSO, with organizing and implementing required drills under their respective 

areas of expertise or responsibility. For example, according to State officials, an EAC may 

task the Information Management Officer at a post with organizing and implementing the 

required drill for staff to practice the emergency destruction of sensitive material. 

1012 FAH 1 H-012, 12 FAH-1 H-765. 
Page 8 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Figure 2: Nine Types of Drills Each Overseas Post Is to Complete Every Fiscal Year

a

The consular warden system is a mechanism through which a post reaches out to American citizens 

in country, typically by phone or e-mail, in the event of an emergency, disaster, or threat, for the 

purposes of distributing information of interest. 

Overseas post staff we visited reported that in addition to maintaining 

EAPs and conducting required drills, other activities and training help their 

posts prepare for crises and evacuations. For instance, staff at one 

overseas post we visited reported that the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat 

(FACT) training course and new arrival briefings help them prepare for 

crises and evacuations. State established FACT to help safeguard and 

prepare personnel serving in high threat countries by providing instruction 

in personal security skills necessary for recognizing, avoiding, and 

responding to potential terrorist and other threat situations. FACT training 

will be required for all overseas post foreign affairs personnel and certain 

family members by 2019.11 New arrival briefings—which the FAM 

requires each post’s RSO to provide—are helpful because they acquaint 

new post staff and family members with the post’s current security 

situation and threat environment.12

 11In expanding the requirement for staff at all overseas posts to complete FACT training, 

State is using a phased approach. After January 1, 2019, staff at all overseas posts will be 

required to complete this training for mitigating the risks of operating in non-permissive 

environments. FACT training also is required for family members who are offered U.S. 

government employment before or after arriving at posts and is made available and 

strongly encouraged for family members not employed by a U.S. government entity at 

posts. 

1212 FAM 424.1. Also see GAO, Diplomatic Security: State Should Enhance Its 

Management of Transportation-Related Risks to Overseas U.S. Personnel, GAO-17-124 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2016). 
Page 9 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

The FAH establishes processes for overseas posts to follow when 

considering or implementing a drawdown of post personnel, including 

evacuations under an authorized departure or an ordered departure.13

When a post determines that there is imminent danger to the lives of post 

staff or their family members, the post’s Chief of Mission is to cable a 

request for either an authorized or an ordered departure to State’s Under 

Secretary for Management. Under an authorized departure, certain post 

staff and all family members can voluntarily choose to depart the post by 

submitting a request through the post’s EAC, which forwards it to the 

Chief of Mission for a final decision. Under an ordered departure, certain 

post staff and family members are ordered to depart the post. Authorized 

and ordered departures can be tailored to fit the posts’ particular 

circumstances. For instance, a Chief of Mission could recommend an (1) 

authorized departure for certain family members only, such as children of 

a certain age or spouses; (2) ordered departure of certain family 

members only; or (3) ordered departure of certain family members 

coupled with authorized departure of certain post staff. The FAH also 

outlines how authorized and ordered departures are to be coordinated 

among various sections at an overseas post, the relevant regional 

bureau, and with others in State headquarters.14

State guidance establishes that authorized and ordered departures are 

approved for an initial period of 30 days, which may be extended in 30-

day increments for a maximum of 180 days. Prior to the expiration of 

each 30-day period, posts are to submit a recommendation to State 

headquarters as to whether the authorized or ordered departure status 

should be continued. To that end, the EAC at a post on departure status 

is to meet to evaluate the security environment and determine if the crisis 

situation leading to the evacuation has abated. If the EAC decides that 

the crisis situation has abated, it can recommend that the Chief of Mission 

submit a cable to State’s Under Secretary for Management requesting 

approval to terminate the authorized or ordered departure. If an overseas 

post continues on ordered departure status for 180 continuous days, 

State headquarters can automatically change that post’s classification 

status to unaccompanied. At unaccompanied posts, only post staff and 

 1312 FAH-1 Annex K.

1412 FAH-1 Annex K 2. 

State Has Established 

Processes for Conducting 

Evacuations of Overseas 

Posts
Page 10 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

their post-employed family members may be present; other family 

members are prohibited.15

According to DS officials, if the crisis situation in-country deteriorates and 

an overseas post requires U.S. military support to bolster its defensive 

capabilities, the post can coordinate with DOD to receive such 

assistance, depending on the location of the overseas post and the 

availability of DOD assets. Overseas posts also can coordinate with DOD 

in situations requiring U.S. military evacuation assistance from an 

overseas post. Such DOD-assisted evacuations are known as 

“noncombatant evacuation operations” and involve post personnel as well 

as American citizens in country.16 According to the FAM, under State’s 

“no double standard” policy, an overseas post is required to share the 

same relevant threat information with private U.S. citizens in that country 

as the post communicates to the official U.S. government community. In 

cases where the evacuation of private U.S. citizens is necessary, the 

policy also requires that private U.S. citizens be given the same 

evacuation opportunities and assistance as the official U.S. government 

community, when appropriate and feasible.17

According to State officials, the costs associated with evacuations of 

State staff and their family members from overseas posts are covered by 

the appropriation for Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular 

Service, also known as the K Fund. Other agencies with staff and family 

members at overseas posts, such as the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, are responsible for covering the costs associated with the 

evacuation of their staff and family members. In fiscal years 2010 through 

2016, State’s reported costs associated with evacuating from posts on 53 

occasions were roughly $25.5 million. According to State officials, costs 

associated with evacuations varied due to several factors, including the 

number of post staff and family members evacuated. In fiscal year 2014, 

costs associated with evacuating Embassy Maseru in Lesotho were 

roughly $20,000, while in the same year, costs associated with 

 15At certain unaccompanied posts, post-employed family members may be prohibited as 

well.

16Noncombatant evacuation operations are directed by State, in coordination with DOD, 

whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are 

endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster, to the United States or other 

designated safe havens.

1712 FAH-1 Annex K Addendum 1.3.
Page 11 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

evacuating Embassy Sana’a in Yemen were roughly $1.9 million. Figure 3 

displays the K Fund expenditures for post evacuations during fiscal years 

2010–2016.

Figure 3: Expenditures Reported by State Related to Post Evacuations from the K 

Fund (Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service), Fiscal Years 2010–

2016

Note: Fiscal year 2011 costs were associated with evacuating posts on 11 occasions; during fiscal 

years 2010–2016, the greatest number of evacuations occurred in fiscal year 2011.

