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IMPLEMENTATION OF IRAN SANCTIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 29, 2010

Serial No. 111–110

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 29, 2010 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Einhorn, Robert J., Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, U.S. Department of State; Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department

of the Treasury; Joseph A. Neurauter, Deputy Associate Administrator,

Office of Acquisition Policy, U.S. General Services Administration; and

Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S.

Government Accountability Office ............................................................... 15

Christoff, Joseph A. ................................................................................... 42

Einhorn, Robert J. ..................................................................................... 15

Glaser, Daniel ............................................................................................ 26

Neurauter, Joseph A. ................................................................................ 38

Jorisch, Avi, president, Red Cell Intelligence Group; and Mark Dubowitz,

executive director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ...................... 97

Dubowitz, Mark ......................................................................................... 106

Jorisch, Avi ................................................................................................ 97

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Christoff, Joseph A., Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of .............................. 44

Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Virginia, prepared statement of .............................................................. 134

Dubowitz, Mark, executive director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 108

Einhorn, Robert J., Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of ............................. 18

Glaser, Daniel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and

Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 28

Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the State of

California, prepared statement of ................................................................ 9

Jorisch, Avi, president, Red Cell Intelligence Group, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 101

Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, article dated March 6, 2010 .................................................. 63

Neurauter, Joseph A., Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, U.S. General Services Administration, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 40

Quigley, Hon. Mike, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Illinois, prepared statement of ..................................................................... 136

Towns, Chairman Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 3

(1)

IMPLEMENTATION OF IRAN SANCTIONS

THURSDAY, JULY 29, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edolphus Towns (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Towns, Maloney, Cummings, Kucinich,

Tierney, Clay, Connolly, Quigley, Kaptur, Davis, Van Hollen,

Cuellar, Foster, Speier, Driehaus, Chu, Issa, Burton, Duncan, Jordan, Flake, Fortenberry, Chaffetz, Luetkemeyer, and Cao.

Staff present: John Arlington, chief counsel—investigations;

Kwane Drabo, investigator; Brian Eiler, investigative counsel;

Linda Good, deputy chief clerk; Adam Hodge, deputy press secretary; Carla Hultberg, chief clerk; Mike McCarthy, deputy staff director; Steven Rangel, senior counsel; Ophelia Rivas, assistant

clerk; Ron Stroman, staff director; Gerri Willis, special assistant;

Alex Wolf, professional staff member; John Cuaderes, minority deputy staff director; Rob Borden, minority general counsel; Jennifer

Safavian, minority chief counsel for oversight and investigations;

Frederick Hill, minority director of communications; Kurt Bardella,

minority press secretary; Benjamin Cole and Seamus Kraft, minority deputy press secretaries; Justin LoFranco, minority press assistant and clerk; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member; Mark

Marin and Brien Beattie, minority professional staff members; and

Sharon Casey, minority executive assistant.

Chairman TOWNS. The committee will come to order.

Good morning and thank you all for being here.

The United States has banned nearly all trade with Iran. We

have done so for good reason: the extremists who currently rule

Iran are a major threat to the safety and security of their own people and to the rest of the world.

It is vitally important to the national security of the United

States and its allies to persuade the Iranian regime to end its

quest for nuclear weapons and to end its support for terrorism.

Since 1995, our nation has attempted to do that, by banning U.S.

companies from doing any business in Iran. In 1996, the Iran Sanctions Act provided for sanctions against foreign firms that invest in

Iran’s energy sector.

It was revealed earlier this year that the Federal Government

has awarded more than $100 billion in contract payments, grants,

and other benefits over the past 10 years to foreign and multiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63147.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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national American companies while they were doing business in

Iran.

So, not only are some companies doing business in Iran, but they

are also getting Government contracts at the same time. Obviously,

Federal agencies all need to get onto the same page.

Earlier this month, Congress acted to strengthen economic sanctions against Iran. Recognizing that banking is the life blood of

international trade, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act imposes tough new restrictions on

banks and insurance companies. It also requires Federal contractors to certify that they are not doing business with Iran.

However, for U.S. sanctions to be successful, they must be fully

implemented and enforced, and I am looking forward to hearing

from our witnesses about how they intend to do that.

I particularly want to thank the State Department and the

Treasury Department for agreeing to testify at today’s hearing.

I understand that both agencies are in the process of investigating companies that may be doing business with Iran. We certainly

don’t want to compromise ongoing investigations, and in that regard I am going to ask the Members to be judicious in their questions.

Sanctions cannot just be a cat and mouse game where the Government tries to chase after companies who are evading sanctions

and undermining global security in the name of profit. Companies,

especially those doing business with the Government, need to take

responsibility and avoid supporting the Iranian regime.

With each passing week, as Iran moves closer to developing nuclear weapons, the stakes are raised higher and higher and higher.

Today, I look forward to hearing how we can ensure that economic

sanctions are effectively implemented.

I now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, the gentleman

from California, Congressman Issa.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Edolphus Towns follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Chairman Towns, and thank you so much

for holding yet another hearing on this important subject.

When we began, as a body, trying to figure out what to do with

the religious-based extreme takeover, it was 1979. I was an Army

lieutenant. The world was a very different place 31 years ago.

So although, for the most part, today we will be talking about

sanctions, whether the President’s outreached hand has been good

or bad toward dissuading Iran on its nuclear ambitions, it is very

clear to all of us who today have graying hair and 31 years ago

were comparatively young, comparatively fit, and ready to bomb

the hell out of Iran in order to get them to release our embassy

people that they had taken in violation of international law, protocol, and any sense of common decency.

Mr. Chairman, nothing has changed in 31 years. Or has it? Thirty-one years ago, as the Ayatollah took over and ‘‘a sleight of hand’’

caused radical students to take our embassy, not the government,

we all looked and said how do we resolve this. Well-meaning people, bipartisan and bicameral parts of Congress looked to try to

find a way to work out a diplomatic solution. Day after day after

day, throughout all the waning days of the Carter administration,

people of good faith and good will tried to do the right thing without violence, and to no avail.

Mr. Chairman, only the coming of a President willing to do anything necessary to end the humiliation for the American people and

this violation of world protocol brought an end to it.

I look forward today to hearing how actual sanctions with greater teeth, passed on a bipartisan basis in this Congress, are working. I look forward to a day in which not only will we be talking

about Iran giving up its ambitions for nuclear weapons; a day in

which Iran will realize that those sanctions will not just be lifted

if they ‘‘stop trying to develop a nuke,’’ but they also abandon their

expansionist views of a Shia-greater state that goes from the Mediterranean to who knows where.

Mr. Chairman, this is about an organization that began on a lie,

has continued a lie, and has transitioned over these many decades.

At one time people thought it was a theocracy. I think people who

have looked at Iran in more detail realize that, over time, all parts

of government have become, to a greater extent, controlled by the

Revolutionary Guard by people who come up through a very limited, very exclusive military background. That is how you move

ahead in Iran.

But, at the same time, there is a religious vein. It is a vein of

radical Islam, one that is willing to see people killed or kidnapped

in Lebanon as early as the 1980’s, one that continues to fund death

and a lack of peace in the Middle East, particularly in the Lavant.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to all of the good that can be done

by this sanction. I look forward to hearing that it is working at

last. But until or unless we can truly say we look forward to a day

in which Iran becomes a part of the nations that obey all of the

rules, including not exporting terrorism, not funding overthrow of

peaceful governments, we will not have an Iran we can truly work

with.

I am not an extremist. I am not a person who wants to use weapons. But if the only weapon we have doesn’t work, America will

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eventually have no choice but to use alternate means in order to

prevent nuclear holocaust.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearing and yield

back.

[The prepared statement of Darrell E. Issa follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

Let me just indicate that we are going to have two opening statements on each side, 3 minutes, so you will select in terms of the

two on your side.

I now yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York, Congresswoman Maloney.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Chairman Towns, for your leadership

on this issue and for having this very important and timely hearing.

Iran is on a fast path toward achieving nuclear weapons capability. In Iran, a nuclear weapon would likely spell the end of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. If Iran acquires such a capability,

nuclear weapons could spread throughout the region.

As Iran’s nuclear capabilities have increased in the last few

years, more than a dozen Arab states have discovered a newfound

interest in peaceful nuclear energy. And if nuclear capabilities proliferate in the Middle East, they will spread across the world. The

chances for nuclear technology to fall into the hands of terrorists

will rise and we will all live in a much more dangerous world.

It is not just the United States that thinks so; five United Nations Security Council resolutions have mandated that Iran stop all

its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities. And yet Iran

has yet to heed the calls of the international community. Its brutal

repression of the Iranian people continues unabated. Millions of

Iranians rose up against a stolen election last summer, electrifying

the entire world; it was inspiring. And according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has already stockpiled

enough low-enriched uranium that, if further enriched, it would be

enough for the cores of two nuclear weapons.

So this is very, very troubling and it underscores the importance

of the hearing. Despite the efforts of President Obama to reach out

to the Iranian government and to engage it diplomatically over the

course of the last 18 months, the regimes in Tehran continue to

spurn our efforts and that of our allies. That is why the United Nations Security Council adopted more stringent sanctions on Iran

this past June; it is why the European Union announced this week

the strongest set of sanctions on Iran it has ever proposed; it is

why President Obama announced stepped up U.S. sanctions; and

it is most assuredly why Congress overwhelmingly, last month,

passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act.

I strongly believe that, if fully implemented, this legislation, in

combination with the new multilateral efforts, presents perhaps

the best last hope of changing Iran’s nuclear ambitions through

diplomatic, economic, and political activity.

I would like to remind the committee that this is the fourth law

that has been enacted over the past 14 years that imposes sanctions against Iran. We must ensure that it is the one that finally

will make the difference and once and for all squash this enrichment activity.

I see that my time is up, but I have a great deal more to say.

I ask unanimous consent to place my entire statement into the

record.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection, so ordered.

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I now yield to the gentleman from Indiana, Congressman Burton

for 3 minutes.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was one of the conferees on the Iran sanctions bill and I am not optimistic that it is

going to work. But I would like to refer to some things that my

predecessor, the young lady, just mentioned.

There have been three moves to try to control or get Iran to stop

its nuclear program. In 1995, on March 15th, President Clinton

signed an Executive order. A subsequent order was on May 8,

1995, and that banned virtually all trade with Iran. And Warren

Christopher warned the International community that the path

Iran was on was following the mirror image of states taken by

other nations that sought nuclear weapons capabilities. Then in

1996 Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, and that

was to encourage foreign persons to withdraw from the Iranian

market, and it also was supposed to impose sanctions on any foreign entity that invested $20 million or more in Iran’s energy sector.

Now, the reason I bring that up is because we passed what I

thought was a very, very strong bill, and, in conjunction with the

EU and others, I thought it was going to have a pretty strong impact on Iran. But it gave the president waiver authority. And that

bothers me a great deal because this $20 million penalty that was

supposed to be imposed in 1996 has never been imposed on anybody. So whether it is a Republican president or Democrat president, whatever it is, these penalties have not been imposed, and we

have given waiver authority to the President once again.

So the one thing I would like to say today, Mr. Chairman and

Mr. Ranking Member, is that we ought to do everything we can to

make absolutely sure that the sanctions are followed through and

there is no waiver. The reports that are required from the President should be complete and they should make sure that no waivers have been granted. If we don’t do that, in my opinion, I think

we are on the precipice of a war which could threaten the economy

of the United States; not just the Middle East, but the economy of

the United States, because we get about 30 to 40 percent of our energy from that part of the world, and we certainly are not even

close to energy independence.

With that, I will yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman TOWNS. I thank the gentleman from Indiana for his

statement and now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio,

Congressman Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As some of you know, I voted against H.R. 2194, the sanctions

bill. I opposed it because I think that these sanctions will inflict

economic hardship on the Iranian people and have no impact on

the Iranian government. As a matter of fact, it will probably

strengthen the Iranian government, which relies on confrontation.

And instead of working to build a pro-democracy movement by taking care not to have sanctions that are inevitably going to hurt the

people of Iran, we are doing exactly the opposite.

And if there is anyone in this room who thinks that the United

States can afford still another war with troops in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, if there is anyone who thinks we can afford anVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63147.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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other war, then maybe you don’t need to be in this discussion. But

what we ought to be looking for is a more effective means of engaging Iran and continue to work behind the scenes to try to work behind the scenes to try to bring Iran to the table.

This is not an easy issue, granted, but the easy reach that some

inside the Government, and I am not speaking about this committee, some inside the Government have to seek to escalate is very

dangerous, quite dangerous; and I think that we should be thinking more about how you promote democracy without creating sanctions which are going to undermine the very people we say we care

about.

I opposed nuclear proliferation for military purposes for all countries. At the same time, I think it is pretty clear that sanctions

have proven to be a failed policy. I have argued that the sanctions

included in the legislation play into the hands of leaders in Iran,

undermine the efforts of Iranian people who have courageously

challenged their government, often at the cost of their lives.

So I am hopeful that, as we get into this discussion today and

down the road, we will look at the situation as it is; at what happens when you try to use sanctions as an excuse for diplomacy and

what happens when we get off the diplomatic track and start to

move toward escalation. We cannot have military escalation. Matter of fact, I want to ask unanimous consent to submit for the

record a recent comment by Admiral Mike Mullen, who advised

against an attack on Iran.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. On that note, I now recognize the gentleman

from Missouri, Mr. Luetkemeyer.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. For 3 minutes.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you.

I think that today we need to acknowledge the fact that we have

a very fragile political situation in the Middle East and that Iran

is a major portion of that problem. I think the ranking member alluded to the situation that has been brewing now for many, many

years. This is not a new situation, but now it has continued to grow

and fester to the point where we need to acknowledge what is

going on and need to take some action.

The first thing that needs to happen is that we, as a country, and

the President himself, needs to acknowledge that terrorism exists.

These people are there wanting to do us harm. Many Americans,

Mr. Chairman, believe that the President doesn’t understand the

threat and is ill-prepared to meet it. According to surveys, 57 percent of Democrats, 59 percent of Independents, 80 percent of Republicans think the President has not been tough enough on Iran.

Meanwhile, the President’s reticence to support popular opposition to the Ahmadinejad regime has extracted an incalculable cost

to our strategic efforts and the Nation’s moral standing. Indeed,

President Obama’s general approach to Iran seems to be based on

the absurd belief that the Iranian nuclear program has been encouraged by American belligerence and American diplomatic

intransigency. In response, President Obama has offered a course

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of conciliation and supplication. This response is beyond naive; it

is very dangerous.

I think it is also important to note that, going forward, the fact

that we are here today discussing sanctions would seem to indicate

that the tacit acknowledge that the past program and protocol of

holding hands and the approach of trying to be friends with these

people at the expense of our friend, Israel, an ally there in the Middle East, has not worked.

I look forward to the discussion and I yield back the balance of

my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for his

statement and I now ask unanimous consent to leave the record

open for 7 days so Members may submit their opening remarks and

questions for the record.

We have two panels today. The first panel, we will turn to them

now.

Mr. Robert J. Einhorn, who is Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control with the U.S. Department of State.

Our next witness is Mr. Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes at the U.S. Department of Treasury.

The next witness is Mr. Joseph A. Neurauter, Deputy Associate

Administrator with the Office of Acquisition Policy at the U.S. General Services Administration.

Our final witness in this panel is Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, who

is the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

It is committee policy that all witnesses are sworn in, so if you

would stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOWNS. Let the record reflect that the witnesses all

answered in the affirmative.

You may be seated.

I will begin with you, Mr. Einhorn. Of course, as you know, the

lights start off on green, then go down to 1 minute and it turns to

yellow, and then, after that, it turns to red. Now, red means stop,

so we would appreciate it if you would recognize that, which will

allow the Members to have an opportunity to raise questions with

you. You may begin, and you have 5 minutes.

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STATEMENTS OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR

NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; DANIEL GLASER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCIAL

CRIMES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; JOSEPH A.

NEURAUTER, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE

OF ACQUISITION POLICY, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; AND JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN

Mr. EINHORN. Thank you very much, Chairman Towns. Mr. Issa,

members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

A nuclear-armed Iran would severely threaten the security and

stability of a part of the world crucial to our interests and to the

health of the global economy.

In the face of this challenge, American policy is straightforward.

We have pursued our broad policy goals through both engagement

and pressure. We have sought to sharpen the choice now before the

Iranian leadership.

Last year we embarked on an unprecedented effort to engage

with Iran. Engagement is both a test of Iran’s intentions and an

investment in a partnership with a growing coalition of countries

deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. We have sought

and continue to seek opportunities for Iran to demonstrate convincingly that its nuclear program is intended entirely for peaceful purposes. These opportunities have not been embraced by Iran.

