Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

In this monograph, volume two of three, Dr. Tom Searle articulates a general 

theory of special operations. In his view, robust special operations are not niche 

specialties, but unconventional operations that may range to the full extent of 

military authority and capability. He argues that this thinking reduces friction 

and clarifies the nature of special operations such that conventional forces are 

free to focus on fewer tasks. Searle also dedicates an appendix to illustrate how 

his general theory relates to other efforts. Readers are encouraged to examine 

all three volumes (Rich Rubright, Ph.D., Tom Searle, Ph.D., and the compendium 

edited by Peter McCabe, Ph.D.) with an open mind. These three volumes provide an opportunity for the reader to challenge their own preexisting positions, 

incorporate fresh perspectives, and perhaps think differently about what is 

necessary and sufficient for a special operations theory. 

ISBN 978-1-941715-20-8

Outside the Box: A New General 

Theory of Special Operations

Tom Searle, Ph.D.

JSOU Report 17-4

JSOU Report 17-4 A New General Theory of Special Operations Searle 

Volume Two of a Three-Part Theory Series

Military special operations are military operations that are 

outside the conventional box. 

Conventional

Operations

All DOD Responsibilities and Authorities

Special Operations
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where efforts center upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 17-4

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2017

Outside the Box: 

A New General Theory of 

Special Operations

Tom Searle, Ph.D. 
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in July 2017.

ISBN 978-1-941715-20-8
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

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JSOU Report 17-3, Roby Barrett, Ph.D.

A Social Marketing Analysis for Suicide Prevention Initiatives in USSOCOM: A 

Framework for Future Research and Success, JSOU Report 17-2, R. Craig Lefebvre, Ph.D.

A Unified Theory for Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-1, Richard W. Rubright, Ph.D.

IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, JSOU 

Report 16-11, Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov

Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel, JSOU Report 16-10, 

Russell D. Howard, Greta Hanson, and Carly Laywell

Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, 

Colombia, El Salvador, and Iraq, JSOU Report 16-9, Patrick Paterson

On the cover. The Trojans pull a huge wooden horse left outside their gates presumably as a victory trophy, into their city. Later that night, a select force of Greek 

troops creep out of the horse and open the gates for the rest of the Greek army who 

enter and destroy the city of Troy, ending the 10-year war. PHOTO BY FINE ART 

IMAGES HERITAGE IMAGES/NEWSCOM.

Back cover. The author illustrates that military special operations are military operations that are outside the conventional box.
v

Contents

Foreword .....................................................................................vii

About the Author ..........................................................................ix

Acknowledgements ......................................................................xi

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

1. Why the SOF Community Needs a General Theory of 

Special Operations ....................................................................... 5

2. Defining Special Operations.................................................... 11

3. The “Outside the Box” Theory of Special Operations ............... 17

4. Implications of the Theory for Conventional and 

Special Operations ..................................................................... 23

5. Implications for SOF................................................................ 31

Appendix: Outside the Box vs. Other Theories of 

Special Operations...................................................................... 41

Endnotes...................................................................................... 59

vii

Foreword 

In April 2017, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) celebrated its 30th anniversary as a combatant command. Throughout history, but certainly since USSOCOM’s formation, researchers and doctrine 

writers have argued for and against a specific theory of special operations. 

Advocates argue that theory can be essential in determining and explaining the appropriate roles and missions for Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

and for building and sustaining the forces assigned to USSOCOM. They 

argue that a theory should explain the strategic utility of SOF, bolster the 

strategic art within SOF, and inform doctrine. Those opposed to a specific 

theory argue that existing military theories are necessary and sufficient for 

special operations. They acknowledge that special operations have a strategic 

value and can generate strategic effects, but insist such characteristics are 

inadequate for a distinct theory. They also worry that a formalized theory 

may be coopted to serve an institutional objective or otherwise substitute for 

deep, critical thinking that is a hallmark of special operations.

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) dedicated several monographs to the discussion of special operations theory and two events intended 

to bring the discussion to an academic culminating point. JSOU Press monographs by Robert Spulak, Ph.D. and Rich Yarger, Ph.D. supplemented seminal 

works on the subject by Navy Admiral (retired) William McRaven and James 

Kiras, Ph.D. In 2011, JSOU hosted a SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward 

for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art. Attendees concluded that a 

healthy strategic culture and the practice of a special operations strategic art 

required the development of a suitable, feasible, and acceptable special operations theory. However, the topic languished as overseas operations, cyber 

power, and countering weapons of mass destruction dominated USSOCOM 

attention. 

Despite these myriad of issues, JSOU chose to engage once more in the 

discussion in August 2016 when it hosted a symposium titled, “Special Operations Theory.” The symposium addressed the full landscape of opinion 

for and against formation of a special operations theory. Event organizers 

from the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research proposed 

publication of two studies and a compendium of chapters relevant to the 
viii

discussion. JSOU professors, Dr. Richard Rubright and Dr. Tom Searle agreed 

to offer two studies to further stimulate thinking after the symposium, and 

Dr. Peter McCabe, a resident senior fellow, was designated lead for a compendium of shorter works to bring the conversation to an academic conclusion. 

In this monograph, volume two of three, Searle articulates a general 

theory of special operations. As in the first volume, Searle asserts that a 

special operations theory is necessary but approaches the argument from a 

different perspective. He abandons the search for an idealized view of special 

operations. Rather, he flips the discussion by describing special operations 

as everything that is not within the box of conventional operations. In his 

view, robust special operations are not niche specialties, but unconventional 

operations that may range to the full extent of military authority and capability. He argues that this thinking reduces friction and clarifies the nature 

of special operations such that conventional forces are free to focus on fewer 

tasks. Searle also dedicates an appendix to illustrate how his general theory 

relates to other efforts. 

Readers are encouraged to examine all three volumes (Rubright, Searle, 

and the upcoming compendium edited by McCabe) with an open mind. As 

a former SOF senior leader observed during the August symposium, “one 

of the beautiful things about SOF is the ability to change our minds, take 

a different turn, figure out a different approach, [and] solve a problem that 

arises that we didn’t think about because of an innate cognitive agility.” These 

three volumes provide an opportunity for the reader to challenge their own 

preexisting positions, incorporate fresh perspectives, and perhaps think differently about what is necessary and sufficient for a special operations theory.

 Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Author 

Tom Searle, Ph.D. is a course director in the College of Special Operations, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill AFB, FL.

He retired from the Army after 23 years as a special forces officer. During 

his military career he deployed to combat with every active and reserve 

Special Forces Group, the Joint Special Operations 

Command (JSOC) and all its components, and most 

Air Force Special Operations Command, and United 

States Naval Special Warfare Command elements. 

He also deployed forward to work with every Theater 

Special Operations Command (except Special Operations Command North). In addition to Permanent 

Change of Station tours to Germany and Korea, he 

participated in many overseas operations including Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES, 

Operation WILLING SPIRIT, Operation ALLIED FORCE, Operation JOINT 

ENDEAVOR, and Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. As a 

civilian he served as a research fellow at the Air Force Research Institute 

and as an intelligence subject matter expert at U.S. Central Command before 

joining the JSOU faculty.

Dr. Searle holds a Ph.D. in history from Duke University, a master of 

strategic studies degree from the U.S. Army War College, and a bachelor of 

science and engineering degree from Princeton University. He co-authored 

two unclassified books published by Air University Press and is the author 

of many classified studies for the USSOCOM History Office and the JSOC 

History Office. His unclassified articles and book reviews have appeared in 

the Special Operations Journal, Joint Forces Quarterly, The Journal of Military History, Air and Space Power Journal, Airpower History, and Armor 

Magazine. 

xi

Acknowledgements 

I would like to thank the senior fellows at the Joint Special Operations 

University for the key role they played in this project. They all provided 

encouragement and insightful suggestions, but Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Dave 

Ellis, Ph.D., and Mr. Will Irwin were particularly helpful. Pete’s vision for a 

Special Operations Theory Symposium, followed by a multi-volume collection of theories of special operations, will advance our understanding of special operations theory more than this volume, or any single volume, could.

I would also like to thank the rest of the JSOU community for their assistance. Richard Rubright, Ph.D. in particular has been working on related 

issues for a long time and his views have certainly influenced my own. I 

also need to thank my students for their patience as I tried out various early 

versions of these ideas on them. Of my students, I would particularly like 

to thank Army Captain John “JK” Karlsson for his engagement with these 

ideas and his insight into how they can help the entire U.S. military and 

particularly the special operations community.

In spite of the best efforts of all these people, and many not mentioned, 

some errors will remain in the monograph. These are, of course, entirely 

my fault.

1

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

Introduction 

Special operations have long been seen as “handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures.”1

 As the phrase implies, special operations provide the 

material for great stories, filled with amazing characters, attempting nearly 

super-human feats against impossible odds. The legendary stories have generated a steady stream of books, movies, and video games, and guaranteed 

special operations, and the people who conduct them, a large place in the 

popular imagination. This same view of special operations has, however, 

generated relatively little in the realm of theory. After all, why would one 

develop a theory of “desperate ventures?” Would it not be better to spend 

our time improving theories of diplomacy, conflict, and war to the point 

that we stayed out of “desperate” situations? Special operations, as “desperate ventures” seem to take place only when our theories fail. The handful of 

heroes help us survive our previous mistakes, and buy us time to improve 

our theories, but do not seem like promising objects for their own theory. 

The logic of the previous paragraph is appealing, but mistaken. The growing role of special operations in our national security strategy suggests that 

special operations are not merely “desperate ventures” the nation turns to 

when all else fails.2

 Instead, special operations have become a powerful tool 

the nation routinely employs, along with all the other available tools, to 

achieve our national security goals. As such, special operations need a theory 

every bit as much as other military operations do, and it is desperately important that the theory be correct. To date, the special operations community 

has muddled along with theories for specific types of special operations, and 

some official doctrine that tries to codify basic common sense concerning 

special operations. But the community has lacked a clearly stated and widely 

accepted understanding of what special operations are, how they relate to 

conventional operations, and how special and conventional operations combine to address the challenges facing the U.S. military. 

The pages that follow provide a new and general theory of military special 

operations based on the notion that special operations are “outside the box.” 

As the name suggests, this theory is best presented through a visualization 

which is presented on the back cover of this document.3 The outside the box 

theory sees military special operations as those operations within the large 
2

JSOU Report 17-4

circle of military operations, but outside the conventional military operations box. The theory thus starts from a definition of special operations as 

different from conventional operations. The specific tasks the military is 

authorized to conduct evolve over time as do the types of operations considered conventional. In terms of the outside the box theory, changes in 

what the military is authorized to do are represented by changes in the size 

and shape of the large circle depicting military operations. Changes in what 

constitutes a conventional operation are represented by changes in the size 

and shape of the conventional box. 

Other authors recognize that special operations are different from conventional operations, however, they still tend to see the world from inside 

the box.4 The inside the box point of view leaves them burdened with the 

assumption (usually implied) that conventional tasks represent the essence 

of military responsibilities and authorities. These authors tend to see special operations as useful because they support conventional operations, or 

because they execute conventional tasks (sink a battleship, capture a fortress, 

destroy the enemy’s port facilities, etc.) in unusual ways and thus accomplish 

conventional tasks when conventional forces cannot.5 From outside the box 

things look different.

From outside the box it becomes obvious that conventional operations 

are not all the military can do, or should do. In fact, conventional operations 

are merely a portion of what the military is responsible for, and authorized 

to do. The military, as an institution, chooses to define a certain portion of 

its responsibilities as normal, or conventional, and devotes the vast majority 

of its attention to building conventional forces to handle conventional tasks 

in conventional ways. From outside the box we see how arbitrary and risky 

any definition of conventional is, and how potentially disastrous it would 

be to bet everything on our ability to correctly guess the challenges of the 

future and successfully tailor conventional responses to those challenges.

A variation on the conventional box mistake is to see all special operations as somehow related to one particular type of special operation. Some 

view all special operations as variations on a commando raid, others view 

them all as somehow related to psychological operations, or efforts to assist 

insurgents in driving out an occupying power or conducting a revolution. 

While each of these is a type of special operation, when one views one type as 

the archetype for all special operations, the conventional box is swapped for a 

different box that limits the ability to see the full range of special operations 
3

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

and hinders the way that special operations and conventional operations can 

and should evolve. The outside the box visualization helps guard against this 

mistake. From outside the conventional box, and occupying all of the special 

operations space, we see that special operations may be special for many 

different reasons, and that there is no single, ideal type of special operation. 

Organizationally, this paper starts by considering whether we need a 

theory at all. This discussion is necessary because some thoughtful scholars 

of special operations believe we are better off without an explicit theory, or 

need multiple small theories, one for each type of special operation, rather 

than a large general theory. These views deserve a counterargument before 

a general theory is presented, but readers who already accept the need for a 

general theory may prefer to skip this section. Next, the monograph defines 

what “special” means and does not mean, in the context of special operations, 

so that we can develop a solid definition of special operations. With special 

operations defined, the paper moves to the heart of the argument and presents a new general theory of special operations to visualize the relationship 

between special and conventional military operations. This visualization also 

sheds light on the relationship between military special operations and the 

international and interagency partners who are simultaneously conducting 

their own operations that interact with military special operations. 

The visualization reframes our understanding of special operations and 

considers the implications of this reframing for the military, special and conventional operations, and Special Operations Forces (SOF), and those who 

lead them. These implications are the 

most important results of the general 

theory, but this monograph can only 

begin to explore all the implications of 

the theory. For those who accept the 

outside the box theory of special operations, there will be a great many additional implications of the theory that 

will only become apparent over time and with the input of more observers. 

The monograph concludes with an appendix that considers other attempts 

at a general theory of special operations, how these theories relate to one 

another, and how the outside the box theory compares with prior theories.6

For those who accept the 

outside the box theory of 

special operations, there will 

be a great many additional 

implications of the theory that 

will only become apparent 

over time and with the input 

of more observers.
4

JSOU Report 17-4

The outside the box theory focuses on U.S. military special operations. 

There will be some references to the term “special” outside the U.S. military, 

and the author hopes that the theory will be useful in understanding nonmilitary “special” operations, such as police Special Weapons And Tactics 

(SWAT) teams, but the monograph does not attempt to prove the universal applicability of the outside the box theory. The theory is based on the 

U.S. experience and may or may not be fully valid for the military forces 

of nations that have a very narrow definition of special operations and an 

expansive view of conventional operations. 
5

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

1. Why the SOF Community Needs a 

General Theory of Special Operations7

Special operators seem to have muddled along so far without a broadly 

accepted general theory of special operations and some intelligent 

observers have concluded that SOF are better off without a theory.8 Even 

among those who accept that special operations need theory, some believe 

that two or more small theories encompassing certain types of special operations are needed, rather than a single overarching theory that tries to encompass all of special operations.9

 Since the value of a general theory of special 

operations is in question, it is necessary to consider what a theory of special 

operations might do for the special operations community, and the dangers of an imperfect theory. To do so one could consider various scientific 

theories, such as Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection or Sir Isaac 

Newton’s third law of motion, and then examine how they changed the 

fields of study they addressed, in these cases biology and physics. However, 

U.S. military special operations are military activities, not part of a natural 

science, or a social science. The theories that explain other military operations are the ones that provide the best examples of what a theory of military 

special operations should look like, what it can do for SOF, and the dangers 

of getting it wrong. With that in mind, we shall examine some theories about 

other types of military operations to determine what those theories do for 

different communities of interest, and the dangers of bad theories. 