After an authorized or ordered departure has been terminated at an 

overseas post, State guidance recommends that posts engage in a 

lessons learned discussion. CMS at headquarters is to work with the 

overseas post, the relevant regional bureau, and State’s Management 

Bureau to facilitate a lessons learned discussion for the record. State 

guidance also requires post staff to transmit an after-action report listing 

lessons learned to State headquarters.18

 1812 FAH-1 Annex K4.2-1.
Page 12 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

According to State officials, because of the attacks in Benghazi, Libya, 

and other overseas posts in 2012, State developed and implemented a 

risk assessment process called the Vital Presence Validation Process 

(VP2). State officials indicated that VP2 is an annual assessment by 

senior management at State headquarters—in consultation with affected 

posts and respective regional bureaus—to determine whether the U.S. 

presence in the approximately 30 posts designated by State as high 

threat and high risk should continue, discontinue, or restart operations.19

According to State officials, State also conducts VP2 reviews for opening 

or reopening overseas posts categorized as critical threat, or high threat, 

high risk. VP2 is not meant for determining short-term evacuations from a 

post, such as authorized or ordered departures. State’s Office of 

Management, Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation is responsible for 

coordinating VP2 assessments. During these assessments, the affected 

overseas post and respective regional bureau are to complete a 

document detailing, among other things, threats to a post and any 

mitigating factors; the post’s staffing, mission, and programs; program 

implementation; and program benefits. The Core High Threat Post 

Review Board, which includes representatives from various State offices, 

is to review and endorse each VP2 assessment before sending it for 

approval to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Under 

Secretary for Management. The VP2 assessment is then sent to the 

Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary for Management and 

Resources for consideration and final approval.

State’s implementation of preparedness processes for crises and 

evacuations at overseas posts has multiple gaps:

• Overseas posts have not updated EAPs annually within required time 

frames.

• When EAPs are submitted to DS for annual certification, DS does not 

fully review key EAP sections that should be updated each year.

• EAPs are lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily 

usable in emergency situations, according to State officials.

 19High threat and high risk posts are determined by their ratings in political violence and 

terrorism on DS’s Security Environment Threat List, among other data points. VP2 

assessments can also be conducted on an ad hoc basis.

Overseas Posts Deemed 

Likely to Experience 

Crises and Evacuations 

Are Subject to Additional 

Review through the Vital 

Presence Validation 

Process

State Has Gaps in Its 

Crisis and Evacuation 

Preparedness for 

Overseas Posts
Page 13 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

• Although overseas posts are required to conduct drills intended to 

prepare for crises and evacuations, for fiscal years 2013–2016, posts 

reported completing about half of their required drills.

• Overseas posts have not submitted required lessons learned reports 

following evacuations.

The gaps in State’s implementation of preparedness processes for crises 

and evacuations at overseas posts increase the risk that post staff are not 

sufficiently prepared to handle crisis and emergency situations.

Although the FAH requires each overseas post to comprehensively 

review and update its EAP annually, from fiscal year 2013 to 2016, almost 

a quarter of overseas posts, on average, did not complete required 

annual EAP updates within specified time frames.20 During the 

comprehensive review, each post must update any out-of-date 

information and certify that all other information remains current. 

Overseas posts have made considerable improvements in their timeliness 

in completing EAP updates during fiscal years 2015-2016 compared to 

fiscal years 2013-2014. State headquarters officials noted that, following 

the attack in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, State took actions to 

encourage overseas posts to improve their timeliness in completing 

annual EAP updates. These actions included State headquarters 

becoming more involved in annually reviewing decision points in posts’

EAPs as well as State headquarters issuing cables emphasizing that 

posts need to update their EAPs annually.

In fiscal year 2016, about 1 in 12 overseas posts were late in completing 

required annual updates. On average, these posts were about 6 months 

late in completing their EAP updates.21 For fiscal year 2016, the list of 

posts that were late in completing their annual EAP updates included 7 

posts rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism. Table 1 shows, 

for fiscal years 2013 to 2016, the percentage of overseas posts that did 

not complete required annual updates of EAPs within the 1-year deadline 

 2012 FAH-1 H-036. In addition, federal internal control standards call for agency 

management to evaluate performance and hold individuals accountable for their internal 

control responsibilities. See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: September 2014). 

21All data are as of March 10, 2017. We identified EAPs that were submitted a number of 

months after their due date as well as EAPs that had not yet been submitted as of March 

10, 2017. We identified one EAP that was not submitted by March 10, 2017. For this EAP, 

we calculated months late as the difference between the due date and the date we last 

received updated data from DS.

Overseas Posts Have Not 

Updated Emergency 

Action Plans within 

Required Time Frames
Page 14 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

and the average number of months these EAP updates were late. See 

appendix II for additional details on posts that were late in completing 

their EAP updates for fiscal year 2016.

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Overseas Posts Late in Completing the Required Annual Update of Emergency Action 

Plans (EAP) for Fiscal Years 2013–2016 and the Average Number of Months Late

Fiscal year Number of overseas posts 

required to complete annual 

update of EAPsa

Percentage of overseas posts 

late in completing required 

annual update of EAPs

Average number of months late in 

completing required annual update 

of EAPsb

2013 179 54 7

2014 164 30 8

2015 211 11 12

2016 203 8 6

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State (State) data. | GAO-17-714

Note: GAO’s analysis is based on a review of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) data on 

dates when overseas posts completed their required annual updates of their EAPs for fiscal years 

2013–2016.

a

The total number of overseas posts required to complete annual updates of EAPs varies from fiscal 

year to fiscal year and is determined by DS. For example, if a post submitted its annual EAP update 

for fiscal year 2014 12 months late in fiscal year 2015, DS can determine that the post is no longer 

required to submit a separate annual EAP update for fiscal year 2015. In this case, DS can determine 

that the post’s next annual EAP update would be due in fiscal year 2016.

b

All data are as of March 10, 2017. We identified EAPs that were submitted a number of months after 

their due date as well as EAPs that had not yet been submitted as of March 10, 2017. We identified 

one EAP that was not submitted by March 10, 2017. For this EAP, we calculated months late as the 

difference between their due date and the date we last received updated data from DS. As a result, 

the average months late for 2016—shown in italics—cannot be compared with the average for the 

prior years.

Officials at all six overseas posts we met with reported some difficulties 

using the current electronic system to update their EAPs. Difficulties in 

using the current system, as well as challenges in reviewing and updating 

a relatively large document, may impact posts’ timely completion of EAP 

updates. Overseas posts with EAPs that have not been annually 

reviewed and updated as required could leave post staff insufficiently 

prepared to handle emergency situations, placing them and others with 

them at increased risk of harm.