Iran’s intransigence left the international community no choice

but to employ a second tool of diplomacy, namely, pressure. The

adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 was an essential

first step in that effort, building upon and strengthening previous

sanctions resolutions.

It bans transfers of major conventional weapon systems to Iran;

it bans all Iranian activities related to ballistic missiles that could

deliver a nuclear weapon; it establishes a framework for cargo inspections to detect and stop Iran’s smuggling and acquisition of illicit items; it prohibits Iran from investing abroad in sensitive nuclear activities, such as uranium mining; it creates important new

tools to help block Iran’s use of the international financial system

to fund and facilitate its nuclear and other destabilizing weapons

programs; it targets directly the role of the Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps in Iran’s proliferation efforts, adding 15 IRGC entities

to the list of designees for asset freeze; and, for the first time, the

Security Council highlighted formally in the Security Council Resolution the potential links between Iran’s energy sector and its nuclear ambitions.

Our goal now is to ensure the most aggressive implementation

of these sanctions as possible. We are not alone. The European

Union has acted strongly to followup by endorsing a series of significant steps, as have Australia and Canada. We have called on

states around the world to take additional measures, and will continue to engage with these partners.

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Our efforts to implement and endorse the multilateral sanctions

are supplemented by a number of important national tools, in particular, the Iran Sanctions Act and the recently passed Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. As was

the case with the original Iran Sanctions Act, the obligations of the

new legislation are already a regular part of our dialog with foreign

governments and the private sector. Our efforts have yielded significant results. At least $50 billion to $60 billion in oil and gas development deals have either been put

on hold or have been discontinued in the last few years, due in part

to our conversations with companies about the threat of ISI sanctions. Our pressure has contributed to the decisions by major international oil companies such as Total, Statoil, ENI, Lukoil, and

Repsol not to undertake any new activities in Iran. In addition,

major fuel suppliers, such as Vitol, Shell, Reliance, IPG, Glencore,

and Trafigura have announced that they will no longer sell refined

petroleum products to Iran. The net result is that Iran now faces

profound challenges in securing the foreign investment in its energy sector that it desperately needs.

The administration has also undertaken to review past activity

that could trigger sanctions under the ISA to ensure that we are

appropriately implementing the act. We have already seen that

pressure, in combination with other goals, can have an impact on

Iran. Through rigorous trade restrictions and active work to interdict WMD trade, illicit WMD trade, we have denied Iran access to

items that it needs for its nuclear program.

As Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Glaser can describe in

greater detail, Iran is having greater difficulty in obtaining access

to financial services that are the lifeblood of international commerce and Iran’s proliferation programs. The international private

sector has grown wary of conducting business with any Iranian

banks. International financial institutions have voluntarily gone

beyond their legal requirements to curtail their interactions with

Iran.

The same can be said of Iran’s government-owned shipping industry, which lacks both credibility as a legitimate entity and has

difficulty obtaining foreign insurance for most of its fleet. Impeding

Iran’s shipping lines access to foreign ports hinders Iran’s ability

to exploit those ports for proliferation purposes.

Chairman TOWNS. Mr. Einhorn, could you summarize? Your time

is up. Could you summarize?

Mr. EINHORN. Sure.

The designation of IRGC’s construction arm, Khatam al-Anbiya,

has had a similar effect: the company is pulling out of operations

in South Pars, Iran’s major natural gas field, and KAA referenced

recent sanctions in its announcement on why it was doing so.

So, in conclusion, our aim has been to use these tools of pressure

to sharpen the choice that the Iranian government faces and to

press it to negotiate seriously with the international community

and the P5+1 countries on its nuclear program. Pressure is meant

to complement, not replace, the diplomatic solution to which we

and our partners are still committed. We continue to acknowledge

Iran’s right to pursue civilian nuclear power, but with that right

comes a profound responsibility to meet its international obligaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63147.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tions. Our foremost objective is a durable diplomatic solution to the

world’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. There is growing

international pressure on Iran to live up to its obligations and

growing international isolation for Iran if it does not.

Security Council Resolution 1929——

Chairman TOWNS. Mr. Einhorn, Mr. Einhorn——

Mr. EINHORN. I am just finishing, Mr. Chairman.

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act, and the amplifying efforts that I have discussed help significantly sharpen that choice for Iran. We are pleased that Congress has given the administration the tools to increase pressure

even further. We will continue to work very hard to implement

them and continue to urge our partners to follow suit with their

own tough national sanctions to complement Resolution 1929.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you.

Mr. Glaser.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL GLASER

Mr. GLASER. Thank you, Chairman Towns, Ranking Member

Issa, distinguished members of the committee. It is a pleasure to

appear before you today.

Over the last several weeks, the international community and

the United States have significantly enhanced our ability to apply

financial pressure on Iran and obstruct its ability to further develop its nuclear capabilities. In particular, new sanctions adopted

by the United Nations, United States, and allies such as the European Union, Canada, and Australia, highlight Iran’s increasing isolation. These multilateral and national measures give us new and

powerful tools that enable us, acting in concert with the private

sector, to increase the financial pressure on Iran and further protect the international financial system from Iranian abuse.

Our objective over the next few months will be to broaden and

deepen the existing sanctions framework. We will, of course, begin

by implementing the provisions of the newly enacted Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, and by

continuing to take actions under existing sanctions authorities.

These domestic actions will be accompanied by a strong diplomatic

effort to ensure that the financial isolation of Iran is not limited

to the countries that have already acted, but in fact extends

throughout the world.

A series of U.N. Security Council resolutions form the corps of

the international community’s Iran sanctions framework. This

framework was substantially strengthened last month with the

adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929. UNSCR 1929

contains important new financial provisions that should meaningfully impact Iran’s ability to access the international financial system.

This progress at the U.N. has been enhanced by a number of significant national measures taken by the United States and our allies. In the United States, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act provides the Treasury Department with a powerful new set of tools with which to put additional

financial pressure on Iran, particularly relating to corresponding

banking. In addition, the Treasury Department continues to use

preexisting sanctions authorities to designate individuals and entities involved in facilitating both Iran’s WMD programs and its support for terrorism. On June 16th, Secretary Geithner announced

numerous Iran designations under our counter-proliferation authority, including Post Bank and several entities related to the

IRGC.

Many of our partners have also taken recent action. Just this

week, the EU adopted a Common Position on Iran sanctions. The

Common Position substantially augments the EU’s current sanctions program and not only implements but goes well beyond Europe’s obligations under UNSCR 1929. It imposes a range of restrictions with regard to business with Iran in the trade, energy,

and transportation industries.

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With regard to financial services, the Common Position designates seven Iranian banks, designates the IRGC and others,

freezing their assets and prohibiting them from engaging in nearly

all transactions. The EU also imposed a set of systemic measures

aimed at restricting Iran’s ability to abuse the European financial

system.

Australia and Canada have also taken substantial steps beyond

what is required by UNSCR 1929. Like the United States and the

EU, Australia has recently designated Bank Mellat and the head

of the IRGC’s construction arm. Indeed, just this morning, just

within the last few hours, Australia announced that it is designating over 100 individuals and entities connected to Iran’s nuclear

program and revealed new restrictions on Australian businesses

dealing with Iran’s oil and gas sector.

Canada has also adopted systemic measures that go well beyond

UNSCR 1929. In that respect, all of these countries represent a

model for the rest of the world to emulate.

As I mentioned earlier, our objective is to broaden and deepen

the international sanctions framework. At the same time, we will

continue to engage with the private sector, describing the potential

effects of the new Iran sanctions legislation on their business and

encouraging them to curtail their business with Iran.

As Mr. Einhorn just said, we have already seen how this is producing results. The IRGC’s construction arm, Khatam al-Anbiya,

recently pulled out of developing the South Pars gas field. The recent imposition of sanctions on the IRGC and on Khatam al-Anbiya

is likely to have played a significant role in this decision, as international corporations are increasingly unwilling to do business

with those entities.

We will continue to put in the hard work required to ensure

broad, global implementation of sanctions. Actions by the United

States, EU, Canada, and Australia should be reinforced by the actions of countries in Asia, the Middle East, and South America. Mr.

Einhorn and I, as well as many of our other colleagues, will be

traveling to those regions in the weeks to come to encourage them

to do just that.

Recent actions have demonstrated that the international community is increasingly united in its efforts to apply financial pressure

on Iran. This effort will make Iran’s choice increasingly clear: to

choose the path of engagement offered by President Obama and the

international community or to further deepen its isolation.

Thank you, Chairman. I welcome any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glaser follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Glaser, for your

statement.

Mr. Neurauter.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. NEURAUTER

Mr. NEURAUTER. Good morning, Chairman Towns and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for providing me

the opportunity to testify on the implementation of Iran’s sanctions.

Section 102 of the act we have been discussing this morning requires that no later than 90 days after the enactment of the act,

the Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], shall be revised to require a certification from each person that is a prospective contractor stating that the person, and any person owned or controlled by

that person, does not engage in any activity for which sanctions

may be imposed under the act.

The FAR is overseen by the Federal Acquisition Regulatory

Council, which consists of the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, along with three signatories from DOD, GSA, and

NASA, respectively.

To work on a rule, we open a FAR case, and this case, No. 2010–

012, opened on July 14, 2010, and assigned to the FAR Acquisition

Law Team, whose responsibilities include foreign acquisitions and

sanctions activities. The FAR case was opened as an Interim Rule

due to the time line requirements of the act. Interim Rules become

effective upon publication in the Federal Register. We project that

the publication of this rule will occur on or before September 29,

2010, a date that falls within the timeframe provided by the act.

The Law Team held its first meeting on July 20, 2010, to begin

drafting the FAR text to implement Section 102 of the act. The

Team is drafting solicitation provisions, contract clauses, and a preamble that will be published with the rule to help the public and

the affected stakeholders understand the new rule. The Team is

consulting with Department of State’s Terrorism, Finance, and Economic Policy Office, and Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control

as part of this effort. This is what we have accomplished so far,

and we certainly have a sense of urgency in this matter.

Let me now briefly describe where we go from here. Going forward, once the Law Team finishes developing the new or revised

FAR text and the Federal Register notice, the Team’s proposal will

be discussed by two councils, the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council. These bodies

are staffed with acquisition policy officials who square their agency’s views and offer refinements, as necessary, to address any concerns and achieve consensus on FAR changes and supporting materials.

After GSA’s Office of General Counsel goes over the agreed-upon

Rule for legal sufficiency, the case will be forwarded to the Office

of Management and Budget for final review. Subsequent to that,

the Regulatory Secretary and GSA will then prepare the rule for

formal publication, obtain signatures from GSA, DOD, and NASA,

and transmit the Rule to the Federal Register.

I want to personally assure you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished

members of the committee, that we take this matter very seriously

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and are fully confident that everyone working together in the FAR

rulemaking process, we will complete this FAR case on time. We

know how vital it is to expedite the process and get this done.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify here today,

and I look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Neurauter follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much for your statement.

Mr. Christoff.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,

thanks for inviting GAO to this important hearing. I am here today

to discuss our work on the implementation of U.S. sanctions

against Iran. The United States has banned most trade and investment with Iran, prohibited firms from shipping U.S. goods through

other nations, and constrained investments in Iran’s energy sector.

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 expands existing sanctions and requires the administration to report on its implementation efforts.

My testimony will discuss three key challenges the United States

faces in: first, deterring the illegal transshipment of U.S. goods to

Iran; second, restricting foreign investments in Iran’s energy sector; and, third, assessing the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. I also

will discuss how the new act addresses these challenges.

First, we found that Iran has circumvented the U.S. trade ban

by transshipping U.S. military and dual-use items through other

countries. Between 2007 and 2008, the United States prosecuted 30

firms and individuals for illegally transshipping U.S. aircraft components, night vision goggles, and other sensitive technologies to

Iran. In particular, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and

Singapore have served as key transshipment routes for U.S. goods.

The new act authorizes the President to designate a country as

a destination of diversion concern if the country continues to allow

illegal transshipments of U.S. goods. The United States would either provide technical assistance to strengthen the country’s export

controls or restrict U.S. exports to the country.

Second, we found that the United States faces challenges in restricting foreign investments in Iran’s energy sector. Iran seeks

such investments to increase production from its vast oil reserves,

the third largest in the world. According to the IMF, Iran’s oil production has remained virtually flat in recent years, and will likely

stagnate without more investment. In addition, Iran must import

about 130,000 barrels of gasoline each day to meet domestic demand.

In March we identified 41 foreign firms that had commercial activities in Iran’s energy sector between 2005 and 2009. Seven had

contracts with the U.S. Government valued at almost $880 million.

Under existing law, foreign firms that invest more than $20 million

in Iran’s energy sector in any 12-month period are subject to U.S.

sanctions. However, the only time the United States tried to impose sanctions was in 1998, when it determined that the investments of three foreign energy firms were sanctionable. At that

time, the Secretary of State waived the sanctions, citing U.S. national interests.

The new act requires additional action on the part of the President. The President is now required to investigate any report of

sanctionable activity where there is credible evidence, and determine in writing to the Congress whether the activity had in fact

occurred. The President would then be expected either to impose or

waive sanctions.

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Finally, we found that U.S. agencies had not collected data on

the results of the sanctions they enforced and had not established

baseline information for monitoring and reporting. In addition, we

found no comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of U.S.

sanctions. A comprehensive assessment becomes more critical as

the new act expands sanctions and imposes new reporting requirements. For example, the United States can now sanction foreign

firms that sell refined petroleum products or sensitive communications technologies to Iran. And the administration must now report

on foreign firms’ investments in Iran’s energy sector, the activities

of foreign export credit agencies, and destinations of diversion concern. A comprehensive assessment would provide important information on whether or not the sanctions helped the United States

achieve its security and foreign policy goals.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Issa, that concludes my statement and I look

forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

Let me thank all of you for your statement. Now we have the

question and answer period.

Let me begin with you, Mr. Glaser. The Treasury Department

has had some success in getting certain financial institutions to

stop doing business with Iran. The new U.S. sanctions target certain banks. Why shouldn’t the U.S. Government target all foreign

banks that do business with Iran?

Mr. GLASER. Why shouldn’t we target? Well, I think that is the

goal. I think the goal that we have at the Treasury Department,

what we have been trying to achieve over the past few years is to

create a dynamic in the international financial system that encourages banks throughout the world, no matter where they are, no

matter what their size is, to make the decision not to do business

with Iran.

With respect to the actual legal authorities we have, I think Congress made the right decision in the types of activities that it chose

to target. I think it is important that we keep our sanctions activities based conduct focused to demonstrate, to get to Mr. Kucinich’s

point, that the goal here is not to harm the people of Iran.

So by focusing on U.N.-designated entities, by entities that have

been designated by the Treasury Department for being involved in

terrorism and for being involved in proliferation, which, frankly, is

virtually all of the Iranian banks, we get the effect that I think we

are looking for, which is increased financial pressure on Iran, increased difficulty for Iran to engage in regular international transactions, increased ability to obstruct Iran’s proliferation-related

transactions, while at the same time ensuring that, when we go

and talk to other countries about this and try to enlist their support, we can emphasize that this is a conduct-based effort, this is

an activity-based effort; what we are targeting is the illicit conduct

that Iran is engaged in.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much. There is nothing that

we need to do legislatively in order to make it possible for you to

have more success?

Mr. GLASER. Mr. Chairman, I think you have just done legislatively something very important to allow us to have more success.

As you have indicated, and as I indicated in my testimony, I think

we have had tremendous progress over the last 3 or 4 years in creating a shift in attitude among international financial institutions

away from Iran.

We have been largely successful in that, but we have not been

completely successful in that. There do still remain financial institutions that we are concerned about that are engaged in business

with Iranian institutions that are engaged in deceptive financial

practices, that are designated by the United Nations, that are designated by the United States, that are designated by the European

Union and Canada and Australia, and it is important that we be

able to get at those institutions; and that is precisely what the new

legislation allows us to do.

You have given us 90 days to issue regulations under that bill.

We have every intention of issuing those regulations in the time allotted to us and we have every intention of robustly and responsibly implementing that legislation. I think we have a pretty good

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track record of using the authorities that have been given to us by

Congress to target banks that we think pose a threat to the international financial system, a threat to U.S. security, and a threat

to the U.S. financial system, and we will certainly continue to do

so.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Christoff, let me direct this question to you. Your report

identified 41 foreign firms with commercial activity in Iran’s energy

sector. You have named names. What reactions have you gotten

from those firms? And let me also ask what reactions have you gotten from the State Department and Treasury, as well?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, let’s start with the reaction from the firms.