Sea Power Theory

Naval warfare was the first to be graced with its own theory. The essence of 

sea power theory is that even though wars are about people, and people live 

on land rather than at sea, control of the sea gives you enormous influence 

over what does, and does not happen ashore.10 Specifically, the country that 

controls the seas between the land masses can move freely between different land masses, trade easily with anyone, raid or invade anywhere along 

the entire coast of a hostile power, and can prevent hostile powers from 

trading or moving forces between different land masses. The globalization 

of the world economy in recent years has radically increased overseas trade 
6

JSOU Report 17-4

reinforcing the argument that access to the sea is a vital and growing economic interest to virtually everyone. 

Naval forces existed for thousands of years without a sea power theory. 

For island nations, like Japan or Great Britain, the sea was their only neighbor, making the balance of naval power between themselves and their potential adversaries an issue of obvious and vital concern, independent of any 

explicit theory of sea power. However, the existence of large navies and a 

long history of naval warfare seem to have increased rather than decreased 

the need for a theory. When Alfred Thayer Mahan first popularized his sea 

power theory in the late nineteenth century, he became an instant celebrity 

in Great Britain and the U.S., and his book was added to the library of every 

high school in Japan.11 Navies all over the world felt that the sea power theories expressed in the writings of Mahan and others helped them do their 

jobs better and understand more clearly their role in the security of their 

nations.12

The general theory of sea power described above has been widely popular 

since the late 19th century, and there is plenty of room under this general 

theory for more detailed theories about 

how best to achieve the benefits of sea 

power. These more detailed theories 

have been hotly-debated for more than 

a century and have often been influenced 

by technological developments, such as 

the emergence of submarines, airplanes, 

guided missiles, aircraft carriers, etc. Sea power theories have also influenced 

technological development since navies fund the research that theory suggests will be most useful. 

Recent variations on the basic theory of sea power have emphasized 

demographics, specifically the fact that a large and growing portion of 

the world’s population lives on or near the coast and hence is accessible to 

the U.S. Navy and the amphibious capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps.13

Through more than a century of changes in politics, demographics, economics, and technology, the general theory of sea power described above has 

served the world’s navies remarkably well. 

This is not to say that Mahan had all the answers. On the contrary, there 

were plenty of flaws in his detailed views about how best to achieve sea power. 

These flaws provided opportunities for those who did not follow Mahan, and 

Sea power theories have 

also influenced technological 

development since navies fund 

the research that theory suggests will be most useful.
7

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

created dangers for those who followed his recommendations too closely. For 

example, Mahan emphasized the importance of concentrating one’s own 

fleet and using it for offensive operations against the enemy fleet. However, 

in WWI German submarines were able to pose an existential threat to Great 

Britain by avoiding the British fleet and instead focusing their attacks on 

British merchant shipping. The British initially responded to this threat by 

sending their ships on ineffective offensive operations to hunt submarines 

and were slow to provide naval escorts for merchant ships because this dispersed and defensive use of naval forces violated the principles laid down 

by Mahan.14 Thus, holes in Mahan’s specific theories led to holes in ships, 

even though his fundamental theory—that sea power provides enormous 

economic and military advantages—held true. 

Air Power Theory

Air power theory is related to, but not identical with, sea power theory. Air 

power theory claims that control of the air not only enables you to put all of 

the enemy’s assets at risk (within the range of your weapons) but also enables 

you to observe the enemy from above and prevent him from observing you. 

This can be summarized as the Zeus fantasy under which airpower enables 

us to stand, Zeus-like, upon a cloud, invulnerable but all-seeing, and able 

to hurl thunderbolts as needed to smite the wicked. As with the general 

sea power theory described earlier, this theory of air power leaves plenty of 

room for arguments over the best way to achieve it (space-based systems, 

or ballistic missiles, or manned aircraft, or unmanned aircraft, etc.). Since 

airpower is expensive and limited and can reach more potential targets than 

land or sea power, there is plenty of room for arguments over what should be 

targeted (enemy surface forces, or enemy air forces, or economic targets, or 

the enemy’s political leadership, or enemy civilians, etc.). These arguments 

have often been heated and even acrimonious, and they have important 

implications for the sort of air power a nation chooses to build. However, all 

parties to these arguments agree that the side with superior air power has 

an enormous advantage over the side that has no air power, or inadequate 

air power. 

The version of air power theory described above is a consensus description of what air power can and should do. The classic “Airpower Theorists,” 

from Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet writing in the aftermath of WWI, 
8

JSOU Report 17-4

through John Warden in the post-Cold War era, emphasized attacks on 

vital centers far in the rear of enemy ground and naval forces (so called 

“strategic bombing”), over other uses of air power.15 However, this theory 

nearly led Britain to disaster in the early stages of WWII. Following strategic bombing theory, the British Royal Air Force overemphasized strategic 

bombing and bomber aircraft before the war, and underemphasized fighter 

aircraft; it barely corrected this error in time to avoid defeat in the Battle 

of Britain.16 Strategic bombing theories have had other weaknesses as well. 

For example, from our current perspective, Douhet’s enthusiasm for using 

chemical weapons against civilians seems troubling, to say the least; and 

Warden’s five-rings seem unhelpful when confronting decentralized networks of non-state actors.17 The bureaucratic politics of strategic bombing 

has also created unhelpful incentives since strategic bombing can potentially 

be done entirely by the U.S. Air Force and, if successful, might make the 

other military services irrelevant. This gives strategic bombing an obvious 

appeal to the Air Force and makes it less appealing to the other services. 

The consensus theory of air power, on the other hand, has had virtually no 

detractors, and has ensured that even the services that distrust strategic 

bombing agree that the U.S. needs plenty of air power.

Combined Arms Theory

Interestingly, while theories of sea power and air power are broadly accepted 

in the U.S. Navy and Air Force, there is no comparable “land-power” theory 

that animates the U.S. Army.18 This is partly due to the fact that, until Mahan, 

theories about war could often be treated as 

synonymous with theories about armies. From 

Sun Tzu and Thucydides through Machiavelli, 

Jomini, and Clausewitz, theorists typically 

did not feel a need to discuss, separately, the 

nature of military power on land and sea.19

In spite of recent efforts by the U.S. Army 

to develop a theory of land power, the central 

idea that still drives the U.S. Army is “combined arms.”20 Combined arms theory holds that real military power comes 

from the synergy of different types of assets (arms) working together rather 

than the perfection of any one type of asset. Thus the U.S. Army believes 

Combined arms theory 

holds that real military 

power comes from the 

synergy of different types 

of assets (arms) rather 

than the perfection of 

any one type of asset.
9

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

that the key to success is the skillful orchestration of different arms (e.g., 

infantry, tanks, and artillery all working together) rather than the ruthless exploitation of a single arm (e.g., vast numbers of state-of-the-art tanks 

operating with minimal support from anything else). The great strength of 

this theory is that, conceptually, it is easy to expand it to include the rest 

of the U.S. Army, other military services, other U.S. government agencies, 

allies, nongovernmental, or intergovernmental organizations, etc. The great 

weakness of combined arms theory is that it does not provide much guidance 

as to how to prioritize among the seemingly infinite number of potential 

assets that could be combined. As a result, combined arms theory has not 

explained the Army’s value to Congress and the public the way the other 

theories described above have helped the Navy and the Air Force. On the 

other hand, combined arms theory has done an excellent job of explaining 

to each part of the Army how it fits in with all the other parts, and it has 

also made the Army more receptive than it might otherwise have been to the 

advantages of integrating non-Army elements into Army activities. 

There are, of course, many other theories that inform many other government and military organizations, but the purpose here is not to list every 

theory animating every organization. The purpose in considering these 

theories is to see what theories do for organizations and determine whether 

the U.S. government, and particularly the United States Special Operations 

Forces (USSOF) would benefit from a theory of special operations. Theories 

of sea power and air power have clearly informed how seamen and airmen 

see themselves, how they understand their roles in the world, and how they 

explain themselves to others. Combined arms theory has helped the Army 

understand how it needs to function as a system on the battlefield and how it 

can work with other organizations. Note also that all of these broad, general 

theories have room for smaller sub-theories. For example, there is plenty of 

room for a theory of close air support under the general air power theory. 

Clearly all of these general theories have been enormously valuable to the 

institutions that have adopted them. On the other hand, theories are not 

risk-free. The wrong theory can be dangerous, as Mahan’s focus on offensive 

operations was when confronting German submarines and the Royal Air 

Force’s enthusiasm for strategic bombing was when it became the victim of 

strategic bombing during the Battle of Britain. 

These examples indicate that a theory of special operations has the potential to help the special operations community understand itself better and 
10

JSOU Report 17-4

explain itself more clearly to those outside the community. The danger of an 

inaccurate or incomplete theory is that it can lead to misunderstandings and 

ultimately, failure. Interestingly, from the examples above, it seems that a 

general theory is the most likely to have lasting value whereas more detailed 

theories that claim to offer a shortcut to achieving the aims of the general 

theory are more likely to prove incomplete, inaccurate, and even dangerous. 
11

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

2. Defining Special Operations

Any theory of special operations needs to start with a definition of special 

operations, but before defining special operations we have to consider 

what “special” means, and what it does not mean. 

Special, not Elite

Special is not the same as elite. Too often, special operations attract inordinate attention in the media and a certain mystique due to the perceived 

elite-ness of the SOF that conduct these operations. The general public are 

not the only ones who make this mistake; Robert G. Spulak, Jr. builds an 

entire theory of special operations on the elite-ness of SOF, and my friend 

and colleague Richard Rubright also puts undue emphasis on the elite-ness 

of SOF in his theory of special operations.21 

To highlight the difference between elite and special, consider the way 

the terms are commonly used. An elite organization does the same things 

as a regular organization of that type, it just does them better. Thus, an 

elite university does all the things that a regular university does, it just does 

them better. By the same token, an SS Panzer Division was an elite unit in 

that it did the same things a regular Panzer Division did in World War II, 

it just did them better. Special, on the other hand, implies different rather 

than merely better. Therefore, Special Prosecutors are not just normal prosecutors who 

do normal prosecutions better than everyone 

else, they are a different and unusual sort of 

prosecutor who does unusual, special prosecutions that are different from normal prosecutions in important ways. The 

Special Prosecutors may appear elite because they are likely to be at least 

better-than-average prosecutors, and are almost certainly not extremely 

inexperienced or utterly incompetent in normal prosecutions. Moreover, 

the selection for unusual assignments as a Special Prosecutor may cause 

them to be treated with the same deference shown to elite prosecutors. But 

they are not conducting normal prosecutions and their performance will 

probably be judged by different metrics from those used to evaluate normal 

prosecutors. (For example, normal prosecutors might be expected to handle 

Special, on the other 

hand, implies different 

rather than merely better.
12

JSOU Report 17-4

a large number of cases in a short time and produce a high conviction rate, 

whereas special prosecutors might handle a much smaller number of cases, 

and take a much longer time to handle them, and conviction rate might not 

be the measure used to evaluate their ultimate performance.)

The special-equals-elite error is so common, that correcting it requires 

another example. Special education teachers are not elite teachers, but rather 

teachers with the unusual skills needed to handle the same mission (teaching) but under unusual conditions (unusual students). Teachers are not elite 

because they are not the best teacher in the school at teaching normal children. But they have received training and education that the other teachers 

lack, and are accorded more respect than the average teacher (and may be 

paid more as well) because they can do things other teachers cannot do (such 

as teach deaf children to read).22 Note that, by the metrics used to measure 

other teachers: scores on standardized tests; reading skills above normal for 

the student’s age; graduation rate; progression to college; etc., special education teachers may produce some of the worst statistics in the school; statistics 

that might get other teachers fired. No one holds those low statistics against 

them because everyone realizes they are doing a different job that should not 

be judged by the same criteria used to evaluate other teachers. 

To provide a military example, let’s consider U.S. Navy SEALs. They are 

certainly naval forces who conduct special operations, but are they elite 

sailors? SEALs are elite sailors only in the sense that they go through a more 

demanding selection process than most sailors do, and because they receive 

more training than most sailors. This puts them in the same category with 

Navy fighter pilots, Navy doctors, and other carefully selected and highly 

trained sailors. But in the more important sense of elite, SEALs are not elite 

sailors because they do not perform normal Navy tasks—such as operating large, grey-hulled combat ships—markedly better than other Navy sailors. What makes SEALs important is 

that they are special, rather than elite, 

because they do things normal sailors do not do. Normal sailors operate aircraft, large surface ships, and 

large submarines. SEALs lock-out of 

submarines, jump out of planes, leave large ships, operate mini-submarines, 

swim to meet the enemy, and SEALs often fight the enemy on land. All these 

are very different, unusual, and special activities for sailors. 

What makes SEALs important is 

that they are special, rather than 

elite, because they do things 

normal sailors do not do.
13

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

U.S. Army Rangers illustrate the difference between special and elite by 

trying to do both at the same time. They are explicitly charged with being 

the best light infantry in the world (i.e. elite conventional forces) and are 

also counted among the nation’s SOF tasked with performing special, i.e. 

non-conventional operations.23 This bifurcated role for the Rangers has a long 

history as indicated by the title of the best academic history of the Rangers: Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers 

from Dieppe to Grenada by David W. Hogan, Jr. If SOF and elite forces were 

synonymous, the Rangers would have had no problem filling both roles (i.e., 

there would be no need for the word “or” in the title of Hogan’s book) but the 

Rangers are instead continuously pulled in two directions trying to do all 

conventional infantry tasks better than any other conventional infantry unit 

(i.e., be elite) while at the same time doing things that are quite different from 

what conventional infantry does (i.e., be special). While it is enormously 

challenging to reconcile the Rangers’ elite conventional responsibilities with 

their special operations responsibilities, those who succeed in the Ranger 

Regiment often gain unique skills in both conventional and special operations. That experience has enabled leaders like Army General Joseph Votel to 

succeed in conventional roles, such as Deputy Commander 82nd Airborne 

Division, and in special operations roles such as Commander Joint Special 

Operations Command, and Commander United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM). In his subsequent role as Commander of United 

States Central Command, he is responsible for both conventional and special 

operations in his geographic area of responsibility.

Special, not Specialized

The special-equals-elite misunderstanding is not the only one that plagues 

discussions of SOF and special operations. Another serious misunderstanding is the common view that SOF are somehow more specialized than conventional forces. This view is neatly summarized in the way some people 

use the term “general purpose forces” as a synonym for conventional forces, 

implying that SOF are so specialized as to be unsuited for “general” purposes.24 This view, on the surface, seems reasonable since specific examples of 

SOF, such as a Military Information Support Team (MIST) seem highly specialized, i.e. great for certain tasks but ill-suited for virtually anything else.25

However, this view ignores the level of specialization in the conventional 
14

JSOU Report 17-4

force. Consider some typical conventional forces, such as a squadron of F-15C 

fighter aircraft or an artillery battery armed with the Multiple Launch Rocket 

System (MLRS). The F-15Cs are great for the highly specialized task of shooting down enemy planes, but ill-suited for almost anything else. By the same 

token, the MLRS battery is great at performing artillery’s traditional, highly 

specialized mission of “putting steel on target” (i.e. killing everyone and 

destroying everything in a target area miles away from the firing battery) but 

ill-suited for other tasks. Of course the MLRS battery could use its tracked 

vehicles to pull stranded motorists out of snow drifts, or park its major weapons systems and retrain and reequip its personnel for counterinsurgency 

(COIN) or other missions, but any “general purpose” advantage the MLRS 

battery has over the MIST is the result of its size advantage rather than any 

inherent difference between SOF and conventional forces. In short, SOF are 

no more specialized than conventional forces, though they may appear specialized to someone who has focused on conventional operations for so long 

that conventional operations appear to be the general purpose of all military 

forces. 