According to DS officials, in response to our ongoing work, in December 

2016 DS developed new guidance and policy to encourage posts to 

complete their annual EAP updates on time. In particular, DS developed a 

standardized 60-day notice e-mail and established policy to send these 

standardized notices to all posts 60 days before the deadline for posts’

annual EAP update submissions. While implementation of this action may 
Page 15 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

assist in reminding all posts of the relevant requirements, further steps, 

such as focusing follow-up efforts on the posts that are late in their 

submission, could result in improved timeliness.

The FAH directs DS to review each EAP submitted by an overseas post 

during the annual EAP review cycle to ensure that EAPs include updated 

information needed by State headquarters and other agencies to monitor 

or assist in responding to emergency situations at posts.22 To conduct 

these annual reviews, DS Emergency Plans Review Officers in 

Washington use a list of 27 key EAP sections that the Emergency Plans 

Review Office has determined should be updated each year.23 According 

to DS officials, Emergency Plans Review Officers spot check these 27 

key EAP sections to review and approve each EAP. In addition, DS 

officials told us that Review Officers consider forms included in key EAP 

sections that they spot check to meet the annual update requirement if 

the forms were updated up to 3 years prior to the check.24

DS does not document its annual EAP review process. We requested the 

results of the Emergency Plans Review Officer reviews, including data on 

who conducted them and what deficiencies, if any, were found. Federal 

internal control standards call for agency management to evaluate 

performance and hold individuals accountable for their internal control 

responsibilities.25 However, DS was unable to provide copies of the 

reviews completed because the Emergency Plans Review Officers do not 

document these results.

Our analysis of a nongeneralizable sample of EAPs for 20 posts that DS 

had reviewed and approved showed that only 2 of the 20 posts’ EAPs 

 2212 FAH-1 H-035.

23Key sections of the EAP to be reviewed and approved by DS include sections covering 

information on a post’s emergency food supplies; medical supplies; chemical, biological, 

and radiological countermeasures equipment; and evacuation procedures. For a full list of 

the 27 key EAP sections, see app. III.

24According to DS officials, in response to our ongoing work examining the processes that 

DS uses to review and approve EAPs, in December 2016 DS modified its spot check 

reviews to consider only forms updated within 1 year prior to the check to meet the annual 

update requirement. Since State is still in the process of implementing these efforts, we 

did not evaluate their effectiveness.

25GAO-14-704G. 

DS Does Not Fully Review 

Key Sections of EAPs 

Submitted by Overseas 

Posts
Page 16 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

included evidence that posts had updated all 27 key sections.26 In the 

remaining 18 of 20 posts’ EAPs, we found at least 1 key EAP section that 

had not been updated. The extent to which each post had not updated its 

EAP varied. For example, one post had not updated almost 90 percent of 

the 27 key EAP sections that we reviewed, while another post had not 

updated about 20 percent of the 27 key EAP sections that we reviewed.27

For all 20 EAPs we reviewed, on average, posts had not updated over 50 

percent of the key EAP sections we reviewed. In addition, in several 

EAPs we reviewed, we found emergency supplies listed that were a year 

or more past their expiration dates. Because DS Emergency Plans 

Review Officers do not check all 27 key EAP sections, EAPs submitted to 

DS have not been fully reviewed. Overseas posts with EAPs that have 

not been fully reviewed may leave post staff—especially new staff—

insufficiently prepared to respond to emergencies and leave State and 

other agencies without accurate information to assist an affected post 

during an emergency.

According to the FAH, EAPs should be readily usable plans to handle 

emergency situations and should contain information to assist post staff in 

responding to emergencies.28 In addition, federal internal control 

standards call for an agency to internally communicate necessary quality 

information to achieve the agency’s objectives.29

However, at both State headquarters and at all six posts we met with, 

officials told us that EAPs are lengthy and cumbersome documents that 

 26We reviewed available unclassified and classified portions of the 20 EAPs requested. 

However, because the classified and unclassified portions of these EAPs were not current 

as of the same date, we restricted our analysis to the unclassified portions. By reviewing 

the available unclassified portions of these EAPs, we were able to assess an average of 

over 70 percent of the 27 key EAP sections for the 20 EAPs in our nongeneralizable 

sample. State officials explained that each overseas post determines which portions of its 

EAP should be classified. The portions of EAPs that were classified varied by post—both 

the number that were classified and which ones—due to the differing situations and risks 

faced by each post. 

27In the first example, we found the post had not updated 24 of the 27 key EAP sections 

that we reviewed. In the second example, we found the post had not updated 5 of the 27 

key EAP sections that we reviewed. 

2812 FAH-1 H-012.

29GAO-14-704G.

Emergency Action Plans 

Are Viewed As Lengthy 

and Cumbersome 

Documents That Are Not 

Readily Usable in 

Emergency Situations
Page 17 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

are not readily usable in emergency situations.30 Officials at all six posts 

also said that EAPs are voluminous documents that contain large 

amounts of boilerplate content, and officials at four of six posts we met 

with noted that this includes especially explicit instructions on how to fill 

out each of the plan’s sections and subsections. The boilerplate content 

in EAPs is automatically generated by the electronic system that all posts 

use to draft and update their EAPs; this content focuses on information 

about how posts should update their plans rather than information on how 

to handle emergency situations. In addition, none of the nongeneralizable 

sample of 20 EAPs that we reviewed had a single, comprehensive table 

of contents or index, potentially making it challenging for post staff to 

search for and find a particular section quickly, especially during an 

emergency.31

While officials from State headquarters and all six posts we met with told 

us that EAPs are not readily usable in emergency situations, officials at 

five of the six posts we met with also said there is value for post staff to 

participate in the process of updating EAPs to prepare for emergencies. 

The process of updating the EAP, they noted, includes reviewing 

applicable checklists and contact lists before an emergency occurs, which 

can help post staff be better prepared in the event of an emergency. 

Officials at two of the six posts we met with also observed that EAPs 

contain large amounts of guidance because it is easier for responsible 

staff at post to complete required updates to their specific sections if all 

the guidance they need is directly written into each EAP.