There were many firms that did not comment on our report, and

we gave them a full opportunity to comment. Generally, those firms

were from China, India, Russia, and Korea. The European companies did comment, and I think Websol of Spain, in particular, met

with GAO twice now over the past 3 months since we issued our

list. They gave us a letter which they had sent to the Iranian government indicating that they were pulling out of the $10 billion

L&G project, where they had a 25 percent stake. They just met

with us again on Monday and said that they had informed their

partner Shell that they were officially pulling out effective July

31st, the day after tomorrow.

Other companies such as Shell told us that they were still considering the extent to which they were going to continue their investments. They also have a 50 percent stake in a $10 billion

project. I would think, though, that with the new EU sanctions,

they would be accelerating their decisions as to whether or not they

are going to continue with those kinds of investments.

State Department’s reactions. We have, in the past, back in 2007,

we also put out a list of companies that had commercial activities

in Iran’s energy sector. We have been told by that bureau within

State Department that is responsible that they are reviewing those

kinds of lists and anticipate that there will be actions taken, but

we are not aware of what those specific actions will be.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

My time has expired. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman

from California, Ranking Member Congressman Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Einhorn, I listened for about 10 minutes to your 5 minute

opening statement. If I believe everything you said, things are

going great; it is all working, you’re having tremendous accomplishment. Would you like to shorten that and characterize it perhaps

a little differently just so that I not misunderstand? Because everything you talked about, I heard it again and again, and I reread

it while the others were speaking. You are telling me it is all working; after more three decades, suddenly it is all working. Is that

what you want us to have us leave believing?

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, what I would ask you to recognize

is that we are working aggressively to implement the law and to

implement and to achieve the objectives of the law, which is to reduce investments in Iran’s petroleum sector.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Einhorn, did you seek this legislation on your

watch?

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Mr. EINHORN. I am sorry?

Mr. ISSA. Did you seek this legislation on your watch? Is this legislation you would have had us pass?

Mr. EINHORN. The administration worked very closely with Members of Congress on this legislation. We believe it is strong legislation; that is why the President signed it on July 1st.

Mr. ISSA. Then, Mr. Einhorn, why all the out clauses? Why is it

the administration wanted something that didn’t tie its hands one

bit, but gave the symbolism of strength because there are many

things that could be done, but ultimately the President still has

tremendous waiver authority under the current law?

Mr. EINHORN. The administration worked with the Congress to

develop a tool that could be effective, and sometimes you need flexibility in the tool to persuade key targets to do what we want them

to do, and we have used that flexibility to good effect.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Einhorn. Thank you.

Mr. Glaser, you were a little less rosy, but you are at the tip of

the spear; you have to actually follow the money, is that right?

Mr. GLASER. Yes, certainly, part of it is following the money.

Part of it is just applying broad systemic pressure.

Mr. ISSA. OK, the UAE is very often mentioned. On one hand we

have their leader outright making statements that are very bold,

and on the other hand we have some of the Emirates openly trading with Iran, isn’t that true?

Mr. GLASER. I don’t know about the trade side, but on the financial side there are certainly financial——

Mr. ISSA. Financial and others.

Mr. GLASER. Absolutely.

Mr. ISSA. There is movement of goods and money. It is a facilitation, but it is a facilitation in one region. What are you going to

be able to do about that? You have a partner here who doesn’t have

control, and I think this is something Mr. Christoff touched on, is

we have this lack of control. What are you going to do to empower

a union, a federation of Emirates that is one of the key challenges

to this sanction working?

Mr. GLASER. Thank you for the question. As I said in both my

oral and written remarks, it is not enough what has happened to

date. We have seen vigorous implementation of the U.N. resolution

in Europe, in America, Canada, Australia; and now our challenge

is to ensure that it is vigorously implemented elsewhere, and I specifically mentioned the Middle East as one of the key places.

And it goes without saying, but I will say UAE is absolutely key

in that as well. I visited the UAE many times; my boss, Stuart

Levey, is planning to go to the UAE in the next couple of weeks,

and an important part of that discussion is going to be the provisions of the new legislation, the provisions that force banks to

choose to put their corresponding banking at risk with the United

States if they continue to engage in relationships and significant

relationships with designated Iranian banks. That is going to be an

important part of that discussion.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that.

Mr. Christoff, among other things, you touched on this and some

of the other failures over time. You probably would not characterize

the current success at the same level as others. Iran is in the procVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63147.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ess of what they call privatization, and it is a shell game. They announce that they are going to sell something from the government

and then people who somehow have money, but in fact the only

thing they have ever been is connected to their military, buy it.

As that privatization goes on, isn’t it going to get harder and

harder to enforce a sanction that right now is failing already? And

if so, what do we need to do to create a regime in which individuals

who can operate much more globally, and without the cover of the

government, are in fact part of a shell game of buying assets, often

nuclear-related?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think you are right, and privatization is going

to be a challenge in the future.

Mr. ISSA. Or crony privatization, if you will.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Absolutely. But also I think you made a very

good point about having more of a collective approach to dealing

with the UAE in this transshipment issue. I really think that is an

important issue. The UAE is now the No. 1 exporter of goods and

services to Iran. The UAE remains the No. 1 country that the Commerce Department is concerned about with these post-shipment

verifications that fail. We sell our goods to the UAE; we go over

and inspect them; they are either not there or they are not being

used as intended. So there needs to be a concerted focus on the

United Arab Emirates.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I went into Libya on the first trip into

Libya after we lifted all visitation sanctions, it was in a U.S. military aircraft, and we had several hours before we met with their

‘‘leader,’’ and what I discovered was that there was more American

goods, more American brand names in Libya on that first trip than

I would typically see at Wal-Mart.

So I have been somebody who is critical not of the laws we pass;

I think the sanctions we are passing are right and they are attempting to give real power, but it is very clear that unless we get

implementation from the administration, some day, somewhere, we

are going to have an event no different than October 23, 1983, at

the Beirut barracks, where 241 Marines lost their lives. The next

one will be nuclear and it will be exponentially greater, and it is

likely to be here in the United States.

I yield back.

Chairman TOWNS. That is why we are having this hearing.

Yes, Congresswoman Maloney for 5 minutes.

Mrs. MALONEY. First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the hearing and all of the panelists for your testimony and for your commitment of implementing the sanctions. I

would like to direct my question to Mr. Neurauter, since this committee has direct responsibility, both legislatively and with oversight over procurement.

Mr. Neurauter, under the new sanctions signed by the President,

GSA is required to revise the Federal Acquisition Regulations to require a certification from each person that is a prospective contractor; that the person, and any person owned or controlled by the

person, does not engage in any activity for which sanctions may be

imposed under Section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act. Specifically, can

GSA commit to meeting the timetable? You have committed to

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meeting the timetable under the law to require this particular part

to certify that contractors are not conducting any prohibited business.

Mr. NEURAUTER. Yes, we are definitely committed to doing that.

We are definitely committed to having the interim rule in place.

The folks in GSA are fully aware that this has started. Because the

key is to implement the rule once it is in effect, and that is what

we will do.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, specifically what steps has GSA taken to

ensure that companies that are making accurate and complete certifications, how do you know they are telling you the truth when

they sign that box? Are you reviewing it or doing any research to

make sure that they are accurate in what they are saying? Because

obviously many companies have been conducting business in the

prior sanctions that we had before the world, actually?

Mr. NEURAUTER. In the context of certifications and representations, that is a normal part of our business, and that is what companies do, and they certify as to many things.

Mrs. MALONEY. But what do you do to make sure that what they

are certifying is accurate? What if a company knowingly makes a

false certification and you find out, as we found out in Mr.

Christoff’s report, that many companies were doing business with

America and Iran, in direct conflict with the prior Iran sanctions

act? What do we do if a company knowingly signs that box and

made a mistake or is just outright lying?

Mr. NEURAUTER. Speaking from my view as the GSA Suspension

and Debarment official, I am very concerned about contractor integrity and honesty. If that kind of situation comes to my attention,

if need be, I will ask the IG to investigate further to get me the

facts; otherwise, I have the ability to call in the company and ask

them whether the certification was accurate or not and, if not, to

tell me what the facts are.

Mrs. MALONEY. The question is what if you find out that they

made a mistake or were outright lying? Is there a fine? Do you

debar them? Do you terminate the contract? What do you do if you

find that situation?

You know, there was this one article that was in the New York

Times—I would like permission to put it in the record, Mr. Chairman—about U.S.’s richest companies defying its policies on Iran.

This was in March 6, 2010, and it talks about companies that were

defying our law, yet getting billions, literally, in American contracts.

What happened? Did we terminate that contract? Did we fine the

people? If you find someone knowingly really violates the law, you

said you would do an IG investigation. What if the IG investigation

comes back, or the investigation by the New York Times comes

back and says that they are defying our policies, violating the law?

Do we find them? Do we terminate our Government contracts with

them? What do we do?

Mr. NEURAUTER. Specifically, I can speak to what I would do. If

I find that contractor non-responsible based upon an integrity

issue, I would debar them.

Mrs. MALONEY. You would debar them.

Mr. NEURAUTER. Yes.

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Mrs. MALONEY. But there is no real requirement in law. What

happened to these companies that are getting billions in American

contracts and defying prior Iranian sanctions? Did anything happen to these companies?

Mr. NEURAUTER. I don’t know, ma’am.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, could you find out and get back to us and

let us know?

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. NEURAUTER. Yes.

Mrs. MALONEY. The new sanctions also prohibit the head of an

executive agency from entering into or renewing a contract for the

procurement of goods or services with a person that exports sensitive technology to Iran. What role will GSA play in administering

this portion of the law? That is a very sensitive area, sensitive

technology. What role will GSA play in administering this section

of the law?

Mr. NEURAUTER. Of this statute here?

Mrs. MALONEY. Yes.

Mr. NEURAUTER. As far as I know, that would be included in the

FAR case.

Mrs. MALONEY. That will be included.

My time has expired. Thank you very much. Thank you for your

service.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

I now yield to the gentleman from Indiana, Congressman Burton.

Mr. BURTON. One of the things that has concerned me was I

guess back during the Clinton administration, Madeline Albright

waived the penalties on a Russian company and, I think, a South

American company because they had done business with Iran, in

violation of the law. I think it was Gazprom 1998 and Petronas Oil

Companies.

But Madeline Albright waived them at the direction of the President, and the President said that the United States would not impose sanctions on violators from the European Union, presumably

with the hope that the EU would, instead, immediately take action

on its own, but it didn’t. So these early sanctions made it clear to

violators that they were not seriously threatened by the sanctions.

One of the things that concerns me, as I said before, and I think

Mr. Issa mentioned as well, is that there is so much waiver authority by the President on almost every one of the sanctions that are

in the bill, which I opposed in the conference committee. But, nevertheless, it is in there, and I just would like to, once again, express my concern about that, because, in the past, no President,

going back to beyond Clinton, has ever imposed any sanctions that

have been carried through.

The other thing I would like to ask is I noticed in the United Nations legislation it does provide a mechanism for civil penalties for

financial institutions that are involved in any kind of a bank transaction of a $250,000 penalty or an amount that is twice the amount

of the transaction that is the basis of the violation. But one thing

that I can’t really ascertain is whether or not the language in the

bill that we passed provides a mechanism for freezing Iranian assets in the United States. I am not sure that the U.N. resolution

does as well.

Can you tell me, any of you, whether or not freezing assets in

banks, their money in the United States, is allowed in the bill that

we passed and went through conference committee, or in the U.N.

or any of the other bills that passed, the EU or any of them? Freezing their assets, absolutely saying you cannot let them have their

money.

Mr. GLASER. Most Iranian assets in the United States would already be frozen now under a whole wide variety of Iran sanctions

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legislation. The Treasury Department, over the past few years, has

designated most Iranian banks under our counter-terrorism or

counter-proliferation authority, that freezes their assets to the extent that there are assets in the United States. There would be,

frankly, very few assets, if any, of those banks in the United

States.

So I think the problem that the bill was trying to get at with respect to banks was not freezing their assets that are under U.S.

control, because there aren’t any assets under U.S. control, and we

have already designated these banks and applied sanctions on

them. What I think it was trying to get at was third-party banks

that were providing these designated Iranian banks indirect access

into the United States.

That is what the bill tries to get at and I think it was a very

important problem that Congress identified and it is something

that we are going to try to use to solve. But the assets of these

banks, to the extent in U.S. jurisdiction, are likely already frozen.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Einhorn, you are with the State Department.

In the event that General Electric, which has been accused of doing

business through their subsidies with Iran, if they continue to do

business in any way and there are sanctions imposed upon them

because of that business being conducted, would the State Department in any way recommend a waiver of that penalty? Because

that has been done, as I said before, by Madeline Albright during

the Clinton administration.

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, without reference to any particular

U.S. entity——

Mr. BURTON. Well, any company. I just used that as an example.

Mr. EINHORN. Any company, when we get information, credible

information that a company is involved in sanctionable activity

under the law, we will examine this very closely. We will go to the

company itself; we will go to U.S. embassies, see what they can

find out; we will inquire of the intelligence community.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say will the recommendation of the

State Department be that they will not waive the sanctions to the

President?

Mr. EINHORN. I can’t predict what the recommendation of the

State Department will be; it will depend on the situation. You mentioned, Congressman Burton, you talked about waiver authority

and so forth.

Sometimes it is very useful to have that authority in there, and

I will tell you why. Sometimes you deal with a company that may

have engaged in sanctionable activity. What you want them to do

is to stop that activity and to pledge not to repeat it again. You

need some flexibility in the law essentially to bargain with that

company. And if there is a situation where a company has stopped

all sanctionable activity and pledges not to resume it, then perhaps

the waiver of authority, the ability to waive sanctions is a useful

tool to stop that sanctionable activity, and that is worthwhile.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Congressman

Quigley.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. Einhorn, I guess what you are getting from some of these

questions is whether or not any administration has been strong

enough on any of these sanctions through time. While I have faith

in this administration, with all due respect, I am not sure your testimony would evoke greater faith that we would move forward appropriately with the new sanctions. From page 4 of your testimony:

In this review, we identified a number of cases dating from before

the Obama administration which appeared problematic and warranted more thorough consideration.

Given the extraordinary circumstances here, and the fact that

the timeframe for a viable deliverable weapon seems to be collapsing upon itself, what does problematic mean? If you add that into

the equation, and the fact that we are reading articles every day

about how spry other countries seem to be circumventing these actions, are we spry enough? Are we forceful enough? And can you

be a little more forceful from that testimony?

Mr. EINHORN. Thank you, Congressman. I can’t speak for previous administrations. I certainly can’t speak for the 8 years of the

George W. Bush administration, where no determinations were

made, no sanctions were made, no determinations of even

sanctionability. All I can speak for is the Obama administration;

and Secretary Clinton, early on, instructed us to act aggressively

to implement the law. We have carried out a thorough review of

a large number of cases. We winnowed those down to less than 10.

We are now in the process of engaging other agencies. The Secretary of State has been delegated authority to take decisions. We

have to get the input from other agencies; we will provide that

input to Secretary Clinton and she will make decisions. I would say

that she, before very long, will have to make determinations under

the law as to the sanctionability of this relatively small number of

cases, fewer than 10.

Mr. QUIGLEY. And can you ballpark the timeframe here?

Mr. EINHORN. She wants us to move expeditiously. As I say, the

dossiers are out to other agencies. We need to hear back from

them, get their recommendations, and feed those to the Secretary,

and she can make decisions.

Mr. QUIGLEY. And I appreciate that.

For the panel, switching directions, given the short timeframe we

have with you, to the extent you can, tell us a little more of your

thoughts about how China plays into this equation, filling the gap,

perhaps flooding everything else, overwhelming everything else we

are trying to do here.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think China is one of the countries in which

the U.S. attention has to turn to. The EU sanctions were passed,

but China has gone, over the past 15 years, from having minimal

trade with Iran to being either the first or the second biggest importer and exporters of goods and services to Iran. They are aggressive in investing in Iran’s energy sector. Their companies have

been sanctioned under the nonproliferation provisions multiple

times, to no effect. So that is the next country that I think we need

to turn our attention to.

Mr. QUIGLEY. And by attention, your suggestions?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Einhorn certainly has some suggestions, but

I think there has to be a recognition that, at least with some of the

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nonproliferation sanctions, when you have Chinese companies that

have been sanctioned three or more times, there has to be a reevaluation of the effectiveness of those particular sanctions, because it is not changing their behavior.

Mr. EINHORN. If I can just followup, Congressman. You are right

to identify China. China is of concern to us in this regard. China

has backfilled, when a number of responsible countries has

distanced themselves from Iran. We need to speak with the Chinese.

We have begun to raise this at the highest levels with Chinese

leaders. Deputy Assistant Secretary Glaser and I will be going to

China in August to begin a dialog, and this dialog will be pursued

at all levels. We need for them to enforce the Security Council resolutions conscientiously, and we also need for them not to backfill

when responsible countries have distanced themselves from Iran.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.

Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to read some quotes from when this issue, a couple of

times that it came up before, and if there is any time left, then I

would be happy for you to respond.

A little over 3 months ago, the Congressional Quarterly, on April

22nd, had an article that said, ‘‘Business groups say the House and

Senate bills could effectively prohibit U.S. businesses from

partnering with certain foreign companies even if the relationships

have nothing to do with Iran.’’ Then they added: ‘‘The National Association of Manufacturers released a study arguing that at least

$25 billion in exports and 210,000 jobs could be lost if sanctions

legislation is enacted.’’

The next day, in the Hill newspaper, Patrick Disney and Lara

Friedman, and I am not familiar with who they are, wrote this in

an article, they said: The United States has sanctioned Iran for

decades, with little to show for it, and added that, ‘‘Certain sanctions have unambiguously failed to achieve their objective, contributing instead to the suffering of ordinary Iranians.’’

Last December 15th, the National Security Subcommittee had a

hearing in this very room in which I participated, and four witnesses testified, and I will tell you that all four of them were

against sanctions. Dr. George Lopez, Chair of the Kroc Institute at

Notre Dame, said that sanctions ‘‘will inflict economic pain in Iran,

but produce no political gain on issues important to the United

States. In fact, research on the history of sanctions cases predicts

that these sanctions imposed on this Iranian government in the

manner imposed in H.R. 2194 will do more harm than doing nothing.’’

James F. Dobbins, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center, said that while sanctions are sometimes appealing, they are not without cost to the imposing states and ‘‘some

of that cost is eventually transferred to the American taxpayer.

Further, sanctions against Iran are not likely to alter Tehran’s nuclear policies. Sanctions will weaken the state economically and

even militarily that imposes it, and strengthen the regime’s domesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63147.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tic support and hold on power.’’ In other words, strengthen Iran’s

hold on power.

Journalist Robin Wright said, ‘‘The regime could exploit new

sanctions as an excuse to clamp down further on the opposition’’

and said, ‘‘Sanctions also hold the potential to hurt the public more

than the regime.’’

Finally, Suzanne Maloney, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, said, ‘‘Sanctions do not offer a cure-all or a silver bullet for

resolving our longstanding concerns about Iranian policy. There

should be no illusions about the likelihood that even more rigorous

and more broadly implemented sanctions can produce a reversal of

Iran’s nuclear calculus.’’

What I am concerned about is that sanctions will end up hurting

the poor and lower income people of Iran more than anybody, while

doing very little good for us. And I noticed that Mr. Christoff said,

in his testimony a while ago, that because these sanctions we have

imposed now are the toughest ever, that we need to very soon have

a very good analysis of the effectiveness of these sanctions.

Now, if anyone wishes to respond. Yes, sir, Mr. Einhorn.

Mr. EINHORN. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. There

is a long debate on the utility of sanctions; do they work, what is

their impact, and so forth. Our view is that sanctions are not an

end in themselves; they are a vehicle for changing Iran’s behavior.

We want them to recalculate costs and benefits and come up with

a conclusion that they are better off ending their defiance of the

international community and meeting their international obligations.

I think, until recently, Iranians have been very self-confident

that they could have their cake and eat it too; they could have their

nuclear ambitions, but they could also have good commercial financial relationships with the international community.

What we have been trying to do is turn up the pressure on Iran

so that it has to make a choice between one or the other, and there

is pretty good evidence coming in every day that Iranians are feeling the pressure. Every day another major company decides to distance itself from Iran, and we think Iran is beginning to feel the

heat.

We read in the papers by Iranian economists that their economic

situation is worsening, that oil production is declining, that the

cost of imports is increasing because of the difficulty of getting financing. So we believe we have begun to turn the corner on this

and that Iran is feeling the pressure, but we have to continue stepping that up.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, let me just say, because my time is up, we

have given people in our Government great power through this

sanctions legislation. But I hope that power is exercised in a humane and judicious manner so that we don’t end up hurting an

awful lot of people in the process.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I now recognize Mr. Foster from Illinois.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Christoff, were the Chinese companies that were sanctioned state-owned or privately-owned companies?

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Mr. CHRISTOFF. I don’t know that, Mr. Foster, but I can try to

get that information for you for the record.

Mr. FOSTER. OK. Well, what I am getting at is whether it is reasonable to view the Chinese government as basically a holding

company, so that the sanctions—you know, presumably, if there is

a subsidiary that violates the sanctions, that reflects onto the holding company as a general principle. Is that how it works?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. So in the case, which I think is likely, that at least

some of these sanctioned companies, you could make a reasonable

logical argument that in fact the holding company, namely, the

Chinese government, might be sanctioned as a whole. I am just

wondering if you can explore that for the record.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, I will look into that.

Mr. FOSTER. Deputy Secretary Glaser, what do you view the biggest holes are in the financial net that we are trying to cast around

the IRGC? For example, how are illicit arms or technology shipments typically paid for? Are there enhancements to the international reporting that would really do you a lot of good that we

could encourage at the congressional level?

Mr. GLASER. Thank you for the question. I am glad you focused

on the IRGC, because I think that is really one of the key entities

we should be looking at. The IRGC is engaged in the whole range

of bad conduct that we associate with Iran, from proliferation activities, terrorist activities, suppression of democracy within Iran.

The IRGC is engaged across the board. It is also a very attractive

target because they have such extensive economic and financial

networks both within Iran and throughout the world. So that is

their strength, but it is also their weakness; it also creates a target-rich environment.

The challenge that we have had up until, really, the last month

is getting universal action with respect to the IRGC. We have had

tremendous success with that recently with 1929, and really most

especially with the European Union’s Common Position this week,

which applies sanctions to the IRGC and Europe across the board,

the IRGC as an entity plus numerous subsidiaries.

Again, the challenge I don’t think is a legislative one; I don’t

think it is an authority challenge. The challenge is to make this as

broad and deep as possible, to get out on the road, to present information to the private sector, to present information to foreign governments to let them know what kind of activity the IRGC is engaged in in their countries, and then expect them to live up to their

obligations under international law and under the domestic law.

That is what we have been doing and that is what we are doing.

And as Mr. Einhorn said, I think we are starting to see that is

working. And we both mentioned it, but I think it is worth underscoring, Khatam al-Anbiya is one of the primary companies owned

by the IRGC, and they just had to pull out of South Pars, and they

had to pull out because, as they themselves admitted, it was

against Iran’s national interest for them to be involved because

they couldn’t get the international——

Mr. FOSTER. Well, are you seeing evidence that individuals are

transferring money to private accounts offshore that you can’t identify in havens, or is that something with acceptably?

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Mr. GLASER. Well, the issue of bank secrecy havens is a broader

issue than it applies to Iran.

Mr. FOSTER. Absolutely.

Mr. GLASER. Look, the Iranians are very sophisticated and they

are very smart, and they have complex financial systems, and they

know how to engage in deceptive financial practices, and they do.

And we try to prevent that from happening, but the fact of the

matter is that, on a case-by-case basis, on a transaction-by-transaction basis, they are going to be able to do transactions that they

want to do. The challenge is on the systemic level, because you

can’t run an economy on deceptive financial practices. So the challenge is to make it costly or risky or less effective for them to do

that, and I do think we are succeeding in that.

Mr. FOSTER. OK.

Mr. Einhorn, the Iran Sanctions Act, as recently amended, states

that the President shall initiate an investigation when credible evidence is presented, and I think a report within 180 days. How is

that going?

Mr. EINHORN. Well, Congressman, this law was only enacted less

than a month ago, and we are now in the process of figuring out

how to implement it effectively and how to deal with the 180-day

period. Often, thorough investigations of these activities take

longer than 180 days because often you get some initial public indication that a deal is in the works, but it may not be consummated

for 3, 5, 10 years. So it is a challenge to wrap everything up in 180

days. We are trying to figure out how to do that.

Mr. FOSTER. But you are committed to——

Mr. EINHORN. Absolutely.

Mr. FOSTER [continuing]. At least some kind of finding in 180

days?

Mr. EINHORN. Absolutely. We are committed to implementing

that aspect of the law, all aspects of the law.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I now yield to the gentleman from Arizona, Congressman Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the Chair and I thank those who have testified. I am sorry I missed part of it; other obligations. So I hope you

are not plowing the same ground here.

Mr. Einhorn, in your view, let me just step back, is it possible

to have an effective sanctions regime without the active participation of Russia and China?

Mr. EINHORN. As your question implies, it is very important for

Russia and China to be involved. They were involved to some extent already, in the sense that they voted for Security Council Resolution 1929, which is the base for many of the national measures

that have subsequently been taken. So that is positive.

But we also need their effective enforcement of 1929, and we also

ask them to recognize their responsibility as permanent members

of the Security Council to go beyond 1929 and to join with the European Union and us and the Australians and Canadians and have

a strong regime of pressure that can move Iran to meet its international obligations. But Russia and China are very important.

Mr. FLAKE. Very important, but not really helping is what you

are saying?

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Mr. EINHORN. Well, recently Russia took an important decision:

it decided that, in accordance with the Security Council resolution,

it would not deliver an advanced air defense system, the S–300, to

Iran. We have been pressing Russia very hard for a number of

years not to make that delivery, and they have agreed not to make

it, and that is positive.

Mr. FLAKE. Should we worry about getting too far ahead of our

allies, European allies and ahead of Russia and China as well? I

mean, there are two schools of thought here: if we lead, they will

follow; but there is also the notion that if we get too far out ahead,

they won’t. Where do you think we are now? Do we risk getting too

far ahead so we don’t have active, enthusiastic ongoing cooperation,

not just public, but privately, in enforcing these resolutions as well

with Russia and China?

Mr. EINHORN. We are very grateful that the European Union

took the decision it took this week. It set some very high standards

for sanctions. We will use those high standards in our discussions.

Danny Glaser and I will be in Seoul and in Tokyo next week to see

if Japan and South Korea could come up to that mark. We will also

go to China later in the month. It is important that China step up

and recognize its international responsibilities here.

Mr. FLAKE. We keep saying that we are targeting the regime and

not the people of Iran; we are just looking at items that would help

them build nuclear capacity. How is gasoline used to build nuclear

capacity?

Mr. EINHORN. Well, gasoline is not directly used, obviously, to

build nuclear capacity, but I think by putting some pressure on

their access to refined petroleum products you encourage them to

recompute what is in their best interest and to recognize that unless they stop their defiance of the international community, the future for Iran will look a lot dimmer; and hopefully they are coming

to that conclusion.

Mr. FLAKE. That is my point. It is not directly, but we all know

how these sanctions regimes usually work. They only work if you

have leaders that care a little more bout the plight of the people.

I mean, if we thought rationally, we certainly wouldn’t have had

the same embargo we have had in Cuba for 50 years, for example.

So I worry that we say publicly we don’t want to hurt the Iranian people, we don’t want to drive them into the arms of the regime, but then we target items that have nothing to do with building nuclear capacity, but would provide a pinch on the people without hurting the regime. We all know the regime finds ways certainly when we see just example after example after example of

ways that the black market works here, and our own Secretary of

State has used the term ‘‘leaky,’’ these sanctions are leaky, and

that is quite an understatement.

Anyway, thank you for your testimony.

Mr. EINHORN. If I could just respond to that. All sanctions regimes are leaky to some extent, but what we are seeing here is

that the sanctions are becoming more and more comprehensive,

and that is good. As far as dealing with the people of Iran is concerned, our intention is not to harm the people of Iran. Our intention is to get the leadership of Iran to reconsider. And that is why

we have done things like ensure that organizations like the IRGC

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and IRISIL, the Iran shipping line, is specifically targeted. That

will be an important signal to the elites of Iran.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Congressman

Van Hollen, for 5 minutes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank all of you for your testimony today. I just want to followup

on some of the questions that have already been asked. I think, obviously, there is consensus. To the extent we can broaden those

countries that are participating in the sanctions, obviously, they

are much more effective. The step the EU took recently was another positive measure.

To what extent does the sanctions regime that we have here

overlap with what the EU has done, and what specific steps are we

taking now with the EU to make sure that we have uniform enforcement as much as possible?

Mr. EINHORN. Mr. Glaser may want to add to this. We have the

most comprehensive sanctions regime against Iran than any other

country in the world. You realize that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Yes.

Mr. EINHORN. I think what the Europeans did this week really

closed that gap quite significantly. There are still differences, but

the gap was closed significantly, and I think it was probably a very

rude shock to the leaders of Iran to see the strength of the steps

they took.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Just to followup, there has been some concern

expressed about the relationship with some of the banks in Germany, specifically, with respect to Iran. Could you comment on

that, especially in light of the decision taken by the EU, how the

EU decision will impact especially the question of German banks

doing business with Iran?

Mr. GLASER. Well, I think the EU decision, the EU Common Position is going to significantly impact any German banks or any

European banks that are doing business with Iran. So any German

banks that are doing business with any of the seven banks designated by the EU will have to stop. Any German or other European banks that do any sizable transaction with Iran will have to

get preapproval for that transaction, and they have to wait 4 weeks

for that preapproval. So it is really a huge step forward.

That said, there are some German banks, there is one German

bank that was discussed in the press, EIH, that does remain a concern for us, and that is something that we continue to discuss with

the Europeans, and with Germany in particular. I think their business will inevitably decline based on the new EU measures, but it

is something that is going to remain a subject of conversation between us and our allies in Germany.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Einhorn, you mentioned the fact that

China had voted for the resolution of the United Nations. Obviously, they also worked very hard to weaken some aspects of the

proposal we put forward, so I am pleased to hear you are going to

be traveling there in the near future.

How do you grade the prospects for getting the Chinese to really

be serious about this effort in Iran? I think it is clear, based on

their actions to try to dilute sanctions at the United Nations, that

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they are obviously not onboard. What goals do you have specifically

for that trip? How would you measure success in your discussions

with the Chinese?

Mr. EINHORN. Two important criteria. One is that they enforce

the letter of Resolution 1929 conscientiously, and that if there are

Chinese entities that are in any way assisting, for example, the

missile programs in Iran, that China take strong steps against

those entities. That is one. Second, we want China to recognize its

responsibility not to backfill when responsible governments show

restraint and distance themselves from Iran. That will be very important.

The Chinese will argue that they have important energy security

needs, tremendous demands for energy; they need to do what is

necessary to ensure energy security. In our view, they are overachieving in terms of their energy security needs. We think they

have to kind of rebalance their priorities and recognize that, as a

permanent member of the Security Council, it is their responsibility to prevent proliferation and to put pressure on Iran and persuade Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

My last question relates to the standard that applies to granting

a waiver of the sanctions. As I understand the legislation, the

standard is that it will be vital to the national security interests

of the United States and that the government with primary jurisdiction over the sanctions violator is closely cooperating with the

United States in this effort.

This is probably by way of a comment more than a question, but

I think it is absolutely essential that we keep that standard as

tight as possible. For example, I think it would be very difficult to

argue today that the Chinese or the Russians were meeting the intent of that language with respect to cooperation, given their conduct.

So I would hope that you send the right signal to others as to

how you interpret that, because you don’t want a flexible interpretation of the rule to send a green light to others that they are going

to be able to get away with this. So I hope that discretion will be

pursued in a way that maximizes a tight uniform sanctions regime.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. I thank the gentleman from Maryland.

I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Utah, Congressman

Chaffetz.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

Thank you all for being here, I appreciate it. For the sake of clarity, in a rapid fashion, I am looking for like a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ here.

I just want to make sure that each of your organizations are committed to the timetables laid out in legislation. You have the infrastructure, you have the resources, and that you are going to be able

to make the timetables that are implemented in the legislation.

Perhaps we can start with Mr. Einhorn.

Mr. EINHORN. If you want a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ yes.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Is there anything in your way to making sure

that you get these done? Please continue down the line.

Mr. GLASER. Yes.

Mr. NEURAUTER. Yes.

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Mr. CHRISTOFF. We don’t have anything to implement, but we assure continued oversight on the part of GAO to make sure they are

implementing it.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Thank you.

Chairman TOWNS. So that is a ‘‘yes,’’ right?

Mr. CHAFFETZ. That is a ‘‘yes.’’ That is an absolutely. That is

good to hear. Mr. Einhorn, let’s talk for a moment, if we could,

about Turkey, given the recent situation. Can you assess the level

of commitment that they have to helping and assisting in these efforts?

Mr. EINHORN. We believe the government of Turkey shares our

objective of preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. We appreciate the hard work that Turkey has put in in trying to persuade Iran to adopt a more reasonable position. Sometimes we differ with Turkey on tactics.

For example, Turkey joined with Brazil and Iran in what was

called the ‘‘Tehran Declaration’’ in May, and they supported what

we considered to be an unacceptable version of a proposal we supported back in October on refueling the Tehran Research Reactor.

