[Cite as State v. Freeman, 2019-Ohio-669.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

UNION COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 14-18-16 

 v. 

RICHARD B. FREEMAN, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 17CR0184 

Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: February 25, 2019 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Perry R. Parsons for Appellant 

 Raymond Kelly Hamilton for Appellee 
Case No. 14-18-16 

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SHAW, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Richard B. Freeman (“Freeman”), brings this 

appeal from the August 21, 2018, judgment of the Union County Common Pleas 

Court sentencing Freeman to eighteen months in prison after he was convicted in a 

jury trial of Receiving Stolen Property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A)/(C), a felony 

of the fourth degree. On appeal, Freeman argues that the trial court erred by 

imposing a maximum prison term on him, and that the trial court erred by failing to 

give him jail-time credit in this matter. 

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On September 6, 2017, Freeman was indicted for Receiving Stolen 

Property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A)/(C), a felony of the fourth degree. It was 

alleged that he received, retained or disposed of a 2013 Honda Civic, the property 

of Germain Honda of Dublin (“Germain”), knowing or having reasonable cause to 

believe that the property had been obtained through commission of a theft offense. 

Freeman pled not guilty to the charge and his case proceeded to a jury trial on 

August 20-21, 2018. 

{¶3} At trial, the State presented evidence that James Ferguson turned in his 

leased 2013 Honda Civic to Germain in Dublin, Ohio, on July 14, 2017. The vehicle 

was received and was placed in one of Germain’s lots, which spanned multiple 

properties and over ten acres. There were hundreds of preowned vehicles in 
Case No. 14-18-16 

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Germain’s lots. Germain officially purchased the 2013 Honda Civic at issue on July 

17, 2017. 

{¶4} On July 18, 2017, Deputy Phipps of the Union County Sheriff’s 

Department conducted a traffic stop involving Freeman, who was driving the same 

2013 Honda Civic that had been turned into Germain days prior. The traffic stop 

occurred between 1 and 2 a.m. 

{¶5} During the traffic stop, Freeman made a number of false statements 

regarding whether he had a license and his social security number, making it 

difficult for Deputy Phipps to initially identify him. Once Deputy Phipps finally 

identified Freeman, he learned that Freeman did not have a license. The 2013 Honda 

Civic was also not registered to Freeman. Freeman told Deputy Phipps that he was 

borrowing it from a friend with the name “Miller,” though he could not provide 

“Miller’s” contact information or a location that Deputy Phipps could contact 

“Miller.” 

{¶6} Later that same day, Tim Gould, a pre-owned sales manager at Germain 

was contacted by an officer who indicated that one of Germain’s vehicles, the 2013 

Honda Civic, had been found being driven by Freeman. Gould testified that he then 

checked and found that the 2013 Honda Civic was not on the lot as it was supposed 

to be, and then he reported that it had been stolen. He indicated that at no time was 

Freeman given permission to take the vehicle. 
Case No. 14-18-16 

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{¶7} Freeman spoke with the police on two subsequent occasions and still 

could not provide the contact information of any individual who had purportedly 

loaned him the vehicle. 

{¶8} The jury found Freeman guilty of Receiving Stolen Property as 

indicted. His case then proceeded to sentencing, wherein the trial court noted that 

Freeman had a criminal history dating back to 1969, with as many as fifteen felonies. 

The convictions included a number of prior Receiving Stolen Property charges. 

Based on his criminal history, the trial court sentenced Freeman to a maximum 

eighteen month prison term. 

{¶9} A judgment entry memorializing Freeman’s sentence was filed August 

21, 2018.1

 It is from this judgment that Freeman appeals, asserting the following 

assignments of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. 1 

The trial court erred when it imposed a maximum sentence upon 

the Appellant for a felony of the fourth degree. 

Assignment of Error No. 2 

The trial court erred when it failed to give the Appellant credit 

for jail time. 

First Assignment of Error

{¶10} In Freeman’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court 

erred by imposing a maximum sentence on him. Specifically, he argues that the 

 

1

 This judgment entry was subsequently modified by an entry the following day, notifying Freeman of his 

right to appeal. 
Case No. 14-18-16 

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trial court only found one of the factors under R.C. 2929.12(B) indicating that 

Freeman’s conduct was more serious than conduct normally constituting the 

offense, and that was not sufficient to support a maximum prison term. Freeman 

argues that community control was a more appropriate sanction than a maximum 

prison term. 