However, officials at five of the six posts we met with suggested that 

having a streamlined version of the EAP—such as a shorter EAP with just 

checklists and contact lists—in addition to the full EAP could make the 

EAP more readily usable in emergency situations. Officials at five of the 

six posts we met with also suggested that making a streamlined EAP that 

is not marked as sensitive or classified and could be stored on a mobile 

device could also be helpful in an emergency situation. This could allow 

staff at post who do not have security clearances—such as locally 

employed security personnel—to more readily access the EAP. While the 

 30Post officials noted that EAPs often are more than 800 pages long. Our review of a 

nongeneralizable sample of 20 EAPs confirmed this; the 20 EAPs in our sample ranged 

from 913 to 1,356 pages long.

31Our review of EAPs found that, while each major section, annex, and appendix of an 

EAP had its own table of contents, the full EAP lacked a single, comprehensive table of 

contents or index. 
Page 18 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

FAH requires posts to maintain full copies of their EAPs—in printed hard 

copy and CD-ROM forms—it does not contain a provision for preparing or 

maintaining alternate streamlined versions of the posts’ EAPs.32 Absent 

such a change in State’s relevant policy and procedures, officials may not 

have readily usable important information during a crisis.

State is in the process of developing a new electronic system for 

overseas posts to draft and update their EAPs to address issues with the 

current system, according to State headquarters officials. For example, 

officials told us that post staff have complained that the current system is 

cumbersome to work with, difficult to search and navigate, and makes 

drafting and updating their EAPs difficult and time consuming. State 

headquarters officials also said they hope the new system will allow staff 

to more quickly and easily draft and update their EAPs. They also said 

they hope the new system will result in more streamlined EAPs. State 

plans to launch the new system in the second half of 2017. As State 

develops its system, officials could consider turning their hopes for 

streamlined EAPs into specific requirements for the planned system.

Although the FAH establishes requirements for overseas posts to 

annually conduct nine types of drills to prepare for crises and 

evacuations, we found that, on average for fiscal years 2013–2016, 

overseas posts reported completing 52 percent of required drills.

33

Officials at headquarters and at all six overseas posts we met with told us 

that regularly conducting required annual drills is one of the most 

important steps to help prepare post staff for crises and evacuations and 

to keep them safe during crisis events. The required frequency of 

required drills is determined by ratings in the two Security Environment 

Threat List categories of political violence and terrorism. Posts that are 

not rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism are required to

conduct nine types of drills at least once per fiscal year. Posts that are 

rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism are required to 

conduct the same nine types of drills at least twice per fiscal year.

Relevant incident commanders at posts, including RSOs, are tasked with 

organizing and conducting required drills under their respective areas of 

 3212 FAH-1 H-035. 

3312 FAH 1 H-765. In addition to the relevant requirements in State guidance, federal 

internal control standards call for agency management to hold individuals accountable for 

their internal control responsibilities and to establish and operate monitoring activities to 

monitor the internal control system and evaluate the results. See GAO-14-704G. 

Overseas Posts Reported 

Completing About Half of 

Required Drills Intended to 

Prepare Post Staff for 

Crises and Evacuations
Page 19 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

expertise or responsibilities. RSOs record their posts’ completion of drills 

into DS’s Security Management Console, which logs the drill records into 

a drilling database maintained by DS. While DS collects the information 

submitted by RSOs in the database, DS does not independently verify the 

data to ensure its accuracy or validity.

State officials told us that when posts are identified as being 

noncompliant with drilling reporting during post security program reviews, 

DS works with posts either to retroactively input data on completed drills 

or conduct remaining drills in a timely manner.34 DS officials also told us 

that, partly in response to our ongoing work, the bureau has recently 

developed a standard operating procedure to review drilling data 

quarterly. However, the results of the first analysis of these data were 

unavailable at the time of our review.

As shown in table 2, for fiscal years 2013 through 2016, overseas posts 

reported completing an average of 52 percent of required annual drills. 

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, overseas posts rated high or critical 

in political violence or terrorism reported completing an average of 44 

percent of required annual drills.

 34DS is to conduct post security program reviews every 1 to 3 years depending on a post’s 

ranking on the Security Environment Threat List. These reviews help ensure that posts 

competently manage life safety, emergency preparedness, and information security 

programs with full mission support and participation, adequate personnel, sufficient 

resources, and appropriate management controls.
Page 20 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Table 2: Percentage of Required Annual Drills Reported Completed by Overseas 

Posts, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

Fiscal year Percentage of required 

drills reported completed 

by overseas posts 

Percentage of required drills reported 

completed by posts rated high or 

critical in political violence or 

terrorisma

2013 50 41

2014 50 41

2015 51 42

2016 56 50

Average 52 44

GAO analysis of Department of State data. GAO-17-714

Note: Diplomatic Security’s Security Environment Threat List includes ratings for political violence and 

terrorism at all U.S. overseas posts.

a

Posts that are rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism are required to conduct all nine 

types of drills twice per fiscal year.

Figure 4 provides a breakdown by drill type of the percentage of overseas 

posts reporting completion of each type of required annual drill, on 

average, for fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Completion rates for the 

drills ranged from a high of 78 percent to a low of 22 percent, depending 

on the type of drill. For example, in fiscal years 2013 through 2016, an 

average of 78 percent of posts reported completing required duck and 

cover drills; an average of 58 percent of posts reported completing 

required employee warden system drills; an average of 36 percent of 

posts reported completing required evacuation/drawdown training drills; 

and an average of 22 percent of posts reported completing the required 

consular warden system drills.
Page 21 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Figure 4: Percentage of Overseas Posts That Reported Completing Drilling Requirements by Drill Type, Fiscal Years 2013–

2016

a

The consular warden system is a mechanism through which a post reaches out to American citizens 

in country, typically by phone or e-mail, in the event of an emergency, disaster, or threat, for the 

purposes of distributing information of interest. 

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, we found that, on average, 3.4 

percent of posts reported completing all required annual drills (see 

table 3).
Page 22 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Table 3: Overseas Posts Reporting Completion of Required Annual Drills, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 

Fiscal year Number of overseas posts 

reporting completion of drillsa Number of overseas posts reporting completion of all 

required annual drillsb

Percentage of overseas posts 

reporting completion of all 

required annual drills

2013 253 7 2.8

2014 257 4 1.6

2015 274 12 4.4

2016 261 13 5.0

Average 261 9 3.4

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State (State) data. GAO-17-714

a

The number of overseas posts fluctuates from year to year. According to State’s Security 

Environment Threat List, there were 277 overseas posts in fiscal year 2016, which includes posts 

where operations had been suspended. Drills are not conducted at posts where operations have 

been suspended, and we did not factor those posts into our analysis.

b

Posts that are not rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism are required to conduct nine 

types of drills at least once per fiscal year. Posts that are rated high or critical in political violence or 

terrorism are required to conduct the same nine types of drills at least twice per fiscal year.