Having shown that special means different, rather than elite or specialized, 

we still have to define special operations. Put another way, if special means 

different, then what are special operations different from? In the case of military special operations, they are different from conventional military operations. So, the definition of military special operations is: Special operations 

are operations outside the conventional operations box. The term “operations,” as used here, 

is defined broadly to include actions, activities, 

tasks, missions, etc. (This is roughly congruent with the current, 15 October 2016, edition 

of DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms which defines “operation” as “A military action or the carrying out of 

a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military 

mission.”) 

The outside the box theory of special operations follows from this definition, but before we can visualize the theory we must defend this definition 

against its detractors and see how closely it tracks with current U.S. military 

doctrine. Defining special operations as outside the conventional operations 

box defines special operations in relation to something else. Some people 

find this definition of special operations (and variations on it) intellectually 

Special operations are 

operations outside the 

conventional operations 

box.
15

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

unsatisfying because it does not define special operations in terms of a fixed 

ideal of what all special operations have in common.26 Instead it defines them 

in opposition to conventional operations. Worse yet, since the definition of 

conventional operations changes over time, it follows that whether or not a 

particular operation counts as “special” in a particular era is a dependent 

variable determined by the then-current nature of conventional operations. 

This seems to leave special operations on very shaky footing and without 

the solid and static (or nearly static) definition some people would like to 

impose on it. 

Their concerns are misplaced on two counts. The first is that evolving definitions are just fine. If the term “conventional operations” can be useful even 

though it applies to different activities in different historic eras, then there is 

no reason the term “special operations” needs to be rigid and fixed for all time 

in the operations to which it refers. The second is that this definition is accurate. Whether or not a particular operation counts as a “special” operation, 

in fact, evolves over time based on the evolving definition of conventional 

operations. For example, throughout the 19th century, military government 

(later re-named civil affairs) was an absolutely routine part of conventional 

U.S. military operations. It was conducted in peace and war by ordinary 

infantry, cavalry, and artillery soldiers without any specialized training for 

the task. (Though they had received specialized training to become infantry, 

cavalry, or artillery soldiers.) By the 1990s, however, civil affairs (CA) had 

become a special operations core activity for which selected troops received 

specialized training.27 Thus, during the 20th century, CA tasks transitioned 

from being conventional operations to being special operations. 

While some conventional operations have become special operations, it 

has been even more common in recent years for special operations to become 

conventional. For example, flying helicopters at night using night vision 

devices was once considered the essence of special operations in the helicopter 

community. In fact, the nickname of the 160th Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment (160th SOAR) is the “Night Stalkers,” a name that dates back to 

the predecessor organizations of the 160th SOAR in the early 1980s.28 Back 

then, nighttime helicopter operations were indeed special operations, but 

during the intervening decades training and equipment for night flying have 

become a normal part of conventional operations across the U.S. military. 

One can even imagine a future where night flying equipment and training 

have become so common, and the daylight air defense threat to helicopters 
16

JSOU Report 17-4

has become so great that all conventional helicopter combat operations are 

done at night, and daylight helicopter combat operations become the “special” 

missions conducted by specially trained and equipped SOF aviators. 

In defining special operations as military operations outside the conventional operations box we are staying fairly close to the definition of special 

operations used by the current (2014) edition of Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 

Special Operations. JP 3-05 states that “Special operations require unique 

modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment.” Since 

“unique” means different from everything else, JP 3-05 reinforces the point 

that special operations are different from conventional operations. JP 3-05 

is a little more restrictive than outside the box in its definition of special 

operations, since it specifies only five reasons an operation might be special rather than conventional (modes of employment, tactics, techniques, 

procedures, and equipment). However, terms like “modes of employment” 

are vague enough that the JP 3-05 definition remains nearly as flexible and 

expansive as outside the box. 

The outside the box theory also covers the various lists of different types of 

special operations found in law and doctrine. For example, our definition of 

special operations includes all the special operations activities listed in Title 

10 U.S. Code § 167 (direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional 

warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), CA, military information support operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search 

and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the President or 

the Secretary of Defense), but is not limited by that list. It likewise includes 

all the special operations core activities listed in JP 3-05 (direct action, special 

reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, 

UW, FID, security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, COIN, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information operations, CA operations, and other such activities as may be specified by the President and/or 

Secretary of Defense), but is not limited by this list either. The current (2011) 

edition of USSOCOM Publication 1, Doctrine for Special Operations, provides yet another, unique list, this time broken down into Core Operations 

and Core Activities, and including many items not found in the other two 

lists.29 Together, the fact that all three lists are in effect, the fact that they 

differ from one another, and the fact that the lists often include escape clauses 

about “other activities” that are not listed, suggest the truth: no list of special 

operations could be complete. 
17

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

3. The “Outside the Box” Theory of 

Special Operations

Satisfied with our definition of special operations, let’s consider the outside the box theory of special operations it generates. Visually, we can 

understand the way special operations 

fit into the spectrum of military activities by starting with a large circle. This 

represents the entire range of operations that the military is responsible 

for and legally authorized to conduct 

(see fig. 1). The large circle contains an 

enormous variety of activities the military may need to conduct in situations 

ranging from peaceful cooperation to 

thermonuclear war. 

The entire U.S. military cannot hope to be highly proficient at every 

possible type of operation. Rather than spreading its resources evenly over 

every possible task, the civilian and 

military leaders of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), with plenty 

of guidance from Congress and the 

President, allocate resources based on 

national strategic goals and expectations about the future. They define 

conventional operations as operations 

that the DOD will focus its resources 

on and put the vast majority of its 

resources into conventional forces to 

conduct conventional operations. Visually, this is depicted in figure 2 by the 

shaded box representing conventional operations within the large circle of 

all possible military operations. 

Since military special operations are all military operations that are 

not purely conventional operations, everything inside the circle of military 

Conventional

Operations

Figure 1. All DOD Responsibilities 

and Authorities.

Figure 2. Conventional Operations 

within DOD Responsibilities and 

Authorities.
18

JSOU Report 17-4

responsibilities and authorities, but outside the conventional operations box, 

is a special operation (see fig. 3).30

This visualization of the relationship between special operations and 

conventional operations emerges naturally from our definition and it helps 

us understand several important aspects of the relationship between special 

and conventional operations. The first thing to emphasize is that a narrower 

definition of conventional operations allows conventional forces to become 

better at those operations (since they are dividing their training time among 

fewer different activities).31 However, narrowing the definition of conventional operations also makes the conventional box smaller causing more 

activities to fall outside the conventional box and become special operations. 

As a result, efforts to focus conventional forces on a smaller range of tasks, 

and thus increase their proficiency, should be coupled with expanding special operations capabilities since the DOD will still need to maintain some 

capability in the areas that are no longer considered conventional operations. 

Figure 3 demonstrates that special operations capabilities must be a 

sacred trust within the DOD. Neglecting special operations leaves us unable 

to perform tasks that have been assigned to the department and would thus 

constitute professional negligence and dereliction of duty on the part of the 

DOD leadership. 

Another way of looking at figure 3 is to see special operations capabilities 

as insurance against the possibility that our leadership has guessed wrong 

Conventional

Operations

Special Operations

Figure 3. Military special operations are military operations that are outside 

the conventional box.
19

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

and that conventional operations are not the only things the DOD needs 

to do. Furthermore, the insurance provided by competent and robust SOF 

allows the rest of the force to concentrate on conventional operations, thus 

indirectly enhancing conventional capabilities while directly mitigating 

risks. 

Insurance against guessing wrong is desperately important. As Navy 

Admiral (retired) Michael Mullen admitted when he was Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff: “We’re pretty lousy at 

predicting the kind of warfare we’ll be in.”32

Competent SOF are the insurance that protects us against “lousy” predictions. Fortunately, the U.S. has purchased this insurance 

at a startlingly low cost since USSOF receive a tiny portion of DOD resources: 

less than 5 percent of the total and often closer to 1 percent of the total, 

depending on the resource in question.33

In addition to mitigating the unforeseen problems of guessing wrong 

about enemy threats, special operations capabilities also create new options 

and unanticipated opportunities. For example, in late 2001, when the U.S. 

found itself preparing for a totally unexpected war in Afghanistan, it was 

enormously helpful that the nation already had units organized, trained, 

and equipped to link up with irregular indigenous forces and assist them 

in liberating their country. (In U.S. military doctrine this type of operation 

is called “unconventional warfare” or UW.) These units were, of course, the 

Army Special Forces and other special operations personnel who helped 

topple the Taliban government. The existence of this special operations capability before the conflict began made it possible for the U.S. to drive the 

Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies out of Afghanistan much sooner, and with 

many fewer U.S. casualties than might have been achieved by conventional 

operations alone.34

Ironically, special operations capabilities are just as important when we 

guess right, as they are when we guess wrong. Our preference is to deter 

conflict rather than fight wars, and we build conventional forces to deter 

our potential enemies. But what happens when we correctly assess the way 

an adversary wants to confront us, and we respond correctly by building 

and deploying conventional forces that successfully deter that adversary? 

Some potential adversaries might abandon confrontation in favor of cooperation, but others might abandon conventional military confrontation in 

Competent SOF are the 

insurance that protect us 

against “lousy” predictions. 
20

JSOU Report 17-4

favor of an approach that evades our conventional deterrence. In such cases, 

special operations capabilities may be vital to countering the adversary’s 

non-conventional approaches. Therefore, the better we are at conventional 

operations, the more successful we will be in deterring the enemy from 

confronting us conventionally and the more likely we will have to conduct 

special operations. Arguably, this is exactly what has been happening on 

NATO’s eastern flank where NATO conventional forces seem to be successfully deterring Russian conventional operations, but rather than cooperating 

with NATO, Russia has chosen to pursue a confrontational approach using 

what some call “hybrid warfare.”35 To date, this approach has successfully 

advanced Russian interests by force without justifying NATO conventional 

operations in response. If NATO conventional operations cannot counter 

Russian “hybrid warfare,” then special operations may become NATO’s main 

military option.36

The Conventional Error-“Specialized” Forces

The definition of special operations as military operations that are not conventional operations may seem obvious, and figure 3 may seem like basic 

common sense, but they serve a vital purpose in helping us avoid the trap 

many conventional-minded troops fall into. Too often conventional forces 

see only the conventional box in figure 3 and imagine that box is the entire 

role of the DOD in the world, instead of merely the more than 95 percent 

of DOD resources that are not devoted to special operations. From inside 

the box, and seeing only the box, some conventional forces come to believe 

that special means “specialized” and that special operations are quirky 

little tasks within a conventional operation that require specialized forces 

to handle them. This is an easy mistake to make since many types of special 

operations forces, such as the MIST mentioned earlier, are specialized and 

can handle a quirky task within a large conventional operation. What these 

conventional troops miss is that special operations are not just niches within 

a conventional operation but also the vast array of things that are not conventional operations, i.e. outside the box, because DOD has a vast array of 

responsibilities and authorities outside the conventional box and someone 

has to handle them. 

Figure 3 helps explain the origins of USSOCOM and the Major Force Program (MFP)-11 SOF funding. Congress defined the large circle of activities 
21

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

it wanted the military to be able to conduct, but the conventional-minded 

service chiefs chose to see their duties as confined by the much smaller 

conventional box. As a result, when Congress authorized funding to address 

concerns associated with special operations as depicted in figure 3, i.e. inside 

the military circle but outside the conventional box, the military services 

consistently redirect those funds to address conventional priorities inside 

the box. The failed attempt to rescue hostages from Iran in 1980 provided 

objective proof that this approach was leaving the U.S. military unprepared 

for hostage rescue missions, counterterrorism more generally, and by extension, all special operations outside the conventional box. Congress finally lost 

patience. In 1986, over the objections of all the services, Congress created a 

funding stream, MFP-11, outside the control of the services. Congress also 

created a combatant command, USSOCOM, with service-like responsibilities, to manage MFP-11 funds and address the special operations challenges 

that the services had neglected for so long.37 Figure 3 highlights the gap 

between what Congress saw: the whole circle; and what the services saw: the 

conventional box; and thus helps clarify the disagreements between Congress 

and the services over special operations. 

23

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

4. Implications of the Theory for 

Conventional and Special Operations 

The definition of special operations depicted in figure 3 has a host of 

important implications. One is that, since special operations extend to 

the boundaries of what the DOD is authorized to do, special operations will 

be unusually sensitive to changes in DOD authorities. Another important 

implication is that, as depicted in figure 4, extending to the outer edges of 

what DOD is authorized to do means special operations are much more likely 

than conventional operations to overlap with the authorities and activities 

of other U.S. government agencies such as the Department of State, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, etc. (Overlapping authorities are 

much better than gaps between authorities, and they provide vital flexibility 

and options to the President, but overlaps create challenges for all the agencies involved.) For example, the now-famous raid on Abbottabad, Pakistan, 

that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011 could have been a military mission given to the DOD, but the President chose to give it to the CIA instead. 

The CIA could have used its own personnel as the raid force, but with the 

approval of the DOD and the President, the CIA employed military SOF 

as the raid force on this CIA mission.38 In this case overlapping authorities 

Conventional

Operations

Special 

Operations

Country X

DOS Etc.

CIA

DOJ

Figure 4. Relationship between conventional operations, special operations, 

international partners and interagency partners.
24

JSOU Report 17-4

between DOD and CIA gave the president two options instead of one, and 

both the CIA and DOD could employ SOF to accomplish the mission.

As depicted in figure 4, special operations are more likely than conventional operations to involve not just other U.S. government agencies, but 

foreign governments as well. For example: a SOF team in Colombia working on a FID or Security Force Assistance mission might be working side 

by side with personnel from the U.S. State Department, including the U.S. 

Agency for International Development; U.S. Justice Department, including 

the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Colombian military, including 

both conventional forces and Colombian SOF; the Colombian Police, including police antinarcotics commandos; and many other U.S. and Colombian 

government agencies.39

As one might expect, from figure 4, the primary customers for special 

operations are those responsible for all U.S. military operations (i.e., the 

entire circle containing both special operations and conventional operations). Specifically, special operations are typically conducted on behalf of 

a U.S. Ambassador or the Commander of a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC).40 Ambassadors are in charge of all U.S. government activities 

in their assigned country, including all military operations, both special 

and conventional. GCCs are responsible for all military operations (i.e., the 

entire circle, including both special and conventional operations) within 

their geographic areas of responsibility. Oddly, since GCCs are staffed almost 

entirely with personnel whose previous assignments were in conventional 

forces, many people think of these commands as conventional commands 

supported by SOF. They are in fact joint commands equally responsible for 

both conventional and special operations. (They are not conventional commands supported by SOF any more than they are Army commands supported by the Air Force.)