We didn’t appreciate the timing because it was on the eve of voting

on the U.N. Security Council resolution, and perhaps some of the

participants had in mind derailing that vote on a Security Council

resolution. So sometimes we disagree with Turkey on tactics, but

we believe their motivation is good. They want to solve this Iran

nuclear issue just as we do.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Glaser, any sense or any assessment of using

the Patriot Act along the way, if we need to use that authority?

Mr. GLASER. We have a wide variety of authorities under the Patriot Act, under IEPPA. We consider all of those authorities. Any

authority that we have that we think we can put to good use would

be considered.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. As the Treasury, and then I would like to go to

State, if I could. My time will run short here. Just very rapidly because time is so short, what are your top three concerns about really fully implementing all these sanctions? What are the three

things that you are worried about that are obstacles we need to

overcome to actually fully implement? Yes, please.

Mr. GLASER. To fully implement? I keep coming back. The challenge is to make these sanctions as broad as possible, and what I

mean by that is vigorous global implementation. That is the big

challenge. We now have the tools, we have the authorities really

throughout the world. The challenge is global implementation. And

when I say deep, I mean countries going, as appropriate and as

necessary, beyond the scope of what——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So which three countries, then, would you be

most worried about?

Mr. GLASER. Well, I will tell you which three regions I think

need to be focused on right now, and that is the Middle East, Asia,

and South America. Europe has taken strong action; we have taken

strong action in North America; Australia has taken strong action.

And as Mr. Einhorn said, Bob and I are going to be traveling to

Japan and South Korea next week; we are going to be in China

later in the month. Asia is important. My boss, Stuart Levey, as

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I said before, is going to be in the UAE in the next couple of weeks.

The Middle East is important. South America is important too.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Einhorn.

Mr. EINHORN. I would agree with Danny’s characterization. I

would just say it is very important to maintain the momentum.

Since June, when the Security Council resolution was adopted,

there have been a series of actions, including U.S. Executive order

designations. We talked about Australia, Canada, Europe, and so

forth. We have to keep up the momentum.

Part of this is psychological. Part is practical, on-the-ground,

what is happening economically, but part of it is psychological. We

have to demonstrate to Iran’s leaders that the situation is going to

deteriorate, it is going to continue to deteriorate unless they change

their behavior. So keeping the momentum up throughout this summer, into the fall, will be critical.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

Mrs. MALONEY [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Ms. Chu. Thank you, Madam Chair.

The U.N. Sanctions Resolution 1929 was a positive step; however, the financial sanctions in the resolution left something to be

desired. For example, only one new bank was added to the list of

sanctioned entities. And even here in the United States, sanctions

announced by the Treasury Department last month added only one

bank to the list of those sanctioned.

Is the Treasury Department aware of foreign financial institutions that continue to conduct business with sanctioned Iranian

banks? And what steps is the Treasury Department taking to ensure corresponding relations between the United States and foreign

banks are not being abused by Iran to gain access to U.S. financial

markets?

Mr. GLASER. Thank you for the question. I certainly agree that

the financial component of this whole effort is key to its success.

I actually was pleasantly surprised by how strong the 1929 was on

the financial side. I think we got some really, really important provisions in there that we have been looking for for a long time, especially with respect to correspondent banking. And you saw that the

EU picked right up on that and themselves even went beyond the

U.N. in terms of correspondent banks.

So I think it is becoming really, just in the past month, increasingly difficult for Iran to access the international financial systems

through its correspondent banking networks. And that has been reducing. Over the past 3 years or so we have been having a lot of

success in banks moving out of the Iran business.

Now, the question is, as you raise, what do we do with respect

to the few remaining that are continuing to do this business. As we

discussed earlier, Congress just gave us very, very important new

authority on that, and the Treasury Department has 90 days to

issue regulations that, when applied, would severely restrict or cutoff a third-party bank’s corresponding relationship with the United

States if it is doing business with a designated Iranian entity. And

we have every intention of meeting that 90-day deadline of issuing

those regulations, and we intend to implement the law that Congress gave us.

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Our hope, though, is that banks around the world, the few remaining, see the choice that they have to make, that they are going

to make the economically intelligent decision as to what to do. That

has been a part of our strategic dialog with the international financial sector for years now, and I think that is working. There are

some banks, even after that, that aren’t exposed to the United

States that we would have less leverage on, and we are going to

have to come up with creative ways of dealing with them as well.

But this is something that we have been seized with for a long

time, and it is really what we see as one of our main contributions

to the effort, is to do precisely what you are suggesting.

Ms. CHU. Actually, I am aware about the designation process

taking too long to complete, and many companies and banks, including, for instance, subsidies of previously sanctioned entities,

going unsanctioned, for example, IRISIL, Iran’s state shipping company, and the process there, because after the U.S. initially sanctioned this company, they began to evade it by renaming ships and

establishing front companies to take over ownership of the vessels.

And last month, more than a year later, the Treasury Department finally updated its sanctions on IRISIL; yet, even this failed

to identify multiple front companies that were identified by the

Commerce Department as it relates to the transfer of this speed

boat from a South African company to an Iranian company last

year.

So what is going on with actions against these numerous IRISIL

front companies, some of which have already been identified by the

Commerce Department?

Mr. GLASER. You raise a very important point, and it is a challenge that we face, and we face it every day. Chairman Towns, in

his opening remarks, said sanctions can’t just be a ‘‘cat and mouse’’

game, and I wrote it down when he said it because I thought it was

an extremely important point.

There are two components to our sanctions regime with respect

to Iran, and with respect to a lot of different sanctions regimes we

have, but certainly with Iran: The targeted side and the systemic

side. And if they are not both working, especially the systemic side,

then you are not going to get the results you are looking for.

So, yes, there is a cat and mouse aspect to it, and that is what

you are referring to, which is we take an action and then that

causes a response, and we have to catch up to the response. And

if that is the only way we do it, that is not going to be successful,

because it is much easier to change a company’s name than it is

to go through a procedure that has due process and fairness in it,

and take a formal government action that has an impact on people.

So that is always going to be an issue.

What that has to be combined with is strong systemic protections: obligations on banks and on other private sector entities to

themselves be careful, to in themselves understand who they are

dealing with, to themselves prevent themselves from being abused

by Iranian entities, by Iranian banks, by IRISIL, and that is part

of all this.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you.

Mr. Luetkemeyer is recognized.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

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Mr. Einhorn, just quickly, I have some concerns with regard to

just the general activity over in the Middle East. It would seem as

though, with the recent agreement with Syria that Iran has had,

the recent testing of the missiles that now, I think, 1,200 miles is

what their reach is, that they have made tremendous progress with

regards to developing and putting in place a plan not only to make,

but also deliver, nuclear arms. Where are we at?

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, what you just cited is a source of

concern to us. It is not just a question of Iran making progress in

its centrifuge enrichment program; it is progress in means of delivering a possible nuclear weapon; and they have been making

progress in their missile program, and that is a problem. The new

Security Council resolution specifically prohibits Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear weapons,

and——

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. What is the enforcement mechanism?

Mr. EINHORN [continuing]. That gives us leverage. When we believe there is a shipment to Iran from any country that could support their missile program, we will utilize the inspection provisions

of that resolution to try to interdict it.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. OK, there is another country that may be

even more interested in what is going on over there than what we

are, and that is Israel. Are we discussing the sanctions with them,

more than just sending them copies of our newspapers every day?

Do we have detailed briefings with the Israeli officials to where

they are drawn in to these discussions, made a part of what is

going on so that they are informed and can have some input? Because I am sure they have as good, or better, intelligence of what

is going on as we have because of the dramatic impact it has on

them.

Mr. EINHORN. Absolutely, Congressman. We are in close touch

with the Israelis. As a matter of fact, this afternoon we have a

meeting with a senior Israeli team to talk about Iran and to talk

about sanctions, and they are an important source of information.

We cooperate on intelligence matters with lots of friendly countries

around the world, but Israeli intelligence is particularly good.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Where are we going with our relationship

with Israel? It seems it is kind of a cold relationship at this point

with this administration. Are we starting to warm up to them a little bit? Are we starting to work with them a little bit more? Because I know they are not very happy, from what I understand,

with what has been going on.

Mr. EINHORN. Well, my impression is that Prime Minister

Netanyahu’s recent visit was very successful. We are strengthening

the relationship all the time, and I think today’s consultations on

Iran is an example of how closely we can work with the State of

Israel.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. OK, through this process, is there some sort

of retribution or some sort of sanction or some sort of pressure that

we are going to be putting on Syria and other countries in the area,

just immediate area, besides Russia and China, that are helping

the Iranians?

Mr. EINHORN. Syria is on our list of state sponsors of terrorism.

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Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Right. They admit that they are terrorists, is

that right?

Mr. EINHORN. There are many, well, they are on our list.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. OK.

Mr. EINHORN. And there are many sanctions that apply to Syria

for that and other reasons, including Syria is a big importer of missile technology, which is a problem also. So we have reached out

to Syria. We are trying to explore whether there is the basis for

some meaningful dialog, but we do so without any illusions about

the nature of the regime and about some of its ambitions in the

area of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. OK.

With that, Madam Chair, I yield the balance of my time to Mr.

Burton.

Mr. BURTON. I just want to make a real brief comment. I know

the four of you have a great responsibility because of the legislation

we passed, and I know Mr. Flake and others have indicated that

maybe, you know, these sanctions won’t work. But I would just like

to say that those who are aware of history realize that this may

be one of the last chances we have to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

And I would like to remind you and everybody else that what

happened back in the late 1930’s led to 50-some million people

being killed because we didn’t do everything necessary to stop the

Luftwaffe, Hitler and everything else. And I think Mr.

Ahmadinejad is one that can be equated with possibly Hitler, and

I think it is very important that we do everything possible to stop

them with their nuclear program so we don’t have to face that

prospect.

With that, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am going to

plead in advance with the panelists. Thank you for being here. You

need to speak into the microphone like this; otherwise you cannot

be heard. You sound muffled and I missed much of your testimony.

So please. The acoustics are terrible here. We are going to fix that,

though.

The Washington Post, Mr. Einhorn, had a story last week about

South Pars and how sanctions may actually be having the intended

effect, although the Chinese and the Malaysians are trying to pick

up some of the slack. Would you agree with that assessment? And

are there other salient examples of where we can point concretely

and say that is because of sanctions?

Mr. EINHORN. I think it is accurate. I do think it is accurate. I

think the Iranians are having some difficulty getting investment in

some of the big projects, including South Pars. Danny Glaser

talked about Khatam al-Anbiya withdrawing from that project. I

mentioned in my testimony major oil companies that have pulled

back from their interest in Iran. So I do believe that these sanctions are having the desired effect of discouraging investment in

Iran’s petroleum sector.

Mr. CONNOLLY. You mentioned, speaking of China, that the State

Department has elevated this to the highest level and it is now a

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topic of conversation when we have diplomatic discussions. What is

the nature of the representation and what is the nature of the response?

Mr. EINHORN. Well, we invested a lot of diplomatic time and effort on the European Union’s recent decision at every level of Government. A number of us traveled to Europe and spoke to Europeans. Danny Glaser’s boss, Stuart Levey, played an important role

in this. Secretary Clinton has been very active on the telephone

and in her meetings. Vice President Biden, President Obama, all

of them have put a lot of effort into making these sanctions work

and generating pressure that can lead to a change in Iran’s behavior.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but you are not giving us any reassurance

that the Chinese care or are receptive to your message. In fact,

there is some evidence they don’t.

Mr. EINHORN. I mentioned before that after China’s yes vote,

which was a good thing, China remains a matter of concern, and

China is going to be the focus of very high level attention over the

next weeks and month. But China needs to be an important part

of this international effort to put pressure on Iran.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, Mr. Glaser, the March GAO report on enforcing restrictions recommended that the Department of Treasury

should be ensuring that they are developing the capability to provide all other Federal agencies that are relevant, and Congress,

with complete and timely information concerning all licenses issued

for the export of goods to Iran. What progress have we achieved on

that recommendation in the Treasury Department?

Mr. GLASER. I believe that was a recommendation made to an office of the Treasury Department called the ‘‘Office of Foreign Assets

Control.’’

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can I tell you I cannot hear you, Mr. Glaser?

Mr. GLASER. I am sorry. I apologize, Mr. Congressman.

That recommendation, I believe, was made to a portion of the

Treasury Department called the Office of Foreign Assets Control,

so I will have to take that question back to them, and we can provide you an answer.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would you get back to us for the record, please?

Thank you.

Let me ask U.N. Security Resolution 1540 obligates U.N. member states to develop and enforce measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. Presumably, that resolution has direct relevance to Iran, even though it is

not called Iran sanctions, but it certainly has direct relevance.

Have we been able to use that resolution in our diplomatic efforts

to ensure compliance with Iran sanctions and/or to encourage others to sort of try to see this issue our way? Mr. Einhorn.

Mr. EINHORN. Congressman, 1540 may be an indirect way of addressing the question of Iran. It has basically been seen as a vehicle for strengthening the capacity of lots of countries around the

world to cope with the threat of terrorism, the threat from nonstate actors. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism; it has given support to a number of terrorist organizations. We need to increase the

ability of countries to cope with that threat, whether coming from

Iran or other terrorists.

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. My time has expired.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. CONNOLLY. My time has expired. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Christoff, in addition to the 41 companies and all the other

research you did in your April report, you have also, I assume, observed one of the subjects that is talked about a lot, the gasoline

that has to be imported into Iran. Is that not so?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. In fact, Mr. Issa, we are planning on issuing

a report next week, as soon as we get all comments from a variety

of companies that we have identified in open sources as selling refined petroleum products, particularly gasoline, to Iran.

Mr. ISSA. And without asking you to get ahead of your own report, for all practical purposes, Iran is not suffering; they are getting that 145,000 or so barrels of gasoline and petroleum products

they need, right?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, the spot market is such that it is a very

fungible product, and you can get the product even though the

costs might be an additional cost to get the product. You can still

get the product.

Mr. ISSA. So bottom line is at least that part of the sanction not

so good.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, it has just started.

Mr. ISSA. As long as they have money, they get the fuel.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I think it has just started. I mean, these

new sanctions were just imposed this week, in which the State Department would have to begin identifying companies and starting

to enforce sanctions against those who in fact do sell refined petroleum products to Iran.

Mr. ISSA. But we leaned on Kazakhstan a long time ago, a country that could deliver the refined petroleum quicker, cheaper, easier, because they are in the closest proximity to Tehran, which is

where the ultimate shortage is. The shortage is in the north, not

the south. And it didn’t help that they didn’t supply it; they still

got it over this period leading up to this week, is that right?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. They need 140,000 barrels of gasoline every day.

That is their domestic shortage. According to even intel sources,

they are working to try to increase their refining capacity, but they

are still going to be dependent upon imports.

Mr. ISSA. OK. Well, you know, Iraq was the same way, and they

simply built a pipeline in addition to all the other leakage, shipped

oil to Syria, Syria refined it, took a big cut and sent a certain

amount back. And it wasn’t until after we took Baghdad and

bombed that pipeline that we actually stopped it.

Mr. Einhorn, that takes me back, if you will. You have been on

the ground and working in this one unique area since Nixon, is

that true?

Mr. EINHORN. That is right. Not in this specific area, but I began

government service in 1972.

Mr. ISSA. And you have been, more or less, in nonproliferation

and related subjects for much of that time.

Mr. EINHORN. That is correct.

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Mr. ISSA. So when you began there were five countries that had

nukes, right, the Gang of Five?

Mr. EINHORN. Roughly.

Mr. ISSA. Roughly?

Mr. EINHORN. Roughly five.

Mr. ISSA. My recollection, as a younger man, it wasn’t India, it

wasn’t Pakistan, it wasn’t Israel, it wasn’t North Korea, and it

wasn’t Iran; it was the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the

U.K., and France. Pretty much right?

Mr. EINHORN. Those were the acknowledged nuclear weapon

states.

Mr. ISSA. Right. I realize that there is declared and undeclared.

And I realize if Japan wanted a nuclear weapon, it could probably

produce it in 90 days. I mean, there are people who have the capability, if they chose to.

What I find amazing is I want sanctions to work. I want peaceful

activities to work. I want this country that has resisted reform

since the revolution 30 years ago, I want it to work. I wanted

North Korea to respond. Now, you were clearly on the ground in

the Clinton administration when we used a combination of sanctions and gifts to North Korea, and they gave us a promise and

they lied to you. They got away with it. Now they have the bomb.

Why in the world is it any different with Iran? Why is it that

Iran, who has a close relationship with North Korea on this particular subject, why is it that we shouldn’t believe they are just

lying to you, cheating you, delaying you, and ultimately they are

going to end up exactly like North Korea? Except the difference is

North Korea is not killing people in Lebanon and in Israel every

day. They are not exporting free and subsidizing terrorism. They

can barely feed their own people.