For those posts rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism, we 

found that, on average for fiscal years 2013 through 2016, 2.3 percent of 

posts reported completing all drills at least twice per fiscal year as 

required (see table 4).

Table 4: Overseas Posts Rated High or Critical in Political Violence or Terrorism Reporting Completion of Required Annual 

Drills, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

Fiscal year Number of overseas posts rated 

high or critical in political violence 

or terrorism reporting completion 

of drillsa

Number of overseas posts rated 

high or critical in political violence 

or terrorism reporting completion 

of all required annual drillsb

Percentage of overseas posts 

rated high or critical in political 

violence or terrorism reporting 

completion of all required 

annual drills

2013 106 2 1.9

2014 106 1 0.9

2015 114 3 2.6

2016 102 4 3.9

Average 107 2.5 2.3

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State (State) data. GAO-17-714

a

The number of overseas posts fluctuates from year to year. According to State’s Security 

Environment Threat List, there were 277 overseas posts in fiscal year 2016, which includes posts 

where operations had been suspended. Drills are not conducted at posts where operations have 

been suspended, and we did not factor those posts into our analysis.

b

Posts that are not rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism are required to conduct nine 

types of drills at least once per fiscal year. Posts that are rated high or critical in political violence or 

terrorism are required to conduct the same nine types of drills at least twice per fiscal year.
Page 23 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

State headquarters officials told us that, while posts are aware of the 

requirements to report completed drills, posts may be underreporting drills 

completed. They said that post RSOs have significant workloads and that 

this may result in RSOs failing to report a post’s completion of some 

required drills. When RSOs report completion of drills in the DS Security 

Management Console, the FAH also requires that they record information 

about how the drill was conducted, including post participation, 

deficiencies identified, and corrective actions. These additional reporting 

requirements further add to RSO workloads and may contribute to 

underreporting, according to State headquarters officials. Moreover, State 

officials told us that incident commanders responsible for conducting 

certain types of drills may not notify RSOs about completed drills. Absent 

more complete drill reporting, State headquarters and post leadership 

lack information on posts’ preparedness for responding to crises and 

conducting evacuations.

DS officials told us that—partly in response to our ongoing work—the 

bureau recently has established a DS Drills Working Group to clarify RSO 

roles and requirements for reporting drills and to address some of the 

challenges leading to underreporting the completion of required drills. DS 

officials also told us that they plan to modify the new electronic system for 

drafting and updating EAPs to include a post drills reporting feature. This 

feature, projected by DS to be incorporated into the new system in 2018, 

would allow incident commanders to report completion of drills for which 

they are responsible. DS officials said that they hope this new feature will 

improve the reporting of completed required drills.

Nevertheless, officials at three posts we met with told us that posts may 

not be completing required drills because compliance with annual drilling 

requirements is not a priority in State’s organizational culture. For 

example, officials at one post rated high in political violence and terrorism 

told us that the previous RSO had not adhered to the post’s drilling 

schedule for meeting annual drilling requirements. The new RSO at this 

post told us that the previous RSO had completed less than 40 percent of 

required drills in fiscal year 2016. Another official at the same post told us 

that the Ambassador had denied requests for additional drills that the new 

RSO deemed necessary, saying that the post was too busy to hold such 

drills. If drills are not conducted as required, overseas post staff may lack 

the preparation to respond to a crisis, which could endanger post staff 

and family members.
Page 24 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

During fiscal years 2013 through 2016, there were 31 evacuations from 

overseas posts; however, according to CMS, none of the posts submitted 

required lessons learned reports to State headquarters following the 

termination of their authorized or ordered departures. We requested that 

State headquarters provide us with any documents—produced by 

overseas posts—containing lessons learned or any challenges 

encountered by posts that experienced an evacuation during fiscal years 

2013 through 2016. State was unable to provide any documents 

responsive to our request. CMS officials told us that State currently does 

not have an established process for centrally collecting and assessing 

lessons learned documents, but that CMS is taking steps to develop and 

implement such a process. In September 2016, CMS formed a new unit 

to work on, among other tasks, lessons learned projects to ease the 

burden on posts and to develop a collection and assessment process for 

lessons learned. Separately from CMS, DS provided us with two 

classified reports containing some lessons learned about overseas posts 

that had experienced evacuations. However, neither of these documents 

was produced by the overseas posts themselves and, according to DS 

and CMS officials, DS is not the entity within State that is responsible for 

collecting and assessing lessons learned reports from posts following 

evacuations.35

As previously discussed, State guidance recommends that posts engage 

in a lessons learned discussion after an authorized or ordered departure 

has been terminated. State’s CMS team at headquarters is to work with 

the overseas post, the relevant regional bureau, and State’s Management 

Bureau to facilitate a lessons learned discussion for the record. 

Additionally, the FAH requires post staff to transmit an after-action report 

listing any lessons learned from their experience to State headquarters.36

In addition, federal internal control standards call for agency management 

to hold individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities 

and to establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the internal 

control system and evaluate the results.37

 35Working separately from CMS, DS had started collecting various lessons learned

documents on its own; these documents convey multiple aspects of DS’s responsibilities 

and can cover evacuations as well as other emergency preparedness activities. DS’s 

collection includes over 500 lessons learned documents.

3612 FAH-1 Annex K 4.2-1.

37GAO-14-704G.

Overseas Posts Have Not 

Submitted Required 

Lessons Learned Reports 

following Evacuations
Page 25 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

CMS officials told us that overseas posts often lack sufficient resources to 

produce lessons learned reports following termination of the post’s 

authorized or ordered departure. CMS officials also told us that even after 

the crisis leading to an evacuation has abated and staff have returned to 

post, there is often a backlog of tasks to be completed. They also said 

completing these tasks is a priority for post staff, which limits their ability 

to develop and submit lessons learned reports. Moreover, CMS officials 

said that post staff curtailments also can challenge a post’s ability to 

develop and submit lessons learned reports following an evacuation, as 

staff present during the evacuation may no longer be present when the 

post resumes normal operations.38

We learned of several challenges that posts faced in different evacuations 

in discussions with officials from the six posts with whom we met. 