The routine overlap between special operations and the activities of other 

U.S. government agencies and other governments means that the forces who 

conduct special operations need to develop unusually good skills in interagency and international operations. Figure 4 also suggests that forces who 

routinely conduct special operations occupy a middle ground between U.S. 

conventional forces and non-DOD agencies, both foreign and domestic. As 

a result, forces who routinely conduct special operations will often serve as 

liaisons between U.S. conventional forces and both international and interagency partners. This liaison role will come naturally, since other nations 
25

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

and agencies will often encounter forces conducting U.S. special operations 

before they encounter those conducting U.S. conventional operations. Fortunately, forces conducting special operations will often have the necessary 

international and interagency skills already due to their previous experience 

in special operations. 

This is not to say that conventional operations do not frequently overlap 

with the activities of other U.S. government agencies and especially foreign militaries. For example, U.S. Forces Europe and U.S. Forces Korea are 

overwhelmingly conventional forces and their conventional components 

have been working closely with foreign conventional forces for generations. 

But these are exceptions. Conventional U.S. military operations are usually 

defined with the intention of creating a gap between military operations and 

the activities of other U.S. government agencies, and foreign forces tend to be 

given a geographic slice of a ground operation to handle on their own, rather 

than incorporated within conventional U.S. military thinking. By contrast, 

special operations such as FID, UW, CA, etc., are tightly integrated with 

other U.S. government agencies and with the activities of friendly foreigner 

governments and organizations. 

What Happens as Conventional Operations Evolve? 

Some authors have been uncomfortable defining special operations as different from conventional operations because this definition means that 

what constitutes a special operation changes in response to changes in the 

definition of conventional operations. Their mistake is to see such changes 

as a problem to be solved or a trap to be avoided rather than a fact to be 

acknowledged and accepted. 

To understand how the evolution of conventional operations affects 

special operations we need to consider some of the many types of special 

operations. Figure 5 depicts five types of military operations: FID; CA; UW; 

Psychological Operations (PSYOP); and counterinsurgency (COIN). The 

first four were among the “Principle Special Operations Missions” listed in 

USSOCOM Pub 1 dated 25 January 1996, and that list was still current on 

11 September 2001.41 The term COIN was still out of favor in the DOD, as it 

had been since Vietnam. It is, however, included with an asterisk in figure 

5 because if the term had been acknowledged, it would almost certainly 

have been listed as a special operations core activity, as it was later in the 
26

JSOU Report 17-4

2014 edition of Joint Pub 3.05 “Special Operations.”42 (The five missions 

depicted in figure 5 are, of course, a severe oversimplification of the true 

diversity of special operations, but including more activities and missions 

associated with special operations would make the figure more confusing 

without advancing the argument.) Figure 5 depicts specific missions that 

were considered special operations rather than conventional operations in 

2001. 

Now compare figure 5 to the situation at the height of the Iraq War, in 

about 2008, depicted in figure 6. Several things have changed. COIN has been 

reinstated as an accepted doctrinal term, and has even become fashionable in 

some circles. It has also been identified as a special operations core activity. 

PSYOP has been renamed Military Information Support Operations (MISO). 

Most importantly, the long occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. conventional forces has forced U.S. conventional operations to expand into areas 

that had previously been considered special operations. By 2008, parts of 

the CA, MISO, FID, and COIN missions were all routinely conducted by 

conventional forces and there were prominent conventional officers, such 

as Army General (retired) David Petraeus, who were trying to permanently 

expand the U.S. Army’s view of conventional operations to include elements 

of COIN, FID, CA, and MISO. UW, on the other hand, remained strictly 

Conventional

Operations

Special Operations

CA

PSYOP UW

*

COIN

FID

Figure 5. Some of the principle Special Operations Missions.
27

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

a special operation. In terms of visualization, the conventional operations 

box expanded to include parts of CA, FID, MISO, and COIN, but not UW. 

The expansion of the conventional operations box depicted in figure 6 

may prove to be temporary. Certainly there are conventional officers who 

want to narrow the scope of conventional operations (shrink the box) back 

to pre-9/11 size, and there are special operations personnel who want to keep 

these missions, and the forces who conduct them, entirely within the special 

operations camp.43 But the fact remains that in recent years the conventional 

operations box did expand and change its shape to include things that had 

previously been strictly special operations. This sort of evolution in the size 

and shape of the conventional operations box is both natural and desirable. 

The precise list of what is, and is not a conventional operation has changed 

over time and should continue to change as the world changes. Figure 6 helps 

explain the implications of those changes for both SOF and conventional 

forces. The fact that the conventional operations box expanded after 9/11 

to include, for example, some portions of CA, does not mean that CA was 

never a real special operation. It means instead that the situation changed 

and CA, which had previously seemed peripheral to success in conventional 

Conventional

Operations

Special Operations

CA

UW

MISO

COIN

FID

Figure 6. Changing Nature of Special Operations. The situation at the height of 

the Iraq War with the conventional operations box expanding to include parts 

of CA, MISO, COIN, and FID, but not UW.
28

JSOU Report 17-4

operations before 9/11, now seemed more central to conventional success. 

Fortunately for conventional forces, prior to 9/11 the DOD did not put 100 

percent of its resources into conventional operations as defined at that time 

and instead invested a small, but prudent amount in maintaining a CA 

capability within the special operations community. That pre-9/11 investment in special operations CA meant that when conventional operations 

required CA, a capability already existed and could be brought into conventional operations and expanded as needed to meet the new, and unexpected 

requirements. If there had been zero CA capability pre-9/11, then the post9/11 expansion of CA would have been vastly slower, more difficult, and less 

effective. The same holds for FID, COIN, and MISO.

Thus, SOF not only create and maintain capabilities outside the conventional box, they also serve as scouts preparing the way in case the conventional box needs to expand into those 

areas. This scout role requires SOF to 

share their techniques and expertise 

with their conventional brethren and 

not guard their roles and missions 

with the jealousy that too often characterizes the military services. Of 

course, figure 6 also disproves any 

theory of special operations that seeks 

to develop a static and permanent list of special operations that can never 

become conventional operations. 

Implications for Theories of Specific Types of 

Special Operations

Figure 5 (principle Special Operations Missions) shows that the outside the 

box theory of special operations described above is an umbrella theory under 

which separate theories need to be developed to understand each type of special operation. For some specific special operations, such as COIN and Direct 

Action, a body of theoretical literature has already emerged. For others, the 

theoretical literature is much leaner. One obvious next step in developing the 

outside the box theory of special operations will be to refine existing theories 

of specific special operations and develop new ones to create a mature family 

of specific theories under this general theory.

This scout role requires SOF 

to share their techniques and 

expertise with their conventional 

brethren and not guard their 

roles and missions with the jealousy that too often characterizes 

the military services.
29

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

Some thoughtful observers, following Army Lieutenant General (retired) 

Charles Cleveland’s division of special operations into “special warfare” and 

“precision strike,”have claimed that the special operations community needs 

two theories: one for special warfare and another for precision strike.44 There 

is certainly room for these theories under the outside the box theory the 

theories covering more narrowly defined types of special operations, such 

as UW and direct action. 

Figure 6 (Changing Nature of Conventional Operations) shows that no 

type of special operation is permanently and inherently special rather than 

conventional because every type of special operation could, potentially, 

become a conventional operation under the right circumstances. Failure 

to recognize this has led some theorists astray. For example, Navy Admiral 

(retired) William McRaven, in his famous book Spec Ops, Case Studies in 

Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, proposes a theory of special 

operations based on case studies of direct action raids.45 His approach implies 

that the direct action raid is the archetype or ideal special operation and 

that other types of special operations are special because they are somehow 

related to direct action raids. (Many in the Army Special Operations community make a similar mistake by claiming that UW or Psychological Warfare 

is the ideal from which all other special operations are derived. They seem 

to base this on the fact that psychological warfare troops were the first U.S. 

Army SOF established after World War II and the fact that the largest element 

within Army SOF is the Special Forces whose original mission was UW.) 

Figure 6 illustrates that there is no single ideal special operation. No particular type of operation 

is inherently special, 

because special is 

defined negatively by 

what special operations are not (they 

are not conventional 

operations).46 Special 

operations are outside the conventional box, regardless of the reason why a 

particular type of operation is outside that box, and the operation remains 

special only so long as the conventional box does not expand to include 

that type of operation. In other words, anyone who develops a theory for a 

particular type of special operation, and then tries to expand it to cover all 

Special operations are outside the conventional 

box, regardless of the reason why a particular 

type of operation is outside that box, and the 

operation remains special only so long as the 

conventional box does not expand to include 

that type of operation.
30

JSOU Report 17-4

special operations, is looking through the wrong end of the telescope. The 

small theories for particular types of special operations can develop under 

the umbrella of a general theory, but the outside the box theory explains 

why the small theories cannot be expanded to cover the entire spectrum of 

special operations. 
31

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

5. Implications for SOF

Figures 1-6 above depict operations, missions, tasks, or techniques, but 

not forces. There is, however, a connection to forces, since certain forces 

are commonly associated with specific tasks. For example, Civil Affairs (CA) 

Teams are routinely assigned CA missions depicted by the CA circle that 

is entirely outside the conventional operations box and inside the special 

operations area in figure 5 (representing the U.S. military in 2001). In figure 

6 (representing the U.S. military in 2008), the CA circle is partly inside the 

expanded conventional operations box, and partly still outside that box in the 

realm of special operations. As the situation changed between figure 5 (2001) 

and figure 6 (2008), some CA Teams that had been SOF became conventional forces, or special operations forces who routinely support conventional 

operations, rather than special operations. At the same time, conventional 

infantry, armor, and artillery units that would have been conducting conventional combined arms maneuver inside the conventional box in figure 5 

(2001) had their mission set expanded into FID and COIN in figure 6 (2008). 

This might have started out as conventional forces performing a special 

operation on a temporary basis, but later (as the situation changed from 

figure 5 in 2001 to figure 6 in 2008) transitioned into conventional forces 

conducting a conventional operation that used to be a special operation. The 

conventional portion of the U.S. Army embraced FID and COIN to such an 

extent that entire Advise and Assist Brigades were organized, trained, and 

equipped, within the conventional force, for the specific tasks of FID and 

COIN.47

These examples should dispel any notion that only SOF can conduct 

special operations, or that all the operations conducted by SOF are special 

operations, or that conventional forces can only conduct conventional operations. However, writing without the benefit of the visualizations provided 

above, some authors have raised these issues and they need to be addresses 

in more detail. For example, authors anxious to exaggerate the gap between 

special operations and SOF have been quick to point out that special operations have been conducted since ancient times, long before institutionalized 

special operations forces existed.48 They also point out that successful special 

operations have been conducted by conventional forces, and that SOF often 
32

JSOU Report 17-4

conduct conventional operations. None of these facts call into question the 

value of SOF, or the intimate connection between SOF and special operations, but they do require explanation within the context of our outside the 

box theory of special operations. 

SOF can, and often do, conduct conventional operations. In the past 

this has led to complaints that SOF were being “misused” and such complaints are likely in the future when SOF are again ordered to conduct conventional operations. If the task and method 

of execution are conventional, they remain 

conventional, regardless of whether the 

task is performed by SOF or conventional 

forces. And SOF are “special” based on their 

intended use, regardless of the missions they 

actually conduct. The real question about the 

“misuse” of SOF should be the opportunity 

cost. When SOF are performing a conventional task, is there a special operation SOF could be performing instead that 

would contribute more to the war effort or national security? The fear among 

SOF is that conventional commanders, viewing the world from inside their 

conventional box and not always able to see all the possibilities outside the 

conventional box, ignore opportunities and use all resources, including SOF, 

only to accomplish tasks inside the conventional box. The conventional commanders’ fear is that SOF define their appropriate missions so narrowly that 

they become irrelevant and sit around forever, doing nothing, while waiting 

for the perfect task which never comes.49 In this argument each side has a 

valid point but in making it they need to avoid losing sight of the equally 

valid concerns on the other side. 

Based on the outside the box visualizations presented in the figures above, 

instances when conventional forces have undertaken special operations can 

be understood as the result of either defining conventional operations too 

narrowly, or putting too many resources in the conventional box and having 

inadequate resources left over for special operations outside that box. This 

was, arguably, the case in 2001 (fig. 5) and the problem was partially corrected 

by 2008 (fig. 6) through a redefinition of “conventional” facilitated by small, 

preexisting SOF that could share their expertise with conventional forces. 

But what about special operations that are conducted by conventional forces 

on a temporary, ad hoc basis and do not result in a standing SOF capability 

If the task and method 

of execution are conventional, they remain 

conventional, regardless 

of whether the task is 

performed by SOF or 

conventional forces.
33

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

to perform that mission? What do such cases tell us about the relationship 

between SOF and special operations? These questions are best answered by 

considering several cases where a special operation did, and did not, result 

in a standing SOF capability. 

Let’s start with the ancient Greek myth of the Trojan Horse. The myth 

claims that after a ten-year siege of Troy, the Greek besiegers built a huge, 

hollow, wooden horse, filled it with their best soldiers (elite forces), while 

the rest of the army boarded their ships and moved out of sight of Troy. 

They then conducted an elaborate deception and psychological operation 

to convince the Trojans that the Greeks had fled and that the horse should 

be dragged inside the walls of Troy. (This psychological operation was so 

successful that the Trojan Horse was incorporated into the crest of the U.S. 

Army Psychological Operations Command and remains part of the crest now 

that the command has been renamed the U.S. Army Military Information 

Support Operations Command.) The Trojans dragged the horse inside the 

city, and that night, as they got appropriately drunk celebrating their triumph 

after ten long years of war, the Greek heroes snuck out of the horse, hacked 

and stabbed their way to the city gates, opened the gates, and allowed the 

rest of the Greek army to enter and sack the city. 

The Trojan Horse was an extremely high risk operation. If the Trojans 

had not dragged the huge wooden statue inside the city, but had instead surrounded it with their army and set it on fire, the Greeks inside would have 

been rapidly exterminated. This would certainly have doomed the Greeks’ 

efforts to conquer Troy. Furthermore, given the political prominence of the 

Greek heroes inside the horse, their deaths would almost certainly have 

caused simultaneous political revolutions 

in city states all over Greece. For our purposes, the key fact is that the Trojan Horse 

was a ruse that could only work once. 

Anyone who had heard the story of the 

horse would immediately set fire to any 

giant wooden statue the Greeks might leave in the future, so it could not be 

the basis for institutionalized SOF capable of perfecting and repeating the 

techniques used in that operation. 