Standard of Review 

{¶11} Revised Code 2953.08(G)(2) provides that when reviewing felony 

sentences, a reviewing court may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may 

vacate and remand the matter for resentencing, only if it clearly and convincingly 

finds that either the record does not support the sentencing court’s statutory findings 

or the sentence is contrary to law. State v. Kerns, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-18-05, 2018-

Ohio-3838, ¶ 10, citing State v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104354, 2017-Ohio99, ¶ 7. 

Analysis 

{¶12} “ ‘The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the 

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give 

its reasons for imposing maximum or more than [a] minimum sentence[].’ ” State 

v. Castle, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-16, 2016-Ohio-4974, ¶ 26, quoting State v. 

King, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 2012-CA-25, 2013-Ohio-2021, ¶ 45. Nevertheless, when 

exercising its sentencing discretion, a trial court must consider the statutory policies 
Case No. 14-18-16 

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that apply to every felony offense, including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12. State v. Kerns, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-18-05, 2018-Ohio-3838, ¶ 8, citing 

State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38. 

{¶13} Revised Code 2929.11 provides that sentences for a felony shall be 

guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing: “to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender and to promote the 

effective rehabilitation of the offenders[.]” R.C. 2929.11(A). In order to comply 

with those purposes and principles, R.C. 2929.12 instructs a trial court to consider 

various factors set forth in the statute relating to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism. R.C. 2929.12(A)-(F). 

{¶14} In the case sub judice, Freeman was convicted of Receiving Stolen 

Property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A)/(C), a felony of the fourth degree. Revised 

Code 2929.14(A)(4) provides, “[f]or a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term 

shall be six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, 

sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months[.]” Thus, the trial court’s sentence of 

eighteen months was within the statutory range for a felony of the fourth degree. 

However, Freeman argues that the record does not support a maximum sentence in 

this matter. 

{¶15} More specifically, Freeman argues that the trial court’s sentencing 

entry had a checklist for all of the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12 regarding 
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seriousness of the offense, and only one subsection was checked indicating that the 

offense was more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. While a 

review of the trial court’s entry indicates this is true for that section, Freeman 

ignores that the trial court “checked” several factors under R.C. 2929.12(D) 

indicating that Freeman was likely to commit future crimes, and the trial court found 

that there were no factors under R.C. 2929.12(E) indicating that Freeman was not 

likely to commit future crimes. Moreover, the trial court expressed clear concern 

with Freeman’s significant criminal history. 

{¶16} Since 1969, Freeman had been convicted of at least fifteen felonies, 

eleven of them since 1985. His prior convictions included similar offenses to the 

one before us, such as an Auto Theft in 2007, a Burglary, and multiple Receiving 

Stolen Property convictions. After reviewing Freeman’s criminal history, the trial 

court stated that “Given your prior record, * * * a maximum sentence is warranted 

in this case.” (Tr. at 17). 

{¶17} On appeal, we cannot find that the trial court’s sentence was clearly 

and convincingly contrary to law. The trial court carefully analyzed all of the 

appropriate sentencing statutes and conducted a thorough examination of Freeman’s 

lengthy criminal history. After reviewing all of these things, the trial court elected 

to impose a maximum eighteen month prison term on Freeman. The trial court’s 
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sentence was thus supported by the record. Therefore, Freeman’s first assignment 

of error is overruled. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶18} In Freeman’s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court 

erred by neglecting to give him jail-time credit in this matter. The State actually 

concedes in its brief that the trial court failed to properly give Freeman jail-time 

credit, and urges this Court to remand this matter so that Freeman may receive 

proper credit. 

{¶19} From the record before us, it does appear that Freeman would be 

entitled to jail-time credit. While denying a pretrial motion to dismiss on speedy 

trial grounds that Freeman had filed, the trial court noted in its entry that the parties 

were in agreement that Freeman was incarcerated for 64 days awaiting trial on the 

charges in this case. Freeman argues on appeal that the trial court failed to give him 

credit for these days at sentencing, and the State agrees. 

{¶20} On the basis of the record before us we are compelled to reverse this 

matter so that Freeman may receive appropriate jail-time credit. Therefore, 

Freeman’s second assignment of error is sustained. 
Case No. 14-18-16 

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Conclusion

{¶21} For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Union County Common 

Pleas Court is affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and this cause is remanded to 

the trial court for further proceedings. 

Judgment Affirmed in Part, 

Reversed in Part and 

Cause Remanded 

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur. 

/jlr