Different posts mentioned various challenges, including disorganized 

evacuation logistics and transportation, unclear communication with local 

staff, confusion surrounding the policy for evacuating pets, problems with 

shipment and delivery of personal effects, difficulty tracking the 

destination of staff who were relocated, poor communication with senior 

State leadership regarding the post’s evacuation status, difficulties getting 

reimbursement for lodging or personal expenses related to the 

evacuation, and other similar challenges.

Absent a functioning lessons learned process, State’s ability to identify 

lessons learned and to share best practices from staff that have 

experienced evacuations may be constrained. According to CMS officials, 

holding lessons learned exercises can help to identify challenges that a 

post faced during an evacuation within a reasonable time frame. The 

subsequent after-action reports could be used to modify guidance for 

posts on how to best respond to emergency situations. According to CMS 

officials, these reports also can help staff at other overseas posts learn 

about the challenges the evacuated posts faced, identify relevant insights 

and best practices, and prepare for potential future evacuations.

 38Curtailments are the shortening of an employee’s tour of duty from his or her 

assignment. It may include the employee’s immediate departure from a bureau or post.
Page 26 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

U.S. personnel working at overseas posts, along with the family members 

who accompany them, face a range of threats to their safety and 

security—such as terrorism, civil unrest, and natural disasters. To help 

protect them, State has established processes to prepare overseas posts 

for crises and to conduct evacuations. However, State has significant 

gaps in implementation of its preparedness processes for crises and 

evacuations at overseas posts. Overseas posts are not completing 

required annual EAP updates, DS is not identifying incomplete updates in 

its EAP reviews, and the EAPs themselves are not readily usable during 

emergency situations. In addition, although regular drilling is a critical 

crisis preparedness task, very few overseas posts have completed all 

required annual drills. Finally, because overseas posts are not submitting 

required after-action reports containing lessons learned following 

evacuations, State is missing important opportunities to identify 

challenges and best practices and to make changes to prepare for future 

evacuations from overseas posts. While State has taken initial actions—

including some actions in response to our ongoing work—to improve 

implementation of its preparedness processes for crises and evacuations, 

significant shortcomings exist. While each of these gaps is of concern, 

taken together, they increase the risk that post staff are not sufficiently 

prepared to handle crisis and emergency situations.

To address gaps in State’s crisis and evacuation preparedness, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State take the following five actions:

1. Take additional steps to ensure that overseas posts complete annual 

updates of their EAPs within required time frames, such as identifying 

posts that are late in completing their annual updates and continuing 

to follow up with those posts until they complete their annual EAP 

updates.

2. Establish a monitoring and tracking process to ensure that DS fully 

reviews and documents the review of key sections of EAPs submitted 

to it during the annual EAP review cycle.

3. Take steps to make the EAP more readily usable during emergency 

situations. For example, State could develop a more streamlined 

version of the EAP—consisting of key sections, checklists, and 

contact lists—that could be used by overseas post staff, in addition to 

the full EAP. In addition, for its new system planned for later this year, 

State could consider including requirements for streamlined EAPs.

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 27 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

4. Take steps to ensure that overseas posts complete and report 

completion of required drills within mandated time frames.

5. Take steps to ensure that overseas posts complete required lessons 

learned reports following authorized or ordered departures and submit 

the reports to State headquarters for analysis.

We provided a draft of the sensitive but unclassified report to State and 

DOD for comment. State’s comments on the sensitive but unclassified 

report are reprinted in appendix IV. In its comments, State concurred with 

all five recommendations and described actions planned or under way to 

address them. For example, State concurred with our recommendation 

that the department take steps to make the EAP more readily usable 

during emergency situations. State further said that it is developing a 

redesigned EAP that minimizes redundancy, groups content according to 

posts’ planning and response needs, and makes the EAP organized and 

user-friendly for all EAC members and other users. State also provided 

technical comments on the draft of the sensitive but unclassified report, 

which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD did not provide comments on 

the draft of the sensitive but unclassified report.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Michael J. Courts

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Agency Comments
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 28 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

This report examines (1) the processes the Department of State (State) 

has established to prepare overseas posts for crises and to conduct 

evacuations and (2) State’s implementation of preparedness processes 

for crises and evacuations at overseas posts. This report is a public 

version of a sensitive but unclassified report that was issued on June 28, 

2017, copies of which are available upon request for official use only by 

those with the appropriate need to know.1 State deemed some of the 

information in our June report to be sensitive, which must be protected 

from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits information identified 

by State as sensitive. Although the information provided in this report is 

more limited, the report addresses the same objectives as the sensitive 

report and uses the same methodology.

To conduct this review, we obtained and analyzed guidance from State’s 

Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and Foreign Affairs Handbooks (FAH), 

including a portion called the Emergency Planning Handbook. We 

analyzed information from State’s Emergency Action Plans (EAP) drilling 

database, Security Environment Threat List, and the State account for 

Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service known as the K 

fund. In addition, we interviewed officials from State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS); Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and 

Innovation; Crisis Management Support; Africa Regional Bureau; Western 

Hemisphere Regional Bureau; Near Eastern Affairs Regional Bureau; and 

European Regional Bureau. We reviewed GAO’s most recent work 

regarding evacuations and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) support 

for State in crisis situations.2 We also interviewed representatives from 

DOD’s Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

We conducted fieldwork at four overseas posts in the Africa and the Near 

East geographic regions. We are not naming the specific posts we visited 

for this review due to security concerns. In addition, we conducted 

interviews—via secure video conference—with two additional posts in the 

Near East and Africa geographic regions, and with a DOD combatant 

command to gather their perspectives on State’s implementation of crisis 

 1

GAO, Embassy Evacuations: State Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency 

Preparedness, GAO-17-560SU (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2017). 

2

GAO, State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can 

Be Improved, GAO-08-23 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 19, 2007) and Interagency 

Coordination: DOD and State Need to Clarify DOD Roles and Responsibilities to Protect 

U.S. Personnel and Facilities Overseas in High-Threat Areas, GAO-15-219C 

(Washington, D. C.: Mar. 4, 2015).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

and evacuation preparedness processes for overseas posts. This sample 

of countries was designed to account for geographic diversity and to 

include posts that have experienced authorized departure, ordered 

departure, and suspended operations since September 2012; had a mix 

of posts where family members or members of household were 

authorized or not authorized to reside; and a mix of both high-risk posts 

and posts where a Vital Presence Validation Process (VP2) assessment 

had been conducted. At posts we visited, we met with a variety of post 

staff including Emergency Action Committee members, Ambassadors, 

Deputy Chiefs of Mission, Regional Security Officers (RSO), Management 

Counselors, Community Liaison Office Coordinators, and U.S. staff and 

locally employed staff who had experienced previous evacuations.