The famous “Doolittle Raid” was another special operation that did not 

result in a standing SOF element designed to repeat its performance.50 To 

review the history of the raid, immediately after the humiliating U.S. defeat 

For our purposes, the key 

fact is that the Trojan Horse 

was a ruse that could only 

work once.
34

JSOU Report 17-4

at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) the U.S. was very impatient to strike back 

at Japan, particularly at Tokyo. However, the U.S. had no airbases remotely 

within range of Tokyo and could not risk bringing its few aircraft carriers 

close enough to Japan to attack Tokyo with the short-range Navy planes 

designed for carrier operations. The solution was to protect the aircraft carriers by launching the planes from farther away. Since normal Navy planes 

lacked the range, U.S. Army medium bombers were modified to increase 

their range and launch off an aircraft carrier. The catch was that the medium 

bombers could not land on aircraft carriers and would have to try to land 

in China and find their own way home from there. James Doolittle, then a 

Lieutenant Colonel, led the raid on Tokyo which took place in April 1942.51 

The raid did minimal physical damage to Japan but had a significant psychological impact in both Japan and the U.S., and the carriers survived to 

fight in subsequent battles. All the aircraft were lost, but most of the crews 

survived. (Doolittle received the Congressional Medal of Honor and went 

on to become a Lieutenant General and command the Eighth Air Force 

bombing Germany.) The minimal damage inflicted on Japan, the 100 percent 

loss rate for aircraft participating in the raid, and the enormous risk to the 

aircraft carriers if the U.S. tried to repeat the stunt, all conspired to make the 

Doolittle Raid a one-and-done operation. There was no point in building a 

training pipeline to institutionalize the production of Doolittle Raiders (i.e. 

create standing SOF based on the Doolittle model) because the Doolittle 

Raid was not a model the U.S. wanted to repeat. 

The case of the Night Stalkers (160th SOAR) was the opposite of the Greek 

heroes and the Doolittle Raiders. From November 1979 until January 1981 

American Embassy staff were held hostage in Iran. In response, conventional 

U.S. Army helicopter personnel created a temporary, ad hoc organization 

to develop the equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures to facilitate a 

rescue attempt. The U.S. launched a rescue mission, but it used longer-range 

Marine helicopters and failed due to problems with the helicopters.52 Rescue 

planning ceased when the hostages were released, but the U.S. Army was 

left with a question: Should it institutionalize a special operations helicopter 

force so that one would be available for future special operations, or should it 

shut down the existing effort and start from scratch if another contingency 

occurred? The U.S. Army decided to institutionalize a special operations 

helicopter capability which has become the 160th SOAR.53
35

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

What was the difference? Why did the somewhat successful Doolittle 

Raid not lead to institutionalized SOF, while the failed Iran hostage rescue 

mission, and efforts to prepare for additional rescue attempts that never 

took place, led to an entire regiment? The issue was whether there was an 

enduring requirement for the new capability. Institutionalizing the Doolittle 

Raid capability did not make sense because the risk versus reward calculations for repeating that raid were not promising and there were other, more 

promising means of fighting Japan. On the other hand, in 1981, the recent 

U.S. failure to rescue hostages from Iran might make hostage-taking look like 

an attractive option for those who opposed U.S. foreign policy. This made a 

hostage rescue capability look like a handy tool to have, and helicopters were 

understood to be part of that capability, since they were the part that failed 

during the rescue attempt in Iran. However, making hostage rescue a mission 

for conventional U.S. forces (i.e., expanding the conventional box to include 

hostage rescue) did not make sense, since hostage rescue operations required 

extensive specialized training and would never require a large percentage 

of the entire U.S. Army helicopter fleet. The solution was to institutionalize 

the capability, but not incorporate it into the conventional force, i.e. create 

standing SOF with the required capability.

As these examples demonstrate, deciding whether or not to institutionalize a new and different “special” capability is highly-dependent on the 

details of the specific special operation and the institution’s expectations 

about future challenges. The cases above differ in the repeatability of the 

specific operation, but the same operation might be a repeatable model for 

some institutions, at some times, but not repeatable for other institutions at a 

different time. For example, the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo in 1902 was one 

of the most successful special operations in U.S. history, but it did not lead 

to a standing SOF capability whereas similar operations did lead to standing SOF in other cases. From 1899 until 1902 Aguinaldo led the Philippine 

insurrection against U.S. occupation of the Philippines following the 1898 

Spanish - American War. In the spring of 1902, Brigadier General Frederick 

Funston and a small group of his officers captured Aguinaldo by pretending 

to be prisoners of their own Filipino scouts who were in turn pretending 

to be guerrillas. As guerrilla reinforcements bringing back captured U.S. 

Army officers, the group was able to enter Aguinaldo’s camp, meet with him, 

and capture him. The Philippine Insurrection was nearly defeated by 1902. 
36

JSOU Report 17-4

Aguinaldo’s capture, and his subsequent agreement to give up the fight and 

encourage his followers to surrender, pretty much ended the insurrection.54 

Funston’s action was clearly a special operation, since the elaborate ruse 

was well outside the normal conduct of U.S. military operations at the time, 

but it was seen by the U.S. Army as a one-time-only attempt to capture a 

uniquely important target and it did not lead to institutionalized SOF capable 

of repeating this success. However, about forty-five years later, faced with the 

Huk Rebellion, the newly independent Philippine government institutionalized a small special operations unit known as Force X to conduct “false-flag” 

operations like Funston’s by pretending to be anti-government insurgents.55

The Rhodesians went even further and built a 1,500 man force, the Selous 

Scouts, to conduct their “false-flag” or “pseudo” operations in the 1970s.56

Why did the U.S. Army not feel the need to institutionalize this sort of 

special operations force in the Philippines in 1902 while the Filipino security 

forces institutionalized them on a small scale in 1948 and the Rhodesian 

security forces institutionalized them on a much larger scale in 1973?57 A 

vast number of reasons come to mind but certainly one critical difference 

was that the U.S. Army was finishing a COIN campaign in 1902 whereas the 

Filipinos in 1948, and especially the Rhodesians in 1973, understood that they 

might be at the beginning of long COIN fights and would have a continuing 

need for this type of special operations capability. (The Huk Insurrection 

did not end until 1955 and the Rhodesians eventually lost their war in 1980.) 

Thus there is no inherent connection between the “specialness” of the 

mission and the creation of standing SOF to conduct that mission. Instead, 

the decision on whether or not to institutionalize a particular kind of SOF, 

i.e. create a standing force to conduct a particular type of special operation, 

is based on the perceived enduring need for that capability. For one-timeonly missions, a nation will typically have to create an ad hoc force after the 

mission is identified, just as the Greeks did with their Horse outside Troy, 

and Doolittle did with his Raiders.58 For enduring missions, like helicopter 

infiltration deep into enemy territory, a standing special operations force, 

like the 160th SOAR, might be created. If, when the new mission appears, 

there are no standing special operations forces with appropriate skills, then 

the troops who conduct the unique special operation will be drawn from the 

forces that do exist, and since most available forces are conventional forces, 

they may be given the special mission. But the special operation is special 

because it is outside the conventional box, regardless of whether the troops 
37

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

who conduct it are conventional or SOF and regardless of whether permanent 

SOF are created to conduct similar missions in the future. 

One additional nuance in the relationship between standing SOF and 

special operations needs to be captured. It will be considered through the 

example of 617 Squadron of the British Royal Air Force in World War II. The 

squadron was organized, trained, and equipped in early 1943 for the famous 

“Dam Busters” mission, code named Operation Chastise. The squadron used 

heavily modified aircraft to approach the dams from the lake side with each 

aircraft dropping a single bomb from an altitude of 60 feet and a speed of 

220-240 miles per hour. The bomb, code name Upkeep, was a unique cylindrical design, five feet long and weighing more than 9,000 lbs. It was dropped 

with a backspin of 500 revolutions per minute and designed to bounce several times before reaching the dam and then sinking to the desired depth, 

in contact with the dam, so that the water behind the dam would enhance 

the explosive effect on the dam. The mission was a success destroying two 

major dams in the Ruhr Valley, but the weapon and tactics were never used 

again and eight of the nineteen bombers were lost with their entire crews.59

Operation Chastise was thus a classic one-and-done special operation 

and 617 Squadron, like the Doolittle Raiders, was an ad hoc SOF element 

created for a single mission out of volunteers from the larger conventional 

force.60 The Royal Air Force (RAF) could have disbanded 617 Squadron after 

the mission, and that was considered. Instead, the RAF decided to keep the 

617 Squadron as a standing SOF element to conduct other special operations 

for the RAF that required unique weapons and tactics. The experience of 617 

Squadron is far from unique since SOF elements established for one type of 

special operation often see their roles expand as new types of special operations emerge. (For example, U.S. Army Special Forces were established to 

conduct UW but soon saw their mission expand into COIN.)

Implications for those Leading SOF 

The outside the box theory of special operations, as laid out in figures 1 

through 6, has some interesting implications for the personnel who lead 

and conduct special operations. The first is that the people who volunteer to 

join the special operations community have decided to join the DOD, but 

have also volunteered to be members of the small force that does unusual 

things rather than the much larger conventional force that does what DOD 
38

JSOU Report 17-4

considers normal and important things. Such people are thus conformist 

enough to join, and remain in DOD, but too non-conformist to be happy 

at the center of what DOD considers its main tasks. They are likely to have 

atypical views within the DOD and will thus add a different perspective to 

any team of conventional planners they join. Such people are also likely to 

be unusually independent minded, highly motivated, and perhaps stubborn, 

since they chose not to be a part of the conventional forces that the DOD 

focuses its resources on. Thus people who volunteer for special operations 

are likely to be unusually imaginative and creative, but may also be less 

cooperative when they disagree with a course of action.61

People who choose a life in special operations are choosing to be near 

the edges of DOD rather than the center. Such a choice suggests that they 

are not entirely comfortable in DOD but also suggests they may be more 

comfortable than their conventional peers when working with foreign governments and other U.S. government agencies. Out on the fringes of DOD, 

in special operations, everything is likely to be less structured than it is at 

the conventional center. People who choose to work where the bureaucratic 

structures are weaker and the rules and regulations are less clear are likely 

to be people who are unusually comfortable dealing with unstructured problems, in situations of high uncertainty, with only vague guidance. They are 

probably also self-motivated enough to work hard without the expectation 

that their performance, good or bad, will receive much attention from the 

institution. This may make them less sensitive to the rewards and punishments that motivate conventional forces and their leaders may have to find 

other, more unconventional means to motivate them.

In short, the people who volunteer for special operations training and 

assignment are likely to have strengths and weakness that do not match 

those of their conventional peers. Leading them will likely involve somewhat 

different challenges from the challenges of leading conventional forces, or 

elite forces that perform conventional operations. Understanding the outside 

the box diagram helps us predict some of these challenges and the previous 

paragraphs have attempted to do so. 

Figure 5 (depicting different types of special operations) suggests that 

even though we may be able to predict some general characteristics of people 

who volunteer for special operations units, the field of special operations 

consists of a wide variety of different sub-specialties that might attract very 

different sorts of people. The common characteristic across SOF is only that 
39

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

the operators have chosen not to focus on conventional operations, beyond 

that they may have very little else in common. This means that leading a 

Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) 

combining many different tribes of SOF 

might appear to pose the challenge of 

leading several groups with incompatible 

cultures. However, it might actually pose 

the very different challenge of leading 

groups that are good at concealing their 

actual cultures within a larger, potentially 

hostile culture. For example, a small SOF 

element working with a foreign army, or a large conventional task force, will 

only be effective if it can assimilate with the much larger cultural context it 

finds itself in. However, it will simultaneously work diligently and quietly 

to maintain its own internal culture. Convincing these disparate groups to 

pursue the commander’s goals might be unusually challenging since they 

are uncommonly adept at pursuing their own goals while paying lip service 

to the goals of their superiors and the larger institution. 

Conclusion

The outside the box theory of special operations starts from a definition of 

special as different, not merely specialized and not necessarily elite. It proceeds to define military special operations as different from conventional 

operations. Specifically: “military special operations are military operations outside the conventional operations box.” This definition is depicted 

as a large circle containing all the operations the military can, and should 

conduct, and a small box within that circle depicting conventional operations. By definition, military special operations are everything inside the 

military operations circle but outside the conventional box. This theory sees 

special operations not as niche capabilities within the conventional box but 

expansively, as everything outside the conventional box, out to the limits 

of military responsibilities and authorities. Special operations can support 

conventional operations directly, but their most important role is to cover all 

the tasks the military must be prepared to accomplish that are not conventional, i.e., outside the box. In so doing, robust special operations capabilities 

indirectly support conventional capabilities by allowing the military to use a 

The common characteristic 

across SOF is only that the 

operators have chosen not 

to focus on conventional 

operations, beyond that they 

may have very little else in 

common.
40

JSOU Report 17-4

tighter definition of conventional operations and thus achieve higher levels 

of proficiency in those operations by focusing on fewer tasks. 

The theory explicitly recognizes that the edges of the military circle 

expand and contract as military responsibilities and authorities change over 

time, and that the conventional box within that circle also changes its size 

and shape as the definition of conventional operations evolves. The visualization makes it obvious that special operations will be extremely sensitive 

to changes in the size and shape of the circle and that out at the edges of 

military authorities and responsibilities, special operations will frequently 

overlap with the activities of other U.S. government agencies, and with the 

activities of friendly foreign and non-governmental actors. Special operations will also be extremely sensitive to changes in the size and shape of the 

conventional box since special operations expands when the conventional 

box shrinks, and special operations roles and missions become conventional 

operations when the conventional box expands. 

The outside the box theory of special operations provides a new vantage 

point from which to view and understand special operations, conventional 

operations, special operations forces, conventional forces, and the relationships among them. It also provides a clear understanding of how these relationships evolve. (See fig. 5 and 6 comparing 2001 and 2008). It does this by 

abandoning the search for a single, ideal special operation and embracing 

both the inherent diversity of special operations and evolving definitions of 

conventional and special. 
41

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

Appendix: Outside the Box vs. Other 

Theories of Special Operations

The previous pages explained the outside the box theory of special operations. The explanation included some passing references to other theories but kept that discussion to a minimum in the interest of brevity and to 

maintain the focus on outside the box. In order to do justice to the previous 

theories it is important to mention here that they have been invaluable to 

the current author and to the development of the outside the box theory. 

To advance the scholarly debate it is necessary to discuss where the new 

theory fits among the various existing attempts at a general theory of special 

operations. Though every book, article, and movie about special operations 

includes at least an implied theory of special operations, only a few authors 

have offered an explicit and general theory of special operations. Four of the 

most prominent are Navy Admiral (retired) William McRaven, Dr. Robert 

G. Spulak, Dr. Harry R. Yarger, and Dr. Richard Rubright. 

Admiral McRaven

Admiral William McRaven published the first explicit theory of special 

operations in his book Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice.

62 At the time of writing, Admiral McRaven was a 

mid-career Navy SEAL officer fully conversant with U.S. military doctrine 

and the writings of various military theorists, including Carl von Clausewitz. (Admiral McRaven went on to be a four-star Admiral and command 

USSOCOM.) Admiral McRaven developed his theory to answer an apparent 

paradox. Defense has an advantage over offense, and large forces have an 

advantage over small forces, and yet direct action raids sometimes succeed 

even though they involve small forces attacking larger forces. He builds his 

theory on eight detailed case studies of direct action missions (all but one of 

them a raid) and hopes, rather than proves, that his theory of direct action 

raids can be expanded to cover other types of special operations. 