Why is it that I shouldn’t believe that this is a much bigger

threat than the failure, a decade ago, to deal with North Korea before they got a weapon? Because this is a country with money,

money to buy that gasoline somehow, and everything else. Please.

Mr. EINHORN. Clearly, Iran has not earned our trust. Quite the

opposite.

Mr. ISSA. Hell, they haven’t even given back our embassy.

Mr. EINHORN. This is a government we do not trust. Its track

record has been very poor in terms of meeting its obligations, fulfilling its commitments. So we remain skeptical about their behavior.

But there is a difference between Iran and North Korea, and it

is an important difference. North Korea’s leaders don’t seem to

mind being isolated. In fact, they may believe that isolation is the

only way their regime can survive.

Iran has different priorities. Yes, they want to move their nuclear ambitions forward, but they always want to be seen as a respected member of the international community. They need commerce. They need trade. They need to engage with the world. We

need to demonstrate to them that they can’t have their cake and

eat it too. They can’t have their nuclear ambitions and have these

good relations with the rest of the world.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. My time has expired.

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Mr. Chairman, I would at least take this opportunity to say I

agree with everything that Mr. Einhorn said, that they want to be

respected. I would strongly suggest that as we get into looking at

figure sanctions, we recognize that as long as the world allows

them to have embassies and allows them to hold our embassy hostage, that we are in fact still allowing them to have normalized relationships with virtually every country on Earth and then hope

that sanctions will work.

I, for one, believe that we need to take another step and a step

that is far greater than sanctions, before we do military, but I certainly believe we need to take another step. And I would hope that

as we continue looking at this program, if we see it fail, you will

join with me in trying to find additional steps to give pressure

against Iran.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS [presiding]. Thank you very much. And that is

the reason why we are having this hearing, no question about it.

I now yield 5 minutes to Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur from the

great State of Ohio, in fact, my classmate. Thank you.

Ms. KAPTUR. That is right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very

much. Glad to see you with the gavel.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing. Mr. Glaser, I just wanted

to ask you, to whom do you report at the U.S. Department of

Treasury? Who is your superior?

Mr. GLASER. My direct superior is Assistant Secretary Cohen,

and he in turn reports to Under Secretary——

Ms. KAPTUR. Assistant Secretary who?

Mr. GLASER. David Cohen. And he reports——

Ms. KAPTUR. David Cohen. What is his title?

Mr. GLASER. Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes. And he reports to Under Secretary Levey.

Ms. KAPTUR. And he reports to who?

Ms. GLASER. Under Secretary Stuart Levey, who is the Under

Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you for placing that on the record. Let me

just state that I believe history will show that since World War II

U.S. relations with Iran have been very counterproductive to our

own interests, both in terms of the advancement of democratic

ideals across that vast region, along with the lack of promotion of

competitive markets for goods.

Sadly, so much of that history, I think, will show that oil has

been a great diversion for this country. I keep thinking to one of

the commandments in my own faith: Thou shall not covet thy

neighbor’s goods.

My question is how does one implement sanctions in a manner

that supports U.S. democratic ideals and reform across an undemocratic and mercantilist Middle East? I think one can argue

geostrategically the impact of current sanctions actually operates

against U.S. long-term interests, because what we are seeing is a

backfill of connectivity by us by China, by Russia. You have admitted in your own testimony about the United Arab Emirates. One

can look at other countries. So it must be really frustrating for you

to enforce a sieve.

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I also wanted to just place on the record, for history’s sake, back

in 1953, since World War II, really, our relations with Iran, we

never seem to get it right. There was a coup back in the early

1950’s when someone by the name of Mohammed Mosadec was installed. Well, he had actually taken office earlier in a democratic

election. But then in 1953, by spontaneous combustion, he was removed and the Shah of Iran, when we were growing up, we remember him as children, became head of that country.

But the reason the other guy was removed is he was actually trying to change, attempting to reform the monopoly control that one

company had over the extraction of oil from Iran. That company

was called the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., commonly known now as

‘‘BP.’’

So I think it is important for us to remember a little bit of history here.

And through the decades of the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s, the

Shah’s rule became more and more repressive. I can remember the

Savac, studying the Savac when I was in college, and trying to understand what that was all about.

Then in 1979, some of us lived through the Iranian revolution,

when the Shah was removed and U.S. hostages were taken, and

the American people were just stunned by it. Terry Anderson, from

my own State, an ABC reporter, was taken in that and ultimately

released, thank God.

But then, after all that happened, and I remember those hostages were returned on the day Ronald Reagan became President.

Remember that? Some of the people here remember that.

Then, for the next decade we enlisted Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to do some dirty bidding, and there was a terrible war between

Iran and Iraq. Millions of people died.

So there is a little backdrop to why the Iranians also, looking

through whatever lens they are looking through, as they look at us

and they look across that region, might feel vulnerable.

I am not defending their government. I don’t defend any government in that region. And I certainly don’t defend the economic interests that try to exploit all of them.

But in thinking about the future, if in fact we are to be a democratic Nation, one that also believes in competitive markets, the report from the GAO shows that, well guess who has their fingers in

the till over there? Halliburton. If you look at the amount of money

that they get in Government contracts, Halliburton, $27.1 billion.

Well, who is a bigger investor in Halliburton? The former Vice

President of our country, for heaven sake. And their fingers aren’t

clean.

It seems like the public and private interests get all mixed up

here, and then we try to use these pitiful sanctions, which look

good on paper and look like we are really doing something. But

they don’t do anything to promote our geostrategic interest. They

don’t do anything to bring competitive markets. They don’t do anything to promote democracy in that part of the world. And I feel

sorry for our country. I feel sorry for the road that we are on here

because I don’t see that it is really hurting Iran in any way, and

it is certainly, most importantly, not advancing the cause of democracy.

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So in terms of two-way trade, my question goes to the future generation. That is a literate country. There were hundreds of thousands of students demonstrating for democracy in that country,

and there were some sanctions that apparently made it very difficult for them to be able to communicate with the West, with others, in their efforts to try to democratize inside that country.

And my question is, is the administration, or has the administration taken action to allow hardware, software, and technology used

to access the Internet to be legally exported to Iran? How do we

incentivize future democratic reforms and many of the literate people in that country that can’t connect to the rest of the world, who

are part of the future, so they don’t stub their toe and kill millions

of more people, as the last generation has done for 50 years, in that

extremely important but troubled region? What are we doing to

promote connectivity between those who love democracy?

Mr. EINHORN. That you, Congresswoman. We very much support

your strong statement of support for human rights in Iran. It is

very important to us.

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you.

Mr. EINHORN. It is also important that civil society in Iran be

able to express themselves, that they have free and secure access

to the Internet. The State Department has worked very closely

with the Treasury Department to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not

prevent access to tools that allow the Iranian people to freely access the internet.

State did a waiver recently that enabled Treasury to publish a

general license in the Federal Register in March that authorizes

U.S. companies to make mass market personal communication software available inside Iran. It is very important that they have the

tools to communicate with one another, and we are trying to make

that possible. And any adjustments in the sanctions law that are

necessary, we will seek to adopt.

Ms. KAPTUR. You know, I just wanted to say for the record finally, Mr. Chairman, I represent many people who have immigrated from that part of the world, and this Ahmadinejad, they always have him on TV, and he goes to the U.N. and really doesn’t

do a very good job for his own people. But the people who hold the

real power in that country are many of the clerics, and it just

seems to me that anything we can do to bridge walls is extraordinarily important.

I don’t share many of my colleagues’ view that the answer to everything is military action against any troubled state. But I think

that the power of literacy inside that country, unlike Afghanistan,

is so important. Anything one can do to encourage connectivity and

enhance those individuals within that country that are trying to

meet the rest of the world in a peaceful way is worth the effort,

and I would hope you would think hard about that in the important roles that you have. And also on the oil side to promote competitiveness.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentlewoman’s time has long expired.

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois,

Congressman Davis.

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Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me

thank you for calling the hearing.

Mr. Einhorn, let me ask you how does the State Department

measure success in terms of what would be a successful implementation of sanctions against Iran? Could you share that with us?

Mr. EINHORN. Ultimately, the measure of success is whether Iran

changes its behavior. That is what we are looking for. But intermediate steps involve putting serious economic pressure on Iran so

that it recomputes its calculation in costs and benefits, and realizes

that the future is going to look bleaker and bleaker unless it alters

its behavior and stops its defiance of the international community.

That is what we are looking for.

Mr. DAVIS. So one could reasonably say that the purpose of sanctions is to change behavior——

Mr. EINHORN. Exactly.

Mr. DAVIS [continuing]. Of whoever it is that is being sanctioned.

Let me ask are there any items that are not covered? What are we

trying to prevent Iran from doing?

Mr. EINHORN. The combination of the law the Congress recently

gave to us, as well as the recent Security Council resolution, as

well as our own executive authorities, the combination of all those

tools I think give us what we need to pursue an effective strategy

of pressure against Iran.

Mr. DAVIS. Are there any items that we would say it is quite all

right if we were to interact with those items getting into the country?

Mr. EINHORN. There are many items. For humanitarian purposes, to deal with medical problems, there are all kinds of items

that are legitimate. We are not trying to interrupt legitimate trade,

certainly not trade having to do with humanitarian, civilian kinds

of uses. But we are primarily going after their programs to acquire

weapons of mass destruction, advance conventional weapons, and

other sensitive items. We are not interested in a total embargo of

Iran; that is not what we are trying to do.

Mr. DAVIS. So there is a humanitarian component to the sanctions, especially as it relates to medicine or medical technology or

lifesaving instruments, or advances that may have been made in

one country that have not necessarily been made in another country. We are saying that it is quite all right.

Mr. EINHORN. That is right. We don’t intend to block Iran’s access to those.

Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask if each of you perhaps would address this

question. Our Government has awarded more than $107 billion in

contract payments, grants, and other benefits over the past decade

to foreign and multinational American companies while they were

doing business in Iran. Is there any way that one could suggest

that this is somewhat conflicting in terms of the overall purpose of

sanctions to try and change the behavior of another nation?

Mr. EINHORN. This development, these interactions were what

led to an important provision of the new comprehensive sanctions

law. I think it was Mr. Neurauter who spoke to that and can describe to you what is involved. But the idea is to avoid such contractual arrangements between the U.S. Government and these

93

other entities that have dealings with Iran, especially dealings that

are sanctioned under our law.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Davis, if I could add to that. That connection

is changing behavior, and I will give you the best example. Repsol,

which is a Spanish conglomerate, had, based on our report, over

$343 million in contracts with the U.S. Government. They also

were investors in Iran’s energy sector. They have since made the

decision this week to pull out of this $10 billion South Pars project

and no longer invest in Iran.

Mr. DAVIS. So we would agree, though, that this whole business

of sanctions does have a level of complexity that sometimes the average citizen, unless they take a good look, may not fully understand what is taking place in relationship to them and what they

have actually accomplished and what they have actually meant?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Absolutely. And I would also note that one other

decision that Repsol made was the divestment clauses in the new

act. They were concerned about shareholders divesting in their firm

as one of the reasons why they pulled out of the South Pars project.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much.

And that too is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, that I appreciate your calling this hearing, to try and bring as much clarify to

actions that are taken so that the only way we experience this democracy that my representative friend from Ohio, Ms. Kaptur, was

talking about is that people be able to understand what it is that

the Government is doing, what it is that the Government is trying

to do, and what the intents are. So I thank you again for the hearing and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much for your participation

as well.

I now yield to the gentleman from California, the ranking member, Congressman Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to wrap up a little bit, Mr. Christoff, in the committee’s report, I hope you have looked at it, Ms. Kaptur really sort of talked

to this point when she said Halliburton, $27.1 billion. First of all,

just for the record, my understanding is the Vice President, when

he became Vice President, relinquished all stock in the company,

most of which, all of which, was not by purchase, but by having

been an executive there, and is not an investor.

But notwithstanding her not understanding what an investor is, perhaps, Halliburton is $27.1 billion. That is how much they got for

servicing the need for the U.S. Government. Do you know what

they received, some subsidiary of Halliburton received for participation with Iran during that same period of time?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I don’t know those details, sir.

Mr. ISSA. So, actually, how much money somebody got from the

United States isn’t particularly important at all. What is important

is how important was Iran to these subsidiaries. And if I understand correctly, under prior law a subsidiary, wholly owned, not

wholly owned, joint venture, controlled, uncontrolled, to be honest,

they were allowed to do this. So everything that is here about these

companies prior to just a short period ago, they were doing things

that were perfectly routine, legal, and not prohibited by Executive

order or any other law.

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Mr. CHRISTOFF. The new act has changed that. Subsidiaries are

now affected, but previously they were not.

Mr. ISSA. So back to the sanctions. I have been very tough on Mr.

Einhorn, but I want to go to you based on past performance. Compliance with the past laws by companies seems to be reasonably

good, and the past service and sales and how everyone was circumventing, they were simply complying with the law and meeting

their responsibility to their stockholders. Haven’t we, with the last

sanction regime, changed the message to them relative to the best

interest of their stockholders?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. You have definitely changed the message, I think

particularly with the divestment clauses, because they are hearing

opportunities for shareholders to speak with their voices and pull

out of those companies that continue to invest in Iran.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Glaser, I want to close with just a question to you.

The U.S. financial system is a relatively open system. The chairman and I might disagree on whether or not, no, we might agree,

but disagree with Treasury on whether or not we have given you

all the tools of transparency that we would like you to have in the

way of data bases and so on.

But the U.S. companies, companies with a presence and are reporting in the United States, wouldn’t it be fair to say that you get

good transparency on them, and if they continue, directly or indirectly, to trade with Iran, you will be able to detect that and thus

sanction them? In other words, do you have those tools?

Mr. GLASER. Yes, I think that we know what is going on——

Mr. ISSA. OK. Would you, in closing, for me, our partners in Europe on this measure who have promised to do the same thing, do

they have the same tools? And the final question, if you answer

that they do, is: are they going to use them as aggressively as you

will?

Mr. GLASER. I have been at this for a few years now. I really do

think Europe has come a long——

Mr. ISSA. That is why you get to be here before us. We ask the

experts.

Mr. GLASER. It is an honor. I think Europe has come a long way

and, again, this has been a very surprising 6 weeks. The U.N. went

farther than I personally thought they would. The EU went considerably farther than I would have predicted, if you had asked me

3 months ago how far will the EU go. In all sincerity, I think there

is a real growing international consensus that something needs to

be done and that countries need to take responsibility.

Does that mean we are not going to have issues to work out with

particular European countries? I was talking to Mr. Van Hollen

about one of those. There is going to continue to be issues, but I

do think Europe is serious about this and I think they have been

a good partner.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Mr. Einhorn, the last word goes to you, as long as you include

in it letting us know how our former colleague, Ms. Tauscher, is

doing.

Mr. EINHORN. You know Ellen Tauscher. She has a lot of spirit,

a lot of fight, a lot of grit. She is going to have a rough patch, but

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she is going to come out of it fine. And I will send to her your best

wishes.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you very much. Please do.

Thank you. Yield back.

Chairman TOWNS. Please associate me with that as well.

Let me just close with you, Mr. Glaser, and I guess Mr. Einhorn,

both. First of all, GAO has identified 41 foreign firms with commercial activity in Iran. Do you agree with that, 41, the number?

Mr. GLASER. This is really something that is outside of the

Treasury Department’s jurisdiction. We target, with our particular

authorities, entities that are engaged in illicit activity, be it proliferation or terrorism. The Treasury Department is not keeping

track of foreign companies that are doing business in Iran as a

broad matter; that would be for the Commerce Department or others.

Chairman TOWNS. Mr. Einhorn, do you agree with the numbers?

Mr. EINHORN. I am sorry, could you repeat that, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman TOWNS. GAO has identified 41 foreign firms with commercial activity in Iran’s energy sector. First of all, do you agree

with the number?

Mr. EINHORN. We examined all of those cases very carefully and,

as I mentioned before, we winnowed that number down to less

than 10. These are a number of entities that are very problematic.

I have to say that a number of them have been engaged in

sanctionable activity. But as I also said before, we are reaching the

conclusion of this process; it is out for interagency views, and Secretary Clinton will make her decisions on this in a short period

ahead.

Chairman TOWNS. What can you do about these companies, even

the 10 that you——

Mr. EINHORN. Well, it is important to recognize that a number

of the entities in this small list have already stopped or are in the

process of stopping their engagement in Iran’s petroleum sector. So

I think what we found is the law is working. The threat of penalties has encouraged these countries to get out of the business of

dealing with Iran. So it is quite effective.