To examine the processes State has established to prepare overseas 

posts for crises and to conduct evacuations, we reviewed State’s policies 

and procedures in the FAM and associated FAH requiring posts to 

prepare EAPs and to conduct crisis-situation and evacuation drills, as well 

as policies and procedures to conduct evacuations at overseas posts. We 

also reviewed memoranda of agreement between State and DOD 

regarding coordination of U.S. military support to posts during 

evacuations. We interviewed State officials at headquarters, including 

from relevant regional bureaus and other offices and groups that assist 

posts during crises and evacuations, and at four overseas posts. Further, 

we interviewed officials via secure video conferences at two additional 

posts and a DOD combatant command to discuss State policies and 

procedures that define their roles in crisis and evacuation preparedness.

To determine the amount State had spent on evacuation-related 

expenses, we assessed State-provided expenditure data from the K Fund 

by totaling the amounts reported for overseas post evacuations that took 

place in fiscal years 2010–2016; we did not conduct a financial audit of 

the expenditure data. The K Fund is used to cover post evacuationrelated expenditures. State provided K Fund data on overseas post 

evacuations that it collects and tracks through its Global Financial 

Management System for these years. We assessed the reliability of these 

data by querying knowledgeable State officials about them. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to present State’s 

expenditures on evacuations in fiscal years 2010 through 2016.

To assess State’s implementation of preparedness processes for crises 

and evacuations at overseas posts, we conducted several analyses. First, 

to assess the extent to which overseas posts annually updated EAPs 

within required time frames, we reviewed DS data to identify the dates 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 30 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

when overseas posts completed the required annual updates of their 

EAPs for fiscal years 2013–2016. To assess the reliability of DS data on 

when posts completed their annual EAP updates, we performed basic 

logic checks on the data provided and reviewed DS’s responses to a 

series of data reliability questions. We concluded that the DS data on 

EAP annual updates were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

report. Second, to determine the extent to which DS met requirements to 

fully review key sections of EAPs submitted by overseas posts, we 

requested documentation from DS on the reviews completed, including 

who conducted them and what deficiencies, if any, were found.

Third, we analyzed a nongeneralizable, judgmental sample of 20 post 

EAPs that DS had reviewed and approved to assess whether this sample 

of EAPs contained evidence that key EAP sections, as identified by DS, 

had been updated. We selected the sample of post EAPs to ensure that 

we examined EAPs from posts that had experienced evacuations or 

suspended operations since September 2012, whose evacuations or 

suspended operations that had occurred for a variety of reasons (e.g., 

natural disasters as well as security threats), with different statuses 

regarding accompaniment of family members, and from different 

geographic regions. For all 20 EAPs, we examined the dates indicating 

each key section’s most recent update to determine if the overseas post 

had reviewed and updated the information within required time frames. 

The dates we reviewed are updated by State’s current electronic system 

for generating and updating EAPs whenever a section of the EAP is 

edited and put through the approval process for republication. We 

reviewed available unclassified and classified portions of the 20 EAPs 

requested. However, the classified and unclassified portions of these 

EAPs were not current as of the same date; therefore, we restricted our 

analysis to the unclassified portions. By reviewing the available 

unclassified portions of these EAPs, we were able to assess an average 

of over 70 percent of the 27 key EAP sections for the 20 EAPs in our 

nongeneralizable sample. State officials explained that each overseas 

post determines which portions of its EAP should be classified. The 

portions of EAPs that were classified varied by post—both the number of 

portions that were classified and which ones—due to the differing 

situations and risks faced by each post. To assess the degree to which 

the EAPs are readily usable in emergency situations, we interviewed staff 

at overseas posts and State headquarters about the utility of EAPs in 

emergency situations. In addition, for the sample of 20 EAPs we 

reviewed, we determined the average number of pages of those 

documents.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 31 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Fourth, to understand the extent to which posts have complied with 

requirements to conduct drills intended to prepare them for crises and 

evacuations, we reviewed DS’s drilling database for overseas posts for 

fiscal years 2013–2016. RSOs report completion of their post’s drills into 

DS’s RSO Security Management Console, which logs the drill records 

into a drilling database maintained by DS. The data elements we 

assessed from the drilling database were for overseas posts that reported 

completing required drills for fiscal years 2013–2016. DS officials 

indicated that some posts may be underreporting completion of their 

required drills. In addition, DS is unable to confirm that all drills completed 

by posts for fiscal years 2013–2016 were reported in DS’s RSO Security 

Management Console. Consequently, the data elements we assessed 

from the drilling database do not fully capture the extent to which drills 

might have been completed at posts for fiscal years 2013–2016. In 

analyzing the data, we also requested and received from DS information 

on those posts that were rated high or critical for terrorism or political 

violence on its Security Environment Threat List for fiscal years 2013–

2016, as those posts have more frequent annual drilling requirements.

Upon reviewing the Security Environment Threat List data along with the 

data on posts from the drilling database, we found 23 posts with potential 

data anomalies. We sent DS follow-up questions to clarify these 

anomalies and received responses from DS. To assess the reliability of 

the drilling database, we performed basic logic checks on the database 

and reviewed State’s responses to a series of data reliability questions. 

We concluded that, although State does not independently verify the 

accuracy of data reported within DS’s RSO Security Management 

Console to ensure its accuracy or validity, the data are sufficiently reliable 

for the purposes of reviewing which overseas posts reported completing 

required annual drills for fiscal years 2013-2016.

Fifth, to determine the extent to which overseas posts that had 

experienced evacuations complied with requirements to submit lessons 

learned reports to State headquarters following the termination of an 

authorized or ordered departure, we requested from State officials at 

headquarters any required lessons learned reports submitted by posts 

following evacuations for fiscal years 2013–2016. State was unable to 

provide us with any lessons learned reports.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted 

from March 2016 to June 2017 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

subsequently worked with State from June 2017 to July 2017 to prepare 

this version of the original sensitive but unclassified report for public 

release. This public version was also prepared in accordance with these 

standards.
Appendix II: U.S. Overseas Posts Late in 

Completing Required Annual Update of Their 

Emergency Action Plan for Fiscal Year 2016

Page 33 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

For fiscal year 2016, 203 overseas posts were required to complete 

annual updates of their Emergency Action Plans (EAP). Of these, the 17 

posts listed below were late in completing their required annual updates.