The reflexive answer to the paradox that bothered Admiral McRaven 

is that the small direct action raiding force has the advantage of surprise 

on its side, and once it loses that advantage, the raiding force is likely to be 
42

JSOU Report 17-4

in serious trouble. Admiral McRaven went beyond this and developed a 

concept of “relative” superiority that is necessary for a “special operation” 

(really direct action) to succeed, and six “principles of special operations” 

that are key to developing relative superiority. His six principles are simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. He finds that “special 

operations forces are able to achieve relative superiority over the enemy if 

they prepare a simple plan, which is carefully concealed, repeatedly and 

realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose.”63

Admiral McRaven depicted relative superiority on a graph with time as 

the X-axis, probability of success as the Y-axis, and relative superiority being 

the horizontal line representing 50 percent chance of success (see fig. 7).64 

The probability of successful mission completion changes over time and is 

drawn on the graph. Admiral McRaven acknowledges that the moment when 

the clock starts on this relative superiority graph is somewhat arbitrary but 

he starts it from the moment the raid force reaches the first enemy defenses 

and calls this point the “point of vulnerability.” His graph leads Admiral 

McRaven to focus on the area above the probability of success line which he 

Probability

of

Mission

Completion

Point

of

Vulnerability

(PV)

Relative Superiority

Achieved

Mission

Complete

Relative Superiority

Line (RS Line)

Key Events

During Mission

Time

(Hours)

1 2 3 4 5 6

Relative Superiority Graph

Figure 7. McRaven's Concept of Relative Superiority 
43

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

calls the “area of vulnerability.” If the raiding force can shrink this area of 

vulnerability, its probability of success improves. He points to three ways to 

shrink the area of vulnerability. The first is to move the point of vulnerability 

up by improving infiltration methods so that the force is closer to relative 

superiority before it becomes vulnerable to the enemy. The second way to 

shrink the area of vulnerability is to achieve relative superiority sooner. 

The third way to shrink the area of vulnerability is to complete the mission 

sooner, perhaps by changing the objective to one that can be achieved more 

quickly.65 The graph is also helpful because it emphasizes the moment when 

relative superiority is achieved, i.e. when the probability of success becomes 

greater than 50 percent. This is the critical moment and special operations 

planners can use this graph to help identify the critical actions that gain 

relative superiority so that those actions can receive the extra attention they 

deserved and not get lost among the less important items that clutter the 

execution check list. 

As already mentioned, the most obvious weakness of Admiral McRaven’s 

theory for special operations is that it really only applies to direct action raids 

and is much less helpful to other special operations such as CA, COIN, FID, 

MISO, etc.66 For example, speed and surprise are great principles for direct 

action but may be virtually impossible in CA and FID activities that can 

continue for years. Furthermore, in claiming that his theory is a theory of 

special operations he implies that all surprise attacks by small forces against 

larger defending forces are special operations when in fact such operations 

can be, and often are, a routine part of conventional operations. A further 

weakness is that this theory focuses only on single operations that can be 

rapidly completed. It has nothing to say about campaigns involving a series of 

operations arranged and conducted in a way that achieves a larger objective, 

and most operations (whether conventional or special) achieve their greatest 

operational and strategic results within a campaign rather than in isolation. 

(To his credit, Admiral McRaven has acknowledged these weaknesses.) 

On its own terms, as a theory of direct action, Admiral McRaven’s theory 

has one major weakness and that is his assumption that large-scale conventional reinforcements will not be available to back up a raid force that gets 

in over its head. He states that: “If relative superiority is lost, it is difficult 

to regain” and “An inherent weakness in special forces [sic] is their lack of 

firepower relative to a large conventional force. Consequently when they lose 

relative superiority, they lose the initiative, and the stronger form of warfare 
44

JSOU Report 17-4

generally prevails.”67 He uses the example of the British commandos who had 

to surrender at Saint-Nazaire to prove this point, but their experience was 

not universal. For example, in the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

direct action raids have routinely been backed up by conventional airpower 

and reaction forces capable of regaining relative superiority, and that was 

the case in Vietnam as well. It fact, it happened so often in Vietnam that 

SOF actually got a reputation for dragging conventional forces into fights 

by getting in trouble and needing help (i.e. losing relative superiority and 

requiring conventional assistance to extricate themselves). 

This flaw in Admiral McRaven’s theory would be of only academic interest 

except that in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, Task Force RANGER conducted 

a direct action raid, made famous by the book and movie titled “Blackhawk 

Down,” in which it lost relative superiority and got pinned down inside the 

city. Eventually superior conventional forces were assembled and successfully 

extracted the task force, but the theoretical assumption that overwhelming 

conventional force would not be available to back up the raid force may have 

led to inadequate planning and coordination for such an eventuality. The 

loss of relative superiority by Task Force RANGER not only contributed to 

the loss of American lives but also contributed to the failure of the entire 

U.S. mission in Somalia with dramatic implications for Somalia, Africa, and 

the United States. Thus a weakness in the theory behind the operation (in 

this case that the raid force should conduct operations alone and not expect 

to bring in overwhelming conventional force the moment it lost relative 

superiority) led to a strategic failure that could have been avoided. Admiral 

McRaven’s theory did not explicitly drive Task Force RANGER’s operations (Admiral McRaven was in Monterey, California writing the thesis that 

explained his theory when the task force ran into trouble) but his theory was 

congruent with the task force’s failure to rapidly regain relative superiority 

by immediately bringing in the overwhelming conventional force that was 

available nearby. 

The outside the box theory is quite different from Admiral McRaven’s 

theory. Outside the box tries to understand special operations and SOF in 

terms of how they differ from the conventional. McRaven tries to explain 

how, when, and why a particular type of operation (direct action) succeeds 

in order to conduct such operations with more consistent success in the 

future. Thus outside the box provides no prescriptions comparable to Admiral McRaven’s “principles of special operations” or assessment tools like the 
45

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

relative superiority graph to explain success or failure but instead provides 

a larger umbrella theory of special operations 

under which theories like Admiral McRaven’s 

can address specific types of special operations. To make an analogy with the airpower 

theory mentioned earlier, outside the box is 

comparable to the general theory of airpower 

whereas the McRaven’s theory would correspond to a theory of close air support, i.e. one particular way of using certain 

airpower assets.

Spulak68

Dr. Robert G. Spulak’s theory of special operations was published a decade 

after Admiral McRaven’s. Spulak worked for Admiral McRaven and, according to Spulak, Admiral McRaven asked him “to think about a ‘theory’ for the 

employment of SOF to help guide [Admiral McRaven’s] visionary efforts to 

design Naval Special Warfare forces for the future.”69 The resulting theory 

accepts Admiral McRaven’s theory of special operations described above 

as a theory of direct action and attempts to “generalize this idea to provide 

a theory of SOF based on the enduring limitations of conventional forces, 

based in turn on the immutable nature of war itself.”70

Spulak states his theory on page 1. According to Spulak:

Special operations are missions to accomplish strategic objectives 

where the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable 

risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires 

special operations forces that directly address the ultimate source 

of friction through qualities that are the result of the distribution 

of the attributes of SOF personnel.71

He claims: (a) special operations accomplish strategic objectives, (b) special operations are those which Clausewitzian friction prevents conventional 

forces from conducting, and (c) that SOF are able to overcome Clausewitzian 

friction (and thus conduct these missions) because of “the distribution of 

attributes of SOF personnel.” His claim that special operations accomplish 

strategic objectives is more of a hope or a wish than a fact since special operations have often been directed at tactical or operational goals. For example, 

Outside the box tries 

to understand special 

operations and SOF in 

terms of how they differ 

from the conventional.
46

JSOU Report 17-4

SOF conducted many thousands of direct action raids in Iraq and virtually 

all of them were tactical. Like Admiral McRaven, Spulak also neglects campaigns in favor of single operations. (It can be argued that all those SOF raids 

in Iraq were part of a campaign to achieve strategic objectives, but the same 

can be said of tactical conventional operations and thus does not distinguish 

one from the other.) 

Spulak insists on a static definition of special operations and thus cannot 

define special operations by exclusion as operations that are not conventional 

since he sees improvements in conventional forces allowing them to take on 

missions that had previously been special operations. In his words, “special 

operations (and SOF) cannot theoretically be defined in terms of specific and 

unchanging missions, skills, or capabilities.”72 [emphasis and parenthetical 

in the original]. To retain a static definition of special operations he defines 

them as requiring “special men,” i.e. SOF, who can overcome Clausewitzian 

friction when others cannot. The result is a theory of special operations based 

on a theory of SOF and, according to Spulak, “a theory of SOF and a theory 

of special operations cannot be separated.”73

Spulak’s states: “It is not the missions that define special operations but 

rather the personnel” which threatens to become circular—special operations are whatever SOF does—but he avoids this by stressing that special 

operations are also tasks that conventional forces cannot perform. In his 

words: “If the conventional forces can accomplish the mission, it is time for 

SOF to move on.”74

Spulak explains that the key to understanding SOF is the “distribution 

of attributes” depicted in figure 8.75 He uses this graph to illustrate how SOF 

differ from conventional forces. This graph is a schematic representation 

rather than the plotting of empirical data (though he did draw the area under 

the SOF curve to be 3.8 percent of the area under the military curve, reflecting SOF’s approximate size within the U.S. military.) The graph assumes 

that everyone in the military has been tested and scored for some individual 

attribute for which SOF are selected and trained. The key point he is trying 

to get across is that the selection and training process gives SOF a much 

higher average score for that attribute, and a much narrower distribution of 

scores for that attribute. Therefore, even though conventional military forces 

contain plenty of people with high scores for the attribute in question, their 

average score is lower and their wide range of scores makes performance 

lower and much harder to predict, increasing risk and friction. This graph 
47

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

is a very helpful way of understanding the relationship between elite forces 

and the larger force from which they are drawn.

Spulak claims that the distribution of attributes depicted in figure 8 

explains why SOF can overcome friction and conventional forces cannot. 

Spulak (following Barry Watts) lists three “ultimate sources of friction: (a) 

constraints imposed by human physical and cognitive limits, (b) informational uncertainties and unforeseeable differences between perceived and 

actual reality, and (c) the structural nonlinearity of combat processes.” 

Spulak lists three characteristics of SOF that enable them to overcome these 

three sources of friction. To cope with the first source of friction, SOF are 

“elite warriors” who can exceed the physical and cognitive limits typical of 

conventional forces. To overcome the second source of friction, SOF are also 

“flexible” which enables SOF to deal better with “uncertainties” and differences between perception and reality, than conventional forces. Finally, to 

surmount the third source of friction SOF are “creative” which enables them 

to exploit the unpredictability and “nonlinearity” of combat and also create 

more friction for the enemy.76 For Spulak, SOF are both different (due to 

superior flexibility and creativity) and elite. 

Spulak’s emphasis on friction is an interesting and valuable advance 

on Admiral McRaven’s theory which mentions friction only in passing. 

"Score" for some individual attribute

Number with that score

Military

SOF

Figure 8. Spulak's distribution of attributes
48

JSOU Report 17-4

Focusing on the Clausewitzian idea of friction appears to have the advantage 

of immediately joining his theory to centuries of previous military thought. 

But, on closer examination his claim that SOF are relatively immune to friction seems to parallel the outside the box theory in suggesting that centuries 

of theories of conventional operations have limited utility in understanding 

special operations. 

Focusing on the three “ultimate sources of friction” he borrows from 

Barry Watts leads Spulak to understate the role of size in friction and thus 

give up one of his best arguments. Anyone who has grabbed the car keys 

and dashed out to the store (very little friction), and also arranged a multifamily, multi-generational picnic, with pets (plenty of friction), understands 

that doing anything with a larger force is more challenging than doing the 

same thing with a smaller force, even if the same people are involved. And 

the same holds true for flexibility. (Compare the small challenge of adding an 

extra stop to your trip to the store with the much larger challenge of changing the time and place of the multi-family picnic.) Note that the advantage 

small groups have over large groups holds for both friction and flexibility, 

even if the attributes of the members of the small group are the same as 

those of the larger group. Since SOF operate in much smaller units than 

conventional forces, SOF would enjoy significantly less friction and greater 

flexibility than conventional forces even if the “distribution of attributes” 

were identical. Unfortunately, Spulak ignores this point.

Spulak’s theory is weakened by an inadequate examination of what he 

means by “elite warriors.” For example, in an Air Force fighter squadron, the 

elite warriors would include pilots who can stay in formation while conducting radical maneuvers involving high G-forces. On the other hand, AC-130s, 

the classic Air Force SOF aircraft, do not fly in formation and do not perform 

high-G maneuvers. In short, the skills of AC-130 crews (SOF) seem to be 

different from those of fighter pilots rather than better, i.e. special but not 

elite. In terms of the “distribution of attributes” Spulak emphasizes, the skills 

of the AC-130 pilots do not obviously represent the far right portion of the 

graph of the skills of all pilots of strike aircraft. Even within SOF, the nature 

of an organization’s elite-ness varies. For example, Air Force Pararescuemen 

(PJs) and Navy SEALs clearly have elite swimming skills. They are selected 

and trained for these skills and it is clearly part of their elite-ness, but SOF 

aviators do not have comparable swimming skills. Is SOF elite-ness closely 

connected with swimming skills (as the SEALs and PJs might claim) or 
49

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

nearly unrelated to swimming skills (as the aviators might claim)? If there 

are different types of elite-ness which overcome different human physical 

and cognitive limitations, then the “elite warrior” aspect of SOF is much 

more complicated than Spulak’s graph suggests. 

The claim that SOF are uniquely flexible and creative also requires closer 

examination than Spulak offers. As mentioned above, flexibility is related to 

the size of the organization at least as much as the attributes of the personnel 

inside the organization. The same can be said for creativity. For example, 

many highly flexible and creative small firms become much less flexible and 

creative when they become big firms, even if the characteristics of the people 

inside the firm do not change. Spulak seems to short change the flexibility 

and creativity of conventional forces. For example, he acknowledges that, as 

technology and techniques are disseminated, conventional forces can take 

on missions that were formerly special operations, but does not acknowledge 

the flexibility conventional forces show in rapidly adopting new equipment, 

tactics, and techniques. As for creativity, the development of amphibious 

doctrine, aircraft carrier doctrine, and airpower doctrine between the first 

and second world wars showed enormous creativity. And it was done by conventional Marines, sailors, and airmen. This same creativity was also visible 

among the Army officers who developed air assault doctrine between Korea 

and Vietnam, and their successors who developed Air-Land Battle doctrine 

after Vietnam. In all these cases, conventional forces showed remarkable 

creativity, contrary to what Spulak’s theory suggests.

Spulak’s theory has an obvious appeal to SOF personnel. SOF love being 

told they are elite warriors who overcome normal human physical and cognitive limitations, and demonstrate flexibility and creativity conventional 

forces cannot match. Furthermore, Spulak tells SOF they are the only ones 

who can conduct special operations. But SOF must be careful of ideas that 

appeal to egos, and outside the box is a less complimentary, but more accurate, theory. 

The outside the box theory captures the difference between special and 

elite that Spulak misses. Spulak’s focus on elite-ness implies a ratchet effect 

where special operations may become conventional, but conventional operations may not become special operations (unless conventional forces become 

radically less capable). The outside the box theory, on the other hand, allows 

missions to move back and forth between special and conventional operations, as CA, COIN, security assistance, and other missions have. Outside the 
50

JSOU Report 17-4

box also offers more useful suggestions for leading SOF than Spulak provides. 

