the doors closed. Appellant and Anthony Thorns, who witnessed the 

altercation, approached the vehicle after the undercover officers left the 

scene, entered the vehicle, and drove away. Thorns drove the vehicle, 

while appellant rode in the passenger seat. A recording device in the 

vehicle captured a conversation between appellant and Thorns in which 

Thorns told appellant that they needed to figure out what to do with the 

vehicle. Appellant responded that they would take it to a "chop shop." At 

a designated location, police officers remotely shut off the Chevy Tahoe's 

engine. Appellant and Thorns exited the vehicle through the driver's side 

window and fled but were captured a short time later. 

Appellant claims that he cannot be convicted of grand larceny 

because the vehicle was owned by a corporation rather than a person. 

However, NRS 193.0205 defines "person" as including "this State or any 

other state, government or country which may lawfully own property 

within this State whenever it is used to designate a party whose property 

may be the subject of an offense." We conclude that this definition 

encompasses the circumstances here where the LVMPD owned the vehicle 

that was stolen. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence 

presented that appellant was guilty of burglary and grand larceny auto. 

See NRS 205.060(1) (defining burglary in pertinent part as occurring when 

"[a] person who, by day or night, enters any. . . vehicle. . . with the intent 

to commit grand or petit larceny"); NRS 205.228. 

Appellant next argues that his sentence of 12 to 36 months in 

prison for grand larceny constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 

because he was never in actual or physical control of the vehicle and 

because he was wrongfully convicted of the offense, as the vehicle was 

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taken from a corporation rather than a person. Regardless of its severity, 

a sentence that is within the statutory limits is not 'cruel and unusual 

punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or 

the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock 

the conscience." Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 

(1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 

(1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) 

(plurality opinion) (explaining that Eighth Amendment does not require 

strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an 

extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime). The 

sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by the relevant 

statute, see NRS 205.228, and appellant does not allege that the statute is 

unconstitutional. We are not convinced that the sentence imposed is so 

grossly disproportionate to the crime as to constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment. 

To the extent appellant argues that the district court abused 

its discretion in sentencing, we conclude that his claim lacks merit. We 

note that appellant neglected to include a transcript of the sentencing 

hearing and therefore the basis of the district court's sentencing decision 

is unknown. This court will refrain from interfering with the sentence 

imposed "[510 long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting 

from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts 

supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence." Silks v. State, 

92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). Appellant does not allege that 

the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence and as 

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Hardesty 

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Parraguirre V Cherry 

observed above, the sentence falls within the parameters of the relevant 

statutes. 

Having considered appellant's arguments and concluded that 

they lack merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge 

Law Office of Betsy Allen 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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