Chairman TOWNS. Let me just close by asking is there anything

more that we need to do on this side of the aisle, in terms of from

a legislative standpoint, in order to make this effective?

Mr. EINHORN. I think you have just given us a big and important

tool to tackle this threat, and you did that only less than 4 weeks

ago. We have to work hard within the administration to figure out

how best to implement this law to maximum effect. So for the time

being we have nothing else to request of you.

Mr. GLASER. I agree with Mr. Einhorn. I think you just passed

a very important new piece of legislation. We are in the process of

implementing that and I think it is going to have a powerful impact.

Mr. NEURAUTER. Mr. Chairman, we are proceeding to implement

the rule required by the act, and we will do so.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I would encourage vigorous and continuous oversight on the part of the Congress to ensure not just that the old

sanctions are being enforced, which many had not been, but the

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host of new sanctions that are on the plates of the executive

branch.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very, very much for actually——

Mrs. MALONEY. Would the gentleman yield?

Chairman TOWNS. I would be delighted to yield.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you very much.

I really would like to ask Mr. Neurauter and Mr. Christoff something that has come up throughout this hearing, and that is the report that throughout the last decade GSA spent roughly $170 billion of taxpayers’ money contracting with 74 companies doing business in Iran at the exact same time we were trying to put pressure

on Iran.

And my question is, basically how did this happen? Did the fact

that these companies were doing business with Iran ever come up

when you were reviewing the contracts or signing contracts in

GSA? Did anyone from anywhere in the Federal Government point

out we shouldn’t be giving part of our Federal procurement to companies that were really in direct violation of our stated foreign policy goals? Did anyone ever talk to you, Mr. Neurauter, about these

contracts and that they should not be getting $170 billion in taxpayer money when we are trying to impose sanctions?

Mr. NEURAUTER. The short answer is no, I have not been involved in these matters. I will be happy to look into this and get

back to you for the record. I returned to GSA 2 years ago as the

Director of the Office of Acquisition Integrity, with my duties as

Suspension and Debarment Official. But before that I was at HUD

as the senior procurement executive and was not aware of any such

matters at HUD. But I will be happy to look further into this.

Mrs. MALONEY. If you could, and get back to us.

Mr. Christoff, do you want to comment on it? How did this happen that we are handing out billions in Federal contracts to companies in direct violation of our stated policy goals, foreign policy and

stated laws of the country?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, first I would state that, as we all know, it

is the responsibility of the executive branch to investigate companies, determine what is credible evidence, and try to impose sanctions. The number that I think you are referring to is the New

York Times article, where there was over $100 billion in contracts.

When I looked at their list, many of those companies are companies

that would not be sanctionable under what was then the laws of

the land. Companies that were in the automobile industry, for example, would not have been——

Mrs. MALONEY. Would they be sanctionable now under this law?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Not necessarily.

Mrs. MALONEY. Why not?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Because it still doesn’t cover items such as the

automobile industry. And there were a lot of companies on that list

that dealt in the automobile community.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, maybe we should cover them with sanctions.

I just want to mention, Mr. Glaser, that the Treasury Department has done a very good job, and I compliment you on the work

you have done. As a member of the Financial Services Committee,

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other panel, but I have a series of questions, respectfully, I would

like to place in writing to you so that we can get these answers,

and I congratulate you on your work.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection, so ordered.

Mrs. MALONEY. Also the State Department for your international

work to get compliance. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

Now, let me just say to the Members that within a few minutes

we will have two votes on the floor, so what I would like to do is

to adjourn until 1:30. We will reconvene at 1:30. I am sorry about

that, but we have to vote around here. And if we don’t vote, they

talk about us. So this panel is actually dismissed and the committee will adjourn until 1:30 and we will come back.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOWNS. The committee will reconvene.

I would like to welcome our second panel. As with the first panel,

it is committee policy that all witnesses are sworn in, so please

stand and raise your right hands as I administer the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOWNS. Let the record reflect that they both answered

in the affirmative.

You may be seated.

Mr. Avi Jorisch is the founder and president of the Red Call Intelligence Group. Welcome.

And Mr. Mark Dubowitz is the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Your formal testimony is in the record, so if you could just summarize within 5 minutes, which would allow the committee members to raise questions with you, we would appreciate it.

Why don’t we start with you, Mr. Jorisch?

STATEMENTS OF AVI JORISCH, PRESIDENT, RED CELL INTELLIGENCE GROUP; AND MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

STATEMENT OF AVI JORISCH

Mr. JORISCH. Thank you. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member

Issa, distinguished Members of Congress, thank you very much for

your service to our country and for holding this very important

hearing and giving me the opportunity to present some testimony

to you.

Today, the world’s attention has turned to Iran’s defiance of the

international community in regards to its nuclear program, but

there isn’t a lot in terms of material in terms of the banking community and how we might use sanctions in order to really make

the Iranians feel financial pain.

Today, per the topic of this hearing, I would like to outline the

implementation of sanctions against the Iranian regime specifically

focusing on the banking community. First, I will go over an overview of the Iranian banking community, the international sanctions against the Iranian regime, which banks are still in the market, which our previous panel touched on just a little, and the Iranian banks around the world, and wrap up with a little bit of the

legislation that was just enacted.

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If I could start with the first slide. That is the second slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. When I started looking at the Iranian banking community a few months ago, there was very little in terms of information as to actually which banks were actually in the Iranian market, so I started doing a tremendous amount of research looking at

which banks are there, and what I found out is as follows. If you

look on the screen—that is already the fourth slide. Could we go

back to the first slide? There are 30 Iranian banks in the market,

and some of those banks have been sanctioned by the United Nations; some of those banks have been sanctioned by the United

States.

If you go to the second slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. We will just go over the international sanctions regime and the domestic sanctions regime. The United Nations has

basically designated four Iranian banks: Sepah, Saderat, Melli, and

the First East Export Bank of Malaysia. That is what the United

Nations has done in terms of the four Security Council resolutions

in the last few years. The United States has taken a step further.

If we can go to the next slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. The United States has essentially designated another 13 banks. Now, I don’t expect you to remember these banks,

but essentially we have a total of 17 banks that have been designated by the U.S. Government for its proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction.

So that was the first kernel. What I started figuring out was I

wanted to see, OK, now that I know which banks are actually in

Iran and what banks have been sanctioned by the international

community and by the United States, who are they actually doing

business with.

And there was very little in terms of information; what were

their correspondent banks, which were the banks around the world

that were actually helping them out. There was no name and

shame; there was certainly no bank accounts in the open sphere.

So I wanted to put that all together.

So what I started to do was I spoke to every compliance officer

I knew in terms of getting information about how we could figure

out who was actually helping the Iranian banks conduct their business, and what I found was very interesting. I found some open research and resources that pointed to something called the correspondent banking relationship. In short, when a bank does not

have a physical presence in a country, it tasks another bank and

acts in its steed to actually conduct its business; and in this case

I managed to chart out all of the Iranian banks and their relationships, and what I found out was fascinating.

First, you see these 17 banks here.

If you go to the next slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. There were banks around the world that were providing it with currencies. You will see here the dollar, the Euro, the

pound, the yen, etc. But what was more interesting, not only was

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the currencies, but which banks were actually conducting this business.

If you go to the next slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. You will see before you a complete list of 44 banks

around the world.

Go to the next slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. Those 44 banks are providing Iran with correspondent banking services, and they are household names: ING, Bank

Tokyo Mitsubishi, Commerce Bank, Deutsche Bank. And I was able

to provide all the bank account numbers and the swift codes for

these correspondent accounts. So, in other words, mapping out a financial map of these particular financial institutions.

Then I wanted to figure out how to basically give leverage to

Congress, so what I did was I mapped that back to the United

States. So, in other words, so you have the Iranian banks in the

center, then you have the banks around them that were supporting

them, and then which banks in the United States supporting those

banks.

If you go to the next slide, it will probably clarify things. One

more.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. So you will see in the center there are 30 Iranian

banks. Four have been designated by the United Nations, 17 were

designated by the United States. Then there are 44 international

banks that are servicing the designated entities, and then there are

banks in the United States that are supporting those banks. The

lever point is actually which U.S. banks are doing business with

the international community who is doing business with designated

entities. So there you have examples like JPMorgan, Wells, Bank

of New York that are doing business with the Deutsche banks, the

Commerce banks, the INGs, the Tokyo Mitsubishis that are doing

business with the designated entities.

I would be remiss if I didn’t mention where Iran itself had

branches around the world.

If you go to the next slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. There are U.N. and U.S. designated banks that

have offices all over the world, including Asia, Europe, South

America.

And if you go to the next slide.

[Slide shown.]

Mr. JORISCH. You will see there you have Iranian-designated

banks operating in Afghanistan, Armenia, Hong Kong, Paris,

Frankfurt, Hamburg, Athens, Baghdad, Rome, and a bunch of

other well-known places. And these are designated banks by the

United Nations that are operating in friendly countries.

Let me wrap up by talking a little bit about the sanctions regime

and CISADA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment

Act.

Some of the Members of Congress talked about this waiver ability. I would point out that in the way that CISADA was actually

written, this is an unbelievable bill. It is a sunlight bill. If the GovVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63147.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ernment actually asks for a waiver, it has to actually come back

to you and tell you why it is asking for that waiver. That is No.

1.

No. 2, I would ask you to remember that what brought down the

South African apartheid regime was actually banking sanctions,

not anything else.

Finally, this is basically a clean hands bill. U.S. banks now need

to certify not only who their customers are, but who their customers’ customers are; and this is a sea change. So, in other words,

JPMorgan of Boni or Citibank are going to have to declare that not

only they are not doing business with a designated entity, but none

of their customers’ customers, none of the banks that they are

working with are dealing with designated entities.

With the passing of CISADA, we have all the tools necessary to

pursue and punish banks doing business with Iran. If we are truly

going to stop Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, it would be prudent for us to use all the arrows in our quiver.

Thank you for your time, and I am open to any questions you

might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jorisch follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Dubowitz.

STATEMENT OF MARK DUBOWITZ

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman

Towns and Ranking Member Issa, and distinguished members of

the committee. And thank you, Mr. Jorisch, for his work on banking.

President Obama has made it very clear that stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons is a priority. His administration can potentially

achieve this by striking at the Iranian energy sector. Let’s be clear:

the Iranian energy sector is the lifeblood of the Iranian regime. Oil

export revenues constitute 80 percent of export earnings, 76 percent of government revenues. Iran’s natural gas reserves are second in the world only to Russia’s.

Energy wealth enables the Iranian regime to fund its proliferation and terrorism activities, as well as a vast system of repression.

The threat of sanctions has persuaded many foreign companies to

stop doing business with Iran, but many more remain. The regime

increasingly relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to

manage the energy industry, and this makes IRGC leaders and

IRGC entities prime targets for sanctions. The U.S. Treasury has

adopted this approach, as we heard this morning, with IRGC designations in 2007 and 2010 for proliferation in terrorist activities.

Mr. Chairman, as we heard this morning, international energy

sanctions are gaining significant support abroad. The new U.N. Security Council resolution establishes for the very first time the

nexus between the Iranian energy sector and proliferation activities, and this is a very important development. In fact, this development provided political cover to the EU, Canada, and Australia

to finally impose their own tough energy sanctions.

In parallel, as we heard this morning, the new U.S. legislation

expands the Iran Sanctions Act and it goes after almost all of the

Iranian energy supply chain, almost all. And we can talk about

what it doesn’t address in Q&A.

Now, critics, as we heard, dismiss sanctions as a feckless measure that will enrich Chinese and Russian opportunists at the expense of Americans and Europeans. I believe that energy sanctions

are not a silver bullet. But they are silver shrapnel, and shrapnel

can wound this regime as part of a comprehensive economic warfare strategy.

The mere possibility of energy sanctions has had an impact. During Ahmadinejad’s first 4 years in office, foreign direct investment

plummeted by 64 percent, from $4.2 billion to $1.5 billion. In fact,

without an annual investment of $25 billion, Iran could become a

net importer of oil.

Now, the Iranians despise this regime not only for its human

rights abuses, but for the disastrous state of the economy. Imagine

what Syria sanctions, vigorously enforced, could do. This presents

an opportunity to policymakers. We can leverage the economic malaise in Iran and the political frustration as expressed by the Green

Movement, the Bazari merchant class, and disaffected clerics.

Now, this is not to say that sanctions are going to have their desired impact. Iran has decades of experience circumventing sancVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:35 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63147.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tions. It is implementing countermeasures today. It is using fund

companies and cutouts and smuggling, and hot spots for this activity include Dubai and Malaysia, Turkey, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Furthermore, if sanctions are not enforced, companies may assess that their interests are really not in jeopardy given Washington’s poor historical record of sanctions enforcement, and we are

going to face serious challenges to enforcement from China and

Russia, but also Turkey and Iraq, Brazil, Venezuela, and perhaps

even India.

This administration now has more authority to counter the Iranian threat than any administration in U.S. history, and it should

be commended for establishing broad international support for

these sanctions. But let’s be clear: we only have a very limited window before Iran realizes its nuclear ambitions.

To this end, I present to you the following recommendations. The

first is enforce U.S. law. The credibility of sanctions depends on the

willingness of the United States to sanction violators. Nothing will

focus minds like stiff penalties and the denial of Federal contracts.

It is worth remembering that the U.S. Government imposed almost

$1 billion worth of fines against three European financial institutions for violations of U.S. sanctions law. That sent a ripple of fear

through the financial industry. We need to send the same ripples

of fear throughout the energy sector.

Also remember that this new law is not just about gasoline. In

addition to banking sanctions, it also leverages the full scope of

U.S. laws by sanctioning companies that provide technology, goods,

and services to the Iranian oil and natural gas sectors. It also targets energy projects outside of Iran, where foreign companies are

partnering with Iranian-controlled government entities in projects

off the coast of Scotland and Croatia, in Azerbaijan and elsewhere.

We need to encourage Europe to enforce its energy sanctions because, after all, this will be the ceiling for actions by other allies,

particularly in Asia and the Gulf.

We should harmonize our sanctions laws with the EU. We did

this in a commission that successfully coordinated sanctions

against Serbia, and those sanctions were very effective.

We should expand Treasury’s list of energy-related entities. The

IRGC operates thousands of front organizations that contribute to

Iran’s energy sector. Targeted sanctions work only if there are sufficient targets.

And, finally, we need to expose every foreign company that does

business in Iran’s energy sector. I believe Congress should establish a standing bipartisan advisory board on sanctions enforcement,

a bipartisan congressional commission to collect open source and

classified research, make recommendations, hold hearings to ensure that sanctions are enforced.

For sanctions to work, they must cripple the Iranian energy sector. And if sanctions yield no compromise from Iran’s leaders on its

nuclear program, no one can argue that America and its allies did

not try all peaceful options.

On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank

you for the opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you. Let me thank both of you for your

testimony.

Let me begin with you, Mr. Jorisch. Some of these banks are the

biggest banks. Why have they been able to get away with this?

Some that you had on that chart were some of the biggest. How

do they get away with it?

Mr. JORISCH. In general, banking is not a transparent business.

When you have a bank account, not everyone knows about those

bank accounts. Before this came out, before I put out this study,

there was nothing on bank accounts or Iranian bank accounts or

otherwise on the internet, on the ‘‘E road.’’ This is the first expose

of their accounts all over the world.

Chairman TOWNS. So that is the reason why they were getting

away with it, you are saying?

Mr. JORISCH. The Treasury Department is not in the habit of

calling out, naming and shaming, international banks that are

doing business with designated entities.

Chairman TOWNS. Mr. Dubowitz, do you believe that our U.S.

sanctions are strong enough, or should we do something else?

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I think U.S. sanctions are certainly strong,

and I think if we vigorously enforce them and if we impose crippling sanctions against these companies, again, I think it will send

a ripple of fear through the energy sector. Our friends in Treasury

have done a superb job in persuading many financial institutions

to stop doing business in Iran.

But let’s remember, as I said in my testimony, the U.S. Govern- ment and the district attorney of New York imposed $1 billion

worth of fines on three European banks between 2005 and 2009,

and that focused minds on the financial sector. We have never

sanctioned any energy companies, and I believe that if we impose

the equivalent of $1 billion worth of fines on the Turkish and Chinese and Malaysian and other companies that are continuing to do

business in the gasoline trade and in the oil and natural gas sectors, that could have a profound effect.

Chairman TOWNS. Do you believe that the United States and EU

sanctions on Iran will effectively reduce the number of foreign

firms conducting business in Iran? Do you think it will reduce the

number?