For example, the narrow range of abilities Spulak posits for SOF implies 

fewer leadership challenges with SOF than with conventional forces whereas 

outside the box more accurately suggests different leadership challenges.

Yarger77

Dr. Harry R. Yarger, writing after Admiral McRaven and Dr. Spulak, was certainly influenced by their ideas but he had a different goal. Admiral McRaven believed he was providing something new and explaining the theory of 

special operations.78 (He subsequently came to accept that his theory was not 

as powerful as he had at first hoped.) Spulak was trying to achieve Admiral 

McRaven’s original goal with an eye on how SOF (particularly U.S. Navy 

SOF) should evolve. Yarger wrote 21st Century SOF: Toward an American 

Theory of Special Operations after a 2011 Joint Special Operations University 

workshop titled “SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art.” His goal was to assemble in one place the 

collective wisdom of the entire special operations community. He does not 

claim to offer anything dramatically new and different, but instead his “definitions and 26 premises and 14 principles encapsulate what American special 

operations and SOF are and how they function together in an American 

model to serve national security.”79 His hope is that this will provide “the 

foundation for a unified theory and school of thought for American special 

operations.80

Unfortunately, Yarger’s definitions are unconvincing. After reviewing historic U.S. military definitions of special operations, he laments the 

inconsistencies and ambiguities among them and advocates a simple solution: “simply accepting that only SOF conduct special operations as the U.S. 

military defines them.”81 The first sentence of his 189-word definition of special operations is: “Military operations conducted by Special Operations 

Forces.”82 This would appear to be both inaccurate and unhelpful. Inaccurate 

because SOF can and do conduct conventional operations, and conventional 

forces can and do conduct special operations. Unhelpful because defining 

special operations as whatever SOF happen to do makes SOF, rather than 

special operations, the subject of study in a book offering a theory of special operations rather than SOF. He tries to solve the first problem by stating: “conventional forces may be called upon to conduct special missions 
51

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

that require unique preparation and arrangements, but ‘special operations’ 

involve SOF.” This implies that “special missions” can only be conducted 

by conventional forces, since anything SOF does automatically becomes a 

“special operation” instead of a “special mission.” Unfortunately he does 

not explain the difference between a “special mission” (conducted only by 

conventional forces) and a “special operation” (conducted only by SOF). This 

leaves his definition at best confusing and incomplete and puts all the onus 

for understanding special operations onto his definition of SOF. His definition of SOF repeats the definition found in the DOD Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms. It states that SOF are: “Those Active and Reserve 

Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of 

Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and 

support special operations.” This creates a circular definition in which special 

operations are military operations conducted by SOF, and SOF are forces 

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations. The noncircular aspect is his insistence that SOF are “designated by the secretary of 

defense.” This seems unhelpful and overly legalistic. It implies that no form 

of special operation can exist until the Secretary of Defense designates a 

force to conduct that type of operation, and also designates the force to be 

SOF. On the whole, Yarger’s definitions appear over-long and do not seem 

to advance our understanding.

Yarger goes on to list his 26 premises, or propositions, for American 

SOF. He claims that “collectively the offered premises explain the whole of 

American special operations and SOF from a theoretical perspective, and 

that the 26 premises are inclusive, and that each premise is required.”83 In 

this his ambition seems truly breathtaking, and we should not be surprised 

if he falls a bit short. His premises are:

1. Special operations represent a distinct military capability of strategic 

value to national security.

2. Special operations have strategic utility.

3. SOF are an instrument of military power.

4. SOF are part of the larger American military profession and subject 

to the obligations of the profession to the nation.
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JSOU Report 17-4

5. Special operations and SOF exist on the cutting edge of change and 

continuity in the security environment.

6. Military special operations can be conducted unilaterally, in support 

of, or supported by conventional, interagency, whole of government, 

and coalition operations, or in concert with all of the above.

7. SOF and conventional capabilities are complementary, integrative, 

and mutually supportive.

8. Natural tensions exist between special operations and SOF and the 

greater American political system and conventional military.

9. Special operations and SOF evolve over time according to strategic 

context.

10. Special operations and SOF are applicable at all the levels of war and 

interaction—strategic, operational, and tactical.

11. Special operations missions are defined by the strategic, operational, 

and tactical contexts.

12. Special operations and SOF’s relative value increase as direct strategic 

utility is approached.

13. Special operations can be conducted overtly, covertly, clandestinely, 

or mixtures thereof; however, any choice is associated with potential 

political, legal, moral, and operational risks.

14. SOF organizational culture champions creativity, adaptability, flexibility, competency, and performance in SOF personnel and organizations.

15. Special operations are enhanced by selectivity in personnel, expressed 

in the SOF Truth that quality is better than quantity.

16. The proficiency of SOF personnel and the applicability of special 

operations are enhanced by the degree of cross-cultural competence 

of the forces involved.

17. Special operations are enhanced by horizontal and particular organizational structures and practices.

18. Special operations are enhanced by selectivity in technology and 

equipment.
53

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

19. Special operations make use of and are dependent on enablers.

20. Special operations benefit from diversity within SOF and among 

enablers.

21. Special operations inform and improve conventional forces.

22. Special operations depend on vertical, horizontal, and competency 

hierarchies, and their simultaneous interaction, to achieve mission 

success.

23. Special operations success centers on the human aspects of warfare.

24.Extraordinary relationships exist between SOF and intelligence activities, other interagency organizations, and multinational partners.

25. In special operations, an organization’s effectiveness is inversely proportional to the complexity of the organization’s size, structure, and 

mechanisms of control.

26.Organizations dedicated to special operations are inherently 

precarious.

His claim that all 26 are necessary seems overstated. For example, premise 1 (Special operations represent a distinct military capability of strategic 

value to national security) seems to imply premises 2 and 3 (Special operations have strategic utility, and SOF are an instrument of military power). 

He also neglects the apparent tensions between competing premises. For 

example, premise 15 (Special operations are enhanced by selectivity in personnel, expressed in the SOF Truth that quality is better than quantity) is in 

obvious tension with premise 20 (Special operations benefit from diversity 

within SOF and among enablers) since a larger group, not selected for specific attributes is less SOF-like (according to premise 15) but will produce 

greater diversity (a requirement according to premise 20). He calls into question his claim that the 26 premises “explain the whole of American special 

operations and SOF” by following them with an additional 14 “principles of 

special operations.” 

Yarger’s principles of special operations, like the principles of war, are 

supposed to lead to success when followed and explain failure when they 

are ignored. Yarger’s principles of special operations are listed as follows:
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JSOU Report 17-4

1. Relative superiority

2. Direct action

3. Purpose

4. Understanding

5. Initiative

6. Surprise

7. Simplicity

8. Security

9. Risk management

10. Warrior ethos

11. Mobility

12. Integrated operation

13. Asymmetrical operations

14. Preparedness

Yarger borrows his first principle, relative superiority, from Admiral 

McRaven. However, McRaven sees relative superiority as the goal that his 

six principles of special operations (simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, 

speed, and purpose) achieve. Yarger, on the other hand, sees relative superiority as another principle alongside and separate from simplicity, security, 

surprise, and purpose. His decision to summarize each precept in a single 

sentence and each principle in one or two words makes the two lists appear 

less similar than they actually are. For example, he lists “asymmetric operations” as a principle but instead he could easily list the same idea as a precept 

such as “special operations achieve success through asymmetric operations.” 

The precepts and principles are sometimes overlapping making one of them 

redundant. For example, precept 23 (Special operations success centers on 

the human aspects of warfare) seems awfully similar to principle 10 (warrior ethos) because he says “Warrior ethos is the ability to capitalize on the 

human dimension in warfare.”84 
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Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

Overall, Yarger’s 26 precepts and 14 principles represent his attempt to 

summarize the collective wisdom of the entire special operations community. These 40 ideas include a lot of good sense, but in his effort to be 

comprehensive Yarger has included some redundancy and some unexamined conflicts between his various ideas. The result is a somewhat ungainly 

compilation based on an unsatisfactory definition of special operations as 

military operations conducted by forces designated as SOF by the Secretary 

of Defense. His insistence on a hard distinction between special missions and 

special operations, and his failure to define the difference, leaves the reader 

profoundly uncertain as to exactly what Yarger means by special operations. 

Rubright85 

The most recent effort to publish an explicit theory of special operations 

comes from Dr. Richard Rubright in his 2017 monograph A Unified Theory 

For Special Operations. His goal is to provide “a theory that is holistic in 

nature, timeless, focused solely upon special operations, and serves as an 

umbrella framework for other theories about 

special operations and Special Operations 

Forces.”86 Rubright offers a “lexical semantic” theory (i.e. one focused on the definitions of words). Since the term “special 

operations” does not include or necessarily 

imply the term “military,” he believes that his lexical semantic theory applies 

to all “special operations” by any organization, not merely military special 

operations. In this he is even more ambitious than Spulak. 

Rubright claims to offer “the first comprehensive theory of special operations” and, given the weaknesses of the theories mentioned above, he is 

probably correct. His theory focuses on a one-sentence definition of special 

operations. According to Rubright, “special operations are extraordinary 

operations to achieve a specific effect.”87 This definition is radically different 

from those used by Admiral McRaven, Spulak, and Yarger, and this is what 

makes it more comprehensive. Rubright’s definition is similar to, but not 

identical with, the definition used in the outside the box theory. Specifically, 

both Rubright and the outside the box theory rely on a negative definition, 

i.e., defining “special operations” in relation to what they are not. Rubright 

says they are “extraordinary,” which can only be understood in opposition 

Rubright offers a “lexical 

semantic” theory (i.e. one 

focused on the definitions 

of words).
56

JSOU Report 17-4

to whatever was “ordinary” for that organization, at that time. Outside the 

box defines “special operations” as different from “conventional operations.”

Rubright defines special in opposition to “ordinary” (i.e., as “extraordinary”) rather than in opposition to “conventional” in order to make his 

theory applicable to non-military contexts where the term “conventional” is 

rarely used. Rubright concedes that “special operations are simply unusual 

when compared to conventional operations” but does so only once.88 The 

frequent repetition of “extraordinary” and the single mention that this means 

“unusual when compared to conventional” leaves his theory open to misinterpretation and confusion. After all, in the common use of the term, a conventional operation can be extraordinarily large, and hence extraordinary; 

and a particular type of special operation could be conducted so routinely 

that it no longer seems particularly extraordinary. There are significant drawbacks to relying on the term “extraordinary” and this author believes that 

the term “conventional” captures what special operations are not, better than 

“extraordinary” captures what special operations are.

The term “extraordinary” immediately begs the question: extraordinary 

to whom? Interestingly, the exact same things that make something a special operation to one community might make it quite ordinary to another 

community. For example, a police SWAT unit will typically employ military 

equipment such as assault rifles and armored vehicles. These same pieces 

of equipment are special in a police context but entirely ordinary or conventional in a military context. This leads to the paradox that once one 

has standing SOF developing detailed doctrine and training intensively for 

specific types of special operations, and even conducting them routinely, 

those types of special operations would seem to stop being extraordinary 

for that standing SOF community. In fact, conventional operations would 

be extraordinary for the SOF community and special operations would be 

the normal and ordinary to them. 

Rubright does not pursue this line of inquiry but many friends of SOF 

and special operations worry that the existence of large, standing, and permanent SOF, with all the bureaucracy, doctrine, and institutionalization they 

require, makes special operations and SOF less special, and hence less effective. Jessica Turnley, for example, describes the challenge SOF face in Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream.

89 In a similar 

vein, Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, Army Major General James 

Linder, and Army Chief Warrant Officer 3 Ronald Dempsey felt it necessary 
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Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

to co-author a recent article defending the need for special operations doctrine against those who prefer a more ad lib approach.90 In Rubright’s terms, 

extraordinary operations have a certain inherent creativity, flexibility, and 

level of innovation that can never be matched by ordinary operations, conducted routinely, according to published official doctrine, by ponderous, 

bureaucratic structures. With USSOCOM commanding close to 70,000 

people, guided by volumes of joint and service doctrine, and conducting 

dozens of special operations every day in scores of foreign countries, special 

operations seem to be ordinary and normal for the USSOF community. Are 

they still “extraordinary,” and if not, what have we lost? 

None of the theories of special operations discussed in this paper directly 

addresses the potential costs of expanding and institutionalizing SOF. Admiral McRaven and Yarger do not acknowledge the issue. Spulak implies that 

the flexibility and creativity of SOF personnel will overcome any ossifying 

effects of institutionalization. Rubright sidesteps the issue by defining all 

special operations as “extraordinary” and hence not routine, ordinary, or 

mundane, regardless of how large the organization might be that conducts the special operation. The outside the box theory 

comes down in favor of institutionalization. 

It stresses the value of operations that are 

outside the conventional box and implies that a standing, professional SOF 

designed to conduct a particular type of special operation will outperform 

a more ad hoc force. 

Rubright uses an admirably brief definition. He says “special operations 

are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific effect.” But the second 

half of the definition is even less clear than the first. One would hope that 

all operations, not just special operations, are conducted to achieve some 

effect, and one suspects that the desired effect could be specified in a way 

that made it specific. Rubright claims that he is using “specific effect” because 

he believes SOF overstate their case when they claim to achieve “strategic 

effects.” He doubled the length of his definition by adding “to achieve a 

specific effect” and thus seems to imply that there must be “extraordinary 

operations” that are not special operations because they are conducted to 

achieve no effect, or an unspecific effect. Unfortunately, he does not provide 

examples of extraordinary operations that are not special operations and 

The outside the box theory 

comes down in favor of 

institutionalization.
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JSOU Report 17-4

without examples the reader is ultimately left uncertain what he gained by 

adding the “specific effect” clause to his definition.91

In direct opposition to Spulak and Yarger, Rubright emphasizes the difference between special operations and SOF, making it clear his theory is 

about special operations, not SOF. Rubright insists that, from the perspective 

of his theory, SOF “have nothing to do with special operations.”92 Spulak 

and Yarger, on the other hand, claim that SOF and special operations are 

inseparable. The outside the box theory takes a middle path. It recognizes 

that special operations can be conducted by non-SOF units, and that SOF can 

conduct conventional operations. However, outside the box also recognizes 

that SOF are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct specific special 

operations which means SOF have a connection with special operations. 

Rubright’s focus on the word “extraordinary” is congruent with the outside the box theory’s use of “special” to mean different rather than elite or 

specialized. However, Rubright insists that “special” only truly applies to 

the operations, not to SOF. In his view: “It is not the people conducting the 

mission [SOF] that are special; they are elite.”93 Outside the box, on the other 

hand, sees SOF as special and not necessarily elite. 

Conclusion

The summary of previous theories of special operations should demonstrate 

the enormous debt this author owes Admiral William McRaven, Dr. Spulak, 

Dr. Yarger, Dr. Rubright, and many others. This work has benefited enormously from both the strengths and weaknesses of their work and would 

have been impossible without their prior efforts. It is hoped that outside the 

box continues to advance and refine our understanding of special operations. The author also believes that the visualizations provided in figures 1-6 

provide a new perspective on special operations and their role in advancing 

national security. 
59

Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

Endnotes

1. Colin S. Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special 

Operations Succeed?” Parameters, Spring 1999.