Table 5: Overseas Posts Late in Completing the Required Annual Update of Their 

Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Number of Months That 

These Posts Were Late

Overseas posta Number of months 

lateb Completed update as of

March 10, 2017

Vienna 10 Yes

Manama 10 Yes

Pristina 10 Yes

Yerevan 8 Yes

Seoul 8 No

Sarajevo 7 Yes

Frankfurt 7 Yes

Quebec 6 Yes

Matamoros 5 Yes

Recife 4 Yes

Port-au-Prince 4 Yes

Ulaanbaatar 4 Yes

Wellington 4 Yes

Skopje 3 Yes

Shanghai 2 Yes

Surabaya 2 Yes

Bamako 1 Yes

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State (State) data. | GAO-17-714

Note: GAO’s analysis is based on its review of data from State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) 

containing the dates when overseas posts completed their required annual updates of their EAP for 

fiscal year 2016.

a

The total number of overseas posts required to complete annual updates of EAPs varies from fiscal 

year to fiscal year and is determined by DS. For example, if a post submitted its annual EAP update 

for fiscal year 2014 12 months late, in fiscal year 2015, DS can determine that the post is no longer 

required to submit a separate annual EAP update for fiscal year 2015. In this case, DS can determine 

that the post’s next annual EAP update would be due in fiscal year 2016.

b

All data are as of March 10, 2017. We identified EAPs that were submitted a number of months after 

their due date as well as EAPs that had not yet been submitted as of March 10, 2017. We identified 

one EAP that was not submitted by March 10, 2017. For this EAP, we calculated months late as the 

difference between the due date and the date we last received updated data from DS.

Appendix II: U.S. Overseas Posts Late in 

Completing Required Annual Update of Their 

Emergency Action Plan for Fiscal Year 2016
Appendix III: Main Sections, Annexes, and 

Appendixes of the Emergency Action Plan 

(EAP) and 27 Key EAP Sections

Page 34 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

The Foreign Affairs Handbook directs the Department of State’s (State) 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to review the Emergency Action Plans 

(EAP) annually submitted by overseas posts to ensure that it contains the 

necessary information. Each EAP for an overseas post includes the main 

sections, annexes, and appendixes listed below. To conduct the annual 

reviews, DS Emergency Plans Review Officers in Washington, D.C., use 

a list of 27 key EAP sections that the program office has determined 

should be updated each year. The 27 key EAP sections reviewed by DS 

are also listed below, indicated with a  (key) symbol. Several of the key 

EAP sections contain related checklists or forms.

Table 6: Main Sections, Annexes, and Appendixes of the Emergency Action Plan 

(EAP) and 27 Key EAP Sections Reviewed by the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS)

Main EAP section, annex, or appendix

H-000 Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH)

H-100 Legal

H-200 Organization

 H-282 – Cut-off plan

H-300 Consular services

H-400 Public affairs

H-500 Medical

H-525 – Medical supplies

H-600 Mission security

H-700 Crisis preparedness

Annex A Bomb

Annex A-2.4 – Evacuation

Annex A-3.2 – Imminent danger 

Annex B Fire

Annex B-2.1 – Discovery of fire 

Annex C Civil disorder

Annex C-4.1 – Procedures for planned or on-going event (violent 

event targeting U.S. citizens) 

Annex D Internal defense

Annex D-2.2 – Defense of outermost perimeter

Annex D-2.3 – Breach of perimeters 

Annex E Destruction of sensitive material

Annex E-3.2 – Flash destruction procedures

Annex E-4.2 – Facility planning details for destruction 

Appendix III: Main Sections, Annexes, and 

Appendixes of the Emergency Action Plan 

(EAP) and 27 Key EAP Sections
Appendix III: Main Sections, Annexes, and 

Appendixes of the Emergency Action Plan 

(EAP) and 27 Key EAP Sections

Page 35 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Main EAP section, annex, or appendix

Annex F Weapons of mass destruction and other hazardous materials

Annex F-4.3 – Chemical, biological, and radiological 

countermeasures equipment 

Annex G Hostage taking and personnel recovery

Annex H Hijacking

Annex I Assist to U.S. citizens in major accident/disaster

Annex J Assist to host country in major accident/disaster

Annex K Drawdowns and evacuations

Annex K-5.1 – Preparation (charter-assisted evacuation)

Annex K-5.2 – Assembly and processing

Annex K 5.3 – Departure

Annex K-6.1 – Preparation (implementation of military evacuation)

Annex K-6.2 – Assembling and processing

Annex K-6.3 – Departure 

Annex L Receipt of evacuees

Appendix 1 Master contact list

Appendix 2 Mission organization for emergencies

Appendix 3 Command and control locations

Appendix 3.2-1 – Command centers

Appendix 3.2-2 – Safe havens

Appendix 3.2-3 – Off-site safe areas 

Appendix 4 Assembly and movement surveys

Appendix 4.2-1 – Assembly area data

Appendix 4.2-2 – Helicopter landing zone data

Appendix 4.2-3 – Airport data

Appendix 4.2-4 – Seaport data 

Appendix 5 Medical services surveys

Appendix 6 Logistics and transport

Appendix 6.2-1 – Supplies

Appendix 6.2-4 – Sources of additional vehicles

Appendix 7.2-2 – Emergency communications 

Appendix 7 Communications

Appendix 8 Unified command

Appendix 9 Facility information

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State (State) data. | GAO-17-714

Note: The Foreign Affairs Handbook directs DS to review EAPs annually submitted by overseas posts 

to ensure they contain necessary information. Each EAP for an overseas post includes the main 

sections, annexes, and appendixes listed above. To conduct the annual reviews, DS Emergency 

Plans Review Officers in Washington, D.C., use a list of 27 key EAP sections that the program office 

has determined should be updated each year. The 27 key EAP sections reviewed by DS are also 
Appendix III: Main Sections, Annexes, and 

Appendixes of the Emergency Action Plan 

(EAP) and 27 Key EAP Sections

Page 36 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

listed above, indicated with a  (key) symbol. Several of the key EAP sections contain related 

checklists or forms
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

Page 37 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

Page 38 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

Page 39 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

Page 40 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

Page 41 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State

Page 42 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 43 GAO-17-714 Embassy Evacuations

Michael J. Courts, (202) 512-8980 or mcourtsm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Costa (Assistant 

Director), Ian Ferguson (Analyst-in-Charge), Mason Thorpe Calhoun, 

David Dayton, Neil Doherty, Ming Chen, Martin de Alteriis, and Mark 

Dowling made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102035)
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