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I was in Brussels a couple of weeks ago, meeting

with the key drafters of the U.S. sanctions order, and I think the

Europeans have gone very far in the energy sector. What they

didn’t provide were sanctions against the supply of gasoline. And

a number of European companies have been involved in that supply chain for many years, though reportedly they are out. They

have cutoff or prohibited investment in technology transfer and

technical assistance, and, again, I think this is sending a message

to European energy firms that Iran is not open for business.

But again, I am somewhat skeptical that our European friends

are going to enforce those laws. The commercial relationship between the EU and Iran is enormous and growing.

Chairman TOWNS. Mr. Jorisch, you have spent time both as a

former Treasury official and as a private consultant tracking how

Iran manages its resources within the international economy. Can

you discuss why you believe effective sanctions enforcement against

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Iran’s banking sector in particular is so important to halting Iran’s

nuclear weapons program?

Mr. JORISCH. If you look historically, one of the things, again, as

I mentioned in my testimony, that brought down the South African

apartheid regime was banking sanctions, first. In addition, if Iran

doesn’t have access to the international market, it can’t procure

currency, it can’t send wire transfers. If it doesn’t have the hub of

the banking sector, it can only rely on the informal ways of moving

money.

There are only four ways of moving money: there is the banking

sector, the informal financial sector, cash, and commodities. Mr.

Dubowitz talked about the commodities side of the house: gas, oil.

But if you cutoff the banking sector, what does the regime have

left? It is much more difficult for them to move money. This is really one of the lifebloods of the regime.

If you are able to cutoff the banking community from Iran, it becomes much more difficult for them to move money, and that is the

power that this last sanctions legislation actually passed. U.S. financial institutions will have to certify that they are not doing

business with anyone who is doing business with a designated entity. That is a third-party sanction. If that really does go through,

you will find that most banks will pull out of the market.

Chairman TOWNS. On that note, I yield back and I call on the

gentlewoman from New York, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney.

Mrs. MALONEY. I would like to thank both gentlemen for their

testimony and first to ask Mr. Jorisch the Central Bank is not covered under the sanctions. Iran’s Central Bank is not covered, so

what does that mean in terms of trying to put sanctions on them?

And what is the role that clearinghouses are playing?

Can you give specific examples of how the clearinghouses might

be used to get around the sanctions? And, again, the exemption,

am I correct that there is an exemption for the Central Bank of

Iran from the sanctions? And what impact does that have on it?

Mr. JORISCH. I will work backward. There is an exemption for

the Central Bank. It hasn’t been designated by the United States

or the United Nations, and it is certainly a hole in the sanctions

regime. If you don’t designate every Iranian bank, effectively there

is a hole in the sanctions regime. So that is firstly.

In terms of clearinghouses, there is one huge scheme, called the

Asian Clearing Union. It is based out of Tehran and it is a conglomerate of somewhere between 8 and 10 countries, the central

banks of 8 and 10 countries. And they get together and they are

essentially moving money through this clearinghouse, and Iran effectively is moving up to 10 percent of its imports and exports yearly. Its biggest trading partner in the Asian Clearing Union is India.

It is a way for them to procure dollars and Euros and evade sanctions.

I have written about this at length. This is one of the biggest

holes outside of the formal financial sector, the banking community, and until the U.S. Government either designates or puts them

on some kind of sanctions regime, they are going to be able to move

money through this formalize informal financial sector.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, maybe we should close that

loophole they are pointing out.

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Mr. Dubowitz, I would like to ask you about the international

community. We heard in the prior session that we had from State

Department that we have been successful this time in engaging the

international community, with the exception of Turkey and China

and Russia, and we are working on those countries; but in the past

parts of the European Union did not really work with us on the

sanctions. What has happened that they are now willing to be part

of this effort? Could you give your interpretation of what is happening in the international community and what impact that will have

on making them stronger this time?

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Thank you for the question. First of all, I think

the U.S. Government has done a remarkable job in building international support, but I think we should be careful about not exaggerating the level of international support. What essentially we

have now is a Security Council Resolution, 1929, that lays the

predicate for the possibility of further support. We have the Europeans, the Canadians, and the Australians who, so far, have formally passed their own energy sanctions.

Within Europe there was a lot of debate within the 27 member

union over sanctions. You had the French very aggressive. In fact,

the French were willing to include refined petroleum sanctions as

part of the final sanctions package. But you have countries like

Sweden and others who are pushing back for a variety of reasons.

So there is still a lot of dissension and disagreement within the

European Union. You don’t see that in the final Executive order,

in the final sanctions order, but you will see that in enforcement;

and I think we should be very cautious about congratulating the

Europeans until we see what they are going to do on the enforcement side.

Are the Germans, who have the largest trade relationship with

Iran in the EU, going to move forward on some of these remaining

banks and on the technology companies and infrastructure players

that play a critical role in supporting the Iranian energy sector? So

I think the time for celebration will be when we see the Europeans

also imposing their own stiff penalties and sanctions against their

own firms or firms that are operating on European soil.

Mr. JORISCH. I wonder if I could just followup on that for just a

moment.

Mrs. MALONEY. Sure.

Mr. JORISCH. I would like for you to recall the fact that there are

designated Iranian banks sitting in London, Parish, Rome, Frankfurt, Hamburg. The new legislation barred any new business from

taking place with these banks, but not preexisting business, and a

lot of our European allies are congratulating themselves, when in

fact they are allowing old contracts to go through and using these

designated Iranian banks on their soil. They have not closed down

these banks in Europe.

Mrs. MALONEY. And they are among our closest allies, would you

not say, in Europe and Asia and the Middle East? And they have

the physical branch operations from the Iranian banks. So do you

think that we went far enough, or we should have covered also the

existing businesses, Mr. Jorisch?

Mr. JORISCH. The existing businesses? In other words, the existing banks?

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Mrs. MALONEY. Yes.

Mr. JORISCH. We essentially used the ability we had. We leveraged the U.S. financial system. We told these banks you can choose

between us and you can choose between them. It was a clean hands

bill. All these U.S. banks now need to certify that they are not

doing business with anyone who is doing business with the designated entities. In other words, it forces these European, Asian,

and South American banks to basically choose between us and

them.

In terms of the Iranian banks, there is very little leverage we

have. There is very little leverage we have, other than going

through the United Nations and the State Department.

Mrs. MALONEY. What about the correspondent banks? What role

do they play in empowering financial services, expanding financial

services for Iran?

Mr. JORISCH. So that was the thrust of my testimony. I found 44

banks around the world that are providing designated Iranian entities with correspondent banking services. Again, when a bank

doesn’t have a physical presence in a country, it pays another bank

to act as its agent.

Those 44 banks are essentially acting as Iran’s tentacles around

the world, and a lot of those banks have a physical presence here

in the States. Deutsche Bank, Commerce Bank, they have branches

here and they are basically working with designated entities. Those

44 banks also maintain correspondent banking relationships with

our own financial institutions; again, JPMorgan, Citibank, Boni.

So, this latest round of sanctions, we are using the power we have

because we are forcing our own financial institutions to certify that

they are not doing business with anyone.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California, the

ranking member of the committee, Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am a big supporter of trying to use sanctions, trying to make

it work, but I am going to be the devil’s advocate a little bit here

today for both of you. I did international banking, if you will, in

the import-export business for years. Everybody has a correspondent bank. Hong Kong, Shanghai prides itself on having a correspondent relationship basically with everybody, as does

JPMorgan and so on. As a matter of fact, that is why they call a

lot of these guys financial center banks.

Ultimately, isn’t it true, Mr. Jorisch, no matter what we do, if

they are able to put money into banks, which they can through

their private entities that are essentially nongovernment, that has

millions, if not billions, they can move it to enough banks that

eventually they will always have a correspondent?

In your opinion, based on your research, in order to actually

make banking sanctions work, don’t we actually have to create an

audit trail of the money, the transactions, level of transparency on

the actual money transactions, what they are for, who they go to,

and follow them on a global basis? And anything less than that,

aren’t we really sticking our fingers in the kind of sieve that we

generally put spaghetti in when we are draining it?

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Mr. JORISCH. The short answer is yes. There is no perfect system. You are never going to be able to lock out an entire country

from the formal financial sector. Having that said, though, Stuart

Levey, my former boss at the Treasury Department, always says

our job is not to close down the regime; our job is to make it more

difficult and financially painful for them to move our money, and

that is what this does.

Mr. ISSA. Well, and to that level I would like to ask both of you,

and, Mr. Dubowitz, perhaps you could start. I remember how we

went after South Africa. They weren’t doing a nuclear weapon.

Their weapon was the tyranny over their majority. We did it with

pure shame. We basically shut down diplomatic relations with

South Africa on a global basis. We did have banking sanctions, but,

to a great extent, what happened was we did not welcome their deposits, period. We were able to get more and more banks to recognize that if you took their deposits, you were taking the equivalent

of blood money in diamonds today.

Even though our sanctions are strong, even though I know

Treasury is doing the best they can, I will start with Mr. Dubowitz,

the next step that we have to look at, not just Government Oversight, but the Congress, isn’t it to find those areas in which truly

we can change how they are viewed and how they feel they are

viewed?

And I have been all over the world. I started on Foreign Affairs

in this Congress. The fact is you find Iranians at the finest hotels.

We normally don’t stay at those hotels, but if I go to a meeting in

those really good hotels you are going to see Iranians. So isn’t that

the next step, diplomatic sanctions, including not having Ambassadorial postings of Iranians in countries in Europe?

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, Congressman Issa, that is exactly right. I

think to take the big picture view of sanctions, sanctions are a way

of putting the Iranians in the wrong and keeping them there.

There has been a sea change in the narrative about Iran even in

12 months even in this August body. Twelve months ago we were

talking about a grand bargain with Iran over common interests

and common values; today we are talking about——

Mr. ISSA. I think that was down the road about 16 blocks.

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Now we are talking about how crippling can

sanctions be. Now, that is a significant change in the narrative in

Washington. It is certainly a significant change in the narrative in

Europe. When I was in Europe 12, 18 months ago, the talk about

the Iranian regime and its legitimacy was certainly in the mouths

of most diplomats and most politicians on both sides of the aisle.

So I think these sanctions have played a very important strategic

communications role in putting the Iranians in the wrong and

keeping them. I think we can go further by, in fact, barring their

diplomats, barring their embassies. I was born in South Africa; I

have a sense of what was done actually in South Africa, and I

think what was very important there was to target the legitimacy

of the South African government, to show the evil nature of apartheid.

Now, I want to make just one further comment, because my fear

with sanctions, whether it is in the banking sector or in the energy

sector, is that we spend the next 12 months playing a game of

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‘‘whac-A-Mole.’’ That is the game in the carnival that we used to

play as kids, where you hit one mole and another one pops up. I

think if we spend the next 12 months chasing corresponding banking accounts and gasoline suppliers and technology providers, we

are going to have our folks at the State Department inundated

with work, but I don’t think we are going to be targeting the real

Achilles heel of the Iranian economy.

Unlike South Africa, Iran is a one crop country. All the Iranians

really do is produce energy. And we have to identify a very short

list of major investors in the energy sector and major technology

providers, of which there are only a few really big ones, and I can

tell you most of them are German, who are providing critical technology to the Iranian natural gas sector. We should identify them

and then penalize them.

Mr. ISSA. OK, my time has expired, and I agree with you; it was

in your testimony.

I am going to just do a yes or no question for both of you at the

end. During this time, as we attempt to do that, should we urge

the State Department to urge our allies around the world to recall

Ambassadors and/or to discharge Iranian ambassadors as a way of

showing, without hurting one Iranian citizen, a way of showing

that this is not a country that is currently in favor for their actions?

Mr. JORISCH. Yes.

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much. Thank you for your

questions.

Let me just ask, is there anything that we need to do from a legislative standpoint, on this side of the aisle?

Mr. DUBOWITZ. If I could start. I think that Congress can play

a critical role in continuing a relentless and determined drive to

ensure sanctions are enforced. As I mentioned in my testimony, I

think it would be very valuable to set up a bipartisan commission

on Iran sanctions enforcement and to make sure that the staff that

is employed there has access to the best information, that they are

relentless and determined in monitoring what is a very opaque and

very complex energy sector and banking sector, and that they are

finding the best information in order to ensure that we can name

and shame the energy companies and the banks that are doing

business with Iran, we can hold hearings, and we can hold the administration to account for its commitment to sanctions enforcement. I think that can be done legislatively, and I would suggest

that be an important first step.

Chairman TOWNS. You can be assured we will hold hearings.

Mr. JORISCH. I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Dubowitz. I think

Congress ought to consider, again, just echoing Mark’s words, a bipartisan body that oversees sanctions, that collects this information, brings it out to the public and holds the administration’s feet

to the fire on this. The implementation if where the rubber meets

the road here. Writing legislation is great. Passing legislation is

wonderful. If there is no implementation, you have nothing.

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Chairman TOWNS. Gentlewoman from New York, do you have

any closing remarks?

Mrs. MALONEY. I would like to just followup with what Mr.

Dubowitz said, that instead of playing Whac-a-Mole or Whack-ABall, whatever it is called, we should be focusing on the energy sector, which is the key component. Could you elaborate a little bit on

that? I know that the bill did not address refined petroleum trade.

It did not penalize companies involved in this trade.

Also, their energy needs help from foreign countries, really, for

them to develop their energy business and, according to some estimates, about 60 percent of the technology Iran uses to exploit its

natural gas resources comes from one European nation, Germany,

the rest from other U.S. allies, Japan, South Korea, Europe.

Last week, companies were free to provide these products and

services to Iran and natural gas businesses. Now that has changed

and Congress really gave the President the means now to sanction

any company that provides technology, goods, or services valued at

$20 million or more in any single year to the Iranian energy industry.

What is your opinion of how committed the European Union is

to stopping the transfer of this key European technology to Iran?

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I was surprised by how tough the EU sanctions

were. I would not have expected that 3 to 6 months ago. They have

gone after very specifically the providers of technology and technical expertise, and they are essentially going after their own companies in writing that order, because they know very well that 60

percent of the key natural gas L&G technology is provided by Germany and France and Holland and other European countries. So

they have that in mind.

I find it fascinating that they focused on that. Mr. Jorisch is exactly right, they have only focused on new contracts, not existing

contracts, which, for me, provides a massive loophole in which new

deals can be characterized as existing deals. There is a whole array

of things that a company can do to circumvent that restriction. So

certainly the paper looks good; the words look good.

It will be very interesting to see whether Europe sanctions the

Linde Group, which is a German natural gas technology player. It

is a massive German company that are providing key L&G technology for the Iranian natural gas sector. If they are not sanctioning the Linde Group or any other organization like that, then I

don’t think the Europeans are serious, and then Congress has the

authority under this new sanctions law to go after the Linde Group

and other technology providers, because you did something brilliant, you eliminated, in the Iran Sanctions Act, an exclusion under

investment which, prior to this, companies providing technology,

goods, and services were free to do so for the past 15 years. You

closed that loophole and you should be commended for that.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you very much. I have additional questions, but I would like permission to place them in writing.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection.

Mrs. MALONEY. I really want to thank you, Chairman Towns, for

putting this hearing together, and I thank your staff, who worked

hard, and I thank my own staff for their hard work. This was not

an easy hearing to put together and I know you persevered, and

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I want to publicly thank you and the professionalism of your staff.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much. I appreciate your giving my staff praise, because there is no raise. [Laughter.]

Mr. JORISCH. Or show me the money.

Chairman TOWNS. I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony, and I appreciate the participation of the Members who attended the hearing as well.

If there is one thing I think we can all agree on, it is that we

must do everything we can to prevent Iran from developing nuclear

weapons. And we must cutoff Iranian support of terrorism.

I believe the key to doing that is through the financial services

system. If banks currently doing business with Iran can be persuaded to withdraw from the Iranian banking market, it will put

very significant pressure on the current regime. Congress has now

given the State Department and Treasury the power to do just

that, and we fully expect they will carry out congressional intent.

We will be watching, and so will the rest of the free world. They

also will be watching.

There is another important issue I would like to address. Some

have argued that economic sanctions may have more of an adverse

effect on the ordinary people of Iran, than on the current regime.

I think we are all concerned about that. However, I think we

need to remember that continued trade with Tehran primarily benefits the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which, despite its

name, is a business enterprise that controls almost 70 percent of

the Iranian economy and the entire Iranian oil industry. It is important for the international community to deny resources to the

regime which are used to suppress the pro-democracy movement,

some of whom have been working to help lift the veil on Iranian

nuclear programs.

In closing, let me say to my colleagues and to others that there

is very strong interest in this issue in Congress and I believe that

my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will be interested in ensuring that these economic sanctions are implemented effectively and

quickly.

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes this hearing. I thank the

Members for attending.

[Whereupon, at 2:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly and Hon.

Mike Quigley, and additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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