2. Colin S. Gray, the author of the “handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures” quote 

later acknowledged that his title had misrepresented the full range of special 

operations. James Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy (London; New York: 

Routledge, 2006), xii.

3. A theory that is summarized by a picture may seem inherently less sophisticated 

than one summarized by an equation, but many powerful theories are best 

remembered through a visualization. For example, John Warden’s “Five Rings,” 

Abraham Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs,” and Benjamin Bloom’s “Taxonomy of 

Educational Objectives” are all best understood and presented in visual form.

4. For example, the vast majority of the special operations case studies William 

McRaven considers in his book Spec Ops (New York: Presidio, 1996), concern 

special operations conducted in support of conventional operations and attacking conventional targets like battleships and fortresses. James Kiras, in Special 

Operations and Strategy (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), makes the argument that special operations are most effective when conducted as campaigns, 

rather than single operations, and when those campaigns support conventional 

campaigns in achieving conventional objectives.

5. Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2007), takes this approach quite 

explicitly.

6. The four theories addressed in the Appendix are William McRaven, Spec Ops: Cast 

studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Presidio, 

1996); Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2007); Harry R. Yarger, 

21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (MacDill 

AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2013); and Richard Rubright, A Unified Theory of Special 

Operations (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2017).

7. Oddly, there are still a few old timers who insist that, because Title 10 U.S. Code 

only uses “special operations” as a noun only once, the term can only be used 

as an adjective and thus there are no special operations that need a theory. This 

view is disproved by the fact that Title 10 includes a use of “special operations” as 

a noun, and includes no legislation declaring that the term “special operations” 

can only be used as an adjective. This view also begs the question whether special 

operations, as adjective, noun, verb, or anything else, could have existed before it 

was mentioned in Title 10, U.S. Code, and what to do about all the other words 

that might not yet be included in Title 10, U.S. Code.

8. James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: ‘These Ideas Are Dangerous,’” 

Special Operations Journal, Volume 1, No. 2, 2015, pp. 75-88.
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JSOU Report 17-4

9. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “SO What? The Value 

of Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research,” in 

Special Operations Journal, Volume 1, No. 2, 2015, pp. 89-104.

10. Two of the earliest, and most important works of sea power theory were Alfred 

Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published 

in 1890, and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 

1793-1812, published in 1892. As the titles indicate, these books attempt to 

prove that events like the Seven Years’ War, the American Revolution, and the 

Napoleonic Wars, which had traditionally be seen in terms of political history 

and land warfare, were in fact decided by sea power.

11. By 1890 Britain had been the world’s dominant naval power for a century but it 

did not have a sea power theory. Mahan’s books explaining sea power theory made 

him an instant celebrity in Britain, indicating how much the British yearned for 

a theory of sea power. Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan” in Peter Paret, ed. 

Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 447. 

The Japanese were almost equally impressed with Mahan and made his book, 

The Influence of Sea Power upon History, a text book in all Japanese naval and 

military colleges. Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan” in Peter Paret, ed. 

Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 474.

12. Of course, some non-sailors were less taken with Mahan and sea power theory. 

Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War from 1940-1945, famously claimed that, 

during World War II the Navy Department “frequently seemed to retire from the 

realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his 

prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church.” Henry L. Stimson 

and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 

1948), p. 506.

13. John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral J.M. Boorda, Chief of Naval 

Operations; and Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

FORWARD ... FROM THE SEA, 1994.

14. Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York: Henry 

Holt & Co., 1994), p. 329.

15. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama, 

2009, originally published in Italian between 1921 and 1930); William Mitchell, 

Winged Defense (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2006, original copyright, 

1925); David R. Mets, The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower 

Theorists (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1998).

16. David MacIssac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists” in 

Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 

1986), p. 633.

17. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama, 

2009), p. 187-207. Consider the ineffectiveness of Warden’s “five rings” model (as 

described in his famous article: “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal 9 

Spring 1995, p. 40-55) in attacking a “starfish” opponent like the Apache Indians 
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Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

described by Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom in The Starfish and the Spider

(New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 11-27.

18. Parameters: The U.S. Army War College Quarterly, describes its subject as “Contemporary Strategy & Landpower” but it does not offer a theory of landpower. 

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/.

19. This oversight is somewhat surprising since Thucydides was abundantly aware 

of the asymmetry between Athenian naval power and Sparta’s superior army. 

Machiavelli was similarly aware of how Venetian naval power distinguished her 

from army-centric Florence. For their part, Jomini and Clausewitz knew that 

the British navy and the Russian army each had an enormous, but very different, 

role in the defeat of Napoleon.

20. The U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center (a three-star command) was established 

in 1973 but the idea of combined arms warfare has dominated U.S. Army thinking since at least World War II. www.usacac.army.mil.

21. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations. 

22. "Average Teaching Salary in Florida." 2015's Top Teaching Degrees: Compare Programs by Cost, Location, Size. Accessed 28 June 2017, http://www.teachingdegree.

org/florida/salary/. Special education teachers in Florida have an annual mean 

wage slightly higher than non-special education teachers. 

23. John Alvarez, Robert Nalepa, Anna-Marie Wyant, and Fred Zimmerman, ed.s, 

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fourth Edition, 2015 (MacDill AFB, 

FL: JSOU Press, 2015), p. 3-24.

24. The term General Purpose Forces is not defined in JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms and is generally used as a synonym for conventional forces, i.e. those forces capable of operations using nonnuclear weapons 

and not designated as special operations forces. However, General Purpose Forces 

are funded by Major Force Program (MFP) 2, distinguishing them from: MFP-1, 

Strategic Forces; MFP-3, Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, 

and Space; MFP-4, Mobility Forces; MFP-5, Guard and Reserve Forces; MFP-6, 

Research and Development; MFP-7, Central Supply and Maintenance; MFP-8, 

Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities; MFP-9, Administration and Associated Activities; MFP-10, Support of other Nations; and MFP-11, 

Special Operations Forces. Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 

https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/pages/2192.aspx, accessed 1 Dec 2016.

25. At the current writing, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) is a detachment (usually three to nine soldiers trained in Military Information Support 

Operations (MISO)) that provides support to a U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. 

Embassy country team. John Alvarez, Robert Nalepa, Anna-Marie Wyant, and 

Fred Zimmerman, ed.s, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, p. 3-10, 

3-11.

26. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations, p. 1-2.

27. Stanley Sandler, Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of 

U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991 (Ft Bragg, NC: 
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JSOU Report 17-4

U.S. Army Special Operations Command History and Archives Division, 1994), 

pp. 1-139.

28. John Alvarez, Robert Nalepa, Anna-Marie Wyant, and Fred Zimmerman, ed.s, 

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, p. 3-29, 3-31.

29. USSOCOM Pub 1, “Doctrine for Special Operations” 5 August 2011, p. 20-28.

30. Some authors use or imply a one dimensional line to depict the range of operations from special operations at one end to conventional operations at the other. 

For example, Charles T. Cleveland, James B. Linder, and Ronald Dempsey, in 

“Special Operations Doctrine: Is it needed?”, PRISM Volume 6, Issue Number 

3, p. 13, includes a linear depiction of the U.S. Army Range of Military Operations to show which types of operations U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) develops doctrine and training for, which types of operations 

are under the doctrine and training responsibility of Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) and which types 

of operations are under shared responsibility of all three commands. The problem with the linear depiction is that it implies a strict hierarchy of specialness 

and conventional-ness whereas the two-dimensional box-in-a-circle depiction 

captures the innumerable whys that an operation might be special.

31. The author is reminded of his role in training and advising a heavy-mech task 

force in the Royal Saudi Army during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. 

The initial mission of the task force, before large coalition conventional forces 

arrived in the kingdom, was “delay defense,” and that was what we helped 

them train for. As coalition forces built up, the mission changed to “deliberate 

defense.” Later still it changed to “deliberate attack” through minefields and 

prepared defenses. The repeated changes of mission meant that the task force 

never achieved the level of proficiency it could have achieved if we had trained 

for just one mission the entire time.

32. Quoted in Micah Zenko, “100% Right 0% of the Time: Why the U.S. military 

can’t predict the next war,” Foreign Policy October 16, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.

com/2012/10/16/100-right-0-of-the-time/ accessed December 8, 2015. Mr. Zenko 

also includes similar quotes from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Commander 

U.S. Central Command Gen. James Mattis, and other prominent DOD leaders.

33. For example, USSOCOM contains about four percent of U.S. Active Duty military 

personnel (56,000 out of 1.3 million in DOD), less than one percent of the DOD 

civilian work force (6,600 out of 742,000 in DOD), and less than one percent of 

National Guard and Reserve personnel (7,400 out of 826,000 in DOD). Figures 

taken from USSOCOM 2016 Posture Statement, Statement of GEN Joseph L. 

Votel, Commander USSOCOM before the House Armed Services Committee 

March 1, 2016, and “About the Department of Defense,” on the U.S. Department 

of Defense website, http://www.defense.gov/About-DOD accessed 3 May 2016.

34. The most complete account of what SOF did to facilitate the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban is Charles Briscoe, et al., Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in 

Afghanistan (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003).
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Searle: A New General Theory of Special Operations

35. For a good introduction to how Russia has kept its aggression against Ukraine 

below the level of conventional warfare see “Little Green Men:” a primer on 

Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Ft Bragg, NC: 

United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015).

36. Combating Terrorism Exchange (CTX) vol. 6, no. 4 (November 2016). 

37. USSOCOM History Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 

6th Edition, (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM History Office, 2008), pp. 5-7.

38. Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), p. 289-331.

39. Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and Wil R. Griego, Persistent Engagement in Colombia

(MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2014).

40. Joint Pub 3-05, “Special Operations” (16 July 2014), ix.

41. United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Pub 1: Special Operations in Peace and War, 25 January 1996, pp. 3-2, 3-3.

42. Joint Pub 3-05 “Special Operations” (16 July 2014), xi. Shortly after Vietnam the 

term Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, was invented to describe COIN when the 

term was being expunged from official Army doctrine after Vietnam.

43. For a conventional officer calling for a rush back to the old definition of conventional operations, see Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost (New York: Houghton 

Mifflin, 2014). For a SOF officer who wants SOF to retain primacy in advising 

foreign militaries, see Tim Ball, "Replaced? Security Force Assistance Brigades vs. 

Special Forces" Waronthrocks.com 2/23/2017 https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/

replaced-security-force-assistance-brigades-vs-special-forces/ accessed 16 March 

2017.

44. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “SO What? The Value 

of Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research,” in 

Special Operations Journal, Volume 1, No. 2, 2015, pp. 89-104.

45. William McRaven, Spec Ops: Cast studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory 

and Practice, (New York: Presidio, 1996), pp. 1-3.

46. Former SOCOM Commander, ADM (Ret) Eric Olson, made this point during 

his remarks to the Special Operations Theory Symposium on 31 August, 2016.

47. U.S. Department of the Army, “Deploying Brigade to Test Advise and Assist 

Concept,” U.S. Army, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/05/01/20528-deployingbrigade-to-test-advise-and-assist-concept/ (accessed March 16, 2017).

48. Richard Rubright, A Unified Theory of Special Operations (MacDill, AFB, FL: 

JSOU Press, April 2017), Report 17-1, p. 25-26.

49. Perhaps no one makes the conventional case better than Field-Marshal William 

Slim, the hero of the Burma campaign, does in his famous book, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945 (UK: Cassell and Co., 1956).

50. The Doolittle Raid is often listed as an example of a special operation and is 

included as such in the Introduction to Special Operations course given by the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
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JSOU Report 17-4

51. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces In World 

War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) Vol. I, pp. 438-444. 

52. Col. James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try (New York: Orion Books, 1990).

53. John Alvarez, Robert Nalepa, Anna-Marie Wyant, and Fred Zimmerman, ed.s, 

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, p. 3-29, 3-31.

54. Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War: 1899-1902 (Lawrence, KS: University 

of Kansas Press, 2000), p. 275-276.

55. Lawrence E. Cline, Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from 

Other Countries (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p.1, available 

at, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=607.

56. Ibid., p. 8-13.

57. False flag operations are a violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict, but they also 

have much in common with routine, and entirely legal, “undercover” operations by 

law enforcement agencies. Thus the level of enthusiasm for “false flag” operations is 

partly influenced by attitudes toward war crimes and whether the conflict is seen 

as a domestic law enforcement task or a military operation in a foreign country.

58. Of course there are other operations, such as global thermonuclear war, that 

might be one-time-only and are well covered by standing conventional forces.

59. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War 

on Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 35-57; and Paul Brickhill, The Dam 

Busters (London: Evans Brothers, 1951). 

60. Paul Brickhill, The Dam Busters (London: Evans Brothers, 1951), p.87.

61. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (London, UK: Penguin, 2013), p. 153.

62. McRaven, Spec Ops.

63. Ibid., p. 381-2.

64. William H. McRaven, “The Theory of Special Operations,” Thesis for the Naval 

Postgraduate School, 1993, Thesis Advisor: Russel H.S. Stolfi, p. 10.

65. McRaven addresses all three of these in his conclusion.

66. In fairness, many authors have used special operations as a synonym for direct 

action raids. For example, Colin S. Gray’s explanation of when special operations 

succeed is titled: “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures” which certainly 

conjures up images of direct action raids rather than FID or MISO. Colin S. 

Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations 

Succeed?” Parameters, Spring 1999.

67. McRaven, Spec Ops, p. 6.

68. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations.

69. Ibid., p. xi.

70. Ibid., p. 4.

71. Ibid., p. 1.

72. Ibid., p. 2.
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73. Ibid., p. 21.

74. Ibid., p. 13.

75. Ibid., p. 11.

76. Ibid., 19-21.

77. Yarger, 21st Century SOF.

78. Hy Rothstein remarks at Special Operations Theory Symposium, MacDill AFB, 

FL, 30 Aug 2016.

79. Yarger, 21st Century SOF, p. 75.

80. Ibid., p.4.

81. Ibid., p. 21.

82. The entire definition is: “Military operations conducted by Special Operations 

Forces. Special operations are overt, covert, and clandestine operations of an 

unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve or support 

significant political or military objectives in support of national security and foreign 

policy. Such operations range across the spectrum of conflict from peace to war 

and make use of unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and 

training. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments where the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. 

They are characterized by one or more of the following: subtlety and imagination 

in planning and execution, time and political sensitivity, low visibility, support 

of indigenous forces, discriminate use of violence, need for regional expertise, 

oversight at the highest levels, and a high degree of risk. Special operations may 

support or be supported by conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted 

independently. Military and nonmilitary resources, including intelligence assets, 

may be used in concert or as enablers. Special operations doctrinal missions evolve 

with the changing context of the strategic environment, the needs of national 

security, and roles and missions of conventional forces.” Ibid., p. 21-22.

83. Ibid., p.47.

84. Ibid., p. 66.

85. Richard Rubright, A Unified Theory of Special Operations.

86. Ibid., p. 1.

87. Ibid., p. 6.

88. Ibid., p. 24.

89. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go 

Mainstream (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2008).

90. Charles T. Cleveland, James B. Linder, and Ronald Dempsey, “Special Operations 

Doctrine: Is it Needed?” PRISM Vol. 6, No. 3., Dec. 2016, p. 5-19.

91. Ibid., p. 29-31.

92. Ibid., p. 17.

93. Ibid., p. 20.